You are on page 1of 211

Special Publication of the IEEE Power System Relaying Committee

Copyright IEEE 2011

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Developed by a working group of the Power System Relay Committee (PSRC) First published in 1995 widely presented within the industry, including a presentation at the 2003 PPIC Conference Updated, published, and presented for the first time at the 2011 57th IEEE Pulp and Paper Industry Conference

Michael Thompson, Chair Christopher Ruckman, Vice Chair Hasnain Ashrafi Gabirel Benmouyal Zeeky Bukhala Stephen P. Conrad Everett Fennell Dale Finney Dale Fredrickson Jonathan D. Gardell Juan Gers Randy Hamilton Wayne Hartmann Gerald Johnson Patrick M. Kerrigan Sungsoo Kim Prem Kumar

Hugo Monterrubio Charles Mozina Mukesh Nagpal Brent Oxandale Russell W. Patterson Mike Reichard Mohindar Sachdev Kevin Stephan Sudhir Thakur Demetrios Tziouvaras Joe Uchiyama Quintin Verzosa, Jr. Thomas Wiedman Michael Wright John Wang Murty V. V. S. Yalla

Michael J. Thompson received his BS, magna cum laude, from


Bradley University in 1981 and an MBA from Eastern Illinois University in 1991. He has broad experience in the field of power system operations and protection. Upon graduating, he served nearly 15 years at Central Illinois Public Service (now AMEREN), where he worked in distribution and substation field engineering before taking over responsibility for system protection engineering. Prior to joining Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. in 2001, he was involved in the development of several numerical protective relays while working at Basler Electric. He is presently a Principal Engineer in SELs Engineering Services Division; a senior member of the IEEE; a main committee member of the IEEE PES Power System Relaying Committee; and a registered professional engineer. Michael was a contributor to the reference book, Modern Solutions for the Protection Control and Monitoring of Electric Power Systems, has published numerous technical papers, and has a number of patents associated with power system protection and control.

Charles (Chuck) Mozina received a B.S. degree in electrical engineering


from Purdue University, West Lafayette, in 1965. He is a Consultant, for Beckwith Electric Co. Inc., specializing in power plant and generator protection. His consulting practice involves projects relating to protective relaying applications, protection system design and coordination. Chuck is an active 25-year member of the IEEE PES Power System Relay Committee and was the past chairman of the Rotating Machinery Subcommittee. He is active in the IEEE IAS I&CPS, PCIC and PPIC Committees, which address industrial protection systems. He is the past U.S. representative to CIGRE Study Committee 34 (now B-5) on System Protection. He has over 25 years of experience as a protective engineer at Centerior Energy (now part of FirstEnergy), a major utility in Ohio, where he was Manager of System Protection. For 10 years, he was employed by Beckwith Electric as the Manager of Application Engineering for Protection Systems. He is now a consultant for that company. He is a registered Professional Engineer in the state of Ohio and a Liife Fellow of the IEEE. 6

Fundamentals Multifunction Generator Protection Systems Stator Phase Fault Protection Stator Ground Fault Protection Field Fault Protection System Backup Protection Generator Breaker Failure Abnormal Frequency Protection Overexcitation and Overvoltage Protection

Underexcitation / Loss-of-Excitation Protection Current Unbalance (Negative-Sequence) Protection Loss of Prime Mover (Antimotoring) Protection Out-of-Step Protection Voltage Transformer Signal Loss Inadvertent Energization Protection Other Protective Considerations Tripping Modes

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Basic design and operation of synchronous generators Power system connections Behavior under short-circuit conditions Generator grounding Generator stability IEEE guidelines Device numbers

Reactive Power Into System + MVAR Overexcited Overexcitation Limiter (OEL)

Rotor Winding Limited

MW G System MVAR Normal Overexcited Operation Stator Winding Limited + MW Real Power Into System

Underexcitation Limiter (UEL) Underexcited MVAR Reactive Power Into Generator Stator End Iron Limited Steady-State Stability Limit MW G MVAR Underexcited Operation System

kV 2 RC MVA = Z RV kV 2 RC Z= MVA R V
X

Angle Angle

R Z

Current

Current

Current

Accumulation of Damage Over Time


8000 wattseconds 6000 4000 2000 0 0.01
wattseconds

Total Generator System


0.1 1 time, seconds 10

Most damage occurs in period after the generator breaker opens

Types of Instability

Steady-State Transient Dynamic

Pmax =

Eg Es X

Pe =

Eg Es X

sin g s

Power Flow L1 L2 L3 L4 Power POWER System

SYSTEM

Egg

Ess

Generator G Xd V Per-Unit MVAR

GSU

System Reactance

XS Where: XT Xe = XT + XS Xe

V2 2

1 1 X X d e

V2 2

1 1 + X X d e

Xd Xe 2

Xd + Xe 2

Per-Unit MW

MW-MVAR Per-Unit Plot

R-X Diagram Plot

Power System

Ess
Three-Phase Short Circuit

Substation 1

GSU 78 = Out-of-Step Protection Es = System Voltage Eg = Generator Voltage s = System Voltage Phase Angle g = Generator Voltage Phase Angle 78 G T

Egg

Maximum Power Transfer

Pmax =

Eg Es X

All Lines in Service Breakers 1 and 2 Tripped

A2 PM = Pe

Pe =
A1 C 0 90 g s 180

Eg Es X

sin g s

Occurs when fast-acting AVR control amplifies rather than damps small MW oscillations Most likely to occur when generators are remote from load centers Power system stabilizer (PSS) damps oscillations required in Western United States

Latest developments reflected in


Std. 242, IAS Buff Book C37.102, IEEE Guide for Generator Protection C37.101, IEEE Guide for AC Generator Ground Protection C37.106, IEEE Guide for Abnormal Frequency Protection for Power Generating Plants
Created / maintained by the IEEE PSRC & IAS updated every 5 years

C37.102-2006 updated version now available includes significant changes and additions

Device Number

Function

Tutorial Chapter

11 21 24 27TN 32 40 46 49 51G 51TG 1&2

Multifunction Protection System Distance Relay Backup for System and Generator Zone Phase Faults Volts / Hertz Protection for Generator Overexcitation 100 Percent Stator Ground Fault Protection Reverse Power Relay Antimotoring Protection Loss-of-Field Protection Negative-Sequence Current Unbalance Protection for Generators Stator Thermal Protection Time-Overcurrent Ground Relay Backup for Ground Faults

5.2 2.4 3.2 2.2 3.5 3.3 3.4 2.2

Device Number

Function

Tutorial Chapter

51V 59 59G 60 63 62B 64F 71 78

Voltage-Controlled or Voltage-Restrained Time-Overcurrent Relay Backup for System and Generator Phase Faults Overvoltage Protection Overvoltage Relay Stator Ground Fault Protection for Generators Voltage Balance Relay Detection of Blown Voltage Transformer Fuses Transformer Fault Pressure Relay Breaker Failure Timer Field Ground Fault Protection Transformer Oil or Gas Level Loss-of-Synchronism Protection

2.4 3.2 2.2 3.7 2.5 2.3 3.6

Device Number

Function

Tutorial Chapter

81 86 87G 87N 87T 87U

Frequency Relay Both Underfrequency and Overfrequency Protection Hand-Reset Lockout Auxiliary Relay Differential Relay Primary Phase Fault Protection for Generators Stator Ground Fault Differential Protection Differential Relay Primary Protection for Transformers Differential Relay Overall Generator and Transformer Protection

3.1 5.1 2.1 2.2 2.2

Transformer Fault Pressure 63 Oil Low 71

87T

Unit Transformer

51 TG1 51 Transformer Neutral TG2 Overcurrent

87O Unit Differential 24 2 Second V/Hz UAT Oil Low Voltage Balance 71 UAT Fault Pressure 63 UAT Overvoltage 59 50/ 27 Inadv. Energ. (Note 4) 78 Loss of Synchronism 24 1 Loss of Field 40 V/Hz 51 51 TG1 TG2 51 Unit Auxiliary Bus Phase Time Overcurrent UAT Neutral Overcurrent 50 51 UAT Backup

60

81

Frequency

87T

UAT Differential

Field Breaker

32 49 Reverse Power

Auxiliary VTs

41
Stat. Temp 64F 53 87G

Generator Differential

Field (Note 1) Ground 46 Negative Sequence Generator Neutral Overvoltage 21/ 51V System Backup (Note 2)

59G

27 TN

100 Percent Stator Ground (Note 3)

50/ 51G

Generator Neutral Overcurrent

Notes: 1. Dotted devices optional. 2. Device 21 requires external timer. See Chapter 2.4. 3. See Chapter 2.2 regarding 100 percent ground protection. 4. Device 50 requires external timer. See Chapter 4.1.

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Generator protective relaying technology has evolved from discrete electromechanical and static relays to digital multifunction protection systems With availability, additional performance, economic advantages, and reliability of digital multifunction protection systems, this advanced technology is incorporated into most new protection schemes

In most cases, new generators are protected with one of the following:

Dual MGPSs Single MGPS, possibly backed up by single-function relays

Inputs ROM Voltage Inputs RAM EEPROM Current Inputs Data Acquisition System User Interface Microprocessor

Outputs

Other Analog Inputs

Targets Digital Outputs One or More Power Supplies

Digital Inputs

Communications

High-Voltage System Bus

52 87T

Generator Transformer 87AT Auxiliary Bus 52

87O 11G MGPS #1 Relaying Functions 24 27/59 32-1 32-2 40 46 49 50 51V or 21 50/51G 59G 60 78 81 87G 27TH or 59THD or 64S 11G MGPS #2 Relaying Functions 24 27/59 32-1 32-2 40 46 49 50 51V or 21 50/51G 59G 60 64F 81 87G 27TH or 59THD or 64S

Field

Note: Only use functions as appropriate.

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Saturation

Stator differential protection does not detect turn-to-turn faults Current can be 6 to 7 times nominal and can damage stator Use turn-to-turn protection schemes to detect and avoid damage

Imperfection in generator construction Temperature variations Winding connections External faults Terminal voltage and load variations

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

The Method of Generator Neutral Grounding Determines its Performance During Ground Faults
Solidly Grounded Low Impedance High Impedance Hybrid Grounding Ungrounded

Multiple Bus (No/Low Z/High Z)


Directly connected to bus Likely in industrial, commercial,

BUS

and isolated systems May have problems with circulating 3rd harmonic
Use of single grounded machine can help

Adds complexity to discriminate

ground fault source if ground resistance is high (less than 25A)

Same type of grounding used on 1 or mutiple generators

Low Resistance Grounding Systems


2000/5

45MVA Generator
2000/5 CTs
80% 87

87 Set at 0.2A Pickup 20% of Winding Not Protected

2000/5

400 A

62

Percentage of Stator Winding Unprotected

87G Generator Differential 87GD Generator Ground Differential 51N Neutral Overcurrent

IA IB
Residual current calculated from individual phase currents. Paralleled CTs shown to illustrate principle.

IC IG
IG 3 I0

90 3I O 180 0 IG 270

-3Io x IG cos (180) = 3IoIG

IA IB
Residual current calculated from individual phase currents. Paralleled CTs shown to illustrate principle.

IC IG
IG 3I 0

90

180

0 3I O 270

-3Io x IG cos (0) = -3IoIG

IG

59N, 3V0 overvoltage, covers 95% of winding


Tuned to the fundamental frequency Must work properly from 10 to 80 Hz during startup.

3rd Harmonic methods cover remaining 5% of winding near neutral


27TN, 3rd harmonic undervoltage 59D, Ratio of 3rd harmonic voltage at terminal and

neutral ends of winding

64S, Subharmonic voltage injection, covers 100% of winding

High-impedance ground limits ground fault current (limits damage on internal winding to ground fault) Conventional neutral or zerosequence overvoltage relay (59G) provides coverage for the ground faults involving up to 90%95% of the winding from phase terminal
R

59G

51G connected in the primary or secondary neutral circuit can be used as a backup to 59G

Last 5%10% near neutral not covered by neutral overvoltage relay (59G) because a ground fault in this winding region bypasses grounding transformer or resistor (R) or 59G, solidly grounding the machine

59G

XHL

Sensitively set 59G relay to detect ground faults (up to 95% of the winding) can also pick up for faults on the HV side of GSU or in the VT secondary circuit

59G

Io

Co

CHL
Zero-Sequence Network

Z0 VR := V0 Z + X HL 0
XHL

R 3Io

VR

3R

Xo

V0

Third-harmonic voltage develops in stator due to inherent presence of third harmonic flux in the rotor field

Rotor MMF

I3h A, B, C

Co

Generator winding and terminal capacitances provide path for the third-harmonic stator current via grounding resistor
R 3I3h

Machine construction the pitch of the stator Levels of excitation (MVAR) and machine output (MW) Terminal capacitance

Normal Operation Neutral No Load Full Load V3RD Fault at Neutral Neutral Fault at Terminal Neutral No Load Full Load V3RD

+V3RD

Full Load No Load Terminal

Present in terminal and neutral ends Can vary with loading Detects ground faults near neutral

+V3RD Full Load No Load Terminal

Note: If third harmonic goes away across neutral resistor, conclude a ground fault near neutral

Terminal

I3h

C0

Under normal conditions, 27N3 is picked up because of the third-harmonic voltage drop across neutral resistor

3I3h

59G

27N3

I3h

C0

For a fault close to neutral of the stator winding, 27N3 drops out because the fault bypasses the neutral resistor A supervisory overvoltage (59C) relay located at the generator terminal blocks 27N3 operation during startup or shutdown to avoid misoperation

3I3h

59G

27N3

100%

59G

~95% of winding from terminal by 59G ~15%30% of winding from neutral by 27N3

27N3 5% 0%

59G

27N3

Compares third-harmonic voltage magnitude at the generator neutral to that at the generator terminals
Ferroresonance damping resistor
59D

59G

100%

59G

~95% of winding from terminal by 59G ~15%30% of winding from neutral and terminal by 59D
59D

59D 5% 0% 59D

59G

Does not rely on third-harmonic signature of generator Provides full coverage protection Provides online and offline protection prevents serious damage upon application of excitation Is frequency independent

Injection Signal 20 Hz Generator

Pickup Setting

64S

Measurement Signal 20 Hz Filter Measurement Value

For stator ground fault, 20 Hz increases and relay (64S) operates

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Hazards of field faults Field ground protection Tripping considerations Field ground relay selection and settings Field overcurrent

Field

Exciter

Field Breaker

64F DC

Voltage Relay Grounding Brush

Ground #1 Ground #2

Shorts out part of field winding expect unit vibrations, possible damage Causes local rotor current expect rotor heating, distorted rotor, vibration Causes arc damage at fault points

Field

Exciter Field Breaker

Use on generators with brushes Has variable detection sensitivity

64F DC

Voltage Relay Grounding Brush

Field Breaker Control Varistor

Positive

R2 Generator Generator Field 64F Test Pushbutton (optional) Voltage Relay R2 + Exciter

Field Breaker Control

Negative

Field +

Exciter Field Breaker

Brush CR C1 AC R 64F C2

Immediate tripping is recommended on first ground However, most installations alarm and shutdown the machine in orderly manner if ground alarm persists Relays should also be provided with time delays to override transients

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

System backup protection for generators consists of time-delayed protection for phase-to-ground and multiphase fault conditions Backup generator protection schemes protect against failure of system protection and subsequent long-clearing system faults

Relay settings for backup relaying must be sensitive to detect low fault current conditions Settings must balance opposing sensitivity requirements to detect distant faults and security to prevent unnecessary generator tripping

Note locations of current and voltage transformers.

Use either distance or voltagerestrained overcurrent relay to detect system multiphase faults.

Use a time-inverse transformer neutral connected overcurrent relay for system ground faults.

98

Choose protection based on line relay type


If distance type, back up with distance If time-overcurrent type, back up with V-R or

V-C overcurrent

Time coordinate with system relays including breaker failure relaying

Voltage element supervises (torque controls) a sensitive, low pickup time-overcurrent element Under fault conditions, voltage drops below set level dropping out voltage element and permitting overcurrent element to operate

Current Level

V-R overcurrent consists of an overcurrent element whose pickup level varies as a function of voltage applied to relay Normally, generator terminal voltage is above voltage setting, VS1, and current pickup setting is IS

Current Pickup Level

When close-in fault occurs, voltage can drop below voltage setting, VS2, and current pickup level is reduced by factor k to kIS For voltages between VS1 and VS2, pickup level varies proportionately between IS and kIS

Current Pickup Level

Set pickup below generator fault current using synchronous reactance


V-C pickup will likely be below rated current V-R pickup must be above rated current

Calculate 51V voltage element setting to avoid 51V relay misoperation under extreme emergency conditions (with lowest expected system voltage)

To allow for selectivity, time-delay settings must be coordinated with transmission system primary and backup protection, including breaker failure time Coordination is usually calculated with zero voltage restraint

Use three V-C or V-R time-overcurrent relays for complete multiphase fault coverage Note that generator fault current may decay rapidly when low voltage is at generator terminals overcurrent phase fault backup may not operate for system faults Check setting with fault current decrement curve for particular generator and excitation system

Setting detects line fault when protection equipment fails Relay impedance reach and time delay must be coordinated with system primary and backup protection, including breaker failure time Setting must remain conservatively above machine rating to prevent inadvertent trips on generator swings and severe voltage disturbances

F5

FLT

F4

F1

The impedance relay for each generator requires sensitive settings to detect faults at the ends of long lines in the presence of other sources.

F3

F2

Sensitive settings may cause backup relays to unnecessarily trip generator under some loading conditions or for minor, stable swings With this system configuration, it is generally possible to set backup relays to detect only close-in faults Redundant line relaying and breaker failure relaying are necessary for line, bus, and transformer protection

Set impedance relay to smallest of the three following criteria:

120% of longest line (with infeed) if unit is connected to breaker-and-a-half bus, calculate percent using adjacent line length 50%66.7% of load impedance (200%150% of generator capability curve) at machine-rated power factor 80%90% of load impedance (125%111% of generator capability curve) at relay maximum torque angle (MTA)

GCC Zone 1 Zone 2 System

jX 30.0 Longest Line (With Infeed) 75.5 Ohms

25.0

20.0 Zone 2 15.0 50-67% of GCC @ RPFA

Zone 2 reach will not provide adequate phase fault system backup protection as it would require an extremely large setting. The only way to ensure adequate protection to avoid sustained currents to the fault is to provide redundant transmission system protection.

10.0 Shortest Line (No Infeed) 5.0

GCC

Zone 2 limited to 67% of generator capability curve at rated power factor. Zone 1 set to cover 120% of GSU impedance.

MTA Zone 1 RPFA R 20.0

10.0

5.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

Transformer High Side 5.0

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Provides for tripping of backup breakers when the generator breaker does not open after trip initiation upon detection of

Fault Abnormal condition

Open circuit to trip coil Mechanism fails to open breaker Breaker opens but breaker contacts fail to interrupt fault Tripping of circuit breaker left open after maintenance

Generator trips may not always be from high-current events (faults)


Overexcitation Overvoltage Sequential tripping

Need to include breaker auxiliary contact status in addition to current detection BF protection should be fast enough to maintain stability but not so fast as to compromise tripping security

Breaker flashover is a type of breaker failure Breaker flashover is most likely to occur just prior to synchronizing or just after generator is removed from service

Three-phase simultaneous flashovers are rare, thus most protection schemes are designed to detect the flashover of one or two poles

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Underfrequency occurs as the result of sudden reduction in input power through loss of generators or key intertie importing power Overfrequency occurs as the result of sudden loss of load or key intertie exporting power

Regional reliability councils will typically provide settings for underfrequency load shedding and generator tripping Load shedding schemes must coordinate and meet regional criteria Generator tripping criteria must accommodate any frequency excursion during any islanding scenario

60

59

Frequency (Hz)

58

57 Generator tripping permitted on or below curve without requiring additional equivalent automatic load shedding.

56

55 0.1 1 3.3 Time (s) 10 100 300

V%

Operation outside shaded area is limited in extent, duration, and frequency of occurrence Severe restrictions could be imposed on the generator itself
94 96 98 100

106

104

102

102

104

f%

98

96

Possibility of frequency operational limits exists for the generator in the form of time-frequency characteristics
94

Copyright 2005 IEC, Geneva Switzerland

Protection of the long tuned blading in the low-pressure turbine element for steam units Possibility of cumulative blading fatigue and blading failure Similar limitations for combustion and combined-cycle turbines Virtually no frequency limitations for hydro generating units

Example of fictitious steam turbine operational limits shown in the plot


62 Restricted Time Operating Frequency Limits Prohibited Operation 61 60 59 Restricted Time Operating Frequency Limits 58 57 56 0.001

Continuous Operation

Prohibited Operation 0.005 0.01 0.05 0.50 0.10 1.0 Time (Minutes) 5.0 10.0 50.0 100.0

Obtain turbine capability 63 62 from manufacturer 61 Verify if IEC 60034-3: 2007 is applicable Have manufacturer approve protection scheme
60 59 58 57 56 55 54 1 10 100 1000 Total Accumulated Time Limit (Minutes) 10-Minute Maximum Continuous Operating Region

Limits similar to steam turbine Example of frequency limits in the plot

Frequency (Hz)

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

V/Hz application can result in:


Heating of stator core iron Stray flux increasing beyond design limits causing

additional heating

Overvoltage application:
Stresses stator insulation and connected components Cannot be reliably detected using V/Hz alone

Offline generator voltage regulator problems


Operating error during unit synchronizing Control failure VT fuse loss in voltage regulator (AVR)

System problems
Unit load rejection: full load, partial rejection Power system islanding during major disturbances

Generators: 1.05 pu (generator base) Transformers:


1.05 pu at rated load at 0.8 PF 1.1 pu at no load

V% 106

104

102 94 96 98 100 102 104 f%

98

96

94
Copyright 2005 IEC, Geneva, Switzerland

130 125 120 115 110 105 100 0.1 1 10 100

140

130

120 Individual manufacturers should be consulted for limits of a specific transformer. 110 0.01

0.1

1 Time (minutes)

10

100

V/Hz (%)

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Limiting factors are rotor and stator thermal limits Underexcited limiting factor is stator end iron heat Excitation control setting control is coordinated with steady-state stability limit (SSSL) Minimum excitation limiter (MEL) prevents exciter from reducing the field below SSSL

Reactive Power Into System + MVAR Overexcited

Rotor Winding Limited

MW G MVAR Stator Winding Limited + MW Real Power Into System System

MEL Underexcited MVAR Reactive Power Into Generator MW SSSL Stator End Iron Limited G MVAR System

Field open circuit Field short circuit (flashover across slip rings) Accidental tripping of field breaker Voltage regulator control system failure LOF to main exciter Loss of ac supply to excitation system

Impedance variation with the machine operating at or near full load locus follows path from C to D Machine that initially operates at 30% load and underexcited. Impedance locus follows path from E to F to G and oscillates in region between F and G Generally for any loading, impedance terminates on or varies from D to L

Two modern offset mho relays can be used Relay with 1.0 pu impedance diameter detects LOF condition from full load to about 30% load First relay is set with short time delay; 0.1-second delay suggested for security against misoperation during transients

0.5 R Diameter = 1.0 pu

+X

+R Offset =
X d 2

2 Diameter = Xd 1 X 1 2

Second relay is set with time delay; 0.5 to 0.6 seconds provides protection for LOE condition up to no load Two offset mho relays provide LOE protection for any loading level Both relays are set with offset of Xd/2

0.5 R Diameter = 1.0 pu

+X

+R Offset =
X d 2

2 Diameter = Xd 1 X 1 2

Experience has shown that these settings are secure over a wide range of system conditions. However, transient stability analysis should be performed to verify this.

MEL and LOF characteristic are coordinated so they do not overlap MEL prevents leading var excursions into the LOF characteristic to avoid relay misoperation for system transients Negative-offset mho element characteristic leaves underprotected area relative to SSSL and stator end iron limit curve of the machine capability

0.8

0.4

Generator Capability

LOF MEL Relay SSSL

0.4

0.8 0 0.4 0.8 1.2

P pu (MW)

Generator

GSU

System Reactance XS Where Xe=XT + XS


X Xe

G
Per Unit Mvar

Xd

XT

V2 2

1 Xe

1 Xd

V2 2

1_ + 1 Xe Xd

Xd - Xe 2 Xd + Xe 2

Per Unit MW

MW - Mvar PER UNIT PLOT

R-X DIAGRAM PLOT

This scheme combines positive-offset mho relay, directional relay, and undervoltage relay applied at generator terminals and set to look into machine 1.1 (X )
d

Z2 Setting

XS
X d Offset = 2

Z1 Setting R

Machine Capability

Directional unit supervises mho unit because positiveoffset allows it to operate for faults external to generator terminals

MEL

SSSL

Improves coverage

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

System Asymmetries

Open system circuits


Downed conductors Stuck breaker poles or open switches

Unbalanced loads
Untransposed transmission lines Single-phase GSU with unequal impedances

Unbalanced system faults

Strongest I2 source is generator phase-tophase fault Generators connected with delta-wye GSU transformer
System ground faults appear as phase-to-

phase faults to the generator


Generator ground faults typically do not create

as much I2

I2 in the stator creates a magnetic field component that rotates in opposite direction of rotor and power system (positive-sequence) field component

As a result, double-frequency current is induced in rotor At twice fundamental frequency, skin effect promotes current in rotor surface areas and, to a smaller degree, in the field winding

Beyond a point, the induced surface currents can cause heating of metal wedges that hold field windings and / or retaining rings on rotor ends, causing them to anneal, expand, and loosen with catastrophic results

For salient-pole machines, double-frequency currents concentrate at pole faces and teeth Much current appears in the pole-face amortisseur windings

Continuous Unbalance Current Capability


Generator Type Salient Pole Connected Amortisseur Windings Nonconnected Amortisseur Windings Cylindrical Rotor Indirectly Cooled Directly Cooled To 350 MVA 3511250 MVA 12511600 MVA 8 8 [(MVA-350)/300)] 5 10 10 5 Permissible I2 Stator Rating Percent

Short-Time Unbalance Current Capability


Generator Type Salient Pole Synchronous Condenser Cylindrical Rotor Indirectly Cooled Directly Cooled 0800 MVA 8011600 MVA 10 See Graph (next slide) 30 K Permissible
2 I2 t (I2 in pu)

40 30

I2 2 t = 10

I2 2 t Capability

I2 2 t = 10 [(0.00625)(MVA 800)]

Values shown in Tables I and II of this chapter are for machines manufactured to IEEE C50 standards since 2005 Equipment nameplate data and / or the manufacturer may be consulted to verify machine capabilities

Has limited I2 sensitivity of about 60% of generator full-load rating


Generally insensitive to load unbalances or

open conductors
Limited protection as damaging heat can

occur even at low levels of I2

Allows backup protection for unbalanced faults (high levels of I2)

Allows relay characteristics that can match generator I2 capabilities Allows I2 pickup settings down to 0.03 pu Can be set to alarm at lower than generator limits, allowing plant operator to attempt to reduce I2 before trip occurs

1 103

100

K Setting Adjustable Over Range 240

Time (seconds)

10 Minimum Pickup 0.04 pu 1

40

10 5 2

0.1 0.01

0.1 1 Negative-Sequence Current (per unit)

10

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Generator Type Diesel Gas Turbine Hydro Steam

Potential Damage Risk of Explosion Gear Damage Blade Cavitation Overheating

Generator Type Diesel Gas Turbine Hydro Steam

Typical Motoring Power 5% - 25% > 50% 0.2 - 2% 0.5% - 3%

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

The 78 protection scheme protects the generator from OOS or pole-slip conditions Common relay schemes for detecting generator OOS events include:
Single blinder Double blinder Concentric circle

When a Generator Goes Out-of-Step (Synchronism) with the Power System, High Levels of Transient Shaft Torque are Developed. If the Slip Frequency Approaches Natural Shaft Frequency, Torque Produced can Break the Shaft. High Stator Core End Iron Flux can Overheat and Damage the Generator Stator Core. GSU Subjected to High Transient Currents and Mechanical Stresses.
171

172

One pair of blinders (vertical lines) Supervisory offset mho Mho limits reach of scheme to swings near the generator

Double Lens Scheme

Double Blinder Scheme

The most popular OOS protection is the single blinder scheme Pickup area is restricted to shaded area defined by inner region of mho circle and area between Blinders A and B
Z3(t3)

Z0(t0) Z2(t2) Z1(t1)

Positive-sequence impedance must originate outside either Blinder A or Blinder B It should swing through the pickup area and progress to the opposing blinder Swing time should be greater than time-delay setting

Rotor Angle Generator G_1 Angle (degrees) Case 1 (tc = 90 ms), with controls Case 2 (tc = 180 ms), with controls Case 3 (tc = 190 ms), with controls

Case 1 (tc = 90 ms), without controls Case 2 (tc = 180 ms), without controls Case 3 (tc = 190 ms), without controls

Time (seconds)

R-X diagrams show trajectory followed by impedance seen by relay during disturbance When an oscillation in the generator is stable, the point of impedance does not cross the line of the system When an OOS condition occurs, the point of impedance crosses the line of the system impedance each time the slip is completed

R-X Diagram for Case 1

R (ohm)

X (ohm)

R (ohm)

X (ohm)

R (ohm)

Case 1 Tc = 0.09 ms

Case 2 Tc = 0.18 ms

Case 3 Tc = 0.19 ms

Apply OOS if swing impedance passes through GSU or generator This zone is protected by differential relays that do not respond to power swings Consider application of OOS if swing passes outside GSU but line protection is blocked or does not respond to swings

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Common causes
Wiring failure Open in VT draw-out assembly Blown fuse due to short-circuit Fuse left out after maintenance

Affected functions
21, 27, 32, 40, 50/27, 51V, 67N, 78, 81 Automatic voltage regulator (AVR runaway)

When fuse blows, unbalanced voltages created Two sets of VTs required

Loss of One or Two Phases


Negative-sequence voltage

Three-Phase Loss
Low three-phase voltages

& no negative-sequence current = fuse loss


Negative-sequence voltage

& low three-phase current & positive-sequence current = fuse loss


Low three-phase voltages

& negative-sequence current = fault

& high three-phase currents = fault

Wye-wye grounded VTs on ungrounded system Mitigation


Line-to-line rated VTs Broken-delta VTs VT loading resistor

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Operating errors Breaker head flashovers Control circuit malfunctions Combination of above

Typically, normal generator relaying is not adequate to detect inadvertent energizing Generator behaves as induction motor Flux induced into generator rotor causing rapid rotor heating Rotor current is forced into negativesequence path in rotor body

Unit Step-Up Transformer X1T I EG

Equivalent High-Voltage System X1S

X1S = system positive-sequence reactance X1T = transformer positive-sequence reactance X2G = generator negative-sequence reactance

Gen.

X2G

ET Equivalent System Voltage

ES

EG = generator terminal voltage ES = system voltage ET = transformer high-side voltage I = current R2G = generator negative-sequence resistance

Gen.

R2G

Undervoltage (27) supervises low-set, instant overcurrent (50) recommended 27 setting is 50% or lower of normal voltage Pickup timer ensures generator is dead for fixed time to ride through three-phase system faults Dropout timer ensures that overcurrent element gets a chance to trip if voltage is higher than 27 setting during event

Generator Phase Voltage Fault Inception

Breaker Opens Generator Phase Currents

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Large gas turbines are started as a motor using static frequency converter V/Hz is maintained constant until rated voltage is reached, after which rated voltage is maintained Extended operation occurs at low speeds while purging and firing cycles are completed Generator must be protected during low-frequency operation

Some protection such as phase overcurrent and phase unbalance is provided by converter controls To be effective, multifunction generator relays must maintain protection down to low frequencies At lower frequencies, protective functions may deviate from normal specifications In some cases, protective functions may have to be disabled during starting because of possible false operation

Fault-to-ground on dc link cannot be detected by converter controls Fault causes dc current to flow through any wye-connected VTs and generator ground
.

DC current saturates magnetic elements (VTs and distribution transformer in generator neutral) Damage can occur if fault is not cleared PT can be damaged in approximately 50 ms Two strategies to address this fault include
Measure dc current in generator neutral (e.g., with

transducer) and use dc relay and turn converter off before damage occurs
Eliminate any ground path through magnetic elements

during starting (use delta-connected VTs and disconnect generator neutral while starting)

To avoid damage to generator or GSU unit, synchronizing across breaker should be done within tight limits Typical recommendations are
Electrical degrees 10 Voltage 0 to +5 percent

Frequency difference < 0.067 Hz

Synchronizing equipment or supervising relays should take into account breaker closing time and relative slip, closing breaker in advance so that angle between generator and system at closing is as close to zero as possible

Generators may be operated at lower frequency during startup and shutdown Electromechanical relays can become very insensitive at off nominal frequencies Plunger-type overcurrent relays have flat characteristics down to low frequencies and are used to provide supplementary protection during start up and shutdown these relays cannot be energized continuously and have to be disconnected during normal operation Microprocessor-based relays can provide protection down to lower frequencies and generally do not require supplementary protection
Pickup in Multiples of 60 Hz Pickup

(B) (D)

(C)

(D)

(E)

(B) (C)

2 (A) (A) 0 10 20 (E)

(F) 30 40 50 Frequency in Hz 60 70 80

(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)

Plunger-Type Current Relay Induction Overcurrent Relay Generator Differential Relay Generator Ground Relay Harmonic Restraint Transformer Differential Relay Plunger-Type Voltage Relay

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Generator protection functions with same trip / shutdown modes are grouped together

Operated by protective functions, auxiliary lockout relays, 86G (usually hand-reset), perform most tripping Where possible, primary and backup relays trip via separate paths / lockouts

Includes tripping of all electrical and mechanical power sources Provides fastest way to isolate generator

Does not shut down prime mover Used when abnormality can be corrected quickly allowing fast reconnection

Only trips generator breaker(s) Used when disturbance is on system and it is desired to have generator run its own auxiliaries

Used to prevent overspeed when delayed tripping of breakers is not detrimental following a prime mover trip, planned or unplanned, breakers are tripped after reverse or low (hydro) power is detected Not used for clearing faults

Much tripping philosophy depends on ability of generating unit to continue operating after disconnection from system (full load rejection) If unit cannot support its own auxiliaries, then a tripping mode that transfers auxiliaries should be incorporated

Table II provides suggested steam unit trip logic by IEEE protective function numbers Some functions are alarmed only In general, G means generator and N means neutral or ground

21 or 51V 24 32 40 46 50/27 50/51G 51TG2 50/51 UAT 59

59G 63 63UAT 67N 78 87G 87GN 87T 87T UAT 87O

51TG1 and 81 are examples of functions set to trip in unit separation mode

Table III provides typical tripping for hydroelectric units Trip requirements are similar to thermal generators but may need slightly different slip / shutdown operations
Slower rotation devices Different mechanical control devices

A generator disconnect switch is often used when tie to transmission system is dual-breaker arrangement

Sometimes generator protective functions are enabled / disabled by utilizing auxiliary switch contacts based on position of disconnect switch Be cautious about bad or incorrect disconnect position status leaving generator unprotected