Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 315

2002

338(100)
65.5
!95

: 
!95 / . . !
. . .: , 2002. 306 .
ISBN 5!88044!147!4
, !
19972000 . !

,
, .
, , , !
.
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338(100)
65.5

Series of Lectures on Economics: Leading World Experts at the


Carnegie Moscow Center.
: http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/2002/09tm


the Marit and Hans Rausing
Charitable Foundation. !
.
, !
!
.

ISBN 5!88044!147!4

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002


........................................................................................... vii
................................................................................................ 1
.
: ............ 17
. ........................................... 69
, .
? .................................145
. . ! ..................................179
, . :
.......................................................209
, .
................................................................253
Summary .............................................................................................293
.............................................................................305

Contents
About the authors ................................................................................ vii
Introduction ........................................................................................... 1
Rudiger Dornbusch. Macroeconomic Stability and Structural
Reforms: The Lessons from Latin America .................................. 17
Asaar Lindbeck. The Swedish Experiment ........................................... 69
Paul Collier, Jan Willem Gunning. Why Has Africa Grown Slowly? ....145
J. Bradford De Long. Robber Barons ...................................................179
Michael Gavin, Ricardo Hausmann. The Roots of Banking Crises:
The Macroeconomic Context ......................................................209
Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti. The Political Economy of Budget
Deficits ...........................................................................................253
Summary (In English) .......................................................................293
About the Carnegie Endowment ......................................................305

vi


!
(Harvard University).
!
, (University of California at Berkeley).
!
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
,
(Free University, Amsterdam); !
!
, (Amsterdam Institute
for International Development, University of Amsterdam and Free
University, Amsterdam).

, !! (UBS Warburg).
!
(Oxford University);
(Development
Economics Research Group, The World Bank).
!
!
(The Institute for International Economic Studies, University of
Stockholm).

(Columbia University).
!
.
. (John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University).

vii




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131

27

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35
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53
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134

54

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[61].
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, , [102] [6].
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57
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() #
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59
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. 5.
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1990 1993 .
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62
#
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[33].
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1994 1996 .
64
VAR, [118], ,
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[2, chap. 6] ,

135


, , .
66
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19811982 19911993 .
, ,
1,3
( 0,7 1,3, , #
).
8% , 16% .
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68
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69
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[95, . 4749].
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70
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3% 47% 70# 90# [41].
71

[50], #
[45; 77; 58].
72
#
, . , 19911996 . 300 #
50
[103].

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#
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.
.
1776 . #,

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.
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42

Summary
The last decade has seen tremendous development in the economic
debate in Russia. In the early 1990s, few Russian economists had much
understanding of the essence of a real market economy. Plenty of
amateurish ideas caught on, for instance, that high inflation was good
for economic growth, or that monetary emission did not cause infla#
tion under Russian conditions. These ideas had for the most part died
out by the mid#1990s. Russian economics became sophisticated and
the economic debate is far superior to the public discussion in most
Western economies.
At the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, we asked our#
selves how we could provide international input into the Russian eco#
nomic debate. The answer we heard loud and clear was that Russian
economists wanted foreigners to come and tell them about the prob#
lems they have been experiencing or analyzing abroad that are of rel#
evance to the Russian situation. Considering the degree of sophistica#
tion of the Moscow audience, the best and brightest were called for.
Responding to our ideas, Hans Rausing kindly made a substantial
contribution to a series of Hans Rausing Lectures to be held intermit#
tently at the Carnegie Moscow Center. On behalf of the Carnegie En#
dowment of International Peace, we want to thank Hans Rausing for
his generous gift, which has entirely financed both the lectures and
this volume.
The aim was for excellent lecturers, the leading world experts
on the respective topics, to share any international economic expe#
rience of relevance to Russias current economic situation or de#
bate. Since the former communist world has been rather extensively
discussed already, we chose themes from countries further away and
invited lecturers with limited involvement in the post#communist
transformation in order to gain new perspectives. We asked them
to talk about their insights without trying to apply them to Russia,
although in this summary, we shall make some comments on points
293

294

SUMMARY

that are particularly relevant to Russia. All the lectures focus on


applied economics, involving a fair amount of political econom#
ics. They deal with the period between 1997 and 2000. This volume
contains six of these lectures. Most of the lectures have been pub#
lished elsewhere, as indicated for each lecture concerned. We ap#
preciate receiving the copyright in all these cases. The lectures are
not presented in chronological order, but in a manner designed to
make sense to the reader.
The Russian debate often refers to the economies of particular coun#
tries or regions, which are presented in the form of relevant compari#
sons or models. Three articles present such examples. The crisis and
reform experiences perceived as most relevant to Russias transition
are the reforms that have taken place in Latin America during the past
two decades. Professor Rudiger Dornbusch from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology presents a magnificent survey lecture on this
topic. The Swedish model was the last mainstay of the old Soviet econ#
omists, and it was widely seen as the ideal form of socialism. The top
expert on the Swedish economic model, Professor Assar Lindbeck
from the Institute for International Economic Studies at the Universi#
ty of Stockholm, dispelled that illusion for us. For decades, Africa has
had the worst economic performance of all the regions in the world.
While that is often perceived as a special African issue, the question
arose after the Russian financial crash of August 1998 of whether it
might actually be of relevance to Russia. Professor Paul Collier from
the University of Oxford and head of the Research Department of the
World Bank shed a great deal of light on the nature of the African
predicament.
Three other articles deal with specific themes. The point is often
made that America also has its robber barons, who differ little from
the Russian oligarchs. Professor Bradford De Long from the Universi#
ty of California at Berkeley enlightens us on what the U.S. robber bar#
ons actually did. In September 1998, in the midst of the Russian bank#
ing crisis, we were happy to host Ricardo Hausmann, then Chief Econ#
omist of the Inter#American Development Bank and now a professor
at the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard University, who gave a splen#
did presentation of the banking crisis in Latin America. From 1986 to
1998, the Russian budget deficits seemed intractable and they were
huge. What could be done? It was all too evident that the problem was
not economic but political, so we asked Professor Alberto Alesina from
Harvard University to explain the political economy of budget defi#
cits in the West, which he did brilliantly.

SUMMARY

295

During the past two decades, Latin America has undergone two
great events, hyperinflation followed by macroeconomic stabilization
and the opening and liberalization of a closed, state#dominated econ#
omy. Rudiger Dornbuschs study from the end of 1997 focuses on the
three big Latin American countries, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. All of
them have undergone macroeconomic stabilization, but Brazil and
Mexico have not taken it much further. The state continues to play a
major role in their economies, easily breeding new budget deficits,
which can cause new macroeconomic destabilization, as was the case
in Mexico in December 1994.
The lesson is that it is not enough to bring inflation under control
by monetary policy. The fiscal deficit must be kept small, and the states
financial commitments must be reduced. In order to do so, far#reach#
ing privatization is needed. A key aspect of reform is the liberalization
of foreign trade, because it does away with rents, which the old upper
class often so heavily relied on. Domestically, broad deregulation is
needed so that the states burden on enterprises does not become over#
whelming. Therefore, state governance must be reformed so that the
state does not continue to favor the privileged.
The most successful case among these countries is Chile, which
underwent truly radical reform in all regards. Two important reforms
have been deregulation of the labor market and privatization of the
pension system. In both these regards, Chile has set a trend not only
in Latin America, but also throughout the rest of the world.
A key concern for Dornbusch is the exchange rate. The ideal is that
countries maintain a low real exchange rate and avoid excessive real
revaluation. Therefore, it is extremely dangerous to fix the exchange
rate. The Mexican crisis of December 1994 is a case in point. Brazil
was heading for a current account crisis in 1998#1999, caused by a too
high and rising exchange rate. The high exchange rate did not only
aggravate the current account but it also depressed economic growth,
as was obvious in Brazil and Mexico.
While Dornbusch never mentions Russia, the reader is left in little
doubt that the Latin American experiences are of great relevance to
Russia, and it is striking how well informed many Russian economists
are about the Latin American experiences of the past few decades.
Today, the picture of Latin America is has changed, and most
things look much worse than at the time of Professor Dornbuschs
writing. Latin Americas recent experiences show that the road to a
well#functioning market economy is longer and more complicated
than many had hoped. There are no miracle cures, only hard work

296

SUMMARY

helps. Like Russia, Latin America suffers from corruption and poor
governance, especially in the judiciary system. However, Russia has
the great advantage that its population is far more educated. Thus,
unlike a few years ago, Russia looks rather better than Latin Amer#
ica.
In the late Soviet Union and early post#communist Russia, Sweden
was often presented as the ideal socialist economic model. It was
praised by reform communists, such as academicians Leonid Abalkin
and Oleg Bogomolov, as well as Speaker of the Supreme Soviet Ruslan
Khasbulatov. A popular perception was that the Swedish model repre#
sented the ideal compromise between capitalism and socialism, the
wealth of capitalism and the welfare of socialism, minimal effort and
maximal welfare.
Assar Lindbeck is an outstanding expert on the Swedish economic
system. He distinguishes between the two Swedish models. The first
lasted from 1870 to the 1960s. It was a very liberal model character#
ized by very low public expenditures and taxes and very free markets
in both domestic and foreign trade. Private ownership predominat#
ed. The public sector functioned well because it was small, transpar#
ent, and subject to great public control. As a result, together with Ja#
pan, Sweden enjoyed one of the highest growth rates in the world from
1870 to 1970.
Around 1970, the liberal Swedish model was replaced by a social
democratic model, which is very different from the old model. Its pre#
dominant features are high taxes, large public expenditures, and vast
social transfers. The social transfers are not targeted at the poor, but
go to a disproportionate extent to the middle class. While few enter#
prises in Sweden have been nationalized, the household sector has
been socialized to an uncommon degree. Another characteristic fea#
ture of the Swedish model has been an ever more rigid labor market,
where trade unions with the help of the social democratic state have
come to dominate over employers. Social responsibility was concen#
trated in the state, resulting in corporatism.
The new Swedish model persistently underperforms in economic
growth, and Swedens real GDP has increased on average one percent
less than that of other OECD countries between 1970 and 1997. Clear#
ly, something has gone seriously wrong. Lindbeck explains growth re#
tardation by an aggravation of incentives. Capital productivity has been
tempered by the rigid labor market. The return on human capital has
been low because of high progressive income taxes and control over
wage setting by trade unions. Since the return on work has been limit#

SUMMARY

297

ed and social transfers abundant, many have chosen to limit their sup#
ply of work. Another problem has been that private employment has
fallen continuously since the mid#1960s, while tax#financed public
employment has expanded. The increasingly constricted productive
private sector has naturally become petrified, and Sweden is suffering
from the extreme dominance of a score of large enterprises, while the
country has abnormally few small enterprises. This rigid enterprise
structure has led to obsolescence and further aggravated the decline
in economic growth.
As the role of the public sector became enhanced, the seemingly
ever#lasting macroeconomic stability started to falter. In the 1970s, in
response to the oil price shocks, Sweden abandoned its old policy of
balanced state budgets and opted for large#scale fiscal stimulation. As
elsewhere in the Western world, the result was rising inflation rather
than higher economic growth, while the state debt grew. In the early
1990s, the long#standing policy of nearly full employment finally fell
apart, and Sweden suddenly found itself with high unemployment rates
typical of the rigid labor markets of Western Europe. Swedens per
capita GDP dwindled in the course of less than three decades from
the fourth highest in the world in 1970 to eighteenth place in the
OECD.
Swedish development has not been dramatic, and much of West#
ern Europe has undergone a similar experience. Yet, Sweden suffered
through extreme taxes, public revenues, and public expenditures, and
the results are plain. The second Swedish model failed. The question
today is to what extent or how fast this Swedish experiment may un#
wind. A serious conserving force is that most of the population lives
on public salaries or social transfers, and they vote for more taxes and
thus state expenditures to their own benefit. Yet, several forces chal#
lenge the states domination. The most important force is international
integration. Sweden has remained a very open economy, and interna#
tional competition put limits on what tax rates are possible. Another
vital force is liberal economic thinking, which is proliferating togeth#
er with the evident poor results. The social democratic model is in#
creasingly perceived not only as inefficient, but also as old fashioned.
Yet people do not seem to understand that it is not very just either.
Few social benefits go to the truly poor, and the victims of unemploy#
ment are marginal workers who are doomed to long#time unemploy#
ment.
Assar Lindbecks advice was that the Swedish models are well worth
studying, and the first model is worthy of emulation, while the second

298

SUMMARY

model should be seen as an intimidating example. In the long run, no


welfare comes without effort.
No other part of the world has had such a persistent, miserable eco#
nomic performance as Africa in the last three decades. During the
1980s, the per capita GDP declined by 1.3 percent per annum. Africa
is often dismissed as a special case, caused by tropical diseases, tribal#
ism, poor education, unstable states, etc. However, Paul Collier and
Jan Willem Gunning have analyzed African economic trends in a stan#
dard fashion, and the results they achieved fall into the economic
mainstream.
They test the explanatory variables of the economic growth litera#
ture, and they find strong evidence. Product markets have been heavily
distorted because of far#reaching domestic and external regulations,
which should harm growth in this case. Financial markets are extremely
limited, which also has negative effects, while labor markets are liber#
al and cause no problems.
Yet three impediments to growth typical of Africa were not proper#
ly reflected in the growth regressions, namely high risk, inadequate
social capital, and inappropriate infrastructure. All three factors point#
ed to state failure. The high risk and poor social capital primarily re#
flect an intrusive and arbitrary state, which provides little or no legal
security. Admittedly, Africa also has high transportation costs for nat#
ural geographic reasons, while poor health care and the ineffective
police force are indications of poorly functioning states.
Even so, there is a reasonable consensus between the results of
growth regressions and the problems suggested in other literature.
Four problems stand out: closed product markets, limited social cap#
ital, high risk, and poor public services. The first is indicative of ex#
treme protectionism and domestic regulation, facilitating rent seek#
ing among the privileged. The other three factors are results of a
malfunctioning state. Africa stagnated because its governments were
captured by a narrow elite that undermined markets and used public
services to their own benefit, ignoring the broader population. These
policies reduced the returns on assets and increased the already high
risks experienced by entrepreneurs. To cope, private agents moved
both financial and human capital abroad and focused on minimizing
risks at home. These problems are largely of a microeconomic nature.
The tasks can instead be summarized as deregulation and cleansing
of the state so that it can undertake elementary state functions. Obvi#
ously, these are issues of economic policy rather than a permanent
condemnation because of difficult natural conditions.

SUMMARY

299

In their analysis, Collier and Gunning debunk many purported


causes of Africas economic decline. Macroeconomic issues are not
central. High inflation, large budget deficits, and excessive mone#
tary emission have not been a major concern in Africa, while the
foreign debt has often become overwhelming, and exchange rates
are sometimes fixed at an unrealistically high level. Rather than
suffering from a shortage of capital per se, Africa has seen substan#
tial capital drainage, since private agents have been unable to in#
vest their capital profitably in the continent. Neither does Africa
in strictly economic terms suffer from a shortage of education. On
the contrary, educated people flee the continent because they can#
not usefully deploy their skills in such a restricted environment. A
special African factor is its geographic disadvantage, but this does
not appear insurmountable.
Anybody claiming that dictatorship benefits economic development
should take a look at Africa. No other continent has had so many and
such powerful dictators, but almost invariably they tend to represent a
very limited elite rather than broader popular interest.
The conclusion for Africa is that it is not that different economical#
ly from other parts of the world. What Africa needs is a good econom#
ic policy in the ordinary liberal sense of the word, notably with the far#
reaching liberalization of product markets and an improvement in
governance. In order to embrace such an economic policy, popular
demands need to break through in the political process, and that might
be the key to Africas future development. In the 1990s, a large num#
ber of African countries have launched substantial economic reforms,
and they have generated positive results, even if the many missing links
have mitigated growth rates.
The lesson for Russia is that Africas economic predicament is far
more relevant to Russia than has been generally perceived. Africa shows
that macroeconomic stabilization and private ownership are not
enough. These preconditions of economic growth need to be accom#
panied by effective liberalization and governance, and good gover#
nance is not likely to be borne out of dictatorship, but requires that
the population has a say. If it has been possible for many African coun#
tries to make sudden advances in spite of the deeply entrenched rent#
seeking elites, this should be a far easier task for Russia.
The American robber barons are a legendary breed, and their use#
fulness and harmfulness, respectively, remain in dispute. Bradford De
Long provided a multifaceted picture of them. Ever since America
gained its independence, wealth concentration has increased, and

300

SUMMARY

especially in the three decades between 1870 and 1900, the age of the
robber barons, when the share of U.S. wealth held by the one percent
richest rose to 45 percent. Yet the total number of American billion#
aires in current dollars was only 22 in 1900.
The dominant source of the robber barons wealth was the railways
and their financing, although individual billionaires made their money
on other industries, such as John D. Rockefeller on oil and Andrew
Carnegie on steel. The robber barons benefited from initial monopo#
ly rents on the nascent markets because of limited competition. They
were not very law#abiding as a rule, and their nascent business, espe#
cially the railroads, required discrete deals with the government in#
volving massive privatization of land. Still, many went bankrupt on
unsuccessful railway ventures, so success was by no means guaranteed.
Although the robber barons achieved near monopolies or oligopo#
lies, their industries were characterized by sinking prices, as they were
able to take advantage of previously unexploited economies of scale.
Financing was critical to their success. They would not have become
billionaires if Wall Street had not offered a substantial, well#function#
ing market for industrial securities, and J.P. Morgan had not func#
tioned as the gatekeeper to Wall Street financing.
In the early 1900s, the robber barons came under heavy attack from
populists or social democrats for being too rich, monopolistic, not
very law#abiding, and a menace to the economic welfare of others be#
cause of economic crises they brought about. The latter argument
became particularly potent during the Great Depression, which
prompted the Glass#Steagall Act that required a distinct division to be
made between investment banking and commercial banking. The com#
bination of the depression and the legal changes of the New Deal dried
up the flow of new billionaires. Yet it was not evident that this had any
positive economic effects.
The deregulation initiated by President Ronald Reagan once again
made it possible to combine entrepreneurship and financing, and
small investors flocked to Wall Street, facilitating the remaking of new
billionaires. Rather than arousing a broad public reaction, the cre#
ation of new fortunes is largely seen as the result of innovation. Thus,
the emergence of new billionaires is justifying the existence of robber
barons, while the populism and social democracy of 1930#80 that put
an end to them are now seen as outdated and misperceived. De Long
notes that there is no evidence that the robber barons were detrimen#
tal to economic welfare or development, and that their historical con#
tribution should be evaluated much more positively.

SUMMARY

301

The question is how relevant this is to a current evaluation of the


Russian oligarchs. Few remember the actual crimes of the robber bar#
ons, while their economic achievements and charitable activities are
all the more noteworthy. They are primarily seen as daring pioneers of
capitalism. The argument has often been made that the robber bar#
ons invested and built enterprises, while oligarchs only steal from the
state. However, by 2001, it was evident that the most successful oli#
garchs are deeply involved in investment and enterprise restructur#
ing, which is vitally important in Russia today. Possible excesses of the
oligarchs, the evolution of future crises and ideological developments
are likely to set societys attitude against the oligarchs, as was the case
with the robber barons.
Banking crises are commonplace all over the world, but Latin Amer#
ica has been particularly badly hit, as elaborated upon by Michael
Gavin and Ricardo Hausmann. The costs vary with the degree of shock,
monetary expansion, and the vulnerability of banks, and the Latin
American banking crises have been aggravated by all of these factors.
A boom and bust cycle is the origin of each banking crisis, which is
initiated by an excessive expansion in bank lending. Gavin and Haus#
mann argue that such a lending boom cannot be held back by bank
regulation, or by focusing on the capital#asset ratio, because that is no
problem in the long#run. Instead, the expansion of lending needs to
be restrained by a restrictive monetary policy.
A banking crisis is unleashed by a macroeconomic shock. Latin
America has suffered from twice as high volatility in the GDP and terms
of trade as industrial countries, and the volatility of the real exchange
rate has been nearly three times as high. Gavin and Hausmann reckon
that the effects of exchange rate policy on banks are a strong argu#
ment for introducing a flexible exchange rate policy. They warn of a
fixed exchange rate that cannot be sustained. First, interest rates will
be driven up to a very high level in defense of the peg, and then the
exchange rate shock will be all the greater when the peg fails. With a
flexible exchange rate, the external shock will lead to an exchange
rate depreciation and a rise in the domestic price level, which will
reduce the real value of bank loans so that they can be paid. At the
same time, the real value of bank liabilities will fall helping to main#
tain bank solvency.
Given that Latin America has both many and severe banking crises,
the banks in the region need stronger defenses against crises than else#
where. Banks need two buffers, one is their capital, and the other is
their liquidity. The greater the macroeconomic volatility, the more

302

SUMMARY

bank capital is needed. Therefore, Latin American banks ought to have


higher capital#asset ratios than Western banks. Curiously, banks have
adverse incentives to hold liquid reserves in a volatile environment,
because interest rates are high then, raising the alternative cost of liq#
uid reserves. Moreover, a major liquidity shock tends to be so great
that even very liquid banks are brought down. It is also presumed that
the central bank will act as a last resort lender, reducing the need for
liquidity.
An effective means for reducing macroeconomic risks, as well as
the risk of bank failures, is internationalization. It allows domestic
banks to diversify their currency risks, and foreign banks are less vul#
nerable to trouble in a particular country. Moreover, foreign banks
may have better access to foreign liquidity. Besides, external liberal#
ization of banking is likely to limit rents and malpractice.
Ricardo Hausmann presented his findings in the midst of the Rus#
sian banking crisis of 1998, and the parallels with Russia were all too
apparent. The macroeconomic shock was tremendous and brought
down about half Russias banks. The critical shortcomings of the fail#
ing banks were exposure to domestic treasury bills and revalued for#
eign debt, hurting primarily the big internationalized banks, while
small, cautious, domestically#oriented banks survived. The problems
of the banks were aggravated by the high pegged exchange rate fol#
lowed by drastic devaluation. The saving grace was that the total cost
of the Russian bank crash was relatively limited because monetization
of the economy was so small, making banks much less important to
the economy than in Latin America.
Until 1998, the predominant economic problem in Russia was a
patently large budget deficit. Alberto Alesina offered an overview of
the political economy hypotheses of budget deficits based on an arti#
cle written together with Roberto Perotti. The first question was why
large and persistent budget deficits had arisen in peacetime, and why
they occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. The second question was why
large public debts accumulated in certain countries, notably Ireland,
Belgium, and Italy, but not in others. The assumption is that some
political and institutional factors influence fiscal policy.
One theory is that the government aims to maintain a constant tax
rate. Such a tax smoothing policy would lead to alternating deficits
and surpluses depending on the business cycle. In the longer term,
the American and British experiences fit the tax smoothing policy,
with the debt#to#GDP rising during wars while falling in peacetime,
but the rise in the American debt burden in the 1980s cannot be ex#

SUMMARY

303

plained by this model, and it does not explain the differences between
countries.
Another theory is that voters are caught in fiscal illusions, not un#
derstanding that debt#financed expenditure programs will have to be
paid for later on. Keynesianism contributed to excessive deficits by
jeopardizing the responsible budget balance rule. Asymmetrically,
politicians are willing to run deficits in recessions, but not to run sur#
pluses in good times. However, political business cycle models do not
explain long#run trends in debt burdens.
A third idea is that the public debt is redistributed in favor of the
current generation of voters, leaving the debt to be paid by future
generations. However, high public debts have often been accumulat#
ed and sharply reduced within the lifetime of one generation. Nor
does this theory explain differences among countries.
A fourth idea is that debt is accumulated because of political polar#
ization. The government of one party extends the debt to restrain the
policies of the next government of another party. The more polarized
the parties are, the larger the debt is likely to be. Support of this theo#
ry is that governments have changed more often from left to right and
vice versa in the 1970s and 1980s than previously. Yet empirical work
on these models remains limited.
A fifth theory connects budget deficits with unresolved conflicts
over distribution. The more unequal the distribution of stabilization
costs, the later the expected time of stabilization. Correspondingly,
the more unequal the burden of stabilization is, the higher the bene#
fits from waiting. An extension of this model is that an economic crisis
may anticipate stabilization by forcing a solution to the war of attri#
tion. Thus, an economic crisis can be socially beneficial. While it has
its costs, it shortens the delay in adopting the necessary stabilization.
A sixth theory suggests a geographical conflict over distribution.
Yet it presupposes that different levels of government are responsible
for taxation and spending. In OECD countries, increasingly less spend#
ing goes to regional programs and more is spent on social transfers
and entitlements.
Looking at Russia, the positive effects of a macroeconomic crisis in
line with the fifth theory strike the strongest chord. The conflict over
distribution between the center and the regions has probably been
particularly severe in Russia because of the immense confusion over
federal and regional rights and responsibilities. Polarization and a
perverse perception of Keynesianism have probably also contributed,
while tax smoothing seems irrelevant.

304

SUMMARY

There is no doubt that economic experiences from other parts of


the world are highly relevant to Russia, and these are just a few strate#
gic examples. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hopes
to continue inviting top economists from all over the world to partic#
ipate in the Russian economic debate, which is becoming ever more
outstanding.


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CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036, USA
Tel.:
(202) 483#76#00
Fax:
(202) 483#18#40
E#mail: info@ceip.org
http://www.ceip.org

, 125009, ,
., 16/2
.: (095) 935#89#04
: (095) 935#89#06
E#mail: info@carnegie.ru
http://www.carnegie.ru

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. . 060437 26.11.1996.
16.01.2003.
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