INSTITUTIONALISING JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: PUBLIC REASON AND THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT JP for certainty The law of England

d would be a strange science if indeed it were eci e !" #rece ents $n%"& Precedents serve to illustrate principles and to give them a 'i(e certaint". B)t the %a* $' Eng%an , which is e(c%)si+e $' #$siti+e %a*, enacted by stat)te, e#en s )#$n #rinci#%es, an t-ese #rinci#%es r)n t-r$)g- a%% t-e cases according as the particular circumstances of each have been found to fall within the one or the other of them. o Jones v. Randall, [1 !", Mans'ie% s#eci'ies -e is re'erring t$ case %a* e+e%$#e !" t-e c$)rts #f a group of cases in+$%+es t-e sa.e #$int, the parties e(#ect t-e sa.e ecisi$n. #t would be a gr$ss in/)stice t$ eci e a%ternate cases on opposite principles. #f a case was decided against me yesterday when # was a defendant, # shall loo$ for the same %udgment today if # am plaintiff.

Car $0$: To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast& it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights .... A -erence t$ #rece ent .)st t-en !e t-e r)%e rat-er t-an t-e e(ce#ti$n if litigants are to have faith in the even'handed administration of %ustice in the courts. Fran1ena: The paradigm case of in%ustice is that in which there are two similar individuals in similar circumstances and one of them is treated better or worse than the other. #n this case, the cry of in%ustice rightly goes up against the responsible agent or group& and )n%ess t-at agent $r gr$)# can esta!%is- t-at t-ere is s$.e re%e+ant issi.i%arit" after all between the individuals concerned and their circumstances, he or they will be guilty as charged. N$te: T-is c-a#ter is re%ate t$ !$t/) icia% reas$ning an #rece ent&

Law hold JP for justice, but not for anything else (ord )enning* I' %a*"ers -$% t$ t-eir #rece ents t$$ c%$se%", '$rget')% $' t-e ')n a.enta% #rinci#%es $' tr)t- an /)stice *-ic- t-e" s-$)% ser+e, they may 'in t-e *-$%e e i'ice c$.es t).!%ing $*n a!$)t t-e.& o Just as the scientist see1s '$r tr)t-, so the %a*"er s-$)% see1 '$r /)stice. Just as the scientist ta1es -is instances an 'r$. them builds up his genera% #r$#$siti$ns, so the %a*"er s-$)% ta1e -is #rece ents an 'r$. t-e. !)i% )# -is genera% #rinci#%es& Just as the propositions of the scientist 'ai% t$ !e .$ i'ie *-en s-$*n n$t t$ 'it a%% instances, or even discarded when shown in error, so the #rinci#%es $' t-e %a*"er s-$)% !e .$ i'ie *-en '$)n t$ !e )ns)ite t$ t-e ti.es or discarded when found to *$r1 in/)stice

INTRODUCTION +fter the historical approach of the previous chapter, we now want to turn to one of rhe fundamental, defining features of common law* the doctrine of binding precedent. T-e 'irst #art $' t-e c-a#ter considers the r$$ts $' t-e $ctrine and the arg).ent t-at /) ges $ n$t .a1e %a*& ,e want to place our understanding of precedent on a more contemporary foundation. ,e will argue that the $ctrine $' #rece ent can !e )n erst$$ as an instit)ti$na% '$r. $' #)!%ic reas$n that operates in a democratic conte-t* o %egiti.ate /) icia% %a* .a1ing in a democracy is c-aracterise !" /) icia% restraint, and by the public reas$ns /) ges gi+e '$r reac-ing t-e c$nc%)si$ns that they have. [#n Judges ma$e law, then why we need legislator"

 ,e will go on to outline a theory of precedent as a %udicial practice that we will develop in more detail in the following chapter o ./nderlying precedent is an emphasis on stability, permanence and the wisdom of the past ' the c$..$n %a* !eing c$ncei+e as an acc).)%ati$n $' s)c- *is $. ' combined with reverence for the higher courts as the 0elders and betters1 of the lower courts. o Precedent reflected the vision of law as an underta$ing !ase $n %earning, ac2)ire s1i%%s an e(#erience& o +t the same time, since #rece ents e(ist in $r er t$ !e a##%ie , the s"ste. essentia%%" e.#$*ere t-e -ig-er c$)rts t$ %egis%ate. o Presente as a restraint, #rece ent ca.$)'%age %a*3 .a1ing *-i%st in rea%it" c$nstit)ting %a*3.a1ing&2 34icol, 56678.

Ne* Secti$n: THE JUDGE AND THE COMMON LA4 Common law and judicial law making J) ges are t-e centra% 'ig)res in common law systems. Case %a* is t-e #r$ )ct $' /) icia% eter.inati$n and it is sometimes referred to as %udge'made law. 5et c$..$n %a* s"ste.s c%ai. t-e" $#erate t-e r)%e $' %a*, n$t $' .en 3and traditionally, and in large part continuing today, appellant courts are staffed by male %udges8. The -).an e%e.ent t$ %a*6s $#erati$n a##ears inesca#a!%e& -$* is case %a* /)sti'ie , legitimised and resc)e 'r$. c%ai.s $' ar!itrariness an ra.#ant s)!/ecti+it"9 o +t one time, a progressive view was that codification was the solution to the problem o ,ith limited 3if sometimes, as in #ndia, notable8 e-ceptions this did not occur.

o :ost large scale schemes of converting case law into statutes consisted mainly of consolidating legislation with the aim of preserving the e-isting structure of principles and rules developed over time by the common law %udges. #n addition, c$..$n %a* s"ste.s *it- t-eir +ariet" $' '$r.a% s$)rces $' %a* s#eci'" t-at certaint" an rec$gnisi!i%it" $' %a* are features of their systems. The statements of the %udge3s8 are in ;lac$stone2s classic words of 1 7< (the peak of the declaratory theory of the common law8 !)t 7e+i ence $' *-at is t-e c$..$n %a*6, t-e" are n$t t-e.se%+es t-e 'ina% *$r & A#$%$gists $' t-e ec%arat$r" t-e$r" would -$% t-at /) icia% 'i e%it" is n$t $*e t$ t-e artic)%ati$ns $' #re+i$)s /) ges, !)t t$ t-e %a*. #t is -ar means. t$ 1n$* e-actly what this

The .$ ern #ractice $' #rece ent c-a%%enges t-e ec%arat$r" t-e$r" *it- t-e arg).ent t-at /) ges $ .a1e %a*&

 H$* can *e )n erstan .a1ing8

/) icia% %a*

E+$%+ing -ist$rica% c$n iti$ns, not some analytical set of logical related and clearly specified concepts and ideas, #r$+i es $)r 'irst #$int $' re'erence. 4e *ant t$ '$c)s $n t*$ interre%ate iss)es* o the e+e%$#.ent $' .$ ern case re#$rting, o the '$r.a%i0ati$n $' tec-ni2)es $' %ega% arg).ent&

To =ind the authority law is to adhere to JP A c-aracteristic an +ita% c$ncern in t-e c$..$n %a* *$r% is the eter.inati$n $' t-e a)t-$rit" $' #r$#$siti$ns '$)n in t-e %a* re#$rts to be considered to be accurate statements of the law, i.e. strategies $' rea ing an gi+ing *eig-t an acc$r ing s)!stance t$ t-e rec$r e state.ents !" t-e /) ges in .a1ing /) g.ent in eci ing cases& P)t si.#%", *-at is t-e stat)s $' t-e *$r s t-erein c$ntaine 8 +s generations of introductory boo$s state the .$st i.#$rtant .et-$ $' ran1ing an *eig-ing /) g.ents is a -erence t$ t-e 7 $ctrine6 $r 7r)%e6 $' #rece ent 3in modern form a tightening of the older principle guiding %udicial determination called .stare decisis28. T-e $ctrine .a" !e re%ati+e%" easi%" state in crude terms !)t it soon !ec$.es .$re c$.#%e( *-en *e #ercei+e t-e .)%ti'acete ca%%s a %a*"er .a1es in *$r1 $n a -ar case. Reading case reports to find relevant propositions .of law2, neg$tiating !et*een 7%ea ing6 an 7 issenting6 /) g.ents, *eig-ting )# *-et-er

state.ents are 7rati$6 $r 7$!iter6 is not mechanical process. State.ents are gi+en i''ering *eig-t t$ state.ents e#en ing $n -$* t-e" c$ntri!)te t$ e+e%$#ing an ans*er t$ a %ega% 2)esti$n and as material to e+a%)ate t-e arg).ents of the opponent + term that is often used is .authority2* what is the a)t-$rit" >or, or against, the argument9 T-is is n$t an a!stract c$nsi erati$n !)t ee#%" #ractica%. Put another way* $ne #art $' %ega% researc- is a!$)t t-e tec-nica% #r$!%e.s $' -$* t$ 'in $r %$$1 )# 7t-e %a*6& !)t 'ace *it- $ne set $' c$ncrete res)%ts $' t-$se searc-es ' i.e. a range of decisions and %udgments ' -$* s-$)% t-e %a*"er ran1 an i''erentiate t-e .ateria% t-at -e $r s-e 'in s8 One ans*er is !" '$%%$*ing t-e $ctrine $' #rece ent& o :ean that in order to find ratio, then %ust loo$ at the following case law in which the %udgment determine the ratio

o ?o, following doctrine of precedent

JP' stare decisis It is re%ati+e%" eas" t$ #ara#-rase sc-$%ar%" escri#ti$ns $' #rece ent9 it is usually e-plained by reference to the English translation of the (atin phrase .stare ecisis6, which literally translates as .to stand by decided matters2. The phrase stare decisis is itself a shortened version of the (atin phrase .stare decisis et non @uieta movere2, .t$ stan !" ecisi$ns an n$t t$ ist)r! sett%e .atters6& #n student boo$s it is common to run together stare decisis and the modern doctrine of precedent as if they were the same,

Old meaning: o but technically, stare decisis is the older term referring to the practice before the modern doctrine of .binding precedent2& o it appears to have given %udges fle-ibility, one stood by previous decisions but weighed up their effects and their meaning in the overall understanding of the common laws2 conception of the %ust state of affairs for the community. Modern view: Prece ent, in its .$ ern '$r., i&e& !in ing #rece ent, developed from the looser stare decisis in the course of the nineteenth century and too$ on more of the character of a binding set of rules, whereby the ecisi$n $' a -ig-er c$)rt *it-in t-e sa.e nati$na% $r #r$+incia%, state $r istrict /)ris icti$n acts as binding a)t-$rit" $n a %$*er c$)rt *it-in t-at sa.e /)ris icti$n.

 The ecisi$n $' a c$)rt $' an$t-er /)ris icti$n $n%" acts as persuasive a)t-$rit". The degree of persuasiveness is dependent upon various factors, including, o the nat)re $' t-e $t-er /)ris icti$n and o the %e+e% $' c$)rt which decided the precedent case in the other %urisdiction. o ate of the precedent case on the assumption that the .$re recent the case, the .$re re%ia!%e it will be as authority for a given proposition, although this is not necessarily so. o +nd on some occasions, t-e /) ge6s re#)tati$n may affect the degree of #ers)asi+eness of the authority.

4ot fact actually recur so only adhere to material fact #f things seem simple at this level of generality they get comple- when *e rea%ise t-at a%% cases are an inter.i(ing $' #r$ce )re, 'acts an 7%a*6, and that it is $n%" #artic)%ar #arts $' a ecisi$n t-at are ca%%e )#$n as a)t-$rit", but often it is n$t eas" t$ i''erentiate between the different parts. G%an+i%%e 4i%%ia.s described it for generation of law students thus* o O!+i$)s%" it $es n$t re2)ire t-at a%% t-e 'acts s-$)% !e t-e sa.e. o ,e $now that in the flu- of life a%% t-e 'acts $' a case *i%% ne+er rec)r, but the legally material facts may recur and it is with these that the doctrine is concerned. o The ratio decidendi [reason of deciding" of a case can be e'ine as t-e .ateria% 'acts of the case plus the decision thereon. o The same learned author who advanced this definition went on to suggest a helpful formula.

o ?uppose that in a certain case facts +, ; and A e-ist, and suppose that the court finds that facts ; and A are material and fact + immaterial, and then reaches conclusion B 3e.g. %udgment for the plaintiff, or %udgment for the defendant8. o Then the doctrine of precedent enables us to say that in any future case in which facts ; and A e-ist, or in which facts + and ; and A e-ist the c$nc%)si$n .)st !e :. o #f in a future case +, ;, A, and ) e-ist, and the ne* 'act D is -e% t$ !e .ateria%, the 'irst case *i%% n$t !e a irect a)t-$rit", t-$)g- it .a" !e $' +a%)e as an ana%$g"&

 #t follows from ,illiam2s analysis, however, that the addition of fact ) to a future case means that conclusion B may or may not follow. #n other words, the presence of a ne* 'act D .a" -a+e t-e e''ect $' isting)is-ing t-e ')t)re case 'r$. t-e #rece ent or conversely the #rece ent .a" !e e(ten e t$ a##%" t$ t-e ')t)re case. o #n this account, legal rules, embodied in precedents, are generalisations that accent)ate t-e i.#$rtance $' certain 'acts and isc$)nt $r ign$re $t-ers. o T-e a##%icati$n $' #rece ent re%ies $n reas$ning !" ana%$g". o Ana%$gies can !e neit-er c$rrect n$r inc$rrect !)t .$re $r %ess #ers)asi+e +s reasonable person may reach different conclusion and yet it is defensible

JP %ustified by certainty instead of fairness There has been considerable writing on whether the doctrine of binding precedent is a good or bad one but the $ctrine is )s)a%%" /)sti'ie !" arg).ents *-ic- '$c)s $n t-e esira!i%it" $' sta!i%it" an certaint" in the law and notions of /)stice an 'airness

Just' treated a li$e, so no %udicial arbitrary Reliance upon precedent also #r$.$tes t-e e(#ectati$n t-at t-e %a* is /)st. The idea that %i1e cases s-$)% !e treate a%i1e is anchored in the assumption that one person is the legal e@ual of any other. Thus, #ers$ns in si.i%ar sit)ati$ns s-$)% n$t be treate i''erent%" e(ce#t '$r %ega%%" re%e+ant an c%ear%" /)sti'ia!%e reas$ns. Precedent #r$.$tes /) icia% restraint and %i.its a /) ge6s a!i%it" t$ eter.ine t-e $)tc$.e of a case in a way that he or she might choose i' t-ere *ere n$ #rece ent& o E(tra 'act e.erge .a" c$.e #)t i''erent ecisi$n !)t n$t against *-at -as eci e #re+i$)s%" This function of precedent gives it its normative force.

Efficiency' no need start from beginning Precedent also enhances efficiency. Reliance on the accumulation of legal rules helps g)i e /) ges in t-eir res$%)ti$n $' %ega% is#)tes. #f %udges had to !egin t-e %a* ane* in each case, they would add .$re ti.e t$ t-e a /) icati+e process and would duplicate their efforts.

JP related to law report T-e )se $' #rece ent is re%ate to and e#en ent )#$n t-e #)!%icati$n $' %a* re#$rts that contain case decisions and the articulated rationale of %udges. T-e #a)cit" $' %a* re#$rts until their re'organisation under the Aouncil of (aw Reporters and the adoption of .official2 series .eant t-at )ncertaint" e(iste as t$ t-e act)a% *$r s t-at /)sti'ie ear%" ecisi$ns 3many early reports were more reporting the procedure or the argument used, often the decision was not includedC8.

+udiences of %udicial %udgment ,e could say, then, that there are at least three audiences listening to and watching contemporary %udicial argument* o the parties to the dispute, o the public, o other legal professionals. The latter include fellow %udges and in particular the %udges who are li$ely to hear the case again if the legal issues go on appeal as well as legal academics eager to write case notes or articles and boo$s in which particular cases are described as correct, others .wrong2, certain %udgments as incisive , others as not particularly well reasoned and so forth.

#t2s not mechanical issue The process of interpretation and pronouncement on the law is n$ .ec-anica% #r$cess& i' it *ere then the iss)e s-$)% n$t -a+e reac-e c$)rt& ,e now want to develop these points.

Ne* Secti$n: PRECEDENT, ADJUDICATION AND PUBLIC REASON T-e secti$n a!$+e -as e(a.ine t-e !asic t-e.es t-at e'ine /) icia% reas$ning ;n$t ')%%" re%ate t$ #rece ent<& S$.e $' t-ese are -ist$rica%, such as the e+e%$#.ent $' stare ecisis or of the s"ste. $' re#$rting /) icia% ecisi$ns& others are str)ct)ra% an c$ncern -$* '$r. is gi+en t$ /) icia% arg).ent& ,e also drew attention to various terms, for the most part (atinate, that are used to describe various features of the %udicial art. 4e n$* *ant t$ ra* t$get-er t-ese i+erse t-e.es t$ gi+e )s a c%ear sense $' t-e "na.ic nat)re $' t-e c$nte.#$rar" $ctrine an #ractice $' #rece ent&

Public reason to reasoning judicially essential to democracy functioning Dur focus is the idea that /) icia% reas$ning, and the structures that define it, articulate a particular form of #)!%ic reas$n t-at is essentia% t$ a ')ncti$ning e.$crac". To develop this argument, *e nee t$ e'ine a 1e" ter. *-ic- *e *i%% t-en %in1 !ac1 t$ t-e /)sti'icati$n $' /) icia% %a* .a1ing: a /) icati$n &

A /) icati$n3 important in resolve disputes to make social wellregulated, so judges seem to make law =uller made the following comments on ad%udication* o #t is customary to thin$ of a /) icati$n as a means of sett%ing is#)tes or controversies. o &&&& :ore fundamentally, however, ad%udication should be +ie*e as a '$r. $' s$cia% $r ering, as a way in which the re%ati$ns $' .en t$ $ne an$t-er are g$+erne an reg)3 %ate & o E+en in t-e a!sence $' an" '$r.a%i0e $ctrine of stare decisis or res %udicata, an a /) icati+e eter.inati$n will normally enter in some degree int$ t-e %itigants6 ')t)re re%ati$ns and into the future relations of other parties who see themselves as possible litigants before the same tribunal. o E+en i' t-ere is n$ state.ent !" t-e tri!)na% of the reas$ns for its decision, some reason will be perceived or guessed at, and t-e #arties *i%% ten t$ g$+ern t-eir c$n )ct acc$r ing%"&

 The important point for =uller is that a /) icati$n is a *a" $' res$%+ing is#)tes over the terms in which s$cia% re%ati$ns are 7reg)%ate 6. o Judges ad%udicate that why can be regarded as ma$e law A /) icati$n in'%)ences ')t)re %ega% re%ati$ns-i#s by determining the e-istence or e-tent of duties, rights and obligations.

JP and stare decisis wor$ within the ad%udication T-e a /) icat$r *i%% -a+e reas$ns for the decision that s>he has given. #n a '$r.a%ise s"ste. $' a /) icati$n, these reasons will be made c%ear. #ndeed, t-e *-$%e #$int $' t-e 'irst #art $' t-is c-a#ter *as t$ %$$1 at t-$se -ist$rica% an %$gica% str)ct)res t-at e'ine t-e Britisc$..$n %a* s"ste. $' a /) icati$n.

How to justify judicial adjudication Eowever, *-at sti%% re.ains +ag)e is the lin$ between /) icia% reas$ning in a /) icati$n an #)!%ic reas$n. ,e now want to clarify this relationship.

Legiti.ac" $' /) icia% %a* .a1ing !" a /) icati$n 1. Judicial law ma$ing is limited by JP and Eierarchy of court In t-e c$nte.#$rar" $ctrine $' #rece ent a /) ge gi+es reas$ns '$r t-e ecisi$n t-at s=-e -as .a e& ,hy9 (et2s revisit some of the $ey points that we made in our argument above. ,e asserte t-at /) icia% re%iance $n #rece ent 7#r$.$tes t-e e(#ectati$n c-at t-e %a* is /)st6& :oreover, #rece ent 7#r$.$tes /) icia% restraint6 an 7%i.its t-e /) ge6s a!i%it" t$ eter.ine t-e $)tc$.e6 $' a case in an ar!itrar" .anner. To elaborate* $)r n$ti$ns $' /)stice an 'airness are %in1e t$ t-e sense that, in t-e $ctrine $' #rece ent .%i1e cases are eci e a%i1e2 and 3to echo Eart2s clarification of this principle of %ustice8 unli$e cases are not decided in the same way.

 ?o, our first point is that #rece ent is an instit)ti$na%ise s"ste. $' reas$ning where patterns of li$eness are asserted or denied.

 This relates to the second point. These interpretative r)%es $' #ractice i.#$se restraints $n *-at a /) ge can an cann$t 7 $ *it- t-e %a*6 in a case. o ,e will return to this point in later chapters* the art $' t-e /) ge is +er" .)c- $ne $' e'erence $r restraint* of wor$ing within limits. #n other words, to elaborate a point that we made above, /) icia% %a* .a1ing is %egiti.ate !eca)se it is restraine * it $#erates *it-in certain !$)n aries o 3the boundaries are themselves defined by the institutional location of the democratic %udge8.

Judicial law ma$ing restraint and therefore provide certain' legitimate for the society The -ierarc-" $' t-e c$)rts provides '$)n ati$n for /) icia% #)!%ic reas$n. Recall =uller2s argument above that* o .ad%udicative determination will . . . enter in some degree int$ t-e %itigants6 ')t)re re%ati$ns an int$ t-e ')t)re re%ati$ns $' $t-er #arties & & &6 This is a way of thin$ing about the thesis that the %a* nee s t$ !e sta!%e an certain. F)%%er has himself stressed that this is one of the conditions for the %egiti.ac" $' a %ega% s"ste.. ,e should therefore not be surprised to find that the -ierarc-" $' t-e c$)rts an t-e n$ti$n $' !in ing #rece ent ens)re t-at /) icia% %a* .a1ing is, c$ntr$%%e an #re icta!%e& +s we will see in the ne-t chapter, there are perturbations in %udicial practices, but, t-e" $ n$t /e$#ar ise t-e ')n a.enta% str)ct)res of the doctrine which assert t-e #re $.inant +a%)es $' sta!i%it" an -ierarc-" over fle-ibility and .%ustice2 in an individual case.

5. Judges give reasoning to persuade citiFen B)t it is n$t /)st t-e -ierarc-" $' t-e c$)rts t-at is i.#$rtant& To return to the point we made above* underlying the n$ti$n $' t-e %egiti.ac" $' /) icia% %a* .a1ing is the fact that a /) ge .)st gi+e reas$ns '$r -is $r -er ecisi$n. This . )t"6 ass).es #artic)%ar i.#$rtance in a .$ ern e.$crac"& The following argument helps us to develop this point* 3?lolum8 o .[*>e .)st gi+e #)!%ic reas$ns i' our %ustifications for the law are t$ in'$r. $r #ers)a e $)r 'e%%$* citi0ens in general and the legal community in particular2. E-plaining this point re@uires us to elaborate another argument we made in the first' part of this chapter.

G.1 +udiences of Reasoning ,hen we were discussing %udicial law ma$ing we pointed out that there are* .at least three audiences . . . listening and watching the %udicial display* the #arties t$ t-e is#)te, the #)!%ic, and other %ega% #r$'essi$na%s.2 These a) iences .)st !e a!%e t$ )n erstan what the %udges are saying and writing. #t is this mode of discourse which we are escri!ing as #)!%ic reas$n&

G.1 +udience* (awyer' can appeal the %udicial decision and e-plained the law to the citiFen Judicial reasons are addressed, first of all, to a professional audience* other %udges and lawyers. ,hatever a /) ge asserts in a /) g.ent will be teste !" $t-er #r$'essi$na% %a*"ers o +t one level this relates to the appellate structure of the courts. o A ecisi$n can !e a##ea%e * %udge2s arguments are either are wrong in relation to evidence or 3more rarely8 wrong in law. The #r$'essi$na% a) ience 7.e iates6 %ega% arg).ents '$r citi0ens at %arge& #n part, citi0ens #a" '$r t-e ser+ices $' %a*"ers in order to -a+e %ega% reas$ns e(#%aine t$ t-e. and strategies developed in the light of how the law stands.

G.5 +udience* Parties themselves submit their argument and participate in the trial Eowever, the audience for %udicial reasoning is not limited to that of professional lawyers. The reasons that underlie a /) icia% ecisi$n are a resse t$ t-e #arties t$ t-e case itse%'& an -ence t$ a%% citi0ens who are contemplating using the courts to affirm their rights& or find themselves a defendant in a criminal trial. #n Ahapter 1G these concerns are related to the n$ti$n $' #artici#ati$n as one of the $ey normative )n er#innings $' a ci+i% $r cri.ina% tria%. + condition of participation is that the parties can )n erstan t-at t-eir arg).ents $n %a* an e+i ence are ta1en seri$)s%"& + %udge has to show in detail how his decision is %ustified.

G.G +udience* Public debate by citiFen in democracy Judicial reasoning is not limited to the parties to a dispute, or to professional lawyers. +s %udicial law ma$ing relates to the development of the common law, it is of interest t$ a%% citi0ens. Judicial decisions can !e rea !" t-e #)!%ic at %arge but most importantly, ecisi$ns are c$..ente on in the media and feature in general #$%itica% e!ate. Justice, as we will see, has to be delivered in open court. The fundamental lin$ between freedom of speech and a %udge2s duty to give reason for a decision both point towards the +irt)es $' e.$cratic culture* e+er"t-ing can !e isc)sse , an e+er"t-ing can !e criticise & +s (ord ;ingham has commented* 7 e.$cracies ie !e-in c%$se $$rs&6 =or us, (ord ;ingham2s statement has to be understood as rec$gniti$n $' t-e +ita% #)!%ic nat)re $' %ega% reas$ning.

 + robust culture of argument is central to a democracy. /nderstanding %udicial reason must have a critical dimension. The a##r$ac- is n$t si.#%" to suggest that a training in law is !ase $n %earning 7'acts6 about the legal system ' $r is tantamount to learning +er!ati. %ega% /) g.ents on the basis that they are somehow .true2, authoritative and beyond criticism. Rat-er, we nee t$ )n erstan t-at /) ges are ;$' necessit"< .a1ing arg).ents a!$)t t-e %a*. ,hilst according the %udge and the %udgment the necessar" res#ect, *e .)st a##r$ac- /) icia% reas$ning in a critica% *a". ,e need to as$ ourselves whether we accept the arguments put before us. )o they persuade us9 #f not, why not9 =or us, t-ese are e.$cratic 2)esti$ns& and the proper way in which %a* s-$)% itse%' !e isc)sse , st) ie an isse.inate in a e.$crac"

Limitation of debate Eowever, #)!%ic e!ate has to be *e%% in'$r.e an inte%%igent& Powerful interests .)st n$t -a+e )n )e in'%)ence $+er t-e isse.inati$n an isc)ssi$n $' .atters $' #)!%ic c$ncern. o ,e don2t have the space in this boo$ to develop these ideas in detail ' !)t *e -a+e #r$'$)n c$ncerns a!$)t t-e c$ntracti$n $' t-e s#aces an $##$rt)nities for all citiFens to e!ate an react t$ ecisi$ns, !$t- %ega% an #$%itica%, t-at a''ect t-eir interests. [That mean debate cannot have undue influence over legal and political interest but public debate must not totally disregard"

G.! +udience* ?tudent and +cademic' understand the wor$ing ,e want to ma$e a final point about #)!%ic reas$n* st) ents an aca e.ics are i.#$rtant c$nstit)ents $' t-e a) ience '$r %ega% /) g.ents. The boo$ that you are reading #res)##$ses an e )cati$na% c)%t)re where individuals underta$e training to be lawyers, or at least engage with the study of law on the basis that it can be understood& that reasons can be given for the e-istence of legal rules and principles. Dur arguments throughout this boo$ are reflections on this process. #f law is a set of practices, one has to engage in t-$se #ractices t$ )n erstan -$* t-e" *$r1& This means that you, in reading these words, are engage *it- a '$r. $' #)!%ic reas$n&

 Dur concern in writing this boo$, and 3we guess8 your concern 3dear reader8 in reading it, is to )n erstan -$* )n er%"ing str)ct)res an #ractices $#erate. To further elaborate our arguments above in the light of this fact: i' %a* is n$t si.#%" a resse t$ %a*"ers, !)t, t$ t-e citi0ens $' a e.$cratic c)%t)re, t-en $ne -as t$ a##r$ac- it in a +er" s#eci'ic *a"&

?ummary ?o, to summarise this section of the chapter. Dur point is that a /) ge .)st gi+e reas$ns for his>her decision, and that t-ese reas$ns can !e e(a.ine !" %a*"ers, and !" citi0ens themselves. Dne has to study /) icia% reas$ning in the instit)ti$na% c$nte(t of the law. o Judicial law ma$ing operates in the c$nte(t $' a #)!%ic intereste in what %udges assert, and if necessary, a!%e t$ criticise !$t- t-e reas$ns '$r a ecisi$n and the i.#act $' t-at ecisi$n on their interests. There are now a couple of points, implicit in our argument above, that we want to spell out. J) icia% reas$ning is in-erent%" inter#retati+e an creati+e. This is why it has to !e 1e#t *it-in an instit)ti$na% 'ra.e*$r1& In $r er t$ e(#%ain t-ese iss)es, *e *i%% e+e%$# ')rt-er t-e c$nce#t $' /) icia% #ractice&

[Precedent as practice2s description' difficult to understand" o ,e can use some ideas developed by the =rench social theorist B$)r ie) to help us wor$ out *-at *e .ean *-en *e assert t-at #rece ent 3as well as statutory interpretation8 is a #ractice& o Dur point of reference is to ;ourdieu2s concept of habitus. o + -a!it)s is defined as an understanding of .s"ste.s of durable, transposable is#$siti$ns 3way to do things8. . . predisposed to ')ncti$n as str)ct)res6 o The word -a!it)s in (atin means a c$n iti$n $r a c-aracter& o #t is related to the word habitat. o +lthough this might be used in the natural sciences, we can understand it as relating to an 7en+ir$n.ent6 *-ic- eter.ines !$t- *-at 7t-ings6 e(ist, and -$* t-e" re%ate t$ eac- $t-er& o #t is thus a ')n a.enta% 7gr$)n ing6 c$nce#t.

o To return to ;ourdieu* a -a!it)s is 7a )ra!%e set $' is#$siti$n 3way to do thing8 that are str)ct)re 3by socialisation and particular historical relations8 an str)ct)ring 3in guiding, but not determining, an individual2s actions8 3;ourdieu, 1H , 58. o #n this sense, then, a -a!it)s is a set of -ist$rica% str)ct)res t-at c$.e $)t $' 7s$cia%isati$n6 and determine -$* a #erce#t)a% ?*$r% @ is str)ct)re & o Running throughout this boo$ are meditations on this very theme* those -ist$rica% an s$cia% e-periences that e'ine t-e c$..$n %a* an c$..$n %a*"ers&

Relate to system of law o Eow is #rece ent a is#$siti$n *it-in t-e s"ste. $' %a*9 o ,e can crudely understand a disposition as a way of doing things. o Thus, #rece ent, as a is#$siti$n, as a way of deciding cases, is !ase $n a #ractice $' /) icia% inter#retati$n which re%ates to other parts of the system ' i.e. the inter#retati$n $' stat)tes& o ?o, precedent can be thought of as a structuring disposition because it #r$+i es t-e ')n a.enta% .eans ;i&e& t-e str)ct)re< t-r$)g- *-ict-e c$..$n %a* $#erates& o T-e i.#$rtant #$int t$ gras# is t-at t-is ?str)ct)re@ is n$t an"t-ing as s)c-. o It is a *a" t-at /) ges an %a*"ers $ t-ings ' i.e. inter#ret an arg)e cases& o In t-is sense it is a #ractice&

o Alearly it has institutional supports ' and an institutional location. o =or instance, it ta1es #%ace in c$)rts& it #res)##$ses an a +ersaria% #resentati$n $' t-e case& o #n a wider sense, it presupposes structure of education, the transmission of legal s$ills and ideas that constitute the law

Ne* Secti$n: PUBLIC REASON AND 7RIGHTS ANS4ERS6: PRECEDENT AS JUDICIAL PRACTICE3 judicial practice accepts the inescapable nature of interpretative prejudice as making for good uality decision making Prece ent )n erst$$ as a /) icia% #ractice allows us to see #)!%ic reas$n $#erating in its instit)ti$na% c$nte(t& o given s-a#e !" t-$se c$nstraints that have developed to guide and e'ine /) icia% %a* .a1ing& Dur account of public reason is not .thic$2. ,e $ n$t see1 to argue that %udicial reasoning is .$ra%, or based on c%ear #-i%$s$#-ica% gr$)n s. Dur account of #)!%ic reas$n has two minimal re@uirements* o that %udges gi+e reas$ns for their decisions o that there are instit)ti$na% str)ct)res that sta!i%i0e /) icia% %a* .a1ing. [?tructure as stated above* by #rece ent, and -ierarc-" $' c$)rt>

Justification of the legal argument determined by various factors which depend on individual prejudice! Ernest J& 4ienri!* (aw is .a /)sti'icat$r" enter#rise6. This tells us something else about legal argument. +n argument that $es n$t c$-ere *it- t-e *i er str)ct)re $' %a* is %i1e%" t$ !e a %ess #ers)asi+e and a wea$er %ustification than an argument that appears to .fit2 with the wider principles of the law. #t would be wrong, however, t$ $+erstate t-is c$-erence $' %a*& o Reason* La* is ani.ate !" tensi$ns and shot through *itirres$%)ti$n . That mean in (aw, there is no clear cut principle. #f we argue that only argument ma$e sense when cohere with wider area of law, it is not fi-ed as it said. The artic)%ati$n $' a c%ear r)%e $r #rinci#%e is a #r$ )ct $' t-e inter#reter6s 7c-$ice6 to assert coherence.

 The law can be thought of as a . $)g-6 t-at can !e *$r1e int$ t-e esire s-a#e.

 The s-a#e $' t-e 7 $)g-6 *i%% !e eter.ine !": o t-e c$-erence $' t-e %a*, o the restraints )n er *-ic- t-e /) ge is operating o et-ica% $r #$%itica% +a%)es of the %udge him or herself. )uncan Iennedy has put this point well .an in i+i )a%6s #re/) ices *i%% eter.ine t-eir a##r$ac- t$ %ega% inter#retati$n, t$ t-e 0Restraints an #$ssi!i%ities t-at t-e" 'in in t-e %a*&6@ (egal argument is a .#r$/ect6 that ta1es t-e inter#reter t-r$)g- t-e %a*. Rules are .verbal formulae2 that drift in and out of consciousness, or become illuminated in different ways when a pro%ect presents itself.

Prejudice" #es when faced the grey area which open for discretion Jiewed from the position of a more conventional %urisprudence, this [pre%udice" e(ercise is )nacce#ta!%e. The /) ge6s /$! is t$ a##%" t-e r)%es entire%" *it-$)t #re/) ice. The point is that this is n$t a rea%istic .$ e%. Inter#retati+e #re/) ices are a%*a"s #resent. A%t-$)g- inter#retati$n is c$nstraine in s$.e *a"s, t-e 7gre" area6 of r)%es can !e $#ene t-e iscreti$n an inter#reti+e esires $' t-e /) ge.

t$

Judges are not guided by clear rule so public reasons is important O)r acc$)nt $' #rece ent ac1n$*%e ges that /) ges are n$t g)i e !" c%ear r)%es and principles in all cases. It is t-e 7.ess"ness6 $' %a* that ma$es an )n erstan ing $' #)!%ic reas$n s$ i.#$rtant. Precise%" !eca)se the nat)re $r e(istence $' a r)%e $r #rinci#%e is $#en t$ 2)esti$n, a %udge must show why and how the artic)%ati$n $' -is=-er #$siti$n is /)sti'ia!%e&

$%ample of prejudice! to interpret by upholding the public reason- Lord &offman uphold the Law value ,e can briefly consider an illustration of our general idea. Aonsider L$r H$''.ann6s speech from the Be%.ars- case* [gaining of torture evidence issue" o #n proceedings in which the a##e%%ant to ?#+A .a" -a+e n$ 1n$*%e ge $' t-e e+i ence against -i., it would !e a!s)r t$ re2)ire -i. t$ #r$+e t-at it -a !een $!taine !" t$rt)re. it *$)% !e 7a!s)r 6 '$r a #ers$n a%%eging t-at e+i ence $!taine !" t$rt)re t$ !ear t-e !)r en $' #r$$' o Artic%e AB of the Torture Aonvention, which spea$s of the )se $' t$rt)re !eing 7esta!%is-e 6, could never have contemplated a procedure in which the person against whom the statement was being used had no idea of what it was or who had made it. o #t must be for ?#+A, if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that to have been the case 3for e-ample, because of evidence of the general practices of the authorities in the country concerned8 to ma$e its own in@uiries and not to admit the evidence unless it is satisfied that such suspicions have been rebutted.

o Dne of the difficulties about the ?ecretary of ?tate2s carefully worded statement that it would not be his policy to rely upon evidence .where there is a $nowledge or belief that torture has ta$en place2 is that it leaves open the @uestion of how much in@uiry the ?ecretary of ?tate is willing to ma$e. o #t appears to be the practice of the security services, in their dealings with those countries in which torture is most li$ely to have been used, to refrain, as a matter of diplomatic tact or a preference for not learning the truth, from in@uiring into whether this was the case. o #t may be that in such a case the ?ecretary of ?tate can say that he has no $nowledge or belief that torture has ta$en place. o ;ut a court of law would not regard this as sufficient to rebut real suspicion and in my opinion ?#+A should not do so.

 L$r H$''.ann *as n$t in t-e .a/$rit" on this particular point. #n other words, the rati$ $' t-e case asserte a i''erent test '$r t$rt)re e+i ence. #n the terms of our argument above, our concern is with the .fit2 of this case into the law as a whole. o The .a/$rit" arg)e t-at t-e c$rrect test was for the #ers$n a%%eging t-at e+i ence -a !een $!taine !" t$rt)re t$ #r$+e it $n t-e !a%ance $n #r$!a!i%ities& o ;ut (.Eoffman argued that there is no way for the person without $nowing the evidence to prove it is torture

 This illustrates the point we made above* t-e %a* is c-aracterise !" tensi$ns !et*een i''erent #rinci#%es an r)%es& There were, in the ;elmarsh case, t*$ entire%" arg)a!%e +ersi$ns $' t-e re%e+ant test. #f you read the %udgment in its entirety, you will find there are i''erent #$siti$ns t-at can !e ta1en& eac#$siti$n c%$se%" arg)e an /)sti'ie . To return again to the language we used above, each position shapes the .dough2 of the law in a particular way& eac- La* L$r -as a i''erent 7#r$/ect6 $r +isi$n $' t-e %a*. H$* $ *e c-$$se !et*een arg).ents8 This @uestion engages our own interpretative pre%udices ' %ust as it does those the (aw (ords who decided the case. #f, for e-ample, *e are s$ .in e t$ agree *it- L$r H$''.ann, then *e nee t$ #r$ )ce an inter#retati$n $' t-e 'a+$)re +ersi$n of the test that fits into the wider body of legal rules and principles. (ord Eoffman achieves this end in an accomplished way.

 Ee argues that it *$)% !e 7a!s)r 6 '$r a #ers$n a%%eging t-at e+i ence $!taine !" t$rt)re t$ !ear t-e !)r en $' #r$$' 3in other words, the person alleging that evidence obtained by torture -a in ee !een s$ $!taine 8. This would be a misinterpretation of +rticle 1< of the Torture Aonvention. 4otice how (ord Eoffmann is critical of the practices that have grown up around .not in@uiring2 whether or not evidence had been obtained by torture. This leaves the opinion on a masterfully critical note.

 4it-$)t e(#%icit%" sa"ing it, L$r H$''.ann -as e''ecti+e%" c$ntraste t-e integrit" $' t-e %ega% #r$cess, with the #r$'$)n %" c$.#r$.ise nat)re $' t-e 7#$%itica%6 $r i#%$.atic #r$cess that, for whatever reason, are n$t t$$ s2)ea.is- about how evidence might have been obtained. o S2)ea.is-' easily upset by unpleasant sights ,ho is (ord Eoffmann )%ti.ate%" a ressing9 ,e as$ed this @uestion above, and suggested that there were at least t-ree 1in s $' a) ience for a legal %udgment. (ord Eoffmann2s argument clearly addresses the other La* L$r s who decided the case, the %a*"ers and #arties involved. #t is also of relevance to a%% t-$se *-$ are t-in1ing a!$)t t$rt)re& and has to be placed in a wider #)!%ic e!ate. To further elaborate a point that we made above, we could suggest that (ord Eoffmann2s speech ultimately addresses the law itself.

 ,hat do we mean9 o To shift .eta#-$rs again, from words to music, we could e@ually as$* who does musician play for9 Perhaps we could say that it is for the music itself& to show what music can do. ,e have to be careful with this analogy. (aw is not music, but, presumably .showing what music can do2 is showing how notes, rhythms, chords etc can be put together* music addresses music. o Dn this analogy, we can hopefully appreciate what we mean when we assert that (ord Eoffmann addresses the law itself. o His /) g.ent 7#)ts t-e %a* t$get-er6 in a #artic)%ar *a"& o #t is a c$.#$siti$n t-at re%ates t$get-er +a%)es, #rinci#%es an r)%es. o There are other compositions& other arguments in the same way that there can always be another improvisation, another tune.

Precedent as practice, formed by consensus shared by practitioner and case decided based on the particular conte%t but not in bald! understanding of JP, to understanding only to get in! ?o, to escri!e #rece ent as a #ractice is to ra* attenti$n t$ t-e acti+it" $' /) ges inter#reting %a*. o A##e%%ate c$)rts create #rece ents in c$..$n %a* system. o The /.?. ?upreme Aourt, settles conflicts over the status of law within a particular constitutional framewor$ laid down at independence. o + $ey factor in the choosing of new ?upreme Aourt %udges is their attitude to precedent. o Aourt decisions eit-er rea''ir. $r create #rece ents& o #t is clear that es#ite it6s re%iance $n #rece ent, the C$)rt *i%% e#art 'r$. its #ri$r ecisi$ns when either historical conditions change or the philosophy of the court undergoes a ma%or shift.

o The most famous reversal of precedent is ;rown v. ;oard of Education 31H<!8, in which the ?upreme Aourt repudiated the .separate but e@ual2 doctrine of Plessy v. =erguson, 31KH78. o This doctrine had legitimated racial segregation for almost 76 years but finally gave way in ;rown, when a unanimous court ruled that separate but e@ual was a denial of e@ual protection of the laws. #nterpretation is n$t 'ree stan ing but .ta1es #%ace6 in t-e +ari$)s acti+ities that ma$e up legal systems. Practices are s-a#e !" t-e %ega% c)%t)re and #ractices in t)rn a''ect %ega% c)%t)re. :oreover, #ractices are ne+er )nitar" . They are ani.ate !" tensi$ns that reflect isagree.ents $+er t-e #recise *a" in *-ic- t-e #ractice s-$)% !e #er'$r.e & [?o, this as" + c$nsens)s s-are between #ractiti$ners $+er t-e tec-ni2)es an #er'$r.ances t-at c$nstit)te a #ractice re'%ects t-e sta!i%it" of the practice as a *-$%e&

 ,e will see that /) icia% inter#retati$n is a re%ati+e%" sta!%e #ractice. Eowever, there have been i.#$rtant is#)tes over its precise operation and in some important areas, n$ta!%" -).an rig-ts, e!ates are $n g$ing. There are some peculiar conse@uences of this argument. #f #ractices are essentia%%" *a"s $' acting in gi+en circ).stances, an" genera% t-e$r" .a" !e t$$ istant 'r$. t-e #ractice to capture how %udges actually interpret cases. J) icia% inter#retati$n is a%*a"s a .atter $' a s#eci'ic case an a sing)%ar set $' 'acts. T$ )n erstan why a %udge in a particular case comes to the conclusion that s>he does necessitates a st) " $' a #recise %ega% c$nte(t& #n other words, a genera% acc$)nt $' #rece ent perhaps can at best provide no more than a 7t-in6 escri#ti$n $' )n er%"ing str)ct)res. #t may be that the !est *a" t$ )n erstan the practice of %udicial

interpretation is t$ see -$* it #r$cee s in i''erent $ctrina% areas $' %a*& This would indicate that the !est *a" to understand the #ractice $' #rece ent is t$ st) " cases *it-in t-eir s#eci'ic c$nte(ts& To bring these points together with our arguments above* $)r st) " $' #rece ent is !$)n t$ !e s$.e*-at isa##$inting& It *i%% $)t%ine, in rat-er !a% ter.s, !asic str)ct)res an -$* t-e" in'$r. /) icia% reas$ning& H$*e+er, in a .$re .eaning')% *a", it *i%% ena!%e t-e t"r$ t$ get t-e !asics* and to realise that the st) " $' %a* in its entiret" is t-e st) " $' t-$se #rece ent cases t-at e'ine $ctrines. +s the +merican poet EFra Pound suggested* t-ere is n$ s)!stit)ti$n '$r a %i'eti.e& Get t$ *$r1&

CONCLUSION This chapter has focused upon the legitimacy of %udicial law ma$ing. ,e started from the understanding that /) ges .a1e %a*, and then s$)g-t t$ esta!%is- *-at 'act$rs %egiti.ate such an activity. Dur answer presupposes that /) ges *$r1 *it-in t-e c$nte(t $' a e.$cratic s$ciet", where their decisions have to be /)sti'ia!%e, '$reseea!%e and c$-erent. ,e drew attention to the role that #)!%ic reas$n plays in re2)iring reas$ne /) g.ent, and the instit)ti$na% c$nstraints #r$+i e t-e $ctrine $' #rece ent& ,e then e-amined the i ea $' #rece ent as an inter#retati+e #ractice t-at is ri+en, at %east in #art, !" t-e inter#reter6s #re/) ices& #t is worth stressing that our understanding of %udicial practice acce#ts t-e inesca#a!%e nat)re $' inter#retati+e #re/) ice as .a1ing '$r g$$ 2)a%it" ecisi$n .a1ing& themes we will pic$ up on in the ne-t three chapters.

!"

CODA: THE LIMITS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 'ecide case by case by case! basis #f the doctrine $' #rece ent #r$+i es instit)ti$na% restraints '$r /) icia% creati+it", what restraints are there within human rights law9 #t would seem, first of all, t-at t-ere is 'ar greater %assit) e '$r inter#retati$ns of the Aonvention. The EAtER sees the treaty as .a %i+ing instr).ent which . . . .)st !e inter#rete in t-e %ig-t $' #resent3 a" c$n iti$ns2. o Tyrer v. /I o N$t a strict #rece ent #ri.a 'acie This is a dynamic principle that a%%$*s t-e c$)rt t$ )# ate #rinci#%es s$ t-e" re%ate t$ c-anging c$n iti$ns.

(he way of $Ct&) decide cases B)t, *-at g)i es /) icia% inter#retati$n8 There are a number of statements from the ?trasbourg court that offer guidelines for the interpreter. +lthough the EAtER does not follow a binding doctrine of precedent, the Lrand Ahamber has stated that .it is in t-e interests $' %ega% certaint", '$reseea!i%it" an e2)a%it" !e'$re t-e %a* t-at it s-$)% n$t e#art, *it-$)t g$$ reas$n, from precedents laid down in previous cases2. o Ahristine Loodwin v. /I +s far as interpretations of the Aonvention rights themselves are concerned, that it will .see$ the interpretation that is most appropriate in order to rea%ise t-e ai. an ac-ie+e t-e $!/ect $' t-e treat"6 in order to elaborate human rights principles, and wi%% re'rain 'r$. '$%%$*ing an inter#retati$n .which would restrict t$ t-e greatest #$ssi!%e egree t-e $!%igati$ns )n erta1en !" t-e Parties6. o ,emhoff v. Lermany

 The ob%ect of the treaty is to .maintain and #r$.$te t-e i ea%s an +a%)es $' a e.$cratic s$ciet"6 ' or ' to further .the #r$tecti$n $' in i+i )a% -).an !eings2 and ensure that the rights provided are .#ractica% an e''ecti+e6. o I%eldsen, ;us$ :adsen and Pedersen v. )enmar$ The Aonvention must also be interpreted in such a way as to .#r$.$te interna% c$nsistenc" and -ar.$n" !et*een its +ari$)s #r$+isi$ns6 and so as to be c$-erent *it- t-e 7re%e+ant r)%es an #rinci#%es $' internati$na% %a*6. o ?oering v /I

Problems of &uman right is not fully legal in nature and political in nature, not so legitimate for judges to decide +s we will see in Ahapter K, these principles can lead to tensions !et*een t-e inter#retati$ns $''ere !" $.estic c$)rts, and t-$se 'a+$)re !" Stras!$)rg& H$*e+er, we need, for the moment, t$ ea% *it- a 2)esti$n $' t-e %egiti.ac" $' -).an rig-ts %a*, gi+en t-e inter#retati+e 'ree $. t-at it a##ears t$ gi+e /) ges& Aertainly critics of human rights have seiFed on this problem. H).an rig-ts are n$t #r$#er%" 7%ega%6& they are somehow .t$$6 in eter.inate . R)%ings $n -).an rig-ts are n$t s)''icient%" g)i e or restrained by principle. =urthermore, Stras!$)rg ecisi$ns are essentia%%" #$%itica% inter#retati$ns $' .atters !est %e't t$ nati$na% Par%ia.ents&

&owever, *reason of legitimate for judges decide &)+ -&) same with other area of law which involved a set legal interpretation which too focus on certainty as well, - politic need law for human life, so even &) is political in nature, still need law to enforce human right - &), give idea of )-L, which restrain power of govt ,e can deal with these points in order. +s we will show below, a%% %ega% inter#retati$n in+$%+es a set $' inter#retati+e c-$ices. #t is i''ic)%t t$ #r$+e that -).an rig-ts are eit-er .$re $r %ess in eter.inate t-an $t-er areas of %ega% $ctrine& Detai%e st) " of human rights doctrines would, no doubt, show that developments within human rights law are as #re icta!%e as those in other areas of law. In $t-er *$r s, Stras!$)rg6s c$..it.ent t$ 7certaint"6 an 7'$reseea!i%it"6, and the principles underlying human rights law, #r$+i e instit)ti$na% an str)ct)ra% restraints t-at a%%$* .$re $r %ess c$-erent e+e%$#.ent $' $ctrine&

 Eow can we deal with the other criticism9 T-$se *-$ $!/ect t$ t-e #$%itica% e%e.ents $' -).an rig-ts, $ n$t #ercei+e t-e #$%itica% e%e.ents in-erent in %ega% ecisi$ns& +ll %ega% ecisi$ns $''er a 7te.#%ate '$r & & & -).an %i'e6 in $ne *a" $r an$t-er& I' #$%itics cann$t !e 7stri##e $)t6 $' %a*, then *e .)st ac1n$*%e ge t-at %a* is a *a" $' $ing #$%itics !" $t-er .eans& T-is )n er%ies t-e %a* $' -).an rig-ts. J) icia% e+e%$#.ent $' -).an rig-ts principles is a *a" $' )n erstan ing a c$.#e%%ing i ea $' t-e r)%e $' %a** there should be %i.its $n t-e #$*er $' g$+ern.ent&

C-art J) icia% %a* .a1ing in a /) icati$n eci e t-e s$cia% $r er s$ 7.a1e %a*6 T-en t$ %egiti.ate it in e.$crac" c$nte(t is !" restraint #$*er !" JP=H $' c$)rt an gi+e #)!%ic reas$ning S$ JP can !e )n erst$$ as instit)ti$na% '$r. $' #)!%ic reas$n t-at $#erate in e.$cratic c$nte(t, is t$ %egiti.ate t-e /) icia% %a* .a1ing JP as #ractice, *-ic- 7#re/) ice6 ecisi$n !" #ractiti$ner t$ )#-$% *-at is act)a% %a* a!$)t an in t)rn '$r. a c$nsens)s s-are !" #ractiti$ner&