A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model Author(s): Robert A. Dahl Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol.

52, No. 2 (Jun., 1958), pp. 463-469 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1952327 . Accessed: 28/03/2011 15:12
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A CRITIQUE

OF THE RULING ELITE

ROBERT A. DAHL Yale University

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A greatmanypeople seem to believethat "they" runthings:the old families, the bankers,the City Hall, machine,or the party boss behind the scene. This kind of view evidentlyhas a powerfuland many-sidedappeal. It is simple, dramatic, "realistic." It gives one standingas an inside-dopester. compelling, idealism,it has just the right For individualswith a strongstrainof frustrated touch of hard-boiled cynicism.Finally, the hypothesishas one very great advantage over many alternativeexplanations:It can be cast in a formthat makes it virtuallyimpossibleto disprove. Considerthe last point fora moment.There is a type of quasi-metaphysical regressof explanations. theorymade up of what might be called an infinite in this way. If the overtleaders of a The rulingelite model can be interpreted do not appear to constitutea rulingelite, then the theorycan be community saved by arguingthat behind the overtleaders thereis a set of covertleaders who do. If subsequentevidence shows that this covertgroup does not make a rulingelite, then the theory can be saved by arguing that behind the first covertgroupthereis another,and so on. Now whatever else it may be, a theorythat cannot even in principle be theory.The least that controverted by empiricalevidence is not a scientific we can demand of any rulingelite theory that purportsto be more than a that the burdenof proofbe on the metaphysicalor polemicaldoctrineis, first, proponentsof the theoryand not on its critics; and, second, that there be accordingto whichthe theorycould be disproved. clear criteria With these points in mind, I shall proceed in two stages. First, I shall try a verysimple the meaningofthe concept"rulingelite" by describing to clarify formof what I conceive to be a rulingelite system.Second, I shall indicate test of any what would be requiredin principleas a simple but satisfactory assertingthat a particularpolitical systemis, in fact,a rulingelite hypothesis system.Finally, I shall deal with some objections.
I. A SIMPLE RULING ELITE SYSTEM

surelyit assertsthat withinsome says anything, If a rulingelite hypothesis specificpolitical system there exists a group of people who to some degree over otheractors in the system.I shall make the exercisepower or influence assumptionsabout power:' following 1. In orderto compare the relativeinfluenceof two actors (these may be individuals,groups,classes, parties,or what not), it is necessaryto state the The statement, scope of the responsesupon which the actors have an effect.
I

pp. 201-215.

Science,Vol. 2 (July1957), See RobertA. Dahl, "The ConceptofPower,"Behavioral

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"A has morepowerthanB," is so ambiguousas to vergeon themeaningless, since it does not specify the scope. of two actors who always per2. One cannot comparethe relativeinfluence to thegroupinfluenced. form identicalactionswithrespect What thismeans as a in influence one can test fordifferences practicalmatteris that ordinarily only in initial preferences. wherethereare cases of differences At one extreme, the alternativeA and anothergroup difference may mean that one group prefers exclusive.At the otherextreme, prefers it may mean B, A and B beingmutually alternativeA to otheralternatives,and anothergroup that one group prefers If a political systemdisplayed completeconsensusat all times, is indifferent. a satisfactory directtest of the hypowe should findit impossibleto construct thesis that it was a rulingelite system,although indirectand ratherunsatisfactorytests mightbe devised. Consequently,to knowwhetheror not we have a rulingelite,we must have in preferences, fromtime to a political systemin which there is a difference the the individual human in among beings system. Suppose, now, that time, among theseindividualsthereis a set whosepreferences regularly prevailin all or at least in all cases of disagreement over key political cases of disagreement, issues (a term I propose to leave undefinedhere). Let me call such a set of individualsa "controlling group."In a full-fledged democracy operating strictly a controlling accordingto majorityrule,the majoritywould constitute group, even though the individual membersof the majoritymightchange fromone a rulingelite system,we issue to the next. But since our model is to represent in size. requirethat the set be less thana majority However, in any representative systemwith singlemembervotingdistricts where more than two candidates receive votes, a candidate could win with to imagine a truly less than a majorityof votes; and it is possible,therefore, sovereignlegislatureelected under the strictest"democratic" rules that was the first nonetheless governedby a legislative majorityrepresenting preferences ofa minority ofvoters.Yet I do not thinkwe wouldwant to call such a political I propose that systema rulingelite system.Because of this kind of difficulty, of a rulingelite any controlling we excludefromour definition group that is a productof rulesthat are actuallyfollowed(that is, "real" rules) underwhicha majorityof individualscould dominateif theytook certainactionspermissible a rulingelite a controlling underthe "real" rules.In short,to constitute group rules. must not be a pure artifact of democratic A rulingelite,then,is a controlling groupless than a majorityin size that is of individualswhose not a pure artifactof democraticrules. It is a minority in preferenceon key preferences regularlyprevail in cases of differences political issues. If we are to avoid an infiniteregressof explanations,the of the rulingelite must be moreor less definitely composition specified.
II. SOME BAD TESTS

we are d.1ing-with wquld run aloig these 1ines; "Such and The hypothesis such a politicalsystem(the U. S., the U.S.S.R., New Haven, or the like) is a

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rulingelite systemin which the rulingelite has the followingmembership." Membershipwould then be specifiedby name, position,socio-economic class, socio-economic roles, or what not. Let me now turn to the problem of testinga hypothesisof this sort, and begin by indicatinga few tests that are sometimesmistakenlytaken as adequate. The first impropertest confusesa rulingelite with a group that has a high Let me explain. Suppose a set of individualsin a political potential forcontrol. thereis a veryhighprobability that if they systemhas the following property: agree on a key political alternative,and if they all act in some specifiedway, thenthat alternativewill be chosen.We may say of such a groupthat it has a In a largeand complexsocietylike ours,theremay be highpotential forcontrol. many such groups. For example, the bureaucratictriumvirateof Professor In the City of New Mills would appear to have a high potential forcontrol.2 Haven, withwhichI have some acquaintance, I do not doubt that the leading with the leaders of both political parties have a high businessfigures together potentialforcontrol.But a potential forcontrolis not, except in a peculiarly Hobbesian world,equivalent to actual control.If the militaryleaders of this countryand theirsubordinatesagreed that it was desirable,they could most assuredlyestablish a militarydictatorshipof the most overt sort; nor would or the executivebranchof theyneed the aid ofleaders of businesscorporations But they have not set up such a dictatorship.For what is our government. on a key politilackingare the premisesI mentioned earlier, namelyagreement actions. That is to say, cal alternativeand some set of specific implementing a group may have a high potential for controland a low potential for unity. of a groupis a function ofits potentialforconThe actual politicaleffectiveness trol and its potentialforunity. Thus a group with a relativelylow potential forcontrolbut a highpotentialforunitymay be morepoliticallyeffective than a groupwith a highpotentialforcontrolbut a low potentialforunity. test confusesa rulingelite with a group of individuals The second improper than any othersin the system.I take it forgranted who have more influence that in everyhuman organizationsome individualshave more influence over key decisionsthan do others.Political equality may well be among the most Utopian of all human goals. But it is fallaciousto assume that the absence of politicalequality provesthe existenceof a rulingelite. The thirdimpropertest,whichis closelyrelated to the precedingone, is to generalizefroma single scope of influence.Neither logically nor empirically does it followthat a groupwith a high degreeof influence over one scope will over anotherscope withinthe same have a high degreeof influence necessarily that system.This is a matterto be determined empirically. Any investigation that different elite groupshave difdoes not take into account the possibility ferentscopes is suspect. By means of sloppyquestionsone could easilyseem to discoverthat thereexists a unifiedrulingelite in New Haven; forthereis no
2 C.

Wright Mills,, The Power Elite (New York, 1956), pa-sim.

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doubt that small groupsof people make many key decisions.It appears to be the case, however,that the small group that runsurban redevelopment is not the same as the small group that runs public education, and neitheris quite the same as the two small groupsthat run the two parties.Moreoverthe small with a highdegreeof unitywould almost groupthat runsurban redevelopment if its activitieswere extendedto eithereducation or the certainly disintegrate two political parties.
III. A PROPOSED TEST

If testslike these are not valid, what can we properly require? Let us take the simplestpossible situation. Assume that there have been some number-I will not say how many-of cases where therehas been diswithinthe political systemon key political choices.Assume further agreement eliteprefers one alternative and otheractorsin the that the hypothetical ruling Then unlessit is truethat in all or verynearly otheralternatives. systemprefer all ofthesecases the alternative eliteis actuallyadopted, preferred by the ruling the hypothesis(that the systemis dominatedby the specifiedrulingelite) is clearlyfalse. I do not want to pretendeitherthat the researchnecessaryto such a test is lifelends itselfconveniently at all easy to carryout or that community to strict of the test. But I do not see how interpretation accordingto the requirements thedominance anyonecan supposethathe has established of a specific groupin a or a nationwithout examination community basinghis analysis on thecareful ofa decisions.And these decisionsmust eitherconstitute the uniseriesof concrete verse or a fairsample fromthe universeof key politicaldecisionstaken in the political system. Now it is a remarkableand indeed astoundingfact that neitherProfessor Mills nor ProfessorHunter has seriouslyattempted to examine an array of Yet I suppose thesetwo worksmore cases to testhis major hypothesis.3 specific than any othersin the social sciencesof the last fewyears have soughtto inas instancesof a rulingelite. terpret complexpoliticalsystemsessentially To sum up: The hypothesisof the existenceof a rulingelite can be strictly tested only if: 1. The hypothetical rulingelite is a well-defined group. 2. There is a fair sample of cases involvingkey political decisionsin which of the hypotheticalrulingelite run counterto those of the preferences any otherlikelygroupthat mightbe suggested. of the elite regularly 3. In such cases, the preferences prevail.
IV. DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS

Several objectionsmightbe raised against the test I propose. would run as First, one mightargue that the test is tooweak.The argument then the test is satisfacfollows:If a rulingelite doesn'texistin a community,
3 Mills,

PowerStructure (Chapel Hill, 1953). op. cit.; Floyd Hunter, Community

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tory; that is, if every hypotheticalrulingelite is compared with alternative controlgroups,and in fact no rulingelite exists,thenthe test will indeed show whose preferences that thereis no minority regularly prevail on key political alternatives. But-it mightbe said-suppose a rulingelite does exist. The test will not necessarily demonstrate its existence,since we may not have selected the rightgroup as our hypotheticalrulingelite. Now this objection is valid; but it suggeststhe point I made at the outset about the possibilityof an infinite regress of explanations.Unless we use the test on everypossiblecombinawe cannot be certainthat thereis not tion of individualsin the community, some combinationthat constitutesa rulingelite. But since there is no more a priorireason to assume that a rulingelite does existthan to assume that one ofthehypothesis, does not exist,the burdenofproofdoes not restupon the critic but upon its proponent.And a proponentmust specifywhat group he has in then the test I have sugmind as his rulingelite. Once the groupis specified, valid. gested is, at least in principle, For supposethat thememSecond,one could object that the testis toostrong. as to the outcome of various political bers of the "ruled" groupare indifferent alternatives.Surely (one could argue) if thereis anothergroup that regularly it is in fact the rulinggroupin the gets its way in the face of this indifference, this case fromthe other society.Now my reasons forwishingto discriminate of using the term "ruling involvemorethan a mere question of the propriety of elite," which is only a term of convenience.There is, I think,a difference some theoreticalsignificance between a systemin which a small group dorninates over anotherthat is opposed to it, and one in which a group dominates overan indifferent mass. In the secondcase, the alternatives at stake can hardly be regardedas "key political issues" if we assume the point of view of the indifferent mass; whereasin the first case it is reasonableto say that the alternatives involvea key politicalissue fromthe standpointof both groups.Earlier I fromdefining refrained the concept "key politicalissues." If we were to do so at this point, it would seem reasonable to require as a necessary although conditionthat the issue should involve actual dispossibly not a sufficient agreementin preferences among two or more groups. In short,the case of "indifference vs. preference" would be ruled out. However, I do not mean to dispose of the problem simply by definition. The point is to make sure that the two systemsare distinguished. The test forthe second,weakersystemofelite rulewould thenbe merelya modification of the test proposed forthe first and more stringent case. It would again rethat when "the quire an examinationof a series of cases showinguniformly word" was authoritatively passed down fromthe designatedelite,the hitherto indifferent majorityfell into ready compliancewith an alternativethat had nothingelse to recommend it intrinsically. Third, one mightargue that the test will not discriminate between a true rulingelite and a rulingelite togetherwith its satellites.This objection is in one sense trueand in one sense false. It is true that on a seriesof key political questions,an apparentlyunified groupmightprevail who would, accordingto

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our test, therebyconstitutea rulingelite. Yet an inner core might actually make the decisionsforthe whole group. must be true. Eitherthe innercore and the However,one oftwo possibilities front men always agree at all timesin the decisionprocess,or theydo not. But if they always agree, then it followsfromone of our two assumptionsabout influence that the distinctionbetween an "inner core" and "frontmen" has no operational meaning; that is, there is no conceivable way to distinguish betweenthem. And if they do not always agree, then the test simplyrequires a comparisonat those points in time when they disagree.Here again, the advantages of concretecases are palpable, forthese enable one to discoverwho initiatesor vetoes and who merelycomplies. Fourth, it mightbe said that the test is eithertoo demandingor else it is If it requiresthat the hypothetical too arbitrary. elite prevails in every single case, then it demands too much. But if it does not requirethis much, then at what point can a rulingelite be said to exist?When it prevailsin 7 cases out of 10? 8 out of 10? 9 out of 10? Or what? There are two answersto this objection. On the one hand, it would be quite reasonableto argue,I think,that since we are considering only key political choices and not trivialdecisions,if the elite does not prevail in everycase in which it disagrees with a contrarygroup, it cannot properlybe called a rulingelite. But since I have not supplied an of the term "key political choices," I must admit that independentdefinition On the otherhand, I would be inclined this answeris not whollysatisfactory. to suggestthat in this instanceas in many otherswe oughtnot to assume that political realitywill be as discreteand discontinuousas the conceptswe find convenientto employ. We can say that a systemapproximatesa true ruling elite system,to a greateror lesser degree,withoutinsistingthat it exemplify the extremeand limitingcase. Fifth,it mightbe objected that the test I have proposedwould not workin the most obvious of all cases of rulingelites, namely in the totalitariandictatorships.For the controlof the elite over the expressionof opinion is so hence no cases on whichto base a great that overtlythereis no disagreement; judgmentarise. This objectionis a fairone. But we are not concerned herewith totalitariansystems.We are concernedwith the application of the techniques of moderninvestigation to Americancommunities, where,except in very rare is not so pervasivethat the investigator is barredfromdiscovering cases, terror of citizens.Even in Little Rock, forexample, newspapermen the preferences in finding seemed to have had littledifficulty diverseopinions;and a northern ofmy acquaintance has managed to completea large number politicalscientist of productive interviewswith White and Negro Southernerson the touchy subject of integration. Finally one could argue that even in a societylike ours a rulingelite might be so influential over ideas, attitudes,and opinionsthat a kind of false consensuswill exist-not the phonyconsensusofa terroristic totalitariandictatorship but the manipulated and superficially self-imposedadherence to the A good deal of normsand goals of the elite by broad sectionsof a community.

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in this way, although it is not ProfessorMills' argumentcan be interpreted this is what he means to resthis case on. clear to me whether Even morethan the othersthisobjectionpointsto the need to be circumspect the evidence. Yet here,too, it seems to me that the hypothesis in interpreting confirmed withoutsomething equivalent to the test I cannot be satisfactorily have proposed. For once again either the consensus is perpetual and unwho is breakable, in which case there is no conceivable way of determining rulerand who is ruled. Or it is not. But ifit is not, thenthereis some point in opinionsat whichthe one groupwill be seen to initiate the processof forming and veto, whilethe restmerelyrespond.And we can onlydiscoverthese points cases wherekey decisionsare made: by an examinationof a series of concrete military subsidies,welfareprograms, decisions on taxation and expenditures, policy, and so on. to know, for example, whetherthe initiationand It would be interesting veto of alternativeshaving to do with our missile programwould confirm ProfessorMills' hypothesis,or indeed any reasonable hypothesisabout the observerit would scarcelyappear existenceof a rulingelite. To the superficial that the militaryitselfis a homogeneousgroup,to say nothingof their supposed coalitionwith corporateand political executives. If the militaryalone is a rulingelite, it is eitherincredibly in incompetent or the coalitiontogether its own fundamentalaffairsor else it is unconcernedwith the administering success of its policies to a degreethat I findastounding. However I do not mean to examine the evidence here. For the whole point of this paper is that the evidencefora rulingelite,eitherin the United States has not yet been properlyexaminedso far as I or in any specificcommunity, examined,I have triedto argue, know.And the evidencehas not been properly criteriato determine because the examinationhas not employed satisfactory a fairtest of the basic hypothesis. what constitutes