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III.How did he rule his state?


A.What was his foreign policy?
B. Succeses and failures of it?
C. Result of foreign policy?(did it help maintain the regime?)
D.what was the impact of his regime outside the state?(effect
on other countries)
E. what was the impact as a factor in the cold war?

A.

SINO- JAPANESE WAR

Mao had little experience of foreign travels and never mastered any other language
other than Chinese. His mission and passion was limited to his country. His foreign
policies were based on the fact that foreign countries mattered only as far as they
interfered with China or had ideas and experience from which China could learn. He
used the Sino- Japanese war to take over the country and intervened rarely, only when
china’s interests were directly involved.

According to the standard Chinese Communist Party line, from his base in Yan'an,
Mao led the Communist resistance against the Japanese in the Second Sino-Japanese
War (1937-1945). More critical examinations of his role reveal that Mao was
primarily concerned with expanding CPC influence and weakening the KMT; Under
Mao's leadership CPC officials arranged ceasefires with the Japanese in central areas
to protect Japanese train lines and allow time for an increase in CPC membership, all
while pretending to be vigorously opposing the Japanese. In fact, as of late 1940, Mao
was so focused on opposition to the KMT that he confided to top CPC officials that he
wished for continued Japanese occupation of China. Mao further consolidated power
over the Communist Party in 1942 by launching the Zheng Feng, or "Rectification"
campaign against rival CPC members such as Wang Ming, Wang Shiwei, and Ding
Ling.

During the Sino-Japanese War, Mao Zedong's strategies were opposed by both Chiang
Kai-shek and the United States. The US regarded Chiang as an important ally, able to
help shorten the war by engaging the Japanese occupiers in China. Chiang, in
contrast, sought to build the ROC army for the certain conflict with Mao's communist
forces after the end of World War II. This fact was not understood well in the US, and
precious lend-lease armaments continued to be allocated to the Kuomintang. In turn,
Mao spent part of the war fighting the Kuomintang for control of certain parts of
China. Both the Communists and Nationalists have been criticized for fighting
amongst themselves rather than allying against the Japanese Imperial Army. However
the Nationalists were better equipped and did most of the fighting against the
Japanese army in China.

In 1944, the Americans sent a special diplomatic envoy, called the Dixie Mission, to
the Communist Party of China. Most of the Americans were favourably impressed.
The CPC seemed less corrupt, more unified, and more vigorous in its resistance to
Japan than the Guomindang. United States fliers shot down over North
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China...confirmed to their superiors that the CPC was both strong and popular over a
broad area. In the end, the contacts with the USA developed with the CPC led to very
little.

US continued to support Chiang Kai-shek, now openly against the Communist Red
Army (led by Mao Zedong) in the civil war for control of China. The US support was
part of its view to contain and defeat world communism. Likewise, the Soviet Union
gave quasi-covert support to Mao (acting as a concerned neighbor more than a
military ally, to avoid open conflict with the US) and gave large supplies of arms to
the Communist Party of China, although newer Chinese records indicate the Soviet
"supplies" were not as large as previously believed, and consistently fell short of the
promised amount of aid.

On January 21, 1949, Kuomintang forces suffered massive losses against Mao's Red
Army. In the early morning of December 10, 1949, Red Army troops laid siege to
Chengdu, the last KMT-occupied city in mainland China, and Chiang Kai-shek
evacuated from the mainland to Taiwan (Formosa) that same day. Thus Mao was able
to oust the nationalists using the war against Japan.

On the eve of the establishment of New China, Mao Zedong set forth some policy
perception in order to formulate the foreign policy of New China. The Second Plenary
Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China convened
in March 1949 and the First Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference convened in September of the same year made important decisions
respectively with regard to the foreign policy of New China.

In order to make a clean break with the foreign policy of the old and semi-colonial
China and uphold the independence and sovereignty of New China, Chairman Mao
Zedong advocated that they should "start anew" and "put the house in order before
inviting guests". That is to say China renounced all the diplomatic relations the
Kuomintang Government had established with foreign countries, treated heads of
foreign diplomatic missions accredited to Old China as ordinary foreign nationals
instead of diplomatic envoys; reviewed all the treaties and agreements Old China had
concluded with foreign countries; gradually cleared up the prerogatives and influence
the imperialist countries had in China; and established new diplomatic relations with
other countries on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity,
and equality and mutual benefit.

The policy of "leaning one side" is to declare that China would lean to the side of
socialism. During the War of Liberation in china, there emerged a sharp confrontation
between the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and the imperialist camp
headed by the United States on the international scene. The United States stood on the
opposite side of the Chinese people and supported the Kuomintang in launching the
civil war. Moreover, after the birth of New China, the imperialist were not reconciled
to their defeat in China, might carry out armed intervention against China while the
Soviet Union had long been sympathetic to and supportive of the national democratic
revolution of the Chinese people. Thus the above-mentioned situation necessitated
China's allying with the socialist countries.

The principle of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China, as it arose from
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the conference. is protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory and


sovereignty of the country, upholding of lasting international peace and friendly
cooperation between the peoples of all countries, and opposition to the imperialist
policy of aggression and war. The "Common Programme" provides that "the People's
Republic of China shall unite with all peace-loving and freedom-loving countries and
peoples throughout the world, first of all with the USSR, all People's Democracies
and all oppressed nations. It shall take its stand in the camp of international peace and
democracy, to oppose imperialist aggression and to defend lasting world peace"; "the
People's Republic of china may restore and develop commercial relations with foreign
governments and peoples on the basis of equality and mutual benefit" and so on.

KOREA

In accordance with these views Mao decided to intervene in the Korean Civil war,
both to stop the spreads of imperialism, since South Korea was supported by the
Americans, and to protect china’s national security.

After the north Korean attack, assisted by the Soviets in the level of combat advisors,
military pilots, and weapons, South Korea was supported by the United Nations
Command forces in Korea (U.N.), consisting primarily of American troops, and with
their help the invaders were pushed back to the 38th parallel

. The U.N. offensive greatly concerned the Chinese, who worried that the U.N. forces
would not stop at the Yalu River, the border between North Korea and China, but they
would extend their rollback policy into China. Many in the West, including General
MacArthur, thought that spreading the war to China would be necessary. However,
Truman and the other leaders disagreed, and MacArthur was ordered to be very
cautious when approaching the Chinese border. Eventually, MacArthur disregarded
these concerns, arguing that since the North Korean troops were being supplied by
bases in China, those supply depots should be bombed. However, except on some rare
occasions, U.N. bombers remained out of Manchuria during the war.

China warned American leaders through neutral diplomats that it would intervene to
protect its national security. Truman regarded the warnings as “a bald attempt to
blackmail the U.N.”

On October 8, 1950, the day after American troops crossed the 38th parallel,
Chairman Mao Zedong issued the order to assemble the Chinese People’s Volunteer
Army. Seventy percent of the members of the PVA were Chinese regulars from the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Mao ordered the army to move to the Yalu River,
ready to cross. Mao sought Soviet aid and saw intervention as essentially defensive:
“If we allow the U.S. to occupy all of Korea… we must be prepared for the U.S. to
declare… war with China,” he told Stalin. Premier Zhou Enlai was sent to Moscow to
add force to Mao’s cabled arguments. Mao delayed while waiting for substantial
Soviet help, postponing the planned attack from October 13 to October 19. However,
Soviet assistance was limited to providing air support no nearer than sixty miles
(100 km) from the battlefront. The Chinese were angry at the limited extent of Soviet
involvement, having assumed that they had been promised full scale air support. The
Soviet role was known to the U.S., but it was kept quiet so as to avoid the possibility
of escalating the conflict into a nuclear war.
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The Chinese made contact with American troops on October 25, 1950, with 270,000
PVA troops under the command of General Peng Dehuai, much to the surprise of the
U.N., which had disregarded evidence of such a massive force. After some battles and
the chinese push towards south korea, the war reached a stalemate from 1951 to 1953,
and finally a ceasefire was signed.

China had managed to achieve is main goal, which was to support its interests, and
create create a communist north Korea while stopping impreialist advance, but was
put in great danger from the US as it had openly opesed it in the field of battle.

While the Chinese initially took their principal cues in shaping foreign policy from
domestic developments and generally adhered to the initial pro-Soviet line, they
began to act—on the basis of several important lessons gained during the Korean
struggle—to reduce Beijing's militant and isolationist attitudes in international affairs.
Beijing had recognized that the great costs of the war, the questionable reliability of
Soviet military backing, and the danger of direct U.S. retaliation against China had
come close to threatening its very existence. Although in preserving North Korea as a
communist state China had attained its principal strategic objective, its leaders
understood the costs and risks involved and were determined to exercise a greater
caution in their international dealings. Another lesson was that the neutralist countries
in Asia and Africa were not Western puppets, and it was politically profitable to
promote friendly relations with them. These lessons, as reinforced by domestic
considerations, led China to take a conciliatory role in the conference leading to the
Geneva Accords on Indochina in 1954 and to try to normalize its foreign relations.

Premier Zhou Enlai symbolized China's more active diplomatic role at the Bandung
Conference in April 1955, held at Bandung, Indonesia, which discussed Asian-African
issues. His slogan was “Unity with all,” according to the line of peaceful coexistence.
This “Bandung line” associated with Zhou gained worldwide attention when he told
the delegates there that his government was fully prepared to achieve normal relations
with all countries, including the United States. One result of his initiative was the start
of ambassadorial talks between China and the United States.

Between 1955 and 1957, however, changes in Soviet and U.S. policies caused
Chinese leaders to doubt the validity of this more cautious and conciliatory foreign
policy. At the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956, First Secretary
Nikita Khrushchev announced a de-Stalinization policy. This development angered
Mao Zedong for two reasons: he thought, correctly, that it would undermine Soviet
prestige, with potentially dangerous consequences in eastern Europe, and he chafed at
Khrushchev's warning to other communist parties not to let a willful leader have his
way unchecked. Thus, a new situation in Sino-Soviet relations began to emerge, in
which antagonisms based on different national traditions, revolutionary experiences,
and levels of development that had previously been glossed over broke through to the
surface.

Chinese leaders—Mao foremost among them but by no means alone—now began to


question the wisdom of closely following the Soviet model. Economic difficulties
provided a major set of reasons for moving away from that model, and increasing
mutual distrust exacerbated the situation. Nevertheless, at the end of 1957 the Soviet
Union evidently agreed to provide China with the technical assistance needed to make
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an atomic bomb, and during 1958 the Soviet Union increased its level of aid to China.
In the final analysis, however, the spiraling deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations
proved impossible to reverse.

China adopted a new, more militant foreign policy that can be traced most clearly to
Mao's statement during a Moscow trip in November 1957 that the “East wind prevails
over the West wind,” which implied a return to militant struggle. According to some
estimates, the change in line was necessitated by the U.S. buildup of anticommunist
regimes to encircle China and by the lack of major gains in peaceful coexistence with
Third World neutrals. Other analysts argue that Mao regarded the launching of a
Soviet space vehicle (October 1957) and the Sino-Soviet nuclear-sharing agreement
as indications that the balance of world forces had changed in favour of communism.

CHINESE- INDIAN RELATIONS

One of the most basic policies for the new Indian government was that of maintaining
cordial relations with China, reviving its ancient friendly ties. India was among the
first nations to grant diplomatic recognition to the newly-created PRC. However,
within a short time the PRC announced its intention to occupy Tibet, and later
extended its influence by placing border posts within the Indian-claimed territory of
Aksai Chin. India protested against these moves and decided to look for a diplomatic
solution to ensure a stable Sino-Indian border.

Three years later the Chinese occupation of Tibet, in 1954, China and India negotiated
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence by which the two nations agreed to abide
in settling their disputes. India was seeking to form a strong Chinese- Indian axis.
However, their relations were greatly damaged after Nehru accommodated the Tibetan
religious leader after a failed Tibetan uprising against the Chinese.

Tensions continued to rise as Mao implied that the Tibetan uprising had been caused
by Indians, and on 6 May 1959, Mao published "The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's
Philosophy", where he accused Nehru of openly encouraging Tibetan rebels. India
was branded as China's imperialist enemy. Border incidents continued though this
period. In August 1959, the Chinese army took an Indian prisoner at Longju, which
had an ambiguous position in the McMahon Line, and two months later in Aksai Chin
a clash led to the death of nine Indian frontier policemen.

On October 2, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev defended Nehru in a meeting with


Mao. This action reinforced China's impression that the Soviet Union, the United
States and India all had expansionist designs over China. However, Mao decided
against further escalation because he feared the intervention of the United States.
Negotiations were restarted between the nations, but no progress was made. China
was now waiting for a good opportunity to settle the issue with India and claim
territories that it considered to be hers. This opportunity arose in 1962 with the Cuban
missile crisis that brought the United States and Soviet Union within a whisper of
nuclear war. The timing, which precluded the possibility of India getting any
immediate outside help, was made doubly favourable by two other developments - an
American promise earlier in July to hold Taiwan from initiating hostilities across the
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straits that enabled China to single-mindedly mobilise against India, and Soviet leader
Nikita Khrushchev's subtle yet discernible tilt towards Beijing on the Sino-Indian
border issue in an apparent effort to buy Chinese support in the looming Soviet
confrontation with the United States.

The Sino-Indian Border Conflict was a war between China and India. The initial
cause of the conflict was a disputed region of the Himalayan border in Arunachal
Pradesh, known in China as South Tibet.

Fighting began on 10 October 1962 between the Chinese People's Liberation Army
and Military of India. The first heavy engagement of the war was a Chinese attack on
an Indian patrol north of the McMahon Line. The conflict eventually widened to
include the region of Aksai Chin which the PRC regarded as a strategic link, via the
China National Highway route G219, between the Chinese-administered territories of
Tibet and Xinjiang. The war ended when the Chinese captured both disputed areas
and unilaterally declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, which went into effect at
midnight.

CHINA AND INDOCHINA- VIETNAM

The rise and fall of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance is one of the most crucial
developments in the history of the Cold War in Asia in general and Chinese foreign
relations in particular. In the quarter century after the founding of the People's
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Beijing assisted the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (DRV) in its struggle against two formidable foes, France and the United
States. In the 1950s Chinese formulas served as a model for the Vietnam Workers'
Party (VWP) in its war against France and in its efforts to rebuild the north. In the
1960s, Beijing provided extensive aid to help Ho Chi Minh fight the United States.
China's support was crucial in the VWP's defeat of the French in 1954 and in its
ability to resist the American pressure in the Second Indochina War. At the height of
Chinese-DRV solidarity, Ho characterized the relationship as "comrades plus
brothers." In the early 1970s, however, as the war in Vietnam began to wind down and
as China adjusted its strategic priorities by opening to the United States to balance
against Soviet threats, Beijing's relations with Hanoi started to deteriorate,
culminating in a direct clash in 1979.

In general, the importance of China in the two Vietnam wars has been overlooked or
underrated in both Vietnamese and Western writings. However it is certain that Mao,
following his policy of restricting imperialist claims and attacks on foreign states,
supported the Vietnamese efforts, while at the same time he believed that he should
maintain good relations without trying to take hold of the country. as history has
shown, the Vietnamese have fought Chinese aggression for thousands of years and
Mao did not see how this could now change.

B.
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Thus Mao was able to oust the nationalists using the war against Japan.
In accordance with these views Mao decided to intervene in the Korean Civil war,
both to stop the spreads of imperialism, since South Korea was supported by the
Americans, and to protect china’s national security
Beijing had recognized that the great costs of the war, the questionable reliability of
Soviet military backing, and the danger of direct U.S. retaliation against China had
come close to threatening its very existence. Although in preserving North Korea as a
communist state China had attained its principal strategic objective, its leaders
understood the costs and risks involved and were determined to exercise a greater
caution in their international dealings
At the end of 1957 the Soviet Union evidently agreed to provide China with the
technical assistance needed to make an atomic bomb, and during 1958 the Soviet
Union increased its level of aid to China
Mao was also able to support Chinese interests in Tibet and north India through the
Sino- Indian Border Conflict.
Mao was able to support Vietnam in kicking the French and Americans out of the
country, thus stopping the spread of imperialism.

No major failures can be found in his Foreign Policies from 1927 to 1976.

C.

Mao’s foreign policies helped in advancing socialism as they saw it, in finding trade
allies for china (in Korea and Vietnam), and in promoting a sense of security since the
barrier of capitalist states around china was beginning to brake. At the same time they
saved Mao and increased his influence, especially the was against India, since at the
time his popularity was low due to the “Great Leap Forward”.

D.

It contained imperialism in the East. It saved North Korea and Vietnam from
American influence, it made all the other states to understand that a new power
was rising, and it promoted Chinese interests which often opposed those of the
neighbouring countries, especially India.

E.

The foreign policy of China during the Cold War followed similar lines as
America’s. instead of promoting socialism and being offensive, the Chinese
sought to contain capitalism in the same way that the Americans tried to contain
communism. China’s foreign policy was based on stopping American influence in
the states around china and in promoting its interests in Tibet.