Chapter 13 THE VALUE OF PARTICIPATION: THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENCE, EQUALITY OF ARMS AND ACCESS TO USTICE This Chapter

r examines the importance of part!"!pat!#$ a% a$ &$'erp!$$!$( )#r a )a!r tr!a*. The focus is pr!+ar!*, #$ the "r!+!$a* tr!a*, although the last section of the chapter will review the principle of access to justice, which is of wider relevance.

Participation important in criminal trial as against state power Our argument in the Introduction was that part!"!pat!#$ re*ate% t# the !'ea that the "r!+!$a* tr!a* is a -h#*'!$( t# a""#&$t. of a citizen for an alleged breach of the criminal law. For this holding to account to have moral authorit , the tr!a* ha% t# arr!/e at a$ a""&rate re"#$%tr&"t!#$ #) the re*e/a$t e/e$t% and the r!(ht% #) the 'e)e$'a$t ha/e t# 0e re%pe"te'. This is because a "r!+!$a* tr!a* 0r!$(% the pr#%e"&t#r!a* re%#&r"e% #) the %tate to bear on the individual. To be fairl held to account, the !$'!/!'&a* +&%t 0e pr#te"te' )r#+ a (reater p#1er2 The individual!s participation in a trial is thus defined " somewhat paradoxicall " b those r!(ht% that pr#te"t h!%3her %!*e$"e or the 4!$' #) e/!'e$"e that +!(ht pr#/e pre5&'!"!a*2 #e will see that the common law has 0a*a$"e' the%e 'e)e$"e #r!e$tate' r!(ht% a(a!$%t th#%e

which e$a0*e the pr#%e"&t!#$ t# %e"&re "#$/!"t!#$%2

Focus on Art. 6 and critical to Criminal Trial Our argument in this chapter is focused on three fundamental and interconnected $rticle % doctrines& the rights of the defendant, e'ualit of arms and the right of access to the courts. $s with Chapter (), our concern is the relationship between common law principles and human rights norms. Our #05e"t!/e is to a%%e%% "#++#$ *a1 pr!$"!p*e% a(a!$%t a$ !$ter$at!#$a* %ta$'ar'. In so doing, we will argue that !t !% $e"e%%ar, t# "#$%!'er '!%%e$t!$( a% 1e** a% the +a5#r!t, 5&'(+e$t% !$ the ECtHR. This is because 1e $ee' a 0r#a' a$' "r!t!"a* %e$%e #) the "r!+!$a* tr!a*2 In order to assess the extent to which a trial is fair, !t +a, 0e the "a%e that '!%%e$t!$( 5&'(+e$t% pr#/!'e a$ a*ter$at!/e /!%!#$ of the values and structures that

constitute a robust &$'er%ta$'!$( #) a )a!r tr!a*2

Overview #e will begin with an examination of the pre%&+pt!#$ #) !$$#"e$"e and the pr!/!*e(e a(a!$%t %e*)6 !$"r!+!$at!#$2 #e will then examine the '#"tr!$e #) e7&a*!t, #) ar+%, and some important recent rulings that draw our attention to issues around hear%a, e/!'e$"e and the r!(ht t# a %#*!"!t#r. The final section will engage with the right of a""e%% t# the "#&rt% and *e(a* a!'. The r!(ht #) a""e%% re*ate% t# 0#th "!/!* a$' "r!+!$a* tr!a*%, and so broadens out our anal sis a little* it does not, however, blur our main points& the "#++#$ *a1 tr!a* ha% t# 0e "r!t!"a**, a%%e%%e' )r#+ the per%pe"t!/e #) h&+a$ r!(ht% pr!$"!p*e%2

Ne1 Se"t!#$: THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION Definition of presumption of innocence Following +oberts and ,uc-erman!s anal sis, this principle could be presented as& .the r!(ht #) the !$$#"e$t $#t t# %&))er "r!+!$a* "#$/!"t!#$ a$' p&$!%h+e$t2! The presumption of !$$#"e$"e +a4e% +#%t %e$%e as a bod of -r&*e% #) e/!'e$"e. re*at!$( t# -the 0&r'e$ a$' %ta$'ar' #) pr##).2

Prosecutor has to prove beyond reasonable doubt This point is clearl made in the celebrated speech of /iscount 0an-e in 8##*+!$(t#$ /2 DPP& Throughout the web of the 1nglish Criminal 2aw one golden thread is alwa s to be seen, that it is the '&t, #) the pr#%e"&t!#$ t# pr#/e the pr!%#$er.% (&!*t . . . subject to what I have alread said as to the defence of insanit and subject also to an statutor exception. If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there !% a rea%#$a0*e '#&0t, created b the evidence given b either the prosecution or the prisoner . . . the pr#%e"&t!#$ ha% $#t +a'e #&t the "a%e and the pr!%#$er !% e$t!t*e' t# a$ a"7&!tta*2 3o matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the pr#%e"&t!#$ +&%t pr#/e the (&!*t #) the pr!%#$er !% part #) the "#++#$ *a1 #) E$(*a$' and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained. /iscount 0an-e !s speech shows that the pr#%e"&t!#$ "arr, the '&t, #) pr#/!$( the (&!*t #) the a""&%e'.

 The standard of the credibilit of the prosecution evidence must show that the accused is *!4e*, t# 0e (&!*t, 0e,#$' rea%#$a0*e '#&0t2 If the pr#%e"&t!#$ "a$$#t pr#/e the!r "a%e 0e,#$' rea%#$a0*e '#&0t then the a""&%e' %h#&*' $#t 0e )#&$' (&!*t,. It is worth remembering that we are concerned here with a "#++#$ *a1 "#&rt that '#e% $#t a"t !$7&!%!t#r!a**,. In other words, the part!e% pre%e$t the e/!'e$"e a$' the "#&rt a"t% a% a $e&tra* &+p!re2 The %ta$'ar' #) pr##) is effectivel the thre%h#*' that the pr#%e"&t!#$ +&%t pa%% in order for a 5&r, t# 0e /er, %&re that the defendant is guilt of committing a crime.

urden of proved can be moved to defendant as long as within reasonable limit !has right to defence" #it is not presume the guilt$ 4ow has the pre%&+pt!#$ #) !$$#"e$"e 0e"#+e a$ !%%&e !$ h&+a$ r!(ht% *a15 The issue that has arisen is the extent to which it is 5&%t!)!a0*e that the a""&%e' %h#&*' 0ear the 0&r'e$ #) pr##)2 One of the leading cases is Sa*a0!a4& /2 Fra$"e. 0alabia-u had been convicted of offences relating to smuggling goods. 4e had collected a trun- from +oiss $irport, which he believed had been sent to him b a relative in ,aire. #hen officials opened the trun-, it was found to contain cannabis seeds. 0alabia-u claimed that he had pic-ed up the trun- b mista-e.

 4is case before the French court focused on the .a*+#%t !rre0&tta0*e. pre%&+pt!#$ #) h!% (&!*t2 6nder the Customs Code, this pre%&+pt!#$ 1a% 0a%e' #$ the +ere )a"t #) p#%%e%%!#$ of the trun-, Sa*a0!a4& ar(&e' that th!% a+#&$te' t# a 0rea"h #) Art!"*e 9:;< a$' 9:1<2 The court argued that the pr#0*e+ 1a% $#t 1!th the pre%&+pt!#$ #) (&!*t, as all legal s stems +a4e pre%&+pt!#$% #) 0#th )a"t a$' *a12 From the perspective of $rticle %, the real issue was the e=te$t t# 1h!"h the pre%&+pt!#$% 1ere "#$%!%te$t 1!th the C#$/e$t!#$2 Certainl , a pre%&+pt!#$ #) (&!*t could a+#&$t t# a 0rea"h #) '&e pr#"e%%, as it would e))e"t!/e*, 'epr!/e the "#&rt #) !t% -(e$&!$e p#1er #) a%%e%%+e$t. and ma-e a nonsense of the presumption of innocence. The critical 'uestion thus becomes& '#e% the pre%&+pt!#$ #) (&!*t (# 0e,#$' -rea%#$a0*e *!+!t%. to such

an extent that !t *!+!t% the -r!(ht% #) the 'e)e$"e.5 6nder the relevant legislation, the -p#%%e%%!#$ #) %+&((*e' (##'%. !% a )!$'!$( #) )a"t2 4owever, this finding of fact '#e% $#t !++e'!ate*, %h#1 the (&!*t of the accused.

The court pointed out that the 'e)e$"e #) e=te$&at!$( "!r"&+%ta$"e% was available to 0alabia-u.

0hifting the 0&r'e$ #) pr##) t# the 'e)e$"e !% $#t !$ !t%e*) a 0rea"h #) the Art!"*e, pr#/!'e' that th!% #perate% 1!th!$ -rea%#$a0*e *!+!t%. and ac-nowledges the fundamental issues in the case and the .r!(ht% #) the 'e)e$"e.2

As long as primary burden with prosecution H#a$( /2 Fra$"e further elaborates this position. $rticle % is not breached so long as the pr!+ar, 0&r'e$ )#r pr#/!$( (&!*t "a%e re%t% 1!th the pr#%e"&t!#$2

Presume innocent lin%ed with privilege against self&incriminate& right to silent The pre%&+pt!#$ #) !$$#"e$"e can 0e *!$4e' 1!th the pr!/!*e(e a(a!$%t %e*)6!$"r!+!$at!#$.

The privilege against self" incrimination ."#$)er% a )ree'#+ t# re)&%e t# a$%1er 'uestions when the repl +!(ht !$"r!+!$ate the per%#$ to whom the 'uestion is addressed!.

This privilege is *!+!te' t# -S&%pe"t% a$' the a""&%e'!. L#r' M&%t!** in e= parte S+!th pointed out that the so"called right to remain silent is, in fact, a cluster of .!++&$!t!e%., which, 'e%p!te the!r '!))ere$t h!%t#r!e% a$' pr#/e$a$"e, have been 0r#&(ht t#(ether &$'er a %!$(*e hea'!$(.

'ight to silence has be changed by statute These rights have been *!+!te' a$' re'e)!$e' 0, %tat&te2 If we ta-e these considerations together, it ma-es the .r!(ht t# %!*e$"e. appear somewhat h!(h6 %#&$'!$(& a rhetorical claim rather than a legal realit . Is this an accurate judgment5 #e will begin our anal sis b briefl examining the -e common law authorities.

Case"law histor & 0ilence evidence no necessar cannot be used The common law has primaril grappled with two related issues& to what extent is pre6tr!a* %!*e$"e a$ a'+!%%!#$ #) (&!*t* and t# 1hat e=te$t !% !t a""epta0*e for the a""&%e'.% %!*e$"e t# 0e "#++e$te' #$ '&r!$( the!r tr!a*> One of the major authorities is R2 /2 Cha$'*er. In Chandler, La1t#$ L reviewed the law and explained that although the accused had a privilege against self" incrimination, !t '!' $#t !+p*, that .the )a!*&re t# a$%1er an accusation or 'uestion when an answer could reasonabl be expected! "#&*' $#t -pr#/!'e %#+e e/!'e$"e !$ %&pp#rt #) a$ a""&%at!#$!.

In other words, the %!*e$"e #) the a""&%e' '&r!$( !$terr#(at!#$ 1a% $e/er $e"e%%ar!*, %a"r#%a$"t and could, in certain circumstances,

0e &%e' 0, the pr#%e"&t!#$ !$ "#&rt2

Old statute $s far as silence during the trial is concerned, the Criminal 1vidence $ct of (787 provided that the .failure! of .an person charged with an offence to give evidence! could not be made .the subject of an comment b the prosecution!. This section concerns a person charged with an offence, and so it was necessar to develop case law on the status of the silence of an accused prior to charge. The first thing to note is that although the (787 $ct prevented the prosecution from ma-ing comments on the accused!s silence, it did not prevent the judge from so doing. There was some confusion about the precise form of the comments that the judge could ma-e. In 9artinez Tobon, 2ord Ta lor C: suggested that it was hard to see where the distinction la between .permissible and impermissible comment!. 4e stressed that the defendant did not have to testif , and the jur were not permitted to assume guilt from his or her silence.

 The judge could then go on to comment on facts given in evidence b the defence, which contradict prosecution evidence and which the defendant must have -nown about. The law in this area of criminal evidence has been "ha$(e' 0, %e"t!#$ 3? #) the Cr!+!$a* &%t!"e a$' P&0*!" Or'er A"t 1@@?2

Cr!+!$a* &%t!"e a$' P&0*!" Or'er A"t 1@@? 0ection ;< is "#$tr#/er%!a*2 It states that when an a""&%e' (!/e% e/!'e$"e !$ her3h!% 'e)e$"e, which, at the time that the offence was charged or when s=he was 'uestioned under caution, %3he -)a!*e' t# +e$t!#$.2 The "#&rt #r the 5&r, ma then 'ra1 %&"h !$)ere$"e% a% -appear pr#per.2 The section also covers the situation where the a""&%e' -"#&*' rea%#$a0*, ha/e 0ee$ e=pe"te' t# +e$t!#$ !$)#r+at!#$ 1he$ %3he 1a% 7&e%t!#$e', "har(e' #r !$)#r+e'!. In this situation the court or the jur would also be allowed to 'ra1 %&"h !$)ere$"e% a% appeare' appr#pr!ate2

 0ection ;>?)@ and ?;@ provide something of a safeguard. The accused had to be put on notice that if %3he "h##%e% $#t t# (!/e e/!'e$"e, then the "#&rt #r the 5&r, "a$ 'ra1 !$)ere$"e% about a refusal .1!th#&t (##' "a&%e ... to answer an 'uestions!. 0ection ;7?;@ goes further& a per%#$ "a$$#t 0e "#$/!"te' .%#*e*, on an inference! 'ra1$ )r#+ h!% #r her %!*e$"e.

Case law& e(plain to D) tell the *ury and e(plain to *ury) give chance to D e(plain+ The case law relating to this section suggests that the "#&rt% ha/e 0ee$ /er, "are)&* to %tre%% the $arr#1 +ea$!$( #) a$ a""&%e'.% %!*e$"e. +. v. +oble A(88BC which %tre%%e' the !+p#rta$"e #) +a4!$( !t 4$#1$ t# the 5&r, that the 'e)e$'a$t ha' re+a!$e' %!*e$t #$ the 0a%!% #) *e(a* a'/!"e. +. v. Doldur confirmed that !$)ere$"e% "a$ #$*, 0e 'ra1$ 0, the 5&r, #$"e the pr#%e"&t!#$ ha/e e%ta0*!%he' a %tr#$( pr!+a )a"!e case. The judge has to remind the jur that on arrest and at the start of an police interview, the 'e)e$'a$t ha' t# 0e "a&t!#$e', and 1ar$e' a0#&t the "#$%e7&e$"e% #) re)&%!$( t# a$%1er 7&e%t!#$%2 In their summing up, the 5&'(e +&%t the$ te** the 5&r, that the a""&%e'.% 'e)e$"e ha' re*!e' &p#$ e/!'e$"e that was $#t

+e$t!#$e' '&r!$( p#*!"e !$ter/!e1. The 5&'(e +&%t (# #$ t# e=p*a!$ the pre"!%e ter+% #) the pr#%e"&t!#$ "a%e. The judge must then explain that !t 1a% )#r the 5&r, t# 'e"!'e 1hat !$)ere$"e% "#&*' 0e rea%#$a0*, 'ra1$, stressing that )a!*&re t# +e$t!#$ information "a$$#t !t%e*) establish the accused!s (&!*t. The jur must alwa s bear in mind that the 'e)e$"e +a, ha/e pr#'&"e' e/!'e$"e that e=p*a!$% the a""&%e'.% %!*e$"e or failure to answer 'uestions and, #$*, !) th!% )a!*% to offer an .!$$#"e$t e=p*a$at!#$., %h#&*' !$)ere$"e% 0e 'ra1$ a(a!$%t the a""&%e'. In Ar(e$t, the court stressed that 1hether #r $#t the a""&%e' ha' re"e!/e' *e(a* a'/!"e was an !+p#rta$t )a"t#r to be ta-en into account b the jur .

Difficult to ma%e final assessment yet& immunities against self& incriminate restricted while C, has some value protect defendant #ithin the scope of this chapter it is '!))!"&*t t# #))er a$, )!$a* a%%e%%+e$t #) the %tat&% of the pr!/!*e(e a(a!$%t %e*)6 !$"r!+!$at!#$2 #hilst the 1@@? A"t "erta!$*, %ee+% t# 1#r4 in )a/#&r #) the pr#%e"&t!#$ rather than the defence, 0&t !t 1#&*' 0e pre+at&re to conclude that the cases 1e ha/e e=a+!$e' a** pr!/!*e(e pr#%e"&t!#$ /a*&e%. The "#++#$ *a1 ha% $e/er %!+p*, "#++!tte' itself to pr#te"t!$( the -r!(ht. #) the a""&%e' $#t t# (!/e e/!'e$"e, and to re)&%e t# rep*, to police 'uestions.

 There have been numerous statutor interventions, and the !++&$!t!e% a(a!$%t %e*) !$"r!+!$at!#$ have been "#$%!%te$t*, re%tr!"te' #r *!+!te'. $t the same time, the "#++#$ *a1 ha% $#t a0a$'#$e' a certain "#++!t+e$t t# 'e)e$"e6 #r!e$tate' /a*&e%2 For instance, the "#$"er$ 1!th the pre"!%e 1#r'% that the 5&'(e "a$ &%e to "#++e$t #$ %!*e$"e, and the r!(ht #) appea* !) the '!re"t!#$ !% pre5&'!"!a* t# the 'e)e$"e, suggest that the *a1 !% "#$"er$e' 1!th h#*'!$( a *!$e 0et1ee$ the pr#%e"&t!#$ a$' the 'e)e$"e2 A'et#r# /2 UA is a recent authorit on s.;< C:EO (88< and %?(@ 1C4+. $detoro argued before the 1Ct4+ that the judge had misdirected the jur on the adverse inferences that the could draw from his silence. The 1Ct4+ held that although the judge had misdirected the jur , the app*!"a$t !) ha' a )a!r tr!a*, and that the +!%'!re"t!#$ ha' $#t "#+pr#+!%e' the 5&r,.%

&$'er%ta$'!$( #) the e/!'e$"e a(a!$%t the app*!"a$t

Ne1 Se"t!#$: SELF INCRIMINATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS -elf&incrimination and status of evidence To understand the law of ECtHR on self incrimination, we need to appreciate that the jurisprudence lin-s together the !++&$!t, a(a!$%t %e*) !$"r!+!$at!#$ 1!th a re*ate' !%%&e& the %tat&% #) e/!'e$"e unfairl obtained under compulsion. This -ind of evidence would also include "#$)e%%!#$ e/!'e$"e, which te$'% t# !$"r!+!$ate the a""&%e', and is re$'ere' &$re*!a0*e 0e"a&%e !t 1a% #0ta!$e' 0, -#ppre%%!#$.2 The relevant provisions of '#+e%t!" *a1 are contained in the P#*!"e a$' Cr!+!$a* E/!'e$"e A"t 1@B?2 In the following section, we will see that, whilst the common law is broadl consistent with international standards of procedural law, 0&t 1e "a$ tra"e the %!+!*ar te$%!#$% ar#&$' the %tat&% #) !++&$!t!e% a(a!$%t %e*) !$"r!+!$at!#$ as we noted in the section above.

Art.6 did not lay down any rules $ reading of $rticle % reveals that !t '#e% $#t *a, '#1$ a$, r&*e% to deal with incriminating evidence. This might suggest the rather startling conclusion that %&"h r&*e% are $#t part #) E&r#pea$ h&+a$ r!(ht% jurisprudence.

Sa&$'er% /2 U$!te' A!$('#+& right to silence and privilege against self- incriminate as international standard although not in art.6 0aunders put forward the argument that& .the r!(ht $#t t# 0e "#+pe**e' t# "#$tr!0&te !$"r!+!$at!$( e/!'e$"e. was -!+p*!"!t. !$ Art!"*e 9 and %h#&*' 0e -*!$4e'. t# the -pre%&+pt!#$ #) !$$#"e$"e! which was .e=pre%%*, (&ara$tee'. 0, Art!"*e 9:;<2 0aunders had been convicted on numerous charges including false accounting and theft. 4e argued that the use of the Department of Trade and Industr ADTIC inspector!s interviews in the trial had made the proceedings unfair. The ECtHR a(ree' 1!th Sa&$'er% !$ pr!$"!p*e. $lthough $rticle % did not contain an explicit mention of either the right to silence or the privilege against self"

incrimination, 0#th pr!$"!p*e% are re"#($!%e' -!$ter$at!#$a* %ta$'ar'%. #) a )a!r tr!a*2 The .r!(ht. $#t t# %e*)6!$"r!+!$ate is thus ."*#%e*, *!$4e' t# the pre%&+pt!#$ #) !$$#"e$"e "#$ta!$e'. !$ Art!"*e 9:;<2 Different context& M&rra, The court went on to assert that the r!(ht t# re+a!$ %!*e$t -'#e% $#t e=te$'. to the use of e/!'e$"e #0ta!$e' &$'er "#+p&*%!#$ that -ha% a$ e=!%te$"e !$'epe$'e$t #) the 1!** #) the %&%pe"t.. The -e examples are .breath, blood . . . urine! and .D3$ samples!. 0aunders does not, however, raise concerns with this -ind of evidence& the sole 'uestion relates to the evidence obtained under DTI interview ?para %8@. The court held that there had indeed been a 0rea"h #) the r!(ht $#t t# !$"r!+!$ate #$e%e*).

 The '!' $#t a""ept the Cr!t!%h G#/er$+e$t.% ar(&+e$t% that the "#+p*e= $at&re #) "r!+e% of fraud justified .%&"h a +ar4e' 'epart&re 2 2 2 )r#+ #$e #) the 0a%!" re7&!re+e$t% #) )a!r pr#"e'&re.2

M&rra,& ECtHR see the right to silence has the limitation :ohn 9urra v. 6nited Fingdom raises a similar point to 0aunders, but in a different context& the !$/e%t!(at!#$ #) terr#r!%t #))e$"e%. 9urra had re)&%e' t# a$%1er a$, 7&e%t!#$% either at the time of his arrest or during the )("hour period of his 'uestioning. It was onl towards the end of this period that he was allowed access to a solicitor, although the %#*!"!t#r 1a% $#t pre%e$t '&r!$( the )!$a* h#&r% #) the !$terr#(at!#$ . Gefore the 1Ct4+, 9urra relied on the case law of the Convention to argue that the right to remain silent had to be understood as the refusal to answer police 'uestions and to refuse to testif at trial.

4is argument& Fair trial guarantees would also be breached if adverse inferences could be drawn from either silence in 'uestioning or at trial. These are .absolute rights which an accused is entitled to enjo without restriction!. To allow limitations on these rights would .subvert A. . .C the presumption of innocence and alter the fundamental structure of the trial, where the prosecution have the burden of showing the defendant!s guilt!. These arguments were %&pp#rte' 0, !$)#r+at!#$ 'ra1$ )r#+ A+$e%t, I$ter$at!#$a*, 2ibert and $rticle (<?;@?g@ of the 6nited 3ations International Covenant on Civil and Eolitical +ights. Anot so importantC This e=p*!"!t*, pr#/!'e% that an a""&%e' %ha** -$#t 0e "#+pe**e' t# te%t!), a(a!$%t h!+%e*) #r t# "#$)e%% (&!*t.2

 The international context of this principle was also demonstrated b reference to +ule <)?$@ of the +ules of Erocedure and 1vidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Hugoslavia which also stresses the right of the accused to remain silent. The wording of the Draft 0tatute for an International Criminal Court further elaborates& the r!(ht t# %!*e$"e !% $#t t# 0e *!+!te' 0, -%!*e$"e 0e!$( a "#$%!'erat!#$ !$ the 'eter+!$at!#$ #) (&!*t #r !$$#"e$"e.2 Cited at para <). The Cr!t!%h G#/er$+e$t 1ere $#t part!"&*ar*, !+pre%%e' b these arguments. The asserted that the sources used b the applicants .did not demonstrate an internationall " accepted prohibition on the drawing of common"sense inferences from the silence of an accused whether at trial or pre trial!.

1Ct4+!s decision" limitation to the right and privilege The 1Ct4+ re)&%e' t# (!/e -a$ a0%tra"t a$a*,%!% #) the %"#pe. #) the -!++&$!t!e%. and re)&%e' t# "#++e$t #$ the !%%&e #) -!+pr#per "#+p&*%!#$.2 Instead, the argued that 9urra !s case re7&!re' "#$%!'erat!#$ of& whether or not the !++&$!t!e% are -a0%#*&te. t# the e=te$t that the a""&%e'.% %!*e$"e "a$$#t 0e -&%e' against him in court! or whether ?more precisel @ the 1ar$!$( that h!% %!*e$"e ma 0e &%e' a(a!$%t h!+ a+#&$t% t# -!+pr#per "#+p&*%!#$.2

 There can be no 'uestion of %#*e*, 0a%!$( a "#$/!"t!#$ #$ %!*e$"e* 0&t, li-ewise, the a""&%e' %h#&*' $#t 0e a0*e to h!'e 0eh!$' h!% #r her %!*e$"e to )r&%trate the "#&rt. This would suggest that the ECtHR %ee% the r!(ht t# %!*e$"e a% *!+!te', and #pe$ t# 7&a*!)!"at!#$2 The defendant!s silence can therefore have implications at trial. #as there compulsion of the applicant5 The court noted that M&rra,.% %!*e$"e '!' $#t !$ !t%e*) a+#&$t t# a$ #))e$"e or to "#$te+pt #) "#&rt2 If, following the (#/er$+e$t.% "a%e, this %!*e$"e !% $#t !$ !t%e*) a$ !$)ere$"e #) (&!*t, then it would be hard to lin- this to the other cases on compulsion. In F&$4e, charges had been brought in order to "#+pe* the 'e)e$'a$t t# pr#/!'e e/!'e$"e #) #))e$"e% that he 1a% %&%pe"te' #) "#++!tt!$(. This clearl amounted to a 0rea"h #) Art!"*e 92

 H#1e/er, the case was '!%t!$(&!%ha0*e )r#+ the )a"t% #) M&rra,2

Sh#rt S&++ar, )#r the%e ; "a%e% Implication by Art.6 In asserting that the !++&$!t, a(a!$%t %e*)6!$"r!+!$at!#$ was *!$4e' t# the pre%&+pt!#$ #) !$$#"e$"e, and that both were !+p*!e' 0, Art!"*e 9, Sa&$'er% %tre%%e' the "e$tra*!t, #) the%e '&e pr#"e%% guarantees to 1uropean human rights law. +ight to silence and privilege against self"incrimination as international standard The "a%e '!' $#t h#*' that the were a0%e$t )r#+ the "#++#$ *a1* rather, it +a'e a $arr#1er p#!$t a0#&t re*!a$"e on a certain -ind of evidence during fraud trials. In this sense, Sa&$'er% 0r!$(% the "#++#$ *a1 !$t# *!$e 1!th !$ter$at!#$a* %ta$'ar'% and pre/e$t% a $at!#$a* (#/er$+e$t "reat!$( '!))ere$t %ta$'ar'% #) e/!'e$"e for different criminal offences.

CL consistent ith international la in status of silence -must be assessed in the conte!t of the case and the chec"s and balances that e!ist in a national legal system #h$ M&rra, a*%# "#$)!r+% that the "#++#$ *a1 re+a!$% "#$%!%te$t 1!th !$ter$at!#$a* standards as far as the %tat&% #) %!*e$"e is concerned. The 1Ct4+ argued that& #hether the 'ra1!$( #) a'/er%e !$)ere$"e% )r#+ a$ a""&%e'.% %!*e$"e infringes $rticle % is a matter to be 'eter+!$e' !$ the *!(ht #) a** the "!r"&+%ta$"e% of the case, having particular re(ar' t# the %!t&at!#$% 1here !$)ere$"e% +a, 0e 'ra1$, the 1e!(ht atta"he' t# the+ 0, the $at!#$a* "#&rt% in their assessment of the evidence and the 'e(ree #) "#+p&*%!#$ !$here$t in the situation. The &%e #) %!*e$"e !$ "#&rt must be a%%e%%e' !$ the "#$te=t #) the "a%e and the "he"4% a$' 0a*a$"e% that e=!%t !$ a $at!#$a* *e(a* %,%te+.

 8h!*e th!% +!(ht %ee+ +&"h t## 0r#a' to be a useful clarification of an international standard, 0&t !t '#e% a**#1 a 'e(ree #) )*e=!0!*!t, to the precise wa in which a national court draws inferences on silence. It 1#&*' $#t 0e a 0rea"h #) !$ter$at!#$a* standards to 1ar$ a$ a""&%e' that the!r %!*e$"e might be used against him or her at trial. The ECtHR.% p#%!t!#$ is probabl 5&%t!)!a0*e as a 0a*a$"!$( #) 'e)e$"e 6 a$' pr#%e"&t!#$6 #r!e$tate' /a*&e% but, before we draw a final conclusion, we should consider one final authorit & Condron v. 6F.

C#$'r#$ /2 UA2" criminal trial needed to be carefully advised by the #udge$ and if this safeguard fails then it is li"ely that the trial itself is compromised. Condron is an a&th#r!t, #$ %e"t!#$ 3? #) the Cr!+!$a* &%t!"e a$' P&0*!" Or'er A"t 1@@?2 The applicants were alleging that the judge!s decision to leave to the jur the 'uestion of whether the should draw adverse inferences from the accused!s silence had breached $rticle %?(@. #hile accepting ?on the basis of the :ohn 9urra judgment@ that the right to silence was not absolute, 0&t the app*!"a$t% "#$te$'e' that the $e"e%%ar, %a)e(&ar'% 1ere $#t !$ p*a"e.

Fact on the case& Anot so importantC 9ain point& the :udge did not give direction properl In particular, the trial judge had not ta-en into account the applicants! solicitor!s .honest belief! that the applicants were not fit to be interviewed and were .vulnerable and confused!. Despite this fact, the judge advised the jur that the could draw negative inferences from their silence in the interview. The judge had not reminded the jur that the applicants! silence ma have been due to the fact that the had been so advised, and were suffering from the s mptoms of drug withdrawal. 3or had the trial judge reminded the jur that the prosecution had to establish a strong prima facie case.

 The ECtHR t##4 !%%&e 1!th the 5&'(e.% a'/!"e t# the 5&r,. $lthough he had reminded them of the solicitor!s advice, his direction was in such terms as to leave the jur to draw inference .notwithstanding! that the explanation appeared reasonable& In the Court!s opinion, as a matter of fairness, the 5&r, %h#&*' ha/e 0ee$ '!re"te' %main point is should be directed properly$ fact are not important& that it could onl draw an adverse inference if satisfied that the applicants! silence at the police interview could onl sensibl be attributed to their having no answer or none that would stand up to cross" examination. In other words, the '!re"t!#$ %h#&*' ha/e 0ee$ +&"h +#re pre"!%e2 The 1Ct4+ found that th!% 1a% a %er!#&% )a&*t, given the fact that the 5&'(e.% '!re"t!#$% t# the 5&r, were an !+p#rta$t %a)e(&ar' in the absence of the jur !s explanation for its decision.

 De%p!te a(ree!$( 1!th the Cr!t!%h G#/er$+e$t that #ther %a)e(&ar'% 1ere !$ p*a"e, 0&t the ECtHR ar(&e' that the $at&re #) the 5&'(e.% '!re"t!#$% 1ere %&"h a% t# "#+pr#+!%e the )a!r$e%% #) the tr!a*2 The 0trasbourg court held unanimousl that there had been a 0rea"h #) 9:1<2 Condron suggests that the "he"4% a$' 0a*a$"e% !$ the "#++#$ *a1 #$*, #perate in an acceptable wa from a human rights perspective !) the 5&'(e.% '!re"t!#$ t# the 5&r, !% pre"!%e2 The #ther %a)e(&ar'% !$ "r!+!$a* pr#"e'&re 1!** $#t #))%et a +!%ta4e$ '!re"t!#$. For instance, the 1Ct4+ noted the Cr!t!%h G#/er$+e$t.% ar(&+e$t% that the app*!"a$t% ha' 0ee$ !%%&e' 1!th a "*ear*, 1#r'e' "a&t!#$, and had indicated that the, &$'er%t##' the "#$%e7&e$"e% #) re+a!$!$( %!*e$t. 9oreover, the had had the advice of a solicitor and the usual safeguards of a criminal trial. !That mean ritish had done

 It is also interesting that the ECtHR +a'e a$ !+p#rta$t '!%t!$"t!#$ between. the Court of $ppeal!s ruling that the accused!s .convictions! were safe, and the issue of whether or not there had been a fair trial. E/e$ !) "#$/!"t!#$% appear %#&$', !t "#&*' be the case that there were !%%&e% !$ the tr!a* that +a'e !t% pr#"e'&re &$)a!r2 This suggests a +#re 'e+a$'!$( %ta$'ar' tha$ that #) the %a)et, #) "#$/!"t!#$. It !% perhap% pr#per that "r!+!$a* pr#"e'&re %h#&*' 0e he*' t# th!% h!(her thre%h#*', as it poses the p#1er #) the %tate and its re%#&r"e% a(a!$%t the !$'!/!'&a*2 Condron suggests that for the 5&r, t# 0e a$ a""epta0*e !$%t!t&t!#$ 1!th!$ a "r!+!$a* tr!a*, it $ee'% t# 0e "are)&**, a'/!%e' 0, the 5&'(e, and !) th!% %a)e(&ar' )a!*% then it is *!4e*, that the tr!a* !t%e*) !% "#+pr#+!%e'2

E=tra "a%e: "#+pe* t# (!/e e/!'e$"e 5&%t!), #$ *e(!t!+ate a$' pr#p#rt!#$ate Grown v. 0tott A)II( Grown had been &$'er "#+p&*%!#$ under s,(B)?)@?a@ of the +oad Traffic $ct (877$ct to a'+!t that %he ha' 0ee$ the 'r!/er #) her "ar2 $s there is penalt if refuse to answer Could this information be used in a separate prosecution under >?(@?a@ of the same $ct5 Grown argued that &%!$( the e/!'e$"e #) her a'+!%%!#$ would be in 0rea"h #) the pr!/!*e(e a(a!$%t %e*) !$"r!+!$at!#$2 The $ppeal Court in 0cotland accepted this argument, and the Cr#1$ appea*e' t# the Pr!/, C#&$"!*2 The basis of their argument was that the privilege was not absolute, and that the relevant sections of the (877 provided a .legitimate and proportionate interference!. The Eriv Council held that although the -#/era** )a!r$e%% #) a "r!+!$a*

tr!a*. "#&*' $#t 0e -"#+pr#+!%e'., 0&t the -"#$%t!t&e$t r!(ht%. "#&*' 0e, pr#/!'e' the *!+!tat!#$% 1ere -*e(!t!+ate a$' pr#p#rt!#$ate.2 The court had to achieve a 0a*a$"e 0et1ee$ the (e$era* !$tere%t #) the "#++&$!t, a$' the per%#$a* r!(ht% #) the !$'!/!'&a*2 In so deciding, the distinguished 0aunders. On the facts, the *ar(e $&+0er #) )ata*!t!e% in road traffic accidents indicted that %21D; 1a% -*e(!t!+ate.2 It was pr#p#rt!#$ate because !t '!' $#t *!"e$%e *#$( a$' #ppre%%!/e 7&e%t!#$!$(, and the pe$a*t, )#r re)&%!$( t# a$%1er 1a% -+#'erate a$' $#$ "&%t#'!a*..

Ne1 Se"t!#$: EQUALITY OF ARMS Art.6 and /0uality1s definition $lthough Article 6 does not mention .e'ualit of arms! explicitl , but it has come to be seen as an e%%e$t!a* "#+p#$e$t of )a!r tr!a* r!(ht%. Its 'e)!$!t!#$ !% a *!tt*e '!))!"&*t to pin down. E7&a*!t,, in this context at least, '#e% $#t ha/e the sense of a pr#h!0!t!#$ #$ '!%"r!+!$at!#$* a +ea$!$( that !t "arr!e% !$ +#%t h&+a$ r!(ht% law. 'here is another art focus on prohibition$ so e(uality can be argued did not include discrimination Tre"h%e* argues that the principle -!+p*!e% that ea"h part, +&%t 0e a))#r'e' a rea%#$a0*e #pp#rt&$!t, t# pre%e$t h!% "a%e " including his evidence " under conditions that '# $#t p*a"e h!+ at a '!%a'/a$ta(e /!%6a6/!% h!% #pp#$e$t.!

 In the jurisprudence of the court, the concept can also be '!%t!$(&!%he' )r#+ the -r!(ht t# a'/er%ar!a* pr#"ee'!$(%.2 Eerhaps the most" useful statement of the principle comes from Aa&)+a$ /2 Ce*(!&+& the 'e)e$'a$t in criminal proceedings .+&%t ha/e a rea%#$a0*e #pp#rt&$!t, of pre%e$t!$( h!% ea%e under conditions which '# $#t p*a"e h!+ at a %&0%ta$t!a* '!%a'/a$ta(e vis"a"vis his opponent!.

2/0uality1 applied the same to the civil cases The principle of e'ualit of arms also app*!e% t# "!/!* a% 1e** a% "r!+!$a* "a%e%2 In D#+0# Ceheer /2 The Nether*a$'%, the court made a distinction between the fair trial rights that are relevant in criminal cases and those app*!"a0*e 1here "!/!* r!(ht% a$' #0*!(at!#$% are at %ta4e.

$lthough contracting states might have a .greater latitude in civil cases to determine rules of procedure, 0&t there are "#++#$ "#$"ept% %hare' 0, 0#th "!/!* a$' "r!+!$a* *a1& most notabl that .the re'uirement of e'ualit of arms! be understood as +a4!$( )#r -a E)a!r 0a*a$"eF 0et1ee$ the part!e%..

In relation to litigation between two private parties, this means that ea"h part, +&%t ha/e -a rea%#$a0*e #pp#rt&$!t, t# pre%e$t h!% "a%e., 0&t $at!#$a* a&th#r!t!e% "a$ 'eter+!$e the pre"!%e )#r+ #) the #pp#rt&$!t!e% so afforded. $s the majorit of the cases concern criminal matters, we will follow this theme.

C, and /Ct3' coherent but some did not agree The leading cases where the principle of e7&a*!t, #) ar+% has been applied to 1nglish law have concerned prosecution '!%"*#%&re #) e/!'e$"e !$ the "r!+!$a* tr!a*2 The authorities determine that a*th#&(h there is "#here$"e 0et1ee$ the "#++#$ *a1 a$' Art!"*e 9 on the dut of the prosecution to disclose evidence, 0&t !$ "erta!$ !$%ta$"e% there are !$%&))!"!e$t %a)e(&ar'% t# pr#/!'e e7&a*!t, #) ar+%. 4owever, there is a /#"a* +!$#r!t, in the 1Ct4+ who see 0#th r!(ht% 5&r!%pr&'e$"e a$' E$(*!%h *a1 a% )a!*!$( !$ !t% '&t, to ensure e'ualit of arms. $s :udge ,upancic argued, &$5&%t *!+!tat!#$% on the r!(ht #) '!%"*#%&re "a$ -a))e"t the 1h#*e ph!*#%#ph, #) "r!+!$a* pr#"e'&re. Ed ards v )*

E'1ar'% / UA" although CL defect in disclosure evidence but proceeding fair as a hole$ ho ever$ some #udges dissent on +disclose principle as fundamental, In 1dwards, the applicant had been sentenced to a long period of imprisonment for burglar .

4e sought to argue that the p#*!"e ha' "#$"#"te' the e/!'e$"e a(a!$%t h!+, and that the &%e #) p&0*!" !$tere%t !++&$!t, to pre/e$t h!% "#&$%e* ha/!$( a""e%% t# the P#*!"e C#+p*a!$t% A&th#r!t,.% !$/e%t!(at!#$ into the matter rendered his conviction unsafe. -ot so important. $fter the Court of $ppeal rejected his argument, he unsuccessfull petitioned the 4ome 0ecretar . Gefore the 1Ct4+, he argued that his trial remained flawed because neither the Court of $ppeal, nor the 4ome 0ecretar had seen the report, nor examined police witnesses that, he contended, were vital to his case.

 The ECtHR a))!r+e' that the "#++#$ *a1 r&*e% on disclosure of evidence recognised the importance of fairness to the criminal trial and there had, indeed, 0ee$ -'e)e"t%. in 1dward!s case. 4owever, the 1Ct4+ went on to sa that )a!r$e%% +&%t &*t!+ate*, 0e a%%e%%e' !$ the "#$te=t #) the pr#"ee'!$(% a% a 1h#*e. -ot so important fact. There had been an independent investigation into the conduct of the police, and the Court of $ppeal had considered a t pe"script of the trial and had rejected the applicant!s arguments about the credibilit of the police witnesses. 9oreover, 1dwards had been represented b both junior and senior counsel at the appeal hearing. 1dwards alleged before the 1Ct4+ that the failure to disclose the independent report rendered his trial unfair but the court commented that he did not appl to the Court of $ppeal for its production. That mean he did not appl for production of his own evidence

:udge Eettiti dissent and argue disclose as fundamental procedural rule The dissenting opinion of &'(e Pett!t! is interesting as it !$terpret% the "a%e thr#&(h the !%%&e #) p&0*!" !$tere%t !++&$!t,. 4e argued that this prevented the disclosure of important evidence at trial, and that the failure of counsel to appl for disclosure before the Court of $ppeal was not .relevant!. 4e invo-ed the civilian principle of .$&**!t, )#r rea%#$% #) p&0*!" p#*!",..

This doctrine can be emplo ed b the court itself, and thus relieves counsel of the burden of rectif ing procedural faults.

The principle is 5&%t!)!e' 0, -the )&$'a+e$ta* pr#"e'&ra* r&*e that pr#h!0!t% the "#$"ea*+e$t #) '#"&+e$t% #r e/!'e$"e.. :udge Eettiti!s concerns are reiterated in his dissenting judgments in F!tt and R#1e a$' Da/!%2

R#1e a$' Da/!%6 C/A case- e! parte hearing is not sufficient safeguard In R#1e a$' Da/!%, the applicants had been convicted of a number of charges including murder, assault and robber . The appealed to the Court of $ppeal, arguing that there were .!$"#$%!%te$"!e%. !$ the e/!'e$"e a(a!$%t the+. During the appeal hearing, the pr#%e"&t!#$ +a'e a/a!*a0*e t# the "#&rt a '#"&+e$t that ha' $#t 0ee$ %h#1$ t# the 'e)e$"e, ar(&!$( that !t "#$ta!$e' %e$%!t!/e !$)#r+at!#$. Pr#"ee'!$( e= parte, the C#&rt #) Appea* he*' that the '#"&+e$t '!' $#t ha/e t# 0e '!%"*#%e' and was pr#te"te' 0, p&0*!" !$tere%t !++&$!t,2 2ater, information came to light that the prosecution!s case had relied on the evidence of an informer, who had been rewarded for the evidence he provided. The applicants applied to the Criminal Cases +eview Commission, who found that the

case should be remitted to the Court of $ppeal #hilst the case was waiting to be heard, but the ECtHR "#$%!'ere' the applicants! argument that the ha' $#t ha' a )a!r tr!a*2 Their argument rested on the understanding that there 1a% $# a0%#*&te r!(ht t# '!%"*#%&re, and that there 1ere *e(!t!+ate rea%#$G% )#r pre/e$t!$( !t* h#1e/er, -pr#"e'&ra* %a)e(&ar'%. %h#&*' 0e !$ p*a"e t# e$%&re the #/era** )a!r$e%% of the trial. The e= parte hear!$( b the Court of $ppeal was $#t a %&))!"!e$t %a)e(&ar'. The argued that there %h#&*' 0e a -%pe"!a* "#&$%e*. who would have a""e%% t# the !$)#r+at!#$ a$' "#&*' te%t the pr#%e"&t!#$.% "a%e2

The government- responded that the special counsel system ould involve insuperable procedural difficulties and that the present s stem, in which the trial judge determined whether or not public interest immunit applied, was the best.

 The 1Ct4+ followed the principle in 1dwards, and asserted that !t 1a% $e"e%%ar, t# "#$%!'er the pr#"ee'!$(% a% a 1h#*e2 The then invo-ed the e7&a*!t, #) ar+% argument that the pr#%e"&t!#$ %h#&*' $#t e$5#, &$)a!r a'/a$ta(e% #/er the 'e)e$"e, lin-ing it to the ver idea of the adversarial trial where .0#th pr#%e"&t!#$ a$' 'e)e$"e +&%t 0e (!/e$ the #pp#rt&$!t, t# ha/e 4$#1*e'(e of and comment on the observations filed and the e/!'e$"e a''&"e' 0, the #ther part,.2 0randstetter v. Austria Art!"*e 9:1<, and E$(*!%h *a1 in general, were in a(ree+e$t on the '&t, #) the pr#%e"&t!#$ t# pr#/!'e -a** +ater!a* e/!'e$"e !$ the!r p#%%e%%!#$ )#r #r a(a!$%t the a""&%e'H

 The court also asserted that this r!(ht 1a% $#t a0%#*&te, and it was $#t )#r the ECtHR t# 'eter+!$e 1hether a$, part!"&*ar re)&%a* #) '!%"*#%&re 1a% *e(!t!+ate or not, as this fell e$t!re*, 1!th!$ the 5&r!%'!"t!#$ #) the $at!#$a* "#&rt. 4owever, the problem was that the e= parte hear!$( 1a% $#t a %&))!"!e$t %a)e(&ar' t# e$%&re e7&a*!t, #) ar+% between prosecution and defence.

F!tt" reasoning did not applied to trial court 1previous case is appeal court2 and " evidence did not formed part of prosecution and presented to #ury A-3 " #udges can monitor the fairness It also concerned an e= parte app*!"at!#$ )r#+ the pr#%e"&t!#$ t# the tr!a* 5&'(e. The prosecution argued that evidence from a police informer ?C.@ was protected b public interest immunit and should not be disclosed to the defence. The important point of '!%t!$"t!#$ )r#+ R#1e a$' Da/!% is that the e= parte hear!$( !$ the "a%e t##4 p*a"e '&r!$( the tr!a* !t%e*), rather tha$ !$ a$ appea* hear!$(. This suggests that the ECtHR )#&$' a 0rea"h #) Art!"*e 9 !$ R#1e a$' Da/!% 0e"a&%e the C#&rt #) Appea* %h#&*' ha/e ha' +#re r#0&%t %a)e(&ar'% in place. Th!% rea%#$!$( '!' $#t app*, t# a tr!a* "#&rt2

-o important fact On the evidence presented b the prosecution, Fitt was found guilt of numerous offences, including conspirac to rob. In his appeal he argued that the evidence of the informer needed to be examined to show that he had been falsel implicated in the conspirac to rob. In particular, he was arguing for disclosure of a series of statements made b C. in other cases that would tend to strengthen his case. The Court of $ppeal upheld the convictions, and the ECtHR he*' that the tr!a* ha' 0ee$ )a!r. The stated that& The Court is satisfied that the de)e$"e 1ere 4ept !$)#r+e' and were permitted to ma-e submissions and part!"!pate !$ the a0#/e 'e"!%!#$6+a4!$( pr#"e%% a% )ar a% 1a% p#%%!0*e 1!th#&t re/ea*!$( t# the+ the material which the prosecution sought to -eep secret on public interest grounds.

 The 1Ct4+ also rejected submissions that there should be a special counsel s stem to introduce an .adversarial element! into disclosure hearings. $lthough there were good reasons for such a s stem in immigration hearings, there was no argument to extend their operation to criminal trials. The e=!%t!$( *a1 (&ara$tee' e7&a*!t, #) ar+%. For instance& the evidence that was not disclosed in this "a%e $e/er a"t&a**, )#r+e' part #) the pr#%e"&t!#$.% "a%e and 1a% $e/er %ee$ 0, the 5&r,2 This can be '!%t!$(&!%he' )r#+ the 4!$' #) $#$6'!%"*#%&re !%%&e% that la behind recent major miscarriages of justice, 1here the -e=e"&t!/e. +a'e &%e #) e/!'e$"e that the 'e)e$"e $e/er %a12 9oreover, the tr!a* 5&'(e h!+ #r her%e*) pr#/!'e% a$ !+p#rta$t %a)e(&ar', as he has a dut to .+#$!t#r 2 2 2 the )a!r$e%% #r

#ther1!%e #) 1!thh#*'!$( the e/!'e$"e!.

 +eviewing the relevant case law, the ECtHR he*' that E$(*!%h *a1 on the matters to be ta4e$ !$t# a""#&$t on '!%"*#%&re -)&*)!*%. the -"#$'!t!#$%. *a!' '#1$ 0, Art!"*e 92

Dissenting to e( parte hearing. 4udges should hear the argument from the both side There were a number of powerful dissenting opinions. #e will examine those of :udges Ealm, Fischbach, /ajic, Thomassen, Tsatsa"3i-olovs-a and Traja. The held that the principle of e'ualit of arms was 0rea"he' 0, the )a"t that the pr#%e"&t!#$ had .a""e%% t# the 5&'(e. '&r!$( the e= parte hear!$(, and were thus a0*e t# -part!"!pate !$ the 'e"!%!#$ +a4!$( pr#"e%%. 1!th#&t the pre%e$"e #) the 'e)e$"e2 The r#*e #) the 5&'(e a% the $e&tra* umpire "#&*' $#t "#&$ter0a*a$"e th!% )&$'a+e$ta* !$e7&a*!t, in the trial process.

This was $#t t# !+p&($ the !+part!a*!t, a$' !$'epe$'e$"e of the judge 0&t t# a%%ert that in order to ma-e a fair decision the 5&'(e ha' t# hear ar(&+e$t% )r#+ 0#th %!'e%2

Dissenting& 5easure to restrict right need to be applied :udge 4edigan relied on the ruling in /an 9echelen and others v. The 3etherlands. The 1Ct4+ stated that& .4aving regard to the place that the r!(ht t# a )a!r a'+!$!%trat!#$ #) 5&%t!"e holds in a democratic societ , a$, +ea%&re% re%tr!"t!$( the r!(ht% of the defence %h#&*' 0e %tr!"t*, $e"e%%ar,2 If a *e%% re%tr!"t!/e +ea%&re "a$ %&))!"e then that +ea%&re %h#&*' 0e app*!e'.! AThat means in order to get justice, then have to restrict the right of defence. Gut the measure to restrict have to be applied, to what extent the right should be restrictedC This suggested that the arguments put forward for a %pe"!a* "#&$%e* t# #perate !$ "r!+!$a* tr!a*% %h#&*' ha/e 0ee$ +#re "are)&**, "#$%!'ere' b the Gritish Jovernment.

 The special counsel is to investigate whether the un" disclosed evidence is justif

Access to st lawyer is necessary during 6 interrogation but has the fle(ibility In Ca''er, the 0C held that Art!"*e 9:1< normall .re'uired that . . . a""e%% t# a *a1,er %h#&*' 0e pr#/!'e' as from the )!r%t !$terr#(at!#$ #) a %&%pe"t.. 4owever, the court went on to sa that there 1a% -r##+ )#r a "erta!$ )*e=!0!*!t,. !$ th!% pr!$"!p*e. Ea"h "a%e 1#&*' 'epe$' #$ !t% )a"ts& .the 'uestion . . . 1a% 1hether, !$ the *!(ht #) the e$t!ret, of the proceedings . . ., the a""&%e' Iha% 0ee$ 'e$!e' J a )a!r hear!$(.!

-uspect do not have the legal right prior to 2police custody or pre&trial detention but still remain unclear on application It is worth stressing, that in Sa*'&K /2 T&r4e, the 1Ct4+ held that a %&%pe"t '#e% $#t ha/e a r!(ht t# *e(a* a'/!"e at an point pr!#r t# -p#*!"e "&%t#', or pre6tr!a* 'ete$t!#$G $lthough the general principle appears clear, Sa*'&K *e)t 7&e%t!#$% &$a$%1ere' ln particular, the critical issue was 1hether -the Ca''er r&*e. a*%# app*!e% t# pe#p*e "har(e' a$' 7&e%t!#$e' 0e)#re 'ete$t!#$ at a p#*!"e %tat!#$ ?2ord Grown in A+0r#%e@

A+0r#%e /2 Harr!% " -C follow closely to /Ct3' 'uling " 'ight to access to lawyer do not available when 0uestioned but 2investigation1 to the 2incrimination1 This point was considered in A+0r#%e /2 Harr!%. The SC "h#%e t# %t!"4 "*#%e*, C#$/e$t!#$ jurisprudence. $ccording to the ECtHR, the +#+e$t 1he$ a$ !$'!/!'&a* !% "har(e' provides a -e point of reference. O$"e a per%#$ ha% 0ee$ "har(e', he #r %he ha% a r!(ht t# *e(a* a'/!"e. 0trasbourg case law understands the point of "har(e a% that +#+e$t 1he$ -the %!t&at!#$ #) the !$'!/!'&a* I!%J %&0%ta$t!a**, a))e"te'.. $ person!s situation is -%&0%ta$t!a**, a))e"te'. !) a .%er!#&% !$/e%t!(at!#$. #) the a**e(e' #))e$"e ha% 0e(&$2

 Interpreting the position of the 1Ct4+, the 0C held that %#+e#$e $#t ,et !$ p#*!"e "&%t#', 1h# 1a% &$'er %&%p!"!#$ )#r a$ #))e$"e, a$' 0e!$( 7&e%t!#$e', '!' $#t ha/e a r!(ht #) a""e%% t# a *a1,er2 2ord 4ope suggested that the definition of -p#*!"e !$terr#(at!#$. could !$"*&'e the p#*!"e p&tt!$( 7&e%t!#$% t# a %&%pe"t at the .r#a'%!'e #r !$ the per%#$.% h#+e.. These .!$!t!a* %ta(e%. of an investigation '!' $#t e$(a(e Art!"*e 9. S#, on the facts of the case, the %tate+e$t% +a'e 0, the %&%pe"t at the r#a'%!'e were a'+!%%!0*e in court.

The 0C did stress one point& e/e$ !) the !$!t!a* stages of an investigation were not covered by the Article, #$"e -the p#*!"e ha/e rea%#$ t# th!$4 that the, +a, 1e** e*!"!t a$ !$"r!+!$at!$( re%p#$%e )r#+ h!+. the Art!"*e '#e% app*,.

R /2 H#r$"a%t*e6 4C held that ECtHR misunderstand )* CL %in fact they are misunderstand&$ therefore follo )* rules 0o, in A+0r#%e the SC pre)erre' Stra%0#&r( t# r&*e #$ r!(ht #) a""e%% to a law er rather tha$ art!"&*ate the ter+% #) the r!(ht )#r the+%e*/e%. This situation "#$tra%t% 1!th R2 /2 H#r$"a%t*e. In 4orncastle, the 0C refused to follow the 1Ct4+ in $l"Fhawaja and Taber v. 6F. $l"Fhawaja was )#"&%e' #$ the a'+!%%!0!*!t, #) a 1r!tte$ 1!t$e%% %tate+e$t !$ "#&rt 1he$ the 1!t$e%% 1a% a0%e$t2 9ore specificall , $l"Fhawaja raised concerns about the so called .sole or decisive rule! developed in Convention jurisprudence. This rule held that the r!(ht% #) the 'e)e$'a$t are -&$'&*, re%tr!"te'. !) a "#$/!"t!#$ -!% %#*e*, #r +a!$*, 0a%e' #$ e/!'e$"e pr#/!'e' 0, 1!t$e%%e% 1h#+ the a""&%e' !% &$a0*e t# 7&e%t!#$ at an stage

3o important fact& The facts and issues raised b $l" Fhawaja and Taher can be summarised as follows. $l"Fhawaja a surgeon had been convicted for indecent assaults on his patients. One of his patients had given evidence to the police, but had died before the trial too- place. The defence ac-nowledged that the statement from the deceased was crucial evidence, but it would be possible to rebut it through cross examination of other witnesses. The judge reminded the jur in his summing up about the ris-s of including written witness evidence. Taher !s case was similar to the extent that he was convicted of wounding on the strength of a witness statement read to the court in the absence of the witness. The judge had also given the jur a warning that the evidence had not been tested through cross examination.

 Gefore the 1Ct4+, $l"Fhawaja and Taher ar(&e' that the &%e #) hear%a, e/!'e$"e a+#&$te' t# a 0rea"h #) Art!"*e 9?;@?d@ and the re'uirement for .the attendance and examination of witnesses! in court. The Cha+0er he*' that Art!"*e 9 ha' !$'ee' 0ee$ 0rea"he'. 4earsa evidence in a written form amounted to a breach of $rticle % because the person who made the statement was not present in court and could not be cross examined. H#1e/er, in R2 /2 H#r$"a%t*e the S&pre+e C#&rt re)&%e' t# )#**#1 this ruling. #ith reference to the re*e/a$t UA %tat&te% ?the Criminal :ustice $ct )II; and the Criminal 1vidence ?#itness $non mit @ $ct )II7@, the SC ar(&e' that !) Stra%0#&r( 5&r!%pr&'e$"e '!' *a, '#1$ %&"h a$ -!$)*e=!0*e. a$' -&$7&a*!)!e'. pr!$"!p*e #$ hear%a, e/!'e$"e, then .the 1h#*e '#+e%t!" %"he+e )#r e$%&r!$( )a!r tr!a*% 2 2 2 "a$$#t %ta$' a$' +a$, (&!*t, 'e)e$'a$t% 1!** ha/e t# (# )ree.2

It would be har' t# "#&$te$a$"e that th!% 1a% the C#&rt.% !$te$t!#$* and indeed, that the, ha' pr#per*, &$'er%t##' the 1a, !$ 1h!"h the *a1 #) the UA 'ea*t 1!th hear%a, e/!'e$"e2 It is worth remembering that the ruling in $l"Fhawaja and Taher was made b the Chamber.

#hen the Gra$' Cha+0er "a+e t# r&*e #$ the +atter !$ ;L11, the came to a different conclusion. In $l"Fhawaja and Taher v. 6nited Fingdom the 1Ct4+ concluded that& .1here a hear%a, %tate+e$t !% the %#*e #r 'e"!%!/e e/!'e$"e against a defendant, its a'+!%%!#$ a% e/!'e$"e 1!** $#t a&t#+at!"a**, re%&*t !$ a 0rea"h #) Art!"*e 9:1<2, The court asserted that the $#r+a* r&*e was for .a** e/!'e$"e. t# 0e %&05e"te' t# -a'/er%ar!a* ar(&+e$t. !$ a p&0*!" hear!$(. Le(!t!+ate e="ept!#$% to this principle +&%t $#t -!$)r!$(e the r!(ht% #) the 'e)e$"e!.

 1ven though the common law had .abandoned the strict rule against hearsa !, %tat&t#r, %a)e(&ar'% ha' 0ee$ p&t !$ p*a"e 1h!"h +ea$t that the r!(ht% #) the 'e)e$"e 1ere $#t a&t#+at!"a**, "#+pr#+!%e' b hearsa evidence.

Sh#rt C#$"*&%!#$& 4C should sound hen there is misunderstanding but not al ays sound different reasoning #hat do we ma-e of the disagreements between the 0C and the 1Ct4+5 $s we have argued in Chapter 7, we need to see cases li-e $mbrose and 4orncastle as part of an #$(#!$( atte+pt t# art!"&*ate the pr#per re*at!#$%h!p 0et1ee$ the S&pre+e C#&rt a$' Stra%0#&r(2 From the perspective of this chapter we can comment that 4orncastle certainl suggests that "#++#$ *a1 "a$ 0e +!%&$'er%t##' 0, the ECtHR. $ productive relationship between the two C#&rt% '#e% re7&!re the SC t# a%%ert !t%e*). 4owever, this relationship ha% t# 0e &$'er%t##' 1!th!$ the "#$te=t #) E&r#pea$ H&+a$ R!(ht% *a12 I) $at!#$a* "#&rt% 'epart t## )ar from 0trasbourg principles, a "#$%!%te$t *a1 #) h&+a$ r!(ht% !% "#+pr#+!%e'.

 Cases li-e 4orncastle are hopefull few and far between* but will arise when 0trasbourg falls into a serious misunderstanding of the law of the 6F. A+0r#%e, on the other hand, is perhaps less extreme, although the decision of the Chamber is certainl surprising in in that it limits the reach of $rticle %, 0&t there 1ere p#1er)&* "r!t!"a* /#!"e% &r(!$( the SC t# 0e +#re "reat!/e2 4owever, there are counter arguments. I) the SC 'epart% )r#+ Stra%0#&r( r&*!$(%, even to e=te$' the %"#pe #) r!(ht%, the (reater the r!%4 that 'e/e*#p+e$t% !$ h&+a$ r!(ht% *a1 +a, 0,pa%% the !$%t!t&t!#$ that "##r'!$ate% !t% "#$t!$e$t 1!'e 'e/e*#p+e$t.

Ne1 Se"t!#$: ACCESS TO USTICE $s has been pointed out& .AaCccess to legal advice for those with !$%&))!"!e$t re%#&r"e% for their right of access to court to be effective is a*%# re"#($!%e' a% 0e!$( !+p*!"!t !$ the r!(ht #) a""e%% t# 5&%t!"e 0, 0#th the "#++#$ *a1 a$' the ECHR2! 4uman +ights :oint Committee, +eport, 2egislative 0crutin & 2egal $id, 0entencing and Eunishment of Offenders Gill, In +. v. 0ecretar of 0tate for the 4ome Department, e= parte Lee"h A(88<C 2ord 0te n stated that the .principle of our law that e/er, "!t!Ke$ ha% a r!(ht #) &$!+pe'e' a""e%% t# a "#&rt. . . even in our unwritten constitution . . . must ran- as a constitutional right.!

 In R2 :Da*,< /2 Se"retar, #) State )#r the H#+e Depart+e$t A)II(C, 2ord Gingham held that .a""e%% t# a "#&rt a$' the r!(ht #) a""e%% t# *e(a* a'/!"e +a, 0e "&rta!*e' #$*, 0, "*ear a$' e=pre%% 1#r'%. and even then .#$*, t# the e=te$t rea%#$a0*, $e"e%%ar, to meet the ends which justif the curtailment! Art!"*e 9:3<:"< provides that a person charged with a criminal offence has the r!(ht -t# 'e)e$' h!+%e*) in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pa for legal assistance, to 0e (!/e$ !t )ree 1he$ the !$tere%t% #) 5&%t!"e %# re7&!re.2

Different civil and criminal legal aid The jurisprudence of $rticle % goes on to further this !+p*!"!t '!%t!$"t!#$ 0et1ee$ "r!+!$a* a$' "!/!* pr#"ee'!$(%. #hile criminal proceedings re'uire free legal assistance, there is $# e7&!/a*e$t r!(ht !$ "!/!* pr#"ee'!$(%.

Jiven the wa in which the $rticle privileges "r!+!$a* legal aid, the main issue in relation to "!/!* legal aid !% the e=te$t t# 1h!"h *e(a* repre%e$tat!#$ !% -!$'!%pe$%a0*e )#r e))e"t!/e a""e%% t# "#&rt..

This means that the person alleging a breach of $rticle %?;@?d@ ha% a '!))!"&*t ar(&+e$t to ma-e.

Criminal legal aid under A.6& in interest of *ustice To obtain criminal legal aid under Article 6, !t 1#&*' 0e $e"e%%ar, to show that 1!th#&t !t effective participation in proceedings 1a% $#t p#%%!0*e2 Erovision of legal aid must also be !$ the !$tere%t% #) 5&%t!"e. 0uffice to sa , then, that the jurisprudence of $rticle % recognises that a r!(ht t# *e(a* a!' !% hea/!*, 7&a*!)!e'2

G#*'er / UA K right to constitute proceeding !not only applied to proceeding has been instigated" Instigate %causes it to happen& may be mean that proceeding had already started 2egal aid is one important aspect of a wider principle& access to the courts. One of the -e authorities is Jolder v. 6F. #e will examine Jolder, and a second earl authorit $ire , before returning to our discussion of legal aid. G#*'er /2 UA The 1Ct4+ argued that the r!(ht #) a""e%% t# the "#&rt% !% -!+p*!"!t. (!/e$ the 1#r'!$( #) the Art!"*e and its context within a Treat dedicated to preserving the rule of law.

 The 1Ct4+ went on to locate the right of access within the broader concept of a fair trial right& In this wa the $rticle embodies the -r!(ht t# a "#&rt., #) 1h!"h the r!(ht #) a""e%%, that is the r!(ht t# !$%t!t&te pr#"ee'!$(% before courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect onl . ... In sum, the 1h#*e +a4e% &p the r!(ht t# a )a!r hear!$(2 The r!(ht #) a""e%% !% &$'er%t##' a% the r!(ht t# -!$%t!t&te. pr#"ee'!$(%. This rejects the Gritish government!s argument that the right onl applied to proceedings that had been instigated. The 1Ct4+!s interpretation of the $rticle is much broader.

Can be refused regarded to resources H#1e/er, th!% !% $#t t# %a, that the r!(ht #) a""e%% t# the "#&rt% "a$$#t 0e *!+!te'2 The ECtHR dre an analogy ith a ruling on the right to education contained in $rticle ) of the (8>) Erotocol. The right to education "a$ 0e *!+!te' 1!th re%pe"t t# a/a!*a0*e re%#&r"e%, and access to the court must be considered in the same wa .

Gut +ight must not limited when injure substantive right 4owever, the important caveat is that the r!(ht +&%t $#t 0e %# *!+!te' a% t# -!$5&re the %&0%ta$"e #) the r!(ht.2 $s far as the facts of the present case were concerned, Jolder!s petition to the 4ome 0ecretar for access to a solicitor should not have been refused. Jolder intended to initiate legal proceedings against a prison officer, who he accused of libelling him in relation to a matter of prison discipline. The 4ome Se"retar,.% #1$ 'eter+!$at!#$ that Jolder!s "a%e 1a% $#t *!4e*, t# %&""ee' 1a% $#t a /a*!' *!+!tat!#$ on his access to the court.

A!re, /2 Ire*a$' &5ulfilment of duty %give legal aid& under Convention needed positive action from govt but on (ualified term Jolder can be read alongside A!re, /2 Ire*a$'. 9rs $ire was arguing that because legal aid was not available for separation proceedings, the state was effectivel den ing her access to court in breach of $rticle %. The Court asserted that as %eparat!#$ pr#"ee'!$(% concerned civil rights and obligations, Art!"*e 9 '!' app*,2 Furthermore, as judicial separation was onl available in the 4igh Court, it involved difficult issues of procedural law ma-ing it unli-el that a person could represent themselves* besides a litigant in person would have .an emotional involvement that is scarcel compatible with the degree of objectivit re'uired b advocac in court!. The Irish government attempted to refute the applicant!s arguments b distinguishing the case from Jolder.

 In Jolder, a breach of $rticle % was found because of the obstacles that the 4ome 0ecretar placed in the wa of the applicant!s access to court. In the instant case, $ire !s inabilit to initiate proceedings were not a product of an act of the government, but of her own lac- of financial resources for which the government could not be held responsible. The ECtHR rejected this argument in forthright terms& $lthough this difference between the facts of the two cases is certainl correct, the C#&rt '#e% $#t a(ree 1!th the "#$"*&%!#$ 1h!"h the G#/er$+e$t 'ra1 therefrom.

In the first place, h!$'ra$"e !$ )a"t "a$ "#$tra/e$e the C#$/e$t!#$ just li-e a legal impediment . . .

Furthermore, )&*)!*+e$t #) a '&t, under the Convention on occasion $e"e%%!tate% %#+e p#%!t!/e a"t!#$ #$ the part #) the State* in such circumstances, the 0tate cannot simpl remain passive.

 The Irish government saw this as asserting that the Convention re'uired a state to provide .free legal aid! " a position that the Court similarl rejected, noting that 9:3< :"< pr#/!'e' #$*, a 7&a*!)!e' r!(ht. 4owever, just because the essentiall .civil! and .political! rights that are contained in the Convention become effectivel .socialL and .economic! rights, as the include commitments for state spending, does not mean that rights such as $rticle % must be interpreted narrowl . The court also stressed that A!re,.% %!t&at!#$ "#&*' $#t 0e (e$era*!%e' " and that an award of legal aid %h#&*' $#t 0e %ee$ a% #pe$!$( the )*##' (ates, and re7&!r!$( a** 'eter+!$at!#$% #) "!/!* r!(ht% a$' #0*!(at!#$% to re'uire free legal representation. The court found that there 1a% a 0rea"h #) 9:1<2

Stee* a$' M#rr!% / U$!te' A!$('#+6 party able to present his or her case +effectively, n there should not be une(ual access to legal resources and representation. #hat is the impact of this case law on the 6F5 The -e case is Stee* a$' M#rr!% /2 U$!te' A!$('#+2 The applicant!s arguments )#"&%e' #$ the 'e$!a* #) *e(a* a!'2 The impact of this on the case is vividl illustrated b the 1Ct4+&

$t the time of the proceedings in 'uestion, M"D#$a*'.% e"#$#+!" p#1er #&t%tr!ppe' that of man small countries ?the enjo ed worldwide sales amounting to approximatel ;I billion 6nited 0tates dollars in (88>@, whereas the first applicant was a part" time bar wor-er earning a maximum of JGE %> a wee- and the second applicant was an unwaged single parent.

 The !$e7&a*!t, #) ar+% "#&*' $#t ha/e 0ee$ (reater2 AImportant point for this as 9cDonald will raised complex law issue which another applicant cannot handle themselves or with pro bono onl C, so ine'ualit be issue. If onl involve eas law issue which pro bono wor- can handle it, then complete e'ualit cannot be main issue 1'ualit of arm onl ma-e sure part has reasonable opportunit to present the case but not reall complete e'ualit C

$gainst the financial might of 9cDonald!s who emplo ed one of the .largest firms in 1ngland! specialising in libel, the pr# 0#$# 1#r4 #) *ar(e*, !$e=per!e$"e' 0arr!%ter% a$' %#*!"!t#r% 1#&*' "#&$t )#r /er, *!tt*e.

 The ECtHR %&+% &p the!r pr#0*e+% well& $ll the could hope to do was -eep going& on several occasions '&r!$( the tr!a* the, ha' t# %ee4 a'5#&r$+e$t% 0e"a&%e #) ph,%!"a* e=ha&%t!#$2 The 1Ct4+ framed the $rticle % argument as follows. Central to the notion of the fair trial is the idea that the p*a!$t!)) #r 'e)e$'a$t %h#&*' 0e a0*e t# pre%e$t h!% #r her "a%e -e))e"t!/e*,. " and that th!% re7&!re' -e7&a*!t, #) ar+%. " in other words " that there %h#&*' $#t be, as there was in this case, an &$e7&a* a""e%% t# *e(a* re%#&r"e% a$' repre%e$tat!#$2

+estrict the right to legal aid has to be legitimate and proportionate" onl to enable part has reasonable opportunit to present the case but not complete e'ualit The *e(a* a!' %"he+e pr#/!'e' 5&%t %&"h a$ e7&a*!t, #) ar+%2 4owever, 1hether #r $#t *e(a* a!' 1a% re7&!re' had to be 'eter+!$e' #$ the )a"t% #) ea"h "a%e2 This was $#t t# %a,, of course, that there is an a0%#*&te r!(ht t# *e(a* a!'2 H#1e/er, a$, re%tr!"t!#$% #$ th!% r!(ht had to be both *e(!t!+ate a$' pr#p#rt!#$ate2 $cceptable factors included& "ha$"e% #) %&""e%% and the )!$a$"!a* +ea$% #) the per%#$ appl ing for legal aid. the "#+p*e=!t, #) the !%%&e% raised, and

 the e=te$t t# 1h!"h the app*!"a$t 1a% a0*e t# repre%e$t him or her%e*). This meant that it was $#t $e"e%%ar, that -"#+p*ete e7&a*!t, #) ar+%. 0e +a!$ta!$e' " 0&t what was important was that 0#th part!e% t# the a"t!#$ ha' a -rea%#$a0*e #pp#rt&$!t,. t# pre%e$t h!% #r her "a%e " in such conditions that #$e part, 1a% $#t at a -%&0%ta$t!a* '!%a'/a$ta(e. in relation to the other.

Fact to the case& On the facts of the present case, the 1Ct4+ determined that legal assistance would have been necessary to ensure a fair trial. This was because the defendants ere defending their right to freedom of expression in an action that raised many comple! points of la . 9oreover, the financial conse'uences for the applicants in losing the case were significant. $lthough the applicants had proved themselves to be articulate, and did receive pr# 0#$# 1#r4 from law ers " this 1a% $#t %&))!"!e$t t# e$%&re a )a!r tr!a*2

In other words& .The disparity between the levels of legal assistance enjo ed b the applicants and 9cDonald!s had been so great that it must have given rise to unfairness.! 6erhaps this is not the main issue as more importantly applicant cannot represent themselves If they can$ then no issue since +complete e(uality, is not the main point

 There was thus a 0rea"h #) Art!"*e 9.

Fact show applicant did not have reasonable opportunit to present the case 0o, 0teel and 9orris determined that whilst a0%#*&te e7&a*!t, 1a% $#t re7&!re' between the parties to the trial, 0&t 0#th %!'e% +&%t 0e (!/e$ rea%#$a0*e #pp#rt&$!t, to pre%e$t their case. $s far as the law on $rticle % and legal aid is concerned, it is probabl the case that the factors ta-en into account in finding a breach of the $rticle, would consider& .1hat 1a% at %ta4e )#r the !$'!/!'&a*, the "#+p*e=!t, of the law and pr#"e'&re and the per%#$.% a0!*!t, to represent themselves!. In fact$ they cannot handle themselves ith the pro bono so Art.6 is breach. or"

Ne1 Se"t!#$: Le(a* A!', Se$te$"!$( a$' P&$!%h+e$t #) O))e$'er% A"t ;L1;6 "&t the "#%t #) *e(a* a!' t# %a/e +#$e, In conclusion to this section of the chapter, we want to offer some final comments on the government!s Le(a* A!', Se$te$"!$( a$' P&$!%h+e$t #) O))e$'er% A"t ;L1;. $s 4ouse of 2ords Constitution Committee reported, the #05e"t!/e of the Gill is to cut the "#%t #) *e(a* a!'& .The a$$&a* *e(a* a!' 0&'(et in 1ngland and #ales is M;21 0!**!#$2 The Jovernment!s proposals are designed to ma-e M3NL +!**!#$ #) %a/!$(% ?cutting about $ear*, #$e6%!=th of the budget@. The 9inistr of :ustice has a target of reducing its overall budget b );M ?approximatel N) billion@ b )I(<"(>. $mongst its various provisions, the A"t a+e$'% the A""e%% t# &%t!"e

A"t 1@@@ t# *!+!t the a/a!*a0!*!t, #) *e(a* a!' for civil cases.

2egal aid focus on .at sta-e! issue so need to save the resources from other area Ae$$eth C*ar4e defined the underl ing .logicL of reform as determining .1h!"h t,pe% #) "a%e% +#%t &r(e$t*, +er!t %"ar"e re%#&r"e% to e$"#&ra(e pe#p*e t# &%e $#$6a'/er%ar!a* solutions to their problems where appropriate, and to speed up and simplif court processes where not!. Thus, *e(a* a!' -+&%t 0e a/a!*a0*e where people!s life, libert or home is at %ta4e, where the are at ris- of %er!#&% ph,%!"a* har+ or are victims of '#+e%t!" /!#*e$"e.. It should also cover eases which involve ."ha**e$(eI%J It#J %tate a"t!#$. and .where . . . "h!*'re$ +a, 0e ta4e$ !$t# "are.. A/a!*a0!*!t, #) *e(a* a!' !$ the%e "a%e%, re7&!re% %a/!$(% !$ #ther area%2 2egal $id is thus $# *#$(er -r#&t!$e*,J a/a!*a0!*!t, 2 2 2 !$ 2 2 2 )a+!*, '!%p&te%. where +e'!at!#$ 1!** 0e e$"#&ra(e'2 'he 7uardian$ (8=()=((

$ct narrow the eligibilit of legal aid" hard for ordinar people protect their right in court

/er real concerns have been e=pre%%e' a0#&t the 1a, !$ 1h!"h the A"t $arr#1% e*!(!0!*!t, for *e(a* a!'2

9atters of particular concern are the re%tr!"t!#$% #$ the a/a!*a0!*!t, #) *e(a* a!' )#r /!"t!+% #) '#+e%t!" /!#*e$"e, and other changes to .the recoverabilit ! of law er!s fees that .will ma-e it virtuall impossible for the victims of human rights abuses committed b transnational corporations overseas to bring cases against those corporations in the 6F!. 4uman +ights :oint Committee, )) +eport, 2egislative 0crutin & 2egal $id, 0entencing and Eunishment of Offenders Gill, )I(( Other commentators have predicted that& .There will be at least )>M fewer claimants and the remaining B>M will lose up to a 'uarter of their compensation, as the government switches mone from individual claimants in favour of the powerful insurance companies! lobb , which stands to gain more than N).)>bn.!

 It 1!** 0e !$tere%t!$( t# %ee 1hether #r $#t it is possible to 0r!$( a "ha**e$(e &$'er Art!"*e 9 to these changes in funding civil justice. One thing seems certain& it will be much har'er )#r #r'!$ar, pe#p*e t# pr#te"t the!r !$tere%t% in the courts.

Ne1 Se"t!#$: CONCLUSION The +#ra* a&th#r!t, #) the "#&rt t# h#*' a "!t!Ke$ t# a""#&$t depends on the 0a*a$"e !t "a$ a"h!e/e 0et1ee$ the r!(ht% #) the 'e)e$'a$t a$' tr!a* pr#"e%%e% that allow the prosecution to %e"&re a )a!r "#$/!"t!#$ of those who are guilt of the offences with which the have been charged. 4as the common law, in the light of the impact of $rticle %, achieved this balance5 #e would sum up our answers as follows. Cases li-e Sa&$'er% and C#$'r#$ have shown how the "#++#$ *a1 )a**% %h#rt of international standards. 0aunders" ritish 7overnment1s arguments that the comple( nature of crimes of fraud #ustified +such a mar%ed departure . . . from one of the basic re0uirements of fair procedure !prevent from self& incrimination".2

 Condron" the 8udge did not give direction properly but C/A held the conviction as safe 1dwards, +owe and Davis and Fitt raised some important issues, e%pe"!a**, !$ re*at!#$ t# the r!(ht% #) the 'e)e$"e a$' '!%"*#%&re of criminal evidence. #hile 0rea"he% 1ere )#&$' !$ R#1e and Da/!e%, 0&t the three cases ta-en t#(ether '# $#t %&((e%t a +a5#r )a!*!$( #) the "#++#$ *a1 to protect the rights of the defendant. +owe" e! parte hearing as not a sufficient safeguard but the right is not absolute 1Ct4+ agree with Fitt ?trial case@, trial judges can ma-e sure the fairness

 A+0r#%e and H#r$"a%t*e are .har' "a%e%. and, as such, har' t# )!t !$t# a patter$2 Certainl , the 0C!s assertive stance in H#r$"a%t*e shows that common law principles on hearsa are $#t in breach of human rights standards* 0C against 1Ct4+ on 1Ct4+ misunderstand C2 A+0r#%e, on the other hand, suggests that an opportunit to elaborate rights to a solicitor ma have been missed. 0C follow 1Ct4+ closel

 Stee* a$' M#rr!% suggests real failings as far as access to the court is concerned. 2egal aid issue