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R 290504Z JAN 95 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0345 INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMCONSUL LAHORE AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION USUN NEW YORK AMCONSUL KARACHI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMCONSUL JEDDAH AMCONSUL PESHAWAR AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE AMEMBASSY TASHKENT AMEMBASSY RIYADH USMISSION GENEVA -Q NP !- D B N T I A L ISLAMABAD 000975 LONDON FOR POL: TUELLER CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

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00975

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINS, PREL, MOPS, PK, AF SUBJECT: NORTHERN AFGHAN STRONGMAN GENERAL DOSTAM MEETS TALIBAN REPRESENTATIVES 1. -eOM'FI-B-BOTIAL- -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. r
1 RECENTLY TOLD POLOFF OF A REPORTED

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MEETING BETWEEN GENERAL ABDUR-RASHID DOSTAM AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TALIBAN IN MAZAR- I -SHARIF . ( JSAID SEVERAL TALIBS, ' ACCOMPANIED BY TWO UNIDENTIFIED PAKISTANIS, CALLED ON GENERAL DOSTAM IN EARLY DECEMBER. [_ J WHO SAID HIS GOVERNMENT HAS EXCELLENT SOURCES WITHIN THE DOSTAM CAMP, REPORTED THAT THE GIST OF THE MEETING WAS THAT DOSTAM WAS TOLD THAT THE TALIBAN HAD NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS IN THE NORTH AND THAT DOSTAM SHOULD NOT OPPOSE THEM. SHOULD THE RELIGIOUS STUDENTS SUCCEED IN OPENING THE KANDAHAR -KABUL ROAD, THEIR STATED INTENT WAS TO DECLARE KABUL AN OPEN CITY. IN THAT EVENT, DOSTAM WAS ASKED TO AGREE TO OPEN THE SALANG TUNNEL AND NORTHERN ROAD, AND TO ENSURE THAT HEKMATYAR DOES NOT SEIZE THE CAPITAL.
3, 1 ~

Jj ADDED THAT DURING DOSTAM ( s VISIT TO ISLAMABAD IN DECEMBER, PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS REPORTEDLY HAD TOLD DOSTAM NOT TO CONSIDER AN ALLIANCE WITH AHMED SHAH MASOOD, AND TO INSTEAD MAINTAIN HIS LINKS WITH HEKMATYAR. UNSPECIFIED SENIOR PAKISTANI OFFICIALS TOLD DOSTAM, "(ALLEGED, THAT
GONF-i^EWTTKL PAGE 03 ISLAMA 00975 290501Z "HE NEED NOT WORRY ABOUT THE TALIBAN, BECAUSE PAKISTAN CAN TAKE CARE OF THEM." DOSTAM WAS REPORTEDLY ASKED TO AGREE, IN THE EVENT THE TALIBAN OPENED THE KANDAHAR -KABUL ROAD, TO OPEN THE NORTHERN SALANG ROAD, WHICH WAS DESCRIBED AS "VITAL^ TO PAKISTAN'S PLANNED CENTRAL ASIAN TRADE. IN RETURN, * 3 CLAIMED, PAKISTAN AGREED TO CONTINUE ITS LIMITED FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO DOSTAM. ^ ~~] TOLD POLOFF JANUARY 24 THAT SOURCES IN MAZAR- I -SHARIF SHARED [~ _lGIST OF DOSTAM 'S MEETINGS WITH PAKISTANI OFFICIALS IN ISLAMABAD", AND ADDED THAT DOSTAM HAD REPORTEDLY AGREED TO THE ALLEGED PAKISTANI REQUESTS. MONJO

_ j SUBSEQUENTLY PROVIDED POLOFF WITH A SIMILAR READ-OUT ON THE TALI BAN -DOSTAM MEETING IN MAZAR. THE

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O 301322Z NOV 95 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6502 INFO AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY DIA WASHDC AMEMBASSY MOSCOW USMISSION USUN NEW YORK AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY TASHKENT C-.-O--N-PID -E~N~T-r-ft-fc IS LAMABAD 011049 DEPARTMENT FOR SA/PAB

Depfc of SWe, RPS/IPa Margaret P Grafeld Dir. 00 Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny (tf) Declassify

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LONDON FOR POL:TUELLER; PARIS FOR POL:ALLEGRONE; ROME FOR POL:STORELLA E.O. 12958: DECL:11/27/05 TAGS: MOPS, PINS, UN, AF SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: RUSSIAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL CLAIMS IRAN INTERFERING MORE THAN PAKISTAN 1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN C. HOLZMAN, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, Page - 1

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2. (C) ZAMIR KABULOV, THE WELL-INFORMED COUNSELOR FOR CENTRAL ASIAN AND AFGHAN AFFAIRS AT THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY HERE, BRIEFED POLOFF NOVEMBER 28 ON RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS OF PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. ON PAKISTANI SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN, HE ALLEGED THAT: -- MOST TALIBAN FUNDING STILL COMES FROM AFGHAN TRADERS, BUT THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT ALSO PROVIDES MODEST FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO KEY TALIBAN FIGURES -- PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE CENTRAL SHURA IN KANDAHAR. FORMER NAJIBULLAH REGIME PILOTS IN KANDAHAR SAY PAKISTAN INDIRECTLY AIDS PRO-TALIBAN AFGHAN TRADERS BY MAKING NO EFFORT TO STOP THE BOOMING SMUGGLING TRADE (MOSTLY ELECTRONICS FLOWN INTO KANDAHAR AIRPORT FROM DUBAI AND THEN SMUGGLED INTO PAKISTAN FOR SALE) . THE GOP PROVIDES JET AND DIESEL FUEL TO THE TALIBAN, AS WELL AS SOME LOGISTICS SUPPORT (MAINLY COMMO GEAR, REPAIR OF COlfFTDEWTTftfi

PAGE 03 ISLAMA RADAR SYSTEMS, ETC.).

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LETHAL ASSISTANCE IS LIMITED, ALTHOUGH PAKISTAN'S ISID GIVES THE TALIBAN SMALL AMOUNTS OF AMMUNITION, "MOSTLY TO MAINTAIN INFLUENCE -- THE TALIBAN CAPTURED ENOUGH AT SHINDAND AND HERAT TO MEET THEIR CURRENT NEEDS, INCLUDING A KABUL SIEGE." PAKISTAN HAS PROVIDED TANK AND ARTILLERY TRAINING IN QUETTA TO 20-30 TALIBAN, AND ALSO GAVE "REFRESHER" FLIGHT INSTRUCTION TO FORMER NAJIBULLAH PILOTS NOW WORKING FOR THE TALIBAN. 3. (C) IN CONTRAST TO WHAT HE CHARACTERIZED AS PAKISTAN'S "MODEST BUT PERVASIVE" AID TO THE TALIBAN, KABULOV COMMENTED THAT IRAN WAS POURING LARGE AMOUNTS OF MONEY AND MATERIEL INTO AFGHANISTAN IN SUPPORT OF THE RABBANI GOVERNMENT. HE CLAIMED: IRANIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BORUJERDI HAS OFFERED LARGE BRIBES TO DOSTAM, KARIM KHALILI AND HEKMATYAR IN AN EFFORT TO SHATTER THE OPPOSITION SCC COALITION. TEHRAN WAS RECRUITING, ARMING, AND TRAINING "SEVERAL THOUSAND" ANTI -TALIBAN AFGHAN REFUGEES IN CAMPS INSIDE IRAN BUT CLOSE TO THE AFGHAN BORDER. Page - 2
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IRAN HAD ESTABLISHED AN "AIR BRIDGE" TO BAGHRAM FROM MASHHAD, WITH SEVERAL FLIGHTS EACH DAY BRINGING WEAPONS AND MONEY FOR THE KABUL GOVERNMENT. MOST OF THESE FLIGHTS CAME AT NIGHT, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKMENISTAN HAD BECOME SUFFICIENTLY ANNOYED AT THE FREQUENCY OF THESE UNCLEARED FLIGHTS THAT IT HAD LODGED A PRIVATE PROTEST WITH TEHRAN.

JION-F-IDBMTIAL PAGE 04 ISLAMA 11049 301327Z 4. (C) AS TO RUSSIAN AID TO KABUL, KABULOV WAS COY, SAYING ONLY THAT MOSCOW COULD NOT CONTROL THE MANY AFGHAN AND RUSSIAN ENTREPRENEURS WHO ENGAGED IN 'PRIVATE' BUSINESS DEALINGS -ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT ASSISTANCE TO RABBANI AND MASOOD FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION WAS PROBABLY ON THE INCREASE. HOLZMAN

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PAGE 01 OF 02 ISLAMA 03637 ACTION: PUB1J lit 03) ACTION SA-00 INFO IHFO: SAFI04) INLB-01 EAP-00 LAB-fl! OIC-82 SCT-00 PMB-00 OF 02 SRAI01) AF (01) - 10/1740Z AS ClfiE-00 EUR-00 L-00 0118-81 SP-OD PRHE-01.

INCOMING

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ARA/NEA REARCS

101I50Z 032315

M^

S083759

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DOE [-80 INR-06 NSAE-flfl P-00 SNIS-00

LOG-00
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SMEC-00 INI -01 OASY-B0 OIGO-31 H-0! TEDE-00 NEA-00 ADS-00 fl-00 PM-B0 PRS-00 PA-00 SSO-Dfl TRSE-00 FMP-00 DRL-09 G-00 /623V ...Rfinnf IB1K 17 /IS

ISL AHA .08637 80 OF 62 101150Z 002875 S0S3759 TO STOP FIGHTING MASOOO AND RA8BANI - "THAT'S A WASTED EFFORT," SHAIKH NOTED A DELEGATION FROft OOSTAM IS COOLINC ITS HEELS IN PESHAWAR. HE SAID DOSTAM WANTS TO SEE TALIBAN LEADER 1AULV! RABBANI, BUT RABBANI" IS ILL INfll. THE QUEST I OH NOW HAS BECOME ONE OF PROTOCOL: IF RABBANI IS UNAVAILABLE. THEN WHOM SHOULD DOSTAfl MEET? SHAIKH OPINED THAT ANY SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN THE TALIBAN AND DOSTAfl WOULD TAKE PLACE INSIDE AFGHANISTAN. SHAIKH DID NOT SEEH OPTIMISTIC. HOWEVER. THAT PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS TO GET DOSTAfl AND THE TALIBAN TOGETHER IN ANY LASTING WAY WOULD SUCCEED - "HOW SUCCESSFUL WE WILL BE IN THIS ENDEAVOR IS UP IN THE AIR." 4. 1C) THE AMBASSADOR ASKED SHAIKH TO COMMENT ON REPORTED SIGNS OF INCREASED PAKISTANI MATERIAL SUPPORT TO THE TALIBAN. SHAIKH DODGED THE QUESTION. WOTE: ON OCT 3 SHAIKH CALLED THE AMBASSADOR TO REPORT THAT HE HAD "CHECKED THREE PISCES" AND FOUND NO BASIS FOR REPORTS OF INCREASED PAK ASSISTANCE TO THE TALIBAN. HE SUGGESTED THAT ICRC FOOD CONVOY CONSISTING OF "TRUCKS OF COLOR" ARE PERHAPS BEING MISTAKEN FOR PAK MILITARY VEHICLES. (SEE REFTEL B FOR CONSULATE PESHAWAR'S READING ON TRAFFIC AT THE BORDER CROSSING) 5. (0 REGARDING THE SITUATION ON-THE-GROUND. SHAIKH SAID HE "DOUBLE CHECKED" CONCERNING THE STATUS OF DOSTAM'S FORCES AT SALANG TUNNEL - "FROH WHAT WE KNOW. DOSTAfl HAS ABANDONED POSITIONS ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE TUNNEL." SHAIKH ADDED THAT DOSTAM HAD APPARENTLY RECEIVED "LOTS" OF AMMUNITION AND EfllHPNENT FROM MASOOO'S RETREATING ~TROOPS. " ' ACCORDING* TO ONE REPORT, SHAIKH NOTED. DOSTAM HAD ALSO RECEIVED TANKS AND "THOUSANDS" OF KALASHNIKOVS FROM HEKMATYAR'S FORCES AS THEY RETREATED. SHAIKH CITED STILL ANOTHER REPORT - THIS ONE DESCRIBED AS "UNCONFIRMED" -- TO THE EFFECT THAT DOST AM HAD RECEIVED IS TANKS AND 6 PLANES FROM KAZAKSTAN OR, POSSIBLY, UZBEKISTAN. SHAIKH ADDED THAT THE PAK CONSULATE IN MAZAR-E-SHARIF WAS CHECKING OUT THIS REPORT.

0 101122Z OCT 96 fn AMEMBASSr ISLAMABAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2475 INFO AMCQNSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEHBASSY RIYADH lUSiA WASHDC 5959 AMEM8ASSY BEIJING ANEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE AMEflBASSY ASHGABAT AHEMBASSY ALHATY AMEflBASSY BISHKEK AMEMBASSY HEW DELHI AMEflBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY ANKARA 01A VASHDC USfllSSION USUN NEW YORK AMEflBASSY TASHKENT AMEflBASSY BONN AMEflBASSY ROME C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 30363?

DEPT FOR SA/PAB. NEA/NGA, AND EUR/CEN; LONDON FOR POL

PARIS FOR POL - RAVELING; ROME FOR POL - NDEMPSEY

TUELLER;

E.O. 129S8: DECL: IS/03/01 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, AF SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: FOREIGN SECRETARY HULLS OVER AFGHANISTAN REF: A. ISLAMABAD 8520: B. PESHAWAR 916 1. IU.I CLASSIFIED BY AHB. THOHAS W. SIMONS. JR. REASON:!.5 (B.DI. 2. 1C) SUMMARY: FOREIGN SECRETARY SHAIKH CALLED IN THE AMBASSADOR OCT 6 SEEMINGLY TO DISFEl ANY NOTION THAT PAKISTAN IS THROWING ITS CHIPS IN WITH THE TALIBAN; SHAIKH.STRESSED THAT PAKISTAN'S FOCUS IS 10 GET THE TALIBAN AND JUNBESH LEADER DOSTAN TOGETHER SO FIGHTING IN THE NORTH DOES NOT SPREAD. WHEN ASKEO ABOUT REPORTS OF INCREASED PAK ASSISTANCE TO THE TALIBAN. SHAIKH DODGED THE QUESTION. BUT A COUPLE Of DAYS LATER CALLED THE AMBASSADOR TO REPORT THAT HE HAD CHECKED AND COULD CONFIRM THERE HAD BEEN NO SUCH INCREASE. THE AH8ASSADOR BRIEFED (AND ON OCT B UPDATED) SHAIKH ON THE STATUS OF A USG VISIT TO KABUL. END SUMMARY. GOP PUSHING RECONCILIATION 3. (Cl FOREIGN SECRETARY SHAIKH CALLED IN THE AMBASSADOR OCTOBER 6 [0 "DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN." SHAIKH'S POINT SEEMED TO BE THAT PAKISTAN'S MESSAGE TO THE TALIBAN IS TO "GET TOGETHER" WITH DOSTAM TO ENSURE THAT FIGHTING DOES NOT SPREAD TO THE NORTH. REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER

6. 1C) NOTING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE AGREED THAT STOPPING THE FIGHTING IN THE NORTH WAS THE ISSUE Of THE MOrOTj NOT ONLY TO PREVENT FURTHER BLOODSHED, BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF CONCERN OVER HOW AFGHANISTAN'S" NEIGHBORS MIGHT REACT. THE AMBASSADOR THEN SKETCHED FOR SHAIKH HIS PERSONAL VIEWS ON TWO POSSIBLE SCENARIOS OF HOW EVENTS COULD UNFOLD IN AFGHANISTAN: - THE "GOOD" SCENARIO WOULD HAVE THE TALIBAN CONDUCTING THEMSELVES IN A STATEHANSL IKE MANNER. RESPECTING IHE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES. AND BRINGING PEACE AND PROSPERITY TO AFGHANISTAN. UNDER THIS SCENARIO. AFGHANISTAN WOULD BECOME A BRIDGE -- NOT A BUFFER -'- BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. -- THE "BAD" SCENARIO WOULD HAVE THE TALIBAN TRYING TO DOMINATE THE OTHER ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS. FORCING OOSTAM INTO THE ARMS Of THE UZBEKS AND RUSSIANS, CAUSING A BREAKDOWN IN THE TAJIKISTAN CEASEFIRE, DRIVING THE RUSSIANS CRAZY, AND INSPIRING IRAN TO INTERFERE FURTHER TO PROTECT ITS PERCEIVED INTERESTS IN AFGHAN AFFAIRS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID MUCH DEPENDS ON HOW THE TALIBAN PLAY THEIR CARDS. THE TALIBAN. HE NOTED, ARE STILL A RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT NOT MUCH GIVEN TO THINKING IN POLITICAL TERMS AND, IN LIGHT OF THEIR MILITARY SUCCESSES, ARE NOW EVEN LESS LIKELY TO THINK POLITICALLY. REITERATING THE USG VIEW THAT THERE CAN BE NO DURABLE MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION, THE AMBASSADOR SAID A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE TALIBAN AND BOSTAft REINFORCED BY OUTSIDE SUPPORT WOULD BE A RECIPE FOR THE DIVISION

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PAGE 92 OF 02 ISLAMA 0S637 80 Of 31 10I150Z 002875 S0S3759 OF AFGHANISTAN -- A DEVELOPMENT THAT WOULD NOT BE IN PAKISTAN'S OR ANYONE ELSE'S INTEREST. SHAIKH AGREED THAT THE INTEGRITY OF AFGHANISTAN IS VITAL TO PAKISTAN'S INTERESTS. 7. (Cl THE AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. INTENDED TO SEND A SHALL TEArt HEADED BY THE DCM TO KABUL- MA1AR-E-SHARIF, KANDAHAR AND BACK TO KABUL FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TALIBAN AND DOSTAM. BUT THE TRIP HAD BEEN PUT OH HOLD BY THE TALIBAN FOR THE MOMENT. (NOTE; AFTER THE DCM'S MEETING W I T H A -TALIBAN REPRESENTATIVE ON DC I 7 (REFTELl, THE AMBASSADOR CALLED SHAIKH TO UPDATE Hill ON THE TALIBAN'S DECISION TO DELAY A VISIT BY AN OFFICIAL USG DELEGATION UNTIL AFTER THE T A L I B A N HAVE BEEN RECOGNIZED" BY SOME ISLAMIC COUNTRIES.) 8. (0 TURNING TO THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION, SHAIKH SAID IJLAL ZAIOI, CHAIRMAN OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S POLICY COORDINATION COMMITTEE, WAS LEADING A TEAM TO THE THREE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES DIRECTLY BORDERING AFGHANISTAN TO DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. SHAIKH NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH MOSCOW WAS NOT ON THE TEAM'S ITINERARY, THAT WOULD NEED TO BE ADDED. CONCERNING IRAN, SHAIKH SAID HE HAD TALKED TO THEM BOTH BEFORE HE WENT TO THE UNGA AND AGAIN IN NEW YORK. HE SAID IRAN WAS OVER-REACTING TO EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. HE ADDED THAT THE T A L I B A N ' S SWIFT ADVANCES WERE AN UNPLEASANT SURPRISE FOR IRAN, WHICH HAD THOUGHT THAT THINGS WERE GOING WELL FOR IT IN AFGHANISTAN - "THE TEHRAN-PROPOSED REGIONAL CONFERENCE WAS SUPPOSED TO PUT A STAMP OF LEGITIMACY ON THE THEN KABUL GOVERNMENT." WHEN ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT IRAN MIGHT UNLEASH ISMAEL KHAN, SHAIKH OPINED THAT THIS WAS NOT A LIVE OPTION "ISMAEL'S VOLUNTEER FORCES ARE NOT VERY ENTHUSIASTIC AND SUCH AN OPERATION WOULD BE VERY EXPENSIVE FOR IRAN." 9. (Cl COMMENT: SHAIKH WENT TO GREAT PAINS TO REASSURE (IS THAT PAKISTAN IS NOT THROWING ITS CHIPS IN WITH THE TALIBAN. IN ANY CASE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE PAKISTAN TO AVOID THE TEMPTATION OF SIDING WITH THE TALIBAK, BUT INSTEAD WORK TO PERSUADE THE TALIBAN THAT A DURABLE PEACE IS POSSIBLE ONLY THROUGH GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION INVOLVING ALL AFGHANISTAN'S ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS. SIMONS

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ISt IKE PAKISTAN INTERSERVICl INTELLIGENCE DIRECT08ATE IS THE TALI8M FORCES V!T IWUHKUtSi FUEL, AND FOCfi. THE PAXISTAN INU5SERt/ICE IHTEUIGEKCE OlSKTMATE (S CtSIXG A PRIVATE SECTOR TitANSPMrATIOK CO/SPAM TO FI/KXtl SlimiES I DTD tfCHMISTM AND TO THE FAtlSAK FOSCES.

?Kl 84 RKOJWA5IU TEXT: i. X IH PAtllSrANI ISID IS CUMEdfLY UTILIZING A P8IVSTE SECFO TfiWSfOJT.DllOH COKPftXI IHFtl fO FUHHEL SUPPLIES TO IALIBAN T8RNS?ORiAI!0)i CORPJHV U f l L I Z E S VEHICLE COM1/OVS TO HQl/ SUPPLIES FWn PflSISTAH IHiO AfGHSISrA. !E SUPPLIES CONSIST OF HL'SITIOHS, Oil, L'JBSIC/WTS, AM FODO, THE flUNITIORS CONUOVS DEPAR1 L A T E IN iJit EVtSING HOyS ADO ARE CONCEALED TO SEVEAi THEIR T8UE CONTENTS I d F l l . T H E FOOD AND P0t CONWS DEPAJT PAKIStAS OU8IHC 0Y IICKI HOU3S fKO ARE d! CONCtALEO to P.EVfAl THEI8 [Rf COT[,VTS.

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PftCF CHO VftSHlNGfOX DC/ SfCSTAfE KASHINGIOII JOIST STAff VASHINGTON SECDtf VRSH1HCION Af, AND lERfliBAIES IK ABUL. 1. (SI BflHANHUO KOflARll. TAU3AK LEADER' IS CURSMrLY LOCATO IN OAKOAHAR, AfGKfiHISIAS. ONCE THE SITU4TIOX IN KA3UL SETTLES, ChWt (NTENOS TO RELOCATE '0 WBUl. OMR IS S T I L L COKTROLLING Til TALIBAN SIFUATION FRON OUTSIDE KSBUL.

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O 131323Z AUG 97 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9215 INFO AMCONSUL KARACHI AMCONSUL PESHAWAR DIA WASHDC USMISSIQN USUN NEW YORK USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL AMCONSUL LAHORE AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY BEIJING AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY TASHKENT CONFIDENTIAL

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER DATE/CASE ID: 21 NOV 2003 200104208

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PAGE 02 AMEMBASSY AMEMBASSY AMEMBASSY AMEMBASSY ISLAMA BISHKEK DUSHANBE ALMATY ASHGABAT 06882 01 OF 03 131332Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 006882 i DEPT FOR SA/PAB, EB, AND EUR/CEN; PARIS FOR POL/RAVELING; CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/13/97 TAGS: PGOV, ETRD, EAGR, KISL, SNAR, AF, PK SUBJ: AFGHANISTAN: PAKISTANIS TO REGULATE WHEAT AND FUEL TRADE TO GAIN LEVERAGE OVER TALIBAN REFS: (A) ISLAMABAD 6827; (B) 96 ISLAMABAD 10540 (NOTAL) REASON: 1.5 (C) (D).

(U) CLASSIFIED BY THE AMBASSADOR.

1. (C) SUMMARY: GOP POLICY-MAKERS SAY THEY ARE MOVING FORWARD ON PLANS TO REGULATE TRADE WITH AFGHANISTAN. ALTHOUGH THE CONCEPT HAS BEEN UNDER INTERNAL GOP DISCUSSION SINCE THE APRIL WHEAT CRISIS, THE OBJECTIVE NOW APPEARS TO BE PRIMARILY POLITICAL: REGULATING TRADE ON THE NOW WIDE-OPEN BORDER COULD PROVIDE PAKISTAN ADDED LEVERAGE WITH THE TALIBAN. THE GOP IS GRAPPLING WITH WAYS AND MEANS, AND IN AUGUST 12 MEETINGS, | |TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT AN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED (ALTHOUGH NOT YET FINALIZED) WITH THE TALIBAN ON TRADE IN WHEAT, AND THE ISAID POL (PETROLEUM AND PRODUCTS) IS SOON TO COME.OTHER PRODUCTS CARRIED BY ROAD WILL NOT BE SO REGULATED, IN ORDER TO CUT BACK ON SMUGGLING AND GIVE THE GOP SOME INCOME ON TRADE THAT IS NOW CONFIDENTIAL

B1

CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ISLAMA 06882 01 OF 03 131332Z COMPLETELY SMUGGLED. WE SEE THE PAKISTANI EFFORTS AS POSITIVE, ESPECIALLY IF THE GOP GAINS LEVERAGE AND USES IT TO TRY TO MODERATE THE TALIBAN. END SUMMARY.

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GAINING LEVERAGE ON THE TALIBAN 2. (C) VARIOUS HIGH-LEVEL PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE MADE A NUMBER OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS ON THE NEED FOR PAKISTAN TO GAIN CONTROL OF ITS TRADE WITH AFGHANISTAN. THE CONCEPT OF REGULATING TRADE IN WHEAT AND FUEL (PAKISTAN'S TWO MAIN INPUTS TO TALIBAN) HAS BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION WITHIN THE GOP SINCE THE APRIL WHEAT CRISIS, WHEN | 1

(MENTIONED IT TO THE AMBASSADOR AND SAID i

IWAS PROMOTIJMU

Bl

IT WITH PM MIAN MUHAMMAD NAWAZ SHARIF. BUT IT IS ONLY NOW TAKING CONCRETE FOR: IN A JULY 26 SPEECH AT TORKHAM ON THE AFGHAN BORDER WITH THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE, NAWAZ PROMISED THAT TRADE WITH AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE REGULATED "UNDER AN ESTABLISHED POLICY." COMMERCE MINISTER MOHAMMAD DAR MADE SIMILAR REMARKS ON AUGUST 9. IN AN AUGUST 11 MEETING, THE AMBASSADOR RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH | [, WHO CONFIRMED THAT ONE KEY ASPECT OF THE GOP'S REVIEW OF ITS POLICY IS ITS DESIRE TO ATTEMPT TO REGULATE TRADE WITH AFGHANISTAN AS A WAY OF ENHANCING PAKISTANI LEVERAGE ON THE TALIBAN (REF A).
3. (C) L | | PROVIDED POLCOUNS FURTHER DETAILS ON THIS POLICY IN AN , AUGUST 1 MEETING. HE NOTED THAT THE PROCESS OF CREATING LEVERAGE TO USE ON THE TALIBAN HAD BEEN ENERGIZED BY A DECISION OF THE PRIME MINISTER IN JUNE THAT THE BORDER HAD TO REGULATED. GOP MINISTRIES, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ISLAMA 06882 01 OF 03 131332Z

IADDED, ARE NOW WORKING TO FIND WAYS TO IMPLEMENT SHARIF'S

POLICY. THE FOCUS OF THEIR EFFORTS AT THIS TIME IS TO REGULATE THE EXPORT OF WHEAT FLOUR, SINCE THE GOP DOMESTICALLY SUBSIDIZES THIS COMMODITY AND IS LOSING A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY THROUGH SMUGGLING TO AFGHANISTAN. TRYING TO REGULATE THE WHEAT TRADE

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J, THE AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY AC-COUNSELOR, RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE CROSS BORDER TRADE IN WHEAT. | |NOTED THAT MUCH OF THE ILLICIT TRADE IN WHEAT ACROSS THE BORDER IS POSITIVE BECAUSE IT BRINGS IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE. HOWEVER, PAKISTAN HAD MADE A DECISION TO REGULATE THIS TRADE AND, TOWARD THIS END, THE GOP HAD AGREED IN WRITING TO SELL WHEAT ON CASH TERMS (U.S. DOLLARS) DIRECTLY TO THE TALIBAN. ALTHOUGH NO FORMAL BILATERAL AGREEMENT HAD YET BEEN SIGNED, IT SOON SHOULD BE: THAT SAME DAY HE HAS PUSHED FOREIGN MINISTER GOHAR AYUB KHAN TO GET IT DONE. 5. (C) UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT, ACCORDING TO| |, THE GOP HAD AGREED TO MAKE 600,000 TONS OF WHEAT AVAILABLE TO THE TALIBAN -- 300,000 TONS WOULD BE SOLD EACH AT TORKHAM AND CHAMAN.

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O 131323Z AUG 97 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9216 INFO AMCONSUL KARACHI AMCONSUL PESHAWAR DIA WASHDC USMISSION USUN NEW YORK USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL AMCONSUL LAHORE AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY BEIJING AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY TASHKENT CONFIDENTIAL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 006882 DEPT FOR SA/PAB, EB, AND EUR/CEN; PARIS FOR POL/RAVELING; CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/13/97 TAGS: PGOV, ETRD, EAGR, KISL, SNAR, AF, PK SUBJ: AFGHANISTAN: PAKISTANIS TO REGULATE WHEAT AND FUEL TRADE TO GAIN LEVERAGE OVER TALIBAN Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL Page: 5

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THE SALE PRICE WAS FIXED AT 9.5 PAISA/KG OR 9,500 PK RP/TON (40.50 PK RP=1 $US). IF THE TALIBAN WANT WHEAT FLOUR, 1 PAISA/KG WOULD BE ADDED TO THE PRICE. ALL PAYMENTS WOULD BE MADE IN ADVANCE, IN DOLLARS. THE BUYERS WOULD NOMINATE REPRESENTATIVES TO PICK UP STOCKS IN QUETTA AND PESHAWAR. THE AFGHANS WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSPORTING THE WHEAT FROM THERE TO AFGHANISTAN, AND BEAR THE COST, ALTHOUGH THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENTS OF THE TWO PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS (NWFP AND BALOCHISTAN) WOULD BE INVOLVED IN PROVIDING TEMPORARY STORAGE; IDEALLY, HOWEVER, WHEAT COULD BE SCHEDULED FOR SHIPMENT STRAIGHT FROM KARACHI AS PORT OF ENTRY TO THE BUYERS. 5. (C) WHEN ASKED IF SOME WHEAT WOULD BE SOLD IN THE NORTHERN PART OF AFGHANISTAN, WHICH IS CONTROLLED BY ANTI-TALIBAN FACTIONS, r~ HREPLIED THAT THE GOP IS ONLY DEALING WITH THE TALIBAN. HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT IF THERE IS A MARKET FOR THE WHEAT IN THE CONFIDENTIAL Bl

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CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ISLAMA 06882 02 OF 03 1313332 NORTH, THE WHEAT WOULD GET THERE THROUGH PRIVATE TRADERS AS IT HAS IN THE PAST. QUERIED ABOUT WHETHER REGULATION OF THE WHEAT TRADE MIGHT PROVIDE THE GOP POLITICAL LEVERAGE OVER THE T A L I B A N , | | AFFIRMED THAT THE OOP'S OBJECTIVE IS NOT POLITICAL, BUT ECONOMIC AND NARCOTICS-RELATED -- "IT IS IN PAKISTAN'S INTEREST TO KNOW WHAT WE ARE GETTING IN RETURN FOR OUR WHEAT, " AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE HARD CURRENCY RATHER THAN "POWDER." AMERICANS SHOULD BE HAPPY, HE ADDED, AT THE ELIMINATION OF DRUG PAYMENTS, AND IT WILL CERTAINLY HELP PAKISTAN, WITH ITS 3 MILLION ADDICTS. ELABORATES ON GOP PLANS (C) IN AN AUGUST 12 MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR (SEPTEL), 1. ELABORATED ON SEVERAL ASPECTS OF TRADE WITH AFGHANISTAN.THE GOP HAD RECENTLY REVERSED A PREVIOUS POLICY WHICH COMPLETELY BANNED ROAD TRADE WITH AFGHANISTAN, HE SAID. UNDER THIS EARLIER POLICY, A LARGE AMOUNT OF PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT-SUBSIDIZED WHEAT AND OTHER PRODUCTS HAD BEEN Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL Page: 6 6.

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SMUGGLED INTO AFGHANISTAN. THIS SERIOUSLY UNDERCUT LOCAL PAKISTANI INDUSTRIES, AND DEPRIVED THE GOP OF INCOME IT NEEDED. IN PLACE OF THIS POLICY,r [ADVOCATED OPENING LAND TRADE AS AN ANTI-SMUGGLING MEASURE AND AS A SOURCE OF REVENUE FROM TRADE THAT IS NOW COMPLETELY SMUGGLED. THE OPENING OF ROAD TRADE, HOWEVER, HAS TWO CONDITIONALITIES: IT DOES NOT INCLUDE FOOD, INCLUDING WHEAT, OR POL, AND THE ROAD TRADE ITSELF WILL NOT BE SUBSIDIZED BY THE GOP THROUGH EXPORT REBATES AND THE LIKE. | 7. (C) COMMENTING FURTHER ON THE SYSTEM FOR WHEAT AND POL TRADE, I SAID THE GOP SUPPORTS A SYSTEM IN WHICH THE AFGHANS WILL CREATE CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ISLAMA 06882 02 OF 03 131333Z THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND CONTROL THE TRADE FOR THESE ITEMS. THERE WILL BE NO PERMITS ON THE PAKISTANI SIDE, BUT THE AFGHANS WILL CREATE A PERMIT SYSTEM ON THEIR SIDE OF THE BORDER, AND PAKISTAN WILL HONOR THOSE PERMITS FOR AUTHORIZED AFGHAN PURCHASERS OF WHEAT AND POL IN PESHAWAR AND QUETTA. THE WHEAT SYSTEM IS NEARLY AGREED, AND POL WILL FOLLOW SHORTLY. COMMENT 8. (C) MANY PAKISTANIS ASSERT THAT THEY ARE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE TALIBAN, BUT THEN QUICKLY ADD THAT PAKISTAN HAS NO LEVERAGE ON THEIR BEHAVIOR. WE SEE THE GOP'S ATTEMPTS TO GRAPPLE WITH THE ISSUE OF TRADE WITH AFGHANISTAN AS POSITIVE BECAUSE, GIVEN THAT THEIR MAJOR INPUT TO THE TALIBAN WAR EFFORT IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO PAKISTANI FOOD AND FUEL, REGULATION COULD PROVIDE SUCH LEVERAGE. THE GOP'S EFFORTS, THUS FAR, HAVE BEEN HALTING. INDEED, THEY HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT THE NEED TO REGULATE TRADE FOR A LONG TIME (SEE REF B). HOWEVER, THERE SEEMS TO BE A NEW INTENSITY TO THEIR SEARCH FOR LEVERAGE, WHICH IS PERHAPS MOTIVATED BY THE GOP'S CONCERN THAT IT HAS BECOME TOO CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE TALIBAN, ESPECIALLY THROUGH ITS PRECIPITATE RECOGNITION OF THE TALIBAN IN LATE MAY. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SYSTEM, AND TO ENCOURAGE THE GOP TO

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CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 AMEMBASSY AMEMBASSY AMEMBASSY AMEMBASSY ISLAMA BISHKEK DUSHANBE ALMATY ASHGABAT 06882 03 OF 03 131333Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 006882 DEPT FOR SA/PAB, EB, AND EUR/CEN; PARIS FOR POL/RAVELING; CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/13/97 TAGS: PGOV, ETRD, EAGR, KISL, SNAR, AF, PK SUBJ: AFGHANISTAN: PAKISTANIS TO REGULATE WHEAT AND FUEL TRADE TO GAIN LEVERAGE OVER TALIBAN USE IT, ONCE IN PLACE, TO MODERATE THE TALIBAN. SIMONS

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RELEASED IN FULL
TO
FRQH ME. KIERAN PHENDERGAST, OSG DFA, DHATIONS, NEW YORK NORBERT H. HOLL, SPECIAL MISSION ONSMA, ISLAMABAD 3O OCTOBER 1997
CIY

ONLY
I O <o I
*

DATE NUMBER SUBJECT REF.

O*J

FAX OUT: SMA

PRESENT PAKISTANI INITIATIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

FAX AMBASSADOR BRAHIMI , DATED 29 OCTOBER 1997

1. YESTERDAY, 29 OCTOBER, I MET AS MURSHID TO DISCUSS CURRENT PAKISTANI INITIATIVES WITH RESPECT TO AFGHANISTAN WITH HIM. I ASKED TWO QUESTIONS IN PARTICULAR: WHAT IS THE BACKGROUND OF THE RECENT "OFFER" FOR NEGOTIATIONS MADE BY MULLAH RABBANI ON 15 OCTOBER AND THE SUBSEQUENT VISIT, OF, CHIEF SECRETARY RUSTAM SHAH MOHAMED IN FAIZABAD? HOW DOES GOP ASSESS THE FIRST ROUND OF THE G8 ON 16 OCTOBER 1997? HURSHID ANSWERED AS FOLLOWS: ' 2. ON THE MORNING OF 15 OCTOBER r PM WAWAZSHARTF HM> :; : MULLAH RABBANI. HE EXPRESSED HIS GROWING "IMPATIENCEflMITH &KEi -IACK OF PROGRESS IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL-

THE " T B O ^ S l OF THEr^AJiIgAir.:^BDE v J T O D H U L B X i l l TO SUBjES' URGENTLY .dp^TO ISLAMABAD .-TO MEET ^HIK-v(THE 2 '' ' ' 3. RABBANI ACCEPTED THE INVITATION DAY, HE MET NAWAZ SHARIF FOR A LENGWnf^DISCUSSlN/^IisnBD^BY A WORKING DINNER. FS SHAMSHAD AND MURSHID HERE ALSO PRESENT. THE PM DEMANDED, THAT THE TALIBAN SHOULD MAKE A. GESTURE OF GOODWILL. HE PROPOSED IN PARTICULAR, THAT MULLAH RABBANI "SHOULD MEET WITH PROFESSOR RABBANI. ~ " 4. KULLAH_RABBANI REFUSK) TO DO THIS, CLAIMING THAT PROFESSOR RABBANI WAS ~A~"HAN WITHOUT "POLITICAL RELEVANCE. AFTER A LONG AND DIFFICULT DISCUSSION, HE FINALLY AGREED TO MEET WITH ALL THE FOUR LEADERS AT THE SAggJEIHE, NAMELY: PROFESSOR RABBANI, MASOUD, DOSTUfi COH MALIK) AND KHALILI . THE MEETING SHOULD TAKJ PLACE IN ISLAMABAgl MULLAH RABBANI^DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION THE POW -'OR VTP *ISSUE AS A PRECONDITION FOR TALKS. PH CONSIDERED THIS A SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL BREAKTHROUGH. MURSHID WAS MUCH yORE CAUTIOUS AND SA11J 1 H ' ' TRh. Js^UW 'Xi HAU : ALWAYS COKE UP IN THE FINAL INSTANCE AND THAT THEREFORE OMITTING IT THIS TIME SHOULD NOT BE OVERESTIMATED.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER DATE/CASE ID: 05 DEC 2003 200104208

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5. THE FOLLOWING DAY, 16 OCTOBER, I TRAVELED Tp^KABUL MYSELF AND TALKED TO THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER LMOHAMMED HASSAN, WHO REJECTED MORE ADAMANTLY. THAN EVER ANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE, CLAIMING THAT THEY WFRE PEOPLE ONE COULD NOT TRUST (I HAVE REPORTED ON MY VISIT.) DURING MY VISIT IN KABUL, I WAS NOT AWARE OF THE VISIT OF MULLAH RABBANI IN ISLAMABAD ON 15 OCTOBER AND HIS SUBSEQUENT OFFER FOR TALKS. OTHERWISE I WOULD HAVE CONFRONTED MULLAH HASSAN WITH THE MORE POSITIVE STATEMENT OF THE TALIBAN PRIME MINISTER. HOWEVER, THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN OFFICE HAD DEEMED USEFUL NOT TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON RABBANI'S MEETING WITH-.THE PRIME MINISTER. NAWAZ SHARIF, NOTICING THIS OMISSION THE FOLLOWING DAY AND CRITICISING IT, INSTRUCTED THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON RABBANI'S VISIT. THE STATEMENT WAS EVENTUALLY PUBLISHED ON 17 OCTOBER.
s

6. RUSTAM'S TRIP TO THE NORTH WAS A FOLLOW UP TO THE PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE. FIRST RUSTAM WANTED TO FLY TO MAZAR, IN ORDER TO TALK TO DOSTUM. HOWEVER, THE CHIEF SECRETARY DID NOT GET FLIGHT CLEARANCE. THE REASONS FOR THIS REFUSAL ARE UNKNOWN. 7. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES RUSTAM DECIDED TO FLY TO FAIZABAD, WHERE HE MET PROFESSOR RABBANI. MURSHID DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE FLIGHT. HE TOLD ME THAT RUSTAM HAD MADE NO PROGRESS. RABBANI HAD REACTED EVASIVELY TO THE PROPOSAL OF A MEETING OF THE "BIG 4" IN ISLAMABAD. MURSHID SEEMED TO SHARE MY SKEPTICISM THAT LEADERS LIKE RABBANI AND MASOUD COULD AGREE TO TRAVEL TO ISLAMABAD. SHOWED AS TO THE G8 MEETING ON 16 OCTOBER, THE* MEETING HAD BEEN A "NON-EVENT." AMBASSADORKAH&L HIS .REPORT HAD DESCRIBED IT AS ."COMPLETE .liQN-^3TARTERT'? ALL COUNTRIES (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE US - ASS INpERFURTH)J H&D BEEN REPRESENTED "ONLY" BY THEIR PERMANENT UN RBPR^'EliTATIVES, ;; WHICH SHOWED TAHT THESE GOVERNMENTS ATTACHED LIMITED IMPORTANCE TO THE MEETING. TWO OF THE COUNTRIES ( TURKMENISTAN, TAJIKISTAN) HAD NOT EVEN TAKEN THE FLOOR, UZBEKISTAN HAD ONLY REQUESTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORKING GROUP.
S.

fl

9. PAKISTAN HAD PROPOSED THAT THE AFGHAN SEAT AT THE GA SHOULD BE DECLARED VACANT, BUT HAD BEEN ISOLATED BY THE OTHER SEVEN PARTICIPANTS. IT ALSO HAD PROPOSED AN ARMS EMBARGO, WHICH WAS TURNED DOWN. ON THE OTHER HAND, PAKISTAN HAD NOT AGREED - AND WOULD NEVER DO SO - TO AN OIL EMBARGO AGAINST AFGHANISTAN. PAKISTAN, OF COURSE WAS AN OIL -THFORTER" NOT EXPORTER. THE POL SUPPLIES TO AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN FUNDED FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS BY SAUDI ARABIA. THESE SUPPLIES HAD GONE TO THE RABBANI REGIME IN KABUL IN PRKVIOUS YEARS. NOW THEY WENT TO THE TALIBAN. PAKISTAN WOULD NEVER AGREE TO IMPEDE THE POL TRANSIT. MURSHID EXPRESSED HIS SURPRISE THAT I HAP NOT BEEN INVITED TO PART^grPATTETTN THK MKETTNG^ HE INFORMED ME THAT THE KEXT GATHERING WOULD TAKE . PLACE ON THE _30 OCTOBER.. 10. IT MAY BE OF INTEREST, THAT I ALSO MET US AMBASSADOR SIMONS YESTERDAY. HE CONFIRMED THAT AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN HIGH ON THE

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Ig* * "/la '87

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UNSMA

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AGENDA DURING THE TALKS OF USS PICKERING WXTK GOP, THE POSITIONS HAD BEEN THE SAME AS AT THE G8 MEETING. GOP HAD REQUESTED THAT USA SHOULD SUPPORT THE IDEA OF DECLARING THE AFGHAN SEAT VACANT AND OF IMPOSING AN ARMS EMBARGO. GOP USSD TWO ARGUMENTS TO SUPPORT THEIR REQUEST: FIRST, THE US HAD SET A PRECEDENT THEMSELVES BY DECLARING THE AFGHAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON VACANT. SECOND, IRAN CLAIMED THAT ITS MILITARY SUPPLY TO THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE WAS JUSTIFIED, S.INCE PROFESSOR RABBANI WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE UN AS LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN .
11. PICKERING DID NOT GIVE IN TO THESE PAKISTANI REQUESTS AND, IN RETUKK," TRIED HAKU TU CONVINCE THE PAKISTANIS TO AG'REfe TO AN POL AND WHEAT EMBARGO . GOP HAD NOT AGREED TO EITHER PROPOSAL. ON THE CONTRARY: GOP WOULD SIGN A NEW CONTRACT WITH THE TALIBAN TODAY, 30 OCTOBER, FOR THE SUPPLY OF 6OO,OOO TONS OF WHEAT FOR A PERIOD OF 12 MONTHS. -----

12. AMBASSADOR SIMONS ADMITTED THAT PICKERING . AFTER HIS TALKS WITH GOP (PM, FM, FS, AS); HAD SHOWN "FRUSTRATION AND FATIGUE." HOWEVER, THE US DIPLOMAT WAS CONFIDENT THAT TEE SITUATION WAS DYNAMIC AND NOT STATIC. CERTAINLY GOP CONTINUED TO BUY TIME AND TO KEEP ITS POLITICAL GAME IN AFGHANISTAN UNDISTURBED FROM OUTSIDERS, BUT ISLAMABAD REALIZED THAT THERE WAS AN INCREASING RISK^OF INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION', PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO SOME OF "iTS TRADITIONAL FRIENDS . "' 13. I WOULD APPRECIATE IF YOU COULD PASS -THIS MESSAGE SPEEDILY TO AMBASSADOR BRAHIMX. NO NEED TO REPEAT MY VIVID INTEREST IN BEING BRIEFED ON THE OUTCOME OF THE GS MEETING TODAY.

BEST REGARDS

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENTED: 179756317 DOCNO: "" 005964 PRODUCER: ISLAMABAD SOURCE: STATE DOCTYPE: IN DOR: 19980806 TOR: 090926 DOCPREC: O ORIGDATE: 199808061308 MHFNO: 98 2330506 DOCCLASS: C HEADER OO RUEAIIA ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH MSI9548 CO- RUEHC DE RUEHIL #5964/01 2181308 ZNY CCCCC ZZH 0 061308Z AUG 98 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9046 INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 6258 RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 3955 RUEHDB/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 3374 RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 4489 ROEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0235 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 3132 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUSBPW/AMCONSQL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 1333 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2910 \~ RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ5/PQLAD// PRIORITY RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 3336 RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 1797 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2070 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1581 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3437 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0472 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1915 , RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 4179 Dept. of State, R^S/IPS, Margaret P. QjKffeld Die

RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0711

RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 9683
BT
CONTROLS

( ) Release (t^fexcise ( ) Deny ( n,te ia ft uate (a I w tl 1 n . v < - ^ ^ P

I

C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 005964 DEPT FOR SA/PAB AND EUR/CACEN; LONDON FOR POL/SUTPHIN; PARIS FOR POL/RAVELING E.G. 12958: DECL: 8/6/08

TEXT TAGS: PGOV, MOPS, KISL, AF, PK COMBINE: COMPLETE

Page 1

SUBJ: AFGHANISTAN: EVIDENCE NOT THERE TO PROVE ASSERTIONS THAT PAR TROOPS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO ASSIST TALIBAN IN THE NORTH REFS: (A) FBIS LONDON DTG 051447Z AUG 98 (B) FBIS LONDON DTG 040915Z AUG 98 (CJ ISLAMABAD 5928, AND PREVIOUS REASONS: 1.5

(0) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN SCHIMDT, POLITICAL COUNSELOR. (G) (D). 1.

(0) THIS MESSAGE WAS COORDINATED WITH CONSULATE PESHAWAR.

2. (C) SUMMARY: SINCE THE TALIBAN BEGAN TO MAKE THEIR GAINS IN THE NORTH THIS PAST JULY, THERE HAS BEEN AN EVER-INCREASING DRUMBEAT OF CHARGES BY NORTHERN FACTIONS AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORTERS THAT PAKISTANI MILITARY FORCES ARE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING. DESPITE THE CLAMOR AND ALL THE CONVICTION,. THE EVIDENCE IS JUST NOT THERE TO SUPPORT THESE CLAIMS. HOWEVER, IT DOES SEEM POSSIBLE THAT THE TALIBAN MAY BE BENEFITING FROM THE PRESENCE OF SOME PAKISTANI MILITARY ADVISERS. IN" ADDITION, NO ONE .-- THE TALIBAN AND GOP INCLUDED DENIES THAT PAKISTANI CIVILIAN VOLUNTEERS ARE AT THE FRONT, APPARENTLY IN LARGE NUMBERS. END SUMMARY. CLAIMS THAT PAKISTANI TROOPS ASSIST TALIBAN 3. (C) SINCE THE TALIBAN ADVANCED INTO FARYAB PROVINCE IN EARLY JULY AND THEN UNEXPECTEDLY CAPTURED THE KEY CITY OF SHIBARGHAN ON AUGUST 2, THE NORTHERN FACTIONS AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORTERS HAVE STEPPED UP ASSERTIONS THAT THE ARMED FORCEff-'OF PAKISTAN HAVE INTERVENED ON BEHALF OF THE TALIBAN. FOR EXAMPLE, .IN AN AUGUST 6 Nre-FTTXT^ WITH poLOFF, _____ ,\ CLAIMED THAT PAKISTANI ARMY UNITS ARE "LEADING THE CHARGE" FOR THE TALIBAN IN THE NORTH. IN ADDITION, HE SAID, PAKISTANI AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT -ARE FERRYING ARMS-RELATED SUPPLIES TO THE TALIBAN FORCES IN THE NORTH, INCLUDING TO SUCH PLACES. A. THE RECENTLYCAPTURED MAIMANA AIRFIELD IN FARYAB PROVINCE . MADE SIMILAR POINTS TO POLOFF IN AN AUGUST 3 MEETING. (C) MEANWHILE, A NORTHERN REPRESENTATIVE -. I IN AN AUGUST 5 CONVERSATION SAID HE WAS "ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN" "THAT PAKISTANI MILITARY UNITS WERE DEPLOYED WITH THE TALIBAN AND WERE CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE OFFENSIVE. (NOTE: SEE REFS A AND B FOR MORE ASSERTIONS OF THIS SORT ABOUT THE PAKISTANI ROLE.) WHERE'S THE BEEF? 5. (C) WHEN CHALLENGED ABOUT THESE CLAIMS BY POLOFF, THE REACTION AMONG NORTHERN REPRESENTATIVES, AND OTHERS HAS BEEN ONE OF AMAZEMENT] THAT ANYONE COULD DOUBT IT. " TOLD POLOFF POINT-BLANK THAT IT 4.

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JfAS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE TALIBAN COULD "DO IT ALL ON THEIR OWN." ' JASSURED POLOFF THAT "EVIDENCE WAS NOT NECESSARY" BECAUSE IT WAS "IMPOSSIBLE TO COME BY ANYWAY." HE THEN REPEATED CLAIM THAT THE TALIBAN WERE IN NO POSITION TO LAUNCH SUCH AN OFFENSIVE ON THEIR OWN. IN FACT, THEIR OFFENSIVE HAD ALL OF THE INDELIBLE TRACES OF A PAKISTANI MILITARY OPERATION: "LOOK, THE TALIBAN ARE MOVING WITH A PURPOSE, CAREFULLY WATCHING THEIR SUPPLY LINES. THIS: IS UNLIKE THE WAY THEY USED TO OPE~RATE._ THE .. PAKISTANIS ARE TEACHING THEM THESE THINGS," ' EVIDENCE OF PAK TROOPS IS NOT THERE 6. (C) IN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS, POLOFF HAS ASKED A NUMBER OF SOURCES WHETHER THEY HAVE ANY EVIDENCE OF PAK TROOP INVOLVEMENT. (NOTE: NATURALLY, THE GOP AND THE TALIBAN EXPLICITLY DENY THE ACCUSATION.) BASED ON THEIR R " ' ^ Pnr.nFF'S CONCLUSION IS THAT F 3 THE EVIDENCE IS_JUST NOT THERE _. , A SAMPLE OF THE COMMENTS OF OBSERVERS:
jt*

,& . ;: g /

. M

AN AFGHAN BUSINESSMAN WHO HOLDS ANTI-TALIBAN-VIEWS, TOLD POLOFF AUGUST 6 THAT HE HAD JUST ARRIVED FROM HERAT, THE TALIBAN'S MAIN BASE FOR RESUPPLYING THEIR NORTHERN FORCES. IN HERAT, HE HAD SEEN MANY TALIBAN MOVING NORTH, BUT NO PAK TROOPS. TOLD POLOFF AUGUST 3 THAT HE HAD VISITED SHIBARGHAN LATE LAST WEEK BEFORE THE TALIBAN TAKEOVER. HE ASKED NIMA OFFICERS TO BACK UP THEIR CLAIMS ABOUT PAK TROOPS: THEY PROVIDED NO EVIDENCE. (NOTE: _J1HAD A DIFFERENT aiyjfKJiasiON, LATER TELLING INTERLOCUTORS THAT^HE SAW.A "DISTINCT PATTERN" OF GOP INVOLVEMENT. END NOTE.) IN AN AUGUST 5 MEETING, j A PARTY AFFILIATED WITH THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE), SCOFFED"AT THE REPORTS OF . INVOLVEMENT BY PAKISTANI TROOPS, ASSERTING THAT HE HAS BEEN PRESENT AT MEETINGS WHERE NORTHERN REPRESENTATIVES TALKED ABOUT USING THIS CLAIM AS PROPAGANDA AGAINST THE TALIBAN. POSSIBLY SOME ADVISERS 7. (C) ALTHOUGH INTERLOCUTORS DISCOUNTED REPORTS OF PAKISTANI TROOP INVOLVEMENT, THEY LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT A SMALL NUMBER OF PAKISTANI MILITARY ADVISERS MAY BE HELPING THE TALIBAN. jTOLD POLOFF THAT HE HAD HEARD RELIABLE REPORTS THAT "A COUPLE OF"~PAKISTANI MILITARY MEN" HAD BEEN SEEN IN MAIMANA. J IN AN AUGUST S MJSJsITlNtT WITH FOiiOff, ADMITTED WITH A TWINKLE IN HIS EYE THAT "WE (PAKISTAN) MAY HAVE SOME MEN CLOSELY MONITORING THE SITUATION." ,WENT ON TO INTIMATE THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

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SOME OFFICIALS ATTACHED TO THE PAKISTANI CONSULATE IN HERAT MAY HAVE TRAVELLED TO THE NORTH. QUERIED ABOUT THE WHEREABOUTS OF. COLONEL IMAN (RETD), THE PAK CONSUL GENERAL IN HERAT (WHO IS KNOWN TO MAINTAIN VERY CLOSE LINKS TO THE TALIBAN), SAID HE WAS NOT SURE, BUT THEN ADDED "HE (IMAN) IS PROBABLY AROUND^THE ACTION AS USUAL." EVERYONE AGREES ABOUT PAKISTANI NATIONALS 8. (C) ONE POINT THAT EVERYONE AGREES ON IS THAT TALIBAN RANKS ARE FULL OF PAKISTANI NATIONALS. MOST OBSERVERS CLAIM THAT MOST OF THESE PAKISTANIS ARE PASHTUNS (LIKE MOST TALIBAN) FROM THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE (NWFP) AND BALOCHISTAN. THERE MAY ALSO BE SOME PUNJABIS. MOST OF THE PAKISTANIS APPEAR TO BE VOLUNTEERS WHO JOINED TO 'SUPPORT THE TALIBAN'S ISLAMIC CRUSADE. THE TALIBAN DO NOT BOTHER TO DENY ALL OF THIS, NOR DO GOP OFFICIALS. WHEN PRESSED AS TO WHY THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT IS NOT STOPPING ITS NATIONALS FROM CROSSING THE BORDER TO ASSIST ONE OF THE SIDES IN A CIVIL WAR, I 1 THREW UP HIS HANDS AND REPLIED: "YOU KNOW THE BORDER. IT IS EXTREMELY POROUS. THE SOVIETS TRIED TO SEAL IT IN THE 1980'S WITH THOUSANDS OF TROOPS AND THEY FAILED. WE TRY TO MAKE CHECKS IN CHAMAN (BALOCHISTAN) AND TORKHAM (NWFP) BORDER POINTS, BUT WE CANNOT KEEP UP WITH THE TRAFFIC. BESIDES, MANY OF THE PRO-TALIBAN ELEMENTS SLIP OVER THROUGH THE TRIBAL AREAS." 9. (C) THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT PAKISTANIS ARE CURRENTLY CROSSING THE BORDER IN LARGE NUMBERS; MOST SEEM TO HAVE GONE THERE < IN 1996-97. AS TO NUMBERS, IT IS 'AN OPEN QUESTION HOW MANY OF THE 10,000 OR SO TALIBAN TROOPS IN THE NORTH ARE PAKISTANI-. THE GENERALLY PRO-TALIBAN SON OF A WELL-KNOWN POLITICAL/RELIGIOUS LEADER, TOLD POLOFF THAT HE WOULD GUESS 20 PERCENT OF THE TALIBAN FORCE IS PAKISTANI. POLOFF HAS HEARD OTHER ESTIMATES THAT PLACE THE FIGURE AS HIGH AS 40 PERCENT. ARABS 10. (C) THERE ARE ALSO SOME CLAIMS THAT ARAB EXTREMISTS HAVE JOINED THE TALIBAN FORCE IN THE NORTH. ,TOLD POLOFF THAT THERE ARE "DOZENS OF ARABS" "TN FARYAB NOW. HE ADDED THAT SADDI TERRORIST USAMA BIN LADIN IS PAYING FORJTHE UPKEEP FOR THESE ARABS THROUGH AN OFFICE IN HERAT. HOWEVER,; ".HAD NO ! EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIMS. " COMMENT

11. (C) UNTIL EVIDENCE COMES TO LIGHT, THE CLAIM THAT PAKISTANI ARMY UNITS ARE HELPING THE TALIBAN IS EASY TO DISCOUNT. IT WAS

Page 4

EVIDENT THAT THE, NORTHERN FACTIONS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS ONLY BEGAN TO HARP ON THIS CLAIM WHEN THE NORTH BEGAN ITS SLIDE. BLAMING PAKISTAN MAKES SOME SENSE FOR THE NORTH IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE TRUTH THAT IT HAS BEEN (AT LEAST TEMPORARILY) OUTFOXED BY THE TALIBAN IS PROBABLY DIFFICULT TO TAKE. INDEED, THE TALIBAN HAVE ENGAGED IN A SIMILAR TACTIC IN THE PAST WHEN THEY WERE TAKING IT ON THE CHIN IN THEIR CASE, BLAMING IRAN AND RUSSIA, AND OTHERS. HOWEVER, WITH ALL THAT SAID, THE GOP COULD POSSIBLY BE DOING MORE TO PREVENT ITS NATIONALS FROM CROSSING AN' INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER (EVEN A POROUS ONE) TO FIGHT IN A WAR IN A NEIGHBORING STATE. IN ADDITION, AS ELABORATED ON ABOVE, IT APPEARS POSSIBLE THAT THE TALIBAN MAY BE GETTING SOME ASSISTANCE FROM PAKISTANI MILITARY ADVISERS, ALTHOUGH THIS IS BY NO MEANS PROVEN. SIMONS ADMIN END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTION
PAGE 61 OF 02 ACTION: PK (011 INFO: IN (01) ISLAMA
SAF (01)

*""""""" "UNCLASSIFIED DEPARTMENT OF STATE ^

ARA/NEA REARCS
014643
S85

01320 08 OF 03

1715S22

ISLAMA 01320 00 OF 03 LESS HONEY AND SUPPLIES THIS YEAR

171552Z

SRAI01 ) MILT (011 >(01) 17 /1 6092 A5 MAH TOTAL COPIES: 01 ACDE-00 INLB-01 DODE-00 H-01 TEDE-00 NEA-00 NRRC-00 OPIC-01 PA-00 SSO-00 TRSE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 /025W AID-00 DOEE-00 INR-80 NSAE-08 PN-00 US IE -00 DRL-02 AMAD-01 SRPP-0JI 10-00 : NSCE-0C PRS-00 FMP-00 G-00 ACQ-00 DS-00 L-00 OES-81 P-88 SNIS-00 NFAT-08

ACTION SA-00 INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 EUR-00 ADS-00 OIC-02 SCT-00 NISC-00 SAS-00 ACDA-0S SMEC-00 F6IE-00 N-0fl OHB-0i SP-00 SSD-01 SWCI-00

2. (0 THE TALIBAN SEEK TO HAVE LESS HONEY AKD SUPPLIES THIS YEAR. A NUMBER OF SOURCES HAVE TOLD POLOFF THAT COMPARED WITH PAST YEARS THE T A L I B A N SEEN TO BE HAVING ft PROBLEM PAYING COMMANDERS. INCLUDING THOSE WHO ARE NOMINALLY LOYAL TO THE TALIBAN. THIS APPARENTLY HAS CAUSED GRUMBLING AMONG A NUMBER OF COMMANDERS AND HAS LED TO SOME DEFECTIONS TO THE OPPOSITION IN SUCH SECTORS AS BAGHLAN QNDUZ PROVINCES' WHERE JANIAT-I-ISLANI FORCES VERE REPORTEDLY FLUSH KITH CASH (SEE PARAS 9 AND 10). | 1C) VITH RESPECI TO SUPPLIES. \ J ~^ I T O L O POLOFF FEBRUARY 17 IHAT (ALIBAH FORCES WERE ALSO HAVIKii PROBLEMS IN THIS AREA. I HSAID HE HAD HEARD REPORTS THAT THE TALIBAN COMMANDERS IN CHARGE W MILITARY LOGISTICS' VKO ARE MOSTLY BASED IN KANDAHAR. VERE COMPLAINING THAT THEY WERE RUNNING LOW ON AMMUNITION FOR KALASHHAKOUS. MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS- AND ARTILLERY PIECES. IN ADDITION' SPARE PARIS FOR THE TALIBAN'S JAPANESE-HADE RADIOS WERE NOT AVAILABLE. IN DISCUSSIONS OK THE TALIBAN SUPPLY PROBLEM. MOST OF POLOfF'S SOURCES ASCRIBE IT BACK TO THE GENERAL LACK OF FUNDS. SINCE HOST OF THE SUPPLIES ARE APPARENTLY PURCHASED BY TALIBAN AGENTS ON THE GREY ARKS MARKET IN THE UAE< ESPECIALLY IN DUBAI AND SHAWM. 4. (0 ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM FOR THE TALIBAN IS THAT THEY 3.

. ..., airmr mv, m F

0 171330Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO SECSTATE VASHDC IMMEDIATE 3994 INFO USMttSION USUN NEW YORK AMEMBASSY ASNGABAT AMEMBASSY ALMATY AMEMBASSY BISHKEK AMEMBASSY TASHKENT

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY RIYADH 01A WASHINGTON DC AMCONSUl PESHAWAR USCINCCENT HACDILL AfB FL//CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJS/POLAO// ANEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AMEMBASSY ROME CONFIDENT
A L ISLAMABAD 081320

RELEASED IN PART Bl,

ARE OVER-STRETCHED. THEIR MILITARY OFFENSIVE LATE LAST YEAR SVALLOVED SO MUCK TERRITORY THAT THEIR LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES NAVE HAD A DIFFICULT TIME KEEPING PACE WITH THE INCREASED EXPENDITURES NECESSITATED BY LONGER SUPPLY LINES. FOR EXAMPLE. THE-TRANSPORT Of SUPPLIES FROM KANDAHAR AMD HERAT TO POINTS IN THE NORTH IS VERY EXPENSIVE. AS IS TRANSPORT WITHtN MOUNTAINOUS HAZARAJAT. BUT THE TALIBAN BUDGET FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPLY OF THESE AREAS HAS NOT EXPANDED ENOUGH TO MEET THE HEW COSTS. ACCORDING TOP CONTACTS. INTAKE OF FUNDS FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES REPORTEDLY DECREASES S. (0 THE HUB OF THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE TALIBAN APPEAR TO BE RECEIVING LESS MONEY FROM LONGTIME SOURCES IN PAKISTAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST. AS FAR AS THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT WAS CONCERNED'

DEPARTMENT FOR SA/PAB AND EUR/CACEN! ALMATY ALSO FOR DUSHANBE; LONDON FOR POl/SUTPKIN; PARIS FOR POL/RAVELING! ABU DHABI PLEASE PASS TO DUBAI

E.O. 12S58: DECL: 2/17/03

TAGS: PGOV. K I S L < PARM. HOPS. Af, PK. IR. SA SUBJ: AFGHANISTAN: TALIBAN SEEM TO HAVE LESS FUNDS AND SUPPLIES THIS YEAR. BUT THE PROBLEM DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE THAT ACUTE KEFS: (A) ISLAMABAD 922; IB) 97 ISLAMABAD 5835 REASONS:

(Ul CLASSIFIED BY JOHN R. SCHMIDT, POLITICAL COUNSELOR. l.S ffilOH.

[OLD POLOFF THAT HE WAS QUITE SURE THAT THE GOP 10 "Will I CHECK* WORTH A MILLION OR SO DOLLARS EVERY COUPLE OF MONTHS. HOWEVER. HE BELIEVED THAT THE AMOUNT OF HONEY BEING GIVEN BY THE GOP HAD DECREASED. HE DID NOT ATTRIBUTE THIS TO ANY ATTEMPT BY THE GOP TO PRESSURE THE TALIBAN IN ANY WAY. RATHER. IT WAS SIMPLY THAT THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT HAS HAD LESS MONEY TO GIVE DURING THE PAST YEAH DUE TO ITS OWN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. WHICH WERE ESPECIALLY GRAVE IN THE MONTHS IMMEDIATELY AFTER SANCTIONS

1. (Cl SUMMARY: THE TALIBAN SEEM TO HAVE LESS MONEY AND SUPPLIES AVAILABLE TO THEM THIS YEAR. THIS IS PROBABLY DUE TO THEIR RECEIVING LESS MONEY FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES' INCLUDING PAKISTAN AND THE KIDDLE EAST. THE GOP< BECAUSE OF ITS OWN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. APPEARS TO HAVE PROVIDED THEM WITH LESS FINANCIAL SUPPORT IN PAST MONTHS. MEANWHILE. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT - ANGRY BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF USAMA BIN LAOIN IN AFGHANISTAN - SEEMS TO HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN CUTTING THE FLOW OF CASH FROM PRIVATE SOURCES TO THE TALIBAN. DESPIIE THE DECREASE IN SUPPLIES OF MONEY AND MATERIAL. THE PROBLEM DOES NOT SEEM THAT ACUTE FOR THE TALIBAN THEY SHOULD BE ABLE FO LAUNCH WHAT IS EXPECTED TO BE A LARGE-SCALE WARM WEATHER OFFENSIVE IBIS YEAR. THAT SAID' THEIR MAJOR OPPONENT. JAMIAT-I-ISLAHI. SEEMS TO BE FLUSH WITH IRANIAN-SUPPLIED CASH RIGHT NOW, WHICH IS HELPING THEM GAIN LOCAL SUPPORT ON THE BATTLEFRONTS. END SUMMARY.

WERE IMPOSED FOLLOWING ITS MAY 1998 NUCLEAR TESTS. (NOTE: THE GOP HAS NEVER ADMITTED TO PROVIDING FUNDS OR MILITARY SUPPLIES DIRECTLY TO THE TALIBAN- AND THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT MILITARY SUPPLIES HAVE CROSSED THE BORDER. HOWEVER. IN THE PAST. THE GOP HAS ADMITTED PROVIDING THE TALIBAN WITH WHEAT FLOUR AND FUEL. IK A RECENT MEETING KITH A/S INDE8FURTH, [~ | ASSERTED THAT PAKISTAN HAD RECENTLY PROVIDED THE IALIBAN VIIH SHOES FOR WINTER- BUT HE SAID THE DIRECT SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP - WHICH HE DID NOT DESCRIBE FURTHER -- HAD ENDED MONTHS AGO - SEE REF A. END NOTE.) 6. 1C) THE TALIBAN'S INTAXE OF FUNDS FROM MIDDLE EASTERN SOURCES HAS ALSO REPORTEDLY DECREASED. I 1

(SAG) NAD BEEN QUITE SUCCESSFUL IN PREVENTING PRIVATE SAUDI

PCW nJUkMy ll Hut IE SAUDI GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER DATE/CASE ID: 05 DEC 2003 200104208

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ARA/NEA REARCS
FACE 02 OF 02 ISLAM 81320 00 OF 03 171552Z 014543 SF57018 SOURCES/ INCLUDING FOUNDATIONS- FROM DISPERSING hOHEV TO THE TALIBAN AS THEY DID IN THE PAST. THE SAG REPORTEDLY IMPLEMENTED THESE MEASURES IN SEPTEMBER 1338 WEN TENSIONS BETVEEN RIYADH AND THE TALIBAN LED TO AN OPEN RIFT OVER KANDAHAR'S HARBORING OF TERRORIST USAHA BIN UDIN. AS FOR OTHER SOURCES OF ASSISTANCE TO THE TALI6AN<r~~]- AND OTHER CONTACTS - BELIEVE THAT THE TALIBAN CONTMFTtf RECEIVE SOME LEVEL OF FUNDING FROM PRIVATE UAE SOURCES' INCLUDING SOME VEALTHY INDIVIDUALS BASED IN SHARJAH, AND FROM QATAR I SOURCES. THE PROBLEM IS NOT THAT ACUTE 7. 1C) DESPITE THE DECREASE IK MONEY AND SUPPLIES, THE TALIBAN'S PROBLEM DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE THAT ACUTE. NO ONE BELIEVES THAT IT VILL INTERFERE KITH THEIR APPARENT PLANS TO CONTINUE THE FIGHT AGAINST JAMIAT CONKANDER AHMAD SHAH HASOOD COME THE VARM VEATHER MONTHS (MOM LATE APRIL OR SO). (NOTE: IN REFERENCE TO TALIBAN PLANS: IN A RECENT INTERVIEW TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH OMAR SAID THE TALIBAN SHOULD HAVE NO MORE PROBLEM DEFEATING JAHIAT THIS YEAR THAN THEY HAVE HAP DEFEATING OTHER FACTIONS IN THE PAST. I ACCORDING TO ^ | ' ' [THE TALIBAN STILL HAVE Bl MONEY FOR PURCHASING SUPPLIES, DESPITE THE DRAVDOVN IN SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES. FOR EXAMPLE* TALIBAN ACCESS TO HARD CURRENCY MADE BY NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS SEEMS TO HAVE HELD STEADY OVER THE PAST YEAR. ALTHOUGH HAMPERED BY THE CONTINUED CLOSURE Of TKE BORDERS VITH IRAN AND UZBEKISTAN. THE TALIBAN STILL SEEK TO BE COLLECTING A FAIR AMOUNT OF CUSTOMS INCOME FROM THE TRANSIT TRADE. MOTE: BIN LAOIN HAS ALSO PROVIDED THE TALIBAN WITH SOME MONEY* BUT PROBABLY NOT ENOUGH 10 MAKE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IK THEIR CASH BALANCE.) WITH LITTLE MONEY (IF AKY) SPENT ON INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, ALL OF THESE fUNDS ARE VHOLLY DEVOTED TO TKE VAR EFFORT. 8. (C) ANOTHER FACTOR HELPING TO ALLEVIATE THE MONEY AND SUPPLY PROBLEM FOR THE TALIBAN IS THEIR CAPTURE OF A FAIR MOUNT OF EQUIPMENT DURING TKEIR SUCCESSFUL LATE 1998 MILITARY CAMPAIGN. TOLD POLOFf THAT THE TALIBAN HAD CAPTURED LARGE SUPPLY DEPOTS LY CONTROLLED BY NATIONAL ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (NIHA) LEADER GENERAL OOSFAff IN HAIfttKA. IN FARYAB PROVINCE' AND IN SHIBARGHAN, IN JOZJAN PROVINCE. MIEN THEY ENTERED THESE AREAS LATE LAST JULY AND AUGUST. RESPECTIVELY. ANOTHER LARGE DEPOT VAS SEIZED FROM HI MA'S ISMAIll MILITIA WEN THE KAYAK VALLEY. IN BAGHIAN PROVINCE. VAS TAKEN IN SEPTEMBER. VITH FULL SUPPLY COMPLEMENTARITY BETVEEN THE TALIBAN AND .THEIR OPPOSITION -- SINCE BOTH SIDES BASICALLY USE SOVIET-ERA EQUIPMENT - THE TALIBAN'S SEIZURE OF THESE DEPOTS HAS ADDED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THEIR EXISTING ARMORY.
======:::=:;: = ; t = = = 2 :s = : : ; :==;;;=: s:=;s== ;:;

ISLAMA 01320 03 OF 03 171S52Z 014643 5657018 AND SUPPLIES SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED. ASIDE FROM IRANIAN SOURCES, THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT JAMIAT ALSO RECEIVES ASSISTANCE FROM RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT SOURCES' AS VELl AS UZBEKISTAN AND TAJIKISTAN,
10. (C) THANKS IN LARGE PART TO THE OUTSIDE SUPPORT.| Hi SAID MASOOD'S SUPPLY DEPOTS IN THE PANJSHIR VERE NOV "IMflEHST"" MASOOD'S COMMANDERS VERE VELL-ARMED AND VELL-PAID, NASOOD ALSO HAD SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF MONEY LEFT OVER FOR BRIBING NOMINALLY PROTALIBAN AND INDEPENDENT COMMANDERS TO COME OVER TO HIS SIDE. AS NOTED IN PARA TVO< JAMIAT HAS MANAGED TO GAIN (AT LEAST THE TEMPORARY ADHERENCE! OF A NUMBER OF LOCAL COMMANDERS IN BAGHLAN AND KUNDUZ REPORTEDLY THROUGH BRIBES. MORE IMPORTANTLY. MASOOD SEEMS VEIL-SUPPLIED FOR THE EXPECTED FIGHTING COKE THE VARM VEATHER. COMMENT 11. (Cl AS VE HAVE REPORTED MANY TIMES BEFORE (SEE REF B. FOR EXAMPLE!, IT IS VORTH NOTING THAT THE VAR IN AFGHANISTAN IS VERY SMALL-SCALE -- VHAT PASS FOR MAJOR BATTLES USUALLY INVOLVE ONLY SEVERAL HUNDRED IRREGULAR SOLDIERS. IN ADDITION' DECISIVE EVENTS ARE USUALLY SHAPED BY THE INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS OF SEVERAL KEY THEATER COMMANDERS' WO Of TEN DEFECT AND REOEFECT. HIGH-TECH MILITARY ITEMS ARE KOT IN USE; ALMOST ALL THE VEAPONS ARE INEXPENSIVE' LOWTECH, SOVIET-HADE ITEMS (NOV AVAILABLE AT FIRE SALE PRICES IN GREY ARMS MARKETS DIRECT FROM FAILING MANUFACTURERS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION). 12. (C) COMMENT (CONTINUED): IN SHORT; THE FACTIONS ARE FIGHTING A VERY LIMITED VAR ON THE CHEAP. THAT SAID, SLIGHT VARIATIONS IN FUNDING AND SUPPLIES CAN MEAN THE DIFFERENCE BETVEEN VICTORY AND DEFEAT. FOR EXAMPLE, IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1998, IF THE TALIBAN HAD NOT HAD FUNDS AVAILABLE TO BRIBE KEY COMMANDERS, IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN MUCH HARDER FOR THEM TO TAKE HAZAR-1-SHARIF AND BAM I YAK. BUT THEY DID HAVE THE MONEY AND. AFTER USING IT, THEY CAPTURED THESE STRATEGIC TOWS VITH EASE. SIMULTANEOUSLY. IF IT HAD NOT BEEN FOR TKE RECEIPT OF COPIOUS SUPPLIES FROM IRAN, MASOOD MAY NOT NAVE SURVIVED TKE PRESSURE PLACED OK HIM BY THE TALIBAN LATE LAST YEAR. VITH RESPECT TO THE CURRENT SITUATION, FLOVS OF MONEY AND SUPPLIES SEEM TO BE TURNING AGAINST THE TALIBAN. THE PROBLEM DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE OVERLY SERIOUS AT THIS TIME AND SHOULD PROBABLY NOT HAMPER TKEIR EXPECTED LARGE-SCALE EFFORT TO ATTACK JAMIAT POSITIONS THIS SPRING. NONETHELESS. IF THE TALIBAN'S MONEY AND SUPPLY PROBLEMS ESCALATE- IT COULD PUT THEM -- NOT JAMIAT -- ON TKE DEFENSIVE. HOVEVER. NASOOD HAS A PROBLEM TOO: BECAUSE A MUCH HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF HIS CURRENT VEALTH APPEARS TO COKE FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES. HE IS MUCH MORE SUSCEPTIBLE THAN THE TALIBAN TO THE VHINS OF HIS PATRONS. END COMMENT. MILAM

JAMIAT SEEMS TO BE FLUSH VITH FUNDS AND SUPPLIES

9. (C) WILE THE TALIBAN APPEAR TO HAVE SOME PROBLEMS' JAMIAT, THEIR MAIN OPPONENT, SEEMS TO BE DOING QUITE VELL IN TERMS OF FUNDING AND SUPPLIES. SOURCES HAVE REPEATEDLY TOLD POLOFF THAT JAMIAT VAS RECEIVING LARGE AMOUNTS OF CASH AND MILITARY SUPPLIES, MOSTLY FROM IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SOURCES. THE FUNDS AND SUPPLIES REPORTEDLY COME FROM IRAK TO POINTS IK TAJIKISTAN (KULYAB A I R B A S E , FOR EXAMPLE). VHERE THEY ARE PICKED UP BY JAHIAT HELICOPTERS AND FERRIED TO THE PANJSHIR VALLEY AND OTHER POINTS. | FRflH IRAN'S HINISUV Of INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (HOIS) AND THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS (IRGC) VERE STATIONED IN HASOOD'S KEY BASE IN THE TOWN OF KHENJ IN THE PANJSHIR VALLEY, VHERE THEY PARTICIPATED IK THE OFF-LOADING OF THE SUPPLIES. THE MOIS AKD IRGC OFFICIALS ALSO VORKED VITH JAMIAT COMMANDERS IN DETERMINING TO VHOM THE FUNDS

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