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[G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998] 293 SCRA 141 FACTS: Petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople assailed the constitutionality of the Administrative Order No. 308 entitled Adoption of Computerized Identification Reference System on the following grounds: 1.) The administrative order issued by the executive is deemed to be a law and not a mere administrative order thus it is a usurpation of legislative power of the congress to make laws, and 2.) It impermissibly intrudes the citizens constitutional right of privacy. ISSUE: Does the Administrative Order No. 308 violates the constitutional right to privacy? HELD: Yes, the Administrative Order violates the constitutional right to privacy because its scope is too broad and vague that will put peoples right to privacy in clear and present danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks of proper safeguards for protecting the information that will be gathered from people through biometrics and other means. Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individuals liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for fishing expeditions by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.


G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where she is the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected were involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et al. The basis of the Ombudsman ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts is a trail managers checks purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-097-0411, pending with the office of the Ombudsman by virtue of its power to investigate and to require the production and inspection of records and documents granted to it by RA No.6770. ISSUE: Whether or not an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405) HELD: We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case. In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. Whats existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman.

Zone of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.

GRISWOLD VS. CONNECTICUT 381 U.S. 479 Facts. Appellant Griswold, Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut and Appellant Buxton, a licensed physician who served as Medical Director for the League at its Center in New Haven, were arrested and charged with giving information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons on means of preventing conception. Appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. Appellants appealed on the theory that the accessory statute as applied violated the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellants claimed standing based on their professional relationship with the married people they advised.

Issue. Does the Constitution provide for a privacy right for married couples? Held. The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion, which although not expressly included in the Amendment, is necessary to make the express guarantees meaningful. The association of marriage is a privacy right older than the Bill of Rights, and the States effort to control marital activities in this case is unnecessarily broad and therefore impinges on protected Constitutional freedoms.

ROE VS. WADE Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when
medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Issue. Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to
terminate her pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment?

Held. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not
unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation. The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage, deriving from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. At common law abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established common law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus. Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the States concern is to protect pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the States interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion. For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant womans attending physician, and may not be criminalized by statute. For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the States interest in promoting the health of the mother. For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the mothers life, based upon the States interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child.


FACTS: On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 7774 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

GR# 164368-69, APRIL 2, 2009, J. BRION FACTS: On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias, was likewise filed against him. In the information, it was alleged that on or about 04 February 2000, in the City of Manila, then President Estrada without having been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to conceal the ill-gotten wealth he acquired during his tenure and his true identity as the President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally represent himself as JOSE VELARDE in several transactions and use and employ the said alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued. A Special Division in the Sandiganbayan was made to try, hear, and decide the charges of plunder and related against respondent Estrada. At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury. After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to file a demurrer to evidence in these cases. In its Joint Resolution, the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense leave to file demurrers in illegal use of alias and perjury. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the people failed to present evidence that proved Estradas commission of the offense. ISSUE: Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142 HELD: No. The Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity does not apply to violations of CA No.

142. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest. The presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity. Bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy. Given the private nature of Estradas act of signing the documents as Jose Velarde related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. Petition was denied.