Disaster Ending in Final Victory: The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire Volume Iii

Copyright © 2010 by Gaetano V. Cavallaro.

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OTHER BOOKS BY GAETANO V. CAVALLARO

The Beginning of Futility

Futility Ending in Disaster

Disaster Ending

In Final Victory

The Dissolution of the Austro-

Hungarian Empire

Diplomatic, Military, Political and

Social Events in the First World War

on the Austro-Italian Front 1918

Vol. III

GAETANO V. CAVALLARO

Contents

LIST OF MAPS (EDITED)

INTRODUCTION

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER X

CHAPTER XI

CHAPTER XII

CHAPTER XIII

CHAPTER XIV

CHAPTER XV

CHAPTER XVI

CHAPTER XVII

CHAPTER XVIII

CHAPTER XIX

CHAPTER XX

CHAPTER XXI

EPILOGUE

AUTHOR’S COMMENTS

APPENDIX I

APPENDIX II

APPENDIX III

APPENDIX IV

APPENDIX V

COMPLETE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

TO LLOYD GEORGE, SAVIOR OF ITALY

IN HER GREATEST NEED

LIST OF MAPS (EDITED)

INTRODUCTION

IN THE BEGINNING of Futility the persistent Italian attacco frontale resulted in Habsburg losses and a dangerous situation for the A.O.K. Eleven Italian offensives had lead to the Austro-Hungarian Caporetto counteroffensive in October 1917 narrated from both sides of the trench in Futility Ending in Disaster. This debacle was the first example of blitzkrieg in which using maneuver warfare Austro-German troops slashed through Italian defenses arriving at the Piave River. Unable to handle enemy tactics many of the bewildered illiterate fanti fled or were taken prisoner. Here and in the adjoining mountains were written some of the most beautiful and terrible pages of Italian military history as they halted an enemy attempting to crash through the mountains and attack the rear of Italian troops deployed on the river. Most of them had never seen snow nor experienced the frigid temperatures of high mountain elevations, but the enemy was not allowed to pass. Frightened at the specter of Italy being out of the war the Anglo-French rushed troops to the Italian Front eighty percent of which remained for about ninety days, saw little combat but gave great moral support to the beleaguered Italian troops.

Realizing that there could not be a military solution to the conflict the A.O.K. planned one last offensive to be in a better bargaining position at the peace table. The U.S.A. had declared war on Germany in April, 1917 and Austria-Hungary the following December. Meanwhile Lloyd George and President Woodrow Wilson feeling that the war was lost were negotiating with Emperor Charles I who notwithstanding the Caporetto victory was looking for a unilateral peace treaty. War being a part of a political act descriptions of diplomatic maneuvers are included which are not the main theme in the text but are discussed as a subsidiary to it.

On June 15, 1918 the long-awaited Habsburg offensive started as Vienna’s troops attacked Italian positions on the Piave, Grappa, Montello and the Altopiano dei Sette Communi (Asiago Plateau), the latter being defended by Anglo-French troops. The defenders held, Vienna’s troops withdrew but planned yet another offensive. Wilson’s announcement of his Fourteen Points with Point No. Ten aimed at the Habsburg Empire started a process which resulted in its destruction. This was the dawn of American diplomatic power. The president unsuccessfully attempted to use moral power instead of the balance of power in his dealings which did not go well in European Chanceries. Military and political conditions were intertwined with factors in one affecting the other.

On October 16, 1918 the emperor issued his Manifesto whereby the different ethnics would have independent nation status in a federation under the Habsburg crown.

Eight days later Italy and her allies went on an offensive in what became known as the Battle ofVittorio Veneto. Aware of the proclamation by Charles the different ethnics in the army deserted or mutinied intending to go home to serve in the army of their newly created fatherland. Territories formerly part of the empire announced their independence while its neighbors annexed many of its territories. Three weeks after the Manifesto the empire was no more. Pursued by allied forces, beset by daily mutinies, Habsburg troops started their homeward trek to enlist in the newly emerging nations’ armies. An armistice was signed to take effect on November 4, 1918 at 1500.

Included is a chapter on the tragedy of the Italian-speaking people of the Trentino a mountainous area bordering Italy and Switzerland. For many years Rome had had its eyes on this area. Like the Japanese-Americans of the Second World War while its men were fighting in the Austro-Hungarian Army on the Eastern Front its residents were uprooted and taken to concentration camps in Austria. Returning home after the conflict the men who had (who had fought in the losing army) were arrested and interned in Italy where many died. Some had chosen to go from Russia via the Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok then to home. These tragedies are largely unknown but the residents of this beautiful area do not want this to be forgotten.

History is like a soup that periodically receives another ingredient as when sealed documents are opened and contents released. Information for researchers in Italy has been a long time in coming as it took a long time for documents to be assembled. Some information was obtained from the Italian III Army Museum in Padua. Prior to the Second World War the Fascist regime would not allow anything critical of the army while after the conflict the citizens really wanted to forget all the violence and have mental peace and quiet. The residents of the Italian boot also wanted to forget the agony of 1915-1918.

Graphically illustrated maps are provided to acquaint the reader with the layout of the battle sectors. The reader is reminded that a good deal of the combat in later years was of the maneuver-warfare type which complicated matters as opposed to the simple frontal infantry attack used in the past. Distance scales would be worthless in the road-less mountains so they are not used in the maps unless indicated. To make the reader understand a battle an attempt has been made to provide an overview map as well as a detailed map of the sector involved. Maps that are excellent reference points for a battle in progress but not pertaining to it are referred to as Map for geography. Sometimes on the map not all the points quoted in the text are noted, but most are so the reader will have a good idea of what took place. Most maps do not have arrows I feel that this would be inappropriate for an in-depth work. Some maps of a necessity are in a previous volume as combat went back and forth over the battlefield. To complete the scene rare photographs are provided from archival and private sources. Throughout the text the phrase Austro-Hungarian is used instead of the Austrian word used in other texts. I feel that the men of the Hungarian portion of the empire fought valiantly on the Italian Front and should be given credit for their courage. Glossaries of the previous two volumes should be used for this volume.

Christmas 2002

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

AS THE TIME complete the final volume arrives one thinks of all the people who have aided me greatly in this great work. I wish to acknowledge the drawing on the cover done by Signor Guido Bertello. Attempts have been made to contact him, all in vain. Perhaps this volume will bring success. Signora Carmen Fratto has assisted me in obtaining documents in Milano. Concetta Lanza aided me in an emergency. Beth Osterhout with her excellent photographic work helped me greatly. Joseph and Lannayre Liggera helped me very much with their encouragement in all three volumes. Heartfelt thanks is due Sir John Keegan for the use of the maps on the inside covers of this work. I wish to acknowledge my daughter Maria Grazia Cavallaro who gave me my first text on the subject. I am indebted to Dottoressa Lucia Romaniello of the Museo del Risorgimento, Milano who assisted me in obtaining documents. Many people who provided assistance in the previous two volumes also gave it in this volume.

If there is someone that has been left out it has not been intentional.

Volume III

CHAPTER I

PRELUDE TO THE A.O.K.’S SWAN SONG   1918

After Caporetto and the defeat of Czarist Russia the A. O.K. decided it must go on the offensive to either knock Italy out of the war or obtain better terms at a peace conference. All politico-military leaders agreed that the war was lost. Within the A.O.K. hierarchy there was agreement that the army was in bad shape but disagreement as to where the assault should take place. Both Army Group commanders Conrad and BoroeviC wanted to lead the offensive. Charles picked both losing any hope of success. On June 15, the A.O.K. attacked on the Montello, the Altopiano dei Sette Communi (Asiago Plateau), the Grappa and the Piave.1

The Die is Cast.

Julius Caesar

AS THE WAR wound into 1918 all sides were exhausted. Vienna decided to make one more big offensive push, conquer more territory, then have a peace conference with Italy.

Military Preparations2

During and after the war the A.O.K. had been accused of not taking into account the lack of resources when determining objectives. Strategic as well as political aims had to be taken into account. Vienna now was in the embrace of Berlin, could not let go but wanted to go her own way. The British blockade had limited importation of raw materials for munitions impeding their production.

Conrad now felt that the Italian army was now like a man hanging from a fourth floor window sill. Step on his fingers and he would fall. His group was deployed from the Passo Stelvio to the Astico Valley with the Tenth Army (Krobatin) and from there across the Altopiano dei Sette Communi to the Quero Gorge on the eastern border of the Grappa with the Eleventh Army (Gen. Scheuchenstuel) (Vol. I, Map 1, this vol. Maps 24, 31). FM Svetozar Boroevié von Bojna commanded the other unit consisting of the Sixth Army (Archduke Gen. Josef of Habsburg), deployed on the Piave from Valdobbiadene to the Priula Bridges with the Fifth Army (Armée Isonzo-GO Wurm), deployed from there to the Adriatic (Map 42). He had held up the Italian advance on the Isonzo for over two years. After the victories of Caporetto and Gorlice-Tarnow, most of the Central Powers generals were offensive minded with both Habsburg commanders wishing to be the star in the new offensive. The battle sector had an accentuated angle between the mountainous and river sectors. Crossing in the mountains meant occupying the Grappa, the Altopiano dei Sette Communi or the Montello sites where assaults the previous November had failed (Maps 35, 42). Should there be a break-through in the mountains Italian troops on the Piave would be attacked in their rear and vice versa (Map 35). An attempt to cross the river was also in the works with the crossing place being in the flat lands along the Adriatic which was a swampy, mosquito-infested area with rampant malaria. Contemporary descriptions likened it to the Florida swamps minus the alligators. All defensive positions were linked. Crossing the river meant controlling the Montello from where shelling could halt any crossing by enemy troops. Controlling the Montello meant occupying the Grappa (Map 35).

Many of the Austrian writers of the Piave battles were men who had participated in the fighting but were not objective due to loyalty to their commanders. Following the war they were employed at the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna. GM Maximilian von Pitreich, Boroevié’s chief of staff noted, If one wishes to confess the truth, one should not fear to make it appear in all its entirety nor force the reader to understand what is hidden between the lines, each time that the A.O.K. is made party to a suit, because it involves the honor of the old and valorous army.3 Knowing all this the Kriegsarchiv did not open the archives until 1938 by which time all important people were dead. Looking at everything closely, one will see that actions on the battlefield, diplomatic and home fronts were all intertwined. Germany would role the dice in March 1918 on the Western Front, so the A.O.K. felt it would have to emulate it with its own offensive. The new emperor’s role in the military and diplomatic sphere is also examined.4

On January 18, Conrad sent a proposal to the A.O.K. illustrating that with thirty-four divisions an attempt should be made to cross the Altopiano dei Sette Communi, then break into the Venetian plain proceeding toward Vicenza.5 Acknowledging his expertise Krauss who had been exiled to the Ukraine was queried regarding Conrad’s plan.6 He was in agreement that an offensive was in order, but disagreed on the tactics as shall be noted. GM von Sundermann who would lead the attack troops, called the plan A show off plan.7 Food and munitions were in short supply.8 The daily needs of a division (when not on the move) were seventy tons of food, thirty tons of fodder, and thirty tons of munitions. To meet military needs all non-military personnel and goods were banned from traveling on the rails. Adopting this policy allowed the A.O.K. to daily send in additional to the regular traffic, twelve convoys to the Tyrol and nine to the Veneto.9 It was imperative to have all artillery mouths and munitions in place by the time of the offensive. During the first half of 1917, there were 288 artillery mouths produced while the same number had decreased to 118 the next year. Artillery shells produced in 1916 were 1,400,000 per month. Prior to the Battle of the Piave in June, 1918, there were only 750,000 artillery shells produced a drop which was reflected in the battle where shelling dramatically decreased.10 With the inadequate railway system, munitions did not arrive in time at the front resulting in poor artillery support of the infantry.11 In general artillery deployment for one division should be per two km (1.2 miles) thus:12 of 104 and 150 mm.

16 batteries of heavy field howitzers (four mouths per), or sixty-four heavy howitzers either field artillery of 150 mm. M 14 or heavy howitzer of 150 mm.13

The OULK reported that in the June 15 offensive twenty-five infantry divisions were in the first line (not considering the First, Sixth and Eighteenth Cavalry Divisions plus the Twentieth Infantry Division) none of which would participate in the initial jumping-off point. In all there were 5,473 mouths but there should have been 5,75014 Bombards were not counted. The assault sector was about sixty miles (100 km.) wide. Comparing artillery deployment to the Western Front would be as follows:15

In the June Veneto offensive the A.O.K. deployed one heavy field piece every 84 meters (273 ft.) and one medium piece every 22 m. (72 ft.)16 The thorn in all these plans was the inadequate supplies of good shells.17 Also complicating matters was a lucky Italian hit on two ammunition depots near Tezze destroying 3,000 tons of artillery shells (Map 38 for geography).18 One author felt that there should be 230 artillery mouths per two kilometers (slightly over one mile).19 Attacking in the altipiano was given secondary importance. The other leader of an Army Group was FM BoroeviC (also known as The Serb appointed a Feldmarschall on February 1) who reminded all that the 1917 breakthrough was on the Isonzo not in the mountains.20 His opinion was that the army should stand on the defensive and allow the Germans to win the victory, but if an offensive was obligatory on the Piave, he would submit a plan. Much to the embarrassment of the A.O.K. the emperor was now making military decisions.21 In 1914 Charles was only a major when Francis Ferdinand was assassinated but was rapidly promoted and assumed more responsibilities. All responsible people in the empire knew that the war was already lost. Conrad later insisted, the only thing for the military to do was to attack and break the will of the enemy.22 Hindenburg had already noted that if victory did not come in 1918, Germany would never win due to the arrival of American troops.23 Vienna was also afraid of the arrival of the Americans.24 Each offensive was given the name of a famous Habsburg military leader who had crushed Italian armies in the past.25

Inspecting Conrad’s plan on March 8, Lt. Col. Sigismund von Schilhawsky, Chief of the Italia section of the A.O.K. Operations Dept. declared that he was opposed to any action west of Asiago (Maps 14A for geography, 35). He felt that the principal effort should be east of the Brenta River, with a secondary action on the Altopiano dei Sette Communi (Asiago Plateau). Taken into consideration should have been the tall mountains with fortified positions, deep valleys, rivers and streams the latter easily becoming raging rivers overnight as well as the general malnourishment of the troops. Another attack from Habsburg-occupied Papadopoli Island in the Piave would give the possibility of a pincer movement (Map 42).26 Needed would be about twelve divisions over a front of nine miles.27 Favoring an assault between the Brenta and Piave Rivers was Waldstatten. The sector he proposed to be crossed was about three to four miles wide resulting in artillery deployments not having to be changed often.

On March 23 Conrad received directives that an offensive would soon start in an area defined as between Asiago and the Piave (Maps 14A, 35).28 He justly felt that the principal attack should be in the Altopiano sector.29 The Serb was notified on March 28, with orders to organize a subsidiary offensive at Treviso.30

Conrad who had less than half of what he thought necessary was given five more infantry and one cavalry which he still felt insufficient. Brazenly he asked Arz for more divisions.31 He felt that he would succeed even with only two thirds of what he had asked for.32 The only good thing about his plan was that the Italian defenses where he wished to attack were only three miles deep with a good chance of crashing through.33 The former A.O.K. chief of staff asked for more troops noting that the troops on the Isonzo could give up one and a half infantry and seven cavalry divisions to his forces and still be effective.34 He now had twenty-two divisions far less than the necessary thirty-one. Later he was assigned the Edelweiss.

With BoroeviC attacking on the river, the enemy would be trapped and annihilated. With his plan he would perform the major push while Conrad pushed from the north. Confusion reigned in the A.O.K. Which plan to pick?

On April 11, Charles summoned Conrad to Baden where the Tyrol Group commander made all look easy showing the principal assaults to be between the Astico and Brenta Rivers and between the Piave and Brenta Rivers all while BoroeviC was crossing the Piave and proceeding to Treviso trapping the whole enemy army (Maps 35, 42). With such a grandiose scheme it should be evident to the reader that he did not realize the limitations of the empire’s munitions industry. Raw materials for explosives were limited due to the blockade. In the A.O.K. there was strong opposition to this plan. In the road-less mountains, once a breakthrough was accomplished how would men and supplies be brought forward? Attacking on the Asiago Plateau would encounter tremendous difficulties. One only had to look at the topography (See Vol. II, p. 252) but he had his mind-set fixed on attacking there. Attacking west of the Brenta he declared would save time.35 Convincing the emperor he insisted that the contiguous army corps would support each other in actions.36 Showing immaturity Charles entrusted him (not the operations chief) with the planning.37 Even after dismissing him he was still under Conrad’s spell. After the failure of the Conrad offensive, BoroeviC brought this to the emperor’s attention. Always mesmerized the emperor’s response was But Conrad wished it so.38

Manpower which was becoming scarce was dissipated to different sectors resulting in no victory anywhere. Realizing that moving troops about would be easiest on the river front, the biggest effort should have been there. In the Tyrol all knew the transportation difficulties involved but Conrad was still allowed to divide his forces and attack in two different sectors. Even on the river front reserve troops (First Cavalry Division) were assigned to perform diversionary attacks while the Passo Tonale Offensive used two divisions of valuable troops. The attacking forces were too fractionated to achieve success. Cramon realized it too late else he would have requested the German High Command to intervene in the plans.39

Transportation would be a huge problem. Habsburg railway transport had not improved in fifty years.40 Supplies and operative loads would need over one thousand trains to move them from the Russian to the Italian Front a process which would take about two months with bottlenecks on a single rail line such as at Bukovina.41 Troops sent to forward positions had neither food for themselves nor fodder for the beasts of burden until supplies arrived.42 The Serb’s men were short 15,260 horses causing problems in moving supplies. Serious problems would arise after any breakthrough. Lacking quadripeds, troops had to carry supplies on their backs on their way to the front, then engage in combat or were used to pull artillery pieces, then go into combat. How would more supplies be brought forward? Some artillery brigades were reduced to one horse. A good accounting of the situation in the Eleventh Army at the end of May ‘1918 was reported.43 Lacking were the following:

Artillery: fifty of the planned batteries or a total of three brigades Shells: all types were lacking leading to terrible consequences for the infantry

Quadripeds: 6,000 lacking, approximately half each for the infantry and artillery Trucks: were missing in a large unspecified quantity Food Supplies: were half what they should have been

One author (Brendl) took the commanders to task for going on the offensive lacking all that was necessary for insuring success, while the latter were depending on the infantry’s courage to make up for any deficiency in supplies. As noted initially BoroeviC had called for a strong defense awaiting developments on the Western Front.44 Changing his mind he presented his plan on April 23, feeling that there should be a two-sector attack. The first from the Astico River to the Piave, the second across and beyond the Piave River, which required twenty three divisions in all (Map 35). Hence his mind-set went from a defensive posture to a frontal assault across the river threatening the enemy rear (Maps 35, 42). Once Treviso, a railway knot was taken, it would be impossible for the Italians to move their forces between the Brenta and Piave Rivers as well as deploy any reserves.45 Should Conrad have had a victory in his sector it would be in a strategic sense since tactics here would play a great part. The river was constantly changing and would present problems in crossing, bringing up supplies, evacuating wounded etc. The Armee Isonzo commander had really not performed well during the Caporetto campaign. The reader is reminded that he had told his German allies that they would never reach the Tagliamento and also prevented Hofacker’s men from controlling the Latisana Bridge (see Vol. II, p. 153). He now wished to make amends for his past misdeeds. Baj-Macario stated that each commander had his pet project.46 Initially, Conrad was to have the principal thrust. However, on May 5 the A.O.K. wrote BoroeviC from Baden that his plan „had a value equal to those of Conrad. Only for psychological reasons was Conrad made to feel that his was to be the main thrust.47 In fact, in his operational orders, Conrad still referred to the jab toward Treviso.48 The two commanders acted as prima-donnas wanting to be the center-stage of the offensive. The A.O.K. in its relationship with the two commanders, was as one who tries to calm down a married couple, who while arguing incessantly, have the same aims. Reserve troops were shifted from The Serb to Conrad, causing the former to protest vehemently to the A.O.K. receiving the response „The A.O.K. has obtained from the War Minister permission to use the Honved Fifty-first which will be transported, starting June 1, to the sector of the same Army Group BoroeviC.49 In the same letter was a phrase that would really raise eyebrows. Even in the A.O.K. circles, few really understand exactly all the ramifications of Operation Albrecht. 50 ,51 After the second day of the offensive there was much confusion in Baden as to whether to give the mountain and river offensives the same importance and assistance. Josef noted that making both assault units of equal strength if successful would result in their inner flanks colliding. On that (second) day noting that the Conrad offensive was not proceeding well, BoroeviC telegraphed Baden noting his forecasts of the Conrad failure. Waldstätten wrote that the Conrad offensive was to be the primary one. However, in the margins of the telegram, Arz wrote, No, for some time, it had been decided, to give equal value to both operations.52 The right hand did not know what the left was doing and both were issuing orders. Other confusing moves were common throughout the army. The Sixth Army (former Austro-German XIV Army), commander felt he could not take the Montello with only five divisions and requested reinforcements.53 These were denied, but the order to attack remained in effect. On June 1, the A.O.K. issued orders to rescind the offensive on the Montello, which was too late.54 Men and materials, were used in an attack that its commanders did not believe would succeed. Conrad was to receive 138 rail convoys loaded with munitions but rail capacity south of Fortezza was thirty-nine convoys daily resulting in troops not receiving timely munitions at the battlefront.55 The commanders also fought for reserves. Conrad wished the reserves to be placed to the left of the Eleventh Army. In mountain warfare, reserves never arrive on time. BoroeviC was very upset that ten divisions had been taken from him. He declared, Available reserves have little value in the course of a battle, because only those which are present (author’s italics) can decide the outcome.56 The river sector had two railways to supply it, the first from Ljubljana, the second across the Passo dei Tauri and Villach from which there was a single track to Tarvisio and Gemona (Volume I, Map 2). Motor roads were in good condition and plentiful. A problem to be solved was the location of the Piave crossing. May and June were the months of heavy flows with depths varying up to nine feet and widths up to 1,000 feet. The decision was made to cross in the middle Piave. The northern end was controlled by Italian troops on the Montello while the southern end was covered by shoals, rocky protrusions and in certain areas attained a depth of nine feet not conducive to a large unit crossing.

Assault locations over a distance of seventy five miles were picked. In the end, Charles gave neither commander what they needed, thus dooming the offensive to failure.57 Written on maps by armchair strategists the plan was excellent until one came to the actual troop deployment and logistics. Much criticism has been directed at the amateur military thinkers alluding to Charles and his entourage. Being in the field to lead the troops may had elevated troop and Home Front morale but led to anguish in the ranks of the A.O.K. which Ludendorff was urging to go on the offensive.

There would be three assaults.

I.    Operation Lawine (Avalanche): Conrad would attack in the Trentino northwest of Trento through the Passo Tonale and V. Camonica, shortening the front and threatening Milan (Maps 30, 35, 43 for geography). Starting two days early its objective was to take the hills north and south of the roadway there then proceed to Ponte Legno, Val Canonica and Valtellina (Map 30).58

II.    Operation Radetzky: Conrad would attack on the Grappa and Altopiano dei Sette Communi breaking into the Venetian plain. To be overcome here was the bad terrain which would impede any quick advance of supplies and reserves as BoroeviC had noted. Needed were six infantry divisions for the Grappa, plus twelve infantry and four cavalry for the altopiano. The III Corps (five divisions), opposite the French Twenty fourth and British Twenty-third was to reach the southern edge of the Asiago on the first day. East of the Brenta any advance depended on the rapid capture of M. Grappa. Three corps on a narrow front would proceed toward Treviso. As with most Habsburg plans, this was great on paper, but hostile terrain and lack of supplies would make victory unachievable. The usual problems proceeding in the mountains were encountered. There was one railway to supply the mountain sector going from Innsbruck to Bolzano to Trento to the Val Sugana (Map 29). To the rear of the Grappa there were no roads to facilitate transportation of supplies needed after the presumed breakthrough. In the author’s second trip to the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna, he was shown photos of bulldozers as part of the attacking equipment. Road-building equipment was part of the armamentarium of the troops. The alternative was to send supplies along the poor roads in the Brenta River Valley, then via a small railway to the battle zone. Particulary dear to Conrad’s heart was the sector between the Brenta and Astico Rivers known as the Asiago Plateau by the British, the Altopiano dei Sette Communi to the Italians garrisoned by Anglo-French and Italian divisions.

Transportation here was also poor with a heavily wooded area on the southern border, but better than the Grappa as it had cable cars and the railway of the Val Sugana to the north which was parallel to the battle front (Map 43 for geography) 59 Successfully breaking through here would lead to the occupation of Vicenza or Padua. An attack in the Garda sector was considered but discarded. Transportation there was excellent, but the front was small, giving the enemy an excellent chance at defending and maneuvering troops about.

III. Operation Albrecht: BoroeviC would cross the Piave proceeding toward Treviso. As the offensive jump-off date approached both BoroeviC and the A.O.K. realized that the Montello assault commanded by FML Ludwig Goiginger one of the most capable of Habsburg military commanders was doomed to failure. With his XXIV Corps he was to cross the Piave and set up defensive positions on the western-most sector of the assault protecting that flank. The Montello itself was not to be taken but positions would be established on its base. As noted, from its summit the Italians could shell Austro-Hungarian attempts to cross the Piave, as well as Goiginger’s men at the base. The plan was changed ordering him to assault the whole Montello.60 Wurm insisted on this noting that holding it was indispensable for his assault from Susegana to the Adriatic. The optimum place to cross the river was between S. Dona and Nervesa, a stretch of twenty five miles chosen because of good transportation on both sides of the river allowing artillery to keep up with the infantry (Maps 29, 33, 35). Roadways would facilitate any transportation needs. However, on the other side of the river, the road net would make it easier for the Italians to retreat. Experiences of the A.O.K. had led it to compile Battle Doctrine Part 12 stating that it needed one division per two miles of front. This would use up all the divisions in Italy or about thirteen divisions plus flanking units.61 A disadvantage in crossing the river was the fact that there were no available observation points available to the Habsburg troops. A new artillery-spotting tool the airplane would have greatly assisted the crossing but not having command of the air Habsburg artillery was both blind and helpless.

Further complicating the situation was the request of Ludendorff for Habsburg divisions on the Western Front.62 Arz refused hoping to use the army to quell any disturbance in the empire as it had done in 1848, while his officers no longer had any hope of victory.

Factors Influencing the Battle. Diplomatic.

On April 2, while addressing the Vienna Municipal Council, Imperial Foreign Minister, Count Ottocar von Chudenitz Czernin declared that France had approached him regarding a peace agreement. He had rebuffed the offer because France wished to have Alsace Lorraine returned while Czernin rejected this due to loyalty to Berlin starting a journalistic war. French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau was not known as The Tiger for nothing. Releasing a letter that Charles had written in March 1917 to his brother-in law, Prince Sixtus (an officer in the Belgian Army in France) who subsequently forwarded it to French President Raymond Poincare, he noted that it declared that France had legitimate claims to Alsace-Lorraine. The letter was proven to be authentic. Embarrassed, Czernin resigned to be replaced by Stephan von Burian. Charles summoned Lt. Gen. Augustus von Cramon, German liaison to the A.O.K., explaining that he was simply trying to make peace which both Germany and Austria-Hungary desperately needed. He requested that this be explained to Kaiser Wilhelm. Cramon immediately left for the Western Front where he explained the matter to the shocked Hindenburg and Wilhelm suggesting that both leaders meet. Like the proverbial pilgrimage to Canossa, Charles met Wilhelm on May 12 and 13, exchanging ideas and promising not to sue for a unilateral peace. Canossa is a small town in north-central Italy with a castle. In medieval times Henry the German emperor had had a disagreement with Pope Gregory. Finally he decided to ask forgiveness and was kept waiting for three days in the snow outside the castle before Gregory would accept his apologies.

Poor Charles, he was now Supreme War Lord, making military, political and diplomatic decisions from Odessa to Bucharest to Belgrade to the Italian Front with little or no experience. In the past he had periodically left the front to confer with Francis Joseph at the Schonbrunn concerning these matters. Some authors feel that in so doing he developed a diplomatic expertise all while leading an army corps in the field.63 With the multiple problems facing the empire in such a short time it was impossible to learn all that was necessary to govern the empire during the coming diplomatic hurricane. Unexpectedly ascending the throne in his twenties he was unprepared for the multiple problems he would face. Surrounding himself with Yes men, the unsure emperor felt all the more secure of his military prowess.64 Even GM. Baron von Waldstatten who would eventually become Operations Chief at the A.O.K. confessed one day, I am obligated to work in the worst of conditions.65

By 1918 A.O.K.—Baden was no longer the well-organized staff it had once been. Charles who had no real troop-leading experience would interfere with many a well-planned operation.66 Years later Pitreich complained to Glaise about this. By September 1, 1905 (at eighteen years of age) Charles was a second lieutenant in the Lorena Dragoons stationed in Kostelitz. He subsequently attended Vienna University obtaining a law degree, but then returned to the army. His commander noted that he was a very prepared officer but then what officer would criticize the heir-apparent.67 In 1916 he had commanded an army corps in the Straf expedition with Conrad making sure that he was surrounded with a good staff who kept his corps out of harm’s way. To place things in perspective, the present Queen Elizabeth II of Great Britain had a different training. While she was still a teenager the British Government realized that the U.S.A. would be Britain’s major ally. She therefore learned David Muzzey’s text on the history of the U.S.A. while Charles had had no such preparation.

Vienna was now perturbed by its dependence on Berlin, both in military matters (Gorlice and Caporetto), as well as the foodstuffs and munitions. It still wanted to keep its place in Central Europe as part of the German family, while Ludendorff was constantly asking for Austro-Hungarian troops for the Western Front. Arz and Charles were leery of this due to the logistics of supplying them. Ammunition which Austro-Hungarian troops used was different from Germany’s, while Empress Zita objected to sending troops to the Western Front, as Cramon reported on March 10.68 Finally, Charles still held out for a separate peace and did not want to endanger the secret peace negotiations he was carrying on.69 On March 15, 1918, Hindenburg telegraphed Arz, reporting that Anglo-French troops were being withdrawn from the Italian Front to bolster the Western Front defenses insisting that Austria-Hungary go on the offensive to force Allied troops on that front to remain there.70

Arz responded on March 16 and 27 declaring that preparations for his offensive would be ready by the end of May and that upon reaching the Adige River he expected the military collapse of Italy (Map 35).71 On January 8, 1918, Wilson issued his famous Fourteen Points which were to establish peace in the world. Point No. Ten did not describe a rupture or breaking apart of the prison of nations, as Austria-Hungary had described noting the autonomous development of the different ethnics in the empire leading to exiled leaders feeling betrayed. Subsequently Wilson recognized the Czechoslovak National Congress as a de facto government (author’s italics) much to the consternation of the Ballhausplatz and to the joy of the exiles. In April 1917, Count Czernin had sent a memorandum to Kaiser Wilhelm noting that Vienna was at the end of its resources, hoping that the Central Powers would consider making peace. Noting the victories in Russia, the Kaiser rejected this out of hand. Charles was therefore obliged again to start thinking about a separate peace.72 The last Foreign Minister at the Ballhausplatz Count Andrassy noted that Vienna would have to sue for a separate peace soon. His father had been Foreign Minister at the time of the signing of the Triple Alliance. The Danubian monarchy was fighting for its survival, while Germany was fighting for its status as a great nation which was the difference.73 The offensive in which many military commanders had no faith in went off because of diplomatic and political considerations. Not approving of Charles’ actions ,when the German-speaking populace the most loyal to the monarchy heard about the Sixtus letter there were demonstrations in Salzburg in favor of Germany and against their emperor.74

Lord Northcliff, master of British propaganda, arranged for a Congress of Peoples under the Yoke of Austria-Hungary to take place in Rome from April 8 to 11.75 The Italian government did not officially participate in the congress. By June 29 there was a volunteer Czech Division (composed of Bohemians in Italian prisoner of war camps fighting in the Italian Army against their former masters).76 They went into action on Col del Rosso on the same day.77 If captured by Vienna’s armies wearing the Italian uniform, they were immediately hung from a roadside tree. Finally, in 1917, as a sign of weariness, the Italian General Staff had approached Vienna without the knowledge of the Consulta with the purpose of concluding some type of peace.78 Nothing came of this, but it was followed by Caporetto, strengthening the resolve of the A.O.K. to see things through to the end.

Home Fronts and Food Supplies

With the declaration of war, the British blockade caused problems with food supplies in the Central Powers. These were alleviated by foodstuffs from conquered Russia, Romania and Italy but never enough for the needs. In Italy, the lack of cereals was alleviated by an understanding with Lloyd George who agreed to ship coal and cereals to Italy as needed. Italian inflation started to climb so that a base of 100 in July 1914 would climb to 1560 by the spring of 1918.79

After Caporetto, the Austro-Germans troops had gorged themselves on the captured Italian foodstuffs. In a weird twist of the war, Austro-Hungarian military were allowed to send food packages weighing up to fifty pounds to the home front where people were starving due to the British blockade. On the battlefront they had to live off the land, but these food stores had been depleted. Food was plentiful in Hungary but Budapest (separate parliament) refused to send food to other parts of the empire. It also established food distribution centers for Hungarian troops at the front. Those men in the trench received food, while their non-Hungarian comrades fighting alongside of them went hungry. This was the first cause of the shattering of morale in the army. Prior to the war, in good harvest years, the empire was self sufficient in cereals.80 When war broke out, as men and farm animals were requisitioned, cereal production dramatically decreased. In peace time, each inhabitant consumed 500 grams of cereals (375 grams of bread with 456 grams in a pound) daily. Pro capita consumption of potatoes was 493 grams which by 1917 had decreased to 156 grams. By 1918, it was seventy grams. Available foods gradually decreased in the empire throughout the war until by the beginning of 1918, rationing was 265 grams of cereals or 200 grams of bread.81 Meat distribution was almost non-existent. Vienna obtained 30,000 tons of flour from Germany secured by 50,000 hogs and 35,000 cattle to be delivered from Hungary.82 There was much feuding between the Hungarian and Austrian portion of the empire. On January 26, 1918, Charles appointed Prince Ludwig Windischgraetz as Minister of Foodstuffs for the whole empire. In the 1917 harvest of corn, wheat and hay, Austria had produced 19,2 million tons. By January 1918, the cereal stores were down to zero. Hungary had 0.23 million tons but felt that it needed this to feed its citizens. Windischgraetz requested and obtained seven combat divisions from the front to carry out the work of collecting and distributing food. Hungary was using its position as the most important food source in the empire as a bargaining chip to obtain more independence.

On April 30, Vienna had no flour to distribute to its population of over one million. Maj. Gen. Ottokar Landwehr, military food supply chief for the Vienna sector seized some German barges loaded with cereals proceeding on the Danube from Romania to Germany. When Wilhelm heard of this, he made a condition of the Canossa meeting of the two sovereigns that Charles would guarantee such would not happen again.83 Vienna also entered into a peace for bread treaty with the newly formed Ukraine Republic.84 This too proved unsuccessful as the Ukrainians were unable to deliver. On May 18, in a meeting at Berlin, Germany promised to immediately send 151,000 tons of cereals by June 15 from warehouses in Romania but later it was realized that these stores did not exist. Some cereals were sent to Vienna, but not enough for its need.85 The critical food shortage filtered from the populace to the soldiers at the front, and naturally to any prisoners of war which Vienna had. By the eve of the decisive battle on June 14, Austria had a supply of 4,300 tons of grains, while Hungary had 26,000 tons. Austria consumed 3,800 tons daily. The government was forced to reduce the daily flour ration to the ridiculous amount of 82.5 grams 86 daily (one ounce is 28.35 grams). By April 1918, daily fat and meat consumption ranged from one-half ounce in Vienna to one ounce in Hungary.87

In January 1918, Hungary made a new bid for autonomy in military affairs. Since the Ausgleich of 1866, it had been constantly trying to obtain ever more autonomy in its affairs. It now requested that all troops raised within its borders be answerable only to Budapest.88 In Crown Council meetings, this request was shunted aside until after the war. By February 1918, after exhausting the captured Italian foodstuffs, the famine reached the Habsburg trenches. For those in the trenches, the daily ration was 283 grams of flour. In the rear lines, some received ground corn meal. Meat for those in the trenches was reduced to 200 grams daily. With the lack of cereals, horses were not fed and died, thus decreasing mobility of the army, especially the artillery.89 There were now repercussions in the military from the highest to the lowest. BoroeviC wrote to the A.O.K., A starving soldier is not ideal to undertake an assault.90 In March, Charles sent soldiers in their fifties home. Officers were now aware of the food shortages at the front. One in particular noted that troops would even take bread from the pockets of a headless cadaver.91 One now saw poor cereal production impinging on food supply for citizens as well as army mobility and combat effectiveness. Cavalry was dramatically decreased. as were horses used to draw the artillery.92 Another effect of lack of quadripeds was that men now had to labor several hours daily to haul supplies up steep mountain paths, but still did not have enough provisions.93

Worker Strikes:

In Jan. 1918, when the flour ration was decreased, over one million factory works crossed their arms and refused to work. The first strikes were at the Daimler plant at Wiener Neustadt. The strike soon spread to Graz, Ternitz and other industrial centers.

Calm only returned when badly needed front line troops were sent to quell the disturbances. 94

Military Strikes:

On January 16 news reached Vienna that the workers in the naval yards at Trieste and Pola had gone on strike. Soon after, 6,000 sailors at the naval base of Cattaro (today Kotor in Montenegro) raised the red flag on some ships. Immediately, the commander intervened, summoning troops from Herzegovina to surround the strikers. Coastal artillery was ready to fire, should the ships try to sail.95 The commander was replaced by newly promoted Vice Admiral Miklos Horthy, future dictator of Hungary.

Military-Diplomatic:

The German High Command had made its plans for 1918. Charles had the choice of either aiding it or not. Should Charles decide not to aid them, Austria-Hungary would not keep its place in the European landscape no matter who won the war. To its north Vienna would have an arrogant German-speaking nation which looked down on it. Should the Central Powers not win the war, the Habsburg monarchy was finished. Already the different nationalities were campaigning in Rome, Washington and London for independence. Some powerful people in these cities felt that the Habsburgs as a reigning family were a past event.

In a meeting in May, 1918 at German High Command headquarters Charles agreed to undertake another offensive in Italy. Arz and Conrad were in agreement on this although it was well-known that supplies were lacking.

There was much anxiety in Vienna as soldiers returned from Russian prisoner of war camps. They were given four weeks furlough, checked for Bolshevik leanings and sent home. Vienna was afraid to mix them up with combat troops for fear that the Bolshevik philosophy which many of them carried would spread. There were now several different mutinies throughout the empire. Mutinies happened with the Slovenian troops at Judenburg, a Serb unit at Fünfkirchen, and a Czech unit at Rumburg. The worst example was that at Kragujevac in May, 1918 where a battalion of the 71° mutinied.

Meanwhile desertions increased dramatically. The Grüne Kader (Green troops), were mostly composed of men released from Russian prisoner-of-war camps as well as deserters. There were over 250,000 deserters by the end of 1917. They roamed the woods of the southern part of the empire, looting and pillaging. Discussions continued in the A.O.K. concerning the up coming offensive. No one in the military hierarchy paid any attention to the mutinies and worker strikes. Throughout the empire’s history, the army had simply maintained order (against internal enemies) and fought external enemies.

On the Italian Front the unit farthest to the