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1 ,,riilllllll DELEUZEI a EDITED BYAt-rnnr\r HAKr( This is the first dictionary dedicated to the
EDITED BYAt-rnnr\r HAKr(
is the
dictionary dedicated to
'work of
Gilles Deleuze.
It providesan in-depth and lucid introduction to one of the most influential
figuresin coniinentalphilosophy.
The dictionarydefinesand contextualisesmore than 150 ter-rnsthat relate to
philosophy including concepts such as 'becoming', 'body without
organs', 'decerritorializatiqn','differenre','repetition','rhizome' and'schizoanalysis'.
The clear explanationsalso -address the main intellectualinfluenceson Deleuze
as well as tl're influence Deleuze has had on suDiectssuch as feminism,
cinema,postcolonialtheory, geographyand cultural studies.Those unfamiliar
with Deleuzewill find the dictionarya user-friendlytool equippingthem with
definitionsand interpretations both as a study and/or a teachingaid.
The entries are written by some of the rnost prominent Deleuze scholars
inciudingRosiBraidotti,ClaireColebrook,TomConley,EugeneHollarrdand Paul
Patton.Thesecontributors bringtheir expert knowledgeand criticalopinion to
bear on the entries and provide an enrichingtheoretical context for anyone
interestedin Deleuze.
Adrian Parr is Professorof contemporary art and designat the SavannahCollege
of Art and Design. She is the editor, with lan Buchanan,of Deleuzeond the
Contemporory World,f orthcom ing from Edinburgh University Press.
IS SBN 0-7 186-1899-6

The Deleuze Dictionarv

Editedby AdrianParr




Contents vl Acknowledgements @in this edition, Edinburgh University Press,2005 @in the individual contributions is
@in this edition, Edinburgh University Press,2005
@in the individual contributions is retainedby the authors
Claire Colebrooh
Edinburgh University PressLtd
22 GeorgeSquarg Edinburgh
Entries A-Z
Typesetin Ehrhardt
by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Longsight, Manchester,and
printed and bound in Great Britain by
Antony RoweLtd, Chippenham,Wilts
A CIP record for this book is availablefrom the British Library
Noteson Contributors
0 7486 18988 (hardback)
ISBN 0 7486 18996 (paperback)
The right of the contributors
to be identified asauthorsof this work
has been assertedin accordance with
the Copyright, Designsand PatentsAct 1988.



Acknowledgements Introduction First I wouldlike to thankall rheauthorswhocontributedto this proiect. Claire Colebrook
First I wouldlike to thankall rheauthorswhocontributedto this proiect.
Claire Colebrook
you this dictionary would never have come into existence.
Everyonewho hasentriesincludedhereandmy editor, JackieJones, have
beentremendouslycooperativeandhelpful in morewaysthanone.I would
like alsoto thank Keith Ansell-Pearson,Ronald Bogue,Paul Patton and
James Williamsfor theircommentsandsuggesgions,all of whichhavecer-
tainly strengthenedthe theoreticalrigour of this dictionary;any short-
comingsareentirelymy own.I amverygratefulto MonashUniversityand
SavannahCollegeof Art andDesignfor their continuingsupport.Lastly,
the strongintellectandgenerosityof Ian BuchananandClaireColebrook
havebeenawonderfulsourceof inspirationfor meandI would iust liketo
extendmy warmestthanksto you both; this projectwould neverhaveseen
the light of daywithout your continuingencouragementandsupport.
Adrian Parr

Why a Deleuzedictionary?It might seema particularlycraven,disre- spectful,literal-mindedandreactiveprojectto form aDeleuzedictionary. Not only did Deleuzestrategicallychangehis lexicon to avoidthe notion that his texts consistedof terms that might simply nameextra-textual truths, he alsorejectedthe ideathat art, scienceor philosophycould be understoodwithout a senseof their quite specificcreativeproblem.A philosopher's concepts produce connections and styles of thinking. Conceptsareintensive:theydo not gathertogetheranalreadyexistingset of things (extension);they allow for movementsand connection.(The conceptof 'structure' in the twentieth century,for example,could not be isolatedfrom the problemof explainingthe categoriesof thinking andthe imageof an impersonalsocialsubjectwho is the effectof a conceptual system;similarly, the conceptof the 'cogito' relatesthe mind to a move- ment of doubt,to a world of mathematicallymeasurablematter,andto a distinctionbetweenthoughtandthebody.)To translateaterm or to define anypoint in a philosopher'scorpusinvolvesan understandingof a more generalorientation,problem or milieu. This doesnot mean that one reducesaphilosophyto its context- say,explainingDeleuze's 'nomadism' asareactionagainstarigid structuralismor linguistics.On thecontrary,to understanda philosophyasthe creationof a plane,or asa wayof creating someorientationby establishingpoints and relations,meansthat anyphi- losophyis more than its manifestterms,more than its context.In addition to the producedtextsandterms,andin additionto the explicithistorical presuppositions,thereis anunthoughtor outside- theproblem,desireor life of a philosophy.For Deleuze,then, readinga philosopherrequires going beyondhis or her produced lexicon to the deeperlogic of produc- tion from which therelationsor senseof thetextemerge.This senseitself canneverbesaid;in repeatingor recreatingthemilieuof aphilosopherall wecando is produceanothersense,anothersaid.Even so,it is this striv- ing for sensethat is the creativedrive of readinga philosopher.Sq when l)eleuzereadsBergsonheallowseachterm andmoveof Bergson'sphilos- ophy to revolvearounda problem:the problemof intuition, of how the humanobservercanthink from beyondits own constituted,habituated rrndallttxlhumanworld,

INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION It would seem,then, that offering definitionsof terms in the form of a dictionary-
It would seem,then, that offering definitionsof terms in the form of a
dictionary- asthougha word could be detachedfrom its philosophicallife
andproblem- wouldnotonly beatoddswith thecreativeroleof philosophy;
it would alsosustainan illusion that the philosophicaltext is nothing more
thanits 'said'andthatbecoming-Deleuzianwouldbenothingmorethanthe
adoptionof acertainvocabulary.Do we,in systematisingDeleuze'sthought,
reduceaneventanduntimelyprovocationto onemoredoxa?
If Deleuze'swritingsaredifficultandresistantthis cannotbedismissed
asstylisticallyunfortunate,asthough he really oughtto have just satdown
and told us in so many words what 'difference in itself' or 'immanence'
really meant.Why the difficulty of
styleandvocabularyif thereis moreto
Deleuzethan a wayof speaking?A preliminary answerliesin the nexusof
conceptsof 'life', 'immanence'and 'desire'.The one distinction that
Deleuzeinsistsupon,both whenhe speaksin his own voicein Dffirence
and,Repetitiozandwhenhe createshis senseof the historyof philosophy,
isthe 'imageof thought'.Philosophybeginsfrom animageof whatit is to
think, whetherthat be the graspof idealforms,the orderlyreceptionof
senseimpressions,or the socialconstruction of the world through lan-
guage.The conceptsof a philosophy both build, and build upon, that
image. But if the history of philosophy is a gallery of such imagesof
thought - from the conversingSocratesand mathematicalPlatq to the
doubting Descartesand logicalRussell- somephilosophershavedone ,
morethanstrollthroughthis galleryto addtheir own image.Somehave,
in 'schizo' fashion,refusedto add one more proper relation between
thinker and truth, and havepulled thinking apart.One no longermakes
one more stepwithin thought- tidying up a definition,or correctinga
seemingcontradiction.Only when this happensdoesphilosophyrealiseits
poweror potential.
Philosophyis neithercorrectnor incorrectin relation to what currently
countsasthinking; it createsnew modesor stylesof thinking.But if all
philosophyis creation,ratherthanendorsement,of an imageof thought,
somephilosophershavetried to givea senseor conceptto this creationof
thinking:not onemoreimageof thoughtbut 'thoughtwithout an image'.
Deleuze'scelebratedphilosophersof univocity confront the genesis,
rupture or violenceof thinking: not manwho thinks,but alife or unthought
within which thinking might happen.When Spinozaimaginesoneexpres-
sive substance,when Nietzsche imaginesone will or desire,and when
Bergsoncreatesthe conceptof life, they go someway to towardsreally
askingabouttheemergenceof thinking.This isno longertheemergenceof
thc thinker,or one who thinks, but the emergenceof somethinglike a
minintrrlrclation,cvcntor pcrocptionof thinking,fronrwhich'thinkcrs'arc
thcn cll'cctctl.'l'hisnlcrulsthrrtthc rcrrlhistoryof'plrikrsophyrcquircs
understandingthewayphilosophersproducesingularpoints,or theorien-
tationswithin which subjects,objects,perceiversand imagesareordered.
Any assemblagesuchasa philosophicalvocabulary(or an artistic style,
or a set of scientificfunctions) facesin two directions.It both givessome
sortof orderor consistencyto a life whichbearsa muchgreatercomplex-
ity anddynamism,but it alsoenables- from that order- the creationof
further andmoreelaborateorderings.A philosophicalvocabularysuchas
Deleuze'sgivessenseor orientationto our world, but it alsoallowsus to
producefurther differencesand further worlds.On the one hand,then,
a Deleuzianconceptsuch asthe 'plane of immanence'or 'life' or 'desire'
cstablishesa possiblerelation betweenthinker and what is to be thought,
giving us somesort of logic or order.On the other hand,by coupling this
tfunctiont, or
conceptwith other concepts,suchas taffectt 'concept'and

'planeof transcendence'and'imageof thought',wecanthink not just about life or the planeof immanencebut alsoof how the brainimagines,relates to,styles,pictures,representsandordersthatplane.This is theproblemof howlife differsfrom itself,in itself.The roleof adictionaryisonlyoneside of a philosophy.It looksat the way a philosophystratifiesor distinguishes its world, but oncewe haveseenhow 'a' philosophythinks and movesthis shouldthen allow usto look to other philosophiesand other worlds. There is thenanecessaryfidelityandinfidelity,not only in anydiction- irry or any reading,but alsoin any experienceor any life. Life is both cffectedthroughrelations,suchthat thereis no individualor textin itself; rrtthesametime,life is not reducibleto effectedor actualrelations.There rresingularitiesor'powersto relate'thatexceedwhatisalreadygiven.This isthesenseor thesingularityof atext.Senseisnot whatis manifestlysaid rrrdenoted;it is whatis openedthroughdenotation.Sq wemight saythat weneedto understandthemeaningof Deleuze'sterminology- how 'ter- ritorialisation' is defined alongside'deterritorialisation','assemblage', 'llody without Organs'and so on - and then how thesedenotedterms cxpresswhatDeleuzewantsto say,theintentionof theDeleuziancorpus. llut this shouldultimatelythenleadusto thesenseof Deleuze,which can only begiventhroughthe productionof anothertext.1 cansay,here,that thesenseof Deleuze'sworksis theproblemof howthinkingemergesfrom life, and how life is not a beingthat is givenbut a powerto givevarious scnsesof itself(whatDeleuzerefersto as'?being').But in sayingthisI have producedanothersense.Eachdefinitionof eachterm is a differentpath from a text,a differentproductionof sensethat itself opensfurther paths lirr definition.So,far from definitionsor dictionariesreducingthe forceof itniruthoror a philosophy,theycreatefurther distinctions. 'l'his clocsr.rotmcfln,as ccrtirinpopular vcrsionsof Frcnch post- structuralismmightirrclicrrtc,thilttcxtshuvclronrcaningsrnd thrt oncctn

INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION makeanythingmeanwhat one wantsit to mean.On the contrary,the life or problem of
makeanythingmeanwhat one wantsit to mean.On the contrary,the life
or problem of Deleuze'sphilosophy lay in the event: both the event of
philosophicaltextsandtheeventof worksof art.The eventisadisruption,
violenceor dislocationof thinking.To readisnot to recreateoneself,using
the text asa mirror or mediumthroughwhich onerepeatsalreadyhabit-
ual orientations. Just aslife canonly be lived by risking connectionswith
other powersor potentials,so thinking can only occur if there is an
encounterwith relations,potentialsand powersnot our own. If we take
Deleuze'sdefinitionof life seriously- that it is not a givenwhole with
potentialsthat necessarilyunfold through time, but is t airtual power to
far from believingthat onemight return thought to life and overcomethe
submissionto system,recognisesthat the creationof a systemis the only
wayonecanreallylive non-systemically.One createsaminimal or dynamic
order,bothto avoidabsolutedeterritorialisationon theonehandandreac-
tiverepetitionof thealready-orderedon theother.In this sense,Deleuzeis
a child of the Enlightenment.Not only doeshe inhabit the performative
self-contradiction, 'Live in such a way that one's life divergesfrom any
givenprinciple,'healsodeducesthis 'principlethat isnot one'from life.If
oneis to lioe,theremustbothbea minimalconnectionor exposureto the
outsidealongsideacreationor perceptionof that outside,with perception
beinga difference.
createpotentialsthrough contingentandproductiveencounters-
Deleuze'sontology- that relationsareexternalto terms- is acommit-
will relatedirectlyto anethicsof reading.Wecannotreadathinkerin order
to find whatheissaying'tous',asthoughtextswerevehiclesfor exchang-
ing information from one being to another.A text is immanent to life; it
createsnewconnections,newstylesfor thinking andnewimagesandways
of seeing.To read a text is to understandthe problem that motivatedits
assemblage.The more faithful we areto a text - not the text'sultimate
messagebut its construction,or the way in which it producesrelations
amongconcepts,images,affects,neologismsand alreadyexistingvocabu-
laries- the more we will havean experienceof a style of thought not our
own,anexperienceof thepowerto think in creativestylesassuch.
One of the mostconsistentand productivecontributionsof Deleuze's
thought is his theory and practiceof reading,both of which aregrounded
in a specific qonceptionof life. If thereis oneunderstandingof philosophy
andgoodreadingasgroundedin consistencyanddoxa,whichwouldreturn
atextto anassimilablelogicandallowthoughtto remainthesame,Deleuze
placeshimselfin a counter-traditionof distinctionand paradox.Neither
philosophynor thinking flowsinevitablyandcontinuouslyfrom life; reason
is not the actualisationof what life in its potentialwasalwaysstriving to be,
More thananyotherthinkerof histime Deleuzeworksagainstvitalismor
the ideathat reason,thinking and conceptssomehowservea functionor
purposeof life, a life that is nothing morethan changeor alterationfor the
sakeof efficiencyor self-furthering.If thereis a conceptof life in Deleuze
it is a life at oddswith itself,apotentialor powerto createdivergentpoten-
tials.Admittedly,it is possibleto imaginethinking,with its concepts,dic-
tionariesand organon,asshoring'man' againstthe forcesof chaosand
dissolution,but we canalso- whenweextendthis potential- seethinking
asa confrontationwith chaos,asallowingmoreof whatis nrt ourselvesto
transformwhatwetakeourselvesto be.In this sensethoughthas'majori-
tarian'and 'minoritarian' tendencies,both a movementtowardsreducing
mentto perceivinglife; life is connectionandrelation,but theoutcomeor
eventof thoserelationsis not determinedin advanceby intrinsicproper-
ties.Life is not, therefore,the ground or foundation differentiatedby a set
of ternls,suchthat adictionary might provide uswith oneschemaof order
amongothers.The productionor creationof asystemisboth anexposure
to thosepowersof differencenot alreadyconstitutedaspropercategories
of recognising 'man' and
a radical enlightenment.Enlightenment is,
defined dutifully, freedom from imposed tutelage -
the destruction of
masters.Deleuze'sdestructionof masteryis an eternal,ratherthan per-
petual, paradox.Rather than defining thought and liberation against
anothersystem,with acontinualcreationandsubsequentdestruction,the
challengeof Deleuze'sthought is to createa systemthat containsits own
aleatoryor paradoxicalelements,elementsthat areboth insideandoutside,
orderinganddisordering.This is just whatDeleuze'sgreatconceptsserve
to dol life is both that which requiressomeform of order and system
(giving itself through differencesrhar are perceivedand synthesised)and,
that which alsoopensthe system,for life is just rhat power to d.ifferfrom
which conceptsemergebut that canneverbeincludedin theextensionof
Wecanonly beginto think andlive whenwelosefaith in the world, when
weno longerexpectaworld to answerto andmirror ourselvesandour already
constituteddesires.Thinking is paradox,nor becauseit is simpledisobedi-
chnoticdiffcrcnccto uniformityand samencssand a tendcncytowards
opcninglhoscsrmcuniticsto n'stttttcring'orinconrprchcnsion,I)clcuzc'
enceor negationof orthodoxy,but becauseif thinkinghasanyforceor dis-
tinctionit hasto workagainstinertia.If a bodywereonly to connectwith
whatallowedit to remainrelativelystableandselfcontained- in imageof the
autopoieticsystemthat takesonly what it canmasterand assimilate- then
theverypowerof life for changeandcreationwouldbestalledor exhausted
byself-involvedlifeformsthatlivedin ordertoremainthesame.Despitefirst
appearancesadictionarycanbetheopeningof aself-enclosedsystem.If we
nrc faithfulto thc lifc of Dclcuzc'sthought- rccognisingit asn crcation
INTRODUCTION ratherthandestinedeffectof life - then wecanrelivethe productionof this systemandthis responseasanimageof
ratherthandestinedeffectof life - then wecanrelivethe productionof this
systemandthis responseasanimageof productionin general.
mustcreatea systemor be enslavedby anotherman's'- sodeclares
Blake'sidealpoetin thehighly contestedandchaoticagonisticsof his great
poemJerusalem.Blake'saphorismswereindebtedto anenlightenmentlib-
erationismthat found itself in a seeminglyparadoxicalstructure.If weare
condemnedto livein someform of systemthenwecaneitherinhabitit pas-
sivelyandreactively,or wecanembraceour seemingsubmissionto asystem
of relationsnotourownandrespondcreatively.Blake'searlyresponsepro-
vided an alternative to the inescapabilityof the categoricalimperative
which still hauntsustoday:if I amto speakandactasa moralbeingthen
I canneithersaynor do what is particularor contingentfor me; living with
othersdemandsthatI decidewhatto do fromthepointof viewof 'human-
ity in general'.To speakor to live is alreadyto beother than oneself,andso
morality demandsa necessaryrecognitionof an initial submission.Such
Lee Spinks
a final consensusor intersubjectivitymayneverarrive,but it hauntsall life
The distinction between active and reactive forces was developedby
nevertheless.By contrast,Deleuze'sparadoxicalandeternalaffirmationof
creationbeginsfrom the inescapabilityof a minimal system- to perceive
or live is alreadyto be connected,to be other- but far from this requiring
astriving for asystemof consensusor idealclosure,this producesaninfin-
ite opening.It might seemthat the Enlightenmentimperative- abandon
all externalauthority - comesto function asyet onemoreauthority,and it
might alsoseemthat afidelityto Deleuzeis acrimeagainstthe thinkerof
difference.But theproblemof Deleuze'sthoughtis iust this passagefrom
contradictionto paradox. To notbeoneselfis contradictoryif onemustbe
eitherthis or that, if life must decideor stabiliseitself (form a harrativeor
Friedrich Nietzschein his Oz the Genealogyof Morality and rhe notes
posthumouslycollectedas The Will to Power.In his seminalreadingof
Nietzsche,Deleuzeseizedupon this distinction (andwhat it madepossible)
andplacedit at theveryheartof theNietzscheanrevaluationof values.For
Nietzsche,the distinction betweenactiveand reactiveforceenabledhim to
present 'being'asa processratherthan 'substance'.The
world of substan-
imageof itself). 'Becoming-imperceptible',by contrast,is an enablingand
productiveparadox.One connectsor perceivesin order to live, in order to
be,but this very tendencyis alsoat the sametime a becoming-other:not
a nonbeingbut a?being.A Deleuziandictionarycomesinto beingonly in
its use,only when the thoughtsthat it enablesopenthe systemof thought
to theveryoutsideandlife that madeit possible.
tial being,heargued,is producedby therecombinationof multiple effectsof
forceinto discreteideas,imagesandidentities.Thereis no essential 'truth'
of being;nor is therean independent 'reality' beforeandbeyondthe flux of
appearances;everyaspectof therealisalreadyconstitutedby quantitiesand
combinationsof force. Within this economyof becoming,every force is
relatedto otherforcesandis definedin its characterby whetherit obeysor
commands.What we call a body (whetherunderstoodaspolitical, social,
chemicalor biological)is determinedby this relationbetweendominating
and dominatedforces.Meanwhile Deleuzemaintainsthat any two forces
constituteabodyassoonastheyenterinrorelationship.Within thisbodythe
superioror dominantforcesaredescribedas'active';the inferior or domi-
forcearetheoriginalqualitiesthat definetherelationshipof forcewith force.
If forcesaredefinedby the relativedifferencein their quality or power,
the notion of quality is itself determinedby the differencein quantity
betweenthe two forcesthat comeinto relationship.The characterof any
relation,that is,is producedthroughforces.There areno intrinsicprop-
ertiesthat dctcrmine how forccswill relate:a masterbecomesa master
throughthe act<lfovcr.powcring,In thc-cncountcrbctwccnforccs,each
ACTIVE,/REACTIVE ACTUALITY force receivesthe quality that correspondsto its quantity.Forcesare dominant,or
force receivesthe quality that correspondsto its quantity.Forcesare
dominant,or dominated,dependingupontheirrelativedifferencein quan-
tity; but they manifestthemselvesasactiveor reactiveaccordingto their
differencein quality.Oncethe relationhasbeenestablishedthe qualityof
forces- dominantor dominated- producesan activepower(that com-
mandsthe relation)and a reactiyepower(definedby the relation).The
differencebetweenforcesdefinedaccordingto their quantity asactiveor
reactiveis describedin terms of a hierarchy.An activeforceis the stronger
term andgoesto the limit of what it cando.Its characteristicsaredomi-
nating,possessing,subjugatingandcommanding.The expressionof activ-
ity is the expressionof what is necessarilyunconscious;all consciousness
doesisexpresstherelationofcertain reactiveforcesto theactiveforcesthat
dominatethem.Activeforceaffirmsits differencefrom everythingthat is
weakerthan and inferior to itself; meanwhilereactiveforce seeksto limit
activeforce,imposerestrictionsuponit, andto recastit in thespiritof the
negative.Crucially reactiveforcecannottransformitselfinto afully active
force; nor can a collection of reactiveforcesamalgamatethemselvesinto
somethinggreaterthanactiveforce.A slavewhogainspower,or whobonds
with other slaves,will remaina slaveandcanonly be freedfrom slaveryby
abandoningconsciousness.Consciousnessremainswhat it is, and is unlike
the active force of difference. Consciousnessrepresentsand recognises
activeforces,therebyseparatingactivityfrom whatit cando.Suchsepara-
tion constitutesa subtractionor division of activeforceby makingit work
againstthe power of its own affirmation. The remarkablefeatureof the
becoming-reactiveof activeforceisthathistoricallyit hasmanagedto form
the basisof anentirevisionof life. This visionembodiesthe principleof
'ressentiment':a movementin which a reactiveand resentfuldenialof
higher life beginsto createits own moral systemand accountof human
experience.The reactivetriumph expressedin movementsof conscious-
nesslike ressentiment,bad consciousnessand the asceticidealdepends
upon a mystificationand reversalof activeforce:at the coreof thesenew
potentiallysublimeelementin asmuch asthey areableto advancea new
interpretation of life (the world of moral ideas,for example)and they
supplyuswith anoriginal,althoughnihilistic,versionof theWill to Power.
By inventingatranscendentideaof lifein orderto judge life,reactiveforces
separateusfrom our powerto createvalues;but theyalsoteachusnewfeel-
ingsandnewwaysof beingaffected.What needsro beunderstoodis that
there is a variation or internal differencein the disposition of reactive
forces;theseforceschangetheir characterandtheir meaningaccordingto
theextentto which theydeveloptheir affinityfor the will to nothingness.
Consequentlyoneof thegreatproblemsposedto interpretationisto deter-
minethedegreeof developmentreactiveforceshavereachedin relationto
negationandthewill to nothingness;similarlyweneedalwaysto attendro
the nuanceor relativedispositionof activeforcein termsof its develop-
mentof therelationbetweenactionandaffirmation.
Will to Power
Claire Colebrook
interpretations of life reactive force simulatesactive force and turns it
againstitself.It isatpreciselythehistoricalmomentwhentheslavebegins
to triumph over the masterwho hasstoppedbeing the spectreof law,
An active force becomesreactive when a reactive force managesto
separateit from what it can do. The historicaldevelopmentof reactive
anaffinitywhich is itselfa weakform of theWill to Powerin sofar asit is
ancxprcssionof nihilismor thcwill to nothingncss.Thc will toasceticism
rlr wrlrld-rcnunciittionis, lftcr rrll, still itn
cxprcssionof rpil/. 'fhus,
whilc rcnctivclirrccsrtrcwcnkcrthnnrctivc firrccs,thcy rlso posscssil
It might seemthatDeleuze'sphilosophyisdominatedby anaffirmarionof
the virtual andis highly criticalof a wesrerntradition that hasprivileged
arctuality.To a certainextentthis is true,andthis privilegecanbeseenin
thewayphilosophyhastraditionallydealtwith difference.First, rhereare
deemedto beactualterms,termswhichareextendedin time- havingcon-
tinuity - andpossiblyalsoextendedin space.Thesetermsarethenrelated
to eachother,sodifferenceis somethingpossiblefor an alreadyactualised
entity. Differenceis betweenactualterms, suchasthe differencebetween
consciousnessand its world, or is a differencegroundedupon actuality,
suchassomethingactualbearingthe capacityfor possiblechanges.This
understandingof actualityis thereforeried to the conceptof possibility.
Possibilityis somethingthat canbepredicatedof, or attributedto,abeing
which rcmainsthe same.Now againstthis understandingof actuality,
l)clcuzcsctsr diffcrentcouplc:actuality/potenriality.If thereissomething
rctualit isnotbccirr.rscit trrkcsuptimc,norbccausctimcisthatwhichlinks
l0 ACTUALITY AFFECT il or containsthechangesof actualbeings;rather,actualityis unfold'ed'from potentiality.We
or containsthechangesof actualbeings;rather,actualityis unfold'ed'from
potentiality.We should seethe actualnot asthat from which changeand
differencetakeplace,but asthat which hasbeeneffectedfrom potentiality.
Time is not the synthesisor continuityof actualterms,asin phenomen-
ologywhereconsciousnessconstitutestime by linking the pastwith the
presentand future. Rather,time is the potentialfor variouslinesof actual-
ity. From any actual or unfolded term it should be possible(and, for -
Deleuze,desirable)to intuit the richer potentialityfrom which it has
As anavowedempiricistDeleuzeseemsto becommittedto theprimacy
of the actual:one should remainattentiveto what appears,to what is,
without invoking or imagining some condition outside experience.
However,whileit istruethatDeleuze'sempiricismaffirmslife andexperi-
ence,herefusesto restrictlife to theactual.In this respectheoverturnsa
rcvolution,theRussianrevolution,arespecificanddifferentonly because
rrctualityis theexpressionof an Ideaof revolutionwhich canrepeatitself
Felicity J. Colman
history of westernmetaphysicsthat definesthe potential and virtual
accordingto alreadypresentactualities.We shouldnot, Deleuzeinsists,
definewhat somethingis accordingto alreadyactualisedforms. So we
shouldnot, for example,establishwhatit isto think on thebasisof whatis
usually,generallyor actuallythought.Nor shouldwethink thatthevirtual
is merelythe possible:thosethings that, from the point of view of the
actualworld,mayor maynot happen.On thecontrary,Deleuze'sempiri-
cismis that of the Idea,andit is the essenceof the Ideato actualiseitself.
There is, therefore,an Ideaof thinking,the potentialor powerto think,
which is then actualisedin anysinglethought.We canonly fully under-
standandappreciatethe actualif we intuit its virtual condition,which is
alsoa realcondition.That is,realconditionsarenot thosewhich mustbe
presupposedby the actual- suchasassumingthat for anythoughtthere
Watchme:affectionis theintensityof colourin asunseton adry andcold
autumnevening.Kiss me:affectisthataudible,visualandtactiletransfor-
mation producedin reactionto a certainsituation,eventor thing. Run
irwayfrom me:affectedarethe bodiesof spectreswhentheir spaceis dis-
turbed.In all thesesituations,affectis an independentthing; somerimes
describedin termsof theexpressionof anemotionor physiologicaleffect,
but all the while trans-historical,trans-temporal,trans-spatialand
mustbeasubjectwhothinks- rather,realconditionsare,for Deleuze,the
potentialsof life from which conditionssuchasthebrain,subiectivityor
For example,if wewantto understanda text historicallyweneedto go
beyondits actualelements- not iust whatit saysbut alsobeyondits man-
ifestcontext- to thevirtualproblemfrom whichanytextisactualised.For
instance,we shouldnot read John Milton's ParadiseLost(1667)asa his-
toricaldocumentrespondingto the Englishrevolution,a revolutionthat
wemight understandby readingmoretextsfrom theseventeenthcentury.
Rather,weneedto think of thepotentialor Ideaof revolutionassuch:how
Milton's text is a specificactualisation,fully different,of the problemof
howwemightbcfree,of howpowermightrealiscitscl[,of howindividuals
rrrightrclclscthcmsclvcstirlmimposcclscrvituclc.Anylctu:rltcxtor cvcnt
isp<lssiblcorrlybcciruscrcrrlityhrrsl virtuitldintcttsion,il powcrtocxprcss
itscll'irrirlwirystlill'crcrrtrrctuirlitics:thc l',nglislrrcvolttlion,tltc l"r'cnch
Affect is the change,or variation,that occurswhen bodiescollide,or
come into contact. As a body, affect is the knowableproduct of an
cncounter,specificin its ethicalandlived dimensionsand yet it is alsoas
indefiniteasthe experienceof a sunset,transformation,or ghost.In its
largestsense,affectis part of the Deleuzianprojectof trying-to-under-
stand,andcomprehend,andexpressallof theincredible,wondrous,tragic,
painfulanddestructiveconfigurationsof thingsandbodiesastemporally
mediated,continuouseyents.Deleuzeusesthe term'affection'to referto
theadditiveprocess€s,forces,powersandexpressionsof change.
Affectcanproduceasensoryor abstractresultandisphysicallyandtem-
porallyproduced.It isdeterminedby chanceandorganisationandit con-
sistsof a varietyof factorsthat includegeography,biology,meteorology,
:rstronomy,ecologyand culture.Reactionis a vital part of the Deleuzian
conceptof affectivechange.For instance,describingBaruch Spinoza's
studyof thetransformationof a body,a thing,or a groupof thingsovera
period of spaceand time, Deleuzeand Guattari write in A
Plu,teaus:iA.ffectsarebecomings'(D&G 1987:256).Affect expressesthe
modificationof experiencesasindependentthingsof existence,whenone
produccsor rccognisesthe consequencesof movementandtime for (cor-
porcirl,spiritual,:rnimirl,ntincral,vcgctlblcand or c<lnceptual)bodies.
Afl'cctisnotonlyitttcxpcricntiallirrcc,it crrnbcconrcrrnrirtcriirlthing,irncl
13 t2 ARBORESCENT SCHEMA AFFECT Connectives assuch,asDeleuzedescribes,it cancompelsystemsof knowledge,history,
assuch,asDeleuzedescribes,it cancompelsystemsof knowledge,history,
memoryandcircuitsof power.
Deleuze'sconceptionof affectdevelopsthrough hisentireoeuvre.In his
studyof David Hume in Ernpiricismand,SubjectiaityDeleuzediscussesthe
linkagesbetweenideas,habitsofthought, ethics,patterns,andrepetitions
of systems;all the while describingthe relationshipbetweenaffectand
differencein terms of temporallyspecificsubjectivesituations.Empiricism
and,SubjectioityalsosignalsDeleuze'sinterestin Henri Bergson,a key
thinkerin theDeleuziandevelopmentof atheoryof affect.Bergson'sbook
Matter and,Memory addressesthe corporealcondition of what he terms
'affection'in relationto perception(D 1988a:l7). Deleuzealsoengagesthe
workof Spinozaandthelatter'saddressof affectionsandaffectin termsof
Linesof flight
a modalityof 'takingon' somethingin theEthics(1677).In his essay'On
the Superiorityof Anglo-AmericanLiterature',Deleuzedescribesaffect
asverbsbecomingevents- naming affectsasperceivableforces,actions,
and activities.In relation to art in What is Philosophy?he and Guattari
describeaffectsasmorethansensateexperienceor cognition.Through art,
wecanrecognisethat affectscanbedetachedfrom their temporalandgeo-
In accountingfor experiencein a non-interpretive manner,Deleuze's
conceptionof affectexposedthelimitsof semioticsthat tendsto structure
emotionalresponsesto aestheticand physicalexperiences.Undeniably
a romanticconceptwithin his discussionof the regulationandproduction
of desireand energywithin a socialfield, Deleuze'swritings of affect
neverthelessenablea material,and thereforepolitical,critiqueof capital
and its operations.Within a Deleuzian framework, affect operatesas
adynamicof desirewithin anassemblageto manipulatemeaningandrela-
tions, inform and fabricatedesire,and generateintensity - yielding
different affectsin anygivensituationor event.Perceptionis anon-passive
continualmoulding, driven and givenby affect.
Closelylinkedto DeleuzeandGuattari'sconceptsof 'multiplicity','expe-
rience'and'rhizomatics',theconceptof 'affect'shouldalsobeconsideredin
relationto theconceptsof'arborescence'and'linesofflight'. Situatedaspart
of theDeleuzian'and'of becoming,themolecularthresholdsof bodiesand
thingsaseventsaredescribedby Deleuzein termsof affectivehappenings;
occasionswherethingsand bodiesarealtered.To
this end,affectdescribes
theforcesbehindall formsof socialproductionin thecontemporaryworld,
powers.In Deleuze'ssingularandcollaborativeworkwith Guattari,affective
firrccsarcclcpictedasreactiveor activc(followingFriedrichNietzsche),tacit
or pcrfrlrmccl.As l)clcuzcportrtysit, nffcctivcpowcrcirnbe utilisedto
cnrrhlcrrbility,'rruthrlrity,cotttroltnd crcntivity,limbrrrccrrtc,
The arboreal schemais one of Deleuze's many potent and prominent
biologicalandorganicimages.His criticism,andhis useof the schema,is
scatteredacrosshiscorpus,atvarioustimestargetingapproachesto philos-
ophy psychiatry literature, science,theoreticalcriticism and evenevery-
dayliving. The notion of an arborescentor tree-likeschemais Deleuze's
counterpointto hismodelof therhizome,which heusesto challengeten-
denciesin thinking andto suggestwaysof rehabilitating'thought' asacre-
Deleuze'smodelof the tree-likestructureappearsto be quite simple.
Typically, at its top, is someimmutableconceptgiven prominenceeither
by transcendentaltheorisingor unthinking presumption.In Deleuze's
works on epistemologyand ontology,he identifiesPlato's Forms, the
modelsof thesubjectespousedby Ren6DescartesandImmanuelKant, as
well as the 'Absolute Spirit' of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel as
cxamples.All otherconceptsor particularsareorganisedverticallyunder
this conceptin a tree/trtnk/root arrangement.The orderingis strictly
hierarchical,from superior to subordinate,or transcendentto particular,
suchthat the individualor particularelementis conceivedaslessimport-
rrnt,powerful,productive,creativeor interestingthanthe transcendent.
The subordinate elements, once so arranged, are unable to 'move'
lrorizontallyin sucha way asto establishcreativeand productiveinter-
lclationshipswith other concepts,particularsor models.Rather,their
positionis final, accordingto an organisingprinciple implied or deter-
rnincdby the superiorconcept.
lfurthermorc,thc trcc is a self-containedtotalityor closedsystemthat
is cqual just to tlrc sum of its parts.Rclationsbctwccnclcmcntsof the
t4 ARBORESCENT SCHEMA l5 ART systemare interior to and inherent within the model. They are
systemare interior to and inherent within the model. They are stableor
evenessentialin so far as,first, the superior concept is the all-powerful
definingforcethatdictatesthepositionor meaningof allelsein thesystem
and, second,the tendencyis to think of the systemeither ascompletein
itselfor elseunconnectedto othersystemsin anymeaningfulway.The tree
is 'fixed to the spot' and static.Any remainingmovementis minimal and
internal to the systemrather than exploratoryor connective.Becausethe
creativepotential of disorderand inter-connectivityis precluded,the
potentialinherentin conceptualisingandthinking in this manneris very
Deleuze'smodelcallsto mind theporphyriantree,adeviceusedby the
philosopherPorphyry to show how reality and our conceptsare ordered
andhow logicalcategorisationproceeds.The conceptof'Substance'can
be placedat the top of the tree,anddichotomousbranchingat eachlevel
obtainedby addingaspecificdifferencesuchthat,at thelowestlevel,some
individualcanbeidentifiedasa sub-setof 'Substance'.
This versionof the arborealmodelalsohighlightssomethingof its com-
plexity and ontologicalimportancefor Deleuze.The differenceevident
betweenparticularsis subsumedby the similarity that definesthem in
terms of superior concepts in general and the transcendentconcept
(Substance)in particular.Ratherthan derivingconceptsfrom individual
particulars(or interactionsbetweenthem),an abstractconceptis usedto
organiseindividualsand determinetheir meaningrelative just to the
organisationalhierarchy.Differencehasto beaddedbackto eachelement
in order to defineit asa particular,rather than havingindividual elements
serveasthestartingpointfor conceptualisation.In contrast,Deleuzeholds
that lived experiencecomprisesparticularity and uniquenessin each
moment, experienceand individual, the inherent differencesof which
ought alwaysto be acknowledged.By positing the conceptover the
particular,thinking of the arborealkind abstractsfrom lived experiencein
its verystructure.
For Deleuze,thinking in sucha way stiflescreativity,leavessuperior
conceptsrelatively immune to criticism and tendsto closeone'smind to
thedynamism,particularityandchangethatisevidentin livedexperience.
Not only is suchthinkingnecessarilyabstract,it alsoservesto protectthe
statusquo and relievedominant conceptsand positionsfrom productive
Felicity J. Colman
Deleuze'sdescriptionsof art remind us that it is one of the primary
mediumswith which humans learn to communicateand respondto the
world. Art excitedDeleuzefor its ability to createthe domainsthat he
saw,felt, tasted,touched,heard,thought,imaginedand desired.Besides
publishingbookson singularwriters and artists,including makingspecific
manifestostylestatementsconcerningart asa categoryof criticalanalysis,
Deleuze'sspecificactivitiesin respectto art extendedto writing short
cxhibition catalogueessaysfor artists (for exampleon the French painter
Deleuze'spreferredart worksfor his discussionsencompasseda range
of mediums,including music and sounds(birdsong),cinema,photo-
graphy,the plasticarts (sculpture,paintingand drawing),literatureand
lrchitecture. Deleuze's philosophical interestsalso led him to discussa
numberof performativeandtheatricalworks,usingexamplesfromanthro-
pologyto makecultural andphilosophicaldistinctions.Deleuzeaddresses
thevisual,aestheticand perceptualtermsof art through distinctivepolem-
icalmethodologiesdrawn from the sciences,suchasbiologicalevolution,
Deleuzeleansupon acritical assortmentof art history critics,film critics,
sophicalpractice:Wilhelm Worringer,Alois Riegl, Paul Claudel,Clement
Greenberg,LawrenceGowing,GeorgesDuthuit, GregoryBateson,Andr6
llazin,ChistianMetz, andUmbertoEco.Asawriter,Deleuze'sliterarypre-
clccessorsfigure prominently (seework in EssaysCritical and'Clinical). His
cognitiveapproachtowardart comesfrom hisadoptedphilosophicalfathers
includingImmanuelKant, Baruch Spinozaand Friedrich Nietzsche.In
Nietzscheand.Philosophy,Deleuzeemploys'art' asa categoryof 'Critique',
rrny analysisof this world is bound by epistemologicalstructures.For
l)cleuze,the descriptivenatureof art lieswith art's ability not merelyto
rcdescribe;rather art has a materialcapacityto evokeand to question
throughnon-mimeticmeans,by producingdifferentaffects.
l)eleuzetreatsplasticart movementsincludingByzantine,the Gothic,
thcBaroque,Romanticism,Classicism,Primitive, Japanese, andArt Brut,
rrstrans-historicalconceptsthatcontributeto thefieldof art throughtheir
virri<luspropositionsand developmentof forms,aestheticsandassociated
Vinccnt Virn (iogh, lhul (l6zrrnrrc, Prtul
'Ihom:rs Hardy,Maric
l6 ART AXIOMATIC T7 Henri-Beyle Stendhal, Samuel Beckett, Antonin Artaud, William S.
Henri-Beyle Stendhal, Samuel Beckett, Antonin Artaud, William S.
Alain Robbe-Grillet are critically absorbedby Deleuze in terms of their
respectiveenquiriesinto thecreationof art formsthat translate,illustrate
and perform the forcesof the world (such as desire),by making them
visible.Deleuzementionsin passingan enormousrangeof artistsof
variousmediumsto makeapointor anobservation- from Igor Stravinsky
to Patti Smith, from Diego Vel6squezto Carl Andre. The meansand
methodsby whichart isableto transformmaterialinto sensoryexperience
is of course part of the modernist contribution to art in the twentieth
century.In hisdiscussionsconcerningart,Deleuzeisthusacontributorto
The methodologyof art forms the coreof Deleuze'sstudyof Marcel
Proust's work A lo recherchedu tempsperdu(1913-27),a book that exam-
inesaspectsof temporalitydesireandmemory.Asin hisbookco-authored
with Guattari on KaJba,in Proust,Deleuzeunderstandsart asbeingmuch
morethanamediumof expression.
Deleuze'sbookFrancisBacon:TheLogicoJ'Sensationworksthrough the
complicatedconnectionsof DeleuzeandGuattari'sBodywithoutOrgans
(BwO) and EnglishpainterFrancisBacon'streatmenrof the powerand
rhythms of the human body,to a discussionof the differencesfrom and
similaritiesto the work of FrenchpainterClzanneof Bacon'sown work.
In thisbook,Deleuzeprivilegespaintingasanart form thataffordsacon-
creteapprehensionofthe forcesthat renderabody.
In Deleuze'sfinal work co-authoredwith Guattari, What is Philosophy?
'art' is accordeda privilegedpositionin their triad of philosophy,art and
science.Art is an integral componentof their threeleveloperationsof the
cerebralqualityof things(thebrain-becoming-subject).In thisbook,'art' as
acategoryhasdevelopedinto themeansby which DeleuzeandGuattarican
operateaffect,temporality,emotion, mortality, perceptionand becoming.
The active, compounding creativity of artists' work are describedas
'percepts'-independentaggregatesof sensationthatlivebeyondtheircre-
isgivenbysensations;theaffectof methods,materials,memoriesandobjects:
refer to the entrieson 'art',
'becoming * performanceart', 'Bergson','BodywithoutOrgans','ethics',
'feminism'r'Foucault * fold','hysteria','Lacan'and'linesof flight f
art *
Alberto Toscano
Proposedby Deleuzeand Guattariin A Thousand,Plateaus'axiomatic'is
usedto definetheoperationof contemporarycapitalismwithin universal
historyandgeneralsemiology.Originatingin thediscourseof scienceand
mathematicalset theory in particular, 'axiomatic' denotesa method that
neednot providedefinitionsof the termsit workswith, but ratherorders
a givendomainwith the adjunctionor subtractionof particularnormsor
natureneednotbespecified.They areindifferentto thepropertiesor qual-
ities of their domain of applicationand treat their obiectsaspurely func-
tional, rather than as qualitatively differentiatedby some intrinsic
character.Axiomsarein turn accompaniedby theorems,or modelsof real-
isation,which applythem to certainempiricalor materialsituations.
An axiomaticsystemdiffersfrom systemsof codingandovercodingby its
capacityto operatedirectlyondecodedflows.In thisrespect,whilstit implies
a form of capture,its degreeof immanenceand ubiquity is far greaterthan
thatof codingsystems,allof whichrequireaninstanceof externalityor tran-
scendence.That is why Deleuze and Guattari defend the thesis of a
differencein kind betweencapitalistandpre-capitalistformations:thelatter
codeflows,while the former operateswithout coding.Within universal
historytheimmanentaxiomaticof capitalismis activatedwith thepassingof
l thresholdof decodinganddeterritorialisation,at the momentwhen,fol-
'Wepaint,sculpt,compose,andwritewith sensations'(D&G1994:166).
klwingKarl Marx, weareconfrontedbybarelabourandindependentcapital.
The axiomaticmethod,asinstantiatedby contemporarycapitalismand
royalscience,canbe juxtaposed to schizoidpractice,which is capableof
combiningdecodedflowswithout theinsertionof axioms,aswellasto the
problematicmethodin the sciences,which is concernedwith eventsand
singularpointsratherthansystemicconsistency.Oneof thebolderclaims
mlde by DeleuzeandGuattariisthatweshouldnot think of theaxiomatic
irsirnotionanalogicallyexportedfrom scienceto illustratepolitics.On the
contrary,within scienceitself the axiomaticis deemedto collaboratewith
thc Statc in thc fixation of unruly flows,diagramsand variations.
lisscntinllyit isrrstrrrtifyingor scmioticisingrgcncythatsubordinatcsthe
BAcoN, FRANcrs t9 t8 ( tgog-gz) AXIOMATIC transversalcommunicationsandconjunctionsof flowsto asystemof fixed
( tgog-gz)
transversalcommunicationsandconjunctionsof flowsto asystemof fixed
As Deleuzeand Guattari indicate,the unity of an axiomaticsystem
and of capitalismin particular,is itself very difficult to pin down, since
the opportunisticcharacterof the adjunctionandsubtractionof axioms
opensup the questionof the saturationof the systemand of the inde-
pendenceof the axioms from one another.Moreover, though their
dependenceon the axiomsmakesmodelsof realisationisomorphic(for
exampleall statesin onewayor anothersatisfythe axiomof production
for the market),thesemodelscandemonstrateconsiderableamountsof
social-democratic,or 'failed' states).The axiomaticsystemis therefore
not a closed dialecticaltotality, since it also generates 'undecidable
propositions'that demand either new axiomsor the overhaulof the
system,and it is interrupted by entities(for examplenon-denumerable
infinite sets)whosepoweris greaterthan that of the system,and which
thus open breachesto an outside.It is the capacityto conjugateand
control flows without the introduction of a transcendentagency
BACON, FRANCTS (t909-92)
John Marks
(a totaliser)that makesthe capitalistaxiomatic the most formidable
apparatusof domination.
andconnectionsbetweendecodedflows,that areotherwiseincommensu-
rableandunrelated,andsubordinatestheseflowsto a generalisomorphy,
suchasthe subjectwho must producefor the market.In this sensetoo,
DeleuzeandGuattaridiscernthatthecapitalistaxiomaticpointsto aresur-
genceof machinicenslavement,onethatisallthemorecruelbecauseof its
impersonality(its beyondforms of citizenship,sovereigntyand legitima-
tion). In asmuchasits modeof operationcanentirelybypasssubjective
beliefor thecodingof humanbehaviour,suchanaxiomaticmovesusfrom
a societyof disciplineto a societyof control,wherepoweractsdirectlyon
a decodeddividualmatter.Nevertheless,DeleuzeandGuattariarecareful
to note,it isnot simplythecasethatflowscontinueto evadeandevenover-
powerthe axiomatic,but that the globalandnon-qualifiedsubjectivityof
capitalneverattainsabsolutedeterritorialisation,and is alwaysaccompa-
nied by forms of socialsubjection,in the guiseof nation-states,and a
panoplyof territorialisationsat thelevelof its modesof realisation.
Generallyin hiswork,Deleuzeseeksto contradictthereceivedwisdom
thatartistssuchasBaconor FranzKafkaarein somewayexpressingadeep
tcrror of life in their art. For this reason,he is at painsto point out that
llaconhasa greatloveof life, andthat his paintingevincesanextraordin-
rrryvitality.Baconisoptimisticto theextentthathe'believes'in theworld,
but it is a very particularsort of optimism.Baconhimselfsaysthat he is
ccrebrallypessimistic- in that hepaintsthehorrorsof the world- but ar
thc sametime nervouslyoptimistic.Bacon'swork may be imbued with
irll sortsof violence,but he managesto paint the 'scream'and not the
'lrrlrror'- thcviolcnceof thesensationratherthantheviolenceof thespec-
( lrrpitrrlisrl
litclc- rnd hc rcpro:rchcshimsclfwhcnhc feelsthat he haspaintedtoo
tttttclrhorrot'. 'l'hc filrccstlut cirusctlrcscrcirnrshouldnotbcconfirscdwith

Deleuze'saimin FrancisBacon:TheLogicofSensation,aswith all hisother work on art, is to producephilosophicalconceptsthat correspondto the 'sensibleaggregates'that theartisthasproduced.The 'logicof sensation' that Deleuzeconstructsshowshow FrancisBaconuses'Figures'to paint sensationsthataimto actdirectlyon thenervoussystem.'Sensation',here, refers to a pre-individual, impersonalplane of intensities.It is also, Deleuzeclaims,theoppositeof the facileor theclich6sof representation. It is at oneandthe sametime the humansubjectandalsothe impersonal event.It is directedtowardsthe sensibleratherthantheintelligible. In developingthe useof the 'Figure', Baconpursuesa middle path betweentheabstractandthe figural,betweenthe purelyopticalspacesof abstractart andthepurely 'manual'spacesof abstractexpressionism.The 'Figure'retainselementsthatarerecognisablyhuman;it isnotarepresent- ationalform, but ratheranattemptto paintforces.For Deleuze,thevoca- tion of all non-representationalart is to makevisibleforcesthat would otherwiseremaininvisible.It is for this reasonthat Bacon'sfiguresappear to be deformedor contorted,sometimespassingthroughobjectssuchas washbasinsor umbrellas:the body seeksto escapefrom itself.There are cvensomepaintingsin which the 'Figure' is little more than a shadow within a 'scrambledwhole', asif it hasbeenreplacedentirely by forces. ln short,Bacon'spaintingscanbe consideredasan artisticexpressionof l)eleuzeandGuattari'sconceptof theBodywithout Organs.

20 BACoN, FRANcIs (tgog-gz) BECOMING 2l thevisiblespectaclebeforewhichonescreams.The screamcapturesinvis-
20 BACoN,
thevisiblespectaclebeforewhichonescreams.The screamcapturesinvis-
ibleforces,whichcannotberepresented,becausetheylie beyondpainand
feeling. So, cerebrally,this may lead to pessimism,since theseinvisible
forcesare evenmore overwhelmingthan the worst spectaclethat can be
represented.However,Deleuzeclaimsthat, in makingthedecisionto paint
the scream,Baconis like a wrestler confronting the 'powers of the invis-
ible', establishinga combatthat wasnot previouslypossible.He makesthe
activedecisionto amrmthepossibilityof triumphingovertheseforces.He
allows life to screamat death,by confronting terror, and entering into
combatwith it, ratherthanrepresentingit. The 'spectacle'of violence,on
theotherhand,allowstheseforcesto remaininvisible,anddivertsus,ren-
deringuspassivebeforethis horror.
It is for thesereasonsthat Deleuzetalks at somelength about the
importanceof 'meat' in Bacon'spaintings.For Deleuze,Baconis a great
painterof 'heads' ratherthan 'faces'.Baconseeksto dismantlethe struc-
tured spatialorganisationof the facein orderto makethe heademerge.
Similarly,Baconsometimesmakesa shadowemergefrom the body asif it
wereananimalthat the body wassheltering.In this way,Baconconstructs
not formal correspondencesbetweenmanandanimal,but rather azoneof
indiscernibility.The bonesarethe spatialorganisationof thebody,but the
flesh in Bacon'spaintings ceasesto be supportedby the bones.Deleuze
remarksupon Bacon'spreferencefor prone'Figures'with raisedlimbs,
from which the drowsyfleshseemsto descend.This flesh,or meat,con-
stitutesthe zoneof indiscernibilitybetweenman and animal.The head,
then,constituteswhatDeleuzecallsthe 'animal spirit' of man.Bacondoes
not askusto pity the fateof animals(althoughthis could well beoneeffect
of his paintings),but rather to recognisethat everyhuman being who
suffersis a pieceof meat.In short,the manthat suffersis an animal,and
the animalthat suffersis a man.Deleuzetalksof this in termsof a 'reli-
gious'aspectin Bacon'spaintings,but areligiousdimensionthatrelatesto
thebrutalrealityof thebutcher'sshop.The understandingthat weareall
meat is not a moment of recognition or of revelation, but rather, for
Deleuze,amomentof true becoming.The separationbetweenthe specta-
tor and the spectacleis broken down in favour of the 'deep identity' of
SAMUEL (190G89)-
entries on
'minoritarian *
cinema' and tspace'.
'logether with 'difference','becoming' is the key theme of Deleuze's
corpus.In sofar asDeleuzechampionsa particularontology,thesetwo
conceptsareits cornerstones,servingasantidotesto whatheconsidersto
be the western tradition's predominant and unjustifiablefocus upon
beingandidentity.This focusisreplicated,Deleuzeargues,in our every-
daythinking,suchthat the extentof the varietyandchangeof the expe-
riencedworld has been diluted by a limited conceptionof difference:
difference-from-the-same.Deleuze works at two levels to rectify such
habitual thinking. Philosophically,he developstheoriesof difference,
rcpetition and becoming. For the world of practice, he provides chal-
lcnging writings designedto upsetour thinking, togetherwith a rangeof
'tools' for conceivingthe world anew.At both levels,becomingis critical,
fbr if the primacy of identity is what definesa world of re-presentation
(presentingthe same world once again), then becoming (by which
l)eleuze means'becoming different') definesa world of presentation
Taking his leadfrom Friedrich Nietzsche'searlynotes,Deleuzeuses
thc term 'becoming' (deoenir)to describethe continualproduction (or
'rcturn') of differenceimmanent within the constitution of events,
whetherphysicalor otherwise.Becomingis thepuremovementevidentin
changesbetweenparticularevents.This is not to saythat becomingrepre-
scntsa phasebetweentwo states,or a rangeof terms or statesthrough
whichsomethingmight passon its journey to anotherstate.Ratherthana
product, final or interim, becomingis the very dynamismof change,situ-
rtlcdbetweenheterogeneousterms and tending towardsno particular goal
rlr cnd-state.
llecoming is most often conceivedby comparing a start-point and an
crrd-pointanddeducingthesetof differencesbetweenthem.On Deleuze's
irccount,thisapproachmeansfirst subtractingmovementfrom thefieldof
rrctionor thinking in which the statesareconceived,and then somehow
rcintroducingit asthe meansby which anotherstaticstatehas'become'.
l'irr l)cleuze,this approachis an abstractexercisethat detractsfrom the
liclrncssof our cxperiences.For him, bccomingis neithermerelyan
rttlrillutcoflnortn intcrmcditrybctwccncvcnts,butircharirctcristicof thc
22 + MUSIC 23 BECOMING BECOMING veryproductionof events.It is not that thetime of changeexistsbetween oneeventand
veryproductionof events.It is not that thetime of changeexistsbetween
oneeventand another,but that everyeventis but a unique instantof pro-
duction in a continualflow of changesevidentin the cosmos.The only
thing 'shared' by eventsis their havingbecomedifferentin the courseof
their production.
The continualproductionof uniqueeventsentailsaspecialkind of con-
tinuity: they areunified in their very becoming.It is not that becoming
'envelops' them (sincetheir production is wholly immanent)but that
becoming'movesthrough' everyevent,suchthat eachis simultaneously
start-point,end-pointandmid-point of an ongoingcycleof production.
Deleuze theorisesthis productivecycle using Nietzsche'sconceptof
'eternalreturn'. If eachmomentrepresentsauniqueconfluenceof forces,
and if the nature of the cosmosis to move continuallythrough states
without headingtowardsanyparticularoutcome,thenbecomingmight be
conceivedastheeternal,productivereturn of difference.
Deleuzebelievesthat eachchangeor becominghasits own duration,
'Becoming' and 'music' are two terms that can be brought together such
that a becoming is capable of proceeding through music, for example
through the musical operation known
as 'counterpoint', or the interweav-
a measureof the relativestabilityof the construct,and the relationship
betweenforcesat work in defining it. Becomingmust be conceived
neither in terms of a 'deeper'or transcendentaltime, nor asa kind of
'temporal backdrop'againstwhich changeoccurs.Becoming-differentls
itsowntime,therealtime in which changesoccur.This time which does
not changebut in which all changesunfold is not a Kantianapriori form
dependingupon attributesof a particularkind of consciousness.Rather
it isthetime of production,foundedin differenceandbecomingandcon-
sequent to relations between internal'and external differences.For
Deleuze,the presentis merelythe productivemomentof becoming,the
momentcorrelatingto theproductivethresholdof forces.As such,it rep-
resentsthe disiunction betweena past in which forceshavehad some
effectand a future in which new arrangementsof forceswill constitute
newevents.In otherwords,becomingper seis Deleuze'sversionof pure
and empty time.
Suchaviewof theworld hasimportantimplicationsfor conceptstrad-
itionallyconsideredcentralto philosophy.It undercutsanyPlatonictheory
that privilegesbeing,originality and essence.For Deleuze,there is no
world 'behindappearances',asit were.Insteadof beingabouttransitions
that somethinginitiatesor goesthroggh, Deleuze'stheory holds that
things and states areprod'uctsof becoming.The human subiect,for
example,oughtnot to beconceivedasastable,rationalindividual'experi-
encingchangesbut remaining,principally,the sameperson.Rather,for
of' lilrccs, rn cpiphcnomcnonarising from chanceconfluencesof lan-
Hurl11c$, rlrgrtnisms,socictics,cxpcctrttitlns,litwsitnclstltln.
ing of severaldifferent melodic lines horizontally where the harmony is
produced through linear combinations rather than using a vertical chordal
structure or setting. Counterpoint might most usually constitute a specif-
ically 'musical' casein that when one speaksof musical counterpoint the
ilssertionsmade regarding the term usually refer back to a given musical
cxample: in short, counterpoint is something that we normally hear.
However, when counterpoint describesthe interweaving of different lines
rs something other than what we can hear,then it opens up to a different
function, a function that freesthe term from a direct relation to properly
musicalcontent. Consider the work of the ethologistJakob von Uexkiill on
the relationship between animal behaviour among certain speciesand the
cnvironments inhabited by thesespeciesthat led him to propound a theory
of this relationship basedon a conception of counterpoint. To this extent,
nature - in the very ways in which it can be figured through the inter-
rction of different lines of movement, between animals and their environ-
ments, or between and across different species of animals - can be
tunderstoodasconstituting a counterpoint in a sensethat extends beyond
rrstrictly metaphorical deployment of the term. From the perspectiveout-
lined here, music enters into a relation of proximity to nature where music
If the term 'nature' is somewhat problematic asa rule in cultural theory,
it is to the extent that it cannot be unquestioningly presupposedashaving
rrnyobjective existencebeyond the terms which define it, terms which are
often loaded.In the present case,the term aims at neither an objectivecon-
ccption nor a discursive one.Rather, this description attempts to restoreto
'nilture' a material dimension that extends beyond the confines of dis-
coLfrse,to the extent that discourse impliesmaterial processesthat cannot
lrc rcduccd to intcrpretation or the statusof fixed objects.To im-ply, in this
irrstirncc,isto cn-{irld,whcrcby langurgccanin somcinstrnccsbc dcploycd
BECOMING + PERFORMANCE ART 25 24 BECOMING + PERFORMANCE ART in waysthat foregroundits enfoldingof
in waysthat foregroundits enfoldingof materialprocesses.Implicationin
thissenseisillustratedby theuseof theterm 'counterpoint',aterm which
haslargelybeenretainedby Deleuzeand Guattari in A Thousand,Plateaus
becauseit ishighlyamenableto athinkingorientedtowardsprocess.As was
mentionedearlier,theterm ismostoftenusedin amusicalcontextto figure
the (harmonic)interactionsof melodiclines.As suchit doesnot describe
United States; Joseph Beuys,Marina and Ulay,ValieExport, Hermann
Nitsch and the ViennaActionismusin WestEurope; Jan Mlcoch, Petr
Stembera,Milan Knizak, GaborAttalai, TamasSzentjobyin EastEurope;
Stuart Brisley,and Gilbert and Georgein England;and Jill Orr, Stelarc
andMike Parrin Australia.More recentlyperformancehasbecomeasig-
nificant,if not primary,ingredientof many artistic practices.Examples
a fixed objectand the term's linguistic or semanticsenseis insufficientto
accountfor whatactuallyhappenswhencounterpointtakesplaceasit draws
its contingentconnectionsbetweendifferentmelodiclines.
This characteristicof the term makesit amenableto the taskof con-
structing a different conceptionof nature,in that it is detachablefrom its
strictly musicalcontext in sucha way that it still retainsits capacityboth
to describeandat thesametimeto imply,or enfoldprocess.This capacity
iswhatallowsusto usetheterm to describenon-musicalaswellasmusical
interactions,wherethe ideaof themelodicline,strictly speaking,givesway
to anexpandedconceptionoflinear interactions,suchasthosetakingplace
betweenthe bodiesof different animals,animal species,their environ-
ments)andoneanother.This expandedsenseof theterm permitsthecon-
struction of a renewedconceptionof nature that puts it in proximity
to music, where na,turebecomesmusic.hn exampleof this proximity is
embodiedin the work of the French composerOlivier Messiaenwho
famouslytranscribedthesongsof differentbird speciesbeforeincorporat-
ing them into his musicalcompositions.The territorialcodingsbetween
and acrosscertainbird speciesand their environments(transcodings)are
carriedoverinto the musicin the useof birdsong,suchthat therecanno
longerbea binaryor hierarchicaldistinctiondrawnbetweenthe produc-
andthoseof 'naturet.
Music becomesna,tureandnaturebecomesmusicandtheir resulting indis-
cernibility is the product of aphilosophicallabour:to selecttermsbestsuited
to the tashof thinhingand,d,escribing prlcess.Counterpoint is such a term
becauseit is capableof putting music and nature into proximity and
describingthe materialimplications that orient thought towardsprocess.
include but are not restricted to: Coco Fuscq Guillermo G6mez-Pefra,
Ricardo Dominguez, Santiago Sierra, Franco B., VanessaBeecroft,
StronglyinfluencedbyAntonin Artaud,Dada,theSituationists,Fluxus
and ConceptualArt, performanceart in its early days tended to define
itself asthe antithesisof theatre,in sofar asthe eventwasneverrepeated
thesamewaytwiceanddid not havea linearstructurewith a clearbegin-
ning,middleandend.More importantlythough,allperformanceartinter-
rogatesthe clarity of subjectivity,disarrangingthe clear and distinct
positions that the artist, artwork, vieweq art institution and art market
Trying to articulatethe changedrelationshipbetweenartist, artwork
rnd viewer that performanceart inauguratedcanat times be difficult but
the Deleuzian concept of 'becoming' is especiallyuseful here in that it
allowsusto considerart in termsof atransformativeexperienceaswell as
conceptualisethe processof subjectificationperformanceart sustains.
'Becoming' pointsto a non-lineardynamicprocessof changeand when
usedto assistus with problemsof an aestheticnature we areencouraged
not just to reconfigurethe apparentstabilityof the art objectas'object'
definedin contradistinctionto a fully coherent'subject'or an extension
of that 'subject'but rather the conceptof art's becomingis a fourfold
bccoming-minor of the artist, viewer, artwork and milieu. It is in this
rcgardthatperformancepromptsusto considertheproductionandappre-
ciation of art away from the classicalsubject/objectdistinction that
prcvailedby andlargeup until the 1960s.
A good example of this would have to be Acconci's FollowingPiece
(1969)that beganwith a propositionrandomlyto follow peoplein New
Yrrrk.The ideawasthat the performancewould independentlyarriveat a
krgicalendpoint,regardlessof the artist'sintentionanddespitethe 'goal'
ot'theworkbeingachieved.Instead,it wasthepersonbeingfollowedwho
Ad,rian Parr
lrroughtthe work to its final conclusion,suchaswhen sheenteredher
irl)ilrtmentor got into her caranddroveoff. In this instancethe work was
a proposition, 'to follow anotherperson',but
The earlyera of performanceart from the mid-1960sand through the
1970sincludcd such figures as Allan Kaprow, Vito Acconci, Bruce
Nirunrirn, (lhris llurdcn, Adrian Pipcr, Lauric Anderson,Lacy lnd
tlrccvcntualform the work took wasstructuredby the movementsof the
l)crson bcingfirllowcd.In fact,hcretheart canbeconsideredasa process
scnsitivcto itsowntrrnsfilrmation;asthcartistwaslcdlround thccityat
| ,lhowitz,I lannrrltWilkc, ( llrolccSchnccnrirnn,anclAnirMcndictrrin thc
26 BERGsoN, HENRI rg4r) HnNnr 27 ( r 859- BERGSoN, (r859-rg4r) thewhim of someoneelse.There is
26 BERGsoN,
( r 859-
thewhim of someoneelse.There is apropositionto do 'X' thentheactiv-
ity of doing 'X' activatesnew previouslyunforeseenorganisationsto take
place;the art is in the 'becomingof art' that is in itself social.Art of this
kind maybebestarticulatedas'art without guarantees';this is becauseit
existsentirelyin durationandamidsttheplayof divergentforcesthattypi-
fiesDeleuze'sunderstandingof 'becoming'.
Whatismore,with performanceart artisticvalueisproducedsocially;it
is not an abstractvaluethat is imposedoutsidethe creativeprocessitself.
Hence,whatwefind isthatthiskind of artisticpracticeconcomitantlypro-
videsaradicalchallengeagainstthewholeconceptof labourin acapitalist
context.Valueis not decidedaccordingto profit marginsandthe market,
rather it is a particularkind of socialorganisation.For example,when
BeuysarrivedattheRen6BlockGalleryin NewYork(May 1974)wherehe
lived with awild coyotefor sevendaysin the gallery,the art wasin how the
two slowlydevelopeda senseof trust in theotherto the point wherethey
eventuallysleptcurledup together.The meaningthat emergedout of the
piecewasnot universal,nor wasit absolutelyrelative;asan a-signifying
processthis wasanart practiceoccurringat thelimits of signification.
In theexamplesgiven,theart wasbothsociallyproducedandconceived
in terms of 'socialformation', one that convergeddifferencesin their
mutualbecoming.Hence,whatthis demonstratesis that performanceart
practicesaim at producingan encounteror event,not in the simplistic
sensethat it'happened'at a particularmomentin time,but in sofar asit
aspiresto bring a variety of elementsand forcesinto relation with one
another.Ultimately, performanceart involvesa multiplicity of durations,
eachof whichis impliedin theart work asawhole.
The crucialpointisthatperformanceartcannotbedescribedwithin trad-
itional aestheticparametersthat reinforcethe validity of subject/object
distinctions,consequentlythe conceptualapparatus'becoming'offersus
is descriptive.It helps us describethe processof changeindicative of
performanceart; an eventthat in its singularityconcomitantlyexpressesa
multiplicity of relations,forces,affectsandpercepts.
andperception.Alongwith thethoughtsof GottfriedWilhelmvonLeibniz,
Baruch Spinoza,Friedrich Nietzsche,David Hume, Antonin Artaud,
Guattari and Lucretius, DeleuzeengagesBergson'sempiricism asa chal-
lengeto therigidityof philosophy,especiallyin itsuseof transcendentalele-
ments,phenomenologicalassumptions,andthe questfor 'knowledge'and
'truth'. Deleuze'sphilosophicalinterestin Bergsonis manifoldandcentral
to his entireoeuvre.Although neglectedin philosophicalcanonsof the
secondhalf of the twentieth century,in the early decadesof that century,
Bergson'swork waswell known and widely discussedin manyartistic and
literaryarenas,from theFrenchCubiststo theEnglishwriterT E. Hulme.
In BergsonDeleuzefinds an intellectualpartnerfor someof his core
philosophicalpursuits:conceptsand ideasof temporality,the affective
natureof movementand duration,the politicalimplicationsof multipli-
city anddifference,the morphologicalmovementof genetics,andthe tem-
poralcausalityof eventsashabitualandassociatedseries.Deleuzesignals
his interestin Bergsonin his essayon Hume, EmpiricismandSubjectiaity.
Then, in 1966,DeleuzepublishedhisbookBergsonism,in which hecalled
for 'a return to Bergson',through an extendedconsiderationof what he
sawasBergson'sthreekeyconcepts:intuition asmethod,the demandfor
aninventionandutilisationof ametaphysicalorientationof science,anda
logicalmethodandtheoryof multiplicities.Bergsonnotonly questionsthe
logisticsof existencein termsof movement,but his writing indicateshis
genuinefascinationwith the subjectsand objectsof life - appealingto
Bergson'sconceptsareinfluentialfor Deleuze'swork in Dffirenceand
Repetition,where Deleuzedevelopsideasof differenceand repetition,
memoryandrepetition,theintensiveandextensiveformsof time,andthe
physicalmovementsof time; all of which areindebtedto Bergson'sdis-
cussionof the paradoxicalmodalitiesof time in his book, Matter and
Memory lMatiire etMimoirel (1896).Bergsonproposesamovingmodelof
duration- a conceptof durationthat is not spatiallypredeterminedbut
BERGSON, HENRI (1859-1941 )
continuallyaltersits past through cognitivemovement.Then, later in
CreatioeEoolutionBergsonincorporatesthe cinematicmodel into his
philosophicalexpression,noting the cinematographicalcharacter of
irncientphilosophyin its apprehensionof the thoughtof ordinaryknow-
lcdge(B 19l1:331-33).Fromthismodel(andtheKantiannotionof time,
rrndHegelianconceptionof thoughtandmovement)Deleuzedevelopshis
cxplicationof how the perceptualrecognitionof moving imagesof the
Felicity J. Colman
I )clcuzchmbccncrcditedwithrestoringFrenchphilosopherHenriBergson
Io lhc crrnonof'kcythinkcrsof'hisgcncration,andBergson'sworkcontin-
rucsl0 irnprirctirllondisciplincsconccrncdwith timc,movcmcnt,nlcnlory
cincmaticscreenoperatesnotthroughtheapprehensionof thatmovement,
br.rtthrough specificmomentsof sound and optical registration.This
f)clcuzcdiscusscsatlcngthin histwobooksonthecinema,CinemaI : The
trtttttcrnutl-imageitncl ( )inL'ma2:'l'hc'l'irnc-Iinuga.
28 BLACK HOLE BLACK HOLE 29 Memoryisconceivedof byBergsonasa temporalblendingof perceptual
Memoryisconceivedof byBergsonasa temporalblendingof perceptual
imageryandthisideabecomescentralto Deleuze'shypothesisin hisdiscus-
sion of the philosophicalimportanceof cinema.In his secondbook on
cinema, The Time-lmage,Deleuze draws from Bergson'sinterest in the
different typesof possiblememory states- dreams,amnesia,d6ji-vu, and
death.To theseDeleuzeaddsabreadthof memoryfunctions:fantasy,hallu-
cinations,Nietzsche'sconceptof 'promise-behaviour' wherewe makea
memoryof thepresentforthefutureuseof thepresent(nowaspast),theatre,
Alain Robbe-Grillet'sconceptof the 'recognition' processwherethe por-
trayalof memoryisthroughinventionandelimination,andnumerousothers.
abilitiesof thedreamor wakefulreceptorof memoryeventsor imageryare
dependentupon a complexnetworkof factors.As Bergsondiscussesin
MatterandMemory,systemsof perceptualattentionarecontingentupon
the 'automatic'or 'habitual' recognitionof things.Thesedifferentmodes
of rememberingare further temperedthrough the degreeof attention
givenin theperceptionof things,affectingnot only thedescriptionof the
object,but the featuresof the object itself. From Bergson,Deleuze's
matureconceptionof duration and the movementsand multiplicitiesof
time aredeveloped.
contribute to; philosophical or otherwise.These engagementsare at times
fleetingand at times more sustained,and contribute to their strategyof pre-
venting their position from stabilising inro an ideology, merhod, or single
metaphor.In other words,they encouragephilosophy to occupy the spaceof
slippage that exists between disciplinary boundaries,and to question how
things are made, rather than simply
analysing or interpreting the taken-
for-granted final result or image.This providesthe foundation for the work
presentedin I nti-oed'ipusandA TkousandPlateaus,andthe seriesof renewed
terms proposedby thesetexts (including schizoanalysis,rhizomatics,prag-
matics,diagrammatism,cartography,and micropolitics).
Appearing predominantly in A Thousand,Plateaus,the term .black hole,
has been sourced from contemporary physics. Referring to spacesthat
cannotbe escapedfrom oncedrawn into, Deleuze and Guattari describethe
black hole asa star that has collapsedinto itself. while
although this term
existsliterally rather than asa metaphor (becauseit maintains an effectthat
is fully actualised,affective and real), it has been relocated away from its
original sourcein scientific discourse.As with many of the terms appropri-
ated by A ThousandPlareaus,it is presentedas being engaged in its own
processof deterritorialisation that is independent from the text that it has
been woven into; these concepts do not exist for the newly bricolaged-
together text, but happen to come into contact with it or move through it as
l condition or processof their own moving trajectory or line of flight.
In the context of A Thousand.Pleteeus,the black hole is presented as
being one - unwanted but necessary- outcome for a failed line of flight.
l)eterritorialising movement strays away from the concept and state of
molar identity and aims to force splinters to crack open into giant ruptures
rrnd cause the subsequent obliteration of the subject as he becomes
cnsconcedwithin a processof becoming-multiple. Engaged in this process,
the subject is deconstituted, and becomesa new kind of assemblagethat
occupieswhat Deleuze and Guattari call the 'plane of consistency', which
is a spaceof creativity and desire. However, becausethis plane is alsothat
of death and destruction, traps are scattered throughout
this process.
l')xisting as micro-fascisms across this plane, black holes threaten self-
consciousacts of transcendenceand self-destruction alike, which is why
Kylie Message
l)cleuze and Guattari
advise nomads to exercise caution as they dis-
DeleuzeandGuattaribelievethattheroleof philosophyisto inventnewcon-
Becauseof this,theydrawboth from newideasandfrom thoseof a multi-
organisethemselvesawayfrom the molar organisationsof the State.So, in
witlrirrthclicklol'r:ont:cplrritlttritlriccsthittthcyllothlpprollriltc li'otttitttd
sirlple terms, the black hole is one possibleoutcome of an ill-conceived
(which oftcn equatesto overly self-conscious)attempt at deterritorialisa-
tion thirt is cirusedby a threshold crossedtoo quickly or an intensity
lrcconrcdangcrousbcciruscit is no longer bcarable.
Arrotlrcrwayof'thirrkinglbout thc blrrckholc is in tcrms of how Deleuze
ittttl (ittltltitt'i rcwritc lhc rclittiottshipphilosophyirnclpsychoirrralysishirs



with desireand subjectivity.If the black hole is one possibleoutcome faced by the overly convulsive,self-consumed desiring subject, then it works to illustrate their contention that every strong emotion - such asconscious- nessor love - pursues its own end. As a potential outcome for both paths of transcendenceand destruction, the lure of the black hole indicates the subject's attraction toward an absolute (lack) of signification. This expressesthe absoluteimpossibility of representation at the sametime as it actively works to show how grand narrative statementscontinually inter- twine subjectivity and signification. In appealing to a deterritorialising activity, Deleuze and Guattari problematisethe processof subjectification which, they claim, results either in self-annihilation (a black hole), or re-engagementwith different planesof becoming. In addition to presentingthe black hole asapossibleend-point to certain actsof deterritorialisation, Deleuze and Guattari useit asa way of further conceptualising their notion of faciality. In this context, black holes exist asthe binary co-requisite of the flat white surface,wall or landscapethat nominally symbolisesthe generic white face of Christ. In order to break through the dominating white face,or wall of the signifier,and avoid being swallowed by the black hole, one must renounce the face by becoming imperceptible. However, Deleuze and Guattari advise caution when embarking on such a line of flight. Indeed, they claim madnessto be a def- inite danger associatedwith attempts to breakout of the signifying system representedby the face.We must not, they warn, entirely reject our organ- ising boundaries becauseto do so can result in the complete rejection of subjectivity. Recalling the sloganof schizoanalysis,they tell us not to turn our backson our boundaries,but to keep them in sight so that we can dis- mantle them with systematiccaution.






Bruce Baugh

'liocly'tirrl)clcuzcisclcfincclitsirnywholccomposedof parts,wherethese llrrlls sl:rrrtlirrsorrrctlc(irritcrclirtiorrtooncrlnothcr,rtnclhrsr citpacitvlilr

Irt'ing:rlli't'tt'rl lrv otlrcl

lrorlics.'l'lrt'ltttrttrtrt llrxlv is jttsl ottc cxittttgllt'ol'



such a body; the animal body is another, but a body can also be a body of work, a socialbody or collectivity, a linguistic corpus, a political party, or evenan idea.A body is not defined by either simple materiality, by its occu- pying space('extension'), or by organic structure. It is defined by the rela- tions of its parts (relations of relative motion and rest, speedand slowness), and by its actions and reactions with respect both to its environment or milieu and to its internal milieu. The parts of a body vary depending on the kind of body: for a simple material object, such asa rock, its parts are minute particlesof matter; for a socialbody,its parts arehuman individuals who standin a certain relation to eachother. The relations and interactions of the parts compound to form a dominant relation, expressing the 'essence'or a power of existing of that body, a degreeof physical intensity that is identical to its power of being affected. A body exists when, for whatever reason,a number of parts enter into the characteristic relation that definesit, and which corresponds to its essenceor power of existing. Since nature as a whole contains all elements and relations, nature as a whole is a body, a system of relations among its parts, expressing the whole order of causalrelations in all its combinations. Deleuzeis fond of quoting Baruch Spinoza'sdictum that'no oneknows what a body can do'. The more power a thing has,or the greater its power of existence,the greaternumber of waysin which it can be affected.Bodies are affected by different things, and in different ways, each type of body being characterised by minimum and maximum thresholds for being affectedby other bodies: what can and what cannot affect it, and to what degree. Certain external bodies may prove insufficient to produce a reac- tion in a body, or fail to pass the minimum threshold, whereas in other cases,the body being affectedmay reach a maximum threshold, such that it is incapableof being affectedany further, asin a tick that diesof engorge- ment. A body being affectedby another,such that the relations of its parts are the effect of other bodies acting on it, is a passivedetermination of the body, or passion. If an external body is combined or 'composed' with a body in a way that increasesthe affected body's power of being affected,

this transition to a higher stateof


irffect of sadness.It is impossible to know in advancewhich bodies will composewith others in a way that is consonant with a body's characteris- tic relation or ratio of its parts, or which bodies will decomposea body by c:rr.rsingits parts to enter into experimental relations. Whcther the effectis to increaseor decreaseabody's power of acting and bcing 1ll'cctccl,onc body affecting;anothcr,or producing effectsin it, is in rcrrlityrrcrlnrbinirrgirnclrrmixing of thc tw<lb<lclics,irnclm<lstoficn 'bit by

bil', or pru't by l)iu't. Sonrctintcsthis nrixing lrllu's onc ol'lhc bodics

activity is experiencedas joy; if the com-

decreasesthe affected body's power of being affected,this is the

ll I




aa 32 BODY WITHOUT ORGANS BODY WITHOUT ORGANS JJ (aswhen food is alteredin beingassimilated,or when
(aswhen food is alteredin beingassimilated,or when a poisondestroys
a body'svital parts);sometimesit altersboth and producesa composite
relationof partsthatdominatestherelationsof bothcomponents(aswhen
chyleandlymph mix to form blood,whichis of adifferentnaturefrom its
components);andsometimesit preservestherelationof partsamongthem
both, in which casethe two bodiesform partsof awhole.The characteris-
tic relationthat resultsfrom harmoniouslycombiningthe relationsof the
asa communityor an association,correspondsto a collectivepowerof
beingaffected,andresultsin collectiveor communalaffects.
Sincea body is a relation of parts correspondingto an essence,or
a degreeof physicalintensity,a body neednot havethe hierarchicaland
dominatingorganisationof organswe call an 'organism'.It is ratheran
intensivereality,differentiatedby themaximumandminimum thresholds
of its powerof beingaffected.
Kylie Message
A phraseinitially takenfrom Antonin Artaud, the Body without Organs
(BwO)refersto asubstratethatisalsoidentifiedastheplaneof consistency
(asa non-formed,non-organised,non-stratifiedor destratifiedbody or
term). The term first emergedin Deleuze'sTheLogicof Sense,and was
further refined with Guattari in Anti-OedipusandA ThousandPlateaus.
The BwO is proposedasa meansof escapingwhatDeleuzeandGuattari
perceiveasthe shortcomingsof traditional(Freudian,Lacanian)psycho-
analysis.Ratherthan arguingthat desireis basedon Oedipallack,they
claimdesireis aproductive-machinethat ismultipleandin astateof con-
stantflux. And whereaspsychoanalysisproclaimsclosureand interpret-
trtion, their critique of the three terms (organism,significanceand
sr.rbjcctiticrrtion)that organiseand bind us most effectivelysuggeststhe
possibilityof'opcningsnndsp:rccsftrrthccrcationof ncwmodesof cxpcri-
crtcc'.l{itlhcr tltiin llrrrcccding dircctly to invcrt rlr dcc<lnstructlcnlls

dominantin the productionof identity and consciousness,they suggest that implicit within, between,and all aroundtheseareother - possibly moreaffective- fieldsof immanenceandstatesof being. Attentionisrefocusedawayfromthesubjectivity(aterm whichtheyfeel is toooftenmistakenfor theterm 'consciousness')traditionallyprivileged by psychoanalysisas Deleuze and Guattari challengethe world of the articulating,self-definingandenclosedsubject.The BwO is theproposed antidote(aswellasprecedent,antecedentandevencorrelate)to thisarticu- lateandorganisedorganism;indeed,theyclaimthat theBwO hasno need for interpretation.The BwO doesnot existin oppositionto the organism or notionsof subjectivity,and it is nevercompletelyfreeof the stratified exigenciesof proper language,the State,family, or other institutions. However,it is, despitethis, both everywhereand nowhere,disparateand homogeneous.In termsof this, therearetwo main pointsto note:firstly, thattheBwO existswithin stratifiedfieldsof organisationat thesametime as it offers an alternativemode of being or experience(becoming); secondlgtheBwO doesnot equateliterallyto anorgan-lessbody. In referenceto the first point, Deleuze and Guattari explain that althoughtheBwO is a processthat is directedtowarda courseof contin- ual becoming,it cannotbreakawayentirely from the systemthat it desires escapefrom. While it seeksa modeof articulationthat is free from the bindingtropesof subjectificationandsignification,it mustplaya delicate gameof maintainingsomereferenceto thesesystemsof stratification,or elseriskobliterationor reterritorialisationbackinto thesesystems.In other words,suchsubversionisanever-completedprocess.Instead,it iscontinu- ousandorientedonly towardsits processor moyementrather than toward anyteleologicalpoint of completion.Consistentwith this,andin orderto be affective(or to haveaffect)it must exist- more or less- within the systemthat it aimsto subvert. Deleuzeand Guattari takeMiss X astheir role model.A hypochon- driac,sheclaimsto be without stomach,brain, or internalorgans,and is left with only skinandbonesto givestructureto her otherwisedisorgan- isedbody.Through thisexample,theyexplainthattheBwO doesnot refer literally to an organ-lessbody.It is not producedas the enemyof the organs,but is opposedto the organisationof the organs.In otherwords, theBwO isopposedto theorganisingprinciplesthatstructure,defineand speakon behalf of the collectiveassemblageof organs,experiencesor statesof being.Whereaspsychoanalysisprivileges 'lack' asthe singular lnd productiveforcethat maintainsdesire,Deleuzeand Guattari claim that by bindingand judging desirein this way,our understandingand rclati<lnshipwith the real or Imaginarybecomesfurthcr removedand cornpromiscd.




Elaboratingfurtheron thenatureof theBwO,Deleuzealsoinvokesthe Germanbiologist,AugustWeismann,and his 'theoryof the germplasm' (1885,published1893)to contendthat- like thegermplasm- theBwO is alwayscontemporarywith and yet independentof its host organism. Weismannbelievedthat at eachgeneration,theembryothat developsfrom thezygotenot onlysetsasidesomegermplasmfor thenextgeneration(the inheritanceof acquiredfeatures)but it alsoproducesthe cellsthat will developinto the soma- or body- of the organism.In Weismann'sview, thesomaplasmsimplyprovidesthe housingfor the germplasm,to ensure thatit isprotected,nourishedandconveyedto thegermplasmof theoppo- site sex in order to createthe next generation.What comesfirst, the chickenor theegg?Weismannwouldinsistthechickenissimplyoneegg's devicefor laying anotheregg.Similarly,Deleuzepresentsthe BwO as equivalentto theegg;like theegg,theBwO doesnot existbeforeor prior' to the organism,but is adjacentto it and continuouslyin the processof constructingitself. Insteadof slottingeverythinginto polarisedfieldsof the norm and its antithesis,Deleuzeand Guattari encourageus to removethe polesof organisationbut maintain a mode of articulation.They advisethat in seekingto makeourselvesaBwO, weneedto maintaina modeof expres- sion,but rid languageof the centralrole it hasin arbitratingtruth and realityagainstmadnessandthe pre*symbolicreal.Relocatingdesireaway from a dichotomouslinguistictrajectory,DeleuzeandGuattaripresentit asbeingcontextualisedby the field of immanenceofferedby the BwO ratherthan by the conclusivefield of language.As such,desireis always alreadyengagedin a continuousprocessof becoming.However,despite occupying(andin somecasesembodying)afieldof immanenceor aplane ofconsistencywhichareoftendescribedasbeingdestratified,decodedand deterritorialised,theBwO hasits own modeof organisation(whoseprin- ciplesare primarily derivedfrom Baruch Spinoza).Rather than being aspecificform, thebodyismorecorrectlydescribedasuncontainedmatter or a collectionof heterogeneousparts.













JOSEPH (I8+2-I925) - referto theentrieson 'hysteria'and


and'post-structuralism* politics'.



refer'to the entries on tart'


GEORGES (1904-95)-refertotheentryon'schizo-



Jonathan Roffe

In theperiodbeforehis death,Deleuzeannouncedin aninterviewthat he would like to composeawork which would becalledTheGrand.eurofMarx. This factclearlyindicatesDeleuze?spositiveattitudetowardsthephiloso- phy of Karl Marx, which heneverabandoneddespitealteringmanyof its fundamentalelements.Certainlythe mostimportantof theseelementsis capitalism.The Marxism of-Deleuzecomesfrom his insistencethat all politicalthoughtmusttakeits bearingsfrom the capitalistcontextwelive in. While mentioningcapitalismin passingin anumberof places,it is the two volumesof CaphalismandSchizophreniawhich contain the most sus- tainedandradicaltreatmentof this theme. Deleuze and Guattari insist any given socialformation restrictsor structuresmovementsor flows.They claim that theseflowsarenot just the flowsof moneyand commoditiesfamiliar to economists,but canbe seenat a varietyof levels:the movementof peopleand traffic in a city, the flowsof wordsthat arebound up in a language,the flowsof genetic codebetweengenerationsof plants,and eventhe flow of matter itself (the movementof the ocean,electronsmoving in metals,and so forth). Thus, Deleuze and Guattari's political ,thought begins with the prcmissthat natureitself,the Whole of existence,is at oncea matterof fkrws,andthat tny s<lcictymust structrlretheseflowsin ordcr to subsist. All Stltc rnclprc-Strtcsocictics- rrllthoscwhichirccordingto Murx lrc




pre-capitalist- on DeleuzeandGuattari'saccount,havesucharestriction

of flowsastheir basicprinciple.

Deleuzeand Guattari call this processof restriction,or structuring, 'coding'. They conceivecoding as at once restrictive and necessary. Societies,asregimesof coding,aim to bring aboutcertainfixed waysof


leable ways. However, without some structure - our own coherent individualityand agencyfor example,which Deleuzeand Guattaricon- siderspecificto eachsocialformationandalwaysoppressive- therewould beno basisuponwhich to challengeandattemptto alterthegivencoding

regime.Both Anti-Oed,ipusandA Thousand,Plateausincludelengthyanaly- sesof differentkindsof societiesandthewaysin which theycodeflows. Capitalismistheradicalexceptionto thisbasiccentralunderstandingof the nature of society.There are four featuresto this exceptionalstatusof capitalismfor Deleuzeand Guattari.First, insteadof workingby coding flows,capitalismisaregimeof decoding.Second,andin tandemwith this, therecodingthat would takeplacein non-capitalistsocietiesto recapture decodedflowsis replacedby the processof axiomatisation.For example, the codingof sexualrelationsthroughmarriage,the church,moralsand

popularculture- which in differentsocietieslocatethe practiceof sexin

certaincontexts,whetherthat is marriage,prostitutionor youthculture- hasbeendecodedin capitalistsocieties.This isfirstof all,for Deleuzeand Guattari, a good thing, making possiblenew kinds of relationsthat were

excludedby thecodingregimesin question.In capitalism,however,acor- relativeaxiomatisationhastakenplacemakingpossiblethe saleof sexas a product (what Karl Marx calleda 'commodity').Axioms operate,in short,by emptyingflowsof their specificmeaningin their codedcontext (sexastheactof marriage,themealasthecentreof familylife,andsoon)

and imposinga law of generalequivalencein the form of monetaryvalue. Theseflowsremaindecodedin sofarastheyarefluid partsof theeconomy. They cannot,ascommodities,beboundto acertainstateof affairsto have

value- for food to be a product it must be possibleto eat it in a context

otherthanthe familyhome,or tribe. The third important aspectof capitalismfor Deleuzeand Guattari- drawingon Marx - is thatthis processof decoding,/axiomatisationhasno real limit. Given that all such limits would be codes,this movement effectivelyand voraciouslyerodesall suchlimits. This accountsfor the sensein capitalistsocietiesof perpetualnovelty and innovation,since codcdflowsarecontinuallybeingturned into commoditiesthroughthis proccss,furthcr cxtcnclingtherealmof monetaryequivalence. I krwcvcr,suclrirproccsscoulclncvcrbc total.Thus,fourthly,thc fact thrrtcrrllitirlislsrrcicty ;rrocccds in thiswaycklcsnotmcanforI)clctrzcrrnd






Guattarithat codedelementsof socialformationareentirelyabsent.It is rather the casethat certainfragmentsof Statesociety(in particular)are put to work in the serviceof capitalism.Obviously,structureslike the governmentand the family still exist in capitalism.As they note,there couldbeno totaldecodedsociety- anoxymoronicphrase.Governments andmonarchiesremain,while havingtheir real juridical powersubstan- tially reduced,asregulativemechanismsstabilisingthe growth of decod- ing/ axiomatisation.The nuclear family in particular, the kind of coded entity that one might imagine would be dissolvedby the decoding/ axiomatisingmovementof capitalism,isfor DeleuzeandGuattarithesite of asurprisingminiaturisationof Statesociety,wherethefathertakesthe position(structurallyspeaking)of the despoticand all-seeingruler. None of thesepoints,howeveqmakesfor a celebrationof the libera- tory effectsof capitalism.Deleuzeand Guattari remain Marxists in so

far as.they consider real freedom to be unavailablein the world

monetaryequivalenceenactedby capitalism.While imitating the decod- ing that makespossiblethe freeing up of flows and new waysof existing,

capitalist society only produces a different, more insidious, kind of unfreedom.










DeleuzeandGuattariarealoneamongpost-structuraliststo resuscitatethe notion of universalhistory.But by drawingon Karl Marx rather than GeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegel,theyinsistthatthisisan'ironic'universal history,for threereasons:it is retrospective,singularandcritical.[t is ret- rospectivein that theperspectiveof schizophreniaonly becomesavailable towardtheendof history,undercapitalism;yet at the sametime,capital- ismdoesnot representthetelosofhistory,but ratheracontingentproduct of fortuitous circumstance.This confirms the singularity of capitalist socicty:it is not somehiddensimilaritybetweencapitalismandprevious s<rcillfirrmsthrt makcsclpitrrlismunivcrsirl,but rathcrwhatM:rrx(in thc Orunilrisse\cirllsthc 'csscntirtldifl'crcncc'bctwccrrit arrdthc othcrs:it






exposesthesourceofvaluethatprevioussocietieskepthidden.And hence capitalismoffersthe key to universalhistory becausewith capitalism, societycanfinally becomeself-critical. Capitalistmodernityrepresentsthe key turning point in this view of universalhistory,for a crucialdiscoveryis madein a numberof different fields:by Martin Luther; by Adam Smith andDavid Ricardo;somewhat laterby SigmundFreud,whowill thereforebeconsidered'theLuther and the Adam Smith of psychiatry'.The key discoveryis that valuedoesnot inhere in objects but rather gets invested in them by human activity, whether that activity is religiousdevotion,physicallabour or libidinal desire.In this fundamentalreversalof perspective,objectsturn out to be merelythe supportfor subjectivevalue-givingactivity.Yetin eachof the threefields,thediscoveryofthe internal,subjectivenatureofvalue-giving activity is accompaniedby a resubordinationof that activity to another externaldetermination:in the caseof Luther, subjectivefaith freedfrom subordinationto theCatholicChurchisneverthelessresubordinatedto the authority of Scripture;in Smith and Ricardo,wage-labourfreed from feudalobligationsis resubordinatedto privatecapitalaccumulation;in Freud,the free-formdesireof polymorphouslibido is resubordinatedto heterosexualreproduction in the privatised nuclear family and the Oedipuscomplex.To freehumanactivityfrom theselastexternaldeter- minationsis the taskof world-historicalcritique:Marx providesthe cri- tique of political economyto free wage-labourfrom private capital; FriedrichNietzscheprovidesthecritiqueof religionandmoralismto free Will to Powerfrom nihilism; Deleuzeand Guattari provide the critique of psychoanalysisto free libido from the private nuclear family and the Oedipuscomplex. If capitalismmakeshistoryuniversal,this is ultimatelybecauseit pro- motesmultiple differences,becausethe capitalistmarket operatesas a 'difference-engine'.For Marx, the key humanuniversalwasproduction:

the species-beingof humanity wasdefined in terms of its ever-growing abilityto produceits own meansof life ratherthansimplyconsumewhat natureoffered.For Deleuzeand Guattari, the key universalis not just production(not evenin theverybroadsensetheygrantthat term inAnti- Oedipus),but specificallythe productionof differencefreefrom codifica- tion andrepresentation.The marketfostersanincreasinglydifferentiated networkof socialrelationsby expandingthe socialisationof production alongwith the divisionof labour,eventhoughcapitalextractsits surplus from thc differentialflowsenabledby this network,by meansof exploita- ti<lnirnclthc ncvcr-cnclingrepaymcntof aninfinitedebt.Eventhoughthe rlifl'crcrtcc-cngincof' crrpitrrlfails firlly tu rcllisc universalhistory,it noncthclcsstttitkcstrrrivcrsrrlitypossiblc;putsit on lhc lristoricirlirgcndrr.



So while the capitalistmarket inauguratesthe potentialfor universal historyin its productionof difference,it is theeliminationof capitalfrom the market that will multiply differenceand realisethe freedominherent in universalhistory.


Alberto Toscano

The conceptof 'capture'isusedby DeleuzeandGuattarito dealwith two problemsof relationality:first,howto conceiveof theconnectionbetween the State,the war machineand capitalismwithin a universalhistory of politicallife;andsecond,howto formulateanon-representationalaccount of the interactionof different beingsand their territories, such as to ground a thinking of becoming.In the first instance,capturedefinesthe operation whereby the State (or Urstaat) binds or encaststhe war machinb,therebyturning it into anobjectthatcanbemadeto workfor the State, to bolster and expand its sovereignty.Apparatusesof capture constitutethe machinicprocessesspecificto Statesocieties.They canbe conceivedasbeingprimarily a matterof signs;whencethe figureof the One-EyedEmperorwho bindsand fixessigns,complementedby a One- Armed Priestor jurist who codifiesthesesignsin treaties,contractsand laws.Capturecanbeunderstoodasconstitutingacontrolof signs,accom- panying the other paradigmatic dimension of the State, the control of tools.The principalontologicalandmethologicalissuerelatedto this con- ceptionof capturehasto do with thetypeof relationbetweencaptureand the captured(namelyin the caseof the war machineasthe privileged correlateof the apparatus). Deleuzeand Guattari'snotion of universalhistory evadesanyexplan- ation by strict causality or chronological sequence.Rather, it turns to notionsdrawnfrom catastrophetheoryandthe sciencesof complexityto revivetheHegelianintuition that the Statehasalwaysbeenthere- not as an ideaor a concept,but asa thresholdendowedwith a kind of virtual efficacy,evenwhenthe Stateasa complexof institutionsandasa system of controlis not yet actual.The logicof captureis suchthat whatis cap- tured is simultaneouslypresupposedandgeneratedby the actof capture, appropriatedandproduced.Deleuzeand Guattarireturn to manyof the key notionsin Karl Marx's critique of politicaleconomyto bolsterthe thcsisof a constructivecharacterof capture,arguing,for instance,that surpluslabourcanbcunclcrst<xrdtocngcndcrlabourpropcr(th<lughit can irlsobc urrdclsloodirstlrcirttcrrrplto llkrckrlr nranipulatc:rconstitutivc

40 CAPTURE + +l CAPTURE POLITICS flight from labour). Capture is thus both an introjection
flight from labour). Capture is thus both an introjection and determination
of an outside and the engendering of the outside asoutside of the appar-
atus.It is in this regard that capture is made to correspond to the Marxian
concept of primitive accumulation, interpreted asa kind of originary vio-
lence imposed by the State to prepare for the functioning of capital. Here
Deleuze and Guattari are sensitiveto the juridical aspectsof the question,
such that State capture definesa domain of legitimate violence,in asmuch
asit alwaysaccompaniescapture with the affirmation of a right to capture.
In its intimate link to the notion of machinic enslavement,the apparatusof
capture is proper to both the initial imperial figure of the State and to full-
blown global or axiomatic capitalism, rather than to the intermediary stage
represented by the bourgeois nation-state and its forms of disciplinary
The notion of capture can also be accorded a different inflection, this
time linked to the privileging of ethological models of intelligibility within
a philosophy of immanence.Here the emphasisis no longer on the expro-
priation and appropriation of an outside by an instanceof control, but on
the process of convergence and assemblagebetween heterogeneous series,
on the emergenceof blocs of becoming, such asthe one of the wasp and
the orchid. What we have here is properly speaking a double capture or
inter-capture, an encounter that transforms the disparate entities that
enter into a joint becoming. In Deleuze and Guattari's KaJha, such a
processis linked to a renewal of the theory of relation, and specifically to
a reconsideration of the statusof mimesis, now reframed asa type of sym-
biosis.Under the heading of capture we thus encounter two opposite but
Paul Patton
DeleuzeandGuattaridenythat the Stateis an apparatuswhich emerged
astheresultof prior conditionssuchastheaccumulationof surplusor the
emergenceof privateproperty.Instead,theyarguethat Stateshavealways
existedand that they arein essencealwaysmechanismsof capture.The
earliestforms of Stateinvolvedthe captureof agriculturalcommunities,
the constitutionof a milieu of interiority and the exerciseof sovereign
power.The ruler became'the sole and transcendentpublic-property
owner,themasterof thesurplusor stock,theorganiserof large-scaleworks
(surpluslabour),the sourceof public functionsand bureaucracy'(D&G
1987:428).Historicallythe most importantmechanismsof capturehave
beenthoseexercisedupon landandits products,upon labourandmoney.
Thesecorrespondto Karl Marx's 'holy trinity' of the modernsourcesof
capitalaccumulation,namelyground rent, profit and taxes,but they have
longexistedin otherforms.In all cases,wefind thesametwo keyelements:
theconstitutionof ageneralspaceof comparisonandtheestablishmentof
a centreof appropriation.Together,thesedefinethe abstractmachine
entangled actions, both of
which can be regarded asschemataalternative
to a dominant hylomorphic mode of explaining relation: the first, under-
stood asthe political control of signs,translatesa co-existenceof becom-
ings (as manifested by the war machine) into a historical succession,
making the State pass from an attractor which virtually impinges upon
non-State actors to an institutional and temporal reality; the second
defines a co-existence and articulation of becomings in terms of the
assemblageof heterogeneous entities and the formation of territories.
What is paramount in both instancesis the affirmation of the event-bound
and transformative character of relationality (or interaction), such that
capture, whether understood ascontrol or assemblage,is alwaysan onto-
logically constructive operation and can never be reduced to models of
which is expressedin the differentforms of State,but alsoin non-state
mechanismsof capturesuchasthe captureof corporealrepresentationby
faciality,or thecaptureof politicalreasonby publicopinion.
Consider first the capture of human activity in the form of labour.
Deleuzeand Guattariarguethat 'labour(in the strict sense)beginsonly
with whatiscalledsurpluslabour'(D&G 1987:490).Contraryto thewide-
spreadcolonialpresumptionthat indigenouspeopleswereunsuitedfor
labour,theypoint out that 'so-called primitivesocietiesarenot societiesof
shortageor subsistencedueto anabsenceof work,but on thecontraryare
societiesof freeactionandsmoothspacethathavenousefor awork-factor,
anymorethantheyconstituteastock'(D&G 1987:491).Inthesesocieties,
productiveactivityproceedsunder a regimeof 'freeaction'or activityin
continuousvariation.Suchactivityonly becomeslabouroncea standard
of comparisonisimposed,in theform of adefinitequantityto beproduced
unilateral causation.
( lrrpitrrlisnr

or atime to beworked.The obligationto providetaxes,tributeor surplus labourimposessuchstandardsof comparison,therebyeffectingthetrans- formationof freeactioninto labour. The sametwo elementsarepresentin the conditionswhich enablethe extractionof ground rent, which Deleuzeand Guattari describeas 'the vcry modcl of an apparatusof capture'(D&G 1987:441).From an eco- nomicpointof vicw,thccxtrtrctionof grounclrcntprcsllpposcsr mcansof conrpirrirrgthc prtlcluctivityol'dill'crcntprlrtirlnsof'llrrrclsinrrrltirrrcorrsly

42 cARRoLL,



exploited,or of comparingthe productivityof the sameportion succes- sively exploited.The measurementof productivity providesa general spaceof comparison;ameasureof qualitativedifferencesbetweenportions of the earth'ssurfacewhich is absentfrom the territorial assemblageof hunter-gatherersociety.Thus, 'labourandsurpluslabourarethe appara- tusof captureof activity just asthecomparisonof landsandtheappropri- ationof landaretheapparatusof captureof territory' (D&G 1987:442). One further condition is necessaryin order for ground rent to be extracted:thedifferencein productivitymustbelinkedtoalandowner(D&G 1987:441).In other words,from a legal point of view,the extractionof ground rent is 'inseparablefrom a processof relativedeterritorialization' because'insteadof peoplebeingdistributedin anitinerantterritory,pieces of landaredistributedamongpeopleaccordingtoacommonquantitativecri- terion'(D&G 1987:441).The conversionof portionsof theearthinhabited by so-calledprimitivepeoplesinto anappropriableandexploitableresourte thereforerequiresthe establishmentof a juridical centreof appropriation. The centreestablishesa monopolyover what hasnow becomeland and assignsto itselftherightto allocateownershipof portionsof unclaimedland. This centreis the legalsovereignandthe monopolyis the assertionof sovereigntyovertheterritoriesin question.That is why the fundamental jurisprudentialproblemof colonisationis the mannerin which the terri- toriesof theoriginalinhabitantsbecometransformedinto auniform space of landedproperty.In thosecolonieswhichwereacquiredandgovernedin accordancewith British commonlaw,the sovereignright of the Crown meantthatit hadthepowerbothto createandextinguishprivaterightsand interestsin land.In this sense,Crownlandamountsto a uniform expanse of potentialrealpropertywhich coverstheearthto theextentof the sov- ereignterritory.It followsthat,within thesecommon-law jurisdictions, the legalimpositionof sovereigntyconstitutesanapparatusof capturein the precisesensewhich DeleuzeandGuattarigiveto this term. The imposi- tion ofsovereigntyeffectsaninstantaneousdeterritorialisationofindigen- ousterritoriesand their reterritorialisationasa uniform spaceof Crown landcentredupon thefigureof the sovereign.



LEWIS (1832-98)- refertotheentrieson'art'and 'incor-


liort',trtd'scttsltlioitt c:ittcrttlt'.

PAUL (ltl39-1906)- rcfcr to rhccnrricson 'irrr','sclrs:r-




Alberto Toscano

This termcanbesaidto receivetwomaintreatmentsin theworkof Deleuze andGuattari,oneintra-philosophical,theothernon-philosophical.In the first acceptation,chaosdesignatesthe type of virtual totality that the philosophyof differenceopposesto the foundationaland self-referential totalitiesproposedby the philosophiesof representation.In polemical

juxtaposition to thosesystemsof thought that lie beyondthe powersof representation,this Deleuzianchaos,in which all intensivedifferencesare

contained- 'complicated'but not 'explicated' - is equivalentto the onto-

logicallyproductiveaffirmationof thedivergenceof series.Put differently, chaosenvelopsanddistributes,withoutidentifying,theheterogeneitiesthat makeup the world. In other words,Deleuzianchaosis formlessbut not undifferentiated.Deleuze thus opposesthis Joycean and Nietzschean chaosmos,in which the eternalreturn selectssimulacrafor their diver- gence)to thechaosthat Platoattributesto the sophist,whichis aprivative chaosof non-participation.Moreover,heconsiderssuchachaosmosasthe principalantidoteto the trinity sustainingall philosophiesof representa- tion andtranscendence:world, God andsubject(man). In A Thousand,Plateaus,having moved away from the structuralist- inspiredterminologyof series(which chaoswasseento affirm),Deleuze and Guattari providea critique of both chaosmosand eternalreturn as an insufficientbulwark againsta (negative)return of 'the One' and of representation.Againstthis they proposethe conceptsof 'rhizome'and 'planeof immanence'.When chaosmakesits reappearancein What is Philosophy?it isasthesharedcorrelateof thethreedimensionsof thought (or of the brain),alsodesignatedaschaoids;science,art and philosophy. In this context,chaosisnot definedsimplyby themannerin whichit con- tains(or complicates)differences,but by its infinite speed,suchthat the particles,forms and entitiesthat populateit emergeonly to disappear immediately,leavingbehindno consistency,referenceor anydeterminate consequences. Chaosis thusdefinednot by its disorderbut by its fugacity.It isthenthe taskof philosophy,throughthedrawingof planesof immanence,invention of conceptualpersonaeandcompositionof concepts,to giveconsistencyto chaoswhilstmaintainingits speedandproductivity.Chaosis thusboththe intimatethreatandthesourceof philosophicalcreation,understoodasthe impositionontothevirtualof itsowntypeof consistency,for exampleacon- sistcncyothcrthrn thoscprovidcclbyfrrnctir)nsor percepts.Phiklsophycan


+4 45 CINEMA CINEMA chaos- and againstthe sterileclich6sof opinion (doxa)- by creating model, a symbolic
chaos- and againstthe sterileclich6sof opinion (doxa)- by creating
model, a symbolic blockage. Within
these totalising and homogenising
conceptualformscapableof sustainingtheinfinitespeedof chaoswhilstnot
succumbingto thestupidity,thoughtlessnessor folly of theindeterminate.
Philosophicalcreationis thuspoisedbetween,on theonehand,thesubjec-
tion of theplaneof immanenceto somevarietyof transcendencethatwould
guaranteeits uniquenessand, on the other,the surgingup of a chaosthat
woulddissolveanyconsistency,anydurabledifferenceor structure.
Chaosand opinion thus providethe two sourcesof inconsistencyfor
thought,the onedeterminedby anexcessof speed,theotherby a surfeit
of redundancy.Thoughchaosis avitalresourcefor thought,it isalsoclear
that the struggleis twofold throughand through,in asmuch asit is the
inconsistencyor idiocy of a chaotic thought that often grounds the
recourseto the safety and identity of opinions. In the later work with
Guattari it is essentialto the definitionof philosophicalpracticeand its
demarcationfrom andinterferencewith theotherchaoids,that chaosnot
beconsideredsimplysynonymouswith ontologicalunivocity,but thatit is
by philosophicalthought.
approaches to film, repetition (redundancy) functions as a principle of
unification, limiting - but never totally arresting - cinema's potentially
active and creative lines of flight. In place of these nomalising - infor-
mational and/ or symbolic - accountsof cinema, another approach devel-
ops an experimental-creative understanding of film in which an attentive
misrecognition abandons representation (and subjectification) to sketch
circuits - and
and - between a series of images. The latter
describes Deleuze's 'crystalline regime', an intensive system which
resists a hierarchical principle of identity in the former present, and
a rule of resemblancein the present present, to establish a communica-
tion betweentwo presents (the former and the present) which co-exist in
relation to a virtual object - the absolutely different. This direct presen-
tation of time - a becoming-in-the-world - brings cinema into a relation
not with an ideal of Truth, but with powers of the false: opening, in the
place of representation, a sensation of the present presence of the
moment, acreative stammering (and
These two critical interpretations of film correspond to, yet cut across'
the separateaspectsof cinema dealt with in each of the Cinemabooks. In
Cinema 1, Deleuze identifies the classicalor 'movement-image' as that
which givesrise to a 'sensory-motor whole' (a unity of movement and its
interval) and grounds narration (representation) in the image. This
movement-image, which relates principally to pre-World War II cinema,
contributes to the realism of the 'action-image', and produces the global
domination of the American cinema. In Cinema 2, Delguze describesa
post-war crisis in the movement-image, a break-up of the sensory-motor
link that gives rise to
a new situation - a neo-realism - that is not drawn
out directly into action, but is 'primarily optical and of sound, investedby
senses' (D 1989:4).
As Deleuze describesit, even though this optical-
Constantine Verezsis
Followinghis work on A ThousandPlateaus,Deleuze'sCinemabooks-
Cinemal: Themooement-imageand Cinema2: Thetirne-image- under-
stand film as a multiplicity, a phenomenonsimultaneouslyoriented
sound image implies a beyond of movement, movement does not strictly
stop but is now grasped by way of connections which are no longer
sensory-motor and which bring the sensesinto direct relation with time
and thought. That is, where the movement-image and its sensory-motor
signs are in a relationship only with an indirect image of time, the pure
toward a network of reproductive forces, which make it a-signifying
totality (a 'being-One'), and equally toward a network of
forces, that facilitate the connection and creation of an
(a 'becoming-Other').The first interpretationof film finds its clearesr
optical and sound image - its 'opsigns' and 'sonsigns' - are directly con-
nectedto atime-im age - a 'chronosign' - that hassubordinated movement.
Appealing to Henri Bergson's schemataon time, Deleuze describesa situ-
ation in which the optical-sound perception enters into a relation with
expressionin two Breat mechanismsof cinematicovercoding- historical
poeticsandtextualanalysis- that havedominatedanglophone,academi-
ciscclfilm intcrprctationsincethe mid-1970s.Eachof theseapproaches
turrdcrstrrnclsrcpctitionasa kind of rcdundirncy,onethatcontril'rutcsto
lhc.huhiluulrccttgttitioltof'tlrc sllnlc:ilr.rindustrirl rcprcscrrtirtiorrirl
genuinely airtualelements. This is the large circuit of the dream-image
('onirosign'), a type of intensive system in which a virtual image (the
bccomes actual not directly, but by actualising a different
inritgc,which itsclf playsthc rrllcof thc virtuitl imagcbcing rtctualiscdin
+6 CINEMA + WERNER HERZOG +7 CINEMA * WNRNER HERZOG another, and so on. Although
another, and so on. Although the optical-sound image appearsto find its
proper equivalent in this infinitely dilated circuit of the dream-image, for
Deleuze the opsign (and sonsign) finds its true geneticelement only when
the actual image crystallises with its own virtual image on a small circuit.
The time-image is a direct representationof time, a crystal-imagethat con-
sistsin the indivisible unity of an actualimage and its own virtual image so
that the two are indiscernible, actual and,virtual at the sametime. Deleuze
says:'what we seein the crystal is time itself, a bit of time in the pure state'
(D 1989:82).
In a brief example,Chinatown(1973) is a perfectly realised(neo-
classical)Hollywoodgenrefilm bur one that exhibitsan ability to exceed
itself. Chinatzwncanbeunderstoodasarepresentationalandsymbolictext
- a detectivefilm andanOedipaldrama.But its subtlepatterningof rep-
etitions- themotifsof waterandeye- whilecontributingto thefilm'snar-
rative economysketchthe complementarypanoramicvision of a large
circuitindifferentto theconditionsof meaningandtruth. Additionally,the
film's finalrepetition- a woman'sdeathin Chinatown- bringsthedetec-
tiveGittes'pastandpresenttogetherwith hallucinatoryexactitudeto form
asmallcircuit in whichthevirtualcorrespondsto theactual.The finalact
gesturestowardneitheradiegeticnor oneirictemporality,but acrystalline
Linesof flight
Time imase
Deleuze's affinity with WernerHerzog
exceedsthe explicit referencesto
This thinking of the impersonal, of an earth beyond man, is given
remarkable,albeit divergent expressionin films such asFitzcarraldo (1982)
or Stroszek(1977),where it is accompaniedby the depiction of figuresthat
approximate what Deleuze called structuralist heroes:pure individuals or
larval subjectscapableof sustaining their habitation by pre-individual sin-
gularitiesand deformation by spatio-temporaldynamisms,attaining a point
of non-distinction between man and nature. Herzog immerses the viewer
in the (micro- and macro-) cosmosof sensationborne by beingsof remark-
able fragility (akin to Bartleby) and great hallucinating, doomed visionar-
ies.The cinematicideasextractedfrom the work of Herzog intervene at two
very significant moments in Deleuze's confrontation with cinema, first in
terms of the large form and the small form of the action-image in Cinerna
1, then in Cinema2 with the momentous introduction of the crystal image.
Herzog's 'action films' provide two extreme realisationsof those cinematic
schematapreoccupiedwith the transformative interaction of action and sit-
uation. In the idea(or vision) of the largeform (SAS'), a situation (S) poses
a problem to a character requiring an action (A) whereby the initial situ-
ation (and the character herself) will be transformed (S'). Herzog's varia-
tion on this schemaentailsthe stagingof actionswhosedelirium is to try to
transform situationsthat doesnot makeany such requirement on the char-
acter.These arein turn split betweena sublime or hallucinatory aspectthat
seeksto equalan unlimited nature, and aheroic or hypnotic one,which tries
to confront, through an excessiveproject, the limits imposed by nature.
What Deleuze isolatesin Herzog is thus a pure idea of the large,staged
asa mad attempt to delve into the abyssof nature by linking man and land-
scapein the creation of a sublime situation. While Herzog operateson the
large form by excess,making the two situations (S and S') incommensur-
able,he transforms the small form (ASA ) by weakening it to the extreme,
such that the actions and the charactersbearing them are stripped oftheir
use,reduced to entirely inoperative and defencelessintensities (whether in
Kinski's foetal figure in Nosferatu (1979)or in the films starring the schiz-
ophrenic actor Bruno S.). Sublimity and a kind of bare life are the meta-
physical foci of Herzog's implementation of the action image, which
reaches its most accomplished moments precisely when it stagestheir
the German filmmaker in the Cinema volumes. Herzog's films and docu-
mentaries of the 1970sare unmatched ascontemporary representativesof
a heterodox fidelity to romanticism, separatingthe latter from its Kantian
presuppositions and Hegelian consequencesin order to discovera dimen-
reversibility (the sublimity of bare life in Kaspar Hauser (1975), the desti-
tution of visionary greatnessin Aguirre (1972)).
The metaphysical import of Herzog's work is even more prominent in
Cinema2, where he is accorded the rare praise of having best realisedthe
sion in which materiality and ideality, nature and production, become
irrdisccrniblc. 'l'his is thc kinclof romanticismwhich, in the referenceto
lfrrclrrrcrirt thc vcry ot.ltscrtol' ,'lnti-Octlipus,is a progcrritorof thc schiz<l-
rtttrtlvlit' sliln('c.
crystal image: the smallest possible circuit joining,
in a kind of perpetual
oscillation irnd indiscernibility, the actual and the virtual. This point of
irrdisccrnibility signrrlsil purc cxpcriencc of timc (indisccrnible from
ctcrnit.y)irrrdol' c:rcrrtion (indiscclrriblclirrrrt lhc intp:tssivc).IIcrz.og's


48 COGITO COGITO 49 Heart of Glass(1976)is the key locus for the cinematicmanifestationof this
Heart of Glass(1976)is the key locus for the cinematicmanifestationof
this exquisitelymetaphysicaltype of image.Followingon from an intu-
ition of Gilbert Simondon,Deleuzeunderstandsthisfilm in termsof the
relationbetweena germ capableof crystallisationand a milieu of appli-
cation which is qualifiedas actuallyamorphous.But this amorphous-
nessis not that of amereprime matter,sincefrom anotherperspectiveit
is a virtually differentiatedstructure;and the germ, initially qualifieda
virtual image,isunderstoodasactual.Thus, thoughactualandvirtual are
ultimately indiscernible,they can be distinguishedby the perspecive
takenon the relation at hand (for examplegerm/milieu). Heart of Glass
is, in Deleuze'seyes,a kind of alchemicaladventure,hauntedby the
uncertaintyof the crystal,in which what is at stakeis the encounter
betweentheredcrystalglassandtheworld, suchthat theformercanpass
from virtual to actualimageandeffectthe passageof thelatter from actual
amorphousnessto virtual and infinite differentiation. We can thus see
howthecrystalimageisnot simplyamatterof acertainkind of intuition,
but involvesthe constructionof scenarioswith their own very special
kinds of actions, revealing Herzog's genius for joining the most
deprived and infinitesimal of creatureswith the most cosmic and
grandioseof projects,an inspiration that can perhapsbe trackedelse-
wherein Deleuze'soeuvre.
James Williams
Deleuze'scriticalapproachto the cogitoof Ren6Descartes;the 'I think,
thereforeI am' from theDiscourseonMethodor the 'I think, I am' from the
Meditations,can be divided into a critique of the Cartesiananalytic
method,a critiqueof the self-evidenceof the cogitoand an extensionof
the Cartesianviewof thesubject.
Descartes'foundationalmethod is the rationalistconstructionof a
systemof analytictruths.That is,hebelievesthatcertainpropositionsare
true independentlyof anyothersand that thereforethey can standasa
groundfor thedeductionof further truths accordingto reason.Deleuze's
synthetic and dialecticalmethod, developedin Dffirence and,Repetition,
dependson theviewthat all knowledgeis partialandopento revision.
Thus, any relativetruth is opento extensionthrough syntheseswith
further discoveriesand through further experiments.The
'fhcrc is r rcciprtrcirlproccssof rcvisionand changcbctwccnthcm, as

opposedto Cartesianmovesfrom secureand inviolablebasesout into the unknown.WhereDescartessituatesreasonat the heartof his method,as shownby theroleof thinkingin thecogito,Deleuzeemphasisessensation. Sensationis resistantto identity in representation.Thought must be responsiveto sensationsthat go beyondits capacityto representthem. Thesepointto arealmof virtualconditionsdefinedasintensitiesandIdeas (thecapitalindicatesthat thesearenot ideasto bethoughtof asernpirical thingsin themind, rathertheyarelike KantianIdeasof reason). Deleuzeholdsthatno thoughtisfreeof sensation.The cogitocannotbe self-evident,becausesensationalwaysextendsto a multiplicity of further conditionsandcauses.The Cartesianhopeof defeatingsystematicdoubt throughthecertaintyof thecogitomustthereforefail.Deleuzeoftenturns to dramatisationsfrom art, literatureand cinemato convinceus of the insufficiency of the cogito. Wherever we presume to have found pure thought,or purerepresentations,theexpressivityofthe artspointsto sen- sationsanddeeperldeas. A thought,suchasthe cogito,is thereforeinseparablefrom sensations thatthemselvesbringaseriesof intensitiesandIdeasto bearonthesubject. The 'I' is thereforenot independentbut carriesall intensitiesandall Ideas with it. Thesearerelatedto any singularthought in the way it implies differentarrangementsof intensitiesanddifferentrelationsof clarityand obscuritybetweenIdeas. You do not think without feeling.Feelingdefinesyou asanindividual. That singulardefinitionbrings someintensitiesto the fore while hiding others(morehating,lessanger,greatercaring,less jealousy). In turn, these intensitieslight up Ideasin differentwaysmakingsomerelationsmore obscureand othersmore distinct (The Idea of love for humanity took centrestage,after their sacrifice). The subjectis thereforeextendedthrough the sensationsof singular individualsinto virtual intensitiesandIdeas.Unlike the Cartesiancogito, which is positedon the activity of the thinking subject,Deleuze'sindi- vidual hasan all-importantpassiveside.We cannotdirectly chooseour sensations,wearethereforepassivewith respectto our virtual 'darkpre- cursorst. Deleuze'sphilosophydependson Descartes'rationalistcritics,notably BaruchSpinoza,for thesyntheticmethodandfor theoppositionto thefree activity of the subject, and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, for the extensionof the subjector monadto the wholeof reality.Deleuzeis not simply anti-Cartesian;rather,he extendsthe activesubjectthrough pas- sivityandthroughtheconditionsfor sensation.The cogitoisanimportant momentin philosophy,but it requirescompletingthroughsynthesesthat bclicitsindcpcndcncc,

50 CONCEPTS 51 CONCEPTS Connectives Kant Sensation CONCEPTS CliffStagoll Deleuzeunderstandsphilosophyasbeingthe
Deleuzeunderstandsphilosophyasbeingthe art of inventingor creating
concepts,or puttingconceptsto workin newways.He doesnot considerit
to be very usefulor productive,however,whenit createsand usesconceprs
in themannerthathethinkshastypifiedmuchof westernphilosophytodate.
Too often, Deleuzeargues,philosophyhasusedreal experiencemerelyas
asourcefor extractingor deducingabstractconceptualmeansfor categoris-
ing phenomena.[t hastendedthento employthesesameconceptseitherto
determineor expresstheessenceof phenomena,or elseto orderandrank
themin termsof theconcept.An exampleis Plato'sconceptof Forms,the
absoluteandchangelessobjectsandstandardsof knowledgeagainstwhich
all humanknowledgeis but aninferiorcopy.Sucha conceptdoesnot help
us appreciateor contributeto the richnessof lived experience,Deleuze
subjectto metaphysicalillusion. The applicationof abstractconcepts
merely gatherstogetherdiscreteparticularsdespitetheir differences,and
privilegesconceptsoverwhat is supposedto be explained.For example,
onemight understandthingsasinstancesof Beingor usefulness,thereby
presupposinganontologicalor epistemologicalprivilegefor theconceptof
'Being'or 'utility' that is not evidentin immediateexperience.By bearing
in mind that the conceptat work relates just to thisbeingor thisuseful
In Deleuze'swork, conceptsbecomethe meansby which we move
beyondexperienceso asto be ableto think anew.Ratherthan 'standing
apart' from experience,a conceptis defined just by the unity that it
expressesamongstheterogeneouselements.In otherwords,conceptsmust
becreativeor activeratherthanmerelyrepresentative,descriptiveor sim-
plifying. For this reason,in his work on David Hume, Deleuzegoesto
somelengthsto showhowcausationisatruly creativeconceptby explain-
ing how it bringsusto expectandanticipateoutcomesbeforethey occur,
andevenoutcomesthat wedon't observeat all.In suchcases,anticipatory
creationis sopowerfulthat it becomesanormalpart of life,andcausation
is a conceptthat representsthe creationof other conceptswithout the
norm. It is true,he argues,that conceptshelp us in our everydaylivesto
organiseandrepresentour thoughtsto others,makingcommunicationand
opinion-formationsimpler;but Deleuzeinsistssuch simplicity detracts
from thevarietyanduniquenessevidentin our experiencesof theworld.
For Deleuzeand Guattari,conceptsought to be meansby which we
movebeyondwhatweexperiencesothatwecanthink of newpossibilities.
Ratherthanbringingthingsrogetherundera concept,he is interestedin
relatingvariablesaccordingto newconceptssoasto createproductivecon-
nections.Conceptsoughtto expressstatesof affairsin termsof the con-
tingentcircumstancesanddynamicsthat leadto andfollowfrom them,so
requirementfor senseperceptionsto groundthem.
Moving from areiterativehistoryof philosophyto thepracticeof philo-
sophymeansengagingwith inheritedconceptsin new ways.This means
for Deleuzethatphilosophersoughtto engagein newlinesof thinkingand
newconnectionsbetweenparticularideas,argumentsandfieldsof special-
isation.Only thendoesphilosophytakeon a positivepowerto transform
our waysof thinking.In hisown work, Deleuzereappropriatesnumerous
conceptsinheritedfrom thegreatphilosophersof thepastin termsof new
problems,uses,termsandtheories.Henri Bergson'sconceptsof duration
and intuition, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz'smonad,Hume's associa-
tionism, and numerousconceptsfrom literature,film, criticism,science
andevenmathematicsarereworkedand put to work in new andcreative
ways.The apparentinconsistencyof their meaningsand uses,whilst
achallengefor hisreader,is asignof Deleuze'srefusalto giveanyconcept
that eachconceptis relatedto particularvariablesthat changeor
it. A conceptis createdor thought anewin relationto everyparticular
event,insight,experienceor problem,therebyincorporatinga notion of
thecontingencyof the circumstancesof eachevent.On sucha view,con-
ceptscannotbethoughtapartfrom thecircumstancesof theirproduction,
andsocannotbehypotheticalor conceivedapriori.
l)clcuzc'stheoryof conceptsispartof apotentcriticismof muchphil-
osophytodrrtc.Hc isarguingthiltiuryphikrsophyfrrilingtorcspcctthcpar-
tictrlitlilyol' coltsc-iottsncssirr lirvoulol' broirdcorrccpluirlskctchcsis
a single purposeor referent. By cutting routinely acrossdisciplinary
boundaries,Deleuzeabidesby his proposalthat concept-creationbe an
'openended'exercise,suchthat philosophycreatesconceptsthat areas
accessibleandusefulto artistsandscientistsasto philosophers.
The centralactivityof philosophyfor Deleuzeis thecreationof concepts,
and it is an activityforcedupon ratherthaninitiatedby the philosopher.
What isit thatbefallsphilosophersthatforcesthemto think?In thecourse
of hiscareer,Deleuzehasgiventhreekindsof answerto thisquestion.In his
earlyworks,it is paradoxthat provokesthought;here,the provocationto
thoughtisinternalto thoughtitself.In thelatercollaborationswith Guattari
(andperhapsbecauseof that collaboration),the locusof the stimulusto
thoughtshiftssteadilyoutsideof thought,andeventuallyevenoutsideof
philosophy.The secondkind of provocationconsistsof topicsor problems
within philosophy(nolongerlimitedto logicalcontradictionsor paradoxes)
that,in theestimationof acreativephilosopher,havebeenpoorlyconceived
andhencedemandto bereconceived.The third kind of provocationarises
from the connectionbetweenphilosophyand its socio-historicalcontext;
herethe problemsarenot strictlyspeakingor originallyphilosophical,but
theynonethelessprovokephilosophicalthoughtto furnishsolutionstq or at
Sotheconnectionbetweenphilosophyandits socio-historicalmilieu is
graspstatesof affairsasthey are;the point is to getrealityright, to settle
on a correctunderstandingof the world. Philosophyaimsneverto settle,
but on thecontraryalwaysto unsettleandto transformour understanding
of certainproblems,becausetheyarethoughtto havebeenbadlyposed,or
notposedatall,bypreviousthinkers,and/or becausetheproblemsarehis-
toricallynewor havechangedsoradicallyovertime asto renderprevious
responsesinadequate.HenceDeleuzeandGuattariinsistthat philosophy
for them 'doesnot consistin knowingandis not inspiredby truth. Rather
it is categorieslike Interesting,Remarkable,or Important that determine
[its] successor failure'(D&G 1994:82).The creationof conceptsis thus
cruciallyselectiveaswellas(or aspartofbeing) diagnostic,andin extract-
ing a philosophicalconceptfrom a historicalstateofaffairs,philosophical
thoughtidentifiescertainaspectsof thatstateof affairsasproblemsrequir-
ing newsolutions.The utopianvocationof concept-creationthusconsists
in proposingsolutionsto the pressingproblemsof the time; in this way,
philosophybecomespoliticaland'takesthecriticismof itsown timeto the
highestlevel' (D&G 1994:99).
leastnewandimprovedarticulationsof,thoseproblems- solutionsor artic-
John Marks
problemsof its own',but to problemspresentedto it or forcedupon it by
its real-worldmilieu.And it isthiskind of connection,betweenphilosophy
and socio-historicalcontextthat Deleuzeand Guattariwill call utopian:
'utopiaiswhatlinksphilosophywith its own epoch'(D&G 1994:99).
Oneof DeleuzeandGuattari'smainconcernsis to distinguisha prop-
erly philosophicalrelationbetweenconceptandcontextfrom the better-
known scientific(or socialscientific)relationbasedon 'representation'.
Unlike the socialand naturalsciences,philosophyis creative,servingas
akind of relaybetweenonepracticalorientationto theworld andanother,
newandimprovedone.Philosophyrespondsto problemsthat arisewhen
a givenmodeof existenceor practicalorientationno longersuffices.Such
problemsarerealenough,buttheyarenotreducibleto reality.The purpose
of philosophyis not to representthe world, but to createconcepts,and
thcscconccptsservenot to replicateaccuratelyin discoursespecificseg-
rrcntsof thcw<lrklrrsit rc:rllyis(m scicnccckrcs),but to proposcarticula-
tions ol'itttd/rlr soltttiorrsto problclns,to oll'cr rrcw ancl clill'crcnt
Deleuzedevelopshisnotionof the'controlsociety'at thebeginningof the
1990s.In the 1970sMichel Foucaultshowedhow,during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries,a d,isciplinarysocietyhad developedthat was
basedon strategiesof confinement.As Deleuze points out, Foucault
carriedout this historicalwork in orderto showwhatwehadinheritedof
thedisciplinarymodel,andnot simplyin orderto claimthatcontemporary
societyisdisciplinary.This isthesenseof theactualin Foucault'swork,in
the senseof what we arein the processof differing from. Deleuzeuses
Foucault'sinsightsasastartingpoint to claimthat wearemovingtowards
controlsocietiesin which confinementis no longerthemainstrategy.
Deleuzereminds us that disciplinarysocietiessucceeded'sovereign'
societies,andthat they concentratedon the organisationof life andpro-
duction rather than the exerciseof arbitrary entitlementsin relationto
thesetwo domains.Disciplinarysocietiesdevelopedanetworkof sitesand
prisons,hospitals,factories,schools,the family -
which indiviclualswcrc locatcd,traincd ancl/<lrpunishcclrt




observable,measurableobject,which is susceptibleto variousforms of manipulation.Essentially,thedisciplinarysystemisoneof contiguity:the individualmovesfrom siteto site,beginningagaineachtime.In contrast to this, societiesof control - which emergeparticularly after World WarII - arecontinuousin form. The variousformsof controlconstitute a network of inseparablevariations.The individual, in a disciplinary society,is placedin various 'moulds'at differenttimes,whereasthe indi- vidualin a contemporarycontrolsocietyis in a constantstateof mod,ula- tion. Deleuzeusesas an examplethe world of work and production. The factoryfunctionedaccordingto somesort of equilibrium betweenthe highestpossibleproduction and the lowestpossiblewages. Just as the worker wasa componentin a regulatedsystemof massproduction,so unionscould mobilisemassresistance.In control societies,on the other hand,the dominantmodelis that of the business,in which it is morefre- quentlythe taskof the individualto engagein formsof competitionand continuingeducationin orderto attaina certainlevelof salary.There is a deeperlevel of modulation,a constantvariation,in the wagespaid to workers.In generalterms)the duality of massand individual is being brokendown.The individualis becominga'dividual',whilstthemassis reconfiguredin termsof data,samplesandmarkets.Whereasdisciplinary individualsproducedquantifiableanddiscreteamountsof energy,'divid- uals' are caughtup in a processof constantmodulation.In the caseof medicine,whichclaimsto bemovingtowardsasystem'withoutdoctorsor patients',thismeansthatthefigurein theindividualisreplacedby adivid- ualsegmentof codedmatterto becontrolled. Althoughheis in no waysuggestingthat weshouldreturn to disciplin- ary institutions,Deleuzeclearlyfinds the prospectof the new control societyalarming.In thedomainsof prison,education,hospitalsandbusi- ness,the old institutionsarebreakingdown and,althoughthesechanges maybepresentedasbeingmorecloselytailoredto theneedsof individuals, Deleuzeseeslittle morethana newsystemof domination.It mayevenbe thecase,hesuggests,thatwemaycometo viewtheharshconfinementsof disciplinarysocietieswith somenostalgia.Onereasonfor this isobviously that techniquesof control threatento be isolatingand individualising. Wemayregretthe lossof previoussolidarities.Anotherreasonwould be thatweareconstantlycoercedinto formsof 'communication'.This means thatwearedeniedtheprivilegeof havingnothingto say,of cultivatingthe particularkind of creativesolitudethat Deleuzevalues.It appearsthat we will incrcasinglylackaspacefor creative'resistance'.He suggeststhatthe movc towarclscontinuous:lsscssmcntin schoolsis bcing cxtendedto socictyirtgcncral,with thccll'cctthatmuchof lif'ctrrkcson thctcxturc<lf llrcHnrncslrowor lhcnrrrrkclirrgsc,rnirrirr'.







The critiqueof contemporarysocietiesthatthenotionof controlsociety entailsmight in somewaysbeunexpectedin Deleuze'swork, giventhat it sometimeslookslike a conventionaldefenceof the individual threatened by thealienatingforcesof globalcapitalism.Onemight expectDeleuzeto bein favourof amovetowardssocietieswhichdoawaywith theconstraints of individuality.However,it is the precisewayin which control societies dismantlethe individual that alarmsDeleuze.Ratherthan encouraging a realsocialengagementwith the pre-personal,they turn the individual into anobjectthat hasno resistance,no capacityto 'fold' the line of mod- ulation.AlthoughtheBodywithout Organslacksthediscretenessof what weconventionallyknowasanindividualthat is not to sayit doesnot have resistance.On thecontrary,it is azoneof intensity.It maybetraversedby forces,but it is not simply a relayfor thoseforces.


Bodywithout Organs Fold Foucault Intensity




Kenneth Surin

In hisshortbutprescientessay'PostscriptonControlSocieties'Deleuzesays thatin theageof thesocietiesof control(asopposedto thedisciplinarysoci- etiesof thepreviousepochfamouslyanalysedby Michel Foucault),capital hasbecomea vast'internationalecumenicalorganisation'that is ableto har- moniseinto a singleoverarchingassemblageeventhemostdisparateforms (commercial,religious,artistic,and soforth) andentities.In this newdis- pensation,productivelabour,dominatednow by the myriad forms of intel- lectuallabourandserviceprovision,hasexpandedto covereverysegmentof society:theexponentiallyextendedscopeof capitalis coterminouswith the constantavailabilityof everythingthat createssurplus-value.Human con- sciousness,leisure,play,andsoon,arenolongerleft to'private'domainsbut areinsteaddirectlyencompassedby thelatestregimesof accumulation.The boundarybetweenhomeand workplacebecomesincreasinglyblurred,as doesthedemrrcationbetween'regular'workand'casual'labour.Capitalism bccomcsinfilrmrrliscd,cvcnasit bccomcsubiquitous. ()apitalism's teloshx irlwnysirrvolvcdthccrcirti<lnofirnccon<lmicoldcrthrt willbclrlllctodispcnsc






with the State,andin its current phasethis teloshasbecomemorepalpably visible.WhereDeleuzeis concerned,thisdevelopmentdoesnot requirethe Stateanditsappurtenancestobeabolished.Rather,thetraditionalseparation betweenStateandsocietyisnownolongersustainable.SocietyandStatenow form oneall-embracingmatrix,in whichall capitalhasbecometranslatable into socialcapital,andsotheproductionof socialcooperation,undertaken primarily by the serviceand informationalindustriesin the advanced economies,hasbecomea crucialonefor capitalism. This needto maintainconstantcontrolovertheformsof socialcooper- ation in turn requiresthat education,training,business,neverend: the businesstime-scaleis now '2+/7'so that theTokyostockexchangeopens whentheonein New Yorkcloses,in anunendingcycle;trainingis'on the job' asopposedto beingbasedon the traditionalapprenticeshipmodel (itself a holdover from feudalism); and education becomes'continuing education', that is, somethingthat continuesthroughout life, and is not confined to those aged six to twenry-rwo. This essentiallydispersive propensity is reflectedin the presentregime of capitalist accumulation, whereproduction is nowmeta-production,that is,no longerfocusedin the advancedeconomieson the useof rawmaterialsto producefinishedgoods, but rather the saleof services(especiallyin the domain of financeand credit) and alreadyfinished products. Social control is no longer left to schoolsand policeforces,but is now a branchof marketing,asevenpolit- icshasbecome'retailpolitics', in which politiciansseekdesperatelyfor an imageof themselvesto marketto theelectorate,andwhen public relations consultantsare more important to prime ministers and presidentsthan goodandwisecivil servants.Recording,whetherin administrationor busi- ness,is no longer basedon the written documentkept in the appropriate box of files,but on bar-codingand other forms of electronictagging. The implicationsof theabove-mentioneddevelopmentsfor statetheory are momentous.The state itself has becomefragmented and compart- mentalised,and hasaccruedmore powerto itself in somesphereswhile totallyrelinquishingpowerin others.However,if theStatehasmutatedin the eraof control societies,it retainsthe functionof regulating,in con- junction with capital,the 'accords'thatchannelsocialandpoliticalpower. In his book on Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Deleuzemaintainsthat stateandnon-stateformationsareconstitutedon the basisof such'con- certs'or 'accords'.These 'accords'areorganisingprincipleswhich make possiblethe groupinginto particularconfigurationsof whole rangesof events,personages,processes,institutions,movements)andsoforth, such thattheresultingconfigurationsbecomeintegratedformations.As asetof rtcc<lrdsrlraxiomsgovcrningtheaccordsthatrcgulatcthcopcrationsof th