eseatrive aus AULUCL WAIL! EU LURETUGUY MUPOMINL areas I nLs Dra involved with emotional control. He is cercainly dangerous but there appear many uiitigating luctors to his crimes. This paragraph is right on point, There would be no possible way w argue 1p a jury that based on Mr, Blarton’s violent bistory and gang affiliation the jurors ‘would net sev himas dangerous. The doctor's acknowledgment of this confirmed the credibility of his conclusions. Both this doctor, as well as Mr. Porter, come to the conclusions that could only be deseribett as establishing that Mr, Blanton stiould nor bbe held emeally blameworthy for what has become of him Accordingly, Mr Blanton’s attorneys were inetfective fir failing to presertcall bf this evidence to the jury. Even if some of the parls of the evidence mentioned above were left our, or not believed, because this evidence woutd stil] establish a lack: of moral blameworthiness op Mr. Blanton's pact. xm. MR. BLANTON’S TRIAL ATTORNEYS WERE INEFFECTIVE IN THELR, HANDLING OF MR. BLANTON’S EQUAL, PROTECTION RIGHTS WITH. RESPECT TO THE STATE'S FXCLUDING OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS FROM THE JURY NUL. MR. BLANTON’S APPELLATE ATTORNEY WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO ARGUE ON APPEAL THAT BATSON IS APPLICABLE TO SHUFFLES AND/OR FAILED TO PROTECT MR. BLANTON’S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS BY PRESERVING THE RECORD FOR APPEAL. SO THAT THE SHUFFLE CLAIM COULD BE EFFECTIVELY PRESENTEDXIV. MR. BLANTON’S ATTORNEYS WERE INEFFECTIVE BY FAILING TO “EFFECTIVELY PROTECT MR. BLANTON’S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS WITH RESPECT TO THE STATE’S EXCLUDING OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS FROM THE JURY Miller-EL Because all of the claims ultimately involve the equal protection clause as interpreted by Batson, a review of the most recent Supreme Court case on Batson to all of the above claims the case is in order. In Miller-El v. Cockerll, $37 U.S, 322 (2003), the Court provided a complete and thorough evaluation of Batson claims and what evidence should be considered in making determinations on Batson claims. Indeed, by briefly discussing Miller-El at one time that discussion can easily be referred back to and establish why any of the above claims should be granted. In Miller-E], the court again reaffirmed the three step analysis as laid out in the direct appeal brief for Mr. Blanton in claim one. Id. at 338. (Appellant's Brief, Point of Error #1). Significantly, the court reminded the tial courts that “the critical question in determining whether a prisoner has proved purposeful discrimination at step three [step dealing with whether there was purposeful discrimination] is the persuasiveness of the Prosecutor's justification forhis peremptory strike. “The court affirmed that at this point the trial court became the judge of the Prosecutor'scredibility. With regards to making this credibility decision the court carefully explained, based on previous State Supreme Court law, that “credibility can be ‘measured by, among other factors, the Prosecutor's demeanor; by how reasonable, or ‘how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.” Id. at 339. In light of this observation, the state’s court affirmed again that “deference to trial court findings on the issue of discriminatory intent makes particular sense in this context because, a8 we noted in Batson, the finding largely wil tum on evaluation of credibility.” Id. The Court went on to state that because there will seldom be much evidence on this issue that “as with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the ~ mind redibility lies ‘parti withi i ui ‘ince’.” Id, (citations omitted). (Emphasis added) In its discussion with respect to deference to the trial court, “the credibility of the 3 ue In the court’s discussion with respect to the evidence in the case, the court ion again reaffirmed well established United States Supreme Court law with respect to what evidence should be looked at and how it should be weighed in making a determination as to whether there has been an equal protection violation. The court 84