1. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO V.

SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: On or about 17 Oct 1988, Santiago the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of EO 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Garchitorena, presiding Justice of Sandiganbayan, issued the arrest of Santiago. Santiago petitioned for a provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. After a long series of appeals and court battles between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter moved for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then, from office. Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days. ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution. HELD: The Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. On the other hand, Sec 13 of RA 3019 provides : SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate. But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the SC has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused. Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended? The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure. 2. DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC). An information was then filed by the Tanodbayan against Doromal for the said violation and a preliminary investigation was conducted. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the information filed by the Tanodbayan.

A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and which company participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution. The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed against him. The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because both old and new informations involve the same subject matter. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution. (2) Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations involve the same subject matter. (3) Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of preliminary investigation. HELD: Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the Supreme Court. RATIO: (1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest." Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any business. (2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" provided by the Constitution. Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that time shall also be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted. (3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct such

investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation. 3. DELOSO V. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: The petitioner was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local elections of November 1971. While he occupied the position of mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a letter complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him of having committed acts in violation of the AntiGraft Law (Republic Act 3019) in relation to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipal waters of Botolan, Zambales during the period 1976 to 1978 and the issuance of five (5) tractors of the municipality to certain individuals allegedly without any agreement as to the payment of rentals. The complaint with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was dismissed. As regards the other complaint, the Tanodbayan filed five (5) separate informations, all dated May 30, 1984 accusing the petitioner of violation of Section 3(e), of the Anti-Graft Law with the Sandiganbayan. The complaint alleged that Amor Deloso taking advantage of his public and official position, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously give unwarranted benefits to Daniel Ferrer thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the discharge of his official functions by issuing to him a tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without any agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of tractor by Daniel Ferrer thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan. Deloso was suspended indefinitely pending the hearing of the complaint. Thus, the instant petition. ISSUE: WON there was violation of the right to due process when Deloso was suspended indefinitely. HELD: Petition GRANTED. RATIO: The order of suspension does not have a definite period so that the petitioner may be suspended for the rest of his term of office unless his case is terminated sooner. An extended suspension is a distinct possibility considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's plea for earlier dates of trial of his cases on the ground that there are other cases set earlier which have a right to expect priority.

It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial office in their command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly extending beyond his entire term simply because the big number of sequestration, ill-gotten wealth, murder, malversation of public finds and other more serious offenses plus incidents and resolutions that may be brought to the Supreme Court prevents the expedited determination of his innocence or guilt. We rule that henceforth a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case. 4. GONZAGA V. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: A complaint for malversation of public funds was filed against CORAZON C. GONZAGA inher capacity as School Principal, based on the audit report of the Commission on Audit that she allegedly incurred a shortage of P15,188.37. The prosecution filed a motion seeking to suspend, pendente lite, the accused as school principal pursuant to Section 13, Republic Act 3019 ("Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"), as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195. The resolution dated September 10, 1990 granted the prosecutions motion to suspend the accused, pendente lite. ISSUE: Is the provision in Sec 13 of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), suspending any incumbent public officer against whom a valid information for any offense involving fraud is pending in court, violative of Gonzagas right to be presumed innocent pendente lite? RULING: Only a preventive suspension lasting for an unreasonable length of time violates the Constitution. Suspension under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019 was held as limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days, in consonance with Section 42 of Pres. Decree No. 807 (otherwise known as the "Civil Service Decree"), except where there is delay in the disposition of the case, which is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein stated. Preventive suspension is not violative of the Constitution as it is not a penalty (it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings). In fact, suspension particularly under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019 is mandatory once the validity of the information is determined. What the Constitution abhors is an indefinite preventive suspension as it violates the due process and equal protection clauses. Since the suspension of petitioner has already been more than 90 days, petitioner may re-assume the position of school principal of the Malabon Municipal High School, without prejudice to the continuation of trial on the merits of the pending case against her in the Sandiganbayan.

5. LAYUS V. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Petitioner Celia T. Layus (hereafter LAYUS), the elected Mayor of the Municipality of Claveria, Province of Cagayan, was charged with estafa through falsification of public documents in an Information[1] iled on 19 February 1997 before public respondent Sandiganbayan and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 23583. The Information stemmed from a complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents and for violation of Section 3(e) and (h), and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed against LAYUS and Pedro V. Layus, Henjie C. Layus and Arnold V. Layus. After preliminary investigation, Graft Investigation Officer II Jose D. Carlos of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in a Joint Resolution dated 21 November 1996, recommended the filing of an information against LAYUS for the first charge and the dismissal of the charges against all of the original respondents for the second. The resolution had the concurrence of Director Ernesto Nocos and was approved by the Ombudsman. On 24 March 1997, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied LAYUS motion for reconsideration of the Joint Resolution of 21 November 1996. On 6 August 1997, the first day set by the Sandiganbayan for the trial of the case, LAYUS informed the court of the prior filing of her motion for reinvestigation[2] ated 2 August 1997, which was allegedly sent by registered mail, but the Sandiganbayan had not received any copy of it. On 7 August 1997, LAYUS filed a motion to quash the Information.[3] In the meantime, with appropriate leave, LAYUS served and filed an Omnibus Motion dated 25 September 1997, reiterating her right to reinvestigation.[4] This was, however, denied by the Sandiganbayan in its resolution of 1 December 1997.[5]LAYUS motion to reconsider the denial likewise failed.[6] In its resolution of 9 October 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied LAYUS motion to quash a nd ruled that the alleged irregularities in the preliminary investigation were not proper grounds for quashing the Information.[7] On 19 November 1997,[8] the prosecution filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite, which LAYUS opposed on 26 November 1997.[9] The resolution of said motion was held in abeyance in light of the May 1998 elections and the prohibition under Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, which provides thus: (x) Suspension of elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer the provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding during the election period, any public official who suspends, without prior approval of the Commission, any elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer, unless said suspension will be for purposes of applying the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in relation to the suspension and removal of elective officials; in which case the provisions of this section shall be inapplicable. On 26 June 1998, the Sandiganbayan eventually granted the motion to suspend LAYUS.

ISSUE: WON the 90-day suspension pendente lite is valid. HELD: Having ruled that the information filed against LAYUS is valid, there can be no impediment to the application of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, which states: Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. -- Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. (Italics supplied) This provision makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer who has been validly charged with a violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, or Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property. This is based on the presumption that unless the public officer is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or both.[24] The imposition of the suspension, however, is not automatic or self-operative. There must first be a valid information, determined at a pre-suspension hearing, where the court is furnished with the basis to suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or refuse suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings which impairs its validity. In the instant case, the records show that LAYUS was given adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against her. Since the required pre-suspension hearing was complied with and the information was deemed valid, it then becomes the ministerial duty of the Sandiganbayan to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension which, however, may not be for an indefinite duration or an unreasonable length of time. Thus, in Segovia v. Sandiganbayan,[25] we ruled that preventive suspension may not exceed 90 days in consonance with Presidential Decree No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree), now Section 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987. Considering that the imposed 90-day suspension pendente lite of LAYUS does not exceed the maximum period thus fixed, the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in granting the prosecutions motion to suspend petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. 6. SEGOVIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Petitioners were designated as members of the Contracts Committee for NPCs Mindanao project. The lowest bidder, Joint Venture was disqualified after the PCAB verified that Joint Venture as well as the 2nd lowest bidder, Urban Consolidated Constructors, was downgraded thereby ineligible as bidders.

Since all other bids exceeded the allowable government estimate on the project, the committee declared a failure of bidding and directed a re-bidding. NPC Board approved, but for reasons not on record. The project was eventually cancelled. Petitioners were charged under RA 3019 for in one way or the other, extending undue advantage to Joint Venture through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence. For this, petitioners were suspended from office. ISSUE: W/N it is mandatory or discretionary for Sandiganbayan to place under preventive suspension public officers who stand accused before it. HELD: Yes, it is mandatory. Under the act, one accused of any offense involving fraud upon government public funds or property whether the crime is simple or complex, regardless of stage of execution and mode of participation, shall be suspended from office. Jurisprudence is clear that upon determination of the validity of the information, a court must issue a suspension order as held in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, Luciano, et al. v. Mariano, Socrates v. Sandiganbayan. 7. JOSON V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FACTS: On Sept. 17, 1996, some SB members of Nueva Ecija filed with the Office of the President a lettercomplaint charging Edno Joson with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. They allege that in the morning of Sept. 12, 1996, they were at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when Joson belligerently barged in to the hall, kicked the door and chairs and uttered threatening words at them; and that Edno was with several men with firearms who encircled the area. They claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150 M. The President acted on the complaint by noting on the margin that the use of force, intimidation or armed followers were unjustified and instructed Sec. Barbers of the DILG to take preemptive and investigative actions. Sec. Barbers directed the petitioner to submit an answer but Edno failed to submit even after several extensions granted by the DILG. On April 22, 1997, Usec Sanchez, then acting Sec., issued an order declaring Edno in default and to have waived his right to present evidence. 2 days later, Ednos counsel entered appearance causing Usec Sanchez to reconsider his order and gave petitioner, for the last time, 15 days to filed his answer. But still, Edno failed to file his answer. The order of default was thus reinstated. Joson then filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the complaint was not verified and that the DILG has no jurisdiction over the case.

On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of Sec. Barbers, Exec. Sec.Torres issued an order, by authority of the President, placing Edno Joson under preventive suspension for 60 days pending investigation of the charges against him. Vice-Governor Tinio was designated as Acting Governor. Edno, on the other hand, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order of default. Edno also filed, among others, a Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation pursuant to the provisions of the LGC and Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 23. The petition for certiorari with the CA was later dismissed. The Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation with the DILG was also denied. The DILG Secretary found the affidavits of complainants witnesses to be more natural, reasonable, and probable than those of Edno Joson. The Exec. Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the finding and recommendation of the DILG and imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for 6 months without pay. The Supreme Court, however, issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of said order. That notwithstanding, Tinio was installed as Acting Governor. ISSUE: (1) Whether the DILG Sec. erred in recommending to the Discipling Authority the preventive suspension of petitioner during the investigation. (2) Whether the Resolution finding petitioner guilty and imposing the 6-month suspension is valid. HELD: (1) No. Preventive suspension is authorized under Sec. 63 of the LGC. It may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. Exec. Sec. Torres found that all requisites for the imposition of preventive suspension had been complied with. Petitioners failure to file his answer despite several opportunities given him was construed as a waiver of his right to file answer and present evidence; and as a result of this waiver, the issues were deemed to have been joined. It was also found that the evidence of petitioners guilt was strong and that his continuance in office during the pendency of the case could influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the evidence against him. (2) Yes. Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence one may have in support of ones defense. To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process. Thus, when petitioner failed to submit his position paper as directed and insisted for the conduct o formal investigation, he was not denied of his right of procedural process.