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Section 12 Custodial Investigation PEOPLE V. CONCEPCION - G.R. NO.

178876, JUNE 27, 2008 FACTS: This is an appeal on the decision of Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, convicting accused-appellants Alfredo Concepcion and Henry Concepcion of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Sometime in the afternoon of 26 November 2002, a confidential informant reported to Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Buenaventura R. Lopez at the PDEA, Regional Office No. 3, Bulacan, that an alias Totoy was engaged in selling drugs, particularly shabu, in Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. SPO1 Lopez instructed the confidential agent to set a drug deal with alias Totoy and order ten (10) grams of shabu. The confidential informant returned and confirmed that the delivery of the 10 grams of shabu would be made in Barangay Guyong at 2:00 a.m. of 27 November 2002. A buy-bust operation was planned and a team formed. The team was composed of SPO1 Lopez as team leader; PO2 Sistemio as the poseur-buyer; and PO2 Arojado, PO2 Navarette and PO2 Kho as backup operatives. The team, together with the confidential informant, proceeded to Barangay Guyong and arrived thereat at 1:15 a.m. of 27 November 2002. PO2 Sistemio and the confidential informant alighted from their vehicle and proceeded to a waiting shed along the highway. The rest of the team positioned themselves ten to twenty meters away in their parked vehicles. After receiving the two plastic packs, PO2 Sistemio lit a cigarette, the pre-arranged signal for the other members of the buy-bust team to approach and arrest the culprits. The boodle money that PO2 Sistemio had with him was no longer given to Totoy. The two plastic sachets given by appellant Alfredo Concepcion to PO2 Sistemio, and the other one recovered in the glove compartment, were marked with the initials "P.S. A", "P.S. A-1" and "A.G.A.", respectively. On the same day, these plastic sachets were sent for laboratory examination to determine the presence of dangerous drugs. After a qualitative examination was conducted on the specimens, Police Inspector Nellson C. Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical Officer, issued Chemistry Report No. D-700-2002 with a conclusion that said specimens contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug. ISSUES: 1. The honorable trial court patently erred in deviating from the established rule that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by police officers should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally protected rights of the accused-appellants. The honorable trial court gravely erred in convicting accused-appellants not on the basis of the strength of the prosecution's evidence but rather on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The honorable trial court gravely erred in not finding that there are situations where an accused can have no other defense but a denial of complicity in the offense charged, as that could be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth

2. 3.

HELD: Appellants argue that the alleged buy-bust operation was not satisfactorily proven and was of doubtful legitimacy because of the failure of the prosecution to present and offer in evidence the physical inventory and the photograph of the evidence confiscated as required by Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and that said operation was not coordinated with the PDEA. After going over the evidence on record, we find that there, indeed, was a buy-bust operation involving appellants. The prosecution's failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory of the seized drugs and the photograph pursuant to Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 will not exonerate appellants. Non-compliance with said section is not fatal and will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case was shown not to have been broken. Appellants' contention that they were not apprised of their constitutional rights upon their arrest cannot lead to their acquittal. The arresting officers' alleged failure to inform them of their Miranda rights or the nature of their arrest should have been raised before arraignment. It is too late in the day for appellants to raise these alleged illegalities after a valid information has been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered. Appellants claim that the PDEA, aside from its supposed non-compliance with Republic Act No. 9165, failed to prove and execute

certain matters that would show that a proper buy-bust operation was conducted. We find their claim untenable. In this jurisdiction, the conduct of a buy-bust operation is a common and accepted mode of apprehending those involved in the illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs. It has been proven to be an effective way of unveiling the identities of drug dealers and of luring them out of obscurity. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit. Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug. These two elements were clearly established in this case. The records show that appellants sold and delivered the shabu to the PDEA agent posing as a poseur-buyer. The plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, which were seized and were found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, were identified and offered in evidence. There is also no question that appellants knew that what they were selling and delivering was shabu, a dangerous drug. Appellants likewise insist that surveillance should have been conducted to verify their illicit activities. We do not agree. Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. The failure of the PDEA operatives to record the boodle money will not render the buy-bust operation illegal. The recording of marked money used in a buy-bust operation is not one of the elements for the prosecution of sale of illegal drugs. The recording or non-recording thereof in an official record will not necessarily lead to an acquittal as long as the sale of the prohibited drug is adequately proven. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust operation. What is material to a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The prosecution duly established both in this case. It must be emphasized that appellants were charged with selling, trading, delivering, giving away, dispatching in transit and transporting dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The charge was not limited to selling. Said section punishes not only the sale but also the mere act of delivery of prohibited drugs after the offer to buy by the entrapping officer has been accepted by the seller. In the distribution of prohibited drugs, the payment of any consideration is immaterial. The mere act of distributing the prohibited drugs to others is in itself a punishable offense. In the case at bar, the shabu was delivered to the poseurbuyer after appellants agreed on the price of the contraband. Appellants deny the existence of the buy-bust operation and cry frame-up.We are not swayed. We uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. The presumption remains because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive. The presumption was not overcome as there was no evidence showing that PO2 Sistemio and PO2 Arojado were impelled by improper motive.

LOLITA EUGENIO V. PEOPLE - G.R. NO. 168163, MARCH 26, 2008 FACTS: The irregularities attending Eugenios arrest and custodial investigation, assuming they did take place, do not work to nullify her conviction as the Supreme Court is neither the proper forum, nor this appeal the correct remedy, to raise this issue. Any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over her person, should be raised in a motion to quash at any time before entering her plea. Petitioners failure to timely raise this objection amounted to a waiver of such irregularity and resulted in her concomitant submission to the trial courts jurisdiction over her person. Petitioner Lolita Eugenio is a commissioned agent of respondent Alfredo Mangali in his check re-discounting and lending business. Eugenio persuaded Mangali to extend loans to various individuals. Two parcels of land, covered by TCT No. 171602 and TCT No. 92585, were offered as securities for the loans. Mangali thereafter extended loans with a condition that the borrowers shall execute Deed of Sale. The loans lapsed and remained unpaid. Mangali inquired from the Register of Deeds the status of TCT Nos. 171602 and 92585. He found out that TCT No. 171602 had been cancelled in 1995 while TCT No. 92585 is not registered with the Register of Deeds. Mangali sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and an entrapment operation was conducted. A Complaint for Estafa

thru Falsification of Public Documents was filed against Eugenio. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Eugenio of one count of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the filing of this petition. Eugenio avers that the prosecution failed to prove that their was conspiracy between her and the borrowers to defraud Mangali. She further avers that the entrapment operation was illegal due to some irregularities which attended her arrest. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the irregularities of the entrapment operation may nullify Eugenios conviction 2. Whether or not the prosecution proved the existence of conspiracy HELD: Petition GRANTED. 1. Petitioner contends that her arrest following the NBI entrapment operation was illegal because it was conducted by a division of the NBI which does not deal with estafa or fraud and without the participation of the police. Petitioner also alleges that after she was arrested, she was neither informed of her constitutional right to counsel nor afforded her right to a phone call. Petitioner concludes that these irregularities tainted the NBIs entrapment operation, rendering the same without any probative value in determining whether or not a criminal act has been committed. Respondent does not contest petitioners claim on the alleged irregularities which attended her arrest. Nevertheless, such irregularities, assuming they did take place, do not work to nullify petitioners conviction as this Court is neither the proper forum, nor this appeal the correct remedy, to raise this issue. Any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over her person, should be raised in a motion to quash at any time before entering her plea. Petitioners failure to timely raise this objection amounted to a waiver of such irregularity and resulted in her concomitant submission to the trial courts jurisdiction over her person. Indeed, not only did petitioner submit to such jurisdiction, she actively invoked it through her participation during the trial. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim the contrary. As for the failure of the NBI agents to inform petitioner of her right to counsel during custodial investigation, this right attains significance only if the person under investigation makes a confession in writing without aid of counsel which is then sought to be admitted against the accused during the trial. In such case, the tainted confession obtained in violation of Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence against the accused. 2. The prosecution failed to prove conspiracy to render petitioner liable as principal to Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, Falsification is committed under any of the following modes: a. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric; b. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; c. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them; d. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; e. Altering true dates; f. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning; g. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or h. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.

The trial court found petitioner guilty of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents (which the Court of Appeals sustained) for petitioners principal role in the loan transactions between Mangali, on the one hand, and Saquitan and Ty, on the other hand. In further pinning liability on petitioner for her role in the alleged falsification of TCT No. 92585, the trial court, for lack of proof of petitioners participation in falsifying such document, relied on the disputable legal presumption that the possessor of a falsified document who makes use of such to her advantage is presumed to be the author of the falsification. In short, petitioners conviction below rested on an implied conspiracy with her co-accused to swindle Mangali, buttressed, as to one count, by a reliance on a disputable presumption of culpability. We reverse. True, conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence as the same can be inferred from the concerted acts of the accused. However, this does not dispense with the requirement that conspiracy, like the felony itself, must be proved beyond reasonable

doubt. Thus, the presence of a reasonable doubt as to the existence of conspiracy suffices to negate not only the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense as principal but also, in the absence of proof implicating the accused as accessory or accomplice, the criminal liability of the accused. Taking into account admitted facts and unrebutted claims, her participation in the events leading to her arrest is cast in an entirely new light raising reasonable doubt as to her culpability. These facts and unrefuted claims are: (1) petitioner works for Mangali, on commission basis, in the latters check re-discounting and lending businesses and (2) the Civil Register of Manila certified as true copy the photocopy of TCT No. 171602 that Saquitan gave petitioner. As Mangalis agent, petitioner is obliged to bring prospective borrowers to Mangali; otherwise, she will not earn commissions. This also explains why she was present in all the occasions Mangali met Saquitan and Ty she was pecuniarily interested in seeing to it that the deals she brokered were consummated to enable her to receive commission from Mangali. On petitioners disclosure to Mangali that TCT No. 171602 is registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila, petitioner merely relied on the certification by the Register of Deeds of Manila that the photocopy of TCT No. 171602 she brought with her was a true copy of the title on file in that office. The prosecution did not rebut this. In sum, we hold that the lower courts rulings are based on a misapprehension of facts justifying reversal on review. Indeed, when, as here, the circumstances surrounding the alleged commission of crimes are capable of two inferences, one favoring the innocence of the accused and the other her guilt, the inference for her innocence must prevail, consistent with the Constitutional presumption of her innocence. ABAY V PEOPLE GR NO. 165896, SEPTEMBER 19, 2008 FACTS: This petition for review assails the Decision 1 dated October 27, 2003 and the Resolution 2 dated October 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 25212. The Court of Appeals had affirmed the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, finding petitioners guilty of the crime of Highway Robbery in Criminal Case No. 9045-B. On January 13, 1995, an Information was filed charging Rustico Abay, Jr., Reynaldo Darilag, Ramoncito Aban, Ernesto Ricalde, Ramon Punzalan, Ariston Reyes, Isagani Espeleta, Cesar Camacho, Leonardo Perello and Danilo Pascual with the crime of Highway Robbery/Brigandage. Said information reads: That on or about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of February 17, 1994, at the South Luzon Expressway, Municipality of Bian, Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Ramoncito Aban y Casiano, Ernesto Ricalde y Jovillano, Rustico Abay, Jr. y Serafico, Ramon Punzalan y Carpena, Reynaldo Darilag y Apolinario, Leonardo Perello y Esguerra and Danilo Pascual y Lagata, who are principals by direct participation, conspiring and confederating together with Ariston Reyes y Plaza, Isagani Espeleta y Arguelles and Cesar Camacho y Deolazo, who are principals by indispensable cooperation and mutually helping each other, form themselves as band of robbers and conveniently armed with handguns and deadly bladed weapons, and while on board a Kapalaran Bus Line with plate number DVT-527 bound for Sta. Cruz, Laguna and a semi stainless owner type jeep with plate number PJD-599 as backup vehicle, accused with the use of the aforesaid handguns and bladed weapons with intent to gain and taking the passengers of the bus by surprise, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously divest and take away personalties of the passengers and/or occupants therein, among them were: a. Thelma Andrade y Lorenzana, P3,500.00 cash; b. Gloria Tolentino y Pamatmat, P30,000.00 cash, $2,000.00 dollars and eyeglasses (Perare) worth P5,000.00; c. Lilian Ojeda y Canta, P120.00 cash; d. Paul Masilang y Reyes, assorted used clothes of undetermined amount; and by reason or on occasion of the said robbery, accused shot passenger Rogelio Ronillo y Lumboy, inflicting upon him gunshot wounds on the neck, thus, accused performed all the acts of execution that would produce the crime of homicide, but nevertheless, did not produce by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is by the timely medical assistance rendered to Rogelio Ronillo y Lumboy, and to his damage and prejudice and to the damages and prejudices of the following: a. Thelma Andrade y Lorenzana in the sum of P3,500.00; b. Gloria Tolentino y Pamatmat in the sum of P30,000.00; c. Lilian Ojeda y Canta in the sum of P120.00 That the commission of the offense was attended with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by a band and

with the use of motor vehicle. With the additional aggravating circumstance that accused Isagani Espeleta y Arguelles and Cesar Camacho y Deolazo, being prison guards, have taken advantage of their public position by bringing out prison inmates and equipped them with deadly weapons and were utilized in the commission of robbery. When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty. However, upon motion filed by accused Ramoncito Aban, with the conformity of the public prosecutor and private complainants Thelma Andrade and Gloria Tolentino, he was allowed to withdraw his earlier plea of "not guilty". Thus, on September 11, 1997, Ramoncito Aban, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded "guilty" to the crime of simple robbery and on even date, the trial court sentenced him. Meanwhile, trial proceeded with respect to the other accused. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Thelma Andrade, Gloria Tolentino and Ramoncito Aban. Ramoncito Aban, the last witness, testified the facts. Petitioners argue that Ramoncito Aban is not a credible witness. They likewise contend that the lower courts erred in relying on Aban's extrajudicial confession which was coerced. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may be convicted on the basis of the testimonies of Ramoncito Aban, Thelma Andrade and Gloria Tolentino. HELD: At the outset, we note that it was not Aban's extrajudicial confession but his court testimony reiterating his declarations in his extrajudicial admission, pointing to petitioners as his co-participants, which was instrumental in convicting petitioners of the crime charged. Settled is the rule that when the extrajudicial admission of a conspirator is confirmed at the trial, it ceases to be hearsay. It becomes instead a judicial admission, being a testimony of an eyewitness admissible in evidence against those it implicates. Here, the extrajudicial confession of Aban was affirmed by him in open court during the trial. Thus, such confession already partook of judicial testimony which is admissible in evidence against the petitioners. In contrast, anent the herein petitioners' participation in the crime, not only is their conviction based on the testimony of Aban, but it was also established by the eyewitness testimony of Andrade and Tolentino who identified positively the petitioners in open court. Worth stressing, this Court has consistently ruled that the defense of alibi must be received with suspicion and caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can be easily fabricated. 20 Alibi is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification of the accused. An alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the petitioners by credible witnesses who have no motive to testify falsely. Considering the testimonies of witnesses and the evidence presented by the parties, we are in agreement that the crime of Highway Robbery/Brigandage was duly proven in this case. As defined under Section 2 (e) of Presidential Decree No. 532, 23 Highway Robbery/Brigandage is the seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine highway. All told, we rule that petitioners Rustico Abay, Jr. and Reynaldo Darilag are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway Robbery/Brigandage. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 27, 2003 and the Resolution dated October 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 25212, affirming the Decision dated November 29, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31 in Criminal Case No. 9045-B, are hereby AFFIRMED. PEOPLE V. LUCERO - G.R. NO. 188705, MARCH 2, 2011 FACTS: Before this Court on appeal is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00469-MIN dated December 17, 2008, which upheld the conviction of accused Federico Lucero in Criminal Case No. 10849, decided by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch30 in Tagum City on April 20, 2005. Before the RTC, the accused was charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated July 31, 1997. In his appeal, Lucero questions the positive identification made by witnesses Jao and Langgoy. He insists that the witnesses were unable to see the face of the perpetrator, and identification was made solely on the basis of the green short pants worn by the suspect. He also claims that Jao did not immediately report the identity of the perpetrator to the

police, and that this casts doubt on the witness credibility. In his defense, he also claims that a DNA test should have been done to match the spermatozoa found in the victims body to a sample taken from him, and that since no DNA test was done,he cannot be linked to the crime. ISSUES: 1. Was the accused denied of his rights under custodial investigation? 2. Is he entitled to an acquittal? HELD: 1.

Yes. The accused was denied of his rights under custodial investigation. Accused-appellant was not informed of his rights, nor was there a waiver of said rights. The investigating officer directly questioned the accused which he also answered. The questioning was made in violation of Sec. 12(1), Article III. Thus, the information elicited is inadmissible, and the evidence garnered as the result of that interrogation is also inadmissible. No. The Court held that even if the confession and evidence gathered are disregarded/held inadmissible, the evidence that remains still supports the result of the conviction of accused-appellant. Even if there are no direct evidence, in this case, it is the circumstantial evidence that comes into play to reach a conclusion. As held in People vs. Pascual, in crimes of rape with homicide, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable since the crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify for herself. Under Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence shall be sufficient for conviction when the ff. requisites are complied with: 1. There is more than one circumstance; 2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; 3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. PEOPLE V. CAPITLE - G.R. NO. 175330, JANUARY 12, 2011

2.

FACTS: Brgy. Chairman Avelino Pagalunan was gunned down by four men at Orambo Drive, Orambo Pasig in Aug. 6, 1993 at 7:40am. This was witnessed by Ruiz Constantino and Solomon Molino which were identified by Arturo Nagares as one of the four gun men. Other witnessed also identified Arturo Nagares as the gun men. Under detention at the NBI, Arturo Nagares executed an extrajudicial confession to the killing of Brgy. Chairman before Atty. Orlando Dizon which was assisted by Atty. Galang, in his confession he is pointing to Vice Mayor Anching De Guzman as mastermind and Rodolfi Capile a.k.a Putol, Elymar Santos and John Doe as his cohorts in the killing of Brgy. Chairman. Solomon Molino in his third affidavit identified Ramil Marquina and Rodolfo Capitle part of the gunmen. Criminall charges were filed against Rodolfo Capitle , Arturo Nagares and Ramil Marquina. During trial the accused offered an alibi as a defense. Nagares said he was sleeping at the house of his sister and was suffering for fever due to boil and was treated at Rizal Medical Center and claimed that he was violated, forced coerced and tortured into admitting the crime. At the trial court found the guilty beyond reasonable doubt except for Ramil Marquina. The Trial court did not give credit to the alibis of the accused and did not find any violation on Nagares constitutional right since he was assisted by an independent and effective counsel during the custodial investigation. They elevated the case to the CA but CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and found no reversible error in the appealed judgement. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the constitutional rights of appellants were violated with regards to the confession making it inadmissible 2. Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt. HELD: 1. No. Nagares extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence. Nagares claims that his right under Art. 3 sec. 12 of the constitution has been violated but based on the records, the extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given. There are no evidence of compulsion or duress or violence. Nagares also did not complain to the officers administering the oath during the taking of his sworn statement. He also did not have himself examined by a physician to support his claim. Furthermore in the confession are photographs taken during the thumbmarking and swearing. All the pictures depicted a "cordial and pleasant atmosphere" devoid of any sign of torture, threat, duress or tension on Nagares' person. In fact, the photographs showed Nagares smiling. Lastly, he was assisted throughout by an effective and independent counsel during the custodial investigation. 2. Yes. Nagares and Captile was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Nagares was positively identified as one of the victims assailant. The CA cannot rule on the credibility of the witness based on the evaluation of the RTC since RTC personally heard such testimony. With regards to the alibi, it was weak and cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the eyewitnesses at the crime scene. Here, Constantino positively identified Nagares as one of the perpetrators of the crime overthrowing the latter's alibi and denial. More importantly, Nagares miserably failed to establish the physical impossibility for him to be at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the felony. Furthermore no record or documents were

presented in his claim. Capitle was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder based on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: a. There is more than one circumstance; b. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and c. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. There is sufficient circumstantial evidence justifying Capitle's conviction. There is more than one circumstance: 1. The victim was gunned down at the corner of Orambo Drive and St. Jude St., Mandaluyong City; 2. Paat heard several gunshots coming from that area; 3. Paat saw four men, including Nagares and Capitle, coming from the corner of Orambo Drive and St. Jude St. and running away towards Shaw Blvd.; 4. The four men, including Nagares and Capitle, were all carrying guns; and 5. Prosecution witness Constantino saw Nagares, together with several other men, shot the victim. To the unprejudiced mind, the foregoing circumstances, when analyzed and taken together, leads to no other conclusion except that of appellants' culpability for the victim's death. The award of P30,000 attorney's fees lacks factual and legal basis and thus must be deleted. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 27 January 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 01479. We award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000. The amounts of moral damages and exemplary damages are reduced to P50,000 and P30,000, respectively. The award of actual damages and attorney's fees is deleted. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE V. MICHAEL BOKINGO and REYNANYE COL G.R. NO. 187536, AUGUST 10, 2011

FACTS: For review is the Amended Decision dated 14 November 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658, Bokingo and Col guilty as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. An Information was filed against Bokingo and Col, charging them of the crime of murder wherein they conspired together armed with a claw hammer and with intent to kill by means of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of confidence, and nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul NOLI PASION, by hitting and beating his head and other parts of his body with said hammer, thereby inflicting upon said NOLI PASION fatal wounds on his head and body which caused his death. During the preliminary investigation. Bokingco admitted that he conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the killing several days before because they got "fed up" with Pasion. On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, Bokingco confessed to the crime charged. The trial court rendered judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, there being the two aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence to be considered against both accused and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty in favor of accused Bokingo only, sentencing them to Death. The Court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court however lowering the penalty to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 7659. ISSUE: Whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator based on Bakingos admission that Col is a coconsiprator HELD:

No. Col is hereby ACQUITTED beyond reasonable doubt. In order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy. Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. As we have previously discussed, we did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy. It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and Cols plan to kill Pasion. Bokingcos confession was admittedly taken without the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence against Col. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Reynante Col is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt. Appellant Michael Bokingco is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. Miranda Rights Safeguarded by the Bill of Rights in relation to Custodial Investigations A. Procedural Requirements MIRANDA V. ARIZONA- 384 US 436 FACTS: The Supreme Court of the United States consolidated four separate cases with issues regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained during police interrogations. The first Defendant, Ernesto Miranda, was arrested for kidnapping and rape. Mr. Miranda was an immigrant, and although the officers did not notify Mr. Miranda of his rights, he signed a confession after two hours of investigation. The signed statement included a statement that Mr. Miranda was aware of his rights. On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested at Arizona his home. The police took him into custody, and transported him to a Phoenix police station. The witness whom had filed the complaint identified him. Miranda was then lead to the interrogation room. Then, the police officers proceeded to question him. Miranda had never been informed of his rights prior to the questioning. He was never told he had the right to an attorney to be present during the questioning. After two hours, the officers had succeeded in getting a written confession signed by Miranda. Located on the top of the confession was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was voluntary, without any promises of immunity or threats. The statement also said that Miranda signed the confession "with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me." When Miranda's case went to trial, the prosecution used the written confession as evidence against him. The defense objected, asking for the evidence to be suppressed. However, the judge allowed the confession to be admitted. Miranda was convicted of all counts, which consisted of kidnapping and rape. On each count he was sentenced to 20 to 30 years, with the sentences running concurrently. On Miranda's first appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona ruled that his rights had not been violated by the admission of the confession, and therefore affirmed the conviction. The basis for the decision was connected to the fact that Miranda never specifically requested council. Miranda eventually appealed his case to the Supreme Court. The second Defendant, Michael Vignera, was arrested for robbery. Mr. Vignera orally admitted to the robbery to the first officer after the arrest, and he was held in detention for eight hours before he made an admission to an assistant district attorney. There was no evidence that he was notified of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.

The third Defendant, Carl Calvin Westover, was arrested for two robberies. Mr. Westover was questioned over fourteen hours by local police, and then was handed to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, who were able to get signed confessions from Mr. Westover. The authorities did not notify Mr. Westover of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights. The fourth Defendant, Roy Allen Stewart, was arrested, along with members of his family (although there was no evidence of any wrongdoing by his family) for a series of purse snatches. There was no evidence that Mr. Stewart was notified of his rights. After nine interrogations, Mr. Stewart admitted to the crimes.

ISSUE: Whether the government is required to notify the arrested defendants of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights against self-incrimination before they interrogate the defendants? HELD: The government needs to notify arrested individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, specifically: their right to remain silent; an explanation that anything they say could be used against them in court; their right to counsel; and their right to have counsel appointed to represent them if necessary. Without this notification, anything admitted by an arrestee in an interrogation will not be admissible in court. The Supreme Court ruled that based off the testimony given by the police officers, and the admission of Miranda, it was obvious that he had never been told in any form of his right to council, or his right to have one during his questioning. The court also stated that Miranda was never informed of his right to not be compelled to incriminate himself. The Court also stated that without these warnings, all statement from Miranda were inadmissible. They went on to rule that, just because the confession had a typed statement saying Miranda had full knowledge of his rights, never reaches the level needed for one to intelligently waive their constitutional rights. Based on this information, the Supreme Court reversed the decision. The Supreme Court went on to say that the process of interrogation is intimidating by its very nature, and that a suspect must be read his or her rights to counteract this intimidation. The Court continued by specifically outlining how a suspect must be informed of his or her rights. First, a suspect needs to be read his rights only before he is to be interrogated. An officer may arrest a suspect without reading the Miranda rights as long as her does not question or interrogate the suspect in any way. PEOPLE V. CAMAT G.R. NO. 112262, APRIL 2, 1996

FACTS: About 9:00 o'clock in the evening of September 1, 1985, Nelson Sinoy and Gonzalo Penalver, both members of the Philippine Marines stationed at Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Metro Manila, were walking along Quirino Avenue, Paraaque, Metro Manila. They had just come from Camp Claudio where they attended a birthday party. While walking along Quirino Avenue, they noticed two persons trailing them closely, about ten meters away. They crossed the street ostensibly to avoid the two men following them. One of them, Wilfredo del Rosario rushed to Nelson Sinoy and kicked the latter. Armando Camat followed del Rosario and pulled out a knife and stabbed Nelson Sinoy. Gonzalo Penalver kicked Camat who in turn stabbed the former, hitting him at the right rib. Wilfredo del Rosario then grabbed the clutch bag from him. Thereafter, Sinoy and Penalver ran away. With the aid of somebody who identified himself as a policeman, they were brought to the San Juan de Dios Hospital. Sinoy died there. Penalver was transferred to AFP Medical Center after his wounds were sutured at San Juan de Dios Hospital. Patrolman Odeo Cario, to whom the case was assigned for investigation on September 2, 1985, stated on the witness stand that appellant Camat orally admitted to him his participation in the killing of the soldier during interrogation at the police precinct. In addition, Camat also allegedly gave the names of Wilfredo del Rosario and one Roland as his co-conspirators in the crime charged, and alluded to appellant Del Rosario as the one who actually stabbed Sinoy. With this information, Patrolman Cario and another policeman traced the whereabouts of Del Rosario and, when they found him, they invited him for questioning. In the police station, appellant del Rosario allegedly confessed to Patrolman Cario his involvement in the crime and informed the latter that the electric tester could be recovered from his relatives. Camat was pointed to by a vendor who allegedly saw what happened on the night of Semptember 1, 1985. As fate would have it, Camat was arrested by Paraaque policemen on October 11, 1985 for acts of lasciviousness, upon the complaint of his sister-inlaw. Since Camat fitted the description given earlier by the eyewitness to the investigating policemen, Patrolman Cario fetched the vendor to verify the identity of Camat. At the police station, said witness recognized and identified Camat as the one who killed

Sinoy. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision of guilty. ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions made to Cario by Camat and del Rosario were admissible in evidence. HELD: The Supreme Court held that both confessions were inadmissible as evidence as these statements were made in the absence of counsel. The Court held in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, et al. that At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the duty of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. The Supreme Court shared the opinion of the trial court that the prosecution, despite presenting only a single witness, satisfactorily proved the guilt of the accused. As such, the Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. B. Duty of an Officer during Custodial Investigation PEOPLE V. DE LA CRUZ, GR 137405, SEPT. 27, 2002 FACTS: On april 14, 1998, accused delfin dela cruz was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and was sentenced to death penalty. The offended party is the accuseds daughter who was only 16 years old during the alleged rape on oct 24, 1196. Accused appeals the ruling on the ground that he was not properly informed of the nature and case of accusation against him which is in violation of his constitutional right. Because it was not properly alleged in the complaint that the offended party is a minor and his daughter. ISSUE: Whether or not he is guilty of qualified rape or simple rape HELD: Accused was held to be guilty of simple rape only because he was not informed of his charges accordingly since qualifying circumstances were not pleaded in the indictment. PEOPLE V. SALCEDO 273 SCRA 473 FACTS: In the present case, the issue confronts us once more. As we have held in similar cases, a voluntary extrajudicial confession of an accused, even where it reflects the truth, if given without the assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver thereof, is inadmissible in evidence against him. In an Information dated October 28, 1988, First Assistant Provincial Fiscal Andres B. Barsaga, Jr. charged Accused-appellants Noli Salcedo, Edison Banculo, Juanito Sual, Jr. and Danilo Laurio, together with Nonoy (Teodulo, Jr.) Esquilona, Reynaldo Cortes, Paco (Romarico) Manlapaz, Gemo Ibaez, Bolodoy Calderon, Gil Rapsing, Jose Fernandez, Noe Albao, Ely Rapsing and Norie Huelva, with the crime of murder committed as follows: That on or about June 20, 1988, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Gabi, Municipality of Baleno, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation(,) treachery and superiority of strength (sic) and taking advantage of nighttime, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with a gun(,) hack with a bolo one Honorio Aparejado y Fideles, hitting the latter on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death. ISSUE: Whether or not the process of obtaining evidence against herein accused is under the duty of the officer during custodial

investigation. HELD: No, the trial court noted that the inclusion of Accused Romarico (Paco) Manlapaz, Reynaldo Cortes and Teodulo Esquilona, Jr. in the charge was based solely on the extrajudicial confessions of Edison Banculo, Juan Sual, Jr. and Danilo Laurio which, absent independent proof of conspiracy, were not admissible evidence against alleged co-conspirators under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Thus, a judgment of acquittal was rendered in favor of Manlapaz, Cortes and Esquilona, Jr. Under Sec. 12, par. 1, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The right to be informed carries with it the correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding what is being conveyed. Since what is sought to be attained is comprehension, the degree of explanation required will vary and depend on education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person being investigated. In further ensuring the right to counsel of the person being investigated, it is not enough that the subject be informed of that right; he should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of the same and should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one will be provided him at his request. If he decides not to retain a counsel of his choice or avail himself of one to be provided him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer. Even assuming that in the instant case the extrajudicial confession made by appellant spoke the truth and was not extracted through violence or intimidation, still the failure of the police investigators to inform appellant of his right to remain silent, coupled with the denial of his right to a competent and independent counsel or the absence of effective legal assistance when he waived his constitutional rights, rendered the confession inadmissible under Sec. 12, par. 3, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is partially GRANTED. Appellants Edison Banculo, Juanito Sual, Jr. and Danilo Laurio are hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and are ordered RELEASED immediately unless they are being detained for some other legal cause. The assailed Decision finding Noli Salcedo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua as well as the payment of the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the victim, Honorio Aparejado y Fideles, is AFFIRMED. Furthermore, accused-appellant is also ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to the victims wife, Lydia Aparejado. The other parts of the said Decision, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the foregoing, are hereby also AFFIRMED. C. When the Rights of Custodial Investigation may be invoked PEOPLE V. LOVERIA G.R. NO. 79138 JULY 2, 1990 FACTS: That on or about the 21st day of February, 1985, in the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with three (3) John Does whose true name, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with a knife, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, hold-up a passenger jeepney with Plate No. NXG-150-Pil. '84, one of the passengers, Richard Bales y Andres of his Seiko Wrist Watch worth P300.00 and a colored brown wallet containing P50.00, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount of P350.00; that on the occasion of said robbery, said accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said knife one Ricardo Yamson y Malanon, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds which directly caused his death, and one Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion the driver of the said passenger jeepney, on the vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds which ordinarily would have caused his death, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause independent of the will of the accused, that is, due to the timely and able medical attendance rendered to the said Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion which prevented his death. Upon being arraigned on July 3, 1985, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty (Record, p. 18.) After trial, the trial court found the appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision dated May 26, 1987 reads: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the prosecution having established the guilt of (the) accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby finds accused David Loveria GUILTY of the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in band, without any mitigating

circumstance; and, in relation to Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, hereby imposes upon him to suffer life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua; and orders said accused: (1) to pay the compulsory heirs of deceased victim Ricardo Yamson, represented by his mother Conchita Yamson, the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) as an indemnity for Ricardo Yamson's death; TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as and for actual damages; TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as and for moral damages; TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as and for exemplary damages: (2) to pay victim Cerilo Manzanero the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY ONE PESOS & 80/100 (P8,221.80) as indemnity for actual damages; P5,000.00 as and for moral damages; and P5,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and (3) to indemnify Richard Bales the amount of THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) for the unrecovered watch. From this judgment of conviction, the appellant filed the present appeal. ISSUES 1. Whether or not the people who testified are credible witnesses 2. Whether or not there is a violation of his constitutional right to counsel HELD: In fine, the Court, after a thorough examination of the entire record of the case, especially the transcript of stenographic notes, finds the trial court's reliance on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses to convict the appellant, to be well-founded. The claims made by the appellant have not impaired the credibility of the prosecution witnesses who positively identified him as one of the perpetrators of the crime. The appellant assails the manner in which he was identified by Manzanero at the headquarters of the 225th Philippine Constabulary (PC) in Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal, claiming violation of his constitutional right to counsel. Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time the events under review occurred reads: Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in the evidence. Sec. 12(1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution provides similar guarantees by stating: Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The court must emphasize that the so-called Miranda rights contained in the abovequoted constitutional provisions may be invoked by a person only while he is under custodial investigation which has been defined as the "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way". Hence, for instance, these constitutional rights may no longer be claimed by a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court because he is no longer under custodial investigation. The ruling enunciated in Gamboa v. Cruz, [G.R. No. 56291, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 642], concerning the right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation finds application in the instant case. In the case at bar, Manzanero, upon learning that certain hold-up men were being detained at the 225th PC Company, Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal in connection with another robbery, went there to check. Having identified the appellant among the detainees, he reported the matter to the Marikina police [See Exh. "B"]. Thereafter, Pat. Bill Ayun accompanied Manzanero back to the PC headquarters in Antipolo where Manzanero identified to Pat. Ayun the appellant as one of the persons involved in the incident. Pat. Ayun then took the sworn statement of Manzanero which was presented in court as Exh. "B" [TSN, December 8, 1986, p. 3.] Since, as in the Gamboa case, the appellant was not investigated when Manzanero was in the process of identifying him, he cannot claim that his right to counsel was violated because at that stage, he was not entitled to the constitutional guarantee invoked. But even assuming that the process of identification of the appellant by Manzanero at the PC headquarters was attended by constitutional infirmities, only Manzanero's sworn statement (Exh. "B") where he identified appellant and which was taken by Pat. Ayun, would be excluded for being inadmissible in evidence. The testimony of Manzanero made in open court positively identifying the appellant, as well as those of Richard Bales and Betty Apolinario, would not be affected. These testimonies, taken together with the other evidence on record, would be sufficient to sustain the trial court's judgment of conviction. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

SEBASTIAN V. GARCHITORENA, GR 114028, OCTOBER 18, 2000 FACTS: This is petition for certiorari seeking to annul a Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which admitted the sworn statements of petitioner and his co-accused in a charge of Malversation of Public Funds as evidence for the prosecution. The accused, together with Rosita C. Pada, Teresita B. Rodriguez, Rachel V. Torres and Lourdes A. Enriquez, were charged of Malversation of Public funds for while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their position, committing the offense in relation to their office, and conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, misapply, and embezzle and convert to their personal use and benefit the amount of SIX HUNDRED FORTY NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY and 05/100 PESOS (P649,290.05), Philippine Currency, out of the postage stamps in the custody of accused Rosita C. Pada, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the aforesaid sum. The marking of the documents to be testified on by the lone prosecution witness, Auditor Lilibeth Rugayan of the Commission on Audit, who conducted the audit examination, took place before the Deputy Clerk of Court of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. The marking of the exhibits was with the conformity of all of the accused and their respective counsel. Upon the completion of the testimony of Auditor Rugayan, the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its evidence. Among those offered as evidence were the sworn statements made by all the accused, including that of petitioner. The aforesaid sworn statements were being objected to on the ground that they are hearsay evidence because petitioner and his co-accused were never presented as witnesses and thus were not given an opportunity to identify and authenticate said documents and that Auditor Rugayan had no personal knowledge of the contents thereof. Petitioner in his supplemental pleading claims to have been deprived of his constitutional rights under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner alleges that nothing in his sworn statement shows compliance with the constitutional provisions on the right to counsel, the right to remain silent and the right to waive these rights in the presence of counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel HELD: NO. The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit. Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only when a person is under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody investigation." Custodial investigation has been defined as any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The fact-finding investigation relative to the missing postage stamps at the Postage Stock Section of Zamboanga City conducted by a Enrique G. Saavedra, Chief Postal Service Officer, is not a custodial investigation. It is merely an administrative investigation. While an investigation conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. It has been held in the case of Lumiqued v. Exevea that the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. Moreover, the sworn statements executed by the petitioner and his co-accused were offered not to prove the truth or falsity of the facts stated therein but only to prove that such written statements were actually made and executed. As stated in the Resolution of the respondent court, the documents were admitted only as part of the testimony of the Examining Auditor. Hence, said sworn statements cannot be considered as hearsay evidence.

PEOPLE V. TAN 286 SCRA 207 FACTS: This is an appeal from the Decision of the Manila RTC, finding the accused CHUA TAN LEE guilty of unlawfully selling 966.50 grams of shabu in a buy-bust operation conducted by the PNP Narcotics Group and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua. In the morning of November 12, 1998, a confidential informant arrived at the PNP Narcotics Group, Intelligence Division, in Camp Crame and reported to Chief Inspector Leonardo Suan about the illegal drug activities of accused CHUA TAN LEE, alias William Chua. After evaluating the report, Suan formed a buy-bust team composed of himself, SPO1 Romeo Velasquez, SPO1 Pongyan, Delos Santos and SPO3 Posero. Velasquez was to act as the poseur-buyer and the others as back-up members. The informant called up the accused and set-up a drug deal for the purchase of one (1) kilo of shabu worth P1.5M at the Harrison Plaza parking area in Malate, Manila, at 4PM. Velasquez prepared the P1.5M boodle money to be used in the buy-bust operation. It consisted of 15 bundles of newspaper pieces, cut into the size of paper money, each bundle representing P100,000.00. Suan gave him two (2) pieces of P1,000 bill which he put on top and at the bottom of the boodle. The boodle money was placed inside a paper bag. The buy-bust team then proceeded to the designated parking area and waited for the accused who arrived in a red Toyota Corolla after about half an hour. Velasquez and the informant approached the accuseds car to meet the accused and secure the deal. Upon being assured of the good quality of the drugs and being handed the bag containing the shabu by th accused, Velasquez paid him with the boodle money, immediately scratched his nose as a signal to his back-up team that the deal was consummated, and then arrested the accused. SPO1 Pongyan recovered the boodle money from the accused and the team brought the accused to Camp Crame where Titong and Suan placed the money in the safekeeping cabinet. The defense, however, sought to establish their theory of hulidap through the testimonies of the accused, his girlfriend Kin Yu and uncle Mauricio Sy Lim who alleged that after the couple failed to buy dried mangoes in Tutuban and opted instead to buy some pizza that they could eat on their way home, the accused was ganged upon by police officers who demanded a million pesos. Refusing to pay, accused was allegedly charged with illegal possession of regulated drugs. ISSUE: W/N the court erred in finding the accused guilty as charged HELD: No. The appellant claims that the prosecution evidence is full of inconsistencies such as errors in the preparation of the documents relative to his arrest and allegedly erroneous details with regards the evidence. His contentions are without merit. In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. The testimonies of the buy-bust team established that an operation was legitimately and successfully carried out on November 12, 1998 to entrap appellant. The positive identification of appellant by poseur-buyer SPO1 Romeo Velasquez as the one who peddled the shabu unequivocally established the illicit sale as he is the best witness to the transaction. Moreover, his testimony was corroborated in every material detail by the other operatives who participated in the buybust operation. The Court is not unaware that in drug-related cases, frame-up and hulidap are the common and standard line of defenses. In the case at bar, we find that the discrepancies cited by the appellant in support of his acquittal are immaterial and insufficient to reverse his conviction. It is settled that the exact date when the crime was committed need not be proved unless it is an essential element of the crime. Nonetheless, in this case, prosecution witnesses and anti-narcotics operatives Velasquez, Pongyan and Titong narrated in detail the events leading to the arrest of the appellant pursuant to a legitimate buy-bust operation. The wrong date of arrest, the description of the drugs being in a heat-sealed bag and the date in the boodle money also respectively appear to be a mere clerical error and a mistake. There is also nothing in the records to show that the appellant identified by name or described the features of any of his supposed captors who he could not even easily identify during the officers appearance in open court. Judgment affirmed with modification as to the penalty of fine D. The right to remain silent PEOPLE V. BANDIN G.R. NO. 176531 APRIL 24, 2009 FACTS: For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, which found appellant Romeo Bandin guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The complaint read: That on or about May 21, 1993, at 12.30 P.M., at Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, accused-appellant Bandin, with force and intimidation, had carnal knowledge with complainant-victim, AAA, a 16 [-year] old woman, against her will.

On August 20, 1993, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest. It could not be served on appellant, however, as he could not be found. On May 4, 1994, another warrant of arrest was issued. This was returned on January 20, 1999. On the same date, appellant was committed to the city correctional officer of Cagayan de Oro City. On arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial ensued. The prosecution presented 2 witnesses, namely: the victim, AAA, and Dr. Aziel Diel, a pathologist of the Northern Mindanao Regional Training Hospital who conducted the vaginal examination of AAA. During the trial, the prosecution established that on May 21, 1993, AAA and her older sister, BBB, went to sleep in their hut in Agora, Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City at about 7:00 p.m. Their other siblings and parents were then in Batinay and Lanao del Norte, respectively. AAA woke up at past midnight because she felt a heavy burden on top of her. It was a naked man who was holding her tightly and who uttered in a commanding voice, "Don't move!" She recognized the man's voice as belonging to her brother-in-law, the appellant. She shouted for help several times but no one responded. She was too frightened to resist appellant because he was armed with a long firearm which he placed beside her. AAA's sister, BBB, was awakened because of the commotion. Fearing that she would be appellant's next victim, she ran out of the house. After having his way with the victim, appellant warned her to keep silent about the incident; otherwise, he would kill her and her parents. Subsequently, appellant fled from the scene, leaving the victim crying from the pain she felt in her vagina. She then discovered that there was blood and semen in it. Alarmed, she went to the house of her aunt, CCC and relayed the whole incident to her. The victim also reported the incident to her father the following morning. However, it took her father several days to decide on what to do as he was afraid of appellant who was a member of the Citizen Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) in Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City. AAA finally submitted herself a week later to a physical examination conducted by Dr. Diel. The medical certificate revealed that "there were healed lacerations which indicated that sexual intercourse had indeed occurred. The defense presented the testimonies of appellant and his fellow CAFGU members, Isidro Encoy and Junifer Baal. Appellant's defense hinged on denial and alibi. He further asserted that his in-laws merely fabricated the charges against him because they blamed him for the death of his daughter which caused his wife, DDD (AAA's other sister), to become insane. On rebuttal, AAA denied fabricating the charges leveled against her brother-in-law. She countered that she would not want to undergo humiliation just to get back at appellant. She also denied harboring any hatred against appellant because she was only 4 years old when her niece (appellant's daughter) died in 1980. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. HELD: The Court affirmed the decision of the CA with modifications. It held that AAA's testimony was credible as she delivered her testimony in a clear, direct and positive manner. Through his voice, she positively identified appellant as the man who sexually abused her. Identification of an accused by his voice has been accepted, particularly in cases where, as in this case, the victim has known the perpetrator for a long time. Consequently, appellant's defense of denial and alibi must crumble in the face of AAA's positive and clear identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime. Denial and alibi cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical. However, the amount of exemplary damages awarded to private complainant was reduced from P50,000 to P30,000 in line with recent jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Romeo Bandin is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. He is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim AAA P50,000 civil indemnity, P50,000 moral damages and P30,000 exemplary damages. People v. Lacbanes 270 SCRA 193 Grajo E. The right to counsel a. When to invoke PEOPLE V. SUNGA, GR 126029, MAR. 29, 2003 FACTS: Appellants Sunga and Lansang were found guilty by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of death. Appellant Pascua was found guilty by the trial court of the crime of rape and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The conviction of appellants was based primarily on the testimony of Locil, an accused who turned state witness. Hence, the automatic review of the case. ISSUE: WON appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt? HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that from the records, it appeared that the following conditions for Locil's discharge under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court were satisfied: 1. The discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought to be a state witness; 2. His testimony is absolutely necessary; 3. No other direct evidence is available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed except his testimony; 4. His testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points; 5. He does not appear to be the most guilty; and 6. He has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest. Appellant Sunga's extrajudicial admissions are inadmissible in evidence and cannot give corroborative support to Locil's testimony because he was denied the right to counsel during the execution of the said admissions. As an exception to the general rule on the requirement of corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice or co-conspirator-turned state witness, her testimony may, even if uncorroborated, be sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature, could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. An exhaustive review of the transcript of stenographic notes of Locil's testimony revealed, however, that the manner by which she related it was punctuated with marks of tentativeness, uncertainty and indecisiveness which the trial court unfortunately failed to take note of in its decision on review. This Court thus found her uncorroborated account to have failed the jurisprudentially established touchstone for its credibility and sufficiency, that of straightforwardness and deliberateness, as evidence to warrant appellant's conviction. The Supreme Court acquitted appellants for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. PEOPLE V. LABTAN, G.R. NO. 127493, DECEMBER 8, 1999 FACTS: On April 23, 1993, information was filed against Henry Feliciano, Orlando Labtan and Jonelto Labtan charging them with robbery with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan De Oro City. Subsequently, another information was filed against Henry Feliciano and Orlando Labtan charging them with highway robbery. Upon arraignment, only Feliciano pleaded not guilty to the two charges. Orlando Labtan had escaped, while Jonelto Labtan had eluded arrest. The two cases were tried together. After trial on the merits, the trial court found Henry Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The lower court likewise convicted him for the crime of highway robbery. In convicting the appellant, the trial court relied on the sworn statement executed by herein appellant before the Cagayan De Oro Police Station and the testimony of one Ismael Ebon. Aggrieved by the decision, herein appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: WON the defendant was deprieved of his right to have a competent counsel.

HELD: "[T]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense. The moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel." We find that accused-appellant Feliciano had been denied of his right to have a competent and independent counsel when he was questioned in the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez testified that he started questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of April 22, 1993 regarding his involvement in the killing of jeepney driver Florentino Bolasito, notwithstanding the fact that he had not been apprised of his right to counsel. b. When presence of counsel is required PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZ , G.R. NO. 129211, OCTOBER 2, 2000 FACTS: Appellant Larry Artellero and Wilfredo Rodriguez, employed as construction workers in the upper floors of the Far East Bank and Trust Company, located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide for the killing of the bank security guard, Ramon Matias y Ibay, whose lifeless body was discovered by a messenger inside the bank premises early morning of October 11, 1991. The body was found hogtied with 32 stab wounds. At around 4:00 P.M., SPO3 Jamoralin and four other WPD policemen conducted a follow-up investigation. They that there was an on-going construction on the upper floors of the bank, and that appellant and his co-accused had access to the bank after office hours. SPO3 Jamoralin went to the barracks of the construction workers where they saw appellant at the ground floor of the construction site. On the third floor, they saw the co-accused Rodriguez, packing his personal belongings. When asked why he was packing, Rodriguez replied that he had "nothing more to do (at the site)." SPO3 Jamoralin and the other police officers saw a pair of worn-out "maong" pants on appellant's bed, which had reddish stains on the right leg. The police also saw reddish stains on accused's shirt. Rodriguez explained that he had a wound on his neck. However, when the police examined his neck, they found no wound. The police then arrested Rodriguez and appellant and brought them to the police station for interrogation. The police took the maong and t-shirt and had them examined by the Chemistry Section of National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On October 15, 1991, Rodriguez executed a sworn statement confessing that he and appellant together with one Rading Mendoza, and two other men whose names he did not know, killed Matias. Rodriguez was assisted by Atty. Procopio Lao III, of the Public Attorney's Office. Upon arraignment on November 22, 1991, appellant and Rodriguez entered their respective pleas of not guilty. On the stand, both Rodriguez and appellant admitted that they were province mates from Masbate and co-workers in the construction site. They slept inside the building on the night before the incident but denied any participation in killing. They claimed that they learned of the killing only on October 11, 1991, at around 7:00 A.M., when they saw many people milling around the area. Rodriguez claimed that on the night of October 11, 1991, he was mauled by policemen to confess to the crime. Appellant, on his part, testified that the policemen merely placed him outside the room where Rodriguez was being interrogated, and that the police did not take any statement from him. Appellant also denied owning the maong pants which the police said were taken from his bed. The trial court found them guilty of murder. Both appealed. However, Rodriguez withdrew his appeal for financial reasons. Instead of filing an Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee's Brief. The OSG points out that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a conspiracy between appellant and Rodriguez independent of the extrajudicial confession of the latter. ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of accused Rodriguez is admissible not only against him but also against appellant Artellero HELD: NO. Appellant Artellero and co-accused Rodriguez are ACQUITTED of the crime of murder. Rodriguez's sworn statement confessing that he and appellant together with three other men, killed Matias, was taken in violation of the safeguards in Art. III, Sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution, hence, could not be used against him and appellant. When Rodriguez and appellant were arrested by the police in the afternoon of October 11, 1991, they were already the suspects in the slaying of the security guard, Ramon Matias, and should have been afforded the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12 of the 1987

Constitution, particularly the right to counsel. The records do not show that Rodriguez and appellant, at the time of their arrest in the afternoon of October 11, 1991, were informed of the well-known Miranda rights. Worse, they were not provided with competent and independent counsel during the custodial investigation prior to the execution of the extrajudicial confession. The four fundamental requisites for the admissibility of a confession are (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. We find the second requisite lacking. Prosecution witness SPO3 Jamoralin testified that the accused and appellant were arrested and brought to the police station at around 5:00 P.M. of October 11, 1991. The records show that the extrajudicial confession of Rodriguez was taken down by Pat. David D. Tuazon at 2:00 P.M. of October 15, 1991. Atty. Lao confirmed on the stand that the police investigators called him at around 2:00 P.M. of October 15, 1991, and that he conferred with the accused for about 10 minutes prior to the execution of the extrajudicial confession. Evidently, Rodriguez and appellant were detained for four days, but Atty. Lao of the PAO was called only on the fourth day of detention when accused was about to put his confession in writing. Under the factual milieu, the moment accused and appellant were arrested and brought to the police station they were already under custodial investigation. So stringent is this requirement that even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion, or even if it had been voluntarily given. Since the extrajudicial confession executed by Rodriguez was given in violation of the safeguards in Art. III, Sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution, we hold that Rodriguez's confession is totally inadmissible, and it was error for the trial court to use it in convicting Rodriguez and appellant. Moreover, the maong pants allegedly belonging to appellant stained with blood had no probative value since the blood type of appellant and the victim were not taken for purposes of comparison. PEOPLE V. BANDULA - 232 SCRA 566,MAY 27, 1994 FACTS: Six armed men barged into the compound of Polo CoconutPlantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental. The armed men were identified by Security Guard, including accused. Salva and Pastrano, security guards were hogtied and accused proceeded to the Atty. Garay, counsel of plantation. They ransacked the place and took with them money and other valuables. Atty. Garay was killed. Accusedappellant is charged with robbery with homicide along with 3 others who were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant was convicted. Now, appellant argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choice.Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged. ISSUE: Whether or Not extrajudicial confessions of appellant is admissible as evidencea gainst him. HELD: No. When accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in Sec. 12, Art. III. Irregularities present include: 1. 2. 3. The investigators did not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of their own choice, even before attempting to elicit statements that would incriminate them. Investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests of the accused for medical assistance. Reason for Accused Sedigos "black eye" which even Pat. Baldejera admitted is not established, as well as Bandulas fractured rib. Counsel must be independent. He cannot be a special counsel,public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.

c. Effective and vigilant counsel defined People v. Sunga, GR 126029, March 27, 2003 FACTS: On July 12, 1994, the mutilated body of Jocelyn Tan (Jocelyn), a minor and a high school student of Palawan Integrated National

School, (PINS), was found at a coffee plantation in Jacana, Barangay Bancao-Bancao in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. Accused in the Information were Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice. Appellants Sunga and Lansang were found guilty by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of death. Appellant Pascua was found guilty by the trial court of the crime of rape and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The conviction of appellants was based primarily on the testimony of Locil, an accused who turned state witness. Hence, the automatic review of the case. The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest. Appellant Sunga's two extrajudicial confessions, which strictly speaking were admissions for they referred to statements of fact which did not directly involve an acknowledgement of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he was charge, could have lent corroborative support to Locil's testimony, having likewise given details of how the crime took place. ISSUE: Whether or not Sunga's admissions is admissible as evidence, not only against him but also against his co-accused appellants. HELD: Appellant Sunga's extrajudicial admissions are inadmissible in evidence and cannot give corroborative support to Locil's testimony because he was denied the right to counsel during the execution of the said admissions. A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is guaranteed the following rights by the Constitution: 1. The right to remain silent; 2. The right to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice, and to be provided with one if he cannot afford the services of counsel; and 3. The right to be informed of these rights. The right to counsel was denied. Sunga during his execution of Exhibit "A" admission before the police on the ground that the counsel who assisted him, Atty. Agustin Rocamora, was the City Legal Officer of Puerto Princesa. In People v. Bandula, this Court made it sufficiently clear that the independent counsel for the accused in custodial investigations cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. A legal officer of the city, like Atty. Rocamora, provides legal aid and support to the mayor and the city in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, which includes maintenance of peace and order and, as such, his office is akin to that of a prosecutor who unquestionably cannot represent the accused during custodial investigation due to conflict of interest. That Sunga chose him to be his counsel, even if true, did not render his admission admissible. Being of a very low educational attainment, Sunga could not have possibly known the ramifications of his choice of a city legal officer to be his counsel. The duty of law enforcers to inform him of his Constitutional rights during custodial interrogations to their full, proper and precise extent does not appear to have been discharged. Notatu dignum is the fact that nothing in the records shows that Atty. Rocamora exerted efforts to safeguard Sunga's rights and interests, especially that of his right not to be a witness against himself. In fact, glaringly, Atty. Rocamora was not even made to testify so he could have related the extent of legal assistance he extended to Sunga at the police station. From the foregoing testimony of SPO2 Janoras, it can be gathered that Atty. Rocamora did not, if at all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options prior to giving his (Sunga's) admission. Evidently, Atty. Rocamora, without more, merely acted to facilitate the taking of the admission from Sunga. Moreover, that Sunga was first questioned by SPO4 Pantollano and Patrolman Bolos before he was investigated by SPO2 Janoras does not escape the attention of this Court. Although Sunga failed to present evidence as to the maltreatment he claimed to have suffered in the hands of SPO4 Pantollano and Patrolman Bolos, he did not have any lawyer by his side at the time these two policemen started asking him questions about Jocelyn's death. At that point, Sunga was already under custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel. Custodial investigation is the stage "where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has

begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements (Italics in the original; Emphasis supplied.). Under such circumstances, this Court cannot but entertain serious misgivings as to the admission Sunga subsequently gave to SPO2 Janoras. Like Exhibit "A," Sunga's second extrajudicial admission-Exhibit "I" is inadmissible, due to the absence of counsel to assist him when he executed it on August 3, 1994 before the NBI of Puerto Princesa City. Although Sunga declared in open court that he made such admission in connection with his desire to apply as state witness which admission he later repudiated, this does not make Exhibit "I" admissible. Sunga was at the time still under detention at the NBI office and had been languishing in jail since his arrest in mid-July 1994. His desire to regain his freedom is not difficult to understand, he having lost it once due to his conviction for another crime. His admission which was done without the benefit of counsel consisted of answers to questions propounded by the investigating agent of the NBI and not of a unilateral declaration of his participation in the crime. To this Court, these conditions are constitutive of an atmosphere pervading that of a custodial investigation and necessitating the assistance of a competent and independent counsel of Sunga's choice as a matter of right but which he had none. Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel must be struck down as inadmissible. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth or even if it had been voluntarily given, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible. The waiver by Sunga of his right to counsel as contained in his sworn statement-Exhibit "I" was not a valid waiver for, on its face, it was executed not in the presence of counsel, contrary to the express requirement of the Constitution. Sunga having had no counsel when he made his admission before the NBI and his waiver of the right to have one being invalid, his statement-Exhibit "I" is inadmissible. The testimony of Sunga during the preliminary investigation before the Municipal Trial Court whereby he expressly acknowledged having executed Exhibit "A" and affirmed the contents thereof did not render his extrajudicial admission into a judicial one which could be used against him and his co-appellants. Neither could his other statements in such proceeding admitting his participation in the crime be utilized to establish his and the other appellants' guilt. For in that preliminary investigation, Sunga again was effectively denied of his essential right to counsel. Atty. Rocamora was appointed Sunga's counselde officio but just like the assistance he extended during the execution of Exhibit "A," Atty. Rocamora utterly did nothing in defense of Sunga's cause. While Sunga was being asked by the judge a barrage of questions calling for answers which could and did incriminate him, Atty. Rocamora did not offer the slightest objection to shield his client from the damning nature thereof. The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed "critical stages" in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution. In the case at bar, Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did have a counsel, for the latter's lack of vigilance and commitment to Sunga's rights, he was virtually denied his right to counsel. The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections; rather it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. As in People v. Abano where the confession by the therein accused in the preliminary investigation was excluded as inadmissible due to the absence of her counsel, this Court will not admit Sunga's. This makes it unnecessary to discuss and emphasize the conflict on material points of Sunga's and Locil's accounts of the incident. -------In light of the weak evidence for the prosecution, the defense of alibi as well as of denial by appellants is accorded credence, for it is precisely when the prosecution's case is weak that the defense of alibi assumes importance and becomes crucial in negating criminal liability. It bears noting that the alibi proffered by appellants, especially that by Lansang, had been corroborated. WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellants Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang and Inocencio Pascua in Criminal Case No. 11984 the decision therein is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED and said appellants are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. d. Assistance after start of custodial investigation PEOPLE V. MATIGNAS, 379 SCRA 56 FACTS: Up for review in this case is the decision of RTC San Mateo finding the appellants guilty of Rape w/ Homicide against one Cherry Olaez and sentencing them to death.

According to the antecedent facts, On January 10, 1994, at past 2:00 oclock in the morning, Herminia Olaez woke up so that she could fetch her daughter, the victim who would be coming home from her work. Shortly before 3:00 oclock in the morning, Herminia and her other daughter Yolanda proceeded to the waiting shed, which was about three minutes walk from their house. They stayed at the waiting shed waiting for Cherry until past 4:00 oclock in the morning but she did not arrive. So they decided to go home because Herminia had to cook food for Yolanda who had to leave for work later. Soon after, neighbors called Hermina inquiring if Cherry was already home as they found her ID as well as articles of clothing in the alleyways. They discovered the body soon after. At around 5:35 oclock in the morning, SPO2 Santos of the Montalban PNP was informed of the incident and he proceeded to the vacant lot where the body was found. There he found the victims pants, underwear, detached lock of jewelry and detached clip of pants. He estimated the vacant lot to be around 25 to 30 meters from A. Bonifacio Street. While interviewing bystanders, a certain San Pascual told him that the gate of Eulogio Rodriguez Elementary School along the side of A. Bonifacio Street was open, which was however locked upon verification. Soon after, the Medical Examiner arrived and conducted a post-mortem exam confirming that cause of death is a cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock secondary to asphyxia by strangulation. A few days thereafter, the Montalban Police charged a certain Cesar Jablo for the crime after he was singled out in a police line-up by Nelita de la Cruz who pointed to him as the killer because he looked like the man who was tailing the victim before her death. Later, however, the case against Jablo was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. State Prosecutor Malenab-Hornilla accordingly returned the case to the Montalban Police and also indorsed it to the NBI for further investigation. Senior NBI Agent Reverva formally coordinated with the Montalban Police on the investigation of the case. Thereafter, new witnesses came out in the person of Benjamin Hernandez and Ernesto Fernandez who claimed that they saw appellants Matignas and de Guzman tail and grab the victim beside the ERES gate along A. Bonifacio St. at around past 2:00 oclock in the morning of January 10, 1994. On July 25, 1994, Benjamin Hernandez executed his affidavit before the NBI attesting to what he saw that early morning of January 10, 1994. The next day, on July 26, 1994, appellant Noel de Guzman was confronted by NBI agents about the incident. He readily signified willingness to cooperate and give his statement, which he did on July 27, 1994, with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Florante Dizon. On July 27, 1997, Benjamin Hernandez went to the NBI and in a line up positively identified both appellants Matignas and de Guzman as the victims assailants. Later, on August 1, 1994, Nelita de la Cruz also appeared before the NBI and she positively identified appellant de Guzman as the person whom she saw following the victim that early morning of January 10, 1994. This time de la Cruz was certain. She explained that she had earlier mistaken Jablo for de Guzman because of similarities in their features, build and the manner in which they walk. The trial court gave full credence to the positive identification of Nelita de la Cruz and others as well as their statements that defendant was tailing victim before her death. The court also took into consideration that another suspect, De Guzman confessed that both he and his co-appellant raped and killed the victim. ISSUE: WON the ruling of the trial court is untenable due to the alleged weakness of circumstantial evidence against appellants. HELD: The court found the petition partly meritorious as the prosecutions witnesses has submitted testimonies that though not conflicting, has failed to agree on certain details. The appellant also contended that some of the witnesses, especially Nelita dela Cruz cannot be given full credence as she initially stood as witness against Cesar Jablo. Also some of the witnesses has remained silent and revealed their knowledge only 6 months after the killings. As for the weight of the circumstantial evidence, This Court has iterated that there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator of the crime. Circumstantial evidence is defined as that which indirectly proves a fact in issue an inference which the factfinder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free. In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz., (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The following circumstances form the unbroken chain which lead us to conclude beyond moral certainty that appellants were the culprits: First, the testimony of Hernandez, who just came from a jueteng lottery, that he saw a man following a girl and upon reaching A. Bonifacio Street another man appeared who likewise tailed her; upon reaching the ERES gate, both men suddenly embraced, pulled and grabbed the girl (whom he later learned to be the victim) around 3:45 a.m. on January 10, 1994. Second, Fernandez, who was with Hernandez at that time because he also participated in the said lottery, gave a similar testimony. Third, Dela Cruz narrated that she saw the victim in the wee hours of the morning and that she was being followed by Appellant De Guzman. Fourth, Perez said that he also observed Matignas near the gambling place during that time.

Fifth, the finding of the body of the victim at a vacant lot near the ERES school. Sixth, the finding of the Matignas bullcap near the place where the body of the victim was found. Seventh, the admission of Appellant Matignas that he was out prowling his neighborhood in the early hours of the morning of January 10, 1994. Eight, appellants were the last persons seen with the victim before her corpse was found a few hours thereafter. Ninth, Hernandez, Fernandez, Dela Cruz, and Perez had no ill motive to testify against appellants. From the foregoing circumstances, it is undisputed that appellants were physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity, and that several eyewitnesses positively identified them as the same persons who tailed, embraced and pulled the victim in front of the gate of the ERES school along A. Bonifacio Street before her body was discovered at a vacant lot near the said school. e. Valid Confession with Counsel PEOPLE V. ORANZA, GR 127748, JULY 25, 2002 FACTS: That on the 6th day of February 1995 at about 8:00 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less, at barangay Baras, municipality of San Miguel, province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all armed with firearm and bladed weapons, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the residence of Remedios Guardo and once inside, with intent to gain and by means of violence upon person, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away items with a total value of P11,375.95; and on the same occasion, the above-named accused, helping one another, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon Teresa Guardo, against the will of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00; or to their damage and prejudice in the total amount of P61,375.95. CONTRARY TO LAW. (In violation of paragraph 2, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code) His co-accused Lape Martinez and Dondon Suarez are at-large. Accused-appellant Jolito Oranza and his co-accused, Rosfil Montero were duly arraigned to which they pleaded "not guilty". Trial ensued. After the testimonies of the victim Teresa Guardo and her mother, Remedios Guardo, accused-appellant Oranza escaped from jail.3 Trial proceeded in his absence. After the prosecution rested its case, the trial court allowed accused Rosfil Montero to plead guilty to the lower offense of simple Robbery under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code and rendered a decision dated February 26, 1996 convicting accused Rosfil Montero of the simple crime of Robbery. Despite ample time given to the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), as counsel for accused-appellant, it failed to present evidence for the defense as Oranza remained at-large, thereby constraining the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision. Hence, the herein RTC decision subject of automatic review. The PAO filed the appeal brief for accused-appellant Jolito Oranza. As admitted by the PAO, accused-appellant remains a fugitive from justice. However, the Court shall proceed with the review of the decision of the trial court as the penalty imposed is death, which, under Section 10, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, calls for automatic review by the Supreme Court.5 Appellant assails the credibility of the identification made of him by Teresa Guardo and her mother, Remedios Guardo, as one of the perpetrators of the crime of Robbery with Rape. He points out that Teresa admitted on the witness stand that it was dark inside their house; that she did not recognize Lape Martinez, Dondon Suarez and appellant Jolito Oranza while they were taking turns raping her; that she recognized appellant only because all the accused including appellant, "flashlighted their faces and asked us if we knew them"; that she recognized appellant as the one who raped her because he was fat; that Remedios admitted that she did not know appellant. Appellant argues that it is unusual for Teresa and Remedios to recognize him by means only of the thin radiance of the flashlight; that since the face of the appellant was not illumined when Teresa's valuables were taken or when she was tied up and raped, he could not be held accountable for said acts because he could not be positively associated with said acts; that the fact that he was with his other co-accused does not necessarily imply that he committed the crime of Robbery with Rape. ISSUE:

Whether or not the confession made by appellant with the counsel shall be admissible evidence against him. HELD: 5. The extrajudicial confession, Exhibit "B",24 of appellant himself bolsters the finding that appellant is guilty as charged. It was identified by SPO3 Balan on the witness stand, he being present when appellant affixed his signature on the written confession.25 He categorically testified that before appellant gave his extrajudicial confession, he was informed of all his constitutional rights, that appellant was duly assisted by Atty. Teofilo B. Manuel, Jr., District Public Attorney of the PAO, Department of Justice; and that appellant subscribed and swore to the voluntary execution of said confession before Municipal Trial Judge Jose M. Garcia. Under rules laid down by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all four fundamental requirements, namely: 1. The confession must be voluntary; 2. The confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3. The confession must be express; and 4. The confession must be in writing. All the above requirements were complied with and therefore the extrajudicial confession of guilt is admissible in evidence against him. Defense was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine said witness but appellant chose to be a fugitive from justice. His counsel objected to the admission of the extrajudicial confession for being hearsay but the trial court admitted the same as part of the testimony of prosecution witness Balan. Notably, appellant did not attack the admissibility of Exhibit "B" in his Brief. But even if we discard Exhibit "B", the testimony of Teresa and the other facts and circumstances heretofore enumerated are sufficient to sustain the conviction of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur (Branch 27) convicting accused Jolito Oranza y Loyola of the complex crime of Robbery with Rape, imposing upon him the supreme penalty of DEATH40 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS only as to the damages awarded to the offended parties in that accused Jolito Oranza y Loyola is ordered: to pay private complainant Teresa and Remedios Guardo the amount of Eight Thousand Seven Hundred (P8,700.00) as and for actual damages; to pay Teresa Guardo the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity in addition to the moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) awarded by the trial court, for each of the three (3) counts of rape, or, a total of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00); and to pay Teresa, Remedios and Biolo Guardo the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as and for exemplary damages. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE V. CANICULA, GR 131802, AUG. 6, 2002 FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide and was sentenced to death. By his extrajudicial statement, he admitted that he boxed the victim, Merlinda Callada four times until the victim fell into the river. The next day, the victim was discovered dead and naked. Based on the autopsy report, the victim suffered serious injuries on the head and face which proved to be fatal. Fresh wounds and minimal bleeding were also found in the victim's vagina. In its Decision dated October 7, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 15, Tabaco, Albay, finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death. ISSUE: Whether or not appellant should be convicted based on the extrajudicial statement obtained from him HELD: The trial court admitted the extra-judicial statement executed by the accused-appellant on December 29, 1996 and found it not to be vitiated. The accused-appellant was duly assisted at that time by a competent counsel in the person of Atty. Danilo Brotamonte from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). When called to testify in court for the prosecution, Atty. Brotamonte asserted that he was called by the police to assist the accused-appellant when the latter's statement was taken. He made sure that the contents thereof were duly explained and understood by the accused-appellant before his signature was affixed. The extra-judicial statement is tantamount to a confession voluntarily given by the accused where the recitals therein are his own and contains details which the accused-appellant is in a position to know. A confession is evidence of the highest order because it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind could deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless he is prompted by truth and conscience. The presumption of spontaneity and voluntariness stands unless the defense proves otherwise.

By the extra-judicial statement, the accused-appellant readily admitted that he was at the scene of the crime with the victim. While walking towards Jonop at 7:15 in the evening of December 25, 1996, he was following a woman until he caught up with her. He suddenly boxed her four times which caused the victim to fall into the river. He recognized the victim to be Merly Callada because he recognized her voice when she allegedly shouted back at him. The next day, the victim was discovered dead and naked. The autopsy report sufficiently reveals that the victim suffered serious injuries on her head and face which proved to be fatal. The extra-judicial statement coupled with the corpus delicti and the autopsy report lead to the conclusion that the accused-appellant is responsible for the death of the victim. The Court, however, finds that the prosecution has not presented that standard of proof required by a law in proving the crime of rape. The extra-judicial statement of the accused-appellant does not mention that he raped the victim. The accused-appellant merely admitted that he boxed the victim four times until the victim fell into the river. The medical report categorically states that there is no finding of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina. While the medical report states that there are fresh wounds and minimal bleeding found, this does not, however, prove that it was the accused-appellant's penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina. Absent any conclusive and categorical evidence that the laceration on the victim's vagina was caused by a male organ, the accusedappellant can not be held for rape.

f.

Confession without Counsel PEOPLE V. CASIMIRO, GR 146277, JUNE 20, 2002

FACTS: Accused-appellant was found guilty by the trial court of violating Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act as amended, for selling or delivering 904.6 grams of marijuana brick. The policemen took him to the 14th Narcom Office, where PO2 Supa, SPO2 Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay wrote their initials on the brick of marijuana before giving it to the evidence custodian. The policemen prepared a booking sheet and arrest report, affidavits, and a request for the laboratory examination of the confiscated marijuana. They also prepared a "receipt of property seized," dated August 18, 1999, (Exh. L) which states: 18 August 1999 RECEIPT OF PROPERTY SEIZED

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I, SPO2 Marquez K. Madlon PNP, the undersigned seizing Officer have seized and taken possession of the property described hereunder from the a. b. c. Suspect: ALBERT CASIMIRO Y SERILLO, 24 yrs. old, single, waiter, native of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and resident of #2 Happy Homes, Old Lucban, Baguio City. Facts of the case: Suspect was arrested by elements of this office on or about 181330H August 1999, in front of Anthony's Grocery along the vicinity of Post Office Loop, Baguio City. Nature of the Case: Violation of Section 4 Art. II of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659.

Accused-appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of counsel. The dried leaves were then examined by the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Cordillera Administrative Region. Police officer and forensic chemist Alma Margarita Villaseor found the specimen to weigh 904.6 grams. The chemistry report dated August 20, 1999, signed by Villaseor, stated that the leaves were positive for marijuana. ISSUE: WON such receipt is valid without the assistance of counsel? HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that although the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, the rule does not apply where it is shown that any fact of weight and substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court. In this case, several such circumstances stand out as having been overlooked or misapprehended by the lower court which entitle appellant to an acquittal. In the case at bar, appellant signed the receipt stating that he delivered a brick of dried marijuana leaves to a poseur buyer. Having been made without the assistance of counsel, it cannot be accepted as proof that marijuana was seized from him. It is inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti of

the offense, an essential requirement in a drug-related case. The Supreme Court acquitted appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt. g. Failure to Object to Confession made without Counsel PEOPLE V. SAMUS, GR 135957, SEPT. 17, 2002 FACTS: For automatic review by this Court is the Decision dated October 8, 1998 in Criminal Case Nos. 5015-96-C and 5016-96-C finding Samus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of murder. The trial court found enough pieces of circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Rejecting his alibi for being unreliable and uncorroborated, it convicted him of homicide for the death of Dedicacion Balisi; and of murder, with dwelling as aggravating circumstance, for the death of John Ardee Balisi. ISSUE: Whether or not the Lower Court gravely erred in admitting and considering evidence that were obtained in violation of the accused's constitutional rights. HELD: In their Joint-Affidavit, the arresting officers said that after appellant had initially jumped from a two-story house to escape, they closed in on him and he voluntarily surrendered. At the same place where he did so, they conducted a preliminary interview, during which he readily admitted killing Dedicacion and John Ardee Balisi. But during their testimonies, the police officers denied questioning appellant after arresting him. Instead, they claimed that it was Rolly Vallejo who had conducted the preliminary interview in their presence as follows: "Pare totoo ba ang sinasabi nila tungkol sa iyo na ikaw ay pinaghihinalaan nilang pumatay sa mag-lola sa Canlubang[?]"; to this question appellant allegedly answered, "[T]otoo nga pare, ako nga." No further questions were allegedly asked by the law enforcement officers. Instead, they immediately brought appellant to Camp Vicente Lim for further investigation. SPO3 Mario Bitos, on the other hand, stated in his Affidavit, also dated September 11, 1996, that during the conduct of the preliminary interview, appellant admitted "that the victim's pair of earrings made of gold was taken by him after the incident and . . . sold to Mr. Jhun Pontanos y Matriano, a resident of Bgy. Niugan, Cabuyao, Laguna, for the amount of five hundred (P500) pesos." During his testimony, however, Bitos denied that they had conducted any investigation. Instead, he claimed that upon their arrival at Camp San Vicente Lim, an interview was conducted by the media in the presence of Major Pante, SPO3 Bitos and SPO3 Malabanan (the investigator). From this interview, the team was able to cull from appellant that he was responsible for the killings, and that he had stolen the earrings of Dedicacion Balisi and sold them to Pontanos for P500. This information was allegedly verified by Bitos upon the order of Major Pante. Thus, the apprehending officers contend that the constitutional rights of appellant were not violated, since they were not the ones who had investigated and elicited evidentiary matters from him. We are not persuaded. The events narrated by the law enforcers in court are too good to be true. Their Sworn Statements given a day after the arrest contradict their testimonies and raise doubts on their credibility. Appellant claims that his alleged confession to the media while in police custody cannot be admitted in evidence. He further contends that the pair of earrings, the turnover receipt, as well as the testimonies of Pontaos and Bitos, relative thereto should be excluded for being "fruits of the poisonous tree." We clarify. After being illegally arrested, appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel. Hence, any admission elicited from him by the law enforcers during custodial investigation are normally inadmissible in evidence. In their affidavits, the police officers readily admitted that appellant was subjected to a preliminary interview. Yet, during their examination in open court, they tried to skirt this issue by stating that it was only the media that had questioned appellant, and that they were merely present during the interview. However, an examination of the testimonies of the three law enforcers show the folly of their crude attempts to camouflage inadmissible evidence.

In the absence of testimony from any of the media persons who allegedly interviewed appellant, the uncertainties and vagueness about how they questioned and led him to his confession lead us to believe that they themselves investigated appellant and elicited from him uncounselled admissions. This fact is clearly shown by the Affidavits they executed on September 11, 1997, as well as by their testimonies on cross-examination. Nonetheless, even if the uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible, under the present circumstances we cannot rule it out because of appellant's failure to make timely objections. "Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given under custodial investigation and was made without the assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to object to its presentation during the trial, with the result that the defense is deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility." Can the testimony of Pontaos and the picture of a pair of earrings together with the turnover receipt, which appellant identified during his testimony, be considered inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree and hence be disregarded at this stage of appeal? Upon examination of the records, we find that during the entire examination in court of Prosecution Witness Pontaos, appellant did not question or object to the admissibility of the former's testimony. Worse, the latter's counsel even freely cross-examined the witness without any reservations. Having made no objection before the trial court, appellant cannot raise this question for the first time on appeal. The evidence having been admitted without objection, we are not inclined to reject it. If only appellant had made a timely objection to the admissibility of the said testimony, the prosecution could have been warned of the need to present additional evidence to support its case. To disregard unceremoniously a major portion of its case at this late stage when it can no longer present additional evidence as substitute for that which is now claimed to be inadmissible goes against fundamental fairness.

PEOPLE V. AVENDANO, GR 137407, JAN. 28, 2003 FACTS: The principal witness for the prosecution was JEFFRE CASTILLO, an eight-year-old son of the victim Remedios Castillo and brother of the victim Melvin Castillo. In his testimony, he stated that his parents were named Remedios and Boyet; that they were six children in the family, namely, Michael, Dikong, Ape, Manolito, the victim Melvin and himself; and that he was a Grade I pupil at the Aguas Elementary School. He testified that he knows appellant, having known him for about three or four years before the incident of July 29, 1997. On said date, at around 6:00 P.M., ;he saw appellant in their house, looking for his plow and asking if he knew who got it, to which he replied that he did not. While appellant was in their house, his mother was upstairs and his Kuya Melvin was also inside the house. His father and the rest of his brothers and sisters were in Cabanatuan City. He recalled that appellant was then wearing a green t-shirt and shorts, the color of which he could not remember. Thereafter, appellant left. After dinner, he, his mother and brother went to sleep. Before they slept, he recalled they had a pangmagdamagan or overnight lamp which was turned on. That night, according to Jeffre, they slept in the same room. He was suddenly awakened when he heard a commotion (kalambugan). However, by the time he woke up, the room was very dark because the lamp was already turned off. He heard his mother shout, Dikong, tulungan mo kami. When he heard the kalambugan he immediately eased his way to where they kept their pillows and tried to hide. Then, there was silence. Then he heard somebody going downstairs. His brother Melvin lit the lamp, while Jeffre stayed where he was. He then heard the person downstairs going up again. He saw through his blanket that the person had come up: Naaninag ko po sa kumot yung tao. That was when he distinctly heard his Kuya Melvin say, Kuya Willie, tama na, tama na! That was just before Melvin was killed. Jeffre recalled that someone coughed and he recognized the cough as that of his Kuya Willie. He recognized it because he had heard a similar cough on several occasions in the past when appellant frequented their house. He remained where he was until appellant left. Jeffre said he fell asleep and was awakened only the following morning by persistent knocking on their door. He opened the door to find his Ate Annie, Ate Norma and Ate Ann looking for his mother. He then told his Ate Annie that Willerie Avendao killed both his mother Remedios and his Kuya Melvin. He remembered that thereafter, their relatives as well as some policemen arrived. According to witnesses, appellant was the adopted son (or palaki) of an aunt of the Castillo brothers. Appellant had four children. His wife lived in San Roque I, Occidental Mindoro, and seldom visited him. He owned and worked on a seven-hectare farm

adjacent to the lot where the witnesses and the victims lived. He frequented the neighborhood while he bought food and supplies from the store of Juliana. Both witnesses claimed that when appellant was working on his farm, he frequented the house of Remedios, dropping by almost three times a day, especially when the victims husband was not around. He sometimes had coffee or left some of his farm implements there. They claimed that appellant had spent a night there. Juliana further testified that on two occasions prior to the incident, the victim Remedios confided to her that she was angry at appellant because he was courting her. Witness Juliana added she already suspected that fact even before Remedios confided in her, but she did not tell appellants wife because the wife might not believe her. Later, according to SPO2 Dimalaluan, they went to the house of appellant 150 meters away from the crime scene. There they found appellant who had just taken a bath. They asked him what he wore the day of the incident, and appellant pointed to the clothes he was wearing. Doubting appellant, Dimalaluan went inside the house. In the bathroom, a green t-shirt with Landbank print and dark short pants, newly washed and still wet, were hanging from the clothesline. He said he noticed dark stains on them. These were brought to the police station. During Dimalaluans testimony he marked the stains found on the clothes. These, however, were not subjected to laboratory examination. Appellant voluntarily went with the police to the police station, according to Dimalaluan. While detained, appellant made an oral admission that he killed the victims and that he used a knife, said the police officer. Hence, on July 31, 1997, Dimalaluan accompanied appellant back to his house, where appellant got from the cabinet a hunting knife with scabbard and then handed it over to him.According to Dimalaluan, appellants admission was not reduced into writing because when appellant made the admission, he was not assisted by a lawyer. The knife was likewise not subjected to any laboratory examination. ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest and the confinement of appellant are legal; and whether or not the T-shirt and short pants taken from appellant are admissible in evidence. HELD: No. It was error on the part of the trial court, however, to give probative value to the alleged verbal admission made by appellant to SPO2 Dimalaluan. The alleged admission was not reduced into writing. It was obtained in violation of appellants right under custodial investigation. As regards the items of clothing as well as the knife found in and taken from the house of appellant, a search warrant should have been obtained as required under Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. Failing thus, the exclusionary rule applies. Hence neither the knife with scabbard nor the T-shirt with shorts ought to be allowed in evidence. However, with regard to the legality of the arrest and confinement of appellant, it was shown that upon arraignment, appellant voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty without first questioning the legality of his arrest. By so pleading, he has submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. Such act amounted to a waiver of the right to question any irregularity in his arrest. Appellant denies the commission of the crime and interposes the alibi that he was in his house on the night of July 29, 1996. For alibi to stand, it must be shown that not only was appellant somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Appellant failed in this regard. His house was only about 150 to 200 meters from the house of Remedios; it was not impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. Alibi is inherently weak and unreliable, unless corroborated by disinterested witnesses. Since appellant is unable to substantiate his alibi with the testimony of a credible witness, it is reduced to self-serving evidence undeserving of any weight in law. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, in Criminal Case No. R-4227, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant WILLERIE AVENDAO is found GUILTY of two counts of homicide. For each count, there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law. Appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs of each victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, together with the costs. h. Right to be informed PEOPLE V. MANRIQUEZ, GR 122510-11, MARCH 17, 2000 FACTS: Ferdinand Duay and Ernesto Gabuyan, agents of Metrodiscom Anti-Narcotics Unit (MANU), were murdered by Heracleo Manriquez and Gregorio Canoy, who, at the time of the crime, were both minors. Manriquez and Canoy surrendered to the police and pointed

Pat. Romarante as the alleged mastermind. Both accused executed a sworn statement at the residence of Atty. Tanjili (PAO lawyer) on the latter's promise that they would not be implicated in the crime but, instead, be utilized as state witnesses. Later, they executed an extra-judicial confession in the presence of the fiscal, wherein they narrated their participation in the commission of the crime. RTC admitted in evidence the extra-judicial confessions and upheld the validity of the waiver of their right to counsel since the same was executed intelligently and voluntarily in the presence of their mothers and Atty. Tanjili, and with full comprehension of the import, meaning, and consequences of what they had signed. The court also found sufficient evidence showing that the two had acted in concert with and had "willingly followed every command of Romarate." The collective responsibility of the conspirators having been established, it became unnecessary to prove who inflicted the fatal blow. In order to insure that DUAY and GABUYAN could not resist the attack, and to facilitate the execution of the crime without risk to themselves, the conspirators, armed with knives and a gun, tied the hands of DUAY and GABUYAN and gagged their mouths to silence them. To the trial court, this clearly constituted treachery and abuse of superior strength. RTC found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Gregorio was the only one who appealed. GREGORIO maintains that the oral admission and extra-judicial confession he gave before the police authorities cannot be used as evidence against him because his waiver of his rights to remain silent and to counsel during custodial interrogation cannot be characterized as one made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently since: 1. The sworn statement was written in English and there was no proof that the preliminary questions and answers therein were translated, much less a translation after every question and answer in his alleged waiver, into the Visayan-Cebuano dialect, a language spoken and understood by him; 2. There was no proof that he, then only 18 years old and a 4th grader, clearly understood the import and consequences of the waiver which was "couched in broad and general terms"; 3. The sworn statement related only to his alleged disinterest to be represented by a counsel but it did not signify an agreement to make a confession of the crime with which he was charged; 4. He executed the sworn statement not knowing that an extra-judicial confession was attached thereto and; 5. The presence of his mother during the signing of the waiver did not guarantee that the same was done voluntarily and intelligently. ISSUE: Whether or not the waiver of his right to counsel of his own choice was valid and the admission of the extra judicial confession can be used as evidence against him. HELD: Section 12 paragraph I, Article III of the Constitution provides: Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. There rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of the counsel. One's right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. It is not enough for the interrogator to merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of such provision in practical terms e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do and in a language the subject fairly understands. The right to be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject's understanding of what is conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation. In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed of such right; he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he could ask for counsel if he so desired or that one could be provided him at his request. If he decides not to retain a counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must still be made with the assistance of counsel, who, under prevailing jurisprudence, must be a lawyer.

In this case, that no meaningful information as to his rights under custodial interrogation was conveyed to GREGORIO. He was not asked if he wanted to avail of his rights and was not told that if he has no lawyer of his own choice he could avail of one to be appointed for him. Furthermore, the waiver states that he does not want the assistance of counsel and it is not shown that he agreed to be assisted by Atty. Tanjili. Nonetheless, the nullity of the waiver and the expurgation of the extrajudicial confession do not absolve GREGORIO from any criminal responsibility. The evidence on record satisfies us with moral certainty that he and his co-accused conspired together to kill DUAY and GABUYAN and that GREGORIO was not a mere witness to the acts of the others; he himself materially contributed to the pursuant of the conspiracy. PEOPLE V. TIZON, GR 133228, JULY 30, 2002 FACTS: Accused-appellants assail the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 47 convicting them of four counts of rape and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The victim, Cynthia Barena, was 38 years old, single and, as a result of a nervous breakdown, mentally imbalanced. Her mental condition made her the butt of jokes in the neighborhood store. On May 4, 1997, her body was found naked in the rice field at Hacienda Guanzon, Barangay Mansilingan, Bacolod City. She was dead. Zenaida Ladrillo, sister of the victim, learned of her sisters death and quickly proceeded to the rice field where Cynthia's remains were discovered. Cigarette burns dotted the victim's body, her legs splayed over a rice paddy. Cynthia's blouse, overalls and panty were scattered alongside her remains. Also found in the field were a pair of slippers and a rubber sandal which was later found by police to be that of Nestor Crisostomo. From the investigation they conducted, the police were able to identify the suspects to the crime as Godofredo Tizon, Jr., Randy Ubag, Arnold Ladrillo and Nestor Crisostomo. That same morning, the police apprehended suspect Godofredo Tizon, Jr. The following day, Tizon, Jr., allegedly assisted by counsel and after being apprised of his rights, executed a statement admitting his presence at the crime scene and pointed the other suspects to the crime. The accused (Ubag, Ladrillo and Crisostomo) all confessed that they, including Godofredo Tizon, Jr., all took turns raping Cynthia and claimed that the crime was the latters idea. The four suspects were charged with four counts of Rape with Homicide. When arraigned, all four accused pleaded not guilty. To prove that the accused's extra-judicial statements adhered to constitutional requirements, the prosecution offered the testimonies of SPO2 Virgilio Q. Pachoro, who took down the statements of Godofredo Tizon, Jr. and Nestor Crisostomo, PO3 Lorenzo Rios, who took down Randy Ubag's statement, and PO3 Levy Pangue, who recorded Arnold Ladrillo's confession. The police officers invariably testified that they informed the accused of their rights and of the consequences of their acts before their statements were taken down. The prosecution also called to the stand Atty. Serafin Guinalon, who purportedly acted as counsel for all the suspects at the time their statements were taken down. Sometime in May 1997, Police Senior Inspector Pedro Laza, the Station Commander of Mansilingan, informed Atty. Guinalon that the suspects to the killing of Cynthia Barena had already been arrested and needed a lawyer. Known to the four as a leader in the community, Atty. Guinalon was requested to assist in the execution of their extrajudicial statements. The lawyer asked the suspects why they requested him in particular. They replied that they knew him and that he, in turn, knew all of them. Atty. Guinalon conferred with the suspects, who expressly signified their intention to put into writing what happened that fateful night. He explained to them that by making a confession, they would be admitting to the commission of a grave crime, which carried with it a severe penalty. After Atty. Guinalon apprised them of their constitutional rights, the four proceeded to execute their respective statements. Atty. Guinalon was in front of the suspects when they gave their statements and was present during the entire investigation. During the trial, Atty. Guinalon readily identified the affidavits executed by the four and affirmed that they were read and signed by each of them voluntarily. Manuel Cardinal, Jr., Assistant City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, subscribed the extrajudicial statements of the four accused. He testified that before he signed the statement of Godofredo Tizon, Jr. on May 6, 1997, he explained to the suspect the consequences of his action, making sure that the latter understood the contents of his statement. The Assistant City Prosecutor told Tizon, Jr. that the same could be used against him and that he could be severely punished for his crime. On May 8, 1997, Asst. City Prosecutor Cardinal also subscribed the extra-judicial confessions of Randy Ubag, Arnold Ladrillo and Nestor Crisostomo. Prior to the signing of these statements, he asked the suspects if the police threatened them or forced them to sign the statements. They answered that they were not. To avert any compulsion, the prosecutor even asked the police officers to leave his cubicle before asking the suspects any question. He also examined their hands and bodies for any injuries and asked them whether they were promised any reward. He found no signs of injury on the suspects, who categorically declared that they were not threatened and that no reward was promised them. Assistant City Prosecutor Cardinal then instructed them to examine every page of the documents and to sign the statements in the presence of their counsel.

However, on their answers, the four accused pleaded denial and alibi, and disowned their respective statements. All the accused testified on sur-rebuttal. They reiterated that they never engaged the services of Atty. Guinalon and that they were never given the opportunity to read their respective statements. After trial, the RTC rendered its decision convicting the four accused of four counts of rape. The four accused seasonably filed their appeal, questioning their conviction, which was based in large part on the extrajudicial declarations extracted from them allegedly in violation of their constitutional rights. ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the accused that the extra-judicial declarations extracted from them are allegedly in violation of their constitutional rights is true? HELD: NO. The SC held that the right to be informed of one's constitutional rights during custodial investigation refers to an effective communication between the investigating officer and the suspected individual, with the purpose of making the latter understand these rights. Understanding would mean that information transmitted was effectively received and comprehended. Hence, the Constitution does not merely require the investigating officers to "inform" the person under investigation; rather, it requires that the latter be "informed." Records reveal that the police officers who took the extra-judicial statements of each accused categorically declared that before the statements were taken appellants were informed of their right to remain silent and their right to counsel of their own choice. The police made sure that they understood that the statements that they would give could be used against them. The police investigators informed the appellants of their constitutional rights in Ilonggo. Appellants replied that they understood the consequence of their acts and that they were giving their statements voluntarily and freely. Appellants did not offer any evidence that they were forced, coerced or pressured by the police to sign their respective affidavits. Against the positive assertion of the police investigators that they fully apprised appellants of their constitutional rights, appellants' self-serving testimonies' that they were denied of such rights cannot hold water. Appellants did not show that the police investigators were impelled by any ill motive to falsely testify against appellants. In the absence of such motive, police officers are presumed to have acted regularly and to have afforded appellants their constitutional rights when they elicited the extra judicial statements. Moreover, appellants' extra judicial statements were subscribed to before Asst. Prosecutor Manuel Cardinal who testified that he asked the appellants if they were forced by the police to sign their statements. They declared that everything was of their own free will. Prosecutor Cardinal examined appellants' bodies to determine if they were harmed. The prosecutor even told the police to get out of the office to preclude any intimidation. Moved by remorse, appellants said they were giving their statements freely and voluntarily. If Atty. Guinalon was not really appellants' chosen counsel, they could have requested for another lawyer or voiced their objection. Appellants never did but instead voluntarily executed their extra-judicial statements. While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the lawyer's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. Atty. Guinalon further testified that he explained to appellants their constitutional rights and asked them if they understood those rights. He told them the possible consequences of their statements. He even advised them not to give any statement if they were in doubt and to think things over. Still, appellants insisted. Atty. Guinalon told appellants that they have the right not to sign their statements if they think that it may incriminate them. Knowing the gravity of the offense, he took pains to explain to them that they were charged with a grave crime and that by their confessions they would be admitting to the commission of the crime. We agree, therefore, with the trial court's finding that appellants were accorded a competent and independent counsel in the person of Atty. Guinalon. Appellants' contention that they executed their extra-judicial statements are inadmissible because they were induced by promises of leniency fails to persuade this Court. F. Waiver of Rights 1. Requisites of a valid waiver a. Must be in writing and in the presence of counsel PEOPLE V. TALIMAN, GR 109143, OCTOBER 11, 2000 FACTS: The appellants assailed the trial court's decision finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The victim was Renato Cuao (hereinafter referred to as "Renato"). Prosecution witness Ernesto Lacson (hereinafter referred to as "Lacson") was the uncle

and employer of Renato, who was the caretaker of his gravel and sand truck. On July 21, 1990, Renato came to see Lacson and informed him that armed and hooded persons 4 were asking for money amounting to six thousand pesos (P6,000.00). The amount was reduced to six hundred pesos (P600.00) and finally to two hundred pesos (P200.00). On July 22, 1990, Lacson arrived home from church. His wife handed him a letter delivered to her by a child. In the letter, purportedly members of the N.P.A. demanded eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) from him. On the same day, at around eight o'clock in the morning (8:00 a.m.), Lacson instructed Renato to take his passenger jeep and to proceed to his "gold field" in Nalisbitan to get his collectibles from the field. This was the last time Lacson saw Renato alive. Also on the same day, Lacson told his employee, prosecution witness Elizer Obregon (hereinafter referred to as "Elizer"), to go to the crossing of Nalisbitan, the place mentioned in the letter to investigate who the persons demanding money were. Elizer complied and reached the place at around five o'clock in the afternoon (5:00 p.m.) of the same day. Upon reaching the place, Elizer saw Renato and spoke with him. In the vicinity, Elizer saw accused Basilio Baybayan, Pedro Taliman and Amado Belano. At that time, accused Sgt. Pedro Taliman and C1C Basilio M. Baybayan were members of the Camarines Norte Constabulary/Integrated National Police Command. Elizer saw two other civilians in their company. Elizer then saw accused Pedro Taliman and Basilio Baybayan take Renato to a hilltop, where he was guarded by accused who were armed. Elizer heard one of the accused say that Renato must be taken as "he must be acting as a lookout (for Lacson)." Elizer then proceeded to Bagong Silang and reported to Lacson that Renato was taken by accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio Baybayan and Amado Belano. A custodial investigation was conducted. Attorney Nicolas V. Pardo was mayor of Labo, Camarines Norte. He went to the police station upon invitation of police corporal Cereno to "assist" accused during their custodial investigation. Accused executed extrajudicial statements, confessing to the commission of the crime. It was during this custodial investigation that accused Basilio Baybayin confessed to prosecution witness Sgt. Bonifacio Argarin that he participated in the killing of Renato because Renato did not give them the money they were demanding. This confession was given without the assistance of counsel and was not reduced to writing. ISSUE: Whether or not the oral waiver of the accused of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation was valid. HELD: NO. Even assuming that the right to counsel was orally waived during custodial investigation, 43 still the defect was not cured. The Constitution expressly provides that the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. This, accused-appellants did not do. b. Must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent PEOPLE V. NICOLAS - 204 SCRA 191 **note: GIL TAPONG: Accused-appellant. FACTS: Gil Tapong, in two separate informations, was charged with the crimes of robbery with homicide and arson allegedly committed with two other co-accused Dilao and Rodolfo Nicolas. It was alleged that they conspired to steal the cash contents of a steel vault of Ong Tai and by reason or in the occasion thereof, they killed Ong Tai and set his house on fire. At the arraignment, they entered separate pleas of "not guilty" in both cases. The RTC rendered a decision thereby convicting Gil Tapos for the crime of robbery with Homicide. Dilao and Nicolas were then acquitted for failure of prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Meanwhile, all three accused were acquitted for the crime of arson. Dissatisfied with the trial Court's finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide in based on the prosecution evidence, accused-appellant Gil Tapong sought for the courts review, above all issues, (meaning yung constitutional issue lang) on the fact that the trial court erred in taking into consideration the extrajudicial confession of the accused without taking into account the rest of the statements contained therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not admissions made by aaccused-appellant during custodial investigation be admissible as evidence given the fact that he rejected having a lawyer to assist him during such. HELD: No. The admissions made by the accused-appellant during custodial investigation as reflected in his sworn statement cannot be admissible in evidence for his statement before was given in gross violation of his constitutional rights as guaranteed under Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution (now Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution). In the case at bar, the accused-appellant gave an uncounselled confession before the investigating officer who simply asked as one of the preliminary questions before the accused-appellant made his declarations relating to the crime of robbery with homicide. Inasmuch as the records are bereft of any proof that the accused-appellant knowingly rejected having a lawyer assist him during the taking of the extrajudicial confession in question, whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case." After 1987 regardless of whether or not the confession of the accused is true, as long as it was given without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence although it was a product of the accused's own free will and volition in view of the current policy with respect to extrajudicial confessions based on the Bill of Rights. The decision of the RTC is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. PEOPLE V. AGUSTIN - 240 SCRA 541 FACTS: Quiao, the gunman who killed the victims, confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiao was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiao was signed, with the assistance of Atty.Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded the privileges like that of Quiao. Agustins defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at gunpoint at Kennon Road. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not push through since Quiao escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was established hence this appeal ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellants extrajudicial statements are admissible as evidence to warrant conviction HELD: No. The statement of the accused is inadmissible as evidence in court. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused, while an admission is a statement direct or implied of facts pertinent to the issue. The rule on inadmissibility, however expressly includes admissions, not just confessions. The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in twenty-two pages appear to be signed by him and Atty. Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the notes which consists of twelve pages was not signed by the appellant. Since the court cannot even read or decipher the stenographic notes it cannot be expected that appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to read or decipher its contents. Despite asking for his uncle to represent him he was provided with an impartial counsel who is an associate of the private prosecutor. It also appears that some of the transcripts of the notes of the proceeding that show the extrajudicial statement made by the accused were not signed by him. By making his statements the accused voluntarily waived his right to remain silent but that was not put in writing either. It would be in violation of the mandate of custodial investigation to admit the statement of the accused when the process undertaken is one bereft of meeting the standard requirements of the due process that should be accorded to the accused in custodial investigation, hence he should be acquitted. G. Extrajudicial confessions

a. Difference between admission and confession LADIANA V. PEOPLE, GR 144293, DEC. 4, 2002 FACTS: The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty of homicide committed against Francisco San Juan on December 29, 1989 and was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term. In rendering judgment against petitioner, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. It held that the Counter-Affidavit which petitioner executed during the preliminary investigation, in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the victim's death, may be used as evidence against him. It ruled that the Counter-Affidavit had sufficiently established petitioner's responsibility for the death of the victim. Hence, this Petition for Review. Among others, petitioner questioned the admissibility of the Counter-Affidavit, arguing that no counsel was present when the Affidavit was executed. Petitioner further claimed self-defense. In affirming the decision of the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court held that the declarations contained in petitioner's CounterAffidavit were admissions that may be used as evidence against him. The Court ruled that the Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police from the accused without the assistance of competent and independent counsel during a custodial investigation. However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily presented by the accused during the preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be used as evidence against the affiant. The Court further held that the unsubstantiated and uncorroborated statements of petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit were utterly insufficient to discharge his burden of proving that the act of killing was justified. It is hornbook doctrine that self-defense must be proved with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. It cannot be entertained if it is uncorroborated by any separate and competent evidence, and it is also doubtful. The Court found that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence of the justifying circumstance of self-defense or any other circumstance that eliminates criminal liability. Hence, his conviction shall of necessity follow on the basis of his admission of the killing. ISSUE: Whether or not the Counter-Affidavit filed by Josue Ladiana contains admissions that may be used against him? HELD: After vigorously arguing against his own Counter-Affidavit, petitioner, in a surprising change of tenor, implores this Court to consider his voluntary surrender to the police authorities as a mitigating circumstance. He argues that two of the prosecution witnesses testified that he had surrendered to the police authorities after the shooting incident. To buttress his argument, he contends that the "main reason for his voluntary surrender is that he sincerely believe[d] that he was legally justified in defending himself as a policeman when he fought the victim after he was attacked by the latter." It goes without saying that this statement only reaffirms the admissions contained in his Counter-Affidavit, which he so vehemently tried to discredit. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested, 2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent, and 3) the surrender is voluntary. To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing them. The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary surrender made by petitioner are statements made by two (2) prosecution witnesses that they were allegedly told by other people that he had already gone to the police station. There is no showing that he was not actually arrested; or that when he went to the police station, he surrendered himself to a person in authority. Neither is there any finding that he has evinced a desire to own to any complicity in the killing. The Court ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to the police headquarters merely to report the shooting incident did not evince any desire to admit responsibility for the killing. Thus, he could not be deemed to have voluntarily surrendered. In the absence of sufficient and convincing proof showing the existence of indispensable circumstances, we cannot appreciate voluntary surrender to mitigate petitioner's penalty. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE V. MAQUEDA, G.R. NO.112983; 22 MAR 1994

FACTS: British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his house in Tuba, Benguet while his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Two household helpers of the victims identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda as the robbers. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw the two accused a kilometer away from the house of the victims that same morning, when the two accused asked them for directions. Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken to Calauag, Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. According to SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he signed such document. Afterwards he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail. While he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to Prosecutor Zarate and to Salvosa. ISSUE: Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the Sinumpaan Salaysay is admissible as evidence. HELD: No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. First, he was not informed of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Second, he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so. The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to such rights anymore because the information has been filed and a warrant of arrest has been issued already, is untenable. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense." Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extra-judicial admission is inadmissible as evidence. As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission (Salvosa), it was given to a private person therefore admissible. Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been made by the SC: Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. b. Requisites for valid extrajudicial confession PEOPLE V. BASE, GR 109773, MARCH 30, 2000 FACTS: Accused-appellant Elberto Base was among those identified on board the jeep and, together with Conrado Guno, Frederick Lazaro and Eduardo Patrocinio, were indicted for Murder with Direct Assault Upon a Person in Authority in a Second Amended Information[1] alleging that In the early morning of February 8, 1990, a group of men arrived at the residence of Julianito Luna y Tagle, Barangay Captain of Namunga, Rosario, Batangas. One of two men who introduced themselves as policemen allegedly looking for a certain Hernandez suddenly shot Julianito in the head with a .45 caliber pistol and immediately after, they sped away in an owner-type jeep Base was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and was sentenced with Reclusion Perpetua. Dissatisfied, accused Elberto Base interposed this appeal alleging that THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ELBERTO BASE OF THE CRIME OF MURDER ON THE BASIS OF HIS ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION DESPITE ITS INADMISSIBILITY. (Issue No. 1)

ISSUE: WON the extra-judicial confession made by the accused-appellant is admissible in court. HELD: Yes. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay would readily show accused-appellants complicity in the slaying of the victim. In the sworn statement, he narrated that a week before the killing, he was with the assassins in conducting a surveillance of the victims residence.] He also declared that he was with Frederick Lazaro and Eduardo Patrocinio when the jeep with Plate Number CFU-178 was borrowed by the two accused] and that he was with them when they left Pasay City bound for San Juan, Batangas, the day the victim was shot. For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must be: 1.] voluntary; 2.] made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3.] express; and 4.] in writing. While the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the fina lchoice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the formers appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. Verily, to be an effective counsel *a+ lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything that might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. When, as in this case, *a+n extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, it constitutes evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. The defense has the burden of proving that it was extracted by means of force, duress, promise or reward. Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that *a+n extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence ofcorpus delicti. In this case the prosecution presented other evidence to prove the two elements of corpus delicti, to wit: a.] a certain result has been proven, i.e. a man has died; and 2.] some person is criminally responsible. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose, concert of action or community of interest. There is treachery *w+hen the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of alevosia is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the victims part. The fact that treachery may be shown if the victim is attacked from behind does not mean it can not also be appreciated if the attack is frontal. Even a frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and the victim is unarmed. PEOPLE V. AVENDANO, GR 137407, JAN. 28, 2003 FACTS: The principal witness for the prosecution was JEFFRE CASTILLO, an eight-year-old son of the victim Remedios Castillo and brother of the victim Melvin Castillo. In his testimony, he stated that his parents were named Remedios and Boyet; that they were six children in the family, namely, Michael, Dikong, Ape, Manolito, the victim Melvin and himself; and that he was a Grade I pupil at the Aguas Elementary School. He testified that he knows appellant, having known him for about three or four years before the incident of July 29, 1997. On said date, at around 6:00 P.M., ;he saw appellant in their house, looking for his plow and asking if he knew who got it, to which he replied that he did not. While appellant was in their house, his mother was upstairs and his Kuya Melvin was also inside the house. His father and the rest of his brothers and sisters were in Cabanatuan City. He recalled that appellant was then wearing a green t-shirt and shorts, the color of which he could not remember. Thereafter, appellant left. After dinner, he, his mother and brother went to sleep. Before they slept, he recalled they had a pangmagdamagan or overnight lamp which was turned on. That night, according to Jeffre, they slept in the same room. He was suddenly awakened when he heard a commotion (kalambugan). However, by the time he woke up, the room was very dark because the lamp was already turned off. He heard his mother shout, Dikong, tulungan mo kami. When he heard the kalambugan he immediately eased his way to where they kept their pillows and tried to hide. Then, there was silence. Then he heard somebody going downstairs. His brother Melvin lit the lamp, while Jeffre stayed where he was. He then heard the person downstairs going up again. He saw through his blanket that the person

had come up: Naaninag ko po sa kumot yung tao. That was when he distinctly heard his Kuya Melvin say, Kuya Willie, tama na, tama na! That was just before Melvin was killed. Jeffre recalled that someone coughed and he recognized the cough as that of his Kuya Willie. He recognized it because he had heard a similar cough on several occasions in the past when appellant frequented their house. He remained where he was until appellant left. Jeffre said he fell asleep and was awakened only the following morning by persistent knocking on their door. He opened the door to find his Ate Annie, Ate Norma and Ate Ann looking for his mother. He then told his Ate Annie that Willerie Avendao killed both his mother Remedios and his Kuya Melvin. He remembered that thereafter, their relatives as well as some policemen arrived. According to witnesses, appellant was the adopted son (or palaki) of an aunt of the Castillo brothers. Appellant had four children. His wife lived in San Roque I, Occidental Mindoro, and seldom visited him. He owned and worked on a seven-hectare farm adjacent to the lot where the witnesses and the victims lived. He frequented the neighborhood while he bought food and supplies from the store of Juliana. Both witnesses claimed that when appellant was working on his farm, he frequented the house of Remedios, dropping by almost three times a day, especially when the victims husband was not around. He sometimes had coffee or left some of his farm implements there. They claimed that appellant had spent a night there. Juliana further testified that on two occasions prior to the incident, the victim Remedios confided to her that she was angry at appellant because he was courting her. Witness Juliana added she already suspected that fact even before Remedios confided in her, but she did not tell appellants wife because the wife might not believe her. Later, according to SPO2 Dimalaluan, they went to the house of appellant 150 meters away from the crime scene. There they found appellant who had just taken a bath. They asked him what he wore the day of the incident, and appellant pointed to the clothes he was wearing. Doubting appellant, Dimalaluan went inside the house. In the bathroom, a green t-shirt with Landbank print and dark short pants, newly washed and still wet, were hanging from the clothesline. He said he noticed dark stains on them. These were brought to the police station. During Dimalaluans testimony he marked the stains found on the clothes. These, however, were not subjected to laboratory examination. Appellant voluntarily went with the police to the police station, according to Dimalaluan. While detained, appellant made an oral admission that he killed the victims and that he used a knife, said the police officer. Hence, on July 31, 1997, Dimalaluan accompanied appellant back to his house, where appellant got from the cabinet a hunting knife with scabbard and then handed it over to him.According to Dimalaluan, appellants admission was not reduced into writing because when appellant made the admission, he was not assisted by a lawyer. The knife was likewise not subjected to any laboratory examination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest and the confinement of appellant are legal; and whether or not the T-shirt and short pants taken from appellant are admissible in evidence. HELD: No. It was error on the part of the trial court, however, to give probative value to the alleged verbal admission made by appellant to SPO2 Dimalaluan. The alleged admission was not reduced into writing. It was obtained in violation of appellants right under custodial investigation. As regards the items of clothing as well as the knife found in and taken from the house of appellant, a search warrant should have been obtained as required under Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. Failing thus, the exclusionary rule applies. Hence neither the knife with scabbard nor the T-shirt with shorts ought to be allowed in evidence. However, with regard to the legality of the arrest and confinement of appellant, it was shown that upon arraignment, appellant voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty without first questioning the legality of his arrest. By so pleading, he has submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. Such act amounted to a waiver of the right to question any irregularity in his arrest. Appellant denies the commission of the crime and interposes the alibi that he was in his house on the night of July 29, 1996. For alibi to stand, it must be shown that not only was appellant somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Appellant failed in this regard. His house was only about 150 to 200 meters from the house of Remedios; it was not impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.

Alibi is inherently weak and unreliable, unless corroborated by disinterested witnesses. Since appellant is unable to substantiate his alibi with the testimony of a credible witness, it is reduced to self-serving evidence undeserving of any weight in law. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, in Criminal Case No. R-4227, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant WILLERIE AVENDAO is found GUILTY of two counts of homicide. For each count, there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law. Appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs of each victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, together with the costs. c. Voluntariness PEOPLE V. ALVAREZ, GR 140388-91, NOV. 11, 2003 ARCIAGA FACTS: The penalty of death was imposed upon appellant after the Regional Trial Court of Davao City found him guilty of the crime of rape committed against Lingilyn L. Lacno, then 11 years old. Hence, this automatic review where appellant insisted that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. In affirming the finding of the trial court that appellant was guilty of rape, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the victim could not have made a mistake in identifying the appellant as her rapist, as the latter lived in the neighborhood and was known to her for many years prior to the rape. In the face of his positive identification by the victim, appellant's self-serving denial and alibi cannot prevail; (2) appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident; (3) the victim's odd behavior and minor lapses during trial do not per se destroy her credibility. Errorless recollection of a traumatic and agonizing incident cannot be expected of a witness when she is recounting details of an experience as humiliating and painful as rape; (4) the victim's inability to remember the birth year of her mother should not at all affect her credibility. It is not unnatural for children to be unaware of the exact birth year of their mother since what is usually given attention is only the birth date; (5) the imputation of ill-motive to the victim and her mother was only a last ditch effort to save the day for the appellant; (6) the absence of fresh lacerations does not preclude a finding of rape nor does the absence of spermatozoa negate the commission of rape because neither of the two is an indispensable element of the crime of rape. However, the penalty was modified by the Court. Since the Information failed to allege any qualifying circumstance, which would justify the imposition of the death penalty, the Court found the appellant guilty only of simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not may the accused be convicted on the basis of rape victims testimony. 2. Whether or not Trial Court Erred in the findings with respect to the credibility of the witness HELD: 1. The accused may be convicted on the basis of rape victims testimony if credible. What is truly decisive in this case is that she was able to identify appellant as her rapist. When a victim of rape says that she has been violated, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed against her and so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. Surely then, we cannot expect a halfwit barrio girl whose chastity was defiled to become instantly smart just because she was recounting her harrowing experience. Lingilyn's odd behavior and minor lapses during trial should not per se destroy her credibility. Errorless recollection of a traumatic and agonizing incident cannot be expected of a witness when she is recounting details of an experience as humiliating and painful as rape. We have held .that a rapist should not expect the hapless object of his lechery to have the memory of an elephant and the cold precision of a mathematician. 2. Trial courts findings with respect thereto accorded the highest respect and even finality. This Court is again tasked to review a case involving the death penalty. Corollarily, the court is once more confronted with the question of whom to believe the victim or the appellant. The process of ferreting out the truth from the conflicting claims of witnesses becomes even more tedious in rape for it is usually only the accused and the complainant who can normally give decisive testimony in the case. It is precisely for this reason that, when the issue is the evaluation of the testimony of a witness or his credibility, this Court accords the highest respect and even finality to the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that it committed palpable mistake, misappreciation of facts or grave abuse of discretion. It is the court a quo which has the unique advantage of observing first-hand the facial expressions, gestures and the tone of voice of a witness while testifying. This case is no exception, hence the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the rule. d. Presumptions PEOPLE V. VALLEJO, GR 144656, MAY 9, 2002 FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Cavite City, sentencing Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino to death and

ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the rape-slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy Diolola. The Information charging accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo with the crime of Rape with Homicide alleged Ten (10) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola, the victim's mother; Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, medico-legal officer of the NBI; Atty. Lupo Leyva; Mayor Renato Abutan of Rosario, Cavite; Atty. Sikat Agbunag of the Public Attorney's Office; Pet Byron Buan, NBI Forensic Biologist; Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, NBI Forensic Chemist; SPO1 Arnel Cuevas of the Rosario, Cavite police station; and Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes, both neighbors of the victim. The victim's mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, she sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to their neighbor's house in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite, so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant, could help Daisy with her lessons. An hour later, Daisy came back with accused-appellant. They were looking for a book which accusedappellant could copy to make a drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to her teacher. After finding the book, Daisy and accused-appellant went back to the latter's house. When Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 o'clock after an afternoon nap, she noticed that Daisy was not yet home. She started looking for her daughter and proceeded to the house of Aimee, Daisy's tutor. Aimee's mother told Ma. Nida that Daisy was not there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her lessons because Aimee was not feeling well as she had her menstrual period. Ma. Nida looked for Daisy in her brother's and sister's houses, but she was not there, either. At about 7:00 o'clock that evening, Ma. Nida went back to her neighbor's house, and there saw accused-appellant, who told her that Daisy had gone to her classmate's house to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went there, she was told that Daisy had not been there. Ma. Nida went to the dike and was told that they saw Daisy playing at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. Nida that Daisy was playing in front of her house that afternoon and even watched television in her house, but that Daisy later left with accused-appellant. Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for Daisy the whole evening until the early morning of the following day, a Sunday, but their search proved fruitless. Then, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, she was informed that the dead body of her daughter was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the "compuerta" by a certain Freddie Quinto. The body was already in the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her daughter. Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck. Barangay Councilmen Raul Ricasa and Calring Purihin reported the incident to the Rosario police. The other barangay officers fetched accused-appellant from his house and took him to the barangay hall. At the barangay hall, Ma. Nida pointed to accusedappellant Gerrico Vallejo as the probable suspect since he was with the victim when she was last seen alive. Accused-appellant was arraigned and, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, whereupon trial ensued. The trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in giving evidentiary weight to the alleged oral confessions of the accusedappellant despite its being hearsay in nature. 2. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error in giving probative value to the written extra-judicial confession of the accused-appellant despite the fact that the same was obtained through force and intimidation and that the lawyer who assisted him during his custodial investigation did not and could not possibly give him effective legal assistance. HELD: We find accused-appellant's contentions to be without merit. The claim is untenable. There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: 1. Coerced confessions, the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and 2. Uncounselled statements, given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same section. The testimony of Atty. Leyva is not only corroborated by the testimony of Mayor Renato Abutan, it is also confirmed by accusedappellant who testified as follows: Clearly, accused-appellant cannot now claim that he was not apprised of the consequences of the statements he was to make as well as the written confessions he was to execute. Neither can he question the qualifications of Atty. Lupo Leyva who acted as his

counsel during the investigation. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed, counsel should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Indeed, accused-appellant admitted that he was first asked whether he wanted the services of Atty. Leyva before the latter acted as his defense counsel. And counsel who is provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where the latter never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation but, on the contrary, thereafter subscribed to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.45 Contrary to the assertions of accused-appellant, Atty. Leyva was not the municipal attorney of Rosario, Cavite but only a legal adviser of Mayor Renato Abutan. For the same reason, the oral confession made by accused-appellant to NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan is admissible. Accusedappellant would have this Court exclude this confession on the ground that it was uncounselled and that Mr. Buan, who initiated the conversation with accused-appellant, was part of the NBI. The issue concerning the sufficiency of the assistance given by Atty. Leyva has already been discussed. On the other hand, the questions put by Mr. Buan to accused-appellant were asked out of mere personal curiosity and clearly not as part of his tasks. As Buan testified: The confession, thus, can be likened to one freely and voluntarily given to an ordinary individual and is, therefore, admissible as evidence. The admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellant is also attacked on the ground that these were extracted from him by means of torture, beatings, and threats to his life. The bare assertions of maltreatment by the police authorities in extracting confessions from the accused are not sufficient. The standing rule is that "where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or duress nor violence on their person; where they failed to complain to the officer who administered their oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim," all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness. Indeed, extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that the declarant's consent in executing the same has been vitiated, the confession will be sustained. Accused-appellant's claim that he was tortured and subjected to beatings by policemen in order to extract the said confession from him is unsupported by any proof: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of DEATH and directing him to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, is hereby AFFIRMED. In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power. PEOPLE V. DEL ROSARIO, G.R. NO. 131036, JUNE 20, 2001 FACTS: On September 26, 1992, at about 8:10 in the morning, Emelita Paragua and a companion, a Delia Aquino, left their house at 1657 Balic-Balic, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City to go to the formers stall in the public market. Raquel Lopez, the 11-year old niece of Paragua, was left behind as she had no classes that day, a Saturday. Notified of the news that their house was on fire, they went home. Paragua saw that the sala set, their merchandise, and the cassette were burned. When she entered the kitchen, she saw her niece lying on her stomach with a raincoat covering her head and her neck and arms tied with CATV wire. Raquel Lopez was already dead when her aunt discovered her. Emelita Paragua likewise discovered that six pieces of her jewelries were missing. On October 2, 1992, the Olongapo City police received a call from the Subic police that Donato del Rosario surrendered to police officer Fernando Morales, the brother-in-law of his common-law wife, Ruby Tan. Thereafter, SPO1 Fernandez, together with Inspector Leonardo Esteban and PO3 Laurea, proceeded to Subic to fetch Donato del Rosario. Del Rosario, even without being asked, told them that he really surrendered to Morales because he was being bothered by his conscience and that he was very willing to accompany them to recover the stolen items. He also volunteered the information as to where he sold the jewelries that he took from the house of Emelita Paragua. A lawyer, Atty. Norberto dela Cruz, was called in to assist del Rosario. During the custodial investigation, Atty. dela Cruz was present

the whole time. He informed del Rosario what was stated in the waiver/confession. It was only when del Rosario said that he fully understood its contents that Atty. dela Cruz signed it as counsel. On April 2, 1997, a decision was rendered by the trial court convicting the accused. ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession obtained is admissible as evidence. HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. The Court held that contrary to the accuseds contentions, the latter was not arrested but voluntarily surrendered to the the authorities. Moreover, during custodial investigation, he was assisted by counsel Atty. Norberto dela Cruz and was aware of the legal effects of signing the confession. A confession to be admissible must be: 1. Express and categorical; 2. Given voluntarily, and intelligently where the accused realizes the legal significance of his act; 3. With assistance of competent and independent counsel; 4. In writing, and in the language known to and understood by the confessant; and 5. Signed, or if the confessant does not know how to read and write, thumbmarked by him. The Court further held that lawyers have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. Absence of evidence to the contrary, the waiver is binding and admissible in evidence. e. To whom such confession can be used against SANTOS V. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR 71523-25, DECEMBER 8, 2000 FACTS: On April 15, 1982, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan three (3) informations for estafa thru falsification of public documents against Felipe Salamanca, Mariano Bustamante, Basilio Tan, Alfredo Fajardo, Jr., Jesus Estacio, Rolando San Pedro, Manuel Valentino, Rolando Santos, Marcelo Desiderio, Jaime Tan and Emilio Reyes.The informations filed were similarly worded except for the dates of commission of the crime charged, the number of the checks involved, and the amounts allegedly misappropriated. Sometime in February 1982, upon learning that somebody from the NBI was looking for him, Estacio went to the NBI. There he told Agent Ranin that he wanted to call a lawyer but Agent Ranin did not allow him to do so. Agent Ranin investigated him from 5:30 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. on February 17, 1982. This continued the following day and lasted a week. In the course of the investigation, Agent Ranin promised Estacio that he would not be harmed should he cooperate and admit the charges against him, and that he would be freed once he becomes a state witness. However, Agent Ranin hit him with a newspaper and poked his gun at him. Estacio was allowed to read the statement before he signed it. On cross-examination, Estacio admitted that during his stay at the NBI for about two months, his wife and children would visit him every week and he could talk to them freely. He was transferred to Muntinlupa and detained at the Death Row for two years. On March 22, 1982, Agent Ranin took his second statement that was a continuation of his first statement. He was unable to read his supplementary statement because of fear of Agent Ranin, who was scaring him. He stressed that the statements he made before the NBI were not true and that he only signed those document] because he was afraid of Agent Ranin

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino are inadmissible in evidence as their right to counsel was violated when said confessions were executed HELD: Relevant to petitioners contention on the admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino is Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution providing for the rights of an accused during custodial investigation. It reads: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the first paragraph of Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution states: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

A comparison of these provisions would readily show that the 1973 Constitution does not specify the right against uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel, which is found in paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. However, the latter constitutional provision cannot be applied to extrajudicial confessions made prior to its date of effectivity. In Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court held that: x x x the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with the assistance of counsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court, through Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The Court specifically ruled that `(t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino, the Court through Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano vigorously taught: `x x x. The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs. Enrileand reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People vs. Galit. x x x. While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation of Morales. Clearly then, the Morales-Galit rulings are inapplicable in these cases as the extrajudicial confessions in question here, were taken on February 13, February 17 and March 22, 1982, long before the date of promulgation of the Morales Decision on April 26, 1983. Prior to this date, the guidelines requiring that waiver of the right to counsel by an accused can be properly made only with the presence and assistance of counsel, had yet to be formulated and pronounced by this Court. The rule on prospective application of judge-made laws was stressed in Co vs. Court of Appeals. In that case, the Court, through then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, ruled that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code providing that (j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines, and Article 4 of the same Code stating that (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided, the principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws, are nevertheless evidences of what the law means. As to the admissibility of the uncounselled waivers of Valentino and petitioner Estacio of their right to counsel during custodial investigation, the intelligent and voluntary execution thereof should be determined. It is settled that once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue The defense attempted to prove that Valentino and petitioner Estacio were subjected to threats and intimidation at the NBI to obtain their confessions. Other than their bare assertions, Valentino and petitioner Estacio miserably failed to present any convincing evidence to prove the NBIs use of force or intimidation on their persons. Before signing their statements, they never protested against any form of intimidation, much more, of maltreatment that they could have relayed to relatives visiting them at the NBI. H. When custodial investigations may not apply a. Preliminary investigation PEOPLE V. JUDGE AYSON - 175 SCRA 216 FACTS: An information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In that place and during that time, according to the indictment, 5 he (Ramos) .. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully ... defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the following manner, to wit: said accused ... having been entrusted with and received in trust fare tickets of passengers for one-way trip and round-trip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the express obligation to remit all the proceeds of the sale, account for it and/or to return those unsold, ... once in possession thereof and instead of complying with his obligation, with intent to defraud, did then and there ... misappropriate, misapply and convert the value of the tickets in the sum of P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated demands, ... failed and refused to make good his obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party .. .

Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten notes admitting the act and proposing to settle the irregularities allegedly charged against him in the amount of P76,000 subject to conditions as may be imposed by PAL on or before 1700/9 FEB 86. At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence dated June 21, 1988, which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K. By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an investigation conducted by the Branch Manager since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel." He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 for the same reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said admission." ISSUE: Whether or not Exhibit A and K are inadmissible and violate the rights of accused on custodial investigation. HELD: No, Exhibit A and K is admissible and do not violate the rights of accused. At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, to which respondent Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the People. The section reads as follows: SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the section, namely: 1. The right against self-incrimination 2. The rights of a person in custodial interrogation Right Against Self-Incrimination The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty. The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. Rights in Custodial Interrogation

Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense" 1. He shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, 2. Nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him; 3. Any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the statement is not protected. Thus, in one case, where a person went to a police precinct and before any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself up for the killing of an old woman because she was threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a statement was admissible, compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation not being exigible under the circumstances. It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation." Furthermore, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit: 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and 2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT 1. To refuse to be a witness; 2. Not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal; 3. To testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution; 4. WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted. It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis was however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside. It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos. WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of the respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988, and he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter proceed with the trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary

restraining order of October 26, 1988 having become functus officio, is now declared of no further force and effect. b. Voluntary Surrender PEOPLE V. TAYLARAN 108 SCRA 373 FACTS: Defendant-appellant was charged of murder for killing his mother-in-law, by repeated stabbing. He went to the house of the daughted of deceased, and refused of entering. Afterwards, he surrendered to Pat. Basilad of the killing, giving the reason, "because she promised to kill me with a 'barang,' hence killed her first. Defendant-appellant also confessed to the daughter of the deceased saying that he killed the deceased because of her promise to kill him by means of witchcraft. ISSUE: WON the constitutional provision of the safeguarding the rights of the accused was violated. HELD: No. Right to silence and to counsel NOT applicable where no written confession was to be presented in evidence as a result of a formal custodial investigation. The defendant-appellent was merely confessing of the crime he committed and giving reason for the same. Furthermore, the constitutional safeguard has no application on the testimony he told to the daughter of the deceased. c. Audit Examination NAVALLO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 97214; 18 JUL 1994 FACTS: Accused was the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School, which school is also located at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. His duties included the collection of tuition fees, preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees, and remittance of collections exceeding P500.00 to the National Treasury. An information for malversation of public funds was filed. A warrant of arrest was issued, but accused-petitioner could not be found. on 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was released on provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond. When arraigned by the RTC on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not guilty. Upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was then docketed with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused had posted a bail bond. Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the accused and (2) that since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. However this was denied and trial ensued and he was found guilty. ISSUE: Whether or Not the constitutional right against double jeopardy and in custodial investigations in favor of the accused violated. HELD: No. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites: 1. 2. 3. 4. The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; The court has jurisdiction to try the case; The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent.

The RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had already been conferred on

the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed. No. Appellant is not in custodial investigation. A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime (examined cash, as ordered by Espino, the provincial auditor) appears to be belied by his own testimony. KIMPO V. SANDIGANBAYAN - 232 SCRA 53 FACTS: Petitioner Luciano Kimpo y Nianuevo, a Special Collecting Officer of the Bureau of Domestic Trade at General Santos City, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the Sandiganbayan of malversation of public funds. He appealed to this Court. That on or about April 30, 1985 and/or sometime prior thereto, in General Santos city, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Luciano Kimpo, a public officer, being the Special Collecting Officer, Bureau of Domestic Trade, General Santos City, and as such is an accountable officer responsible for the funds collected by him by reason of the duties of his office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence, appropriate, embezzle and convert to his personal use and benefit the sum of Fifteen Thousand Three Hundred Nine Pesos (P15,309.00), which amount constitutes his collection, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the aforesaid amount.chanroContrary to law. ISSUE: Won the respondent court erred in law in holding accused liable for malversation of public funds through negligence. HELD: The appeal has no merit. Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for having considered Exhibits "B" to "B-3," inclusive, despite what he claims to be an impairment of his constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3), and Section 17, 2 of the 1987 Constitution. We cannot agree. The questioned exhibits pertain to the Report of Examination, the Statement of Accountability for Accountable Forms without Money Value, and a Reconciliation Statement of Accountability, which are official forms prepared and accomplished in the normal course of audit regularly conducted by the Commission on Audit. Petitioner, not being at the time under investigation for the commission of a criminal offense, let alone under custodial investigation, clearly cannot be said to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogatives he invokes (Villaroza vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 79636, 17 December 1987; People vs. Olivares, 186 SCRA 536). d. Administrative investigation SEBASTIAN V. GARCHITORENA, GR 114028, OCTOBER 18, 2000 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the Resolution dated August 24, 1993 of the Sandiganbayan which admitted the sworn statements of petitioner Salvador Sebastian, Sr. and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 17904 as evidence for the prosecution, and the Resolution dated September 27, 1993 which denied the motion for reconsideration of the said Resolution. On July 28, 1992, Special Prosecution Officer III Teresita Diaz-Baldoz filed with the Sandiganbayan an Information for the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, against Rosita C. Pada, Teresita B. Rodriguez, Rachel V. Torres, Lourdes A. Enriquez and Salvador C. Sebastian. It reads: That on or about the period comprised between January 1989 and June 21, 1990, ROSITA C. PADA, being then the Regional Postage Stamps Custodian, and as such is accountable for the custody of the postage stamps received and issued by her by reason of the duties of her office, TERESITA B. RODRIGUEZ, being then the Senior Clerk in the Postage Stamps Section, RACHEL V. TORRES, being then a Utility Man in the Postage Stamps Section, LOURDES A. ENRIQUEZ, being then a Senior Clerk in the Mail Delivery Section and SALVADOR C. SEBASTIAN, being then a Letter Carrier, all of the Postal Services Office, Region IX, Zamboanga City, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their position, committing the offense in relation to their office, and conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, misapply, and embezzle and convert to their personal use and benefit the amount of SIX HUNDRED FORTY NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY and 05/100 PESOS (P649,290.05), out of the postage stamps in the custody of accused Rosita C. Pada, to the damage and prejudice of the Government. Rosita C. Pada, Rachel V. Torres, and Salvador C. Sebastian entered separate pleas of "Not Guilty" on October 13, 1992. On April 22, 1993, the marking of the documents to be testified on by the lone prosecution witness, Auditor Lilibeth Rugayan of the

Commission on Audit, who conducted the audit examination, took place before the Deputy Clerk of Court of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. Upon the completion of the testimony of Auditor Rugayan, the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its evidence on July 6, 1993. Among those offered as evidence were the sworn statements made by all the accused, including that of petitioner. Said exhibits were offered as part of the testimony of Auditor Rugayan. On August 19, 1993, all the accused (including petitioner) filed their "Joint Objections to Formal Offer of Evidence" on the principal ground that the sworn statements were "hearsay" evidence. The Sandiganbayan in its Minute Resolution admitted said evidence. Dissatisfied, the three accused, jointly filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the respondent court in its Resolution. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the sworn statements of petitioner and his co-accused are admissible in evidence "as part of the testimony of the prosecution witness." HELD: The petition is DENIED. The Court disagrees to petitioners arguments. Petitioner argues that the said issue should be resolved in the negative on the ground that the subject sworn statements are hearsay evidence. Petitioner contends that he and his co-accused were never presented as witnesses, thus, they were not given the opportunity to identify and authenticate their respective sworn statements and that Auditor Rugayan had no personal knowledge of the contents thereof. As a general rule, hearsay evidence is inadmissible. Thus, the rule explicitly provides that a witness can testify only on those facts, which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perceptions. In the present case, the sworn statements executed by the petitioner and co-accused were offered not to prove the truth or falsity of the facts stated therein but only to prove that such written statements were actually made and executed. Title II, Chapter I, Section 55 of P.D. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code provides that "the auditor shall obtain through inspections, observation, inquiries, confirmation and other techniques, sufficient competent evidential matter to afford himself a reasonable basis for his opinions, judgments, conclusions and recommendations." Petitioner in his supplemental pleading claims to have been deprived of his constitutional rights under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner alleges that nothing in his sworn statement shows compliance with the constitutional provisions on the right to counsel, the right to remain silent and the right to waive these rights in the presence of counsel. Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only when a person is under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody investigation." Custodial investigation has been defined as any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The fact-finding investigation relative to the missing postage stamps at the Postage Stock Section of Zamboanga City conducted by a Enrique G. Saavedra, Chief Postal Service Officer, is not a custodial investigation. It is merely an administrative investigation. While an investigation conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. It has been held in the case of Lumiqued v. Exevea that the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. ERMELINDA ESCLEO, vs. MARITESS DORADO, A.M. No. P-99-1312 July 31, 2002 FACTS: Ms Carbon was then engaged to a Korean citizen. She approached respondent who asked her to fill up some forms and to pay the amount of P5,000.00. After some bargaining, the amount was reduced to P4,000.00. Ms Carbon made a down payment of

P2,000.00, and was informed that the marriage ceremony was scheduled for January 12, 1998 at 1:30 p.m. Upon returning home, Ms Carbon informed complainant of the arrangements. Finding the amount paid by her sister exorbitant, complainant went to respondents office the following day. She demanded that respondent return the down payment of P2,000.00 and the document evidencing the legal capacity of her sisters fianc to marry, which had been given to respondent for processing. Respondent, however, refused to return the money and the document allegedly because she had given them to a certain Caloy of Imus, Cavite. A shouting match ensued between the parties. The Commotion caught the attention of respondents superior, MeTC Judge Estella Bernabe, who inquired as to the cause of the argument. Complainant explained to the Judge the events that had just transpired. Judge Bernabe informed complainant that no fees are supposed to be charged for the solemnization of marriage and instructed her to put her complaint in writing. Judge Bernabe referred complainant to MeTC Executive Judge Leticia Ulibarri. When complainant returned the next day, January 11, 1998, respondent still failed to return the money as well as the document. Respondent even told complainant that they should consider themselves fortunate that they were charged only P4,000.00, considering that the so-called japayukis were ordinarily charged P15,000.00. Complainant said she did not care and demanded the document evidencing the Koreans legal capacity to marry. Respondent told her to withdraw her complaint first. Complainant refused, however. Ms. Escleo registered her complaint before Executive Judge Ulibarri. On January 13 and 14, 1998, Judge Ulibarri conducted an investigation of the charges against respondent. Both complainant and respondent were in attendance on both dates. Phoebe Carbon was also present in the investigation held on January 14, 1998. The proceedings before Judge Ulibarri were transcribed and the case was subsequently referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Directed to file an answer, respondent submitted an affidavit vehemently denying the charges. She related that on January 8, 1998, while she was busy transcribing her stenographic notes, a certain Ma. Phoebe Q. Carbon, together with her foreigner-fianc, approached her. Ms Carbon sought her assistance on how they could be married at the soonest possible time without having to await the lapse of the 10-day period of publication of their application for a marriage license. Ms Carbon explained that the urgency of the wedding was due to the fact that they were already deemed overstaying in the country. Since respondent was allegedly busy at work, she directed Ms Carbon to proceed to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar to secure a marriage license and to return to her only after she already had in her possession the necessary document. Since Ms Carbon, then almost in tears, was quite insistent in her request for assistance, respondent decided to seek the help of a friend from Cavite in securing a marriage license for Ms Carbon and her fianc. Complainant proceeded to report the matter to MeTC Executive Judge Ulibarri, who then ordered respondent to return the documents of complainants sister. In a Resolution dated June 9, 1999, the Court resolved to refer the case to Sandiganbayan Justice Romulo Quimbo (Ret.), consultant of the OCA, for investigation, report and recommendation. Justice Quimbo related in his Report the proceedings that transpired in his investigation: We set the first hearing on September 13, 1999. Subpoenas were sent to both complainant and respondent. Only the respondent appeared. It does not appear on record whether the complainant received the subpoena mailed to her. After the declaration of Judge Ulibarri, the respondent opted not to testify in her own behalf nor to present evidence. Instead she prayed for time to file a position paper which the undersigned received on December 21, 1999. In her Position Paper dated December 15, 1999, respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence. She argued that the failure of the complainant to attend the investigation violated her right to cross-examine her accuser. She added that the complaint is based merely on hearsay, complainant not having personal knowledge of the transaction between respondent and complainants sister. Respondent likewise contended that she was deprived of her right to due process. In the investigation by Judge Ulibarri, which was conducted a day after the complaint was filed, respondent was not given the opportunity to answer the complaint in writing. Neither was she given the usual three days to prepare for trial. Moreover, the Judge did not inform her of her right against self- incrimination. The acts complained of, respondent also pointed out, are not within her duties and, hence, could not be punished therefor. Finally, it was complainants sister who solicited respondents help and respondent should not be penalized for merely helping one

in need. On January 7, 2000, Justice Quimbo found respondent guilty of misconduct, although it may not be characterized as gross misconduct. He recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of three (3) months, without pay, and that she be warned that the commission of the same or similar act would merit a more severe punishment. The Court concurs with the Hearing Officers findings and recommendation, save for the penalty. ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint is hearsay, and whether or not respondent was deprived of her right to cross-examine complainant, who failed to attend the hearing called by Justice Quimbo, are largely immaterial. HELD: Respondent was not deprived of due process in the investigation conducted by Judge Ulibarri. What is repugnant to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Respondent cannot deny that she was accorded, and indeed availed herself of, the opportunity to be heard in the proceedings before Judge Ulibarri. Respondent also claims that she had a right to be informed of her right against self-incrimination, pursuant to Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution: Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. This provision is not applicable because respondent was not under investigation for the commission of an offense; hence, the rights granted by said provision did not attach. Judge Ulibarri was under no constitutional obligation to inform respondent of such right. Lastly, respondent insists that the acts complained of have no connection with her duties as court stenographer and that she was merely helping complainants sister, for which punishment is undeserved. The law prescribes certain requirements for a valid marriage license to issue. By agreeing to make it appear that complainants sister and her fianc complied with these requirements, specifically by the antedating of the marriage license, respondent abetted the circumvention of the law. Worse, she did this for a fee. If respondent believes such to be an act of kindness, she certainly has a skewed notion of charity. Clearly, respondent may be held for her acts although they do not involve her functions as stenographer. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees mandates all public officials and employees to refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good Customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. The conduct especially of Court personnel must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free of any suspicion that may taint the judiciary. For abetting the circumvention of the legal requirements in the issuance of a marriage license, respondent is guilty of Simple Misconduct punishable by suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. This appearing to be her first offense, a one month and one day suspension is deemed sufficient as her penalty. WHEREFORE, respondent Maritess M. Dorado is found guilty of Simple Misconduct and is SUSPENDED for a period of ONE (1) MONTH AND ONE (1) DAY, without pay. She is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. e. Not in Police custody People v. Tobias 266 SCRA 229 Grossman OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, vs. JUDGE AUGUSTO SUMILANG

271 SCRA 316

FACTS: On September 1, 1993, Rebecca Avanzado assumed the position of officer in charge. It was during her tenure on August 8, 1994, that an on-the-spot audit examination was conducted by the Fiscal Audit Division of the Office of Court Administrator. In the course of the examination, several anomalous transactions were discovered. One involved a manager's check deposited in the name of

Teodorico Dizon in connection with Civil Case No. 858, wherein Entero Villarica, on August 7, 1992 during the tenure of Malla entrusted the amount of P240,000.00 to said respondent instead of handling it over to the Clerk of Court pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 13-92. When asked to explain where the P240,000.00 was, Malla, explained that she deposited it at the Sta. Cruz, Laguna branch of the Philippine National Bank but she and Judge Sumilang later withdrew it allegedly under the belief that the defendant, Dizon, would demand the delivery of the money upon the termination of the case. Upon further questioning by the examining team, however, Malla admitted that she lent the amount of P87,000.00 to steno-reporter Lagmay, P40,000.00 to steno-reporter Mercado, and P81,000.00 to Mrs. Sumilang, wife of Judge Sumilang. She spent P32,000.00 for the hospitalization of her husband and the remaining balance for personal purposes. Later on, she executed an affidavit stating that only Lagmay and Mercado borrowed P55,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively. On the other hand, she used P100,000.00 for her personal needs. Upon learning that they were being implicated in the anomalous transaction, Lagmay executed an affidavit stating that the amount of P55,000.00 was from the personal account of Malla and not from the P240,000.00 amount deposited before the court and such loan has already been paid. Mercado, on the other hand, claims that the amount of P40,000.00 was borrowed only two weeks before the audit took place, when Malla was no longer employed with the court. Mrs. Sumilang, for her part, denied any involvement in any of the transactions. After carefully studying the records of this case, the Court is convinced that respondents did commit acts prejudicial to the service for which they should be held accountable The evidence against Judge Sumilang adequately proves his gross negligence in this matter. In his proffered explanation, he averred that his wife did not borrow any money from Malla and that he had no knowledge of the irregularities involving members of his own staff. It bears emphasizing that this is not the first time that respondent judge has been charged with an administrative case. In Arviso v. Sumilang, this Court found him guilty of gross negligence and ordered him to pay a fine of P3,000.00 for his failure to act on a motion to dismiss in an expeditious manner. Judge Sumilang's excuse, that upon learning of the irregularities being committed by his court personnel, he immediately acted with haste and instructed Malla to turn over the money, is specious and unconvincing. His admission that he had no knowledge regarding the anomalies going on in his court underscores his inefficiency and incompetence. It clearly demonstrates a lack of control expected of a judge exercising proper office management. The evidence against Malla is equally incriminating. It has been clearly established, and this is not denied by Malla, that she misappropriated for her own use the amount of P240,000.00 which she received from Villarica, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 858, instead of directing him to deposit said amount with the Municipal Treasurer. A court interpreter should not receive payments made by litigants in relation to their cases in his personal charge. In her defense, Malla testified that her uncle Entero Villarica allowed her to use the money on the condition that she should be ready to produce it when necessary. Malla, however, never presented Villarica as her witness to bolster her claim, which, therefore, has no evidentiary value for being self-serving. Besides, there is a disputable presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced during trial. Malla further claims that her constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution were violated when she was " pressured" to sign an affidavit dated September 14, 1994 before the Office of the Court Administrator, where she admitted her misdeed. Thus, she concludes that the affidavit is inadmissible in evidence. ISSUE: WON Mallas affidavit is admissible as evidence to the court. HELD: Malla further claims that her constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution were violated when she was "pressured" to sign an affidavit dated September 14, 1994 before the Office of the Court Administrator, where she admitted her misdeed. Thus, she concludes that the affidavit is inadmissible in evidence. In People vs. Loveria, however, we ruled that the aforementioned constitutional provision may be invoked only during "custodial investigation" or as in "custody investigation" which has been defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The investigation is defined as an "investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigation conducted by the Municipal Police, P.C. (now PNP) and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government." Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement authority

contemplated in the constitutional provision. At any rate, Malla admitted during her testimony that she received the said check from Villarica covering the amount of P240,000.00 payable to Dizon. However, when she tried to deposit it with the Municipal Treasurer, the latter refused because there was no order from Judge Sumilang. Consequently, Villarica entrusted said check to her. It was at this juncture that she used the money for personal purposes. f. Police line-up A. General Rule PEOPLE V. PIEDAD, GR 131923, DEC. 5, 2002 FACTS: Accused Niel Piedad y Consolacion, Lito Garcia y Francisco and Richard Palma y Ider were charged with Murder in an information, which reads as follows: That on or about the 10th day of April, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with and mutually helping with another person whose true identity and other personal circumstances of which has not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, qualified with treachery and evident premeditation and with grave abuse of superior strength, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of MATEO LACTAWAN Y DAGUINOD by then and there hitting him with an empty bottle on the head, ganging him up and mauling him, hitting him with a big stone on the head and stabbing him with a bladed weapon hitting him on the right back portion of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said MATEO LACTAWAN Y DAGUINOD. CONTRARY TO LAW. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued thereafter. Luz Lactawan, widow of the victim Mateo Lactawan, testified that on April 10, 1996, at around 11 oclock in the evening, she left her house to follow Mateo, who had earlier gone. As she was walking by the gate of the company compound where they reside, she heard Fidel Piquero shouting for help because Mateo was being mauled by a group of men. She rushed out of the compound and saw her husband being beaten up by Niel Piedad, Richard Palma, Lito Garcia and five others. She tried to pacify the aggressors, but was beaten herself. Luz embraced Mateo in an effort to protect him. It was then that Niel picked up a large stone, measuring about a foot and a half, and struck Mateos head with it. Then, Lito approached Mateos side and stabbed him at the back, while Richard hit Mateo in the face. Fidel Piquero, who resides in the same company compound as the Laktawans, corroborated Luzs testimony. While eating at Aling Dignas eatery, he saw Mateo and Andrew Gaerlan come out of the compound and buy two bottles of beer at a nearby store. They consumed their beer and were about to leave when Niel, for no apparent reason, struck Mateo with a Tanduay Rhum bottle on the head. Andrew hurled a plastic chair towards Niel, which caused the latter to scamper away. Shortly thereafter, Fidel saw Niel returning to the store with several companions. Upon seeing the approaching group, Mateo and Andrew ran towards the compound. Fidel also ran towards the company compound to ask for help. Later, Fidel emerged from the compound followed by Luz. They saw Mateo leaning by the compound gates and being beaten up by Niels group. Luz quickly came to the succor of her husband and embraced him. Niel hit Mateo on the head with a large stone. Fidel also saw Richard, Lito and Rodel Albuena at the scene of the crime. Lito stabbed Mateo with a balisong. Richard, on the other hand, chased and mauled Andrew. Mateo was rushed to the East Avenue Medical Center where he later died because of the injuries he sustained. SPO4 Lovino Acharon, SPO2 Diosdado Lagajino and two other members of the mobile patrol division responded to the phone call from the East Avenue Medical Center regarding the stabbing and mauling incident. They repaired to the crime scene and apprehended Lito and a certain Luis Rodel. Richard and Niel, meanwhile, were surrendered to the police station by their parents and the barangay chairman of South Triangle. Accused-appellants denied the charges against them and gave a different version of the incident. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the deceased sentencing Nied Piedad and Lito Garcia to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and are likewise held solidarily liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim Mateo Lactawan in the sum of P50,000.00.

Accused Richard Palma is hereby acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Hence, the instant appeal by Niel Piedad and Lito Garcia. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court committed grave and irreversible error in admitting and relying on the in-court identification of accused-appellant Piedad during the trial when it was tainted by a pointedly suggestive and fatally flawed pre-trial identification. HELD: The appeals are devoid of merit. Accused-appellant Niel Piedad argues that the way that he was identified by prosecution witnesses was suggestive and fatally flawed. Niel claims that he should have been put in a police lineup instead of being shoveled into a confrontation with the alleged witnesses and immediately singled out by the police as suspects. He further claims that he was denied his right of counsel during the most crucial stage of the police investigation - that is, his identification as one of the assailants by eyewitnesses. We do not agree. The claim by the defense that Niels pre-trial identification was suggestive due to the absence of a police lineup is more theoretical than real. It must be pointed out that even before the incident, Luz Lactawan knew the accused. Fidel, on the other hand, knew Niel because they played basketball together. Hence, the witnesses were not identifying persons whom they were unfamiliar with, where arguably, improper suggestion may set in. On the contrary, when the accused were presented before the witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm whether they were the ones responsible for the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate the accused simply because they were the only ones presented by the police, rather, the witnesses were certain they recognized the perpetrators of the crime. Besides, there is no law which requires a police lineup before a suspect can be identified as the culprit of a crime. What is important is that the prosecution witnesses positively identify the persons charged as the malefactors. In this regard, this Court finds no reason to doubt the veracity of Luzs and Fidels testimony. The records show that Luz and Fidel positively, categorically and unhesitatingly identified Niel as the one who struck Mateo on the head with a stone, and Lito as the one who stabbed Mateo on the back, thereby inflicting traumatic head injuries and a stab wound which eventually led to Mateos death. Indeed, if family members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants, this Court sees no reason how a wife, who witnessed the violence inflicted upon her husband and who eventually died by reason thereof, could have done any less. It must be stressed that Luz was right beside her husband when the concrete stone was struck on his head, hence, Luz could not have mistaken the identity of the person responsible for the attack. She was only a foot away from Niel before the latter hit Mateo on the head. Lito on the other hand was identified by both Luz and Fidel as the one who was shirtless at the time of the incident. There was light from a bulb five (5) meters away from the scene of the crime. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of the criminals at any given time. Hence, the proximity and attention afforded the witnesses, coupled with the relative illumination of the surrounding area, bolsters the credibility of identification of the accused-appellants. Neither is the lack of counsel during the pre-trial identification process of the accused-appellants fatal. The right to counsel accrues only after an investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and commences an interrogation aimed at a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then propound questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. The presence of counsel during such investigation is intended to prevent the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. What is thus sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him. In the case at bar, however, accused-appellants did not make any extrajudicial confession or admission with regard to the crime charged. While Niel and Lito may have been suspects, they were certainly not interrogated by the police authorities, much less forced to confess to the crime imputed against them. Accused-appellants were not under custodial investigation. In fact, Niel averred during cross-examination that the police never allowed them to say anything at the police station on the day they voluntarily presented themselves to the authorities. Likewise, Lito testified that he did not talk to any of the police officers nor sign any written statement at the police station when he was invited. Moreover, the rights accorded an accused under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution applies only against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined, as was done in this case - presented to

the witnesses to be identified. Accused-appellants were not thus denied their right to counsel. The trial court, therefore, did not err in convicting accused-appellants of the crime of murder. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102, finding accused-appellants Niel Piedad y Consolacion and Lito Garcia y Francisco, guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellants are solidarily ordered to pay the heirs of Mateo Lactawan y Daguinod the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE V. SALVATIERRA 276 SCRA 55 FACTS: While Charlie Fernandez was walking towards Quiapo, appellant and the 2 accused lunged a pointed instrument at Charlie, hitting the latter at the left breast. This resulted to his death. On Nov. 15, 1990 the police received a complaint that appellant was creating a commotion. He was thereafter taken in custody. Appellant put up the defense of alibi alleging that he was having merienda with his wife and children when the incident occurred. He also alleged that he had an altercation with a woman on that day who caused his arrest for the crime of malicious mischief, wherein he was detained after. Then, when police arrived, they brought him to the Homicide Section where he was investigated for the stabbing of Fernandez. Appellant claimed that the arrest was made almost 3 months after thecommission of the crime and no warrant had been obtained during the 3-month intervening period between the commission of the crime and his apprehension, thus making the arrest illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest is violative of his constitutional rights? HELD: No. Appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never raised it before entering his plea. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

PEOPLE V. ESCORDIAL, 373 SCRA 585 *(line- up after custodial investigation starts, requires counsel) FACTS: The Regional Trial Court found accused Anthony Escordial guilty of the crime of robbery with rape. On December 27,1996, two children were playing inside a jeepney parked in front of a boarding house. Later, appellant told them to go home. While the three boarders were sleeping, one of them was awakened by the presence of the man. This man had his head covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife about four inches long. He asked for her money and was able to get P500 from her. She then turned to the other petitioners who were already awake by that time and was able to take P3100 from Michelle and none from Teresa because her bag was in the other room. After taking the money, they were told to blindfold one another. He then proceeded to have carnal knowledge with Michelle. After he finished raping Michelle, he sat down on the bed and talked to the women. He then raped Michelle for the second time, threatening her so shed concede that it would be much worse if hed call others (companions) from outside to rape her. After which he left.PO3 Tancinco was one of those who responded to the crime. A report was made in the police station. Subsequent searches, through the descriptions of the petitioners, the children playing in the jeep in front of the boarding house, and others led to the pinpointing of accused appellant. Accused was playing in basketball when the police invited him to the Pontevedra police station for questioning. At the station Michelle saw him and she identified him as his alleged robber and rapist. He was also brought to the Bacolod police station so that the other witnesses could identify him. They picked him out of four in the line-up. Accused claims that he went home to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental at the time of the incident as testified by three other witnesses for the defense. Accused-appellant questions the legality of his arrest without a warrant. ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused constitutional rights were violated. HELD: On the matter of arrest: The Supreme Court held that the warrantless arrest was invalid but it was cured by the accused-appellants failure to question the legality of his arrest before entering his plea to the crime charged against him. Rule 113 Sec. 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person only under the following circumstances: a. When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense b. When a n offense had just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it and c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. The cases at bar do not fall under paragraphs (a) or( c) of the afore quoted rule. At the time of the arrest, accused-appellant was watching a basketball game in the basketball court in Barangay Miranda Pontevedra Negros Occidental. He was not committing or attempting to commit a crime when he was arrested by the police officers. Nor was he an escaped prisoner whose arrest could be effected even without a warrant. In these cases, the crime took place on December 27,1996 and was arrested only on January 3,1997, a week after the occurrence of the crime. As the arresting officers were not present when the crime was committed, they could not have personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the commission of the crime. Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. (Reasonable: in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts)The records show that accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged against him during his arraignment without questioning his warrantless arrest. He thus waived objection to the legality of his arrest. On the matter of Custodial Investigation: Accused-appellant also invoked Art. III, Sec. 12(1) of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." He contends that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without being informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent counsel preferably of his choice. Hence, he contends, the trial court erred in not excluding evidence obtained from him during such interrogation for violation of accused-appellant's rights under this provision. While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him whether inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. The records do not show that he had given one or that, in finding him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement. In fact, accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when subjected to physical torture, did he ever admit committing the crime with which he was charged. In other words, no uncounseled statement was obtained from accused-appellant which should have been excluded as evidence against him. Of greater significance is the fact that accused-appellant was never assisted by counsel, whether of his own choice or provided by the police officers, from the time of his arrest to the time of his continued detention at the police station. Although accusedappellant made no statement during this time, this fact remains important insofar as it affects the admissibility of the out-of-court identification of accused-appellant by the prosecution witnesses. As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police. An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as "critical confrontations of the

accused by the prosecution" which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." We have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle in a show-up and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been made when accused-appellant did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him. Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications should have been held inadmissible for being "the direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.'" Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object immediately when these witnesses were presented by the prosecution or when specific questions regarding this matter were asked of them, as required by Rule 132, 36 of the Rules on Evidence, accusedappellant must be deemed to have waived his right to object to the admissibility of these testimonies. Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not render the in-court identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the "fruits of the poisonous tree." This in-court identification was what formed the basis of the trial court's conviction of accused-appellant. As it was not derived or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence thereof, it is admissible as evidence against him. However, whether or not such prosecution evidence satisfies the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is another matter altogether. B. Exceptions PEOPLE V. RUFINO GAMER, G.R. NO. 115984. FEBRUARY 29, 2000 FACTS: On September 25, 1989, Antonio Loremas and his wife, Corazon Nazal Loremas, were on their way home on board their owner-type stainless jeep when 2 men went to each side of the jeep and announced a hold-up. Antonio stepped on the gas but one of the men shot him at the back. The jeep swerved to a stop and the two persons took away the spouses' money, clothing, assorted jewelries, imported and local cigarettes, car stereo and equalizer and tools, and drove off with the jeep in the direction of Angeles City. After the assailants fled, Corazon, with the help of passers-by, brought Antonio to the Angeles Medical Center for medical treatment. Unfortunately, Antonio died that same night from the gunshot wound. The jeep was found abandoned the following day. Thereafter, investigation was made. Some time in June 1992, Captain Flores ordered three CIS agents to "invite" appellant for questioning at the CIS Field Office in Diamond Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City. The CIS agents "picked up" appellant and his five year-old son while they were in front of a stall buying something and was brought to CIS Field Office. Appellant was investigated by the CIS until around 7:00 pm and Teodoro Siron, Jr., was also invited by the CIS Agents for questioning after which both appellant and Siron, were placed in a police line-up where Corazon identified appellant as one of the carnappers and a sworn statement was filed by complainant and appellant. The following day, an inquest was made and appellant and Siron, were charged with carnapping with robbery and homicide. Appellant and Siron filed separate Motions for Reinvestigation with the trial court which granted said Motions. As a result of the reinvestigation, the public prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss as to accused Siron on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The trial granted said motion. Hence, only appellant was tried for the crime of carnapping. During trial, private complainant Corazon Loremas, widow of the victim, identified appellant as the one who boarded her side of the jeep, and pointed a gun at her which events were corroborated by her sister. For the defense, appellant vehemently denied any participation in the offense charged and claimed that on July 17, 1992, he and his son were picked up by the CIS agents, forcibly boarded on a car, and brought to the CIS Field Office. There he was stripped naked, and handcuffed. His legs were tied, his mouth was stuffed with a wet rug, water was poured in his nose and hot liquid poured on his genitals. Finally, he was coerced into signing a sworn statement wherein he named the persons who allegedly took part in the carnapping. Appellant (and Siron) denied being placed in a police line-up. The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, this appeal. In his brief, appellant decries the flagrant violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable seizures and his rights under custodial investigation. Appellant questions his identification by private complainant considering that no police line-up was conducted. Appellant also questions the credibility of Corazon's sister considering that she only surfaced during trial. Appellant further contends that the trial court erred in disregarding appellant's testimony of his ordeal in the hands of the CIS agents. ISSUE: Whether the trial court deprived accused rufino m. Gamer of his substantial right to due process by admitting the evidence

of the prosecution that point to the identity of the said accused in an alleged police line-up without being afforded his vital rights and guarantees as provided for in our constitution? HELD: YES. Appellant claims, and the prosecution admits, that he was arrested without a warrant on June 17, 1992. His arrest, however, cannot be justified under any of the circumstances allowing warrantless arrests under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Hence, any evidence obtained in violation of appellant's rights under Section 2 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution shall be inadmissible for any purpose and in any proceeding. Granting that by entering a plea without first questioning the legality of the arrest, appellant is deemed to have waived any objection concerning his arrest, the sworn statement taken from appellant is clearly inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights under custodial investigation. When appellant was invited to the CIS office, he was clearly placed under "custodial investigation" for the question was never a "general inquiry into an unsolved crime" but already focused on appellant as a "particular suspect" in the Loremas carnapping. At that very instance, appellant should have been afforded his rights under Section 12 (1) and (2) Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Hence the sworn statement, which also contains mostly hearsay, should be thrown out for being patently inadmissible in evidence against him. It may be noted, further, that appellant was convicted by the trial court upon the identification of appellant made by Corazon Loremas and her sister, Zenaida Nazal, during the trial. As evidence, the value of the in-court identification, however, is here largely dependent upon an out-of-court identification made during an alleged police line-up. Both appellant and Siron, consistently denied that a line-up was conducted by the police, thus directly controverting the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. In People v. Verzosa, the Court enumerated factors to be considered, following the totality of circumstances test, in order to resolve the admissibility of an out-of-court identification of suspects, viz: ". . . 1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; 2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; 3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; 4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; 5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and 6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure." These factors are pertinent to and applicable in this case. The totality test has been fashioned precisely to assure fairness as well as compliance with constitutional requirements of due process in regard to out-of-court identification. These cited factors must be considered to prevent the contamination of the integrity of in-court identifications better. In this case, the carnapping happened at 8:30 p.m., and the evidence does not disclose whether the locus criminis was sufficiently lighted for purposes of identification. In fact, while Corazon testified that the jeep was not lighted at the time of the incident, her sister claimed that the jeep was in fact lighted, which enabled her to recognize appellant herein as one of the carnappers. Although Corazon reported the incident to the Porac Police the following day, she did not furnish said policemen a description of the perpetrators of the crime. Hence, the authenticity as well as accuracy of the present and future descriptions of the suspected assailants has been placed in doubt for lack of basis. Furthermore, the crime occurred some two (2) years and (8) months prior to the arrest of appellant. Because of this lapse of time, certain physical changes might have occurred in his physical appearance and other attributes already. Corazon also claimed that she viewed the police line-up through a jalousie window while Capt. Flores testified that the persons in the police line-up were in full view of Corazon. This and other contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witnesses weaken the reliability of the out-ofcourt identification of appellant. We are now constrained to agree that the in-court identification of the appellant made by private complainant and her sister could have been tainted by the out-of-court (police line-up) procedure, even if we grant, arguendo, that such line-up did take place. g. Spontaneous statements PEOPLE V. MORADA GR 129723 MAY 19, 1999 FACTS: On April 13, 1995 in Barangay Bukandala 5 in the Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite, Danilo Morayda, with intent to kill, with treachery, with evident premeditation and with the use of superior strength while armed with Bolo, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and hack several times JONALYN NAVIDAD y MONZON inflicting multiple fatal wounds on the head of the said victim causing her instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs. The RTC convicted Tumlod of murder based on the following circumstantial evidences: 1. In the scene of the crime the accuseds pair of slippers with thumbtacks on them was found. This was positively identified as belonging to the accused by Eric Navidad, a younger brother of the victim and the first person who discovered the victims body. Alejandro Dela Cruz, likewise, identified the same subject slippers having seen them during a hide-and-seek game in

the wake of his dead father while Joel Avenda, accuseds half brother, also identified the accused as the owner of the same pair of slippers. 2. Accused was seen by Christopher Saliva coming from the scene of the crime carrying with him a bolo and reacted as if he saw a ghost and turned pale when he saw Saliva. Accused was then wearing a polo shirt with striped design of blue and yellow which matched the blood-stained shirt recovered from a tree beside the nipa house of the accused. From the premises of the accused were recovered a blood-stained yellow and gray striped T-shirt hanging on a tree and one (1) blood-stained bolo about a meter away from the side of the nipa house of the accused. Further, Moradas wife identified the blood-stained T-shirt as belonging to her husband Danilo Morada. The NBI Forensic Chemistry Division laboratory examinations of the blood-stained yellow and gray striped T-shirt and bolo recovered at Danilo Moradas place both gave positive results for human blood. At the police headquarters, accused admitted before Barangay Captain Edgardo Manimbao that the pair of slippers was actually his and that he was really the one who hacked Jonalyn Navidad because Jonalyn Navidad, according to the jail guard when asked by Manimbao, was very angry at him (Morada) up to the point that she spat on his face.

3.

4.

5.

ISSUE: Whether or not the circumstances from which the trial court drew its conclusion have been duly proven by the prosecution and, if so, whether, taken together, they support a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. HELD: The Supreme Court acquitted accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Court was not convinced that appellant's alleged confession to the Barangay Captain is separated or divorced from the police interrogation. It is clear from the records of the case that it was the police authorities who summoned and informed him (Barangay Captain) of the alleged desire of appellant to see him. It would thus appear that the Barangay Captain's conversation with appellant was part of the ongoing police investigation. Since the confession was admittedly given without the safeguards in Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution and the ones provided in R.A. No. 7438, particularly the requirement that the confession be in writing and duly signed by the suspect in the presence of counsel. It was an error for the trial court to use appellant's confession to convict him. The other pieces of circumstantial evidence were also found by the Court insufficient to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In People vs. Andan, this Court held that the constitutional guarantees during custodial investigation do not apply to spontaneous statements not elicited through questioning by the authorities and given during an ordinary conversation or during media interviews, whereby the suspect orally admits the commission of the crime. Our ruling in that case does not, however, authorize the police to obtain confessions they cannot otherwise obtain through media reporters who are actually acting for the police. The holding in Andan is qualified by the following: Clearly, appellant's confession to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. . . . In the case at bar, it is doubtful whether, as Manimbao claimed, accused-appellant's confession was given divorced from the police interrogation. In his testimony, SPO3 Gomez stated: "We conducted [oral] interrogation to the suspect. During our [oral] interrogation with the help of Bgy. Captain [Edgardo Manimbao], the suspect admitted to us that he's the one who hacked Jonalyn Navidad. Although we do not reduced [sic] it into writing because of the absen[ce] of [a] lawyer." It would thus appear that Manimbao's conversation with accused-appellant was part of the then ongoing police investigation. In fact, he said it was SPO3 Gomez who told him about the alleged desire of accused-appellant to see him (Manimbao). Since the confession was admittedly given without the safeguards in Art. III, Section 12 and the additional ones provided in R.A. No. 7438, particularly the requirement that the confession be in writing and duly signed by the suspect in the presence of counsel, we hold that accusedappellant's confession is inadmissible, and it was error for the trial court to use it in convicting accused-appellant. There may indeed be suspicion that accused-appellant is the author of the crime. But our legal culture demands proof beyond reasonable doubt to be established according to law before any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. We cannot render judgment on the basis of mere guesses, surmises, or suspicion. It is not sufficient for a conviction that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or a probability of guilt. Before an accused can be convicted, the hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and must be consistent with all of them. PEOPLE V. DANO, GR 117690, SEPTEMBER 1, 2000 FACTS:

Appellant Alberto Dano was convicted of the crime of murder for the death of his brother Emeterio Dano and the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed upon him. During trial, Wilfredo Tapian testified that on March 16, 1994 at around 6:30 in the evening Teresita Dano asked for his help as her husband, Emeterio, attacked his brother Alberto in the latter's house. When he arrived at the house of Alberto, he saw Emeterio armed with a scythe pacing back and forth in Alberto's front yard and challenging him to a fight. Wilfredo tried to pacify Emeterio, but Emeterio ignored him. Suddenly, Emeterio leaped to Alberto who was standing with his head out of the window and slashed him with his scythe but missed. Seeing that his effort to pacify would be useless, Wilfredo left Brgy. Capt. Demosthenes Peralta also testified that he was informed by Wilfredo Tapian and Fernando Teves that the Dano brothers were quarreling. On his way to Alberto's house, he met Alberto who told him that he killed his brother Emeterio, and he voluntarily surrendered to him. As a result, Emeterio suffered 12 hacked wounds on different parts of his body. For his defense, Alberto invoked self-defense and defense of his family. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the extrajudicial confession of the accused. HELD: Appellant admitted killing the victim before the barangay captain, who is neither a police officernor a law enforcement agent. Such admission, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in violation of appellant's constitutional rights. The constitutional requirements on custodial investigation do not apply to spontaneous statements made in a voluntary manner whereby appellant orally admitted authorship of the crime. What the Constitution proscribes is the compulsory or coercive disclosure of incriminating facts. Alberto Dano was found guilty of the crime of homicide. h. Marked Money *PEOPLE V. LINSANGAN 195 SCRA 784 FACTS: In early November, 1987, police operatives of the Drug Enforcement Unit, Police Station No. 3 of the Western Police District were informed that there was rampant drug using and pushing on Dinalupihan Street, Tondo, Manila. The pusher was described to them as a boy of about 20 years, 5'5" in height, and of ordinary build. He allegedly sold marijuana to anybody, regardless of age ("walang gulang"). In light of these reports, Police Lieutenant Manuel Caeg and the other members of the unit organized a "buy-bust" operation on November 13, 1987 at Dinalupihan St., Tondo, Manila, to effect the arrest of the notorious drug pusher. Patrolman Roberto Ruiz, a member of the WPD since October 1, 1978 and assigned to the Drug Enforcement Unit since October, 1987, doing surveillance and arrest operations, was designated as the team leader, Pfc. Eleazar Lahom, Patrolmen Tomasito Corpuz and Jesus Saulog were designated as team members (pp. 1-19, t.s.n., December 16, 1987). Five (5) days before the appointed date, the police operatives conducted a "test-buy" operation on Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They arrested a person for violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425, as amended (Possession or Use of Prohibited Drug). Under questioning by the police operatives, the person informed them that he bought marijuana at Dinalupihan Street in Tondo. On November 13, 1987 at 10 o'clock in the morning, before the group left the office for the area of operation, two (2) ten-peso bills were given to Pat. Corpuz who had marked them with his initials "T.C." He gave one of the marked bills to the informer. Then, they proceeded to Dinalupihan, using an owner-type jeep driven by Pat. Lahom. They were all in civilian clothes. Pat. Corpuz wore a pair of maong shorts and a white t-shirt placed over his shoulders. They parked the jeep on Dinalupihan Street near Pampanga Street in Tondo. After briefing by the teamleader, Pat. Corpuz and the confidential informant approached the appellant. Pat. Lahom and Saulog remained in the jeep while Pat. Ruiz stood beside the jeep to watch the transaction. As Patrolman Corpuz and the confidential informant walked together, they conversed about the suspect. Pat. Corpuz asked the informant where the suspect was and the informer pointed to the appellant, who was seated by the gutter about six (6) meters away from them, seemingly waiting for someone. He was wearing blue-and-green shorts and a sando (undershirt). The informer raised his hand as a signal to the appellant, who rose and walked toward them. They walked toward a wooden house with a wooden fence and a store on the left side. The informer told the appellant: "Kukuha ako." The informer asked? "Magkano?" The informer told the accused that he would buy P10 worth of marijuana while his "compadre" (referring to Patrolman Tomasito Corpuz), would also get P10 worth. P20 would fetch ten (10) cigarette sticks of handrolled marijuana at P2.00 per stick. The policeman and the informer impressed upon the accused that they were in dire need of marijuana. The accused took the P20 from Pat. Corpuz and tucked it in his front waist. The accused went inside the wooden house, while Pat. Corpuz and the informer waited outside. The accused emerged shortly and handed over to Pat. Corpuz ten (10) cigarette sticks of handrolled marijuana. Pat. Corpuz took them with his right hand and at the same time he grabbed the accused with his other hand, saying: "Pulis ito, h'wag kang pumalag!" Pat. Ruiz saw the signal and rushed over to them. The accused tried to resist but was overpowered. The informer took to his heels (pp. 135, t.s.n., Jan. 13, 1988).

Pat. Ruiz frisked Linsangan and retrieved the marked ten-peso bills (Exhs. A-1 and A-2) tucked in his waist. He asked the appellant to sign his name on the two P10 bills. They boarded the jeep and returned to the police station. Pat. Ruiz prepared a letter-request to the NBI for the laboratory examination of the ten suspected marijuana sticks. The appellant also put his initials "C.L." on each stick (December 18, 1987, t.s.n.). The accused appealed to this Court alleging that the lower court erred in not holding that when the policemen required him to initial the P10-bills, they violated his constitutional right to counsel, to remain silent, and not to incriminate himself while under custodial investigation. ISSUE: WON the police violated accused right to counsel during custodial investigation? HELD: The appellant was not denied due process during the custodial investigation. Although he was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked in his waist, his right against self-incrimination was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was his act of selling marijuana cigarettes (People vs. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47; People vs. Macuto, 176 SCRA 762; Mejia vs. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457). His conviction was not based on the presence of his initials on the P10 bills, but on the fact that the trial court believed the testimony of the policemen that they arrested him while he was actually engaged in selling marijuana cigarettes to a member of the arresting party. The trial court gave more credence to their categorical declarations than to the appellant's denials (People vs. Tan, 145 SCRA 614). That is as it should be for as law enforcers, they are presumed to have performed their official duties in a regular manner (People vs. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 521; People vs. Ale, 145 SCRA 50). Their task of apprehending persons engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult enough without legal and procedural technicalities to make it doubly so. i. Booking Sheets *PEOPLE V. ANG CHUN KIT 251 SCRA 660 FACTS: Ang Chun Kit is a Chinese National and is reputed to be a member of a Hongkong-based drug syndicate. On November 9, 1991, at three oclock in the afternoon, a confidential informer reported, to the Chief Investigator Avelino Razon, that he arranged a transaction with a drug dealer and agreed to consummate the sale at 7:00 in the evening at the lobby of the Cardinal Santos Medical Center to which the Chief Investigator immediately arranged a buy-bust operation. After 15 minutes past seven, SPO2 Jacobo was met by the informer at the lobby and introduced to the accused as the person interested to buy the drugs, they then proceeded to the parking lot and the accused took out the drugs, out of the cars trunk, wrapped in a blue plastic bag. After checking, there was exchange of the object and the money. SPO2 Jacobo lit his cigarette as a signal for the buy-bust team to move in for the arrest. They also searched the vehicle of the accused and found 3 packets more of crystalline substance in a tissue box. The substances were led to the crime laboratory for examination and were confirmed to be shabu, 983.27 grams and 293.70 grams respectively (the one in the plastic bag and the packets in the tissue box). The accused disproved the charges. He said that he was at the hospital that time because someone texted him that his friend was hospitalized and he was going to visit him first before going to a dinner with some other friends. Two persons in plain clothes suddenly appeared from nowhere, with guns drawn, and arrested him without informing the reason for the arrest. The security guard on duty said that there was no untoward incident at the hospital lobby or its vicinity because if there is, it will be reflected in their logbook, the statement was confirmed by his supervisor. Ang Chun Kit also signed in the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at the police station. The RTC of Pasig, giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, found appellant Ang Chun Kit also known as Romy Ang guilty of selling shabu, sentenced him to life imprisonment and ordered him to pay a fine of Php30,000.00. ISSUES:

1. 2.

Whether or not Ang Chun Kits action of signing in the Booking Sheet at the Police Station is an act of admitting the commission of the offense. Whether or not the Decision of the RTC Pasig will be affirmed in this present appeal.

HELD: 1.

No. The act of signing in the Booking Sheet at the police station is merely a statement of the accuseds being booked and a fact of the date when the incident happened. It is only an accompaniment to the arrest. In People v. Mauyao, conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit (unspoken) admissions of the crime charged, since merely unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. Yes. The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. The court finds it difficult to believe the statements of the accused. Ang Chun Kit failed to present the persons he told that would substantiate his version of the story; he also did not reveal the name of the person he was visiting at the hospital.

2.

Custodial Investigation any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Booking Sheet a mere statement of the accused, of being booked which accompanies the arrest. The booking sheet is no more than a record of arrest and a statement on how the arrest is made. It is simply a police report, and it has no probative value as an extrajudicial statement of the person being detained. The signing by the accused of the booking sheet and arrest report is not a part of the custodial investigation which would otherwise require the presence of counsel to ensure the protection of the accused's constitutional rights.

j.

Paraffin Test PEOPLE V. GAMBOA 194 SCRA 372

Essential in the success of the prosecution of an offense is the proof of the identity of the offender. This is usually attained through the testimony of eyewitnesses during, before, or even after the commission of the offense. In the absence of such primary evidence the prosecution generally falls back on such other evidence as the ballistic examination of the murder weapon, a handwriting expert, the extrajudicial confession or similar resources. Otherwise, circumstantial evidence is resorted to which consists in the piercing together of tiny bits of evidence with a view towards ascertaining the accused as the person responsible for the commission of the offense. FACTS: Defendant-appellant John Gabriel Gamboa was charged with the crime of murder together with Miguel Celdran in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. After arraignment but during the trial, the case against Celdran was dismissed. Thereafter, a decision was rendered on August 30, 1989, finding Gamboa guilty of the crime of murder as penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The fatal weapon, a shotgun, was ordered forfeited in favor of the government. Appellant questions the admissibility of the shotgun as the alleged murder weapon. He says it was not found in his possession but his house was searched and the shotgun was confiscated without a search warrant. He also alleges that the three (3) empty shells that were submitted for the ballistics examination were not recovered from the scene of the crime and their production is a frameup by the police. Again, the Court observes that the police investigators confiscated the shotgun from the premises of the residence of the appellant without a search warrant. Such violation of the constitutional rights of a person should be investigated and inquired into ISSUE: WON TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REJECTING THE PARAFFIN TEST RESULTS AS INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. HELD: The Court is not persuaded that the police investigators in this case would willingly allow themselves to be instruments to frame the appellant for so serious a crime as murder. It appears that the three empty shells were actually recovered from the vicinity of the scene of the crime. The ballistics examination shows that it was fired from the very shotgun of the appellant. This evidence corroborates the theory of the prosecution, very strongly, that the appellant was the assailant of the victim. Even if the Court disregards the shotgun as having been illegally secured as well as the results of its ballistic examination in relation to the empty shells, still there is adequate evidence in the record to justify a verdict of conviction. Indeed, the Court did not even

consider it necessary to inquire into the motive of the appellant in the light of his positive identification by the prosecution witnesses. As to the paraffin, that was not conducted in the presence of appellants lawyer, such right is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. 8 His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in this case.Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution. k. When body of the accused is examined PEOPLE V. PIEDAD, GR 131923, DEC. 5, 2002 (NO NEED FOR COUNSEL) (Case repeated) GUTANG V. PEOPLE, GR 135406, JULY 11, 2000 *(When body of the accused is examined) FACTS Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner David J. Gutang guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 8 and 16 of RA 6425, as amended, (for illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs). On March 5, 1994, accused-appellant David Gutang, together with Noel Regala, Alex Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia, Jr., was arrested by elements of the PNP-NARCOM, in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his residence at No. 331 Ortigas Avenue, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. During the search, the following materials were found on top of a glass table inside the master's bedroom: a.shabu paraphernalias, such as tooters; b.aluminum foil; c.two (2) burners (one small, one big); d.fourteen (14) disposable lighters; e.three (3) weighing scales; f.plastic sealant used in repacking shabu; g.several transparent plastic bags of different sizes; h.about 1.4 grams of suspected marijuana fruiting tops contained in a small white plastic; i.about 0.7 gram of suspected dried marijuana contained in a small plastic container. The PNP-NARCOM team also inspected the cars of accused Regala, Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr. and found a Winchester Rayban case (sunglasses) with an undetermined amount of suspected shabu residues and tooters in a black plastic container and aluminum foil inside the car of Regala. The cars of Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr. yielded negative results. The items which were confiscated were then brought to the crime laboratory of the Philippine National Police (PNP) at Camp Crame, Quezon City for laboratory tests. The results of the laboratory examinations showed that the said items found in the master's bedroom of the residence of petitioner Gutang were positive for marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The items found inside the car of Regala were also positive for shabu. The accused were placed under arrest and were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame. According to PNP Forensic Chemist Julita De Villa, their office received from PNP-NARCOM which is also based in Camp Crame a letter-request for drug dependency test on the four (4) men. After receiving the said request, Mrs. Esguerra of the PNP Crime Laboratory asked the four (4) men including the petitioner to give a sample of their urine. The petitioner and his co-accused complied and submitted their urine samples to determine the presence of prohibited drugs. After examining the said urine samples it was found that the said urine samples all tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). Consequently, the informations were filed in court against the petitioner and his companions for violation of Sections 8 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, (otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act) as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The charge against accused Oscar de Venecia, Jr. was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that he voluntarily submitted himself for treatment, rehabilitation and confinement at the New Beginnings Foundation, Inc., a private rehabilitation center accredited by the Dangerous Drugs Board. Upon arraignment, petitioner Gutang entered a plea of not guilty. His co-accused, Regala and Jimenez, likewise pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, joint trial of the cases proceeded and the court after trial found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt which was affirmed by CA. Hence, this petition. ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT the urine sample is inadmissible in evidence since the accuseds urine sample was derived in effect from an uncounselled extra-judicial confession and is violative of Sec. 2 Article 3 of the Constitution? HELD NO. The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from the

accused. Such right is guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial compulsion. The situation in the case at bar falls within the exemption under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of the accused. This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test.

l.

Taking of pictures PEOPLE V. GALLARDE, 325 SCRA 835

FACTS: An information for the special complex crime of rape with homicide was filed charging accused-appellant of having sexual intercourse with one Editha Talan, a minor, 10 years of age, against her will and consent, and thereafter, with intent to kill, cover the nose and mouth of the said minor resulting to her death and then bury her in the field. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. He interposed the defense of denial and alibi that he was at home with his mother and brothers at the time the crime occurred. Trial ensued. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim actual damages. It convicted accused-appellant of the crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge. Hence, this appeal. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant of murder in an information charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory portion of the information showed that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance. In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. In the absence in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of murder. Nevertheless, the Court held that the circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken together, led to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant and no other else, killed the victim and that he was guilty therefor. The Court found accused-appellant guilty of homicide. As to the crime of rape, the Court found no convincing proof that the laceration of the vagina and the rupture of the hymen of the victim were caused in the course of coitus or by a male organ. Accused-appellant's alibi and bare denial deserved no consideration. Even assuming that accused-appellant's claim was true, his stay in his house did not preclude his physical presence at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity. The place where the body of the victim was found buried was a few meters from his house, and can be reached in a short while. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not an accused can be convicted of an offense higher than that charged. 2. Whether or not the pictures of accused taken even violates the right of the accused against self incrimination. HELD: 1.

No. The accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and convicting him of such is an unauthorized denial of said right. In the absence then in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance, GALLARDE cannot be convicted of murder. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information for which he is tried, or is necessarily included in that which is charged. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right. No. The right against self-incrimination is not violated if pictures of accused were taken even without assistance of counsel since purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition. We cannot agree with the trial court's rejection of the photographs (Exhibits "I", "J" and "K") taken of GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken while [GALLARDE] was already under the mercy of the police." The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral

2.

compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. m. Incident to a lawful arrest MARCELO V. SANDIGANBAYAN GR 109242 JANUARY 26, 1999 FACTS: On February 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post office. Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation in apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office. On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi Village following a report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a private car. At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the mail bag to a travelling bag. Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car and started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested the two accused. The NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan. The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters. Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same letters confiscated from them. A case for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan wherein the accused were declared guilty. ISSUE: Whether or not the letters signed by the petitioner were inadmissible as evidence. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the letters were valid evidence. It is known that during custodial investigation, a person has the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. Any admission or confession made in the absence of counsel is inadmissible as evidence. Furthermore, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In the instant case, even though the petitioner was asked to sign the letters, the letters are still admissible as evidence because the accused was convicted not only by means of these letters but also by testimonies made by the NBI agents. Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the letters were validly seized as an incident of a valid arrest and therefore can stand on their own. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed. I. The exclusionary rule a. Violation of rights PEOPLE V. HERMOSO, GR 130590, OCTOBER 18, 2000 FACTS: This is a review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City finding accused-appellant Ranillo Ponce Hermoso guilty of raping and killing seven-year old Glery Geoca and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty. On September 11, 1996, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, was arraigned during which the information was read to him in the

Cebuano dialect which he confirmed to have understood. He then entered a plea of not guilty. He was informed by the trial court of the names of the five prosecution witnesses and their respective addresses. Then the case was tried. After the prosecution had offered its testimonial and documentary evidence, accused-appellant filed a demurrer to which the prosecution filed a reply. On January 9, 1997, the trial court denied accused-appellant's demurrer to evidence for lack of merit. On March 17,1997, the defense manifested in open court that accused-appellant was changing his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty." Defense counsel Atty. Pablito Pielago, Jr. informed the trial court that he had prepared for trial but accused-appellant insisted on changing his plea even after being told of the consequences of pleading guilty to the charge, including the probability that he would be sentenced to death should he be found guilty. Hence, with such desire of the accused to change his plea from Not Guilty to one of Guilty, he was arraigned anew. Thereafter, the trial court rendered its decision, sentencing the accused to suffer the punishment of death penalty. Pursuant to Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review in view of the imposition of the death penalty on accused-appellant. ISSUE: Whether or not the confession made by the accused to Barangay Captain Sonny Boy Altamera is inadmissible. HELD: The question in this case is whether the confession given to the barangay captain was made while accused-appellant was under custodial interrogation. It will be recalled that accused-appellant had been pointed to by Josephine Gonzales and Lilia Bartido as the person Glery P. Geoca was with shortly before the latter disappeared. Accordingly, the barangaycaptain and his men looked for him in his house and, when they did not find him there, they continued their search until they found him under a tree. When they finally found him, they interrogated him in his house and, failing to get anything from him, took him to the barangay captain's house where they continued questioning him. There, Naciansino produced a man's wallet containing the personal effects of accused-appellant. At that point, accused-appellant broke down and confessed to the crime. The investigation had thus ceased to be a general exploratory investigation of an unsolved crime. It had begun to focus on the guilt of accused-appellant so much so that he was no longer allowed to leave. This case therefore comes within the purview of Article III, Section 12, paragraph (1). It is distinguishable from cases in which we found the confession to have been given under circumstances not constituting custodial interrogation. In People vs. Andan, the confession of the accused which he gave to the municipal mayor was held to be admissible in evidence because it was shown that the mayor was a confidant of the accused and he did not act as a law enforcement officer when he heard the confession of the accused. We held that constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admit having committed the crime. In another case, the Supreme Court ruled that the confession made by the accused was admissible because the inquiry had not yet reached a stage wherein the police considered the accused as a particular suspect. The police were just looking into a number of possibilities, having been merely informed that the suspect was wearing what could be a security guard's uniform. The case at bar is a far cry from these cases. As accused-appellant's confession was made without the assistance of counsel, we hold that it is inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution. However, it appears that the defense failed to object, as required by Rule 132, Section 36, immediatelywhen Altamera was presented as a witness for the prosecution or when specific questions concerning the confession were asked. Having failed to do so, accused-appellant is deemed to have waived his right to object to the inadmissibility of Altamera's testimony. It is noteworthy that accused-appellant's confession is corroborated by the corpus delicti. He in fact was even the one who informed the search team of the exact location where the body of the victim could be found. It is not necessary that an eyewitness should testify on having seen the accused committing the crime or seeing him under circumstances indicating that he committed the crime in order to hold the accused liable under his own confession. Hence, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, of Pagadian City finding accused-appellant Ranillo Ponce Hermoso, alias "Allan," guilty of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is AFFIRMED

While at large, he cannot seek relief from the court, as he is deemed to have waived the appeal. Thus, having escaped from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land, accused-appellant revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate, at his pleasure on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option. Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court. Accused-appellant, in the case at bar, has remained at large for most of the proceedings before the RTC, as well as for the entirety of the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, and even until now when his appeal is pending before this Court. He cannot so audaciously hope that his appeal before this Court would succeed. He only hopes in vain. Hence,the appeal was dismissed and the records of the case were remanded to the trial court for the issuance of the mittimus. PEOPLE V. LAPITAJE, GR 132042, FEB. 19, 2003 FACTS: Witness Domingo testified that three armed men robbed his store then left hastily. Thereafter, gunfire was heard and Nelson Saavedra was shot. Another man, identified as one of the robbers, was also found dead. Suspects Lapitaje and Reyes were later identified by the witnesses while Baluyos and Arellano were implicated by the testimony of witness Oarga who had seen four men running towards a waiting taxicab. The trial court concluded that Baluyos and Arellano were lookouts in the robbery. Thus, appellants were ruled guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. As Lapitaje and Reyes were positively identified, the Court ruled them guilty of the simple crime of robbery. Arellano and Baluyos were absolved from liability for lack of sufficient evidence as to their participation in the crime. As to the shooting of Saavedra, although Reyes may have fired the gun he was then holding, there was no sufficient evidence that he shot Saavedra or that Saavedra was shot on the occasion of the robbery. Nobody actually saw the shooting, and there was no evidence that the gunshot wound of Saavedra came from any of the guns used by the robbers. ISSUE: Whether or not the rights of Arellano and Baluyos are entitled to an acquittal from the crime? HELD: Yes, they are indeed entitled to acquittal for the evidence against them is very weak. Accused-appellants Romy Baluyos and Wendel Arellano are ACQUITTED, their guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith and to INFORM the Court within five (5) days from receipt hereof, the date when appellants were actually released from confinement. DCcHIS Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. b. Immunity against self-incrimination GALMAN V. PAMARAN *(supra, Custodial Investigation) FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom. The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military

conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them. Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer. Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution. But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them). Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process. However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was a violation of right against self incrimination. HELD: Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'. The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the AquinoGalman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondentsaccused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.

c. Re-enactments PEOPLE V. SUAREZ G.R. NO. 111193 JANUARY 28, 1997 FACTS: Arlene Tuyor was awakened by loud knocking sounds on the door of her room. She was a domestic helper at that time, working in

the household of Estrellita Guzman. Also in the house then were the nieces of Estrellita. Marivic's husband, Ferdinand Suarez (Jojo), and her three children likewise lived in Estrellita's bungalow-type house. Upon opening the door, Tuyor was surprised to see Ferdinand Suarez, her "Seorito Jojo," surrounded by two men wearing black nylon cloths over their heads and faces. One of the men had a big body frame while the other had a small physique. The men immediately entered her room, tied her up land asked for her money. She was also asked if she knew Jojo. Getting no response from Tuyor, the intruders left her room bringing Suarez with them. From her room, Tuyor heard the sound of the microwave oven located in the kitchen. She also heard the main door of the house slamming and someone crying in the house. When Tuyor went out of her room, she saw Marivic weeping in the living room. She proceeded to her employer's bedroom and found Estrellita bleeding and lying on her bed. All this time, accused Suarez was just sitting on the chair of the piano. Estrellita later died due to severe hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds. Post-mortem examinations revealed that she had sustained an elliptical and gaping wound on the right side of her abdomen and another wound of the same nature on the left side of her back. Further examination also disclosed that the deceased suffered an incised wound on her left thumb. The lawyer of the family of the deceased sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The case was assigned to Atty. Salvador Ranin. Atty. Ranin concluded that the perpetrators could not have entered the house without the aid of somebody inside as the bolt lock of the kitchen door can only be released from within. He had one suspect in mind, that is, Ferdinand Suarez, or Jojo. Ranin had discovered in the course of his investigation that there were no signs of injuries or rope marks on Suarez and that he was not on good terms with Estrellita when the crime happened. He was even found positive for deception after taking the polygraph test at the NBI. Suarez eventually revealed to Ranin his involvement in the commission of the crime after Ranin told him that he had damaging information to the effect that Suarez had left the house in the evening. In his sworn statement before the NBI, Suarez said that one Loreto Reyes, alias "Dondon" or Larry, approached him and talked to him to allow Reyes and his group to rob their house as they badly needed money for the Christmas season. It was only after the group threatened to kill him that Suarez acceded to their demand, on the condition that they would only steal but should not kill him. He began his confession by implicating Wilfredo Lara in the crime. He said that while he, Arthur Lara, Morris Santos, and Eduardo Lozada were doing nothing in their place in San Miguel, Pasig, Lara approached them and told them that he had some good news. Lara told them that he was asked by Suarez to look for some men who could kill his Auntie Estrellita. Reyes could not believe what he heard, so Lara called Suarez to let him tell the gang about his offer. Apparently, Suarez wanted his aunt killed so that he and his wife could get at once any property that Marivic might inherit from Estrellita upon the latter's demise. In exchange for the job, Suarez would allow them to steal what they wanted from the house, in addition to giving them P100,000.00 after one month from the killing of Estrellita. Atty. Ranin was able to retrieve the duplicate keys used by the gang from the father of Reyes after Reyes had admitted that the keys could be found in his father's house in Montalban. Wilfredo Lara was arrested by the NBI at the house of his parents-in-law in Northern Samar. When brought to the NBI office at Taft Avenue, Manila, he likewise confessed his participation in the crime and gave a sworn statement. Based on the foregoing statements and on other evidence submitted by the NBI to the then provincial fiscal of the former municipality of Pasig, an information for the crime of robbery with homicide was filed against Ferdinand Suarez, Loreto Reyes, Wilfredo Lara, Maria Victoria G. Suarez, Noli Licsi, Vicente Rodriguez, and Morris Santos. ISSUE: Whether or not the confessions obtained by the NBI agents violates the constitutional rights of the accused. HELD: After a thorough review of the records of the case, we agree with the lower court's factual finding and conclusion that the extrajudicial confessions of accused Reyes and appellant Lara were freely and voluntarily given and that their retraction and claims of violence and coercion were merely belated contrivances and efforts at exculpation. Their claim that they were forced to sign their respective statements was sufficiently refuted by the witnesses for the prosecution who were present on the day and time the duo gave and signed their sworn statements.

Once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. The burden is on the accused to destroy this presumption. A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency. The sworn statements signed by accused Reyes and appellant Lara state that they had been informed of their rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Reyes stated that he had been assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation and appellant Lara confirmed that he was assisted by a lawyer when he waived his constitutional rights. Additionally, several witnesses for the People testified before the lower court that the constitutional mandates were observed during their investigation. Reyes and Lara were not even able to show any evil or dubious motive corrosive of the credibility of these witnesses whom the court a quo found more worthy of belief than the witnesses for the defense. Accused failed to submit any evidence, apart from their own testimony, that violence and intimidation had been inflicted upon them to extort their sworn confessions. They never complained to Prosecutor Capistrano nor to anyone else about the physical beatings that they claim had been inflicted upon them. They did not ask for medical assistance and there was no proof that any such request was denied. Although Reyes submitted a medical certificate to attest to supposed injuries, the court below did not believe it and accepted it merely to prove its existence. Extrajudicial confessions independently made without collusion, almost identical with each other in their essential details which could have been known only to the declarants, and corroborated by other evidence against the person or persons implicated to show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the crime, are thus impressed with features of voluntariness in their execution. Also, the failure of an accused to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests voluntariness in the execution of the confession. WHEREFORE, the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Wilfredo Lara is hereby MODIFIED and he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The death indemnity awarded by the court a quo is hereby INCREASED to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) in line with present case law and policy, to be assessed against the accused and herein appellant in accordance with Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code.The judgment of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED.

d. Applicability to aliens PEOPLE V. WONG CHUEN MING - 256 SCRA 182 Angala e. Verbal confessions PEOPLE V. SUELA, 373 SCRA 163 *(confession to private party) FACTS: Before the Supreme Court is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. In the same decision, the trial court also found appellant Edgar Suela guilty of simple robbery for demanding money as payment for information on the case. Appellants assailed their conviction. Among others, they questioned the admissibility of their written extrajudicial confessions, the wristwatch, and the letter of appellant Nerio Suela. The Supreme Court held that the extrajudicial confessions of all three appellants were inadmissible in evidence because they were not accorded competent and independent counsel during their custodial investigation. Where the prosecution failed to discharge the State's burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative value. The Court likewise found inadmissible in evidence appellant Batocan's confession as to the location of the wristwatch stolen from the victim, Director Nilo Rosas. He did not execute any written waiver of his right to remain silent or of his right to counsel when he gave this confession. As for the wristwatch itself, the Court found that it was irregularly seized. Hence, it cannot be admitted against the appellants. The

Court, however, found admissible in evidence the letter of appellant Nerio Suela addressed to Director Rosas asking for forgiveness and admitting his participation in the crime. Appellant Nerio was no longer under custodial investigation when he wrote it. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities. Excluding the wristwatch and the written extrajudicial confessions, the Court found the remaining pieces of evidence still sufficient to prove appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The handwritten letter of appellant Nerio Suela, taken together with the recovery from his house of the stolen TV and knife used in the killing of the victim; plus the oral admission of appellant Edgardo Batocan to Director Rosas and his officemates, the written tip of appellant Edgar Suela identifying the malefactors, which he voluntarily handed in open court, and Director Rosas' testimony narrating in detail how appellants committed the crime, convinced the Court with moral certainty of the guilt of the appellants. Accordingly, the Court affirmed appellants' conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, but reduced the penalty imposed on them to reclusion perpetua considering that the aggravating circumstance of disguise appreciated by the trial court was not alleged in the Informations. Hence, it cannot be appreciated to increase the penalty to death. Likewise, the Court acquitted appellant Edgar Suela of the crime of simple robbery for failure of the prosecution to establish the elements of the crime ISSUE: 1) Whether or not extra judicial confession cannot be given probative value 2) Whether or not acknowledgement of guilt is admissible in evidence while he is not under custodial investigation. 3) Whether or not bill of rights apply if he is not under custodial investigation

HELD 1)

The extrajudicial confession cannot be given probative value where accused was not provided with effective and vigilant counsel before he extra judicially admitted his guilt. "In People v. dela Cruz, we stated that 'a confession made in an atmosphere characterized by deficiencies in informing the accused of all rights to which he is entitled would be rendered valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it is, by non-compliance with the procedural and substantive safeguards to which an accused is entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now further implemented and ramified by statutory law.'" Where the prosecution failed to discharge the State's burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicial admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative value. The extrajudicial confessions of all three appellants are thus inadmissible in evidence. The accuseds acknowledgement of his guilt is admissible in evidence where the same was not extracted while he was under custodial investigation. Edgardo Batocan's confession to Rosas who is not a police officer is admissible in evidence. The Rules state that "the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him." Batocan's verbal declarations are not covered by Sections 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, because they were not extracted while he was under custodial investigation. In People v. Tawat, the Court declared: "The rule is that 'any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard is he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance.' "Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony of a person who testifies that he was present, heard, understood, and remembers the substance of the conversation or statement made by the accused." The constitutional law bill of rights procedures do not apply to a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning by authorities. Nerio Suela also contends that his January 31, 1996 letter to Director Rosas is inadmissible in evidence. This letter was properly identified. Nerio was no longer under custodial investigation when he wrote it. In open court, he admitted having written it. Thus, contrary to his contention, the fact that he was not assisted by counsel when he wrote it will not make the letter inadmissible in evidence. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities. Hence, the letter is admissible in evidence.

2)

3)

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED and the appealed Decision MODIFIED. We AFFIRM the judgment insofar as it refers to Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-64616 and Q-96-65071 but REDUCE the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The award of civil indemnities is also AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-64618 for simple robbery, Edgar Suela y Hembra is ACQUITTED. AE PEOPLE V. TABOGA, 376 SCRA 500 *(confession to private party) FACTS: Edralin Taboga was charged with Robbery with Homicide in an Information which reads that with intent to gain, and with violence

against persons, entered the house of one Francisca Tubon, and once inside, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, assault, attacked and stabbed Tubon, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which necessarily caused the death of said Tubon and took away several personal properties belonging to Tubon. He was likewise indicted for Arson for setting the victims house on fire. After finding the burnt house and charred body of Tubon, Baranggay Captain Pagao confronted Taboga, and the latter readily admitted that he killed Tubon and set her house on fire, causing the whole house, including the dead body of the old woman, to be burned. Taboga was brought to the police station for further investigation. Mr. Mario Contaoi, a radio announcer of DZNS, went to Police Station to interview the suspect. Again, Taboga admitted killing the deceased and setting her and her house on fire. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered separate pleas of "Not Guilty" to the crimes charged and interposed an alibi. Accusedappellant also claimed that he was maltreated by the policemen and forced to admit the crime. Regarding his admission to radio announcer Contaoi, he narrated that the interview was held inside the investigation room of the police station where policemen were present and that the reporter acted as an agent for the prosecution. Thus, he had to admit the crimes because he was afraid of the policemen. The RTC rendered judgment finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. ISSUE: Whether or not confession made by the accused to a radio reporter, a private person, can be admitted as evidence against him. HELD: Yes. There is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the police authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused-appellant. Neither is there anything on record which even remotely suggests that the radio announcer was instructed by the police to extract information from him on the details of the crimes. Indeed, the reporter even asked permission from the officer-in-charge to interview accused-appellant. Nor was the information obtained under duress. In fact, accusedappellant was very much aware of what was going on. The records also show that accused-appellant not only confessed to the radio reporter but to several others. Accused-appellant failed to present convincing evidence to substantiate his claim that he was maltreated and compelled to confess. Where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence, on their bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating the voluntariness of the confession. The RTC did not err in admitting in evidence accused-appellant's taped confession. Such confession did not form part of custodial investigation. It was not given to police officers but to a media man in an apparent attempt to elicit sympathy. The record even discloses that accused-appellant admitted to the Baranggay Captain that he clubbed and stabbed the victim even before the police started investigating him at the police station. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily asked help from the newsman. PEOPLE V. BALOLOY, G.R. NO. 140740, APR. 12, 2002 *(res gestae) FACTS: Jose Camacho, father of Genelyn and resident of Inasagan, Purok Mabia, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that at about 5:00 p.m. of 3 August 1996, he asked Genelyn to borrow some rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog. Genelyn forthwith left, but never returned. Thus, Jose went to the house of Wilfredo, who informed him that Genelyn had already left with one ganta of rice. Speculating that Genelyn might have taken shelter at the house of their neighbor Olipio Juregue while it was raining, Jose proceeded to Olipios house. Unfortunately, Jose did not find Genelyn there. Not losing hope, Jose proceeded to the house of Ernesto Derio. On his way, he met Wilfredo, who accompanied him to the house of Ernesto. Genelyn was not there either. They continued their search for Genelyn, but when it proved to be in vain, the two decided to go home. A few minutes after Jose reached his house, Ernesto and Juanito arrived. Juanito informed Jose that he saw a dead body at the waterfalls, whose foot was showing. When asked whose body it was, Juanito answered that it was Genelyns. Immediately, the three went to the waterfalls where Juanito pointed the spot where he saw Genelyns body. Jose reported the incident to Barangay

Captain Luzviminda Ceniza. Antionio Camacho handed to Ceniza a black rope which was reportedly in the spot where the body was found. Ceniza, who was at the wake then, asked the people around who the owner of the rope was. Juanito replied in the affirmative. Ceniza took Juanito away from the other people and asked Juanito to tell her everything. Juanito then confessed how Juanito only intended to frighten Genelyn and how he raped then killed her. Ceniza announced to the people there that Juanito was the culprit. She then turned Juanito over to an officer because the people had become unruly. Juanito was then brought to the police headquarters and was investigated. The police officer took the affidavits of the witnesses thereafter. The next day, Ceniza along with Juanito, went to Judge Dicons courtroom to swear on their affidavits. Judge Dicon asked Juanito if the accusation against him was true. Juanito replied saying Napanuwayan ko, sir. Juanito was never assisted by a lawyer during the investigation by the police and during Judge Dicons questioning. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision of guilty on the accused. ISSUE: Whether or not the verbal confession was admissible as evidence. HELD: The Court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. The confession made by Juanito to Ceniza is admissible because it was a spontaneous statement and was made before custodial investigation. As such, the provision on custodial investigation does not apply. On the other hand, the confession Juanito made to Judge Dicon is inadmissible in evidence as the former was not informed of his constitutional rights nor was he assisted by counsel while he made the confession. The Court held, however, that the confession made to Judge Dicon can be taken as a verbal admission to the crime as can be established by the testimonies of the persons who heard the statement. Lastly, the circumstantial evidence gathered clearly establishes Juanitos guilt. f. Co-accused not bound

PEOPLE V. CAMAT- 256 SCRA 52 *(same case under miranda rights - procedural requirement) FACTS: Accused-appellants Armando Rodriguez Camat, alias Amboy Camat, and Wilfredo Tanyag del Rosario, alias Willie, were charged in Criminal Case No. 19841 of the Regional Trial Court of the then Municipality of Makati, Branch 147, with the so-called special complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide committed in Paranaque, Metro Manila. Patrolman Odeo Cario, to whom the case was assigned for investigation on September 2, 1985, stated on the witness stand that appellant Camat orally admitted to him his (Camat s) participation in the killing of the soldier during interrogation at the police precinct. In addition, Camat also allegedly gave the names of Wilfredo del Rosario and one Roland as his co-conspirators in the crime charged, and alluded to appellant Del Rosario as the one who actually stabbed Sinoy. In support of their lone assignment of error, appellants insist that the trial court cannot rely on the extrajudicial confession of appellant Camat as a basis for their conviction because such confession was obtained during custodial investigation in violation of their constitutional rights invoking section 20 of then 1973 constitution (no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. ISSUE: can the confession of camat be used against his co accused? HELD: As to the implication of Del Rosario in the extrajudicial confession of Camat, no reliance can be placed on the imputation therein because it violates the rule on res inter alios acta and does not fall under the exceptions thereto, especially since it was made after the supposed homicidal conspiracy. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. As against the latter, the confession is hearsay g. Who may raise the question PEOPLE V. BALISTEROS - 237 SCRA 499 David h. When must the objection be raised PEOPLE V. SAMUS, GR 135957, SEPT. 17, 2002

FACTS: For automatic review by this Court is the Decision dated October 8, 1998 in Criminal Case Nos. 5015-96-C and 5016-96-C finding Samus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of murder. The trial court found enough pieces of circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Rejecting his alibi for being unreliable and uncorroborated, it convicted him of homicide for the death of Dedicacion Balisi; and of murder, with dwelling as aggravating circumstance, for the death of John Ardee Balisi. ISSUE: Whether or not the Lower Court gravely erred in admitting and considering evidence that were obtained in violation of the accused's constitutional rights. HELD: In their Joint-Affidavit, the arresting officers said that after appellant had initially jumped from a two-story house to escape, they closed in on him and he voluntarily surrendered. At the same place where he did so, they conducted a preliminary interview, during which he readily admitted killing Dedicacion and John Ardee Balisi. But during their testimonies, the police officers denied questioning appellant after arresting him. Instead, they claimed that it was Rolly Vallejo who had conducted the preliminary interview in their presence as follows: "Pare totoo ba ang sinasabi nila tungkol sa iyo na ikaw ay pinaghihinalaan nilang pumatay sa mag-lola sa Canlubang[?]"; to this question appellant allegedly answered, "[T]otoo nga pare, ako nga." No further questions were allegedly asked by the law enforcement officers. Instead, they immediately brought appellant to Camp Vicente Lim for further investigation. SPO3 Mario Bitos, on the other hand, stated in his Affidavit, also dated September 11, 1996, that during the conduct of the preliminary interview, appellant admitted "that the victim's pair of earrings made of gold was taken by him after the incident and . . . sold to Mr. Jhun Pontanos y Matriano, a resident of Bgy. Niugan, Cabuyao, Laguna, for the amount of five hundred (P500) pesos." During his testimony, however, Bitos denied that they had conducted any investigation. Instead, he claimed that upon their arrival at Camp San Vicente Lim, an interview was conducted by the media in the presence of Major Pante, SPO3 Bitos and SPO3 Malabanan (the investigator). From this interview, the team was able to cull from appellant that he was responsible for the killings, and that he had stolen the earrings of Dedicacion Balisi and sold them to Pontanos for P500. This information was allegedly verified by Bitos upon the order of Major Pante. Thus, the apprehending officers contend that the constitutional rights of appellant were not violated, since they were not the ones who had investigated and elicited evidentiary matters from him. We are not persuaded. The events narrated by the law enforcers in court are too good to be true. Their Sworn Statements given a day after the arrest contradict their testimonies and raise doubts on their credibility. Appellant claims that his alleged confession to the media while in police custody cannot be admitted in evidence. He further contends that the pair of earrings, the turnover receipt, as well as the testimonies of Pontaos and Bitos, relative thereto should be excluded for being "fruits of the poisonous tree." We clarify. After being illegally arrested, appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel. Hence, any admission elicited from him by the law enforcers during custodial investigation are normally inadmissible in evidence. In their affidavits, the police officers readily admitted that appellant was subjected to a preliminary interview. Yet, during their examination in open court, they tried to skirt this issue by stating that it was only the media that had questioned appellant, and that they were merely present during the interview. However, an examination of the testimonies of the three law enforcers show the folly of their crude attempts to camouflage inadmissible evidence. In the absence of testimony from any of the media persons who allegedly interviewed appellant, the uncertainties and vagueness about how they questioned and led him to his confession lead us to believe that they themselves investigated appellant and elicited from him uncounselled admissions. This fact is clearly shown by the Affidavits they executed on September 11, 1997, as well as by their testimonies on cross-examination.

Nonetheless, even if the uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible, under the present circumstances we cannot rule it out because of appellant's failure to make timely objections. "Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given under custodial investigation and was made without the assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to object to its presentation during the trial, with the result that the defense is deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility." Can the testimony of Pontaos and the picture of a pair of earrings together with the turnover receipt, which appellant identified during his testimony, be considered inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree and hence be disregarded at this stage of appeal? Upon examination of the records, we find that during the entire examination in court of Prosecution Witness Pontaos, appellant did not question or object to the admissibility of the former's testimony. Worse, the latter's counsel even freely cross-examined the witness without any reservations. Having made no objection before the trial court, appellant cannot raise this question for the first time on appeal. The evidence having been admitted without objection, we are not inclined to reject it. If only appellant had made a timely objection to the admissibility of the said testimony, the prosecution could have been warned of the need to present additional evidence to support its case. To disregard unceremoniously a major portion of its case at this late stage when it can no longer present additional evidence as substitute for that which is now claimed to be inadmissible goes against fundamental fairness.

i.

Admissible Evidence PEOPLE V. ESPIRITU, 302 SCRA 533

FACTS: Appellant Rizal Espiritu was convicted as charged for the crime of murder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The conviction was based mainly on his confession and the corroborating evidence of corpus delicti. His extra-judicial confession stated that he and Fred Malicdan killed Sato Sanad after being hired by Gerald Alicoy to do so for the sum of P20,000.00. Aside from describing the details of how he had his cohort killed Sanad, during the ocular inspection, he even pointed out the place where the killing had been committed. And when he executed his extra-judicial confession before the police and during the preliminary investigation of the case before the city prosecutor wherein he admitted his participation in the said incident, he was assisted by Atty. Daniel Mangallay. However, during the trial of the case, the accused denied any participation in the killing of Sanad. He also assailed the admissibility of his extra-judicial confession. And, he claimed that Atty. Mangallay was retained by Alfredo Kinao and not by himself and that the said lawyer was unable to advise or to explain to him the contents of his extra-judicial confession before he signed it. ECDHIc ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial confession is admissible as evidence. HELD: We are convinced that the confession of Appellant Espiritu is admissible in evidence, as it was satisfactorily shown that it was (1) voluntary and (2) made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. With respect to the first requisite, we find that Espiritu readily admitted killing Sanad when he was confronted by the relatives of the deceased. Thereafter, without being "invited" by the investigating officers, he went to the police station and voluntarily gave his statement to SPO1 Wilfredo P. Cabanayan. Later, appellant affirmed before Prosecutor Romeo Carbonell the fact that he, with Atty. Mangallay, had gone to the police station to surrender and that the said counsel had assisted him when the police started taking his statement. The Court ruled that appellant's contention that Atty. Mangallay was retained not by the appellant personally but by his uncle, Alfredo Kinao, is not proof of counsel deprivation. The fact remains that Kinao, in hiring the counsel, acted on behalf of appellant. Besides, appellant did not object when Atty. Mangallay represented him during the investigations before the police and the city prosecutor. In fact, he expressly acknowledged Atty. Mangallay as his counsel. And as a consequence of the confession of the appellant, his conviction became inevitable. Such confession was evidence of a high order, "since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience." We must clarify that the right to counsel does not mean that the accused must personally hire his own counsel. The constitutional requirement is satisfied when a counsel is (1) engaged by anyone acting on behalf of the person under investigation or (2) appointed by the court upon petition of the said person or by someone on his behalf. The assailed Decision was AFFIRMED. HacADE PEOPLE V. LUMANDONG, 327 SCRA 650

FACTS: That on or about November 30, 1995, at more or less 9:00 oclock in the evening, at (sic) Bolihon, Taglimao, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with a bladed knife which he was then conveniently provided, with treachery, and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kill one Analou L. Eduave, an 8 year old child/girl, by then and there attacking her, stabbing and hitting her chest and different vital parts of her body several times with said bladed knife, seriously injuring the said victim, resulting to her sudden death. ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confession are inadmissible HELD: The four fundamental requirements on the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession are: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2 ) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing. (See also People v. Daeng, G.R. No. 128045, August 24, 2000; People v. Llanes, G.R. No. 140268, September 18, 2000; and People v. Mameng, G.R. No. 123147, October 13, 2000 J. Rights after custodial investigation PEOPLE V. ALICANDO - 251 SCRA 293 FACTS: Accused, Arnel Alicando, was convicted with a crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the victims body and the parents and police were informed. Another neighbor, Luisa Rebada, witnessed the crime and told the police that she saw accused on top of the child with his hand choking her. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. By virtue of his uncounselled confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty and was convicted with the death penalty. The case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review. ISSUE: Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded to the accused. HELD: Due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial investigation for the accused. He was not informed of his right to a counsel upon making his extrajudicial confession and the information against him was written in a language he could not understand and was not explained to him. This is in violation of section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The lower court also violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant without conducting a search inquiry on the voluntariness and full understanding of the accused of the consequences of his plea. Moreover the evidences admitted by the court that warranted his convicted were inadmissible because they were due to an invalid custodial investigation that did not provide the accused with due process of the law. Thus the SC annulled the decision of the imposition of the death penalty and remanded the case back to the lower for further proceeding. PEOPLE V. DE GUZMAN - 194 SCRA 191 FACTS: The case for the prosecution was based mainly on the testimony of Sgt. Ruben S. Bazar of the NARCOM District Office in Malolos, Bulacan. This witness testified that in the afternoon of December 7, 1987, his office received a tip from a confidential informer that De Guzman would be selling marijuana at Virgen de los Flores, Baliwag, Bulacan, from six o'clock in the evening until midnight. Their chief, Lt. Agrimero V. Cruz, forthwith organized a "buy-bust" team composed of Sgt. Efren Querubin, Sgt. Tahil Amad, the confidential informer, and Bazar himself. Lt. Cruz gave Sgt. Querubin, who was to pose as the buyer, a P50 bill marked with a blue dot between the words "Limampung" and "Piso." The team left at about 6 p.m. and proceeded to the esquinita where De Guzman would be operating. While Querubin and the informer waited for De Guzman, the other team members concealed themselves in various places in the area. Bazar said he was hidden behind some banana trees about ten meters away when he saw the two agents approach De Guzman. A few minutes later, Querubin threw away a lighted cigarette and at this pre-arranged signal the rest of the team closed in on De Guzman and, after identifying themselves as NARCOM agents, placed him under arrest. They confiscated the marked money from him. Querubin turned over a plastic bag containing marijuana dried leaves to Bazar, who

conducted a field test on the contents when they arrived at NARCOM headquarters. The results were positive. The following day he prepared a Receipt of Property Seized which he asked De Guzman to sign. On December 10, 1987, he got the plastic bag from the locker where it had been placed under the care of a custodian and delivered it to the PC Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas for examination. ISSUE: WON the respondent was guilty of the crime committed. HELD: The trial judge regarded as tell-tale signs of De Guzman's guilt his submissiveness when he was arrested and the fact that he signed without objection the Receipt of Seized Property, which was later offered as Exhibit "C." One can easily be cowed into silence by men with drawn guns and ostensible authority and may even be intimidated into involuntary admissions as De Guzman claims he was when he signed the receipt. That receipt was in reality an admission which the accused-appellant was forced to make without the assistance of counsel and without being first informed of the constitutional rights of a person facing custodial investigation. That evidence was totally inadmissible under the Bill of Rights 3 and the consistent rulings of this Court since the case of People v. Galit. While it is true, as the Solicitor General observes, that the accused-appellant did not refute the prosecution evidence of his facing another criminal prosecution for drug dealing, that fact is not relevant in the case at bar. We are not trying him for that charge or for his reputation as a drug dealer. The case at bar is Criminal Case No. 1453-M-87, and no other. The prosecution cannot draw its strength from the weakness of the defense. The evidence of the People must be strong enough to stand on its own two feet instead of leaning on the crutches of the evidence for the defense. It must be strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock must be punished, not because he cannot prove that he is innocent but because it has proved that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude meant only to embellish the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt. That mandate shall be enforced. Section 13 Bail BORLONGAN V. PENA - G.R. NO. 143591, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 FACTS: Magdaleno Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of agent's compensation and expenses, damages, and attorney's fees, against Urban Bank and the petitioners. Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency allegedly entered into with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank's property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Pea filed his Complaint-Affidavit, claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. Petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were falsified. Thus petitioner filed for motion to quash on the ground that they were denied of due process, lack of probable cause and it i s a prejudicial question. The court denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case which fell within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, the court added, petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they already posted bail. ISSUE: Won by posting a bail the petitioners waived their right to assail the validity of WA? HELD: The court ruled that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment being then the officers of Urban Bank. In the earlier ruling of this Court that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of the right to question the validity of the arrest has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto. Records

reveal that petitioners filed the omnibus motion to quash the information and warrant of arrest, and for reinvestigation, on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest. TRILLANES V. PIMENTEL - G.R. NO. 179817, JUNE 27, 2008 FACTS: At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d'etat defined under Article134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. ISSUE: Whether or not Trillianes et al is guilty of coup de tat and that they are allowed to bail HELD: The petition is DISMISSED . In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. PANTILO V. CANOY - A.M. NO. RTJ-11-2262, FEBRUARY 9, 2011 FACTS: A complaint was filed by Gaudencio Pantilo III (Pantilo), charging Judge Canoy with several counts of gross ignorance of the law and/or procedures, grave abuse of authority, and appearance of impropriety (Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct). Pantilo prays for Judge Canoy's disbarment in relation to Criminal Case No. 8072 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide entitled People of the Philippines v. Leonardo Luzon Melgazo. Melgazo was temporarily released upon the order of Judge Canoy after he posted bail in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (PhP30,000). The complainant, Pantilo, the brother of the homicide victim, proceeded to the Office of the Clerk of Court to request a copy of the Information, only to find out that none had yet been filed by the Surigao City Prosecutor's Office. He learned that no Information had yet been filed in Court that would serve as the basis for the approval of the bail. Likewise, he also learned from the City Police Station that no written Order of Release had been issued but only a verbal order directing the police officers to release Melgazo from his detention cell. One of the police officers even said that Judge Canoy assured him that a written Order of Release would be available the following day or on September 4, 2008 after the Information is filed in Court. Pantilo filed a motion for inhibition of Judge Canoy which was later denied. Aggrieved, Pantilo filed a letter-complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator against Judge Canoy. Judge Canoy filed his comment, arguing that the facts in this case were exceptional. In his comment, he admitted that the inquest proceedings of Melgazo before Prosecutor Gonzaga concluded around 5:00 p.m. on September 3, 2008, after which, Melgazo, with his counsel, Atty. Cacel Azarcon, went to his office to post bail for Melgazo's provisional liberty. He noted that because of the time, most of the clerks in his office and the Office of the Clerk of Court had already gone home. Thus, it was no longer possible to process

the posting of bail and all the necessary papers needed for the release of Melgazo. Bearing in mind the constitutional right of the accused to bail and coupled with the insistence of Melgazo's counsel, Judge Canoy summoned Prosecutor Gonzaga and inquired about the result of the inquest proceedings. Thereupon, Prosecutor Gonzaga relayed to him that the charge against Melgazo was for Reckless Imprudence with Homicide and the recommended bail bond was thirty thousand pesos (PhP30,000). However, since it was already past 5:00 p.m., Prosecutor Gonzaga claimed that he could no longer file the Information and that it would have to be filed the next day. Judge Canoy invokes the constitutional right of the accused to bail and Section 17 (c), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which does not require that a person be charged in court before he or she may apply for bail. To his mind, there was already "a constructive bail given that only the papers were needed to formalize it." It would be unreasonable and unjustifiable to further delay the release of the accused. Nevertheless, he submits that if he would be "faulted for such act, he does humbly concede but he merely acted in accordance with what he deemed best for the moment . . . ." The Court Administrator issued his evaluation and recommendation on the case. In his evaluation, the Court Administrator found that respondent judge failed to comply with the documents required by the rules to discharge an accused on bail. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Canoy failed to comply with the documents required by the rules to discharge an accused on bail HELD: The accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to bail, more so in this case when the charge against Melgazo, Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, is a non-capital offense. However, the letter-complaint focuses on the manner of Melgazo's release from detention. Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure allows that any person in custody who is not yet charged in court "may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held." In the case at bar, Melgazo did not file any application or petition for the grant of bail with the Surigao City RTC, Branch 29. Despite the absence of any written application, respondent judge verbally granted bail to Melgazo. This is a clear deviation from the procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of Rule 114. In addition to a written application for bail, Rule 114 of the Rules prescribes other requirements for the release of the accused. In the case at bar, Melgazo or any person acting in his behalf did not deposit the amount of bail recommended by Prosecutor Gonzaga with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer. In clear departure from Sec. 14 of Rule 114, Judge Canoy instead verbally ordered Clerk IV Suriaga of the Surigao City RTC, Office of the Clerk of Court, to accept the cash deposit as bail, to earmark an official receipt for the cash deposit, and to date it the following day. Worse, respondent judge did not require Melgazo to sign a written undertaking containing the conditions of the bail under Sec. 2, Rule 114 to be complied with by Melgazo. Immediately upon receipt by Suriaga of the cash deposit of PhP30,000 from Melgazo, Judge Canoy ordered the police escorts to release Melgazo without any written order of release. In sum, there was no written application for bail, no certificate of deposit from the BIR collector or provincial, city or municipal treasurer, no written undertaking signed by Melgazo, and no written release order. As regards the insistence of Judge Canoy that such may be considered as "constructive bail," there is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite the noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the rights of another. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Victor A. Canoy is found GUILTY of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars. He is meted the penalty of a FINE of eleven thousand pesos (PhP11,000). He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of similar or analogous infractions in the future shall be dealt with more severely. LORNA VILLANUEVA V. JUDGE APOLINARIO BUAYA - A.M. NO. RTJ-08-2131 NOVEMBER 22, 2010 FACTS: In 2005, Lorna Vilanueva charged Acting Presiding Judge Apolinario Buaya of RTC Leyte with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Abuse of Authority stemming from the formers accusation of Vice Mayor Tupa of Palompon, Leyte for violating RA 7610 otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. The MTC judge, after finding probable cause of the commission of the crime, forwarded the case to the Office of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and allowed the accused to post a bail bond totalling P200,000.00. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Prudencio O. Borgueta, Jr. issued a Joint Resolution on Review, recommending the filing of two separate informations for violation of Section 5(b) in relation with Section 31, of R.A. No. 7610 against the accused. He likewise recommended the cancellation of the bail bond ofP100,000.00 (per case) posted by Tupa as, under Section 31, Article XII of R.A. No. 7610, if the offender is a public officer or employee, the penalty provided in Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is imposed in the maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua. Thus, bail is not a matter of right. He also added that

the cancellation of the bail bond was all the more appropriate since there was strong evidence of guilt against the accused based on Villanuevas affidavit-complaint and her material declarations during the preliminary investigation. The accused did not refute these declarations and, in fact, even admitted the alleged sexual acts in his counter-affidavit and through his statements during the clarificatory hearing. Based on the above recommendation, the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte filed two separate Informations for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, in relation with Section 31, Article XII of the same law, against Tupa before RTC Leyte. The presiding judge for RTC Leyte Branch 17 issued a warrant for Tupas arrest which returned unserved as he already went into hiding. On that same day Tupa allegedly surrendered to SPO2 Daau of PNP Ormoc and filed with RTC Leyte Branch 17 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Grant Bal arguing that the prosecutor erred in denying bail asfor purposes of the right to bail, the criterion to determine whether the offense charged is a capital offense is the penalty provided by the law, regardless of the attendant circumstances and not the other way around. The motion was granted by Acting Presiding Judge Buaya on the same day, without hearing and without notice to the prosecution. On December 16, 2004, Villanueva moved to reconsider the order granting the exparte motion. She argued that an application for bail should be heard and cannot be contained in a mere ex-parte motion. Judge Buaya noted that Villanuevas motion for reconsideration was submitted by the private prosecutor without the conformity of the public prosecutor, as required under the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Without acting on the merits of the said motion, Judge Buaya issued an order allowing the accused to submit his comment or opposition within ten days; thereafter, the matter would be submitted for resolution. This prompted Villanueva to file the administrative case at hand. ISSUE: WON Judge Buayas argument that crime charged against Tupa was a bailable offense; when bail is a matter of right, no hearing of the motion to grant bail is required should be legally tenable. HELD: As per the case of Basco v. Rapatalo, the rules outlining the duties of a judge in case of an application for bail are as follows: 1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application or require him to submit his recommendation 2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion 3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the [bail bond]. In this case, Judge Buaya granted the motion instantly despite the requisite hearing required. Jurisprudence has been replete with cases stating the indispensable nature of hearing in bail cases whether it is discretionary or a matter of right. The Court has always stressed the indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail. Where bail is a matter of discretion, the grant or the denial of bail hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the judge to properly exercise this discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Judge Bauya is therefore found guilty of the gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority and is fined P20,000.00. MARQUEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN - G.R. NOS. 187912-14, JANUARY 31, 2011 FACTS: This is a Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner Joey P. Marquez assails the resolution of the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan in this Criminal case and its subsequent resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, which denied Marquezs Motion to Refer Prosecutions Evidence for Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the NBI. As a result of the Report on the Audit of Selected Transactions and Walis Ting-ting for the City of Paraaque for the years 1996 to 1998, conducted by the Special Audit Team of the Commission on Audit (COA), several anomalies were discovered involving Marquez, then City Mayor and Chairman of the Bids and Awards committee of Paraaque City; and Ofelia C. Caunan (Caunan), Head of the General Services Office of said city. It was found that, through personal canvass and without public bidding, Marquez and Caunan secured the procurement of several thousand rounds of bullets of different calibers that were grossly overpriced from VMY Trading, a company not registered as an arms and ammunitions dealer with either the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, (OSP), found probable cause to indict them for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The OSP denied Marquezs allegation of discovery of the forged signatures. Several documentary evidences were offered by Marquez, but were denied. Marquez was also accused of filing the Motion to Refer

Prosecutions Evidence for Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the NBI merely to delay the proceedings. ISSUE: That the public respondent sandiganbayan-5th division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued its resolutions respectively dated february 11, 2009 and may 20, 2009 denying the petitioner's motion to refer prosecution's evidence for examination by the questioned documents section of the national bureau of investigation which denial is in violation of his right to present evidence and his twin constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of law. HELD: Yes. For the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power. One of the most vital and precious rights accorded to an accused by the Constitution is due process, which includes a fair and impartial trial and a reasonable opportunity to present one's defense. Under Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided that: 1. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. 2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (emphasis supplied) In this connection, it is well settled that due process in criminal proceedings requires that (a) the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by necessary implication, it means that the accused should be allowed reasonable freedom to present his defense if the courts are to give form and substance to this guaranty. Should the trial court fail to accord an accused reasonable opportunity to submit evidence in his defense, the exercise by the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this amounts to a denial of due process. JINGGOY ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 148965, FEBRUARY 26, 2002 FACTS: As an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against former President Estrada, five criminal complaints against him and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman. One of the informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner, then Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila. The case was assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the amended information on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law was unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. The Ombudsman opposed the motion. The petitioner filed several other motions. Thereafter, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash and very urgent omnibus motion, as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In this petition, the petitioner questioned the decision of the Sandiganbayan for not declaring unconstitutional the Anti-Plunder Law. Petitioner also claimed that he was denied substantive due process when the charge against him was sustained. He also faulted the Sandiganbayan for not fixing bail for his release from confinement. ISSUE: Whether or not the the Sandiganbayan should have fixed bail for his release from confinement HELD: The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong. Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads: "Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of

whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt. The Supreme Court ruled that it is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter required evidentiary hearing that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The records did not show that evidence on petitioner's guilt was presented before the lower court. Upon proper motion of the petitioner, the Sandiganbayan should conduct hearing to determine if the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner. The petition was dismissed for failure to show that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. GOVT OF USA V. HON PURGANAN, GR 148571, SEPT. 24, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner US government filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the procedure adopted by the trial court of first hearing a potential extraditee, Mark Jimenez, before issuing a warrant for his arrest under Section 6 of PD No. 1069. Petitioner contended that the procedure gives Jimenez notice to escape and to avoid extradition. Petitioner also assailed the trial court's granting of Jimenez's prayer for bail, which allows him to go on provisional liberty while extradition proceedings are pending. Petitioner no longer filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court, but resorted directly to the Supreme Court instead of the Court of Appeals to obtain relief. The Supreme Court allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari to settle once and for all the issue of bail in extradition proceedings, ISSUE: WON the prayer for bail is allowed on extradition proceedings? HELD: In granting the petition, the Supreme Court held that the present extradition case validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Prior acts of respondent eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all costs. Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge to set the hearing for the issuance of the warrant of arrest when it was already evident from the Petition for Extradition itself and its supporting documents that a prima facie finding did exist and he may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused; that there is no requirement to notify and to hear the accused before the issuance of a warrant of arrest under the Constitution which requires only an examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce; and that since accused were allowed to be heard and to present evidence at this early stage, the procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial, which is discordant with the rationale for the entire system and anathema to the summary nature of extraditions. The Court also held that extraditee's immediate detention prior to his being heard does not violate the due process clause; that the right to bail applies only in ordinary criminal proceedings; but that in extradition proceedings, after a potential extraditee has been arrested, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.

SERAPIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR 148468, JAN. 28, 2003 FACTS: Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. This foundation was established to help provide educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students. Donations came pouring in from various institutions, organizations and that of Chavit Singson. However, on the latter part of 2000, Chavit accused then President Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in the illegal number game jueteng as protector, beneficiary and recipient. The Ombudsman took the necessary steps and find probable cause, thus the case of plunder before the Sandiganbayan. The accused, herein petitioner took all legal remedy to bail but consequently due to numerous petitions and motion to quash, the same was suspended and counter petitioned. Petitioner also prayed for issuance of habeas corpus. ISSUES: 1. WON petitioner should be arraigned first before hearing his petition for bail; 2. WON petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended information during pendency of his petition to bail; and 3. WON petitioner should instead be released through a writ of habeas corpus. HELD: 1. 2.

3.

Although he was already arraigned, no plea has yet been entered thereby rendering the case moot. Nonetheless, the court takes cognizance and held that arraignment is not a prerequisite to conduct hearing on petition for bail. The court finds no inconsistency between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of motion to quash. Bail, is a security given to release a person in custody of the law. A motion to quash on the other hand is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint filed against him for insufficiency of its facts in posits law. This tow has objectives not necessarily antithetical to each other. In exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be granted by the court even when the person is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender. However, in the case at bar, there is no showing of any basis for the issuance of the writ. The general rule is that the writ does not apply when the person alleged to be restraint of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by competent court; more so, petitioner is under detention pursuant to a valid arrest order.

4. The petition was partly GRANTED on motion to quash. The petition for habeas corpus and bail was DISMISSED. GOVT OF HONGKONG V. HON. OLALIA, APRIL 19, 2007 FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." Two years later, Hong Kong reverted back to the People's Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with 3 counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance of Hong Kong. He also faces seven 7 counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. He was then arrested. The RTC, through the request of Hong Kong, issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, an Order denying the petition for bail was issued, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order allowing private respondent to post bail. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner seeks to nullify the two Orders of the RTC (1) allowing private respondent to post bail and (2) denying the motion to vacate the first order filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the DOJ, petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent has the right to bail even though there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee. HELD: Yes. Petition is dismissed and remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch. This Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. First, we note that the exercise of the State's power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, 4 have likewise been detained. Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired. Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. Private respondent had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. Waiver of the right PEOPLE V. JUDGE DONATO & RODOLFO SALAS 198 SCRA 130 FACTS: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was

opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPPNPA) 2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address; 3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity; 4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address; 5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and address were also found to be false; 6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest. This however was denied. Hence the appeal. ISSUE: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail. HELD: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him. Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. PEOPLE V. MAPALAO - 197 SCRA 79 FACTS: Adolfo Quiambao is a businessman selling textile materials and sells his goods in Baguio on the weekends. On September 19, 1987 he went to Abatan, Buguias, Benguet using his Ford Fiera with his driver Felizardo Galves and a certain Jimmy Jetwani, where he sold his goods and stayed overnight thereat. The next day, Quiambao, his driver Galvez, and Jetwani proceeded to Mankayan, Benguet with four Muslims namely: Omar Mapalao, Rex Magumnang, Aliman Bara-akal, and a certain Anwar Hadji Edris. On their way back to Baguio (11 passengers), Omar Mapalao then went to the left side of the vehicle near the driver's seat, pointed a gun at Adolfo Quiambao and announced 'This is a holdup.' With the 6 other muslims. As a consequence, the driver Galves was injured. Rex Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa, while poking their knives on the passengers, divested Adolfo Quiambao of P40,000.00, Jimmy Jetwani of P14,000.00, and Simeon Calama of P3,700.00 in cash, watch and clothes. Rex Magumnang, thereafter, went by the side of the driver- Galvez, and took hold of the steering wheel while ordering the latter to step on the accelerator and proceed to the direction of the left side of the road towards the precipice (bangin) indicating an intention to have the vehicle driven to the precipice. Galvez was able to step on the brakes on time to prevent it from falling into the precipice but was then stabbed by Magumnang. Thereafter, the passengers panicked and jumped out of the vehicle scampering in different directions for safety. After escaping from the accused, Quiambao and the other passengers brought Galvez to the Baguio General Hospital but the latter soon after died from the stab wounds inflicted. Quaimbao et al., positively identified the four (4) Muslims in custody, Omar Mapalao, Rex Magumnang, Gumanak Ompa and Aliman

Bara-akal and the weapons used in the holdup were recovered. An amended information was filed in the RTC of Baguio City charging Rex Magumnang, Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar Hadji Edris, Gumanak Ompa and Omar Mapalao of the crime of Highway Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 532, which was allegedly committed on September 20, 1987 at Km. 24 along Halsema Road, Caliking, Atok, Benguet. Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their counsel, pleaded not guilty. Accused Anwar Hadji Edris had not been arrested and remained at large. On March 17, 1988, accused Aliman Bara-akal died in jail during the trial so the case was dismissed as to him on April 4, 1988. Accused Rex Magumnang, after being positively identified by witnesses Adolfo Quiambao, Jimmy Jetwani and Simeon Calama during the trial, escaped from detention on September 25, 1988 when brought for medical treatment to the Baguio General Hospital, so the trial in absentia continued as to him. After the trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the trial court on January 12, 1990 convicting the accused of the offense charged. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not accused who is at large cannot apply for bail or be granted any other relief by the courts until he submits himself to its jurisdiction or is arrested? HELD: YES. After arraignment and during the trial, Rex Magumnang escaped from confinement and had not been apprehended since then. Accordingly, as to him the trial in absentia proceeded and thereafter the judgment of conviction was promulgated. Nevertheless, through counsel, he appealed to this Court. Under Section 8, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court, may "upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." In this case, appellant Magumnang remained at large even as his appeal was pending. Hence, by analogy his appeal must be dismissed. The reason for this rule is because once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. Thus when as in this case he escaped from confinement during the trial on the merits and after his arraignment, and so the trial in absentia proceeded and the judgment against him was promulgated in accordance with Section 14(2) Article III of the 1987 Constitution, nonetheless, as he remained at large, he should not be afforded the right to appeal therefrom unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested, within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment against him. While at large as above stated he cannot seek relief from the Court as he is deemed to have waived the same and he has no standing in court. To this effect a modification is in order of the provision of the last sentence of Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides: "If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to him or his counsel." It should provide instead that if upon promulgation of the judgment, the accused fails to appear without justifiable cause, despite due notice to him, his bondsmen or counsel, he is thereby considered to have waived his right to appeal. However, if within the fifteen (15) day period of appeal he voluntarily surrenders to the court or is otherwise arrested, then he may avail of the right to appeal within said period of appeal. By the same token, an accused who, after the filing of an information, is at large and has not been apprehended or otherwise has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, cannot apply for bail or be granted any other relief by the courts until he submits himself to its jurisdiction or is arrested. Excessive Bail MAGSUCANG V. JUDGE BALGOS, AM NO. MTJ- 02- 142, FEB. 27, 2003 FACTS: It appears from the records that on May 10, 2000, a certain Pepito Lim, owner of the Ace Fishing Corporation, filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against complainant's daughter, Rosalie Magsucang, allegedly for misappropriating cash amounting to P11,200, with grave abuse of confidence. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1593. Subsequently, respondent judge, before

whom the preliminary investigation was conducted, issued a warrant of arrest. Bail was set at P30,000. On May 11, 2000, Rosalie was arrested. Complainant posted bail for his daughter from the proceeds of the sale of his banca and with money borrowed from friends. Meanwhile, more cases for qualified theft were filed by Mr. Lim against Rosalie. These cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1634, and 1635. After preliminary investigations were conducted in these cases, corresponding warrants of arrest were issued by respondent judge. In Criminal Case No. 1635, bail was set at P24,000. Neither Modesto nor Rosalie had money to pay for bail so Rosalie remained incarcerated. Complainant faults respondent judge for allegedly committing irregularities in the conduct of the preliminary investigation when respondent judge administered the oath to Pepito Lim and for having sent Rosalie to prison without the benefit of a hearing. According to complainant, when respondent judge issued several subpoenas on June 2, 2000, requiring Rosalie to file her counter-affidavit in Criminal Case Nos. 1608 to 1613, inclusive, he likewise committed grave abuse of discretion since he failed to consider that Rosalie was, at the time, locked in jail and incapable of defending herself in court. Lastly, complainant states that respondent judge violated applicable rules and regulation when he required excessive bail. On November 10, 2000, the letter-complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator. On January 25, 2001, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo required respondent judge to file his comment. In his comment, respondent maintained that the rules of procedure were followed in the filing of the criminal complaints against Rosalie Magsucang. Criminal Cases Nos. 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1634 and 1635, all for qualified theft, were filed against Rosalie after Criminal Case No. 1593. ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge is liable for requiring excessive bail. HELD: YES. Section 9 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that in fixing the amount of bail in criminal cases, judges shall primarily consider the following factors: (a) financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) nature and circumstances of the offense; (c) penalty for the offense charged; (d) character and reputation of the accused; (e) age and health of the accused; (f) weight of the evidence against the accused; (g) probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h) forfeiture of other bail; (i) the fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j) pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail. The amount of bail should be reasonable at all times. Excessive bail shall not be required. In implementing this mandate, regard should be taken of the prisoner's pecuniary circumstances. That which is reasonable bail to a man of wealth may be unreasonable to a poor man charged with a like offense. Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of defendant when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. In this case, the respondent judge failed to consider that Rosalie Magsucang is illiterate, the daughter of a poor fisherman. She had very limited financial ability to post bail. In Criminal Case No. 1635, one of the nine cases that came after Criminal Case No. 1593, Rosalie Magsucang was accused of stealing only P4,300. Indeed, each of the ten (10) cases carried separate warrants of arrest, each with its own recommended amount of bail. In fixing the unreasonably excessive amount of bail at P24,000 in the last cited case, it is clear that the respondent judge disregarded the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court. In the same breath that Rosalie was told she could be bailed out, she was practically denied the means to do so. The excessive amount required could only mean that her provisional liberty would be beyond her reach. This is ironic, like categorically telling her that she could not avail of the right to bail. Considering that bail involves a basic right of the accused, this Court finds that a higher penalty should be imposed. Thus, the fine should be set at P5,000 13 as more appropriate in view of the violation proved. Right to Bail of Military Personnel COMMENDADOR V. GEN. DE VILLA - 200 SCRA 80 FACTS: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail. The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release. ISSUES: (1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process. (2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail. HELD: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counteraffidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptorychallenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM) It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto. The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with therequirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs. Section 14 Criminal Due Process Criminal due process PEOPLE V. TARUC - G.R. NO. 185202, FEBRUARY 18, 2009 FACTS: On November 8, 1998 at Brgy. Puting Buhangin, Orion, Bataan, accused-appellant feloniously attacked Emelito Sualog using a calibre 45, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim. Upon arraignment, the accused, duly assisted by a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. But, after trial on the merits, Francisco Taruc was found guilty as principal by direct participation of the crime of MURDER and sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The case was then brought to the Court of Appeals for automatic review pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC. On 13 January 2006, accused-appellant, through the PAO, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant's Brief.

And notwithstanding the escape of accused-appellant from prison, the Court of Appeals granted PAO's Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant's Brief, in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in People v. Flores, making the review of death penalty cases mandatory. The period of extension granted had lapsed without the accused-appellant filing his brief; thus, the Court of Appeals required the PAO to show cause why the latter should not be held in contempt for failing to file the same. The Court of Appeals found the explanation valid, and accepted the briefs of both the appellant and the appellee, and considered the case submitted for decision. The CA, in view of R.A. 9346, then made a modification of the penalty imposed by the trial court from death to reclusion perpetua. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not there are questions of law and fact on the Decision made by the Court of Appeals. 2. Whether or not the accused-appellant, given that he escaped from jail and eluded arrest until the present, lose his right to appeal his conviction. HELD: As may be gleaned from the records, before the prosecution witness Randy Espina could be cross-examined, accused-appellant escaped from the Bataan Provincial Jail on 23 August 2002. Thus, the RTC considered the act of the accused as a waiver to crossexamine said witness. Thereafter, the trial court promulgated a judgment of conviction while accused-appellant was at large. He remains at large even while his counsel continues to file various pleadings on his behalf before the RTC, the Court of Appeals, and this Court. It is indisputable that accused-appellant herein, by escaping from jail, was not present at the promulgation by the RTC of its Decision dated 29 June 2005 in Criminal Case No. 8010, finding him guilty of the crime of murder. Accused-appellant failed to surrender and file the required motion within 15 days from the promulgation of the RTC Decision. This alone already deprived him of any remedy against said judgment of conviction available under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, including the right to appeal the same. The foregoing notwithstanding, the escape of the accused-appellant did not preclude the Court of Appeals from exercising its review jurisdiction, considering that what was involved was capital punishment. Automatic review being mandatory, it is not only a power of the court but a duty to review all death penalty cases. In this case, considering that the penalty imposed by the trial court was death, the Court of Appeals rightly took cognizance of the case. Upon review by the appellate court, however, it modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. By escaping prison, accused-appellant impliedly waived his right to appeal. In People v. Ang Gioc, the Court enunciated that: There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him . . . . The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against him. While at large, he cannot seek relief from the court, as he is deemed to have waived the appeal. Thus, having escaped from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land, accused-appellant revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate, at his pleasure on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option. Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court. Accused-appellant, in the case at bar, has remained at large for most of the proceedings before the RTC, as well as for the entirety of the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, and even until now when his appeal is pending before this Court. He cannot so audaciously hope that his appeal before this Court would succeed. He only hopes in vain. Hence,the appeal was dismissed and the records of the case were remanded to the trial court for the issuance of the mittimus. CRUZ V. PEOPLE - G.R. NO. 176504, SEPTEMBER 3, 2008

FACTS: This is a petition for review on the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the RTC-Makati finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft. On the 10th of July 1997, information was filed before the RTC-Makati charging Ferdinand A. Cruz with Qualified Theft that on October 1996, the petitioner who was the Marketing Manager of Porta-Phone Rentals Inc. had accessed the funds of the said corporation with intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of the corporation, with grave abuse of confidence, willfully and unlawfully take and steal the amount of P15, 000.00. Four witnesses, directly connected with the company, corroborated to the alleged fact that Ferdinand did receive the said amount and used it feloniously to which the RTC ruled against Ferdinand Cruz. Ferdinand Cruz filed for a Motion for a New Trial based on the absence of a preliminary investigation and newly discovered evidence but the RTC reinstated its prior decision to which Ferdinand brought it up to the CA for review but the CA denied the motion and affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Ferdinand Cruz received the benefits of due process? HELD: Yes, he did. The requirements of procedural due process are as follows: 1. There must be an IMPARTIAL AND COMPETENT COURT with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it 2. Jurisdiction MUST HAVE BEEN LAWFULLY ACQUIRED over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceeding 3. The defendant must be given an OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD 4. Judgment must be RENDERED UPON LAWFUL HEARING He clearly underwent the procedural due process and the court ruled that the instant petition be denied and the previous decision be affirmed with modification finding Cruz guilty of the Crime of Qualified Theft and is sentenced to suffer intermediate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum and 16 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal as maximum. So ordered. VILLARIN V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 175289, AUGUST 31, 2011 Albay Military Tribunal *OLAGUER V. MILITARY - 150 SCRA 144 Amis TAN V. BARRIOS - 190 SCRA 685 Angala Presumption of Innocence PEOPLE V. LOPEZ - G.R. NO. 181747, SEPTEMBER 26, 2008 FACTS: On august 2002 accused appellant (Narciso Agula y Lopez) was charged at RTC of Quezon City for Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Acts where the accused is selling shabu. In the trial the story during the buy bust operation where entraptment was set up on a man named Sing PO2 Herrera grabbed Sing and frisked him where he recovered 2 plastic sachets with positive shabu and the marked money. On the defense which presented 3 witnesses told a different story. That around 8:30 in the evening of Aug 24, a car stopped in Narcisos store and the men alighted from the car and approached him and put handcuffs on him. Narciso pleaded to be brought to the barangay first however he was immediately brought to the police station. On Fe. 17, 2006 RTC still found Narciso Agulay guilty of drug pushing. It was elevated to CA however CA affirmed the decision of RTC in Aug. 31, 2007. Hence this pettion. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Trial court erred in admitting the sachets of shabu as admissible in evidence

2. HELD:

Whether or not trial court gravely erred in finding accused appellant guilty

1. The accused-appellants clam for the shabu to be inadmissible in evidence was devoid of merit for it was well-established
rule that an arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid "warrantless arrest", in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit: Section 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.

2. Upon review, SC finds no justification to deviate from the lower courts findings and conclusion that accused appellant was
arrested in flagrante delicto selling shabu. In order for a successfulll prosecution of an accused for illegal sale of drugs the prosecution must establish the following elements. Identities of the buyer and seller, the object and the consideration The delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. The testimonies of the prosecution witness proved that all elements of the crime have been established. As the court ruled with regards to presumption of innocence The law presumes that an accused in a criminal prosecution is innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left for the trial courts to determine. Consistent with the rulings of this Court, it is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court and its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case. The exception is when it is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case. Considering that what is at stake here is the liberty of accused-appellant, we have carefully reviewed and evaluated the records of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. On evaluation of the records, this Court finds no justification to deviate from the lower court's findings and conclusion that accusedappellant was arrested in flagrante delicto selling shabu. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 01994 dated 31 August 2007 is AFFIRMED. In the dissenting opinion of Brion, J. Under the proven facts of the present case, the prosecution has not proven that a crime had been committed through proof beyond reasonable doubt that the three plastic sachets that were admitted into evidence during the trial were in fact the same items seized from the accused-appellant when he was arrested. In short, there exists a gap in the prosecution's evidence that opens the room for doubt on whether there indeed had been a buy-bust operation where the accused was caught red-handed selling prohibited substance to a police operative. Significantly, the police testimonies did not receive the minute and detailed scrutiny that they deserve because of the presumption that the police witnesses must have spoken the truth because they were policemen in the regular performance of their official duties. This presumption not only lent credibility to the police witnesses; it also became the basis to disbelieve the defense evidence: who were they to be believed after the police had spoken? Indeed the ponencia's line of reasoning is unfortunate. Had it chosen to minutely scrutinize the police testimonies in light of the procedural requirements of R.A. 9165 on how seized evidence must be handled, and considered all these with the defense evidence particularly the allegation of "frame up" a far different conclusion would have resulted, rendering this Dissent unnecessary; the accused would have been acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome his constitutional presumption of innocence. The Clash of Presumptions Where, as in this case, the ruling relies on the presumption in the regular performance of official duties, there must necessarily be a clash of presumptions in light of the presumption of innocence that every accused enjoys. We note that the presumption of innocence is the root presumption that applies at the inception of the case. It is a constitutional presumption that exists for the accused arising from the fact that he is charged with the commission of a crime; the presumption exists without requiring the accused to do anything to trigger it other than the fact of standing criminally charged.

Main thrust of the dissent The main thrust of the dissent is focused on its conviction that the buy-bust operation and the consequent seizure of the prohibited substance either did not take place or has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt because of a gap in the prosecution's evidence. Convinced that under the proven facts of the present case, the dissent maintains that the prosecution has not proven that a crime had been committed through proof beyond reasonable doubt that the three plastic sachets that were admitted into evidence during the trial were in fact the same items seized from the accused-appellant when he was arrested. Guilt of accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt. Contrary to the dissent's claim, the totality of the evidence would indicate that the sale of the prohibited drug had taken place, and that the sale was adequately established and the prosecution witnesses clearly identified accused-appellant as the offender. Moreover, the seized items, proven positive to be shabu, were properly identified and presented before the court. Elements to constitute the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs In prosecutions for illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, conviction is proper if the following elements are present: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug. 7 The termcorpus delicti means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. PEOPLE V. SANCHEZ - G.R. NO. 175832, OCTOBER 15, 2008 FACTS: A confidential informant arrived at the police station and reported that there is a person, herein accused-appellant Sanchez, who has been selling shabu. An entrapment team was formed wherein one of its police officers, SPO2 Sevilla, acted poseur buyer. PO Sevilla and his informant walked towards the place pointed by the informant and met the drug pusher. PO Sevillo the drug pusher that he badly needs shabu para pumayat and then gave the pusher P100.00 (the marked money) and in return the pusher gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. After receiving the plastic sachet, PO Sevilla signalled his team, who was nearby, and arrested the pusher. During trial, the accused-appellant gave a different version of the. He narrated that he was in his house putting his children to sleep when 3 police officers suddenly barged into his house, searched the premises, frisked him, and forced him to come with them. He recognized one of the policemen as "Sir Levi", a former colleague of his uncle at the police station. The police officers then handcuffed him and asked him to get into a police vehicle. He begged them not to arrest him because they already frisked him and did not find anything and that they might just planted evidence his pocket. The police brought him to the police station and placed him in a detention cell without an investigation being conducted. The police showed him a plastic sachet and said that it was the shabu taken from him. The RTC primarily considered the reputation of SPO2 Sevilla in giving weight to his testimony, and held that "PO Sevilla has been a frequent witness in drugs cases and he has already established his credibility before this court." Its found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime. This decision was affirmed by the CA upon appeal. On this appeal, appelant maintains that the court's order of conviction was merely based on the good reputation SPO2 Sevilla has established with the court based on the many drug cases he had handled. Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove that the sachets allegedly recovered from the appellant were the ones submitted to the forensic chemist for examination, as well as its failure to follow the proper chain of custody in handling the seized evidence. It was only the arresting officer who testified that he confiscated the sachet from the accused. The police officer who conducted the subsequent investigation and to whom the confiscated sachet was allegedly turned over was not identified nor presented as witness. Hence the identity of the evidence presented against the appellant is doubtful. ISSUE: Whether or not Sanchez is guilty beyond reasonable on the basis of PO Sevillas, the lone witness of the prosecution, testimony and credibility. HELD: No. After due consideration, the court resolves to acquit the appellant for the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, while

the charge was laid after a preliminary finding that a probable cause existed showing that a crime had been committed and the accused was probably guilty thereof, the criminal trial itself starts with the substantive presumption of the innocence on the part of the accused, rebuttable only by proof of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of such proof rests with the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its case rather than on the weakness of the case for the defense. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. According to Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs must, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Other than the markings that SPO2 Sevilla alleged, it is clear that no physical inventory and no photograph of the seized items were taken in the presence of the accused or his counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and an elective official. Based on the above testimony, SPO2 Sevilla the prosecution's lone witness also did not mark the plastic sachet of shabu immediately upon seizure; it was only marked upon arrival at the police station. Thus, other than the stipulation regarding the handling and results of the specimen at the forensic laboratory, SPO2 Sevilla's testimony and the evidence he identified constitute the totality of the evidence for the prosecution on the handling of the allegedly seized items. Non-compliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case; police procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the present case. These lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved. In the present case, the prosecution apparently did not want to accept that the police had committed lapses in the handling of the seized materials and thus did not bother to present any explanation to justify the non-observance of the prescribed procedures. It likewise failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items adduced were not tainted as the discussions below will show. The non-observance by the police of the required procedure cannot therefore be excused. TRILLANES V. PIMENTEL - G.R. NO. 179817, JUNE 27, 2008 FACTS: At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening. In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident", petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d'etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al." Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests" (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were: a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate (whether at the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session, and to attend the regular and plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings, committee meetings, consultations, investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are normally held at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.); b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer and the appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and

internet access) in order that he may be able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up the said working area and the related equipment and utility costs can be charged against the budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from the Senate; c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at reasonable times of the day particularly during working days for purposes of meetings, briefings, consultations and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able to assists (sic) him in the performance and discharge of his duties as a Senator of the Republic; d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the country and the public while at the Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to help shape public policy and in the light of the important role of the Senate in maintaining the system of checks and balance between the three (3) co-equal branches of Government; e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the media who may wish to interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or opinion at his place of confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session; and f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate and related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City. By Order of July 25, 2007, the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three. The trial court just the same denied the motion by Order of September 18, 2007. Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff, resource persons and guests from meeting with him or transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests and permit him to attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of the status quo ante of having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons and guests at the Marine Brig. Petitioner asserts that a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor. Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political offense". Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP. In sum, petitioner's first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos. ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners motion be granted due to his status as detention prisoner as opposed to a convict by final judgment, specifically the right to bail. HELD: NO. A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however. The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before

conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied) The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public. The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda: As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. (Underscoring supplied) These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish legislative results. The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights. PEOPLE V. TINGA - G.R. NO. 174771, SEPTEMBER 11, 2007 FACTS: Accused was arrested from a buy bust operation when police bought from him shabu. accused defense was that he was awakened from nap and the police told him that there was a complaint against him and that he should come with them. at the station, he was told to get a good lawyer because two envelopes containing shabu are available evidences against him. lower court found him guilty. Accused appealed to CA, CA dismissed the appeal. ISSUE: WON there is proof beyond reasonable doubt HELD: In the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and 3) the buyer and seller were identified. Although the two police officers identified appellant as the seller in the buy-bust operation, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the corpus delicti. In the instant case, PO2 Magno immediately turned over to SPO2 Lluisma the two sachets he allegedly bought from appellant without even marking them. The overriding consideration in criminal cases is not whether appellant is completely innocent, but rather whether the quantum of evidence necessary to prove his guilt was sufficiently met. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overcome only by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In fact, unless the prosecution discharges this burden, the accused need not

even offer evidence in his behalf

PEOPLE V. MIRA - G.R. NO. 175324, OCTOBER 10, 2007 FACTS: That on or about January 6, 1997, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Interior, Municipality of San Jacinto, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his 11-year old daughter [AAA],[3] against her will and without her consent. CONTRARY TO LAW.[4] On arraignment, appellant entered a guilty plea to the offense charged. On 9 January 1997, AAA was brought to the hospital where she was examined by Dr. Mores. The medical findings showed that AAAs hymen was no longer intact and there were abrasions around the vulva. Dr. Mores concluded that AAA was no longer a virgin; that the sexual intercourse had been forced as evidenced by the abrasions. Unsurprisingly, the defense did not present evidence to counter the charges against appellant, considering his earlier plea of guilt. On 23 May 1997, the trial court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. The trial court relied heavily on the testimonies of the victim and her younger sister in establishing the identity of appellant and the act of rape committed against AAA. It regarded the childrens testimony as credible and invoked the adage that no child in her right mind would testify on a carnal and bastardous act if it were not true. Appellant directly appealed his conviction to this Court. CA reduced the sentence to Reclusion Perpetua Appellant filed the instant appeal. In a Resolution dated 5 February 2007, the parties were required to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs if they so desired. Both parties manifested that they were adopting their respective briefs filed before the appellate court. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not conducting a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and in failing to inform him if he desires to present evidence in his behalf. HELD: YES. Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree to culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf. Based on this rule, there are three (3) conditions that the trial court must observe to obviate an improvident plea of guilt by the accused: (1) it must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his plea; (2)it must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) it must ask the accused whether he desires to present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires. This Court, time and again, has reiterated the guidelines to be observed by the trial court in the proper conduct of a searching inquiry: 1. Ascertain from the accused himself a) How he was brought into the custody of the law; b) Whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and c) Under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judges

intimidating robes. 2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty. Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and to fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.

3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

The searching inquiry conducted by the trial court falls short of these requirements. The inquiry consisted of two simple questions. The questions propounded by the trial court judge to appellant were clearly inadequate. The appellant was not fully apprised of the consequences of his guilt plea. Moreover, the trial court judge failed to inform appellant of his right to adduce evidence despite the guilty plea. Verily, appellant was deprived of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Notwithstanding the incautiousness that attended appellants guilty plea, we are not inclined to remand the case to the trial court as suggested by appellant. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but also on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00452, finding appellant Edison Mira guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED. RE: CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES [FOR CHILD ABUSE]- A.M. NO. 06-9-545-RTC, JANUARY 31, 2008 FACTS: Respondent was convicted for violation of RA 7610. Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (SSP Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) wrote a letter to then CJ Panganiban inquiring whether it is possible to order the immediate suspension of the respondent. The matter was referred to the OCA for comment and recommendation where they recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended. The Court's Second Division approved all of these recommendations, thus, suspending respondent from performing her judicial functions while awaiting the final resolution of her criminal cases. Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration; he claimed that the suspension order was wielded against her without affording her the opportunity to be heard since she was not furnished copies of SSP Velasco's letter and OCA's Administrative Complaint. Thus, respondent submitted that her suspension is essentially unjust. Moreover, respondent manifested that the two criminal cases against her are on appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yet attained finality. As such, respondent still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and her suspension clashes with this presumption and is tantamount to a prejudgment of her guilt. SSP Velasco filed an Urgent Appeal/Manifestation manifesting that respondent continuously defied the courts Resolution. Velasco reiterated that due to her conviction on two counts of child abuse, respondent no longer enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and should remain suspended in order to erase any suspicion that she is using her influence to obtain a favorable decision and in order to maintain and reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.

ISSUES: Whether or not grounds exist to preventively suspend the respondent pending the resolution of this administrative case. HELD: We resolve the issue in the negative. The Court cannot fully agree with the recommendation of the OCA. By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We agree with respondent's argument that since her conviction of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same has not yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues. Moreover, it is established that any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. 41 As aforementioned, the filing of criminal cases against judges may be used as tools to harass them and may in the long run create adverse consequences. The OCA, as well as SSP Velasco, failed to prove that other than the fact that a judgment of conviction for child abuse was rendered against the respondent, which is still on appeal, there are other lawful grounds to support the imposition of preventive suspension. Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that, while it is true that preventive suspensionpendente lite does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty, the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. Likewise, we consider respondent's argument that there is no urgency in imposing preventive suspension as the criminal cases are now before the CA, and that she cannot, by using her present position as an RTC Judge, do anything to influence the CA to render a decision in her favor. The issue of preventive suspension has also been rendered moot as the Court opted to resolve this administrative case. However, even as we find that the OCA and SSP Velasco have not clearly and convincingly shown ample grounds to warrant the imposition of preventive suspension, we do note the use of offensive language in respondent's pleadings, not only against SSP Velasco but also against former CA Lock. To reiterate our previous ruling involving the respondent, her use of disrespectful language in her Comment is certainly below the standard expected of an officer of the court. The esteemed position of a magistrate of the law demands temperance, patience and courtesy both in conduct and in language. Illustrative are the following statements: "CA Lock's hostile mindset and his superstar complex"; "In a frenzied display of arrogance and power"; "(CA Lock's) complaint is merely a pathetic echo of the findings of the trial court"; and "when (CA Lock) himself loses his objectivity and misuses the full powers of his Office to persecute the object of his fancy, then it is time for him to step down." In the attempt to discredit CA Lock, respondent even dragged CA Lock's son into the controversy, to wit: It is noteworthy to mention that CA Lock's hostile attitude was aggravated by his embarrassment when the undersigned mentioned to him that she knew how he used his influence to secure a position for his son at the RTC Library of Pasay City which was then managed by Judge Priscilla Mijares. CA Lock had made sure that his son be assigned to the library to enable the latter to conveniently adjust his schedule in reviewing for the bar examination. Neither was SSP Velasco spared. Of him, the respondent said: "A reading of the motion for reconsideration readily discloses that it is mainly anchored on SSP Velasco's malicious speculations about the guilt of the undersigned. Speculations, especially those that emanate from the poisonous intentions of attention-seeking individuals, are no different from garbage that should be rejected outright"; and "His malicious insinuation is no less than a revelation of his warped mindset that a person's position could cause pressure to bear among government officials. This brings forth a nagging question. Did SSP Velasco use his position at the DOJ to 'cause pressure to bear' and obtain a favorable disposition of the administrative cases lodged against him by the undersigned? Is he afraid of his own ghost?" It must be stressed again that, as a dispenser of justice, respondent should exercise judicial temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting language. She must maintain composure and equanimity. The judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions. This is the price that judges have to pay for accepting and occupying their exalted positions in the administration of justice. One final word. The parties herein have admitted in their various pleadings that they have filed numerous cases against each other. We do not begrudge them the prerogative to initiate charges against those who, in their opinion, may have wronged them. But it is well to remind them that this privilege must be exercised with prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the pursuit of truth and justice. This prerogative does not give them the right to institute shotgun charges with reckless abandon, or allow their disagreement to deteriorate into a puerile quarrel, not unlike that of two irresponsible children. PEOPLE V. ALIVIO - G.R. NO. 177771, MAY 30, 2011 FACTS:

The prosecutions case relied on the theory that the police apprehended the appellants during a buy-bust operation conducted at Alivios residence. During the buy-bust operation, the police found drug paraphernalia at Alivios residence while a search on Dela Vegas person yielded one plastic sachet of shabu which the police seized. The prosecutions evidence showed that at around 9:30 p.m. of May 20, 2003, the Pasig City Police received a tip from an asset that one "Ariel" was rampantly selling illegal drugs in Bagong Ilog, Pasig City. A buy-bust team was immediately formed in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. The buy-bust money, which consisted of two (2) 100 peso bills, was prepared and marked with the symbol, "3L." PO2 Lemuel Lagunay Laro was designated to act as the poseur-buyer. Together with SPO3 Lemuel Matias and PO1 Allan Mapula, PO2 Laro and the asset went to the house of Ariel. While the rest of the buy-bust team strategically positioned themselves at the target area, PO2 Laro and the asset met Ariel. The asset introduced PO2 Laro to Ariel who was later on identified as Alivio. The asset told Alivio that they wanted to buy shabu. Alivio asked how much they wanted to buy, to which the asset replied: "dalawang daan lang pre at saka puwede kaming gumamit dyan?" The two were ushered into the second floor of the house where they saw Dela Vega seated in front of a table with drug paraphernalia. PO2 Laro then gave the buy-bust money to Alivio who handed it to Dela Vega. The latter then took out from his pocket one plastic sachet of shabu which he gave to Alivio who handed it to PO2 Laro. After the exchange, PO2 Laro introduced himself as a police officer and arrested Alivio and Dela Vega. The asset made a signal for the buy-bust team to come inside the house. SPO3 Matias searched Dela Vega and found him in possession of one plastic sachet of shabu. The buy-bust team also retrieved the drug paraphernalia on top of the table, which paraphernalia they correspondingly marked. The buy-bust team took Alivio, Dela Vega and the confiscated items to the police station for investigation. Afterwards, the confiscated items were taken by PO1 Mapula to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The two (2) plastic sachets tested positive for shabu. On February 28, 2005, the RTC convicted the appellants of all charges laid. The RTC relied on the presumption of regularity in the buy-bust operation and the lack of improper motive on the part of the police officers. The RTC rejected the proferred denial and frame-up as defenses as they are inherently easy to concoct, and found that the prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crimes charged and the identity of the appellants as perpetrators. The RTC thus concluded: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows: In Criminal Case No. 12450-D both accused Arielito Alivio and Ernesto Dela Vega are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act 9165 (illegal sale of shabu) and are hereby sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to solidarily pay a FINE of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP500,000.00). In Criminal Case No. 12451-D accused Ernesto dela Vega is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act 9165 (illegal possession of shabu) and is hereby sentenced to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day to Twenty (20) Years and to pay a Fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP 300,000.00). In Criminal Case No. 12452-D accused Arielito Alivio is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 12, Article II, of Republic Act 9165 (illegal possession of drug paraphernalia) and is hereby sentenced to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day to Four (4) Years and a FINE of Ten Thousand Pesos (PHP 10,000.00). The appellants appealed to the CA. On November 30, 2006, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA took into account the consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to support the presumption that the police officers regularly performed the buy-bust operation. The CA likewise ruled that the appellants failed to substantiate their defenses. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of RA 9165 asserting that the presumption of regularity cannot take precedence over the presumption of innocence in their favor. HELD: We find no reversible error committed by the RTC and the CA in convicting the appellants of the crimes charged. While the presumption of innocence is the highest in the hierarchy of presumptions, it remains a rebuttable presumption. In a criminal case, the presumption of innocence can be overcome by the presumption of regularity when the latter is accompanied by strong evidence supporting the guilt of the accused.10 Even without the presumption of regularity, a drug conviction can be sustained through competent evidence establishing the existence of all the elements of the crimes charged. In this case, although the presumption of regularity did not arise considering the evident lapses the police committed in the

prescribed procedures, we rule that the prosecutions evidence sufficiently established all the elements of the three (3) crimes charged and the identity of the appellants as the perpetrators. The existence of the buy-bust operation Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Thus, we generally defer to the assessment on this point by the trial court as it had the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses, their demeanor, and their credibility on the witness stand.11 Our independent examination of the records shows no compelling reason to depart from this rule. Familiarity What matters in drug related cases are not the existing familiarity between the seller and the buyer, but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the dangerous drug. Besides, drug pushers, especially small quantity or retail pushers, sell their prohibited wares to anyone who can pay for the same, be they strangers or not. It is of common knowledge that pushers, especially small-time dealers, peddle prohibited drugs in the open like any article of commerce. Drug pushers do no confine their nefarious trade to known customers and complete strangers are accommodated provided they have the money to pay.22 [Citations omitted] In this case, the prosecutions evidence sufficiently established the exchange of the shabu and the buy-bust money between the appellants and PO2 Laro. The identity of the confiscated shabuand/or drug paraphernalia In ascertaining the identity of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia presented in court as the ones actually seized from the accused, the prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 has been complied with or falls within the saving clause provided in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165; and (b) there was an unbroken link (not perfect link) in the chain of custody with respect to the confiscated items. In this case, although the prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not strictly complied with, we find that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved by the buy-bust team under the chain of custody rule. Under the circumstances, the prosecutions evidence clearly established an unbroken link in the chain of custody, thus removing any doubt or suspicion that the shabu and drug paraphernalia had been altered, substituted or otherwise tampered with. The unbroken link in the chain of custody also precluded the possibility that a person, not in the chain, ever gained possession of the seized evidence. The defenses of Denial and Frame-up The appellants merely denied the buy-bust sale and their possession of the shabu and the drug paraphernalia. They claimed that they were framed by the police who took their earnings and forcibly took them to the police station. In light of the positive and credible testimony and the concrete evidence showing the existence of the buy-bust operation, these defenses are unworthy of belief. Dela Vegas injuries alone cannot rebut the consistent evidence that the appellants were arrested pursuant to a buy-bust operation. We particularly note in this regard that the participating policemen denied that they previously knew the appellants and that they entertained ulterior or illicit motives to frame them. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the decision, dated November 30, 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01138 which, in turn, affirmed the decision, dated February 28, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Pasig City, in Criminal Case Nos. 12450-52-D. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE V. PAGADUAN - G.R. NO. 179029, AUGUST 12, 2010 FACTS: That on or about December 27, 2003 at about 4:30 oclock (sic) in the afternoon, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, dispense, deliver and give away 0.01 gram, more or less, of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, as contained in a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet to PO3 Peter C. Almarez, a member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) who posed as a buyer of shabu in the amount of P200.00, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines. The appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment.

ISSUE: WON the lower courts erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He harps on the fact that the police did not conduct a prior surveillance on him before conducting the buy-bust operation. HELD: Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen seized from the appellant. The procedural lapses mentioned above show the glaring gaps in the chain of custody, creating a reasonable doubt whether the drugs confiscated from the appellant were the same drugs that were brought to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and eventually offered in court as evidence. In the absence of concrete evidence on the illegal drugs bought and sold, the body of the crime the corpus delicti has not been adequately proven.[44] In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating reasonable doubt on the appellants criminal liability. Pagaduan is acquitted. PEOPLE V. FRANCISCO - G.R. NO. 192818, NOVEMBER 17, 2010 FACTS: This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed with modification the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43 in Virac, Catanduanes. The RTC found accused-appellant Prince Francisco y Zafe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. In an Information filed on January 23, 2002, appellant was indicted for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), allegedly committed as follows: That on or about the 24th day of October 2001 at around 8:50 pm, in barangay San Juan, municipality of Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, accused, with evident premeditation, treachery and deliberate intent to take the life of Ramil Tablate did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and criminally, attack, assault and stab the latter, with the use of a bladed instrument (kitchen knife) wounding mortally his chest, abdomen and different parts of his body which wounds were necessarily mortal causing the direct and immediate death of said Ramil Tablate. During arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. However, during the pre-trial on March 4, 2003, he withdrew his former plea. Consequently, on the same hearing, he was re-arraigned and he pleaded guilty to the crime charged. Through the March 4, 2003 Order from the pre-trial proceeding, it was shown that the RTC conducted searching questions to determine that appellant voluntarily entered his guilty plea and that he understood its consequences. The RTC further ordered the setting of the case for the prosecution to adduce evidence proving the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt and to determine the degree of his culpability. The RTC Order states: The Court proceeded to ask the accused searching questions to determine the voluntariness of his plea and as to whether he understood the consequences of the same. Satisfied that the accused willingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty with full knowledge of the consequence of the same and, in addition that he was given proper [advice] by his counsel prior to entering said plea, the Court sets the hearing of this case to April 22, 2003 at 8:30 a.m. to determine the degree of culpability of the accused as required under the Rules in cases of capital offenses. In its November 12, 2003 Order, the RTC stated that during the hearing conducted on the same date, the defense admitted the fact of death of Ramil Tablate due to stab wounds and that it was appellant who stabbed Ramil. To prove appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Dr. Lilian Olfindo, Joseph Romero, Christopher Tablate, and Napoleon Mandac. Dr. Olfindo made the post-mortem examination on the victim. Ramil died of cardiac arrest secondary to cardiac tamponade, secondary to multiple stab wounds in the chest and abdomen. The prosecution rested its case and made its formal offer of exhibits without any objection from the defense. After admitting the death of Ramil resulting from appellant's assault, the defense, however, did not present any witnesses, but simply argued that the offense of appellant is only homicide and not murder. Contending that no treachery attended the assault, the

defense asserted that appellant did not attack Ramil from behind. The trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant of the crime of Murder. The RTC found the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant committed the crime charged qualified by treachery. But it opined that appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation, considering an altercation appellant had with Ramil earlier at a billiard hall. Appellant appealed to the CA, raising the lone issue of whether the RTC erred in convicting him of murder. The appellate court likewise found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. It held that, while there were no transcripts of stenographic notes in the records pertaining to the searching inquiry conducted by the RTC on March 4, 2003, still the prosecution was able to establish the culpability of appellant by means of evidence independent of his admission of guilt. The prosecution witnesses testified in detail how the stabbing incident transpired that caused the death of Ramil. The CA found the killing of Ramil qualified by alevosia or treachery based on the prosecution witnesses' testimony that Ramil was stabbed from behind by appellant, without any provocation from Ramil nor affording Ramil any opportunity to defend himself. The appellate court did not consider passion and obfuscation to mitigate appellant's culpability. The CA pointed out that Christopher's testimony on the altercation between appellant and Ramil in the billiard hall was hearsay, for Christopher had no personal knowledge of the supposed altercation since he only learned about it from another person. ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred, and consequently the CA for its affirmance of the former, in convicting appellant of the crime of murder. HELD: The appeal has no merit. Conviction based on evidence of prosecution and not on plea of guilt by appellant First, appellant assails the March 4, 2003 Order of the trial court as being precipitate considering that the trial judge failed to ascertain the voluntariness of his plea of guilt when he did not fully understand its consequences and significance, for the records show neither proof nor a transcript of the proceedings on March 4, 2003 that appellant indeed voluntarily made a guilty plea and that he fully understood its import. Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently provides: Section 3.Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf. The indispensable requirement of searching inquiry was elucidated in People v. Mangila: To breathe life into this rule, we made it mandatory for trial courts to do the following: 1. Conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the accused's plea; 2. Require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and 3. Inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he so desires. It is also imperative that "a series of questions directed at defense counsel on whether or not counsel has conferred with the accused and has completely explained to him the meaning of a plea of guilt are well-taken steps along those lines." In People v. Bello, the Court explained that: "A 'searching inquiry,' under the Rules, means more than informing cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term but so also, the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony." Lastly, it has been mandated that the accused or his or her counsel be furnished with a copy of the complaint and the list of witnesses against the accused. It has to be made clear that the purpose of the searching inquiry is "not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance

and consequences of his plea." Even assuming arguendo that there was no searching inquiry made, still the ascribed error will not grant relief to appellant for belatedly raising the issue for the first time on appeal. And most importantly, the conviction of appellant was not made solely on his guilty plea improvident or not but on the evidence adduced by the prosecution proving beyond reasonable doubt appellant's culpability and liability for murder. Consequently, even if his plea of guilt during the pre-trial on March 4, 2003 be viewed as improvident, still appellant's conviction for murder stands as duly proved by the prosecution.

PEOPLE V. ANGUS - G.R. NO. 178778, AUGUST 3, 2010 Grajo Right to Be Heard VILLAREAL V. PEOPLE - G.R. NO. 151258, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 Grossman PEOPLE V. RAMILLA GR 127485 JULY 19, 1999

FACTS: Ramilla was charged with raping 10-year old Crisanda. During the trial, when the accused was to present his evidence, he moved to change his original plea of not guilty to guilty. However, considering that the evidence for the prosecution had already been received, the motion was denied. He was then required to present evidence but failed to do so. Thus, the case was deemed submitted for decision and Ramilla was sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify the victim P100,000.00 and to pay the costs. Here, Ramilla underscored the tender age of the victim and remonstrated that he was denied due process. His case was already submitted for decision when he had not yet given his express waiver to present evidence. ISSUE: WON Ramilla was denied the right to be heard when he failed to present evidence. HELD: Fernando was not denied his right to due process because he was afforded the opportunity to present evidence. The fact remains that he did not present, nay, did not even offer to present evidence in his behalf. He in fact moved to change his plea of not guilty to guilty, although the trial court denied the motion for the reason that "the court has already received evidence for the prosecution." Then, from the time the Court terminated the trial and considered the case submitted for decision and announced its promulgation, Fernando never moved for reconsideration, much less offered to present evidence in his defense. Under the facts, such failure to present evidence is tantamount to a waiver on the part of the defense.

Right to counsel PEOPLE V. SALONGA, G.R. NO. 131131, JUNE 21, 2001 FACTS: Accused-appellant Abelardo Salonga was convicted of qualified theft through falsification of commercial document by the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision convicting him of the crime charged; however, it ruled that the penalty imposed was erroneous, and modified the same by increasing th e penalty imposed to reclusion perpetua. Having imposed reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant, the Court of Appeals refrained from entering judgment and certified the case to the Supreme Court for review, in conformity with Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. In his appeal before the Court, appellant contended that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his alleged extrajudicial confession/admission which according to him was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. ISSUE: WON petitioners extra- judicial confession is inadmissible on the ground that there was a violation of right to counsel? HELD: No. The Court rejected appellant's argument that his "so-called extra-judicial confession/admission" taken on January 27, 1987 marked as Exhibit "B" was inadmissible in evidence on the ground that the waiver of his right to counsel was made in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. According to the Court, the constitutional right to counsel may be invoked only by a person under custodial investigation for an offense. Accused-appellant's extra-judicial confession was properly admitted and considered by the

trial court considering that when he gave his statement he was not under custodial investigation. The said admission were made in the course of an interview wherein accused-appellant admitted having issued the subject cashier's check without any legitimate transaction, to his co-accused Amiel Garcia who was then encountering financial difficulties. He also admitted that out of the amount of the check, P8,500.00 went to his personal benefit. His admissions were reduced into writing and offered as Exhibit "B" by the prosecution. The Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction of qualified theft through falsification of commercial document. The Court, however reduced the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the appellate court to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. AMPONG V CSC - G.R. NO. 167916, AUGUST 26, 2008 FACTS: On November 10, 1991, a Professional BoardExamination for Teachers (PBET was held in DavaoCity. A certain Evelyn Decir applied for and took the examination. She passed with a rating of 74.27%. At the time of the PBET examinations, petitioner Sarah P. Ampong and Decir were public school teachers under the supervision of DECS. Later, Ampong transferred to the RTC in Alabel, Sarangani Province, where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III. On July 5, 1994, a woman representing herself as Decir went to the Civil Service Regional Office (CSRO) No. XI, Davao City, to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility. During the course of the transaction, theCSRO personnel noticed that the woman did notresemble the picture of the examinee in the Picture Seat Plan. Upon further probing, it was confirmed that the person claiming the eligibility was different from the one who took the examinations. It was petitioner Ampongwho took and passed the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir. The CSRO conducted a preliminary investigation and determined the existence of a prima facie case against Decir and Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Even before filing an Answer, Ampong voluntarily appeared at the CSRO on February2, 1995 and admitted to the wrongdoing.On March 21, 1996, the CSC found petitioner Ampong and Decir guilty of dishonesty, dismissing them from the service. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of jurisdiction, but the same was dismissed. The CA also dismissed her appeal noting that she never raised the issue of jurisdiction until after the CSC ruled against her. Rather, she willingly appeared before the commission, freely admitted her wrongdoing, and even requested for clemency. Thus, she wasestopped from questioning the Commissions jurisdiction.Can the Civil Service Commission (CSC) properlyassume jurisdiction over administrative proceedingsagainst a judicial employee involving acts of dishonesty as a teacher, committed prior to her appointment to the judiciary? ISSUE: Whether or not the csc has administrative jurisdiction over an employee of the judiciary for acts committed while said employee was still with the executive or education department. HELD: NO but the petition must be dismissed on theground of ESTOPPEL. It is true that the CSC hasadministrative jurisdiction over the civil service. Asdefined under the Constitution and the AdministrativeCode, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, andgovernment-owned or controlled corporations. Pursuantto its administrative authority, the CSC is granted thepower to "control, supervise, and coordinate the CivilService examinations."This authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations. However, the Constitution provides that theSupreme Court is given exclusive administrativesupervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnelscompliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It maytake the proper administrative action against them if theycommit any violation. No other branch of governmentmay intrude into this power, without running afoul of thedoctrine of separation of powers. The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over acourt employee belongs to the Supreme Court,regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary. Indeed, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bringits complaint against a judicial employee before the OCA. Records show that the CSC did not adhere to thisprocedure in the present case. Petitioners admission of guilt stands PEREZ V. PEOPLE - G.R. NO. 164763, FEBRUARY 12, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner Zenon R. Perez seeks a review of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. An audit team headed by Auditor I Arlene R. Mandin, Provincial Auditor's Office, Bohol, conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. The audit team embodied their findings in the Report of Cash Examination,which also contained an inventory of cash items. Based on the said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57. When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his medicine. An administrative case was filed against petitioner. Petitioner remitted in instalments money that fully restituted his shortage in the amount of P72,784.57. Later, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of "not guilty. The Sandiganbayan dispensed with pre-trial and allowed the prosecution to present its witness. The defense presented evidence through petitioner Zenon R. Perez himself. He denied the contents of his first Answer to the administrative case filed against him by the audit team. He claimed it was prepared without the assistance of counsel and that at the time of its preparation and submission, he was not in peak mental and physical condition, having been stricken with diabetes mellitus ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners first answer should not have been given probative weight because it was executed without the assistance of counsel. HELD: No. There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee should be assisted by counsel in an administrative case. On the contrary, jurisprudence is in unison in saying that assistance of counsel is not indispensable in administrative proceedings. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side AQUINO V. PAISTE - G.R. NO. 147782, JUNE 25, 2008 FACTS: The Petitioner, along with Elizabeth Garganta and a certain Adeling went to the residence of the respondent and convinced her to buy a gold bar owned by a certain Igorot named Arnold, which they claim was legitimate. Having no money, Respondent Paiste refused. Regardless, the three returned to the respondents house the next day offering to sell the gold bar, convincing her to go with them to Angeles City to meet Arnold, who stated the price of the gold bar is at P60,000.00. Still having no money, Respondent Paiste refused while Petitioner Aquino repeatedly stated that it will be a good investment. The three consistently appeared before the respondents house for several more days convincing her to buy until one day, informed that the price has been reduced to P10,000.00, respondent agreed to go with them again to Angeles to meet Arnold. Refusing the P10,000.00 offer and counteroffering with P50,000.00, respondent finally purchased the gold bar upon the petitioners insistence. When respondent had the gold bar tested, it was found to be fake, prompting her to confront Petitioner Aquino, who promised the respondent that she will help her locate Garganta and saying that she had no hand in the transaction.

On March 27, 1991, respondent brought petitioner to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)-NCR in the presence of a certain Atty. Tolentino where petitioner amicably promised respondent they would locate Garganta, and the document they both signed would be disregarded should they locate Garganta. The amicable settlement stated that The undersigned accused/respondent hereby waives her right to counsel despite the recital of her constitutional rights made by NBI agent Ely Tolentino in the presence of a lawyer Gordon S. Uy among others. On April 6, 1991, petitioner brought Garganta to the house of respondent. In the presence of BarangayChairperson Atayde and a police officer, respondent pointed to Garganta as the person who sold the fake gold bar. Garganta was brought to the police station where there was a demand against Garganta alone. Subsequently, respondent filed a criminal complaint from which an Information against Garganta, petitioner, and three others for the crime of estafa in Criminal Case No. 92-99911 was filed before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), to which only the petitioner was arraigned and stood trial as the others were at large. The RTC ruled in favour of Paiste stating that petitioner conspired with Garganta, Adeling, and Arnold in committing the crime of estafa. The trial court likewise gave credence to the amicable settlement as additional proof of petitioners guilt as an amicable settlement in criminal cases is an implied admission of guilt. The CA affirmed the RTC stating that despite the presence of an amicable settlement, the RTC still did not err in convicting petitioner as it was indubitably shown by the prosecution through convincing evidence replete in the records that respondent conspired with the other accused through active participation in the commission of the crime of estafa. In fine, the CA found that the prosecution had indeed established the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. As the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, this present appeal was raised. ISSUE: WON the court erred in not declaring unconstitutional the manner in which the waiver of the right to counsel has been asked to be executed and subscribed to by the appellant. HELD: The accused states that she was only coerced to sign the amicable settlement instrument and that she was denied counsel by the NBI, all in violation of Sec. 12 of the Bill of Rights. The court ruled in the negative stating that Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating statements, that the rule begins to operate. It is evident that when petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR on March 27, 1991 to be investigated, she was already under custodial investigation and the constitutional guarantee for her rights under the Miranda Rule has set in. Since she did not have a lawyer then, she was provided with one in the person of Atty. Uy. However, it can be gleaned from the amicable agreement, as aptly pointed out by the CA, that the custodial investigation on the inquiry or investigation for the crime was either aborted or did not push through as the parties, petitioner, and respondent agreed to amicably settle. Thus, the amicable settlement with a waiver of right to counsel appended was executed with both parties affixing their signatures on it in the presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino. Her contention falls flat for the following reasons: 1) It is undisputed that she was provided with counsel (Atty. Uy). The presumption that Atty. Uy is a competent and independent counsel whose interests are not adverse to petitioner has not been overturned. Petitioner has merely posed before the CA and now this Court that Atty. Uy may not be an independent and competent counsel. Without any shred of evidence to bolster such claim, it cannot be entertained. Petitioner made much of the fact that Atty. Uy was not presented as witness by the prosecution and that what petitioner and Atty. Uy supposedly conferred about was likewise not presented. Basic is the principle that consultation and information between counsel and client is privileged communication and the counsel may not divulge these without the consent of the client. Besides, a party in a case has full discretion to choose whoever it wants as testimonial witnesses to bolster its case. We cannot second guess the reason of the prosecution in not presenting Atty. Uys testimony, more so on account of the counsel-client privileged communication. Furthermore, petitioner could have asserted its right "to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses,"for which she could have compelled Atty. Uy to testify. She did not. Petitioner never raised any objection against Atty. Gordon Uys appointment during the time she was in the NBI and thereafter, when she signed the amicable settlement When petitioner engaged Atty. Uy as her lawyer, she undoubtedly executed the amicable settlement. Verily, she was provided with an independent counsel and such "right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth."An amicable settlement is not and does not partake of the nature of an extrajudicial confession or admission but is a contract between the parties within the parameters of their mutually recognized and admitted rights and obligations. Thus, the presence of Atty. Uy safeguarded petitioners rights even if the custodial investigation did not

2)

3) 4)

5)

push through and precluded any threat of violence, coercion, or intimidation. 5. Even granting arguendo that the amicable settlement is in the nature of an admission, the document petitioner signed would still be admissible since none of her constitutional rights were violated. Petitioners allegations of threat, violence, and intimidation remain but bare allegations. Allegations are not proof PUBLIC ATTORNEYS OFFICE V. SANDIGANBAYAN - G.R. NOS. 154297-300, FEBRUARY 15, 2008

FACTS: On March 15 and 18, 2002, Atty. Persida V. Rueda-Acosta, Chief Public Attorney of PAO personally appeared before respondent Special Division of the Sandiganbayan to request the relief of the appearance of PAO as de oficio counsel for accused President Joseph Estrada and Jose Estrada in their criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan. However, the request was denied. On May 8, 2002, the Chief Public Attorney filed an Urgent and Ex-Parte Motion to be Relieved as Court-Appointed Counsel with the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, praying that she be relieved of her duties and responsibilities as counsel de oficio for the said accused on the ground that she had a swelling workload consisting of administrative matters and that the accused are not indigent persons; hence, they are not qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO. On May 9, 2002, respondent Court found the reasons of the Chief Public Attorney to be plausible and relieved the Chief Public Attorney as counsel de oficio of former President Joseph Estrada and Mayor Jose Estrada. On May 14, 2002, the remaining eight PAO lawyers filed an Ex-Parte Motion To Be Relieved As Court-Appointed Counsels with respondent Court on the ground that the accused, former President Joseph Estrada and Jose Estrada, are not indigents; therefore, they are not qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO. On May 28, 2002, respondent Court issued a Resolution denying the motion, but retaining two of the eight PAO lawyers, namely, the petitioners Atty. Usita, Jr. and Atty. Andres. The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads: . . . There being no compelling and sufficient reasons to abandon the Court's previous rulings, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. While it is true that a similar motion filed by the PAO Chief Public Attorney Persida Rueda-Acosta was granted per Court's Resolution of May 9, 2002, the rationalization advanced by Atty. Rueda was found meritorious by the Court in that there was unexpected upsurge in her administrative workload as head of the office including the administration and supervision of more or less 1,000 PAO lawyers and 700 staff nationwide and many other functions which require her immediate attention and undivided time. Nonetheless, considering that there are eight (8) de oficio counsels from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, deems it proper to reduce their number and retain only two (2) of them, namely: Atty. Wilfredo C. Andres and Atty. Maximo B. Usita to continue their duties and responsibilities as counsels de oficio for accused Joseph and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in retaining only 2 of the PAO lawyers as counsels de oficio for Joseph and Jose Estrada. HELD: No. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. At the time of PAO's appointment, the accused did not want to avail themselves of any counsel; hence, respondent exercised a judgment call to protect the constitutional right of the accused to be heard by themselves and counsel during the trial of the cases. Subsequently, respondent reduced the number of PAO lawyers directed to represent the accused, in view of the engagement of new counsels de parte, but retained two of the eight PAO lawyers obviously to meet such possible exigency as the accused again relieving some or all of their private counsels. In any event, since these cases of the accused in the Sandiganbayan have been finally resolved, this petition seeking that PAO, the only remaining petitioner, be relieved as counsel de oficio therein has become moot. Petition dismissed. SIBAL V. PEOPLE - G.R. NO. 161070, APRIL 14, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner, together with one Gilbert Alijid (Alijid), was charged with two counts of Murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Quezon City to which petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty. During trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), counsel of Alijid, took over representing petitioner in view of the death of the latter's counsel. On December 5, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision finding petitioner and his co-accused Alijid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in each count. On May 10, 2002, petitioner, this time unassisted by counsel, filed with the RTC a Petition for Relief from the Decision dated December 5, 2001 together with an affidavit of merit. In his petition, petitioner contended that at the time of the promulgation of the judgment, he was already confined at Quezon City Jail and was directed to be committed to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa; that he had no way of personally filing the notice of appeal thus he instructed his lawyer to file it on his behalf; that he had no choice but to repose his full trust and confidence to his lawyer; that he had instructed his lawyer to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal; that on May 2, 2002, he was already incarcerated at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and learned from the grapevine of his impending transfer to the Iwahig Penal Colony, Palawan; that believing that the notice of appeal filed by his counsel prevented the Decision dated December 5, 2001 from becoming final to warrant his transfer, he instructed his representative to get a copy of the notice of appeal from the RTC; that no notice of appeal was filed by his lawyer in defiance of his clear instructions; and that the RTC Decision showed that it was received by his counsel on February 1, 2002 and yet the counsel did not inform him of any action taken thereon. On September 30, 2002, petitioner's counsel filed a Withdrawal of Appearance from the case with petitioner's consent. Again, the documents before us do not show the action taken by the RTC thereon. Petitioner, again by himself, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing his petition for relief. He claims that the delay in appealing his case without his fault constitutes excusable negligence to warrant the granting of his petition for relief. In a Resolution dated August 19, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition in this wise: Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 28, 2003 for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, in violation of Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court and for failure to attach to the petition, the relevant and pertinent documents. The CA also stressed that procedural rules are not to be belittled simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. ISSUE: Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case due to the defiance of the petitioner's counsel de oficio to seasonably file a Notice of Appeal, constitutes excusable negligence to entitle the undersigned detention prisoner/petitioner to pursue his appeal? HELD: The initial determination of what pleadings, documents or order are relevant and pertinent to the petition rests on the petitioner. If, upon its initial review of the petition, the CA is of the view that additional pleadings, documents or orders should have been submitted and appended to the petition, the following are its options: (a) dismiss the petition under the last paragraph of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; (b) order the petitioner to submit the required additional pleadings, documents, or order within a specific period of time; or (c) order the petitioner to file an amended petition appending thereto the required pleadings, documents or order within a fixed period. The RTC Decision dated December 5, 2001, finding petitioner guilty of two counts of homicide, the Comment of the City Prosecutor as well as the counsel's withdrawal of appearance were considered by the CA as relevant and pertinent to the petition for certiorari, thus it dismissed the petition for failure to attach the same. However, the CA failed to consider the fact that the petition before it was filed by petitioner, a detained prisoner, without the benefit of counsel. A litigant who is not a lawyer is not expected to know the rules of procedure. In fact, even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. . We have held in a civil case that to demand as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know how to establish such right. This finds application specially if the liberty of a person is at stake. As we held in Telan v. Court of Appeals: The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, specially so when as a consequence, life,

liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss. In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel. xxx xxx xxx Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. The demand as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know how to establish such right. The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company. aHTEIA No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal. (Emphasis supplied) The filing of the petition for certiorari by petitioner without counsel should have alerted the CA and should have required petitioner to cause the entry of appearance of his counsel. Although the petition filed before the CA was a petition for certiorari assailing the RTC Order dismissing the petition for relief, the ultimate relief being sought by petitioner was to be given the chance to file an appeal from his conviction, thus the need for a counsel is more pronounced. To repeat the ruling in Telan, no arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal. It is even more important to note that petitioner was not assisted by counsel when he filed his petition for relief from judgment with the RTC. It cannot be overstressed therefore, that in criminal cases, as held in Telan, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable; otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process.

The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong. Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads: "Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt. The Supreme Court ruled that it is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter required evidentiary hearing that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The records did not show that evidence on petitioner's guilt was presented before the lower court. Upon proper motion of the petitioner, the Sandiganbayan should conduct hearing to determine if the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner. The petition was dismissed for failure to show that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. PEOPLE V. MICHAEL BOKINGO AND REYNANTE COL G.R. NO. 187536, AUGUST 10, 2011 FACTS: For review is the Amended Decision dated 14 November 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658, Bokingo and Col guilty as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. An Information was filed against Bokingo and Col, charging them of the crime of murder wherein they conspired together armed with a claw hammer and with intent to kill by means of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of confidence, and nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul NOLI PASION, by hitting and beating his head and other parts of his body with said hammer, thereby inflicting upon said NOLI PASION fatal wounds on his head and body which caused his death. During the preliminary investigation. Bokingco admitted that he conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the killing several days before because they got "fed up" with Pasion. On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, Bokingco confessed to the crime charged. The trial court rendered judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, there being the two aggravating

circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence to be considered against both accused and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty in favor of accused Bokingo only, sentencing them to Death. The Court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court however lowering the penalty to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 7659. ISSUES: Whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator based on Bakingos admission that Col is a coconsiprator HELD: No. Col is hereby ACQUITTED beyond reasonable doubt. In order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy. Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. As we have previously discussed, we did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy. It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and Cols plan to kill Pasion. Bokingcos confession was admittedly taken without the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence against Col. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Reynante Col is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt. Appellant Michael Bokingco is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. Absence of Violation PEOPLE V. AQUINO, GR 129288, MARCH 30, 2000 Sarsonas VILLANUEVA V. PEOPLE, GR 135098, APRIL 12, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner was charged with five counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for failure to pay the dishonored checks issued to complainant Carmencita S. Rafer. The checks bounced for being account closed. Petitioner, duly represented by counsel of choice, was convicted of the charges. His counsel appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the trial court's judgment. Meanwhile, petitioner's counsel withdrew from the case. Atty. Ibay, petitioner's new counsel, filed a motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration on the deadline, June 2, 1998. The motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed on June 11, 1998. The motion for new trial was grounded on the affidavit of desistance of complainant, executed after the appellate court had affirmed the trial court's decision and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied the motion for being filed out of time, hence, this recourse, petitioner alleging that the failure of his

second counsel to timely file his motion for reconsideration violated his right to counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of his second counsel to timely file his motion for reconsideration violated his right to counsel HELD: No. Petitioner contends that this procedural blunder by his lawyer, in effect, violated his constitutional right to counsel. He now argues that he may not be penalized for the costly importunings of his lawyer. We are, however, unable to agree with petitioner's contention. The records show petitioner was represented by counsel of his choice in the trial court, and also by counsel de parte before the Court of Appeals. When his new lawyer filed his motion for reconsideration out of time, there was no violation of petitioner's right to counsel. The constitutional right to counsel is not violated where a member of the Bar represents petitioner. A client is bound by the acts of his counsel. The rule extends even to the mistakes and negligence committed by the latter, except only when such mistakes or neglect would result in serious injustice to the client. In our view, petitioner here has failed to present any cogent reason why this Court should find an exception in his case. There is no showing that Atty. Ibay was so grossly incompetent or so grossly negligent when he filed a tardy motion for reconsideration on petitioner's behalf. In fact, it could be said petitioner was the one who should be faulted, having hired Atty. Ibay when the period to move for reconsideration had run out. A party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect. Private complainant Carmencita S. Rafer executed her Affidavit of Desistance only 6 years after her testimony and after the Court of Appeals had affirmed the trial court's decision and had denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. It is settled that affidavits of recantation made by a witness after the conviction of the accused deserve only scant consideration. Moreover, there is nothing in said affidavit, which would support a different conclusion. The third requisite is, therefore, lacking. The Court of Appeals, thus, committed no reversible error in refusing to treat said desistance as newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial. To hold otherwise would put no end to litigation as every accused could simply wrangle an affidavit of desistance from a principal witness to seek a new trial or to prolong one. Findings of fact of the appellate court affirming that of the trial court are conclusive upon this Court. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Presence of Violation PEOPLE V. NADERA, 324 SCRA 490 FACTS: Accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. has four children by his wife Daisy, namely: Oleby, Maricris, March Anthony and Sherilyn. Daisy left for a job in Bahrain did not return until September 12, 1995. On April 28, 1996, Oleby and Maricris, assisted by a neighbor, Lita Macalalad, told their mother that they had been raped by their father. Thereupon, they went to the police authorities of Naujan and filed a complaint against accused-appellant. After preliminary examination, on June 6, 1996, four informations charging accused-appellant with rape on variouss dates were filed in the RTC. At his arraignment, accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the PAO, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against him. However, after the prosecution had presented Dr. Cynthia S. Fesalbon, accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the crime charged in all the informations. Oleby testified that she was raped in 1992 when she was then 9 years old. She was also raped twice in 1995. Maricris also testified that she was raped by her father in 1996 when she was then 11 years old. RTC found him guilty for four counts of rape. Upon appeal, the accused sought the reversal of the ruling of the trial court in accepting the plea of guilty to a capital offense and in failing to conduct a searching inquiry to determine whether the accused fully understood the consequence of his plea. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in accepting his plea of guilty and in failing to conduct a searching inquiry as to his plea.

HELD: The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf. Under this Rule, three things are enjoined upon the trial court when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered: (1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) the court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and, (3) the court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. What constitutes a searching inquiry is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Hence, a searching inquiry must focus on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. In the case at bar, the record does not show what exactly transpired at the re-arraignment of accused-appellant, for what reason he changed his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty," and whether he fully understood the consequences of his guilty plea. The only indication in the record that accused-appellant changed his plea to guilty is the Certificates of Re-Arraignment. On what exactly accused-appellant said in entering his plea of guilty and what exactly he had been told by the trial judge, the records shed no light. There is thus no evidence to show that accused-appellant's guilty plea was voluntarily made or that he had fully understood the consequences of such plea. The warnings given by the trial court in this case fall short of the requirement that it must make a searching inquiry to determine whether accused-appellant understood fully the import of his guilty plea. A mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient. The judge must be completely convinced that the guilty plea made by the accused was not made under duress or promise of reward. The judge must ask the accused the manner the latter was arrested or detained, and whether he was assisted by counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations. In addition, the defense counsel should also be asked whether he conferred with the accused and completely explained to him the meaning and the consequences of a plea of guilt. Furthermore, since the age, educational attainment and socio-economic status of the accused may reveal insights for a proper verdict in the case, the trial court must ask questions concerning them. In this case, absent any showing that these questions were put to accused-appellant, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken by the trial court. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged. In this case, the trial judge failed to state the factual and legal reasons on which he based accused-appellant's conviction and the counsel for the accused did not cross examine Oleby. CALLANGAN V. PEOPLE 493 SCRA 269 FACTS: On May 28, 1999, petitioner was found guilty of the crime of perjury in Criminal Case No. 38674. On July 5, 1999, petitioner filed a timely motion for new trial on the ground that she was deprived of her day in court because of the gross negligence of her counsel, Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte, and his utter lack of diligence in the performance of his duty to represent her in every stage of the suit. She attributed the following omissions to her counsel: 1. Failure to file the demurrer to evidence despite leave of court previously granted; 2. Failure to inform his client of the April 14, 1999 order of the court considering the intended demurrer to evidence as abandoned; 3. Failure to attend the hearing for the reception of the evidence for the defense (i.e., petitioner) despite notice, which failure was deemed by the MTC as a waiver of petitioner's right to present her evidence; 4. Failure to seek proper relief from the adverse effects of said orders and 5. Failure to appear on the promulgation of judgment. On October 8, 1999, the MTC denied the motion for new trial. It held that the ground invoked by petitioner was not among those provided in the Rules of Court for new trial in criminal cases. Petitioner sought the reconsideration of the order but the same was

also denied in the MTC's December 27, 1999 order. Aggrieved, petitioner questioned the October 8, 1999 and December 27, 1999 orders of the MTC by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the RTC of Pasig City. RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the petition on the ground that the remedy of appeal was still available to petitioner. It also ruled that the MTC did not commit any abuse of discretion in issuing the orders assailed by petitioner. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied it. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the nonfeasance or malfeasance of petitioners counsel is tantamount to a denial of her right to counsel? HELD: YES. True, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC when it issued the order denying petitioner's motion for new trial. The records of the case are bereft of any indication that Judge Cornejo arbitrarily, despotically or deliberately failed to afford petitioner her constitutionally mandated right to be heard. The cause of petitioner's travails and misfortune was the negligence of her own counsel. However, in view of the circumstances of this case, outright deprivation of liberty will be the consequence of petitioner's criminal conviction based solely on the evidence for the prosecution. Thus, to prevent a miscarriage of justice and to give meaning to the due process clause of the Constitution, the Court deems it wise to allow petitioner to present evidence in her defense. The rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client admits of exceptions. The recognized exceptions are: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property or (3) where the interests of justice so require. In such cases, courts must step in and accord relief to a party-litigant. The omissions of petitioner's counsel amounted to an abandonment or total disregard of her case. They show conscious indifference to or utter disregard of the possible repercussions to his client. Thus, the chronic inaction of petitioner's counsel on important incidents and stages of the criminal proceedings constituted gross negligence. The RTC itself found that petitioner never had the chance to present her defense because of the nonfeasance (malfeasance, even) of her counsel. It also concluded that, effectively, she was without counsel. Considering these findings, to deprive petitioner of her liberty without affording her the right to be assisted by counsel is to deny her due process. TIn criminal cases, the right of the accused to be assisted by counsel is immutable. Otherwise, there will be a grave denial of due process. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. In People v. Ferrer, 10 the essence of the right to counsel was enunciated: The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. 11 (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner was accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by a counsel who did not devote himself to the defense of her cause. Counsel's utter lack of action after the prosecution rested its case revealed an extreme shortcoming on his part. Such inaction definitely proved infidelity to and abandonment of petitioner's cause. Considering that this case involved personal liberty, the gross negligence of counsel shocks our sense of justice. It should not be allowed to prejudice petitioner's constitutional right to be heard. This case is hereby REMANDED to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City for a new trial for the purpose of allowing petitioner to present evidence in her defense with directive to the court to decide the case with deliberate speed.

Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation PEOPLE V. DE LA CRUZ - G.R. NO. 175929, DECEMBER 16, 2008 FACTS:

Accused-appellant Rommel dela Cruz seeks a reversal of his conviction by the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for murder. On August 7, 1995, at about 7:00 p.m., Santarin, Pader and Viscaya were conversing near the barangay hall in Nadurata St., Caloocan City. Fronting the barangay hall is a street which was lighted by a fluorescent lamp. Santarin was seated between Pader and Viscaya. They were arms-length away of each other. Appellant was sanding behind them, at a distance of about two (2) meters. Viscaya went to buy some cigarettes from a nearby store beside the barangay hall and returned to the place where Santarin and Pader were. Suddenly, appellant came from behind and stabbed Santarin once. Santarin fell to the ground, chin first. Pader and Viscaya were instantly shocked and were unable to move. Appellant immediately fled the scene. Subsequently, people from the barangay hall arrived and brought Santarin to the nearest hospital. He, however, succumbed to death due to the stab wound. Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, a Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), conducted an autopsy on the victim's body. According to his findings, Santarin sustained one stab wound in the back which was 15 centimeters deep. The wound reached the left lung causing his death. According to Dr. Muoz, the weapon used by the assailant was a sharp, pointed single-bladed instrument which could either be a kitchen knife or a balisong. When arraigned on June 7, 2000, appellant, assisted by Atty. Jimmy Edmund Batara, pleaded not guilty to the Information. Trial on the merits ensued after. The prosecution evidence, which portrayed the foregoing facts, was supplied by the combined testimonies of Viscaya and Dr. Muoz while appellant's version of the events was premised on denial and alibi. On February 26, 2001, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the right of appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. HELD: NO. It is true that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Constitution uses the word "shall", hence, the same is mandatory. A violation of this right prevents the conviction of the accused with the crime charged in the Information. The constitutional guaranty has a three-fold purpose: First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction. Appellant contends that "while it is not disputed that treachery was stated in the information, nonetheless, the same was not specified therein as a qualifying circumstance in an ordinary and concise language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what were those qualifying circumstances". Thus, assuming he is guilty, he could only be convicted of homicide, not murder. However, it was previously held in People v. Aquino that: The fact that the circumstances were described as "aggravating" instead of "qualifying" does not take the Information out of the purview of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 248 does not use the word "qualifying" or "aggravating" in enumerating the circumstances that raise a killing to the category of murder. Article 248 merely refers to the enumerated circumstances as the "attendant circumstances". xxx xxx xxx The use of the words "aggravating/qualifying circumstances" will not add any essential element to the crime. Neither will the use of such words further apprise the accused of the nature of the charge. The specific allegation of the attendant circumstance in the Information, coupled with the designation of the offense and a statement of the acts constituting the offense as required in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule

110, is sufficient to warn the accused ... The words "aggravating circumstances" include "qualifying circumstances". Qualifying circumstances are aggravating circumstances which, by express provision of law, change the nature of the crime to a higher category. The words "attendant circumstances", which still appear in Article 248 (raising homicide to murder), refer to qualifying circumstances those aggravating circumstances that, by express provision of law, change the nature of the crime when present in the commission of the crime. What properly informs the accused of the nature of the crime charged is the specific allegation of the circumstances mentioned in the law that raise the crime to a higher category. PEOPLE V. DE LA CRUZ G.R. NO. 174371, DECEMBER 11, 2008 FACTS: On October 24, 1996, Marikit, then sixteen (16) years of age, had a reunion with her family at their farm in Lagnas, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, on the occasion of the birthday of her father, herein appellant Delfin dela Cruz. The celebration ended at past 9:00 oclock in the evening when appellants two drinking buddies left the place. Shortly before midnight, when Marikit was already preparing to sleep, she was summoned by her mother telling her that appellant wanted to talk to her. Marikit complained that she was sleepy but her mother told her that her father may have something important to tell her. Marikit obeyed and, together with her mother, she went to her father who was waiting at the water pump bomba near their house. There, appellant told Marikit to go with him to the hut of their farm. At first, Marikit declined saying it was very cold already. . . and it is bad for my health, but agreed later on because of fear of her father and considering also that her mother urged her to do so. Upon arriving at the hut which was one kilometer from their house, appellant asked Marikit what is his gift. Marikit replied I do not have a gift. Appellant told Marikit to just follow what he wants. Thereafter, appellant suddenly embraced and kissed Marikit, and started undressing her. She tried to resist but he threatened to harm her. After he removed all [his] daughters clothes, he placed himself on top of her and forcing her to face him. On the witness stand, Marikit exclaimed Ginalaw niya ako, referring to appellant who was able to penetrate his private part on my private part. During their four (4) hours stay inside the hut, appellant sexually abused his daughter twice. Marikit cried and cried and asked her father why he raped her. Appellant, however, did not answer. Thereafter, they left the hut and went home. Marikit was no longer able to sleep that night. Three (3) days thereafter, on October 28, 1996, Marikit decided to file a complaint against her father. On the same date, she submitted herself to medical examination. The examining Health Officer, Dr. Wilfred G. Kenept, issued a Medico-Legal Certificate dated October 28, 1996. The lower court found him guilty, thus this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence HELD: After a meticulous study of the evidence, we are convinced that the prosecution has clearly and sufficiently established the fact of rape and the culpability of appellant for the crime alleged in the Information. Verily, we find no reason to doubt the trial courts finding of guilt. The victim testified on the details of the rape incident in a clear, straightforward and credible manner. There is no higher evidence of guilt than the voluntary testimony of the accused himself. Such admission is evidence of the highest order, since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience GUY V. PEOPLE - G.R. NOS. 166794-96, MARCH 20, 2009 FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for review assailing the decision of the Sandiganbayan dated 2 September 2004 in Criminal Cases No. 26508-10 which found petitioners guilty of violating Sec. 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019). Petitioners Felix T. Ripalda, Concepcion C. Esperas, Eduardo R. Villamor, and Ervin C. Martinez (Ripalda, et al.) are officers and employees of the City Engineer's Office of the City of Tacloban. Meanwhile, petitioners Cesar P. Guy (Guy) and Narcisa A. Grefiel

(Grefiel) are the Barangay Chairman and Barangay Treasurer, respectively, of Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban City (Barangay 36). Said petitioners, together with Edgar Amago, a private individual, owner and proprietor of Amago Construction were charged in three (3) separate Informations with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the construction of three (3) infrastructure projects in Barangay 36, namely: an elevated path walk, a basketball court and a day care center. It appears that an audit investigation was conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) and the team found material defects in the projects and discovered that the contract cost for the basketball court and elevated path walk was overpriced. On 2 September 2004, the Sandiganbayan decided the case against petitioners. Disposing of the graft cases, the Sandiganbayan ruled as follows: Considering that all the elements of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3(e) were without doubt established in these cases and the allegation of conspiracy shown, a moral certainty is achieved to find the accused liable for the acts they committed. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the respondent sandiganbayan palpably disregarded the fundamental right of the petitioner to be presumed innocent and, instead, reversed the presumption and convicted the petitioner of violation of the anti-graft law inspite of the absence of concrete inculpatory evidence. 2. Whether or not the conclusion of the court a quo finding the petitioners guilty of the crime charged is grounded entirely on estimates, speculations, surmises and/or conjectures HELD: Petitioners maintain that the Sandiganbayan had not acquired jurisdiction over them because the three informations failed to state the specific actual allegations that would indicate the connection between the discharge of their official duties and the commission of the offenses charged; or alternatively, assuming that the Sandiganbayan had actually acquired jurisdiction, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, as well as the existence of conspiracy. On the other hand, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), argues that the averments in the Information are "complete and wanting of the slightest vagueness as to denote another interpretation or mislead anyone." Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court merely require the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity as to apprise the accused of what they are being charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment, such that evidentiary matters need not be alleged in the information. The OMB adds that if it were true that the allegations are vague or indefinite, petitioners should have filed a motion for a bill of particulars as provided under Section 9, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court to question the alleged insufficiency of the information, or a motion to quash on the ground that the facts averred do not constitute an offense. The OMB asserts that the prosecution had satisfactorily proven the existence of the elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as well as the existence of conspiracy among the accused. Moreover, in the case at bar, all the elements of violation of Sec. 3 (e) R.A. No. 3019 are indicated in the Informations. The Informations allege that while in the performance of their respective functions either as city or barangay officials, petitioners caused the construction of the subject structures, either without following the approved program of work and drawing plan, or worse, even without any plans and specifications; and furthermore, had given unwarranted benefits to themselves and to Edgar Amago, to the damage and prejudice of the government. Contrary also to petitioners' assertions, the specific acts of the accused do not have to be described in detail in the information, as it is enough that the offense be described with sufficient particularity to make sure the accused fully understand what he is being charged with. The particularity must be such that a person of ordinary intelligence immediately knows what the charge is. Moreover, reasonable certainty in the statement of the crime suffices. It is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished from facts necessary to be stated in order to render the information sufficiently certain to identify the offense. As a general rule, matters of evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be averred. The particular acts of the accused which pertain to "matters of evidence", such as how accused city officials prepared the inspection reports despite the absence of a project plan or how the contractor was able to use substandard materials, do not have to be indicated in the information. Hence, the consolidated petitions were DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated 2 September 2004 in Criminal Case Nos. 26508-10 was AFFIRMED. ALBERT V. SANDIGANBAYAN - G.R. NO. 164015, FEBRUARY 26, 2009

FACTS: March 1999, Special Prosecution Officer II of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao charged Albert with violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act to wit: That on or about May 1990 in Davao City, the accused Albert, a public officer, being the President of a National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation took advantage of his official position by making it appear that two (2) parcels of land are residential lands when in fact, these are agricultural lands; as per the Tax Declarations and Titles provide. The action of misrepresentation Albert caused the NHMFC to release the amount of P4, 535, 400.00 which is higher than the loanable amount and thus causing injury to the government. Albert filed a Motion to dismiss the case for he has been denied the due process of law and his right to be informed that the nature and cause of the case has been violated. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation to the right of Ramon A. ALbert? HELD: There is/are no violation/s of right/s. Petitioner's contentions are futile. The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the Philippine Constitution which provides: "All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This right, however, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.. After reviewing the records of the case, we believe that the right of petitioner to a speedy trial was not infringed upon. The issue on the inordinate delay in the resolution of the complaint-affidavit filed against petitioner and his co-accused and the filing of the original Information against petitioner was raised in petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, and was duly addressed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution denying the said motion. It appears that the said delays were caused by the numerous motions for extension of time to file various pleadings and to reproduce documents filed by petitioner's co-accused, and that no actual preliminary investigation was conducted on petitioner. The Sandiganbayan properly held that a reinvestigation of the case as to petitioner was in order. Although the reinvestigation inadvertently resulted to further delay in the proceedings, this process could not have been dispensed with as it was done for the protection of the rights of petitioner himself. It is well-settled that although the conduct of an investigation may hold back the progress of a case, it is necessary so that the accused's right will not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency. The succeeding events appear to be parts of a valid and regular course of judicial proceedings not attended by delays which can be considered vexatious, capricious, oppressive, or unjustified. Hence, petitioner's contention of violation of his right to a speedy trial must fail. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.SO ORDERED. PACTOLIN V. SANDIGANBAYAN - G.R. NO. 161455, MAY 20, 2008 Albay PEOPLE V. DION GR NO. 181035, JULY 4, 2011 FACTS: Accused-appellant Noel Dion y Duque (Dion) was charged with two counts of statutory rape in two separate criminal complaints filed directly before the RTC and later on found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Dion disputes the validity of the Complaint in Criminal Case No. 4355-R for allegedly having grossly violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Dion argues that because the complaint failed to state the exact, or at least the approximate, date the purported rape was committed, he was not able to intelligently prepare for his defense and persuasively refute the indictment against him. ISSUE:

WON accuseds contention on the validity of Criminal Case No. 4355-R is meritorious. HELD: NO. Taking a cue from the Court of Appeals, we are reproducing here Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides: SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. (Emphasis supplied.) It is clear from the foregoing that the requirement of indicating in the complaint or information the date of the commission of the offense applies only when such date is a material ingredient of the offense. In People v. Espejon, we elucidated on this rule, to wit: An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of it. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The failure to specify the exact date or time when it was committed does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. In People v. Cantomayor, we explained when the time of the commission of the crime becomes relevant: [T]he time of the commission of the crime assumes importance only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. The date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainants narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of the crime. Applying this principle in a statutory rape case, we held: We have repeatedly held that the date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime. It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element. What is important is that the information alleges that the victim was a minor under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her, even if the accused did not use force or intimidation on her or deprived her of reason. (Emphasis ours.) In the case at bar, it is clear that the prosecutions evidence consisting of AAAs credible and straightforward testimony, and the certification from the Municipality of Rosales, Pangasinan Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar as to AAAs date of birth, are sufficient to sustain Dions conviction. The defense raised by Dion, which consisted of an alibi with respect to the April 2001 incident and denial as regards the June 16, 2001 allegation, were not strong enough to create a doubt on AAAs credibility. PEOPLE V. PANGILINAN - G.R. NO. 183090, NOVEMBER 14, 2011 Angala PEOPLE V. VALDEZ - G.R. NO. 175602, JANUARY 18, 2012 Arciaga The Trial MARI V. GONZALES G.R. NO. 187728, SEPTEMBER 12, 2011 FACTS: This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte (RTC), dated January 16, 2009, dismissing the criminal case for rape against PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres (private respondent), and the Resolution dated March 16, 2009, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, be annulled and set aside. On October 25, 2004, petitioner AAA, private complainant below, executed a sworn statement before an Investigator of the 8th Regional Office, Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) in Tacloban City, where she stated that she was raped by herein private respondent on October 10, 2004 at her boarding house at Sogod, Southern Leyte. A preliminary investigation of the case was commenced on November 4, 2004 before the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sogod. A warrant of arrest was issued against private respondent, so he voluntarily surrendered to the Chief of Police of Sogod on November 18, 2004 and was then incarcerated at the Sogod Municipal Jail. On November 20, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion for Bail. Hearings on the motion commenced on December 7, 2004, but

petitioner failed to appear. Only private respondent presented evidence. Thus, on March 16, 2005, the MCTC of Sogod issued an Order allowing private respondent to post bail set at P200,000.00. After posting a surety bond, private respondent was released from confinement. Pursuant to the issuance of A.M. No. 05-8-26, divesting first-level courts of authority to conduct preliminary investigation of criminal complaints cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, records of the subject case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Southern Leyte. The Prosecutor's Office issued a Resolution dated May 26, 2008, finding probable cause against private respondent and, accordingly, an Information for Rape was filed on June 11, 2008. A warrant of arrest was immediately issued against private respondent. On June 27, 2008, private respondent was committed to detention and, on June 30, 2008, the RTC issued an Order stating that accused had voluntarily surrendered to the Office of the Clerk of Court and arraignment was set for July 31, 2008. In the meantime, on July 3, 2008, private respondent filed a Motion to Admit Cash Bond in Lieu of Surety Bond; thus, in an Order dated July 10, 2008, the RTC cancelled the July 31, 2008 schedule for arraignment and reset the arraignment and hearing on said motion for August 20, 2008. At said scheduled date for arraignment and hearing on the motion, nobody appeared for the prosecution. Hence, the RTC issued the Order dated August 20, 2008 resetting the arraignment for October 31, 2008 and stating that: . . . this Court hereby orders the public prosecutor . . . and/or his assistant prosecutor . . . to appear and prosecute this case on the next scheduled hearing from arraignment up to the termination of the trial of this case otherwise this Court will order the dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute or nolle prosequi. On October 28, 2008, petitioner AAA, private complainant below, filed through her private counsel, a Motion for Cancellation of Hearing, manifesting that Atty. Pedro Felicen, Jr. had been granted the authority to prosecute by the Provincial Prosecutor and praying that the scheduled arraignment on October 31, 2008 be cancelled due to the pendency of private complainant's petition for transfer of venue before this Court. The authorized private prosecutor did not appear on said hearing date. The hearing on October 31, 2008 proceeded as the RTC ruled, in its Order issued on the same day, that unless restrained by a higher court, the mere pendency of a petition for transfer of venue is not sufficient reason to suspend the proceedings. Moreover, counsel for accused invoked the accused's right to a speedy trial and, thus, private respondent was arraigned in the presence of the Provincial Prosecutor who was designated by the RTC to represent the prosecution for the purpose of arraignment. However, pre-trial and hearing was again cancelled 4 more times. Thus, invoking the rule to speedy trial, RTC dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution to prosecute. ISSUE: Whether or not Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the case against private respondent for violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial. HELD: NO. The records reveal that the 30-day time limit set by Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court had, in fact, already been breached. The private prosecutor received the Pre-trial Order dated November 24, 2008 on December 3, 2008, while the Provincial Prosecutor received the same on December 2, 2008. This means that at the latest, trial should have commenced by January 2, 2009, or if said date was a Sunday or holiday, then on the very next business day. Yet, because of the prosecution's failure to appear at the December 12, 2008 hearing for the initial presentation of the prosecution's evidence, the RTC was constrained to reset the hearing to January 16, 2009, which is already beyond the 30-day time limit. Nevertheless, the prosecution again failed to appear at the January 16, 2009 hearing. Indeed, as aptly observed by the RTC, petitioners showed recalcitrant behavior by obstinately refusing to comply with the RTC's directives to commence presentation of their evidence. Petitioners did not even show proper courtesy to the court, by filing motions for cancellation of the hearings on the very day of the hearing and not even bothering to appear on the date they set for hearing on their motion. As set forth in the narration of facts above, the prosecution appeared to be intentionally delaying and trifling with court processes. Petitioners are likewise mistaken in their notion that mere pendency of their petition for transfer of venue should interrupt proceedings before the trial court. Such situation is akin to having a pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts. In People v. Hernandez, the Court held that "delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders" must be read in harmony with Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides that the "[p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case." The trial court was then correct and acting well within its discretion when it refused to grant petitioners' motions for postponement mainly because of the pendency of their petition for transfer of venue. The trial court cannot be faulted for refusing to countenance delays in the prosecution of the case. The Court's ruling in Tan v. People is quite instructive, to wit:

An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14 (2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial. IEaCDH Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as "The Speedy Trial Act of 1998," was enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial period to 180 days from the first day of trial. Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court had occasion to state The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent. The Court emphasized in the same case that: A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. . . . . Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. . . . . Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused's right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. xxx xxx xxx We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had already been deprived of his liberty on two occasions. First, during the preliminary investigation before the MCTC, when he was incarcerated from November 18, 2004 to March 16, 2005, or a period of almost four months; then again, when an Information had already been issued and since rape is a non-bailable offense, he was imprisoned beginning June 27, 2008 until the case was dismissed on January 16, 2009, or a period of over 6 months. Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for any duration of time is quite oppressive. Because of private respondent's continued

incarceration, any delay in trying the case would cause him great prejudice. Thus, it was absolutely vexatious and oppressive to delay the trial in the subject criminal case to await the outcome of petitioners' petition for transfer of venue, especially in this case where there is no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by a higher court against herein public respondent from further proceeding in the case. PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. V REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES - G.R. NOS. 177857-58, JANUARY 24, 2012 Chan Trial in Absentia IVLER V. MODESTO-SAN PEDRO - G.R. NO. 172716, NOVEMBER 17, 2010 FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved. ISSUES: 1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and 2. Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband. HELD: On Petition for Certiorari The RTC dismissed Ivlers petition for certiorari, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain said petition arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in the second offense. Thus, without reaching the merits of the said petition, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property. In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, the Court granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions. On Double Jeopardy The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365. These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling. The Right of Confrontation Right to cross-examine, to meet witness face to face PEOPLE V. MONJE, GR 146689, SEPT. 27, 2002 FACTS: Accused-appellant, together with three (3) others, were charged with the crime of rape with homicide for the brutal rape and killing of 15 year-old Imee. After trial, the three were acquitted, but accused was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to death, based mainly on the testimony of Cordero, whose evidence against the accused were purely circumstantial since he did not see the actual rape-slay of the victim. The case for the prosecution is woven principally around the testimony of witness Michael Cordero. It must be emphasized however that his testimony was not sufficiently tested on the crucible of cross-examination, specifically, that significant portion of his direct examination where he purportedly saw the accused and three (3) unidentified persons returning to the tricycle from the ricefield without the victim around 1:00 o'clock the following morning. After his initial cross-examination by defense counsel, witness Cordero failed and refused to return to court for the continuation of his cross-examination. In other words, except for his brief cross-examination which had barely scratched the surface, so to speak, and despite the insistence of the defense counsel to pursue his cross-examination and the repeated warnings from the trial court that it would be constrained to strike out and disregard his testimony should he fail to appear again, the witness stubbornly refused to return to court for his cross-examination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in sentencing the 3 accused purely on the basis of circumstantial evidence and the lone testimony of Cordero, who was not submitted for cross-examination. HELD: YES. It bears stressing that the cross-examination of a witness is an absolute right, not a mere privilege, of the party against whom he is called. With regard to the accused, it is a right guaranteed by the fundamental law as part of due process. Article III, Sec. 14, par. (2), of the 1987 Constitution specifically mandates that "the accused shall enjoy the right to meet the witnesses face to face," and Rule 115, Sec. 1, par. (f), of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure enjoins that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Cross-examination serves as a safeguard to combat unreliable testimony, providing means for discrediting a witness' testimony, and is in the nature of an attack on the truth and accuracy of his testimony. The purpose of cross-examination, however, is not limited to bringing out a falsehood, since it is also a leading and searching inquiry of the witness for further disclosure touching the particular matters detailed by him in his direct examination, and it serves to sift, modify, or explain what has been said, in order to develop new or old facts in a view favorable to the cross-examiner. The object of cross-examination therefore is to weaken or disprove the case of one's adversary, and break down his testimony in chief, test the recollection, veracity, accuracy, honesty and bias or prejudice of the witness, his source of information, his motives, interest and memory, and exhibit the improbabilities of his testimony. The ultimate purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or falsity of the statements of a witness during direct examination. Unfortunately, for the accused, these objectives of cross-examination were never attained in this case because of the continued failure and refusal of witness Cordero to appear for his cross-examination. How can the truth be ascertained if the cross-examination is not completed? We discussed at length in Seneris the effects of the absence or the incomplete cross-examination of a witness on the admissibility in evidence of his testimony on direct examination. The basic rule is that the testimony of a witness given on direct examination should be stricken off the record where there was no adequate opportunity for cross-examination. The verdict in a criminal case can be sustained only when there is relevant evidence from which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the test in determining the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence can be summed up as follows: Is the evidence sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis proving innocence, except the guilt of the accused, given the circumstances of the case? In reviewing criminal cases that could very well exact the ultimate penalty of death, we should do more than merely determine whether the trial court could reasonably conclude that the established facts were more probable than not. We must, in every instance, determine whether the trial court could reasonably conclude that the facts were certain to have occurred. It bears stressing that even the trial judge who was privy to the entire proceedings below did not lend full credence to the entire testimony of Cordero. On the contrary, he even expressed doubt as to their veracity. . . Apparently, the case for the prosecution is woven principally around the testimony of witness Michael Cordero. It must be emphasized however that his testimony was not sufficiently tested on the crucible of cross-examination, specifically, that significant portion of his direct examination where he purportedly saw the accused and three (3) unidentified persons returning to the tricycle from the ricefield without the victim around 1:00 o'clock the following morning. After his initial cross-examination by defense counsel, witness Cordero failed and refused to return to court for the continuation of his cross-examination. In other words, except for his brief crossexamination which had barely scratched the surface, so to speak, and despite the insistence of the defense counsel to pursue his cross-examination and the repeated warnings from the trial court that it would be constrained to strike out and disregard his testimony should he fail to appear again, the witness stubbornly refused to return to court for his cross-examination. Without the benefit of a full cross-examination, the ex parte statements of the witness are too uncertain, shaky and unreliable to be included in the review of controverted facts. They cannot be allowed to form part of the evidence and their consideration by the court a quo was clearly unwarranted. BANGAYAN V. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION - GR NO. 149193, APRIL 4, 2011 FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo Bangyan had 2 bank accounts with RCBC (Respondent) , one savings account and one current account. Both accounts had auto-transfer feature. The petitioner also signed a Surety Agreement with RCBC in favor of 9 corporations. This Surety Agreement was to be used as a security guarantee for any loan obligations, advances, credits and other obligations. Petitioner contests the authenticity of the surety agreement and claims that it has to be notarized. Respondent had also issued Letters of Credit LCs to 3 of the corporations guaranteed by petitioner. The LCs were used for payment for imports. Bureau of Customs sent a letter to RCBC demanding remittance of import duties for 3 shipments for which RCBC had issued 3 LCs. RCBC had informed Petitioner that the BOC had sent a letter demanding outstanding duties. Petitioner told RCBC that he will take care of matter. RCBC froze funds in Petitioners accounts due to the BOC demand, since the latter had given authority under the Surety Agreement. RCBC

would only draw from petitioners accounts upon order from the BOC. Petitioner issued 2 checks, but were returned to with notation of Refer to Drawer. One of the Corporations included in the Surety Agreement had a LC that was due and demandable, RCBC went ahead and debited petitioners account to partially satisfy the loan. After the debit the petitioners passbook reflected a balance of 45.46. Thereafter the petitioner had issued 5 more checks, but were also dishonored. The payees of the dishonored checks were demanding immediate payment. Petitioner demanded that RCBC restore all the funds debited from his account and indemnify him for damages. ISSUES: 1. WON RCBC was justified in dishonoring the checks and whether petitioner is entitled to indemnity. 2. WON the Surety Agreement was valid. 3. WON RCBC violated the Bank Secrecy Law RA 1406, when the BOC made an investigation of 3 of the companies included in the Surety Agreement and if petitioner is can claim damages. HELD: RCBC was not in bad faith when it dishonored the checks. The actions of RCBC were justified by the stipulations of the Surety Agreement. Since the petitioner had guaranteed the corporations stipulated in the Surety Agreement, RCBC had a fiduciary duty to debit the funds from the petitioners account to settle the loans and duties of the said corporations. The Surety Agreement was a valid contract between the Petitioner and RCBC. The petitioner could not prove his allegations of forgery and lack of consent of the agreement. The petitioner signed the Surety Agreement in behalf of the 9 Corporations. The petitioner also acknowledged the Surety Agreement when he was informed by RCBC of the demand from the BOC and he assured the bank that he was going to solve the problem. RCBC and its representative did not divulge any information in the Affidavit submitted to the BOC. The petitioner failed to prove that there was wrong doing on the part of respondent RCBC, since the dishonoring of the checks was the product of an surety agreement for the 4 corporations LCs which he voluntarily contracted. PEOPLE V. NG YIK BUN - G.R. NO. 180452, JANUARY 10, 2011 FACTS: On August 24, 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana received information from an operative that there was an ongoing shipment of contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon Province. Upon instructions from his superior, Major Carlo Magno Tabo, Capt. Ibon formed a team in coordination with a Philippine National Police detachment, and, along with the operative, the team then proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya. The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters. They spotted six Chinese-looking men loading bags containing a white substance into a white van. Having been noticed, Capt. Ibon identified his team and asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were loading on the van. Hwan replied that it was shabu and pointed, when probed further, to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the leader. A total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated. Bundles of noodles (bihon) were also found on the premises. A laboratory report prepared later by Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo on samples of the 172 confiscated bags showed the white substance to be shabu. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred when it held as valid the warrantless search, seizure and subsequent arrest of the accused-appellants despite the non-concurrence of the requisite circumstances that justify a warrantless arrest HELD: On the issue of warrantless arrest, it is apropos to mention what the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the aforequoted provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime,

which does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (Emphasis supplied.) The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van. Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused-appellantswho were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amendedis valid. In People v. Alunday, we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules 10 of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In the instant case, it can plausibly be argued that accused-appellants were committing the offense of possessing shabu and were in the act of loading them in a white van when the police officers arrested them. As aptly noted by the appellate court, the crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting officers. And to write finis to the issue of any irregularity in their warrantless arrest, the Court notes, as it has consistently held, that accused-appellants 11 are deemed to have waived their objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea. Moreover, present in the instant case are all the elements of illegal possession of drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and 12 consciously possesses the said drug. Accused-appellants were positively identified in court as the individuals caught loading and possessing illegal drugs. They were found to be in possession of prohibited drugs without proof that they were duly authorized by law to possess them. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is, therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on the 13 part of accused-appellants. There is, thus, no merit to the argument of the defense that a warrant was needed to arrest accusedappellants. PEOPLE V. AWID - G.R. NO. 185388, JUNE 16, 2010 FACTS: This is a kidnapping for ransom case where the complainant identified one of the accused as he stood with three others in front of the police station while she sat in her tinted vehicle. ISSUE: Whether or not accused Ganih, in conspiracy with others, kidnapped Mrs. Lee for a ransom HELD: What the Court condemns are prior or contemporaneous improper suggestions that point out the suspect to the witness as the perpetrator to be identified.[25] Besides, granting that the out-of-court identification was irregular, Mrs. Lees court testimony clearly shows that she positively identified Ganih independently of the previous identification she made in front of the police station. Mrs. Lee could not have made a mistake in identifying him since she had ample opportunities to study the faces and peculiar body movements of her kidnappers in her almost four months of ordeal with them Indeed, she was candid and direct in her recollection, narrating events as she saw them take place. Her testimony, including her identification of the appellant, was positive, straightforward, and categorical. In fine, the totality of the prosecutions evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that Ganih and the others with him kidnapped Mrs. Lee for ransom. The crime was punishable by death at the time of its commission but, with the enactment of Republic Act 9346 that prohibits the imposition of such penalty, the CA was correct in lowering the penalty to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Compulsory Process PEOPLE V. DY, GR 115326-37, JAN. 16, 2003
8

FACTS: Accused-appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Bernardino separately moved for a reconsideration of the Decision of the Supreme Court which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, finding them guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness. Appellant Dy contended that the Decision of the Supreme Court should have been merely recommendatory, in view of the provision of Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (d) of the Constitution. He averred that Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89 which provides that death penalty cases shall be within the jurisdiction of the Court en banc is incongruous and incompatible with the aforementioned constitutional provision. Accused-appellant Dy further contends that: (1) the sexual intercourse between him and complainant Mobley was consensual; (2) there is no evidence of rape except for Mobley's bare claim; (3) there is no conclusive evidence that Mobley and Tennican were drugged which caused them to black out and become unaware of what was happening to them; (4) Bernardino did not commit acts of lasciviousness; and (5) there is no conclusive proof of conspiracy between the two accused-appellants. Bernardino, on the other hand, alleges that: (1) accused-appellants were not accorded their right to a fair, unbiased resolution of the preliminary investigation when the reviewing prosecutor unilaterally reversed the findings of the three-man investigating panel that recommended the dismissal of the charges against them; (2) the right to be arraigned is not among the rights that are susceptible to waiver or estoppel, thus the lack of arraignment cannot be deemed cured by their participation in the trial; (3) the erroneous decision of the trial judge to hold an expedited trial effectively deprived them of proper preparation for and presentation of an adequate defense; (4) the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to establish his guilt with moral certainty; (5) the trial court erroneously allowed accused-appellant Dy to remain at liberty even after promulgation of judgment on the strength of the same bail bond posted by him during trial, while denying accused-appellant Bernardino's petition for bail; (6) the legal doctrines cited in our Decision do not apply in this case since the premises upon which these principles lie are not present herein; and (7) as a matter of equity, the significant delay in the resolution of this appeal should at least merit our attention to the peculiar effects of the decision in this case particularly as regards accused-appellant Bernardino. He claimed that the Court should have disregarded the findings of the trial court for the reason that the haste with which the trial was conducted necessarily casts a cloud of doubt over the validity of the proceedings; that the conflicting findings of the investigating panel and the reviewing prosecutor should have alerted the Court to varying interpretations of the facts at hand. ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings were hastily conducted and the procedural and substantial requirements were complied with. HELD: The Court found appellant Dy's contention misleading. Under Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members. However, the divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts. Actions considered in any divisions and decisions are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts, but as divisions of one and the same court. Anent the first issue raised by appellant Bernardino, the record showed that the proceedings were not hastily conducted. While the proceedings might have been of short duration than usual, they were nevertheless conducted with due regard to the right of each party to due process. The Court held that what is of prime consideration is not the speed by which the trial was conducted but the manner by which the procedural and substantial requirements were complied with. The Court found that these requirements were adequately met. Anent the second issue, the Court did not see any irregularity in the conflicting findings of the investigating panel vis--vis those of the reviewing prosecutor. It held that it is the prerogative of the reviewing prosecutor to overturn the findings of the investigating panel depending on how he appreciates the evidence. In regard to the other issues raised by both appellants, the Court found that they have been extensively discussed in its Decision and there was no need to reassess them or reconsider their stand. Accordingly, it denied with finality appellants' motions for reconsideration. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by accused-appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Bernardino are DENIED WITH FINALITY. Let a warrant of arrest be issued against accused-appellant Bryan Ferdinand Dy. In this connection, the National Bureau of

Investigation is DIRECTED to serve the warrant of arrest against him, to make a report thereon and submit the same to this Court within five (5) days after serving the same. PEOPLE V. LAPITAJE, GR 132042, FEB. 19, 2003 FACTS: Accused-appellants were found guilty of Robbery with Homicide by the trial court for willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain by means of force, threat and intimidation, entering the store of Domingo Colonia and killing one Nelson Saavedra. Witnesses were presented and and both parties gave their testimonies and alibis. Accused-appellants were brought into custody without a warrant of arrest. Subsequently, firearms were seized by the police without a search warrant. It was alleged that those were the weapons used in the perpetration of the crime. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was deprived of due process safeguarded by the Bill of Rights in relation to the admissbility of evidence. HELD: The court held that the firearms seized by the police was inadmissble as evidence, being acquired without a warrant. This mentioned, the trial court erred in convicting the defendants of Robbery with homicide. The inadmissibility of the firearms as evidence would cause the failure of the prosecution to bind all the accused of the crime charged. Only those proven beyond reasonable doubt by the testimonies and witnesses were held guilty of the court.

Different Offense PEOPLE V. VALDESANCHO, G.R. NO. 137051-52, MAY 30, 2001 Grossman PEOPLE V. DAWISAN, G.R. NO. 122095, SEPTEMBER 13, 2001 FACTS: Domingo Dawisan was charged with the crime of rape. Private complainant, a polio victim, Francisca Catalan, testified that around 11:30 in the morning of 12 December 1992, she was told by her mother, Maria Catalan, to get their bolo from Dawisan's house which was just adjacent to their house. Upon arrival in the said house, she asked the eight-year old sister of Domingo about the bolo. Then, she proceeded to the kitchen, got the bolo and on her way out, while she was passing in front of the bedroom where Domingo stayed, the latter grabbed and dragged her inside the bedroom while he was covering her mouth. Inside the bedroom, Domingo pinned the victim down on the floor, undressed himself, pulled down her skirt and panty, touched her private parts, forcefully separated her thighs and had carnal knowledge of her. She tried to resist but since one of her hands cannot do anything because she had polio, she felt weak and trembled. Meanwhile, Maria was worried because her daughter was not back yet, so she proceeded to Dawisan's house and surprised Domingo who was naked from the waist down and perched on top of her daughter. Maria scouted for something to strike her daughter's ravisher and upon seeing a piece of wood, picked it up and, swung it against Domingo hitting his knee. On the other hand, the defense interposed the theory of denial. Francisca narrated that accused-appellant ravaged her for the first time on 06 December 1992 inside a room of the Dawisan's residence were she and three of her young nieces Marjory, Sinang and Margie slept. Francisca testified that accused-appellant threatened to snuff out her life if she were to divulge the carnal ordeal. According to Francisca, prior to the 06 December incident, she and a few of her child relatives were allowed to sleep in the Dawisan's residence for twelve (12) nights already, 13 as their house was demolished 14 by his father and uncles. At the time of the twin sexual assaults, Francisca's vagina bled. ISSUE: WON the incident happened on Dec 6, 1992 may convict the accuse another count for rape. HELD: As to the 06 December 1992 incident, we firmly hold that accused-appellant may not be convicted therefor without violating Domingo's rights protected by no less than the fundamental law itself. Consistent with the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, an accused cannot be held liable for more than what he was charged. There can only be one conviction for rape if the information charges only one offense, even if the evidence shows that more than one was in fact committed. The right of a person to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. Complainant's tale on the alleged rape not charged in the information may be taken only as proof of specific intent, knowledge, plan, system or scheme.

Absence of Qualifying Circumstance PEOPLE V. MONTEMAYOR, GR 124474, JAN. 28, 2003 FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of five (5) counts of rape of twelve (12) year-old Aileen with the use of a deadly weapon and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death." Upon the commission of the crime, he covered her mouth and tied her. On appeal, he capitalized on his physical handicap of being a one-armed man to disprove the charges against him. ISSUE: Whether or not he can be charged of qualified rape? HELD: Yes, the court charged him with rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon. It must be stressed that what qualifies the crime of rape is not just the overt act of "being armed with a weapon" but the "use of a deadly weapon" in the commission of the crime, i.e., when a deadly weapon is used to make the victim submit to the will of the offender and not when it is simply shown to be in the possession of the latter. In this case, complainant Aileen S. Alba testified that appellant brandished the balisong at her and threatened her with death if she did not submit to his lustful desires; and that the balisong was placed beside her and the handgun was above her head while she was being raped. Thus, the threat to kill her was imminent and constant. While the record is bereft of evidence to show how appellant used the handgun other than placing it above the head of Aileen when he raped her, we find that when appellant brandished the balisong at her, it was sufficient to make twelve-year old Aileen submit to appellant's beastly will. The court give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, for it is most unnatural for a young and immature girl to fabricate a story as sordid as her own defilement, allow a medical examination of her genitalia, subject herself to a public trial and expose herself to public ridicule for no reason other than her thirst for justice. The court find appellant's reliance upon his disability as a futile attempt to disprove the charge against him and escape liability. While it is true that he is one-armed, such fact alone does not sufficiently prove that he could not have committed the crime. His physical defect does not make it entirely implausible for him to have committed the crime of rape, in the face of 12-year old Aileen's positive identification and unwavering testimony that appellant raped her. What is essential is that the essence of the crime sexual penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ is established beyond reasonable doubt. PEOPLE V. DELIM, GR 142773, JAN. 28, 2003 FACTS: It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding the appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of Modesto Bantas. Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are related for modesto is an adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into the house and poked a gun at modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put. Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial and alibi as their evidence against the charge. *alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove ISSUE: Whether or not Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? HELD: Yes there is: CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed. Appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto

There is no: TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove: a) employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity to defend himself b) the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted In the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and killed and this in fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that modesto was defenseless during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants. Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the three took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed. APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF HOMICIDE (THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE) PEOPLE V. ACOSTA, GR 140402, JAN. 28, 2003 FACTS: Appellants were found guilty by the trial court of the crime of murder for the death of Nestor Adajar. The trial court ruled, that the positive testimony of prosecution witness Rodrigo dela Cruz prevailed over the denial and alibi of appellants. Eyewitness Rodrigo dela Cruz, a carpenter and a resident of Pinmaludpod, Urdaneta City, testified that at around 11:00 p.m. of June 14, 1998, he was resting at his house. Rodrigo went outside to urinate and heard a commotion. He went near the place of the commotion, which was about twenty (20) meters away from his house. He hid himself and watched a fist fight among a group who had been drinking. He saw Arnold Acosta, Richard Acosta, Erasto Acosta, Sr. and Carlo Acosta physically assaulting the victim, Nestor. Arnold hit Nestor on the head with a piece of wood (dos por dos) with a protruding nail on one end. Then, Avelino struck Nestor with a pipe hitting the left side of his forehead. Nestor fell down. Rosendo Tara thrust an ice pick on the left side of Nestor's body. Sigfredo Acosta followed by hitting the left side of Nestor's body with a bamboo pole. Erasto, Sr. then uttered, "Are you sure that he is dead?" Erasto told his sons to carry the victim's body and bring it to the road. Carlo, Sigfredo and Arnold carried the victim's body to the road going to Dagupan City, in front of Rodrigo's house. Rodrigo knew the victim because Nestor was his neighbor. The trial court found that the injuries sustained by the victim were consistent with the testimony of Rodrigo dela Cruz and supported by the postmortem findings of Dr. Ronald Bandonill. The trial court noted that all the accused fled from their respective homes after the killing of Nestor which is an indication of guilt. The trial court found that conspiracy was present in the killing of Nestor. The trial court appreciated treachery in the commission of the crime which qualified the killing to murder. The trial court also appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength against the appellants to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Hence, this automatic review The appellants contend, among others, that the court a quo gravely erred in finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder despite insufficiency of evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not treachery attended the commission of the crime thereby qualifying the crime of homicide to murder. HELD: Yes. The trial court correctly held that treachery was present in the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In this case, appellants' concerted and successive attack on Nestor, who was unarmed, ensured his death without giving him an opportunity to defend himself. The attendant circumstance of treachery thus qualified the killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code: "Art. 248.Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1.With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or

afford impunity; . . .." However, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the attendant aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in treachery. Hence, the trial court erred in still appreciating abuse of superior strength apart from treachery, which warranted the imposition of the death penalty. Consequently, there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the death penalty imposed by the trial court should be reduced to reclusion perpetua under Section 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. PEOPLE V. CALOZA, GR 138404-06, JAN. 28, 2003 FACTS: On April 20, 1998, accused-appellant Rafael Caloza, Jr. was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City with three th counts of murder in three separate Informations all stating that accused on or about the 6 day of July, 1997, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and taking advantage of nighttime and with the use of a hard pointed object (bareta de kabra) did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon Dionisio Bulaclac, Edna Bulaclac and Mark Joseph Bulaclac causing their instantaneous deaths. During arraignment, accused entered a not guilty plea and trial ensued. The prosecution presented Allan Bulaclac, the younger brother of Dionisio as witness, claiming he saw Caloza on the date of the murders fleeing the scene with bloodied clothes, but did not see him actually killing the victims. Caloza, who was arrested in Valenzuela City, alleged that he was not responsible for the killings and that it was his two Visayan drinking mates who killed the three with a crowbar when Dionisio refused to supply them with fowl for their pulutan. He also alleged that the two Visayans threatened him if he talks to the authorities. In 1999, The RTC decided against Caloza, penalizing him with death as well as the payment of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity per case. Hence the petition at hand. ISSUE: WON RTC Cabanatuan erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and nighttime and the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength and treachery on the assumption that accused killed the victims. HELD: The court may prove guilt or innocence either by direct or circumstantial evidence as direct evidence is not indispensable in proving guilt. All circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. As for the alleged lack of qualifying circumstances, the court affirms the murder charge as against victim Mark Joseph Bulaclac, who according to medico-legal reports was but a young infant aged 4-8 months. It is evident that Mark Joseph was helpless and could not be expected to defend himself. It is well settled that the killing by adults of minor children aged up to thirteen years old is treacherous because they could not be expected to put up a defense even if the method of attack is not shown. The prosecution was not burdened to prove the precise or exact age of Mark Joseph when he was killed to prove treachery. The prosecution was only burdened to prove that Mark Joseph was at such an age and in such a physical condition that he was helpless and defenseless against the assault of Rafael. As for the killings of the parents, the court does not agree with the RTC ruling stating that nighttime, treachery and abuse of superior strength were attendant. The prosecution failed to submit evidence that Caloza employs means, methods or forms in the execution of the crime which tends directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make in the case of treachery. As for the qualifying circumstance of abuse of auperior strength, prosecution also failed to show evidence that Caloza deliberately took advantage of his superior strength to perform his dastardly acts regardless of killing all the victims by himself. In the case of nighttime, there is also no evidence that appellant actively sought the cover of darkness provided by the night. In fact, By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is especially sought by the offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the offenders immunity from capture. Dwelling was proved by the prosecution, but was not stated in the information, hence it should be disregarded by virtue of Secs. 8-9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Crim. Procedure. The court found him guilty of homicide in the killings of Dionisio and Edna Bulaclac while affirming the verdict of murder with regard to the killing of Mark Joseph Bulaclac. PEOPLE V. LAYOSO, GR 14773-76, JAN. 22, 2003 FACTS: Rosendo Layoso Sendong was convicted of four counts of rape by the RTS of San Carlos City, Pangasinan. The victim, Marlene B. Nitoya was raped three times by Layoso when she was only 14 years old; the fourth rape occurred a few days after she turned 15 years old. On October 22, 1998 at 8:00 in the evening, Marlene went out to buy kerosene at her Aunt Flory's store, about 15 meters from her

house. While she was on her way, accused-appellant suddenly pulled her left arm, kissed her face and threatened to kill her if she shouted. He smelled of alcohol. He dragged Marlene to the bamboo grove at the back of the store. There, he forced Marlene to lie down on the ground. When she refused, he kicked her. He then removed her panties, mounted himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her private parts. Marlene was not able to shout for help out of fear that accused-appellant might kill her. Marlene's ordeal was repeated on November 18, 1998 at the same time and place. On December 14 1998, Marlene was washing her face at the pump well near her grandmother's house when accused-appellant embraced her from behind, covered her mouth, repeatedly kissed her and threatened to kill her if she shouted. He forced her to lie flat on the basement of the pump well, lay on top of her, raised her skirt, removed her panties and inserted his penis into her vagina. The fourth rape incident happened on February 23, 1999 between 7:30 to 8:30 in the evening. Marlene was again about to buy kerosene at the store of her Aunt Flory when, all of a sudden, accused-appellant grabbed her from behind, covered her mouth with his right hand and brought her to a secluded place fronting the store. He forced her to lie down, removed her panties and threatened to kill her with a bamboo stick if she told anybody what he was about to do. He kissed her on the lips and neck then inserted his penis into her vagina. After he finished having carnal knowledge of Marlene, he again threatened to kill her if she told anyone about it. ISSUE: Whether or not: 1. That the honorable judge erred in not considering the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on cross-examination. 2. That the honorable judge erred in disregarding the inconsistencies in the prosecution's testimonies. 3. That the honorable judge erred in not considering the incredibility of the complainant's testimonies. HELD: No. The alleged inconsistencies of prosecution witnesses Juanito Nitoya, Teodora Nitoya, and Victoriano Nitoya are more apparent than real. Their testimonies do not in any way detract from the fact that Marlene was raped by accused-appellant. These alleged inconsistencies are diminimis in nature and in no way destroy their credibility. What is important is that the prosecution witnesses were consistent in relating the significant and indispensable components of the principal occurrence of rape. The testimonies of victims who are young and of tender age deserve full credence and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere fabrication especially where they have absolutely no motive to testify against the accused, as in this case. The commission of the four acts of rape were established by the testimony of Marlene Nitoya herself. Rape, by its very nature, is committed with the least possibility of being seen by the public. More often than not, this crime is committed in the presence of only the victim and her defiler. Thus, we have not hesitated before and will not be disinclined now to uphold the conviction of an accused on the basis of the lone testimony of a private complainant who testifies in no uncertain terms that he was the author of the beastly acts of rape committed upon her person. In the case at bar, Marlene was steadfast and unwavering in her testimony that she was raped on four separate occasions by accused-appellant. She could not have been mistaken in her identification of the accused-appellant as the latter lives within her neighborhood. In the face of his positive identification by Marlene, accused-appellant's self-serving denial and alibi cannot prevail. Moreover, her testimony is corroborated by the findings of the medical examination which indicated that she was in a non-virgin state, physically confirming that Marlene was indeed raped by accused-appellant. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57, in Criminal Cases Nos. SCC-3030 to 3043, finding accused-appellant Rosendo Layoso @ Sendong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay the complainant, Marlene B Nitoya, in each case, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of factual and legal basis. PEOPLE V. BALDOGO, GR 128106-07, JAN. 24, 2003 FACTS: Accused-appellant Gonzalo Baldogo, a convicted felon serving sentence at the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, was again convicted of murder and kidnapping by the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. He was sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death in the murder case and reclusion perpetua in the kidnapping case. On automatic review, appellant averred that he had nothing to do with, and hence, should not be claimed for, the death of Jorge Camacho, the victim, and the kidnapping and detention of Julie Camacho. Appellant claimed that he was acting under duress because he was threatened by Edgardo Bermas, a fellow inmate of the penal colony, with death unless he did what Bermas ordered him to do.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and generic aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the same. HELD: The qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, like any other qualifying circumstance, must be proved with certainty as the crime itself. A finding of evident premeditation cannot be based solely on mere lapse of time from the time the malefactor has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he actually commits it. The prosecution must adduce clear and convincing evidence as to when and how the felony was planned and prepared before it was effected. The prosecution is burdened to prove overt acts that after deciding to commit the felony, the felon clung to his determination to commit the crime. The law does not prescribe a time frame that must elapse from the time the felon has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he commits it. Each case must be resolved on the basis of the extant factual milieu. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation. The barefaced fact that accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag containing their clothing under a tree located about a kilometer or so from the house of Julio Sr. does not constitute clear evidence that they decided to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie. It is possible that they hid their clothing therein preparatory to escaping from the colony. There is no evidence establishing when accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag under the tree. The prosecution even failed to adduce any evidence of overt acts on the part of accused-appellant, nor did it present evidence as to when and how he and Bermas planned and prepared to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie and to prove that the two felons since then clung to their determination to commit the said crimes. Although accused-appellant and Bermas were armed with bolos, there is no evidence that they took advantage of their numerical superiority and weapons to kill Jorge. Hence, abuse of superior strength cannot be deemed to have attended the killing of Jorge. Nighttime cannot likewise be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because there is no evidence that accused-appellant and Bermas purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the killing or to insure its execution or accomplishment or to evade their arrest. Neither is dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge was killed in their house or taken from their house and killed outside the said house.

Difference of Commission of Crime PEOPLE V. CAPINPIN, GR 118608, OCTOBER 30, 2000 FACTS: Ulysses Capinpin was found guilty of rape and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, this appeal, basically centered on the error of the trial court in convicting Capinpin of rape of a woman deprived of reason under an information charging him with rape by the use of force and intimidation, over his continuing objection.The accused-appellant asserts that the trial court erred in convicting him of rape of a woman who is insane or otherwise deprived of reason under an information charging him with rape by the use of force and intimidation, over his continuing objection. Accused-appellant maintains that "the evidence for the prosecution, especially with respect to the essential elements of the crime charged should be as alleged in the information. To allow the presentation of evidence on matters not so alleged is a violation of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him. The accused should not be convicted of an offense not charged in the information. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused of rape of a woman who is insane or otherwise deprived of reason under an information charging him with rape by force and intimidation. HELD: The right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is safeguarded by the Constitution to every accused so he can prepare an adequate defense against the charge against him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. In the recent case of People vs. Moreno, we have ruled that an accused cannot be convicted under paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in an information charging him with rape by the use of force or intimidation because none of these modes of committing rape (i.e., when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the woman is under twelve years of age) were alleged in the information. The rationale for this rule is that "[t]o convict him under either of these statutory

provisions is to deprive him of the constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him." Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him . . . "In US vs. Karelsen, we explained the heart of this constitutional guarantee, thus: "The object of this written accusation was First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal, for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had." In the case at bar, clearly the trial court erroneously found accused-appellant guilty under paragraph 2 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, that is, rape of a woman who is deprived of reason, in an information charging him with rape by the use of force or intimidation, and over the objection of the defense to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution on the mental condition of the private complainant. We agree with the trial court's finding that while accused-appellant's sexual intercourse with Abegail was indeed with her consent, such consent cannot be deemed to have been given with intelligence, because Abegail was suffering from insanity. This is a factual finding which this Court will not disturb on appeal absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked facts of relevant value which, if considered, may affect the outcome of the case. Number of Offenses PEOPLE V. SURILLA, GR 129164, JULY 24, 2000 Sarsonas PEOPLE V. CUYUGAN, GR 146641, NOV. 18, 2002 FACTS: Accused-appellant Rica G. Cuyugan was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City of three counts of estafa committed by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, that is, by postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 30 years of reclusion perpetua. In her appeal, appellant contended that the agreement entered into by her and the Abagat spouses was for a partnership transaction for the supply of materials for the Armed Forces. She further asserted that the Abagat spouses had known her for a long time and had previous business dealings with her. It was actually on account of her good credit standing that they were convinced to become her partners. She issued the subject checks as mere guarantees, hence, they were postdated. ISSUE: WON accused-appellant should be held liable for estafa. HELD: We agree with the OSG that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of estafa as defined by the Revised Penal Code in Article 315, 2 (d), was committed by the appellant. More particularly, the prosecution did not prove the existence of fraud to constitute the issuance of the check as fraud contemplated by the law on estafa. To constitute estafa under this provision the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of defraudation, and as such it should be either prior to, or simultaneous with the act of fraud. The offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of a check whether postdated or not. That is, the latter would not have parted with his money or other property were it not for the issuance of the check. In this case, the trial court failed to consider the testimonies of both the private complainants with respect to the agreement that the checks issued by appellant shall be mere guarantees for the eventual payment of the money given to appellant. As aptly pointed out by the OSG, Norma Abagat admitted on cross-examination that the checks that appellant issued merely guaranteed the payment of the loan. Rodrigo Abagat likewise admitted as much and even testified on cross-examination that he intended to impose a monthly interest at the rate of 5% on the amount lent. The OSG observed that it was not the issuance of the checks that prompted the Abagat spouses to part with their money but rather, the liberality to help appellant who is the wife of Norma's cousin, as well as the expectation to collect interest payment for the loan extended to appellant. The transaction between appellant and the Abagat spouses, in our view, was one for a loan of money to be used by appellant in her business and she issued checks to guarantee the payment of the loan. As such, she has the obligation to make good the payment of the money borrowed by her. But such obligation is civil in character and in the absence of fraud, no criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code arises from the mere issuance of postdated checks as a guarantee of repayment. Considering that the informations against appellant involved violation of Art. 315, 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, we take exception to the OSG's

recommendation that appellant should be held liable for violations of BP 22. Appellant cannot be convicted of a crime for which she was not properly charged, for that would violate appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against her. The purpose of the constitutional guarantee that a person accused of an offense be informed of the accusation against him is (a) to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; (b) to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal, for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and (c) to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. The informations filed with the regional trial court were for three counts of estafa. Earlier, the informations for BP 22 covering the same checks filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 44, were provisionally dismissed on November 13, 1996. These cases were not re-filed nor consolidated with the informations for estafa before the RTC of Pasay. Accordingly, appellant was never apprised of the fact that she may still be held liable for BP 22 and so never had an opportunity to defend herself against an accusation for an offense under the special law. BP 22 cannot be deemed necessarily included in the crime of estafa under RPC, Article 315, 2 (d). The offense of fraud defined under the Revised Penal Code is malum in se, whereas BP 22, also known as Bouncing Checks Law, is a special law which punishes the issuance of bouncing checks, a malum prohibitum. Fraud or estafa under the Revised Penal Code is a distinct offense from the violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. They are different offenses, having different elements. In this case, since appellant is accused of violating a particular provision of the Revised Penal Code on estafa, she may not be convicted for violation of BP 22 without trenching on fundamental fairness. Date of Commission of Crime PEOPLE V. GIANAN, GR 135288-93, SEPTEMBER 15, 2000 TIBURCIO FACTS: Sometime in December 1992, Myra Gianan, when she was 11 years of age, was raped by her father, Jesus Gianan at their own home. She was warned by her father to be quiet or else, he would kill her. A few days later, while Myra was taking a bath, the accused started kissing her but because she resisted, he left. Still, in the same month, while Myra was cleaning the room their house, she was raped by the accused. In March 1993, while Myra was taking a bath, the accused entered the bathroom and consummated the sexual act. In April 1993, while Myra was sleeping, the accused successfully raped her for the fourth time. In November 1995, during the wake of her grandfather, Myra was told by the accused to go home which she complied. A short while later, the accused followed her. The accused then succeeded in doing the carnal act for the fifth time. In June 1996, Myra fled from their house and stayed at a friends house. Before leaving their home, Myra a left a letter to her mother explaining what had happened. When her mother saw the letter, she looked for her daughter and confirmed the contents of the letter. Myra then filed a complaint against the accused for multiple rape and Myra underwent physical examination which showed that she had sexual intercourse several times. The accused denied having raped his daughter. That the case was filed because he was a strict disciplinarian and that Myra resented him for not being allowed to go out with friends. He also testified that he worked as a carpenter from 7am to 5pm and he was also performing duties as a barangay tanod until 3am. However, he also admitted that he can go home anytime he want because his workplace was near his home. RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of multiple rape. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged against him. HELD: The Court convicted the accused of four counts of simple rape, one count of rape that was committed in November 1995 and one count of acts of lasciviousness.

The accused contends that the information against him was as void because it did not allege with certainty the dates of commission of the rapes, as a result of which he was allegedly deprived of the opportunity to defend himself. In addition, he argues that by charging multiple rape, the information charged more than one crime. The Court ruled that the time of the commission of rape is not an element thereof, as this crime is defined in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated therein, i.e., (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. In accordance with Rule 110, 11, as long as it alleges that the offense was committed "at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed," an information is sufficient. In the case at bar, Myra stated in her complaint that her father had raped her several times from 1992 up to November 1995.21 The prosecution was able to establish that during such period accused raped his daughter five times and committed acts of lasciviousness against her once. Hence, the allegation in the information that accused committed multiple rape "sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto" should be deemed sufficient compliance with the requirements that the five counts of rape were committed within the statute of limitations and before the criminal action was commenced in the trial court. In any event, even if the information failed to allege with certainty the time of the commission of the rapes, the defect, if any, was cured by the evidence presented during the trial and any objection based on this ground must be deemed waived as a result of accused failure to object before arraignment. Accused remedy was to move either for a bill of particulars or for the quashal of the information on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. PEOPLE V. TRELLES, GR 137659, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 FACTS The outrage done to Nobelita Trelles, a 22-year old retardate, would have remained hidden were it not for the mute testimony of her steadily growing stomach. By December of 1996, its growth had undeniably reached such noticeable proportions that her mother, Azucena Trelles, suspecting the obvious, finally took her daughter to Dr. Mario Banal for medical examination. The good doctor confirmed that, indeed, Nobelita was with child and, on 09 March 1997, she eventually delivered a baby boy. Azucena pressed her daughter for the identity of the man who impregnated her. As it so sadly turned out, Azucena later recounted in open court, Nobelita had resolutely pointed to her own father, Amadeo Trelles, as having been responsible for it. Indignant at the injustice committed against her daughter, Azucena filed a case for rape against Amadeo Trelles. The victim is one of the six children of Azucena and her common-law husband Amadeo Trelles and is a retardate or feebleminded who never went to school and would often be left alone in the house with her father while her other siblings attended their classes and her mother, a fish peddler, traveled from place to place failing, a few times, to spend the night with her family. It was on one of those occasions, sometime in the month of June 1996 or thereabouts (recorded in the information), when Amadeo Trelles vented his lust upon his imbecile daughter. Amadeo Trelles testified that he was not legally married to Azucena. At the time of the incident in question, he already had a new mistress who was living with him. Amadeo asseverated that Azucena also had a paramour, a certain Marcial, who was the former common law husband of his sister. Amadeo insisted that he could not have impregnated Nobelita because as early as January 1996, Azucena, together with Nobelita and Amelia, a younger daughter, had left their house and returned only in August that year, which was when he first noticed the protruding stomach of Nobelita. When he asked his wife about it, Azucena answered that Nobelita's condition was merely caused by too much "kaliputan" (cold). In December, Nobelita started to vomit blood, prompting him to tell his wife to stop from further ministering herbal concoctions and to instead bring her daughter to a physician. The medical examination on Nobelita by the doctor confirmed her pregnancy. When interrogated what could have motivated Azucena to accuse him of rape, Amadeo replied that his wife had always blamed him for everything that went wrong. The tale of infidelity raises no doubt about the fact that there has been mutual animosity between Azucena and Amadeo that effectively leaves us with the lone testimony of private complainant which, although consisting of monosyllables and vacillations between lucidity and ambiguity, nonetheless, is positive in pointing to and implicating Amadeo Trelles as the person who has so pitilessly abused her innocence. In his appeal before the Court, accused-appellant harped on the inconsistencies of the victim, referring to her incoherent answers on cross-examination and contends that latter is not a competent witness by reason of her mental incapacity. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT an infirmity on the exact date of the commission of rape be a legal obstacle to conviction? HELD:

NO. Nor would an infirmity on the exact date of the commission of rape be a legal obstacle to conviction. This Court has previously said that the precise date when the complainant has been sexually abused is not an essential element of the offense. A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. It has been held that a trial court judge, whose assessment of the credibility of a witness is generally sustained on appeal, absent any meritorious ground, may choose to believe in part and disbelieve in part the testimony of a witness depending on the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of rape. The Court sustains the trial court in its judgment finding Amadeo Trelles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his utterly defenseless and demented daughter. Somewhere in the foggy recesses of her mind, Nobelita Trelles would always carry with her the memory of that detestable event in her life, but her handicap would forever render her practically voiceless in her indignation. The decision of the court a quo has given an ear to her silent torment. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua when, among other things, the rape victim is under twelve years of age or is demented. Carnal knowledge of a woman who suffers from mental deficiency or abnormality or one so weak in intellect as to be incapable of giving legal or rational consent constitutes rape within the meaning of the law. Consistently with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim should be additionally indemnified for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.

PEOPLE V. TAGANA, G.R. NOS. 137608-09, JULY 6, 2001 FACTS: Remegio Taganna was charged with two counts of rape allegedly committed against his daughter Maria C. Taganna. Both informations were filed on 25 February 1998. Twenty eight year old widow, Maria Taganna testified that at midnight on 15 June 1997, she was in bed beside her four children and a younger brother who were sound asleep. Without their prior notice, Remegio Taganna went up their house and entered the room where they were sleeping. Then he lasciviously embraced Maria. Maria cried in anguish as her father took off his clothes, mounted her, forcibly removed her panty and copulated with her. She did not immediately report the incident to the authorities but only after she became pregnant and people began wagging their tongues about her embarrassing condition. Further, she testified that the said incident was not the first time she was molested by her father. She was in her early teens when her father first shattered her innocence. Although she had long forgotten the exact day and year and was even unsure whether she was twelve or fifteen years old at the time, one thing was certain she was in Grade IV when father first ravished her. On the other hand, Remegio Taganna interposed denial as a defense. Thereafter, in a joint Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Br. 30, Basey, Samar, He was convicted of two counts of rape and meted two death sentences. ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction against accused-appellant for rape committed "on or about the year 1984" under an Information filed only on 25 February 1998 can be sustained. HELD: Under our basic rules on criminal procedure, it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material incident of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. Accordingly, a variance of three (3) years between the time set in the indictment and that established by evidence during the trial constitutes an error so serious as to warrant a reversal of conviction on that score. While the precise date of the commission of the offense need not be stated with particularity nor is time an essential ingredient of rape, it must be stated as near to the actual date as the information will permit. This statutory dictum is designed for no other purpose than to afford the defendant an opportunity to prepare an intelligent defense and avoid surprise and substantial prejudice to the defense. To sustain the lower court's ruling in this regard would be to deprive accused-appellant of his constitutionally enshrined right to be informed of the accusation against him. It is to place upon him an unfair and unreasonable burden of preparing a defense on the basis of the averments in the Information only to put him off-balance in the midst of the trial with a totally new allegation for which he is hitherto unprepared to meet. In the case at bar, the Court entertained serious doubt on the sufficiency and reliability of the evidence for the prosecution considering that the first rape was allegedly committed in 1981 according to the evidence, or in 1984 per allegation in the Information. The Court is not convinced that the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE V. BIDOC 506 SCRA 481 FACTS: AAA testified that she was only 14 years of age when the first rape incident happened on 21 November 1999. She narrated that on the said date, she was in their house. At that time, her mother, BBB, was washing clothes in a brook, which was quite far from their house. Her sister, CCC, who was then six years old, went with their mother, while her other siblings DDD and EEE, who were then three and two years old, respectively, were playing outside their house. On that very moment, when only AAA and her father, herein appellant, were left inside the house, the latter started kissing her and went on removing her clothes. She resisted but the appellant was much stronger, hence, despite her resistance, appellant succeeded in undressing her, then eventually raping her. After raping her, appellant even threatened to kill her if she will reveal to anybody what had happened. Terribly frightened and hardly able to comprehend the situation, she could only cry out in utter helplessness and desperation. When her mother came back, she did not tell what happened for fear that appellant might carry out his threat. AAA was then raped for the second time one evening in December 1999. In January 2000, AAA took chances in going to the PNP Station located in Kabugao, Apayao, and reported that she was raped twice by the appellant. SPO1 Agculao testified that on 6 January 2000, AAA voluntarily came to the police station to report that her own father, herein appellant, had raped her. Witnesses for the defense testified that the appellant was with them working in a construction project a few kilometres away from their house, when the alleged rape incidents occurred hence appellant could not have raped his daughter. According to appellant, her daughter was motivated in filing the present cases against him to get even with him because he slapped her on 3 January 2000 in front of her "barkadas" and he even threatened to kill her for fear that she might get pregnant because of her going out at night and coming home late. AAAs mother on the other hand tried to refute these by saying that during the months of November and December 1999, her husband, herein appellant, was at their house. The RTC convicted the appellant of two counts of rape. This was affirmed by the CA. Hence this appeal. The appellant averred that the courts erred in convicting him not on the basis of the strength of the prosecution's evidence but rather on the weakness of the defense's evidence. And also, he should not be convicted because of the failure of the prosecution to state the precise date of commission of the alleged rape, it being an essential element of the crime charged. ISSUE: Whether stating the precise date of commission is an essential element of rape. HELD: No. The SC said that the precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. The exact date of the commission is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent. In this case, the prosecution adequately proved the fact of sexual intercourse by appellant against the will of AAA sometime in December 1999. The veracity of the rape charge is not dependent on the time of the commission of the offense but on the credibility of the offended party. No violation PEOPLE V. CANTOMAYOR, GR 145522, DEC. 5, 2002 FACTS: Nine-year old Liezel Cantomayor charged her father, herein accused-appellant, of sexually abusing her at their house at Sumbang, Iba, Cabanglasan, Bukidnon, on or about the year 1990. Thus, an information for rape was filed against appellant before the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City. Appellant admitted that in 1990, he and his family, including Liezl, were living together in one place. He, however, denied the charge against him. The RTC rejected appellant's denial and subsequently convicted him as charged and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant brought the matter before the Supreme Court praying that his conviction be set aside for failure of the prosecution to allege in the information the exact date of the commission of the crime, thus depriving him of the opportunity to fully defend himself. ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting herein accused-appellant despite the failure of the prosecution to allege in the information the approximate date of the commission of the crime charged. HELD: Accused-appellant invokes the case of People v. Ladrillo, contending that his conviction should be set aside because the information,

charging him with rape allegedly committed "on or about the year 1990," failed to specifically allege the exact date of the commission of the crime, thus depriving him of the opportunity to fully defend himself. The contention is without merit. In People v. Ladrillo, the appellant was indicted for rape allegedly committed "on or about the year 1992." The complainant therein testified that she was raped by appellant in the latter's house at Abanico, Puerto Princesa City. It was, however, established that in 1992, appellant was still residing in Liberty, Puerto, Princesa City and had never been to Abanico, Puerto Princesa City at any time in 1992 nor was he familiar with complainant and her family. In sustaining appellant's defenses of alibi and denial, the Court held that it was impossible for appellant to have committed the crime of rape in 1992 at his house in Abanico, Puerto Princesa City on the basis of the prosecution evidence considering that he was not yet residing in Abanico at that time and neither did his family have a home in the said place. Clearly, therefore, the time of the commission of the crime assumes importance only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. The date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainant's narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of the crime. Such, however, is not the case at bar. While it is true that the information states that rape was committed "on or about the year 1990," the factual backdrop of the instant case is different from that of People v. Ladrillo. In contrast, the defense raised by accusedappellant is plainly denial. He even admitted that in 1990, he and his family including Liezl were living together in one house. The veracity therefore of the rape charge in the case at bar is not dependent on the time of the commission of the offense but on the credibility of Liezl and the truthfulness of her narration as to how she was sexually abused. Moreover, the judgment of acquittal in People v. Ladrillo was not based solely on the failure of the information to sufficiently inform the appellant of the date of the commission of the crime. To be sure, it was based primarily on the finding of the Court that the complainant's testimony was untruthful and not in accord with ordinary human experience. Hence, the ruling in People v. Ladrillo finds no application here considering that Liezl's testimony is convincing and worthy of belief. This case is evidently one of those instances where the Court properly held that the failure to specify the exact date or time when rape was committed does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. Thus, in People v. Espejon, where the Court convicted the appellant for rape under an information charging him with rape perpetrated "sometime in the year 1982 and dates subsequent thereto" and "sometime in the year 1995 and subsequent thereto," the Court explained that the date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. In fact, the precise time when the rape takes place has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. Anent the imposable penalty, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the crime was committed in 1990, the higher penalty imposed for incestuous rape by Republic Act No. 7659 and Republic Act No. 8353, which took effect on December 13, 1993 and October 22, 1997, respectively, not being favorable to accused-appellant cannot be given retroactive application.

PEOPLE V. SARAZAN, GR 123269-72, JAN. 22, 2003 FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of four counts of rape committed against three minor children. The victim Rachel testified that appellant made her smell something that caused her to lose consciousness; that when she regained consciousness, she felt disturbing pain on her hips and in her vagina. The victim Jovelyn also testified to the same effect that appellant at one time made her smell something that made her dizzy before appellant raped her; that in another occasion, appellant raped Jovelyn again. The victim Alona, on the other hand, testified that appellant offered her a drink that made her fell asleep. When she woke up, she felt stabbing discomfort on her hips and felt pain in her vagina when she urinated. The Court affirmed the conviction of appellant. Loss of consciousness during the precise time of rape is not a compelling reason to disregard the weight of the testimonies of the three private complainants on affirmative matters which logically proved the commission of rape by appellant. The accused contests that the testimonies of the victims were insufficient and has no basis for they are unconscious to which they cannot pinpoint to whom the person guilty of the crime is.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is violation of the right of the accused to a just and fair trial and whether the testimonies of the victims are compelling to the decision of the court against the accused. HELD: There is/are no violation/s of right/s. Anent his defense of denial and alibi, accused-appellant failed to present convincing proof that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis during the dates and times when these separate acts of rape were committed on the three minor private complainants. It appears that it only takes an hour to travel by public transportation from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan, and vice versa. At any rate, accused-appellant's bare denials, which are unsubstantiated by convincing evidence, are not sufficient to create a reasonable doubt of the commission of the crimes. When the evidence convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the probative value of denial becomes quite negligible. All told, the conviction of accused-appellant Marlon Sarazan @ Marlon Jara for four counts of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 10003, 10005, 10007, and 10008 should be affirmed. The trial court was correct in awarding to the private complainants the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each act of rape. In addition, and consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of P50,000.00 should likewise be awarded as moral damages for each count of rape. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, finding accused-appellant MARLON SARAZAN @ MARLON JARA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. PEOPLE V. TAPERLA, GR 142860, JAN. 16, 2003 FACTS: Before us is an appeal from the decision1 dated November 22, 1999, of the Regional Trial of Davao City, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 43, 500-99, finding accused-appellant Victor Taperla guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. His co-accused, Ronnie Avila y Culpa and Jonathan Lastimado y Alpeche, were acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. In the evening of July 4, 1999, at around 9:00 oclock, seventeen-year old Maricel Bascones was walking towards the direction of her aunts house located in Sitio Kinapa-an, Daliao, Toril, Davao City. She decided to take a short-cut by passing through the Davao Fish Port Complex which was adjacent to her aunts house.3 As she approached the fish ports main gate, she noticed that accusedappellant had been following her. Maricel hurriedly walked away but was nonetheless blocked by Ronnie Avila and Jonathan Lastimado, who took hold of her arms and brought her to accused-appellant. Accused-appellant dragged the victim towards the back of the Polar Bear Storage. Maricel tried to break free from him but to no avail. She tried to shout but nobody was around.5 Accused-appellants size and weight, at 55" tall and 64 kilograms in weight, enabled him to successfully bring the victim, who stood only 411" and weighed only 45 kilograms, to the back of the storage building.6 He laid Maricel on top of a makeshift table and pinned her neck with his arm. After consummating his lustful act, accusedappellant threatened to kill the victims brother if she were to tell anyone what had just transpired. Maricel immediately proceeded to her aunts house where she narrated her harrowing experience. They first went to the Barangay Captain of Brgy. Lizada and thereafter proceeded to Dr. Casquejo who conducted a physical examination of the victim.9 They then headed to the police station where they filed their complaint against the accused-appellant. Dr. Casquejo further testified that Maricels vaginal canal had lacerations at 3 and 9 oclock positions and the mucus fluid taken inside tested positive for spermatocytes. On the other hand, accused-appellant claimed that he and Maricel were lovers and that what happened on the night of July 4, 1999 was consensual. After trial, judgment was rendered against accused-appellant. Court held that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused VICTOR TAPERLA beyond reasonable doubt as to rebut his constitutionally presumed innocence. For failure of the

prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused RONNIE AVILA y CULPA and JONATHAN LASTIMADO y ALPECHE beyond reasonable doubt and thus failed to rebut their constitutionally presumed innocence, they are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the Information. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt 2) Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in not considering the defense interposed by accused-appellant. 3) Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant notwithstanding the erroneous information as to the date of commission of the offense and the absence of an affidavit-complaint of the private complainant. HELD: The "sweetheart theory" advanced by the defense fails to convince us. It is uncorroborated, self-serving and deserves scant consideration. Save for his own declaration, accused-appellant was unable to prove that carnal knowledge between him and Maricel was consensual. Even assuming that they were sweethearts, he had no excuse to employ force and intimidation in satisfying his carnal desires. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will. A man cannot demand sexual submission and, worse, employ violence upon her on a mere justification of love." The evidence shows that accused-appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the victim by using force and intimidation. Maricel suffered contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Abrasions on the victims body are ample proof of struggle and resistance against rape. As regards the alleged discrepancy of the time of the rape, the rule is well settled that in rape cases, the date or time of the incident is not an essential element of the offense and therefore need not be accurately stated. It is not a pre-requisite for the same to fall within the purview of Section 11 of Rule 110, which states: SEC. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. It cannot be said that accused-appellant was deprived of due process when the Information filed against him for Rape failed to state the exact date of the commission of the offense. Date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of the woman. The phrase "on or about July 4, 1998" stated in the information gives the prosecution sufficient latitude to prove any date which is not so remote as to surprise and prejudice the defendant. Thus, the precise date need not be alleged in the Information. All told, we find that accused-appellant is guilty of rape, as defined in Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B,23 of the Revised Penal Code: ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed.- Rape is committed. 1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force threat or intimidation; WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 43-500-99, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the offended party P50,000.00 as moral damages, is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is reduced to P50,000.00. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE V. LIZADA, GR 143468-71, JAN. 24, 2003 Amis PEOPLE V. DY, GR 115326-37, JAN.16, 2003 Angala Right to speedy trial LUZARRAGA V. METEORO, AM 00-1572, AUGUST 3, 2000 FACTS: Juan S. Luzarraga filed a case for quieting of title which was originally raffled to Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Daet, Camarines Norte where he presented his evidence and rested his case. On June 22, 1996, the case was transferred to the newly created RTC Branch 64, presided over by Judge Amaro M. Meteoro. It was after only eight months or on January 8, 1997, that Judge Meteoro proceeded to hear defendants' evidence. However, on that date, defendants' counsel filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The

said Demurrer to Evidence was resolved only after a period of one year as per Order dated January 13, 1998. Finally, the trial court, in its Order dated July 20, 1998 considered the case submitted for decision. After seven months, the case remained undecided. Hence, Luzarraga filed the instant administrative case against Judge Meteoro for serious misconduct, gross inefficiency, neglect of duty and violation of Section 15(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. In his comment, Judge Meteoro admitted his failure to decide the subject case within the reglementary period but he asked for this Court's compassion and understanding. He attributed his failure to decide the case, among others, to the heavy docket of his court and his failing health since he suffered a stroke. The Court ruled that this conduct of respondent blatantly manifested his incompetence and ineptitude in discharging his functions. Not only did he violate the constitutional and statutory requirements that cases be decided within the period fixed therefor, he likewise contravened Section 16, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." The public trust character of a judge's office imposes upon him the highest degree of responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly administer justice. Needless to say, any delay in the determination or resolution of a case, no matter how insignificant the case may seem to a judge, is, at bottom, delay in the administration of justice in general. The suffering endured by just one person whether plaintiff, defendant, or accused while awaiting a judgment that may affect his life, honor, liberty, or property, tainted the entire judiciary's performance in its solemn task of administering justice. Taking into account his failing health and his advanced age (66 years old), the Court agreed with the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator that respondent be fined, in a greater amount than that recommended, and that P20,000.00 would be more appropriate under the circumstances ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Respondent Judge violated the accuseds right to speedy trial 2. Whether or not charges should be gross inefficiency and serious misconduct HELD: 1.

The respondent judge violated Section 16 of Art. III of 1987 Constitution. He failed to decide on the case within the 90 day reglementary period without having any reasonable excuse. Furthermore he failed to comply to file an extension of time to the supreme court stating his reasons for delay. Not only did he violate the constitutional and statutory requirements that cases be decided within the period fixed therefor, he likewise contravened Section 16, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." The public trust character of a judge's office imposes upon him the highest degree of responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly administer justice (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Benedicto, 296 SCRA 62 [1998]). The court ruled that respondent judge is guilty of gross inefficiency and gross misconduct at the case at bar. Respondent was evidently remiss in the performance of his duty to decide Civil Case No. 96-0013 promptly and expeditiously. First, it was on May 22, 1996 that said case was transferred to the RTC Branch presided by respondent, but it was only on January 8, 1997 that he proceeded to receive the defendants' evidence, or after eight months. Second, the defendants' demurrer to evidence which was filed on January 8, 1997 was resolved only after a period of one year as per Order dated January 13, 1998. And lastly, on July 20, 1998, respondent issued an order submitting the subject case for decision, but as borne out by the records, the case has remained undisposed even as of the promulgation hereof. This conduct of respondent blatantly manifests his incompetence and ineptitude in discharging his functions.

2.

Failing to render decision within the 90 reglementary period constitutes serious misconduct. After carefully evaluating the facts, the Court finds Judge Meteoro administratively liable for failing to decide Civil Case No. 96-0013 within the 90-day reglementary period mandated by Section 15(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The Court has consistently impressed upon members of the judiciary the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. (Re: Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., 247 SCRA 519 [1995]). Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to dispose of the court's business promptly and to decide cases within the periods fixed by law. The failure to render a decision within 90-day period constitutes serious misconduct in derogation of the speedy administration of justice (Re: Report of Justice Felipe B. Kalalo, 282 SCRA 61 [1997]). Respondent Judge should have filed an application for extension of time to resolve the case before the Supreme Court. When circumstances arise that would prevent the judge from disposing a case within the reglementary period, all that he has to do is to file an application with the Court asking for a reasonable extension of time within which to resolve the case (Report on the Judicial Audit, Municipal Trial Court, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, 282 SCRA 463 [1997]). However, the record of this administrative matter does not show that respondent made an attempt to make such a request. Instead, he preferred to keep the case pending, thereby inviting suspicion that something sinister or corrupt is afoot. That he was burdened with a heavy case load and is a stroke victim, serve only to mitigate the penalty, not to exonerate him.

We also note that respondent has been continually collecting his salaries upon certification that he had no pending case for decision, when in fact, he has Civil Case No. 96-0013 still awaiting decision. Said act seriously undermines and reflects on the honesty and integrity expected of an officer of the court. Judges must be reminded, lest they have already conveniently forgotten, that a certificate of service is not merely a means to obtain one's paycheck but is an instrument by which the Court can fulfill the constitutional mandate of the people's right to a speedy disposition of cases (Bolalin vs. Occiano, 266 SCRA 203 [1997]; Re: Judge Fernando P. Agdamag, 254 SCRA 644 [1996]). WHEREFORE, Judge Amaro Meteoro is hereby found guilty of gross inefficiency and serious misconduct and is fined in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), payable immediately to the Court, with the warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. He is further directed to decide the subject case within an non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of resolution, and to submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a copy of his decision within ten (10) days from promulgation thereof. SOLAR ENTERTAINMENT AND PEOPLE V. HON. HOW, GR 140863, AUGUST 22, 2000 FACTS: The City Prosecutor of Paraaque filed an information for estafa against Ma. Fe Barreiro, herein private respondent, based on the complaint filed by Solar Team Entertainment, Inc., herein petitioner. Before the scheduled arraignment on August 5, 1999 could take place, respondent judge Rolando How issued an order resetting the arraignment on the ground that private respondent had filed an appeal with the Department of Justice. The case was further reset twice but before the scheduled hearing on November 18, 1999, private respondent again asked for the deferment of the arraignment. Due to this motion, respondent judge issued an order further deferring the arraignment until such time that the appeal with the DOJ is resolved. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration to the order, but the same was denied. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus questioning the orders issued by respondent judge regarding the indefinite suspension of the arraignment of the accused until the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice has been resolved. Petitioner further submits that this instant petition raises "a pure question of law of first impression" since "it involves the application and interpretation of a law of very recent vintage, namely Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998." Petitioner mainly relies on Section 7 of said law that states that: "SECTION 7.Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial. The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. . . ." By issuing the assailed order, respondent court allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court can indefinitely suspend the arraignment of the accused until the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice has been resolved. HELD: Yes. Petition devoid of merit. The Court ruled that the decision to suspend arraignment to await the resolution of appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of such discretion. A court can defer to the authority of the prosecution arm to resolve, once and for all, the issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to file information. This is in line with the pronouncement in the Crespo case that courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor's discretion over criminal prosecution. Thus, public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it suspended the arraignment of private respondent to await the resolution of her petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit. We are not unmindful of the principle that while the right to a speedy trial secures rights to the defendant, it does not preclude the rights of public justice. However, in this case, petitioner as private complainant in the criminal case, cannot deprive private respondent, accused therein, of her right to avail of a remedy afforded to an accused in a criminal case. The immediate arraignment of private respondent would have then proscribed her right as accused to appeal the resolution of the prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice since Section 4 of DOJ Order No. 223 of June 30, 1993 forestalls an appeal to the Secretary of Justice if the accused/appellant has already been arraigned. Hence, in this case, the order suspending the arraignment of private respondent merely allowed private respondent to exhaust the administrative remedies available to her as accused in the criminal case before the court could proceed

to a full-blown trial. Conversely, in case the resolution is for the dismissal of the information, the offended party in the criminal case, herein petitioner, can appeal the adverse resolution to the Secretary of Justice. In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court aptly pointed out that: "the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken therefrom to the Department of Justice." The fact that public respondent issued the assailed order suspending the arraignment of private respondent before the "Motion to Defer Arraignment" of private respondent could be heard is not tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. It was well within the power of public respondent to grant the continuance since Section 10 (f) of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 clearly confers this authority. PEOPLE V. DY, GR 115326-37, JAN. 16, 2003 Chan Right to impartial trial PEOPLE V. VAYNACO GR 126286 MARCH 22, 1999 FACTS: May anne gabrito, 15 years old on nov 1994 complained that she was raped on sept 1994 by vaynaco, tabones, cajipe and junior oniot delis. She said she was gang raped by 7 college students after she accepted their offer to join them for a drink. on her way home, she was raped by another eleven teenagers. in 199 gabrito was diagnosed to have a mood disorder and major depression hence she is taking anti depressants. accused appeal on the ground that their right to due process was violated - to be convicted of a judge who is not bias and the testimony of the alleged victim was not credible after testimony was elicited through leading questions by the judge ISSUE: WON trial was impartial HELD: The court's inquiries only evince its zealous regards for the truth. We can not equate it with bias for the prosecution or, for that matter, the defense. In fact, the trial court anticipated this issue. The court explained: "Those questions came from the Court. The court was constrained to do the questioning because the private prosecutor after letting the victim identify the 3 accused, and asked what the three did to her and victim answered that she was raped by the 3, terminated his direct examination. (p. 21, TSN of 8/15/95). Probably the private prosecutor was banking on the decision of the Supreme Court that when a rape victim declares that she was raped, all that is needed to be said are already there. The case is a capital offense and the Court feels that her credibility must be tested, more so that her mental condition was questioned by the defense." Appellants argue that the judge built the case for the prosecution when he asked searching questions after the witness gave her direct testimony. The argument is without merit. Trial judges must be accorded a reasonable leeway in asking questions to witness as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to bring out the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. This is not only the right but the duty of trial judges who feel the need to elicit information to the end that justice will be served. Under our system of procedure, it is often expedient or even necessary in the due and faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge, in the exercise of sound discretion, to question a witness in order that his judgment may rest upon a full and clear understanding of the facts. In this case, we do not believe that the trial judge went beyond the permissible limits of questions he could ask the witness considering that she is mentally disturbed even before the rape incident occurred. The court's questioning of the witness is not proof of pre-judgment or bias. PEOPLE V. ESTRADA, GR 130487, JUNE 19, 2000 FACTS: December 27, 1994, at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City, while the sacrament of confirmation was being performed by the Bishop, a man from the crowd walked towards the center of the altar and sat on the Bishops chair. Crisanto Santillan, who was an assistant saw this. He requested the accused to vacate, but the latter refused. They called on the guard. Despite repeated request, he did not move. As the guard was attempting to strike the victim with his nightstick to make him leave accused-appellant drew a knife and stabbed Mararac. He repeated it a lot. After, he got up and shouted via the mic; No one can beat me here! SPO1 Francisco

saw a man, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair. He advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant obeyed, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival. Accused-appellant, filed a Demurrer to Evidence where he claims that: prosecution failed to prove murder; that there was unlawful aggression by the victim; and that accused-appellant was of unsound mind. Inspector Valdez (Jail warden) requested the court to allow accused-appellant, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to some other institution. While motion for reconsideration was pending, counsel for accused-appellant filed a Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination. Appellants counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks. There were 2 letters of the warden requesting the same. The trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the Demurrer to Evidence. Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, testified to the accused being confined and diagnosed with Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Typeschizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type. The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, ISSUE: Whether or not the herein accused has the right to an impartial trial HELD: Yes, when a person commits a felonious act the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind and that all acts are voluntary. An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. There are certain circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties e.g. when he attacked Mararac, then went up the microphone. Accused-appellants history of mental illness was brought to the courts. To test whether the accused would have a fair trial there are two distinct matters to be determined (1) whether defendant is coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary (2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it. To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial. The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally in the discretion of the trial court. In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground of accuseds mental condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding that the questions propounded on appellant were intelligently answered by him. The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accusedappellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge. If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judges mind of accused-appellants competency to stand trial, subsequent events should have done so. One month after the prosecution rested its case, there were letters requesting that accused be confined in hospital, as well as the counsels filing of motion. And despite all the overwhelming indications of accused-appellants state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a medical examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death.

Impartiality of a Judge ALMENDRA V. ASIS, AM RTJ-1550, APRIL 6, 2000 FACTS: Almendra filed 3 administrative cases against respondent judge, Asis, in the grounds of paartiality, gross ignorance of law, and knowingly rendering unjust judgement. These cases are stated in the following: 1. For reversing a CA decision. 2. For issuing a writ of possession without legal basis. 3. For dismissing a warrant for lack of probable cause. The case was reffered to Associate Justice Salazar-Fernando, and was suggested that respondent be suspended from service for 2 months.

ISSUE: WON respondent acted impartially. HELD: In the first case, SC held that respondent committed serious inefficiency for rendering a decision on a civil case already final and executory. This act if contrary to the doctrine of resjudicata, having the requisites of: (1) the former judgment must be final (2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiciton (3) it must be a judgment on the merits (4) there must be identity between the 2 actions. A judge cannot amend a final decision, more so where the decision was promulgated by an appellate court. Judges should respect the orders, resolutions and decisions of higher courts, specially the highest court. SC held respondent liable of serious inefficiency. In the second case, complainant failed to show that respondent judge's act was attended with fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. In the third case, the court failed to see the error in the dismissal of the case. The respondent acted on the basis of the recommendation of the prosecutor. In his three administrative complaints, Antonio Almendra repeatedly imputed charges of bias, partiality and unfairness against respondent judge. However, the fact that respondent judge ruled against complainant in the three cases filed before him did not amount to partiality against said complainant or warrant the conclusion that respondent rendered an unjust judgment. Mere suspicion that a judge was partial to a party is not enough as there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge. A judge will be held administratively liable for rendering an unjust judgment where he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other similar motive. Absent the element of bad faith, an erroneous judgment cannot be the basis of a charge of any offense, mere error of judgment not being a ground for disciplinary action.

Right to a public trial GARCIA V. DOMINGO - L-30104 FACTS: It was alleged and admitted in the petition: "In Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by appropriate informations eight (8) criminal actions against respondents Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana. The trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly held. This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and Friday), Saturday was agreed upon as the invariable trial day for said eight (8) criminal cases." Also this: "The trial of the cases in question was held, with the conformity of the accused and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia." Then came these allegations in the petition: "During all the fourteen (14) days of trial, spanning a period of several months (from March to August, 1968), the accused were at all times represented by their respective counsel, who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only one (1) day when Atty. Consengco, representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. But at the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, and said respondent cross-examined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. In any case, no pretense has been made by the respondents that this constituted an irregularity correctible on certiorari. At the conclusion of the hearings the accused, thru counsel, asked for and were granted time to submit memoranda. Respondents Calo and Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael Consengco, submitted a 14-page memorandum with not less than 35 citations of relevant portions of the transcript of stenographic notes in support of their prayer for exoneration, and for the conviction of petitioner Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges against the latter. It is worthy of note that up to this date, said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not objected to pointed out any supposed irregularity in the proceedings thus far; the memorandum submitted in their behalf is confined to a discussion of the evidence adduced in, and the merits of the cases.". ISSUE: Whether or not there was transgression of the right to a public trial. HELD: We rule that there was no transgression of the right to a public trial, and grant the petition. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this petition, as set forth at the outset, explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. So it is, as likewise made clear, under the present dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one constitutional provision that needed only a single, terse summation from the

Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed by him: "Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner." It would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any discussion, much less a debate. It was merely a reiteration of what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as the Jones Law. Earlier, such a right found expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the then government of this country as an unincorporated territory of the United States. Historically, as was pointed out by Justice Black, speaking for the United States Supreme Court in the leading case of In re Oliver: This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in [the] English common law heritage." He then observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure, "but it likely evolved long before the settlement of [the United States] as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial." It was then noted by him that there, "the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial first appeared in a state constitution in 1776." He could conclude his historical survey thus: "Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to the public." Such is the venerable, historical lineage of the right to a public trial. Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where language is to be given a literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation of the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in procedural due process. Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It is the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals." Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of this right? The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent policemen. What was said by former Chief Justice Moran should erase any doubt as to the weight to be accorded, more appropriate]y the lack of weight, to any such objection now raised. Thus: "In one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused, invoking his right to a public trial, assigned the procedure thus taken as error. The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record that the accused offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was held, his right is deemed waived." The decision referred to, United States v. Mercado, was handed down sixty-eight years ago in 1905. WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted nullifying, setting aside, and declaring bereft of any legal force or effect the order of respondent Judge Felix Domingo, for being issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Trial in absentia; right to be present PEOPLE V. RIVERA - 242 SCRA 26 The case is a review by the Court of the issue of whether the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded to an accused has been sufficiently overcome by the State enough to sustain the judgment of the trial court finding the indictee guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape and thereby imposing upon him the death penalty. HELD: The trial court has correctly imposed the death penalty in the case at bar after taking into account the qaulifying circumstances ofminority of the victim and the paternityrelationship between appellant and the victim, as provided for in Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of rape has been established. Alphamia, the victim, is a minor (merely 10 years of age at the time of commission of the offense), and the offender is the father of the victim. These elements have been properly alleged in the information and proven during the trial. PEOPLE V. TABAG G.R. No. 116511. February 12, 1997

FACTS: At about 10:00 p.m. of 11 March 1984 in Sitio Candiis, Barangay Cabidianan, New Corella, Davao, the spouses Welbino Magdasal, Sr., and Wendelyn Repalda Magdasal, together with their children Welbino, Jr., and Melisa, were massacred in their home allegedly by members of the Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force (ICHDF). The first light on the case was shed on 27 February 1985 when Sergio Doctolero, barangay captain of Buan, Asuncion, Davao, executed a sworn statement declaring that a member of the ICHDF, Romeo Guipo, had confessed to him that it was the team led by Sarenas Tabag that massacred the Magdasals. The real break came three days before the first anniversary of the massacre when Ernesto Mawang, a member of that team, gave his sworn statement naming those involved in the massacre. Not long after, another member thereof, one Pablo Oca, likewise gave a sworn statement corroborating Mawang's statements. On 15 July 1985, an information for murder against accused Coloma Tabag, Sarenas Tabag, Marcelino Tabag, Fernando Maglinte, Jr., Artemio Awod, Romeo Aguipo, Leopoldo Leoncio, and Ernesto Mawang was filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of New Corella, Davao. After examining, through searching questions, witnesses Pablo Oca and Sergio Doctolero, Judge Napy Agayan issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused. No bond was recommended for their temporary liberty, since they were charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt was strong. On 21 August 1985, accused Sarenas Tabag surrendered to Judge Agayan. The others could not be arrested; hence, an alias warrant for their arrest was issued. Sarenas Tabag waived submission of his counter-affidavit and preliminary investigation. After appropriate proceedings, an information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum, Davao, charging the above named accused with the crime of multiple murder. = Since the other accused had remained at large, the court proceeded with the case against Sarenas Tabag only. At his arraignment on 11 December 1985, he entered a plea of not guilty. On 3 March 1987, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the case as against Ernesto Mawang because it found after a thorough re-assessment of the prosecution's evidence that he "does not only appear to be less guilty, but he appears not responsible in any way in the commission of the crime charged. . . [He] has not participated in the killing of the victims, he has not fired any shot nor has lunged any bolo to the victims, and his presence in the crime scene was not voluntary on his part." The court granted the motion and ordered the immediate release of Mawang from detention. In the meantime, accused Coloma Tabag, Artemio Awod, Laureo Awod, and Romeo Aguipo were arrested. All of them entered a plea of not guilty at their arraignment. On 19 October 1989, accused Laureo Awod and Artemio Awod, together with three others, escaped from the Provincial Jail. Upon being informed of this incident, the trial court continued the proceedings as against Sarenas Tabag, Coloma Tabag, and Romeo Aguipo only. On 7 January 1992, the trial court promulgated its decision, finding the accused Sarenas Tabag, Coloma Tabag and Romeo Aguipo or Guipo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of four (4) counts of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, for the deaths of Welbino Magdasal, Sr., Wendelyn Magdasal, Welbino Magdasal, Jr. and Melisa Magdasal, each of them is sentenced to suffer four (4) indivisible prison terms of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to suffer all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not proceeding with the case against Laureo Awod and Artemio Awod after their successful escape while in preventive detention. HELD: The trial court erred in not proceeding with the case against Laureo Awod and Artemio Awod after their successful escape on 19 October 1989 while in preventive detention. They had already been arraigned. Therefore, pursuant to the last sentence of paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, trial against them should continue and upon its termination, judgment should be rendered against them notwithstanding their absence unless, of course, both accused have died and the fact of such death is

sufficiently established. Conformably with our decision in People vs. Salas, their escape should have been considered a waiver of their right to be present at their trial and the inability of the court to notify them of the subsequent hearings did not prevent it from continuing with their trial. They were to be deemed to have received notice. The same fact of their escape made their failure to appear unjustified because they have, by escaping, placed themselves beyond the pale and protection of the law. This being so, then pursuant to Gimenez vs. Nazareno, the trial against the fugitives, just like those of the others, should have been brought to its ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment accordingly. It should not wait for the fugitives re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to present evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who testified against them. The trial court is ordered to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 6364 as against accused Laureo Awod and Artemio Awod if they are still alive, in accordance with the principles laid down in People v. Salas and Gimenez v. Nazareno. .CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT TO BE PRESENT; ESCAPE OF THE ACCUSED AFTER ARRAIGNMENT IS DEEMED A WAIVER THEREOF;

Admissibility of Evidence PEOPLE V. MORIAL, G.R. NO. 129295, AUGUST 15, 2001 Grajo Section 15 THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS When Available IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E. RODRIGUEZ, FILED BY EDGARDO E. VELUZ - G.R. NO. 169482, JANUARY 29, 2008 FACTS: Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities. She was living with petitioner, her nephew, since 2000. He acted as her guardian. In the morning of January 11, 2005, respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R. Pabello took Eufemia from petitioner Veluz' house. He made repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but these proved futile. Claiming that respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that respondents (the legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON in determining in the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus a court should limit itself to determining if a person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty. HELD: We rule for the respondents. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person's liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody. In this case, the issue is not whether the custody of Eufemia is being rightfully withheld from petitioner but whether Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty. Significantly, although petitioner admits that he did not have legal custody of Eufemia, he nonetheless insists that respondents themselves have no right to her custody. Thus, for him, the issue of legal custody is irrelevant. What is important is Eufemia's personal freedom. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime

specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. "The writ ofhabeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ ofhabeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." (emphasis supplied) In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. In this case, the Court of Appeals made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her liberty. It found that she was not: There is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained of her liberty by respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she was forcibly taken by respondents. On the contrary, respondents, being Eufemia's adopted children, are taking care of her. (emphasis supplied) The Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to disturb this finding. AMPATUAN V. MACARAIG - G.R. NO. 182497, JUNE 29, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus for the release of her husband, Police Officer I Basser B. Ampatuan (PO1 Ampatuan). The petitioner alleged that on 14 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan, who was then assigned at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police Station, was asked by the Chief of Police to report to the Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan. He was then brought to the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maguindanao where he was restrained of his freedom without cause. The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City Airport and was made to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police Director Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted where it was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two (2) Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law Department of the COMELEC. However, on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered the release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan. The Order was approved by the City Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan. Hence the petition for habeas corpus. Respondents for their part, alleged that on the evening of 10 November 2007, a sixty-four-year-old man, later identified as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. The investigation conducted by the Manila Police District (MPD) Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutors Office. On 18 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was charged with the administrative offense of grave misconduct for the alleged killing of Atty. Dalaig. On the same day, Police Director General Avelino I. Razon, Jr. ordered that PO1 Ampatuan be placed under restrictive custody. Acting on the orders of General Razon, Jr., Special Order No. 921 was issued by Police Director Edgardo E. Acua, placing PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO, effective 19 April 2008.

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds. However, on 25 April 2008, Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig denied the petition for habeas corpus and held that the placement of PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, par. 4 of Republic Act No. 8551 (otherwise known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998) constitutes a valid restraint of his liberty. ISSUE: WON the placement of PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52 of Republic Act No. 8551 is unlawful or illegal for which the remedy of habeas corpus is proper. HELD: No. PROPRIETY OF THE REMEDY OF HABEAS CORPUS- The writ of habeas corpus applies only to cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. Habeas corpus applies to any form of illegal or unlawful restraint of liberty In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. Habeas Corpus: judicial inquiry and discretion In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. Restrictive custody under R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 8551 is not an unlawful or illegal restraint on liberty Under Section 52 of R.A. No. 8551, the Chief of the PNP has the authority to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel. Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for. Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuans restrictive custody is the administrative case filed against him, his remedy is within such administrative process. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ROXAS V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO - G.R. NO. 189155, SEPTEMBER 7, 2010 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: Supreme Court: Petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily heard the Original Action for Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a judgment which is the subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. FACTS: Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the United States, enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN- USA) of which she is a member. On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her companions rested in the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat. While Roxas and her companions were resting, 15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered the house and dragged them inside a van. When they alighted from the van, she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA). She was then separated from her companions and was brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of gunfire, noise of planes taking off and landing, and some construction bustle. She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to abandon her communist beliefs. She was informed by a person named RC that those who tortured her came from the Special Operations Group and that she was abducted because her name is included in the Order of Battle. On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone with a sim card. She was sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family. After her release, Roxas continued to receive calls from RC thru the cell phone given to her. Out of apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim card. Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of military and Philippine National Police (PNP), on the belief that it was the government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. On 09 June 2009, the Supreme Court issued the writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action. The Court of Appeals granted the privilege of writs of amparo and habeas data. However, the court a quo absolved the respondents because it was not convinced that the respondents were responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas. Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition. 2) Whether or not circumstantial evidence with regard to the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators is enough ground for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo. 3) Whether or not substantial evidence to prove actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is necessary before the privilege of the writ may be extended. HELD: 1) No. 2) It depends. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence. 3) Yes. SUPREME COURT RULINGS: 1. DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WRIT OF AMPARO Command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents is legally inaccurate The use of the doctrine of command responsibility as justification in impleading the respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. Such doctrine is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a partyrespondent in an amparo petition. The Writ of Amparo as a protective remedy As held in the case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, the writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. It does not fix liability

for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law. Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a fullblown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility does not preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded not actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. 2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AMPARO PROCEEDINGS In amparo proceedings, direct evidence of identity must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. 3. EVIDENCE REQURED IN HABEAS DATA PROCEEDINGS Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In the case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an actual or threatened violation of such right. Hence, until such time that any of the respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioners right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature. The Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data. DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. However, it modified the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows: Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction and torture. Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws. Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision. Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court. The Supreme Court likewise referred the case back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to the Supreme Court for its consideration. It was declared that the Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision. BURGOS V. ARROYO - G.R. NO. 183711, JUNE 22, 2010 FACTS: At around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas Joseph T. Burgos a farmer advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.

On April 30, 2007, the petitioner, Edita Burgos, held a press conference and announced that her son Jonas was missing. That same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the person abducted was her son Jonas. In a subsequent police investigation and Land Transportation Office (LTO) verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. The said vehicle was seized and impounded on June 24, 2006 for transporting timber without permit. However, in May 2007, right after Jonas abduction was made public, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 of this 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was missing, and the engine and other spare parts were cannibalized. The police was likewise able to generate cartographic sketches of two of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of eyewitnesses. On August 29, 2007, the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) presented Emerito Lipio a.k.a. Ka Tibo/Ka Cris, Marlon D. Manuel a.k.a. Ka Carlo, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes a.k.a. Ka Lisa/Ramil to support the theory that elements of the New Peoples Army (NPA) perpetrated the abduction of Jonas. In its July 17, 2008 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, denied the petitioners motion to declare the respondents in contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner. Essentially, the CA found that the evidence the petitioner presented failed to establish her claimed direct connection between the abductors of Jonas and the military. It also found that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the PNP did not fully exert their effort in the conduct of investigation. The CA ruled that the AFP has the burden of connecting certain loose ends regarding the identity of Ka Ramon and the allegation that Ka Ramon is indeed Jonas in the Order of Battle. As for the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its investigation as rather shallow and conducted haphazardly. ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties is a fatal to the grant of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo. HELD: Yes. ON PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO: Effect of the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken. DISPOSITIVE: In disposing of the case, the Supreme Court issued the following directives: DIRECTED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct appropriate investigative proceedings, including field investigations acting as the Courts directly commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to make available and to provide copies, to the Commission on Human Rights, of all documents and records in their possession and as the Commission on Human Rights may require, relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws; DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the Commission on Human Rights the records and results of the investigation the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded to the Department of Justice, which were not included in their previous submissions to the Commission on Human Rights, including such records as the Commission on Human Rights may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution; DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigative assistance to the Commission on Human Rights as it may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution; AUTHORIZED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation that extends to all aspects of the case (not limited to the specific directives as outlined above), as the extraordinary measures the case may require under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and

REQUIRED the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court a Report with its recommendations, copy furnished the petitioner, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents, within ninety (90) days from receipt of the Resolution. In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano and the reassignment of the other respondents who have all been impleaded in their official capacities, all subsequent resolutions and actions from the Supreme Court were served on, and directly enforceable by, the incumbents of the impleaded offices/units whose official action is necessary. The present respondents shall continue to be personally impleaded for purposes of the responsibilities and accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies. The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President Gloria Macapagal -Arroyo. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY V. LIM - G.R. NO. 184769, OCTOBER 5, 2010 FACTS: Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). An anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: Cherry Lim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB . . . . Petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO's Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO's Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," in light of the receipt of ". . . reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security." Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of MERALCO's Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised. No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission. The trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent's transfer until such time that petitioner comply with the disclosures required. The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners' refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her person. Hence, the present petition for review contending that the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent may invoke the remedies available under the Writ of Habeas Data in the case at bar HELD: No. Respondent's plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO's Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides: Section 1.Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of

data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one's right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person's right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. Del Rosario that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent's reservations on the real reasons for her transfer a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one's employment are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent's right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners' refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent's safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all." And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of management" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related. Petition is granted. SO V. TACLA - G.R. NO. 190108, OCTOBER 19, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner So filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande accused of Qualified Theft, a non-bailable offense in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. Petitioner So alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a life-threatening situation while confined at the NCMH, the government hospital ordered by the RTC Mandaluyong to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande. The case arose from the following facts. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings, Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center. Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla which states that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she was "not ready for discharge". Judge Tacla ordered Guisandes referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisandes mental health to determine if she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft. Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisande be physically brought to the NCMH to have temporary legal custody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding order of confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMHs determination that she was ready for trial. Eventually, claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her confinement at the NCMH which supposedly worsened her mental condition and violated her constitutional rights against solitary detention and assistance of counsel, accused Guisande and her father filed a Motion for Relief from Solitary Confinement and the present petition for the issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo. The court granted the Motion for Relief. On the petition for habeas corpus and amparo, the court resolved to issue a joint writ of habeas corpus and amparo and refer the petition to the Court of Appeals for decision. Meanwhile, NCMH submitted its Evaluation Report according to which, Guisande is competent to stand the rigors of court trial. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various events occurred which ultimately led to the incident before this Court. Public respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case for Qualified Theft against Guisande. In view of such dismissal, Judge Tacla contends that the cases for issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo and the petition for review on certiorari should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic. ISSUE: WON petition for writs habeas corpus and amparo should be dismissed for being rendered moot and academic. HELD: The petition should be dismissed. The petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner Sos daughter, Guisande. There is no affirmation of petitioner Sos claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-

reputed government forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard by petitioner Sos and accused Guisandes family, had assessed Guisande fit for trial. The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of - confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a persons life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of accuseds own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a supposed mental condition. In addition, it was procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accuseds mental fitness to be arraigned and stand trial. Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisandes person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value." RODRIGUEZ V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO - G.R. NO. 191805, NOVEMBER 15, 2011 FACTS: Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities. She was living with petitioner, her nephew, since 2000. He acted as her guardian. In the morning of January 11, 2005, respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R. Pabello took Eufemia from petitioner Veluz' house. He made repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but these proved futile. Claiming that respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that respondents (the legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON in determining in the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus a court should limit itself to determining if a person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty. HELD: We rule for the respondents. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person's liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody. In this case, the issue is not whether the custody of Eufemia is being rightfully withheld from petitioner but whether Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty. Significantly, although petitioner admits that he did not have legal custody of Eufemia, he nonetheless insists that respondents themselves have no right to her custody. Thus, for him, the issue of legal custody is irrelevant. What is important is Eufemia's personal freedom. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime

specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. "The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." (emphasis supplied) In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. In this case, the Court of Appeals made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her liberty. It found that she was not: There is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained of her liberty by respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she was forcibly taken by respondents. On the contrary, respondents, being Eufemia's adopted children, are taking care of her. (emphasis supplied) The Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to disturb this finding. BALAO V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO - G.R. NO. 186050, DECEMBER 13, 2011 FACTS: On October 8, 2008, Arthur Balao, Winston Balao, Nonette Balao and Jonilyn Balao-Strugar, siblings of James Balao, and Beverly Longid (petitioners), filed with the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparoin favor of James Balao who was abducted by unidentified armed men on September 17, 2008 in Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet. Named respondents in the petition were then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Defense Secretary Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno, National Security Adviser (NSA) Norberto B. Gonzales, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Alexander B. Yano, Philippine National Police (PNP) Police Director General Jesus A. Verzosa, Philippine Army (PA) Chief Brig. Gen. Reynaldo B. Mapagu, PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNPCIDG) Chief Lt. P/Dir. Edgardo Doromal, Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM) Commander Maj. Gen. Isagani C. Cachuela, PNPCordillera Administrative Region Regional Director Police Senior Supt. Eugene Gabriel Martin, the Commanding Officer of the AFP Intelligence Service Unit (AFP-ISU) based in Baguio City and several John Does. On September 17, 2008, at around 8:30 in the morning, a man clad in black jacket, black shirt, black visor and gray pants was standing infront of Saymor's Store at Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet. He had a belt bag and a travelling bag which was placed on a bench. Vicky Bonel was at the time attending to the said store owned by her brother-in-law while Aniceto G. Dawing, Jr. and his coemployee were delivering bakery products thereat. A white van then arrived and stopped infront of the store. Five men in civilian clothes who were carrying firearms alighted from the van and immediately approached the man poking their guns on him. They grabbed and handcuffed him. The man was asking why he was being apprehended. One of the armed men addressed the people witnessing the incident, saying they were policemen. Another warned that no one should interfere because the man was being arrested for illegal drugs. Thereafter, they pushed the man inside the van. One of the armed men went back to the store to get the man's travelling bag. Before leaving the place, one of the armed men was also heard telling the driver of the van that they are going to proceed to Camp Dangwa (PNP Provincial Headquarters in La Trinidad, Benguet). The van headed towards the direction of La Trinidad town proper. The witnesses later identified the man as James Balao after seeing his photograph which appeared in posters announcing him as missing. The petition alleged that in May 2008, James reported surveillances on his person to his family, particularly to his sister Nonette Balao (Nonette), and to CPA Chairperson Beverly Longid (Beverly). James supposedly observed certain vehicles tailing him and suspiciously parked outside his residence, one of which was a van with plate number USC 922. He also claimed to have received calls and messages through his mobile phone informing him that he was under surveillance by the PNP Regional Office and the AFP-ISU. To prove the surveillance, the informer gave the exact dates he visited his family, clothes he wore, and dates and times he goes home or visits friends and relatives. Attached to the petition were the affidavits 4 of Nonette and Beverly attesting to James's

reports of surveillance to his family and to the CPA. It was further alleged that on September 17, 2008, around 7:00 in the morning, James sent a text message to Nonette informing her that he was about to leave his rented house in Fairview Central, Baguio City and that he was going to their ancestral residence in Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet to do his laundry. The travel time from Fairview, Baguio City to Pico usually takes only 20 to 45 minutes. Around 8:00 a.m., Nonette, after discovering that James never reached their parents' house at Pico, started contacting their friends and relatives to ask about James's whereabouts. No one, however, had any idea where he was. Contending that there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy for them to protect James's life, liberty and security, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo ordering the respondents to disclose where James is detained or confined, to release James, and to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his person. They likewise prayed for an inspection order for the inspection of at least 11 military and police facilities which have been previously reported as detention centers for activists abducted by military and police operatives; a production order for all documents that contain evidence relevant to the petition, particularly the Order of Battle List and any record or dossier respondents have on James; and a witness protection order. Petitioners simultaneously filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion 5 for the immediate issuance of a writ of amparo pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. On October 9, 2008, the Writ of Amparo was issued directing respondents to file their verified return together with their supporting affidavit within five days from receipt of the writ. Respondents in their Joint Returnstated: (1) that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is immune from suit and should thus be dropped as party-respondent; (2) that only Arthur Balao should be named petitioner and the rest of the other petitioners dropped; (3) that there is no allegation of specific wrongdoing against respondents that would show their knowledge, involvement or participation in the abduction of James; (4) that Exec. Sec. Ermita, Sec. Teodoro, Sec. Puno, Sec. Gonzales, Gen. Yano, Gen. Cachuela, Gen. Mapagu and Gen. Verzosa in their respective affidavits denied having such participation or knowledge of James's abduction, set forth their actions taken in investigating the matter and undertaking to continue exerting extraordinary diligence in securing the liberty of James and bring all those responsible for his disappearance to the bar of justice, including military or police personnel when warranted by the findings of the investigations; (5) that Supt. Martin already ordered an investigation, came up with interviews of several witnesses, and held a dialogue with the Commander of the Military Intelligence Group I (MIG1) and the Commanding Officer of the Internal Service Unit-Internal Security Group, Philippine Army; and (6) that petitioners themselves did not cooperate with police authorities in the investigation and neither did they ask the National Bureau of Investigation to locate James. Respondents contended that the petition failed to meet the requirement in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo that claims must be established by substantial evidence considering that: (1) petitioners' allegations do not mention in anyway the manner, whether directly or indirectly, the alleged participation of respondents in the purported abduction of James; (2) Nonette and Beverly do not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the abduction of James, hence, their statements are hearsay with no probative value; and (3) the allegations in the petition do not show the materiality and relevance of the places sought to be searched/inspected and documents to be produced, specifically the requirement that the prayer for an inspection order shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the whereabouts of the aggrieved party. Respondents further argued that it is the PNP as the law enforcement agency, and not the respondent military and executive officials, which has the duty to investigate cases of missing persons. At most, the AFP may inquire on the matters being alluded to them as may be ordered by the proper superior, which is primarily done for possible court martial proceedings. Hence, their common denials of having any knowledge, participation or authorization for the alleged disappearance of James Balao. Nonetheless, respondents executed their affidavits to show the actions they have taken and reports submitted to them by the proper authorities. ISSUE: Whether the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance. HELD: The trial court gave considerable weight to the discussion in the petition of briefing papers supposedly obtained from the AFP (Oplan Bantay-Laya implemented since 2001) indicating that the anti-insurgency campaign of the military under the administration of President Arroyo included targeting of identified legal organizations under the NDF, which included the CPA, and their members, as "enemies of the state." The petition cited other documents confirming such "all-out war" policy which resulted in the prevalence of extrajudicial killings: namely, the published reports of the Melo Commission and the UNHRC's Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial

Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Mr. Philip Alston. The petition also enumerated previously documented cases of extralegal killings of activists belonging to militant groups, including CPA leaders and workers, almost all of which have been preceded by surveillance by military or police agents and acts of harassment. Consequently, petitioners postulated that the surveillance on James and his subsequent abduction are interconnected with the harassments, surveillance, threats and political assassination of other members and officers of CPA which is his organization. We hold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the military's counter-insurgency program by itself does not fulfill the evidentiary standard provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance. In the case of Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court noted that the similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. Accordingly, the trial court in this case cannot simply infer government involvement in the abduction of James from past similar incidents in which the victims also worked or affiliated with the CPA and other left-leaning groups. The petition further premised government complicity in the abduction of James on the very positions held by the respondents, stating that The abduction of James Balao can only be attributed to the Respondents who have command responsibility of all the actions of their subordinates and who are the primary persons in the implementation of the government's all out war policy. (Emphasis supplied.) Subsequently, we have clarified that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. Commanders may therefore be impleaded not actually on the basis of command responsibility but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court defined responsibility and accountability as these terms are applied to amparo proceedings, as follows: . . . Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. . . . (Emphasis supplied.) Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in any manner of military and police authorities in the abduction of James has not been adequately proven. The identities of the abductors have not been established, much less their link to any military or police unit. There is likewise no concrete evidence indicating that James is being held or detained upon orders of or with acquiescence of government agents. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting amparo reliefs by ordering the respondent officials (1) to disclose where James Balao is detained or confined, (2) to release him from such detention or confinement, and (3) to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his person. Such pronouncement of responsibility on the part of public respondents cannot be made given the insufficiency of evidence. However, we agree with the trial court in finding that the actions taken by respondent officials are "very limited, superficial and one-sided.

Section 16 SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES YANSON V. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT - G.R. NO. 159026, FEBRUARY 11, 2008 FACTS: On March 27, 1998, Mardy Cabigo and 40 other workers (private respondents) filed with the Department of Labor and EmploymentBacolod District Office (DOLE Bacolod) a request for payroll inspection of Hacienda Valentin Balabag owned by Alberta Yanson (petitioner). DOLE Bacolod conducted an inspection of petitioner's establishment on May 27, 1998, and issued a Notice of Inspection Report, finding petitioner liable for the following violations of labor standard laws: 1. Underpayment of salaries and wages (workers being paid a daily rate of Ninety Pesos [P90.00] since 1997 and Seventy Five Pesos [P75.00] prior to such year);

2. Non-payment of 13th month pay for two (2) years; 3. Non-payment of Social Amelioration Bonus (SAB) for two (2) years; 4. Non-payment of employer's 1/3 carabao share and directing her to correct the same. 5. In addition, DOLE Bacolod scheduled a summary investigation and issued, by registered mail, notices of hearing as well as a subpoena duces tecum to the parties. Petitioner did not appear in any of the scheduled hearings, or present any pleading or document. In a Compliance Order dated August 12, 1998, DOLE Bacolod directed petitioner to pay, within five (5) days, P9,084.00 to each of the 41 respondents or a total of P372,444.00, and to submit proof of payment thereof. It also required petitioner to correct existing violations of occupational safety and health standards. Thereafter, DOLE Bacolod issued on December 17, 1998 a Writ of Execution of its August 12, 1998 Compliance Order. On February 17, 1999, petitioner filed with DOLE Bacolod a Double Verified Special Appearance to Oppose "Writ of Execution" For Being a Blatant and Dangerous Violation of Due Process, claiming that she did not receive any form of communication, or participate in any proceeding relative to the subject matter of the writ of execution. Petitioner also impugned the validity of the August 12, 1998 Compliance Order subject of the writ of execution on the ground of lack of employment relationship between her and private respondents. DOLE Bacolod denied said motion in an Order dated March 11, 1999. Petitioner filed with public respondent a Verified Appeal and Supplement to the Verified Appeal, posting therewith an appeal bond of P1,000.00 in money order and attaching thereto a Motion to be Allowed to Post Minimal Bond with Motion for Reduction of Bond. Public respondent dismissed her appeal in an Order dated September 21, 2001. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari which was denied due course and dismissed by the CA in its assailed October 30, 2002 Decision. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner contends that the CA and public respondent denied her the right to appeal when they rejected her P1,000.00-appeal bond. She insists that her appeal bond cannot be based on the monetary award of P372,444.00 granted by DOLE Bacolod in its August 14, 1998 Order which, having been rendered without prior notice to her, was a patent nullity and completely without effect. 26 She argues that her appeal bond should instead be based on her capacity to pay; otherwise, her right to free access to the courts as guaranteed under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution would be set to naught merely because of her diminished financial capacity. Our sympathy for petitioner cannot override our fidelity to the law. In Guico, Jr. v. Hon. Quisumbing, we held that the posting of the proper amount of the appeal bond under Article 128 (b) is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal from a monetary award in labor standard cases: The next issue is whether petitioner was able to perfect his appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code clearly provides that the appeal bond must be "in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from." The records show that petitioner failed to post the required amount of the appeal bond. His appeal was therefore not perfected Just like the petitioner in the present case, the employer in Guico v. Secretary of Labor had also sought a reduction of the appeal bond due to financial losses arising from the shutdown of his business; yet, we did not temper the strict requirement of Article 128 (b) for him. The rationale behind the stringency of such requirement is that the employer-appellant may choose between a cash bond and a surety bond. Hence, limitations in his liquidity should pose no obstacle to his perfecting an appeal by posting a mere surety bond. Moreover, Article 128 (b) deliberately employed the word "only" in reference to the requirements for perfection of an appeal in labor standards cases. "Only" commands a restrictive application, giving no room for modification of said requirements. Petitioner pointed out, however, that Article 223 of the Labor Code prescribes similar requirements for perfection of appeals to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); yet, the same has been applied with moderation in that a reduction of the appeal bond may be allowed. That is correct; but then, it should be borne in mind that reduction of bond in the NLRC is expressly authorized under the Rules implementing Article 223, viz.: RULE VI. APPEALS Section 6.Bond. In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the Regional Director or his duly authorized Hearing

Officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond, which shall be in effect until final disposition of the case, issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees. The employer, his counsel, as well as the bonding company, shall submit a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine. The Commission may, in justifiable cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond. The filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal. (Emphasis supplied.) No similar authority is given the DOLE Secretary in Department Order No. 18-02 (Implementing Rules), Series of 2002, amending Department Order No. 7-A, Series of 1995, implementing Article 128 (b), thus: Rule X-A Section 8.Appeal. (a) The Order of the Regional Director shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Secretary within ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. (b)The appeal shall be filed with the Regional Office where the case originated together with the memorandum of the appealing party. The appellee may file his answer within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the appellants memorandum. Section 9.Cash or surety bond; when required. In case the order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a duly accredited bonding company. The bond should be in the amount equivalent to the monetary award indicated in the order. Section 10.Writ of execution. (a) If no appeal is perfected within the reglementary period, the Regional Director shall, motu propio or upon motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution to enforce the order. In the enforcement of the writ, the assistance of the law enforcement authorities may be sought. DETcAH (b)A writ of execution may be recalled subsequent to its issuance, if it is shown that an appeal has been perfected in accordance with this rule. (Emphasis ours) Under the foregoing Implementing Rules, it is plain that public respondent has no authority to accept an appeal under a reduced bond. ENRIQUEZ V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN - G.R. NOS. 174902-06, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 Sarsonas MARI V. GONZALES G.R. NO. 187728, SEPTEMBER 12, 2011 (SAME) PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. V REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES - G.R. NOS. 177857-58, JANUARY 24, 2012 FACTS: Coconut Investment Fund was created under Republic Act No. 6260 in 1971.The source of the said fund was a Php 0.55 levy, Php 0.02 was placed at the disposition of the COCOFED, the recognized national association of coconut producers declared by the PCA. Cocofund receipts were ought to be issued to every copra seller. By virtue of P.D. No. 755 which permitted the use of the fund for the acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of coconut farmers and the distribution of the shares of the stock of the bank it *PCA+ acquired free to the coconut farmers (Sec.2).The PCA bought the 72.2% of FUBs outstanding capital stock from Pedro Cojuangco in behalf of the coconut farmers and the rest of the fund was deposited to the UCPB interest free. Thus it PCA acquired First United Bank, which later named United Coconut Planters Bank UCPB).This shares of stock was later become subject of sequestration, which was allowed by the Sandiganbayan by ruling in a Partial Summary Judgment that the Coconut Levy Funds are prima facie public funds and that Section 1 and 2 of PD No.755 were unconstitutional. Hence this Petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the coconut levy fund partakes the natureof taxes.what is the porpose of the coconut levy fund? HELD: The funds were generated by virtue of statutory enactments by the proper legislative authorities and for public purpose. Coconut Levy was imposed in the exercise of the States inherent power of taxation. Thus, it partakes the nature of taxes. Thus, the SC cannot allow the conversion of special funds into a private fund for the benefit of private individuals. Under Article VI, Section 29 (3), All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. Supreme Court held that the coconut industry is one of the great economic pillars of our nation, and coconuts and their by products occupy a leading position among the countries export products. Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues to support the government, but also to provide means for the rehabilitation and the stabilization of a threatened industry, which is so affected with public interest. Fund in particular was created for the protection of the entire coconut industry,

and more importantly for the consuming public. GONZALES V. SANDIGANBAYAN - 199 SCRA 299 *(no violation) FACTS: Through this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks the annulment of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss/Quash the amended information filed by respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner Felix R. Gonzales is the former Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), while private respondent Antonio B. Baltazar is the former Chief of the Deep Sea Fishing Demonstration Division of the BFAR. Criminal Case No. 13563, subject of this petition, arose from an agreement entered into between BFAR, represented by then Director Gonzales, and Roberto F. Palanca for the use of the "Otoshi-Ami Net," also known as "Lambaklad," for experimental test fishing. This net was subsequently installed by Palanca through the assistance of the BFAR. On November 11, 1975, an affidavit-complaint was filed with the City Fiscal of Manila by Baltazar against Gonzales for malversation of public funds and property involving the alleged illegal use of M/V Albacora. City Fiscal's Office issued a resolution finding a prima facie case. However, Gonzales filed a petition for review with the Ministry of Justice which issued on December 16, 1976 a resolution dismissing the complaint. Another Complaint Affidavit was filed by Baltazar charging Gonzales with illegal use of the M/V Albacora and loss of the Otoshi-Ami net, with the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman). On March 16, 1984, Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) Special Prosecutor Carlos D. Montemayor issued a resolution recommending that the first charge (for illegal use of the M/V Albacora) be dismissed for lack of merit and that a preliminary investigation be conducted for the second charge (for loss of Lambaklad). This resolution was approved by then Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez. Preliminary investigaton was conducted. Special Prosecutor Mendoza recommended the dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which was approved by the Tanodbayan. Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration and investigation was made with respect to the charge for the illegal use of the government vessel and the charge that there was negligence in failing to recover the fishing net. This order was approved by Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales. Consonant with the above resolution, TBP Case No. 83-01547 was referred to Special Prosecutor Juan F. Templonuevo who consolidated it with TBP Cases Nos. 84-00787 and 84-02338 for violation of Sections 12 and 3(e), respectively, of Republic Act No. 3019, involving the same parties. Special Investigation Officer Diaz-Baldos filed an information on May 5, 1989 before the Sandiganbayan charging Gonzales and Palanca with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 13563. However, on September 12, 1989, an amended information was filed, excluding Palanca from the charge. On December 12, 1989, Gonzales filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash the information before the Sandiganbayan on the ground that there has been a long delay on the part of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) in the termination of the preliminary investigation of the case and that there was more than one motion for reconsideration filed by Baltazar in violation of Rule 13(c) of Administrative Order No. 3 issued by the Tanodbayan on December 1, 1979. On March 19, 1990, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution denying the motion to dismiss/quash. On May 7, 1990, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution granting the prosecution's motion to amend the information and granting the dismissal of the case against Roberto Palanca. In his present recourse, petitioner adduces the following grounds for the issuance of the writs prayed for: (1) The long delay of the Tanodbayan Ombudsman in the termination of the preliminary investigation violates the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and speedy termination of cases that will warrant the dismissal of the instant case conformably with the doctrine laid down by this Honorable Court in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-72335-39, March 21, 1988, 159 SCRA 70, which the respondent court fails to consider when it issued the questioned resolution in grave abuse of its discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction which is correctible by the issuance of the writ herein prayed for; (2) The recommendation to file the information now pending before the Honorable Respondent Court was filed after more than one motion for reconsideration had been filed by the private complainant in violation of Rule 13(c) of Administrative Order No. 3, promulgated by the Tanodbayan on December 1, 1979." Petitioner contends that he filed his counter-affidavit to the complaint-affidavit of respondent Baltazar, docketed as TBP Case No. 83-01547 which is now the subject of Criminal Case No. 13563, on May 29, 1984. Therefore, as of that date, the case had to be considered submitted for resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a considerable delay in terminating the preliminary investigation of TBP Case No. 83-01547 which was submitted for resolution as of May 29, 1984, up to the time when the amended information was admitted by respondent court on May 7, 1990, or a period of more than six (6) years?

HELD: It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered. In the present case, it will be noted that it was only on August 22, 1988 when the complaint including Roberto Palanca as an accused, together with herein petitioner, was filed. The original information charging petitioner and Palanca with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, was filed on May 5, 1989. After the filing of said information, petitioner filed several motions before the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan seeking reconsideration and re-evaluation of the case and praying for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 13563 during the pendency of the resolution of these motions. Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan ordered the conduct of a preliminary investigation against Palanca and, subsequently, the amended information was filed. It is, therefore, apparent and irremissible that the delay is equally chargeable to petitioner. Hence, he cannot now seek the protection of the law to cover up for his own actuations or benefit from what he now considers the adverse effects of his own conduct in the case.

DUTERTE V. SANDIGANBAYAN 289 SCRA 721 *(preliminary investigation, violation) FACTS: Petitioners were charged before the Sandiganbayan for violating Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft And Corrupt Practices Act for allegedly entering into an anomalous contract for the purchase of computer hardware and accessories with the Systems Plus, Incorporated. It appears that four years prior to filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan, petitioners were merely directed to submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the allegations in a civil case filed against them before the RTC and on the allegations in an unverified complaint filed before the Ombudsman by the Anti-Graft League. Petitioners had no inkling that they were being subjected to a preliminary investigation as in fact there was no indication in the order that a preliminary investigation was being conducted. Petitioners filed a motion a motion for reconsideration alleging among others that they were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation, due process and the speedy disposition of their case, which the Sandiganbayan denied. They filed a motion to quash but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners right to speedy trial was violated by the inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation? HELD: YES. The right to preliminary investigation is not a mere formal right; it is a substantive right. To deny the accused of such right would be to deprive him of due process. The preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioners has been conducted not in the manner laid down in Administrative Order No. 07. The inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation infringed upon their constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of their case. In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, we held that an undue delay of close to three (3) years in the termination of the preliminary investigation in the light of the circumstances obtaining in that case warranted the dismissal of the case. Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is the procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against them had already been dismissed.

Finally, under the facts of the case, there is no basis in the law or in fact to charge petitioners for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. To establish probable cause against the offender for violation of Sec. 3(g), the following elements must be present: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the government; (3) the contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. IMELDA R. MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 126995, OCTOBER 6, 1998 FACTS: On June 8, 1984, IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE DANS, as Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) entered into a Lease Contract with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation (PGHFI) involving an LRTA property in Pasay City for P102,760.00 per month for 25 years; On June 27,1984, the PGHFI subleased the said property for P734,000.00 per month to the Transnational Construction Corporation represented by one Ignacio Jumenez. After petitioners husband was deposed as President of the Philippines, she and Dans were charged of alleged violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. After trial , the First Division of the Sandiganbayan failed to comply with the legal requirement that all the 3 justices must be unanimous in its Decision because Justice Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia voted for the conviction of both accused while Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquit them; Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice issued Administrative Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five and designating Justices Augusto Amores and Cipriano del Rosario; On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote Justice Garchitorena that he be given 15 days his Manifestation. On the same date, however, Justice Garchitorena dissolved the division of 5 allegedly because he and Justice Balajadia had agreed to the opinion of Justice del Rosario. On September 24, 1993, a Decision was rendered convicting the petitioner and Dans of violation of Sec. 3 [g] of RA 3019. On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of the Supreme Court by a vote of 3-2 affirmed the conviction of the petitioner but acquitted DANS. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and at the same time prayed that her Motion be heard by the Supreme Court en banc claiming that her right to due process of law, both substantive and procedural, was violated: a. As a result of the fact that she was convicted as a result of the alleged disparity of the rentals agreed upon with PGHFI and the subsequent sub-lease contract between PGHFI and Transnational Construction Corporation; and b. The First Division convicted her after Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division of 5 after a lunch in a Quezon City restaurant where they agreed to convict her in one case and acquit her in her other cases. The said meeting was attended by another justice who is not a member of the First Division or the Special Division in violation of the Rules of the Sandiganbayan which requires that sessions of the court shall be done only in its principal office in Manila and that only justices belonging to the division should join the deliberations. ISSUE: WON the irregularities in the right of petitioner for speedy disposition of cases. HELD: Yes. We reject the rationalization that the opinion of Justice Amores was of de minimis importance as it cannot overturn the votes of the three Justices convicting the petitioner. This is a mere guesswork. The more reasonable supposition is that said opinion could have changed the opinions of the other justices if it is based on an unbiased appreciation of facts and an undistorted interpretation of pertinent laws. For we cannot unreasonably suppose that Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justices Balajadia and Atienza are bigots who will never change their opinions about the guilt of the petitioner despite a better opinion. Yet, that is not all the value of the aborted opinion of Justice Amores. If it were an opinion for the acquittal of the petitioner, that opinion will have an added value when petitioner appeals her conviction to this Court. Again, depending on its scholarship, that minority opinion could sway the opinion of this Court towards the acquittal of petitioner.

Prescinding from those premises, it is indisputable that the decision of the First Division of the respondent Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner is void for violating her right to substantive and procedural due process of law. It is opined, however, that this case should be remanded to the respondent Sandiganbayan for re-decision by a Special Division of 5. As a general rule, a void decision will not result in the acquittal of an accused. The case ought to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings for a void judgment does not expose an accused to double jeopardy. But the present case deserves a different treatment considering the great length of time it has been pending with our courts. Records reveal that petitioner was first indicted in Criminal Case No. 17450 in January 1992. More than six (6) years passed but petitioner's prosecution is far from over. To remand the case to the Sandiganbayan will not sit well with her constitutional right to its speedy disposition. Section 16, Article III of the Constitution assures "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This right expands the right of an accused "to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial . . ." in criminal cases guaranteed by Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. It has a broadening effect because Section 16 covers the periods before, during and after trial whereas Section 14(2) covers only the trial period. 1 Heretofore, we have held that an accused should be acquitted when his right to speedy trial has been violated. CASTILLO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR 109271, MARCH 14, 2000 *(no violation) FACTS: On August 25, 1986, concerned employees of the Commission on Audit (COA) filed a Complaint before the Tanodbayan against petitioners Ricardo Castillo, Rodolfo Agdeppa and Demetrio Cabison, Jr., COA Auditor VIII, COA Auditor II, and COA Auditor III, respectively, all assigned at the National Housing Authority (NHA), for alleged "submittal of initial very derogatory reports which became the basis for the filing of cases with the Tanodbayan and the reversals of their initial recommendations for selected contractors." In a resolution dated October 30, 1987, the Tanodbayan found a prima faciecase against petitioners and accordingly recommended the filing of an Information against them for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). However, the Information was filed only on November 5, 1990, before the Sandiganbayan. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, petitioners filed a Demurrer to Evidence, but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated December 11, 1992. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution dated January 20, 1993. Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss dated February 15, 1993 citing lack of jurisdiction and violation of due process, but the same was also denied by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. Petitioners contended that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the information notwithstanding that there was a violation of their constitutional rights of "due process" and "speedy disposition of cases" and there was use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner against the petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the Information notwithstanding that there was a violation of petitioners' constitutional rights of "due process" and "speedy disposition of cases"? HELD: This Court finds no violation of petitioners' right to a speedy disposition of their case. The delay was not vexatious, capricious, nor oppressive, considering the factual milieu of this case, namely the structural reorganizations and procedural changes brought about by frequent amendments of procedural laws in the initial stages of this case. The complaint was filed on August 25, 1986. On October 30, 1987, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding a prima facie case and recommending the filing of an Information. Meanwhile, on April 27, 1988, the Zaldivar case was promulgated holding that the Tanodbayan lost his authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of Informations with the Sandiganbayan effective February 2, 1987. Then on November 5, 1990, the Information against petitioners was filed. In addition, it is clearly apparent from the figures cited by petitioners that the Sandiganbayan was burdened with a heavy caseload. Parenthetically, this Court has taken judicial cognizance of the fact that the ever increasing caseload of courts has affected the speedy disposition of cases pending before the Sandiganbayan. While petitioners certainly have the right to a speedy disposition of their case, the structural reorganization of the prosecutorial agencies, the procedural changes brought about by the Zaldivar case as well as the Sandiganbayan's heavy caseload certainly are valid reasons for the delay in the disposition of petitioners' case. For those reasons, the delay certainly cannot be considered as vexatious, capricious and oppressive. Neither is it unreasonable nor inordinate.

This case is evidently one of those instances where the Court properly held that the failure to specify the exact date or time when rape was committed does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. Thus, in People v. Espejon, where the Court convicted the appellant for rape under an information charging him with rape perpetrated "sometime in the year 1982 and dates

subsequent thereto" and "sometime in the year 1995 and subsequent thereto," the Court explained that the date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. In fact, the precise time when the rape takes place has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. Anent the imposable penalty, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the crime was committed in 1990, the higher penalty imposed for incestuous rape by Republic Act No. 7659 and Republic Act No. 8353, which took effect on December 13, 1993 and October 22, 1997, respectively, not being favorable to accused-appellant cannot be given retroactive application.

Section 17. Right against self-incrimination SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD - G.R. NO. 157870, NOVEMBER 3, 2008, VELASCO SABIO V. GORDON - G.R. NO. 174340, OCTOBER 17, 2006 STANDARD CHARTERED BANK V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES - G.R. NO. 167173, DECEMBER 27, 2007 *VILLAFLOR V. SUMMERS - 41 PHIL. 62 *(PREGNANCY TEST) *BELTRAN V. SAMSON - 53 PHIL. 570 *(writing) PEOPLE V. CANCERAN - 229 SCRA 581 *(paraffin test) FACTS: Accused-appellant Romeo Canceran was charged with murder. At around 10:30 o'clock in the evening, during a drinking session with several of his friends, Canceran, armed with a short handgun, with intent to kill and with treachery, suddenly shot Pribert Doroja with the said firearm inflicting a gunshot wound on his head which resulted to his death. Two of his friends who were present, Arnold Bautista and Edralin Melindez, shortly thereafter, went to the police headquarters to report the incident. Based on the statements given by them, the PC Investigating Team proceeded to the residence of accusedappellant's employer, to invite Romeo Canceran for questioning about the incident. Bautista and Melindez alleged that it was Romeo Canceran who shot the victim. On the other hand, Romeo Canceran alleged that Bautista accidentally shot the victim while playing with a revolver. At the instance of the PC investigators, Canceran and Bautista voluntarily submitted themselves to a paraffin test to determine who had fired a gun. The forensic chemist who conducted the test stated that Bautista gave negative results for both right and left hands while the same tests conducted Canceran indicated the presence of nitrates on his hand, yielding a positive result. The chemist further stated that the positive results indicated the possibility that Canceran had recently fired a gun. The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and after trial the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. In this appeal, accused-appellant averred that the trial court erred in giving undue evidentiary weight to the results of the paraffin test considering the crude manner by which it was administered and the extreme likelihood that the paraffin casts of accused canceran and prosecution witness bautista have been interchanged. He also argued that the trial court did not give due consideration to the fact that his constitutional right was denied because of such test. ISSUE: Whether or not the paraffin tests conducted without the presence of counsel is a violation of his the right against self-

incrimination.

HELD: Yes. This court affirms the decision of the trial court that Canceran committed Murder qualified by treachery. The allegation of the accused that the results of the nitrate tests should be disregarded due to the possibility that the results of the tests conducted on the accused-appellant and Bautista may have been interchanged, deserves scant consideration. The defense failed to show even the slight possibility that the paraffin casts were interchanged. The Solicitor General correctly points out that "there is no possibility of interchange since the casts, when submitted to the NBI Manila for examination, were embedded or glued to the paper with proper identification." The issue of violation of the accused-appellant's right to an attorney can be readily settled by reading the original records of this case. During his arraignment, the accused-appellant was duly assisted by a counsel de oficio. The Order of the trial court directed the Citizens Legal Assistance Office to thereafter represent the accused Romeo Canceran. Clearly, no violation of the right to counsel was committed. The paraffin tests conducted without the presence of counsel did not violate the right against self-incrimination nor the right to counsel. Moreover, the 2 witnesses for the prosecution, Bautista and Melindez, were able to adequately establish that it was the accusedappellant Romeo Canceran who shot and killed Pribert Doroja. The alleged inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of Bautista and Melindez pertain to minor matters which instead of damaging their credibility should be considered badges of truth considering the natural fallibility of human perceptions. The accused-appellant's lack of motive is immaterial since he was positively identified as the one who shot the victim. The rule is well settled that the prosecution need not prove motive on the part of the accused when the latter has been positively identified as the author of the crime. PEOPLE V. TRANCA - 235 SCRA 455 *(x-ray, not a violation)

Section 19 Prohibited Punishments BAYLOSIS V. CHAVEZ - 202 SCRA 405 FACTS: The case at bar originated from an information filed in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig charging petitioners Rafael Baylosis and Benjamin de Vera, together with one Marco Palo, with a violation of PD 1866, 4 committed as follows: That on or about the 29th day of March, 1988 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines ..., the above named accused, all known high ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and its military arm, the New Peoples Army, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully , unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, control and custody, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion/subversion, the following, to wit: A. Firearms/Ammunition One (1) AK 47 Automatic Rifle with M22N006726 with magazine and 9 rounds. B. Explosives Three (3) pieces fragmentation hand grenades without first securing the necessary license or permit thereof from a competent government authority. The section (numbered 1) containing the allegedly unconstitutional provision 9 reads as follows: Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed.

The penalty reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall wilfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor. What the petitioners advocate at bottom is that a doctrine laid down by jurisprudence or case law is superior to a statute afterwards enacted by legislative authority; that decisions construing certain specific provisions of one law are sufficient basis for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a subsequently enacted law. More specifically, they contend that the rulings in People vs. Amado Hernandez 5 (reiterated in some ten other subsequent rulings),Enrile vs. Salazar, 6 and Enrile vs. Amin 7 to the effect that the felony of rebellion defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code cannot, in accordance with Article 48 of the same Code, be complexed with the offense of murder, homicide, arson, or other crimes committed in connection with, or on the occasion or in furtherance of, rebellion render invalid, as unconstitutional, Section 1 (3) of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended. The petitioners further posit the unconstitutionality of the challenged provision because "repugnant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, which guarantee full respect for human rights, equal protection of the laws, due process, right to bail, protection against double jeopardy and from cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, and supremacy of civilian authority over the military." ISSUE: WON there is unconstitutionality under sec 19 of bill rights with the punishment HELD: It is well settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. 15 As pointed out by a brother in the Court, a noted authority on Constitutional Law, this Court had held (in People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299), "that mere severity does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Reiterating the rule first announced in People vs. Estoista (93 Phil. 674), it declared that it takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution ... to come under the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly oppressive' 'wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.'" 16 The same noted author further points out that "a penalty not normally proportionate to the offense may be imposed in some instances without violation of the Constitution. ... (as) for example, where the offense has become so rampant as to require the adoption of a more effective deterrent, like the stealing of jeeps or coconuts, which is punished by the Revised Penal Code as qualified theft" 17 or, it may be added, like such crimes as assassinations, bombings and robberies, which are committed nowadays with frightening frequency and seeming impunity with the use of high-powered weapons, explosives or similar devices, whether in connection with or in furtherance or pursuance of, rebellion or subversion, or not. PEOPLE V. ECHEGARAY 267 SCRA 682 *(death penalty) FACTS: The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death. The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. The motion was dismissed as the SC found no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb the verdict. On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the AntiDeath Penalty Task Force of the Fre Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG) A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant aiming for the reversal of the death sentence.

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659. ISSUE: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional HELD: No.Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration are denied for lack of merit. Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and inaccurate. The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty. Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries. Accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life. In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life" The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman; Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture. second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life. Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal system through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870. Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death. The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a

cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life. People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions," Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society What R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes. Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people. The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and needs. Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature. SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because: the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself. PADILLA V. CA (PROHIBITED PUNISHMENT) Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. FACTS: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help pf a civilian witness. Upon arrest

following high powered firearms were found in his possession: 1. 2. 3. 4. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver

Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a complete turnaround and filed Manifestation in Lieu of Comment praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro). ISSUES: 1. WON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule 2. WON the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms 3. WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution HELD: 1. WARRANTLESS ARREST: No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedurea peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioners warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually committing another offence in the presence of all those officers. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible. Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid: Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant) Search of moving vehicle Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must be within arrestees custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest. Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. 2. LICENSE TO CARRY:

No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioners possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioners purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more

formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent courts incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian. 3. PENALTY:

Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a nonsubversive context and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution. The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellants commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner. Equally lacking in merit is appellants allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellants erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive. Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms *are not+ contrary to any provision of the Constitution Appellants grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioners indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to 10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as maximum. People v. Simon Doctrine: Although PD 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the RPC, hence the rules in said code for graduating by degrees of determining the proper period should be applied. PEOPLE V. ALICANTE, GR 127026-27, MAY 31, 2000 FACTS: Sometime in August 1994, noontime, Richelle had just finished taking a bath outside their house. Her brother Richard and sister Racquel were still in school at that time. As she entered the house to change her clothes, her father Armando grabbed her breasts. She slapped him. He got a knife, pointed it to her neck and pushed her down on the bed. He removed her shorts and panty, laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain and saw something whitish coming out of his penis which he later placed on top of her stomach. He threatened to kill her and the other members of her family should she tell anyone of the incident. After ordering her to wash her vagina, he went out of the house. Left alone, she cried in one corner. She did not attend her class at Barangka Elementary School because of the excruciating pain in her sex organ and her headache. Three (3) days thereafter, the incident was repeated. She was outside their house when he called her. After coming in, he locked the door and pushed her against the wall. He took a knife and pointed it to her face. He said, "before anyone else, I should be first." He removed her shorts and panty as he pressed her against the wall. Armando masturbated and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain in her sex organ. After the act, he repeated his threat to kill her and her family. She could not do anything but cry. Within the same month, her ordeal continued. One day, while leaving for school to play softball, she was ordered by Armando to stay. Sensing that he was going to rape her again, she started crying. He slapped her. She ran towards the door but he closed it. While he was looking for a knife, Richelle tried to open the door. He then grabbed and pressed her against the wall. While pinning

her, he pulled her shorts down and took out his penis. He masturbated and mashed her breasts. A whitish substance came out of his penis which he again placed on her stomach. She was thereafter raped by her father once a week in September 1994. During the first week, she was lying on bed together with her siblings, Richard and Racquel. She was at the edge. Her father was on another bed. Her mother was not home. He then approached her and laid on top of her. He inserted his penis into her vagina. She was frightened and nervous, her body shaking. She tried to shout for help but he covered her mouth and slapped her. He started pushing and pulling and she saw a white substance oozing from his penis. She felt pain in her vagina and was nauseated at the act. In the second week, he summoned her inside the house to wash the dishes. She did not obey. He then humiliated her and she was forced to go inside. He took a knife and pointed it to her. While so doing, he pulled her dress and removed her shorts. He th en inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt weak and lost all her strength. Her head was throbbing. During the third and fourth weeks, she was raped again. she was raped three times. In all these instances, he threatened to kill her. She was prevented from shouting because he covered her mouth. She kept these incidents a secret because she feared his threat. she was again raped. Her brother and sister were playing outside the house while her mother was at work. As she was preparing for school, her father called her to their house. She did not obey him. He berated her and forced her to get inside. He locked the door. He started hitting her head with his fists. She fought back. He slapped her twice and grabbed her clothes. While she was being undressed, she pleaded "tama na po!" He ignored her plea and continued removing her shorts and panty. He laid her on the "papag." He then mashed her breasts, kissed her lips, masturbated and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain in her breasts and in her sex organ. Her head was aching. After the act, he put on his shorts and laid down on the bed. Due to shame, she did not inform anyone of the incident. She was raped three times by her father in January 1995. One Thursday morning, he ordered her brother and sister to go outside while she was preparing for school. He then closed the door. He hit her on the nape, pulled her hair and warned her not to scream. Threatening her with a knife, he caressed her and ordered her to undress. She could only cry. She graduated from Barangka Elementary School on March 24, 1995. As she was attending the commencement exercises, Richelle felt dizzy and fainted. In May of the same year, she and her family transferred residence Karangalan Village, Pasig City. She was enrolled in secondary school in Pasig City. While attending her classes, Ms. Presto, her teacher noticed her bulging abdomen. When Ms. Presto asked her about it, she told her what her father did to her. She was physically examined and she was found to be on the 26th-27th week of pregnancy. On the same day, she and her mother gave their respective sworn and signed statements to the Criminal Investigation Division of the Eastern Police District. Subsequently, Pacita Alicante executed her "Salaysay ng Pag-uurong ng Demanda." She gave birth to twin boys who later died. LLpr The records reveal that fifteen (15) informations for the crime of rape were filed against accused-appellant Armando Alicante y David for having carnal knowledge of his minor daughter Richelle. accused-appellant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to all the charges. the case was transferred to Branch 272 of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, as said court was designated as a special court to try cases classified as heinous crimes. Joint trial on the merits then ensued. After trial, the court found ARMANDO ALICANTE Y DAVID is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for seven (7) counts of the crime of rape Hence, this automatic review, where the accused-appellant through counsel raises the following assignment of errors: ISSUE: Whether or not the death penalty law, insofar as it orders the automatic and mandatory judicial killing of appellant and others similarly situated, as punishments for acts which do not include the taking of another person's life, is repugnant to the constitution and amounts to a barbaric, excessive, cruel and unusual punishment. HELD:

The other inconsistencies refer to minor details such as how many times she was raped during a certain month. These do not create a reasonable doubt as to whether or not accused-appellant raped his daughter. It must be remembered that the victim is a girl of tender age who was sexually attacked by her father several times during a period of less than a year. It is not expected that Richelle would remember every single detail of every single rape. It is understandable, even anticipated, that there would be minor lapses and inaccuracies when a young girl is made to recount, detail by detail her frightful ordeal under the hands of her father. Considering the age of the victim, she is more prone to error than an adult person. The grueling experience of testifying in public, face to face with her perpetrator and being questioned by hostile lawyers would undoubtedly intimidate and confuse a young girl. Despite these circumstances, Richelle remained steadfast in her claim that her father raped her. In People v Echegaray, we have affirmed the constitutionality of the imposition of the death penalty for crimes which are not attended by the circumstance of death on the part of the victim: We have already demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the forfeiture of life simply because life was taken, never was a defining essence of the death penalty in the context of our legal history and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this Court has no doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of rape. We find no cogent reason to reverse our stand on the heinousness of the crime of rape when the perpetrator of such bestial act is the father of the victim. To say that the crime of incestuous rape is not heinous simply because the victim did not die is to ignore the lifelong trauma and stigma of the victim brought about by rape. In this particular case, the psychiatrist who conducted and evaluated the test on Richelle observed that she consistently showed signs of post traumatic stress disorder common to persons who have undergone unusual traumatic events in their lives caused by natural or man-made catastrophes. The social worker from the Department of Social Welfare and Development, likewise, noted that Richelle was a greatly traumatized and emotionally injured individual. In sum, we agree with the following findings of the trial court that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven counts of rape WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision sentencing the accused-appellant ARMANDO ALICANTE y DAVID to the extreme penalty of death with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant shall be ordered to indemnify the victim Richelle Alicante, in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00, respectively, as moral damages for each count of the offense proved.

LIM V. PEOPLE, GR 149276, SEPT. 27, 2002 Gammad PEOPLE V. GABIANA, GR 123543, AUGUST 23, 2000 FACTS: In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Laguna, accused-appellant PEDRO GABIANA y CARUBAS was criminally charged of rape. The information indicting appellant, alleges: "That on or about 7:00pm on September 12, 1994 at Sitio Quinale, Barangay Burgos, Municipality of Siniloan, Province of Laguna, the accused with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, had sexual intercourse with one Rosemarie C. Argosino a ten (10) year old girl, against her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice. Rosemarie Argosino is the eldest of the 3 children of Pedro Gabianas live-in partner Rosalia dela Cruz. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. On November 7, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death. Likewise, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay the offended party the sum of P50,000.00 for moral damages. Due to the gravity of the penalty imposed, the case was forwarded to the Court for automatic review. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant and in imposing death penalty on him.

HELD: The Court AFFIRMED (but with the modifications) the decision of the trial court. The trial court gave full faith and credit to the testimony of the private complainant, Rosemarie C. Argosino. A meticulous scrutiny of the testimony of the private complainant indicated that the same could only come from a person who truly suffered the ordeal sued upon. It was simply improbable that private complainant, a girl of tender age, innocent and guileless, would brazenly impute a crime too serious as rape to a man she considered her father. Her disclosure that she has been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of the assault against her dignity, cannot be easily dismissed as mere concoction. Moreover, the alleged inconsistency theorized by appellant was barren of any sustainable basis as the discrepancies alluded to by appellant referred to minor and peripheral details. With respect to the alibi relied upon by appellant, the Court ruled that the same cannot hold against the positive identification by the private complainant of the appellant as the culprit. Basic is the rule that alibi which is easy to concoct cannot prevail over the positive identification by the witnesses. However, the Court is not in accord with the penalty imposed by the trial court. Although it was shown that the appellant is the common-law husband of the complainant's mother, qualifying circumstance of relationship was not alleged in the information under which appellant was arraigned. In People vs. Ambray, the Court held that the failure to allege the fact of relationship between the appellant and the victim in the information for rape is fatal and consequently, bars conviction of its qualified form which is punishable by death. Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment in order not to violate the constitutional right of the accused to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Accordingly, the death penalty imposed below on appellant should be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Moreover, the Court granted civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00, in addition to the P50,000.00 moral damages. PEOPLE V. HORIO, GR 137842, AUGUST 23, 2001 Grajo PAGDAYAWON V. SEC. OF JUSTICE, GR154569, SEPT. 23, 2002 Grossman

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