The Inquiry's verdict on the Siemens scandal

Source: http://www.protothema.gr/politics/article/?aid=101972 After eleven months of research, involving hundreds of meetings and dozens of hearings, was delivered late Monday the findings of the Inquiry Committee investigating the scandal of Siemens. The conclusion includes the positions of the majority expressed by the members members of PASOK is divided into eight main chapters which inter alia describes the flow of "black money", funds of political parties and the loss of the Greek government. The key section of the assessment against which the responsibilities of political and non-persons and requested further investigation of Mr. Michalis Liapis, Christos Markogiannaki, George Alogoskoufis, George Voulgarakis, Yiannis Papathanasiou, Prokopios Pavlopoulos and Byron Polydoras terms of SW and Messrs. Akis Tsochatzopoulos, Tasos Mandela Yiannos Papantoniou, Christos Verelis and Nikos Christodoulakis terms PASOK says: For Mr. Tassos Manteli The former Transport Minister "charged" the programmatic agreements OTE 8002 while presenting a series of arguments that demonstrate the "endangerment of the public interest." While rough "tracking implementation of the operational objectives of this Organization" to "bribe" 250,000 euros from the "black" funds of Siemens. Analysts say: "The failure of supervision of the Minister may be linked to another section of the finding is the process by which emvasthikan on behalf of about 250.000 . The majority of the committee considering that "it is obvious that both transfers to the account of the Minister are illegal money from the" black funds "to Siemens. As it Mr. Anastasios Manteli admits some of that money were sent after 2000 in America to fill his son's tuition fee for postgraduate studies (see Memo apologetic Anastasios Manteli to the Appeals Council on 3.9.2010, p. . 41) "proposes to investigate further responsibilities. For Mr. Christos Verelis Mr Verelis and for the period (04/2000 - 03/2004), which was Minister of Transport is charged lack of oversight at OTE. Features the text states that "Mr. Christos Verelis failed to exercise the authority that belonged to the responsibilities under n.2246/1994. Features may be mentioned the fact that not reacted when Directors of OTE offered the then administration to not Cost Control in 2000 due to price stability, in violation of the "Programmatic Agreement 8002" (see document 62/1/13/2 / 2001) ". Elsewhere, the Committee considers the actions of former minister who is not "has no power, when he realized that the administration of L. Antonakopoulos not prepared closing minutes of programming agreements with exposure effect in 2002, which was the year of expiry thus continuing the "Programmatic Agreement 8002" and after 2002. Finally, responsibility for Mr Verelis seems yielded and Mr. Nikos Christodoulakis in his testimony before the committee. In addition to Mr. Verelis against wrong move and the OSE. Please note that the committee believes that as Minister of Transport was responsible for oversight of program contracts between OSE-Siemens. Analysts say "The then Minister though - it seems that the correspondence-was aware of the problems that existed, failed to order an action to defend the interests of the CIU." For Mr. John Papantoniou The former Minister of Economy and Finance (1996 - 2001) also charged actions that have to do with OTE. Further, the Agency stated function as was required under Article 2 1Av Law 2246/1994, that through his actions, for example through removal of the members of the board of OTE, to protect the public interest. Moreover did not check requirements during the minister of OTE, did not check the progress of program agreements and therefore not protected the public interest by monitoring the implementation of the clauses pouperielamvane the 8002

framework agreement with SIEMENS . Mr. Papantoniou charged "negligence in the performance of certain ministerial powers are" on the system C4I. For Mr. Nikos Christodoulakis Former Minister of Economy and Finance (2001 - 2004) also charged manipulations that have to do with OTE who - according to the committee - led so that "The original amount of the framework agreement has almost tripled over the minister and did not intervene in OTE's management, nor exercised control to protect the public interest and the interest of OTE. Additional did not anyone check if disclosed a reserve stock in stores OTE 150 billion drachmas.' For Mr. Michalis Liapis Mr Liapis and during the period was transport minister charged inter alia that "tries to shirk his responsibilities, the then Minister, when a question from Members on the legal framework of Public Utilities, replied, that he could cancel invitation to awarded (see filing, Mr. Michalis Liapis, the Inquiry Commission on 15.07.2010, p. 100). For this case the legislative framework requires the Minister to monitor, if in sourcing from Siemens and undertake technical support it respected the legal procedures which would contribute to the strategic plans of OTE. That this control was not despite wealth of data for mismanagement of the Agency, such as that carried out preliminary investigation against the board of OTE kakourgimatiki infidelity, proving breach of duty of the Minister, in exercise of statutory competence. " For the handling of former Minister for the CIU in particular stated that "The minister Michalis Liapis and specifically on 16.01.2007 hired by the Greek Shipyards eight suburban railcars type for eight months the price of 850.000 per month. Train maintenance undertaken by Siemens Hellas at a cost of 250.000 per month. These trains were bought by the Greek shipyard on 16.12.2006 for the price of 10.000.000 and sold in autumn 2008 in MAN 10.000.000 (see filing Vassilios Tsimpidis the Inquiry Commission on 14.06.2010, p. 66-69). The juxtaposition of these numbers shows the damage of the OSE. " Finally, Mr. Liapis checked and the signature of the Convention on the suburban train and supply the communication system GSM-R in which "Mr. Michalis Liapis not taken into account, however - or ignore - the difference the project budget between departments of the CIU. While that is the Railway Technical Services estimated that the price for the supply of GSM-R for 2,020 km would reach 40.000.000 , the notice stated that the supply of GSM-R for 730 km would cost 60.000.000 . Finally, responsibilities allocated and manipulations on the work of portable electronic guides that would supply the Siemens the Greek museums the time was Minister of Culture. For Mr. George Alogoskoufis OTE identified and the responsibilities of Mr Alogoskoufis. According to the findings "And when the scandal broke out in 2006 by former Minister or directly requested by Mr. Panagiotis Vourloumis the implementation of cost accounting and control clauses to ensure the price premium for the benefit of the Greek government and OTE, even since 2000 then, neither turned in court, as it should, against SIEMENS claiming the damage suffered by the Greek government. The framework agreement and other public contracts with SIEMENS continued normally throughout the ministers without any control of prices and terms in OTE premium of approximately 65% (eg technical support). The minister, Mr. Alogoskoufis, the Greek Giorou government suffered its biggest loss due to the 8002 framework agreement, having twice had not claimed it as the price premium and is not required by SIEMENS legitimate claims uncovered by the scandal. Consequently, the then Minister of Finance through his actions and

the non-exercise of its powers envisaged compulsory checks violated duties of his office. " In addition to Mr. Alogoskoufis charged acts to conceal the scandal mainly because of the abolition of the Authority for the "black" money manager which was Mr George Zorbas. For Mr. Yannis Papathanasiou To conceal the scandal is controlled and Mr. Papathanasiou as she says it "Although 13.03.2009 by the then Minister of Economy and Finance has accepted the opinion of OWN, which suggested the process could lead to - among others - and impaired SIEMENS contracts signed with the Greek government, Mr. Yannis Papathanasiou took no further action. " For Mr. George Voulgarakis Former Minister of Public Order "Although over substantive minister" as stated in the finding "inadequately monitored the progress of the contract C4I. Even noted that "This conduct of Mr George Voulgarakis was objectively able to hurt the state because the renegotiation of the contract and the non-deductibility of SAIC led to damage of the government." For Mr. Byron Polydoras "The amendment number 5 of the contract signed by Byron Polydoras as Minister of Public Order on 29.3.2007," the conclusion "the most significant change has occurred since the launch of the tradition in C4I subsystem. Thereby removed the substance delivery system should be done with "turnkey" and ruled de facto control of system interoperability "requirement of the Convention of 2003. For Mr. Prokopios Pavlopoulos Under the microscope of the parliamentary investigation proposes to stay and the handling of Mr. Pavlopoulos it. The actions of former Interior Minister (2007-2009) on the C4I namely subsystems CDSS cause questions to members of the committee which ruled that "it is obvious that Mr. Prokopios Pavlopoulos not handled with due attention to public property , which was diepistefmeni in his capacity as Minister. " For Mr. Chris Markogiannaki A series of acts by Markogiannaki both as Secretary of Public Order (2004-2006) and as deputy interior minister with responsibility in matters of public policy (9/1/2009-10/10/2009) led members of the committee verdict that "Mr. Chris Markogiannakis the acts and omissions, as the Minister is not handled properly and with care to public property, which was trusted, so far as the company SIEMENS and SAIC have benefited financially from his behavior and specifically on those payments to and from release the letters of guarantee for good performance with a corresponding loss of government property. " For Mr. Akis Tsochatzopoulos Mr. Tsochatzopoulos checked for his actions as Minister of National Defence for the period from 1996 to 2001. The committee combines the orders made weapon systems to minister to the debt managers 'black' funds that Siemens 'bribe' for the Patriot.

Attachments:

Table of Contents 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Introduction Really Flow Consensus Political Parties Damage Assessment - Responsibilities Suggestions Table documentary

Table of Contents
Source: http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/pinakas_periexomenon.doc Translated: http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&rurl=translate.goo gle.com&sl=el&tl=en&twu=1&u=http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/pinakas_periexomenon.do c&usg=ALkJrhjt3vCxVh0d7I2xjCnFfeWc8vYfnw Pages Introduction Facts The case OTE The case OSE The case C4I The case of electronic guides the Ministry of Culture Supplies and maintenance of medical equipment in hospitals 119-135 136-274 136-160 161-195 196-239 240-242 243-250

Supplies of the Ministry of Defence Patriot, System Hermes" Justice The flow of "black money" - offshore companies - intermediaries Unanimous Porismatikes Reviews Political parties Loss of Greek government Assessment - Responsibilities Siemens Forensic examination of the case Ministers and Deputy-Responsibilities Suggestions List relevant documentation texts (these documents are in the Secretariat of the committee)

251-260 261-273 274-292 293-397 398-401 402-404 405-490 405-409 410-429 430-490 491 492-512

1. Introduction
Source: http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/1_eisagogi.doc Translated: http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&rurl=translate.goo gle.com&sl=el&tl=en&twu=1&u=http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/1_eisagogi.doc&usg=ALkJ rhifrstrE5HRWn8xk-_4a-_ZpiBEKw The Case Siemens Challenge For Transparency And Combat Corruption And Diaplokis The scandal concerns SIEMENS an unusual case in a multinational company which is leader in telecommunications worldwide. Inside it had formed a special organizational structure from top executives, who acted together as a criminal organization by using special devices (designed to ensure both black money and also to put it no trace of illegal payments) and allegedly committing systematically bribed government officials (service and civilian staff) across the field of business. So almost all the structures of the Greek State (Ministry of Communications, Defence, Culture, Health, Public Order, and utilities such as OTE and OSE, etc.). The purpose of these illegal activities was to ensure privileged and dominant position in competition for the procurement of the wider Greek public sector. The above is a criminal activity had occurred simultaneously in many countries with such organization and scope that can be fairly described as the largest industrial-financial scandal in postwar Europe. The dominance of the company commissions OTE and later throughout the Greek public sector, based on this practice, showed the most eloquent way the vast area that has been corruption in the country to the point where it becomes endemic, self-powered and self-replicating systemic phenomenon in the Greek state. Distorts both the functioning of democracy, and the smooth functioning of economic development because: a) distorted the principle of popular sovereignty and a mandate and representation, between political parties and parliamentarians and other citizens, and the accumulation of black money and undue political power in favor of 'favored' various business systems distort the rules of influence in shaping public opinion and the electorate. b) distorted sound business competition and seriously hampered the development of healthy entrepreneurship, as well as the undertaking, and other businesses that use such practices, squeezed out the supplies and works of the Greek government and public enterprises (which make up a large part the Greek economy) other similar companies that do not use such practices, resulting in undue dominance in the market, which has very significant negative impact on the development of the Greek economy. Corruption in public procurement and public works, an essential factor formation and expansion of the financial problem of the country. Apart from the overpricing of goods, works and services required to ensure the "starter" should be relevant and very important additional economic damage to the Greek government. This is due to the

increased prices that are above supplies and low quality due to the non-functioning of healthy competition.

BACKGROUND The presence of SIEMENS in Greece in relation to the procurement of the Greek government dating from the founding of OTE in 1949. Until 1977, the Siemens virtually monopolized the supply of the OTE telecommunications and supporting material (power supply systems, electrical equipment, etc.). On 11.11.1977 was announced by the then government, the foundation of Greek Electronics Industry (ELVIL SA) with shareholders ETVA and OTE. The ELVIL was to organize and operate industrial plant electronic communication equipment for both the needs of OTE and the wider public sector. On 29.04.1981 the ELVIL launched an international tender No. 7901 to find a partner because it was necessary to import expertise through manufacturing company abroad. The aim was to design and manufacture of factory electronic telecommunications equipment, which would cover the initial needs of OTE was about 225,000 lines. The production would take the ELVIL. The year 1987 Mr. Anastasios Mandela and Mr. Theofanis Tombros seek the abolition of ELVIL and the proposal is consistent ETVA and Yvette. The Minister of Transport and Communications, Mr. Constantin Badouvas expressing strong disagreements and arguments negate the idea of repealing ELVIL, leaving the meeting and asked Mr. Ioannis Papanikolaou, Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister and Secretary KY.S.E. D informing the Prime Minister. The whole process was underway, however, and soon announced the abolition of ELVIL without consulting the relevant minister. On 22.12.1987 the Board of Directors of OTE, upon the recommendation of the then DirectorGeneral went on to direct award supply 84,000 to 20,000 digital circuits benefits totaling 7.5 billion drachmas companies SIEMENS and ERICSSON - INTRACOM by invoking decision KYSYM five-year program digitization of the network of OTE As it became known, the prices of these contracts were substantially overvalued in relation to international market prices. In OTE's management identified by the then Minister Costas Badouvas that British Telecom has purchased the ERICSSON AXE centers a price much lower than proposed in the contract. In 1988 the Administration Utility approved the purchase of 470,000 digital services directly awarded to INTRACOM houses and SIEMENS totaling 32 billion drachmas but not adopted in whole ton of competent Minister K. Badouvas as the No. 69166/88 decision merely approves supply only 84,000 digital circuits. Nevertheless the board of OTE proceeded to direct a contract to supply 470,000 digital benefits worth 32 billion. GRD which refused to approve the new Minister J. Charalambous. In June 1989 at sygkyverniseos (government Tzanetakis) OTE's management blocked the above commission, which had already telmatothei after no. 424901/89 opinion LegCo OTE.

In November 1989 Zolotas responsible party government and the Minister C. Kefaloyiannis ignores the contribution of OTE for direct awards of 470,000 digital benefits and instructs the administration of OTE for conducting a public tender. OTE's management responds to a competition and makes negotiations with both suppliers. G. Kefaloyiannis introduces the issue in Cabinet and decided unanimously to conduct public notice, even down three-member committee of ministers Gennimata C., N. Themelis and C. Kefaloyiannis to monitor the implementation of the decision of the Cabinet. While the Cabinet instructs the OTE management to stop negotiations with both suppliers. OTE's management not only stopped the negotiations, but bypasses the Council of Ministers on 30.01.1990 and a notice to inform political leaders falsely that achieved reduction in price by 7 billion. dr and asked to make direct awards to the new value. The truth is that lowered premiums by 7 billion drachmas of the original contract but with a corresponding reduction in material supply. Ie no significant change in baseline was. On 31 January 1990 Constantine Mitsotakis identical with the views of the Management Board OTE causes of political leaders in the Zolota to discuss OTE and charges are pending. At this meeting it was decided to direct assignment, as he suggested in SIEMENS and Intracom and not tendered. The next day 31.01.1990 OTE's management informed of the positive attitude of political leaders and the same evening at 00.10 decided the supply of 470,000 digital facilities with private contracts, by signing the relevant contracts with suppliers at 20.00 of 01.02.1990. As reported to the Commission with a memorandum from 24.02.2010, the former minister John Kefaloyiannis, the above manipulation led him to resign, he announced to the then Prime Minister of universal government Xenophon Zolotas detail referring to its causes. He says that was asked by the then leader of New Democracy Konstantinos Mitsotakis and asked not to resign and that his refusal to postpone the announcement of his resignation a day. John Kefaloyiannis returns the above request of Constantine Mitsotakis who accepted it and ignore the intentions, the will of the political leader not disclosed the reasons for his resignation as Minister in the meantime is orchestrating the resignation of Prime Universal pretext for some other reason (disagreements between political leaders on the crisis led the army). The New Democracy government of Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, which emerged from the elections of 6 April 1990 fully endorsed the disputed commission OTE. Then is prosecuted by the 7 th regular investigator for the above contracts and exculpatory decree issued in March 1993 during the government of Mitsotakis. While in 1994 the 7 th regular magistrate proceeded to an inquiry about the legality of Minister No. "7220/90", "7230/90", "7160/89" and "7170/89" contract and after its completion of the prosecutor brought criminal prosecutions.

In March 1994 the then management of OTE commissioned INTRACOM and SIEMENS supply 1,000,000 digital benefits. Because of stories and complaints of the press, the Prosecutor Prosecutor George Zorbas started on 16.12.1994 to conduct preliminary investigation. On 28.11.1995, the Board of Directors of OTE in a discussion about the process of digitization and modernization of OTE Mr. C. Skarpelis, Director Telecommunication System recommends and suggests the choice of the road program agreements. Even though the soil is not fertile because of fears expressed for years organization's commitment to nursing providers. At the same meeting approved the Business Plan and OTE for the period 1996-2000. In June 1995 Mr George Zorbas in conclusion asked him to bring criminal prosecutions for the OTE officials who were involved in this procurement and suppliers. On 30.6.1995 the case was removed by Giorgos Zorbas, by decision of the Appeals Prosecutor Christos Tzanakaki. On 12.03.1996 was directly awarded order for supply of 270,000 digital services at Siemens and Intracom total cost of 16 billion. dr On 03.05.1996 with its findings, the Court vindicated Mr George Zorbas and identified four (4) violations. In 1998 the case was filed by Attorney Appeals. On 29.01.1997 was directly awarded order for supply of 338,000 digital benefits of which 167,000 to 171,000 and a IINTRACOM SIEMENS total cost 12.2 billion. dr On 28.05.1997 the Board of Directors of OTE approve the Special Development Plan 19971998 OTE. On 31.07.1997, during even the prosecution's 1994 contracts 7220/90, 7230/90, 7160/89 and 7170/89. OTE's management committee recommends negotiating consisting of Messrs. C. Chrysolouri, C. Orfanos, C. Skarpelis, C. E. Kazantzis and Kyriazis, to the assistance of the competent services of OTE and the legal department to negotiate with the companies suppliers, including Siemens and Intracom and explore the possible conditions for the award Contract Programming (CP). Decided not to recruit the House Price Waterhouse as a consultant in this process. On 30.08.1997 Mr. Harris Kastanidis resigned from the DOT in its letter of resignation shall state that "some perceive my presence at the Ministry of Transportation as a barrier to the free exercise of their games." The resignation is accepted without further investigation and replaced immediately by Anastasios Mandela. On 09.12.1997 the Board of Directors of OTE with under No 2544/09.12.1997 approve the conclusion of the program agreements. Approve the necessary budget for all program agreements amounted to 1,118 million euros, of which 464.5 million euros will be provided had concerned the material. On 15.12.1997, signed by the CP 8002 by SIEMENS TELE SA for the supply of hardware, software and services and the digitization of the network. Since 2004, under successive publications in print and on-line at home and abroad, the company Siemens, a leader in the telecommunications sector, was hovering to lessen this unjust distributes money from the "black funds" for contracts not only in our country but in many countries abroad.

From November 2006 launched an extensive investigation by the Prosecutor of Munich for charging any criminal liability against officers and employees, the company SIEMENS AG and of other subsidiaries in corruption, bribery, infidelity, etc. Along with the survey of German prosecutors, in April 2007 the SEC and the Federal U.S. Department of Justice, under control of the international fight against corrupt practices, he began conducting research SIEMENS AG, because the company in March 2001 was listed on the NYSE. Under pressure from these investigations, the Audit Committee of the Board SIEMENS AG decided independently of the parallel investigations by public authorities to instruct the legal firm Debevoise & Plimpton advanced internal audit to investigate the possible commission of company managers, criminal offenses related to illegal practices promotional money laundering. In these publications was hovering to mix senior party officials, senior government officials and government agents. Based on these reports, the Greek Justice, ex officio from 27.04.2005 conducted preliminary investigation initially on the case of system security for the Olympic Games C4I and later the commission OTE and eventually indicted in rem on 01.07.2008. The alleged involvement of politicians made it necessary to investigate the matter by the Greek Parliament, as required by the Constitution and the Rules of the House, especially since the Constitution provides very brief period of limitation of the right of Parliament to bring criminal charges against Ministers and Deputy Ministers. In February 2008 the New Republic has rejected the proposal and PASOK President George Papandreou on the establishment of the Selection Committee for the SIEMENS case on the grounds of a parallel investigation of the case by the court. Further on 9 May 2009 on his own initiative ended early work of the Second Ordinary Session of the XII Period of the House. This decision led to produce legal effects on the restriction of the parliament to prosecute members of the Karamanlis government for offenses committed during the course of their duties until the end of its first legislature in 2007, which achieved in combination with the slow progress of the investigation. The current Prime Minister even put one of its priorities the fight against corruption and to establish principles of transparency in the functioning of the State. For this, on 17.12.2009 was tabled in the House of Assembly, in accordance with Article 68 of the Constitution and Articles 144 and following of the Rules of the House proposal of 128 members of the Parliamentary Group of PASOK, which was accepted by the assembly to set up inquiry Commission to investigate the whole case is Siemens. Ie to inform the parliament and public opinion, truth be identified and attributed any responsibility for those who will arise and to make proposals for establishing the necessary legislative framework to ensure transparency. On 27.01.2010 was discussed and passed unanimously by the House the above proposal. The Examination Committee, appointed by the House, was constituted on 02.02.2010. President was elected MP of PASOK Sifis Valyrakis. I. In its investigation of the Examination Committee to achieve the purpose for which it was created, made the following actions:

Highlighted the elements constituting the existence of a well organized plan drafted by senior executives of the company SIEMENS, which on behalf of and for the benefit of the money traded lessen this unjust contracts with the Greek state and entities of the parastatal. The movement is done through the "black funds" of the company with intricate and complex ways that had adopted the privy to these officials, not to reveal the path of black money. This plan was revealed initially by reports in national and international press, as these illegal practices were applicable to other countries. According to data gathered by the Commission requested a letter from the competent prosecutor be brought additional criminal charges against those responsible for violating article 187 1, 3 of the Penal Code (Organized crime). Indeed on 07.09.2010 brought additional prosecution for the operation of Article 187 paragraph 1, 3 of the Penal Code after a delay of six years from the revelation of the scandal. Even so, the whole judicial investigation to date has included senior executives of the parent SIEMENS, who confessed before the German court that had been established between the network management and handling of money for illegal purposes. Respecting the independence of justice and full respect for the separation of powers, the Commission sent to the competent judicial functionaries from the first day of work, so the minutes of meetings, and any other item periircheto aware of. The consequence of this practice was that the deposit of k, Anastasios Manteli the Inquiry brought the same day without any delay prosecution against him for money laundering from criminal activity. It is worth noting that until then had not been invited either as a witness, although he was the minister responsible for the No. 8002 Convention programming of SIEMENS in OTE, which he was investigating the investigator. Had already apologized strains of OTE and SIEMENS for whom warrants were issued or whether imposed constraints, and the bills were deposited funds from the slush funds of SIEMENS. For this case, the Selection Committee having knowledge that had enabled the clauses in the most favored customer, competitive bidding and costing control envisaged by the Convention "8002" letter of the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court called for an investigation to find any criminal responsibility on the Management of OTE. The prosecutor ordered an preliminary examination. When brought further prosecution under Article 187 (OC) of the Criminal Code, the Inquiry Commission announced in a letter to the responsible ministers and asked them to impose sanctions against the company SIEMENS. By letter to the ministers called for changing the institutional framework of the existing Committee on money laundering and the establishment of independent authorities, as in force until 2008. (The Minister of Economy and Finance George Alogoskoufis had abolished the independent authority and the position adopted by poor administrative control panel, supervised by him). By porismatiki the reference to the Competition Commission of Inquiry Commission requested sanctions in the company SIEMENS, for violating the rules of free competition, which committed the company holds a dominant position in the domestic market and predominantly in the telecommunications sector. After much effort the Commission of Inquiry has requested and received all the files from the Justice for which he had conducted research from 1998 onwards. He also asked all the

ordinances that had been closed and which showed that there were imputed criminal responsibility and had been declared innocent by all stakeholders, affiliates or other companies competing SIEMENS eg The INTRACOM. Occurred on them that Justice was conducting longitudinal research on various individual cases by different magistrates thus breaking the overall investigation into several sub-segments without any correlation, and use of data resulting from each. This process proved ineffective and contributed to impunity for the perpetrators. In fact this case not only did not become any liability company SIEMENS but the above company as a legal person under the legal representation, present outside the research therefore not taken against the necessary measures by the state . Along with studying the details mentioned the Inquiry Commission examined 145 witnesses in 101 meetings, while seeking the cooperation of the competent state bodies and other agencies to uncover and find the real truth. Specifically requested cooperation: Of SDOE to control this account of SIEMENS SA, relating benefits to political entities, controlling persons presumed surrogate and offshore companies involved and the reports of the General Hospital and DEP.A.NO.M. Of the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, to: Opening accounts allegedly "feeder accounts" of slush funds of SIEMENS, and of the recipients (individuals or legal entities), such as those described in the relevant file. Control a) amicable settlement between Christoforakos and SIEMENS AG, b) banking transactions financiers, officials, businessmen, bank, etc. c) the Liberian company MAYO Corporation. Alongside forwarded to the Commission on money laundering documents related to the control of wealth declarations of Ministers and Deputy Ministers Yannos Papantoniou Chris Markogiannaki Byron Polydoras George Voulgarakis Christos Verelis Michalis Liapis Nikos Christodoulakis George Alogoskoufis and requested the authority to make its own actions under the powers and responsibilities he had. Bank of Greece to appoint officers (financial analysts) to study the data generated by the opening of accounts was conducting the Committee for Combating Money Laundering, associated with the company Siemens. For this purpose: Forwarded copies of bank documents were sent by the investigating authorities abroad and had been investigating the case of Siemens. Requested the check on suspicious flows of people involved (surrogate) to politicians or officials, such as those derived from witness statements and were brought to the Commission and the investigation of bank accounts movements for specific transactions. Finally transmit all data received from the Committee for Combating Money Laundering, Bank of Greece for more specific analysis of bank accounts and writing reports. Exchange Commission for the control of companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange and brokers whose accounts allegedly been fueled by black SIEMENS funds or that have occurred

in the process of money laundering. Competition Commission for a) the imposition of legal sanctions to Siemens as directly violate the provisions of both domestic and Community law governing free competition and b) control of the House porismatikon Reporting Accountants of Health of any violations of free competition through "lished 'competitions. Legal Council of State to pursue claims against all parties involved, natural and legal persons arising from criminal case files formed the damages suffered by the Greek state and entities, and applications for interlocutory seeking the seizure of their property. Audit Committee of assets declarations of Members to verify the statements of politicians' assets, which were in the survey year responsibilities related to the case. The assistance of Europol through the courts on whether or not the accounts of individuals involved, such as Mr. Michael Christoforakos, Dionysios Dendrinos, Christos Karavela, vestibule Mavridis and legal persons participating. Judicial assistance of the Prosecutor of Munich, for copies of the file had been formed by the German courts to investigate the matter SIEMENS. Members of the Examination along with some from the Commission last Giorgos Christodoulou after the Prosecution's response, went to Munich and took deposits from the former CFO of the company, the former CEO of SIEMENS HELLAS, the President, Vice President and Head of transparency of SIEMENS AG. The intervention Eurojustice to transmit all the data file formed by the Prosecutor of Munich, evidence has thus far taken the Examination Committee. The discussion of the request has not yet occurred. Data from the Ministries and Agencies of the wider public sector on contracts with the company SIEMENS, and data from the same SIEMENS. For contracts with hospitals were controlled by the Inspectorate of Public Health, whose report with findings, drawn from the Special Committee were sent to the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court and Chief Prosecutor of the Court of Athens. On this basis a preliminary examination by prosecutors for the detection of criminal acts. During its investigation, the Select Committee took into account: The information contained in the criminal case files which have been formed on the contracts of Siemens with the Greek state and entities of the public sector as a) a contract for the System Security C4I, b) program contracts and continuing agreement of the CIU, c) Convention 8002 OTE with enforceable orders, d) the Convention Communications System Battle Zone "Hermes B phase ', and e) to provide software air defense system Patriot . Any other evidence, including testimonies and documents received in the Commission's attention the decisions of German courts, the report of the law firm Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. Note that the content of this report is not disputed by either the individuals involved, nor the company SIEMENS today. With full awareness of the Commissioners of their duty towards the Greek society and the truth

and respecting the absolute freedom of opinion, from the outset sought through dialogue a consensus or even the widest possible consensus, both in individual decisions, and to the extent possible and the wording of the finding, which was expressed in practice by the unanimous adoption of 17 texts, requests or petitions.

2. Really
Source: http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/2_pragmatika.doc Translated: http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&rurl=translate.goo gle.com&sl=el&tl=en&twu=1&u=http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/2_pragmatika.doc&usg=A LkJrhg4ibS9dSoFHltF_noV7-SRvHh5NA 1. The case of OTE Since the establishment of OTE in 1949 and until 1977 the German company Siemens virtually monopolized the supply of the OTE telecommunications and support hardware (power supply systems, electrical equipment, etc.). On 11.11.1977 was announced by the then government to establish the Greek Electronics Industry (ELVIL SA) with capital of 400 million drachmas and shareholders ETVA by 55% and 45% OTE. The ELVIL was to organize and operate industrial plant electronic communication equipment for both the needs of OTE and the wider public sector. On 29.04.1981 the ELVIL launched an international tender No. 7901 to find a partner because it was necessary to import expertise through manufacturing company abroad. The aim was to design and manufacture of factory electronic telecommunications equipment, which would cover the initial needs of OTE was about 225,000 lines. The production would take the ELVIL. The Board of Assessment Committee ELVIL up the offers of manufacturing firms that participated in the contest. In November 1983 the Review Committee under Professor Stavros Thomadaki considered economically and technically most prevalent were the offerings of manufacturing firms Siemens and Ericsson, which had developed technology EWSD and AXE - 10 respectively for the digital exchanges. The issue was the selection of technologies by Vasso Papandreou, Minister of State for Industry, Energy and Technology in meeting KYSYM on 16.09.1986 entitled "Digital Communications Systems ELVIL." At this meeting, as is clear from the record that met, developed a strong argument for the introduction of technologies that will produce telecommunications equipment through ELVIL they have selected two European technology or one European and one American. The KYSYM not really got no decision, and everyone claimed they did then to justify their own choices. The matter was returned again in ELVIL, which under the chairmanship of Mr. N. Painter decided the choice of technologies EWSD and AXE-10 and manufacturing firms SIEMENS and ERICSSON, respectively, for implementation in Greece of the production program of digital telephone exchanges through of ELVIL. Because current law in 1977 stipulated that in order for a company to sign business with the government should have Greek participation of at least 30%. The two manufacturers were sure to indicate the SIEMENS AE or SIEMENS and ERICSSON INTRACOM or as official partners from Greece to overcome the problem of legislation. The first big step in the one-way acquisition of OTE has done only obstacle now is the existence of ELVIL. Mr. Anastasios Mandela, President of OTE and Mr. Theofanis Tombros, CEO of OTE, pushing for the abolition of ELVIL. Cause the meeting at the Ministry of National Economy under Mr. Kostas Simitis with the participation of Greece's OTE MTC and ETVA. Mr. Anastasios Mandela and Mr. Theofanis Tombros seek the abolition of ELVIL and the proposal is consistent ETVA and Yvette.

The Minister of Transport and Communications, Mr. Constantin Badouvas expressing strong disagreements and arguments negate the idea of repealing ELVIL, leaving the meeting and asked Mr. Ioannis Papanikolaou, Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister and Secretary KY.S.E. D informing the Prime Minister. The whole process but did not stop there and soon announced the abolition of ELVIL without consulting the relevant minister. From that moment begins the final "bonding" of OTE the chariot of Siemens. Virtually abolished ELVIL and lost the prospect of creating a State production of digital communications centers in the country. This resulted in the ELVIL be simply an intermediate ring for state commissions from multinationals, downgraded so that a) OTE to distance itself from the operation of ELVIL and b) to withdraw ETVA by the partnership. The 1985 has already issued the "White Paper" of telecommunications policy document European Community, which requires the liberalization of telecommunications, dictating upgrading the network to digital. On 22.12.1987 the Board of Directors of OTE, upon the recommendation of the then DirectorGeneral proceeded to the direct supply of 84,000 and 20,000 digital circuits benefits totaling 7.5 billion drachmas in the selected ELVIL companies, citing Case KYSYM five-year digitization project network of OTE These contracts known as contracts for 7160 and 7170 signed by Mr. Constantine Badouvas, were separate and not joined the program five digitization of the network of OTE. Vendors have undertaken to supply OTE materials or services and to invest in ELVIL a total value equal to 26% of 7.5 billion drachmas As it became known, the prices of these contracts was substantially overvalued in relation to international market prices. In OTE's management identified by the then Minister Costas Badouvas that British Telecom has purchased the ERICSSON AXE centers a price much lower than proposed in the contract. Specifically, British Telecom paid 23,893 drachmas per digital delivery instead of the amount of 85,195 drachmas to buy OTE. Noted that Canada purchased at the cost centers EWSD 25,000 drachmas per digital delivery instead of the amount of 69,457 drachmas bought OTE (see TIME No. 10/1987, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION No. 3 / 1988). Namely the "Convention 7160" which was the supplier Ericsson, the average cost of digital services was for OTE 256% greater than the average purchased by British Telecom. In particular circuits the average price charged for the OTE was 176% greater than those purchased by Canada. In the "7170 Convention", where the supplier was Siemens, the corresponding increases were 165% and 109% respectively. In 1988 the Administration Utility approved the purchase of 470,000 digital services directly awarded to INTRACOM houses and SIEMENS totaling 32 billion drachmas In the summer of 1989 set new management OTE composed by Mr. Anastasios Menes, Mr. Kyriakos and Mr. Kioulafas Maravelia. The new administration commissioned a four-member committee headed by OTE Board Member Mr. T heads to review the legality of contracts 7160 and 7170. The committee gave its findings on 23 October 1989 (see ref 1, 7160 contract audit report and 7170). The main points were: 1. The commission was awarded directly by invoking nonexistent decision KYSYM in violation of Rules of Procurement of OTE.

2. The contract prices were significantly higher in world prices, but also those which had emerged from the contest that was announced by the ELVIL. It was decided to send the findings to the prosecutor to determine whether there criminal responsibility and to take advantage of the renegotiation of contracts with two companies. The time OTE's management ignored the findings of Mr. Kefalea and recommended to the then Deputy Minister of Transport Mr John Kefaloyiannis continue negotiations for the supply of 470,000 digital services by direct assignment. Mr. John Kefaloyiannis did not agree with the recommendation of the Management of OTE and instructed to proceed with OTE to tender for the supply of 470,000 digital services to ensure the interests of the Agency. OTE's management ignored a ministerial order and insisted on direct assignment to specific suppliers. On 25.01.1990 Mr. John Kefaloyiannis introduced the matter to Cabinet, which is holding its contribution unanimously decided to carry out public notice and instructed OTE to stop negotiations with suppliers for direct assignment. The Cabinet appointed three members to the Ministers Mr. George Gennimata, Mr. Nicholas and Mr. John Themelis Kefaloyiannis, with a mandate to monitor the implementation of the decision on conducting a public tender (see ref 2, an extract of the minutes Cabinet meeting on 01/25/1990). OTE's management ignored this decision of the Cabinet and proceeded to direct award. After negotiations, the Commission set renegotiation OTE's management reached a conclusion. Based on this finding the Administration of Mr. Anastasios Menes - Kyriacou Kioulafas on January 26, 1990, sent a note to the three political leaders and Mr Xenophon Zolotas, Universal Prime Minister, who had come from new elections, in which states that achieved improved contract made by Mr Theofanis Tombros, by 6 billion drachmas (from 32.5 to 26.5). This decrease involved nouns and corresponding reduction of the material which conceals the then political leadership. Furthermore, account has two options: i. either signed an improved contract ii. or cancel and issue invitations to new open competition, with the result but on the other hand, endless litigation with two companies and on the other weakness of the OTE for at least two years to meet its investment plan for the digitization of its network. Political leaders and the then Prime Minister, taking into account the information note of the opinion that OTE should proceed to the first solution. The next day, the Board Agency unanimously awarded a revised contract of 470,000 digital benefits. With reference to the media officers of OME - OTE assessed positively the decision (without considering all the facts and without the approval of the Board of OME-OTE). With this in mind OTE's management unanimously recommended the Government to qualify Zolotas improved agreement. Based on this contribution, the political leaders and the Prime Minister did not prevent the signing of the contract. The Communist Party with knowledge now of what had happened, then made three suggestions: Firstly, establishing a Select Committee on the control of major government procurement and OTE. Second, to immediately begin procedures for launching the new competition commission digital centers by OTE, while disengagement process to move from compulsory cooperation with SIEMENS. Thirdly, to clarify its stance and decided the role of ELVIL, which following decisions KYSYM

was "clinically dead" and to ensure the conditions for the fulfillment of the development program of OTE ". On 15.01.1991, the Government of Mr. Constantine Mitsotakis, the new management of OTE (Themelis - Kouremenos) Board recommended awarding supply 720,000 of benefits for both companies. Disagreed with the recommendation of the employee representative on the Board of OTE. A few months later, the contract is awarded, but decreased the number of benefits to 400,000. In March 1992, the Board of OTE decided to call an open international tender for 1,100,000 digital services. On 21.07.1992, the Board decided OTE supply about 157,000 other benefits for the needs of companies from 1993 INTRACOM and SIEMENS, as an extension of previous contracts with two companies. Two days later, have submitted bids for the 1,100,000 benefits companies AT & T, NORTHERN Telekom, ALKATEL, SIEMENS and INTRACOM. Evaluated the technical and financial offers. On 04.03.1993 the Council adopted the Court of Appeals No. 597 Ordinance which acquitted all the defendants from each category (see ref 3, No. OP 597/1993 letter of the President's threemember Steering Committee). On 13.04.1993 was made by the board of OTE, the first evaluation of technical bids of all five companies, based on two ratings, the Evaluation Committee and the Management Center. According to the first rejected the offerings of AT & T, and ALKATEL NORTHERN Telekom. Finally the composition of the two scores is ranked first, followed by the INTRACOM SIEMENS. On 07.05.1993 the Board of Directors of OTE opened the financial bids from five companies and the April 1994 contract awarded to both bidders. On 14.06.1993 the Council of European Communities adopted Directive 38/93 coordinating the procurement procedures in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications in order to complete liberalization of the telecommunications sector. The directive provides for the gradual establishment of the internal market over a period which will expire as of December 31, 1993 and thus created an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital . In accordance with Articles 30 and 59, restrictions of free movement of goods and freedom to provide services for the supply and service contracts in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications. But since it was considered that the implementation of the Directive at the latest by 1.1.1994 and opening the market to competition may have particularly detrimental effects on the economies of some countries, including Greece, gave to our country extension for compliance to this directive until 01.01.1998. Under Article 5 of the instructions under contracts concluded before the entry into force of the directive could still be applied under the conditions it provided, but forbidden now under new contracts (and in Greek law programmatic agreements) and all new contracts should necessarily follow the terms and formulas set out in that Directive. In the spirit of the directive and that the same article states that "States may not use framework agreements improperly and thereby hinder competition," only the choice of street competitions (for which establishes specific types and typing yet and cases of permissible contract by direct agreement), could ensure the effective liberalization. Already in 1995, OTE discuss the conclusion of program agreements and preference towards

the process of tendering, which is considered too long in relation to the immediate need for the Agency to complete the digitization of its network. In 1994 the 7th regular magistrate proceeded to an inquiry about the legality of Minister No. "7220/90", "7230/90", "7160/89" and "7170/89" contract and after its termination, the prosecutor brought criminal prosecutions. In March 1994 the then management of OTE commissioned INTRACOM and SIEMENS supply 1,000,000 digital benefits. Because of stories and complaints of the press, the Prosecutor Prosecutor George Zorbas started on 16.12.1994 to conduct preliminary investigation. In testimony to the former President of the Court who was briefly President of OTE Mr. Anastassios Gonis, said the contest with No. 7753/23.07.1992 concerning the supply of digital services 1,100,000 and 150,000 circuit started "abnormal." The reason was that the date of the was postponed by 20-30 days without observing the essential type of publicity, as required by Regulation commission OTE and none of the bids from five firms (AT & T-HPA, NORTHERN TELECOM- CANADA, FRANCE, ALCATEL, SIEMENS-GREECE, INTRACOM-GREECE) was not consistent with the basic terms of the Declaration (see Ref 4, affidavit Anastasios Goni 22.07.1996 of the Deputy Special investigation this year, Mr. Chris Georgantopoulos). On 20.04.1994 the Deputy Director General of DG 15th European Commission in a letter to the Permanent Representative of Greece to EU notes that some parts of the 7753/92 competition require clarifications, requests for additional data and considers that a body must refrain from concluding contracts with Houses (SIEMENS and INTRACOM), until they can clarify because the procedure followed may not be consistent with Community law. In response to that letter, the then director general of OTE Lambrou wrote to the Department, detailing the positions of OTE. Following the above Deputy Director of DG 15th the European Commission back to 5/20/1994, featuring Submissions evidence insufficient and insists the request not to conclude contracts with companies, warns not to initiate procedure of Article 169 TEC against OTE. On 23.06.1994 the legal department OTE opinion in favor of awarding contracts to firms featuring the demands of the Deputy General Director of DG 15, European Committee for nonbinding, and since the 16.06.1994 was advised that there was no impediment the conclusion of this contract by the opposition that existed for the payment of past agreements between OTE and the Houses. After signing the contract no-action response was not reported by the European Commission. On 28.11.1995, the Board of Directors of OTE in a discussion about the process of digitization and modernization of OTE Mr. C. Skarpelis, Director Telecommunication System recommends and suggests the choice of the road program agreements. Even though the soil is not fertile because of fears expressed for years organization's commitment to nursing providers. At the same meeting approved the Business Plan and OTE for the period 1996-2000. In June 1995 Mr George Zorbas in conclusion asked him to bring criminal prosecutions for the OTE officials who were involved in this procurement and suppliers. On 30.6.1995 the case was removed by Giorgos Zorbas, by decision of the Appeals Prosecutor Christos Tzanakaki. In 1996, Law 2446/1996, extending the validity of Law 1433/1984 for the programming agreements in the public sector includes companies operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications and public sectors, with the right and public enterprises to enter into

programmatic agreements, notwithstanding 2286/1995 for carrying supplies (Law 2446/1996 arthr.16 Paragraph 2) allows the competent bodies of those entities to conclude not only implementing contracts but and contracts under this unprecedented contest. In that law, however, was that "the above programmatic agreements and contracts are subject to final approval of the supervising Minister, after consulting the Competition Commission." Further provided that a portion of the materials to be produced by domestic industries to domestic value added. Already in January 1996 Minister of Transportation undertakes Ch Kastanidis who suggested to the then Prime Minister Simitis to create an independent authority for the control of large public procurement. The creation of "Control Council Procurement and Public Works", then this paper is the program of PASOK for the upcoming election then. However in April 1997 while the rapporteur of the idea of Mr. Harris Kastanidis absent abroad, made an extraordinary meeting of the Cabinet which decided that "existing safeguards of transparency in government is enough," and essentially revoked the constitution of this authority. On 12.03.1996 was directly awarded order for supply of 270,000 digital services at Siemens and Intracom total cost of 16 billion dr On 03.05.1996 with its findings, the Court vindicated Mr George Zorbas and identified four (4) violations. In 1998 the case was closed. On 29.01.1997 was directly awarded order for supply of 338,000 digital benefits of which 167,000 to 171,000 and a IINTRACOM SIEMENS total cost 12.2 billion. dr On 28.05.1997 the Board of Directors of OTE approve the Special Development Plan 19971998 OTE. On 31.07.1997, during even the prosecution agreements of 1994 and just 5 months before the deadline for compliance with Directive 93/38, OTE's management committee recommends negotiating consisting of Messrs. C. Chrysolouri, C. Orfanos, C. Skarpelis, C. E. Kazantzis and Kyriazis, to the assistance of the competent services of OTE and the legal department to negotiate with the companies suppliers, including Siemens and Intracom and explore the possible conditions for the award Contract Programming (CP). Decided not to recruit the House Price Waterhouse as a consultant in this process. On 30.08.1997 Mr. Harris Kastanidis resigned from the DOT in its letter of resignation shall state that "some perceive my presence at the Ministry of Transportation as a barrier to the free exercise of their games," admitting implicitly but clearly can not control the happenings in the area of responsibility. The resignation is accepted without further investigation and replaced immediately by Anastasios Mandela, and has previously served as Chairman of the Board with OTE and T. Tombros had signed the first assignments of digital services in 1987-88 in these Companies. On 07.10.1997 the Board of Directors of OTE decides to proceed with negotiations for a programmatic agreements on sourcing network and E / O hardware. In negotiations benchmark for prices to be decided prices by type of material was achieved by OTE in the last contract. 14.10.1997 On the 20th Council Meeting OTE Division, discussed the report of Price Waterhouse. Recommended by Mr Peter Lambrou full adoption of the findings of Price Waterhouse on the terms and criteria for the supplier. The Board of Directors of OTE decide the further treatment of the framework for the award of MS and for this purpose a working group set

up by N. Kalouptsidis, C. Orfanos, General Managers of telecom system and finance, legal council and other officials. On 02.12.1997 the Board of Directors of OTE authorized the negotiation committee to proceed with final negotiations for the conclusion of programmatic agreements involving the digitization of the network and make an appropriate recommendation to the Board of OTE. On 07.12.1997 the Negotiating Committee shall submit its findings to the management of OTE. In this suggest submitting the findings to the Board for approval and decision. On 09.12.1997 the Board of Directors of OTE with under No 2544/09.12.1997 adopt the above findings, approves the award of MS and authorize the Directors General of Telecommunications and System Functions for setting any issues that would arise until the signing of program agreements and the finalization of the quantities of equipment and services and the A messenger (OP) per house. Approve the necessary budget for all program agreements amounted to 1,118 million euros, of which 464.5 million euros will be provided had concerned the material. Also authorized the President and Chief Executive Officer D. Papoulias to proceed to the signature of the CP and the first OP per house. On 15.12.1997, signed by the CP 8002 by SIEMENS TELE SA for the supply of hardware, software and services and the digitization of the network. On behalf of OTE signed by the Chairman and Managing Director, Mr. Dimitris Papoulias, and on behalf of the SIEMENS Ludwig Zasper and Nicholas Tatsikas on SIEMENS Remote Industrial SA Elias and George for SIEMENS AE. The total estimated cost of the CP 8002 amounted to 464.5 million euros (158 billion drachmas) and would result from the total amount of individual order fulfillment. To safeguard the interests of OTE that CP 8002 included three clauses, whose implementation on an annual basis will ensure the interests of the Agency. Specifically, the economic conditions of MS were as follows: - The term of the deposit of competitive bidding, according to which if any other supplier offering some of the materials at a lower price, should the House to reduce the price of a competitor in this House. - The most favored customer, whereby the firm Price Waterhouse had undertaken to control more than twenty organizations and suppliers to check that the prices at which buy OTE from SIEMENS was at the lower range limit price sell the company . - Clause costing control. Under this clause, which will be being carried out each year, each enforceable order, Cost control at the supplier's financial data to calculate the margin and there is no unfair profit. Proper application of these three clauses would result in a continued reduction in prices, which also agreed a maximum temporary and would fall constantly. The goal of the clauses was to ensure that OTE would buy at prices, which seemed to them would be obtained if you supply each time following a competition. The aim was CP 8002 be implemented in five annual enforceable orders. The price of materials would be formed after the end of each order and following the implementation of the clauses so normally would and pay. In each case, however, will see any overpricing could OTE seek appropriate compensation.

For the implementation of the Programme Agreement 8002 signed the following messenger: The A OP. signed on 15.12.1997, ie with the signing of the contract and the value of the material was finally on the amount of 261,951,577.40 euros. The Second OP signed on 15.11.1999 and the value of materials amounted to 122,561,995.60 euros. TS OP signed on 04.08.2000 and the value of materials amounted to 76,390,315.48 euros. The D OP signed on 7.11.2000 and the value of materials amounted to 112,877,476, 16 Euro. R OP signed on 18.07.2001 and the value of materials amounted to 86,104,181.95 euros. The F OP signed on 29.7.2002 and the value of materials amounted to 33,114,000, 00 Euro. Was enforceable orders relating to telecommunications equipment for the Olympic Games in 2004, which was not planned from the outset, the issue of supply of that material was not provided but in 2002 was that there should be a commission under the terms of CP. The Board of Directors of OTE was the appropriate decision on 18.6.2002. The total cost of which six OP was eventually amounted to 692,999,546, 59 Euro. As part of our SD 8002 established the Panel of that Programmatic Agreement, which consisted of members of OTE, supplier representatives and members of the independent director of Price Waterhouse Coopers. During the first year of implementation of the Programme Agreement 8002 OTE posted revenue and achieved the digitalization of the network at a rate of 74% compared with 40% in prior to the beginning of 8002 Programmatic Agreement. And so began the first discussions on the entrance of the New York Stock Exchange, held in late 1998. Further, the Agency proceeded to buy the investment in March 1998, 90% of the telecom operator Armenia (Armentel) and in December the same year bought 35% of the shares of the respective Agency Romania (Rom Telecom). In the year 2000 begin to identify problems of excessive ordering telecom equipment. It turns out that the Agency approved the respective next order, asking and backup material at a rate of 7% without checking if this is necessary. The result was, as submitted to the Selection Committee, "the stores are filled OTE useless and perhaps obsolete technology equipment." Result of conducting this audit was to reduce the budget next year by half around by then-Chief N. Manasis. The application of these three clauses came to safeguarding the interests of the Agency, in practice proved difficult or impossible. Outset and on materials that had previously held contest, used it as a base price that was achieved by OTE in this competition, which always should be reduced. But given the rapid growth of technology (and the fact that the time when OTE was digitized less than 40% of the network, other European countries had completed the digitization and already started discussions on broadband), these materials may already have been underestimated so

technologically and economically. On the implementation of the clauses and raised the following: A) clause in competitive bid: The implementation of this very important clause that would make the procurement process through the program agreements, in a quasi-competitive process, allowing any third party vendor to bid and the supplier to adjust its price in the price of this offer, it proved impossible to completely practice.

The above has happened since, given the signature program agreements, the Houses of suppliers, guaranteeing a continuous flow of materials OTE and with that series. Rendered on that account impossible for any third party vendor to bid or if the needs of the organization knew, nor the level of compatibility of products with the already becoming established. It follows that the only way to achieve the result of that clause was to cause himself OTE competitive bid for specific materials, giving the required standards, which have done and not merely formally stated in the first minutes of committee Evaluation of CP 8002 that "indicated that for the year was filed competing offer."

The actual situation emerged much later, at least 2001 when the then President of the Board of Directors of OTE Mr. Nicholas Manasis activated, as submitted to the Selection Committee, the first clause, (causing the same competitive bid), which remained empty words previous years. (No. 9 Minute Review Commission 1/15/2001)

B) The most favored customer The clause in question as the previous one by itself could not stand because of confidentiality agreements covering the supply of telecommunication companies, so prices will be calculated only by declaration of suppliers. To enable OTE to proceed with the application of that clause in the company commissioned Price Waterhouse Coopers to conduct comparative research reference evaluation in order to collect under the authority and its sources, ranges for a variety of new materials. In the event that OTE was purchased at a price that is not in some minimum level range, the Supplier is obliged to give a similar discount. When it first panel meeting of the Programme Agreement 8002, on 25.11.1998, decided the material would be given to research comparative reference and evaluation and found to reach only 20-25% of the price of A OP. Was then asked the opinion of the independent Director of Price Waterhouse Coopers, the representatives of which stated that "given the existence of mechanisms and tools in MS considers a reasonable rate of 20-25% of the materials and services given to research comparative reference- evaluation. " C) The clause costing control Was in possession of the supplier to accept any-time access to OTE members appointed by

auditors, the accounting and financial information in order to calculate if the margin is within the legal limits and to avoid yperkostologiseis against OTE. The conduct of its cost controls undertook audit firms of international standing, while a decision of the Evaluation Committee of CP 8002 Cost control was carried out in 1999, as was that A OP had two years and so the 1999 prices would stay constant, In first and check conducted by Arthur Andersen, and check for 5, 6 IP, the Price Waterhouse audit. During the execution of the contract, however, to conduct comparative research reference evaluation, which was undertaken by Price Waterhouse Coopers and Germany that used for the needs of a subcontractor in the corresponding Greek company, had hired the company FICHTNER. That company employed engineers to provide information regarding the technical part of the respective investigations. This company used as a representative in Greece Mr. Panteleimon Karakostas, engineer, who, on 02.11.1998 seem to accept transfer amount of DM 200,000 from the account of former executive SIEMENS Elias George, who has been prosecuted fraud against the government and corruption in continuation of this contract 8002. Alongside himself Panteleimon Karakostas allegedly involved in other illegal payments. Additionally, the personal records seized at the corresponding Public order, number of found notes, letters and faxes with references not only to those performed market research and costing them control of the fifth and sixth OP carried out by Price Waterhouse Audit as also numerous contacts with both members of the company and suppliers houses (Mavridis) and OTE, for consultation that appear to mediate. On 27.08.2010 was brought against Mr Panteleimon Karakostas, criminal prosecution for corruption by continuing active against the Greek government and sought the benefit of over 150,000 euros and has been banned from leaving the country. Detailed report on the Programmatic Agreement 8002 and the six performers orders on handling money lawless executives SIEMENS OTE executives and politicians are unanimous in porismatiki report (see ref 5, no. 216 / 21.09.2010 unanimous porismatiki reference). During the trial process before the inquiry, Mr Anastasios Mandel, Minister of Transport 1998 and a senior member of OTE in late 1980, admits he is the beneficial owner of the account A. ROCOS, as well as that on 02.11.1998 Nearly one year after the signing of the Programmatic Agreement, 8002, remittance received DM 200,000 from the company SIEMENS as a political sponsorship. From the data traffic of that statement proves that the transfer resulted from the accounts of Elijah George was involved in handling money for illegal payments. From the same account seems to accept a second wire 250,000 C M whose ground Anastasios Manteli not know. By Anastasios Manteli brought immediate prosecution and an order prohibiting the removal from the country.

Today the investigative process is ongoing and conducted by the special investigating Mr. Nikolakis this year. 31.12.1997 This was the final day - according to EU Directive 93/38/EEC - which was provided to Greece the opportunity to enter program contracts. As part of this directive OTE's management has taken the following actions: i. Trading Commission established by Messrs Chrysolouri George, George Orfanos, General N / Managers Messrs. George Skarpelis, Christos Kazantzis and E. Kyriazis. The intention was to negotiate with companies INTRACOM SA, SIEMENS TELE SA and others to explore the possible conditions for the award program agreements to meet the needs of OTE, as described in the Operational Plan 1997-2000 and the extraordinary investment program 1997 - 1998 (see ref 6, a decision 2523/31.07.1997). ii. Decided to use for this purpose the house consultant PRICE WATERHOUSE. iii. Decided to proceed with negotiations for a programmatic agreements on sourcing network and E / O hardware. In negotiations on the prices it was decided to apply the values of the last contract, by type of material (see ref 7, Case 2528/7.10.1997). iv. Approve the context of programmatic agreements as outlined in the recommendation of the service agents and agreed this should be the basis for negotiations with suppliers (see ref 8, decision 2532/23.10.1997). v. Authorized the negotiation committee and competent officials to proceed with final negotiations on the conclusion of programmatic agreements involving the digitization of the network and to make recommendations to the Board of Directors of OTE (see ref 9, Case 2542/02.12.1997). On 07.12.1997 the negotiation committee submitted its findings to the management of OTE. On 09.12.1997 OTE's management under the number 2544 (see ref 10, a decision 2544/09.12.1997) decision endorsed the results of the Commission's negotiations with trading firms SIEMENS TELE INTRACOM SA and the conclusion of Programming agreements for five years (1998-2002) and authorized the Chairman and D / Managing Director of OTE for their signature. It also approved the expenditure required for all program agreements 381 billion. DR (1118 million), which allocated 158.3 billion. DR (464.5 million) in SIEMENS and 222.7 billion. DR (653.6 million) in INTRACOM. On 15.12.1997 signed the "Programmatic Agreement 8002 'between the telephone and SIEMENS AE, which concerned the supply of hardware, software and services for the digitalization of the network. For OTE signed by the then Chairman and D / CEO Dimitris Papoulias and supplier Messrs. Ludwig Zasper and Nicholas Tatsikas from SIEMENS Tileviomichaniki SA and Mr George Elias of Siemens AE The total consideration for the agreement, which was budgeted amounted to GRD 158,018,800,000 The final price will be shaped by the sum of the individual price of the orders that would follow and would cover the needs and requirements of the buyer.

On 23.12.1997 the Minister of Transport and Communications Mr. Anastasios Mandela under the number 82961, approved the decision "Programmatic Agreement 8002". The "Programmatic Agreement 8002" by SIEMENS originally decided to implement a five (5) an enforceable orders for each year (1998-2002) and certain materials. He also made part of the materials to obtain the most appropriate way (competition or otherwise). Finally for the implementation of programmatic agreements were six (6) enforceable orders totaling 629.9 million , as it was to integrate the needs of telecommunications equipment OTE to cover the Olympic Games in 2004, programmatic agreements and not become tender. On 28.11.2002 Mr. George Skarpelis Executive Vice President of OTE and no. 62/3686030 letter to the Ministry of Transport and Communications Section of the Parliamentary Control of the content of the question of Mr Emmanuel Kefaloyiannis records information relating to the implementation of programmatic agreements. Specifically states that "increases" (compared to original approved price) made by decisions of the competent organs of OTE (see ref 11 in no. 62/368603/28.11.2002 document of the Ministry of Transport and Communications). OTE's management and Directors General Christos Malapanis Georgitsis and Mr. George, who conducted the negotiations with SIEMENS and its representative Mr. Prodromos Mavridis, trying to satisfy the requirements of the company. The Department relied on the regulation of supplies and procurement applications deposited by their own proposals, which he signed and Mr Christos Malapanis. The Administration of Mr. Antonakopoulos front in denial of the competent Directorate to meet the requirements of SIEMENS left the issue unresolved pending the outcome of upcoming elections. On 25.02.2004 a letter to C. Director Financial Officer of OTE Mr. Panagiotis Drum, G. Director of Technical Affairs, Mr. Christos Malapanis estimated that the cost of services of technical support were provided by the supplier firms for the year 2003 did not exceed 15 million (see ref 12, No. 20/480463 to 25/02/2004). On 19.07.2004 the General Director of Technical Affairs, Mr. Christos Malapanis without having cooperated with the competent department of the Agency recommended to the President and CEO of OTE Panagis Vourloumis to ask the board of OTE to the delegate so that he: (A) to sign contracts to provide technical support with SIEMENS, INTRACOM & ANKO from 01.07.2004 to 31.12.2005 up to EUR 25 million per year (B) be costed by the Directorate of Technical Affairs services provided from 1.1.03 up to 30.6.2004 and (C) costed the same address the remaining requirements of firms for services that were not included in existing agreements. (See ref 13, No. 480702/19.07.2004 Presentation Christos Malapani). On 21.07.2004 the Board of Directors of OTE since it disregarded the recommendation of Mr. Chris Malapani decided after discussion to establish a Committee comprising the CEO and his advisers, Mr. Apostle and Mr. George Baratsi Bitros which authorized me to negotiate: (A) companies SIEMENS, INTRACOM & ANKO the price of services of technical support supplied by OTE up to 01.01.2003 and 30.06.2004,

(B) the terms of contracts for technical support companies for the period 01.07.2004 to 31.12.2005 and To submit a paper (see ref 14, the Ministry Number. 2711/21.07.2004 decision). On 13.09.2004 was announced (GG ar.11392/2004) the election of Mr. Dimitrios (legal adviser to Mr. Alogoskoufis) as a new member of the board of OTE, in place of Mr Apostolos Baratsi who had resigned. On 29.09.2004 Mr. Panagis Vourloumis informed the board of OTE had tasked to resolve the outstanding amount and terms of service contract, the supplier companies, the new Director of Technical Affairs, Mr. George Ioannides, who succeeded the resigned k . Malapani Chris. Following this decision of Mr. Panagis Vourloumis the Commission, which was established by decision of the Board on 21.07.2004 was inactive. On 08.11.2004 the Head D / Division Network Operations and Maintenance OTE Nikitas Baritakis and seven (7) Assistant of the Division sent a note to the management of OTE, which offered as consideration for services rendered technical assistance in the amount of 26.500.000 . Specifically proposed 12.000.000 for Siemens, 14.000.000 for INTRACOM and 500.000 for Anco. The officials stressed that: "Network Management and Maintenance believes that the amount of 40.000.000 for two years without tails, resulting in their budgets for the years 20032004 (15 million euros, respectively 25) approaches the solution, but fails to explain the information in its possession and further that this setting is beyond its powers because of the amount to the responsibility of the Board OTE "(see ref 15 The No. 62/372137/08.11.2004 note Management Division). On 07.12.2004 Mr Prodromos Mavridis, Director General of Telecommunications and Informatics, SIEMENS and Alexander Athanasiadis, Chief Financial Telecommunications & Informatics, Siemens sent a letter to Mr Panayi Vourloumis from which it appears that the substantive negotiations on the price of technical support services carried out by the President of OTE. In this letter Mr. Prodromos Mavridis calling for technical support services in an amount of 18.000.000 plus VAT. On 17.12.2004 the Board of Directors of OTE: (A) approved the payment for technical support services for 2004 to SIEMENS and INTRACOM 18 million and 21 million respectively. (B) instructed direct technical support for the years 2005 to 2007 with a price for each supplier could not exceed the annual price agreed for each of the years 2003 and 2004 (see ref 16, under No. 2719/17.12.2004 decision of the board of OTE). In this way the management of OTE charged for SIEMENS price 30% higher than what was paid for the years 2005 to 2007 by increasing the premium for SIEMENS approximately 25 million , without having made a prior estimate. It seems that there was a prior agreement between Mr Panayi Vourloumis and SIEMENS, since the final price in line with the amount requested by Mr. Prodromos Mavridis the letter of 07.12.2004.

On 19.01.2005 was sent to OTE's management letter Advisor OTE Linardatou Mr. George, who voted against the proposal to delegate technical support to companies and INTRACOM SIEMENS indicating that the proposed financial terms, is injurious to the company (see . ref. 17, the letter of Mr. George Linardatou to OTE's management on 19.01.2005). On 24.01.2005 was announced by Mr. George Ioannidis Mr Nikita Baritaki that upon the recommendation of Mr. Panagis Vourloumis decided to replace him and asked to leave the same day from the office (see ref 18, tabling Nikitas Baritaki the Magistrate on 03/07/2005). The replacement of Mr. Nikita Baritaki due to the fact that he refused to apply the decision of the board of OTE, received a majority to be paid in SIEMENS 18.000.000 for services that had been provided in the years 2003-2004. For the same reason replaced the same day, the deputy director of the same address, Mr Anthony Konstantinopoulos. The recommendation to the Board had manipulated the proposal of the Directorate, which was signed Mr Nikita Baritakis and the proposed price of 12.000.000 for the provision of technical services for two years rather than 18.000.000 decided by the OTE's management. On 27.01.2005 the Board meeting of OTE, which discussed the objections of Board member Mr. George Linardatou. Not taken any final decision, but agreed not to give advance companies (see ref 19, under Decision No. 2721/27.01.2005 Board OTE). On 07.07.2005 was announced (GG ar.7164/2005) that Mr. Panagis Vourloumis becomes President and CEO of OTE. The new management continued through direct assignment orders and materials to SIEMENS INTRACOM, which ekrinonto as exceptional and complementary to the Olympic projects. The SIEMENS believed that they were continuing the sixth messenger. With these actions violated the regulation Procurement Agency and made a multitude of irregularities. With the No. 62/289/13.07.2004 decision OTE Messrs. Aivazi Christos Christos Malapanis, George Georgitsis Panagis Vourloumis agreed to pay 1.6 million to SIEMENS for services. This provision was approved on 21.05.2004, but the request for supply of the relevant D / Division had been later on 27.05.2004. On 22.7.2005 the Director General of Technical Affairs, Mr. Yiorgos Ioannides suggested to the President of OTE to sign technical support contracts with firms for the years 2005 to 2007 at a price of about 30.000.000 a year (see ref 20, letter from General Manager Technical Affairs for President George Ioannidis OTE Panagis Vourloumis ar.prot on 22.7.2005. 720 821). On 28.07.2005 the recommendation Ioannidis accepted by all members of the board of OTE except C. Tsovla Director, who expressed reservations about the fees of the Houses and the amount of payment for the first half of 2005 (see ref 21, Case Number Board OTE Minister. 2732/28.07.2005). On 20.10.2005 was the Prosecutor to conduct preliminary examination of infidelity and ordering to receive deposits from anomoti Messrs. Panagis Vourloumis, George Ioannidis George Georgitsis, Chris Malapani (see ref 22, ordering Misdemeanors Attorney Helen Touloupaki on 20.10.2005, A.V.M. P 2005 / 5) On 27.01.2009 was issued by the Supreme Court decision Done accepted the claim by Nikita Baritaki in OTE, which the former Head of Department Network Operations and Maintenance

sought to restore the price of the harmful behavior of the company against , which has replaced the management tasks (see ref 23, Minister No. 565/2009 decision). The decisions of all three tiers of justice Court, Appeal Court, Supreme Court, vindicating Mr. Nikita Baritaki and ordering the reinstatement of the position held by OTE before removal. Mr. Panagis Vourloumis refuses to execute the decisions of Justice. On 27.12.2009, the deputy public prosecutor suggested that the Council Misdemeanors Misdemeanors be referred to Messrs. Panagis Vourloumis, George Ioannidis, Panagiotis and George Bitros Tabourlos accused of direct complicity in kakourgimatiki infidelity, by abetting the continuing (see ref 24, Giorgos Ioannidis memorandum to the Council of the Magistrates Court of 29.03.2010, ref 25 , Panagiotis Tabourlos statement to the Council of the Magistrates Court on 12.03.2010 and its 26 ref Panagis Vourloumis to the Council of the Magistrates Court on 11.3.2010). On 19.5.2010 issued decree Misdemeanors Athens in the indict Mr. Panagis Vourloumis and George Ioannides of infidelity to a degree felony (see ref 27, under Indictment No. 1693/10 Council magistrate of Athens). The case of Railway Following a decision by the then Minister of Transport Mr. Harris Kastanidis (GG 272/07.04.1997) all co-financed projects had to go to the control and management of the security for this purpose ERGOSE company. In December 1997, the OSE has signed seven contracts worth 180 billion. drachmas for the construction of rolling stock. The agreements were the Siemens was: - The framework agreement concerning the supply 33A 20 A / A to contracting companies DESIRO the Greek shipyards, SIEMENS AG and ZIMENS SA price EUR 115,292,224.12 and the activation date 16.11.1999. - The framework agreement concerning the supply of 39 24 H / A to contracting companies to Greek Shipyards, the SIEMENS AG and Krauss Maffei, price of 74,702,601.83 euros and activation date on 16.11.1999. - The programmatic agreement 41 and 41A relating to the procurement of 106 C / D contracting companies with the K / P Greek Shipyards, SIEMENS Austria, TEMOINSA Spain and ZIMENS SA price EUR 119,801,185.24 and the activation date 10.08.1999 . - The 33 programmatic agreement concerning the supply of 15 A / D Suburban, with contracting companies to Greek Shipyards and Adtranz, price of 51,086,237.34 euros and activation date on 30.08.1999. - The programmatic agreement 37 relating to the reconstruction of 65 S / A normal line with contracting the Greek and Spanish Shipyards TEMOINSA, price of 49,960,180.28 euros and activation date on 18.08.1999. - The framework agreement concerning the supply of 35 12 Railbus (which also manufactured in Switzerland), with contracting companies to Greek Shipyards, the Stadler and Adtranz, price of 68,062,173.82 euros and activation date on 25.11.1999. - The "Convention 1 / 97" with Metro (EUR 227.1 million DM in the joint venture Siemens Bombardier).

According to Article 10.1 of the contracts, the CIU was right after 150 days of delay of delivery of the project or renegotiate the penalty or declare contractors outcast and seek forfeiture of guarantee letters. This was a general provision which applied to all contracts. Alternatively, there was the possibility of calling the K / P to new negotiations on the penalties that would apply to arrears of 150 days for 7.5% against K / P. Furthermore it was possible to require payment of default interest rate of 25% for deposits paid. The original contract provided as a place of manufacture of rolling stock to Greek Shipyards. The Programming Agreements been prepared under Law 2286/1995. According to the proclamation of these contracts, a prerequisite for signing them, was the participation of Greek industry as a percentage of the cost of production and the flow of expertise to the domestic industry. For this reason also the choice of contractor was not under the law of international competitions, but was chosen as a framework agreement 'type' contract. These conventions were ratified by cross-party parliamentary committee. A particularly important reason that led to the signing of these contracts was to preserve jobs in the shipyards Scaramanga. Ruling party was Siemens (see filing Dimitrios Karapanou the Inquiry Committee on 17.3.2010, p. 10). The 1997 was the final year - according to EU Directive 9338 (which was incorporated into Greek law by Presidential Decree 345/2001, relating to water, energy, telecommunications and transport) - which was provided in Greece to conclude program contracts. The Programming Agreements been prepared under n.2286/1995. According to the declaration a prerequisite for declaring the contractor was the Greek contribution to a Greek added value, which ultimately accounted for 30% of the entire project (see filing Manolis Satla the Inquiry Commission on 15.06.2010 , p. 148). All programmatic agreements signed in 1997 and was activated in 1999 when it paid advances amounting to 15 or 20%. This payment was made simultaneously with the release. The consultations took place on the scale ventures in which leader was the Greek shipyards. The original contract provided as a place of manufacture of rolling stock to Greek Shipyards. According to the proclamation of these contracts, a prerequisite for signing them, was the participation of Greek industry as a percentage of the cost of production and the flow of expertise to the domestic industry. If no tiroutan the above contractual provision OSE had the right to request a price reduction. As for the PS 33A and 39, at the request of the K / T, rolling stock manufactured in Germany, while reducing the price - after many negotiations - about 1% of the conventional object. However, the primary goal of SD which was to support the domestic production and the existence of the Greek added value was not reached. On 22.12.1997 signed between the CIU and the Consortium "Greek Shipyards SA - SA SIEMENS - SIEMENS AG the "Programmatic Agreement 33rd" (CP 33a) and "Enduring 33rd Convention" (SF 33a), which were designed to manufacture and supply twenty (20) Electrically railcars (HA / A) normal line type Desiro Electric. According to the original contractual delivery schedule, the first, electric would be delivered to the 7th month of 2002 and the last sixth months in 2004. The fourteen of the twenty trains will be delivered at least before the start of the Olympic Games in Athens. As a total price of a contract agreed amount of 115.292.224 .

On 22.12.1997 signed between OSE and the Consortium: "Greek Shipyards SA - SIEMENS SA - SIEMENS AG - KRAUSS MAFFEI the" Programmatic Agreement 39 "and the" Convention Season 39 "as a single text. The contract provided for the construction of twenty-four (24) total H / A normal line. On 22.12.1997 signed between the CIU and the Consortium "Greek Shipyards - SIEMENS SA SIEMENS Austria - TEMOINSA Spain", the "Programmatic Agreement 41A" designed to build one hundred and six (106) passenger carriages. The Convention was activated on 10.08.1999. The one hundred and six (106) C / D built entirely in Greece, Greek Shipyards Scaramanga from K / O 'Greek Shipyards - SIEMENS SA - SIEMENS Austria - TEMOINSA Spain. " The coaches were not electric, it was clearly hauled rolling stock, either electrically or by diesel traction. The total cost of "Enduring Understanding 41A" amounted to 120.019.507 . Under the "continuing agreement 41A", the one hundred and six coaches will be delivered in the period from 10.06.2001 to 10.02.2005 at a specific rate of deliveries. Endokoinopraktika but problems have arisen consequent long delays in delivery. On 22.10.1999 before the activation of AC 33A in Article 11 that was signed between the CIU and the Consortium 'Annex I', which included technical changes. The parties have agreed a new delivery schedule. As shown by the documents and the filing of the then CEO of OSE Konstantinos Giannakou in the implementation of the Convention there were long delays in terms of the Consortium, which due to poor organization, lack of relevant infrastructure facilities of the Greek shipyard, not making the necessary investment for the project, and staff shortages. Negotiations followed and submitted to OSE Consortium proposal - part of the SP and DS 33A and 33A - which among others - stressed that "the equivalent of rolling stock available on the OSE for use free of charge for a period of 24 months and consists eight (8) twin plants Desiro Classic (diesel) Company Siemens and six (6) electric trains consisted of two locomotives and eight cars. " On 16.11.1999 activated the "Programmatic Agreement 39" and the "Convention Season 39" since that day opened all the credit for payment of first installment payment (advance) and delivered by the consortium equal bonds advance. According to the original delivery schedule, the first H / A will be handed the seventh month of 2002 and the last sixth month of 2004. Emerged, however, endokoinopraktika problems that led to long delays resulting OSE to express his concern. Consortium confirmed that all delays would be covered in time. The guarantee mechanisms for the OSE in these contracts was the loss of earnings, letters of credit (participation and performance), the penalties, interest arrears and the provision in Article 9, saying that any violation of the contract term, the Consortium, the supplier has the obligation to compensate for any damage to the OSE * He was referring, however, for damage due to gross negligence or willful misconduct. For simple negligence there was no provision even though it is common to public contracts, the contractors shall be liable up to the "lucky" (Opinion of Members of the New Republic) .*

The Consortium proposed the new OSE timetables late deliveries. The OSE has not accepted the proposal. Then the parent SIEMENS proposed to transfer the construction of the E / A from Greece to Germany. The Consortium agreed and proposed to transfer the construction of the E / A, while presenting new delivery schedule. It suggested, however, the CIU to cede to use equivalent replacement rolling stock. The OSE has positively assessed the proposal from the Consortium. Since, in the course of the construction project, under the new schedule would not even ready to use the electric network that planned the movement of H / A, the Agency requested the replacement of rolling stock available. The Board of OSE, given the seriousness of the matter, referred the matter to a positive recommendation to the General Meeting of Shareholders. The General Assembly authorized the Board of Railway signed an amendment to the contract (see ref 1, no. 50/07.01.2003 Minutes of the Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of the CIU, the no. 34 decision). On 09.02.2000 by a decision of the Board of Railway finalized the list of projects which will be funded for the period 2000-2006. In 2001 Mr. Dennis Panagiotidis, Director General of Communications and Electrical Engineering of Siemens, told Bruno Flad then charge the company for the Department of locomotives that have paid money to people in Greece compared with the CP 39. The Flad not asked Mr. Dionysis Panagiotidis who should be paid, but rather assumed it was people taking decisions in the CIU or ministries (see ref 2, Report of Debevoise & Plimpton SAGATH00002144). Eventually Siekaczek delivered the same year in Zurich in C. Gebauer, a member of the Board of Siemens Hellas 2.000.000 DM (see ref 3, Report of Debevoise & Plimpton SAG-ATH00002148). On 06.08.2001 the Siemens project manager who was in four of seven overall Programme agreements sent a letter to the Greek shipyards, which estimated that the burden of joint ventures from the consequences of the penalties will be approached to 38.000.000 . On 18.12.2001 signed a debt contract for the sale of shares, which had controlled the State and ETVA, Piraeus Bank. Piraeus Bank was careful and had clarified that acquires ETVA no shares of Greek shipyards, which the Greek government had agreed by contract to sell the German consortium HDW (see Mr. Iakovos Georganas submission to Inquiry Committee on 23.6.2010 , p. 211, 226). On 29.01.2002 the Ministers of Economy and Finance Nikos Christodoulakis, Athanasios Tsohatzopoulos Development and Transport and Communications Christos Verelis, sent a joint letter to the chairmen of OSE and ISAP in which - among others - said that possible changes to the program agreements should be submitted for adoption in GA OSE and ISAP. Emphasized that "the critical period of completion of the privatization of HSY and for safeguarding the legitimacy of the process, decisions will be taken after completion of necessary for the transfer of shares of HSY actions and, always, after notice to us" (see Ref 4, letter No. Protopresbyter: EM.3). On 20.04.2002 was the transfer of shares and Piraeus Bank became mistress ETVA (see Iakovos Georganas filing the Inquiry Commission on 23.6.2010, p. 213).

On 15.05.2002 Development Ministers Athanasios Tsohatzopoulos, Transport and Communications Christos Verelis and Finance Nikos Christodoulakis took over the responsibility from the Greek government for delaying the implementation of the CP 33rd. On 31.05.2002 had occurred by ETVA on behalf of the government, the actual transfer of shares in the shipyard (see Iakovos Georganas deposit 23.6.2010, p. 213). On 31.05.2002 the Ministers of Economy and Finance Nikos Christodoulakis, Athanasios Tsohatzopoulos Development and Transport and Communications Christos Verelis wrote in HSY, which reads as follows: "We recognize the important trade and temporal problems that have occurred in the execution program (mean of SD) and are prepared to provide the necessary support to resolve the problem, making full use of our rights as shareholders of Railway / Metro in the relevant General Assembly We must support the appropriate agreement for the implementation of relevant resolutions and to convene a general meeting to approve the agreement "(see ref 5, a letter in the text of the treatment of HSY against Piraeus Bank 01.06.2004 p. 51 - 52). On 05.07.2002 the HDW sent a letter to the Ministers of Development Athanasios Tsohatzopoulos, Finance Nikos Christodoulakis and Transport and Communications Minister Christos Verelis, which the company sought to move processes to implement the amendments to the CP. Specifically, asking them to cause the convening of the General Assembly of the CIU to be approved amendments (see ref 6, Letter to the HDW Ministers on 07.05.2002). * On 14.10.2002 took place in Zurich, at the offices of ZIMENS, informal, secret, off-exchange meeting between the CEOs of companies involved in the K / P, which proposed to amend the CIU program agreements to allow execution, in view of the need for the Agency for the use of this material, because of the Olympic Games. This follows on from the mails exchanged between jackal and Silke Panoriou which contained instructions for keeping secrecy and extreme precaution of the content of the meeting. After two days the same meeting held at the Ministry. Then, as the culmination of consultations in Zurich, signed on 25.10.2002 MEMORANDUM under the then Minister of Development Mr Tsochatzopoulos .* (Opinion of Members of the New Republic). In December 2002 because the Consortium did not observe the schedule of supply of various types of rolling stock, entered into negotiations for the signing of the Contract Modification. Under the amendments, the venture would have until the end of 2003 have been deliver to the OSE twenty (20) H / A. The relative but not traditionally done. The Greek government had ordered, electric without having exilektrismeno network and not be able to ensure conditions for the timely establishment. Because one hundred and six (106) E / A were late being delivered, the Consortium submitted to OSE on 05.12.2002 and 09.12.2002, under a proposal whereby the gegenimenes up on 31.12.2002 penalties would be incurred by the Consortium. The values of the rolling stock that would result would stabilize under the original contractual delivery dates. Since the conventional equivalent rolling stock would be delivered in the CIU in accordance with the amended schedule the penalties from 01.01.2003 will not by paying.

For the period between the proposed new delivery schedule and the current, the consortium proposes to allocate its own expense, to OSE 28 C / D to use for a period of 38 months. Eventually the schedules modified by decisions of the General Assembly of the CIU. Under the new schedule of five (5) R / A could be delivered from June 2002 to December 2002. From January 2003 to December 2004 will be handed over twenty (29) S / A. 2004 will be delivered thirty three (33) R / A, 2005, thirty three (33) R / A and 2006 six (6) R / A. On 01.01.2003 suspended the imposition of default interest on the advance, subject to compliance with the new modified schedule of "Annex II" of the CP 39. According to this, the first H / D would be delivered on 15.07.2004 and 24.11.2005 on the 24th. So far they have delivered the twenty (20) H / A, while the remaining four were not received by the OSE, as trucks carrying other tolerances. To solve this problem was sought by Siemens to provide opinion fitness Greek institution. In February 2007 submitted to the OSE opinion from the National Technical University and immediately began procedures for the receipt of four (4) trains. On receipt of the input water problem found in gearboxes of the E / A. For this reason, the Acceptance Committee of OSE stopped the tests and wrote It rejects the protocol. OSE accepted to proceed to their reception after an additional letter of guarantee. Already imposed penalties, but the consortium does not accept that the final acceptance of the E / A was delayed by its own fault. On 03.01.2003 a meeting of the Board of the CIU on the modification of contracts. Demetrius Karapanos asked if - because there were delays over 150 days period provided for the payment of penalties - had begun renegotiating penalties for the worst. The answer I got was negative (see Demetriou Karapanou submission to Select Committee on 22.06.2010, p. 180). On 07.01.2003 was accepted by the GA OSE Consortium's proposal for late delivery of one hundred and six (106) R / A with a positive recommendation by the Board of the Agency. So far they have delivered the one hundred and five (105) from one hundred and six (106) E / A and the delivery was a deviation from the conventional schedule. Because conventional techniques variations in air conditioning and noise, the Train seek reimbursement for contractual variations and has withheld the guarantee (see ref 1, no. 50/07.01.2003 Minutes of the Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of OSE The no. 35 decision). On 07.01.2003 the General Meeting of the CIU (ie the Greek State as sole shareholder), decided at its 50th extraordinary meeting of Shareholders of the CIU, accepting the proposal of the consortium as a whole. According to this in exchange for delaying the construction of twenty H / A will be given free of charge for a period of 24 months a) eight (8) Classic Desiro twin units of Siemens and b) six (6) electric trains consisting of two machines and eight suburban-type vehicles, although the equivalent rolling stock was not included in the contractual obligations of suppliers / manufacturers, but reached an agreement to that effect (see ref 1, no. 50/07.01.2003 Minutes of the Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders OSE, the no. 31 decision). * To carry out the decisions of the General Assembly, invited all shapes venturer to sign - in line with their suggestions - amending clauses. Of the six original signed PS changed only three (PS 33A, 35 and 39) while the remaining three (3) did not attend to sign the Greek shipyards and

other syndication companies despite repeatedly calling them .* (Opinion MPs of New Democracy ) On 28.02.2003 the above decision was implemented with the signing between the CIU and the Consortium of "Alter IC 33A and 33A SP", which was called "Annex II". Under the "Annex II", the Consortium was to deliver to 30.07.2004, ie before the start of the Olympic Games, four coaches Electrically type Desiro. The Electrically paredothikan railcars. For the delays were imposed penalties. On 28.02.2003 signed the amendment, the Contract Standing 33rd and 39 of the respective "program agreements." On 28.02.2003 signed between the CIU and the Consortium 'Annex II'. Under this agreement, the OSE has accepted the change of place construction of twenty-four (24) total E / A normal line from Greece to Germany, and reduce the price of 1% on Greek Party and in particular on the amount who had not yet paid in Greek shipyards. The default interest on advances for the period from the contractual dates up to 31.12.2002 was agreed to be paid in the CIU in ten equal installments. The advances were repaid on 15.07.2009. Demetrius Karapanos I have voted against the recommendation of the Board of the Agency to change the place of manufacture of trains. On 28.02.2003 the CIU and the Consortium have agreed to amend the "Agreement Term 33A" and "Programmatic Agreement 33A." In the second article of amendment, agreed to surrender to OSE Consortium for use, without consideration, eight (8) twin units of rolling stock type Desiro Classic for a period of 24 months (equivalent to-use rolling stock). Quantitative and functional delivery and receipt of eight (8) twin railcars type Desiro Classic was at the invitation of the CIU in time to the competent committees of the Agency. On 05.03.2003 the Government through the Privatization Commission approved the signing of the contract with Piraeus Bank for financial advisory services to programmatic agreements and conventions of the OSE and ISAP for the supply of rolling stock (see Iakovos Georganas submission to Commission of Inquiry on 23.6 .2010, p. 213). On 17.03.2003, the then Minister of Transport and Communications Christos Verelis sent a letter to the CEO of OSE Constantine Giannaka stating that any consortium is not fulfilling its obligations on delivery of rolling stock, OSE should initiate the proceedings for a declaration as the fallen of all relevant contracts (see ref 7, Letter to Mr. Christos Verelis Konstantinos Giannaka on 03/17/2003). On 17.04.2003 signed amending the Convention "Convention Standing 35" corresponding Programmatic Agreement. A key element of the amendment to the contract was to OSE Consortium Letters from performance unabated until the completion of deliveries. This will ensure that the timetables for the delivery of rolling stock.

On 29.04.2003 signed the contract, financial advisory services between Piraeus Bank and the Greek State. The Convention was to achieve a restructuring program agreements and contracts of OSE and ISAP. The initial contract period was three months and the extension was made so that the last update to the Interministerial Committee to give the 02/11/2004 (see Mr. Iakovos Georganas submission to Select Committee on 23.06.2010, p. 214). Mr. Iakovos Georganas, as a consultant, to render their account to the Ministers of Economy and Finance, Development, Communications and Transport (see Mr. Iakovos Georganas submission to Inquiry Committee on 23.6.2010, p. 217). The Railway Ministry has proposed to No. 52 Annual General Meeting on June 26, 2003 be declared deposed by the Consortium of SD 37 and Convention Season 37A.Stin Consortium participating companies TEMOINSA, MAV ADTRANZ, DVJKFT and Kioleidis SA. The representative of the shareholder suggested this issue be discussed after a few days at the next meeting of the GA on 07.10.2003 (see schet.8, Minutes of the 52nd Ordinary General Meeting of OSE p. 3). The reason was that "the consultations to reach agreement on the restructuring agreements and speed for delivery of rolling stock, were at an advanced stage, with a positive outlook." (See schet.9 letter of Mr. Iakovos Georganas (24/06/2003) to the then Minister of Economy and Finance Nikos Christodoulakis). The Board of CIU is not invited to the GA 10.07.2003, to discuss the same topic. On 30.06.2003, the then Minister of Communications and Transport minister Christos Verelis sent a letter to then Minister of Economy and Finance Nikos Christodoulakis which - on the disqualification of the Consortium HSY / TEMOENSA - the points to keep the date of 10.07.2003 "For a decision to allow the forfeiture of securities and termination of the contract according to the proposal of the CIU, since the unconventional behavior of the buyer consortium becomes longer for large loss of OSE." Still, on 04.07.2003, signed the minutes of the AGM 26.06.2003 when finished without raised again as a matter of the declaration deposed as the K / P is involved in PS 37 and 37A with management responsibility of OSE (GREEK SHIPYARDS and TEMOINSA). (See ref 10, Christos Verelis letter to Mr. Nikos Christodoulakis id. Protopresbyter: Fin: 6740). On 10.07.2003 the "Greek Nafpigokataskefastiki Holding SA (HSY) wrote to ETVA and the Ministers of Economy, Development and Transport, seeking to fulfill the obligations under the Convention on the Transfer Shares, which ended on 31.05.2002. Specifically HSY called the contribution of ETVA the smooth implementation of program agreements between Greek shipyard and OSE. Recalls the binding will of the Greek government on this issue, as it was expressed in a letter signed by the Ministers of Economy and Finance, Development and Transport. In case this is not the case, threatened to open a reversal of the sale (see ref 11, 10.7.2003 Letter HSY). On 19.12.2003, the then Minister Christos Verelis reply to a letter by the German Ambassador Dr. Albert Spiegel that: "Syndicated, together with the Greek shipyards, companies will be able, because, long years, chronizontas to solve, the problem can assure you that the direction is made and is making every effort in the Management of OSE and the supervising agency said the ministry, whose in charge. The solution should not and can neither departs from the

conventional framework and conditions established between the parties, nor any feasible solution to create conditions for economic or business loss of OSE '(see ref 12 letter to Mr. Christos Verelis Spiegel in Ref: 13021). The 53rd meeting of the Extraordinary General Assembly of unsolicited OSE held on 17.10.2003 was not raised by the Board of Railway as it should according to the Law on Public Limited Companies, the issue of revocation of the Consortium of SD Durable Contracts and 37th (see ref 13, Minister GP Practice No. 53, 17.10.2003). On 15.01.2004 was sent a letter from the CEO of HDW AG Dr. H. Burmester to Mr. Christos Verelis, and communicated to the Ministers of Economy and Finance Nikos Christodoulakis and Development Athanasios Tsohatzopoulos, which then reminded ministers that despite assurances given to the Consortium letter from 31.05.2002 to resolve problems that had arisen from the privatization of the shipyard, there was no progress. Also, the CEO asked to set a meeting before the end of January between the three ministers and members of the Consortium to meet the agreed on 05/31/2002 (ref. 14, letter to H. Bermuster Verelis on 01/15/2004) On 27.01.2004 and pursuant to Article 2 of the above contracts signed concession trains between OSE and the Consortium, which provided the grant eight (8) twin diesel trains and six (6) electric trains, which will include eight (8) wagons two (2), electric over 24 months. In practice granted only eight (8) diesel coaches. It granted six (6) trains with their wagons, electric and (see filing Vassilios Tsimpidis the Inquiry Committee on 14.6.2010, p. 66). On 06.05.2004, the Directorate of Legal Services sent to the Director General of the Railway Technical Support Document to which, under the terms of contracts CP 39 and ED 39 could be replace the original contractor if the CIU will be to agree to it in writing. Debtor, however, after the substitution was the original contractor, who is responsible for his own fault or subcontractors. It was not possible to transfer rights - as requested by Siemens - or a member leaving the Consortium or replacement by a third party (see ref 15, Document Management Legal Services CIU Ref: 2195118 on 05/06/2004) . On 09.06.2004 Mr. Michael Christoforakos wrote to CIU proposed taking charge of implementation of contracts and delivery of rolling stock exclusively by Siemens. As conditions pose a) giving the company complete freedom on how to accomplish contracts, b) to cover claims against Siemens and c) to extend the conventional object. (See ref 16, Letter to Mr. Michael Christoforakos OSE on 09.06.2004). Up to 03.01.2005 by those contracts were not modified in complete stagnation and inertia. In the 41 and the K / S was responsible for the construction of a total of 106 C / A had delivered only 26 of them. In the 33 instead of 15 new, twin railcar normal line, there was no surrender and delivery of the first D / A was to take place in June 2005. As for 37 from a total of 65 C / D - to be delivered until December 2001 - had surrendered only three (3). In view of all this was possible either deprived of the contracting companies while realizing a letter of guarantee or be renegotiated penalties, at a height beyond 7.5%, since the conventionally denominated rate will no longer cover any future requirements of the OSE. On 02.01.2005 the HDW, owner of HSY had already acquired by the Group and Steel ThiessenKrupp EPET series of Greek shipyards. * The K / P not declared deposed if such a move would be totally wrong at that time which

completed the process of change in ownership of Greek shipyards .* (Opinion of Members of the New Republic)

On 23.07.2004 and because there was a significant delay in delivery of the C / D and renovation of rolling stock became official meeting between the Minister of Transport and Communications Michalis Liapis, the General Secretary of the Ministry of Transport Mr John Golias, a lawyer and member of the Board OSE Mr. Phillip Spyropoulos and management of Messrs. Siemens Michael Christoforakos, Dionysios Panagiotidis and the lawyer C. Muriel. According to the minutes of the meeting, the then Minister Siemens regarded as a reliable partner, who should take the earliest possible conclusion of agreements and management of specific projects. He stresses that he and his Ministry would take a leading role in implementing this solution in order to convince the other concerned Ministries, namely Ministry of Finance and Development. "It was explained that a) in the past HDW / the Greek shipyards have repeatedly expressed their desire to leave part of the rolling stock yard and suggested the taking of such agreements by Siemens, the other consortium partners and third parties b) Siemens together with HDW / the Greek Shipyards will review again the situation of their positions and, if necessary, introduce and potential Greek partners in question c) Siemens calls for prompt resolution of individual problem areas in contracts with the help of OSE and the Department, eg with electric locomotives, whose production was transferred entirely to Germany, whose collection / delivery has already started, the remote of the Greek shipyard by the consortium has not yet been described. " (See ref 17, practical meeting Minister of Transport and Communications Michalis Liapis with executives of Siemens on 23/07/2004). On 30.08.2004 an internal memorandum regarding the meeting of the Central Executive Board of Siemens with the Transport Minister Michalis Liapis and Minister of Economy and Oikonomkon Mr. George Alogoskoufis, Mr Michael Christoforakos highlighted the positive developments of the meeting for the company. Particularly noted that Mr. Michalis Liapis asked Siemens to take immediate initiative to investigate the conditions under which the company will assume sole management for the completion of troubled contracts. Ministers indicated that they had secure political freedom by the Government to solve problems related agreements rolling stock. "Siemens said in the past HDW / the Greek shipyards have repeatedly expressed their desire to leave part of the rolling stock of Shipyards and Siemens, the other consortium partners and third parties had offered to undertake the contracts, but the HDW / the Greek shipyards had not agreed to any of the proposals had been until that moment "(see ref 18, Internal Memo of 8/30/2004). On 03.01.2005 Mr. Konstantinos Yiannakos sent to Michalis Liapis letter, which informed him that the companies dechontousan or pay penalties or to give an equivalent rolling stock. Proposed or declared deposed companies or renegotiating the amount of penalties in excess of 7.5% (see filing Konstantinos Giannakou the Inquiry Committee on 22.6.2010, p. 202). On 08.06.2005 the Legal Services Division of the OSE opinion sent to the appropriate agency of which said that the OSE was not required to extend the SP and PP for three more years. This opinion also stressed, that any extension of the CP / PP could be considered and combined by the vendor, who was in default in the delivery of rolling stock, as an exemption from the obligation to pay penalties due to late delivery of rolling stock . Each resulted, that in a single case could be no question of an extension, if the Railway agreed with the vendor delivery schedules new rolling stock, which would be extended beyond the initial four-year effect of SP (see ref 19, Document Management Legal Services with Ref: 2217953 on 06/08/2005).

On 01.08.2005 the then CEO of OSE Konstantinos Yiannakos sent a note to the then Minister of Transport and Communications Michalis Liapis on issues related to programmatic symphonies of OSE and Siemens. Specifically stated that: a) the CIU is not possible to extend the CP 33a (Motor Auto Desiro) b) be paid to Siemens about 60 million c) to cover the liabilities of joint ventures with the OSE is required for free grant of approximately ten trains Classic Desiro until 30.06.2005. Especially for the 37th SP Mr Konstantinos Yiannakos stressed that although this is not about CP Siemens, the company had previously discussed to assume that the CP (see ref 20 letter to Mr. Constantine Giannakou Michalis Liapis on 01/08/2005) On 02.08.2005 an internal memo from Siemens is a summary of those discussed in visiting executives from Siemens to the then Minister of Transport and Communications Michalis Liapis. The meeting took place other than the Minister, his adviser George Tzovlas and Messrs. Christoforakos Michael, Dennis and Panagiotidis Smaxwill by Siemens. There the Minister for among other things, stressed that the cooperation with the company was very good and anxious to find a solution to outstanding problems including the extension of the lease of eight (8) train Desiro Classic, which ended in February 2006 (see ref 21, Memo 1 Siemens on 02/08/2005). On 04.08.2005 the Ministry of Transport met Mr. George Tzovlas by the Ministry, Mr. Dimitrios Roussopoulos by the OSE, Mr. Michael Christoforakos, Dennis Panagiotidis by Siemens and Zacharias from the Greek shipyard. There was continued discussion of topics of the meeting on 02.08.2005 (see sxet. 22, email on 08.09.2005 sent by Mr. Dionysis Panagiotidis in Smaxwill, Moeller, Wiessner, Flad, Dill, Nahmer from the seized hard disk of Siemens) . On 04.10.2005, the Directorate of Legal Services sent a letter to the OSE departments after their question regarding the timing of final acceptance of trains according to the SP / DS 33A. In this tonizeto that the fault of manufacturers final testing of the trains were in March 2005 and the date that should be considered as the date of final acceptance. And after the end of that OSE was required to adopt and sign a unilateral protocol (see ref 23, letter to the Directorate of Legal Services Ref: 2203464 on 10.4.2005). In 2005, the board 33A is closed. The Consortium proposed to extend the agreement for another year. With contributions by Directorate engine OSE informed the Board Agency, that these railcars were used to cover services of OSE and certain suburban routes (Athens Corinth-Athens). On 14.10.2005 a meeting was held at the Ministry of Transport and Communications between representatives of Siemens SA - the meeting was also attended by Mr Dennis Panagiotidis - the Greek shipyard, Legal Consulting OSE and representatives of the Ministry of Transport on the legal possibility of extending the Object of the CP. The representatives of the Consortium claimed that it was legally and contractually permitted to extend the scope of CP and especially the CP / ED 33 for ordering new HA, HA addition of twenty, without creating any legal problem. As main reasons reported that: a) the extension of the CP / ED 33 was not subjected to the legislative framework, as it was from Community law, b) the consortium would probably require pay by OSE to extend the contract and c ) the 'extension of the object "is not blocked by any provision of law. Instead, it was possible under the application of Article 2.2 of the CP and on the opinion of the OWN, which was accepted by the Greek state and thereunder and amendments made in 2003. The legal advisers of the OSE reiterated their view that extending the scope of SP was not allowed and - among others - stressed that: a) the term "extension" conceals "a new kind of commission" and thus circumvented the rules to be applied the supply and training of relevant

contracts, b) the opinion of OWN is not binding on the OSE and can not provide a legal basis for legal and safe decisions by management of the CIU, c) SP signed on time moment at which a specific provision is not applicable in Community Law and d) the Consortium was in default as to the contractual delivery times of HA had already ordered (see Ref. 24, Factsheet Directorate of Legal Services of OSE No. Protopresbyter: 2204226 on 17/10/2005). On 20.10.2005, the Directorate of Legal Services sent a letter to the OSE competent agency of which responded to its request regarding the case of late return of the A / D Desiro Classic. Specifically, the legal department said that the OSE is not obliged to pay rent of 60.000 per month in the Consortium for late return of the S / N (see Ref. 25, letter to the Directorate of Legal Services Ref: 2203876 on 20.10.2005 ). In December 2005 the CIU discussed to extend the concession of eight trains for a further year. The contract was never renewed. Nor after the expiration of that period, the wagons are not returned to the Consortium. They stayed parked for about ten (10) months (from January to November 2006) in the depot of Redi. The storage costs were approximately 5.000.000 which collected from the OSE. OSE could buy the trains at the cost 1.000.000 instead of the initial amount of 2.600.000 each, because it was no longer used. The Board of the Agency decided to rent, upon the recommendation of the then Managing Director Mr Dennis snow, that approved the lease trains for eight months. Additionally the Board instructed the then CEO (see Ref. 26, Decision No. 2512/07.07.2006) to negotiate the price in order to reduce the 895.000 per month proposed by the Consortium (see .27, FAX to OSE Consortium on 07.04.2006). Notwithstanding, however, the decision of the Board of the Negotiating Committee of OSE identified monthly price for 600.000 (714.000 with VAT) without counting the cost of maintenance and security of trains. In parallel, the Commission determined monthly insurance cost 33.300 , while the maintenance of the trains was about 165.066 per month. Therefore, the total price was about 1.077.402,67 and was significantly greater than the sum of 875.520 , which theoretically would be the revenue of the CIU, the use of trains. (See ref 28, Practical Negotiating Group on 07/25/2006 OSE). The damage that the signing of a lease trains from Siemens would reach 1.615.061,36 for eight (8) months. * The suggestion of the Commission, based on actual data use and cost of rolling stock, confirmed by an outside expert and was the basis for conducting an international open tender which opened immediately * (Opinion MPs of New Democracy). On 10.08.2006 the Board of OSE basis in the record of the Negotiating Group decided to conduct bidding for the lease of eight (8) railcars Suburban Press for eight months with a unilateral right to extend the CIU to eight months (see ref 29, Minutes Railway Board on 10.8.2006). To ensure the above process typically launched an open call with number and object 6094/7-112006 hiring eight (8) Suburban trains Releases normal line, new or used maximum age ten (10) years, Greek or foreign origin, award criterion the lowest price in euros with an estimated value of 8.092.000 . The lease term was set at eight (8) months, with unilateral right of the CIU, extending even eight (8) months with the same conditions. The amount of the guarantee letter for participation amounted to 404.600 .

On 04.10.2006 an internal memorandum of Siemens stated that following the meeting held on 16.08.2006 at the Ministry of Transport in the presence of the Minister Michalis Liapis met Mr. Dennis Panagiotidis by the OSE, George Tzovlas as representative of the Ministry and the then Board of OSE Mr. Dennis Hiona and discussed issues related to CP 33A, 39 and 41A. The memo emphasized that Messrs. Dennis and George Hiona Tzovlas requested the support of the company to hire the, electric, that they were in Thessalonica, because they could not be used because the network was not yet technically ready to receive and therefore be used by OSE (see . 30, Internal Memo Siemens 28.09.2006). On 22.11.2006 the Board of OSE awarded the tender to the company Greek Shipyards SA without observing the terms of the cost of rental, maintenance, insurance, fuel and lubricants, which it had imposed (see Related 31, Railway Board Decision numbers: 2800/22.11.2006). Consistency was the challenge to the Agency a loss of 2.048.128 . * Then the file was transferred to the Court for screening and has revealed no question of legitimacy * (Notice of Members New Republic). On 16.12.2006 the Greek Shipyards purchased from Siemens and CBML Mobile eight (8) Twins trains worth 10.000.000 (see filing Vassilios Tsimpidis the Inquiry Commission on 14.06.2010, p. 66). This transaction was for rent at the moment Shipyards did not want any more rolling stock (see filing Vassilios Tsimpidis the Inquiry Committee on 14.6.2010, p. 69). On 16.01.2007, after conducting the tender, the Railway leased the shipyard Scaramanga these trains for eight (8) months at the price of 850.000 per month. At the same time, given the maintenance of these trains oktadymon Shipyards Scaramanga in Siemens Hellas at a cost of 250.000 per month, although staff could Shipyards in accelerated training to undertake maintenance at a cost of 25.000 per month (see filing Kingdom Tsimpidis the Selection Committee on 14.06.2010, p. 67-68). On 30.01.2007, the counsel of the CIU * reiterating its firm position of the Legal Service * (Notice of Members New Republic), sent a note to the Chief Executive Officer Mr Dennis Hiona CIU, where the request for the Siemens' substitution "the Greek shipyard from it during the performance of CP / ED 39 stated: In its proposal the company actually favored a complete withdrawal and release procedure without further substituted membership by the Greek shipyard. This will be a substantial modification of the terms of the contract. According to the legal advisor of the Agency, this action was not permissible and consistent with the nature of the contract as public procurement, and in the majority of OWN was perfectly legal and permissible. For this reason, the legal advisor to the OSE has expressed the opinion that the Board of the Agency should be forwarded to the GA Shareholders of the Company's request-proposal to the sole shareholder, that the Greek government, to examine them in the broader context of general public, because only it had jurisdiction to do so (see ref 32, Factsheet Directorate of Legal Services CIU Ref: 1039783 on 30.1.2007). In June 2007 ordered the First Instance Public Prosecutor at the newspaper is conducting a preliminary examination for the possible commission of offenses of kakourgimatikis infidelity and misconduct against members of the Board of Railway, who voted for the lease of eight Desiro Classic. * Published in the No. 2471/2007 exculpatory decree according to which illegality or dishonesty against the State not found .* (Opinion of Members of the New Republic) On 04.06.2008 a meeting with Siemens to address the issue of final acceptance of the four difficulty / A. Agreed to put the Siemens and then answer the CIU.

On 16.07.2008 the Legal Services Division of the OSE sent to the General Directorate of Administration document which stated that if the consortium delivered late six (6) trains the equivalent rolling stock, the CIU is entitled to collect the requirements of the forfeiture of the guarantee Letters performance (see ref 33, a document of the Legal Services CIU Ar.Prot.: 1040464 / 07/16/2008). In autumn 2008 the trains oktadyma MAN Ferrostaal sold at a price of about 10.000.000 . (See filing Vassilios Tsimpidis the Inquiry Commission on 14.06.2010, p. 69) On 09.10.2008 the Legal Services Division of the OSE sent a letter stressing that the Agency had to keep bonds proper operation of CP / ED 39, because there were gaps in the delivery of units of rolling stock (see schet.34 a letter to the Directorate of Legal Services Ar.Prot.: 1040712/09.10.2008). On 25.08.2009 the Legal Services Division of the OSE sent a letter to the General Directorate of Railway Administration which stated that if the Agency wanted to claim damages for nonresponse supplier of CP / ED 33 to relinquish the remaining rolling stock should be withheld Guarantee letters. In the event that the amount of damage to the OSE would exceed the amount of letters of guarantee, it should be exercised by the Agency's action against the vendor (see ref 35, a document of the Directorate of Legal Services CIU Ref : 1039358/25.08.2009). In December 2009 the OSE has the forfeiture of letters of guarantee amounting to 6.600.000 , considering that actual damage suffered by the non-allocation of six (6) electric trains, as was the contract 33A. In May 2010, Siemens filed injunctions against this decision and subsequently resigned. The case is the ordinary courts, because the company did not agree with this procedure (see submission Mr Asterios Tsavdaris the Inquiry Committee on 11.6.2010, p. 24). Convention Suburban Three Bridges - Piraeus (Convention 994) With the Commission Decision C 814/9.4.2001 joined the entire project in the Suburban financed by the European Union at a total cost of about 687.000.000 , of which 50% were EU grant (see filing Dimitrios Karapanou in Inquiry Committee on 22.06.2010, p. 116). On 19.06.2001 fixed by the Ministries of Environment CMD, Transport and Culture, published in the Gazette 776V 24/14651/1153 the 'Olympic' rail and body construction was the ERGOSE. Among them were the Suburban. On 04.10.2002 the Council of State in the 2805/2002 decision upheld the appeal of the Municipality of Athens and annulled the decrees under which environmental conditions were determined to execute the project of construction of the rail corridor, which fell within the administrative boundaries of the Municipality of Athens . * According to the contract between V272/28.3.1997 OSE - ERGOSE, as amended by 10.5.1997 to 24.7.2000 and similar contracts that were ratified by the 03/07/1997 (V589) and F865606591/21.01.2001 (V254) corresponding decrees, OSE exercising the rights of the shareholder (99%) of ERGOSE decided to shred the necessary work of the Suburban by ERGOSE, and undertook the construction of himself as projects should be conducted under the simultaneous movement of trains. Moreover, pressures from the community, especially the Olympic Games, the existence Suburban Railway was strong, so that part apentachthike from

CSF and decided to finance it from a purely national resources (see ref 36, an agreement Declaration between Giannakou and Tsitouras from 21.03.2003 for the transfer of work from ERGOSE OSE). On 12.08.2009 the Interim Management Transport Authority has included work in the Third Community Support Framework with a budget of EUR 92,047.898,26, as evidenced by 16.06.2010 by depositing the former CEO of OSE Giannakou "money is not lost ... the 2009 summer rejoined the project in EU funding and will even collect 80 million, 90 million "* (Notice of Members New Republic). On 21.03.2003 signed between OSE and ERGOSE agreement with which the work of the Suburban passed by ERGOSE OSE (see ref 36, Contract OSE / ERGOSE of 21.03.2003 and deposit Dimitrios Karapanou the Inquiry Commission on 17.03 .2010, p. 97). The Board of CIU No 3235/07.05.2003 decision, taken after a top priority. 151425/05.05.2003 recommendation of the then CEO of OSE Konstantinos Giannakou approved by the Head of the Authority Statement of the project to conduct a public bidding auction system "with different discount rates." Subject was "Renovation of the railway and the construction of motorized signaling - telecommanding in part:" Piraeus - Athens-Three Bridges - SKA - Acharnes' budget 161.400.000 in which symperilamvaneto works to be carried interest, overheads and contingencies without 190.452.000 VAT and the VAT. The deadline for closing the project was eight months. On 16.07.2003 The tender, but although twenty contracted shapes expressed an interest not submit an offer. Several of them protested on the ambiguities of the Declaration and diapratisis editions. Particularly complained about the short time of construction, while a consortium challenged the validity of the declaration. Following these procedures was the cancellation of the tender as barren (see ref 37, Information Memo Dimitrios Karapanou Magistrate in Athens on 14.10.2005). On 27.08.2003 took place the repeat contest in which only bid submitted by the Consortium Aktor-Terna-ZIMENS with participation rates 40, 40 and 20% respectively. On 28.08.2003 the Group J & P - ABAX SA - Alstrom Transport S.A. sent a letter to the CIU notification Christos Verelis, seeking to declare void a contract and proceed to conclusion of contract negotiations in accordance with Article 8 of Decree 334/2000. The reason he cited the fact that he had seen only one person to undertake the project (see ref 38, Letter J & P - ABAX SA - Alstrom Transport SA to OSE on 28.8.2003 with a copy to Minister Christos Verelis ). Related letters sent and other consortia, one day after the contest (deposits Konstantinos Liakopoulos the Inquiry Commission on 09.06.2010, Konstantinos Giannakou the Inquiry Commission on 24.06.2010, Mr. Asterios Tsavdaris the Inquiry Commission on 12/06/2010) . On 05.09.2003 the work "Three Bridges - Piraeus' by decision of the Board of Railway was awarded to the above K / S in which Zimens participated in 20% of the total package. The discount amounted to 0.964%. * The award is legally equivalent to contract and produce all legal effects thereof. And there is the possibility of the contractor to claim up to 5% of the project without having to perform any work. This adds urgency to the Railway Administration to sign the contract when it transmits the file to the Court .* (Opinion of Members of the New Republic) On 23.09.2003, after the award of the project, OSE has submitted to the Court details of the tender for the statutory judicial review (see ref 39, Presidential Decree 774/1980, as amended by N.2741/1999 ).

Since September 2003 the project was blocked in the fifth step of the Court, which on 17.11.2003 decided by majority that: a) the period of eight months for completion of the project was short and for this reason it was not possible access to the bidding process involved. Therefore, a violation of the principle of objectivity which made the award decision unlawful, b) the fact that only one bid was tabled hurt the principle of equal treatment does not protect the public interest and does not guarantee the actual conditions of free competition. The mission found that these issues should be brought to the attention of the competent Department VI of the Court will ultimately decide on the legality of the award decision of the CIU (see ref 40, Step E Court Act 393/2003) . On 12.11.2004 the Court by decision of the VI Department of the Act numbered 100/12.11.2004 saw no obstacle to signing the draft contract of the work of the Suburban. The Court held that the CIU was to 'excusable error'. The decision on the idea of stressing that "the Three Bridges Liosia until there is no environmental permits or exemption decision setting or study." * On 12.11.2004 the VI section of the Court which remitted after the decision of the team resolve the controversy (a member of the E-step) and concluded that it is legal to award the project, that does not suffer because the competition involved a single K / P or the brief closure of the project because at no stage of the tendering process and to award the project had not violated a rule of national or Community law. The Court recognized the face of board members OSE excusable error .* (Opinion of Members of the New Republic). Article 26 Fri the 2nd Presidential Decree 609/1986 OSE obliged to call in two weeks the contractor to produce the required documents to establish the contract. The updated document is produced when slide closed the subject by the main shareholder in the 13/04/2005 (see filing Dimitrios Karapanou the Inquiry Commission on 17.02.2010, p. 22). On 24.02.2005 the company AVAKAS withdrew the injunction which had won against the CIU and the body to refrain from signing the contract. * Follow on 26/4/2005 the final signature by the CEO of OSE, the already awarded contract (994/26.4.2005) and the project was awarded to K / P "AKTOR-Terna-SIEMENS the price of EUR 161,400,000 . The Community was pushing for immediate absorption of all funds for the Suburban and the CIU could not gamble the epanaprokiryxi work with the litigation and the costs this entailed. The K / P had encountered many difficulties in the manufacturing part of related services of other ministries such as archeology, with many findings, the networks (EYDAP, electricity, sewage) to be shifted, with the return property to the National Bank, the municipality Athens made on appeal and the reactions of residents of St. Anargyroi that lead to continuous delays or suspensions of operations. This justifies the fact that until 8.10.2005 should have done all the work and delivered the project within the OSE, but the project has not yet been completed and have passed already 11 extensions with the latter closed at 21.10 .2010 * (Notice of Members New Republic). On 26.04.2005 signed by the CEO of OSE Konstantinos Giannakou the work of the Suburban Railway in the "Piraeus - Three Bridges" of 161.400.000 awarded to the consortium "AktorTerna-SIEMENS. The project should be closed with the 12/26/2005 (see ref 41, document GC EDISY Vassilis Tsiamanti to the Inquiry Commission on 26.7.2010). Used for signing the authorization was given to Mr. Constantine Giannaka 2003 by prigoumeno Board of the Agency (see submission Mr Manos Panayiotou the Committee of Inquiry on 16.3.2010, p. 23). In May 2005 the consortium submitted a timetable under which the work should be completed by December 2005. Under it the interim period of one hundred sixty-five (165) days from the

signing of the contract provided for in Article 4 of the contract until 08.10.2005 should have done all the work and be delivered to the Board of Railway project between " Athens Station Three Bridges', namely the dismantling of the old line, the new line coat with full signaling and electrification. So far the project has not been completed and given to eleven (11) extensions. The last ended on 31.10.2010 (see ref 41, document GC EDISY Vassilis Tsiamanti to the Inquiry Committee on 26.7.2010 and letter ref 42 EDISY on 08.02.2010 with No. Protopresbyter: 4333218) . On 17.11.2005 repealed by Ministerial Decision of Mr. Michael Liapis the DISTIE (Address Electrification Signalling and Telecommunications Electrical Installations) who was responsible for the security systems of the Agency. The members of this Division does not agree to award the project to the Suburban Siemens (see submission Mr Manos Panayiotou the Committee of Inquiry on 24.06.2010, p. 125) * The views of Members of the New Republic is that it should be removed *. On 03.02.2006 the Council of State with the Ministry No. 3520/2006 decision annulled in part the Minister No. 122836/02.02.2004 CMD with the approved environmental conditions for the work of the Suburban. On 01.01.2007 the contract management and monitoring project implementation is by EDISY, which transferred the contract because of the secession of the infrastructure sector by the OSE and its incorporation into the EDISY. On 14.02.2008 the company Aktor paid the amount of 2.824.610,76 for transfer contracting the Suburban (see submission Mr Manos Panayiotou the Inquiry Commission on 24.06.2010, p. 76). On 10.06.2008 approved the new EIS. provided underground line either side of the Station of Athens. On 12.08.2009 the Interim Management Transport Authority has included work in the third CSF with a budget of 92.047.898,26 excluding VAT. On 21.06.2010 the Management of EDISY submitted the following question to the paying authority "with regard to the avoidance of loss of EU funds is appropriate to grant further extensions of the work or the interruption of epanadimopratisi?". The Authority responded that the contract should be closed by the end of the current schedule to run only work included in the original contract. The Authority noted that the contract is vitiated by the procurement process and in particular the conditions proclamation under which limited competition, and then these conditions are not applied (see ref 41, document GC EDISY Vassilis Tsiamanti in Inquiry Commission on 26.7.2010).

GSM-R On 15.04.2003 the CIU confirmed the calculation of the Ministry of Transport and Communications that the installation of GSM-R would reach 34.22 million (see ref 43, document DISTE OSE to the Executive Director of the Agency for Infrastructure in 15.4 , 2003). On 20.01.2005 signed protocol to delegate implementation of GSM-R project by the OSE in ERGOSE (see ref 44, Protocol award on 20.1.2005). On 16.02.2005 the ERGOSE letter sent to OSE seeking evidence to proceed with the drafting of prodiagrsfon project (see ref 45, document ERGOSE to OSE on 16/02/2005)

On 11.03.2005 the CIU ERGOSE replied that to answer these questions document on 16.02.2005 should have been cooperation between the competent departments of the CIU and ERGOSE to give the correct response and the implementation of the project answers . Then OSE expressed his wonder on how it can be calculated precisely, the project budget without having answered the questions raised in the OSE by ERGOSE, which formed the basis for the preparation of drafting the budget (see . ref. 46, document Train to ERGOSE on 11/03/2005) On 15.04.2005 the Franz Buchholz (Sales Network Europe, Middle East and Africa at Siemens ICN's AU) has sent e-mail to Martin Kine where the GSM-R wrote: "Agreement must be 7 to 8 points." On 16.11.2005 email sent by Mr. John Terzis, who was executive of Siemens in Michael Christoforakos, stating that "our friends in the Division Railway Systems accept this time of war by the General Directorate. This may affect the establishment and operation of the Committee to assess the competition GSM-R . 15.12.2005 On invitation to tender for the supply of digital communication system (network radio coverage) for the CIU price 60.000.000 to 730 km over 40.000.000 for 2,020 km, which had estimated the technical services of the Agency. Attended the consortium Unisystems, Uninortel, and International Construction SA, Siemens SA. (See submission Mr Manos Panayiotou the Committee of Inquiry on 16.03.2010, p. 77). On 31.03.2006 at the Practical Evaluation of tenders, the Chairman of the Evaluation of Tenders I. Katsoulis said that the Siemens bid was out of specification and should be excluded. Then the bids were scored without the president leading to grade Siemens the highest rated and best bidder was the lowest bidder was (see ref 47, Practical Assessment Commission Crisis Offers OSE of 31.03.2006 and submission of Mr Manos Panayiotou the Selection Committee on 16.03.2010, p. 80). 21.03.2008 On invitation to tender for the supply of terminal equipment GSM-R system budget 17.000.000 which was financed by 50% from the ERDF and 50% by national resources. The invitation was blocked by a decision of the supervisory authority that the Board of ERGOSE (see filing Elias Talamagka the Inquiry Commission on 30.06.2010, p. 38). In November 2008 the GSM-R project got extended by the competent Directorate Rail Systems until 26.11.2009, but should have been delivered much earlier (see submission Mr Manos Panayiotou the Inquiry Commission on 16.03.2010, p. 90). Has prompted new extension until January 2011, the adoption is pending in the relevant organs of supervisory authority (see filing Ioannis Dimitriou the Inquiry Commission on 30.06.2010, p. 26). The work that is ongoing, although typically there is no contract. On 07.07.2010 a note of the President of the CIU on progress in project implementation GMS-R states: "Until today it has achieved 90% of the physical object of the project and has paid the 39.03% of the total contractual Object that 22.334.086,78 (see ref 48, Information Note by the President of the CIU on 07/07/2010). * GSM-R * Opinion of Members New Republic * On 15.04.2003 the CIU confirmed the calculation of the Ministry of Transport and Communications that the installation of GSM-R would reach 34.22 million (see ref 43, document DISTE OSE to the Executive Director of the Agency's Infrastructure 15/04/2003). On 20.01.2005 signed protocol to delegate implementation of GSM-R project by the OSE in ERGOSE (see ref 44, Protocol award on 20.1.2005).

With no. 51477/16-2-2005 the ERGOSE sent a letter to the OSE's request to provide information for drawing up the specifications. With no. 92504/11-3-2005 OSE ERGOSE replied that "to answer questions from 02.16.2005 document should have been made cooperation between Directorate CIU ERGOSE." Then the ERGOSE answered with no. 54654/23-3-2005 again requested information on specifications and is available to the OSE for further cooperation. With no. 60247/16-6-2005 ERGOSE the letter back with a full specification file requested by OSE comments. The OSE was never answered and under each contract, after the lapse of one month is presumed tacit acceptance (OSE). In 2005, after having signed the protocol to delegate implementation of the project by the OSE in ERGOSE began the preparation of tender documents of the competition. With no. 2505/25-62003 joint document from the Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Finance to the European Commission had budgeted the entire system at 67.7 million. The project was included in the program of the European Rail Network, for financing by the EU The final budget, which was based on technical specifications that cover interoperability requirements that are common to all European networks, after integration in the Greek legal system, the relevant directive, drafted by ERGOSE in cooperation with the Technical Adviser (Consortium Companies DE CONSULT, LAHMEYER and TRADEMCO). Given the technical nature of this project requiring special expertise and experience criteria for the award was that the cost-effective supply system under both the National Law and the EU Directives. The submission of the dossier of documents for each participating company followed the evaluation of technical bids by the bid evaluation committee, which consisted of three members: Katsioulas as President and Talamagkas and Demetrius as members. The technical bids as submitted by the companies K / W and Unisystem Zimens, scored by two members of the majority and evaluated with 105 and 97 degrees respectively. The Chairman of the committee disagreed that the Zimens meet the requirements of the project, which is why it has no rating. Both companies met the technical specifications. The K / P Unisystem offered one hundred forty one hundred base stations over the SIEMENS and simultaneously filed a cheaper offer, but the work ultimately delivered to ZIMENS because according to committee members evaluating the bids and the specifications of the project, only bid ZIMENS ensure strong signal, regardless of the number of channels, which constituted the full requirement of the project. "The project was single and was a competition performance. What does this mean? It means that the end is measured independently the supplied label, not the number of antennas' (tabling Demetriou from 30/06/2010). This practical assessment passed by a majority of Committee members who rated the companies involved and never challenged. The decision of the Board ERGOSE of that award in the ZIMENS, submitted a complaint to the European Commission which, after thorough consideration of all facts of the case concluded (document 04.09.2006/3903) "that at this stage do not have evidence of violation of Community Law on Public Procurement on issues that have affected the complaints. Therefore I would like to inform you that my services will advise the College of Commissioners to make the filing of this complaint. " 21.03.2008 On invitation to tender for the supply of terminal equipment GSM-R system budget 17.000.000 which was financed by 50% from the ERDF and 50% by national resources. The invitation was blocked by a decision of the supervisory authority that the Board of ERGOSE (see filing Elias Talamagka the Inquiry Commission on 30.06.2010, p. 38). In November 2008 the GSM-R project got extended by the competent Directorate Rail Systems

until 26.11.2009, but should have been delivered much earlier (see submission Mr Panayiotou the Inquiry Commission on 16.03.2010, p. . 90). Has prompted new extension until January 2011, the adoption is pending in the relevant organs of supervisory authority (see filing Ioannis Dimitriou the Inquiry Commission on 30.06.2010, p. 26). There have been delays which are attributable to third with a typical case of licensing of frequencies for which the application was filed by October 2006 and the allocation of frequencies in EDISY was in January 2008. The contract continues to exist and work continues to complete the project if ZIMENS has properly and timely submit a request for further extension of time project delivery. On 07.07.2010 a note of the President of the CIU on progress in project implementation GMS-R states: "Until today it has achieved 90% of the physical object of the project and has paid the 39.03% of the total contractual Object that 22.334.086,78 (see Related 48, Information Note from the President of the CIU on 07/07/2010) .* (Opinion of Members New Republic) 3. The case C4I In 2000, Law 2833 was awarded to Police the security of the Olympic Games and provided for creation of DAOA. In 2001 a Presidential Decree (63/2001) was the mission of DAOA. * As early as 2002 started, and signed contracts with the Directors pension regulations (see a. Contracts BOARTES LTD -2004 on 28.03.2002, b. BOARTES TRADING CO. LTD -2004 on 28.03.2002 and c. Supplement thereto to 03.07 , 2003, including increased pay for C4I amount of 1.272.720 . It contracts with companies METROTECH 23.06.2003, ARMOR GROUP 14.08.2002, ISDS HELLAS SA 30.04.2003, 04.07.2003, PETER RYAN 26.04.2002). In witness Spanoudakis (see Filing on 19/05/2010), Managing Director of the Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games, "when he was hired in 2002 there was no time limit to be hiring by the Ministry of Public Order has therefore the Athens 2004". "We hired the Voartes deposits, the result of their work can be the judge of mediocre or unsuccessful outcome. Very high fees for both the contract and to expand. We add, hired and other companies, but always in agreement with the Ministry of Public Order. These companies FOR FULL PUBLIC credentials from DAOA, which in PD supervised by the Minister of Public Order, and acknowledged that no document certifying that work was performed. He continues "the old familiar BOARTES was the Ministry of Public Order. Established in 2002. We met people and then set up the off-shore Cyprus to set up standards for the Olympic Games. We did the second contract after taking over the C4I. The knew the Ministry (General Manager Security 2004 was the Plaka, former Deputy Chief of Police). Given that the Ministry of Public Order did not want to put the contest "Athens 2004" and then assign the transferred money from the Olympic security budget to cover the gap. There was only verbal approval from the Ministry of Public Order (Chrysochoidis or Efstathiadis or Secretary). " Also witness Maravelias the same testimony that says "I'm in history since 2000. When seeking security adviser to the Ministry formed a committee, which I attended. They called companies including the L1 DATA. It flourished, however, neither they knew how to proceed. After he learned that the BOARTES. "(It is of course that erefniteo inappropriate to undertake the project O1 DATA hired after SIEMENS as a subcontractor for CDSS). O Plate witness, former deputy leader of ELAS, a month after the appointed retired General Safety Manager of the Olympic Games from 08.09.2010 testimony indicates that he made the suggestion for the three consulting firms to indicate the DAOA. The witness from the Cartalis 29.04.2010 testimony states that "the norms prepared by the Organizing Committee" Athens 2004 "with the MPO. It was a decision DESOP. Was prepared from the beginning of 2001 by the MPO to be competition for the security systems. "

In its examination of a witness under oath 07.05.2003 Alexander Polymenopoulos the Attorney Mr. drums (see ref file 2241), Special Advisor to the Minister of Defense in 1998 to the end of 2002 stated that "created DAOA not have any technical or the required qualifications and scientific experience to determine technical and informational techniques to evaluate solutions related to setting up an information management center, risk assessment, risk management and operating tool making. As a scientist and academic standards of judging BOARTES mildly objectionable. I made great efforts to improve the content standards ... I'm afraid not heeded. Here ends the active public involvement in because I resigned in June 2002 explaining the reasons in my letter to Mr. Malesios with a copy to Mr. Chrisochoidis. From 1999 to begin recording the Calendar Tsakalou by 2003 to begin the procedures for the award of Olympic security, there are close relationships with some of the involved ministers and officials of the then Prime Michael Christoforakos such as: For 1999 contacts with Messrs. Papantoniou, Tsoukatou, Dimoschaki, Capralos, Venizelos, neighbors, PASOK, Vaso, Tsohatzopoulos, Papakonstantinou (Maximus), Simitis referred to the relevant pages 15,43,61,159,161,163,175,241,245,283,319,350,405,439,511,601,609,635,675,765,815,847. For 2000 contacts with Messrs. Dimoschaki, Papantoniou, Skandalidis, Simitis Verelis, Tsohatzopoulos, Papakonstantinou, "political contacts" Tsoukatou, MOD, Special to PASOK through 01 Information as listed on pages respectively For the 2001 contacts with Messrs. Verelis, Rovlias, Tsohatzopoulos, Dimoschaki, Tsoukatou, Spanoudakis, Christodoulakis, Kapralos, PASOK Tsoukatou as referring respectively to the pages 1733,1805,1809,1819,1971,2141,2271,2300,2341,2376,1705,2456,2457,2468,2526,2540,2549, 2569,2589,2603. For the 2002 contacts with Messrs. Travlos, Tsohatzopoulos, Verelis, Rovlias, Kapralos, Spanoudakis, Papantoniou, Skandalidis, neighbors, Dimoschaki. As referring respectively to the pages For the 2003 contacts with Messrs. Rovlias, KYSEA Skandalidis, Tsohatzopoulos, Papantoniou, neighbors, Tsoukatou, Kapralos, Smpoko, Christodoulakis, Tsene, Konstantinidis, Simitis / Schroder, PASOK Youth, visit Korakochori Elis, referred to respectively as on pages (Opinion of Members New Republic) In 2002 he founded the Greek Police Special Independent Agency, which reports directly to the Head of the Greek police with the name: Olympic Games Security Division (DAOA). In it was among others - by a Presidential Decree, the responsibility for planning, testing and implementation of security measures for the Olympics 2004. Preparing technical specifications of the Olympic Games security - which became known as C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Coordination & Integration) took the consulting firm Boartes (see filing Dimitrios Efstathiadis the Select Committee of Parliament, to 01.06. 2010, p. 110-113). On 09.07.2002 Mr. Dimitris Efstathiadis, Secretary General Ministry of Public Order, has commissioned a seven-member working group to evaluate the design of C4I and correlation with other studies or actions that were involved and concerned for the safety of the Olympic Games ( See submission Vassiliou Konstantinidis to the Examination Board on 15.03.2010, p.12).

* On 16.07.2002 drafted MINUTES-MAKING SYSKEPSIS MEMORANDUM FOR THE OLYMPIC SECURITY PROGRAM (see ref 000276 file), which was chaired by Prime Minister Kostas Simitis with the participation of Culture Minister E. Venizelos, Minister for Defence, Mr I. Papantoniou, the Deputy Minister of Defense Mr. L. Lotidi, the Minister of Public Order Mr. E. Malesiou, the Minister of Culture Mr. A. Alevras, the Press Secretary, Mr. T. foundries and the General Secretary Olympic Games, Mr. Kartalis and decided the contest to become the bargaining process "from the shortlist of companies" (not "the larger number of suppliers" as defined in Presidential Decree 284/89 and straight violation of it). Also in the upperMemorandum Practically decided to include in the same competition and the platform of the wireless surround communication system (TETRA) again on the shortlist of companies. In witness Konstantinidis (submission 15.3.2010,) "the cursed C4I original budget was 50 million, after TETRA reached 211 million." In witness Maravelia (submission 3/10/2010) The TETRA is 40% of the contract C4I. In particular the witness Trepekli (submission 03/09/2010) "by 2002 no one talked about TETRA. They made various competitions in the past others have gone some not. The Americans had bought the BELABS. The SAIC But He had to work with SIEMENS because they entered the TETRA system. He could not do without TETRA SIEMENS. The proposal for the TETRA made it in the KYSEA Simitis and thereby put the project on SIEMENS "In witness Travlos (18/03/2010)" the MoD had its own C4I. The cost may be lower because there is a special section of Computer and several dozens of specialized officers' .* (Opinion of Members of the New Republic) On 30.07.2002 the Evaluation Committee gave its findings (see filing Vassiliou Constantinides the Inquiry Commission on 15.03.2010, p.13). On 31.07.2002 a meeting held under Mr. Evangelos Malesios, Deputy Minister of Public Order, final decisions are taken. The project costs are budgeted to 211.287.575 (see filing Vassiliou Constantinides the Inquiry Commission on 15.03.2010, p.13-14). The contest will be conducted in accordance with PD 284/1989 "On procurement, subcontracting and Enforcement Operations as amended and supplemented by Decree 189/97" because they provided short time tender. On 28.08.2002 the Interministerial Coordination Committee for the Olympic Preparation (DESOP) decided to set up the Committee on Planning and Monitoring Project C4I chaired by Mr. Evangelos Malesios, Deputy Minister of Public Order (see ref 1, abstracts 39th meeting DESOP). * On 30.08.2002, the then Minister of Defence Papantoniou act by a document reference number 44134/30.8.2002 to characterize the project as special equipment, the description of the item being done by the DAOA of ELAS be implemented by GDDIA (MOD ) RESTRICTED COMPETITION Article 72 para 1 PD 284/89. Article 72 provides that in cases where it is feasible to conduct a public tender for supplies abroad to meet urgent needs, prepared by the department, which conducts the procurement plan and bid document delivered to the largest possible number of suppliers prevalent than the type of supply. On 06.09.2002 with the registration number 44139 MOD letter on "supply a mailing list" is defined to be a special armament program, the commission conducted the procedure with no 72Ed first such application of Article 6 para 2i Decree 284/89, as amended with DPR 189/97, with the help of these articles with articles 71 and 1e ed1a and 73 para 1b and 1e PD 284/89. It is also stipulated that the offsets required by prior agreements or definitive agreements with the Greek industries and companies. AZ The contract will be signed before the signing of supply contracts and will enter into force upon entry into force of the main supply contract. In 21.3.2003

in response to questioning in the House by Mr. Kefaloyiannis, Minister Papantoniou budgetary system, Mr. Papantoniou said inter alia that his decision was the implementation of GDDIA the arms procurement program C4I under P, D 284/89 to dispatch procedure bidding only for SAIC, TRS, Titan, selected as candidates * (Notice of Members New Republic). On 06.09.2002 the General Directorate for Defence Investment (GDDIA) Department of Defense sent a call for expressions of interest in three partnerships of companies, from those which had expressed interest in participating in the contest * (as is clear from press reports and other international majors such as BAE SYSTEMS, whose representatives have already called and the investigating judge, a company which has undertaken the largest project installation C4I system in the U.S. for the U.S. Army was interested to participate but not notified to the document request) * (Opinion Members The New Republic): The Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), the Thales Raytheon Systems (TRS) and TITAN. Eventually the competition offers submitted by SAIC and the TRS. About TITAN withdrawn (see ref 2, No. F.600/44139/S.23/06-09-2002 document and see Ministry of National Economy Minister George Terpekli submission to the Examination Board on 09.03.2010, p. 63). * In the same aforementioned letter from 6.9.2002 stated that the convention AZ signed before the signing of supply contracts and will enter into force upon the entry into force of the main contract. But the contract reportedly signed AZ in English on 11.9.2007 Date of Amendment 6 dated 29.5.2003 and activation number 16/03. In the main Convention 19.5.2003anaferetai in Article 21 (where the number of contract AZ empty) that "should be signed before or at the latest simultaneously with this contract" In witness Vassilakis, who testified before the Inquiry on 18 and 22.3 .2010 "requirement was the implementation of compensation over the period 20032005 but we have not implemented. It is in the air. Certification has become. We must look for. The SDOE could go to companies that are supposed to be defensive. " In witness Konstantinidis, lodged on 15.3.2010 "was superior to another company to trim TRS. During the testimony of Prose 10.3.2010 "countermeasures commonly used southern commissions to be paid to political persons" During the testimony of Sioupioni 15.3.2010, made in 2006 negotiations on compensation 98.3% was construction work and not defense industries . At the same from 6.9.2002 document and special conditions call for expressions of interest states that the deposit (if requested by the supplier) is defined as 40% of the contract. Since on the witness Maravelia the TETRA is 40% of the contract which C4I and paid, as was the TETRA project SIEMENS advance outset had covered the work of SIEMENS. On 11.9.2002 signed contract between SAIC-PROFIT whereby the PROFIT out agents with the representative agent George Trepekli, who in his testimony from 9.3.2010 after that the application of Decree 284 on the purchase of airplanes and tanks rather than systems .* (Opinion MPs of New Democracy). On 23.01.2003 the Government Council for Foreign and Defense (KYSEA), after considering bids from two potential contractors as non-viable, declared the contest barren (see ref 3, No. 1 / 23 -01-2003 Meeting Minutes KYSEA). On 29.01.2003 a new procedure was chosen for the competition. The two companies submitted sealed financial bids. The financial bid of SAIC reached the 376.037.958 and the TRS 398.510.675 . The Commission did not deem acceptable bids, because far exceeded the

original budget of the project (see Ref 4, No. F.600/9024/S.3/29-01-2003 document of Ministry of National Economy A.). On 21.02.2003 the companies submitted sealed financial bids. From the opening showed that the deduction that gave the SAIC was 15.44 and the discount you gave the TRS was 20.11. Based on these discounts, the procurement price of C4I enough for SAIC to 317.971.942 and TRS to 318.361.761 (see filing Prose Mr. Paul in Athens First Instance Court prosecutor Panagiotis Athanassiou, on 30/6/2008, deposit Konstantinidis Kingdom, 15/03/2010, p.18-19). On 22.02.2003 the Commission unanimously submitted a record to the General Directorate for Defence Armaments (GDDIA), whereby both contractors have offered, in terms technikoepicheirisiaki, workable solutions within twelve months, which largely met the specifications set for the System C4I. Even noted that both the financial bids exceeded the budget of 211.000.000 . (See ref 5, practical negotiating committee of the program systems C4I Olympic Security, 02.22.2003). * As of 18.11.2002 Practical Evaluation Committee, Negotiations Committee established for this purpose states that selected the SAIC despite the drawbacks mentioned inter alia that "no clear way of checking and receiving system as a whole, but the emphasis on control and receipt of each subsystem separately "is taken into account that by SAIC subsidiary Telcordia offered OTE engineering services." Also on the 22.2.2003 Statement by the Negotiations Committee which identified and included in the commonly accepted practice basic conditions mentioned in paragraph 10 f "Tradition subsystems within 12 months "* (Notice of Members New Republic) On 27.02.2003 the KYSEA SAIC chose a preferred contractor holding that submitted the best offer, aimed at further improving the conditions of the award program C4I Olympic Security to reduce these costs (see ref 6, no. F.600/9055/S .9/28.02.2003 document of Ministry of National Economy). On 12.03.2003 the SAIC submitted its final bid was to 254.999.000 (see submission Mr Konstantinidis Kingdom to the Selection Committee on 15.03.2010, p.21). On 13.03.2003 the KYSEA a decision mandated the implementation of the C4I supply company SAIC for the amount of 254.990.000 (see ref 7, No. F.900a/3392/6291/21.03.2003 document of Ministry of National Economy) . * In Witness Polymenopoulos (above about) "I had an opportunity informally to see both scientific studies and my view is that the proposal of the TRS was technically far superior. Although the Review Committee determines that technically and economically TRS is advantageous for the Greek state solution (difference in units 7-9) PARADOXOS the contest is null and returns to the Minister of Public Order to reopen the process. The interesting thing is that both ventures were assured that they will do the work in extremely tight time limits ypoleiponto with exactly the same resources and tools, and I am absolutely sure that interior Consortium was handling shrinking resources and tools to be able to cope financially . So we are not accepted ever SAIC to provide a detailed budget of machinery, tools and instruments to use. He suggests the Malesios KYSEA (in a meeting last week of February 2003, where "coincidentally" missing ministers choosing the provisional contractor. Since the proposal of TRS remained technically stronger, the predecessor SAIC by 3.5 units, and economically advantageous at 6,000,000 dollars. I had information about operations and pressures to change the outcome of the competition in favor of SAIC "" From what I know, Friday 2.5.2003 sent by the Technical Committee a recommendatory award initialed by the members of the Commission and the temporary contractor, which means that they have agreed to the Commission together perfectly, the General Armament Department of MOD and yesterday (06/05/2003) is in the

hands of the Minister of National Defence for the final signing of award to the company SAIC "* (Opinion Members of the New Republic) On 19.05.2003 signed between the General Directorate for Defence Investment, Ministry of Defense and the company SAIC a contract to acquire a single, integrated and interoperable Command, Control, Communications Coordination and Harmonization of Olympic Security (C4ICommand, Control, Communication , Coordination & Integration) total cost 254.999.999,00 . The contract included the procurement of three systems: 1. System Support and Decision Support (CDSS) to seven (7) sub worth 18.914.601,00 . 2. Communications and Information System (CIS) with thirteen (13) Subsystems, worth 221.799.048,00 . 3. System Command Center (CCS) to ten (10) Subsystems, worth 14.285.351,00 . The agreement provided that the delivery system would be in total and a "turnkey". One was Subsuppliers SIEMENS, which had taken five (5) Communications and Computer Subsystems value 167.914.655,00 (65,84% of the total project). In the process of performance problems were seen mainly due to failure of the company (see ref 8, the Convention of 19.05.2003). On 19.05.2003 signed between the companies SAIC and SIEMENS SA the subcontract for the C4I security system for the Olympic Games Athens 2004 (see ref 9, no. F092.22/2010 official translation). * On 08.07.2003 as indicated by a document of OWN were proposed by SAIC and DAOA to change subcontractors, which led to a negotiated Amendments 4, so the final purchase price amounted to 259.032.250 * (Opinion Members of the New Republic) On 23.12.2003 signed the first amendment to the contract No020A/03. At the request of the company replaced the TETRA system infrastructure software from Nokia on MOTOROLA to reduce the contract price of 254.999.000 251.932.250 in change of economic data (ref. 10 b. The first of 23.12.2003 amending the contract) . * In 2003, the Special Accounts in the Ministry of National Defense sent a visa for 36 year 2003 money order payment amount 63.109.140 , which was returned atheorito the 79/2004 Act and epaneferthi and again returned atheorito with the following statement by Commissioner k.G.Chondrea (vl.schet. Report from 6.5.2005 to file number 000475) "specifically referred to the excluded pre-contractual control arms procurement programs of the Ministry of Defense, referring to that and 138/2004 opinion OWN not justified and that because the validity of the revised Constitution of 2001, and Article 98 paragraph 1b that the jurisdiction of the Court is owned and control procurement of high economic value in which the State is not exempted from any commission as over control. Besides the plenary of the Court to 27/29.11.2000 Proceedings of the General Meeting had agreed that the audit contract article 8 Law 2741/1999 not exempt or supplies covered by Law 2286/1995 "procurement government "Further to the reported that according to Presidential Decree 82/1996 is not required to produce documentation from individual companies but only by the company claimed to Contracting with the State are not relevant and that because although the Contracting State in here is a joint venture with the name Sykes TEEM but the companies forming the consortium did not lose their legal status, since the relevant union in a joint venture is temporarily to perform a specific task and is liable, since according to the contract undertake to supply significant part of the project to provide the provisions of Presidential Decree 82/1996 documents " In a number 0020/17.11.2005 act of the 5th Division of the Court, which followed over the written opinion of the Commissioner stated that "failure to carry out pre-contractual review by

the Court on the said supply contract makes the process of legally incorrect conclusion because pravasis essential type of the procedure and involves the automatic nullity of the contract is concluded "and rejects the reason for revocation of the Act but accepts" excusable error ". Also decides that the decision of DESOP (chaired by Prime Minister Simitis) received the 37iS/12.6.2002 and decided that "the competitive tendering for Olympic Security Operational Centers from the Ministry of National Defence," under which the decision was carried out the award procedure in question supply the security systems C4I Olympic Games from the Ministry of Defence is not lawful, since in view of the object of this commission, as described in the relevant contract and the tender specifications and functional requirements of competitive bidding and those served by the commission bodies, not including the Defense Ministry, was based on the existing responsibilities of ministries provisions, to be conducted by the Ministry of Public Order in the rules governing this (n, 2286/1995 and Presidential Decree 394 / 1996) after the issue fee and the emerging view in Article 1 of Law 1481/1984 "Organisation Ministry of Public Order" mission primarily serves the needs of the dates and therefore the scope of its own competence and responsibility and not by the Ministry of National Defense under the provisions of Presidential Decree 284/1989, since that provision does not serve either purpose, pursued by Article 1 of n.2292/1995 "Organisation and operation of the Ministry of Defense, command and control of the Armed Forces and other provisions "of the Ministry, nor the operation of" * (Notice of Members New Republic). On 28.02.2004 IET3 failed to exercise, so that the then government refused to pay 31.000.000 in the company (see submission Mr Konstantinidis Kingdom to the Selection Committee on 15.03.2010, p.23-24). On 07.04.2004 signed the second amendment to the contract No020A/03. At the request of the company replacing the subsupplier ELBIT and LIGHTSHIP the company PANOU SA without changing the economic data (ref. 11 b. The second amendment of 07.04.2004 the contract). On 16.04.2004 a meeting between representatives of the "Athens 2004", contractors and DAOA (Olympic Games Security Division) to monitor progress of implementation of the C4I subsystems, TETRA, OKAE, CCTV, it became clear that SAIC was unable to deliver subsystems in the contract period (see ref 12, Proceedings of Meeting 16.04.2004, Athens 2004 SA). On 20.05.2004 after wide meeting was chaired by Mr Chris Markogiannaki, Deputy Minister of Public Order, reiterated the impossibility of delivery (see schet.13, No. 2004-00/1/10-v '/ 20.05 .2004 paper). On 23.06.2004 Mr. Chris Markogiannakis, Deputy Minister of Public Order, sent a confidential letter to the then Mr. George Voulgarakis, Minister of Public Order, which informed him of delays in delivery systems. He reminded the meeting that had been on 20.05.2004 with the U.S. Ambassador T. Miller and unanimous agreement to amend the contract and delivered the C4I on 30.06.2004. He also noted that SAIC insisted pressing to blackmail take 31.000.000 in advance, despite the failure exercise IET3. In these circumstances the Deputy Public Order proposed: I. Be delivered on 01.07.2004 in C4I DAOA for use. II. The targets were not achieved in IET3 be considered non-critical, be transferred to IET4 be granted to SAIC certificate for successful completion of IET3 be reimbursed the amount of 31.000.000 (see ref 14, no. 1 / 23.06.2004 confidential letter from the Minister of Public Order). For the payment of 31.000.000 as stated in the filing Spiliotopoulos on 02.09.2010

before the Inquiry, the DAOA of ELAS witnessed the NGSAE that achieved its objectives and that necessarily disbursed by order of DAOA. * For the payment of 31.000.000 as stated in the filing of Spiliotopoulos 2.9.2010 before the Inquiry, the DAOA of ELAS witnessed the NGSAE it achieved its objectives and that necessarily disbursed by order of DAOA * (Opinion of Members of the New Republic ). On 25.06.2004 signed a third amendment to the contract No020A/03. At the request of the company replaced without material change in financial assets (b ref 15, by 25.06.2004 the third supplementary agreement). On 30.06.2004 the SAIC informed the DAOA that on 01.07.2004 it was ready to demonstrate the operational readiness of the Olympic Security System C4I (see ref 16, No. 2004-50/1/10rkv/30.06 .2004 document EDPS). On 01.07.2004 was made by SAIC's C4I demonstrating the political and natural leadership of the Ministry of Public Order. According to reports by members of the Audit Collection Supplies (EDPS) and the report of the technical advisers Boartes the whole system was unusable (see ref 17, No. 2004-30/29/1-ng ' / 05.07.2004, 2004-50/1/10-rma '/ 07.07.2004, 2004-50/1/10/-rld' / 03.07.2004, 2004-10/20/31/1-rp/06.07. 2004, 2004-30/29/1-nv '/ 05.07.2004, 2004-50/1/10-rle' / 03.07.2004, 2004-50/1/10-rki '/ 02.07.2004, 2004-50 / 1/10-rlst '/ 03.07.2004, 2004-10/20/31/1roth' / 05.07.2004 documents GTSs and no. 50/1/10-rlg/02.07.2004 reporting Boartes). On 07.07.2004 signed between SAIC and the Greek State, represented by Mr. Chris Markogiannaki, Deputy Minister of Public Order, Mr. Leonidas Evangelidis, Secretary General Ministry of Public Order, Mr. Spyros Capralos, General Secretary of the Olympic Games, Mr. Claus Constantinides, Director DAOA, the "Memorandum" focusing on the provisional acceptance of C4I. The October 1, 2004 fixed the date of general testing for final acceptance and exercise IET3 was successful. From the memorandum showed that they respected the contractual time for completion and delivery to 28.05.2004, the objective weakness and culpability of all parties (see ref 18, Memorandum, 7/7/2004).

On 22.07.2004 the KYSEA ratified the Memorandum under the number 1 / 2004 decision was decided: 1. General testing of C4I security system to 01.10.2004 for further making final delivery and acceptance and agreement on any discrepancies and their cost. Failure to reach agreement within 60 days after final acceptance may be followed by the contracted final procedures of dispute resolution 2. Delivery of the security system for use and operation by the Greek government in at the time of receipt situated situation until 20.7.2004 while recording deficiencies and discrepancies. Also decided to amend the original contract for additional projects with supplier SIEMENS and the process of direct award. The amount of the cost of projects was 3.500.000 . Following the decision of the KY.S.E.A SAIC approved by Christos Markogiannaki received the amount of 31.000.000 for the exercise IET3 (see ref 19, No. 536807/22.07.2004 document National Defence General Staff).

On 05.08.2004 signed the fourth amendment to the contract No020A/03 request of the Greek government to run the company for additional work to upgrade the infrastructure of the building the General Police Directorate of Attica. This change resulted in an increase in conventional object 7.100.000 with a consequent increase in the total amount to 259.032.250 (see ref 20, by amending clause 05.08.2004 4th). On 09.08.2004 Commander Mr. Lazarus Doudountsakis, a member of the EDPS sent a confidential letter to Mr. Nicholas Soupioni, President of the EDPS, the members of which informed that a) the C4I system did not meet standards b) members of the body, which had not been informed of the contents of the Memorandum and c) repeating the exercise ITE3 June was not completed successfully (see ref 21, no. 2004-40/13/5-1d '/ 10.08 .2004 document EDPS). On 18.08.2004 the SAIC sent to DAOA financial bid for removal of temporary Olympic facilities (see ref 22, no. 30/13/11/z/19.08.2004 document EDPS). On 28.08.2004 the Boartes to report described the uninstalled equipment type A (9 sites) as a movement, which poses a contractual risks (see ref 23, the internal memo from 28.08.2004 Group consultants computer systems, Boartes). On 28.08.2004 the SAIC sent to DAOA new financial offer to uninstall the Olympic facilities (see ref 24, decision no. CA-T-04-320/28.08.2004 document SAIC). On 30.08.2004 the Mr. Vasilis Konstantinidis and Nikos Soupionis, D / Director and Chairman DAOA GTSs respectively, sent a note to Mr Chris Markogiannaki, Deputy Minister of Public Order on uninstalling the nine (9) Olympic venues. According to SAIC's proposal of 28.08.2004 the total cost amounted to uninstall 36.900 (see ref 25, no. 2004-00/3/13-mg '/ 30.08.2004 document DAOA). On 31.08.2004 the Mr. Vasilis Konstantinidis and Nikos Soupionis, DAOA States, sent a letter to SAIC basis of which gave the mandate to immediately uninstalled nine (9) Equipment Type A, accepting the cost under the letter of the company from 28.08. 2004. They also said that the company will not be tested on uninstalling, and the equipment will not be tested in future qualitative and quantitative (see ref 26, no. 00/3/13-mv '/ 31.08.2004 document DAOA ). At the same time, Mr. Michael Christoforakos asked Mr. Kutschenreuter - according to his testimony to the German Justice - money for illegal payments to get the SIEMENS 30.000.000 by the Greek government for equipment, safety systems Olympic Games (see . ref. 27, Kutsenreuter apology to prosecutors in Munich 07.12.2006, p.42) On 17.09.2004 Mr. Nikolaos Soupionis, President of EDPS, recommendatory note sent to Mr. Chris Markogiannaki, Deputy Minister of Public Order, which proposed to remove and the other Olympic Venues (128 in total) than those who were in a basic operational centers (CRD OSKA, OKEP, OKELS, SEKYPS, OPKA Attica), which could be the dress rehearsal. The cost for removal was 290.000 , costs that do not justify direct competition award. This suggestion was accepted (see ref 28, by letter dated 17.09.2004 DAOA). On 24.09.2004 Mr Vasilis Konstantinidis and Nikos Soupionis, members DAOA sent a letter to the Ministry of National Economy / NGOS & SA / GDDIA by asking them know directly their

views since it was not possible to implement the dress rehearsal on 01.10.2004 (see . ref. 29, No. 2004-00/3/13-p '/ 24.09.2004 document DAOA). * In October 2004, according to the filing Koutsenroiter the German Justice on the issue C4I (Debevoice) M. Christoforakos asking him money for "outstanding requirements for the project." The Christoforakos said that they had made payments of commissions for his work and that it was most needed "in the same court declared that the Sikatsek Christoforakos probably had approached first to seek money supply in relation to this project in 2004 After delivery of the project was well underway. According to Sikatsek the Christoforakos said it would take 10 to 15,000,000 to be paid commissions to 4 ministries, Interior, Defense, Culture and Communications UNDER promise he DOSES IN TIME FOR THE CONTRACT. These payments would become through the system with virtual Floriani invoices within prochronologimenon contracts with companies showcase, directed by the Floriani, and the Weavind Khroma. He said that both of these service contracts business consultant to Siemens was prochronologimenes to appear to provide services before awarding the contract. Recognize and record seven corresponding payments to the Fairways in August and September 2004 more than 1.75 million . The cover promises made during the signing of the contract related to a number 5KLS 563 JS 45994/07 decision of the Court in Munich Sikatsek, with which he was declared guilty of a total prison sentence of 2 years and a fine. "According to Decision was concluded between SIEMENS and WEAVIND an agreement for the project Olympics in Athens, which was dated 31.8.2002, for payment of 2 million Euros, and as they knew all the parties WEAVIND was not able to provide services coordinator for cooperation between SIEMENS and SAIC. Payments as stated in the court order made on 20.7.2004, 2.8.2004 and 20.8.2004 respectively to amounts 785.000 , 615.000 and 475.000 . The same happened with the KHROMA contract dated 15.9.2002 and supply of funds between 1.800.000 and 2.000.000 and payments on 22.7.2004 and 27.8.2004 respectively to amounts 690.000 , 555.000 * (Opinion of Members New Republic). On 30.09.2004 the General Secretariat of Economic Planning and Defense Investments of the Ministry of National Defense sent a letter to DAOA which a) asked to do the test on 01.10.04 and b) the eperripte responsibility for delaying the general test (see . 30, no. F.600/AD.110736 S.35/30.09.2004 document YP.ETH.A.). On 30.09.2004 Mr Vasilis Konstantinidis and Nikos Soupionis, DAOA States, sent a letter to the Ministry of National Economy / NGOS & SA / GDDIA which explained that the general test could not be done on 01.10.2004 by the fault of the supplier (see ref 31 , No. 2004-00/3/13-rv '/ 30.09.2004 document DAOA). On 01.10.2004 Mr George Zorbas, Secretary General of Economic Planning and Defense Investments of the Ministry of National Defence, responding to his letter a letter of DAOA, notified the Prime Minister, recommended to those responsible to inform the political leadership and KY.S . EA the impossibility of implementation of general test of 01.10.2004. Also stressed the need to determine a new date (see ref 32, No. F.600/AD131405 S1037/01.10.2004 document YP.ETH.A.).

On 01.10.2004 started negotiations with SAIC / SIEMENS amending the contract. Among other things, the company required to pay immediately for the additional works carried out by direct assignment of 3.500.000 , without having to amend this contract. On 04.10.2004 Mr Vasilis Konstantinidis and Nikos Soupionis, DAOA States, sent a letter to Mr. Chris Markogiannaki, Deputy Minister of Public Order, which eisigounto to determine the new date of the general test after an agreement with SAIC and after the company declared ready on the outstanding issues exist (see ref 33, no. 00/3/13-rd '/ 04.10.2004 document DAOA). On 09.11.2004 the SAIC sent a court complaint for failure to fulfill contractual obligations of the Greek government to the company (see ref 34, no. 00/6/1-d '/ 10.11.2004 document EDPS).

On 22.11.2004 the k.Nikolaos Soupionis member of DAOA, suggested a letter to Mr. Chris Markogiannaki, Deputy Minister of Public Order, not deprived the SAIC for non-delivery of the project to the conventional date was 28.11.2004. He suggested a decision be issued by the Ministry of Defence, under which an extension would be given 2 months old (see ref 35, No. 00/4/21/1-pd '/ 22.11.2004 document DAOA). n 22.11.2004 Mr. Chris Markogiannakis, Deputy Minister of Public Order, sent the recommendatory note from Mr Nicholas Soupioni, DAOA State, which agreed to Mr Spilios Spiliotopoulos, Minister of National Defence. Mr. Chris Markogiannakis, Deputy Minister of Public Order, but suggested six-month extension (see ref 36, No. 46 confidential letter of Deputy). On 26.11.2004 Mr. Nikolaos Soupionis, President of EDPS, proposed to be deprived D.A.O.A the SAIC (see ref 37, no. 00/2/1-oth '/ 26.11. 2004 document DAOA). On 26.11.2004 Mr. Konstantinos Katavati, government attorney, dismissed the court by letter dated 03.11.2004 SAIC (see ref 38, by 26.11.2004 extrajudicial protest Konstantinos Katavati). On 30.11.2004 Mr. Sotiris Tsenes, Director DAOA Mr Konstantinos Kasapakis, Head of the Centre Management - Control and Division of DAOA, briefed members of the EDPS to continue their work until they answer the Defense Ministry for implementation of the Convention (see ref 39, no. 1/17/29-rk/30.11.2004 document DAOA). On 06.12.2004 Mr. Spilios Spiliotopoulos, Minister of National Defense sent a letter to Mr. George Voulgarakis, Minister of Public Order, with copies to the Prime Minister, which recommended that the convening KY.S.E.A to address issues had resulted from delays and possible revision of existing decision KYSEA or issuing new (see ref 40, no. F.600/EP.132868/S1255/06.12.2004 document YP.ETH.A.) . On 13.01.2005 Mr. John Efthimiou, Director General for Defence Investment, sent a letter to DAOA with copy to Mr Chris Markogiannaki, Deputy Minister of Public Order, which informed him that they approved the two-month extension of time for revocation of the supplier (see ref 41, no. F.600/AD.315505/S70/13.01.2005 document YP.ETH.A.). On 24.01.2005 by Mr. Cheney and Mr. Sotiris Nicholas Soupionis, DAOA States, sent a note to Mr Chris Markogiannaki, Deputy Minister of Public Order, which responded to the letter dated

15.12.2004 of the Ministry of Defence which yield responsibilities to them, because a) found no deficiencies, deviations of the system to implement the blocking rehearsal and b) have completed procedures for additional modifications and works for SAIC. In this paper the DAOA eperripte responsibilities for non-implementation of general test only to the company and reminded Mr Chris Markogiannaki that negotiations for additional projects were after oral order of the same. Interesting is the fact that there is no response, then Minister of Public Order (see ref 42, no. 2004-00/3/13/1-id '/ 24.01.2005 document DAOA). On 07.02.2005 Mr. Nikolaos Soupionis (member DAOA) initiator sent a note to Mr Chris Markogiannaki, Deputy Minister of Public Order, which informed him fully for the resulting situation. In this he said that a necessary condition to implement the action was to modify the contract. Also advised that mandated the EDPS to receive the module 22A (upgrade police headquarters building) and paid the remaining amount to the company, energy entirely unconventional because C4I package should be omitted and the key in hand (see ref 43 , no. 2004-00/3/13/1-kg '/ 07.02.2005 document DAOA). On 17.02.2005 was drafted and signed the protocol quality and quantity of subsystem 22a (see ref 44, no. 30/22/3/1/-mv '/ 17.02.2005 document EDPS). On 28.02.2005 Mr. Dimitris Katopodis, Judge OWN sent to the Ministry of Public Order and DAOA information note expressed the opinion that they should be careful in case of modification, since it would be legitimate to be awarded additional projects. They noted and that the power to propose a percentage reduction, if not met the technical specifications were GTSs (see ref 45, No. 2004-00/3/13/1-lth/09.03.2005 document GTSs ). On 19.03.2005 Mr Sotirios Tsenes, Director DAOA, Gregory Doumentzianos, President E.E.P.P. and Nicholas Soupionis, sent a letter to SAIC by notification in the leadership, which described it: a) the system was totally inadequate, b) the deviations of the individual subsystems exceed the payments until then, and c) the company was unfair pressure on GTSs ( see ref 46, No. 00/3/13/1-mz/19.03.2005 document DAOA). On 30.03.2005 Mr. John Efthimiou, Director General sent a letter GDDIA the Ministry of Public Order and DAOA which requested detailed information on the progress of the project, the implementation rate per module, registration problems and suggestions for solving them ( see ref 47, no. F.600/319445/S768/30.03.2005 document YP.ETH.A.) On 05.04.2005 Mr. Sotirios Tsenes, Director DAOA, Konstantinos Kasapakis, Deputy DAOA Mr. Gregory Doumentzianos, President of EDPS and Mr. Nicholas Soupionis sent a letter to the Ministry of National Defence on the implementation rates per subsystem. The rates are controllable as to the accuracy (see ref 48, No. 2004-00/3/13/1-xa '/ 05.04.2005 document DAOA). On 08.04.2005 Mr. Chris Markogiannakis, Deputy Minister of Public Order informed SAIC draft decision KYSEA and asked for their views / comments on the process (see ref 49, no. 1139st/18.04.2005 document Office of the Deputy Minister of Public Order).

On 18.04.2005 the SAIC sent to Mr Chris Markogiannaki, Deputy Minister of Public Order, a document which was commenting on the draft decision KYSEA and blackmailing the recalled agreed (see ref 49, No. 1139st/18.04.2005 document Office of the Deputy Minister of Public Order). On 28.04.2005 Mr. Sotirios Tsenes (Major) sent a letter to SAIC, by notification in the leadership of the Ministry of Public Order and Hellenic Police and the Ministry of National Defense which characterized the system as inadequate and eperripte responsibilities to SAIC (see ref 50, no. 2004-00/3/13/1-oi '/ 28.04.2005 document DAOA). On 01.07.2005 Mr. Sotirios Tsenes sent to Mr Chris Markogiannaki, Deputy Minister of Public Order, a document which proposed 18-month contract extension, paying technical advisers worth 600.000 from SAIC and drafted the legal adviser Costas Katavati draft letter accepting the proposal of SAIC for alternative CDSS (see ref 51, no. 2004-00/3/13/1-rkv/01.07.2005 document DAOA). On 12.10.2005 Mr. Sotirios Tsenes, Director DAOA, Konstantinos Kasapakis, Sub / Director DAOA and Nicholas Soupionis sent a letter to the Ministry of National Defense, which informed that the tests were completed by 02.04.2005 and that recorded in 26.04.2005 essential differences of the subsystems 1-7, 14, 15, 17, 20, was ongoing consultation process with SAIC to restore them. The SAIC would bear the extra cost of technical consultants for the CDSS. The DAOA recommended extending the years of the contract for the standard coverage of their actions and decision by the KYSEA, according to the draft prepared by DAOA and sent GDDIA on 05.04.2005 (see ref 52, No. 00/3/13/2-ia/12.10.2005 document DAOA). On 14.10.2005 Mr. Gregory Doumentzianos and all members of the body, which suggested the DAOA be deprived the company SAIC, and to them of the legal framework for further action since the system was inadequate, and all the Commission's actions were based on verbal orders of DAOA (see ref 53, no. 2004-00/3/13/2-ith/14.10.2005 document DAOA). On 26.10.2005 Mr. Chris Markogiannakis, Deputy Minister of Public Order, sent a letter to SAIC to set the delivery time of subsystems C4I, stressing that in case of non-compliance and compliance with this timetable would be seen as failure to respond to the company's contractual obligations (see ref 54, No. 3657v/26.10.2005 letter from Deputy Minister). On 03.11.2005 Mr. Konstantinos Katavati, legal director of DAOA / EDPS sent a briefing paper to Mr. Sotirios Tsene, Director DAOA and Nicholas Soupioni by informing them that the actions of the body, which was legal and could be continued until project completion (see ref 55, no. 73/01.11.2005 document Counsel of DAOA / EDPS). On 07.11.2005 Mr. Sotirios Tsenes, Director DAOA sent a letter to members of the EDPS and asked them to continue their work, citing the opinion of Mr Costa Katavati (see ref 56, No. 1 / 17 / 47-rlv/07.11.2005 document DAOA). On 17.11.2005 the Court with the No. 8 / 2005 of the Act decided that the conclusion of the Contract with SAIC was lawful, because those who signed on behalf of the Ministry of Defense were to excusable error (see ref 57, 16th / 17.11.2005 Meeting of the Court).

On 09.01.2006 the SAIC sent a letter to Mr. Chris Markogiannaki, Minister of Public Order, by which showed that on 13.12.2005 it had become a meeting between Messrs. Chris Markogiannaki, Sotiris Tsene, Gregory Doumentzianou and SAIC. The meeting agreed to the timetable, which would amend the contract until 15/02/2006. It is obvious that the leadership of ELAS was not aware of this meeting and the tight schedule of the Negotiations Committee (see ref 58, no. 20/1/1/1-ia/10.01.2006 document GTSs). On 30.01.2006 Mr George Zorbas, General Secretary of the Ministry of National Defense sent a letter to Mr. George Voulgarakis, Minister of Public Order, which recalled that there was: a) decision KYSEA in violation of limits on the delivery - acceptance of C4I system and b) the recommendation of the Ministry of Public Order for the points of the contract should be changed (see ref 59, no. F.600/429204 S. 252/30.09.2002 document YP.ETH.A.) On 31.01.2006 Mr. Sotirios Tsenes, Director DAOA sent a letter to the Ministry of Public Order calling definition Negotiations Committee to amend the contract (ref. 60, decision no 1/17/47/1rx 'document DAOA). On 02.02.2006 the SAIC sent a letter to Mr. Sotirios Tsene, showing that they had held meetings and negotiations on 26.01.2006 and 31.01.2006. The schedule was drawn exclusively from the SAIC and this was agreed by the President of EDPS, Mr. Gregory Doumentzianos. Obviously, other members of the body, which had been unaware of these actions of the President (see ref 61, no. 00/1/11/-i/04.02.2006 document EDPS). On 13.02.2006 sent to the House document of the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court on the investigative action against Mr and Mrs Nicholas Soupioni Vassilios Konstantinidis of infidelity against the government on receipt of C4I and implicating Mr Chris Markogiannaki (see ref 62, no. 10345/13.02.2006 document of the Ministry of Justice). On 15.03.2006 the State Legal Council opinion on the amendment of the Convention that a new decision KYSEA. Under pressure from recourse to the International Court of Arbitration signed CMD (Meimarakis-Polydoras) by which the responsibility for implementation of the contract was transferred to the WTR .* (Opinion of Members of the New Republic) On 21.04.2006 the SAIC filed for arbitration to resolve disputes between SAIC and the Greek government before the International Chamber of Commerce (see ref 63, "Request for Arbitration", 04.21.2006). On 29.04.2006 the SAIC sent to Mr. Byron Polydoras, Minister of Public Order document, which stated that they have not been agreed to amend the Convention on 15.02.2006 and 01.05.2006. The SAIC also said he expects a favorable decision KYSEA and no new date agreed to amend the Convention on 01.08.2006. Stated that it appealed to the Administrative Court and International called for the immediate trading without the withdrawal application (see ref 64, no. 20/1/17/47/3-og/08.05.2006 document EDPS). On 16.05.2006 Mr. Dimitrios Trigazis, Director of Technical AEA and Mr Nicholas Soupionis Head Office for C4I, sent a reply to SAIC on the letter from the company on 29.04.2006 to Mr. Byron Polydoras. From this document are clear responsibilities of SAIC for non delivery of the project but with a tolerance of the Ministry of Public Order and DAOA. Note that although the C4I was unfit to SAIC not declared deposed, as was the agreement and stressed that the amendment to the agreement served only to SAIC. In conclusion, the company ekkaleito to

make clear its intentions regarding the continuation or otherwise of the project and to proceed to amend the contract and the withdrawal of the appeal to arbitration. In the event that they have been stonewalled or new requirements from the company, the Greek government would exercise all legal rights, and - among others - the right to request the disqualification of SAIC (see ref 65, no. 1 / 17/37/3-ria/16.05.2006 document DAOA). On 22.05.2006 the SAIC sent to Mr Demetris Trigazis (Director Directorate of Technical AEA) document blackmail context in which it rejected the allegations of the Division of Technical and provided sixty (60) days to amend the contract, otherwise they would withdraw the appeal of the Arbitration (see ref 66, No. 1/17/47/36-rkth '/ 22.05.2006 document EDPS). On 04.07.2006 Mr. Dimitris Trigazis sent a letter to the Legal Adviser of the Ministry of refuting the arguments of SAIC for arbitration. The document shows that the provisional acceptance of the system in 2004 followed a simple demonstration of C4I, whose function was 20% and 10% interoperability. The tests in 2005 proved that the C4I was unfit for pickup in its entirety and that the negotiations lead to receiving every subsystem (see ref 67, no. 1/17/47/4-rxe/04.07.2006 document of DAOA). On 10.08.2006 Joint Ministerial Decision signed by Mr. Vangelis Meimarakis, Minister of Defense and Mr. Byron Polydoras, Minister of Public Order, which, under Article 19 of Law 3489/2006, the implementation of the contract with SAIC borne by the Ministry of Public Order, which will now proceed to amend the contract and delivery systems C4I (see ref 68, no. 249101/10.08.2006 document Office of the Minister ETH.A). The CMD was signed under the relevant option, envisaged in the amendment of article 19 Law 3489/2006. As it has submitted to the Commission by the then Home Secretary k.Paflopoulos was not necessary to decide KYSEA the 5th Amendment to the Convention as it related to the manner of execution and not borne financially, while the original contract "was a beast, which had not ever gotten any other country in terms of budget was enormous difference to the work of SAIC in Salt lake City. Crucial condition set by then Minister Polydoras for Amendment 5 was the withdrawal of the appeal against the Greek government, which actually occurred on 27,3.2007 so two days later, signed on 29.3.2007 or more Modification, after positive OWN opinions and the Court. As submitted to the Commission Mr Polydoras as appears from a comparison of the texts of the original and amended contract was first drawn to Annex A, which was missing from the original contract and added the text "post-Olympic meet the needs of stakeholders Greek government ", it received no mention akrivochronis execution but simply put the text of Article 26.3 which states" taking into account its importance and akrivochroni execution. "The absence of this annex stating in his testimony and the witness Rigogiannis after about first job with detail and professional manner. The amendment was tabled as Mr. Polydoras been emphasized in Section 1-7, which is "the heart of the system" and no possibility of receiving per subsystem with a receipt of ownership finally in the public, having already paid from 121.000.000 255,000 .000 conventional counterpart, (now the payments were made during the PASOK government was 47.331.855 on 20.6.2003, 15.777.285 to 23.665.928 31.10.2003 and on 19.2.2004 without included in these figures for TETRA and maintenance) is also vested forfeiture, the retention by letters of guarantee deposit until completion of the project and for their performance bonds (vl.Tropopoiisi 5). The amendment was tabled as Mr. Polydoras specifically Article 8, paragraph 9 says "once the process control system and where found substantial deficiencies in non collectable term delivery with key in hand, apply the provisions of Article 34 of the Convention. Reductions were made even though the TETRA operates from the first time by some radio coverage problems,

but which was expected and had already made from the original contract as witnesses Anastopoulos and Maravelia .* (Opinion of Members of the New Republic) On 01.09.2006 Mr. Nikolaos Soupionis initiator sent a note to Mr. Byron Polydoras, Minister of Public Order, attached to the decision to amend the contract. There modulation positions of leadership EL DP as to the legality of the decision On 11.09.2006 Mr. Byron Polydoras, Public Order Minister agreed with the recommendation of Mr. Nicholas Soupioni and signed the decision to regulate issues concerning the project C4I (see ref 69, no. 1 / 17/47/6-a/11.09.2006 document Technical Division). On 11.09.2006 a decision was adopted by ELAS on receipt of the C4I system with its subsystems by 28.05.2008 without sanctions against the company provided operational interoperability. On 29.03.2007 signed the fifth amendment to the contract by Mr. Byron Polydoras, Minister of Public Order. The main changes in the amended contract were: a) receipt by sub b) essentially undo the control of interoperability of subsystems and c) increasing the number of subsystems in which the contractor was and SIEMENS. The value of the purchase reached the amount of 211.127.114,00 of which Siemens would receive 82.62% (see ref 70, the fifth amendment, 29/03/2007). On 02.05.2007, despite the fact that the module 20 (TETRA) was not received by the EDPS, Messrs. Nicholas and Gregory Soupionis Doumentzianos confirmed in writing that the maintenance support provided by SAIC for the Subsystem 20 during the period from 01.08.2004 to 01.09.2006. In the statement, SAIC received on 12.05.2007 the amount of 20.489.066,70 (see ref 71, no. 2004-1/17/47/13/ie '/ 02.05.2007 document Directorate Techniques). On 25.05.2007 Mr. Dimitris Rigogiannis (technical advisor for The CDSS) sent a memorandum to members of the EDPS, with a copy to Mr Nicholas and Gregory Soupioni Doumentziano, which said the company had adopted a passive role on the elements and BFI had failed to fulfill its contractual obligation on the opening phase a detailed analysis of the requirements concerning the structure and end-users. The technical advisor stressed that in order to progress implementation of the CDSS had to make reasonable steps (see schet.72, No. 2004-00/2/4-rla '/ 25.05.2007 document EDPS). On 25.05.2007 prepared by the EDPS Protocol qualitative and quantitative acceptance WR 20 (Tetra) under which the TETRA was rejected because essential contractual differences, according to a report of the Technical Director Mr. George Ksmpouraki (see ref 73, No. . 200400/6/2-a 'document of the EDPS). On 26.05.2007 the Acceptance Committee asked the Ministry of Public Order, Mr. Costas Ailianos (General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order) was pushing - without success - for the receipt of the System. This followed a meeting with Mr. Gregory and Mr. Doumentziano Constantine Katavati when trying to dissuade the Commission to take back rejects protocol (see John Petropoulos submission to Select Committee on 23.03.2010, sel.81). On 29.05.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 11 (Aeroplio) (see ref 74, No. 00/6/2-v 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 02.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 29, (Mobile Police command

center) (see ref 75, No. 00/6/2-g 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 02.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 30, (Mobile command centers APV) (see ref 76, No. 00/6/2-d 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 02.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 21 (OSKA) (see ref 77, No. 00/6/2-e 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 04.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 26 (OPKA Olympic Village) (see ref 78, No. 00/6/2-i 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 04.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 22 (SS) (see ref 79, No. 00/6/2-st 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 04.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 23 (Olympic Stadium) (see ref 80, No. 00/6/2-z 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 04.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 24 (OPKA GREEK) (see ref 81, No. 00/6/2-i 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 04.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 25 (OPKA FALIROU) (see ref 82, No. 00/6/2-th 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 05.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 27 (Centers Fire Administration) (see ref 83, No. 00/6/2-iv 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 04.06.2007 the SAIC sent to the Directorate of Engineering of the Ministry of Public Order document for postponing retirement Protocol for WR 16 (AVL) with the promise that by 20.06.2007 will be submitted rehabilitation plan deviations. Mr. Costas Katavati, counsel, opinion to accept the request and the Directorate of Technical GTSs instructed to accept the request. On 05.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 18 CCTV Olympic Village (see ref 84, No. 2004-00/5/9-roi 'practical meeting members of the EDPS). On 06.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 8 (see ref 85, No. 00/6/2-id 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 06.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 9 (see ref 86, No. 00/6/2-ii 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 06.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 12 (see ref 87, No. 00/6/2-ith 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 06.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 19, (CCTV Olympic Venues) (see ref 88, No. 00/6/2-k 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 06.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 28, (Special Administrative Centres Coast Guard) (see ref 89, No. 2004-00/6/2-ka 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt).

On 06.06.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 10 (see ref 90, No. 00/6/2-ie 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 06.06.2007 the body, which rejected the Subsystem 16 (AVL) due to substantial differences, because according to the report of Mr. George Kampourakis, technical consultant, render it unfit for acceptance. The SAIC is not appealed within 5nthimeron against refusals Protocol (see ref 91, No. 00/6/2-kv 'rejection protocol). On 21.06.2007 Mr Nicholas and Gregory Soupionis Doumentzianos, incorrectly sent a letter to SAIC by asking the timetable for recovery of discrepancies was for WR 16 (AVL) committed on 04.06.2007. The document also indicated that differences did not allow the receipt of AVL, which however was rejected by the EDPS on 06.06.2007. On 29.06.2007 was written protocol for qualitative and quantitative receipt WR 20 (Tetra) by the Arbitration Committee, without making acceptance tests (see ref 92, a protocol to resolve disputes). On 27.07.2007 Mr Nicholas and Gregory Soupionis Doumentzianos sent to SAIC document which highlighted the lack of consistency for the filing of the rehabilitation program Gap Subsystem 16 (AVL). The AVL ultimately judged as paralipteo and included in the final protocol of C4I on 14.11.2007 without separate written protocol. Rejects Protocol of 06.06.2007 was not taken into account. On 11.09.2007 signed by the sixth amendment of the Convention No020A/03 to view the schedule of the contract into line with the timetables for implementing the project as in Annex V (b ref 93, the sixth 11.09.2007 amending the contract). On 26.09.2007 Mr. Dimitris Rigogiannis, technical consultant, sent a petition to the EDPS, with copy to Mr. Nicholas Soupioni, C4I Officer, and Mr. Panagiotis Marketaki member of the Working CDSS, which stressed that the proposal company for the crisis management system was not acceptable (see ref 94, no. 2004-20/1/1/3-26.09.2007 document EDPS). On 11.10.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, image transmission and AIS vessel PLS 607, K.D.A. Piraeus and C. Bus. Mercantile Marine (see ref 95, No. 00/6/2-kst 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 19.10.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS system SHIPS Paz / OS 060, 070 and 080 (see ref 96, No. 00/6/2-kz 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 02.11.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS system board PLS 601 (see ref 97, No. 00/6/2-ki 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 23.11.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, a system of AIS vessels OSs 150 and 610 (see ref 98, No. 00/6/2-kth 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 10.12.2007 Messrs. Panakoulias Dimitris Dimitris Karagounis and George Syllaios, Working Group members CDSS Division of Engineering, sent a note to the EDPS, which indicated that we should not accept the specific structure of the deliverable document analysis configuration CDSS (see ref 99, No. 1/17/47/31-rkd '/ 11.12.2007 document EDPS). On 14.12.2007 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS is the port of Patras

(see ref 100, No. 00/6/2-la 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 18.12.2007 This body proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS system board PLS 602 (see ref 101, No. 00/6/2-lv 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 21.12.2007 This body proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, for port security command center, command center, Patras and Thessaloniki port security (see ref 102, No. 00/6/2-lg 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 16.01.2008 Messrs. Panakoulias Dimitris Dimitris Karagounis and George Syllaios, Working Group members CDSS Division of Engineering, sent a note to the EDPS, which highlighted the different views from the SAIC, in the design configuration requirements of the CDSS. Many claims that SAIC held the contractual and the same body, which had described the contract as a result reject the document of configuration analysis of the CDSS (see ref 103, No. 1/17/47/34la/16.01. 2008 letter from the EDPS). On 29.01.2008 Mr. Dimitris Rigogiannis, technical consultant, sent GTSs technical evaluation phase deliverable detailed analysis of requirements outline the CDSS, with a copy to Mr Gregory and Nicholas Doumentziano Soupioni. Noted that the delivery was not considered acceptable, though some points could have been "approved" so the supplier can proceed to detailed design (see ref 104, no. 20/1/1/4-rka '/ 30.01 , 2008 letter from the EDPS). On 29.01.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS system board PLS 143 and 611 (see ref 105, No. 00/6/2-le 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 08.02.2008 Mr Dimitris Rigogiannis and Costas Kardaras, technical advisors, sent to the EDPS technical evaluation of the deliverables detailed analysis of requirements and detailed structural design of the CDSS, with a copy to Mr Gregory Doumentziano, Nicholas Soupioni and Task CDSS. In this suggested that: a) the Buyer, not to approve deliverables until the deliverable detailed analysis of structural requirements and detailed design deliverable is reviewed and approved b) the Buyer does not approve the installation of any application if the deliverables showed signs of incompatibility , many of which were considered of high importance (see ref 106, no. 20/1/1/4-rld '/ 11.02.2008 document EDPS). On 08.02.2008 the advisory body, which sent the response to the detailed design of the CDSS, with a copy to the address techniques. The document stressed that there were open questions they thought went against the buyer. To ensure fully appreciate that the buyer should be clarified and submitted additional evidence and not accept the detailed design, as described previously (see ref 107, no. 20/1/1/4-rkth ' / 08.02.2008 document EDPS). On 09.02.2008 Mr Panakoulias Dimitris Dimitris Karagounis and George Syllaios, Working Group members CDSS Division of Engineering, sent the note GTSs which rejected the document analysis parameterization of CDSS (see ref 108, No. 1/17/47 / 36-limits' / 12.02.2008 document EDPS). On 13.02.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, for port security command center, command center, Igoumenitsa and Corfu port security (see ref 109, No. 00/6/2-lst 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 19.02.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS system board PLS 606 L / H Samos (see ref 110, No. 00/6/2-lz 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt).

On 29.02.2008 the advisory body, which sent the technical evaluation of the Crisis Management System CDSS, with copy to Mr. Nicholas Soupioni and Task CDSS, which constitute the body, which explicitly reject the crisis management system and to require the company to incorporate some of the other known specialty Crisis Management Applications that are compatible with the ICS, in all applications of CDSS. He suggested the body, which require the vendor to the deliverables detailed analysis of requirements and detailed structural design to incorporate a selected, particular type of crisis management system for the CDSS (see ref 111, no. 20/1/1 / 5g / 17.03.2008 document EDPS). On 29.02.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, k.d.a. Lavrion port (see ref 112, No. 00/6/2-li 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 07.03.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS system board PLS 605 KL Rafina (see ref 113, No. 00/6/2-lth 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 20.03.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, image system, portable video and AIS PLS 604 KL Patron (see ref 114, No. 00/6/2-m 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 24.03.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS system board PLS 142 KL Corfu (see ref 115, No. 00/6/2-ma 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 01.04.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS system board PLS 115 KL Thessaloniki and PLS 614 S / X Samothrace (see ref 116, No. 00/6/2-mv 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 07.04.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS system board PLS 690 S / X Tinos, M / C 512 A / S Skyros (see ref 117, No. 00/6/2-mg ' Protocol for qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 14.04.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS system board S / C KL 517 Rhodes N/G519 KL Chios (see ref 118, No. 00/6/2-md 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 21.04.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS system board PLS 119 KL Heraklion, PLS138 Y / X Ierapetra Heraklion Port Authority (see ref 119, No. 00/6/2-me 'Quality Protocol and quantitative receipt). On 13.05.2008 the advisory letter sent to the EDPS, with a copy to Mr. Nicholas Soupioni, which considered the proposed plan by the company Test (SSAT) for the CDSS as unacceptable and inappropriate (see ref 120, to 'No. 20/1/1/5-o' / 15.05.2008 document EDPS). On 16.05.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS system board PLS 615 (see ref 121, No. 00/6/2-mst 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 30.05.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS system board PLS 608 L / S Paleochora Chania (see ref 122, No. 00/6/2-mz 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 02.06.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 14, Volos Port Authority (see ref 123, No. 00/6/2-mi 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt).

On 11.06.2008 the technical adviser sent GTSs reporting results for the SSAT Subsystem 5 Electronic Protocol Fire Department, with copy to Mr. Nicholas Soupioni. With this acceptance recommend to the subsystem, but also stressed that they should advance to solve problems from the supplier, particularly if they appear to be technically achievable and relatively easy (see ref 124, no. 20/1/1 / 5-rni '/ 06.18.2008 document EDPS). On 19.06.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS system board PLS 613 S / X Kalymnos (see ref 125, No. 00/6/2-mth 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 20.06.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 14, Marina Flisvos (see ref 126, No. 00/6/2-n 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 20.06.2008 the technical adviser sent GTSs reporting results for the SSAT Subsystem 5 Management Education for ELAS, with copy to Mr. Nicholas Soupioni, stressing that the reports of the subsystem was not generally accepted (see ref 127 , no. 20/1/1/5-rxi '/ 23.06.2008 document EDPS). On 23.06.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, AIS system board PLS 140 S / X Patmos (see ref 128, No. 00/6/2-na 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 23.06.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 14, the port of Corfu (see ref 129, No. 00/6/2-nv 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 27.06.2008 the advisory sent to SSAT GTSs reporting results for the module 5 - Managing Staff on rolling, with a copy to Mr Nicholas Soupioni. Technical advisers emphasized that the application was insufficient levels, leading to failure of all standard SRS. Of these only one was successful (see ref 130, no. 20/1/1/5-rpz '/ 03.07.2008 document EDPS). On 27.06.2008 Mr. George Syllaios, a member of the Working Group of the Directorate of Technical CDSS, the EDPS sent a petition which reinforces the conclusions of the technical advisors for the SSAT on module 5 (see ref 131, No. . 1/17/47/55-roa '/ 25.06.2008 document EDPS). On 04.07.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 14, the port of Heraklion (see ref 132, No. 00/6/2-ng 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 07.07.2008 the advisory sent to the EDPS reporting results for the SSAT module 5 Managing Vardiopoiisis the blade and the fire brigade, with a copy to Mr Nicholas Soupioni. According to the document results showed that the Application Management Vehicle and aircraft in their current form were not suitable for acceptance (see ref 133, no. 20/1/1/6-kz '/ 14.07. 2008 letter from the EDPS). On 08.07.2008 Mr Panakoulias Dimitris Dimitris Karagounis, Georgios Syllaios Angela and Philip, Working Group members CDSS Division of Engineering, sent to the EDPS note on which the CDSS should not receive it (see ref 134, No. 1 / 17 / 47/57-8/11.07.2008 document EDPS). On 10.07.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, video and portable video board PLS 610 L / S Mythimna (see ref 135, No. 00/6/2-nd 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt).

On 10.07.2008 the advisory sent to the EDPS, with copy to Mr. Nicholas Soupioni, reporting on the SSAT test results for the CDSS and considered that "it was not suitable for acceptance" (see ref 136, no. 20/1/1/5-mv '/ 07.25.2008 document EDPS). On 21.07.2008 the advisory sent to the EDPS, with copy to Mr. Nicholas Soupioni the SSAT test scores on the CDSS, which showed that the resource management subsystem in its current form was not suitable for acceptance (see ref 137 , no. 20/1/1/6-n '/ 31.07.2008 document EDPS). On 27.07.2008 the body, which drew protocol quality and quantity of WR 17 (camera) and saw paralipteo with minor deviations. The WR 17 received overdue by one year without imposing a clause in the supplier company (see ref 138, no. 2004-00/5/9/1-mst '/ 07.27.2008 Meeting Minutes). On 28.07.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 17 (see ref 139, No. 00/6/2nst 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 03.09.2008 the advisory sent to the EDPS, with copy to Mr. Nicholas Soupioni, internal memo on the subject of reporting results to the SSAT WR 5 - CMS, which emphasized that the system was not suitable for acceptance (see ref 140, no. 20/1/1/6-pz '/ 09.09.2008 document EDPS). On 08.09.2008 the members of the Working Group of the Directorate of Technical CDSS sent to the EDPS information note summarizing the findings for the trial of CDSS. Many of the discoveries leading to non-acceptance of the system (see ref 141, No. 20/1/1/6-pe '/ 11.07.2008 document EDPS). On 09.09.2008 the advisory sent to the EDPS, with copy to Mr. Nicholas Soupioni, internal memorandum reporting the results to the SSAT decision Subsystem (YS1) and the protection official (WR 4), whereby the subsystems were unsuitable for collection (see ref 142, no. 20/1/1/6-rv '/ 12.09.2008 document EDPS). On 30.09.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, a system of VSAT (see ref 143, No. 00/6/2-xe 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 14.10.2008 the body, which went on to receive the subsystem 1 (Subsystem CDSS) with minor variations without taking into account the reports of the Technical Advisors (see ref 144, No. 00/6/2-xz 'Quality Protocol and quantitative receipt). On 14.10.2008 the body, which went on receipt of Subsystem 2 (subsystem CDSS) with minor variations without taking into account the reports of the Technical Advisors (see ref 145, No. 00/6/2-xi 'Quality Protocol and quantitative receipt) On 14.10.2008 the body, which went on receipt of Subsystem 3 (sub CDSS) with minor variations without taking into account Reports of Technical Advisors (see ref 146, No. 00/6/2-xth 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt) On 14.10.2008 the body, which proceeded to the reception subsystem 4 (sub CDSS) with minor

variations without taking into account the reports of the Technical Advisors (see ref 147, No. 00/6/2-o 'Quality Protocol and quantitative receipt) On 14.10.2008 the body, which went on receipt of subsystem 5 (sub CDSS) with minor variations without taking into account the reports of the Technical Advisors (see ref 148, No. 00/6/2-oa 'Quality Protocol and quantitative receipt) On 14.10.2008 the body, which went on to receive the Subsystem 6 (sub CDSS) with minor variations without taking into account the reports of the Technical Advisors (see ref 149, No. 00/6/2-ov 'Quality Protocol and quantitative receipt) On 14.10.2008 the body, which went on to receive the Subsystem 7 (sub CDSS) with minor variations without taking into account the reports of the Technical Advisors (see ref 150, No. 00/6/2-og 'Quality Protocol and quantitative receipt) On 20.10.2008 as technical advisers sent to the EDPS reporting results overall test C4I (SAT), with copy to Mr. Nicholas Soupioni. According to the document the tests conducted there had not completed the work necessary for full integration and interoperability of the system C4I. Technical advisers emphasized that identified deficiencies and discrepancies, which were identified in the past had apokatastithei (see ref 151, the reporting of results from 20.10.2008). On 22.10.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, transferring K.EPICH.LS (see ref 152, No. 00/6/2-oe 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 27.10.2008, a general system testing C4I: In his report technical consultant found that the tests were conducted within the overall test was observed that they had completed the work necessary for full integration and interoperability of the system. On 27.10.2008 signed the seventh amendment to the contract by which time training users CDSS that was a liability of Siemens, was transferred on receipt of the System C4I. Providing training to users was a condition for receipt of C4I and had to be given before the test CDSS and general test C4I (see ref 153, the seventh amendment). On 29.10.2008 the body, which proceeded to receiving subsystem 15, mobile monitoring unit (see ref 154, No. 00/6/2-ost 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt). On 12.11.2008 the Deputy Minister of Interior, Mr. Panagiotis Hinofotis, refused to sign the Judgement of Final Acceptance by the subsystem 14 'Systems Safety Harbor Coast Guard "because it disagreed with the characterization of failures-divergences insubstantial. Instead noted that affect the interoperability and effectiveness of the whole subsystem 14 (see ref 155, No. 9008/13/216-rie/12.11.2008 decision of the Division of Finance Ministry of Interior). On 14.11.2008 drafted the Final Protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt system C4I. The Acceptance Committee ruled unanimously that the system meets the contract and could be dispensed with minor deficiencies, deviations. The protocol included as paralipteo the WR 16 (AVL) which was dismissed on 06.06.2007, without special preparation protocol (see ref 156, no. 00/6/2-oz/14.11.2008 protocol and qualitative quantitative receipt). On 26.01.2009 was held wide meeting chaired by Mr Chris Markogiannaki, Deputy Interior Minister on Public Order, which showed that the arguments that led the EDPS in drafting the

final protocol for the qualitative and quantitative receipt of C4I system is not convinced (see . ref. 157, Proceedings of 1/26/2009). On 16.02.2009 a decision was adopted by Christos Markogiannaki (Deputy Interior Minister on Public Order) for final delivery, with reduced price: a) 1-7 Subsystems that are the Support System Management and Decision Making in CDSS Systems C4I Olympic security, b) subsystem 15 'Aerial Video Coast Guard, "c) subsystem 14' Port Security System Guard", d) part of the subsystem 17 "Sub CCTV CCTV Network Traffic Management" (see ref 158, to 'No. 9008/13/216-rke/16.02.2009 decision of the Division of Finance Ministry of Interior). On 07.03.2009 Mr. Nikolaos Soupionis, Director of Technical Services in response to the court statement DIEKAT, informing them that the body, which made the service a copy of Final Acceptance Protocol System C4I Olympic Security at SAIC and thus any claim likely to turn to it (see ref 159, No. 1/17/47/76-nz/07.03.2009 document fifth part of the D / Technical Services Division). On 17.03.2009 Mr. Chris Markogiannakis, Deputy Interior Minister on Public Order, returned the file of final acceptance of the C4I system and sought clarifications on the strength of network applications, transmission, data migration and customization of applications though from 16.02 .2009 approved the receipt of Subsystems 1-7 (CDSS) (see ref 160, No. 1/17/47/77-xz '/ 19.03.2009 document Technical Services Division). On 13.04.2009, the Directorate of Information & Communications Department of Citizen Protection briefing paper sent to the Directorate of Technical and GTSs on the provision of education by the supplier. The officials said that providing education was not satisfactory and further that on 27.04.2007, and had sent information about the configuration, they are not been taken into account by the supplier (see ref 161, no. 19384 / F .400.4/13.04.2009 document D / Directorate of Information & Communications). On 17.07.2009 the Interior Ministry sent a letter to the State Legal Council, which stated that: "after completion of acceptance testing of the system responsible Acceptance Committee issued the Ministry of 2004-00/6/2oz No. 14.11. 2008 Protocol for qualitative and quantitative receipt of the C4I system with gaps-gaps that do not make it unsuitable for the intended project is proposing a reduction in the total amount of 21.667.195,00 . Because of the impairment should take a reasoned decision of the competent institution, in this case the Deputy Minister of Interior who had to approve partial or final acceptance, which until this time had not been issued. The document stressed that apart from the additional technical equipment which the State failed negotiations to acquire, and lowered the price by at 259.032.250,00 255.540.871,00 (see ref 162, No. 4906/1/1-g/17.07.2009 document of the Ministry of Interior). On 11.08.2009 the ELAS produced a table relating to the payments related to C4I. Total bonds were released in the amount of 118.772.872,71 . They had released 3.106.765,29 writedowns due to individual subsystems and interfaces to any failure during the dress rehearsal. This amount would be committed after approval by the receiving system. They have paid to SAIC 36.900.810,00 plus VAT (25.093.423 ) for the whole equipment because not yet approved the acceptance of C4I system by the competent institution. On 04.09.2009 the ELAS sent a response to the Interior Ministry at the General Secretariat of Public Order, stating that it could not determine whether there is damage from the contract by the Greek government and SAIC for C4I. The reasoning was that the combination of the terrorist attack of 11.09.2002 and the preparation of the Olympic Games could not be measurable.

On 27.10.2009 the written protocol for qualitative and quantitative rejection of Education CDSS (see ref 163, No. 00/6/2-rkv 'document of the EDPS). * When depositing Mr Pavlopoulos, where to begin in May-June 2008 since the system was not received in its entirety and not functioning as a whole, and decided withheld amount 799.000 On 14.4.2010 examined by the special investigating Maria Nikolakis Evangelos Malesios who submits that "the work of the Olympic Games security is apparent from the Gazette stating the tasks I had shared with the minister on work safety and therefore participated in DESOP (Interministerial Coordination Committee for the Olympic Preparation) This Committee was decided on the need to supply the C4I and commissioned for the competition at the Ministry of Defence in July 2002. "In the question of investigating judge that he had formed the DESOP The k.Malesios replied that "in order to expedite the task of preparing the Olympic Games, Prime Minister Simitis has recommended that the Commission consisting of ministers or deputy ministers involved in Olympic preparations and the president of Athens 2004." In related and from 6.2.2008 Mr Malesios states that "indeed the competition commission's work" Olympic security command centers not executed by the Ministry of Public Order was responsible for the security of the Olympic Games in 2004 but the Ministry of Defence. The decision was taken at Ministerial meeting chaired by Prime Minister on 16.7.2002 and stated inter alia "launched by the MoD for a contract project ... the relative competitive process due to the special issue and the function of safety issues is the process of negotiation .. "and continues" It is clear therefore that some knew then that I wanted and I could not give me this project since it was my responsibility, since the competition was a matter for the MoD. "" On 23.1.2003 with decision of KYSEA stopped the Defense Ministry is solely responsible for the execution of the competition and added the Ministry of Public Order ... "The truth then is that from 23.1.2003 until 13 March 2003 KYSEA decided to award the project to the consortium SAIC TEAM competence and responsibility of the competition were the two Ministers MoD and MPO "* (Notice of Members New Republic) On 21.04.2010 Mr. Spyros Vougias, Secretary of Citizen Protection, a decision has not approved the final acceptance and final acceptance of C4I and retained bonds amounting to 18.877.376,29 (see ref 164, No. 8777/21-04-2010 document of the Ministry of Citizen Protection). * On 05.10.2010 the Minister of Citizen Protection communicate to the Commission of Inquiry of the House with a number of Protocol 5 of the letter following the number to 56 by letter dated 16.3.2010 by which he ordered the Chief of the Greek Police conducted Preliminary Administrative Review regarding the installation and reception of the Olympic security system (C4I) and to ascertain whether or not there were omissions of relevant at all stages of installation and implementation of the project, both during the first phase of implementation, and during the installation of individual systems. Also corresponding individual research energithike ordered the Chief of the Coast Guard, the result of which was incorporated and taken into account in this Preliminary Administrative Inquiry. From the report findings energitheisas preliminary administrative review that is suspended disciplinary proceedings because it did not reveal clear and specific deficiencies for which should be sought responsibilities involved in the Acceptance Committee Officers or other officials, who acted in their official powers and no evidence that the basis for the objective and subjective reality of committing a disciplinary offense and punishable involved. Mentions among others the trademarks of the witness Maravelia where it considers that it proved extra-institutional or non-interference and "oppressive and blackmailing" behavior by officials or political factors forcing the EDPS on

26.5.2007, nor that there were pressures on the same day by political factors or to exercise IET3 nor receiving subsystem 22nd while the complaints of the upper witness "smothered documents" is vague and his view that was dismissed along with two other members of the body, which ordered the former Minister D.T not proved since the replacement was initiated at service context * (Notice of Members New Republic). 4. The case of electronic guides the Ministry of Culture In 2000 with Article 6 Paragraph 2 n.2819 up the "Greek Culture Organization SA" which is supervised body of HMC. One of his projects was the supply of HCO Mobile Information Systems of Guest in selected museums and archeological sites. In November 2003 the six selected candidate shapes. In January 2004 autopsies carried out by the candidate companies in fifteen archaeological sites to record features of archaeological environment and to determine accurately their offering. The SIEMENS which was subcontracted by the Foundation of Culture (Efraimoglou) and the HEI did not participate in autopsies performed on all candidates. In June 2005, HP emerged as the best bid (see ref 1, Extract from minutes of a meeting of the Board of HCO on 15.12.2006). In April 2006 the Central Archaeological Council submitted to the then Culture Minister Giorgos Voulgarakis draft ministerial decision with a positive opinion. In July 2006 the Minister signed the certain Ministerial Decision (see ref 2, Ministerial Order Minister George Voulgarakis). On 09.08.2006 by a decision of the Board announced the awarding of the project and were interested have until 14.08.2006 for preparation of the project. On 22.08.2006 the President withdrew the HCO S. Black and the position taken by Mr. M. Siopsis. In November 2006, the HP was withdrawn from the project and Mr. M. and C. Siopsis Zahopoulos proceeded to award the project to Siemens (see ref 1, Extract minutes of a meeting of the Board of HCO on 15.12.2006). On 18.02.2007 signed the final contract year with project completion within fourteen (14) months (see ref 3 contract between Siemens and HCO on 18/02/2007). The condition was raised by the Central Archaeological Council was to implement a pilot installation at three points. Siemens is the signing of the contract received an advance of 40% of the amount (3.800.000 ) by submitting letters of guarantee performance and payment. The installation of electronic tour in fifteen archeological sites, as envisaged in the agreement should be finalized by April 2008. The pilot program, as called for in some places, no. The company had breached the term of the contract for the delivery time and should be deprived and therefore the letter of credit of 2.000.000 , will be forfeited to the State. From documents that were ready to extend a project that had not done anything. The Management of HCO, not only did not move immediately as it ought to declare it void, but had prepared the text of the extension, but neither the pilot scheme has not been delivered!

On 24.04.2008 the President's Legal Council of HCO Mr. Papapetropoulos stated in a letter, sending the plan to extend the labeling, that the contractor has not complied with basic requirements and have activated the relevant sanctions. In parallel, he said there is no force majeure that necessitates an extension (see Ref 4, Internal memo from Mr D. Papapetropoulos on 04/24/2008). On 26.06.2008 Mr. Papapetropoulos returned, indicating that the opinion of the Central Archaeological Council, chaired by Mr Christos Zachopoulos for the study of the pilot project was delayed. He was well known that he had not done anything in accordance with the contract had already imposed sanctions on Siemens. It also noted that the non-approval of the study would make the company deposed. But even this process proceeded (see ref 5, Informative Note of Mr. Papapetropoulos on 26.06.2008). On 01.09.2008 Mr. Papapetropoulos returned indicating that the delay in the proceedings by the HCO give arguments to the Contractor to claim that the delays were due not to it which finally happened (see ref 6, Letter from Mr. Papapetropoulos on 01/09/2008). In November 2008, ie after seven (7) months from the conventional time project delivery, was declared deposed and returned the advance. The whole attitude of the leadership of the Ministry of Culture shows that there was less predisposed to favoring the ZIMENS and attempted to pass an extension, while the company had not seen consistently in any contractual obligation. Mr. Michael Liapis was forced to cancel a contract in late October 2008, after the June 2008 began the revelations and reports about his trip to Germany with Christoforakos and the close relationships he had with the ZIMENS and after questions Members of the House. Until then, an extension of siege imposed on the project, but after the revelations was a change of attitude. Pending in the regular courts of HCO Action against ZIMENS (see ref 7, Action HCO by Siemens AE on 10/21/2008) and ZIMENS against HCO (see ref 8, no. 1396 claim against Siemens AE HCO on 10/29/2009) and conducted a preliminary examination by the magistrate after the non-implementation of the project is consequential for the Greek state from lost earnings and non-jobs for execution and implementation of the project. 5. Supplies and maintenance of medical equipment in hospitals On 03.02.2010 the Commission of Inquiry sent a letter to Secretary of Health and Social Welfare, Mrs Marilisa Xenogiannakopoulou, asking it to send any information concerning the relationship between institutions of the Ministry of the company Siemens (contracts, agreements, etc., see . ref. 1, no. 15/03.02.2010 outgoing letter of inquiry). Until 03.03.2010 the Commission of Inquiry entered 110 documents with answers from both the Ministry of Health, and isolation from the Health Regions, hospitals and other entities or supervised institutions. On 28.04.2010 the Commission of Inquiry sent to the Minister of Health and Social Welfare, Mrs Marilisa Xenogiannakopoulou all documents were related to procurement bodies of the Ministry with Siemens and requested an audit by the competent supervisory body, the SE Y.Y.P (House Auditor Services Health and Welfare) and then to send all relevant findings (see ref 2, no. 79/28.04.2010 outgoing letter of inquiry).

On 29.04.2010 the Minister of Health and Social Welfare, Mrs Marilisa Xenogiannakopoulou, forwarded the request of the Inquiry Inspector General of Health Services and Welfare, Mr Michael Sabatakaki with a mandate to make the deposit of the findings within ten (10) days (see ref 3, no. 51137/29.04.2010 letter of the Minister of Health and Social Solidarity). On 11.05.2010 the Inspector General of Health Services and Welfare, Mr Michael Sabatakakis, informed the Minister of Health and Social Welfare, Mrs Marilisa Xenogiannakopoulou that the volume of contracts (426 contracts) and the need for inspection on each operator would was possible to deliver results in ten (10) days (see Ref 4, no. 453/11.05.2010 Document Inspector General). On 01.06.2010 the General Secretary of the Health Minister, Mr Nicholas Polyzos, provided the Inquiry Commission briefing paper of the Inspector General of Health Services and Welfare, Mr Michael Sabatakaki to the Minister of Health and Social Welfare, Mrs Marilisa Xenogiannakopoulou, which seems the entry control of contracts in Athens and Thessaloniki on 16.05.2010 and 25.05.2010 respectively (see ref 5, no. 64896/01.06.2010 letter of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity). On 15.06.2010 the Commission of Inquiry sent a letter to Inspector General of Health Services and Welfare, Mr Michael Sabatakaki, calling them sent after each test the corresponding porismatiki report (see ref 6, no. 129 / 15.06.2010 outgoing letter of inquiry). On 16.06.2010 the Inspector General of Health Services and Welfare, Mr Michael Sabatakakis informed the Select Committee that there was a mandate to review contracts entered into health services with the company SIEMENS. The criterion for selection of contracts to be controlled was the level of expenditure (over 25.000 ) mainly concerned with supply and maintenance of medical equipment or spare parts (see ref 7, no. 625/16.06.2010 Document Inspector Health Care and Welfare). On 06.07.2010 the Inspector General of Health Services and Welfare, Mr Michael Sabatakakis provided the Commission with 50 audit findings concerning 164 contracts (see ref 8, no. 709/06.07.2010 Document Inspector and Health Services Welfare). On 14.07.2010 the Managing Director of SIEMENS AE, Panos Xini sent a briefing document to the Commission of Inquiry in response to the findings of the Inspector General of Health Services and Welfare. In this stated that a) had taken office in January 2009 and may not be aware of the past b) the "new SIEMENS participates in all competitions with complete transparency c) the current prices offered for maintenance contracts and supply of products is cheaper than the average for their respective products and services in other European countries and d) are available to the Commission for any cooperation (see ref 9, by letter dated 14.07.2010 CEO of Siemens). On 15.07.2010 the Commission of Inquiry sent a letter to the General Inspector of the Inspectorate for Health Services and Welfare, Mr Michael Sabatakaki, calling for an inventory to a specific table-model of the acquisition cost and maintenance of equipment (Medical) (see ref 10, no. 164/15.07.2010 outgoing letter of inquiry). On 15.07.2010 the Commission of Inquiry submitted its porismatikes reports of a) Hospitals in Attica Chief Prosecutor of the Court of Athens, Mrs. Helen Raikou, b) Hospitals outside Attica to the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Mr John Ted and c) the President Competition Committee

Mr. Demetris Kyritsakis (see ref 11, no. 162/15.07.2010, 163/15.07.2010 and 166/15.07.2010 outgoing documents of the Examination Board). On 15.07.2010 the Commission of Inquiry sent two porismatikes reports to the Special Secretary of the House Economic Crime (SDOE), Mr. John Kapeleri. The first report covered porismatiki PEOPLE hospital and asked to do further testing because it allegedly invoiced, which did not meet the actual maintenance and the second DEPANOM because it showed that there was retention of 4% of contract value for 2005 and 2006 (see ref 12, no. 165/15.07.2010 outgoing letter of inquiry). On 15.07.2010 the Commission of Inquiry sent a letter to the Ministers of Economy and Finance and Health and Social Solidarity, Mr. Florence and Mr. Katseli Marilisa Xenogiannakopoulou, respectively, by calling the list sent to members of committees involved in competitions supplies axial tomography and magnetic for the period 1995-2000 (see ref 13, no. 167/15.07.2010 outgoing document of Inquiry). On 20.07.2010 the Minister of Economy and Finance Select Committee sent a list of members of the Committees on Medical Supplies Electronic Equipment of hospitals for the last fifteen years (see ref 14, no. 68/20.07.2010 document Ministry of Economy and Finance). On 24.08.2010 the General Secretary of the Ministry of Health and Welfare sent the Commission Inquiry into the responses of agencies of the Ministry of members of the Committees on Procurement of medical electronic equipment for hospitals in the last fifteen years (see ref 15, into No. 104457/24.08.2010 letter of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity). On 26.08.2010 the Commission of Inquiry sent a letter to the Minister of Labour and Social Security, Mr. Andreas Loverdos, calling to send the porismatikes reports of audits of contracts of polyclinics with Siemens, as well as a summary of the nature, purchase cost and maintenance of any material, by contract, Polyclinic and year for the last fifteen years (see ref 16, no. 187/26.08.2010 outgoing letter of inquiry). On 14.09.2010 the Commission of Inquiry sent to the Minister of Regional Development and Competitiveness list of contracts signed by the Ministry with the Siemens company and asked for control of these contracts and send the relevant porismatikon reports. The document was sent to the Minister of Health and Social Solidarity, Mr. Andreas Loverdos as General Inspector of the Inspectorate for Health Services and Welfare Michael Sabatakaki (see ref 17, no. 208/14.09.2010 outgoing letter of inquiry). On 16.09.2010 the Inspector General of Health Services and Welfare, Mr Michael Sabatakakis forwarded to the Commission twenty-two (22) audit findings involving one hundred thirty-eight (138) contracts (see ref 18, no. 907/16.09 .2010 and documents S.E.Y.Y.P 908/16.07.2010). On 24.09.2010 the Inquiry Commission forwarded a) twenty-two (22) porismatikes reports to the President of the Competition Committee, Mr. Dimitrios Kyritsakis b) seven (7) porismatikes reports of hospitals in Attica Chief Prosecutor of the Court of Athens, k . Helen Rajko that jurisdiction and c) fifteen (15) porismatikes reports of other hospitals in Attica Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Mr John Tents that jurisdiction (see ref 19, no. 219/24.09.2010, 220/24.09.2010 and 221/24.09.2010 outgoing documents of the Commission of Inquiry). On 04.10.2010 the Commission of Inquiry sent to the Minister of Health and Social Solidarity

letter calling for the assistance of the Ministry of Examination in the project by proposing a person who knew the subject of public procurement in order to control seventy-seven (77) porismatikes reports of Inspector of Public Health (see ref 20, no. 229/04.10.2010 outgoing document of the Examination Board). On 13.10.2010 the Minister of Health and Welfare informed the Inquiry Commission that instructed the Minister Theodoros KOMA, Head of Department at the Directorate of Health Care Insured Public and Theofanis Mitsoura, Head of the Directorate for Quality and Efficiency in order to control seventy seven ( 77) findings which were tabled in the House Committee on the S.E.Y.Y.P. (See ref 21, No. DY1a/6/13.10.2010 document of the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity). On 04.10.2010 the Commission of Inquiry sent a new letter to the Minister of Labour and Social Security, Mr. Luka Katseli calling back control of the conventions of polyclinics and urgent tasks of the results (see ref 22, the decision no . 232/04.10.2010 outgoing document of the Examination Board). On 12.10.2010 the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Security, Mr. George Koutroumanis forwarded to the Commission contracts with polyclinics Siemens, without porismatikes reports (see ref 23, no. F1/2/25724/3773 / 12.10.2010 letter to the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Security). On 18.10.2010 the Commission of Inquiry sent a letter to the Governor of IKA, Mr. Robert Spiropoulos, calling for a report on each contract to Siemens to Social Security, along with completing and sending the table with the cost of purchasing and maintenance, machinery (see ref 24, no. 248/18.10.2010 outgoing document of the Examination Board). On 27.10.2010 the Commission of Inquiry sent a letter to the President and CEO of DEPANOM SA, Mr. John lights, calling to know the prices of specific imaging equipment company SIEMENS, for the last decade, both in Greece and Europe . Mr. John Fotakis the Commission that no such information to the public company (see ref 25, no. 260/27.10.2010 outgoing letter of inquiry). On 05.11.2010, the Governor of IKA, Mr. Robert Spiropoulos, sent the Commission Inquiry table with the costs of purchasing and maintaining equipment in polyclinics Siemens (see ref 26, by letter dated 05.11.2010 the Governor IKA). On 10.11.2010 the General Secretary of Commerce, Mr Stephen Komninos, sent to the Examination Committee the costs of sale and service for a CT scan of SIEMENS hospitals YEIA, Henry Dunant and IASO GENERAL, and maintenance costs of medical equipment contracts signed The General Secretariat of Commerce with SIEMENS for hospitals (see ref 27, no. 3596/10.11.2010 document of the General Secretary of Commerce). On 12.11.2010 the General Secretary of Commerce, Mr Stephen Komninos, sent to the Examination Committee the findings of the Special Committee on Assessment of Procurement SIEMENS and information from Austria on the maintenance cost of CT Somatom E (see ref 28, the no. 3617/11.11.2010 document of the General Secretary of Commerce). On 12.11.2010 the General Secretary of Commerce, Mr Stephen Komninos, sent to the Examination Board additional information regarding the maintenance costs of CT scanners

SIEMENS Medical Group Athens (see ref 29, no. 3634/12.11.2010 letter from the Secretary of Commerce). On 24.11.2010 Mr. Theodore pieces porismatikes filed four petitions with the following contents, respectively: In the first porismatiki reference, separated the 77 porismatikes reports on major and minor based on the value of the contracts. In the second and third porismatiki reference to after studying the findings, which had declared a major, gave details of the procurement process of materials and functionality. In the fourth concluding his report, notes the problems identified and in particular: The market prices of the same model machines are different so some of them have been bought at a higher price It met the legal framework laid down procedures for public procurement The maintenance and repair of imaging equipment, in some cases reaching their purchasing Certain types of equipment were damaged, (destruction tubes) in a relative ly short time of acquiring the machine, resulting in the payment of additional amounts for replacement Also noted that all the reports of inspectors S.E.Y.Y.P. that were not provided by the relevant coordinators clear instructions for implementing the single audit process so all the results have not been uniform evaluation (see ref 30, no. 1, 2, 3 and 4 references). On 25.11.2010 the Inquiry Commission issued its findings in the attached reports porismatikes dienergisanta control, the Chief Prosecutor of the Court of Athens, Mrs. Helen Rajko that jurisdiction (see ref 31, no. 286 / 25.11.2010 outgoing document of the Examination Board). On 29.11.2010 the Special Review Committee of the Ministry of Economy & Marine, for contracts of Siemens sent us the final results (see ref 32, by letter dated 29.11.2010 of the special panel Siemens). From the analysis of the reports of Inspector of Health and Welfare Services (S.E.Y.Y.P.) submitted to the Examination Board, which investigates the whole case SIEMENS show that: Hospitals in the NHS The overwhelming majority of purchased goods and services from the company SIEMENS. The contracts signed between hospitals and SIEMENS for the maintenance of equipment for imaging machines were in several cases by direct assignments without negotiations and the amounts paid and payable is estimated to exceed the purchase price in a decade. It is thus clear that in most cases there was no economic evaluation, therefore the cost of purchase, repair, maintenance of machinery hardly be extinguished. From studying the document DEPANOM that: - The budget of the tenders for the supply of CT and MRI scanners meant for hospitals in the NHS based only on prices that existed in the Greek market, while ignoring those of European markets. This means that the budget of the competition was high and thus high and supply offerings. - The commission said the equipment was not taken into account maintenance costs. This means that the purchase price of equipment, although it could not synypologisthike value of maintenance.

6. Supplies of the Ministry of Defence Patriot, System Hermes"

BACKGROUND For Case Patriot preliminary examination conducted by 29.07.2008. With no. O08/47/14.04.2009 act of the Athens First Instance Court Prosecutor for the fourth special investigative Athens mandated to conduct primary investigation for the following acts: 1. Passive and active bribery of public repeatedly and individually, directed against the Greek government where the benefit sought and obtained the perpetrators and the injury suffered by the public exceeds the amount of 150,000 euros or 50.000.000drch. 2. Money laundering from criminal activity (violations of Articles 1, 12, 13a, 14, 26, 27, 45, 94, 98, 235, 236 CC, 1 para 1 L. 1608/1950 as replaced by Article 4 paragraph 5 Law 1738/1987, amended by Article 2 of Law 187 / / 1990, replaced by Article 36, paragraph 1. N. 2172/1993 and supplemented by article 24 paragraph 3 of Law 2298/1995 and 4 Fri 3 a N.2408/1996, 166iCh.a sub a, b aiz Law 2331/1995 as in force today, see ref 1, the 02.02.2010 declaration by civil claimant Greek government). Today primary investigation conducted, which has not been completed and is undergoing the examination of witnesses. The data files requested and received by the Inquiry Commission of the investigating authorities, the Ministry of Defense, the company SIEMENS, and witnesses, shows the following: 1. Program PATRIOT For the defensive shield of the country in 1999 KYSEA decided to contest the assignment of air defense missile system to U.S. company RAYTHEON, which is the sole manufacturer of the type systems PATRIOT. The company commissioned a U.S. company Lockheed Martin Overseas Corporation (LMOC), which was the main subcontractor company RAYTHEON Program "Patriot" and is joined to Offset Program, the production of electronic components incorporated by the manufacturer systems delivered in Greece. The nominal value of the program was 25.000.000 $ (22.934.000 exchange rate of July 1998). The credit value of the program was 87.500.000 $ (80.269.000 ) and the rate of credit was 3.5. The percentage in Division I (combined) of the total nominal value was 13% and the total credit value of 15% Programs AZ of Patriot. The percentage of the total nominal value of AZ Patriot was 10% and the total credit value of 6%. Domestic Value Added (PSC) was over 50%. On 31.08.2005 by the relevant Secretary General Armaments Giorgos Zorbas, AZ amended the contract and increased the amount of the Program of SIEMENS. (The nominal value of $ 25,000,000 was $ 26,820,309 and the credit value of $ 87,500,000 was $ 93,871,801). The program was implemented by 100% and 100% was found (see schet.2 document GDDIA 15.03.2010 to Select Committee, Appendix C paragraph 1, the relative 1). Submarine Program The program of construction of new submarines commissioned since the 26.07.1999 decision of the Greek KYSEA Shipbuilding Inc. (Skaramangas) in collaboration with those proposed by a foreign firm Ferrostaal / Howaldts Werke Deutsche Werft (FS / HDW). The main contract was signed in February 2000 (no 012V/00). The contract was signed for AZ in February 2000 (No. 8 / 00). Activation of the Convention was in AZ 31.03.2000. (The total credit value of all the programs AZ contract was 1.356.635.984 ie 113% of foreign exchange by the Master Agreement). The total nominal value of all the programs of the contract was AZ 248.636.969 . The total implementation period of AZ was ten years and six months.

Currently the implementation of the Convention in AZ is 78.40% (see schet.2 GDDIA letter of 15.03.2010 to the Commission of Inquiry, Appendix C, Paragraph 1, the relative 1). Program Offsets The program offered by AZ SIEMENS AE concerning the implementation of a sub-program No. 1J for the construction of two major electrical panels and assemblies four tables for two submarines. The total nominal value of the program was 2,700,000 euros, or 1% (one percent) of the total nominal value of all programs AZ. The total credit value of the program was 10.800.000 (credit factor 4) is less than 1% of the total credit value of all programs AZ. The program has been completed and has been credited to 102.81% (see schet.2 GDDIA letter of 15.03.2010 to the Commission of Inquiry, Appendix C, Paragraph 1, the relative 11). 2. Program "Privacy Battle Zone 'HERMES' Phase II Expansion Procedures for the "Hermes" In late 1970 designed the A phase of the communication program of the Army "Hermes". The initial implementation of this system started from scratch and was proclaimed an international tender in 1979, since it was co-funded by NATO. The award program was five years later. The implementation of the System of A Phase "Hermes" took the company SIEMENS AG and the work involved and SIEMENS SA The implementation was generally successful. All the expertise for Software and Hardware remained SIEMENS and the software developed was owned by SIEMENS. In December 1995, in proceedings for the renewal of the Framework Convention for Cooperation between the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Greek Aerospace Industry (HAI), the committee of the Army General Staff (GES) and the Force Service Industry (submit ) between the programs offered to join the Framework Convention also included the "Battle Zone Communications" Hermes "(Completion - extension)," namely the B phase of the "Hermes". On 23.04.1996 the DAC in a letter to the MOD on the implementation of the second phase of the System "Hermes", asked to include this program in the Framework Convention DAC-GES. In this letter the ODA states inter alia that: "The ODA has secured the exclusive cooperation of SIEMENS company that built the system of Hermes has predicted combined for most of the material at Tanagra, and has proposed to the General Staff the project through Framework Convention DAC-GES ". In May 1996 the General Staff, with a special package of information and suggestion (FEE) has recommended to the Minister and approved by this program "Hermes" B stage to join the Framework Convention for the DAC, with an agreement (MOU) between ODA and the company SIEMENS. In April 1997 the General Staff with relevant FEE recommended the commission first approved the project (feasibility, necessity). As regards the mode of supply, in his contribution, the General Staff said: "Integration of the program on five-year contract framework MoD / DGE-HAI

and signed a special contract program implementation. Special agreement (MOU) HAI SIEMENS . On 15.07.1997 the General Staff of the FEE, the initial approval of the procurement plan submitted to the Minister, in consultation with the Staff of the Minister of National Defence (EPYETHA). On 19.09.1997 was submitted to the MOD by the ODA Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the DAC of SIEMENS AG and SIEMENS SA In this MOU among others in Article 3 intent (agreement) to create a company managing the program. On 22.10.1997 the recommendation of the General Staff approved by the Minister (see ref 3, F.600.14/65/93236/S.2919/22-10-1997/GES). On 12.12.1997 the General Staff, with relevant documents (see schet.4, F.230.109/46/329418s2280/12.12.97), documenting in detail the need for a Memorandum of Agreement between HAI-SIEMENS for the implementation of "HERMES" program B phase, supported in writing including the following: "In order to implement a system expansion, complementing the existing system and the required compatibility, interoperability is guaranteed by technology-company expertise, which implemented the first phase of the" Hermes ", derived from international competition with NATO procedures. Specifically secured: i. The software compatibility of the devices of the existing and the new system since the software is owned by the company SIEMENS. ii. The interoperability of equipment (hardware) of the two systems. Successful implementation of the existing system from SIEMENS. Achieving compatibility-interoperability is uncertain and there will be considerable delay in the case of another company involvement in the program. Any statement of another company that has the potential implementation of the program can not be considered reliable. The agreement will keep the bulk of the current system of support and training will be required is minimal because of familiarity with the existing system. " On 12.12.1997 was approved in principle the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by the Minister. On 28.05.1998 asked the ODA to submit official university offer. On 22.07.1998 the Council of Defense (SAM) (see ref 5, 9th meeting KYSEA 1998, f Decision SAM, Decision No. 1 of the fifth meeting of 1998) promoted the proposal for the "Extension System Communications Combat Zone Hermes ( Phase B program) "in KYSEA. On 24.07.1998 the KYSEA (9th meeting 1998) approved the award of the ODA program and authorized the Secretary of Defense for its implementation (see p. Proceedings 235236/01.09.2010, Mr. A. Tsohatzopoulos submission to the Examination Parliamentary Committee and ref 6, from 14.09.2010 registered in the relevant 2).

On 14.06.1999 approved the award of the ODA program. On 27.08.1999 approved the partial modification of the award decision. Under the amendment excluded from the contract the supply of cages, air conditioners, the H / G and small tissue SCRA commission and decided to make their own procedures. On 06.09.1999 adopted a) an agreement of cooperation with major subcontractors and material b) agreements on transfer of technology know-contracted by the ODA for the implementation of the Programme (contract 1121/99 ODA-SIEMENS AG, contract 1122/99 ODA and SIEMENS SA and contract DAC-MARCONI). The drafting of the main contract was made by committee. On 06.09.1999 signed contracts Offsets (No.20/99 the company DASA, the company No.21/99 and No.22/99 BAe the company MARCONI). On 07.09.1999 signed the main contract to implement the program. The signed contract and its annexes contain all the necessary conditions and forecasts for the successful implementation of the program. The total cost of the program without reservations and without VAT came to 73,774,078,128 Drs. (216,504,998 euros). The cost of materials and services for companies are the major subcontractors-Subsuppliers program is as follows: SIEMENS A.G. 140.053.330 DM and 21.393.522 G.B.P. Around 69.872.534 and 31.391.815 (1DM = 170 dr., 1 GBP = 500 dr.). Subcontractors of SIEMENS AG was the company DASA and BAe company SIEMENS SA GRD 6,927,919,355. That is 20.331.385 . Total with VAT is 23.991.034 MARCONI 19.441.300.301 L.IT. That is 9.699.255 (1 L. IT = 0,17 dr.) The total expense related to subcontractors-Subsuppliers amounted to 134.954.638 , that amounted to 50% of the total cost of the program. Each one a sub-subsupplier of HAI deposited in HAI performance bonds, which after completion of deliveries and the temporary removal of the system reduced to 4% and remain in force for four months after the security system is working properly. The HAI submitted to the MOD copies of these letters of credit (certified by the issuing bank). The HAI required to assign to MOD requirement in every one or all of these bonds, if any forfeiture. During program implementation there were delays in service level. Examples, delays in ordering vehicles carried tissues and pens. The contract for vehicles MAN-STEYR signed by ELBO in September 2003. The contract for transportable tissues signed with SMAG in November 2003.

The contract was signed in cages with GICHNER (UK) in February 2004. The fact that there were delays in proceedings resulting from the following: In December 2003 was the acceptance of the first stage of the Model of small systems in accordance with the provisions of the first amendment to the contract. In September 2004 trials were carried out for the second phase of the Network Model for Short and July 2005 and made comments to make corrections. On 23.05.2008 signed the second amendment to the contract. On 04.11.2008 took place the final testing of the second stage which was successful. On 05.11.2008 signed the relevant minutes. On 20.03.2009 approved the acceptance of the second stage. From 20.03.2009 force eighteen months the deadline for completing the program. Contracts Offsets (AZ) of the "Hermes" The contract AZ DASA (20/99) had six (6) programs (Main Convention subcontractor (DASA) = 142.844.730 DM, total credit value of AZ = 128.560.257 DM (90%) and two of those commissioned by the DASA to SIEMENS AE 1o The program support activities related to 2,130,000 nominal value, credit worthiness 5.325.000 DM and rate 2.5. The DASA was involved and "Hermes" A PHASE and had worked with SIEMENS AE services similar to this program. The program involved 2o software localization with a par value 1,575,000, credit worthiness 4.725.000 DM and the rate of 3. The first two: 3.705.000 DM nominal value 10.050.000 DM credit value, ie 7.8% of the credit value given by DASA in SIEMENS AE (See ref 2, the document of the General Directorate for Defence Armaments and Investments (GDDIA) to the Select Committee of Parliament, no. F.625/84105/S. 968/15-03-2010 document ANNEX C Fri . 3). The contract AZ BAe (21/99) had ten projects and one of them was awarded to SIEMENS AE / SIEMENS Tileviomichaniki SA This project involved producing 182 cards MINC to be integrated into Hermes, with a nominal value of 1,145,326, credit worthiness 4.581.304 GBP, and a factor of 4. Ie 23.8% of credit value given by the BAe SIEMENS AE / SIEMENS Tileviomichaniki SA The years of program implementation was 36 months from the activation of the contract. With later amendments were awarded four programs (the original program was undertaken, plus three others) with a total nominal value of 1.570.816 GBP and a total credit value of 6.943.264 GBP (36% of the total credit value). According to the letter of GDDIA to the Selection Committee the rate of implementation of the program until 21.12.2005 has reached 24%. The contract AZ MARCONI (22/99) had four projects with a total credit value of 19.746 billion AZ (over 100%). None of the programs not assigned to AZ SIEMENS AE The investigation of Justice began after the deposit of Siekaczek on 08.10.2008 in Munich according to which the witness among others presented: "On this occasion I would like to refer to the following: as mentioned, supplying cash and Mr. Mr. Gebauer and Psarros. I appreciate that this must have been around in 1999 and the mandate I gave Mr Dr. Niedl. Specifically it was the supply of money for a contract in relation to the manufacture of electronic systems for missiles Patriot. Total should deliver around 10 million euros and handed over in a complicated way (I rented an apartment specifically for this). Later I learned that Mr. Gebauer and Mr. Psaros were expelled to Greece and Mr Mavridis hinted that the two are not delivered correctly any more money - and they went some people who claimed that they received other money '.

In his testimony before members of the Commission of Inquiry on the Munich public prosecutor, asked about, testified on who the ultimate beneficiaries of the amount of 10 million DM replied "I do not know. I gave money to Gebauer and Psarros. After a while they both left the SIEMENS Greece. Probably left something in their pockets. But I do not know "(p.22, examination Siekaczek in Munich on 10/26/2010). The cases investigated by the Greek justice. 7. Justice On 04.03.1993 was charged with adultery against members of the board of OTE Mr. Menes Anastasios Kyriakos Kioulafas, Theofanis Tombros, Anastasios Mandel, Anthony Gkalonaki, Dombek Bernahard, George Elias, Socrates Kokkalis, Georgios Anninos, Demosthenes Perdiou etc. and issued the decision no 597 Ordinance of the Council of the Magistrates Court and acquitted each category (see ref 1, no. decree 597/1993). On 01.08.2001 was charged with fraud, inciting and infidelity against members of the board of OTE Mr. George Chrysolouri, Panagiotis Nikaki and Peter Lambrou and of Messrs. Socrates Kokkalis and Constantine Tsoukalidis and published in no. 2058/2001 Ordinance of the Council and the Athens Court of Appeals absolved from each category (see ref 2, no. Decree 2058/2001). On 27.04.2005 was assigned by the Chief Prosecutor of First Instance of Athens, Mr. Dimitris Papagelopoulos the Prosecutor Panagiotis Athanasiou conducting preliminary examination for the procurement system C4I. On 13.02.2006 the Minister of Justice Anastasios Papaligouras sent to the Speaker of Parliament Anna Benaki-Psarouda file involving the former Deputy Minister of Public Order Minister Christos Markogiannaki (see schet.3, Protocol Specific Speaker of the Parliament Secretariat on 14.02.2006 ). This was forwarded to the Minister by the Deputy Prosecutor of the Supreme Court Mr. Eleftherios Vortsela, after mention of the Athens First Instance Court Prosecutor Mr Nicholas Degaitis (see Ref 4, paper No. Protopresbyter: 50598/04.01.2006). The prosecutor asked for an investigation into the temporary removal and use of C4I, inasmuch as the preliminary examination conducted, evidence (see ref 5, written explanations anomotes under Article 31, paragraph 2 CPP Vassiliou Konstantinidis and attachments these documents) that investigators make the commission of crime (no. 1. Fri, the 1st Law 3126/2003) by Mr. Chris Markogiannaki Deputy Minister of Public Order and even regarded as the provisional acceptance metekylie responsibility for the quality of conventional objects to the Greek government and binding "under the statutory procedures for non-legally or contractually." On 15.02.2006 the file announced the Plenum. In November 2006 was the prosecutor Panayiotis Athanassiou additional research on the 8002 Programmatic Agreement of 1997 between SIEMENS-OTE-government concerning the procurement of telecommunications equipment. On 05.12.2006 Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou submitted letters rogatory to Switzerland to send copies of evidence by addressing the crimes of passive and active bribery, breach of Articles 1 and 11 in n.5227/1931 "On the intermediaries' and money laundering crime. (See ref 6, document Prosecutor Athens Protopresbyter No.: 124 529) On 07.12.2006 he apologized to the Munich Public Prosecutor Mr M. Kutschenreuter, who gave key evidence for payments from the slush funds at Siemens's Greek politicians and political parties and the knowledge they had regarding these procedures executives of the company.

This knowledge confirmed by the apology from Mr Kutschenreuter on 08.01.2007 (see ref 7, apology, Mr. Kutschenreuter number: 563 Js 45415/05 on 07.12.2006 and the same apology on 08/01/2007). On 12.02.2008 the majority of the Greek Parliament rejected the proposal of PASOK Committee of Inquiry Case Siemens. On 30.05.2008 the Athens First Instance Court Prosecutor's Office ordered a preliminary examination of the effects of fraud and dishonesty on the acquisition of OSE thirty (30) electrical machinery and one hundred (100) locomotive from Siemens. By ordering was instructed to exclude from consideration the "politicians (ministers) who suggested and signed the necessary contract" (see ref 8, document Misdemeanors Prosecutor of Athens A.V.M. O8/19). On 01.07.2008 the Prosecutor Panagiotis Athanasiou indicted for kakourgimatikes acts of active and passive corruption, money laundering, fraud, etc. and ordered the execution of the main investigation. In testimony to the Inquiry Commission on 04.03.2010 Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou the question if, in conducting the preliminary investigation found evidence of responsibility of politicians replied: "Certain politicians are no '(see submission Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou the Select Committee to 04.03.2010, p. 32). Since July 2008 the case was assigned to the judge Mr Nicholas Zagorianou to conduct lady questioning. On 10.7.2008 sent letter of the Minister of Economy and Finance Mr. George Alogoskoufis at the State Legal Council, which erotouse: 1) What is the observable state to pursue claims of the Greek state or by entities owned by the State of Siemens, where the company has used for years of non-legal means to undertake the execution of public contracts? 2) Can the Greek government to exclude the company from future tendering procedures for making public contracts and under what specific conditions? 3) Can the contracting authority as appropriate to exclude the company from pending tendering procedures for making public contracts and whether the Greek government to declare deposed the company or joint ventures involving the company from carrying out public contracts? End of July 2008 the Minister of Economy and Finance Mr. George Alogoskoufis with n.3691/2008 abolished the independent authority called the "National Authority Anti-Money Laundering." The position adopted an administrative control panel the "Committee to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing" (EMU) which is supervised by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. On 03.12.2008 a meeting was held at the offices of EUROJUST to coordinate actions related to the Greek legal assistance in the case of Mr. Prodromos Mavridis (see ref 9, Minutes of meeting 03.12.2008 801/NMEL/2008 Case) . In this attended by representatives from the judicial authorities in Switzerland and Germany and was about to open accounts in these countries. The minutes recorded the following dialogue between the representative of the Prosecutor of Switzerland and Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou: Dr. Daams: Who was the ultimate receiver of bribes?

Mr. Zagorianou: Government officials. Athanasios: Specifically, the political party of PASOK. But the end of the thread you have in Switzerland. " In the same meeting asked the Deputy Federal Attorney, Switzerland C. Daams what is the timeframe of committing acts and Nicholas Zagorianou, this Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou, replied: "For example we are talking about late 1997 early 1998, but there is evidence that arrive until 2005. Indeed, in 2005 remittances were repayment of the price of C4I, which was never delivered in Greece. The prescription of crimes is fifteen years. Already, some acts of 1997 likely to lapse. Above all, we need to check if we have involvement of political figures. Also, I emphasize that the limitation period is not interrupted during the interrogation. " In testimony before the House Select Committee Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou on the limitation responds differently: "The offense, especially when threatened with life imprisonment is twenty years lapse." (See filing Panagiotis Athanasiou the Inquiry Commission on 04.03 .2010, p. 120). From the above meeting and were aware that there were indications of guilt of individuals SIEMENS executives did not ban the exit of Michael Christoforakos, Prodromos Mavridis, etc. from the country. This does not, although at the same meeting in The Hague Mr Nicholas Zagorianou said "pending adoption of a provision prohibiting exit from the country against the two '(ie against Mr. Prodromos Mavridis and Michael Christoforakos). On 30.12.2008 Mr. George Sanidas sent a letter to the Minister of Justice calling for an advocate to Switzerland to help in opening bank accounts of suspects. On 26.01.2009 Mr. Nikolaos Zagorianou sent additional letters rogatory to Switzerland for a ban on movement and confiscation of the balance of the accounts of thirty (36) persons, including Messrs. Michael Christoforakos, Prodromos Mavridis and Christos Karavelas. On 16.02.2009 the Parliament of the State Legal Council opinion - with the Chairman Rapporteur Mr. George OWN Tzeferakou - the question as follows: The Greek State may: 1) To declare civil claimants in criminal proceedings 2) To sue for damages and compensation for moral damage 3) To sue for damages after verifying damage 4) Instead of the action the government may initiate administrative enforcement if it is satisfied the amount of claims 5) To exclude the company from future tendering procedures after completion of the procedure for applying the administrative remedy of exclusion in the public interest 6) To exclude the company from a pending procedures) after finding illegality in the previous stage of the competition b) for substantive reasons (eg lack of credit, credibility, respect of transparency, competition, etc.) and public interest. 7) After the award and the award of the contract can a) to revoke the award and reversed the contract due to illegality, which crept in the process until the award and b) deprived the company, based on disqualification of the contractor's specific provisions, govern this contract.

On 19.02.2009 the inquisitor Nicholas Zagorianou investigated and made a seizure of documents at the premises of the company Siemens. According to the filing of the magistrate, the space in which records were kept by Mr Michael Christoforakos suggested to investigators from the employees of the company. From the company moved boxes with documents, without a detailed inventory of the products seizure, without a report of seizure and arrested without the hard drive of the office of Michael Christoforakos. (See submission Mr Nicholas Zagorianou the Inquiry Commission on 03.03.2010, p. 303). Also Mr. Nikolaos Zagorianou never asked for the assistance of SDOE - employees which were typically only present during the seizure of the material - the evaluation of evidence seized from Siemens. Besides the officials of SDOE (see ref 10, document SDOE on 03.06.2010 with No. Protopresbyter: 14535) emphasize that it received or pledged, nor seized documents or other tax aspects of the company under investigation. Part of the seized material and calendars are maintained by secretaries of Michael Christoforakos after verbal commands (see schet.11, Protocol by the testimony of Mr. Michael Christoforakos to the House Select Committee on Public Prosecutor's Office in Munich 27.10.2010 , p. 32). The contents of the log has not been evaluated by the interrogator. On 13.03.2009 the opinion of OWN on 16.02.2009 was accepted by the then Minister of Economy and Finance Minister Mr. Yannis Papathanasiou. On 10.04.2009 an additional prosecution brought against Mr Michael Christoforakos kakourgimatiki for fraud against the Greek government in the supply contract of C4I (see ref 12, No. Dikogr.: Z-05 / 4 & Z-07 / No. 50 with Protopresbyter: 329). On 06.05.2009 the majority of the Greek Parliament rejected the proposal of PASOK Committee of Inquiry Case Siemens. On 07.05.2009 the Parliament was closed for conducting the election on 07.06.2009. The House is not in plenary session since national elections were announced on 24.09.2009. On 20.05.2009 escaped Mr. Michael Christoforakos from Greece just before the apology. On 20.05.2009 Mr. Nikolaos Zagorianou issued an arrest warrant against Mr Michael Christoforakos for acts of active corruption and money laundering (see ref 13, No. Dikogr.: Z-05 / 4 & O- 07/50, Arrest No.: 1 / 2009). On 21.05.2009 a European arrest warrant against Mr Michael Christoforakos for these acts. On 29.05.2009 Mr. Chris Karavelas escaped from Greece before the apology. On 29.05.2009 Mr George Elias George Skarpelis and filed a lawsuit against Mr Nicholas Zagorianou for the offense of misconduct and ypexagogis records. With ordinances Minister No. 1692/2009, 1709/2009 and 2170/2009 Council flood / Con Athens accepted the defendants' appeal against the order of the trial judge refusing to grant them copies of all documents in the file removed the disagreement between investigator and defendants in favor of the latter. During the first two members, the Appeals Prosecutor of Athens appealed using literally 2362/03.06.2009 orders of the then Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Mr. George plank. Appeals rejected the substance of the 1426/2009 and 1327/2009 respectively ordinances Council Appeals of Athens. On 31.05.2009, the then Minister for Justice Nicholas Dendias issued a press release stating that asked the then Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Mr. George Sanidas where judicial

authorities have done the legal document on which - according to the report of newspaper "Proto Thema" - referring to a flow of money to fund the New Republic in the period 1990-1994. The Minister said that then-Attorney replied that there is no need to do something because there was no such document in the file of the case of SIEMENS (see ref 14, Press Release 31/05/2009 of the Ministry of Justice). In June 2009 the then Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Mr. George Sanidas after a briefing by the relevant prosecutors and the magistrate said: "We have emerged based on the data, questions of responsibility of politicians .... (see deposit t . Giorgos Sanidas the Inquiry Commission on 09.09.2010, p. 115, 117). On 26.06.2009 Mr. Nikolaos Zagorianou issued an arrest warrant against Mr Michael Christoforakos for fraud against the Greek government on the contract C4I (see ref 15, No. Dikogr.: Z-05 / 4 & O- 07/50, No. Arrest: 10.09). On 29.06.2009 a European arrest warrant against Mr Michael Christoforakos for these acts. On 04.08.2009 the Council of Athens magistrate dismissed the application for separation of the case was submitted by Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou on 20.07.2009 contrary to the Prosecutor's proposal. The rationale behind the ruling was that: a) the German authorities would issue Mr. Michael Christoforakos, b) the case was complex, c) the defendants were many (see ref 16, Ordinance Council flood / Athens Minister Kon No. 2451/4-8-09). On 24.08.2009, the then Vice President of the Supreme Court and Head of Audit, Mr Ioannis Papanikolaou gave a written order to the Inspector Areopagite Michael Theocharides to investigate the detriment of Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou objections, as spelled out in the press and also to investigate the ordinances, which eferonto it was against his actions. So decrees that invalidated acts of investigative work (see filing Ioannis Papanikolaou the Inquiry Commission on 05.02.2010, p. 24). The main complaints against the investigating judge were: a) liability for the escape abroad defendants Messrs. Michael and Chris Christoforakos Karavela failure to timely issue orders against them b) the acceptance of recommendations to responsible investigative actions by the then Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, c) the unjustified refusal to supply copies of the file to the defendants and d) the selective investigation of the case, namely that the magistrate did not investigate as it should, interrogation, operations which had brought the prosecution period 2004 onwards (see filing Ioannis Papanikolaou the Inquiry Commission on 05.02.2010, p. 24-25). On 27.08.2009 the General Secretary Ministry of Economy and Finance Mr Ioannis Sidiropoulos a letter asking the Greek government bodies to implement within their powers to the opinion of the Legal Council of State. On 31.08.2009 was held the plenary Court of Appeals of Athens to set this year investigating the case on 15.09.2009 and Siemens was awarded the case in this year Maria Nikolakis and Mr. John Fioraki, assistant investigator. On 04.09.2009, the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court Mr. Ioannis Tents asked the Vice President of the Supreme Court Mr. Ioannis Papanikolaou deliver the preliminary examination of the disciplinary Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou the Deputy Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Mr. Fotis Makris. On 07.09.2009 Mr. Ioannis Papanikolaou said Mr John Tents that the removal of the disciplinary

file an undertaking canceled arxamenis process of disciplinary proceedings and refused to deliver the file. On 08.09.2009, the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court ordered Mr. John Tents Mr Ioannis Papanikolaou refrain from any further action concerning this disciplinary case. On 11.09.2009 brought disciplinary action by the President of the Inspection Board of the Courts Mr. John smear against Mr Nicholas Zagorianou a serious breach in the performance of official work to harm the interests of the Greek government and to benefit the Michael Christoforakos specifically for misconduct and abuse of power. On 11.09.2009 an additional prosecution brought against Mr Michael Christoforakos kakourgimatiki for fraud against the government by increasing penalties for abusers of government (see ref 17, No. PPP.: Z-05 / 4 & O- No. 07/50 to Protopresbyter: 662). On 13.09.2009 an arrest warrant against Mr Michael Christoforakos for abetting fraud and thus continued against the Greek government (see schet.18, Nos. Dikogr.: O-05/04 & O-07/50 number . Arrest: 9.13). On 14.09.2009 a European arrest warrant against Mr Michael Christoforakos for these acts. On 11.12.2009, the Deputy Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Mr. A. Kanellopoulos ordered the Appeals Prosecutor of Athens prosecution against Mr Nicholas Zagorianou investigator for breach of duty by continuing and abuse of power, the result of 20.05.2009, 29.05.2009 03.06.2009 lawsuits and of Messrs. George Skarpelis and Elias George, and the related OP 710/15.9.2009 report arose automatically offense concerned Vice President of Supreme Court Mr. Ioannis Papanikolaou (see ref 19, EP702/11.12.2009 document). On 15.12.2009 Mr. Ioannis Papanikolaou made a request to the President of the Supreme Court for issuing copies from 11.09.2009 to exempt the application from Mr Nicholas Zagorianou and a copy of any decision adopted at the meeting of 16.09.2009 Council was established by the President of the Supreme Court, and four Areopagite, selection of the president, who served in the Holidays section of the Supreme Court (see ref 20, document No. Protopresbyter 1898/15.12.2009). On 12.1.2010 the Prosecutor General Munich letter requested details regarding the events on which was the European Arrest Warrant of 14.09.2009 vs. Michael Christoforakos to elaborate the procedure (see ref 21, Attorney General's letter of 12.01.2010 Munich, number processing 15 Ausl. A918/09). On 12.02.2010 the Judicial Appeals Board at the request of the special investigating Athens this year decided to split the case for cases: a) the 8002/1997 contract signed between OTE and Siemens and b) the contract for the supply of C4I (see Ref: 22, Appeals Board Ordinance No. 410/2010 Athens Minister issued on 23.2.2010). By Ministry Decision No. 22/2010, the Supreme Judicial Council dismissed the question of the Minister of Justice calling to put a temporary suspension Mr Nicholas Zagorianou, as against pending criminal prosecution for abuse of power and misconduct in repeatedly. On 18.2.2010 the Legal Adviser to the State Legal Council, Mr. Eugenia Velonis lodging of the House Select Committee said that the investigation by then OWN it had a loss for the Greek

Government under the contracts it had signed with Siemens and had not yet responded by public bodies to this question (see submission Mr Eugenia Velonis the Inquiry Committee on 18.2.2010, pages 19 and 32). On 24.3.2010 This year the investigating judge Maria Nikolakis said the Prosecution of Athens, Department of Publications and Subscriptions Judiciary, that the letter of the Prosecutor General Munich clarifications issue of European Arrest as follows: "We have information that could add to support issued by you on 14.09.2010 European Arrest Warrant against the Greek and German national Michael Christoforakos "(see ref 23, a document of the Athens Court of Postmark: OP 077). On 14.04.2010 the Plenum of the Supreme Court, which convened to deal with on appeal by the Minister of Justice Mr. Harris Kastanidis against Minister No. 22/2010 Decision of the Supreme Judicial Council majority decided not to put a temporary suspension The investigator Nicholas Zagorianou against whom he had been prosecuted for abuse of power and misconduct in repeatedly. In the reasoning of the majority decision of the Plenary of the Supreme Court appreciates the investigative acts and actions of the investigator, Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou finding and merits of the prosecution against him (see ref 24, minutes and decision of Minister No.: 5 / 2010 session of the Supreme Court). On 15.04.2010 OWN said a spokesman for the Greek government civil party scene for the recovery of compensation for moral damage it suffered from operations of Siemens SA (see ref 25, a statement of representation of OWN at 04/15/2010). On 16.06.2010 OWN withdrew the mandate to handle the case of Siemens, which was given to Legal Advisors OWN Eugenia Velonis Mr and Mrs Myrto Germany (vl.schet. 26, letter from the Office of Legal Counsel No. Protopresbyter : 244 to 6/16/2010). On 07.09.2010 the Prosecutor Prosecutor filed additional criminal prosecution in Siemens a criminal organization to commit fraud repeatedly in the profession and habit with the aggravating case of Article 1 paragraph 1 of n.1608/1950 laundering from criminal activity and active and passive bribery repeated in Articles 1, 14, 16, 17, 26 para 1, 27 para 1, 45, 187 paragraphs 1 and 3 Penal Code, as replaced by the competent . 1 Fri the 1st n.2928/2001 (see ref 27, document Prosecution Appeals Athens ar.prot.: 417/2010). On 09.09.2010 in his testimony before the Inquiry Committee Mr. George Sanidas said that the file did not show evidence of bribery of politicians by SIEMENS (see submission Mr George stave in Inquiry Committee on 09.09.2010, p. 178). In September 2010 was designated as b Assistant Specialist investigators to investigate the case Siemens Mr Nicholas Pipiligkas. On 21.09.2010 the Council adopted Ordinance Court of Appeals of Athens, which was ordered to conduct further investigation into the main act of abuse of office against Mr Nicholas Zagorianou (see ref 28, no. 2122/2010 Council Ordinance Appeals Athens). By the same decree ordered the transfer of copies of the file to the prosecutor, (according to Article 38 CCP) to investigate the possibility of committing by Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou offenses beyond those for which has already brought the prosecution against him. On 26.10.2010 examined by members of the Examining Board R. Siekaczek said that Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou and Mr Nicholas Zagorianou when came to Munich on 08.10.2008,

assured him that before the testimony will not be used against him directly or indirectly. The Attorney H. Bumler-Hsl, which was present in both investigative operations, said the potential to become the subject of investigations Siekaczek excluded entirely from the Greeks investigative staff for the case Siemens (see schet.29, minutes were kept by the Prosecutor Munich at 26.10.2010, p. 10). On 14.11.2010 he escaped from Greece by Volker Jung, a senior company Siemens. On 18.11.2010 the European Arrest Warrant issued against Volker Jung. The warrant included the acts of corruption and money laundering by criminal activity. Notwithstanding the additional and criminal proceedings brought on 07.09.2010, the European Arrest did not include the crime of conspiracy and criminal organization, according to art 187 1 and 3 as KP had not brought additional charges against his recommendation gang under art 187 Fri, the 3rd PC.

3. Money Trail
Source: http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/3_roi.doc Translated: http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&rurl=translate.goo gle.com&sl=el&tl=en&twu=1&u=http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/3_roi.doc&usg=ALkJrhiDO rYpK3Cc2VfhsLyU01Cj-gWpKw The parent company Siemens before the 1990's, he used illegal methods to promote the interests of many countries. In internal terms, the executives of the company, dedicated to this activity, these illegal acts called "useful expenditure" or "secret payments" and were designed to maintain the dominant position of the company in the international market. Such payments were then - under German law - lawful and justified as business expenses and forfeited by the tax base. By law "to fight corruption," passed in Germany in 1997 and the law "on combating bribery in international level," passed by the German Parliament in 1998, each such payment was intended to bribe government officials criminalized. D) PERIOD BEFORE 1998 By the 1997-1998 payments for the promotion of the company's sales were very simple. The company channeled annually to an account of the bank Raiffeisen Zentralbank, Salzburg various sums between 100 and 200 million DM and a bank account of the Hypo Bank in Innsbruck at least 20 million DM. These accounts were originally anonymous. When the year 1998 removed this possibility, these accounts were registered. The first in the name of Wolfgang Rudolph and second in the name of Heinz Keil Von Jagemann, who were senior executives of the company and system administrators to pay illegal fees "kickbacks." They treated - with the approval of other peers or senior executives (such as Niedl, Beyer, Siekaczek, Kutschenreuter) - Decisions on illegal payments "bribes". The money ended up in bank accounts in Salzburg and Innsbruck in a way that it is not easy correlation with the company Siemens. For this purpose, the Rudolph and Jagemann receive checks that are issued by the accounting firm of Siemens, in execution of payment orders. The requirements are brought for payment to branches of Dresdner Bank or Deutsche Bank in Germany, received the payments in cash, deposited in banks and other intermediary through successive transfers, ended in the above accounts, Salzburg and Innsbruck in Austria. These actions were intended to prejudice the investigation to reveal if the offense can not reach the feeder account, ie the company Siemens.

From these accounts the money through remittances ended the final recipients, either through intermediaries or in arithmetic, (not named) accounts, or were given in cash.

The Rudolph and Jagemann up to implement the Convention which were carried out illegal payments, keep the documents with the demands under which approved these payments in a safe at the office of the company. After the execution of contracts, documentation requests were carried in a safe in the basement of building 1757 and later 1702 or 1703 building of the road Hofmannstrasse Siemens in Munich. Access to this area were above and each immediate supervisor.

This system served to disguise, that if research was carried out by the authorities, making impossible the discovery of incriminating evidence, or be hindered significantly. (See ref 1, No. 5 KLs 563 Js 45994/07 Judgement 5 th Division Criminal Court Munich) B) PERIOD AFTER 1998 Despite the introduction of criminal liability for corruption abroad in the year 1998, Siemens has maintained the same initial system of illegal payments. Officially, of course, the Siemens an internal program "compliance." The company asked employees to submit statements of compliance, which indicated that they were fully informed about the law on acts of corruption and that it would proceed in such. The system of illegal payments are not abolished, but amended and the relevant documents appeared to add: "recipients are not public officers or public officials in accordance with the OECD Guidelines." To add this special stamps were used. The immediate supervisors are not controlled, although the recipients of the money was public figures, because there was no requirement tests, because the insiders in the above mechanism was from a known that the money earmarked for public office. After establishing the criminality of acts of corruption abroad, the then director of commercial management of the sector of Public Networks Rainer Niedl (predecessor Kutschenreuter) apostasiopoieito more and more of these cases. Considered appropriate and interest not to sign him as manager in vouchers, which could demonstrate, that probably had engaged himself in corruption. For this reason, assigned the "responsibility" for this process to subordinate R. Siekaczek, who was then director of the Trade Directorate of the Department of Transport Networks. The system of accounts in Austria was already known to Siekaczek, since the 1997/1998 worked in sales and in doing so, had the responsibility for procurement and the payments "bribes". The Siekaczek view this process as particularly problematic because there is a risk that banks make a statement, a complaint under the law on money laundering and will jeopardize the disguise illegal payments in ICN. Subsequently, he developed the idea to price contracts via virtual advisers, which did not provide actual services received money from Siemens through these companies, and assembled into a tank from various accounts. After distributing the money was deposited in these accounts according to their needs. The then Director of the Trade Directorate of the

Department Rainer Niedl Siekaczek provided the full freedom of action to overhaul the system after the closure of accounts in Austria (Salzburg and Innsbruck). (See ref 1, No. 5 KLs 563 Js 45994/07 Decision 5 th Division Criminal Court Munich) C) PERIOD KUTSCHENREUTER - SIEKACZEK On 01.04.2001 the Kutschenreuter was appointed director of commercial management of the sector and the handling of secret payments via Siekaczek. He gave as a superior, complete discretion and freedom of action to obtain the funds needed for these payments "bribes". The Siekaczek consecutive virtual consultant contracts with insiders in the case, leaders of several companies, using as evidence implementation projects, which in fact had already been completed. Opted for integrated projects, which could justify counseling, which corresponded to the amount of money demanded by agents to promote sales of the company in various parts of the world. If it was necessary prochronologouse fictitious contracts consultants to look real. The training and subsequent payment of these contracts by Siekaczek had the assistance of Martin Rahm, who was an employee of Siemens until November 2000.

The Siekaczek had the legal right to make these instruments. Specifically:

Since the 04.04.1997 was registered in the Commercial Register under number 137 as a commercial representative of Siemens only the main branch of the company, with power to act jointly with a board member or another commercial agent. With this attorney by Siekaczek had the right to represent the company in exchange for third with expanded powers. In addition to 02.03.2002 up to him and Jagemann Kutschenreuter the right to sign for domestic and foreign payment orders. In this way both had the right to authorize illegal payments without limitation, from the funds of Siemens Financial Services GmbH (SFS).

The Kutschenreuter on 31.01.2003 invited Siekazcek and Hans - Werner Hartmann Commercial Sales Manager Corporate Network of the company, Andreas Klenke Director of Audit of the company and Juan Carlos Stotz Director of the Commercial Division of the Department of Siemens Carrier Networks at a meeting at the restaurant Alter Wirt Forstenried in the Monachou.

The purpose of the meeting was to get acquainted those present in the existing system and ensure their cooperation. All agreed that the current system of 'secret payment' should continue to be implemented by Siekaczek in the future and that all would help. Specifically, Hartmann would accept the future without checking accounts in the virtual invoices will fetch and Klenke be confined to formal control to prevent the improper disclosure of cash and contracts. The Stotz said that it would provide support and assistance, and promised Kutschenreuter as leader of the participants in that meeting, support and help. (See ref No. 5 KLs 563 Js 45994/07 Decision 5 th Division Criminal Court Munich) D) THE FUND AMINI

The Siekaczek after closure of accounts Jagemann and Rudolph in Austria before the meeting at the restaurant "Alter Wirt" was jointly developed by Amini - Iranian businessman from London, with contacts in Dubai - an own system for creating "slush funds" and carry out 'secret payment'. The Amini had worked as a legal advisor on behalf of Siemens in Iran until 2001 and advised Siemens on the financing for several large projects. The Siekaczek Amini agreed to enter into bogus contracts consultancy based whose Amini will then issue a virtual invoice to Siemens through companies he controlled, with content (amount, source, date) that was preset Siekazcek. D1) The surrogate companies providing nonexistent services (A) Fiberlite LLC The company's Amini Fiberlite LLC was founded in 2000 by himself, in Dubai. Partner and local partner was Mr. Fikree. Typically, Amini was the owner of the company by 49%. The remainder belonged - because of corporate law in force in Dubai - in Mr. Fikree. Among them was an agreement under which the Amini was principal shareholder and CEO of the company and that earnings will accrue to him. (B) Kelvin Trust Corporation LLC About Kelvin Trust Corporation LLC was a company in Dubai, which was active in the local market and owner was Dr. Amir Kashani Akhavan, a friend of Amini. Virtual invoices KTC to Siemens were prepared by an employee of this company. And in this case the ground and the total amount of the predetermine the invoice Siekaczek. C) THE FUND FLORIANI The Sikaczek decided to introduce a new organizational form of "slush funds" to create an additional pool of money, which would be made available in the future. Important role in establishing this new system played an attorney who gave the Kutschenreuter and Mattes to Siekaczek and Jagemann on 16.12.2002. With this, were given the recent authorization to sign all contracts, which they considered necessary. The companies Paolo Floriani used for the payment of commissions. The new system consisted of three levels:

The first level was Siemens. The second level was the American iconic company BFA Global Advisors LLC (Business and Finance Applications), the PromExport LLC, the Weavind LLC and Austrian virtual company Krhoma Handelsgesellschaft mbH.

The Siekaczek had entered into with these companies, sometimes in conjunction with the Jagemann and sometimes together with Stotz, procurement of consulting services (Business Consulting - Agreements) on behalf of Siemens, based representative from 16.12.2002. Then these companies were issuing virtual tariffs for Siemens, money orders had been predetermined by contracts or Letters of Acceptance. They paid for by payment order edideto of the above mentioned officials of Siemens.

To refine the mask, that is the real reason for the payment of money, and used the third level. This level consisted of fictitious companies that were declared in the British Virgin Islands, Tamarind Group Corp., Eagle Invest & Finance SA Financial recipient of these companies was Siekaczek, also serve the same purpose and the company Electronic Technologie Ltd, which finances recipient was Rahm.

Among the companies in the second and third level were concluded by Floriani-called supply contracts, which were designed, the transfer of money from second to third level. And in this system were used works of Siemens AG as a "virtual projects". If it was necessary contracts dating, due to the start of the project at an earlier time, ie prochronologounto. The companies used by Floriani, no real object, but operating solely as virtual companies.

Under the No 5KLS563JS45994/07 decision of the Court in Munich against Siekaczek published on 28.07.2008, which accepts that Siekaczek along with each other officials mentioned Siemens sign the payment order.

In conclusion the black Funds (Amini and Floriani) led by Siemens, the total amount of 48.884.834,70 . (See ref 1, No. 5 KLs 563 Js 45994/07 Decision 5 th Division Criminal Court Munich) F) THE ORGANIZATION OF BLACK FUNDS OF SIEMENS IN GREECE

By the 1998 controller by Siemens Hellas for the distribution of illegal payments to Greek government officials, was Mr. Chris Karavelas. Mr. Chris Karavelas with the strain of Siemens Hellas, Mr. George Elias had made all arrangements with recipients' mizon "8% over the conventional object of the programming contract OTE 8002/97 (see .2, filing Niedl the law firm "Debevoise & Plimpton LLP" p. 7 SAG-ATH00002069).

These payments under Niedl, who was then representative for the management of slush funds by the parent company Siemens, were implemented by cash or through remittances from a nonnominal account in the Bank etireito Raiffeisenverband Salzburg. After the replacement of Mr. Elias George by Mr. Prodromos Mavridis 1998, was, according to Niedl, a transitional period of about two years during which Mr. Christos Karavelas Mr Prodromos Mavridis competed for who would has the power to control the distribution of "mizon" in Greece.

The above controversy ended in favor of Mr. Prodromos Mavridis, who since 2001, following the retirement of Mr Chris Karavela, handled himself the "bribes" from the agreement of 8%. Same time, Mr. Michael Christoforakos, who was from 1996 until the year 2007 the position of CEO of Siemens Hellas, promoted since 2000 the agreement of 2% on turnover of sales for specific ranges of corporate products, which was approved by the managers of slush funds of the parent. The purpose of the "Agreement 2%" was the bribe Greek political parties to promote sales of the company (see schet.3, warrant punishment district court Munich under number Cs 402 Js 3943/09 to M. Christoforakos p. 3) . O Niedl, examined by representatives of the law firm Debevoise said that there was a separate agreement between Siemens AG and Siemens SA, whereby the ICN / COM paid 2% of annual turnover of Siemens ICN's AU. He said that he had understood from conversations with Bernsau, in the slush funds of co-parent, that the money intended to replace an account of the local Siemens SA, who was in Tileviomichaniki Siemens SA in Thessaloniki and was used to finance local political favors. The Niedl also said that since Bernsau understood that after the closure of this account, Mr. Michael Christoforakos had approached to help him find another way to find the money and had stated that the funds would be used for making payments Political parties in Greece. The Niedl acknowledged at his examination, the relevant testimony that he had been shown as a document which he had written to record the start of the agreement of 2%.

After receipt of money in accounts that were set by the managers of slush funds in Greece (Mr. Prodromos Mavridis, Christos Karavellas, George Elias) energopoieito a similar network similar to that operated abroad. This network was designed to eliminate traces the path of money from dorodokountes employees of Siemens SA to final beneficiaries, namely the Greek passive bribed government officials. The above mechanism in the 90s were originally simple. Was observed even phenomenon, the same period in Germany operating funds of banks in Salzburg and Innsbruck (Rudolph and Jagemann) be remitted funds directly from their accounts to the final passive recipients bribed. Gradually, as happened in the German side so in Greek, the way they were done by illegal payments received technocratic and sophisticated features.

So, Mr. Prodromos Mavridis opened a corporate account on 20.12.2000 in the name of Martha Holdings Company, based in British Virgin Islands and two years later on 31.10.2003 another corporate account for later Martha Overseas company based in Panama which succeeded the previous process flow of black money. The above accounts opened by Mr Prodromos Mavridis at Dresdner Bank, led by the subsidiary bank above Firstrust. The bank manager accounts by Prodromos Mavridis the bank Dresdner, was Jean Claude Oswald and the company Firstrust, who knew that these companies had no commercial activity and were established solely to meet the suspicious activity by Prodromos Mavridis.

Research from foreign judicial authorities about the slush funds of Siemens, which handled Mr. Prodromos Mavridis, was started in 2005.

During the investigation, Mr. Prodromos Mavridis examined on 08.03.2006 by the parent company in an internal control. Also examined by the foreign judicial authorities on 30.03.2006

and 19.07.2006 under preliminary investigation which was conducting the Federal Prosecution Service of Switzerland on the 22.08.2005 decision. In this investigation than Mr Prodromos Mavridis examined and administrator accounts, Jean Claude Oswald, the Swiss prosecutor's office in succession to 29.05.2006, 13.06.2006 and 14.07.2006. Both testified about how to operate the mechanism of the movement of black money from Siemens accounts controlled strains in Greece to the final recipients of Greek government officials. In the same investigation process was searched for the flow of money were tied to banks DRESDNER BANK Switzerland and UBS AG, amounting to 53 million CHF, proprietor of which appeared Mr. Prodromos Mavridis. A portion of committed funds (about 4,2 CHF) was transferred to accounts by Prodromos Mavridis the company's account EAGLE INVEST & FINANCE to Bank LGT BANK based in Liechtenstein and the account of TAMARAIND GROUP CORPORATION BANK SAFDIE the Bank based in Switzerland. According to the testimony of Floriani judicial authorities and those mentioned above, both the account in Liechtenstein and Switzerland of the bill are a part of the "slush funds" of the parent SIEMENS which were used for illegal payments and preparing for new markets to ensure orders. This confirms Mr. Prodromos Mavridis from 30.03.2006 to 19.09.2006 and deposits of the Swiss authorities. Another part of the money transferred to the accounts of Mr. Prodromos Mavridis came directly or indirectly by the company FIBERLITE LLC, which is based in Dubai and a black fund parent Siemens (see above for funds Amini). G. METHODS OF TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM MAVRIDI IN FINAL ACCEPTED a) Mr. Prodromos Mavridis, as part of the intragroup control on 08.03.2006 examinee by Reymond, Psara, Burgard, Hafner and Huppert (p. 463-005732's investigative file) testified that the money had come in the accounts ( personal and corporate Martha Holding and Martha Overseas) from the Siemens slush funds, or used or intended to be used for illegal payments of Greek officials. These payments were mainly - according to the filing by Prodromos Mavridis - not to apply for OTE's planned three clauses of No 8002/97 program contract, but also for other contracts of Siemens. For transport of black money from the funds, controlled by Mr Prodromos Mavridis abroad to final beneficiaries, according to minutes of the above deposit, applied primarily three different ways: 1. "Compensatory model: With the mediation of Dresdner Bank - Company Fitrust, Mr. Prodromos Mavridis came into contact with individuals from Greece, who wanted to transfer money in Switzerland. The money, after mediation of Dresdner Bank, was given by individuals in cash to Mr Prodromos Mavridis, who used them to premiums in Greece. The counter then in Switzerland, the same amount remitted by these accounts in the accounts of individuals. It is here for those accounts anagrafisan the state of Dresdner Bank and who are not known to Mr Mavridis. 2. Credit model: In Switzerland concluded loans secured by their accounts and where the money is then remitted to Greece, made and used by Mr. Prodromos Mavridis. The loans were repaid and then in Switzerland by financial resources of the company. In this

model fits the transfer from 24.09.2002 2 million , the personal account of Mr Prodromos Mavridis held in Societe General Private Banking Hellas. 3. Model Repatriation: In Greece, was previously a tax amnesty. This stipulated that Greek citizens were allowed to repatriate funds from abroad, which had relocated there earlier for tax reasons. During this procedure was applicable to flat tax of around only three per cent on the imported amount. Mr. Prodromos Mavridis has used this feature to transfer money from Switzerland to Greece. This solution applies to the transfer of money from 28/1/2005 EUR 6 million in the aforementioned personal account of Mr Prodromos Mavridis in Greece. " It also states that "All money transfers made was signed by the responsible consultant reviews the main Prodromos Mavridis at Dresdner Bank, as in Fitrust, main Oswald. The Fitrust, which was a subsidiary of Dresdner, undertook to set up companies by Prodromos Mavridis Martha Holdings and Martha Overseas to facilitate the obfuscation of the cash, although it was required by law to report "suspicious" transactions by international guidelines on money laundering, not only did not do so, but arranges with its own advisors laundering process. Oswald was not limited to management of accounts by Prodromos Mavridis. He also set up a network in Greece under the supervision of, so if someone wanted to transfer money abroad without leaving traces of the transaction, prosetreche to him and handed the money cash to intermediaries. Intermediaries handed the cash to Oswald and he to Mr. Prodromos Mavridis, who operated on the bribery of Greek officials. The above cash, which Prodromos Mavridis thereby paralamvane and used bribes to return to the sources, with the following procedure. Send remittances to the accounts of intermediaries abroad, from foreign accounts of companies controlled (Martha Holding, and Martha Overseas). These movements of the accounts of the Mavridis signed himself Oswald. So meet the objective of exploiting the willingness of various individuals to export capital in an opaque manner and without the control of the control mechanisms of the Bank of Greece regarding the legality of the origin of the money they wanted to move from Greece to accounts with banks abroad .

The network that supported this process in Greece was composed according to Oswald (see Ref 4, the testimony of Oswald in the spring of 2006 the Swiss prosecutor Ochsner) by brokers, lawyers, bankers and businessmen. Active role in coordinating this project himself played Oswald, who confesses that came to Greece three to four times a year.

Important role in the above system seems to play Mr. Ioannis Panagiotopoulos, a banker by Prodromos Mavridis, who was Director of Kifissia branch of Societe Generale, was involved only in private banking, was manager of accounts by Prodromos Mavridis in Greece, and worked closely with Oswald. In our shop introduced Mr. Prodromos Mavridis 2005 from abroad the amount of 20.920.000 advantage of the tax amnesty law passed by the Greek Parliament. But did not announce this transaction, as have been due to the BoG. The announcement was delayed for two years and having had meanwhile pledged accounts by Prodromos Mavridis abroad.

The Oswald had connections to Mr. Prodromos Mavridis and the banker (see schet.4, deposit Oswald). Also, the commission granted by Dresdner in Switzerland for movements in customer accounts that had recommended the banker in this bank in the context of these transactions, which in each language called "compensatory". Commissions are paid based on holographic certifications signed by Oswald. Also, Oswald met the above banker, not only every time you come in Greece and abroad. With the network Oswald probably have worked, since they have come up with money from accounts in the black Funds Siemens or have occurred, according to witnesses and Greek businessmen. It does not appear so far, the degree of knowledge of the exact identity of the interests served by this network.

According to the above, every time you deposited money in any account of these companies managed by Mr. Prodromos Mavridis was bribed to Greek officials.

The account holders, who remitted these amounts fall into three categories: i. ii. iii. State officials (officials and politicians) involved will as bribed. Intermediaries or companies receiving the funds for further transfer to the final recipients. Unrelated to the person bribed, but unsuspected in this third, mostly businessmen, who had their own reasons to want to export smuggling money to avoid checking the BoG on operations related to money laundering .

I. THE FINAL RECIPIENTS The Commission has attempted to document and lobbying for the enforcement authorities and competent bodies (BoG Exchange Commission, Office for Money Laundering, etc) to follow the flow of "black money" to arrive at this result. Ie to identify the final recipient of funds from the "black funds" by Christos Karavela, Elias George and Prodromos Mavridis, or by "black funds" operating abroad and were under the control of the parent strains Messrs. Siemens Rudolph and Jagemann or surrogate companies (Fiberlite, KTC, BFA, Weavind, Khroma etc) and having identified them to identify recipients based on the previous three categories. Despite the efforts of the Commission of Inquiry, due to time constraints of work, its inadequate cooperation between government authorities and because of the difficult process of opening accounts in countries abroad, have never been aware of all the information about accounts or transactions accounts. And they received had been completely processed by the competent authorities so that the Selection Committee does not have a complete picture of all the movements of suspicious accounts. Significant size of transactions was, as mentioned above, in cash "compensation model" - so there are no traces of such transactions. The movements of bank accounts that were sent to the Examination Committee by the

Committee for Combating Money Laundering sent to the Bank of Greece. The reports of the Bank of Greece reported to the competent Greek investigators to detect crime. * Investigation of the following transfers to bank accounts linked to any contracts for Patriot and Hermes II A) 500.000 Transfer to a bank account maintained in DRESDEN BANK in Switzerland Antonios Kantas comes from MARTHA OVERSEAS, company Prodromos Mavridis, on 03/24/2003. Anthony Kantas served as Deputy Director General of Armaments in the MOD, from late 1996 until early 2002, the period that the MoD was Akis Tsochatzopoulos. B) Transfer 5.000.000drch. a bank account of Paul Nikolaidis on behalf of UBS, which was trustee Elijah George, July 2000. Mr Nicolaides, personal friend of former MoD Mr. Tsohatzopoulos the '70s, he was EVP of EBO from 1999 to 2002, SIEMENS executive from 1961 to 1981 and responsible economic PASOK from 1974 to 1978 .* (Opinion New Republic). * CIVITAS In testimony to the competent parliamentary committee of inquiry investigating the case Siemens, Chairman and CEO George CIVITAS Flessas asserted: "I consider the specific policy issues of communication. It is a job which bestir oneself to twenty five years of work. When, however, did the company, these activities go through the company and not the person named George Flessas. " From the survey conducted in seized Server for Siemens therefore, that while the company has opened CIVITAS as supplier code 50003846, date 17.01.2005 labeled GR (Greek supplier) and the Greek Tax of the company, 17.01.2005, opened a supplier with the name "FLESSAS 'numbers from the system supplier of Siemens 50006821, again labeled GR (Greek supplier), but excluding VAT or other items. The file from the classer SIEMENS 144 with code 221 in the copy of the diary of Lady Jackal, an alert on 24 May 2001, where beside the name Flessas has an arch that says "payment method rather than accounting." We therefore investigated whether the supplier named FLESSAS exists on the system from Siemens is the CEO of CIVITAS. During the period October 2004 - September 2005 recorded charges of EUR 321,600 Euro, in summary file of suppliers found in the seized Server Siemens. There is a breakdown of charges by order number beside each charge, with the description "Ads". In the second file from the Server logged a total 422,832 euros, while a third file are two figures, 90,400 Euros and 32,000 Euros, this supplier code of CIVITAS, but no order number and not including the first set of 321,600 Euros. In the first case as a justification refers to "advertising expenses" while in the second case of "public relations". You should investigate why there are double aggregate reports and similar expenses without order number to tachtopoiithei the fate of those amounts. If we have such figures in just 12 months, even under conditions of corporate peace, it is understood the total volume of cooperation in the years 2001-2008, where, according to Board of CIVITAS, took the cooperation of the two companies. This raises the important issue refunds for advertising agencies. It is common practice to return a percentage of at least 10% on diafimistiis by the media. In some cases, the percentage is much higher. This means that the CIVITAS, only cooperation with SIEMENS lamvanein had a huge amount as a "return", but could not find anywhere in the check out.

Furthermore, again over the confession of the Board of CIVITAS the examination, he admitted that he had guest politicians and parties which take over public relations. The audit conducted, there were no invoices to political parties. Here then is a major issue for the identification of political figures who were clients of CIVITAS and the scrutiny of their spending to the media during their campaigns. Ie identification of entries. Identification of promotional publications - hits on media to be tested for the crime of passive corruption. With a simple premise, the huge sums the company CIVITAS not receive a refund may be used to promote political figures of the same media, without of course documents. CIVITAS GLOBAL About CIVITAS has two subsidiaries in Romania and Bulgaria. Recently acquired and 80% of the company Global Tanitim in Turkey. According to the filing of Mr. Flessa, these companies have cooperation with NOKIA SIEMENS NETWORK, involving a company in the metric SIEMENS. The survey conducted by the College Economic Crime (AP 518/07.12.2010) found few transactions of the company CIVITAS Hellas with NOKIA SIEMENS NETWORK. Similarly, retail trade were also found with the parent company NOKIA INTERNATIONAL OY also participates in NOKIA SIEMENS NETWORK. During the investigation of SDOE the NOKIA INTERNATIONAL OY is a branch abroad, found violations of 1.322.776,78 , indicative of the turnover ultimately the consortium and the participants in this in Greece. It is therefore evident that the transactions between these companies and the CIVITAS made through subsidiary company CIVITAS in Romania and Bulgaria. So we need to make such actions and its subsidiaries because they allegedly serve longer NOKIA SIEMENS NETWORK doing public relations for them and within Greece, as major record turnovers within Greece. Specifically should investigate the relationship of CIVITAS subsidiaries in Bulgaria-Romania to Greek media and / or journalists as individuals. This view is reinforced because at the time the scandal broke, the company issued invoices CIVITAS hundred thousand euros to SIEMENS Greece on the grounds advertisements in all daily and Sunday press with clear targeting the opposition of the adverse climate created by the outbreak scandal. Please note that according to the testimony of Mr. Flessa when examined in the Selection Committee, through its subsidiaries in Romania and Bulgaria, bought 80% shares of GLOBAL Tanitim, of the largest public relations companies in Turkey, but the official press release of the companies talked about exchange. In this case, since there is no exchange of shares, talk about a movement of capital committed to the acquisition. But a few days ago, on 24.12.2010, the company Global Tanitim adopted a communication on the official website, which claims that majority shareholder is the American giant Hill & Knowlton. Practically, if so, the American company bought a large portion of the shares of Civitas Global, which owned 80% of the Turkish company, ie the majority. So, again in large capital funds of subsidiaries of CIVITAS to be preoccupied by the fate .* (Opinion New Republic)

4. Findings
Source: http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/4_omofonies.doc Translated: http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&rurl=translate.goo gle.com&sl=el&tl=en&twu=1&u=http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/4_omofonies.doc&usg=AL kJrhiUePNwgWf7LpafLhjV9DST26ycUg The Inquiry Commission unanimously voted seventeen (17) porismatikes references. The thirteen (13) addressed to the judicial authorities and the remaining four: The Governor of the Bank of Greece, the Committee for Combating Money Laundering and President of Capital Markets The Competition Commission In the State Legal Council On the ministers of Justice and Public Order The Commission of Inquiry into the porismatikes reports showed data file, as described in testimony, obtained by the Courts of Germany and reflected in the decisions of German courts. It is noteworthy that the files legal fees, and registered bonds showed clearly international, borders, organized crime. Element on which the Selection Committee requested additional exercise initiated by the investigating authorities, a request which it adopted on 07.09.2010. Alongside the examination of witnesses in the prosecution of Munich confirmed the information in its possession of the Commission, and the role of parent Siemens, which traded lessen this unjust money from the slush funds of the company to undertake projects. The board addressed to the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court highlighted the anonymised system for handling secret payments, through commissions paid by SIEMENS to conclude contracts with the Greek State. Referred to the selective handling of the case, attempts to conceal evidence in favor of the company and its stakeholders with whom they committed crimes and especially corruption and money laundering from criminal activity by removing the transparency and healthy competition. Asked to throw ample light on the matter so as not compromised the credibility of the judiciary. On occasion even the escape of Volker Jung Abroad there was the possibility to follow the others involved and requested the immediate closure of the file. The Selection Committee also appealed to the competent authorities of the laundered money and mobilized the capital markets, the Competition Commission and raised the issue of damages claims of the Greek government in N.S.K.

1ST PORISMATIKI REPORT: Case Nicholas Zagorianou In a survey conducted by the House Select Committee on the well-known case SIEMENS, and in light of new information every day come to light in relation to the breadth and depth of the investigated corruption, but following the recent discharge magistrate Mr Zagorianou the

charges against him, which, as we learned, acted preliminary examination, we would note the following: On the basis of 12/11/2009 porismatiki your proposal to Mr. Attorney Athens Court of Appeals, which ordered the prosecution against the above Judicial Officer for misconduct repeatedly and abuse of power, dialavate particular, that Judicial Officer that committed the offense of abuse of power, partly because, in adopting the European arrest warrant, sent to the German authorities, and three of 05.20.2009, 26.06.2009 and 14 - 9-2009 Arrest Warrant against Michael Christoforakos not included offenses of felony bribery, committed by the above, M. Christoforakos during the period from 2004 to 2007, which are persistent in nature within the meaning of Article 98 PC, since in those conducting the investigation selectively confining only to acts committed before 2004, although the evidence in the file, which he knew, showed the commission of that crime and in this period. Because, in this case and as a result of the deeper inspection of the entire case within its jurisdiction, we believe that that Judicial Officer, in addition to these omissions, which are specific forms of abuse of power, had also committed the above offense and Below are more reasons: A) In its application to 11/09/2009 Prosecutor flood / Con Athens additional charges against Michael Christoforakos, under which issued the arrest warrant from 09.14.2009, on the other hand did not include actions relating the period after 05.12.2007, on the other hand, asked the prosecution against Christoforakos and Dendrinou fraud, methodefontas, thus, the responsibility not to disclose the policies involved persons - employees within the meaning of Article 13 Criminal Code the period from 2004 to 2008. In particular, the elements were in evidence, showed both the drafting of the protocol final acceptance of C4I in the year 2008, five groupCommittee, and the lack of interoperability and integration of systems, as well as the nontransfer of knowledge to staff control systems, things that were necessary for proper operation, collaboration and synchronization, and which was the main and essential point of the whole contract, which also had at his disposal. Understood not as any average common sense prejudicial to realize that it was so important that agreement on interoperability, and educationwhich clearly knew both parties, since this was the main goal that was particular supply-so without completing this section of the project, the latter being quite incomplete and dysfunctional in every case, and therefore necessarily defective and unreceptive receipt. Specifically, while the contract provided for delivery of the project to the Greek State interoperable "with turn-key" as a single integrated system of interoperable command, control, communication, coordination and harmonization by SIEMENS and SAIC, which had undertaken the project as a builder and ypokataskefastria, respectively, though the members of the Committee held on the one hand the partial receipt of, paying any expenses incurred a loss of the Greek government and secondly made the final acceptance of the system to 14/11/2008, excluding the point interoperability across all the systems that make it faulty formance will lead to non-receipt. And both the contents of the contract, and the above shortcomings, they were aware of all the members of the Departmental Committee and Final Acceptance, officials within the meaning of Article 13 of the Penal Code, who knew the contract and specifications should have received are the project knew it, in particular, that in no circumstances will formance to receive the project

without the element of interoperability and without the training of personnel handling systems, and yet, obviously pushed by officials of the Government, signed receipt, removing only minimal amounts, compared with the total amount of remuneration of the contractor, for "deviations" of the project as if it were a very minor shortcomings and obsolescence. But even more, while everyone knew that the purpose of a commission was primarily to shield the Olympic and Paralympic Games and after the modernization of existing systems of the State, accepted undue delay in project delivery, ie instead of 2004, as stipulated the original contract, received in 2008, even with substantial deficiencies pranaferthikan. And this after successive amendments thereto with respect to time of delivery of the project to serve only the interests of the contractor. And while all these resulted easily from the documents that the investigating judge had in his hands, but the above has failed to do any research on the perpetration of the crime of infidelity by state employees in receipt of the project, which is the basic and main offense in that case, assuming in advance that they were deceived, although the evidence in the file showed their knowledge on the shortcomings he (the investigators) describes in the indictment and that these were analyzed, and although this was important for the investigated case of C4I, ie whether there was Government and State corruption and bribery of party officials, and not whether the giant companies SIEMENS AG and SAIC, have or not to carry out the work. B) Further, issued by the magistrate that the European Arrest Warrant, contains incorrect reasoning, but the indictment under which it was issued, is obviously irrelevant since, according to uncontested evidence at the conclusion of the contract C4I, contractor of the Greek State was the company SAIC, and not the company Siemens, which accused Mr Christoforakos was CEO, and whose only involvement in the relevant work was that it had entered into a subcontract with the contractor SAIC. Therefore, the reference in the indictment syntagen reasoning that Siemens had the necessary expertise to the project, it is obviously incorrect, since the formal requirements for entering the work judged by the person of the contractor, in this case and the company SAIC . Consequently, even in cases of extradition of M. Christoforakos the Greek authorities, the matter of the act sought his extradition (fraud) will prove essentially unfounded. That was why it was impossible to find and dispatch the requested data to the German authorities of the already authorized by the inquiry this year, Mr. Nikolakis investigating which elements will prove the alleged fraud to justify the requested version of Christoforakos. The above, that judges, did intentionally, so as not accountable to justice the persons involved and all the acts they committed. Since the abuse of power, an offense committed in exakolouthisi.Gia this reason, pointing you to the above items, please for your own actions. 2H PORISMATIKI REFERENCE: Black Money Flow From the Commission's investigation has found that many bank accounts of natural and legal persons (companies and non-offshore) are fed from feeder accounts, which were issued in the names of offshore companies (Martha Overseas, Martha Holdings, Placid Blue, Fairways Estates ), which were controlled by executives of Siemens Hellas (Mavridis, Christoforakos or intermediaries Lecce, Kaldis) and were used for bribery and official policy makers in Greece (black Funds Siemens).

Beneficiaries powered accounts, as shown by the evidence so far of our research, it is fully documented that all involved directly and with knowledge of the source and cause movement of black money, which has origins in black Funds Siemens and destination officials or political figures of our country. More specifically, both the deposit Mavridis (strain Siemens, actors in the bribery of Greek) in the internal audits conducted of the company (schet.1), and the testimony before the Swiss Attorney (schet.2) of Jan Claude Oswald a bank executive bank Dresdner Bank Switzerland, Representative to manage accounts of both companies and Martha Overseas Martha Holdings controlled by Mavridis, but the companies (Placid Blue and Fairways Estates) controlled by the Lecce, Kaldi and Christoforakos and perhaps and other, unknown even to us, the accounts were intended to bribe politicians and officials of the Greek state companies or organizations and the public sector, it can directly be concluded that the basic modes of movement 'black' money were: I. From the above accounts feeders (black Funds Siemens) Amounts remitted to accounts surrogate persons or companies and then the intercalated enevazan amounts in nominal codes or accounts of the recipients in Greece or abroad, who were either government officials or political figures or Officials state companies. II. Oswald was regularly visited Greece and meet with executives of the stock market and banking system, which are either brought into contact with Greek citizens, whether acting on behalf of Greek citizens who wanted to export large amounts of money in foreign banks without n 'trace the transaction in the Greek banking system. The most obvious reason for the interest shown by these Greek citizens, was to avoid the checks, which were established by Law 2331/95 as altered over time and apply today on money laundering, in which included and the criminal offense of tax evasion. Also, another possible incentive for third parties to be investigated, is the desire to purchase shares of these companies in the Greek Stock without showing the actual buyer, but instead that the company abroad, which gives the orders and selling, which ended up the money from the "black funds" to Siemens. Those monies surrendered cash in Greece in Oswald and his colleagues from the Greek parties, it is then delivered, also cash, the executives of Siemens in Greece who were mandated to bribe Greek and so ended up in here illegal destination. The "receipts" that took place in the above way in Greece, "paid for" by Oswald as a bank manager of the accounts of companies controlled by these Mavridis, Lecce, Kaldis, Christoforakos by bank transfers to accounts maintained abroad by various Greeks 'stakeholders' who worked (for their own reasons) in this process. According to the above, there were two parallel processes. One took place in Greece and constituted a cycle of trafficking large amounts of cash and the other was a butt procedure was consisted of the interbank and payment of these proceeds from these accounts of "slush funds" to the accounts of persons who delivered the Cash in Greece.

Regardless of the degree of knowledge of Greek interested in accounts of which remitted such amounts, the source of remittances and the purpose they served the remitted bills (bribery of politicians and service in Greece, an issue investigated in parallel by both the criminal justice and the Select Committee of Parliament), raises an obvious question about an illegal practice in which collude brokers, bankers, and other Greek citizens, in contravention of the provisions of Law 2331/95 as it stands today (N .3691/2008) on money laundering. There at least, that traffickers of slush funds from Siemens, took advantage of an "infrastructure" that existed in the country based brokerage executives and managers of banks were conducting illegal operations transfer funds abroad (see filing Artemios Theodoridis, schet.3) and building this infrastructure, set up a mechanism for withdrawing money in Greece to the graft, which ensured while and stop the trace between the slush funds and the final recipients of money. You should also add that: A) George Kaldis of Christopher, a resident of Kifissia, Attica (Athanasios Diakos 64) and B) Alexander Lecce Frixos, residing in Kifissia, Attica (Chelidona 3) at the behest of Michael Christoforakos founded companies Placid Blue Fairways Estates and which is identified with the movement of money from the slush funds of Siemens to Greek politicians (see notes for explanations of Kaldi and Lecce in Attorney Athanasios schet.4, 5 ). With them have worked with the concept of mediation to find interested people for the opaque transfer of funds abroad: 1. Savvas Yannakakis, broker, resident in Athens, Attica (Rigillis 2) - (vl.ypomnima of the prosecutor Athanasios schet.12 a memorandum Whey ref. 13 the prosecutor Athanasios) 2. documents you transmit (schet.2, 7, 8, 9,10), the following natural and legal persons: 1) Nicholas Devletoglou, broker, resident in Kifissia, Greece (Rhodes 29) 2) Athanasios Rammos, broker, resident in Athens, Attica (Arch 21) 3) George Koronias, businessman, resident Filothei Athens (Eleftherios Venizelos 30) 4) Lawrence Lavrentiadis businessman, as a beneficiary of the accounts of offshore companies WED International Ltd and Ursula Marketing Corp and the company Neochimiki L.V. Lavrentiadis SA (Board of Neochimiki participates Kyritsakis Mentioned above, see testimony to the Inquiry and submission Oswald) 5) Foto Distributors on behalf Dimitrios 6) John Foto Distributors on behalf 7) Torso Konstantinos 8) Nikolidakis Marios 9) Christos Markopoulos 10) Excess Anthony 11) Anthony Kantis 12) "BALISEA" 13) Koukoulomatis Panagiotis 14) KPMG 15) Prince Pacific Ltd 16) Kienest H., a German citizen, retired, living in Greece {The no. 4 to 16 refer to Tables deposit Oswald enopion the Swiss Attorney (ref. 2) and we do

not know the address} 17) Mario Katsikas, Pharmacist, Entrepreneur, Luke Akrita 53, Filothei (vl.katathesi to the Commission) 18) Whey Basil Constantine, residing in Athens (Miniati 4), (vl.katathesi of the Athanasius schet.13) In connection with the above persons (from no. 1 to no. 18) in the accounts of which remitted to the various political figures of the "black funds" of Siemens emfilochorei certainly the possibility that not only involved as a smugglers' funds with foreign banks, but also be involved in substance all or some of them as recipients of these funds on behalf of third parties in such a case have committed the crime of passive corruption. Therefore of interest to our committee to investigate possible route to that money and outflows from the accounts of recipients for politicians or officials of the Greek government officials and companies in the public sector. Therefore, you should check all the bank accounts of these people and especially the controversial periods in which the amounts remitted to bank accounts abroad, to ascertain: A) During the period that received remittances recipients, had actually preceded withdrawals from their bank accounts in Germany for delivery of cash to Oswald, the "export" their accounts abroad, or vice versa, particularly if you lack such a commitment , remitted the money by "black funds" of Siemens in their accounts that they then the same accounts, to retransmit the final potential "beneficiaries"? Therefore requested: a) the movement of all accounts involved and especially to identify (if detected) suspicious flows to politicians or officials in any event, to persons who have no business relationship with the recipients (in particular accounts of companies). b) Any information on any purchase of shares in the Greek Stock from the accounts of these individuals or companies. B) Is a) Securities and Exchange Commission b) the Bank of Greece c) the Authority for money laundering if he has submitted a similar request from the Greek for Justice a) are at earlier stages (screening, the main interrogation) b) if so, whether it be of control by the SEC or T T E and if so, we sent the findings and products of the controls. List of relevant 1. Mavridis deposit in internal control Siemens 2. Oswald deposit before the Swiss Attorney 3. submission to the Commission Artemios Theodoridis 4. Kaldi submission to the prosecutor Athanasios 5. lodging in Lecce Attorney Athanasiou 6a. submission to the Attorney Kyritsakis Athanasiou 6b. submission to the Commission Kyritsakis 7a. submission to the Attorney Devletoglou Athanasiou 7b. submission to the Commission Devletoglou 8a. submission to the Attorney Ramou Athanasiou 8b. submission to the Commission Ramou

9a. Koronias deposit in Attorney Athanasiou 9b. Koronias filing to the Commission 10. submission to the Commission Mario Katsikas 11. deposit Papadogiannaki in investigating Nikolakis 12. Yannakakis statement to the prosecutor Whey 13.ypomnima the prosecutor Athanasios

3H PORISMATKI REPORT: Find bills through EUROPOL The Examination Committee of the Hellenic Parliament, set up after January 28, 2010 by unanimous decision of the Plenum of the Parliament in carrying out the investigation on the well-known case SIEMENS, for criminal responsibilities of the members of the Greek Government in the light of new evidence who daily come to the surface, compared with the breadth and depth of the investigated corruption, having convinced of the need for additional measures in the context of mutual legal assistance between the Member States of the European Union as provided by the International European Convention "on mutual Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters "primarily to combat the crimes of money laundering and financial crimes, corruption, active and passive bribery in connection with the resolution of 26/02/2010 Council of the European Union considers appropriate: Consider also be sought if the persecuted persons during the period from 2002-2009 so far owns or controls one or more accounts of any kind in any bank within the territory of European Union countries (notably Germany, Austria) and outside such as Switzerland, Monaco, USA, Liechtenstein, etc. - and if this is true - to provide all details about the opening of accounts throughout the reported period and for the accounts to which the persecuted persons have proxy management. Persons involved in the application are the following: I. Michael Christoforakos Nicholas II. Dionysios Dendrinos of Eugene III. Chris Karavelas Michael IV. Prodromos Mavridis Panagiotis V. as well as legal persons involving the above in any way VI. any other natural or legal persons who, during the crisis you are involved in the known case Siemens exploring, because: A) The classes assigned according to the indictments (money laundering, active and passive bribery and fraud) justifies, in our opinion, the cooperation with EUROPOL and the Joint Investigation Team - JIT to provide the requested information B) From reports in electronic and printed press reported that Michael Christoforakos paid as compensation to settle the dispute out of court with the Siemens the amount of 1.2 million Euros, which enhances the possibility of the existence of bank accounts in those countries, C) The unlawful pecuniary advantage they gained from their illegal activities is fairly high with a corresponding loss against the Greek government. The legitimacy and in laundering causes irreparable damage to the economic system of the injured country but they are likely to cause damage and the financial system of the country in which it occurs, D) Effective response to a multilateral cross-border criminal activity, money laundering can not

take place in the narrow context of state sovereignty but require international cooperation mainly in Greece and Germany and other Member States of the European Union under the common efforts for combat contemporary forms of crime and own those associated with corruption and disrupt the stability and integrity of the financial system. If you decision on the above requested to consider the possibility of seizure and confiscation of those assets.

4H PORISMATIKI REFERENCE: Nomination this year for legal assistance. Search the entire file By unanimous decision of Parliament of the Hellenic Parliament, under Article 68 paragraph 2 of the Constitution established the Commission of Inquiry "to investigate the whole case is Siemens, to inform the parliament and the public the truth, to identify and attributed responsibilities to those they belong "and especially to members of Government from 1989 to 10.04.2009 on the conclusion and performance of contracts by the Greek government and organizations of the wider public sector company Siemens, because revelations about illegal activities of that company in various countries, including Greece, coupled with complaints or losses relating to our country for involvement of politicians, channeling money to political party funds and bribery of government officials and service personnel they affect institutions and erode the foundations of the political system and democracy itself. In this investigation, to fully prepare the case and find the real truth, the Selection Committee after taking into consideration the list submitted by the President's three-member Council of Administration of the Appeal Court of Athens that contains the names of those serving in the Appeals Court of Appeals Athens, unanimously decided and determined in accordance with Article 147 paragraph 6 of the Special Rules of the House EFET George Christodoulou of the Kingdom to perform procedural acts, namely: 1. According to the Convention 20/04/1959 Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, to travel to foreign countries (Germany, Switzerland ... ... ..) acting either jointly with members of the Selection Committee or individually. 2. Be aware and receive copies of primary materials, documents, etc., formed of proceedings concerning the unlawful activities of officials of the company SIEMENS and concern our country. 3. Examine witnesses residing or staying abroad, especially former and current executives of the company SIEMENS and to ask questions in relation to knowledge about the possible involvement of politicians in offenses related to the case SIEMENS whole. 4. Recommend, in accordance with Article 263V of the PC, after evaluation, the adequacy of the evidence on participation in respondent acts or omissions of persons who served as State Governments, which - if any - offered by offenders to apply for the leniency those who contribute to the discovery of such acts.

5TH PORISMATIKI REFERENCE: Request for prosecution to establish a criminal organization In a survey conducted by the Examination Committee of the House in relation to the known

case SIEMENS, came to light which, in our view, constitute strong evidence and justify prosecution for the act of setting up a criminal organization of Article 187 of ZIP against both strains of companies and SIEMENS AG SIEMENS SA, and any other person. These data, having to that obligation, resulting not only in law but also by popular requirement for transparency and full investigation of the case, we mind you, and ask for the legal actions you as competent to conduct the criminal prosecution. Specifically: The company SIEMENS, a leader in implementing telecommunication projects, at least the end of November 1998, was developed in Greece, a separate, sealed and anonymised system for handling secret payments, through which fees paid to persons eferonto to mediate contracts for state projects were channeled to government officials responsible for awarding the contract to the company, who decided or otherwise assist in the assignment, and thereafter the implementation and acceptance. For the payment of the above-procurement bribery, was a well studied system in terms of company, to be suppressed and the flow of anonymous money. Thus was formed an organized group of initiates officials SIEMENS, which involve both the correspondence, and undertook the release and sending money to their recipients through its regional branches, which operated as autonomous businesses. This group, comprising structured hierarchically and certainly no more than three persons, knowingly formed, and had decided bribery of senior officials, politicians, State Government etc, with continuous action in Greece in November 1998 and until at least 2008, totaling several million euros, calculated the amount of corruption at a rate of 2% for each contract on the cost estimate ("rollover") of workfor politicians, as was called the "PLAN OF THE COMPANY" (see Page 3 with a number of F. 092.221/4880 Munich district court decision), and 8%, intended for senior government officials. The intent of the management company, evidenced by the fact that, after the year 1998, established criminal liability for corruption abroad, the system was maintained and continued to function but using special tricks to conceal, since to circumvent the guidelines of the OECD and the eventual control of the authorities, was placed in a special stamp on documents by adding 'receivers are not public servants under the OECD Guidelines' or' recipients are not civil servants in accordance with the Instructions OECD. " And the director of commercial management, knowing the whole plan bribery abroad and here in our country, after the introduction of criminal liability for corruption abroad, entrusted now to sign the documents on payment to subordinates who acted under the authority of . For handling the funds, were used eferonto companies that provide brokerage services in the execution of contracts, with whom contracts were fictitious, knowing all those involved and for the sole purpose to establish the legitimacy of the outflow of money to end recipients, and other companies through these channeled money from the kept "black funds" to the SIEMENS bribed persons. The above well-organized plan, accepted and implemented as integrated members of a structured group, as above, and senior executives of SIEMENS AG, as well as senior executives SIEMENS SA in Greece, such as Michael Christoforakos, Prodromos Mavridis, etc., who, acting jointly, channeled the "black money" to politicians or senior officials.

Indicative not, under this plan, the SIEMENS AG concluded the so-called Business Consultant Agreement contracts with companies and Weavind Krhoma, the projects' Olympic Games in Athens "and" Olympic Games in Athens C4I "for allegedly providing advisory services for which these companies would receive fees of EUR 2,000,000 and 1,800,000 to 2,000,000 EUR in each case, respectively, while those foreign companies, such knew everyone involved, was not able to provide such services, nor of course was not the purpose of the agreement, which was to create the money to be disbursed this money and then give their recipients (politicians and officials, as stated above). In this case, all decisions of German courts that, for all contracts concluded with SIEMENS, the Greek state paid for each additional 10% of actual value, the signature of the payment orders by the competent bodies ECA, and the disbursement of funds from the responsible for this public service employees, who were persuaded to take the above actions by the false representation of facts as true by symvlithenton the above conventions, who, by submitting contracts with the other standard documentation for approval and disbursement of expenditure, concealed the amount of "turnover" of the contract was augmented at least in the above 10%, by persuading them that the actual amount payable and the project was shown contracts and documents, with the aim of treatments, either to themselves or the company SIEMENS, or other politicians or officials, unlawful pecuniary advantage, in that consisting of at least 10% of the amount of each contract with a corresponding loss Greek government? Always be deduced: the No. F.092.22/1746 decision of the Court Munich I, the No. F.092.22/4880 Munich district court's decision, the No. F092.22/4816 examination report witness BERNSAU HANS-WALTER before the Public Prosecutor of Munich, which literally reads: "But then reached basic agreement with this figure of 2% and then by the next time the exact amount, which took Mr. Christoforakos , calculated from the field ON ... "By letter of 01/18/2010 VOLKER JUNG, which explicitly states that:" ... Unfortunately, my colleagues at Siemens was responsible for controlling all commercial activities were those who urged the system bribes to Siemens ... . The ascertainment of truth by the Selection Committee a cross-border organized crime polypraktou - inextricably connected with economic crime, corruption, laundering of black money, the dishonesty and fraud and that the economic strength, international links and sophisticated techniques constitutes a serious threat to the institutions in society, the legitimacy and democracy, requires the formulation of a common national strategy in principle, the unity of the LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL of operating without flexing its independence against a another, as defined in the Constitution? Because the cross-border organized crime related to corruption in public life and money laundering is not only national identity but a common problem in the Member States of Europe, under the common policy against crime the Council of Europe in accordance with the requirements the Statute, a host of decisions - recommendations on combating crimes and the appropriate selection and formulation of relevant measures in all areas may occur the criminal policy and particularly in the field of legal cooperation (in criminal law, the management of criminal justice, international cooperation on extradition, mutual legal assistance in fighting corruption THE Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions - Law 2656/1998, etc.). Because, according to article 187 of the Penal Code, a criminal organization is a structured and sustained action group of three or more persons seeking to commit a felony or misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment of at least one year.

Because it is obvious that officials and employees of the company Siemens, energisantes in the ways set out above, set up (international) border criminal organization to commit felonies and misdemeanors against the Greek government. Specifically, the purpose of this criminal organization was committing the crime of fraud repeatedly in the profession and practice (Article 386 CC Fri the 3rd) and even with the aggravating circumstance of Article 1 paragraph 1 of Law 1608/1950, on abusers of the public by overcharging whenever the product of Siemens, which was an injury and the Greek government and represented in commissions paid by Siemens to government and officials, who had a decisive role or influence decision making respect to the award of damaging the government contracts. This crime is constant and therefore the limitation of the beginning of removing the illegal situation, namely the cessation of participation of members of criminal organization in it. Also, sygkrotisantes criminal organization, management and employees of the company Siemens, sought to commit active and passive bribery repeated (Article 235, 236 CC in conjunction with Article 187 Fri, the 3rd para. B KP). Note that specifically provided for in Article 1 paragraph 2 of Law 2928/2001 that fall under Article 1 of Law 2331/1995 on money laundering and the cases of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 187 CC, which were not provided until now in fact a long list of such provision (see ref 83/2006 AP PChr. NST 703). Because the above acts were committed in Greece, in so far, regardless of where the decisionmaking, location of crime and acts were in our country. Because after all, in the provision in Article 7 of the Criminal Code, the Greek criminal laws are applied and foreigners for acts committed abroad and designated by them (Greek law) as a felony or misdemeanor, if directed against a Greek citizen, and therefore against Greek government. For these reasons Please order the prosecution to establish a criminal organization to commit: a) fraud repeatedly in the profession and habit with the aggravating case of Article 1 of about 1 N. 1608/1950, on abusers public, b) money laundering and criminal activity and c) active and passive bribery repeated.

6TH PORISMATIKI REFERENCE: Exercise claims and requests for interim measures In a survey conducted by the Examination Committee of the House in relation to the known case SIEMENS, came to light which, in our view, justify bringing actions, applications for interim measures against the company SIEMENS AG, SIEMENS SA, the personnel and any other involved person or entity. These data, having to that obligation, resulting not only in law but also by popular requirement for transparency and full investigation of the case, we mind you, and ask for their own legal actions you: Since November 2006 the company Siemens AG parent partners of "SIEMENS SA", underwent thorough investigation by the Public Prosecutor of Munich in the search for criminal liability of officers and employees of both partners Siemens AG and other subsidiaries in corruption, bribery, infidelity, etc. Along with the investigations of German prosecutors, from April 2007 the SEC and the Federal

Ministry of Justice of the U.S. in the fight against international corruption practices surveyed in Siemens AG since the company was listed by the March 2001 in New York Stock Exchange. Under pressure from these investigations, the Audit Committee of the Board of Siemens AG, Compliance Committee decided independently of the parallel investigations by public authorities to open an internal control with the intent to explore the possible commission of senior officials of the criminal offenses of Corruption, corruption, infidelity and money laundering. Similar surveys were conducted and are still out in most developed countries where activity Siemens AG or its subsidiaries. These investigations revealed that officials had developed an organized and extensive system of corruption, which regulated the activities, especially in countries outside Germany, including our country, and provided for the payment of commissions (bribes) to support business activities of undermining fair competition, stability to trade, the solvency of the financial system and eventually social and political fabric of the country. The method of payment payments were divided into two phases mainly due to the pressures of the OECD Guidelines. In the first phase of the commissions (bribes) flowed through the bank accounts of senior officials of the Siemens AG for recipients of illicit supplies. At a later time and to circumvent the OECD Guidelines, the executives SIEMENS invented a new way of handling the illegal commissions. Created coastal companies with which the company had entered into repeated bogus contracts consultants and issued the invoices, which were also fun, and did not correspond to an actual service, but served only to disguise the illegal payments and persons - recipients of these . In connection with the operations of the company in Greece, from our study and the pooled date evidence - witnesses, documents - and the judgments of German courts that: Executives of the company SIEMENS, sovereign in executing telecom projects, at least the end of November 1999, had developed in Greece, a separate, sealed and anonymised system for handling secret payments. That commission disbursed to persons eferonto arrange for contracts for public works which then channeled to government officials responsible for awarding the contract to the company, who decided or otherwise assist in the assignment, and subsequently implementation and acceptance. For the payment of the above-procurement bribery, was a well studied system in terms of that company executives to be suppressed and the flow of anonymous money. From our research so far obtained strong evidence that: A) Under this plan, the SIEMENS AG concluded the so-called Business Consultant Agreement contracts with companies and Weavind Krhoma, works for "Olympic Games in Athens" and "Olympic Games in Athens C4I" for allegedly providing consultancy services for which these companies would receive fees of EUR 2,000,000 and 1,800,000 to 2,000,000 EUR in each case, respectively. These foreign companies, such knew everyone involved, was not able to provide these services, or course, was the purpose of the agreement, which was to create the money to be disbursed this money and then be given to their recipients (politicians and officials). B) For the 8002/1997 program agreement signed between OTE and the house SIEMENS A.E. and six orders of numbers 8002/1/15-12-1997, 8002/2/15-11-1999, 8002/3/04-08-2000, 8002/4/07-11-2000, 8002 / 5/18-7-2001 and 8002/6/29-7-2002, amounting to 692,999,549.59

euro traded lessen this unjust money from executives of Siemens SA to officials, employees of OTE SA and political figures. Particular showed that long before the conclusion of the basic contract - Framework Agreement between the subsidiary and SIEMENS OTE for the years 1997-2002 (8002 was an agreement between the parent Siemens AG and head of the SIEMENS SA subsidiary, which provided that 'capital equal to 8% of turnover of sales from the business of SIEMENS Greece the Telephone Company will also do diefthentika executives of Siemens AG on request executives SIEMENS Greece for the purpose of payment of commissions for securing the contracts on behalf of Siemens (8% agreement). The existence of the "Agreement of 8%," say executives of Siemens (by Rainer Niedl, by Wolfgang Rudolf, the Franz - Josef Richter, the Michael Beyer, by Michael Kutschenreuter) during the examination in either the audit or investigation from the Prosecutor of Munich. Beyond the evidence of the existence of this agreement is evidenced by the following seized handwritten note: a document of basic principles (Grundsatzpapier), dated 19/01/1998, drawn by Christos Karavela Economics and Director of Telecommunications (1967 8th - 10th 1974) , Chief Financial Officer Telecommunications Division (12th 1996 - 8th 1998) of SIEMENS SA, Siemens AG sent to and approved by Reiner Niedl (Commercial Sales Manager Southern Europe, Middle East and Africa, including Greece's telecommunications sector of Siemens AG from 1995 - 1998) and the Ludwig Jasper (head of sales of the telecommunications sector in Southern Europe, Middle East and Africa until 1998). The payments in execution of the above document on basic principles were requests for payments from Christos Karavela and later by Prodromos Mavridis, addressed to Wolfgang Rudolf (Commercial Manager of Assets and cash telecommunications section (ON, ICN) at SIEMENS AG (1992-2002). The W. Rudolf went then to the payment either by wire transfer of unregistered bank account, which respected for this purpose the bank RAIFFEISENVERBAND SALZBURG, or cash, which were taken from the fund company in Munich and then transferred to an employee of a subsidiary in Greece. Further, it appeared that there was agreement between the parent Siemens AG and SIEMENS SA (Which was prepared on behalf of the latter by M. Christoforakos (CEO and Vice Chairman Board of SIEMENS SA from 1997 9th - 12th 2007) which provided that funds equal to an additional 2% of turnover of sales entrepreneurial activity in Greece SIEMENS fixed telecommunications networks would be made available by executives of Siemens AG at the request of M. Christoforakos for supplies to ensure the contracts on behalf of Siemens (2% Agreement"). The requests were addressed by M. Christoforakos in Michael Kutschenreuter, who was appointed Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Telecommunications at Siemens AG from April 2001 and he then informed the Reinhard Siekaczek (the "Agreement additional 2%" reported by Siekaczek, Neidl, Hans Peter Igel). Finally, all decisions of German courts that all contracts concluded by SIEMENS, the Greek Government A) paid for each additional 10% of the value of which corresponded to a "commission", secret agreements and "oiling" the signature of the payment orders by the competent bodies and B) the relevant organs of government for the disbursement and payment of the amounts of the contracts, were persuaded to make these payments from the show false facts as true by symvlithenton the above contracts. The latter by submitting the relevant documents for approval

and disbursement of expenditure, concealed the amount of "turnover" of the contract was increased by the above 10%. Thereby convinced the officials of the government that the real and payable value of the work was shown at conventions and documents, in order to prosporisoun, either to themselves or the company SIEMENS, or other politicians or officials, unlawful pecuniary advantage. This was the value of 10% of the amount of each contract with a corresponding loss of the Greek government estimated costing of the project and the overall budget, passed, ie, in the contract, paid therefore in each case by the contractor Siemens. The latter course is not spent huge amounts annually to reduce but to increase its revenues. It follows an unprecedented loss of the Greek government and legal persons of the wider Public Sector, which is an increase if the price paid for the purchase of goods and services from Siemens in the amount declared to be paid "commissions" or " beneficial expenditure 'or' oiling '. Consequently 10% of turnover contract is overpriced cost of products and services company Siemens has provided, as is detailed and specialized in the unanimous report we addressed to the Attorney Supreme Court, which is a single text to this reference and integral part of it. Apart from the damage, which is clearly property and which originated among others blamed the tortious acts or omissions of both charged with the conclusion and execution of political executives, service agents of legal entities in the wider public sector and senior management SIEMENS is the company and consequential damage. This consists of the improper execution of various contracts, such as the C41, and the claim for compensation for moral damages suffered by the Greek state and the entities of the broader public sector of the illegal activities of officials and strains of SIEMENS. The final damage for each contract may be determined by the costs that would have given the normal course of things, if they had not mediate the criminal behavior of Siemens executives and employees within the meaning of Article 13 Penal Code against the Greek government and legal entities of the parastatal, which jointly and severally liable because the tort nature of the acts or omissions to restore any damage (art. 926 CC). This responsibility is taken - except the provisions of civil law - from EU directives to combat corruption, money laundering and criminal activities of organized crime and the introduction of transparency in public procurement with emphasis on openness and honesty both in the selection - and commitment during the execution thereof. Besides, especially now that transparency is a dominant sense of the overall framework of rules governing the system of awarding and execution of public contracts in EU law and thus to national laws. That is a general principle of procurement law, which governs how to interpret them. FOR THESE REASONS Please, in accordance with the responsibilities you took action against all involved individuals and legal persons arising from criminal case files formed to restore any damage suffered by the Greek state and entities thereof and requests an injunction requiring the conservative confiscation of their property. 7H PORISMATIKI REFERENCE: Accelerate interrogation Following the exercise, then Public Order after submitting its request in our case involved the SIEMENS, which synetaraxe particularly the public, further prosecution for the criminal acts of a) setting up a criminal organization to commit (the instigation of members of the organization, and they are acted professionally and custom) fraud against the Greek government repeatedly by profession and habit with the aggravating circumstance of Article 1 paragraph 1, N.1608/1950 b) money laundering from criminal activity and c) active and passive bribery

repeated (articles 26, paragraph 1a, 27 para 1, 45, 187 paragraphs 1 and 3 PC as objects in the Article 1 Fri, the 1st Law 2928/2001), please view the current risk of serious limitation plimmelimmatikon acts to speed as possible questioning where this is clearly not detrimental to the public interest in identifying those responsible and the extent of their responsibilities and further to know us , naming them, those government officials and general officials, who, with criminal acts and omissions caused injury to the Greek government, to enable it to pursue their claims for damages against them and against the company SIEMENS. 8TH PORISMATIKI REFERENCE: Request for prosecution by Panagiotis Vourloumis and every person not to activate clauses The investigation of the Examination Committee of the House, which investigates the whole case of SIEMENS emerged below and please for your own actions: Since November 2006 the company SIEMENS AG parent company of SIEMENS SA", underwent thorough investigation by the Public Prosecutor of Munich in the search for criminal liability of officers and employees as the company SIEMENS AG and other subsidiaries in corruption, bribery, infidelity, etc. In addition to investigations by German prosecutors, from April 2007 the SEC and the Federal Ministry of Justice of the United States in combating international corruption practices surveyed in SIEMENS AG since the company was listed in March 2001 in New York Stock Exchange. Under pressure of these investigations, the Audit Committee of the Board SIEMENS AG, Compliance Committee decided independently of the parallel investigations by public authorities to open an internal control with the intent to explore the possible commission of senior executives of criminal offenses Corruption, corruption, infidelity and money laundering. Moreover similar surveys were conducted and are still out in most developed countries where activity SIEMENS AG or its subsidiaries. These investigations revealed that officials had developed an organized and extensive system of corruption, which regulated the activities, especially in countries outside Germany, including our country, which provided for the payment of commissions (bribes) to promote business action of the company in those states, bypassing both transparent procedures, and adopted as part of healthy competition and expected him benefits. The operation - processing of the payment system is divided into two phases - mainly because of pressure of the OECD Guidelines;. In the first phase of the commissions (bribes) flowed through the bank accounts of senior officials of the SIEMENS AG for recipients of illicit supplies. At a later time and to circumvent the OECD Guidelines, the executives SIEMENS invented a new way of handling the illegal supply through the creation of coastal companies with which the company had entered into repeated bogus contracts consultants and issued the invoices which were equally fun and did not correspond to real services, but served only to disguise the illegal payments such as persons who have ended these amounts. In connection with the operations of the company in Greece, from our study and the pooled evidence to date shows: For the 8002/1997 program agreement signed between OTE SA and SIEMENS SA and six performers orders numbers 8002/1/15-12-1997, 8002/2/15-11-1999, 8002/3/04-08-2000, 8002/4/07-11-2000, 8002 / 5/18-7-2001 and 8002/6/29-7-2002 worth 692.999.549,59 traded lessen this unjust money from executives of SIEMENS SA executives in OTE SA and political figures. However, as shown, the price paid by the Telephone Company, was overpriced and certainly far superior to the real-market value of the received material. In particular, it emerged that well before the conclusion of the basic framework contract between the subsidiary and SIEMENS OTE for the years 1997-2002 (8002) was an agreement between

the parent SIEMENS AG and head of the SIEMENS SA subsidiary, which provided that funds equal to 8% of turnover of sales from the business of SIEMENS Greece Telephone Organisation will be paid by managers of SIEMENS AG at the request of managers SIEMENS Greece for the purpose of payment of commissions for securing the contracts on behalf of SIEMENS (Agreement 8%"). The existence of the "Agreement of 8%," say senior executives SIEMENS (by Rainer Niedl, by Wolfgang Rudolf, the Franz - Josef Richter, the Michael Beyer, the Michael Kutschenreute) during the examination or within the upper internal controls or in the investigation by the Prosecutor of Munich. In addition to the above evidence the existence of the agreement evidenced by seized handwritten note - a guidance document (Grundsatzpapier), dated 01/19/1998, drawn by Christos Karavela Economics and Director of Telecommunications (1967 8th - 10th 1974), Chief Financial Director of Telecommunications Division (12th 1996 - 8th 1998) of SIEMENS SA SIEMENS AG sent to and approved by Reiner Niedl (Commercial Sales Manager Southern Europe, Middle East and Africa, including Greece's telecommunications sector SIEMENS AG from 1995 - 1998) and the Ludwig Jasper (head of sales of the telecommunications sector in South Europe, Middle East and Africa until 1998). The payments in execution of the above guidance document made on requests for payments from Christos Karavela and later by Prodromos Mavridis, addressed to Wolfgang Rudolf (Commercial Manager of Assets and cash telecommunications section (ON, ICN) at SIEMENS AG ( 19922002), who then proceeded to pay by bank transfer or unrecorded bank account, which respected for this purpose the bank RAIFFEISENVERBAND SALZBURG, by cash, taken from the fund company in Munich and then transferred an employee of a subsidiary in Greece. In May 2005 while he was focusing on the current scandal in OTE, the then Administration, Utility under Pan.Vourloumi gave instruction to the auditing firm PriceWaterhouseCoopers, to conduct cost accounting due diligence on the performers orders 5 and 6, which were part of over the over supply of materials. The explicit and clear instructions to energisantes control was only to calculate the gross margin the company SIEMENS Hellas, resulting from specific orders under the control of the balance sheet, compared with the other activities of this company in Greece, and not, as expected, the value of such materials in Greek and foreign market. Result of the above standard and very flawed audit was to show that the supposedly sold to OTE specific products and does not normally kostologithikan ypertimologithikan. Moreover, although the contractual agreement between OTE and SIEMENS provided three terms favorable to the OTE, based on which would in any case OTE require ex post (ie after the execution of the contract) retroactive price reductions, they are not only implemented by the Administration, but also raised and, outside the control of the above company acted PriceWaterHouseCoopers. Finally, compared with all other enforceable orders, never echorise any effective control or, in some cases, there was no review by committees of OTE or independent companies, resulting in complete concealment of the full amount paid by OTE unduly to SIEMENS and charged-shifting onto the backs of the Greek people. Specifically, for the loss of OTE are as follows: According to the executives of the parent company SIEMENS AG (Neidl, Rudolf, Kutschenreuter), the height of 'fees' provided to secret agreements concerning procurement and the implementation of projects in various countries, estimated at costing the project and the overall budget, passed, ie, in the contract, paid therefore in each case by the contractor SIEMENS, which certainly is not spent huge sums annually to reduce, but to increase its revenues. From the above data indicate an apparent loss of the OTE-consistency and by the Greek government, which is an increase if the price paid for the purchase of goods and services by SIEMENS for at least the declared amount paid for " commissions "or" useful expenditure "or" oiling ".

Further, that the officials of OTE and receiving gifts under the aforementioned secret agreements, subject actually favored in SIEMENS, apparently in breach of their duties they shall be obliged in the interest of the . TE and the Greek government, resulting from those listed in the report by 11/29/2006 Apology Andreas Walter Mattes, executive SIEMENS AG, before the Prosecution Service Crime Bavaria, a super-profits around 10% above normal profit margins, and as claimed by the excellent relations and contacts with Mavridis OTE result in significantly higher margins contract than is customary in the market (about 10% above normal margins). Also, he Prodromos Mavridis discussions he had in Athens on 08.03.2006 under the Internal Audit Burgard, Hafner and Hupert regulatory compliance office reported the following: "... since 1997 is a framework convention, as well as individual contracts that followed, earned in Greece SIEMENS very high turnovers, which achieved very good prices. Subject of contractual agreement is, moreover, and two individual settings: the Utility had the right to ascertain, with the help of a committee if they complied with the contract, under which the Utility receive the best price billing customers. If this does not happen, then the Utility may subsequently require rebates. Also OTE has the right to control how high their earnings SIEMENS Greece. In case of exceeding a specific value, the OTE can be subsequently require discounts. Finally, OTE may at any time terminate the agreement if the other competitors offer their products at lower prices than the SIEMENS. The Telephone Company never did until now use of three unprofitable for SIEMENS capabilities. Therefore, the yields remained high .... Shows with great clarity from the above set forth, that the statutory authorized representatives of the Utility never triggered pro-OTE clauses of the Contract 8002/1997 (Articles 8 - 10) and had by its capacity but also being able to see the obvious that the price premium OTE asked to pay, known as opposed to commercial usage, the general principles of good administration and good faith, but away from any conduct prudent and media representative NPID Following its discussion in Athens 03.08.2006, Prodromos Mavridis reveals that occurred many paying "bonuses" which was, as expressly stated, is necessary because the management of OTE changed all four (4) times total during the previous years and therefore had to ensure that no change anything in practice that followed and which was favorable for SIEMENS. This system was agreed with his predecessor, Mr. Mavridis and high-ranking officials of SIEMENS AG. To undertake the project and the overall favorable judgments presupposed called "bonuses" that notifiers by Mr. Mavridis Munich and paid from there. Specifically applied primarily three (3) different ways: a. "Model clearing" where individuals in Greece gave money to cash in k.Mafridi which is then spent in Greece to cover the "premium" and in return the same amount of money that was given in cash to remit bank accounts of these individuals in Switzerland in order to achieve avoidance of taxation of these funds in Greece. b. "Model credit" where credit through Switzerland as deposited in an account that was there remitted to Greece. Then assume Mr. Mavridis distribution of "premium". The credit paid for by SIEMENS in Switzerland. This way of remittances on the order of two (2) million in the private account k.Mafridi the Bank Societe General Private Banking Hellas by 24/09/2002. c. "Model repatriation" Mr Mavridis advantage of setting the tax amnesty thus transferred to Greece from Switzerland transfer of six (6) million in the private account in Greece on 01/28/2005.

All transactions through accounts in Greece, had agreed to Mr Mavridis and Mr. Siekaczek and predecessor in this SIEMENS Germany Dr. Neidl and were on their own initiative. Indeed Mr Mavridis was instructed by SIEMENS AG not to any documentation of the payments to Greece and leave only to Switzerland the bank statements of bank and other relevant documents. Inputs to the Swiss accounts were held solely by Mr. Siekaczek, who used for this purpose enterprises Eagle Invest und Finance SA, Tamarind Group Corporation (Note: in both these enterprises Mr. Siekaczek mentioned in the list of bank Dresdner Bank as a financial manager), Kelvin Trust Corporation in Dubai, Fiberlite LLC in Dubai, Ecuro trd est, as well as the company Intercom Telecommunications Systems AG based in Switzerland Bach. All the money injected into the accounts is therefore channeled money to them from SIEMENS. Behest of the Administration of OTE has compared the rate of profit SIEMENS Hellas in this transaction, the rate of profit in other areas of activity (services or sell other products such as electrical equipment to third parties in the Greek market ). Further, no verified if the specific tariffs that made the parent company of SIEMENS to its subsidiary, was the same or different with billings made to other countries. In this way, it never found what was the amount finally paid by OTE for these products beyond the current market value, b), although the effective control should include investigating whether applied in a particular contract are favorable OTE these clauses, this was not examined. The result was, since the clauses were not applied to conceal the consequent damage to OTE. These failures of audit firm, echorisan the responsibility of the then administration of OTE, which, by granting an explicit mandate to audit institutions to make only a simple and meaningless audit the books of Greek SIEMENS, deliberately prevented the carrying out an actual costing control, from which it clearly showed that both the premium (at least 10% of turnover of business SIEMENS SA and OTE) and the non-activation of three pro-OT E clauses (Articles 8.9 and 10 of the Convention - a framework for 8002/1997), reported by P. Mavridis on 03/08/2006 at the void debate in Athens, the passage cited above unchanged, and which given the outrageous overpricing of products, we have implemented formance. Ie the terms of the competitiveness of most-favored customer and costing equipment as specified in detail immediately below: a. (Article 8) Clause COMPETITIVE BID whereby if the Buyer (OTE) take good faith best offer by certified Houses Telecommunications hardware and software (...) and the comparative value of the supply compared with the Specifications, provided the features, quality, quantity (...) is more favorable than the Supplier (SIEMENS), then the Buyer has the right to ask the vendor to revise these terms. b. (Article 9) or clause of most favored client that guarantees equal treatment in terms of price / quality compared to any other customer in the European Union or in countries associated with it. c. (Article 10) or clause of Cost estimate CONTROL - COMPLIANCE DATA according to which the Buyer shall be entitled to cost accounting control of the procured equipment. This audit will be conducted by the Services of the Buyer or by an independent firm of international repute. The managers of the OTE had every opportunity and obligation arising out of the capacity both to develop initiative and to make decisions in the interest of the Utility, if it had acted in this way will formance primarily to make to review and compare prices for disposal of OTE product SIEMENS seller and subsequently applying them to the favorable OTE clauses of the contract, to deduct from the price difference resulting from over-invoicing of goods.

Failure to trigger the favorable terms of the Convention in conjunction with the cast on Price Waterhouse Coopers virtual mandate for cost accounting control, resulted injury to OTE and hence the Greek government, which has been estimated at least 10% of the turnover of trade between the SIEMENS SA and Utility (Most of any consequential damages sought) since at least this amount was over-invoicing of goods sold, excluding even the loss of more than 10% overpricing on the real-market value of products, which came as surplus and unconventional profit funds of SIEMENS. The above loss of 10% related to the void bribes, as evidenced by witnesses reduced to sums million (among remittances of about two (2) million in the private account k.Mafridi the Bank Societe General Private Banking Hellas by 24 -9 to 2002, transfer of six (6) million in the private account in Greece on 28.1.2005). All these practices and deliberate omissions are real indications of the constituent elements described in the provision of Article 256 of the Penal Code the crime of infidelity kakourgimatikis Staff, both in terms of objective, and subjective existence, since at the time arose therefore The administrators of OTE and managers of property, were under an official as described in Article 13 of the Penal Code and Penal Code 263A and OTE is a private entity that serves to prime holding the provision to the public and media communication services. The particular property of OTE, which was trusted to the above managers employees, decreased by several million euros, due to the arbitrary, illegal and immoral "indirect financing of premiums strains Utility" through direct participation of SIEMENS followed by long illegal practice of a yperkostologisis from its services, and the other for payment of premium by the Telephone Company, as trustees during the years INERT deliberately and fraudulently omitted obviously be activate the pro-OTE clauses of the Convention 8002 / 1997 expecting the enjoyment of the surplus from yperkostologisi illegal pecuniary advantage from the famous "black funds" of the company SIEMENS, permitting the company said, obviously knowing them, enjoyed by a super profit by OTE, damaging thus the Greek Government and in general the Greeks citizens. That kind of knowledge do not think it is self-evident, since, besides the fact that it never acted in a real and effective supervision of the implementation of contracts and never have applied the contracted terms, as a matter of course would do any and simple even a business executive if interested in protecting its interests, but also seems to be "open secret" in high business circles, the movement of "black money" from the funds of SIEMENS. Typical is the case, the testimony before the Inquiry Committee k.Kokkali, Chairman of the INTRACOM for several years, inextricably linked in a common place of interest with SIEMENS, who testified that he knew that supplied by SIEMENS OTE Software stock at different prices (price premium) than those charged in Germany interpreting this fact as a logical consequence of a possible illegal bribery policies from SIEMENS (Kokkalis: ... that there were different prices in Germany and very likely were given by SIEMENS Germany black political money from SIEMENS ...). Mr. Kokkalis claimed also to have been charged with respect to the Benchmarking ie comparative regurgitation during the audit. Since the seizure, even files of Mr. Karakostas allegedly specific employee of the company Price Water and Copper, which was given virtual-apparently-ordered by Mr. Vourloumis, had financial transactions in order to alter the details of the alleged costing control. Therefore indicates that OTE's management certainly knew, and after disclosure of the scandal-existence of property damage in OTE, and yet the concealed because it never proceeded to effectively recover and assert true, despite instead suggested a costing a virtual control in order to conceal the damage by presenting out false information of a supposedly fair and lawful management of OTE Under Article 390 CC, as objects in an article in 36 Fri the 2nd N.2172/1993 and objects in again with Article 15 N.3242/24.05.2004 "Anyone with knowledge of damaging property of another, which by law or transaction has custody or administration (total or partial, or only certain acts), punishable by imprisonment of at least three (3) months. If property damage

exceeds the amount of fifteen thousand euros (15.000 ), the offender shall be punished with imprisonment up to ten (10) years. " From this provision shows that the constituent elements of the crime of infidelity to a degree felony is required, although objectively the occurrence of damage to property of third persons, which the offender has the management or custody under the law or act, and deceit and ypokeimenikos particular instant, which is knowledge of the offender in the sense of certainty (thoro-full-secure knowledge-awareness) that the Act, that the act or omission of required action cause damage to property by third Abuse of representative capacity. In consequence of those described above, has now become available or sufficient evidence of guilt, justifying the indictment against the President and CEO of OTE, Panagiotis Vourloumis and Board members for the crime of infidelity to a degree felony, punishable by planned and Articles 26 paragraph 1a, 27 paragraph 2, 45, 390PK, like objects in an article last 36 Fri the 2nd N.2172/1993 and antiques, again with Article 15 of Law 3242/2004, which they committed together, infidelity detected specifically in that, being managers because of their superior properties, property OTE failed to order the action real and effective checks to ascertain if the sales from the company SIEMENS to OTE software and communications material was yperkostologimenes and if so to activate those under the Convention concluded 8002/1997 favorable OTE clauses a) the competitive bid, b) most-favored customer and c) the cost accounting control - record keeping, according to which was provided OTE right to request from SIEMENS revision of the price offered in the above material, which, as mentioned above at least 10% of the actual market value and this is, by most conservative estimates, the amount of 200.000.000 , which is the financial loss of OTE. The above is the Chairman and CEO of OTE and the members thereof, were safe, knowledgeable, aware of prodialiftheisas detrimental to OTE behavior, having been content to conduct formal fancy controls to withhold injury OTE order not activated during the more favorable contract terms. Their knowledge is confirmed by the fact that while the print and electronic media published the scandal, which synetaraxe particularly the nationwide, however, the trustees OTE remained deaf and demonstrate that the criminal conduct that, if and at this stage could order an actual and effective controls to reveal the loss of OTE, the restoration of which they could ask the SIEMENS. The time of that crime arose exikneitai today, after years of crime events at the omission is one in which the arrested those responsible for undertaking the required action (Law Corraface Poin. Law ed. 1978, p. 435, AP790 / 2007, PChr NH-234, AP 1780/2002, PChr NG-693). Note that according to Article 24 paragraph 3 of Law 2298/1995, Article 1 paragraph 1 of N.1608/1950 respect to the crime of infidelity in Article 256 Criminal Code, applies only when the crime is directed against government, local authorities and public entities and not, therefore, is directed against the legal persons mentioned in Article 263A Criminal Code, which include and OTE, which is a private entity (limited company) served with an exclusive and privileged operation providing the public media. Article 263A CC, just broadened the concept of official and not the concept of public property and therefore, the crime of infidelity in the service (Article 256 PC) no evidence, if there is any reduction of property mentioned in this article for legal persons (Ol AP 9 / 1998, PChr MI-883) .-

9 PORISMATIKI REFERENCE: Legal Documentation on Organised Crime According to article 187 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code, which has been replaced with the provision of Article 1 of Law 2928/2001 and supplemented by the provision of Article 11 paragraph 3 of Law 3064/2002 states that: "In prison up to ten (10) years shall be punished whoever set up as a member or part of a structured and sustained action group of three or more

persons to commit more felonies, as provided by Articles 216 paragraph 3, of the Criminal Code (forgery); fraud (Article 386 paragraph 3 of the Penal Code), 374 (aggravated theft "...". This provision provides two crimes, setting up a criminal group (instant offense) and integration to ongoing structured criminal group of new members (permanent crime ). The crime provided that provision is pragmatopages for this reason, members may be replaced or switch between them. For the constituent elements of that crime, the establishment or membership of a criminal group is required to exist between members and active discipline action, it is not necessary and the communication among each other, enough members to perform the delegated tasks to them ', without requiring each member to participate in the formation of criminal activity. The mere agreement of the members, ie the coincidence of wills of members of the commission of certain felonies is not enough because then any form of abetting could be reduced and the sui generis crime of setting up or membership of a structured criminal group. The aim of the perpetrators of these crimes is the systematic perpetration of selected offenses, distinguished for increased anti-social and demerits. For the establishment of a criminal group and development activities of its members are not required all members to act as perpetrators, but can vary the way participation in a criminal action. The perpetrators of these crimes must have intended to commit an unlimited number of felonies, as provided by this provision. The above provision of Article 187 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code was originally established to protect society from terrorist organizations, but also applies to any form of group criminal activity which challenges the civil society and legal order. The duration of the criminal group can not be fixed in advance, may be perpetual, or duration can not be accurately calculated, provided that extends over time. To establish the crime group and membership in it requires at least three persons with the possibility of an increased number of members thereof and rotation of such persons. The purpose of the criminal group should be committing various crimes (like or eteroeidon) with increased social demerits, which are challenging society organizations. The activity of members of criminal group need not be confined within national boundaries, but may extend beyond them, undermining society and the foundations of organized state and economic life of the members of this (state ). For the constituent elements of the crime of the constitution and membership of a criminal group with continuous action is not necessary and the achievement of the objectives to be solemnized crimes, is sufficient to prove the certainty of purpose the termination thereof. In this case punished the willingness of members of criminal group, which made the design of committing a crime or crimes mentioned in this provision, using the existing 'in this (group) oikonomoulikotechnika media (see ref 87/2000 AP PoinDni 3,468, DiatEisEfthes 265/98 Pro. 1999.435, AP 265/2002 Act and the Criminal Law Ratio 2003.223, AP 615/2003 Act and the Criminal Law Ratio 2003.223, AP 402/2004 Act and the Criminal Law Ratio 2004.261, SymvEfATh 3028/2003 PoinChron NE `164, VoulSymvEfATh 1270/2003 Act and Reason Criminal Law 2003 p. 221, AP 33/2006, 48/2006 AP Bank Legal Information Act, VoulSymvEfAig 35/2005 penalty / screen 2005, p. 672, Athanasius Kontaxi EPM. Criminal Law, p. 1629, Mich.. Margaritis, I. Manoledaki , EPM. Penal Code, p. 105, J. Manoledaki, Security and Freedom, p. 103 et seq.) for the constituent elements of the crime of setting up a criminal group and participate in this' minimum required contribution of conceptual features, which refer also to the Palermo Convention (2000), signed by Greece a ') structured group, b') the personal element, which for the formation of the group or membership in an already structured group requires at least three persons and c ') the time element, consisting of duration (life group) and go over time. The association of persons must not be coincidental, but team members must obey the entity, without the participation of all members in the formation of any crime of its members. The simple support of the objectives of the organization does not mean 'need and participation in the group.

The hierarchical dependence of the members among themselves and not a building to commit the criminal purpose of the group, but the existence of this (structure) requires the use of logistical resources for achievement of the objectives of the group. The association to commit a felony, without the need for and the prospect of such time (the union) is a crime gang, referred to provision of Article 187 paragraph 3 of the Criminal Code, which states "Whoever, except in paragraph 1 of this provision, is joined with another to commit a felony, punishable by imprisonment of at least six months." For the constituent elements of the crime of gang requires the association of at least two persons to commit a felony, it is not necessary that (a felony) to include those listed in paragraph 1 of that provision (221/2007 EfThessal Arm 2008.463). The difference between organized crime and gang, can not and should not be running only if the association was set up for continuous or occasional action, but first and foremost on the infrastructure of one or the other. As infrastructure must be understood here not only the existence of hierarchically structured group, and the availability of large sums of money and possession of various technical instruments of any kind, in fact, is not accessible to ordinary gangs. Therefore, the true organized crime, precisely because of its infrastructure, the action of the criminal group acquires great significance (domestic or international), and into the gang's criminal activity, because the infrastructure is also limited and hence the degree of danger of the law is clearly lower (EfThessal 96/2006 PoinDik 2006.412). In this case, a consequence of the unanimous 177/23-08-2010 Porismatikis Reference Examination Board, which was sent to the prosecution and the investigators investigating the case of Siemens, brought further prosecution for the establishment of a criminal organization to commit Crimes of fraud in the case of aggravating Law 608 for abusers of the government, corruption and money laundering activities, not already made lady questioning. Based on our thorough investigation of the Examination Committee, revealed the following: The company SIEMENS, a leader in implementing telecommunication projects, at least the end of November 1990, was developed in Greece, an anonymised system for handling secret payments, through which fees paid to persons eferonto be involved in procurement of government projects were channeled to government officials responsible for awarding the contract to the company, who decided or otherwise assist in the assignment, and thereafter the implementation and acceptance. For the payment of the above-procurement bribery, was a well studied system in terms of company, to be suppressed and the flow of anonymous money. Thus was formed an organized group of initiates officials SIEMENS, which involve both the correspondence, and undertook the release and sending money to their recipients through its regional branches, which operated as autonomous businesses. This group, comprising structured hierarchically and certainly no more than three persons, knowingly formed, and had decided bribery of senior officials, politicians, State Government etc, with continuous action in Greece in November 1990 and until at least 2008, totaling several million euros, calculated the amount of corruption at a rate of 2% for each contract on the cost estimate ("rollover") of workfor politicians, as was the so-called "plan of the parent company ', 8% intended for senior government officials. The intent of the management company, evidenced by the fact that, after the year 1998, established criminal liability for corruption abroad, the system was maintained and continued to function but using special tricks to conceal, since to circumvent the guidelines of the OECD and the eventual control of the authorities, was placed in a special stamp on documents by adding 'receivers are not public servants under the OECD Guidelines' or' recipients are not civil servants in accordance with the Instructions OECD. " And the director of commercial

management, knowing the whole plan bribery abroad and here in our country, after the introduction of criminal liability for corruption abroad, entrusted now to sign the documents on payment to subordinates who acted under the authority of . For handling the funds, were used eferonto companies that provide brokerage services in the execution of contracts, with whom contracts were fictitious, knowing all those involved and for the sole purpose to establish the legitimacy of the outflow of money to end recipients, and other companies through these channeled money from the kept "black funds" to the SIEMENS bribed persons. The above wellorganized plan, accepted and implemented as integrated members of a structured group, as above, and members of the Board and senior management of the SIEMENS SA in Greece, such as Michael Christoforakos, Prodromos Mavridis, etc., who, acting jointly, channeled the "black money" to politicians or senior officials. Indeed, under this plan, the SIEMENS concluded so-called Business Consultant Agreement contracts with companies and Weavind Krhoma, works for "Olympic Games in Athens" and "Olympic Games in Athens C4I" for allegedly providing consultancy services for which these companies would receive fees of EUR 2,000,000 and 1,800,000 to 2,000,000 EUR in each case, respectively, while those foreign companies, such knew everyone involved, was not able to provide these services, nor of course was not the purpose of the agreement, which was to create the money to be disbursed this money and then give their recipients (politicians and officials, as stated above). It is also noted that the seized documents (witness Karakosta) showed involvement intermediaries in the company and OTE PriceWaterHouse which provides instructions for completing inspections of its cost against the Greek government. In this case, all decisions of German courts that, for all contracts concluded with SIEMENS, the Greek state paid for each additional 10% of its value, the signature of the payment orders by the competent organs of the Court Congress, and disbursement of funds from the responsible for this public service employees, who were persuaded to take the above actions by the false representation of facts as true by symvlithenton the above conventions, who, by submitting contract after such other standard documentation for approval and disbursement of expenditure, concealed the amount of "turnover" of the contract was increased by the above 10%, by persuading them that the real and payable value of the work was shown at conventions and documents with the aim of treatments, either in themselves or the company SIEMENS, or other politicians or officials, illegal property debt, consisting of the above value of 10% of the amount of each contract with a corresponding loss of the Greek government. All persons involved at the time were members of a structured group as outlined above, had sustained deceit, extending over time, as far as intended to commit the above offenses for every contract signed or were signed, and final end- pursuit, the illegal taking projects from Siemens and the company making profits of the parent company whether it be against the principles of transparency and fair competition. During the action, moreover, of that organization, was clearly the availability of large funds (EUR million, which were channeled to members, officers and senior government officials, as stated above) but also the possession and use of various techniques and other instruments of any kind, and special tricks (use multiple bank accounts with banks in Greece and abroad, using intermediaries for their movement offshore and creating virtual companies with the sole purpose of channeling the money, bogus entries in the books of the company to disguise the output of black money, and using "models" in order to prevent control of the company by the OECD, namely clearing model, model credit return model), in non-accessible to ordinary gangs, and undoubtedly akin to organized crime.

10TH PORISMATIKI REPORT: Application of international mutual legal assistance to witnesses and searching for the original material in the file According to: a. Convention of the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 20 April 1959 b. the provisions of Articles 48 et seq of the Schengen Agreement which was ratified by Greece with Law 2514/1997 (Government Gazette Issue A 140/27.6.1977) main provisions of Articles 457 of the Greek Code of Criminal Procedure, and d. Article 47ep International UN Convention against Corruption (n.3666/2008) 1. BRIEF HISTORY By unanimous decision of the Plenary of the Hellenic Parliament, under Article 68 paragraph 2 of the Greek Constitution, established Committee of Inquiry "to investigate the whole case is Siemens, to inform the Greek Parliament and the public the truth, to identify and attributed the responsibility to those they belong "and especially to members of the Greek Government from 1989 to 10.04.2009 on the conclusion and performance of contracts by the Greek government and public entities in the Health Sector, The . TE OSE etc. the company Siemens, because the revelations about illegal activities of that company in various countries, including Greece, coupled with complaints or losses relating to our country, mixing political figures, channeling money to political party funds and bribery of government officials and service, from the executives, Michael Christoforakos, Prodromos Mavridis, etc., affect the institutions and erode the foundations of the political system and democracy itself. The Selection Committee in accordance with: a) Article 145 of the Rules of the Greek Parliament has all the powers of the Prosecutor and acting all necessary, at its discretion, investigation to achieve the purpose for which it was created, and the Greek Parliament is solely responsible for prosecuting criminal acts serving or former members of Government, in accordance with Article 86 of the Greek Constitution. b) to Article 147 of that Regulation appointed this year to carry out certain procedural acts, either jointly with members of the Examination Committee, or individually. The inquiries of the Commission of Inquiry to establish the truth, fight corruption, protect the public interest and in general the evidence on these issues may result in criminal convictions of some persons it considers necessary to carry out in the Country you of the following acts, for which international judicial assistance: 2. AITOUMENES EFFECTS A. Backing DIKOGRAFIAS We would like to attend the following members of the Examination Committee of the Greek Parliament and the designated year, either all or some of them on the Munich Prosecutor's office to peruse all documents in the file that was formed and which are linked to the crime behavior of executives of the company Siemens, which promoted the turnover of the company in Greece and official bribing politicians and providing them with relevant copies. B. EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES We would like to give the possibility for the following members of the Examination Committee of the Greek Parliament and in the year, either all or some of them as witnesses to examine them:

1. Michael Kutschenreuter, (Konigswieserst 84a, 81475, Munich, Germany) 2. Reinhard Herbert Siekaczek maiden Siekaczek born on 9.10.1950 in Erding, Germany allegiance, (Am Waldspitz 20b, 81375, Munich, Germany) 3. Michael Christoforakos Greek and German national, (Woerthstrasse 21, 81667 Munich, Germany) 4. Peter Lscher, President of Siemens AG, (Wittelsbacherplatz 2, 80333, Munich, Germany) 5. Peter Y. Solmssen, general manager of Siemens AG, (Wittelsbacherplatz 2, 80333, Munich, Germany) 6. Theo Waigel, Head of Monitor Company Siemens AG, (Wittelsbacherplatz 2, 80333, Munich, Germany) to submit their questions regarding their knowledge of the possible participation of political figures, Greek citizens and officials within the meaning 13 of the Greek Penal Code, the criminal acts of employees of Siemens Company Members of the Examination Committee of the Greek Parliament is as follows 1. Panagiotis Rigas, MP - Vice Chairman of the Examination. 2. Royal Tsonoglou-Vyllioti, MP - Secretary of the Inquiry. 3. Vassilis Kegkeroglou, MP. 4. Panagiotis Glowing, MP. 5. Gregory Apostolakis, MP. 6. Athanasios Pafilis, MP. 7. Dimitrios Papadimoulis, MP. 8. Konstantinos Aivaliotis, MP. EFET has appointed George Christodoulou is the Kingdom. 3. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF REQUEST Executives of the company SIEMENS, sovereign in executing telecom projects, at least the end of November 1999, had developed in Greece, a separate, sealed and anonymised system for handling secret payments, through which fees paid to persons allegedly involved in procurement of government projects were channeled to state officials, who decided or otherwise assist in the assignment, and thereafter the implementation and acceptance. For the payment of the above-procurement bribery, was a well studied system in terms of that company executives to be suppressed and the flow of anonymous money. From our research so far raises serious indications that under this plan: a) SIEMENS AG entered into a so-called Business Consultant Agreement contracts with companies and Weavind Krhoma, works for "Olympic Games in Athens" and "Olympic Games in Athens C4I" for allegedly providing advisory services for which these companies would receive commissions of EUR 2,000,000 and 1,800,000 to 2,000,000 EUR in each case, respectively, while those foreign companies, such knew everyone involved, was not able to provide these services, let alone he was the object of the agreement, which was to create the money to be disbursed this money and then given to recipients, b) for the 8002/1997 program agreement signed between OTE and SIEMENS A.E. and six performers orders numbers 8002/1/15-12-1997, 8002/2/15-11-1999, 8002/3/04-08-2000, 8002/4/07-11-2000, 8002 / 5/18-7-2001 and 8002/6/29-7-2002 worth 692,999,549.59 euro traded lessen this unjust money from executives of Siemens SA executives in OTE SA and political figures. Besides the No. Cs402Js51016/09 district court's decision in Munich shows that for every contract the company signed as commission paid to senior officials, 8% and 2% on political

figures calculated from these rates on the value of each contract with a corresponding loss of the Greek government. To fulfill these nefarious purpose paid by Siemens sums amounting to several million in bank accounts maintained and kept in institutions of Switzerland, Austria, Monaco and other countries members of Siemens SA OTE SA and others. The illegal pecuniary advantage they gained from these activities is quite high, and the legitimacy of the cause irreparable harm to the political and financial system of our country. An effective response to a multifaceted international crime bribery and money requires international cooperation in line with Recommendation Rec (2001) 11, Recommendation No R (88) 18, Law 2656/1988 which ratified the Convention on the combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions, primarily in Greece and Germany, and other States in the common effort to combat contemporary forms of corruption that pervades the healthy competition, stability, trade and overall integrity of the financial system and disrupts the social and political fabric of the country. Moreover, mutual cooperation and joint action in Greece and Germany to combat corruption in public and private sector impose Articles 47ep 10/31/2003 by international convention adopted by the General Assembly and ratified by Greece (n.3666/08) and Germany. In particular, the Inquiry Commission of the Greek Parliament is investigating whether any persons involved, members of the Greek Government in the case under investigation, have committed acts of passive corruption, fraud, infidelity of money laundering and other communities arise during the course of investigations. The above necessary steps, your subscription is necessary to fully elucidate the case since the Commission has not yet become aware of all formed by your service (German judicial authorities) file. Because the procedures of the Examination Committee is very urgent please let us assign a specific date and time no later than September 30, 2010, during which members of the Inquiry and this year will go to Munich to receive copies of the file, to consider the above witnesses and put questions to those who have been summoned for that day. Finally please accept advance express my warmest thanks for your response ready to our request for cooperation and assure you that with such eagerness and care will we respond to any similar your request.

11TH PORISMATIKI REPORT: Determination of estimated damage to public 1. The proxy and power of representation of an entity as a right subject to the general prohibition of Article 281, Civil Code, under which prohibits the exercise of the right, obviously if it exceeds the limits imposed by good faith or morality. Especially in the proxy or power of representation and is consistently recognized as the exercise of the corresponding right and authority to be unfair, when attempted by the attorney or agent acts within the limits of the true power of attorney or power of representation, but is obviously contrary to the interests of the principal detrimental to him or is contrary to the dictates of morality or good faith (Georgiadis, General Principles of Civil Law, 3rd Edition, 2002, 47 et

seq; No. 51 Buoy, General Principles of Civil Law, 4th Edition, 1988, No. 948; Doris, the AK Georgiades / Stathopoulos, Art. 211 No. 15; Deligiannis The proxy in the even us APPLICABLE LAW, 1954, p. 150). As well accepted by the Court, the provisions of Articles 713, 714, 200, 211, 216, 218, 223, 281 and 288 CC concluded that abuse the terms of the proxy or power of representation exists when o dealer or agent acting in such a way that while not exceeding the standard limits of the mandate or power of attorney, but is contrary to the requirement that he (agent or trustee) is to use the power given to him in order to serve in accordance with the requirements of good faith and practices and not to harm the interests of the principal or principal, Member States being required Himself (agent or trustee) to pay the care of a prudent man to trade and thus liable even for slight negligence (AP 34/2002 ChrID 2002, 234 AP 99/2001; ChrID 2001, 794; AP 1609/1991 EllDni 2000, 436). Further, as is unanimously accepted by both theory and case law, if the third party with whom synallachthike representative, knew or should have known of the abuse of power of attorney, the act does not bind the principal pursuant to Articles 229 et seq and 281 DC, where he did not approve (Georgiadis, ibid, No. 53, Doris, ibid; Deligiannis, ibid; AP 34/2002 99/2001 AP ibid; o.p . EfDod 72/1998; Arm 1998, 1331), and in each case and in accordance with Articles 281, 914 and 919 CC and 390 CC, if there is collusion between the agent and the third, in which the agent synallachthike so harm the interests of the principal, based tort liability of both the agent who is abusing the relationship that links him to the principal, and the third, which deals with the agent and acts either intentionally or simply knowing the facts constituting abuse of attorney or mandate (AP 1609/1999 ibid). The above also apply to legal persons regarding the relationship of organic representation, representation or order, which connects the entities with the members of the administration, and this relationship is governed by the same rules as more and more, as required by Article 68 2 CC, apply mutatis mutandis for the representation and the mandate. 2. The Greek state and entities alleged to have suffered direct damage and suffered estimated on at least 10% of turnover for each contract between SIEMENS and the Greek government, which was estimated in the costing of the project and the overall budget , and eventually passed to the Convention, which was paid in each case by the contractor Siemens, which of course is not spent huge sums annually to reduce but to increase its revenues. The exact determination of injury, both positive and as consequential, suffered by the Greek state and the entities apparently exceed the estimated amount of Euro 2.000.000.000,00 necessitating an expert in accordance with Article 183KPoiDik in the that 'if required expertise certain science or art for an accurate diagnosis and present an event to the investigating officers may own motion or on application by a party to order an expert. " As shown in the file has not yet ordered an expert nor OTE, nor for C4I, but neither has been requested by the Greek Government and the involved entities, eg OTE, although it has sufficient time elapsed from the disclosure of the scandal. Nor is an action so far by the Greek state in which according to Article 368KPolDik ff "The court must appoint experts if requested by a party and decides that they need specific knowledge of science or art. Consequently, the damage can be accurately determined both during the criminal proceedings and civil proceedings, if and when an action by the Greek government or legal persons.

12 PORISMATIKI REPORT: Application of international mutual legal assistance for the definition of the transition year Christodoulos in Munich Prosecutor Considering the last letter of the Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection of Bavaria you that the Commission of Inquiry investigating the period from 1989 to October 4, 2009: i. lessen this unjust if channeled money to members of the Greek Government and senior officials in the interests of the consortium contract SAIC, whose work was ypokataskefastria SIEMENS, with the Ministry of Defence for the supply and delivery of the C4I Olympic Security System ii. lessen this unjust if traded cash to members of the Greek Government and to senior officials and employees of OTE SA, under the Programmatic Agreement 8002, signed on 15/12/1997 between OTE SA SIEMENS and in the supply of materials, software and services for the digitization of the network of OTE in the implementation of this framework agreement six (6) orders, ie No. 8002/1/15-12-1997, 8002/2/15-11-1999, 8002/3/04-08-2000, 8002/4/07-11-2000, 8002/5/18-07-2001 and 8002/6/29-07-2002, total amount of 692,999,549.59 euros iii. lessen this unjust if traded cash to members of the Greek Government and senior officials for the sake of other conventions of the Greek government and legal persons of the company SIEMENS, as evidenced by the decisions of German courts, namely the: No. 5 KLs 563 Js 45994/07 decision of the Court Munich I, under 'Cs402 Js 3913/09 decision of the district court Munich, 563 Js 45415/05 report examining the witness on oath BERNSAU HANS-WALTER before the Munich prosecutor, according to which the company paid SIEMENS 8% and 2% on political figures net of these amounts to the value of each contract with a corresponding loss of the Greek government. The testimony of witnesses necessary for the completion of our investigation because of their position in the company SIEMENS. The examination of witnesses will be conducted by a German prosecutor, in accordance with Article 4 of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance April 20, 1959, in the presence of members of the Selection Committee and the Executive this year, written questions will be sent by the Commission of Inquiry in the above Attorney before by the time examination. The Examination Committee of the House decided to go its appointed George Christodoulou this year in Munich in order to provide the necessary consultations with the Prosecutor of Munich: i. to regulate procedural matters and organization of the upcoming transition step of the Examination Committee in Munich ii. to clarify the prosecutors conducting the investigation in the matter of making knowledge of the contents of the file in the part relating to Greece, according to what is specifically mentioned in the request for judicial assistance. As the Selection Committee for the completion of the project has tight deadlines please specify directly the designated time changeover this year in the Munich Public Prosecutor for achieving the above objective, as well as the time for the transition of members of the Selection Committee.

13H PORISMATIKI REPORT: Application of international mutual legal assistance for obtaining copies of the file by the Munich Prosecutor By unanimous decision of the Plenary of the Hellenic Parliament, under Article 68 paragraph 2 of the Greek Constitution, established Committee of Inquiry "to investigate the whole case is

Siemens, to inform the Greek Parliament and the public the truth, to identify and attributed the responsibility to those they belong "and especially to members of the Greek Government from 1989 to 10.04.2009 on the conclusion and performance of contracts by the Greek government and the wider public sector company Siemens, because revelations about illegal activities of that company in various countries, including Greece, coupled with complaints or losses relating to our country, mixing political figures, channeling money to political party funds and bribery of government officials and service strains, affecting their institutions and erode the foundations of the political system and democracy itself. The Commission of Inquiry on the investigation finds that there is strong evidence to commit crime in order to: a) the commission of crimes of passive and active corruption, b) fraud against the Greek government and the Legal Persons with aggravating circumstances Law 1608/1950 for the abusers of the State, c) money laundering a criminal activity that violated articles 235, 236, 285, 386 paragraph 3, 390, 187 paragraph 1 of the Penal Code and Articles 1, 2 and 4 of Law 2331/95. In particular the company's executives SIEMENS AG knowingly formed a group of hierarchically structured and composed in any case more than three (3) persons and decided and carried out, for the benefit of the above company, bribery of senior officials, politicians, members of Government KL am, with continuous action in Greece in November 1998 and at least until 2008, amounting to several million, estimated the amount of corruption at a rate of 2% for each individual contract - on the cost estimate (turnover) of the project, for political persons as required by the so-called "plan of the parent company" and 8% intended for senior government officials. The injury allegedly suffered by the Greek State from the above criminal activity exceed two dissekatommyrion (2 billion euros). The commission of a crime is supported by the reasoning of the decisions of German courts and confirmed by the deposit of 26.10.2010 Sichatsek Rechart before you. To ascertain the truth becomes necessary to grant the requested copies of all the file formed by the Prosecutor of Munich and in particular given us copies of following documents: 1. Debevoice report in its entirety. 2. The documents referred to as a relative two (2) the examination report from 7.12.2006 to Kutschnreuter in Munich I Public Prosecutor (see 10587-06/LW/3.4.2008 and No. PPP. 126 AR 1594-1508). 3. Requests for judicial assistance by the German authorities to the authorities of Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Monaco, Liechtenstein and their responses to relevant documents. 4. Documents from the German authorities on the opening and opening of bank accounts of executives of the company SIEMENS SA who traded the black Funds lessen this unjust money to commit illegal acts in order to conclude contracts and undertake projects and procurement in Greece. Finally, any other evidence that demonstrates the flow of black money and the ultimate beneficiaries, with a view to concluding agreements with the Greek State and Law of the People. The granting of the above copies are necessary to fully elucidate the case and deal with a diverse cross-border criminal activity, bribery, fraud and money laundering in the joint effort of the two states, Greece - Germany to fight the corruption that erodes healthy competition, stability in trade and the integrity of the financial system. Finally please accept again our heartfelt thanks for your response ready to our request for cooperation and assure you that with such eagerness and care will we respond to any similar

your request.

14TH PORISMATIKI REFERENCE: administrative fines In a survey conducted by the Examination Committee of the House in relation to the known case SIEMENS, came to light under which brought further prosecution on 07/09/2010 to establish the criminal organization of Article 187 of the Penal Code . to commit the offenses of active and passive bribery, money laundering and criminal activity and fraud in aggravated circumstances of the Law on abusers of the State, against both strains of the company SIEMENS, and other persons involved. Specifically: The company SIEMENS, a leader in implementing telecommunication projects, at least the end of November 1990, was developed in Greece, an anonymised system for handling secret payments, through which fees paid to persons eferonto be involved in procurement of government projects were channeled to government officials responsible for awarding the contract to the company, who decided or otherwise assist in the assignment, and thereafter the implementation and acceptance. For the payment of the above-procurement bribery, was a well studied system in terms of company, to be suppressed and the flow of anonymous money. Thus was formed an organized group of initiates officials SIEMENS, which involve both the correspondence, and undertook the release and sending money to their recipients through its regional branches, which operated as autonomous businesses. This group, comprising structured hierarchically and certainly no more than three persons, knowingly formed, and had decided bribes maximum officials, politicians, members of governments, etc., with continuous action in Greece in November 1990 and at least until 2008, amounting to several million, calculated the amount of corruption at a rate of 2% for each contract on the cost estimate ("rollover" ) work-for politicians, as was the so-called "plan of the parent company ', 8%, intended for senior government officials. The intent of the management company, evidenced by the fact that, after the year 1998, established criminal liability for corruption abroad, the system was maintained and continued to function but using special tricks to conceal, since to circumvent the guidelines of the OECD and the eventual control of the authorities, was placed in a special stamp on documents by adding 'receivers are not public servants under the OECD Guidelines' or' recipients are not civil servants in accordance with the Instructions OECD. " And the director of commercial management, knowing the whole plan bribery abroad and here in our country, after the introduction of criminal liability for corruption abroad, entrusted now to sign the documents on payment to subordinates who acted under the authority of . For handling the funds, were used eferonto companies that provide brokerage services in the execution of contracts, with whom contracts were fictitious, knowing all those involved and for the sole purpose to establish the legitimacy of the outflow of money to end recipients, and other companies through these channeled money from the kept "black funds" to the SIEMENS bribed persons. The above well-organized plan, accepted and implemented as integrated members of a structured group, as above, and members of the Board and senior management of the SIEMENS SA in Greece, such as Michael Christoforakos, Prodromos Mavridis, etc., who, acting jointly, channeled the "black money" to politicians or senior officials.

Indeed, under this plan, the SIEMENS concluded so-called Business Consultant Agreement contracts with companies and Weavind Krhoma, works for "Olympic Games in Athens" and "Olympic Games in Athens C4I" for allegedly providing consultancy services for which these companies would receive fees of EUR 2,000,000 and 1,800,000 to 2,000,000 EUR in each case, respectively, while those foreign companies, such knew everyone involved, was not able to provide these services, nor of course was not the purpose of the agreement, which was to create the money to be disbursed this money and then give their recipients (politicians and officials, as stated above). In this case, all decisions of German courts that, for all contracts concluded with SIEMENS, the Greek state paid for each additional 10% of its value, the signature of the payment orders by the competent organs of the Court Congress, and disbursement of funds from the responsible for this public service employees, who were persuaded to take the above actions by the false representation of facts as true by symvlithenton the above conventions, who, by submitting contract after such other standard documentation for approval and disbursement of expenditure, concealed the amount of "turnover" of the contract was increased by the above 10%, by persuading them that the real and payable value of the work was shown at conventions and documents with the aim of treatments, either in themselves or the company SIEMENS or other politicians or officials, illegal property debt, consisting of the above value of 10% of the amount of each contract with a corresponding loss of the Greek government. Always be deduced: a) the No. F.092.22/1746 decision of the Court Munich I, b) No. F.092.22/4880 decision of the district court of Munich, c) No. F092.22/4816 examination report witness BERNSAU HANSWALTER before the Public Prosecutor of Munich, which literally reads: "But then reached basic agreement with this figure of 2% and then by the next time the exact amount, which took Mr. Christoforakos calculated from the field ON ... "By letter of 01/18/2010 VOLKER JUNG, which explicitly states that:" ... Unfortunately, my colleagues at Siemens was responsible for controlling all commercial activities were those who urged the system of bribery in the Siemens ... . The ascertainment of the truth a crime related to multi-faceted nature inextricably tied to economic crime, the corruption, money laundering and fraud, requires the formulation of a common national strategy in principle, the unity of the legislative, executive and judicial function without flexing the independence of one over the other, as specified in the Constitution. From the nature of organized crime is a crime polyprakto that the economic strength, international links and its sophisticated techniques, constitutes a serious threat to the institutions in society, the legitimacy and democracy. Furthermore, organized crime related to corruption in public life and money laundering, not only national identity but a common problem at least the Member States of Europe, under the general policy against crime the Council of Europe accordance with the requirements of the Statute, a host of decisions - the recommendations already in the year 1949 until now to combat crime and the proper selection and formulation of relevant measures in all areas may develop a criminal policy and particularly in legal cooperation (in criminal law, the management of criminal justice, international cooperation on extradition, mutual legal assistance, etc.). Because it is obvious that officials and employees of the company Siemens, energisantes in the ways set out above, formed a cross-border criminal organization to commit felonies and misdemeanors against the Greek government.

Because the above acts were committed in Greece, in so far, regardless of where the decision was taken, location of crime and acts were in our country. Because or any contract signed by the Greek State, or each of all contracts signed by each entity separately with SIEMENS (eg OSE, OTE, hospitals) should be imposed as below the projected fined by law. Because the provision of Article 41 of Law 3251/2004 as in force after its amendment to Article tenth N.3875/2010, FEK 158/20.9.2010, defined as follows: "Article 41 Liability of legal persons 1. If any of the crimes of Articles 187 and 187A of the Penal Code solemnized by or for the benefit or account of a legal person by a natural person acting either individually or as an organ of the legal person and has a leading position within the power of representation on the basis or authority for taking decisions on behalf of or exercising control within that are imposed on legal persons by joint decision of the Minister of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights Minister Citizen Protection cumulatively or alternatively, the following sanctions: i. administrative fine of fifty thousand (50,000) million to five million (5,000,000) euro, ii. permanent or temporary for a period of one month to two years of revocation or suspension of authorization or prohibition of business activity iii. prohibition of certain business or establishment of branches or increase the share capital, for the same period, iv. permanent or temporary for the same period of exclusion from public benefits, aid, grants, assignments and services, supplies, advertising and contests the State or legal entities of the public sector. The administrative fine point i always apply, regardless of other penalties. 2. These sanctions are imposed and when one of the crimes referred to in Article 187 paragraph 1 of the Penal Code committed by a criminal organization for the legal person, to blame any of those mentioned in the previous paragraph individuals. 3. When the lack of supervision or control by a natural person referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible the commission of lower rank officer of any of the offenses listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 by or for the benefit or account of a legal person is punishable by a legal person, aggregate or alternatively, the following sanctions: administrative fine of ten thousand (10,000) million to one million (1,000,000) euro, the projected points ii, iii and iv, for up to six months. 4. For the cumulative or disjunctive penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs and the measurement of such penalties shall be determined from the gravity of the violation, the degree of culpability, the financial standing of the legal person and any recurrence. No penalty may be imposed without prior summons of the legal representatives of the legal person to give explanations. The call is communicated to the interested party at least ten full days before the day of the hearing. Moreover, the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 6 of Law 2690/1999 (Code of Administrative Procedure) (Gazette 45 A '). 5. The provisions of the previous paragraphs are independent of the civil, disciplinary or criminal liability reported in these individuals. 6. Prosecutors and police authorities inform the Minister of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights in cases where there is involvement of a legal person within the meaning of paragraphs 1 to 3, in the commission of crimes of Articles 187 and 187A of the Penal Code and issued for the relevant judicial decisions. " Because, under those provisions as a Commission of Inquiry, we have an obligation to inform you (in paragraph 6 of this article), the present case, where there is involvement of the legal

person of the company Siemens (notably both the Greek subsidiary SIEMENS, and the parent and resides in Germany, Siemens) in the commission of crimes under Article 187 of the Penal Code Because, under the described by the foregoing provisions of responsibilities, you should pursuant to the provisions of this section, be imposed by common your decision, the entity above the legal penalties, as an explicit forecast of more above the law, is absolutely independent of the civil, disciplinary or criminal responsibility of individuals involved.

15 PORISMATIKI REFERENCE: Violation of the rules of free competition In a survey, conducted by the Examination Committee of the House in relation to the known case SIEMENS, came to light against which brought further prosecution on 07/09/2010 to establish the criminal organization of Article 187 of the Penal Code . to commit the offenses of active and passive bribery, money laundering and criminal activity and fraud in aggravated circumstances of the Law on abusers of the State, against both strains of the company SIEMENS, and other persons involved. Specifically: The company SIEMENS, a leader in implementing telecommunication projects, at least the end of November 1990, was developed in Greece as an anonymised system for handling secret payments, which, through commissions, which are paid to persons eferonto be involved in procurement of government projects were channeled to government officials responsible for awarding the contract to the company, who decided or otherwise assist in the assignment, and thereafter the implementation and acceptance. For the unfair distribution of money, was a well studied system in terms of company, to be suppressed and the flow of anonymous money. This group, comprising structured hierarchically and certainly no more than three persons, knowingly formed, and had decided bribery of senior officials, politicians, State Government etc, with continuous action in Greece in November 1990 and until at least 2008, totaling several million euros, calculated the amount of corruption at a rate of 2% for each contract on the cost estimate ("rollover") of work-for politicians, as was the so-called "plan of the parent company ', 8% intended for senior government officials. The fault of the company's executives proved by the fact that, after the year 1998, established the charges for corruption abroad, the system was maintained and continued to function but using special tricks to conceal, since, for To circumvent the OECD Guidelines and the eventual control of the authorities, was placed in a special stamp on documents by adding 'receivers are not public servants under the OECD Guidelines' or' recipients are not civil servants in accordance with OECD Guidelines '. The above well-organized plan, accepted and implemented as integrated members of a structured group, as stated above, senior executives of the parent company SIEMENS, and the SIEMENS SA in Greece, such as Michael Christoforakos, Prodromos Mavridis, etc., who, acting jointly, channeled the "black money" to politicians or senior officials. In particular, all decisions of German Courts shows that for all contracts concluded by the Greek State SIEMENS paid for each additional 10% of its value, the signature of the payment orders by the competent organs of the Court and disbursement of funds from the responsible for this public service employees, who were persuaded to take the above actions by the false representation of facts as true by symvlithenton the above contracts. The above, by submitting such contracts with the other standard documentation for approval and disbursement of

expenditure, concealed the amount of "turnover" of the contract was increased by the above 10%, by persuading them that the real value and payable work was shown at conventions and documents, with a view to curing the company SIEMENS illegal pecuniary advantage in the form of speculative commercial benefit, consisting of the above value of 10% of the amount of each contract with a corresponding loss of the Greek government, after holding the total share capital of OTE, and thus damaged the Greek people and consumers. And so, given that OTE bought proven more expensive than existing current market prices of telecommunications equipment in relation to other countries due to the unfair distribution of money from the company Siemens, the contract premium or otherwise in super profit of Siemens matakyliotan Greek consumers and the general public, because they eventually called "pay" the amount recommended by the above profit. During the action, moreover, of that organization, was clearly the availability of large funds (EUR million, which were channeled to members, executives and senior Government officials, as stated above) but also the possession and use of various techniques and other instruments of any kind, and special tricks (use multiple bank accounts with banks in Greece and abroad, using intermediaries for their movement offshore and creating shell companies with the sole purpose of channeling the money, bogus entries in the books of the company to disguise the output of black money, and using "models" in order to prevent control of the company by the OECD, namely clearing model, model credit return model), in non-accessible to ordinary gangs, and undoubtedly akin to organized crime. As examples, have been identified as remitted by the parent company of the following amounts: a) remitted (in 1998) from SIEMENS AG Deutschland in no. 830,026 savings account under the name "Samos" kept by the Elias Georgiou, a credit institution RAIFFEISENVRBAND SALZUBURG (Country Austria), the amount of 1,500,000 German marks (DEM), b) remitted (in 1998) from the SIEMENS AG Deutschland no. 884,130 current account with the name "NICK", maintained the STAVRIANOS Emmanuel in that institution, the amount of 1,000,000 German marks (DEM), c) remitted by SIEMENS AG Deutschland (on 05.17.2001 and 5 -2 to 2002) to no. 6185524/17.264.840, 61855/14.858.393 6179527/17.264.920 and deposit accounts, which kept the Baptist Mavridis in that institution, the amounts of 1,350,000 and 950,000 euro, and the amounts of 3,000,000 and 5,500 .000 euros, d) remitted by SIEMENS AG Deutschland in no. 835,835 savings account called "FRANZ", maintained the SKARPELIS George in that institution, various sums of money [as the amount of 2,500,000 German mMarkon (DEM) on 02.17.1998, the amount of 1,000,000 DEM (DEM) on February 10, 2000, the amount of 1,000,000 German marks (DEM) on February 10, 2000, the amount of 1,500,000 German marks (DEM) on December 21, 2000, and the amount of 1,500,000 German DEM (DEM) on May 17, 2001] e) remitted from the "black funds" offshore companies TAMARAIND GROUP CORPORATION, BFA GLOBAL ADVISOR LLC and FIBERLITE LLC, which had opened and funded by SIEMENS AG Deutschland, during the period of years 2003-2006, the decision no .11.24.854 bank account maintained by the offshore company PLACID BLUE CORPORATION the Bank ABN AMRO BANK NV, branch of Monaco, and funds of many million. It is noteworthy that the sole director and financial beneficiary of the Society of English Virgin Islands PLACID BLUE CORPORATION is George Kaldis Christopher's (resident in Athens, street Athanasios Diakos 64-Kifissia, year born. 1952, Entrepreneur), which maintained friendly relations Mr. Michael Christoforakos. The above account was opened on 20.2.2001,in consultation and collaboration of George Kaldis, Michael and Alexander Christoforakos Lecce Frixos-Nicolas (resident of Athens, street swallows 3 - Kifissia, year born. 1957, Mechanical), with the sole purpose remitted by SIEMENS AG Deutschland (at the request of Michael Christoforakos) 2% of the total turnover of SIEMENS Com Greece, which is then used according to the claims of Michael Christoforakos, to fund "political parties" in Greece, f)

remitted by the SIEMENS AG Deutschland (SIEMENS Germany ) during the period of the years 1993-2003 to 480 028 .0230 decision no bank account at UBS Zurich bank funds several million. This account was opened, were nominated by the Elias Demetriou Georgiou and Negri, the Kon / nou (resident of Athens, street Ilidos 12-Ampelokipi gen.1941 year, retired) in the name of Antonia Mark John (resident of Athens, street Solomou 10 - N. Eritrea), but by proxy of the latter was used exclusively by Elias George and for his own benefit. All persons involved at the time were members of the described structured group had sustained deceit, extending over time, as far as intended to commit the above offenses for every contract signed or were signed, and final end- pursuit, the illegal taking projects from Siemens and the company making profits of the parent company using illegal but also immoral methods and deceptive practices, which constitute flagrant breach of morality, are not contrary to the principles of transparency and fair easy and free competition within the meaning of Articles 81 and 82 TEC and Article 2 of Law 703/1997, as amended by n.3438/2006 "On the control of monopolies and oligopolies and the protection of free competition." Legal Documentation Specifically, under Article 2 of n.703/1977: "No subject of one or more firms exploited abuse of a dominant position them on all or part of the market in the country. Such abusive exploitable may include its own: a) in the direct or indirect constraints for the establishment of either the purchase or selling prices or other unreasonable trading conditions; b) to restrict the production, consumption or technological development, to the detriment of consumers, c) applying dissimilar to the conditions of self-equivalent transactions themselves to undue their refusal sales, purchases or other transactions, so companies tines are made to meionektikin since been incapable of competition, d) at the exartisin the award by its policyholders rather than accepting additional benefits, the award additional contracts century calamity, by the nature of or in accordance with his commercial practice, are not connected after the subject of contracts of them." Analysis of the concept of dominance Company The violation of Article 2 of law 703/77 requires the principle of dominance in the market, but the law define or describe this position. The concept of dominance was primarily case-law both at EU and at national level, which followed the EU practice. In particular, it was considered that an undertaking has a dominant position, where he holds a position of economic power gives it the potential to impede effective competition in the market and the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers. Meaning, that is, not the subjective intent, nor the real impediment to competition, but the objective possibility of such an obstruction. The finding of individual dominance depends on the combination of several factors: a) the market share of the company, b) the share of other competitors in the same relevant market and the degree of vertical integration, c) legal or factual barriers to entry of other competitors in relevant market and others who (actors), if considered separately, not necessarily a sufficient condition for dominance, but when combined together, lead to the creation of (EfAth 283/2005). Furthermore, the EA decision 429/2009 specifies the abuse of dominant position (Article 2 of Law 703/1977) stating that in Article 2 of n.703/1977 dominant position is deemed to have a company that enjoys such an economic position, which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained and offers the possibility of independent over its competitors,

customers or consumer behavior (see, inter alia, Competition Commission, Decision 317/V/2006, of 28.07.2006, Ibid, VII) B) b), where references to earlier decisions of the Competition Commission and ECJ, Case 14-2-1978, United Brands v. Commission, Case. 27/76, Special Editions. Greek. Coll page 75, paragraph 65). For the affirmation of a dominant position in the sense set out above, shall, in particular the size of the business and specific market share held by the company. Moreover, the ECJ has noted that, although the importance of market shares can vary from one market to another, could reasonably be regarded as very high market shares are in themselves, apart from exceptional cases, evidence of the dominance (See ECJ, Case 13-2-1979, Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission, Case. 85/76, Special Editions. Greek. ECR p. 215, paragraphs 41 et seq.) Moreover, in accordance with the settled law of the Competition Commission, an enterprise in a dominant position when it has the power to conduct independent and this independence allows it to act without concern for the competitors, buyers or suppliers. The Court of Justice in United Brands case established the dominant position as the 'position of economic strength enjoyed by an enterprise and enables them to prevent effective competition is maintained in the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and end consumers "(RD 317/2006). On this basis, the dominant position a firm consists of one part on the ability of business to behave independently and partly in company's ability to prevent competition in the market. Independent firm's behavior may be present when the competition does not work for this (the dominant) and its behavior is not determined solely or primarily by the market, and furthermore the company has a real opportunity to influence unilaterally the conditions competition in the relevant market or to impede effective competition in all or part of this market. The dominance and abuse of the company Siemens & executives The company Siemens and its officers, organized in a criminal group, as described in Article 187 of the Penal Code, formed an organized tabs mechanism of long-term and systematic action, reinforced with unfair and deceptive methods in the dominant position the company as well proceeded to abuse its dominant position alonontas the market and distorting free competition through the unfair distribution of money. Specifically, it is undeniable that the company Siemens and has been dominant, the crucial question of the Greek market share held, giving the ability to impede effective competition in telecommunications and security and the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers. Detail as to the coverage criteria for the affirmation of individual dominant position of Siemens in the Greek market, found that: a) it has the largest market share in the telecommunications and security fields, b) the share of other competitors in the same relevant market and the degree of vertical integration is significantly less value and scope, c) put real barriers to entry of other competitors in the market to the unfair distribution of money through organized crime organization formed, formed and attended by executives. From the above it is clear there is no doubt about the existence of a dominant position of Siemens in the Greek market and the consequent abuse of dominant position. Moreover, the dominant position which Siemens had allowed it to hinder the maintenance of effective competition and offer the possibility of independent over its competitors, customers or consumer behavior.

Thus, the company Siemens, through the unfair distribution of money since at least 1998 until 2008, ie by using these illegal methods and deceptive practices in the context and to meet the well-organized criminal plan of illegal payments and commissions, exploited abused its dominant market position, hit the core of healthy and unfettered market competition violating every sense of both morality and business ethics, and further violation of Article 5 of the Constitution and Article 1 of Law 146/1914. With the movement of the upper nefarious money and providing additional subsidies to the then Deputy Minister of Transport Anastasios Mandela, aiming to conclude harmful to the Greek government contracts, the company Siemens has become a dominant not only in the field of telecommunications in our country but also in other key areas such as security through its subsidiaries, Siemens Greece Tileviomichaniki and obviously cooperating with these companies, sacked the market and then, with this unfair advantage of its dominant position, has prevented the healthy, free and unfettered competition as the these areas of business, economic activity and investment. With the practice of illegal donations, monopolized almost all contracts, forcing the contractor directly Greek government to accept the market price or service itself, the company unilaterally imposed, but the already concluded contracts prevented the activation of the clauses, particularly in As regards competition, the provision of competitive bidding and other terms of most-favored customer and so on, thus preventing back free competition. Specifically, in OTE after the contract had been concluded, clauses a. CLAUSE COMPETITIVE BID whereby if the Buyer (OTE) take good faith best offer by certified Houses Telecommunication Hardware and Software (...) and the comparative value of supply over the technical specifications , the offered features, quality, quantity (...) is more favorable than the vendor (Siemens), then the Buyer has the right to ask the vendor to revise these terms. b. clause most-favored client that guarantees equal treatment in terms of price / quality compared to any other customer in the European Union or in countries associated with it. Specifically in terms of the C4I, the Siemens and had to execute the contract as a single functional group, though members or executives, exploiting its dominant position it held in the Greek market which is the result of illegal and applied fraudulent practices-conceived plan for provisional acceptance of C4I, which, although it should by nature be delivered as a single, interoperable set up the 19th of May, not only delivered to the designated date, but has achieved company a temporary receipt, promising to deliver the turnkey project again at a later date. The officers arrested the Siemens project, namely the removal in two different times - and implemented, taking advantage of abused its dominant position the company in this market, which holds the "lion's share" as a formidable economic power and because the monopolistic supremacy, but the fact of "hostage" in which they were deliberately periagagei the Greek government, and to meet the longer unilaterally tethentes conditions due to the short time limits that were truly the most barriers to entry of other competitors in this project so to render impossible any thought to terminate the contract. So years later, this project has not yet been delivered as a single, interoperable set of the company Siemens, which was a subcontractor of the project on bail, accounting severally at the operating company SAIC (for which was the first project in Europe) . H Siemens was responsible for the supply and commissioning of individual systems, C4I, among them there were many central and regional command centers, the traffic management system and video surveillance of streets and places of holding the Games, the central control

system access, communication networks, ie the system TETRA, the Olympic wireless network security with 22000 participants, the automatic vehicle tracking system and implement a Ticket Call Center - information and communication system, which was able to take calls 24 hours in various languages from around the world. Siemens's share in this work was finished in 183 million euros with the possibility of later extensions. And his execution took ICN sector of Siemens. The project C4I, would serve well for marketing and other projects that would later become. A precondition for this, however, was the successful integration. Because of time pressure on the commission of the Olympic Games and for their safety, the C4I delivered, as mentioned above, temporarily. The above exception was one way because of the dominance of Siemens, which was improperly exploited, as described above, even in the sensitive field of security and telecommunications. After the performance, also the Olympic Games, although it was again agreed that the project would be delivered to poison day as a whole, the company's executives, exploiting again the dominant monopoly now in this position, captured the new Draft the partial delivery and reception of individual works of C4I, apparently influencing those responsible for the receipt of public officials who are still not activated the clause in the contract under which the State was entitled to be supplied by third and charge accordingly the SAIC-ie again unfairly prevented the action of free competition. Moreover, the two companies involved in that contract, Siemens and SAIC, apparently were in agreement karteliki Article 29 paragraph 1 of law 703/77 to comb. with Article 81 para 1 TEC, at least in the form of a concerted practice in conducting competitions to award the contract, and thus acted as a catalyst in determining the value of the C4I project in total exclusion of other competitors, since they had prosynennoithei to participate in competitions for both tenders and for the project, from which Siemens, although not declared lowest bidder, has finished the execution of 80% therefore, that in fact the whole of it. Moreover, as mentioned above, for all contracts concluded by SIEMENS with the Greek government revealed that the latter paid for each 10% of turnover, with the signing of the payment orders by the competent organs of the Court, and disbursement amounts from responsible officials in this government, who were persuaded to take the above actions by the false representation of facts as true by symvlithenton the above contracts, which, through the submission of such conventions with the other standard documents for approval and disbursement of expenditure, concealed the amount of "turnover" of the contract was increased by the above 10%. This convinced them that the real and payable value of the work was shown at conventions and documents, with a view to curing the company SIEMENS illegal pecuniary advantage in the form of speculative commercial benefit, consisting of the above value of 10% of the amount of each

1. "E" (f)) to impose fines on undertakings or associations of undertakings which committed the infringement. "" If the Competition Commission speculates, during a survey carried out either automatically or at the request of the Minister of Development or termination, breach of paragraph 1 of Article 1, Article 2 and paragraph 5 of Article 4 of this Law or Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community may decide to accept, on behalf of businesses or associations of undertakings, commitments to cease the alleged infringement, and make those commitments binding on undertakings or associations. The decision may be issued for a specified time when it is probable that there are no grounds for further action. The Commission may, upon application to any interested party or ex officio, to reopen the procedure

if: there was a substantial change in the facts on which the decision was based or the undertakings concerned act contrary to their commitments or decision based on incomplete, inaccurate or misleading information provided by the companies involved. The Competition Commission determines, in its decision, the terms, conditions and procedure for accepting commitments from interested firms or joint ventures. " 2. In the previous section imposed or threatened fines can reach up to fifteen percent (15%) of gross income of the business of the year in which the infringement ceased, or, if this continues until the decision of current use or previous use of the infringement, respectively. "In determining the fine should be taken into account the severity and duration of the infringement. The in the previous section provided a fine amounting to the amount of "$ 10,000" ** for each day of delay compliance with the decision and the date appointed by the decision. "If a fine is imposed on an association of undertakings, threatened or imposed a fine may amount up to fifteen percent (15%) of gross revenues of States, current or previous use of the infringement." Because we think that there are many indications that the company Siemens, applying for a long period (1992-2009) illegal tactics to obstruct free competition, both in Greece and abroad, consisting in secret agreements, channel black money, along with the deception global organizations to cover up such acts as the OECD and the Greek government, which damaged and too-at least 2 billion euros, directly violated the provisions of both domestic and Community law designed to protect free competition, as developed above. Since, moreover, the company Siemens, applying these illegal and harmful to free competition practices of a host of contracts concluded with both the Greek government and with public entities (including hospitals), but also legal persons of the general government sector (as Trains OTE), signing contracts almost every year, continually violated during the period mentioned above, with particular devices, such as the manipulation of the procurement and to disguise the methods, but with particular emphasis in relation to the impact has arisen, the above provisions, we believe that the tactics is the culmination of corruption and the interweaving of circumvention of any notion of transparency that must govern public procurement. For these reasons Please, in the described by the above rules your duties, enforce the legal sanctions.

16TH PORISMATIKI REFERENCE: porismatiki Additional reporting abuse of power According to the 179/24-08-2010 Porismatiki our report, brought further prosecution for the establishment of a criminal organization to commit fraud, money laundering and criminal activity, active and passive bribery. In the void that prosecution, the criminal organization allegedly set up an organized group of initiates employee-company executives SIEMENS, who apparently worked for the benefit of, for and at the behest of the parent company SIEMENS AG. However, although from a variety of evidence, which were adopted by both German courts and by the Greek judicial authorities, that the injury suffered against the Greek government, Done with corresponding interests of the parent company SIEMENS AG, but by Today, the judicial actions that have occurred, they moved to a different direction, namely the disengagement of the parent company, ignoring the more evident in the orchestration of organized crime by senior executives of the latter.

Specifically: The company SIEMENS, a leader in implementing telecommunication projects, at least the end of November 1990, was developed in Greece, an anonymised system for handling secret payments, which, through commissions, which are paid to persons eferonto be involved in contracting government projects were channeled to government officials responsible for awarding the contract to the company, who decided or otherwise assist in the assignment, and thereafter the implementation and acceptance. For the payment of the above-procurement bribery, was a well studied system in terms of company, to be suppressed and the flow of anonymous money. Thus was formed an organized group of initiates officials SIEMENS, which involve both the correspondence, and undertook the release and sending money to their recipients through its regional branches, which operated as autonomous businesses. This group, comprising structured hierarchically and certainly no more than three persons, knowingly formed, and had decided bribery of senior officials, politicians, State Government etc, with continuous action in Greece in November 1990 and until at least 2008, totaling several million euros, calculated the amount of corruption at a rate of 2% for each contract on the cost estimate ("rollover") of work-for politicians, as was the so-called "plan of the parent company ', 8% intended for officials. The fault of the company's executives proved by the fact that, after the year 1998, established the charges for corruption abroad, the system was maintained and continued to function but using special tricks to conceal, since, for To circumvent the OECD Guidelines and the eventual control of the authorities, was placed in a special stamp on documents by adding 'receivers are not public servants under the OECD Guidelines' or' recipients are not civil servants in accordance with OECD Guidelines '. And the director of commercial management, knowing the whole plan bribery abroad and here in our country, after the introduction of criminal liability for corruption abroad, entrusted now to sign the documents on payment to subordinates who acted under the authority of . For handling the funds, were used eferonto companies that provide brokerage services in the execution of contracts, with whom contracts were fictitious, knowing all those involved and for the sole purpose to establish the legitimacy of the outflow of money to end recipients, and other companies through these channeled money from the kept "black funds" to the SIEMENS bribed persons. The above well-organized plan accepted and implemented as integrated members of a structured group, as above, and members of the Board and senior management of the SIEMENS SA in Greece, such as Michael Christoforakos, Prodromos Mavridis, etc., who, acting jointly, channeled the "black money" to politicians or senior officials. Indeed, under this plan, the SIEMENS concluded so-called Business Consultant Agreement contracts with companies and Weavind Krhoma, works for "Olympic Games in Athens" and "Olympic Games in Athens C4I" for allegedly providing consultancy services for which these companies would receive fees of EUR 2,000,000 and 1,800,000 to 2,000,000 EUR in each case, respectively, while those foreign companies, such knew everyone involved, was not able to provide these services, nor of course was not the purpose of the agreement, which was to create the money to be disbursed this money and then give their recipients (politicians and officials, as stated above). As examples, have been identified as remitted by the parent company of the following amounts: a) remitted (in 1998) from SIEMENS AG Deutschland in no. 830,026 savings account under the name "Samos" kept by the Elias Georgiou, a credit institution RAIFFEISENVRBAND SALZUBURG (Country Austria) the amount of 1,500,000 German marks (DEM), b) remitted (in 1998) from SIEMENS AG Deutschland in under No 884,130 current account with the name "NICK", maintained the STAVRIANOS Emmanuel in that institution, the amount of 1,000,000

German marks (DEM), c) remitted by SIEMENS AG Deutschland (on 05.17.2001 and 5 -2 to 2002) to no. 6185524/17.264.840, 61855/14.858.393 6179527/17.264.920 and deposit accounts, which kept the Baptist Mavridis in that institution, the amounts of 1,350,000 and 950,000 euro, and the amounts of 3,000,000 and 5,500 .000 euros, d) remitted by SIEMENS AG Deutschland in no. 835,835 savings account called "FRANZ", maintained the SKARPELIS George in that institution, various sums of money [as the amount of 2,500,000 German marks (DEM) on 17.02.1998, the amount of 1,000,000 DEM (DEM) on February 10, 2000, the amount of 1,000,000 German marks (DEM) on February 10, 2000, the amount of 1,500,000 German marks (DEM) on December 21, 2000, and the amount of 1,500,000 German DEM (DEM) on 17 May 2001] e) remitted from the "black funds" of companies ofsor TAMARAIND GROUP CORPORATION, BFA GLOBAL ADVISOR LLC and FIBERLITE LLC, which had opened and funded by SIEMENS AG Deutschland, as the length of time of years 2003-2006, the decision no .11.24.854 bank account maintained by the offshore company PLACID BLUE CORPORATION the bank ABN AMRO BANK NV, branch of Monaco, and funds of many million. It is noteworthy that the sole director and financial beneficiary of the Society of English Virgin Islands PLACID BLUE CORPORATION is George Kaldis Christopher's (resident in Athens, street Athanasios Diakos 64-Kifissia, year born. 1952, Entrepreneur), which maintained friendly relations Mr. Michael Christoforakos. The above account was opened on 20.2.2001, in consultation and collaboration of George Kaldis, Michael and Alexander Christoforakos Lecce Frixos-Nicolas (resident of Athens, street swallows 3 - Kifissia, year born. 1957, Mechanical), with the sole purpose be remitted by SIEMENS AG Deutschland (at the request of Michael Christoforakos) 2% of the total turnover of SIEMENS Com Greece, which is then used according to the claims of Michael Christoforakos, to fund "political parties" in Greece, f ) remitted by the SIEMENS AG Deutschland (SIEMENS Germany) during the period of the years 1993-2003 to 480 028 .0230 decision no bank account at UBS Zurich bank funds several million. This account was opened, on the advice of Demetrius Elias Georgiou and Negri, the Kon / nou (resident of Athens, street Ilidos 12-Ampelokipi gen.1941 year, retired) in the name of Antonia Mark John (resident of Athens, Solomou Street 10 - N. Eritrea), but by proxy of the latter was used exclusively by Elias George and for his own benefit. Further, it appeared that the Wolker Yung, a member of the Central Board of the parent, ie the main governance body of the entire relevant multinational group, a position which enabled him to have a personal understanding and knowledge of the entire organization, structure, operation and strategy the group, not a branch of the parent company in Greece was an organizational division of the German company, which fell directly, and also was a member of SIEMENS AE from April 1992 until October 1995 and Chairman of the Board the same company from October 1999 until October 1993, he accompanied Michael Christoforakos on visits made to highranking persons of Greek public life, especially government officials to undertake various projects, knowing precisely the tactic of bribery followed by the parent company for all subsidiaries. In particular, the Main Board of the parent company in Germany, was the center for all major decisions at a strategic level. The consistency between the Central Board and individual business sectors, like telecommunications and branches, ensured the participation of members of the Central Board, so the regular meetings of trade sectors, and the Board branches. Thus, this strain of the parent company as a member of the Board , was charged with the supervision and guidance of the trade, International Communication Networks, the parent company of the funds which were disbursed all funds for bribing officials of OTE And the same person, actively involved in taking up distribution rights of the SIEMENS SA in the Balkans, taking advantage of the excellent relations Prodromos Mavridis and executives in OTE, which resulted in significantly higher margins contract than what is customary in the market, some say

10% above normal margins, which were related to corruption, shifting the excess amount to the Greek State. It was not obvious and his involvement in leaking million expenditure in Carrier that has been the telecommunications systems for telephone companies, coming from the "black funds" of Siemens AG, which traded other executives of the parent, including The Kutschenreuter, instructed by VOLKER JUNG. Moreover, from the same sub-contract signed between the company SAIC, as a buyer, and SIEMENS AE, as a seller, who were supporting the work of C4I Olympic Games in Athens shows (Article 36 thereof) entitled "PARENT COMPANY "that" Seller shall provide, within fourteen days of signing this Subcontract written evidence that the seller has received written authorization from the parent company of the vendor, Siemens AG ICN EN, for the signing of this subcontract to Buyer and supports the implementation of the obligations of the vendor in the implementation of the program, as defined in the e-mail to D. DENDRINOU (Siemens SA) to S. WEISS (SAIC) of 19 May 2003. " From the above condition clearly shows the full knowledge and approval of all actions of the Greek Siemens by native German, which clearly was the executrix of the actual project and of course diakinisasa 'black money' for the award of contracts. And while the aforementioned involvement of the parent company resulting from a variety of factors, none of the documents of the Greek Authorities (indictments, petitions to the German authorities) do not mention the role and organization of the project, which was drafted, drafted and organized by the administration itself and its senior executives, in perfect alignment with their joint decisions, with direct intent to commit the above offenses and to eventually increase their illegal income of the parent company to the detriment of policyholders of and here the Greek government. In contrast, the Greek authorities not only overcome silence these facts speak for themselves, but also: I. Requests on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters submitted to the competent judicial authorities in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Italy and other countries, by the Prosecutor, stated that "funds with which conducting these illegal payments were of offenses committed by officers of SIEMENS AG against property (SIEMENS AG) , ie taking as a given, that the supply of black money and other criminal acts were taken to the detriment of the above company and not on behalf of and for benefit of the estate, as in fact happened. II. In syntagenta indictments and based on those issued European arrest syllipsisn and all apangeltheises categories by the investigator did not include strains of SIEMENS AG although they admit that traded from the slush funds of the company SIEMENS AG lessen this unjust money to commit crimes in our country. Even in contracts where contractor Greek government reportedly the Greek company, the black money is channeled, as mentioned above, from the funds of the parent, to which he returned after passing the additional amount against the Greek government after the Payment of the amount of contracts through the inner relation linking the two companies (parent and subsidiary), the capital of the second, but the administration of which attended the first and officers, respectively, so that the second ( affiliate) to act essentially as a substitute body first, which was the only defines the strategy of sales and service and the only recipient of the transaction, the funds and which ended the earnings from the void overpricing. Because the pursuit of criminal prosecution and investigation, conducted diverged purpose, as stated above, so far not been charged with any charges against executives of parent company Siemens, although elapsed period of six (6) years after the revelation of the scandal, be exercised and further prosecution of organized crime with the same delay at the request of the

Examining Committee of the House in imminent danger of cancellation under German law of criminal acts are against our country committed and benefited the company Siemens. Moreover, although the questioning took place selectively performed for pre-2004 period and then only to the Greeks stakeholders, not Included even for this period, the benefits of parent company Siemens, and executives of the parent Siemens in any way involved in criminal acts for which charged. That is, a priori ruled out the involvement of executives of the parent Siemens AG, while revealing themselves before the German justice, design and implementation modalities of the whole project by themselves, under which flows from the "black funds" of the company money to end recipients. Consequently, the selective in over handling of the case raises serious effort to conceal evidence, not only for the benefit of the persons involved but also for the benefit of the same company Siemens, state and irreversibly, in a case with international ramifications, all knew the unfair distribution of money from its parent company, both cheiristhentes research, and their supervisors, but at the same Justice, and thus the same in our country. Because in those above that received the prosecution of any way to blame, officials of parent company mitriksi company SIEMENS AG, failure is not obviously Done to benefit the company SIEMENS AG and protect its reputation, although it was obvious from reports in electronic and printed press and from the case that that company applied to other choress, outside our country, the said criminal plan, namely movement tsi nefarious money from slush funds to undertake public works through the criminal offenses, and his own corruption and the laundering of criminal activity by removing the transparency and healthy competition. Because "anyone who abused its power in accordance with the provisions of Article 239PK, fails to prosecute an offender, or causing the discharge from punishment ... punishment." Further anyone who, under the provisions of Article 46PK, provided with the intent to assist another during the commission of an act and performing the main act. Because having the oversight of the investigation knew that the actual event (ie non-prosecution of officials of SIEMENS AG) and yet through their actions or omissions probably helped their case cheiristhentes magistrates to commit the above act unfairly. Because the primary purpose of criminal investigation should be to find the real truth, especially when it comes to crimes against the Greek government and by extension against the Greek people, was summoned and asked to pay, and 'black money' which given to officials and politicians, in profit of the parent company of the contracts. It is therefore the duty of the judiciary to shed light on all the tentacles of the case, and so preserving the prestige and credibility.

17TH PORISMATIKI REFERENCE: Completion of research for SIEMENS In a survey conducted by the Examination Committee of the House in relation to the known case SIEMENS, came to light by which unanimously with Council 24/08/2010 porismatiki of reference requested and really brought further prosecution of Mr. Appeals Prosecutor of Athens, in agreement with you, for the act of setting up a criminal organization of Article 187 of the Penal Code to commit the offenses of active and passive bribery, money laundering and criminal activity and fraud in aggravated circumstances of the Law on abusers of the State, against both strains of the company SIEMENS, and other persons involved. Among the key executives allegedly involved in planning and implementing the project organized by Siemens against the Greek State and its legal persons, is Volker Yung, who was

CEO of Siemens AE and member of the Central Board of the parent Company Siemens Ag. The above defendant, upon request to the Appeals Prosecutor, on 18/01/2010, had admitted setting up a criminal organization from executives of Siemens. Against those accused, after his apology for the laundering of criminal activity alone, imposed the restrictions a) the occurrence of the first five days of each month at the AT home and b) the prohibition of exit from our country . From a report in German magazine SPIEGEL of 14/11/2010, it appears that that defendant, in violation of the question raised in this restrictive condition of the ban on leaving the country, fled abroad. Because those accused testified before you in the act of participation in that criminal organization, even though additional proceedings concerned precisely this practice has not exercised by 09/07/2010. If not, the story is true, apparently the same tactics and manipulation may follow the other defendants involved. Because the Siemens case is of special importance for the country because one part of the huge losses suffered by the Greek state and its legal persons and thus the Greek people, and secondly, because, in its regular , which is the pinnacle of corruption and interweaving, hit any notion of transparency should govern public procurement. Because, despite the upward gravity of the case, although such investigations have started from 27/04/2005, the case is still in the process of interrogation, without even having asked for an apology for the defendants brought additional prosecution . Because the direct, without any further delay and obstruction prepare the case is a prime duty of Greek justice, to preserve and so the validity and reliability of this. For these reasons and under the responsibility of each one of you, please for your own actions.

5. Political Parties
Source: http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/5politika_kommata.doc Translated: http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&rurl=translate.goo gle.com&sl=el&tl=en&twu=1&u=http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/5politika_kommata.doc&us g=ALkJrhjw3JIpo3f8z-uiI_PAPbBMSnxo1g The Inquiry Commission has statutory responsibility for monitoring the funding of political parties. Therefore not entitled to make an investigation of the finances and control of the funds. Noted that in 1996 the then Government under Article 29 paragraph 2 of the Constitution, recommended and the House voted n.2429 (GG 155/10.07.1996) "Financing of political parties, Publicity and control the finances of political parties and Members of the candidate-statement of property policies, public officials and employees, owners via media and forms and other categories of persons and other provisions. " Under Article 19 Intergroup Committee established by the members of political parties. To fulfill its mission supported by auditors who instructed conducting accounting or financial expertise or other control operations. " In 2002 the House voted n.3023 (GG 146/25.06.2002) "Financing of political parties from the state. Income and expenses, promotion, publicity and control the finances of political parties and candidates for Parliament. " Under Article 21 established an Audit Committee, which acts as a special body composed of one member, a representative of each party and three magistrates. Noted that the institutional framework, although improved, is certain that further structures. From the data of the investigated case alleged that the parties during the period surveyed take several non-statutory funding from companies and funds of unknown origin by natural persons. Specifically, under no. F.092.22/4880 official translation of the order sentencing the district court Munich under number Cs 402 Js 3943/09 Mr Michael Christoforakos held that: "Siemens has decided to make donations to parties calculated the amount to 2% of turnover for each contract during the so-called "draft PARENT company ... so in this way to ensure a strong networking company with Greek politicians, as they did from other major Greek companies .... The payments to the parties would become "covertly" ... it would be unpleasant for the branch in Greece if it became known that Siemens paid money to political parties. " "This rate of 2% per year ... remitted to an account of the company Placid Blue Corporation in the bank ABN Amro-Bank in Monaco ... and the company Fairways Ltd Mr Lecce ... then promoted covertly money (2%) only in two large parties in Greece, New Democracy and Panhellenic Socialist Movement. " ... "Conceive the plan to speed up deliveries of individual works project C4I, influencing those responsible for the receipt of public employees, which of course does not know by name but who, as you know, according to the networking party that existed in Greece belonged to some

the two major parties in Greece. They will be exercised, as desired, the discretion they had in a way that a controversial new cases to decide where in breach of their duties in favor of Siemens. As ways of making decisions for you as a third were not transparent but was known to Greek partisan mechanisms need the support of party members to proceed with division of labor with them. The money would go equally to the funds of political parties LD and PASOK and from there distributed any further. To this end, two treasurers of political parties, as agreed by you together with them, are performed through the party the necessary pressure on civil servants who belonged to their party, so that they can exercise the discretion they had in a way that in contentious cases to decide where in breach of their duties in favor of Siemens (see ref 1, the warrant sentencing district court Munich under number Cs 402 Js 3943/09 Mr Michael Christoforakos and reports the comments of OWN at 16.02.2009, p. 12). Despite the above, the irrevocable punishment of the arrest of the Munich district court yparithm. Cs 402 Js 51016/09 contains two significant differences. First, the Court refutes the charge of abetting in the bribery of public officials. Mr. Michael Christoforakos seems finally to have committed the crime of complicity in infidelity. In justification of it, the final court decision no longer lists the procedure on how to party funding. Mr. Michael Christoforakos on 27.10.2010 to members of the Selection Committee in Munich to the question "During your tenure that have developed very friendly relations with Greek politicians, members of governments and if so by whom?" Replied that "I declare clearly not offered, promised or have never executives / employees of the Greek State or Greek political benefits, grants or gifts of significant value for them personally, nor I ever sought from such persons as personal benefits "while the question" In what political parties in Greece, the company gave you financial support, sponsorship? "refused to answer using the right of a defendant (see 1) ref 2, depositing the Selection Committee in Munich on 27.10.2010, p. 14-16 translation NoF09222/7851 2) ref 3, submission to the Examination Committee in Munich on 27.10.2010, p. 23-24 NoF09222/7851 translation). Mr. Michael Christoforakos, former member of SIEMENS is already committed to at least the compromise agreement on 14.04.2010 with SIEMENS, for maintaining the confidentiality of all intercompany cases brought to his knowledge. (See Ref 4, a compromise agreement with Mr. Michael Christoforakos Siemens AG, Siemens AE). It is obvious that Michael Christoforakos choose carefully defenses in order to relieve the place and not come into conflict with the interests of SIEMENS and agreed between them. Theodoros Tsoukatos lodged on 28.06.2008 in the Athens First Instance Court prosecutor Panagiotis Athanassiou and replied that "... it was standard practice to enhance cost all parties, all the major companies in the country" and a question about the transfer of 1,000. 000 DM testified that "I knew this process, nor the seven (7) accounts, not individuals. I was informed by Mr. Michael Christoforakos that the wire (then I learned for the first time in height) was placed in an account abroad he had given. After a few days Mr. Life has informed me that the money had come to Greece and that was to begin the inflow to the fund of the Party "(see ref 5, Anomoti Additional examination of the witness, Mr. Theodore Tsoukatou on 28.06.2008 Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou).

Against Mr Theodore Tsoukatou has been prosecuted for money laundering by criminal activity and today continues the judicial investigation into the financing of parties from the Siemens. During the investigation of the Examination Committee also learned of the affidavit of a deceased former General Director of the New Republic, and supporting documents pursuant to which sent the company MAYO and deposited in the account of ND total of 101,499,000 drachmas during the period 1989-1990. In addition to the Greek press published documents revealing five remittance that was linking the "slush funds" of the SIEMENS MAFO. Also asked the BoG to take action to open the bill MAFO the Royal Bank of Schottland. The work of the Commission of Inquiry has revealed the involvement of Ministers or Deputy Ministers to the funding of parties. To further investigate the jurisdiction of the Audit Committee of Article 21 of n.3023/2002. The Commission is bipartisan and shared by three judges.

6. Damage
Source: http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/6_zhmies.doc Translated: http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&rurl=translate.goo gle.com&sl=el&tl=en&twu=1&u=http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/6_zhmies.doc&usg=ALkJr hi53PWQHTkt7nrtqieYlDSqjkh2sg On 07.09.2010 criminal proceedings in rem by the Prosecution Appeals for the establishment of a criminal organization (the purpose of committing fraud repeatedly in the profession and habit with the aggravating case of Article 1 paragraph 1 of Law 1608/1950, money laundering and criminal activity and active and passive bribery repeated) against strains of Siemens. From the above criminal activities of executives from Siemens, the Greek government, the entities of the parastatal agencies and the allegedly suffered unprecedented losses, the calculation of which shall be made by the competent organs of the state. The Selection Committee identified the approximate damage to 2 billion , which amounts to a volume of SIEMENS AE (see schet.1 the no. 224/28-09-2010 porismatiki reference). To estimate the amount of damage caused to the Greek government and public organizations function of "slush funds" from SIEMENS AG must take into account the following parameters: 1. The estimated loss (corresponding revenue growth of SIEMENS) in 10% of turnover for each contract in Greece reveals, inter alia, the acquisition, manipulation competitiveness, unfair price increases (in Greece) and degradation materials and services supplied. The percentage of total damage for each contract and the subject was not always constant but varies depending on the circumstances, but always upward relative to the prices of the telecommunications market, which went on declining world market. For example OTE: i. The loss for the Programmatic Agreement 8002 was approximately 40% of turnover, without taking into account the corresponding drop in prices in international market ii. The loss for the technical support was 35% for the years 2003-2004 and 46% from 2005-2010 iii. The loss for the payment by SIEMENS for failing to implement the clauses of the Programmatic Agreement was 10% of turnover Rating agencies have contributed to the alleged cost accounting controls to be implemented by the relevant damage to the buyer, with an equal property of benefit and not SIEMENS protected the interests of the buyer. Under the compromise agreement signed by Mr. Michael Christoforakos on 14.04.2010 with SIEMENS AG and SIEMENS SA (Confidential), and the confidentiality clause contained in it, Mr. Michael Christoforakos obliged not to give any information to third parties regarding the SIEMENS AG and other group companies. Note that all strains of Siemens are committed to such plea agreements, the observance of confidentiality (see ref 2, a compromise agreement with Mr. Michael Christoforakos Siemens AG, Siemens AE).

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

To calculate the damage to the Greek government concern with certain elements of the Annual Report 2009 of SIEMENS AG. As mentioned in the chapter on open legal proceedings the company on December 15, 2008 announced that it completed the legal procedures against Germany in Munich and Washington, USA. The categories refer to allegations of bribery of public officials and dignitaries.

The SIEMENS AG agreed to pay a fine of 395 million for the failure of the former Boar d of SIEMENS AG to fulfill their supervisory duties. Payment of the penalty marked the completion of proceedings against the company by the Prosecutor of Munich. Investigations of former Board members and employees of the company remained unaffected by this outcome. In Washington, SIEMENS condemned by the Federal Court for willful abuse, inability to maintain adequate internal control and failure to comply with U.S. legislation to combat corruption. In related cases three subsidiaries of the company (SIEMENS SA Argentina, SIEMENS Bangladesh Ltd. And SIEMENS SA Venezuela) were convicted for similar acts ("guilty to individual counts of conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act"). The parent company SIEMENS and its affiliates agreed to pay a fine of $ 450 million to settle the charges by the Justice of the U.S.. At the same time paid a fine of $ 350 million to complete the civil proceedings had been initiated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the law on combating corruption. The penalty paid - without accepting the airline category - as a penalty for illegal profits accrued to it by the violation of laws against corruption (see ref 3, SIEMENS Annual Report 2009 p. 179).

7. Assessment - Responsibilities
Source: http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/7_axiologisi.doc Translated: http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&rurl=translate.goo gle.com&sl=el&tl=en&twu=1&u=http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/7_axiologisi.doc&usg=ALk Jrhg_to4x9qE-mPWHZSqfAnciK8dqUQ 1. SIEMENS The company SIEMENS, a leader in implementing telecommunication projects, at least the end of November 1990, was developed in Greece, an anonymised system for handling so-called "relevant expenditure" or "secret payments" (see Court in Munich 28.07.2008 , p. 7). With these commissions paid to persons eferonto arrange for contracts for public works and government officials responsible for awarding the contract to the company, who decided or otherwise assist the commission and then the performance and reception. To achieve these bribes, there was a well studied system in terms of company, to be suppressed and the flow of anonymous money. Thus was formed an organized group of initiates officials SIEMENS, who handle the correspondence and undertook the release and sending money to their recipients through its regional branches, which operated as autonomous businesses. This group, formed in knowing the company was structured hierarchically and certainly consisted of more than three persons, and had decided bribery of senior officials, politicians, State Government etc, with continuous action in Greece in November 1990 and until at least 2008, amounting to several million. According to the plan of the parent company the payments were estimated at 2% for each individual contract for public figures (see County Court in Munich 11.08.2009, p. 3) and 8% of turnover of the contract for senior government officials (see filing Siekaczek members of the Selection Committee in the Prosecutor Munich 26.10.2010, p. 14). The intent of the management company, evidenced by the fact that, after the year 1998, introduced in Germany in charges for corruption abroad, this system was maintained and continued to operate using special tricks to conceal. Specifically: To overcome the OECD Guidelines and the eventual control of the authorities, the relevant documents etithento special stamp by adding 'receivers are not public servants under the OECD Guidelines' or' recipients are not public officers, under the OECD Guidelines. " And the director of commercial management, knowing the whole plan bribery abroad and here in our country, after the introduction of criminal liability for corruption abroad, entrusted now to sign the documents on payment to subordinates who acted under the authority of . In this way the "distancing" the director of commercial management was not to demonstrate that he might be involved in corruption. The aim was that the best possible sygkalipsi the payment system of slush funds (see Court in Munich 28.07.2008, p. 13).

For the movement of the money used eferonto main companies that provide brokerage services in the contracts. The contracts do not these companies were - aware of all involved - virtual and had intended only to establish the legitimacy of the outflow of money to end recipients. Additional and other companies were used by which channeled money from the kept "black funds" of SIEMENS AG to persons bribed (see Court in Munich 28.7.2008, p. 17 et seq.) The above well-organized plan, accepted and implemented as integrated members of a structured team and members of the Management of the Company and senior executives SIEMENS HELLAS, as Messrs. Michael Christoforakos, Prodromos Mavridis, Christos Karavellas, Elias George who, acting together, had the purpose of conducting a "black money" in politicians or senior officials. Indeed, under this plan, the SIEMENS AG entered into a so-called Business Consultant Agreement contracts with companies and Weavind Krhoma, works for "Olympic Games in Athens" and "Olympic Games in Athens C4I" for allegedly providing advisory services for which these companies would receive fees of EUR 2,000,000 and 1,800,000 to 2,000,000 euros. in each case. All parties knew, however, that these companies were not able to provide these services, or course, was the purpose of the agreement. This was to create the money to be disbursed money which then give to their recipients, that is - as mentioned above - to politicians and officials. From witness statements as they gathered in the report of Debevoise that, for all contracts concluded with SIEMENS, the Greek state paid for each additional 10% of the value of the signature of the payment orders by the competent organs of the Court Congress and the disbursement of funds from the responsible for this public service employees (see report Debevoise, SAG-ATH00002063). They were persuaded to take the above actions by the false representation of facts as true by symvlithenton the above contracts, which, through the submission of such conventions with the standard documentation for approval and disbursement of expenditure, the amount withheld of "turnover" of the contract was augmented by at least above 10%, and convinced them that the real and payable value of the project was stated in the contracts and documents. Its purpose was to counterparties treatments, either to themselves or the company SIEMENS, or other politicians or officials, illegal property benefit, consisting of the above value of 10% of the amount of each contract with a corresponding loss of at least the Greek government. All persons involved at the time were members of such structured group had continued deceit who epekteineto over time, as far as intended to commit the above offenses for every contract signed or were signed, with the ultimate goal -seeking, illegal taking projects from Siemens and the company making profits of the parent company whether it be against the principles of transparency and fair competition. In addition to action this criminal organization, was clearly the availability of large funds (EUR million, which were channeled to members, officers and senior government officials, as stated above) but also the possession and use of various techniques and other means any kind, and special tricks. That was done using multiple bank accounts with banks in Greece and abroad, using intermediaries for their movement offshore and creating virtual companies with the sole

purpose of channeling the money, bogus entries in the books of the company to disguise the output of the black money and using "models" in order to prevent control of the company by the OECD, namely clearing model, model credit return model. Such means are not accessible to ordinary gangs. Instead undoubtedly peculiar to organized crime. As a result of incidents exetethikan above, the Inquiry Commission unanimously porismatiki the reference to August 24, 2010 filed a request to the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court Mr. Ioannis Tents to prosecute for construction of a criminal organization (see Porismatiki Report of the Examining Board Number. First .: 179). And the Prosecutor Prosecutor Dimitris Dasoulas - a proposal by the investigating judge Marie Nikolakis this year - brought on 7 September 2010 further prosecution for committing the crime of setting up a criminal organization for the purpose of committing a) fraud to continue, by occupation and habit, with the aggravating case of Article 1 of about 1 L. 1608/1950 on abusers of the public, b) money laundering from criminal activity and c) active and passive bribery in persistence. The reason the investigating judge said that during the processing of case files relating to crimes allegedly committed on otin afkairia contracts 1) 8002/1997 to digitize OTE, 2) for the supply of C4I and 3) for the purchase of antieroporika PATRIOT-type systems found sufficient evidence to commit illegal acts for which they brought complementary prosecution (see letter of this year with special investigating Protopresbyter No.: OP 286 on 07.09.2010 and letter of Public Prosecutions to Appeal No. Protopresbyter : OP: 417/2010 on 09.07.2010). The current leadership of SIEMENS AG, namely the Vice-CEO of parent company and the General Counsel, Peter Solmssen, a letter to the Minister of State Mr. Harry Pambouki assured that they have all done correctly and will join and everything needed for to seek the truth about the "black funds" of SIEMENS (see letter from Peter Solmssen on 21/06/2010). The company's willingness to cooperate verbally reiterated to members of the Selection Committee after the examination of the Prosecution in Munich 26.10.2010. Problem of course is the compromise agreement signed with SIEMENS, Mr. Michael Christoforakos as a former member of SIEMENS on 14.04.2010. This text is obliged to respect the confidentiality of all intercompany cases brought to his knowledge in his work. This condition effectively precluded the disclosure of its major "secrets" he was informed during his employment at SIEMENS, namely the organization and operation of "slush funds" of the company and therefore the information on the final individuals bribes . The reason is that the disclosure of individuals to incriminate and the parent company on whose behalf they acted its executives and could be exploited by competitors in katokyrosi further projects. 2. JUDICIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE The Prosecutor Panayiotis Athanassiou took on 27.04.2005 to conduct preliminary investigation in order to investigate the case of supply security system C4I. The mandate included the "supply", but did not rule and the "receipt" of the system. The investigation of the Prosecutor did not include the evolution of this contract, from 2004 onwards, the amendments thereto, and the procedure for receiving the system.

Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou, who at the Inquiry submitted incorrectly, that undertook the survey in late rather than early 2005 (see submission Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou, the Inquiry Commission on 04.03.2010, p. 5), exceeded both in the statutory time for closing the preliminary, and the statutory four-month extension. By November 2006 there had been no surrender and no conclusion had prosecute. It is clear from any document that was extended by decision of the Appeals Prosecutor. In November 2006 was assigned to the Prosecutor to investigate further if they have committed felonies in connection with the 8002 programmatic agreement concluded between the company Siemens, OTE and the Greek government and concerned in the supply of telecommunications equipment. Until then, Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou - as shown by the figures mentioned - had not been actively involved with the case. The only investigative operations carried out was to send two orders for execution to the Magistrate of Athens, which involved collecting data on case and examination of two witnesses Messrs. Emmanuel Vardakis and Dionysios Dendrinos. Both the testimony of witnesses Messrs. Emmanuel Vardakis, Maravelia Demetrius, Dionysios Dendrinos, and Michael Christoforakos, orders sent to the magistrates (03/06/2005 and 21/02/2006), and the prosecution brought in from 01.07.2008 order, that Mr. . Attorney-focused and led the investigation solely to the award of the contract and payments made by early 2004. Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou ignored evidence necessitating the extension of the investigation and for the period 2004 to 2008. It took into account that the deposit by 13.12.2006 Mr Dionysios Dendrinos on the general failure to perform the test in October 2004 and contracted between Siemens and the then Minister of Public Order Minister Christos Markogiannaki "Additional agreement" made by year 2004 with "additional premium of 8% to 10%." Ignored also by depositing 17.04.2008 by Dimitrios Maravelia contained overwhelming evidence on the fifth amendment C4I Convention held in 2007 and favored companies and SIEMENS SAIC and the intervention of then Minister of Public Order Minister Byron Polydoras replacing the "efthynofovous officers" had no objections to the above received by the reception (see ref submission Mr Dionysios Dendrinos the Prosecutor Panagiotis Athanasiou, on 13.12.2006, p.6). The same attitude kept by the Prosecutor for the case of OTE. By the letter of 01.07.2008, which indicted, appointed as a likely time of committing crimes in the years 1997 to 2005. Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou overlooked that individual enforceable contracts were performed even during the period he was conducting the preliminary examination, but by a multitude of data showing that the bribes were mainly done in this time of the contract. These illegal acts committed not to apply to the period of the three orders a safeguard for OTE clauses contained in the 8002/97 program agreement and were to protect the interests of OTE against counterparty supplying company Siemens. From the preliminary examination of Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou evidence for involvement of political figures and the prosecutor concedes that a case appealed to his superiors. Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou during its examination the Commission stated that it was concerned and contacted on his own initiative with the heads of Mr Panagiotis Poulios, Chief Prosecutor of First Instance and Mr. George plank, Supreme Court Deputy Prosecutor. According to the circular Linos they were responsible for the referral to the House. Messrs. Panagiotis and George Poulios Sanidas but they had the view that there is no need referral (see submission Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou the Inquiry Commission on 4.3.2010, p. 46, 47). Instead, George

Sanidas on the same subject submitted (see submission Mr George stave in Inquiry Committee on 09.09.2010, p. 95) that Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou does not matter raised, whether the case should be Been in the House by the information he had for ministers. The former prosecutor claims that informed the prosecutors and investigators that was not an issue of accountability of politicians. Then he was asked by the then Justice Minister, Mr George replied boards as no involvement of political figures and referral to the House (see submission Mr George stave in Inquiry Committee on 09.09.2010, p. 95 ). He added that the acceptance of gifts by the former Minister Akis Tsochatzopoulos, Mrs Dora Bakoyannis and Mr. Kyriakos Mitsotakis MP may be morally epimempti but not criminally punishable, and not combined with a consideration (see submission Mr George stave in Inquiry Committee on 09.09.2010, p. 97). This view was accepted by the subordinate prosecutor Panagiotis Athanassiou (see submission Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou the Inquiry Commission on 4.3.2010, p. 43, 44, 45) after consultation with each other (see submission Mr Panagiotis Athanasiou the Inquiry Commission on 04.03.2010, p. 45), who argues that "... .... entire year than I learned subsequently, say, the family and Mr. Mitsotakis Tsohatzopoulos from Germany had relations and in the relationships ... ... .... "(see filing Panagiotis Athanasiou the Inquiry Commission on 04.03.2010, p. 44). But it is obvious that it can be done without research and without even a suspicion to the contrary held that these gifts are not designed for present or future compensation (action or omission) per specified the duties of the MP or Minister. Even if the compensation fell within the general duties of Ministers and Parliamentarians. Especially when, as mentioned in testimony by former Prosecutor of the Supreme Court C. Sanidas "and a penny and a million may be considered bribery, enough ..." (see submission Mr George Sanidas the Inquiry Commission on 09.09. The fact that the prosecutor acted unilaterally in preliminary investigation, demonstrated by a petition of at the coordination meeting held on 03.12.2008 in EUROJUST, which was attended by representatives from the judicial authorities in Switzerland and Germany to open accounts at in these countries. The minutes recorded the following dialogue: Dr. Daams: Who was the ultimate receiver of bribes? Mr. Zagorianou: Government officials. Athanasios: Specifically, the political party of PASOK. But the end of the thread you have in Switzerland. " At the same meeting in question Deputy Federal Attorney, Switzerland C. Daams, what is the timeframe of committing acts and Mr Nicholas Zagorianou, this Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou, replied: "For example we are talking about late 1997 early 1998, but there is evidence that arrive until 2005. Indeed, in 2005 remittances were repayment of the price of C4I, which was never delivered in Greece. The prescription of crimes is fifteen years. Already, some acts of 1997 likely to lapse. Above all, we need to check if we have involvement of political figures. Also, I emphasize that the limitation period is not interrupted during the interrogation. "

In testimony before the House Select Committee Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou on the limitation and of course different answers correctly: "the offenses, especially when threatened with life imprisonment is twenty years lapse." (See submission Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou in Inquiry Commission on 04.03.2010, p. 120). Also, the prosecutor complied without substantiation different attitude to persons against whom there were the same elements. Of those for whom - the same documents - revealed that they had been transferred to accounts in money from the slush funds of Siemens: a) others were not considered at all (eg Mr Mrs Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Marios Katsikas KL Fr), b) other witnesses were examined (eg, Mr. C. Koronias, I. Panagiotopoulos) and c) and others as suspects (eg Mr whey, Vogias etc.). Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou - as submitted to the Examination Committee of the House, by command of the then Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Mr. George plank, not relieved from the case after completion of the preliminary examination, but remained informally as "somehow supervision" on the case but had been promoted to the rank of Deputy Prosecutor Prosecutor (see submission Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou the Inquiry Commission on 04.03.2010, p. 12). Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou could neither organic nor through another process to connect to the legitimate investigation, which so far was performed by judge, epikoureito questioning by the prosecutor of the Athens First Instance Court Prosecutor. Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou unacceptably delayed, after the preliminary examination was conducting lasted more than three (3) years. In exercising his duties, deliberately left outside the scope of the investigation of crimes committed from 2004 onwards. Not unduly delayed the pursuit of criminal prosecutions. These actions of the Prosecutor Panagiotis Athanasiou had a catalytic effect on the potential criminal liability limitation ministers for acts committed in the performance of their duties. The then prosecutor of the Supreme Court George Sanidas instead entrust the charge of the case because of its severity, this year a magistrate, the magistrate judge has charged a regulated informally by deputy prosecutor Appeals. About tabled in the House Select Committee (see submission Mr George Sanidas the Inquiry Commission on 9.9.2010, p. 79), although he thought appropriate to entrust the case to a magistrate this year, but reserved the right to introduce the matter to the Council Court of Appeals in September, as the demand for prosecution was in July and it was difficult to convene the sessions of the Appeal Court of Athens during the vacations. "Reserved for September, after seeing him and see what it is. It is from those who can cope? .... "

This argument is a pretext. From July to September, ie in August, the magistrate could only be updated by studying and collating the documents. Actually Mr Nicholas Zagorianou submitted to the Examination, that these were the actions, the first two months after the contract mentioned in it. (See submission Mr Nicholas Zagorianou the Inquiry Commission on 03.03.2010, p. 106) . So Mr George planks in no case could be assessed by September the ability of Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou as an investigator from the investigation of the acts. Beyond that, investigators can not be tested or under the guardianship of the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court.

Furthermore, the holding of the case for a few months by Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou and possible after award at this year investigators would only delay and confusion. The argument that they should be ordered for the prosecution in July and there was introduced the case to the Appeals Council to gain time during the vacations (August), it convinces. It is known that the case was still at the stage of preliminary examination for three and a half years. Instead, in view of the Court of Appeals that the deputy public prosecutor Panagiotis Athanassiou now, who conducted the preliminary examination, remained informal in the case as a supervisor, a situation that logically would not be accepted this year investigator, may lead to the conclusion that deliberately entrusted the case to a magistrate judge, and especially to Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou, which was then available in the special investigative department had been crimes of Law 1608/1950 on abusers of the Greek State, where he served (see submission to Mr Nicholas Zagorianou Inquiry Committee on 03.03.2010, p. 110). The other two investigators Board Minutes holidays excluded, as their term expires (see submission Mr Nicholas Zagorianou the Inquiry Commission on 03.03.2010, p. 104). Therefore, the award went predesigned in his face magistrate Mr Nicholas Zagorianou. This fact reinforces the evidence that it proceeded to award the case to Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou. In May 2009 Mr Nicholas Zagorianou refused copies of investigative material in its entirety, the accused Messrs. Elias George, George and Christos Skarpelis Karavela such as lawyers. The investigator decided to deliver them back section just mentioned, what he in his sole discretion consider that concern each of them based on the acts for which each accused. The decision of Mr Nicholas Zagorianou rejected unanimously by the Council of the Magistrates Court and the Appeals Council, which decided upon an appeal brought by the Chief Prosecutor of the Prosecutor, who acted after the No. 2362/3-6- 2009 order which was issued by the Attorney Supreme Court panel, describing in detail the grounds of appeal (see 16.11.2009 by depositing Sanidas as a witness for the defense of the Appeals Prosecutor Zagorianou Mr. Paraskevaides). The ordinances to which booed the unlawful denial of Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou to provide all requested copies of the accused is irreversible. The request and the trial judge on 20.07.2009 to separate the investigation with the contract C4I, to create a "pretext" for his denial of those rejected by the Council of the Magistrates Court in Athens 245/04.08.2009 It rejects the request bill it. Mr Nicholas Zagorianou prosecuted disciplinary for not providing copies mentioned defendants for acts of misconduct and abuse of power following an inquiry the Chief Inspectorate of Courts, Vice President of the Supreme Court Mr. Ioannis Papanikolaou. Also pending prosecution against him after the prosecution brought by the Deputy Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Mr. Anastassios Kanellopoulos. On August 31, 2009 the then Head of Audit Courts Ioannis Papanikolaou called and examined witnesses in his office at the Supreme Court on the disciplinary case against Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou. The witness after leaving the office of Mr. Inspector, released the reason for the examination and the facts were immediately known. The same day the House convened the Court of Appeals and decided to remove the case from Mr Nicholas Zagorianou. The decision

was not the sessions of the Appeal Court has implemented the same day the prosecutor of the Supreme Court Mr. Ioannis Tents a letter to the Court of Appeals to convene a plenary session and set this year - an investigator. This happened in mid-September 2009. This process is confirmed by the testimony of Mr. John Papanicolaou (see filing Ioannis Papanikolaou the Inquiry Commission on 05.03.2010, p. 94): "I said that 31 August was held the plenary Court of Appeals. They learned that I do disciplinary and have the opinion that under the pressure of my own disciplinary inquiries convened the assembly of the Athens Court. " Moreover, neither Mr Nicholas Zagorianou or other judicial officer reasons why removing the file from Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou just begun its review, given that defenders appreciated that performed very well in investigative duties.

In disciplinary proceedings came as a witness for the defense of Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou Mr. George Sanidas, the honorary president of the Supreme Court, Mr. Romulus Kedikoglou, President of the Union of Judges and Prosecutors Charalambos Athanassiou, Judge, the Chief Prosecutor of the Athens Court of Appeals k . Sakellakos John Attorney Appeals of Athens, an honorary deputy public prosecutor Veroios Supreme Court, the acting Deputy Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Mr. St. Gkrozos, the acting prosecutor Panayiotis Athanassiou others. This event on 'object could exert significant to unbearable pressure on judges to try the sygkekrimenin case. At the same time proving that his case was not handled by the leadership of the Greek Justice as a routine disciplinary action and criminal prosecution, but this was the battle in which, apparently, spearheaded by Mr. George Sanidas discharge of Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou each against toukatigoria. In fact, for the first time in the history of Greek justice brought such a young magistrate panstratia defense witnesses including former President and former Prosecutor of the Supreme Court. It is obvious that the purpose was to state clearly that this magistrate was under their protection and that they agreed completely with the handling of the case of Siemens. He is also obvious that they wanted to break the morale of the judiciary to be invited to decide on the disciplinary and criminal matters. As evidenced by the relevant file, defending Mr Nicholas Zagorianou was luxurious - in terms of control - extremely organized and orderly moving. And of course, raises the reasonable question why an investigator was performing his duties properly, and against whom charges were groundless have had on defense, to show Multifaceted mechanism of protection, unprecedented in the judicial annals of the country?

Mr. John smear examination in the Parliamentary Committee submitted that repelled the efforts of the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Mr John Ted, who had succeeded Mr. George board, to remove it (see filing Ioannis Papanikolaou the Selection Committee on 05.02.2010, p. 45, 46) before the Examining the disciplinary file on a katangeltiko text contained the phrase: "The whole is not obvious that your energy use, even the hierarchy of Article 55 of Act 1756 to '88 during the First Vice-President of the Supreme Court and Head of Audit and the assignment of the case in our immediate subordinate deputy prosecutor of the Supreme Court, unfortunately restore justice in our country in very dangerous, irrational and outdated time when prosecutors were guardianship to the courts even in the judicial crisis, "attempted silencing (see filing

Ioannis Papanikolaou the Inquiry Commission on 05.02.2010, p. 63) that was hearing the application for exemption from the disciplinary case, Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou the initiative and responsibility of the President of the Supreme Court Mr. Kalamidas illegally, without being informed of the weight of the request for exemption and incompetent institution (see filing Ioannis Papanikolaou the Inquiry Commission on 05.02.2010, p. 68) that received written attack mud by now Supreme Court Prosecutor Ioannis Tents (see filing Ioannis Papanikolaou the Inquiry Commission on 05.02.2010, p. 69, 73) and threats (see deposit t . John smear the Inquiry Commission on 05.02.2010, p. 74) and that corruption has permeated the field of justice (see filing Ioannis Papanikolaou the Inquiry Commission on 05.02.2010, p. 76). Typical are the words of Mr Ioannis Papanikolaou: "I came to the court in 1969 at age earos-spring and Retiring in the heavy winter" (see filing Ioannis Papanikolaou the Inquiry Commission on 05.02.2010, p. 123). We can reasonably argue that some of the witnesses actually defending themselves and wanted to cover their own mistakes. All the witnesses and the safety net which covered her Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou aimed, inter alia, to prevent him to "speak" for the manipulation of the scandal SIEMENS, but also the reward for obedience. This is evidenced by the unprecedented heat of praise, completely unusual for a new judge, and true praise for iropoiisi from witnesses, which eventually exposed and weakened and ymnoumeno and the celebrator. Eventually the Appeals Council No. 2122/2010 Ordinance of the answer to the criminal charges against Mr Nicholas Zagorianou - unlike the Appeals Prosecutor Demetrios Dasoula, proposed discharge of Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou of the offenses of abuse of power and misconduct ordered the continuation of the main investigation against Mr Nicholas Zagorianou the Special this year - investigator Ch. Hasiotis. According to the Council's Appeals abuse of power should be attributed to Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou as activity carried repeatedly and intentionally not included in the indictment against Mr Michael Christoforakos the crime of corruption allegedly committed the period 2007-2008 and the final delivery system C4I. The Appeals Council added that the magistrate should be checked for criminal and another felony, namely the abuse of power and especially because Mr. Nikolaos Zagorianou asked the prosecutor to conduct further prosecution for fraud and had to ask the prosecution for a felony the act of infidelity against a loss of government for that part of the case to the delivery of the C4I security system symperielamvanomenon and involved officials. By the same decree ordered the transfer of copies of the file to the Prosecutor to investigate the possibility of commission by Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou and other offenses, except those for which has already been prosecuted. The then prosecutor of the Supreme Court George Sanidas denies any involvement in the case except two or three contacts with the prosecutor Panayiotis Athanassiou and investigating Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou and which were related to the development of requests for mutual assistance. The testimony does not reflect the truth. An example may be mentioned that part of the filing of Mr. George stave in Inquiry where he stated that he made efforts and contacts to find a lawyer in Switzerland to be assisted by the Greek government's request to open bank accounts (See deposit t . George stave in Inquiry Committee on 09.09.2010, p. 52). But it is also clear from his actions that fought until they exhausted all legal remedies against the Appeal against the decision of Mr Nicholas Zagorianou on the exclusion of access to the entire file.

At this point we would emphasize the identity of views Messrs. Board - Zagorianou on a topic which unanimously and irrevocably the Judicial Councils in the first and second grade have expressed the opposite view. Not impressed that the then Prosecutor of the Supreme Court is not satisfied with the decision of the Council of the Magistrates Court, but fought in the second degree for this view, that violates the rights of the accused. This attitude can only be understood by assuming that there was a legal identity of views, but for matching considerations, and objectives between Messrs. Board - Zagorianou, not related to the administration of justice, but in the political management of the case. This view is reinforced by the fact that Mr. George Sanidas, while investigating disciplinary prosecuted because of the above conduct, ran as a defense witness. George Sanidas testified that initially erefnato by Mr. Nicholas Zagorianou contract 8002/97, which had thus criminal interest only until 2004 (see submission Mr George stave in Inquiry Committee on 09.09.2010, p. 103). This claim, however, the former prosecutor is unfounded, as some orders were based on implementing the framework for 8002/97 contracts were made after 2004. Can therefore not explain why the focus was on investigating research - on the contract 8002/97 - which by and investigational time could not be active for political offenses Ministers, while receiving the C4I was insufficient evidence for an active criminal offenses Ministers (See submission by Dimitrios Maravelia the Prosecutor Panagiotis Athanasiou) that threatened to lapse because of the above prioritization of research. From the above demonstrated that both Mr Nicholas Zagorianou, and Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou not investigating a priority, but reserved the above period. Invoked and the argument of the pressure which had barred to foreign authorities as fifteen years for all offenses - were aware that it is two decades for kakourgimatikes acts of Law 1608/1950 on abusers of government - to urge the representatives of the Swiss and German authorities to open accounts that focused exclusively on the period from 1997 to 1998. But even the investigative operations of Mr Nicholas Zagorianou legally verifiable. When - for example - carried out a search at the offices of Siemens Hellas, took the company one hundred and fifty folders without an inventory of seized documents. It is assumed that this failure to raise doubts concerning the safety and integrity of documents in the file. It does not convince Mr. George Sanidas in his testimony, when wanting to justify this failure by the investigator says, "was given his inability to sit for two or three months to record the seized documents" (see submission, Mr George stave in Inquiry Committee on 09.09.2010, p. 104). Also Mr. Nikolaos Zagorianou never asked for assistance with complaints of SDOE - who were present during the seizure of the material - the evaluation of the data seized from Siemens (see submission Mr George stave in Inquiry Committee on 09.09.2010 , p. 218 and letter of SDOE on 03.06.2010 with No. Protopresbyter: 14.535). Also, although the case involved cross-border crime, the investigating judge has not requested the assistance of Europol nor part of "cyber crime" of the Greek Police, who would evaluate data from the computers of the company. The Prosecutor Panayiotis Athanassiou ended his preliminary research through calls for suspects to provide explanations for actions that were time commission from 1997 until 2005.

It is worth noting that neither the prosecutor Panayiotis Athanassiou, neither the magistrate Nicholas Zagorianou not suggested to the prosecutor supervising the investigation to an order prohibiting exit from the country, not to escape Messrs. Michael and Chris Christoforakos Karavelas who were with Mr. Prodromos Mavridis and George Elias longitudinal main traffickers black money of Siemens. This omission was, although this had occupied as a possibility, as is clear from the minutes of the meeting in The Hague 03.12.2008 (Euro justice). About Mr George Sanidas filed misleading the Commission, once said that the ban on leaving the country would be pointless, because within the Schengen Treaty countries who have concluded treated as a single space and therefore there is no border control between them ( See submission by Mr George stave in Inquiry Committee on 09.09.2010, p. 116, 117, 118). But then the former prosecutor was forced to admit that if someone on a ban on leaving, he checked at the entrances and exits of the country which has issued a ban exit (see submission Mr George stave in Inquiry Committee on 09.09.2010, p. 166, 167, 168, 169). Finally after questions from members of the Committee Mr. George Sanidas admitted that mistakes may have occurred during the investigation into the scandal SIEMENS among which are "... possibly the mispricing of the Prosecutor Panagiotis Athanasiou not to adopt provision forbidden to leave the country for Messrs. Michael and Chris Christoforakos Karavela "(see submission Mr George stave in Inquiry Committee on 09.09.2010, p. 157). The evidence cited above suggests that the then Prosecutor of the Supreme Court acted guidance in relation to the acts and omissions of Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou and Nicholas Zagorianou. You should also take into account the statement by R. Siekaczek on 26.10.2010 in his testimony to members of the Examination Committee of the House who went to Germany to examine officers of the company Siemens. The R. Siekaczek stated that Mr. Panagiotis Athanasiou and Nicholas Zagorianou at the time he took on 08.10.2010 in Munich had ruled out was the subject of forensic investigation in Siemens in the future. This statement of the investigating officials, and confirmed by Attorney H. Bumler-Hsl was present in both investigative operations. (See Minutes were kept by the Prosecutor in Munich 26.10.2010 p. 7.8) should be evaluated during the process of criminal prosecution against Mr Nicholas Zagorianou and investigated whether there are criminal penalties and Mr. Panagiotis Athanasius. Apart from the magistrates, who had direct involvement with the interrogation obstructionism seen from other parts of Justice. For example, if the Prosecutor Appeals has ordered from 07.09.2010 additional prosecution for the establishment of a criminal organization additional personalized prosecutions have not yet exercised. Impresses the fact that the plenary of the Supreme Court, in discussing the disagreement of the Minister of Justice Mr. Harris Kastanidis against Decision 22/2010 of the Supreme Judicial Council, under which Mr Nicholas Zagorianou not been temporarily suspended , it has merely to decide on acceptance or otherwise of the dispute by the Minister. Others went to the substance of criminal prosecution against the investigator assessing positive in the majority behavior.

Even the actions of the State Legal Council did not have the required efficiency to protect the interests of the Greek government. Although OWN stated civil claimants for the loss suffered by the contracts was signed with Siemens, the representative of Mr Eugenia Velonis submitted to the Examination Board that the investigation of OWN is not a loss (see submission Mr Eugenia Velonis the Inquiry Commission on 18.02.2010, p. 19 and 32). Executive Power The then Minister of Economy and Finance Mr. George Alogoskoufis with n.3691/2008 abolished the independent Authority for Combating Money Laundering. In place of the established administrative control panel to "Committee to Combat Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism" (EMU) which epoptefeto by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Note that at the time of its repeal by the Authority investigated after written request by the then President of the Authority, Mr George Zorbas economic aspects of the scandal of Siemens (see submission by Giorgos Zorbas the Inquiry Commission on 06.07.2010, p. 20 ).

The EMU until the middle of 2010 alone provided raw data for certain bank accounts without any overview or conclusions of its work. * The Clash of Members of the New Republic is that: The establishment of committees of inquiry is an instrument of parliamentary control of the House of Parliament is a matter not covered by either the legislative or the executive or judicial powers in the state. In the system of parliamentary scrutiny within only the executive ie the government and not the Judiciary. Therefore Parliamentary scrutiny of the judiciary from the parliament does not mean in the power of the Greek Constitution. In this light it has no supervisory responsibility for acts or omissions of the judiciary institutions of the State Any reports or findings made in this report are defined in reference to the relevant selective institutions of justice, which must be seized to investigate the causes of which have been delays in adjudication of cases involving the Siemens * ( Opinion of Members of the New Republic). 3. MINISTERS AND STATE SECRETARIES - RESPONSIBILITIES OTE 1. General comments From the documents and testimony regarding the procurement of Siemens OTE shows that: - Upon the decision of KYSYM under which it is estimated that technological development and independence of the country, particularly the rapid technological developments in

telecommunications and international practice enforced the use of two technological digital telecommunications systems for our country. By the same resolution authorized the competent bodies to call for final negotiations two prevalent foreign firms, which according to the results of the contest ELVIL is Ericsson and Siemens (see practical KYSYM of 18/09/1986). - The contract to supply 84,000 to 20,000 digital circuits benefit did not require OTE to purchase houses by themselves, when in fact violated the conditions of contract "7160" and "7170" which provided extra value 26% and participation ELVIL companies Siemens Hellas and Intracom. - For signing contracts "7220/90" and "7230/90" was written by practical Committee appointed by the Board of Directors of OTE. Through this effort was to prove that the original contract amount was reduced after negotiations by 5 billion. GRD, the study of the annexes that: while the stock fell, that bought fewer digital exchanges, prices remained unchanged. (See Minute Trading Commission on 31.1.1990, a) attachment statement Antonis Konstantinopoulos who did not sign because they disagreed and found himself forced to sick and b) comments on objections to the minutes of Mr. Athanasios Grevenitis). - From a letter from Mr John Kefaloyiannis sent to the Examination Committee and the testimony shows that the routing of supplies OTE Intracom and Siemens began with bipartisan approval. - It interrelation with Siemens and tolerances in Intracom are primarily political characteristics. - The deposit of the former Director of Network Management and Maintenance OTE Nikitas Baritaki that: the argument that the initial contracts "7160/89" and "7170/89" are those which led OTE way process is stale, since all communication systems are open and compatible with the communication protocols of the ITU. Besides the choice of a technology in telecommunication systems is prohibitive to install other systems, since they have common communication protocols (see filing Nikitas Baritaki the Inquiry Commission on 25.10.2010, p. 67 et seq.) But this argument was used to provide the digital exchanges and transmission systems to specific suppliers. - The political decision of the government of Costas Simitis to implement Directive 93/38/EEC through programmatic agreements is correct, since it was not bound by the OTE which suppliers will be selected. Contrary to the Agency gave great bargaining power to obtain low prices, because it would negotiate with any interested provider an investment program over five years. - The "Programmatic Agreement 8002" which had a value of 158.3 billion. Drs contained safeguards to not lose control of prices. These consisted of the clauses referred to in Articles 8, 9 and 10, relating to competitive tender (Article 8), in clause most-favored-customer (Article 9) and cost accounting control (Article 10). Specifically: o Article 8 enable OTE to obtain bona fide offer from other manufacturers of telecommunications equipment and software in addition to Siemens, the EU or any country connected economically with the EU So if the comparative price of the offer was more favorable than that of Siemens, since OTE called the Siemens to offer the equivalent terms. o Article 9 is obliged to supply Siemens OTE with hardware-software equivalent prices to those offered by Siemens to any customer in the EU or in countries associated with it. o Article 10 gave the right OTE to make cost accounting control equipment suppliers. If the cost accounting review found that the price of equipment is less than that agreed in the framework agreement, then the final price would be taken that resulted from the cost accounting control in

conjunction with Articles 8 and 9. o In accordance with Article 10, Siemens was forced to keep and maintain all equipment on the framework agreement books, documents and accounts relating to the cost and pricing them for six (6) years after the last payment. Under this section the OTE was entitled to conduct in-depth audits costing six years before the last payment. If you find that the price was high, Siemens had to repay the resulting differences. - In Article 7, the "Programmatic Agreement 8002" envisaged the creation of two committees, the Management Committee of the Programme Agreement and the Evaluation Committee. The same agreement provided that the Management Committee shall consist of three (3) representatives of OTE and three (3) of Siemens and its decisions are taken unanimously. Duties and Responsibilities of the Management Committee - among others - was: Actions and Measures to reduce costs, new efficiency improvements and information on new technologies. - The Evaluation Committee consists of two representatives (Senior Management) OTE, two of Siemens and will be attended and one (1) an independent consultant appointed by the parties with advisory powers. Duties and responsibilities of the Evaluation Committee - among others was: Monitoring the price paid for this technology if the price was fair and consistent with the tighter market conditions, this assessment should be limited based on: (a) the development indices of Greek and international economy and (b) the price evolution of Greek and International market. - The decisions of the Evaluation Committee should be taken until September 30 of each year on matters referred to in the next year. Therefore if applicable clauses were ensomatethei the "Programmatic Agreement 8002" will ensure the public interest. But this contract was launched along with the performers orders each year, without giving effect to Articles 8, 9 and 10, nor to have made specific responsibilities of the committees. - According to the documents mentioned as members of committees (62/D.1487/18-6-99 G.D.CH.TH decision signed by the D / Managing Director of OTE Mr. George Symeonidis) defined the same departmental managers prepared lists of materials and handled the procurement. So those who decide the price for an enforceable order was the same as those considered in the evaluation committee and / or management of the program if the premiums were properly and fairly. - So the "Programmatic Agreement 8002" by Siemens and enforceable orders were implemented unchecked, these terms were missing and Evaluation Committees and Management allowed the formation of prices in accordance with the instructions of the suppliers. The Proceedings of the Evaluation Committee, submitted to the Commission by former President OTE Dimitris Papoulias demonstrate that control and was performed for all the years when the company was subject PriceWaterHouse (PWH) there were no differences in value to allow OTE to assert money from Siemens. Specifically: o According to 31.7.2000 and from 4.8.2000 no. 6 and 7 Minutes, respectively, after costing audit conducted by PWH was that the premiums of the "Programmatic Agreement 8002". for 1998 were reasonable.

o In a letter signed by Mr. L. Papadimato (Supply Division), D. White (Telecommunications Investment Division), D. Kouvatsos (G.D.CH.TH) and G. Argyropoulos (G.D.T.TH) was proposed to the then CEO of OTE Mr. . Nick Manasis not occur on Cost Control in 1999 due to price stability by controlling cost accounting in 1998 was made by ARTHUR ANDERSEN. Nominated not be conducted in 2000 after it had now implemented the second (2) enforceable order (see document number 62/1/13/2/2001). The then CEO of Nikos Manasis submitted to the Examination Committee, asked that it be provided with all elements of cost accounting controls until then and continue checks for all objects in the Programmatic Agreement. It also noted that during his term of office from June 2000 until March 2002 and was asked to Articles 8,9,10 the 8002 framework agreement with the result that generate economic benefits for OTE (see filing Nikos Manasis the Inquiry Committee on 23.2.2010, p. 22-24). o Under no. 14, 13.6.2002 Minutes of the Evaluation Committee on costing audit conducted by PWH was that the premiums of the "Programmatic Agreement 8002" for year 2000 was reasonable.

o Under no. 20, 23.12.2005 Minutes of the Evaluation Committee after cost accounting audit performed by the PWH found the following: gross profit margin and operating margin from other activities to Siemens was greater than the figures obtained for the fifth and sixth enforceable order of the "Programmatic Agreement 8002". Because of this conclusion the members of the Evaluation Committee asked the Siemens issue a credit invoice for the difference of 7.7% that occurred between the gross margin business and the company's gross profit margin and amounted to 2.594.900 . However, the Evaluation Committee at its next meeting (see Minutes of 21/29.07.2009) concluded that reported for Siemens in the no. 20/23.12.2005 handy, do not apply, because if we applied the same methodology was applied and costing audits for 1998 and 2000 margins overall effect on the fifth (5th) and sixth (6th) executive order was 10.3% against the net profit rate of 17%. Therefore, the Evaluation Committee considered that the prices of Siemens for these performers orders were reasonable and approved. - Therefore, by costing audits conducted for the years 1998, 2000 and 2002 ARTHUR ANDERSEN AE (See Contracts of the company OTE and 1056/22.6.2001 600/12.11.1999) and PRICE WATERHOUSECOOPERS GMBH (see Convention of the company OTE 2122/21.06.2005) found that there were economic differences and that the economic price for the question was reasonably enforceable orders. In this way under the cost accounting checks out, there was no possibility of repayment to OTE by Siemens. - It is obvious that the implementation of cost accounting controls were inadequate. The responsibility lies with the Evaluation Committees and Management Programmatic Agreement, the directors of OTE and the financial advisor PWH. The way in which operating personnel and members of the hierarchy of OTE's confession confirms executive of Siemens, the German justice officials had paid official of the Agency not to apply the clauses (see the minutes of a meeting between representatives of the Office of Compliance Siemens Mr. Prodromos Mavridis on the 08.03.2006, Jens Burgard lodging in the Bavarian Office for Prosecution of Crime in Munich on 07/24/2007). - As demonstrated by the witness to the Examination Committee and the existing documents, Effective Cost Control in the sense of actual costing control and application of Articles 8 and 9 of the Agreement was never in any period of the program agreements. (See filing Nikitas Baritaki the Inquiry Commission on 25.02.2010, p. 101 et seq.) The current

President of OTE Panagis Vourloumis not convincing when, in testimony to the Select Committee argues that the clauses of competitive bidding and the most favored customer "rather not put in place but does not know details because this process is not in the jurisdiction "(see filing Panagis Vourloumis the Inquiry Commission, 01.03.2010, p. 185). - The "Programmatic Agreement 8002" by Siemens and six (6) messenger arrived at the amount of GRD 236,139,595,500 although the estimated price was 158,018,800,000 dr there that by 2002 a premium amounting to GRD 92,406,995,500 . without the consent of the competent Minister of Transport and Communications, who had approved the initial value of the framework agreement. The decisions taken by management and the professional hierarchy OTE, who from 1998 onwards decided increase in the original budget of CP without the approval of relevant government institutions. This is demonstrated - among others - by the numbers 62/368603/28-11-2002 letter from the Executive Vice President of OTE Mr. George Skarpelis to address parliamentary control of the Ministry of Transport & Communications. There confirmed that the premium program agreements will only be approved by the Board of the Agency. - The General Managers have direct negotiations with suppliers and formed the premiums without verification and Evaluation Committees. This is illustrated by the decision of the Tribunal on 26.03.2003 Antonakopoulos, which, despite the fact that the programmatic agreements had expired, were ordered for direct award to Siemens ISDN benefits of 7.5 million . The price was too high, because he had already discredited the ISDN technology and applied technology is ADSL. - Through the "Programmatic Agreement 8002 'has exceeded the contractual terms, because each need OTE telecommunications equipment was part of its program without taking into account the stocks that already existed. As submitted to the Selection Committee, the then Head of Department Network Management and Maintenance Nikitas Baritakis and confirmed by the testimony of then President of OTE Mr. Nick Manasseh, 2001 stocks in telecommunications equipment OTE reached 100 billion. DR. Of these 40 billion drachmas had been billed as maintenance materials without the director responsible to have requested or ordered. The Administration of Mr. Nikos Manasis ordered investigation and instructed not to OTE to any commission before the material is exhausted (see filing Nikos Manasis the Inquiry Commission on 23.02.2010, p. 25., Deposit Nikitas Baritaki the Inquiry Commission on 25.02.2010, p. 10). - It is obvious that the continuous and unchecked commission OTE harmed the Greek state. Responsibility for this loss bring the management of OTE with CEO Mr. Lefteris Antonakopoulos, the directors-general of Technical Affairs (Mr. Christos Malapanis) and CSE / latory Committee (G. Georgitis) since 2002 should have shut the programmatic agreements to prepare the report results and send the Ministries of Transport and Communications and National Economy. The fact that there was no practical closing of the "Programmatic Agreement 8002" in 2002 was the year's end, led to continued implementation of the agreement and after this time limit. - The Management of Panagis Vourloumis continued to direct awards to Siemens. Analithos tabled by Mr Panagis Vourloumis the Inquiry Commission that by 2005, Siemens and Intracom were the main suppliers while after 2006 and "detox" has done, is not in the top ten suppliers of OTE (see deposit t . Panagis Vourloumis the Inquiry Commission, 01.03.2010, p. 181 et seq.) The official table suppliers OTE shows that from 2006 to 2009, during which he had supposedly done to "detox" from Siemens, the company still has a long involvement in the procurement of OTE with company Alfa SA KOPY E. (AK), a representative of Nokia in Greece, NOKIA

SIEMENS NETWORKS SA (Nokia). Specifically: o For 2006, the AK is third with 25,109,799 Euros o For 2007, the AK is fifth with 32,127,516 euros and Siemens AE seventh to 21,552,477 euros, o For the year 2008, the AK is third with 25,236,296 Euros and the Nokia sixth with 16,244,534 Euros o In 2009 the AK is fourth with 16,707,147 Euros. - The Administration Panagis Vourloumis did in 2004 using Article 10 of the "Programmatic Agreement 8002", that require cost accounting control over depth of six years, ensuring the return of premium to OTE. - It should be noted that Justice investigated allegations of infidelity against the Agency by members of the Board and others. - Specifically: - On 4.3.1993 prosecution brought by the Attorney flood / Athens own infidelity against members of the board of OTE Mr. Menes, Kioulafas, Tombros, Mandela Gkalonaki, George, bone, Anninos, partridges, Bernahard etc. - Infidelity on the service referred to the detriment of OTE, and the benefit according to the prosecutor pursued the perpetrators and the injury threatened OTE exceed 5,000,000 drachmas, because without competition, signed with the No. 7220 and 7230 Conventions with companies SIEMENS TILEVIOMICHANIKI Intracom SA and AE from these contracts because of the increased unit price, OTE has been - according to the prosecutor - damage 4,600,000,000 GRD GRD 5,400,000,000, respectively. - The Indictment No. 597/1993 of the Council of Athens Misdemeanors 23.2./93 defendants were exonerated from any category. - The Prosecutor Prosecutor George Zorbas conducted a preliminary examination and in June 1995 on its findings called for prosecution for those involved in the supply of 1,000,000 digital benefits OTE and suppliers. - In 1998 the case was filed after the Justice did not assess the existence of crime. - On 1.8.2001 brought by the Attorney flood / Con Athens prosecution for fraud in the profession and practice together and repeatedly against OTE's instigation, ypexagogi documents and infidelity against members of the board of OTE Messrs. Chrysolouri, Nikaki, Lambrou, bones, etc. Tsoukalidis to sign contracts that were not profitable and generally economically beneficial for OTE, were it not that the loss of the Agency exceeded the amount of GRD 50,000,000 - With Indictment No. 2058/2001 Council Appeals Athens, 10.10.2001 defendants were exonerated from any category. - On 27.1.2009 to Indictment No. 565/2009 the Court of Cassation issued a decision, which upheld the claim by Nikita Baritaki in OTE, which the former Head of D / Division Network Operations and Maintenance calling for restoration of money, adversely affecting the behavior of the company against him. - The decision vindicates Mr. Nikita Baritaki and ordering the reinstatement of the position held by OTE before removal. - Mr. Panagiotis Vourloumis refuses to execute the decisions of Justice. 2. Responsibilities Political Insider I. Anastasios Manteli President of OTE (1985-1988), General Secretary Ministry of Industry (09/1993-09/1995) Minister of Communications and Transport from (09/1997-04/2000) As the Minister has approved the "Programming Agreements 8002" on 23.12.1997 by Ministry

No. 82961 decision and accepted the honor that made OTE without checking the market prices. This action was required on the part of political power as it was - according to the art of the Second 1Av N.2246/1994 - supervision of the telecommunications sector. The endangerment of the public interest by specific agreement at this time point demonstrated by the following documents: - From the practical (7/12/1997) of the Negotiating Committee appointed by the management of OTE which shows that the basic principle of negotiation on prices were supplies of past prices. This event was unable to negotiate such a large and multi-task because the possibility of giving the supplier to do a little discount from the previous values. Through this process, the Agency asserted that ensure better prices and actually bought much higher than market prices. - The negotiation committee felt that for materials purchased by OTE for the first time, the prices agreed with suppliers should be the maximum temporary. This clause does not protect the public interest because it was clear that suppliers will not allow it to emerge lower values than the maximum temporary. The Commission should have done research international market for all materials needed by the OTE. Specifically it should have been addressed to other manufacturers as it was possible, because the argument that until then was digitized to 50% of OTE's network of both worlds and therefore not allowed to choose other technologies such compatibility is - as discussed above - unfounded. - The Board of Directors of OTE accepted and approved as such the proposal negotiable without further negotiation or investigation rates. Management Agency's left to run almost the entire year of expiry of the EEC directive to submit to the then Transport Minister Anastasios Manteli approval of programmatic agreements, so there is time to review or renegotiation. So OTE's management has planned and coordinated action to achieve a specific outcome that is the signature of program agreements between OTE and the companies Intracom and Siemens. These features were at the time of approval of this Agreement strong evidence for the existence of improvisation and delays will certainly affect the cost of the operational plan of OTE. Therefore, the screening of "Programmatic Agreement 8002" was a mandatory action for the then responsible Minister Anastasios Mandela, the responsibility of which was - according to Article 3 paragraph 2 para. 2 N. 2414/N.1996 - the tracking performance of the operational objectives of this Organization. The failure of supervision of the Minister may be linked to the process by which emvasthikan on behalf of about 250.000 . Specifically in September 1998 the best man Mr Anastasios Mandela, George Tsoungranis, opened an account with Dresdner Bank, Branch in Geneva, the name "Rocos". On 02.11.1998 emvasthikan this account 200,000 German marks from the "black funds" of Siemens and 250,000 German marks in February 2000. According to testimony, the money paid by sponsors Anastasios Manteli strengthening of the upcoming elections (see submission Mr George Tsoungrani the Inquiry Commission on 26.05.2010, p. 55). George Tsoungranis submitted that Mr. Anastasios Manteli admitted to him that the 200,000 German marks deposited in the account came from Siemens (see submission Mr George Tsoungrani the Inquiry Commission on 26.05.2010, p. 85 ). He added that the Swiss account was closed in 2007 and the money transferred into his account at Alpha Bank. (See submission Mr George Tsoungrani the Inquiry Commission on 26.05.2010, p. 129). It can persuade Mr. Anastasios Mandela, when depositing the Inquiry Commission that on the transfer of 200,000 DM in behalf of Mr George Tsoungrani in November 1998, received a phone call from an executive of Siemens, whose name remembers. This strain - according to his testimony - said he represents the administration of Siemens of Germany and that the company

wanted to strengthen the electoral of the race. Nor can convince that does not know where they came from the other 240,000 German marks (see filing Anastasios Manteli the Inquiry Committee on 26.5.2010, p. 186). Analithos testifies that former Minister was careful to order checks on the implementation of the clauses of the "Programmatic Agreement 8002 ', from which emerged that OTE had profit from this contract (see filing Anastasios Manteli the Inquiry Commission on 26.5. 2010, p. 322-323). The minutes of the Evaluation Committee which submitted to the Examination Committee by the former President of OTE Demetrios Papoulias concluded that there was no Cost control would lead to the activation of the clauses of the "Programmatic Agreement 8002". The process of transferring money to Swiss account Anastasios Manteli corresponds to the method of payment "bonus" from Siemens to ensure practices that would be favorable for the company (see minutes of meetings of the Office of Compliance Officers of Siemens with k Prodromos Mavridis and testimony of 26.7.2007 Jens Burgard's Bavarian crime prosecution service in Munich on 24/07/2007). Thus can be interpreted as the fact that the money transferred to the then Minister's account a year after the adoption by it of the "Programmatic Agreement 8002". The postdated payments would ensure the failure of supervision by Mr. Anastasios Manteli in implementing the agreement in order not to activate the safeguards in favor of OTE. According to the above it is evident that both remittances on behalf of the Minister of an illegal money from the "black funds" to Siemens. As it Mr. Anastasios Manteli admits some of that money were sent after 2000 in America to fill his son's tuition fee for postgraduate studies (see Memo apologetic Anastasios Manteli to the Appeals Council on 3.9.2010, p. . 41) Proposed to investigate further responsibilities. II. Christos Verelis Minister of Transport and Telecommunications (04/2000 - 03/2004) Until August 31, 2001 exercised the authority of OTE as required by law. The reason is that when a company the share of the Greek government has fallen below 50% ceases supervision of the competent Minister and now the company is managed under the provisions of Law 2190/1920. Mr. Christos Verelis failed to exercise its oversight responsibilities belonged to the under n.2246/1994. Features may be mentioned the fact that not reacted when Directors of OTE offered the then administration to not Cost Control in 2000 due to price stability, in violation of the "Programmatic Agreement 8002" (see document 62/1/13/2 / 2001). The fact also that the testimony of the then Minister considers that the audit firms, who even performed by the standard cost accounting controls cheated the Agency, indicate that Mr. Christos Verelis was aware of the approaches which were compared with the cost accounting controls . (See filing Christos Verelis the Inquiry Commission on 14.07.2010, p. 67). Especially as the question whether made no attempt to limit the powers to prevent the loss of OTE by improper performance of duties of Administration declined to answer (see filing Christos Verelis the Inquiry Commission on 14.07.2010, p. . 183). Note finally that it brought the supervisor's obligation, when they took no action when it found that the administration of L. Antonakopoulos not prepared closing minutes of programming agreements with exposure effect in 2002, that was the end of the year, so continue the "Programmatic Agreement 8002" and after 2002. Responsibilities attributed indirectly to Christos Verelis and the then Minister of Economy and Finance Nikos Christodoulakis. The latter in his testimony says the Ministry No. 393/2003 opinion of the State Legal Council, which interprets the Law 2414/1996 and concludes that it is possible to modify or change contracts after the recommendation of Administration utilities and

supervising Minister (see filing Nikos Christodoulakis to the Examination Board on 26.08.2101, p. 85). Proposed to investigate further responsibilities.

III. Yiannos Papantoniou, Minister of Economy and Finance (1996 - 2001) As Minister of Finance in accordance with Article 7 and the first N.2187/1993 21 paragraph 3 of Law 2733/1999 provided members of the Board of the Agency, which according to this analysis have caused damage to the OTE. As a responsible Minister did not follow the operation of the Agency as was required under Article 2 1Av Law 2246/1994, that through his actions, for example through removal of the members of the board of OTE, to protect the public interest. Moreover did not check requirements during the minister of OTE, did not check the progress of program agreements and therefore not protected the public interest by monitoring the implementation of the terms included the 8002 framework agreement with SIEMENS. Proposed to investigate further responsibilities.

IV. Nikos Christodoulakis Minister of Economy and Finance (2001 - 2004) Questions arise about the neglect of the duty supervisor who was under n.2414/1996. For if the meetings of the board of OTE parefrisketo representative of the Minister of Finance, who will probably tell him the differences and gaps regarding the cost accounting controls provided for in the "Programmatic Agreement 8002" did not initiate the possibilities of giving the Law 2414/1996. Specifically, the then Home Secretary attended as have been due - in accordance with Article 3 paragraph 2 of Law 2414/1996 - the state of implementation of orders, so if they found problems in implementation, to review how to make the sygkekrimenopy goal. Besides, as he presented the then Minister of the Inquiry Commission Act of 1996 gave him the opportunity after agreement of a service to modify or change contracts (see filing Nikos Christodoulakis, the Selection Committee on 26.08.2010 , p. 84-85). That did not check on the progress of the Programme Agreement 8002 and the application of protecting the interests of OTE's public shareholders. Not asked as a representative government and majority shareholder of OTE closing the program agreements in 2002 with a corresponding assessment of the economic effect. The original amount of the framework agreement has almost tripled over the minister and did not intervene in OTE's management, nor exercised control to protect the public interest and the interest of OTE. The supplements did not exercise any control when disclosed in a reserve stock in stores OTE of 150 billion drachmas Proposed to investigate further responsibilities.

V. Michalis Liapis Transport and Communications Minister (2004 - 2007).

The then Minister breached the duty of inspection was in accordance with Articles 7, 8 of n.3429/2005. Specifically: according to his testimony before the Committee of Inquiry, Mr. Michalis Liapis was as a member of the Interministerial Committee on Public Enterprises and Organizations, the right to review legality, ie the right and obligation to verify whether an action by the Administration of Public Utilities within the limits of the law (see filing Michalis Liapis the Inquiry Commission on 15.07.2010, p. 16). Contradicted the then Minister if in his testimony on the one hand accept that as Minister of Transport had control over the legality of OTE on the other claims that had only the authority (see filing Michalis Liapis the Inquiry Commission on 15.07. 2010, p. 100). From the interpretation of Law 3429/2005 shows that the state control over SOEs, which belonged OTE fall - among others - and the obligation of the Minister of Transport to confirm that OTE charged the current institutional framework (see . Articles 7, 8 n.3429/2005). Deliberately not claim Mr. Michalis Liapis, the role of the Ministry of Transport and Communications exhausted its institutional role. Namely that the Minister was only able to submit legislation to parliament for the broader field of telecommunications (see filing Michalis Liapis the Inquiry Commission on 15.07.2010, p. 122). Trying to shirk its responsibilities, the then Minister, when a question from Members about the legislative framework of Public Utilities, replied, that he could cancel tender awarded (see filing Michalis Liapis the Inquiry Commission on 15.07.2010, p. 100). For this case the legislative framework requires the Minister to monitor, if in sourcing from Siemens and undertake technical support it respected the legal procedures which would contribute to the strategic plans of OTE. That this control was not despite wealth of data for mismanagement of the Agency, for example the fact that out prakatartiki consideration against the board of OTE kakourgimatiki infidelity, proving breach of duty of the Minister, in exercise of statutory competence. Note that the end result of his testimony, Mr. Apostolos Baratsi the deceased now Linardatos had informed the then Minister for Transport Minister Michalis Liapis and the Secretary of the Cabinet Prof. Argyris Karras happening for OTE and for administrative action Mr Panayi Vourloumis (see submission Mr. Apostolis Baratsi the Inquiry Commission on 03.03.2010, p. 35). Proposed to investigate further responsibilities.

VI. George Alogoskoufis Minister of Economy and Finance (2004 - 2008). The then Minister of Economy and Finance, State, and that as the then Minister of Transport and Communications k.Michalis Liapis Committee of Ministers of Public Enterprises and Organizations to which the state control of utilities. So had this obligation to monitor the legality and feasibility of management actions OTE accordance with Articles 7, 8 Law 3429/2005. Specifically, the 8002 framework agreement went into force without a check of the terms and prices even though the closing years of programming have gone. Although the then Minister as representative government and majority shareholder of OTE had exercised the necessary control to implement the clauses would provide in-depth six years ie from 1998 all the premium and would protect in the best way the public interest as defined by clauses (Articles 8, 9, 10 of Programming). This does not mean that the check amounts to substitution of OTE's management, including former Minister claimed the Selection Committee. It is obvious that Mr. George Alogoskoufis

deliberately misinterpret the concepts of "administration" and "control" trying to justify his own failings (see submission Mr. George Alogoskoufis to the Examination Board on 31.08.2010, p. 91). That deliberately executed the task control is demonstrated by his testimony before the Committee of Inquiry, which stated that overall the effects of the administration of Panagis Vourloumis was in the interest of the Agency (see submission Mr. George Alogoskoufis to the Examination Board On 31.08.2010, p. 87) and adding that even confirmed as representative of the Greek government the appointment of Mr Panagis Vourloumis as CEO of OTE, although aware that pending charges against the Greek Justice. (See submission Mr George Alogoskoufis 31.08.2010, p. 86). And when the scandal broke out in 2006 by former Minister or directly requested by Mr. Panagiotis Vourloumis the implementation of cost accounting and control clauses to ensure the price premium for the benefit of the Greek government and OTE, even from 2000 onwards, turned or pay as it should, against SIEMENS claiming the damage suffered by the Greek government. The framework agreement and other public contracts with SIEMENS continued normally throughout the ministers without any control of prices and terms in OTE premium of approximately 65% (eg technical support). The minister, Mr. Alogoskoufis, the Greek Giorou government suffered its biggest loss due to the 8002 framework agreement, having twice had not claimed it as the price premium and is not required by SIEMENS legitimate claims uncovered by the scandal. Consequently, the then Minister of Finance through his actions and the non-exercise of its powers envisaged compulsory checks violated duties of his office. Proposed to investigate further responsibilities.

OSE 1. General comments The evaluation of deposits to the Examination Board of Supervisors policies were ministers in the signature and contract management of CIU Siemens, which developed in the previous section leads to two key findings: 1.1. The two Ministers of Transport and Communications who have dealt with the conventions of CIU Siemens gives a completely different picture of the pressures that have accepted to implement the specific contracts. Mr. Christos Verelis in testimony to the Commission of Inquiry reported that Siemens was pushing from all sides - even through the ambassador of Germany not to create OSE difficulties in implementing the relevant conventions (see filing Christos Verelis the Selection Committee on 14.10.2010, p.50). Unlike his successor, Mr. Michalis Liapis stressed that there has been no corresponding pressure on the company (see submission Mr. Michalis Liapis, the Inquiry Committee on 15.07.2010, p. 114). 1.2. Mr. Michalis Liapis during his testimony before the Inquiry Commission had denied that any meeting with executives of Siemens which reflected positively on the company. Denied also documents in the file stating meeting that had taken place by the then Minister of Economy and Finance Mr. George Alogoskoufis and Mr. Michael Christoforakos (see filing, Mr. Michalis

Liapis, the Inquiry Commission on 15.07.2010, p. 84). Additional reported that all the documents proving that the then Minister had friendly relations with Mr. Michael Christoforakos is unreliable (see filing Michalis Liapis the Inquiry Commission on 15.07.2010, p. 119). About his relationship with Mr. Michael Christoforakos testified that it was only ceremonial (see filing Michalis Liapis the Inquiry Commission on 15.07.2010, p. 136). As for the trip to Leipzig, where syntaxidepse by Michael Christoforakos said it was private and it was because the Greek National football struggled in certain cities of Germany (see filing, Mr. Michalis Liapis, the Inquiry Commission on 15.07 .2010, p. 168). 2. Responsibilities of politicians 2.1. "Programming Agreements" and "Term Contracts" Minister No. 33a, 39 and 41st 2.1.1. Christos Verelis, Minister of Transport and Telecommunications (2000 - 2004) Mr. Christos Verelis had during the ministries of the management of delays in deliveries of rolling stock as provided by the CP 33a, 39 and 41st. These contracts signed by the CIU Ventures, a member of which was the Siemens. The then Minister though - it seems that the correspondence - was aware of the problems that existed, failed to order an action to defend the interests of the CIU. These actions were part of the obligations was supervising Minister to monitor in accordance with Article 3 paragraph 2 of Law 2414/1996 of the implementation of the operational plan OSE. Examples: Failed to instruct to start renegotiating the amount of penalties than 7.5%, since there were delays of more than 150 days as provided in Article 10.1.a of program agreements. The response by Christos Verelis, to a question during testimony to the Select Committee that there was acceptance of renegotiation by counterparties ventures, not evidenced by documents in the file (see submission Christos Verelis the Inquiry Commission on 14.07 .2010, p. 255 256). Unlike the testimony of Mr Costa and Mr Dimitris Giannakou Karapanou that not even begun talks to renegotiate the amount of penalties (see filing Costas Giannakou the Inquiry Commission on 22.06.2010, p. 177 and Demetriou Karapanou the Selection Committee on 22.06.2010, p. 180). Mr. Christos Verelis not attempt to promote an alternative to the implementation of CP 41st already foreseen in the contract. It gave that command to complete the arrears portion of the project by another Greek company that had already been the subject (see Mr Efstathios Stephanopoulos tabling the Committee of Inquiry on 14.06.2010, p. 133). The then Minister for Transport approved the 2003 amendments to the CP, SE 33rd and 39 respectively, which - among others - had been accepted by the OSE as changing the place of manufacture of electric trains from Greece to Germany without a care to ensure that CIU equivalent return. Through the transfer of manufacturing abroad the government was losing the "domestic value added," that constituted the raison pension program agreements. It could certainly be assumed that the transfer of the place of manufacture was necessary to implement the Convention. But it is obvious that the determination of the contractual penalty of 1% of the total price of the contract, could not outweigh the loss was the Greek state from non-how, which was the construction, electric in Germany (see submission Dimitrios Roussopoulos the Inquiry Commission on 29.06.2010, p. 90). Although the 33rd Amendment of MS provided for the granting by the Consortium in the CIU eight (8) twin diesel trains and six (6) electric trains as equivalent, the latter are not handed anything (see filing Kingdom Tsimpidis the Inquiry Commission on 14.06 .2010, p. 66). The Minister of Transport took no action to enable the Agency to force the consortium to perform its contractual obligations.

Mr. Christos Verelis sent on 17.03.2003, while a letter to Mr Costa Giannaka stating that the Railway should initiate the proceedings for a declaration as deprived of all the contractors did not meet their obligations (see letter Christos Verelis a Costas Giannaka on 17.03.2003 with No. Protopresbyter: OIK/2184). But the next actions and especially his letter to the then Minister of Finance Nikos Christodoulakis, which asked him to move the proceedings for the forfeiture of the Supplier of SP / NPs 37th, it is clear that Mr. Christos Verelis sought the disqualification of the supplier only SP 37 SE 37th, which was the company TEMOESSA. For contracts where the supplier was and Siemens did not take any action. Particularly strange obsession by Christos Verelis to transfer its responsibilities regarding the deductibility of suppliers was in arrears to the then Minister of Finance Nikos Christodoulakis (see filing Christos Verelis the Inquiry Commission on 14.07.2010 , p. 149). According to the interpretation of article 16 paragraph 3 of Law 2446/1996, which was confirmed by the opinion number 393/2003 of the plenary of the Legal Council of State, responsible for the approval - and not signing, as apparently to escape the responsibilities of the claims in his statement the Minister (see filing Christos Verelis the Inquiry Committee on 14.7.2010, p. 100) the amendments to the CP, which include the discount suppliers, is the supervising Minister say in this case the then Transport Minister Christos Verelis. The Ministry of Economy and Finance as representative of the sole shareholder, that the Greek government had the power to approve or reject the decision of the Tribunal's Statute, which came as a proposal of the Board of OSE at the General Meeting. Motion for adoption by the General Meeting of shareholders a discount of supplier contracts where the contractor was and Siemens was never the Board of OSE. It is therefore obvious that if the then administration of the CIU and the supervising minister had the political will to deduce the contracts to which the supplier was and Siemens was the legal basis for its realization. With these shortcomings of the then Minister, who as supervisor Minister was responsible for the careful management of the assets of the CIU to diminish and therefore adversely affects the behavior of the Greek State is the sole shareholder of the Agency. Proposed to investigate further responsibilities. 2.1.2. Michalis Liapis Minister of Communications and Transport (2004 - 2007) The then President of the Railway Minister Costas Yiannakos sent to Michalis Liapis on 03.01.2005 letter informing him that the suppliers refused to pay penalties for delays in implementation of CP / ED or to deliver an equivalent material. Although Mr. Costas Yiannakos suggested renegotiating the amount of penalties in excess of 7.5% or declaration deposed suppliers, the then Minister took no action. The consequence of inaction by Mr Michalis Liapis was continued pending the completion of contract against the interests of the CIU. The minister Michalis Liapis and specifically on 16.01.2007 hired by the Greek Shipyards eight suburban railcars type for eight months the price of 850.000 per month. Train maintenance undertaken by Siemens Hellas at a cost of 250.000 per month. These trains were bought by the Greek shipyard on 16.12.2006 for the price of 10.000.000 and sold in autumn 2008 in MAN for about 10.000.000 (see filing Vassilios Tsimpidis the Inquiry Commission on 14.06.2010, p. 66-69). The juxtaposition of these numbers shows the damage of the OSE. The

Minister justified the Inquiry Commission approval given to this Convention, saying that officials of the Railway considered "reasonable" amount of rent (see filing, Mr. Michalis Liapis, the Inquiry Commission on 15.07.2010, p. 56; 57) In his attempt and document the hiring decision said that if the CIU buy diesel trains, would not know what to do, where to eight months would have electric trains (see filing, Mr. Michalis Liapis, the Inquiry Commission on 15.7.2010, p. 58). Obviously, the then Home Secretary thought the case of resale of trains, as did the Greek shipyards after the end of their lease by OSE. With this in active and omissions by the then Minister, who as supervisor Minister was responsible for the careful management of the assets of the CIU to diminish and therefore adversely affects the behavior of the Greek State is the sole shareholder of the Agency. Proposed to investigate further responsibilities.

2.2. Convention Suburban Three Bridges - Piraeus (Convention 994) 2.2.1. Christos Verelis, Minister of Transport and Telecommunications (2000 - 2004) During the ministries, namely in 2003 proclaimed the work to carry out public bidding for the construction of the Suburban from Three Bridges to Piraeus. Although as supervising Minister ought to be taken to control the terms of the proclamation, Mr. Christos Verelis omitted any action and allowed to carry out the competition with a perforated proclamation, which eventually fell by decision of the Council of State on 3.2.2006. Major deficiencies in environmental impact assessment, failure prediction of archaeological findings that will appear during the construction of the Suburban, and the legal uncertainties with respect to ownership regimes regions from which it passed the Suburban, indicate at least negligent preparation relevant documents. Surprising is the fact that Mr. Christos Verelis approved time of eight months in accordance with the declaration required to finish the project while it was certainly due to the particularities of the project to extend the deadline was given in advance. Incomprehensible is also authorizing the award of the project to the consortium of Siemens with a minimum discount of 0.964% while under the par.2v) and c) and paragraph 4 of art 24 of PD 609/85 Minister as Head of the Authority could cancel the auction. The objections of the then President of the CIU K. Giannakou that the discount was low because he had pressed the cost estimate the project does not prove (see filing Costas Giannakou the Inquiry Committee on 22.6.2010, p. 147). Through the approval of these Mr. Christos Verelis, who as supervisor Minister was responsible for the diligent management of assets of the CIU, the reduced and thus negatively affected the behavior of the Greek State is the sole shareholder of the Agency. Proposed to investigate further responsibilities.

2.2.2. Michalis Liapis, Minister of Communications and Transport (2004 - 2007) The ministers signed the contract between the CIU and the Consortium attended the Siemens for the project of the Suburban. Mr. Michalis Liapis approved the signing of the contract with 0.964% discount even though he had voted the n.3263/2004, which provided for reductions

from 18% to 35%. The Minister did not use the feature that was in accordance with Article 2 paragraph 2b n.3263/2004 to launch again the contest to benefit the Greek state from the lowest price. The loss of OSE is evidenced by the fact that if you add together one of the discount rate and this revision because of price change in the types of construction from 2003 to 2005, which reached 11%, finds that the project was finished off with a negative . The argument of Mr. Michalis Liapis, the epanaprokyrixi the competition would give rise to claims for compensation from the Consortium can not persuade (see filing, Mr. Michalis Liapis, the Inquiry Commission on 15.07.2010, p. 99). The reason is that even the payment of compensation be to the disadvantage relative to the benefit of having the government from epanaprokiryxi notice. Moreover, Mr. Michalis Liapis could go to epanaprokiryxi notice, because the contractor did not have the required certificate from the Law transparency. It is obvious that the delay has served the company. Beyond the application for interim measures by the rival company is not in itself a legitimate reason not to invite the consortium, says the then CEO of OSE in his testimony. It should also be noted that the period of 8 months to complete the project as defined in the contract because of the urgency is not there now, if the Olympics were over. So the project could epanadimopratithei the time limits were proposed by officials of the Railway. In his testimony, the then Minister stresses that the then Chairman of the Railway Minister Costas Yiannakos persuaded him orally that the project should not be re-announced and that neither the legal nor technical services said, one that this work should renegotiate or reannounced (see filing, Mr. Michalis Liapis, the Inquiry Commission on 15.07.2010, p. 99). Already this argument proves the utter lack of control and supervision of the Minister on such an important and expensive project. The proper approach of the Minister would be - and if possible consider the possibility epanaprokiryxis project - ask in writing the opinion of the competent services and not be content with a verbal assurance from the President of the CIU, which, naturally, would defend the process he had started. The decision of the fifth step of the Court as early as 17.11.2003, which had held that a period of eight months was short for the completion of the project, the questions of members of the Southwest as the opposition and the press on the subject of the award project are factors that should lead the Michalis Liapis the decision to consult on epanadimopratisi project. The failure of the respective actions of Mr. Michalis Liapis, who as supervisor Minister was responsible for the careful management of assets of the CIU, leading to lowering of. Consequently, the then Minister harmed by the conduct of the Greek State is the sole shareholder of the Agency. Proposed to investigate further responsibilities.

2.3. Contract for supply of Digital Communication System for Railway (GSM-R) 2.3.1. Responsibilities Michalis Liapis Minister of Communications and Transport (2004 - 2007) During the ministries launched the project for supply of OSE with a digital communication system (GSM-R). Mr. Michalis Liapis, but did not mind it - or ignore - the difference the project budget between departments of the CIU. While that is the Railway Technical Services estimated that the price for the supply of GSM-R for 2,020 km would reach 40.000.000 , the notice stated that the supply of GSM-R for 730 km would cost 60.000.000 . There are no official documents of the institutions of the CIU to justify this difference. In his testimony, Michael Liapis claims ignorance about the evolution of the budget (see filing Liapis 15.7.2010, p. 159). Already this

assumption prove negligent supervision of Mr. Michael Liapis in connection with the completion of his obligations as a minister. Questions posed by the lateness of the licensing of frequencies for GSM-R, for which it took fourteen months. Although the application was in October 2006 the administration of the beneficiary frequency ie EDISY was in January 2008. From the permit process indicates that there was political will to delay the approval of the license to EDISY (see filing Elias Talamagka the Inquiry Committee on 30.6.2010, p. 19-23). It is also understood the reason why the contract for supplying the digital communication system is not contained and terminals, while it is obvious that without terminals the system could not operate. The omission of Mr. Michalis Liapis to investigate a question and to take appropriate action leads to the CIU is now totally dependent on the Siemens and virtually compelled to obtain from it the terminals to which the GSM-R can be work. Thus the failure of the respective actions of Mr. Michalis Liapis, who as supervisor Minister was responsible for the diligent management of assets of the CIU, leading to lowering of. The Minister has damaged the behavior of the Greek State is the sole shareholder of the Agency. Proposed to investigate further responsibilities. C4i 1. Yiannos Papantoniou Minister of National Defence (2001 - 2004) Although he was responsible - the power - to implement the delegation of the C4I denies that he had knowledge and therefore it followed the procedure. He claims that if there were ignoring margins autonomous policy actions of the then Minister of Public Order Minister Evangelos Malesiou and leaves unclear whether there was disagreement between him and the then Minister of Public Order Minister Michalis Chrysohoidis about who had the full authority and control procedures ( See submission Mr Yannos Papantoniou on Committee of Inquiry on 03.05.2010, p. 92). At this point it should be noted that the responsibility for the composition of the Evaluation Committee made preparations for the signing of the contract C4I had the Ministry of Defence Ethynikis (see submission Mr Evangelos Malesiou the Inquiry Commission on 11.05.2010, p. 128-130). Contradictory is also the testimony of the Minister regarding the integrity of the C4I contract signed in the days since a correct assessment of government action to terminate, although ultimately views it as advantageous to the Greek State (See submission by Mr Yannos Papantoniou the Selection Committee 03.05.2010, p. 123, 133). In conclusion: although in his testimony admits that as Minister of National Defence had substantial responsibility for implementing the Act (see submission Mr Yannos Papantoniou on 03.05.2001, p.30), did not follow procedures as the ultimate guarantor of compliance Law and demonstrated so negligent in the performance of the specific ministerial responsibilities. Proposed to investigate further responsibilities. 2. George Voulgarakis Minister of Public Order (08/03/2004 to 02/14/2006) Although over substantive Minister, poorly monitored the progress of the contract C4I. As he

submitted to two - at least - showed cases of ignorance and indifference regarding the pursuit of his official duties. Specifically: in April 2005 made the political decision to proceed in the process of renegotiating the contract C4I. He was not able to justify why it took the decision despite the fact that they had done tests showing that the system could not produce the desired result. The general and vague references on the strategically important meeting which decided to renegotiate, the contradictions about who took the final decision (see testimony of Mr. George Voulgarakis the Inquiry Commission on 12.05.2010, p. 47 and 131 ) and without substantiation relied on the opinions of legal advisers of the Ministry (see testimony of Mr. George Voulgarakis the Inquiry Commission on 12.05.2010, p. 44 and 156) show significant omissions in the exercise of state power. The omission of evidence and that part of his testimony where he says ignorance about a letter he sent in December 2004 the then Minister of Defence Mr. Spilios Spiliotopoulos. In it he pointed out violations of the procedure for impairment in value of the provisional acceptance of the C4I system and proposed revision of the decision KYSEA. (See testimony of Mr. George Voulgarakis the Inquiry Commission on 12.05.2010, p. 162, see testimony of Mr. Spili Spiliotopoulos the Inquiry Commission on 02.09.2010, p. 38, letter to Mr. Spili Spiliotopoulos Mr. George Voulgarakis on 15/12/2004). If the claim of the Minister, that we do not read such an important letter is true, it turns out that the way of the ministerial functions exceeding the limits of negligence. In his testimony, Mr. George Voulgarakis, but relies pressures of the international community to secure Olympic Games, hides meetings with U.S. Ambassador (see confidential letter to Mr. Chris Markogiannaki Mr. George Voulgarakis on 06/23/2004) and blackmails American terms for payment of 31.000.000 , which were not paid to SAIC by the previous government after the failure of the exercise IET3 (see testimony of Mr. George Voulgarakis the Inquiry Commission on 12.05.2010, p. 27-28). The former Minister did not mention the fact that after the Olympics and particularly on 28.11.2004 should and could - according to the contract - to initiate the procedure for revocation of SAIC. Despite vague statements in his testimony (see testimony of Mr. George Voulgarakis the Inquiry Commission on 12.05.2010, p. 67-72) the briefs of DAOA - for example those dated 4.10.2004 and 8.10.2004 - and letter from Mr George Zorba the 01.10.2004 show that Mr. George Voulgarakis knew or at least ought to be aware of the inadequacy of the systems. Although in many parts of the testimony sought to renounce their responsibilities (see testimony of Mr. George Voulgarakis the Inquiry Commission on 12.05.2010, p. 79-81), documents DAOA had addressed the same show a different picture. While - for example - the Commission receives a letter from 26.11.2004 recommended the disqualification of SAIC, the DAOA through documents, on 30.11.2004, did not accept the suggestion. Then the GDDIA / MOD a letter dated 13.1.2005, rejected the request of Mr. Chris Markogiannaki six-month extension. This document was known to the then Minister. So Mr. George Vougarakis was aware of all these processes. In addition to the deposit (see deposit Minister George Voulgarakis the Inquiry Committee on 12.5.2010, p. 82, 153), the then Minister concealed the truth in terms of testing the system took place in April 2005. These tests were only the individual subsystems of C4I. There were generally trials the period 2004 and 2005, and the tests conducted in sub demonstrated the inadequacy of C4I. (See document DAOA of 5.4.2005 to GDDIA / MOD and letter of 28.5.2005 DAOA to SAIC). Finally, while Mr. George Voulgarakis stressed the degree of development of some Subsystems not mention that: the overall functionality of the system

reached 10-20%, interoperability 5-10%, the CDSS was inappropriate and that the TETRA showed significant deviations. Continued reports of the Minister's actions Christos Markogiannaki an indication that there was interest on the part of the information on the evolution of the Convention C4I (see testimony of Mr. George Voulgarakis the Inquiry Commission on 12.05.2010, p. 178) show the offending - by omission - conduct in the performance of his duties on a contract in the amount of 255.000.000 . This conduct of Mr George Voulgarakis was objectively able to hurt the state because the renegotiation of the contract and the non-deductibility of SAIC led to damage of the government. Proposed to investigate further responsibilities.

3. Byron Polydoras Minister of Public Order (2006-2007) Regarding the test / demo system held on 1.7.2004 Mr Byron Polydoras acknowledged that the show failed and explained in this way Mr. Chris Markogiannaki, who as Minister of Public Order was responsible for the outcome of the Convention C4I (see submission Mr Byron Polydoras the Inquiry Commission on 07.06.2010, p. 12-13). With the amendment number 5 of the contract signed by Byron Polydoras as Minister of Public Order on 29.3.2007 came the biggest change since the launch of the tradition in C4I subsystem. Thereby effectively abolished the requirement of the Convention of 2003, that the delivery system should be done with "turnkey" and ruled de facto control of system interoperability. This amendment is contrary to the interests of the Greek government, because - as stated in the prospectus of the Technical Division on 16.5.2006 to the then Minister - thus were given the opportunity to SAIC to complete its work, which in the main deficiencies could not be received as a single, interoperable. The decision of the Minister of 11.09.2006 be amended in this way the contract was not taken into account the letter of the Technical Division of 04.07.2006. In this stated that interoperability and the uniform system are key parameters that would allow the receipt of the safety system with "turnkey". In his testimony, Mr. Byron Polydoras gave no explanation for why it has proposed and signed a receipt every subsystem. Relied on vague, like Mr Chris Markogiannakis, extortion by SAIC. (See submission Mr Byron Polydoras the Inquiry Commission on 07.06.2010, p. 18-28). With regard to negotiations on amending the Convention Mr. Byron Polydoras testified that his predecessors were committed to go to it, thereby exposing Mr. Chris Markogiannaki. Fact is, it followed the same policy and used the same persons in the negotiations without taking into account that the C4I was unfit to be received. At the same time accepted the terms of SAIC and Siemens. The inadequate preparation of the amendment to the contract evidenced by the fact that President corresponding Negotiations Committee was appointed on 30.8.2006 with decision of the Minister of the then Deputy Police Commissioner Nicholas Soupionis whose position was no - in accordance with DPR 274/89 - incompatible . The reason was that Mr. Nicholas Soupionis served as Chairman of the C4I Pick an earlier phase of the contract. The argument of Mr. Byron Polydoras that he knew that Mr Nicholas Soupionis was president and former membership of

this Commission is not persuaded. He's then Minister claimed that there were few officers who dealt with this subject. (See submission Mr Byron Polydoras the Inquiry Commission on 7.6.2010, p. 45-47, 127-129). Contradicts Mr. Byron Polydoras in his testimony regarding the application of action SAIC to arbitration (see submission Mr Byron Polydoras the Inquiry Commission on 7.6.2010, p. 78-81). The fact that the Greek government was drawn into the process of negotiating three (3) years, which served only to SAIC, discredit the strong legal position of the Greek government towards it, since - as demonstrated by its actions - the company was unable to meet the requirements the contract. (See note to the Directorate of Technical SAIC on 16/05/2006). Although many documents show that the delays in the project was solely responsible SAIC (see example letter dt / ATC Counsel in the Ministry of Public Order), the then Minister tolerate blackmail by Vice the company to resume negotiations while the appeal of SAIC to arbitration (see letter dated 29.04.2007 of the Deputy SAIC to Mr. Byron Polydoras). Mr. Byron Polydoras gives no convincing answer to why not declared deposed by the company, after the correspondence with SAIC that the C4I was inoperable and why concealed the exhortations of the MOD for immediate action to KY.SE.A. (See submission Mr Byron Polydoras the Inquiry Commission on 07.06.2010, p. 105-108). About the secret decision of 11.9.2006, which outlined the terms of the contract amendment, the then Minister of concealed, that the segmentation and delivery of the C4I subsystem returned by the corresponding letter of guarantee to SAIC, provided that the company asked insistently since 2004. Concealed that the SAIC through the use of arbitration in 2006 blackmailing the negotiating process and even stated that if we did not enjoy a favorable modification will not withdraw its application. In his testimony, Mr. Byron Polydoras silent, there was suggestion (see initiator 2004-1/17/47/6i/1-9-2006) stating that there were reactions from the natural leaders of ELAS on amending the Convention (see submission Mr Byron Polydoras the Inquiry Commission on 07.06.2010, p. 9799, 108-110). Despite what he said in his testimony, the then Minister (see submission Mr Byron Polydoras the Inquiry Commission on 07.06.2010, p. 18-28) the plan of the fifth amendment, which the Ministry has forwarded to the Court for judicial review did not include a clause constituents. The clause was imposed on the Court, which under the Act No. 26/2007 returned the original text of the contract to the Ministry and asked to include the term interoperability of C4I (Fri V. of Act 26/07 and Article . 8.9 of the contract). According to the Court, if the final receipt was not achieved interoperability needed to implement the provisions of the Convention, namely to become the Supplier Discount. The allegation of Mr. Byron Polydoras the Subsystem 16 (AVL) function does not correspond to the truth (see submission Mr Byron Polydoras the Inquiry Commission on 07.06.2010, p. 25). The AVL was totally inappropriate since 2004. On 05.04.2007 the Acceptance Committee informed SAIC essential deviations of the subsystem (2004/10/20/31/13-md/05.04.2007 Document Delivery Committee), which the company has not accepted (07-03688/27.4.2007 Document SAIC). The Commission having, and the report of the Technical Advisors (5/18/2007 Report Technical Advisors) dismissed the Subsystem 16 (2004-00/6/2-kv/6-6-2007 Protocol Rejection Subsystem 16 (AVL)). The company is not appealed within five (5) days of the Protocol, as specified in Annex B of the contract. The Directorate of Technical ignored rejects protocol and timing requested by the Company for the rehabilitation of the main differences

2004-1/17/47/16-rlst/21.6.2007 letter dt / ATC to SAIC). Such a schedule that SAIC did not make before. The then Minister of National Defence, Mr. Panagiotis Hinofotis denied receiving subsystem 16. The reason was that having considered the Rapporteur proposal receipt, found that the alleged minor deviations of the system was effective, because it affects the interoperability of the subsystem, and overall system security C4I (See filing Panagiotis Hinofotis the Inquiry Commission on 08.02.2010, p. 41). Eventually the AVL paralipteo included as the final protocol of 14.11.2008 and is down from 3.10.2009 because - among others - no trained staff. Inaccurate was the testimony of Mr. Byron Polydoras on the receiving subsystem 17 (Network Traffic Management) (see submission Mr Byron Polydoras the Inquiry Commission on 07.06.2010, p. 25). Although SAIC outset had installed the module on a technical system, which rendered impossible the delivery of the then Minister of the renegotiated in a manner that was installed by the company and not to create nodes, as in the original contract a technical information that would lead to safer operation. On receipt of the subsystems 14 (Ports) and 15 (Coast Guard vessels) Mr. Byron Polydoras not mention that during the negotiation process for the years 2005 and 2006 they were conditional on the cradle construction because the tests of 2005 were unfit to be received (see submission Mr Byron Polydoras the Inquiry Commission on 07.06.2010, p. 91). On whether there was inconsistency in accordance with Article 16 PD 284/79, for Mr. Vasilatos, who while a member of the Negotiations Committee was both a member of the Committee on Delivery of Subsystems for the Coast Guard, the then Minister replied that "it has no knowledge or comment" (see deposit t . Vyron Polydoras the Inquiry Commission on 07.06.2010, p. 90). Difficult this claim can be accepted. Responsibilities also the then Minister for the reception subsystem 20 (TETRA). Once the Commission receives a protocol of 25.5.2007 dismissed the receipt of a subsystem and a digital radio Electronic equipment was called on 26.05.2007 at the Ministry of Public Order in a meeting with Mr. Gregory Doumentziano, former chairman of the receipt, Konstantinos Katavati , Legal Adviser of the Ministry and Mr. Kosti Aelianus, General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order. The above requirement - even with threats and degrading expressions - from members of the Commission to revoke rejects protocol, which has not happened. (See submission Mr Gerasimos Vasilatou the Inquiry Commission on 22.03.2010 p. 212 and see filing Dimitris Maravelia the Inquiry Committee on 15.4.2010 p. 96). Although Mr. Byron Polydoras in his testimony said ignorance of the act of the General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order (see submission Mr Byron Polydoras the Inquiry Commission on 07.06.2010, p. 94) can hardly be persuaded that this coordinated action by senior members of his Ministry had the approval, if not the motivating. The defect management of public property by Mr. Byron Polydoras evidenced by the fact that the Minister dioristheisa Arbitration Committee received the TETRA one month after discharge on 29.06.2007, after evaluating the different existing Report acceptance of the subsystem. The Appeals Board that was - according to the approved protocol and testimony - statements by expert advisers that the government system works, without making the same in control mode (see filing Panagiotis Kotti the Inquiry Commission on 04.05.2010 , p. 153). By decision of the Byron Polydoras 8.7.2007 approved the - through the above organize - receipt of TETRA released letters of the company value 5.936.825 and 19.998.607 . Proposed to investigate further responsibilities.

4. Prokopis Pavlopoulos Home Secretary (2007-2009) Reports on the seventh amendment to the contract shifted to education, having received final security system is inaccurate and designed to mislead about the source signature (see Mr. Prokopios Pavlopoulos submission to Commission of Inquiry on 08.06.2010 , p. 166-169). Until the fifth amendment was accepted that education in sub 8 to 30 was an obligation of the company. Therefore the training of users, and managers for Partition 1 7 (CDSS) will have been completed before drafting the final protocol of receipt of C4I. This action was not made until the summer of 2008 that began the process of testing of subsystems. While the Technical Advisor reports have indicated the inadequacy of the CDSS Acceptance Committee did not take them into account and proceeded on 14.10.2008 to receiving subsystems 1-7. Because the fifth amendment contained a condition required the company to train its staff, could not be final protocol received. For this reason, the then Minister signed the seventh amendment to the contract to allow for the overall delivery of the C4I. It is obvious that Mr. Prokopios Pavlopoulos not handled with due attention to public property, which was diepistefmeni in his capacity as Minister. Proposed to investigate further responsibilities.

5. Chris Markogiannakis Deputy Minister of Public Order (2004-2006) Deputy Interior Minister with competence in matters of public policy (9/1/2009-10/10/2009) I. Incorrectly submits that the C4I system was rejected in 2005 after 6-month process. In the letter dated 12.10.2005 DAOA to GDDIA / MOD (document ar.Prot. 2004-00/3/13/2ia) that was sent and the then Deputy Minister stated that the tests were completed on 04.02.2005 (see submission Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 26.04.2010, p. 20). Analithos also tabled by the then Secretary to the Technical Consultants BOARTES had not submitted reports on the progress of the project (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 26.04.2010, p. 30). As is clear from the documents the technical consultants BOARTES (2004-30/27/2-2rxd/13/6/2004 report BOARTES, 2.7.2004 Report BOARTES, 200450/1/10-rlg/2/7 / 2004 Report BOARTES) had provided: a) reports on trials in various sub b) to assess the performance IET-3 and "rigged" demonstration of 1/7/2004. From all these reports clearly show that the C4I was not suitable to be used. In contrast to the testimony of former Secretary of State (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 26.04.2010, p. 37), the then Minister of Defence Mr. Spilios Spiliotopoulos was the one who appealed to the Court and not the lawyers SAIC . The Spilios Spiliotopoulos called at his request on 19.09.2005, the withdrawal of the Ministry Number. 8 / 2005 Act the Court to prevent disbursement of 63.109.140 and paid for projects related to C4I. Eventually the arrest was considered by the Court on the grounds of "excusable error" of those who signed the agreement (see No. 16is/17-11-2005 Ministry Decision of the Court). Mr. Chris Markogiannakis testified that throughout the period constituted Acceptance Committee with specific officers (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 26.04.2010, p. 46-47). He asserts, therefore, in this way that the faces of his colleagues met the provisions of Article 16 of Decree 284/89 'incompatibility' where they had served as members in more than

one committee of the same work (Negotiation and Acceptance). The testimony of then Secretary of State, that in 2004 signed a memorandum on the provisional acceptance of C4I, because in testing the system in early July found "that could offer important things in the state it was at that time" is insufficient and partially inaccurate ( See submission by Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 26.04.2010, p. 56). The agreement with SAIC for provisional acceptance finalized - before deciding the KY.SE.A - on 01.07.2004 and signed without taking into account: i. The Acceptance Committee and technical advisors to BOARTES exposure were evaluated negatively resumed the exercise IET-3. ii. The demonstration of C4I by SAIC on 01.07.2004 had negative results, as evidenced by the reports of Commissioners and Acceptance Report BOARTES. iii. Subsystems 1-7 of CDSS were not developed and there was only partial interoperability independent operation. It appears from the reports of the Committee members, members of the Committee and the Olympic Delivery Security Centre knew nothing about the demonstration of 01/07/2004. Unlike were ordered in the evening before to attend the demonstration as observers. (See Memorandum of 07.07.2004, the No. 1 Decision Meeting 9is/21-7-2004 KYSEA, the F.600/AP 45070 S.9/28-7-2004 Letter Defence Minister k . Spilios Spiliotopoulos, the 04-2186 (CA-04301) / 30-7-2004 letter from SAIC, the 04-2191/2-8-2004 letter from SAIC, the letter 04-2231/98-2004 SAIC, 04-02462/17-9-2004 letter to SAIC, the F.600/AD 110736S35/30-9-2004 document GDDIA / MOD and F.600/AD 131405S1037/1-10-2004 document Giorgos Zorbas see also submission Spiliotopoulos 2.9.2010, p. 37, stressing that the decision of 21.07.2004 KY.SE.A not implemented). The then Secretary filed analithos KY.SE.A that covered all the changes that were made in the contract. In his testimony, Mr. Christos Markogiannakis concealed that the fourth amendment to the agreement legalized the direct assignment project (upgrading police headquarters) amounting to 7.100.000 DIEKAT and incorporated as an additional module in the C4I (the 22A) (see 06/30/2004 Statement by evaluating the performance targets reassessed IET-3 Pickup Commission, the No. 04-1994/30-06-2004 Letter SAIC, Twelve (12) Review Commission Members Receipt of P.S . and the Olympic Security Centre on the demonstration of C4I on 7.1.2004, the Exhibition of 2004-50/1/10-rlg/2-7-2004 BOARTES, 07/07/2004 by the Memorandum between the Ministry of Public Order and SAIC). Analithos also testified that the SAIC insisted on making the dress rehearsal on 01.10.2004 (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 26.04.2010, p. 57). The date was decided by the KY.SE.A after his presentation whether he knew he first had to test the sub, which had not happened. Although KY.SE.A decided these procedures until 01.10.2004, changed the procedures under the responsibility of the Minister and others who favored the SIEMENS. It is noted that it was directly assigned to uninstall without his equipment has been tested. Inaccurately filed, the then Secretary of State that in April 2005 in SAIC told him that the Greek government can not accept the system C4I (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 26.04.2010, p. 58). From the correspondence that Mr Chris Markogiannakis negotiated in accordance with the terms and conditions laid down by the company SAIC. From

the documents before it that the actions of the Ministry of Public Order and especially the handling of the matter by the then Secretary of State had not legitimizing basis. Specifically: A) Despite the finding that the C4I was inappropriate since the period of the Olympic Games in SAIC's fault though not initiated the proceedings for the deposed company. B) were given incorrect information on the development of subsystem MOD without any tests on them. C) The Secretary then sent to SAIC KY.SE.A draft decision concerning the amendment of the Convention. The SAIC responded by setting new conditions. Mr. Chris Markogiannakis accepted the recommendation of Mr. Sotirios Tsene for 18 month extension to declaring the deposed SAIC (see 2004-00/3/13/1-mz/19-3-2005 DAOA letter to SAIC, F. 600/319445.S.768/30-3-2005 document GDDIA / MOD, 2004-00/3/13/1-xa/5-4-2005 document DAOA, CA-05-386/18-4-2005 Letter SAIC to Chris Markogiannaki, 2004-00/3/13/1-oi/28-4-2005 document DAOA, 2004-00/3/13/1-rkv/1-7-2005 DAOA recommendation to Mr. Chris Markogiannaki, 2004-00/3/13/1-rkg/30-6-2005 document DAOA, 168/2005 Opinion Counsel MoD). He filed inaccuracies about the climate that prevailed in the negotiations on amending the contract. Accepted as "correct" the company's claim to receive the C4I per module, knowing that this provision had the effect of repealing the term of the original contract on receipt of the 'keyin-hand. " Reasons for the direct assignment of the police headquarters building in engineering company DIEKAT renaming it to "module" (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 26.04.2010, p. 66-68). II. From the documents that Mr Chris Markogiannakis negotiating with SAIC-SIEMENS DIEKAT and without examining the legality of actions and the fact that a stronger position of SAIC, where the negotiations took place under the conditions and requirements posed by the company. Specifically: A) The then Secretary of State negotiated with SAIC and DIEKAT companies and gave a direct award to upgrade the building of police headquarters cost 7.100.000 . The project came as a subsystem Subsystem to the fourth amendment of the Convention and incorporated in C4I. B) The SAIC was pushing for an agreement that the acceptance of C4I be done at the subsystem to return the corresponding letters without a substantive response to pressure. C) The TETRA showed significant differences. D) Acceptance Committee has recommended deprived the SAIC. This suggestion was not accepted and ordered to continue its work. Delivered an opinion in favor of continuing the Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Public Order Minister Costas Katavati. C) Mr. Chris Markogiannakis accepted the recommendation of DAOA for immediate need money by then its actions, since DAOA moving through the bounds of legality. This fact proves that it never took into account the decision of KYSEA and remarks of the Minister of National Defence (See 2004-00/3/13/2-ith/14-10-2005 Committee document receipt, 2004-00/3/13 / 2ke/21-10-2005 Committee document receipt, letter from Mr. Chris 3657.v/26-10-2005 Markogiannaki at SAIC, 2004-1/17/47-rlv/7-11-2005 DAOA document, the recommendatory note from 12/03/2005 to DAOA Christos Markogiannaki).

F) Mr. Chris Markogiannakis concealed the truth about the sub received as deputy Interior Minister in 2009, stating that it had "no stimulus" for the fact that they were not working (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the Select Committee on 26.04.2010, p. 69). Ministers Panagiotis Hinofotis and Prokopis Pavlopoulos had refused in 2008 receiving subsystem 14. Unlike approved the receipt of Subsystem in 2009 and released two letters of SAIC worth 2.797.903, 62 and 3.802.022, 67 . G) Upon receipt of Subsystems 1-7 (CDSS) and C4I globally by the Commission, the then Minister convened a meeting at the Ministry of Interior. Although the minutes of the meeting showed that there was a problem overall effectiveness of C4I, by resolution approved the receipt of Subsystems 1-7 (CDSS) and returned to SAIC bonds totaling 11.158.065,14 . H) The Minister presented false facts about the time of the C4I security covered by the 5th amendment (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 26.04.2010, p. 76) since the warranty had expired C4I equipment to 30.10.2006, ie before the signing of the fifth amendment and maintenance-support of all the subsystems C4I and TETRA ended at 30.09.2009 with the exception of some subsystems of the CDSS for which there was a two year warranty from date of receipt (see 020A / 03 agreement - the fifth amendment). Also submitted incorrect information in relation to the receipt and function of AVL Subsystems and CDSS (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 26.04.2010, p. 82). The Minister knew that the AVL was rejected by the Commission in 2007 due to essential differences. He also knew that did not meet provisions of the contract and the provisions of PD 284/1989. The action to include AVL by the Commission in the final protocol, as paralipteo is illegal. He also knew that the subsystems of CDSS has never worked and do not work to achieve total interoperability of C4I. He also knew that after the seventh amendment was not trained to operate and support the CDSS. He was known to the receiving Subsystems 1-7 (CDSS) was made by the Commission without taking into account the reports of the Technical Advisors of the Ministry, under which they were unfit to be received. As for the bonds misled the Selection Committee, after approving the receipt returned to SAIC equal guarantees, letters after deduction of impairment and the reservations he had about "the burden of the response system," these were the Final Protocol and rather than singly protocols (see 2004-00/6/2-kv/6-62007 Protocol Reject H / S 16 (AVL), Final Acceptance Protocol System C4I (14-11-2008), Protocols Collection Subsystems 1 -7 (CDSS)). I) On the functioning of the CDSS in the ambulance, Mr Chris Markogiannakis accepted the argument that the SAIC CDSS would work wonderfully, but does not operate any employee of the ambulance by efthynofovia (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the Commission of Inquiry to 26.04.2010, p. 95). Correspondence with the ambulance, however, shows that although the staff has been trained, the CDSS is not working. The Minister further submitted inaccuracies regarding the functionality of subsystems and the interoperability of the system C4I which he defended (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 26.04.2010, p. 140-141). To disprove the reports of the Technical Advisors, the Commission's report of receipt of the CDSS during testing of the subsystem 2008 and the technical report that it was inappropriate for the C4I receipt (see Reports of Technical Advisors Rigogianni / Kampourakis / churn in terms of functionality the CDSS and the interoperability of C4I). I) Mr. Chris Markogiannakis assessed as blackmail the behavior of SAIC, when the company after 28.5.2004 were not able to deliver the system (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the

Inquiry Commission on 26.04.2010, p. 160 -161). Instead of exploiting the weakness of the SAIC to the exchequer, has worked for the company's operations, such as the repetition of the failed exercise IET-3, the signing of a Memorandum and recommendations to KY.SE.A for provisional acceptance of C4I. K) The Minister submitted inaccurate information about the individual and interoperability of subsystems, maintenance and warranty (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 26.04.2010, p. 166-167) since it made no reference the negative technical reports Rigogianni / Kampourakis / churn and moved to the logic of "misled the Minister," citing the trust had on business partners of Mr. Nicholas and Mr. Gerasimos Soupioni Vasilatos and included in the warranty, maintenance and support of all subsystems, although he knew that guaranteed under the 5th Amendment - was only for Subsystems 1-7 (CDSS). He knew of course that since it had not approved the final protocol received by him, the relevant provisions are not applicable (see art 15.1., 15.1.1, 15.1.2, 15.1.3, 16.1, 16.1.1, 16.1.2, 16.1.3 Convention after the 5th amendment). III. A) The interpretation of Mr. Chris Markogiannakis given on the process of negotiations with SAIC for the redesign of Partition 1 7 (CDSS), namely that the government rejected the proposals, not confirmed by the facts (see deposit Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 26.04.2010, p. 191-195). The documents show that the pressures of SAIC were related to failure to meet agreed and the delay in amending the contract. For this reason the company used the arbitration and withdrew its request in 2007 that a few days before the fifth amendment of 29.03.2007. The compliance of the then Deputy Minister to the pressures of SAIC finds no basis in facts regarding the complete inadequacy of C4I. Nevertheless he was quoted giving the company time and legal arguments (see SAIC CA-05-386/18-4-2005 letter to Mr. Chris Markogiannaki, 2004-00/3/13/1-rkv/1-7 -2005 rapporteur Mr Sotirios Tsene to Mr. Chris Markogiannaki, 2004-00/3/13/2-ia/12-10-2005 document DAOA, CA-06-446/9-1-2006 SAIC letter to Mr. Chris Markogiannaki, 4/21/2006 By action of SAIC in Arbitration, 20041/17/47/4-rxe/4-7-2006 letter D / Engineering Division Counsel in the Ministry of Public Order). B) Mr. Chris Markogiannakis gave inaccurate information about the negotiation of a direct award to upgrade the police headquarters in DIEKAT (Subsystem 22nd) (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 26.04.2010, p. 202-203). As is clear from the minutes of the Committee of Evaluation and Monitoring Project C4I January 2004 the Commission under the then Deputy Minister of Public Order Mr. Tsertikidi agreed with SAIC cost of police headquarters (22A) to the amount of 7.000.000 . For three months, SAIC, exploiting the election period did not begin its work after the elections, on 19.03.2004 has submitted a new offer of 7.400.000 . On 23.03.2004 the Commission met with the president Mr. Chris Markogiannaki, renegotiated the module 22A and agreed with SAIC in the amount of 7.100.000 . Therefore, the SAIC, although he had breached the agreed, benefited by 100.000 . In his testimony and the then Secretary of State has not explained why the fourth amendment to the contract was signed in August 2004 concerned only the 22A and not what decided the KY.SE.A (see 1183/26-3-2004 Practical Assessment Committee and Monitoring Project C4I, 200400/3/13/1-kg/7-2-2005 recommendatory note from Mr Nicholas Soupioni / Sotirios Tsene to Mr. Chris Markogiannaki). C) The Secretary then filed false information to justify its decision on provisional acceptance of C4I and continued negotiations with the company (see filing Markogiannaki 27.4.2010, p. 2134). From Practical Integration Exercise IET-3 of 11/3/2004 that the Exercise O-3 failed to fourteen (14) by twenty (25) goals. The twelve (12) failures due to SAIC and two (2) the

unavailability of Olympic Venues. The exercise was designed to examine the development of subsystems 1-7 (CDSS) and repeated in June 2004. It appears from the record of the evaluation have not been six (6) objectives of IET-3 and one (1) of the IET-2 that had been transferred. This resulted in the cancellation of the exercise of IET-4. Mr. Chris Markogiannakis the letter sent to the then Minister Mr George Voulgarakis on 23.6.2004 stated falsely that the Exercise IET-3 failed to 4-5 minor objectives were, at SAIC, 23% of all system, and does not affect its functionality and stressed that the company "insists pressing, I would say blackmail, take the amount of 31.000.000 . That complement and DAOA advocated the position of SAIC, and while there were two opposing minutes DAOA proposed targets were not achieved to be considered non-critical, be granted a certificate to SAIC for the successful conduct of the exercise IET-3 and the paid the amount of 31.000.000 . At this point it should be noted that Mr. Chris Markogiannakis the 1643rd yparithmo decision had already been on 3.6.2004, ie before sending the letter to the responsible Minister to instruct DAOA to follow a specific course of action including the received for use of the subsystems that were completed after the test procedure and acceptance (see Basil Konstantinidis filing in Magistrate on 28.11.2005 p. 4). To renounce the responsibilities of the then Secretary of State suggested in KY.S.E.A provisional acceptance of the system, which decided in part different from the terms of the Memorandum. This is clear from the letter of the Minister of National Defence on 28.7.2004 which states that the objectives of Exercise IET-4 will be tested in practice during the Olympics. From the result that the act was not tested anything (see Practical Integration Exercise IET-3 of 03.11.2004 from 04.16.2004 Information Note of the Commission President S. Pick Tsene, No. 1 / 23

E) The filing by Christos Markogiannaki on receipt of C4I contains inaccuracies and contradictions (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 27.04.2010, p. 6569). Specifically: unlike many filed by former Minister of the Acceptance Committee did not act voluntarily. Procedural follow the contract terms and provisions tiy PD 284/89. Technical advice on the reports evaluated negatively subsystems of CDSS and C4I in its entirety. The Acceptance Committee did not take into account reports of technical advice and proceeded to the reception. Incorrectly reported by the former Minister, that in accordance with the contract acceptance process was not completed because they had completed the training and the users had not obtained a certificate of training for the operation of subsystems. This condition existed in the original contract and remained with the 5th amendment. By the 7th Amendment but the receipt of Subsystems 1-7 (CDSS) was disconnected from the requirement for staff training that will work (Article 8 paragraph 6.3). On - according to the testimony of the Minister - doubts regarding the quality of the load response of the subsystems of the CDSS and interoperability can be asked why it had those doubts, when it approved the receipt of singly Subsystems 1-7. After such receipt, the SAIC paid normally and returned the letters. IV. The Minister in his statement concealed the truth about the interoperability of C4I and receiving Subsystems 1-7 (see filing Christos Markogiannaki the Inquiry Commission on 27.04.2010, p. 106-109). The Technical report evaluated Partitioning 1-7 (CDSS) after the tests as inappropriate. Nevertheless, the Commission received the receipt and the then Minister approved on 16.02.2009 by decision after receipt. She and the Acceptance Committee accepted the system of all despite the fact that the technical report on the overall test of the C4I evaluated as inappropriate.

From the above that Mr. Chris Markogiannakis the acts and omissions, as the Minister not handled properly and with care to public property, which was trusted, so far as the company SIEMENS and SAIC have benefited financially from his conduct namely payments to them and the release of letters of guarantee their performance with a corresponding loss of government property. Proposed to investigate further responsibilities.

Masking

I. George Alogoskoufis Minister of Economy and Finance (2004 - 2008). The then Minister of Economy and Finance Mr. George Alogoskoufis with n.3691/2008 abolished the independent Authority for Combating Money Laundering. In place of the established administrative control panel to "Committee to Combat Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism" (EMU) which epoptefeto by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Note that at the time of its repeal by the Authority investigated after written request by the then President of the Authority the financial aspects of the scandal of Siemens (see submission by Giorgos Zorbas the Inquiry Commission on 06.07.2010, p. 20). The EMU until mid-2010 provided no overview for opening accounts involved persons would lead to disclosure of recipients of black money. Proposed to investigate further responsibilities.

II Ioannis Papathanasiou Minister of Economy and Finance (01/08/2009 - 05/10/2009) Although the 13.03.2009 by the then Minister of Economy and Finance has accepted the opinion of OWN, which suggested the process could result - among others - and the discount SIEMENS contracts concluded with the Greek State Mr. . Yiannis Papathanasiou took no further action. This does not, despite the fact that he was aware of correspondence between SIEMENS and the General Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, Mr. John Sidiropoulos and letter sent by the company in the Prime Minister with content references to the actions of SIEMENS to combat public corruption officials (see letter SIEMENS HELLAS to the then Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis on 28.01.2009 and notification to Mr. Yannis Papathanasiou with Protopresbyter No.: 1171, and reply of the Secretary, Mr. I. Sidiropoulos with the SIEMENS HELLAS 22.5.2009 to Protopresbyter No.: 25763 / 1441). Only the Secretary General on 27.08.2009 Ministry of Economy and Finance Mr Ioannis Sidiropoulos a letter asking the Greek government bodies to implement within their powers to the opinion of the State Legal Council, just four days before the notices of national elections in 2009. Consequently, the then Minister for delay action to bring under the supervision of a responsible representative of the interests of the Greek government the appropriate action.

Proposed to investigate further responsibilities.

Apostolos Tsochatzopoulos Minister of National Defence (1996 to 2001) In testimony to the Commission of Inquiry, the then Minister said that at one stage and then not followed the project payments Hermes (see submission Mr A. Tsohatzopoulos on 01.09.2010 p. 260) and recognized in this way the poor performance of duties. In his testimony R. Siekaczek the Prosecution of Munich investigators Messrs. Zagorianou and Athanassios said that he delivered 10 million euros to Messrs. Gebauer and Psarros as commission to contract for missile PATRIOT. So says the apology and Niedl, which states: "At the time, ran a project with the Greek armed forces. There was an official product of SIEMENS, but the local company wanted however to get the project and supported the Sikaczek. To close the contract, the Army wanted <sachet> ". (See filing Sikaczek Attorney at Munich on 8.10.2008 Niedl an apology to the Office of Forensic Research in Munich on 11/23/2007). The Sikaczek But in his testimony to members of the Selection Committee in Munich Prosecutor referring to the same issue stated that: "I gave money to Gebauer and Psarros. After a while they both left the SIEMENS HELLAS. Probably left something in their pockets. But I do not know "(see Sikaczek lodging in Munich Prosecutor's office by members of the Selection Committee on 26.10.2010, p. 22). Funds which allegedly come from SIEMENS found in two existing accounts and in particular a) the then Deputy Director General of Directorate General Equipment and b) a Board member of the EBO. The Justice conduct an investigation on the armament programs PATRIOT and Hermes. Proposed to investigate further responsibilities. Ministry of Culture Michalis Liapis Minister of Culture (2007-2009) As Minister of Culture supervises the HCO SA and appointed members of the Board which caused damage to the Greek State. Although there was a delay in declaring the company as deposed to the work of supply of portable information systems prepared for visitors - it is clear from the facts of the case - the Board of the Agency unreasonably extend the contract for the benefit of the company SIEMENS. So as a responsible minister attended the function as the Agency was required, pursuant to article 2, paragraph 1a of Law 2246/1994, that through actions to protect the public interest. Proposed to investigate further responsibilities.

8. Suggestions
Source: http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/8_protaseis.doc Translated: http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&rurl=translate.goo gle.com&sl=el&tl=en&twu=1&u=http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/8_protaseis.doc&usg=ALk JrhgIKzrKHoY3YzxdS6oYYqPb4orJjw Motions Committee Members: 1. To speed up the earliest possible completion of a criminal investigation for individuals who have started since 2005. To bring an action against the company SIEMENS both the Greek State and the entities to restore the positive and consequential damages allegedly suffered Be imposed against Siemens by the competent organs of the State provided administrative penalties including fines and to shelter the transparency in all functional areas of the State. To revise Article 86 of the Constitution that the legislation promoted by the Ministry of Justice to ensure the fairness of the political members of the Government in the prosecution of crimes against the citizens To expedite the change of the institutional framework for a) the financing of political parties and b) amending the provisions concerning the "Occupying" of politicians and public officials to ensure full transparency of their financial Establish a central electronic system for effective control of public procurement. To give a direct encoding of polydiaspartis legislation and harmonization with European law and to abolish the overregulation that there are clear legal rules and public procurement and public procurement To obtain the electronic recording of very long material in the file.

3. 4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

9.

9. Documents Referenced
Source: http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/9_pinakas_tekmiriotikon.doc Translated: http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&rurl=translate.goo gle.com&sl=el&tl=en&twu=1&u=http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/aaa/9_pinakas_tekmiriotikon.d oc&usg=ALkJrhjNG0I2frMXwyvjP0mtROkATgOa8g

OTE 1. 2. 3. 4. Audit Report 7160 and 7170 conventions. Extract from minutes of the Cabinet meeting on 25.1.1990 The No. 597/1993 of the Council Ordinance Appeals A. Goni affidavit on 22.7.1996 to the Deputy Special investigation this year Chris Georgantopoulos 5. The unanimous decision no .216/21.09.2010 porismatiki Review Committee of Inquiry 6. The Case No. 2523/31.07.1997 meeting 7. The Case No. 2528/07.10.1997 meeting 8. The Case No. 2532/23.10.1997 meeting 9. The Case No. 2542/02.12.1997 meeting 10. The Case No. 2544/09.12.1997 meeting 11. The no. 62/368603/28.11.2002 document of the Ministry of Transport and Communications 12. The No. 20/480463 document Mr. Malapani on 25.02.2004 13. The No. 480702/19.07.2004 document OTE 14. The Case No. 2711/21.07.2004 meeting 15. The No. 62/372137/08.11.2004 note of the Directorate Management 16. The under Decision No. 2719/17.12.2004 Board of OTE. 17. The letter from Mr George Linardatou to OTE's management on 19.0.2005) 18. The filing by Nikitas Baritaki the Magistrate on 07.03.2005. 19. The under Decision No. 2721/27.01.2005 Board of OTE. 20. The no. 720821/22.07.2005 letter from the Director General of Technical Affairs Yiorgos Ioannides to the President of OTE Panagis Vourloumis. 21. The under Decision No. 2732/28.07.2005 Board OTE 22. The No. A.V.M. P 2005/20-10-2005 order of Attorney E. Touloupaki 23. The Ministry decree No. 565/2009 of the Court of Cassation 24. The statement by George Ioannides to the Council of the Magistrates Court on 29.03.2010 25. The legend Panagiotis Tabourlos to the Council of the Magistrates Court on 12.03.2010 26. The memo Panagis Vourloumis to the Council of the Magistrates Court on 11.03.2010. 27. The under Indictment No. 1693/10 Council Misdemeanors Athens

OSE

1.

The No. 50/07.01.2003 Minutes of the Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of OSE 2. Report Debevoise & Plimpton SAG-ATH00002144 3. Report Debevoise & Plimpton SAG-ATH00002148 4. Letter No. Protopresbyter: EM.3 5. Letter to the text treatment of HSY against Piraeus Bank, 1.6.2004, p. 51-52 6. Letter to the HDW Ministers on 5.7.2002 7. Letter to C. Verelis Mr Yiannakis on 17.03.2003 8. Proceedings of the 52nd Ordinary General Meeting of OSE p. 3 9. Letter from J. Georganas (24/06/2003) to the then Minister of Finance N. Christodoulakis 10. C. Letter to N. Christodoulakis Verelis id. Protopresbyter Fin: 6740 11. Letter HSY on 10.7.2003 12. Letter to H. Spiegel Verelis with Ref: 13021 13. GP Practice Minister No. 53 on 17.10.2003 14. Letter H. Bermuster to Verelis on 15.01.2004 15. Document Management Legal Services CIU Ref: 2195118 on 6.5.2004 16. Letter to M. Christoforakos OSE on 9.6.2004 17. Practice meeting Minister of Transport and Communications Mr Liapis, the executives of Siemens on 23.7.2004 18. Internal Memorandum of 30.8.2004 19. Document Management Legal Services with Ref: 2217953 on 08.06.2005 20. Letter to Mr. M. Liapis Giannakou on 1.8.2005 21. Legend 1 Siemens on 2.8.2005 22. E-mail sent on 8.9.2005 by D. Panagiotidis in Smaxwill, Moeller, Wiessner, Flad, Dill, Nahmer from the seized hard disk Siemens 23. Document Management Legal Services with Ref: 2203464 on 4.10.2005 24. Factsheet Division Legal Services CIU Ref: 2204226 on 17.10.2005 25. Document Management Legal Services with Ref: 2203876 on 20.10.2005 26. Decision No. 4139/07.07.2006 27. FAX to OSE Consortium on 04.07.2006 28. Practical Negotiating Group of the CIU on 25.7.2006 29. Practical Railway Board on 10.8.2006 30. Letter, 4.10.2006 from the seized hard drive company-Siemens Internal Memo on 28.09.2006 31. CIU Board Decision number: 4226/22.11.2006 32. Factsheet Directorate of Legal Services CIU Ref: 1039783 on 30.01.2007 33. Document Management Legal Services CIU Ref: 1040464 on 16.07.2008 34. Document Management Legal Services with Ref: 1040712 on 09.10.2008 35. Document Management Legal Services CIU Ref: 1039358 on 25.08.2009 36. Agreement OSE / ERGOSE on 21.03.2003 37. D. Information Memo Karapanou in Athens Magistrate on 14.10.2005 38. Letter from J & P - ABAX SA - Alstrom Transport SA to OSE, 28.8.2003 by notification in C. Verelis 39. PD 774/1980, as amended by N.2741/1999 40. Step E Court Act 393/2003 41. Document GC EDISY B. Tsiamanti to the Inquiry Commission on 26.07.2010 42. Document EDISY on 08.02.2010 with No. Protopresbyter: 4,333,218 43. Document DISTE OSE to the Executive Director of Infrastructure Agency on 15.04.2003 44. Protocol award on 20.01.2005 45. Document ERGOSE to OSE on 16.02.2005

46. Document Train to ERGOSE on 11.3.2005 47. Practical Assessment Commission Crisis Offers OSE on 31.03.2006 48. Informative Note from the President of the CIU on 07.07.2010

C4I Extract of minutes of meeting 39 th Ministerial Coordination Committee for the Olympic Preparation (D.E.S.O.P) 2. The No. F.600/44139/S.23/06-09-2002 document of the Ministry of Defence (Ministry of National Economy). 3. The No. 1/23-01-2003 minutes of meetings of the Governing Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (KY.S.E.A) 4. The No. F.600/9024/S.3/29-01-2003 document of the Ministry of Defence (Ministry of National Economy). 5. The practical negotiating committee of the program systems C4I Olympic Security 6. The No. F.600/9055/S.9/28-02-2003 document of the Ministry of Defence (Ministry of National Economy). 7. The No. F.900a/3392/6291/21-03-2003 document of the Ministry of Defence (Ministry of National Economy). 8. The No. S020A/19-05-03 Convention 9. The No. F092.22/2010 official translation of the contract between SAIC and SIEMENS. 10. The one from 23.12.2003 the amendment is 11. The 2 of 04/07/2004 amending the Convention 12. Minutes of Meeting 04.16.2004, Athens 2004 13. The No. 2004-00/1/10-v '/ 20.05.2004 letter of the Audit Committee and Receipt Notice (E.E.P.P). 14. The No. 1/23-06-2004 confidential letter from the Minister of Public Order 15. The three of 25/06/2004 amending the Convention 16. The No. 2004-50/1/10-rkv/30-06-2004 letter of the Audit Committee and Receipt Notice (E.E.P.P). 1.

17. The No. 2004-30/29/1-ng '/ 07.05.2004 document E.E.P.P The No. 2004-50/1/10-rma '/ 07.07.2004 document E.E.P.P The No. 2004-50/1/10/-rld '/ 07.03.2004 document E.E.P.P The No. 2004-10/20/31/1-rp/06-07-2004 document E.E.P.P The No. 2004-30/29/1-nv '/ 07.05.2004 document E.E.P.P The No. 2004-50/1/10-rle '/ 07.03.2004 document E.E.P.P The No. 2004-50/1/10-rki '/ 02.07.2004 document E.E.P.P The No. 2004-50/1/10-rlst '/ 07.03.2004 document E.E.P.P The No. 2004-10/20/31/1-roth '/ 05.07.2004 document E.E.P.P The No. 2004-50/1/10-rlg '/ 02.07.2004 document E.E.P.P 18. Memorandum 19. The No. 536807/22-07-2004 document of the General Staff of National Defense. 20. The four of 05/08/2004 amending the Convention
o o o o o o o o o o

21. The No. 2004-40/13/5-1d '/ 10.08.2004 letter of the Audit Committee and Receipt Notice (EDPS). 22. The No. 30/13/11/z/19-08-2004 document GTSs 23. The internal memo from 28.08.2004 Group consultants computer systems Boartes 24. The No. CA-T-04-320/28-08-2004 document SAIC 25. The No. 2004-00/3/13-mg '/ 30.08.2004 document DAOA 26. The No. 00/3/13-mv '/ 08.31.2004 document DAOA 27. The apology Kutsenreuter to prosecutors in Munich 07.12.2006 28. The letter dated 17/09/2004 from DAOA 29. The No. 2004-00/3/13-p '/ 24.09.2004 document DAOA 30. The No. F.600/AD.110736 S.35/30-09-2002 document of the Ministry of Defence (Ministry of National Economy). 31. The No. 2004-00/3/13-rv '/ 30.09.2004 document DAOA 32. The No. F.600/AD131405 S1037/01-10-2004 document of Ministry of National Economy 33. The No. 00/3/13-rd '/ 04.10.2004 document DAOA 34. The No. 00/6/1-d '/ 11.10.2004 document GTSs 35. Decreto arithm.2004-00/4/21/1-pd '/ 22.11.2004 document DAOA 36. The No. 46 confidential letter from the Minister of Public Order 37. The No. 00/2/1-oth '/ 11.26.2004 document DAOA 38. The on-court protest 26.11.2004 Katavati 39. The No. 1/17/29-rk/30-11-2004 document DAOA 40. The No. F.600/EP.132868/S1255/06-12-2004 document YP.ETH.A. 41. The No. F.600/AD.315505/S70/13-01-2005 document YP.ETH.A. 42. The No. 2004-00/3/13/1-id '/ 01.24.2005 document DAOA 43. The No. 2004-00/3/13/1-kg '/ 07.02.2005 document DAOA 44. The No. 30/22/3/1/-mv '/ 17.02.2005 document GTSs 45. The No. 2004-00/3/13/1-lth/09-03-2005 document GTSs 46. The No. 00/3/13/1-mz '/ 03.19.2005 document DAOA 47. The No. F.600/319445/S768/30-03-2005 document YP.ETH.A. 48. The No. 2004-00/3/13/1-xa/05-04-2005 document DAOA 49. The No. 1139st/18-04-2005 document Office of the Deputy Minister of Public Order 50. The No. 2004-00/3/13/1-oi '/ 04.28.2005 document DAOA 51. The No. 2004-00/3/13/1-rkv '/ 07.01.2005 document DAOA 52. The No. 2004-00/3/13/2-ia '/ 10.12.2005 document DAOA 53. The No. 2004-00/3/13/2-ith '/ 10.14.2005 document DAOA 54. The No. 3657v/26-1-0-2005 letter from the Minister of Public Order 55. The No. 73/03-11-2005 document Counsel of DAOA / GTSs 56. The No. 1/17/47-rlv '/ 07.11.2005 document DAOA 57. The 16 th / 11.17.2005 Meeting of the Court 58. The No. 2004-20/1/1/1-ia '/ 01.10.2006 document GTSs 59. The No. F.600/429204 S.252/30-09-2006 document YP.ETH.A. 60. The No. 1/17/47/1-rxth 'document DAOA 61. The No. 2004-00/1/11/-i '/ 02.04.2006 document GTSs 62. The No. 10345/13-02-2006 document of the Ministry of Justice 63. The No. Request for Arbitration 64. The No. 20/1/17/47/3-og '/ 05.08.2006 document GTSs 65. The No. 1/17/37/3-ria/16-05-2006 document DAOA 66. The No. 1/17/47/36-rkth '/ 05.22.2006 document GTSs 67. The No. 1/17/47/4-rxe/04-07-2006 document DAOA 68. The No. 249101/10-08-2006 document Office of the Ministry ETH.A.. 69. The No. 1/17/47/6-a/11-09-2006 letter of the Directorate of Technical

70. The five of 03/29/2007 amending the Convention 71. The No. 2004-1/17/47/13/ie '/ 05.22.2007 document of the Directorate of Technical 72. The No. 2004-00/2/4-rla '/ 25.05.2007 document GTSs 73. The No. 2004-00/6/2-a 'document GTSs 74. The No. 00/6/2-v 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 75. The No. 00/6/2-g 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 76. The No. 00/6/2-d 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 77. The No. 00/6/2-e 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 78. The No. 00/6/2-i 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 79. The No. 00/6/2-st 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 80. The No. 00/6/2-z 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 81. The No. 00/6/2-i 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 82. The No. 00/6/2-th 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 83. The No. 00/6/2-iv 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 84. The No. 2004-00/5/9-roi 'practical meeting members of the EDPS 85. The No. 2004-00/6/2-id 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 86. The No. 2004-00/6/2-ii 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 87. The No. 2004-00/6/2-ith 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem. 88. The No. 2004-00/6/2-k 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem. 89. The No. 2004-00/6/2-ka 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem. 90. The No. 2004-00/6/2-ie 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem. 91. The No. 2004-00/6/2-kv 'rejection protocol subsystem 92. Protocol dispute settlement system TETRA 93. The 6 by 09.11.2004 the amendment is 94. The No. 2004-20/1/1/3-26-09-2007 document GTSs 95. The No. 2004-00/6/2-kst 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem. 96. The No. 2004-00/6/2-kz 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem. 97. The No. 2004-00/6/2-ki-p protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem. 98. The No. 2004-00/6/2-kth 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem. 99. The No. 1/17/47/31-rkd '/ 12.11.2007 document GTSs 100. The No. 2004-00/6/2-la 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem. 101. Decreto arithm.2004-00/6/2-lv 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem. 102. The No. 2004-00/6/2-lg 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem. 103. The No. 1/17/47/34-la/16-01-2008 document GTSs 104. The No. 20/1/1/4-rka '/ 30.01.2008 document GTSs 105. The No. 00/6/2-le 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem. 106. The No. 20/1/1/4-rld '/ 11.02.2008 document GTSs 107. The No. 20/1/1/4-rkth '/ 02.08.2008 document GTSs 108. The No. 1/17/47/36-ria '/ 12.02.2008 document GTSs 109. The No. 2004-00/6/2-lst 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 110. The No. 2004-00/6/2-lz 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 111. The No. 20/1/1/5-z '/ 17.03.2008 document GTSs 112. The No. 00/6/2-li 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 113. The No. 00/6/2-lth 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 114. The No. 00/6/2-m 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 115. The No. 00/6/2-ma 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 116. The No. 00/6/2-mv 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 117. The No. 00/6/2-mg 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 118. The No. 00/6/2-md 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 119. The No. 00/6/2-me 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem

120. The No. 20/1/1/5-o '/ 15.05.2008 document GTSs 121. The No. 00/6/2-mst 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 122. The No. 00/6/2-mz 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 123. The No. 00/6/2-mi 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt subsystem 124. The No. 20/1/1/5-rni '/ 18.06.2008 document GTSs 125. The No. 00/6/2-mth 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 126. The No. 00/6/2-n 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 127. The No. 20/1/1/5-rxi '/ 06.23.2008 document GTSs 128. The No. 00/6/2-na 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 129. The No. 00/6/2-nv 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 130. The No. 20/1/1/5-rpz '/ 03.07.2008 document GTSs 131. The No. 1/17/47/55-roa '/ 25.06.2008 document GTSs 132. The No. 2004-00/6/2-ng 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 133. The No. 20/1/1/6-kz '/ 07.14.2008 document GTSs 134. The No. 1/17/47/57-8/11-07-2008 document GTSs 135. The No. 2004-00/6/2-nd 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 136. The No. 20/1/1/5-mv '/ 07.25.2008 document GTSs 137. The No. 20/1/1/6-n '/ 07.31.2008 document GTSs 138. The No. 2004-00/5/9/1-mst '/ Meeting Minutes 27/07/2008 139. The No. 2004-00/6/2-nst 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 140. The No. 2004-20/1/1/6-pz '/ 09.09.2008 document GTSs 141. The No. 2004-20/1/1/6-pe '/ 07.11.2008 document GTSs 142. The No. 20/1/1/6-rv '/ 12.09.2008 document GTSs 143. The No. 00/6/2-xe 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 144. The No. 00/6/2-xz 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 145. The No. 00/6/2-xi 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 146. The No. 00/6/2-xth 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 147. The No. 00/6/2-o 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 148. The No. 00/6/2-oa 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 149. The No. 00/6/2-ov 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 150. The No. 00/6/2-og 'protocols for qualitative and quantitative receipt 151. On 10/20/2008 by reporting results of technical consultants 152. The No. 00/6/2-oe 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 153. The 2 of 04/07/2004 amending the Convention 154. The No. 00/6/2-ost 'protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 155. The No. 9008/13/216-rie/12-11-2008 decision of the Division of Finance Ministry of the Interior 156. The No. 00/6/2-oz/14-11-2008 protocol qualitative and quantitative receipt 157. Meeting Minutes 26/01/2009 158. The No. 9008/13/216-rke/16-02-2009 decision of the Department of Finance, Ministry of Interior 159. The No. 1/17/47/76-nz/07-03-2009 letter of 5 th part of the D / Technical Services Division 160. The No. 1/17/47/77-xz '/ 03.19.2009 document of the Directorate of Technical 161. The No. 19384/F.400.4/13-04-2009 document D / Directorate of Information & Communications 162. The No. 4906/1/1-g/17-07-2009 document of the Ministry of Interior 163. The No. 00/6/2-rkv 'document GTSs 164. The No. 8777/21.04.2010 Extrajudicial Statement

CULTURE 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Extract from minutes of a meeting of the Board of HCO on 15.12.2006 Ministerial Decision Voulgarakis C. Contract between Siemens and HCO on 18.02.2007 Internal memo on 24.04.2008 by D. Papapetropoulos Information Note on 26.06.2008 by D. Papapetropoulos Letter dated 01.09.2008 of Mr. Papapetropoulos Education HCO by Siemens SA on 21.10.2008 Action by Siemens AE HCO with AP: 1396/29.10.2009

HEALTH 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. The No. 15/03.02.2010 outgoing document the Commission of Inquiry The No. 79/28.04.2010 outgoing document the Commission of Inquiry The No. 51137/29-04-2010 letter of the Minister of Health and Social Solidarity The No. 453/11.05.2010 Document Inspector General The No. 64896/01.06.2010 letter of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity 6. The No. 129/15.06.2010 outgoing document the Commission of Inquiry 7. The No. 625/16.06.2010 Document Inspector of Health and Welfare Services 8. The No. 709/06.07.2010 Document Inspector of Health and Welfare Services 9. The letter dated 14.07.2010 from the Managing Director of Siemens 10. The No. 164/15.07.2010 outgoing document the Commission of Inquiry 11. The No. 162/15.07.2010, 163/15.07.2010 and 166/15.07.2010 outgoing documents of the Examination Committee 12. The No. 165/15.07.2010 outgoing document the Commission of Inquiry 13. The No. 167/15.07.2010 outgoing document the Commission of Inquiry 14. The No. 68/20.07.2010 document of the Ministry of Economy and Finance 15. The No. 104457/24.08.2010 letter of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity 16. The No. 187/26.08.2010 outgoing document the Commission of Inquiry 17. The No. 208/14.09.2010 outgoing document the Commission of Inquiry 18. The No. 907/16.09.2010 and 908/16.07.2010 documents S.E.Y.Y.P 19. The No. 219/24.09.2010, 220/24.09.2010 and 221/24.09.2010 outgoing documents of the Examination Committee 20. The No. 229/04.10.2010 outgoing document the Commission of Inquiry 21. The No. DY1a/6/13.10.2010 document of the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity 22. The No. 232/04.10.2010 outgoing document the Commission of Inquiry 23. The No. F1/2/25724/3773/12.10.2010 letter to the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Security 24. The No. 248/18.10.2010 outgoing document the Commission of Inquiry 25. The No. 260/27.10.2010 outgoing document the Commission of Inquiry 26. The letter of 05.11.2010 the Governor IKA 27. The No. 3596/10.11.2010 letter of Secretary of Commerce 28. The No. 3617/11.11.2010 letter of Secretary of Commerce 29. The No. 3634/12.11.2010 letter of Secretary of Commerce 30. The No. 1, 2, 3 and 4 references

31. The No. 286/25.11.2010 outgoing document the Commission of Inquiry 32. The letter dated 29.11.2010 by the Special Committee on Evaluation Siemens

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (PATRIOT - HERMES) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 02.02.2010 Declaration by the civil claimant in the Greek public Document GDDIA 15.03.2010 to the Commission of Inquiry Paragraph 1 ANNEX C-1 relative F.600.14/65/93236/S.2919/22-10-1997/GES F.230.109/46/329418s2280/12.12.97 9 th Meeting KYSEA 1998, f SAM Decision No. 1 of the 5 th Meeting 1998 Registered on 14.09.2010 - 2 relative

JUSTICE 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Indictment No. 597/1993 Council Appeals Athens Indictment No. 2058/2001 Protocol Special Secretariat of the President's House 14.02.2006 Document No. Protopresbyter: 50598/04.01.2006 Anomotes written explanations in accordance with Article 31, paragraph 2 CPP Vassiliou Konstantinidis and attachments to these documents 6. Prosecution Document No. Protopresbyter Athens: 124529 7. Apology Mr. Kutschenreuter number: 563 Js 45415/05 on 07.12.2006 and the same apology on 08.01.2007 8. Document Misdemeanors Prosecutor of Athens A.V.M. O8/19 9. Minutes of meeting 03.12.2008 Case 801/NMEL/2008 10. Document SDOE on 03.06.2010 with No. Protopresbyter: 14,535 11. Protocol by the testimony of Mr. Michael Christoforakos to the House Select Committee on Public Prosecutor's Office in Munich 27.10.2010, p. 32 12. Number. Dikogr.: Z-05 / 4 & O-07/50 to Protopresbyter No.: 329 13. Number. Dikogr.: Z-05 / 4 & O-07/50, Arrest No.: 1 / 2009 14. Press Release 31/05/2009 of the Ministry of Justice 15. Number. Dikogr.: Z-05 / 4 & O-07/50, No. Arrest: 10.09 16. Indictment Council flood / Athens Minister Kon No. 2451/4-8-09 17. Number. Dikogr.: Z-05 / 4 & O-07/50 to Protopresbyter No.: 662 18. Number. Dikogr.: O-05/04 & O-07/50 Arrest No.: 13/09 19. Document EP702/11.12.2009 20. Document No. Protopresbyter 1898/15.12.2009 21. Attorney General's letter of 12.01.2010 Munich, number processing 15 Ausl. A918/09 22. Appeals Council Ordinance No. 410/2010 Athens Minister issued on 23.2.2010 23. Letter of Appeal of Athens Protopresbyter No.: OP 077 24. Proceedings and Decision of Minister No.: 5 / 2010 session of the Supreme Court 25. Statement representation of the OWN to 15.4.2010 26. Document of the Office of Legal Counsel No. Protopresbyter: 244 on 16.06.2010

27. Document Prosecution Appeals Athens Ref: 417/2010 28. Indictment No. 2122/2010 Council Appeals Athens 29. Proceedings by the Prosecutor in Munich 26.10.2010, p. 10

MONEY FLOWS Decision 5 th Criminal Court of Munich Department No. 5 KLs563 Js45914/07 Filing the Report Niedl Debevoise & Plimpton p. 7 SAG-ATH 2069 Arrest Munich district court sentencing a number of Cs 402Js 3943/09 to Christoforakos p.3 4. Oswald 2006 received the Attorney Ochsner 5. Proceedings by Attorney Munich 26.10.2010 AP: 126 AR 5306/10, p. 45 1. 2. 3.

POLITICAL PARTIES 1. The warrant sentencing district court Munich under number Cs 402 Js 3943/09 Mr Michael Christoforakos statements on the recommendation of the OWN to 16.02.2009, p. 12. 2. The submission to the Examination Committee in Munich on 27.10.2010, p. 14-16 NoF09222/7851 translation. 3. The submission to the Examination Committee in Munich on 27.10.2010, p. 23-24 NoF09222/7851 translation. 4. Compromise agreement with Mr. Michael Christoforakos Siemens AG, Siemens AE

Siemens Media Coverage:

Date Source Article Title URL

21 July 2011

Bloomberg

Greece Seeks $285 Million Fine From Siemens, Handelsblatt Says

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-21/greeceseeks-285-million-fine-from-siemens-handelsblattsays.html

20 July 2011

ekathimerini

Siemens to sue Greece over damage claims 1BN CORRUPTION FINES OF GERMAN FIRM THAT COST BRITAIN 1,400 JOBS PASOK wants Parl't to probe Siemens Jason Manolopoulos: You can blame the Greeks but they have been betrayed by their leaders Magistrate gives 7 individuals implicated in Siemens affair until May 12 to prepare defence

http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_ 20/07/2011_399089 http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/258231/-1bncorruption-fines-of-German-firm-that-cost-Britain-1-400jobs http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_ 08/07/2011_397640 http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/jaso n-manolopoulos-you-can-blame-the-greeks-ndash-butthey-have-been-betrayed-by-their-leaders-2299318.html http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showplain?maindoc=7501 922&service=142 http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showplain?maindoc=8804 375&maindocimg=6106385&service=98 http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showplain?maindoc=7754 711&maindocimg=7284996&service=8 http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showplain?maindoc=7659 933&maindocimg=6106385&service=96 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-09/siemensseeks-greek-settlement-on-bribery-bills-spiegel-says.html http://www.expatica.com/de/news/german-news/germanytargets-greek-ex-minister-for-corruptionreport_143065.html http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9MISC7 80.htm http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showplain?maindoc=9816 635&service=142 http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_ 13/04/2011_387537 http://www.expatica.com/de/news/german-news/greekminister-says-german-firms-encouragedcorruption_139304.html

12 July 2011 8 July 2011

Express.co.uk ekathimerini The Independent Athens News Agency Athens News Agency Athens News Agency Athens News Agency

18 June 2011

June 2011

June 2011 June 2011

Siemens bribery case Papandreou outlines proposals against corruption

June 2011

New arrests in Siemens case Siemens Seeks Greek Settlement on Bribery, Bills, Spiegel Says Germany targets Greek ex-minister for corruption: report Greece: Ex-minister convicted on false declaration Gov't calls for explanations by Siemens Ex-minister convicted over undeclared Siemens cash

9 May 2011

Bloomberg

16 April 2011

Expatica Business Week Athens News Agency

15 April 2011

April 2011

13 April 2011

ekathimerini

3 March 2011

Expatica

Greek minister says German firms encouraged corruption

26 January 2011

21 January 2011

Bloomberg Corruption Current (Wall Street Journal)

Siemens Greek Unit Says Applies Program to Prevent Corruption

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-26/siemensgreek-unit-says-applies-program-to-preventcorruption.html http://blogs.wsj.com/corruptioncurrents/2011/01/21/greek-politicians-named-in-siemensbribery-probe/

Greek Politicians Named In Siemens Bribery Probe

29 June 2009

Spiegel Magazine

Ex-Boss Could Help Shed Light on Corruption

http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,6331 98,00.html

2 July 2008

Deutsche Welle

Siemens Hit by Corruption Charges in Greece, Norway

http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3455188,00.html

Greece Seeks $285 Million Fine From Siemens, Handelsblatt Says Bloomberg http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-21/greece-seeks-285-million-fine-from-siemenshandelsblatt-says.html 7 July 2011 The Greek government is seeking 200 million euros ($285 million) from Siemens AG (SIE) in fines for bribery, Handelsblatt reported, citing unidentified people close to the company. Siemens has asked a Munich court for a declaration confirming that Greece has no valid claims, the German newspaper said. Munich-based Siemens in the past few months has been negotiating with the Greek government on a solution and may have been willing to pay 150 million euros on the condition Greece retracts its claims, the newspaper said. Siemens spokespeople werent immediately available to comment when contacted by Bloomberg News. Greek government spokespeople didnt respond immediately to a call and an e-mail seeking comment.

Siemens to sue Greece over damage claims Ekathimerini http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_20/07/2011_399089 20 July 2011 The German electronics and engineering powerhouse Siemens has said it will take legal action against the Greek government over damage claims in the bribes-for-biz scandal. In a meeting with senior Socialist officials on Tuesday, the firm said its lawyers plan to file suit in a Munich court. Siemens denies claims by Athens that it must pay damages to the Greek state for its wrongdoing. Siemens Hellas, the local division of the Munich-based company, is alleged to have paid bribes to political parties and public officials to gain lucrative contracts, which are estimated to have led Greek taxpayers suffering damages of some 2 billion euros. In a statement issued late on Tuesday, Haris Paboukis, who is alternate minister for development, said the government will use all appropriate means to safeguard the interests of the state and recover damages from the German company. According to sources, the two sides have made, so far unsuccessful, efforts for an out-of-court settlement.

1BN CORRUPTION FINES OF GERMAN FIRM THAT COST BRITAIN 1,400 JOBS Express.co.uk http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/258231/-1bn-corruption-fines-of-German-firm-that-costBritain-1-400-jobs 12 July 2011 By John Ingham Transport Editor THE German engineering giant which cost 1,400 British workers their jobs after landing a huge train contract was at the centre of a corruption row yesterday. Questions were asked whether Siemens was a suitable bidder after 1billion in fines were imposed by German and US authorities in 2008 over allegations of bribing public officials. Siemens was also fined 349million by the European Commission in 2007 for alleged violations of competition law. Last month the firm was awarded the 1.5billion contract to build carriages for the Thameslink rail line ahead of UK manufacturer Bombardier leading to the loss of 1,400 jobs in Derby. The Daily Express last week launched a campaign to save the Bombardier jobs. A Greek parliamentary committee is also investigating alleged wrongdoing by Siemens, a claim the firm rejects as unfounded. Yesterday UKIP MEP Derek Clark urged the EU to inquire into the decision to hand the train contract to the firm. There is no suggestion that Siemens acted dishonestly in securing the deal. The Department for Transport said it was satisfied that the firm was a suitable bidder. Siemens said: As a result of the issues that occurred in the past Siemens has a zero-tolerance approach to non-compliance which is enforced throughout the global company.

PASOK wants Parl't to probe Siemens Proposal to investigate four ex ministers in connection to cash-for-contracts scandal Ekathimerini http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_08/07/2011_397640 8 July 2011 Ruling PASOK on Friday submitted to Parliament a proposal that an investigative committee be set up to probe the alleged involvement of four former ministers in the Siemens cash-forcontracts scandal. A total of 103 PASOK MPs have asked that a parliamentary committee scrutinize all the evidence of the case to determine whether the four ex ministers former Defense Minister Akis

Tsochatzopoulos and former Transport Minister Tassos Mantelis from PASOK, and former Finance Minister Giorgos Alogoskoufis and former Interior Minister Christos Markoyiannakis from the main conservative opposition New Democracy -- should be held accountable on criminal charges including bribe-taking, money laundering and breach of faith. Some of the charges will not be applicable as the alleged misdeeds have expired under the statute of limitations. Responding to PASOKs proposal on Friday, the centrist party Democratic Alliance, led by former conservative foreign minister Dora Bakoyannis, accused the two main parties of colluding in an effort to cover up the scandal so that the Greek people never learn where the money went and who got the kickbacks. Last month, outgoing Justice Minister Haris Kastanidis now Interior Minister said that he had prepared the paperwork for the Greek branch of Siemens to be fined following allegations that it bribed officials to secure contracts. Kastanidis, who was replaced by Militiadis Papaioannou at the Justice Ministry, said Greece was ready to impose a heavy fine on Siemens Hellas. All you will have to do is sign it, Kastanidis told his successor before taking over at the Interior Ministry. He did not give details about the size of the fine or how the fine would be collected. Earlier this year, the government had suggested it was close to reaching an out-of-court settlement with the company. A string of probes has yet to lead to anyone being convicted of offering or accepting bribes.

Jason Manolopoulos: You can blame the Greeks but they have been betrayed by their leaders The Independent http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/jason-manolopoulos-you-can-blame-thegreeks-ndash-but-they-have-been-betrayed-by-their-leaders-2299318.html 18 June 2011 Shocking examples of kleptocracy by the political elite explain the ferocity of the reaction. And it is this which has repercussions for the rest of Europe Thieves! Thieves!" cry the protesters outside the Greek parliament in Syntagma Square, although thief is not the most colourful allegation being levelled at the Greek ruling class. The scenes are now familiar to TV viewers across the world: the angry banners, the scuffles or sometimes more serious violence, the petrol bombs and tear gas, the world's media, including battle-tested war reporters, descending. The latest wave of Hellenic protesters call itself Aganaktismenoi, in the spirit of the Spanish indignados, a broad-based and non-party-political movement. The silent majority is, at last, finding a voice. Around me, in Athens, the fear, outrage, despair are palpable. But there is also a profound sense of bewilderment at a situation from which there appears no escape, and to

which the only response is a call for more economic pain made by some of the same people who created the fiasco. How did it come to this? How fair is this charge of "Thieves"? Did Greek politicians simply loot their own country, and EU taxpayers, for personal gain? There is truth in this tale, but like any Greek tragedy, there are multiple narratives, none of them pretty. The protesters' cry of "We don't owe anything, we won't pay" doesn't impress German taxpayers, who feel they are bailing out the country, but for some sections of Greek society, it's an understandable reaction. It helps to recognise that Greece is very different from other Western European societies. There are, in fact, more similarities to states run by political oligarchies than anyone in the EU hierarchy would like to admit. Shocking examples of kleptocracy by the political elite certainly form part of the explanation for the ferocity of the reaction we are now seeing on the streets of Athens. And it is this ferocity which has intensified the risk of a default, the repercussions of which would reverberate throughout Europe and threaten the existence of the euro as we know it. Greece is not a mature democracy, nor does it have a flexible economy. Up to 1974 it was either a colony or a dictatorship. Greece has had a clan-based rather than a class-based structure, and a public sector accustomed to giving favours to family or other interest groups. Its politics is characterised by cronyism, restrictive practices, bureaucracy and corruption. In researching my new book, I found that joining the EU and the single currency, and gaining access to huge inflows of global capital, actually exacerbated these unhealthy dynamics, rather than bolstered Greek democracy. The Siemens bribery scandal was the most notorious. Investigators found that the company's Greek branch had an annual slush fund of some 15m to pay "commissions" for politicians who helped secure contracts. There have been arrests and prosecutions but by authorities in the US, Switzerland and Germany, not in Greece. The political class, meanwhile, benefits from Article 62 of the constitution, which means parliamentarians accused of crimes have to be tried by fellow parliamentarians. Payment of taxes is erratic, with some individuals hit hard with demands, while others escape almost entirely. Domestic Greek interest groups are not without blame. From 2001 to 2009, trade unions seized their opportunity for annual pay rises without links to productivity. With easy access to borrowing hard currency, and a big incentive to buy votes, both the left-wing Pasok and its right-wing counterpart New Democracy duly indulged. As long as they had access to easy loans, they could buy enough social peace to deflect attention from scandals and mismanagement. Now the money has run out. Cronyism has meant that much government wealth stayed within ministerial families. The assiduous Leandros Rakintzis, head of a public spending watchdog trying to rein in the excesses, has uncovered shocking cases. In one example, a retired former culture ministry employee was found to have had 9m in his bank account that he was unable to justify according to his income.

Ordinary private sector workers, on the other hand, benefited from none of this orgy of borrowing or debt; they have lost most and are being asked to pick up the bill. They have some of the lowest wages and longest hours in Europe; they pay high taxes yet they receive limited public services. A recent study by Patrick Artus, chief economist of French bank Natixis, showed that they worked much longer hours than workers in Germany, countering a recently expressed view by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Living standards for most Greeks have collapsed. Regulated and controlled markets with no competition combined now with higher taxes have led to some of the highest petrol and supermarket prices in the continent. Greece has the third highest prices at the pump, behind only Denmark and the Netherlands. Lack of full competition in supermarkets mean that the typical shopping basket is about 25 per cent more than the European average. This all adds to the sense of betrayal. The misconduct of the elite means that, just as the pain of IMF-dictated austerity is intensifying, there is little or no sense of social solidarity. As in Spain, youth unemployment is high, further eroding a sense of hope. Violent crime, once rare in Athens, is on the rise. Yet my country's politicians and senior officials are not the only villains. Europe's leaders may well lament that chaos in Greece is putting the very peace and stability of the EU at risk. But it was they who refused to learn the lessons of Argentina's currency peg or the European exchange rate mechanism, and proceeded with monetary union before economic convergence. Goldman Sachs colluded with Greek politicians to make the deficit in 2001 appear smaller than it was, in a manoeuvre that simply passed the debt into the future and made it more expensive. At the same time, a wave of deregulated capital came in search of easy gains. With eurozone interest rates kept low to prevent overheating in Germany, vast amounts were loaned to property developers, especially in Ireland and Spain. And searching for a bit of extra yield on government bonds, much went to the Greek government. Investors were reassured by official statements that the euro could not be allowed to fail, so the belief grew that the loans were as safe as Germany's, only with a higher yield. This is how a small, semi-developed economy came to borrow an unsupportable 300bn. As recently as 2009 and even early 2010, serious voices in Brussels were denying the unsustainability of the ballooning sovereign debt in the eurozone's periphery. In early 2009, the then economics commissioner Joaquin Almunia claimed the Greek economy was "the strongest" in the EU. There is still a refusal by EU officials to admit that economic convergence was never achieved, and that the euro was mis-sold to its citizens. It was a good idea, not done badly, done very badly. So the demonstrators venting their outrage at the Greek parliament tell a part of the story, but not the whole story. Some are innocent victims; others have had a hand in creating this economic, social and political catastrophe. But their voices will have to be acknowledged, because the high-decibel volume reflects the scale of the crisis that confronts us all. As Thucydides observed, justice will not come to Athens until those who are not injured are as indignant as those who are.

Magistrate gives 7 individuals implicated in Siemens affair until May 12 to prepare defence Athens News Agency http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showplain?maindoc=7501922&service=142 June 2011 Seven individuals summoned as possible defendants in the ongoing Siemens kickback case requested and were granted a continuance on Monday by a special examining magistrate in Athens. Six of the seven appeared before magistrate Nikos Zagorianos, with the seventh represented by an attorney. The postponement, until May 12, was granted to allow defence attorneys time to study a relevant indictment and to prepare their clients' statements. Six out of the seven individuals are former high-ranking executives of Siemens Hellas, the German multinational's subsidiary in Greece, while a seventh is a former high-ranking executive for Hellenic Telecoms (OTE). All seven have been called to answer bribery and money laundering charges related to the signing of several hefty contracts in 1997 between Siemens and OTE for the digitalisation of the latter's telephone substations.

Siemens bribery case Athens News Agency http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showplain?maindoc=8804375&maindocimg=6106385&service= 98 June 2011 The Parliamentary examination committee investigating the Siemens bribery scandal on Tuesday decided unanimously to write a letter to the prime minister and request that he lodge a demarche with Germany over the case. The MPs say the German government should be asked to instruct the electronics giant Siemens to fully cooperate with the investigation by providing evidence of the bribery in Greece, while the issue must also be raised with EU bodies. During Tuesday's session, the committee had a chance to examine two files confiscated by Greek authorities from the desk of a secretary working for the former Siemens executive considered a main suspect in the case, Mihalis Christoforakos. In these were listed the names of various individuals that had received domestic appliances and other electronic goods from Siemens or companies that worked with Siemens. It also heard testimony from the former deputy public order minister under New Democracy, Panagiotis Hinofotis, and from former interior minister Prokopis Pavlopoulos concerning the

problems arising with the security system C4I provided by Siemens, which they had refused to accept delivery of due to substantial deficiencies that affected the proper working of the system. The seized files on those accepting appliances and electronic goods included several familiar names, though it was not clear in all cases whether the goods were a gift from Siemens or finally paid for by the recipient. The first or 'blue' file contained a summary list showing that either former minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos or his daughter Areti, as well as aides of the former minister, have received appliances and equipment worth 1.34 million drachmas between 19982001 and an additional 13,993 euros until 2004. Also in the blue file were records of a 1997 invoice for 283,000 drachmas in the name of Triantafyllia Daskalaki, a relative of the then General Bank president Giorgos Daskalakis, and a Siemens donation to PASOK's youth group in 2003 amounting to 15,000 euros. The second or 'red' file contained only invoices related to an order made by ND MP Kyriakos Mitsotakis - who was exposed some months ago for having received 160,000 euros worth of equipment for his two campaign offices in the 2007 elections but later asserted that he had paid for them - and one for 6,252 euros to an aide of former ND minister Dora Bakoyannis. The evidence in the files was dismissed as "small change" by many of the MPs present, however, who hinted that it was designed to divert attention from the real bribes. "Company gifts of 30 and 40 euros are pitiful when the real question is to find what happened to kickbacks of hundreds of millions linked to the signature of the contracts for OTE, OSE and C4I," said ND MP Stavros Kalafatis. Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) party MP Kostas Aivaliotis withdrew from the committee, saying as he departed that the evidence sent on the gifts by Siemens did not lead to uncovering the real events. "The whole thing leads to a cover-up and LAOS is departing unless there is an intention for full revelation in the investigation of the Siemens scandal," he said.

Papandreou outlines proposals against corruption Athens News Agency http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showplain?maindoc=7754711&maindocimg=7284996&service= 8 June 2011 Main opposition PASOK leader George Papandreou addressed his party's Political Council Thursday and outlined four proposals aimed at tackling corruption, including the confiscation of property not declared in the means and assets statements submitted by politicians. In reference to the ongoing Siemens investigation, and the damaging testimony linked to PASOK that has emerged from this, Papandreou stressed that the party wanted a full and thorough investigation into what had happened.

"I am the first that wants to know if someone has neglected his duty or who has become involved in cases of scandal in the past," he stressed, adding that PASOK had made clear and specific proposals on this issue while ruling New Democracy preferred to remain silent. He also underlined that there were several other scandals that remained "open", such as the Vatopedi monastery land swaps affair, the structured bonds sold to social insurance funds, the subsidised ferry lines and others. Papandreou underlined that PASOK's stance on issues of corruption was consistent and called for "transparency at any cost and with no exceptions," alleging that an attempt is being made to hold the entire political world hostage. His four proposals included holding an extraordinary plenary session in Parliament to set up a parliamentary investigation committee on the Siemens case; exerting pressure on the German company to present all evidence that concerns Greece; adoption of a special regulation providing preferential treatment for those who present tangible evidence against corrupt politicians and confiscation of undeclared property assets. He noted that the four measures would require an act of legislation and asked for the backing of the other opposition parties for the immediate measures he had proposed. PASOK's leader repeated his party's call for immediate elections, saying that ND "cannot handle the fate of the nation", and adding that PASOK intends to submit a policy platform at the Thessaloniki International Fair that will be the result of broader discussion.` "PASOK's goal is victory in the elections, a majority government but also to create broader social consensus," he added. Papandreou was particularly critical of the government's handling of economic affairs, stressing that Greece was in dire economic straits and lacked a plan for dealing with the crisis. "We have never seen the country in a worse economic state," he underlined, saying that the measures taken by the government were "measures of desperation, that do not address the long-term problems but instead strike at middle and low incomes," while warning of another wave of similar measures in October. Papandreou went on to brief the Political Council on his recent tour of the Balkans and announced that the Socialist International will put together a special team on green development, while the SI's will present its proposals to the United Nations in September and at the World Summit on Climate Change in Copenhagen at the end of 2009.

New arrests in Siemens case Athens News Agency http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showplain?maindoc=7659933&maindocimg=6106385&service= 96 June 2011

The 22-year-old daughter of former Siemens Hellas executive Christos Karavelas, a fugitive from justice, was arrested Monday night following a warrant by the examinining magistrate on charges of money laundering. The special examining magistrate investigating the Siemens' kickbacks scandal, Nikos Zagorianos, has also ordered three more arrest warrants for Karavelas' wife and two other daughters. Karavelas had been summoned before the examining magistrate on Friday to answer charges of bribery and legalising income from illegal activities (money-laundering), but failed to comply, but his lawyer appeared and said that his client was abroad. The charges concern a contract signed between Siemens Hellas and Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (OTE) in 1997 to digitalise OTE centres. Zagorianos later Friday issued an international arrest warrant for Karavelas. Karavelas is the second suspect in the Siemens scandal in Greece to flee abroad after Siemens Hellas former CEO Mihalis Christoforakos, who has taken refuge in Germany. As a holder of German nationality and a German passport, laws in Germany prevent Christoforakos' automatic extradition to Greece to stand trial.

Siemens Seeks Greek Settlement on Bribery, Bills, Spiegel Says Bloomberg http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-09/siemens-seeks-greek-settlement-on-bribery-billsspiegel-says.html 9 May 2011 By Holger Elfes Siemens AG (SIE) is seeking a settlement with Greeces government in disputes over unpaid bills and the governments damage claims related to bribery allegations, Der Spiegel reported, without saying where it got the information. Greece wants at least 2 billion euros ($2.9 billion) from Siemens because of alleged bribery cases while the Munich-based manufacturer wants the state to pay for work valued in the lowtriple-digit million-euro range, the German magazine reported. Initial talks have started in resolving the disputes, it said. Alexander Becker, a Siemens spokesman, declined today to comment on the report. George Petalotis, a Greek government spokesman, didnt immediately answer two calls made by Bloomberg News to his mobile phone seeking comment. To contact the reporter on this story: Holger Elfes in Hamburg via helfes@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Celeste Perri at cperri@bloomberg.net

Germany targets Greek ex-minister for corruption: report Expatica.com http://www.expatica.com/de/news/german-news/germany-targets-greek-ex-minister-forcorruption-report_143065.html 16 April 2011 German prosecutors are targeting a Greek former defence minister in a corruption probe concerning a submarine deal, the weekly Der Spiegel reported in its edition to be published Monday. The weekly said Akis Tsohatzopoulos, who is also the object of an inquiry in Greece, had been named in charges against two former directors of the Ferrostaal company as a recipient of bribes. Tsohatzopoulos told Der Spiegel, "I have never asked for or received money or other advantages in connection with the sale of submarines to Greece." The prosecutions office in Munich, which is conducting the probe, was not available for comment Saturday. According to Der Spiegel, the charge sheet alleges that other Greek officials were also implicated in the 2000 deal involving four submarines built by Ferrostaal. The weekly said Ferrostaal was suspected of paying hundreds of millions of euros in kickbacks to win contracts with foreign governments, including for a gas pumping station in Turkmenistan. Current Greek Defence Minister Evangelos Venizelos last month accused German companies of encouraging corruption in his country over a long period, naming the Siemens group, Ferrostaal and its former parent company MAN. He cited "elements" provided by a German legal investigation into Ferrostaal, and a report by the Greek financial authorities which, according to press reports, calculated that $140 million in bribes had been paid. A preliminary inquiry was launched by the Greek legal authorities but in view of the supposed involvement of former ministers, one of them identified by newspapers as Tsohatzopoulos, the case had to be sent to parliament.

Greece: Ex-minister convicted on false declaration Bloomberg Businessweek http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9MISC780.htm

13 April 2011 ATHENS, GREECE A former Socialist transport minister in Greece has been sentenced to three years in prison for making false income declarations. Judicial officials say Tassos Mantelis was not jailed following his conviction Wednesday, pending an appeal. The 66-year-old former minister also faces separate charges of money laundering for allegedly receiving an illegal campaign donation from German industrial giant Siemens in 1998. Greece's Socialist government has promised to crack down on corruption after imposing harsh austerity measures to deal with the crisis. Mantelis, once a senior Socialist party official, served as transport minister between 1997 and 2000.

Gov't calls for explanations by Siemens Athens News Agency http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showplain?maindoc=9816635&service=142 April 2011 (ANA-MPA) -- Justice Minister Haris Kastanidis on Wednesday announced that the Greek state will impose fines on German multinational Siemens before the end of May for violation of laws against money laundering. Kastanidis made the announcement while addressing Parliament on the amended ministerial liability law, while he clarified that on Monday he will send a letter to Siemens' management, demanding explanations within the next 15 days. "The German side has an obligation to compensate the Greek side regardless of the court ruling that will be issued in the Siemens bribery case. The usually judgmental Germans will stand accused, because their own companies are champions of corruption worldwide," Kastanidis said. Main opposition New Democracy (ND) Parliamentary spokesman Prokopis Pavlopoulos also lashed out at German justice, underlining that the Greek justice system should not take the entire blame for procrastination when, essentially, it was the German justice system that covered up the cases in question. Opposition Popular Orthodox Rally (LA.O.S) president George Karatzaferis characterised the draft law under discussion as "declaration of remorse delayed by 10 years". He also accused the two major political parties of being responsible for the fact that "nobody was sent to jail and

nobody will be". He also stated that former defence minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos should not be the only one to appear before a parliamentary preliminary examination committee. In response, the ND parliamentary spokesman stated that the payments made by ND ministers were in accordance with contracts signed under the Simitis government.

Ex-minister convicted over undeclared Siemens cash Ekathimerini http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_13/04/2011_387537 13 April 2011 Mantelis given suspended sentence as justice minister prepares to tie up loose ends with German firm Former Transport Minister Tasos Mantelis claims that the money he received from Siemens was a campaign donation. Former Transport Minister Tasos Mantelis became on Wednesday the first politician to receive a prison sentence, albeit a suspended one, in connection to accepting money from the German electronics and engineering giant Siemens, which is alleged to have paid millions of euros in bribes to Greek political figures, parties and public servants to secure state contracts. Manteliss conviction came on the same day that Justice Minister Haris Kastanidis revealed that he is about to write to Siemens in a bid to reach an out-of-court settlement with the company in relation to the damages suffered by the Greek state as a result of the bribes paid to its officials. An Athens appeals court handed Mantelis a three-year suspended sentence for submitting a false source-of-wealth declaration. The former minister was called to testify after revealing before a parliamentary committee last year that he had accepted money from Siemens, although he insisted that it was an election campaign contribution rather than a bribe. Mantelis is alleged to have accepted the equivalent of about 200,000 euros from Siemens in two payments. The former minister argued that the money was never used and that it did not technically belong to him as it was paid into a friends bank account. The court, however, rejected his argument and said that he should have declared the money. It also imposed a 7,500-euro fine on Mantelis and withdrew his voting rights for a year. Mantelis has yet to stand trial as part of the main investigation into the Siemens investigation. He faces charges of money laundering, which is a felony, and has been bailed pending his appearance in court. Apart from the outstanding judicial investigation, the Siemens scandal continues to be an open wound for Greece as it has not reached any settlement with the German company. Kastanidis said that he would be sending a letter to Siemens on Monday to ask the firm to provide details about any illegal activities in Greece with a view to reaching a financial settlement.

Sources said that Kastanidis would ask Siemens to cooperate by the end of May or else face the prospect of being fined by the Greek government in accordance with the countrys antimoney laundering legislation.

Greek minister says German firms encouraged corruption Expatica.com http://www.expatica.com/de/news/german-news/greek-minister-says-german-firms-encouragedcorruption_139304.html 30 March 2011 The Greek defence minister Wednesday charged German enterprises with encouraging corruption in his country over a long period, citing alleged bribery in a deal to buy submarines from the Ferrostaal firm. "There is an annoying problem ... which is that at a certain period all the big German companies dealing with the Greek state were creating a problem," Evangelos Venizelos told a radio station. He named the Siemens group, involved in a high-profile corruption scandal in the early 2000s, the Ferrostaal company and its former parent company MAN. "Our European partners should help us monitor the application of transparency rules, which are not violated uniquely or mainly in Greece, but above all in the countries of origin of the entreprises," he said. He observed that "German law has since changed" and reckoned that the acts of corruption, which notoriously went unpunished in Greece, were "alas not punished in Germany either." Venizelos launched his accusations while acknowledging that the order of four Type 214 submarines concluded and then extended under the previous Socialist governmnents of Costas Smitis between 1996 and 2004 were "clearly" tarnished by suspicions of corruption. He cited "elements" provided by a German legal investigation into Ferrostaal, and a report by the Greek financial authorities which, according to press reports, calculated that $140 million in bribes had been paid. A preliminary inquiry was launched by the Greek legal authorities but in view of the supposed involvement of former ministers, one of them identified by newspapers as the Socialist former defence minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos, the case has to be sent to the parliament. Greece only accepted delivery of the submarines in March 2010 to guarantee the survival of one of its shipyards and after long negotiations with the German authorities. It had blocked delivery in 2006, claiming problems in the construction of the first, the Papanikolis.

Siemens Greek Unit Says Applies Program to Prevent Corruption Bloomberg http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-26/siemens-greek-unit-says-applies-program-toprevent-corruption.html 26 January 2011 Siemens AG, Europes biggest engineering company, is applying a strict restructuring program to prevent corruption, said Panos Xinis, chief executive officer of the companys Greek unit. Siemens Hellas is one of the first to fully implement this program, Xinis wrote in response to Greeces demand for damages from the company, according to an e-mailed statement from the government today. Greece said yesterday it wants Siemens to reimburse the state for the manufacturers alleged part in a corruption scandal that embroiled at least two administrations in the country. Greeces Investment Minister Haris Pamboukis sent a letter to Siemens Hellas saying that the state will use all means at its disposal to seek damages for the vicious practices of your company in the past, according to a copy of the letter that his office e-mailed yesterday to Bloomberg News. Xinis would help the government in any way possible, and Siemens has submitted all available documents in Greece to the relevant authorities examining the case, according to the statement. To contact the reporter on this story: Eleni Chrepa in Athens echrepa@bloomberg.net To contact the editor responsible for this story: Angela Cullen at acullen@bloomberg.net

Greek Politicians Named In Siemens Bribery Probe Corruption Currents (The Wall Street Journal Blog) http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/01/21/greek-politicians-named-in-siemens-briberyprobe/ 21 January 2011 By Samuel Rubenfeld A Greek parliamentary investigation into bribes paid by Siemens AG in the country named 15 ministers from both main political parties as recipients of illicit funds. But an AFP report on the investigation says the lawmakers cant agree on a common list of suspects, leading to scorn among the local press. Also, only some of those on the list can be prosecuted because of a statute of limitations on ministers, the AFP article says.

Siemens paid EUR1.3 billion ($1.8 billion) in bribes to foreign officials around the world in exchange for business between 2000 and 2006, about EUR100 million of it to officials in Greece. For its actions, Siemens paid $800 million to settle charges in the U.S., the largest punishment to date for violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, a law that bans the bribery of foreign officials for business purposes. It also paid another $800 million in fines to German authorities. Only two Greek officials, former minister Tassos Mantelis and one-time Pasok political strategist Theodoros Tsoukatos have admitted taking Siemens money, according to the AFP report. The former said it was a personal campaign donation while the latter said he took the payment on behalf of his political party, Pasok, which has denied it. Mantelis was charged with money laundering as part of the Greek investigation.

Siemens Bribery Scandal in Greece: Ex-Boss Could Help Shed Light on Corruption Spiegel Online http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,633198,00.html 29 June 2009 The former boss of Siemens in Greece, Michael Christoforakos, was arrested last week in Germany after going on the run. While Greece wants to see him extradited, Munich prosecutors may prefer to keep him in Germany if he agrees to spill the beans on the extent of the Siemens bribery scandal. Michael Christoforakos, the former Siemens boss in Greece who was arrested in Germany last week, could become a key witness in the ongoing investigation into the bribery scandal at the German engineering giant. While Greek prosecutors want the German authorities to extradite Michael Christoforakos back to Greece to face corruption charges there, prosecutors in Munich may prefer to hold on to him. The 56-year-old former head of Siemens in Greece was arrested last Thursday after police tracked him down to a private house in Rosenheim, southeast of Munich. He and another former Siemens manager had gone on the run in May. The Greek authorities had issued an international warrant for their arrest in connection with the alleged payment of bribes to obtain key contracts. Christoforakos, who has dual German and Greek nationality, is one of seven former Siemens executives targeted in a Greek investigation into the awarding of a 1990s contract with the national telecommunications operator OTE. SPIEGEL has learned from sources in the judiciary that the Munich state prosecutor's office wants to launch its own investigation into the former Siemens boss, in connection with possible bribes paid to Greek politicians to secure contracts in the run-up to the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens.

According to the Munich-based newspaperSddeutsche Zeitung, prosecutors in the city are planning to interrogate the former top executive this week -- and it is looking highly likely that he will help them with their inquiries. "Christoforakos is ready to face trial in Munich," his lawyer Stefan Kursawe told the paper. "He would cooperate there." German investigators want to uncover the full extent of the Siemens bribery affair. The company has already admitted that between 1999 and 2006 as much as 1.3 billion ($1.8 billion) was spent on dubious payments. The company is thought to have resorted to bribery after its communications division had missed a series of industry trends and suffered from a collapse in overall demand. If Christoforakas were to provide detailed testimony, it could go a long way to shedding light on the extent of the corruption in Greece. According to the Sddeutsche Zeitung, Christoforakas's lawyer is hoping to cut a deal with the Munich prosecutors whereby he would be tried in Germany in exchange for telling them everything he knows. This would mean he could not be prosecuted in Greece for the same crime. Those found guilty of corruption in the country can face particularly tough sentences, including life. However, there could be a hitch in his plan. The Greek authorities could offer to hand over Volker Jung -- a German former Siemens director who has been banned from leaving the country due to corruption charges -- in exchange for Christoforakos. Daniel Peter, another of Christofarkos's lawyers, said that they would oppose any such deal. "This is not a question of secret agents who can be swapped," he told the SZ. smd -- SPIEGEL with wire reports

Siemens Hit by Corruption Charges in Greece, Norway DW-World.de http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3455188,00.html 2 July 2008 Embattled engineering giant Siemens, under investigation in Germany for allegations of bribery and corruption, was dealt another blow this week as faced charges of bribing politicians in Greece and a fine in Norway. A Greek prosecutor on Tuesday, July 1 filed charges of bribery and money laundering in a corruption probe into deals between the Greek state and German engineering company Siemens. The charges follow a two-year investigation into contracts won by Siemens to equip Greece's main telecoms operator OTE over a decade ago and later to help create an expensive security system for the 2004 Athens Olympics.

The charges have not been brought against any individual. Under Greek law, charges can be filed against "all responsible." That allows authorities to open a wide-ranging investigation and anyone considered a suspect in it is automatically charged. Scandal rocks Greek politics The probe in Greece began after revelations in 2005 that Siemens had earmarked a significant amount of funds for bribes to secure foreign contracts. So far about 100 people, including former executives in Siemens AG's Greek unit and OTE, have testified to Athens prosecutor Panayiotis Athanassiou during the two-year investigation. Several businessmen and stockbrokers suspected of acting as middle men for the payouts have also gone on the stand. The affair has rocked the two main political parties in Greece, the ruling New Democracy conservatives and the opposition Pasok socialists. The Greek media has for weeks speculated that officials on both sides received perks, gifts and payments from Siemens slush funds. However, both parties have denied receiving cash. The socialists were in power until 2004 and oversaw the bulk of preparations for the Athens Olympics. But the ruling New Democracy conservatives could also be implicated in the scandal as the Siemens payments continued after they came to power, Greek press reports claim. On Tuesday, respected Greek daily Kathimerini claimed Siemens company officials earmarked more than 12 million (US$19 million) for Greece's main political parties between 1998 and 2005. Socialist spokesman Giorgos Papaconstantinou on Tuesday called for a special Parliamentary investigation, and accused the government of trying to cover up a scandal. Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis last week vowed to open a parliamentary inquiry into the case as soon as the judicial investigation is complete. Norway slaps fine Separately, police in Norway said Tuesday they were imposing a fine on the local unit of German engineering giant Siemens of two million kroner ($400,000) for corruption in defense contracts. It was the second Siemens unit to be fined in Norway. The company is contesting both fines. Siemens, one of the world's best known companies, is being investigated in several countries over allegations of bribery and corruption. In Germany, Siemens is fighting a damaging corruption scandal since 2006. It centers on the existence of a slush fund that was used to win industrial contracts. The group, which employs 400,000 people around the world and makes a broad range of products including household appliances, medical equipment, trains, turbines and power

stations, acknowledged following an internal probe that 1.3 billion euros ($2 billion) disappeared into various funds. It said it had found evidence of violations across the company and in several countries. German investigators have since determined that payments to obtain foreign contracts were a widespread practice among Siemens multiple divisions. Siemens has said it is cooperating in all the investigations, and has introduced changes designed to make its corporate structure leaner and more transparent.