Conclusion from Murder Old Definition by the Chief Justice of the time, Sir Edward Coke AR is committed if D unlawfully

y killeth any reasonable creature in rerum natura under the Queens peace R v Moloney murder is committed where a person, intending to kill or intending to cause grievous bodily harm and in the absence of a defence, unlawfully kills another human being

Modern

Unlawful
Lawful killin Unlawful $illin !"lia#le lia#le Lawful killing use of reasonable force in self!defence" #nlawful separation of twin, mercy killing etc Re % &children' $%&&&' the (ourt of Appeal held that an operation to separate con)oined twins in order to save the life of the stronger was not unlawful even though it would inevitably result in the death of the weaker" R v ( lis %&*& +um kill paraplegic son as genuinely believe she committed mercy killing"

Consent to #e killed Lia#le

R v !icklinson ,%&*% (onsent to be being killed by affirmative action is inoperative

)atient refuse treatment

!"Lia#le St *eor e+s !,S ,ealth Care -rust v S A patient can validly refuse treatment necessary to preserve that patients life

*..age

/$illeth+
$ill terminal ill Lia#le R v Co0 /ven though patient in terminal ill, doctor will still liable for murder if they terminate their life using medicine" 0nly need to show that D accelerated the death of 1, not that 1 would have lived without the in)ury perpetrated by D" 2o even if 1 is suffering from terminal cancer, D will be liable if he fatally stabs 1"

Re % the operation of separation of con)oined twin serves to hasten her inevitable death )ust as the lethal in)ection accelerates the death of a patient at a terminal stage" 3he severance of the artery will be treated as a cause of her death"

%..age

Death
Old medical view Modern medical view (essation of the cardiopulmonary system, i"e" the absence of heartbeat and breathing" 4owever, enables patients to be kept alive in the sense that they are conscious and lucid even though their respiratory functions have ceased" ,even brain no functioningConference of Royal Medical Colle es &1232' that once there has been an irreversible cessation of the brain stem a person will be regarded medically as dead even where they are being mechanically ventilated"

Court su44ort5

R v Malcherek6 R v Steel Did the Court of %44eal ado4t the medical test of #rain stem death5 Although Lord Lane acknowledged that the medical profession recognise brain stem death as the true test of death ,body considered death with mechanically lung and blood operate-, the court did not think it necessary to give it legal backing ,support 7hy was it not necessary to ive le al #ackin to the medical definition of death5 5t was clear from the medical facts that, up to the time of conventional death, that is, after the life support machinery was disconnected, the original in)uries inflicted by the appellants were operating and substantial" 3hey were therefore legal causes of the victims deaths" 3he doctors decision to discontinue treatment and switch off the machines was a bona fide one given by competent practitioners following conventional procedures and therefore did not break the chain of causation between the initial in)ury and the death"

6..age

any reasona#le creature in rerum natura

7hen a human life in #ein 5 R v )oulton (hild must wholly e7truded from the body of mother and alive and no re8uire that umbilical cord is unconnected !"Lia#le R v Reeves 9o part of child must remain within part of mother /ven if the child is deliberately throttled when only the head is protruding and this is not murder" Lia#le R v 8rain 9o need the baby take the first breath, as this may occur after some time after birth 3he test is not that the child is capable of living independently of its mother :#3 whether it is living independently of its mother" re % $%&&*' /ven useless lung and heart still under protection law of murder after birth ,under con)oined twin this case +ary had separate functioning organs and she was independent of her mother" -hus, althou h she was inca4a#le of se4arate e0istence, she was a se4arate individual" 3he twins had an e8ual right to life and were entitled to the protection of the criminal law to the same e7tent as other human beings"

$ill in the middle of ivin #irth

$ill #efore 1st #reath

$ill a #a#y with useless heart and lun

Lia#le

;..age

9oetus: human #ein ar ument

$ill a foetus !"lia#le According to R v )oulton, it is not murder nor is it manslaughter to kill a foetus in the womb or in the process of leaving the womb"

7ant to in=ure 4re nant woman and ive #irth and #a#y died

Lia#le &!" Murder '

%ttorney *eneral+s Reference &!o" ; of 122<' incapacity of the foetus to be the ob)ect of homicide %ttorney *eneral+s Reference &!o" ; of 122<' 5n this case, D stabbed his pregnant girlfriend in the back" 9o in)ury to the foetus was detected but it was born prematurely and died four months later from a lung condition attributed to her premature birth" (onstructive manslaughter is an unlawful and dangerous act leading to death, in circumstances where it was foreseeable that it might hurt anyone at all" 5t was unnecessary to prove that D knew that his act was likely to in)ure the person who died as a result of it or intended to in)ure that person" 5ncapacity of the foetus to be the ob)ect of homicide" ,transfer malice only within same offence, killing a foetus is called festicide(an be argued that Ds intent being transferred to the child< 3o give an affirmative answer re8uires a double =transfer= of intent first from the mother to the foetus and then from the foetus to the child as yet unborn" (ourt not recognise

7hy not murder

7ant to kill the #a#y and (n=ure the foetus and #orn alive and died 7ant to in=ure #a#y and hurt foetus and #orn alive with #rain dead5

Lia#le

%ttorney *eneral+s Reference &!o" ; of 122<' 5t is possible to interpret the situation as one where the mental element is directed, not to the foetus but to the human being when and if it comes into e7istence, no fiction is re8uired" *lanville 7illiams 5f born alive, no matter how short still alive :ut in born with brain dead ,no brain activity-, court is likely to hold that he was born dead ,only keep on ventilator-

!" lia#le

>..age

7ithin the >ueen+s )eace &not so im4ortant'

kill an alien enemy in the heat of war" kill enemy soldiers who have #een ca4tured or surrendered" !"Lia#le neither murder nor manslaughter

Lia#le

7ithin a year and a day &a#olished'

3here used to be a rule, dating from the si7teenth century, that only if the death of 1 followed within a year and a day of Ds attack could the death be attributed to Ds attack"

?..age

Mens rea for Murder Modern definition R v Moloney $*@A>' intention to kill or cause B:4

D+s aim or Lia#le 4ur4ose was to kill or cause *8, (t was not his Lia#le R v 7oolin aim or 4ur4ose Death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty C #ut he knew barring some unforeseen intervention C as a result of the that death or defendants actions and *8, was that the defendant appreciated that such was the case" virtually certain (f D foresaw a !"lia#le R v Doolin principles not satisfied risk of death or *8, #ut at a he foresaw that death or B:4 was probable C then that is level lower not sufficient to amount to an intention to kill or cause than virtual B:4" certainty

E..age

D+s motive to esca4e and kill a 4olice

Liable R v ,ales ?@AABC ,attempt .olice managed to get a handcuff onto one of Ds wrists" murder 4owever, 4ales managed to get away" 4ales into the driverFs seat" 3he officer ran back to the car" 3here was evidence that he tried the driverFs door and then went round to the back of the car, where he banged on the rear window and shouted" 3he car, however, was put into reverse by D and in reverse it went over the officer, causing him severe in)uries" 0ne needs to be very careful about how the word GdesireH is used when suggesting that a person did not desire to kill" -he CrownDs 4osition was that he was 4re4ared to kill in order to esca4e" 5t may not have been a gratuitous killing in the sense that the motive was a desire to kill" -he motive was that the officer was in the way and that the a44ellant ,ales was 4re4ared to kill in order to esca4e" 3hat is not a situation which re8uires any different direction from the conventional one on intent" De can see no reason why anything other than that normal direction was re8uired in the present case" 3he appellant was in no way pre)udiced by that"

A..age

(ntention to cause *8,

Murder #y intent to cause #h 7hat+s means #y *8,5 7hat+s means #y /really+ Lia#le Eickers D)) v Smith cause grievous bodily harm C really serious harm C will suffice for murder Saunders $*@A>' the omission of the word really when directing the )ury was not significant Cunnin ham ?12F1C 3he harm does not have to be life!threatening Eickers $*@>E' 3he appellant broke into a house with the intention of committing a burglary and was found by the owner, an elderly woman" 5n order to prevent recognition he struck her many blows and she died" +alice aforethought ,no longer used- always been defined in /nglish law as, I im4lied, where, #y a voluntary act, the accused intended to cause rievous #odily harm he cannot say that he only intended to cause a certain de ree of harm" 4e realiJed that the victim recogniJed him and he therefore inflicted grievous bodily harm on her, 4erha4s only intendin to render her unconscious, #ut he did intend to inflict rievous #odily harm #y the #lows he inflicted u4on her and #y kickin her in the face, of which there was evidence"

!o need to life threatenin ,ow to know intention to cause *8,5

@..age

)in4rick E who is haemo4hilia and died

)in4rick and cause #h -heoretically Smith and ,o an pg ;@A lia#le Dhether the harm is really serious is depending on assessment of harm caused to particular victim 3he age and vulnerability of the 1 therefore vulnerability 5t is not depend on whether D though the harm he cause was serious 2o, now it is possible that there is murder even though by pinprick 1 who is haemophilia and died as the pinprick can be regarded as really serious harm :etter view 2o, the better view is depending on the circumstances following the 1ickers principles" Depend of D did on 1 :ut in situation that D did not know 1 is haemophilia, more likely )ury will not find there is such intention" , B" Dilliam, pg 6E&, 6rd edition,although 2mith and 4ogan did state there is possible-

D knew E was haemo4hilia and 4in4rick and E died C)S char in standard

Lia#le

5ntent to cause B:4

5t is for the )ury to decide whether the harm is really serious" 4owever, e7amples of what would usually amount to really serious harm include in)ury resulting in permanent disability, loss of sensory function or visible disfigurementK broken or displaced limbs or bones, including fractured skull, compound fractures, broken cheek bone, )aw, ribs, etcK in)uries which cause substantial loss of blood, usually necessitating a transfusion or result in lengthy treatment or incapacity

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** . . a g e

*uide for Jury D intend E died Ludge must give the )ury the standard direction, G+embers of the )ury to find the defendant guilty of murder you must be sure that D intended to kill 1 or cause him B:4" G in the rare cases where the standard direction $that it is for the )ury simply to decide whether the defendant intended to kill or to do serious bodily harm' is not enough, the )ury should be directed that they are not entitled to find the necessary intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious #odily harm was a virtual certainty &#arrin some unforeseen intervention' as a result of the defendantDs actions and that the defendant a44reciated that such was the case"H ,R v Doollin3here may be rare cases where the )ury prefer not to find the conse8uence intended although they are sure it was foreseen as certain" 3hese will be cases where death may have occurred as a side effect of some other action" 3he special direction gives the )ury some elbow room to do this" 3his option is not available to it if As purpose was kill, even if, as in cases of mercy killing, they approve As motive 5n (outts $%&&?' #M4L 6@ the 40L allowed an appeal against a murder conviction on the basis that the )ury was not allowed to consider manslaughter as an alternative verdict"

D did not E died, only fri hten

Can =ury did not find such intention even there is virtual certainty of the result5

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