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respondent Philippine Musicians Guild (FFW) is a duly registered legitimate labororganization. LVN Pictures, Inc., Sampaguita Pictures, Inc.

, and Premiere Productions, Inc 1arecorporations, duly organized under the Philippine laws, engaged in the making of motion pictures andin the processing and distribution thereof. Petitioner companies employ musicians for the purpose of making music recordings for title music, background music, musical numbers, finale music and otherincidental music, without which a motion picture is incomplete.Ninety-five (95%) percent of all the musicians playing for the musical recordings of saidcompanies are members of the Guild. The Guild has no knowledge of the existence of any otherlegitimate labor organization representing musicians in said companies. Premised upon theseallegations, the Guild prayed that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agency for allmusicians working in the aforementioned companies. In their respective answers, the latter deniedthat they have any musicians as employees, and alleged that the musical numbers in the filing of thecompanies are furnished by independent contractors.The lower court sustained the Guild s theory. A reconsideration of the order complained of having been denied by the Court en banc,LVN Pictures, inc., and Sampaguita Pictures, Inc., filed thesepetitions for review for certiorari . ISSUE: Whether the musicians in question(Guild members) are employeesof the petitioner filmcompanies. RULING: YES The Court agreed with the lower courts decision , to wit:Lower court resorted to apply R.A. 875 and US Laws and jurisprudence from which saidAct was patterned after. (Since statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes achievedand the evils sought to be remedied). It ruled that the work of the musical director andmusicians is a functional and integral part of the enterprise performed at the same studio substatially under the direction and control of the company. In other words, to determine whether a person who performs work for another is thelatter's employee or an independent contractor, the National Labor Relations relies on 'theright to control' test . Under this test an employer-employee relationship exist where the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end to

be achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching the end. (United Insurance Company, 108, NLRB No. 115.). Notwithstanding that the employees are called independent contractors', the Board will hold them to be employees under the Act where the extent of theemployer's control over them indicates that the relationship is in reality one of employment.(John Hancock Insurance Co., 2375-D, 1940, Teller, Labor Dispute Collective Bargaining, Vol.).The right of control of the film company over the musicians is shown (1) by calling themusicians through 'call slips' in 'the name of the company; (2) by arranging schedules in itsstudio for recording sessions; (3) by furnishing transportation and meals to musicians; and(4) by supervising and directing in detail, through the motion picture director, theperformance of the musicians before the camera, in order to suit the music they are playing tothe picture which is being flashed on the screen. The musical directors have no such control over the musicians involved in the present case. Said musical directors control neither the music to be played, nor the musicians playing it. Th film companies summon the musicians to work, through the musical directors. The film companies,through the musical directors, fix the date, the time and the place of work. The film companies, not themusical directors, provide the transportation to and from the studio. The film companies furnish mealat dinner time.It is well settled that "an employer-employee relationship exists . . .where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to controlnot only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end . . . ." (Alabama Highway Express Co., Express Co., v. Local 612 108S. 2d. 350.) The decisive nature of said control over the "means to be used", is illustrated in the case of Gilchrist Timber Co., et al., in which, by reason of said control, the employer-employee relationshipwas held to exist between the management and the workers, notwithstanding the intervention of analleged independent contractor,who had, and exercise, the power to hire and fire said workers. The aforementioned control over the means to be used" in reading the desired end is possessed and exercised by the film companies over the musicians in the cases before us. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed,

Rosario Bros v. OpleFACTS: Private respondents are tailors hired by the petitioner in its tailoring department. They were paid weeklywages on piece-work basis, minus the withholding tax of BIR. They were registered with SSS as employees of petitioner. They were required to report for work and stay in the shop for no less than 8 hours a day. A mastercutter distributed job orders equally.Private respondents filed a complaint for violation of PD 851(13th month pay) and PD 525 (EmergencyLiving Allowance) against petitioner. ISSUE: WN an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner and private respondents HELD: Yes. The existence of ER-EE relationship is determined by:1.the selection and engagement of employee2.payment of wages3.power of dismissal4.power to control employees conductAlthough the fourth element is the most important.An independent contractor is the one who exercises independent employment and contracts to do a pieceof work according to his own methods without being subjected to control of his employer except as to the result of his work.In the case at bar, the selection and hiring of respondents was done by petitioner through the mastercutter. Respondents received their weekly wages from petitioner on piecework basis within the meaning of theterm wage under the Labor Code, which defined as the remuneration or earnings. However, designated, whetherfixed on a time, task, piece or commission basis, payable by an employer to an employee under a written orunwritten contact for work done or to be done or for services rendered or to be rendered.Petitioner also had the power to dismiss respondents, thus, the latters conduct was controlled bypetitioner. Respondents were allowed to register with SSS and withholding taxes were also deducted from theirwages.Wherefore, petition is dismissed

Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc., vs IAC and F ermin Llamar (1994) G.R. 64948 F acts: Respondents were caddies and employees of Manila Golf & Country Club who originally filed a petition withthe S ocial S ecurity Commission ( SS C) for coverage and availment of benefits under the S ocial S ecurity A ct.They alleged that although the petitioners were employees of the Manila Golf and Country Club, a domesticcorporation, the latter had not registered them as such with the SSS . I n the case before the SS

C, the respondent Club alleged that the petitioners, caddies by occupation, wereallowed into the Club premises to render services as such to the individual members and guests playing theClub's golf course and who themselves paid for such services; that as such caddies, the petitioners were notsubject to the direction and control of the Club as regards the manner in which they performed their work;and hence, they were not the Club's employees. Issue: WON there exist an employer -employee relationship between the cadies and the Golf Club? Held: No existence of employer -employee relationship. In the very nature of things, caddies must submit to some supervision of their conduct while enjoying theprivilege of pursuing their occupation within the premises and grounds of whatever club they do their workin. For all that is made to appear, they work for the club to which they attach themselves on sufferance but,on the other hand, also without having to observe any working hours, free to leave anytime they please, tostay away for as long they like. It is not pretended that if found remiss in the observance of said rules, anydiscipline may be meted them beyond barring them from the premises which, it may be supposed, the Clubmay do in any case even absent any breach of the rules, and without violating any right to work on their part. All these considerations clash frontally with the concept of employment.The

IAC would point to the fact that the Club suggests the rate of fees payable by the players to the caddiesas still another indication of the latter's status as employees. It seems to the Court, however, that theintendment of such fact is to the contrary, showing that the Club has not the measure of control over theincidents of the caddies' work and compensation that an employer would possess. Court agree that thegroup rotation system so -called, is less a measure of employer control than an assurance that the work isfairly distributed, a caddy who is absent when his turn number is called simply losing his turn to serve

andbeing assigned instead the last number for the day.Moreover, as pointed out by petitioner which was never refuted that: has no means of compelling thepresence of a caddy. Acaddy is not required to exercise his occupation in the premises of petitioner. He maywork with any other golf club or he may seek employment a caddy or otherwise with any entity or individualwithout restriction by petitioner.



Petitioner Dealco Farms is a corporation engaged in the business of importation, production, fattening and distribution of live cattle for sale to meat dealers, meat traders, meat processors, canned good manufacturers and other dealers in Mindanao and in Metro Manila. Petitioner imports cattle by the boatload from Australia into the ports of General Santos City, Subic, Batangas, or Manila. In turn, these imported cattle are transported to, and housed in, petitioners farms in Polomolok, South Cotabato, or in Magalang, Pampanga, for fattening until the cattle individually reach the market weight of 430 to 450 kilograms.

Respondents Albert Caban and Chiquito Bastida were hired by petitioner on June 25, 1993 and October 29, 1994, respectively, as escorts or "comboys" for the transit of live cattle from General Santos City to Manila. Respondents work entailed tending to the cattle during transportation. It included feeding and frequently showering the cattle to prevent dehydration

and to develop heat resistance. On the whole, respondents ensured that the cattle would be safe from harm or death caused by a cattle fight or any such similar incident.

Upon arrival in Manila, the cattle are turned over to and received by the duly acknowledged buyers or customers of petitioner, at which point, respondents work ceases. For every round trip travel which lasted an average of 12 days, respondents were each paid P1,500.00. The 12day period is occasionally extended when petitioners customers are delayed in receiving the cattle. In a month, respondents usually made two trips.

On August 19, 1999, respondents were told by Dealcos hepe de viaje that their replacement had been effected immediately, but no reason was given for their replacement. Respondents attempted to meet with petitioner but failed. Petitioner denies the existence of an employer-employee relationship with respondents, claiming that: (a) respondents are independent contractors who offer "comboy" services to various shippers and traders of cattle, not only to petitioner; (b) in the performance of work on board the ship, respondents are free from the control and supervision of the cattle owner since the latter is interested only in the result thereof; (c) in the alternative, respondents can only be considered as casual employees performing work not necessary and desirable to the usual business or trade of petitioner, i.e., cattle fattening to market weight and production; and (d) respondents likewise failed to complete the one-year service period, whether continuous or broken, set forth in Article 280 of the Labor Code, as petitioners shipments were substantially reduced in 1998-1999, thereby limiting the escort or "comboy" activity for which respondents were employed.


Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and respondents and therefore the latters termination was illegal.


Complainants task of escorting the livestock shipped to Manila, taking care of the livestock in transit, is an activity which is necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of respondent. It is of judicial notice that the bulk of the market for livestock of big livestock raisers such as respondent is in Manila. Hogs do not swim, they are shipped. The caretaker is a component of the business, a part of the scheme of the operation.

More, it also appears that respondents had rendered service for more than one year doing the same task repeatedly, thus, even assuming they were casual employees they may be considered regular employees with respect to the activity in which they were employed and their employment shall continue while such activity exists (last par. of Art. 280).

In the case at bench, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were one in their conclusion that respondents were not independent contractors, but employees of petitioner. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC examined and weighed the circumstances against the four-fold test which has the following elements: (1) the power to hire, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to dismiss, and (4) the power to control the employees conduct, or the so -called "control test." Of the four, the power of control is the most important element. More importantly, the control test merely calls for the existence of the right to control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof.

The presence of the four (4) elements in the determination of an employer-employee relationship has been clearly established by the facts and evidence on record, starting with the admissions of petitioner who acknowledged the engagement of respondents as escorts of their cattles shipped from General Santos to Manila, and the compensation of the latter at a fee of P1,500.00 per trip.

The element of control, jurisprudentially considered the most essential element of the four, has not been demolished by any evidence to the contrary. The branch has noticed that the preparation of the shipment of cattle, manning and feeding them while in transit, and making a report upon their return to General Santos that the cattle shipped and which reached Manila actually tallied were all indicators of instructions, supervision and control by [petitioner] on *respondents+ performance of work as escorts for which they were hired. This we agree on all

fours. The livestock shipment would cost thousands of pesos and the certainty of it reaching its destination would be the only thing any operator would consider at all time and under all circumstances. It is illogical for [petitioner] to argue that the shipment was not necessary or desirable to their business, as their business was mainly livestock production, because they were undeniably the owners of the cattle escorted by respondents. Should losses of a shipment occur due to respondents neglect these would still be petitioners loss, and nobody elses.

Considering that we have sustained the Labor Arbiters and the NLRCs finding of an employer employee relationship between the parties, we likewise sustain the administrative bodies finding of respondents illegal dismissal. Accordingly, we are not wont to dist urb the award of separation pay, claims for COLA and union service fees fixed at 10% of the total monetary award, as these were based on the finding that respondents were dismissed without just or authorized cause.

Charlie Jao vs. BCC Products Sales and Terrance Ty, G.R, 163700
PETITIONER Charlie Jao alleged that respondents BCC Product Sales, Inc. (BCC) and Terrance Ty employed him as a comptroller. On Oct. 19, 1995, the security guards of BCC barred him from entering its premises. Respondent BCC countered that petitioner was not its employee but that of Sobien Food Corp. (SFC), its major creditor and supplier. SFC had posted him as its comptroller in BCC to oversee BCCs finance and business operations and to look after SFCs interests or investments in BCC. Which contention is more meritorious? Ruling: That of BCC. The Supreme Courts (SC) perusal of the affidavit of petitioner compels a conclusion similar to that reached by the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Labor Arbiter to the effect that the affidavit supported the contention that petitioner had really worked in BCC as SFCs representative. It does seem more natural and more believable that petitioners affidavit was referring to his employment by SFC even while he was reporting to BCC as a comptroller in behalf of SFC. As respondents pointed out, it was implausible for SFC to still post him to oversee and supervise the collections of accounts receivables due from BCC beyond December 1995 if, as he insisted, BCC had already illegally dismissed him and had even prevented him from entering the premises of BCC. Given the patent animosity and strained relations between him and respondents in such circumstances, indeed, how could he still efficiently perform in behalf of SFC the essential responsibility to oversee and supervise collections at BCC? Surely, respondents would have vigorously objected to any arrangement with SFC involving him. We note that petitioner executed the affidavit in March 1996 to refute a statement Ty himself made in his own affidavit dated Dec. 11, 1995 to the effect that petitioner had illegally appropriated some checks without authority from BCC.

Petitioner thereby sought to show that he had the authority to receive the checks pursuant to the arrangements between SFC and BCC. This showing would aid in fending off the criminal charge respondents filed against him arising from his mishandling of the checks. Naturally, the circumstances petitioner adverted to in his March 1996 affidavit concerned those occurring before December 11, 1995, the same period when he actually worked as comptroller in BCC (Charlie Jao vs. BCC Products Sales Inc. and Terrance Ty, G.R. No. 163700, April 18, 2012)

TONGCO VS MANUFACTURERS LIFE The case arose from a complaint for illegal dismissal with various claims filed by Tongko against Manulife. Tongko alleged that he was an employee of the company since the latter exercised control over him. Of course, Manulife claims otherwise insisting that he was an agent.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case not finding any employer-employee relationship. This was reversed by the NLRC. On appeal to the CA, the latter ruled in favor of Manulife finding no employer-employee relationship. Hence, Tongko appealed to the Supreme Court. Central to the resolution of the Supreme Court in the appeal was the disquisition on the existence of employer-employee relationship. The significance of this finding is that if it is found that no such relationship exists, the labor courts have no jurisdiction over this case. The employeremployee relationship is established by the four-fold test, as follows:

(a) the selection and engagement of the employee;

(b) the payment of wages;

(c) the power of dismissal; and

(d) the employers power to control the employees conduct.

As foundation for its decision, the Supreme Court held that if the specific rules and regulations that are enforced against insurance agents or managers are such that would directly affect the means and methods by which such agents or managers would achieve the objectives set by the insurance company, they are employees of the insurance company. Applying said standard, the Court held that Tongko was an employee of Manulife since the latter had the power of control over the former.

The Court accorded much weight on the various codes of conduct that Tongko had to observe pursuant to the agency agreement. It held:

Thus, with the company regulations and requirements alone, the fact that Tongko was an employee of Manulife may already be established. Certainly, these requirements controlled the means and methods by which Tongko was to achieve the companys goals.

More importantly, Manulifes evidence establishes the fact that Tongko was tasked to perform administrative duties that establishes his employment with Manulife.

In short, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Tongko which prompted Manulife to file its Motion for Reconsideration.