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Gilles Deleuze Difference and Repetition ‘Translated by Paul Patton COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS YORK Columbia University ress New York English translation copyright © 1994 The Athlone Press Limited Allrights reserved Difference et Repetition © 1968, Presses Universtsces de France ‘The publishers wish to express this appreciation of assistance given by ‘the government of France through the Fench Ministry of Culture inthe preparation ofthis translation. Library of Congress Cataloging in-Publication Data Delewe, Gils. [Dilérence e éptition. English Ditference and repettionilles Deleuze: translated by Paul Patton. Pm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-231.08158-8 1. Difference Philosophy) 2. Repetition (Philosophy) 3, Philosophy, French—20eh century. I. Til B2430.D453D4513 1993, 9341815 111—de20 cp 10987654321 109 Contents ‘Translator's Preface xi Preface tothe English Edition xv Preface xix INTRODUCTION: REPETITION AND DIFFERENCE 1 Repetition and generality: first distinction feom the point of view of conduct — The ewo orders of generality: resemblance and equality — Second distinction, from the point of view of law — Repetition, law of nature and moral law — The programme of a philosophy of repetition according to Kierkegaard, Niewsche and Péguy — True movement, theatre ‘and representation — Repetition and generality: thed distinction from the point of view of concepts — The comprehension of concepts and the phenomenon of ‘blockage’ — The three cases of ‘natural blockage’ and repetition: nominal concepts, concepts of nature and concepts of freedom = Repetition is not explained by the identity of the concept, any more than itis by a purely negative condition — The functions of the ‘death instinct’ repetition in its relation to difference and as requiring a positive principle. (The example of concepts of freedom) — The two repetitions: by means of the identity of the concept and a negative condition, and by means of difference and excess in the Ides. (Examples of natural and ‘nominal concepts) — The bate and the disguised in repetition — Conceptual difference and difference without concept — But the concept of dlfference (Idea) cannot be reduced to a conceptual difference, any more than the positive essence of repetition can be reduced to difference without concept (CHAPTER I DIFFERENCE IN ITSELF 28 Difference and the obscure ground — Must difference be represented? The four aspects of representation (fourfold root) — The propitious moment, diffrence, the large and the small — Conceptual diference: the greatest and best — The logic of difference according to Aristotle, and the confusion of the concept of difference with conceptual difference — ‘Specific and generic difference — The four aspects or the subordination of vi Difference and Repetition difference: identity of the concept, analogy of judgement, opposition of predicates, resemblance of the perceived — Difference and organic representation — Univocity and difference — The two types of distribution = The impossibility of reconciling wnivocity and analogy — The moments ‘of the tunivocal: Duns Scotus, Spinora, Nietzsche — Repetition in the ermal return defines the univocity of being — Difference and orgiastic ‘representation (the infinitely large and the infinitely small) —The ground as reason — Logic and ontology of dlference according to. Hegel contradiction — Logie and ontology of difference according to Leiba: vieedicion (continuity and indiscernibles) — How orgiastic oF infnice representation of difference does not escape the four aspects previously mentioned — Difference, affirmation and negation — The illusion of the ‘negative ~ Eternal return and the elimination of the negative — The logic and ontology of diference according to Pato — The figures ofthe method Of division: claimants, the ground-test, problems-questions, (non)-beig, and the status ofthe negative — That which is crucial in the problem of dlference simulacra and the resistance ofsimulacra CHAPTER II REPETITION FOR ITSELF. 70 Repetition: something is changed — First synthesis of time: the living, present — Habitus, passive synthesis, contraction, contemplation — The problem of habit — Second synthesis of time: the pure past — Memory, Duce past and the representation of resents — The four paradoxes ofthe past — Repetition in habit and in memory — Material and spiritual Fepetition — Cartesian Cogito and Kantian Cogito — The indeterminate, determination, the determinable — The fractured 1, the pasive self and the ‘empty form of time — Inadequacy of memory: the third synthesis of time — Form, order, totality and series of time — Repetition in the third synthesis: its condition by default, its agent of metamorphosis, its lunconditioned character’ — The tragic and the comic, history, and faith from the point of view of repetition in eternal return — Repetition and the ‘wnconscious: “Beyond the pleasure principle’ — The first synthesis and binding: Habitus — Second synthesis: virtual objects and the past — Eros and Mnemosyne —~ Repetition, displacement and disguise: difference —— ‘Consequences for the nature of the unconscious the serial, differential and {questioning unconscious — Towards the thied synthesis or the third “Beyond! the narcissistic ego, the death instint and the empey form of tne —Death instinct, opposition and material repetition — Death instinct and tation ache eternal seun — Resemblance aa dite What system? — the dark precursor and the ‘dilferencator” — The literary system — ‘he phantasm or simulacrum and the theee figures of the sletical in elation to diference — The true motivation of Platonism lis in the problem of simulacra — Simulacra and repetition in eternal retara (CHAPTER Il THE IMAGE OF THOUGHT 129 The problem of presuppositions in philosophy — First postulate: the principle ofthe Cogitatia natura universalis — Second postulate the ideal ‘of common sense — Thought and doxa — Thied postulate: the model of recognition — Ambiguity of the Kantian Critique — Fourth postulate: the clement of representation — Differential cheory of the faculties — The iscordant functioning of the faculties: the violence and limits of each — Ambiguity of Platoaism — Thinking: its genesis in thought — Fifth postulate: the ‘negative’ of error — Problem of stupidity — Sixth postulate: the privilege of designation — Sense and proposition — The paradoxes of sense — Sense and problem — Seventh postulate: the modality of solutions = The illusion of solutions in the doctrine of truth — Ontological and cpistemological importance of the category of problems — Eighth postulate: the result of knowledge — What does it mean “to leash"? — Recapitulation of the postulates as obstacles to philosophy of difference and repetition CHAPTER IV IDEAS AND THE SYNTHESIS OF DIFFERENCE 168 The Idea as a problematic instance — Indeterminate, determinable and determination: dlference — The differential — Quantitabilty and the principle of determinabilty — Qualitabilty and the principle of reciprocal determination — Potentialty and the principle of complete determination {che serial form) — Futility of che infinitely small n differential calculus — Differential and problematic — Theory of problems: dialectic and science — Idea and multiplicity — Structures: their criteria, the types of Kea — Procedure of vice-iction: the singular and the regular, the distinctive and the ordinary — Ideas and the differential theory ofthe faculties — Problem and question — Imperatives and play — Ideas and repetition — Repetition, the distinctive and the ordinary — The illusion of the negative —