THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT Section 3 The interpretative provisions of the Human Rights

s Act have had a major impact in judicial interpretative practices. Our consideration of the new practices has to begin by looking at section 3 of the Act. Note first of all that the range of this provision it app ies to primar! an" secon"ar! e#is ation !$%ene&er enacte"' before or after the Act.

 The effect of s." #$% b& however& is that the incompati(i it! of a piece of primary legislation with the HRA "oes not mean t%at t%is e#is ation is %e " to (e &oi". 'oreover& it "oes not a o$ a court to %o " s)(or"inate or secondary legislation to be in&a i" if the primary legislation does not allow the incompatibility with the HRA to be remedied. (n other words* par iamentar! so&erei#nt! is left in place.

Impact on Judicial Practice )e are thus concerned with the rea i#nment o+ a j)"icia practice The pressing *uestion is+ how will the courts interpret legislation in the light of s.", The government )hite -aper& !Rights .rought Home/ stated that s." would go !far beyond/ the rules prior to the HRA which had allowed the court to take into account the 01HR in interpreting legislation and clarifying ambiguity+ !T%e co)rts $i (e re,)ire" to interpret e#is ation so as to )p%o " con&ention rights )n ess t%e e#is ation itse + is so c ear ! incompati( e with

the 1onvention that it is impossi( e to "o so'.

 )hile this clearly articulates a rule of interpretation& it leaves a great deal of discretion in the hands of the interpreter to "etermine $%et%er or not it is impossi( e to interpret e#is ation as compati( e $it% t%e Con&ention. )e are concerned once again with the constit)tiona (o)n"aries o+ t%e j)"icia practice-

Interpretation of HRA .i son &- First Co)nt! Tr)st 2ord Nicholls/ argument. He addressed the idea that the co)rts are t%emse &es p)( ic a)t%orities& and therefore (o)n" (! t%e HRA. )ould this mean that as the courts are bound by the Act& t%e! $o) " (e compe e" to "isco)nt an Act o+ Par iament t%at $as inconsistent $it% t%e Act, This would c ear ! (e a &er! (roa" interpretation of the Human Rights Act. (ndeed& it would e++ecti&e ! ma/e t%e H)man Ri#%ts Act itse + so&erei#n& and (rin# to an en" t%e so&erei#nt! o+ Par iament-

 As this was ne&er t%e inten"e" e++ect of the Act& it co) " not (e a &a i" interpretation.

 (n interpreting a statute in the light of the HRA& it was necessary to abide by constitutional principles and give effect to the will of -arliament3 however& the court could consider the 0proportiona it! o+ e#is ation'. (n approaching the issue of proportionality& the co)rt $as +) +i in# a re&ie$in# role. Par iament retaine" t%e primar! responsi(i it! for deciding the appropriate form of legislation. The court would reach a different conclusion from the legislature

on ! $%en it $as apparent t%at t%e e#is at)re %a" attac%e" ins)++icient importance to a person/s Con&ention ri#%t. The readiness of the court to depart from the views of the legislature "epen"e" on t%e circ)mstances& one of which was the subject matter of the legislation. The more the legislation concerned matters of (roa" socia po ic!& the ess rea"! a co)rt $o) " (e to inter&ene-

1onclusion+ (nsofar as it is possible to draw a conclusion& the House of 2ords might be suggesting that e#is ation $o) " (e interprete" to protect Con&ention ri#%ts if the court thought it necessary when considering the 0proportiona it! o+ e#is ation'. (n so doing& the 1ourt would defer to -arliament& but would reser&e +or itse + t%e po$er to 0reac% a "i++erent conc )sion from the legislature/ i+ 0t%e e#is at)re %a" attac%e" ins)++icient importance to a person's Con&ention ri#%t'

Nicols Argument: HRA is not the dialogue but enable udges to ta!e broad SI approach The interpretation of sections " and 4 has shown itself to be one of the sites where the scope of the Act has been fought out . As Nicol has observed& t%ose j)"#es !who wish the HRA to ensure that the 1onvention rights as interpreted by the 0uropean 1ourt of Human Rights become the supreme law of the land/ ta/e a (roa" approac% to section 3 that ena( es t%e co)rt to strain t%e itera meanin# o+ an Act to +in" a Con&ention comp iant interpretation-

 Nicol opposes this interpretative faction to those who understand the Act as !a uni*ue participatory instrument/& which must involve the courts and -arliament in a dialogue over the e5tent of human rights in common law. T%is ten"enc! pre+ers narro$er interpretations of section "& with the concomitant reliance on declarations under section 4. Thus& )n"er !in# t%e "isa#reements over the scope of the Act are "i++erent )n"erstan"in#s o+ 0constit)tiona +)n"amenta s' That mean if court interpret differently that mean 1ourt and -arliament has different understand of Human Right

which constitute the constitutional fundamental Has this argument been resolved in the wake of Anderson in favour of the narrow interpretation of section ", )e will e5amine this claim& and 6avanagh/s counter argument in the following section.

New 7ection+ R & A 8 7." application (n R. v. A.& the House of 2ords interpreted 7ection 49 of the 1riminal 0vidence Act 9::: in the light of Article ;. 7ection 49 pre&ente" e&i"ence (ein# #i&en a(o)t t%e comp ainant's se1)a %istor! without the leave of the court. The instances where the co)rt co) " a o$ this kind of evidence $ere narro$ ! "ra$n. Despite t%e c arit! of the wording of the section& the Ho)se o+ Lor"s interprete" t%e Act so as to ma/e it compati( e with Article ;.

 (n Lor" Ste!n's judgment& the interpretative powers given to the court under section " were (roa" eno)#% to a o$ a 0 in#)istica ! straine" interpretation'& e&en $%en t%ere $as no am(i#)it! in the Act.

Re S- cannot depart from fundamental feature 1an Re 7. be seen as a reaction to the !judicial overkill/ of R. v. A. , The Co)rt o+ Appea interprete" the 1hildren/s Act 9:<: in such a way as to ma/e it compati( e $it% Articles < and ;. The Ho)se o+ Lor"s "isa#ree" with this approach& asserting that section 3 "i" not a o$ a co)rt to read a statute in such a way as to "epart +rom 0a +)n"amenta +eat)re o+ t%e Act'+ =A> meanin# $%ic% "eparts s)(stantia ! +rom a +)n"amenta feature of an Act of -arliament is i/e ! to %a&e crosse" t%e (o)n"ar!

between interpretation and amendment. This is especially so where the departure has practical repercussions which the court is not e*uipped to evaluate This argument rests on the "istinction between the +)nctions o+ t%e e1ec)ti&e an" t%e co)rts The +ormer are +ar more a( e to create po ic! and assess its impact& as the co)rt is +)n"amenta ! passi&e and imite" to respon"in# to t%e e&i"ence given by parties to a dispute. ?udges must therefore restrain the uses that they make of section ".

 2ord Nicholls was especially critical of 2ord 7teyn/s #R v A/s judge% position.

 (t was not the case that the court/s interpretati&e ")t! $o) " on ! (e imite" (! e1press $or"s indicating that -arliament intended that an Act was incompatible with the 1onvention. There thus appears to be a departure from R. v. A in Re 7. a line of reasoning that was confirmed in Anderson.

Anderson case" #ollo$ Re S% &' Nicholl The argument pressed upon the House of 2ords in Anderson was that as the sentencin# po$ers of the Home 7ecretary in section $: of the 1riminal #7entences% Act 9::@ $ere incompati( e with Article ;& The House of 2ords were )nanimo)s in t%eir a#reement t%at rea"in# section 23 in t%is $a! $o) " e1cee" t%e interpretati&e po$ers o+ section 3. 2ords .ingham& 7teyn and Hutton a#ree" $it% Lor" Nic%o 's speec% in Re S Nicol observes that even Lor" Ste!n #A/s judge% performed a

!volte face/ and appeared to retreat +rom t%e ar#)ments ma"e in R- &- A.

 -recisely because a panel of se&en La$ Lor"s "eci"e" An"erson& it represents a reso )tion o+ t%e ar#)ment a(o)t t%e scope o+ t%e co)rt's interpretati&e po$ers in the )n"erstan"in# o+ t%e position o+ t%e co)rt artic) ate" (! Lor" Nic%o s. 2ater cases& such as 4e in#er &4e in#er are co%erent $it% An"erson (n the former& Lor" Ste!n referred to 2ord Nicholl/s speech and& in the latter& a certi+icate o+ incompati(i it! was issued& rather than s)(ject t%e Matrimonia Ca)ses Act 5363 to a straine" rea"in#.

(here is difference in A and Re S% so Re S cannot represent the limit of S'3 Are we therefore to accept that Re 7. and Anderson represent the correct statement of the limits of section ",

6avanagh/s argument+ Significant fact difference 7a&ana#% argues that the si#ni+icant "i++erences o+ +act (et$een R- &- A- an" Re S. mean that Re S- cannot (e #i&en t%e stat)s accor"e" to it (! Nico . R- &- A- concerned j)"icia interpretation o+ a speci+ic section of the 9::: Act.

 (n Re S.& there were no sections of the 1hildren/s Act 9:<: that co) " (e sin# e" o)t The Co)rt o+ Appea $as t%)s +orce" to consi"er #in Hale 2?/s words%& not so much what the Act said& but $%at it "i" not sa! That mean judges/ argument built from what Act did not say Re S- cannot& therefore& be seen as "ea in# $it% t%e same iss)e as R- &- A-

 Aurthermore& whereas the conse*uences of the 1ourt of Appeal/s decision in Re 7. would have had significant cost implications for local authorities but R- &- A- concerne" an area in which the co)rts %a&e m)c% #reater competence+ the re#) ation o+ t%e +orensic process Re S- cannot (e rea" as a more #enera statement of a correct j)"icia attit)"e to section 3 Re 7 concern about the Childrens Act

 As 6avanagh puts it+ Section 3859 s%o) " not (e )se" as a way of radically re+ormin# a $%o e stat)te or writing a *uasi legislative code granting new powers and setting out new procedures to replace that statute. However& that "oes not necessari ! mean that the decision r) es o)t t%e t!pe o+ 0rea"in# in' $%ic% $as a"opte" in R- &- A (f this argument is correct& then cases such as An"erson m)st (e seen as speci+ic responses to stat)tes& rat%er t%an as e&i"ence o+ a co%erent j)"icia attit)"e a"opte" to section 3-

Anderson has special context The refusal of the House of 2ords in Anderson to read limitations into the power of the Home 7ecretary under section $: of the 9::@ Act can be e5plained by reference to the conte5t in which the case was heard. The ECtHR %a" j)st iss)e" t$o r) in#s a#ainst t%e U7 %o "in# t%at section 23 $as in (reac% o+ Artic e :. As the #o&ernment $as t%)s 0 e#a ! o( i#e"' to c%an#e t%e a$& there would have been no point in ma/in# a straine" interpretation o+ section 23 and& thus& the (etter co)rse of action was to issue a certificate of incompatibility.

Bellinger not suitable for radical interpret .ellinger shows that the !case by case/ or !limited/ a$ ma/in# po$ers o+ t%e co)rt $ere not s)ita( e to interpret t%e Matrimonia Ca)ses Act in a ra"ica $a!3 it was correct to issue a declaration of incompatibility so that -arliament could assess the policy implications of changes in the law.

1onclusion )hat do we make of these two positions, -erhaps the precise scope o+ section 3 is sti open and that #for the most part% the La$ Lor"s are see/in# a $or/in# re ation& rat%er t%an a con+rontation with -arliament.

ialogue btw institution relationship 7 )# has specifically taken the notion of dialogue as the key to understanding the operation of the Act+ .ehind the construction of ss." and 4 was a carefully thought out constit)tiona arran#ement that sought to inject princip es o+ par iamentar! acco)nta(i it! and transparenc! into j)"icia procee"in#s without removing whole policy areas to judicial determination. (n other words it sought to create a ne$ "!namic (et$een t%e t$o (ranc%es of the 7tate. =Transparency based on my understanding is that now ?udges can comment openly

what is the Human Right should be by declaring incompatible> 6lug argues that Lor" Hope's approac% in R- &- A is m)c% c oser to t%e spirit of the Act than that of 2ord 7teyn. The !dialogic/ relationship envisaged by the Act re,)ires t%e j)"#es to %a&e t%e 0co)ra#e' to iss)e "ec arations& and to actively en#a#e t%e "ia o#)e $it% t%e e1ec)ti&e* rather than to see them as a last ditch measure. Dec arations cannot t%ere+ore (e seen as a "istortion o+ t%e j)"#es' re ation to Par iament3

 Rather& they are part of a vision of the legislature& the e5ecutive and the judiciary 0in+ )encin#' eac% ot%er )hether or not this means that Anderson correctly states their position is open to *uestion. However& evidence on declarations of incompatibility also suggests that the Act is openin# )p a "ia o#)e (et$een t%e co)rts an" t%e e1ec)ti&e-

GHAIDAN & GODIN MENDO;A< read the word into the statute A good e5ample of a (roa" interpretation of an Act under the HRA is Bhaidan v. Bodin 'endoCa. The defendant was contending that the Rent Act discriminated against him as a homose5ual in depriving him of rights over the flat of his deceased partner. The 1ourt of Appeal had held that the Act amounted to an infringement of the defendant/s rights under Articles < and 94 of the 1onvention. 94 prohibit discrimination

 The 1ourt of Appeal had used s." of the HRA to rea" t%e Act in a (roa" $a!& thus a o$in# t%e "e+en"ant to ta/e o&er the tenancy of the flat. The Ho)se o+ Lor"s con+irme" t%e approac% of the 1ourt of Appeal. (t was thus not necessar! to iss)e a "ec aration o+ incompati(i it!& as the Act co) " (e rea" in s)c% a $a! as to ma/e it Con&ention comp iant The House of 2ords did note& %o$e&er& that the new meaning of the Act must be !consistent $it% t%e +)n"amenta +eat)res of the legislative scheme/.

7." read in word to comply not depend whether the statute word is ambiguous )e need to investigate this argument in a little more detail. 2ord Nicholls pointed out that there are a n)m(er o+ $a!s o+ rea"in# s-3 as there is a certain degree of ambiguity in the word 0possi( e' A narrow reading would hold that s-3 only a o$e" co)rts to reso &e am(i#)ities in stat)tor! an#)a#e in +a&o)r of 1onvention compliant interpretations. A much broader interpretation of the section has been preferred& which a o$s t%e co)rts to #i&e a "i++erent meanin# to the language of the statute in order to

make its meanin# consistent $it% t%e Con&ention-

 This co) " in&o &e rea"in# in $or"s& as in R- &- A There is no nee" for the language of the Act to be am(i#)o)s +or t%e Co)rt to ta/e t%is co)rse o+ action This means that the court can 0"epart +rom t%e )nam(i#)o)s meanin# the legislation would otherwise bear/.

'ay depart from intention as well Norma !* t%e co)rt $o) " %a&e to "etermine t%e intention of -arliament by using the language in the Act. However& s." means that the co)rt ma! %a&e to 0"epart +rom t%e intention of the enacting -arliament/. )e can begin to appreciate how the H)man Ri#%ts Act ma/es +or a potentia ! ra"ica "epart)re from conventional methods of interpretation. However& this "oes not e1ten" to the idea that the court is now an e,)a partner $it% Par iament when it comes to legislation.

 The +)n"amenta re,)irement is that the co)rts s%o) " +o o$ Par iamentar! intention in interpreting an Act. The *uestion becomes+ %o$ $o) " a co)rt /no$ t%at it is e#itimate to depart from -arliamentary intention, The answer to this *uestion "epen"s on t%e "e#ree to $%ic% Par iament inten"e" that the !act)a ' $or"s of a statute& as opposed to the concept t%at t%ose $or"s e1press& is to be !determinative/ of the Act/s meaning. )hat does this mean,

 2ord Nicholls argues that the "eterminati&e +actor cannot (e t%e $or" o+ t%e Act& since the HRA a o$s t%em to (e interprete" a#ainst t%eir o(&io)s sense. 7." re*uire to interpret !as far as possible/

 (t would be possible& therefore& for a court to rea" $or"s into an Act .ut not the concept which the word wish to e5press Aor e5ample in this case& husband and wife interpreted as !as if husband and wife/ This would be consistent $it% t%e +act t%at s-3 0re,)ires' t%at co)rts rea" in $or"s to ma/e an Act comp iant with the 1onvention. There is a imit to this process. Although the court can read in words& Par iament co) " ne&er %a&e inten"e" that !the courts should adopt a meaning

inconsistent with a fundamental feature of legislation/ #ibid.%. =perhaps what this statement means that as the present fact& if !-arent and children/ never can read as !husband and wife/ while homose5ual can.> This would cross the line& and show the courts interfering with the sovereign rights of -arliament.

Another example! R 8.i son9 &- .!c%a&on DC =$DD@> saw the Co)rt o+ Appea attempt to "e+ine t%e 0ran#e' o+ t%e G%ai"an princip es 2ord Nicholls pointed out that Par iament was charged with !the primary responsi(i it! for deciding the best way of "ea in# $it% socia pro( ems' and the co)rt's ro e was one of re&ie$. The only legitimate grounds on which the co)rt co) " reac% 0a "i++erent conc )sion +rom t%e e#is at)re/ is !when it is apparent t%at t%e e#is at)re %as attac%e" ins)++icient importance to a person's Con&ention ri#%ts'.

 The court/s willingness to undertake a review "epen"s on conte1t.

 Aor instance& the co)rt $i on ! rare ! consi"er matters of !=n=ationa %o)sin# po ic!' as it is )p to Par iament lo determine where !a fair balance/ lies !between competing interests/. However& the co)rt $i (e more $i in# to consider !a e#e" &io ations' of convention rights (ase" on race* #en"er or se1)a orientation. (n such instances& !the co)rt $i scr)tinise with intensity an! reasons sai" to constit)te j)sti+ication/ and reasons #i&en m)st (e 0co#ent> to j)sti+! !differential treatment/. That mean - will determine policy

 .ut whether the policy will constitute !discrimination/ will be reviewed by 1ourt !7top notices/ under the Town and 1ountry -lanning Act could be used to prevent gypsies developing land on which they had settled without planning permission. As the legislation did not apply to normal dwellings & the applicants were arguing that the provisions were discriminatory and in breach of their 1onvention rights. However& the court considered that the e#is ation $as proportionate on #ro)n"s o+ en&ironmenta protection.

 (n considering whether or not legislation was proportionate& the co)rt %a" to accor" a ar#e meas)re o+ "iscretion to Par iament.

New 7ection+ DEFINING THE PARAMETERS OF THE NE. PRACTICE A )ialogue formed The sample of cases that we have been e5amining suggests that $e are at t%e c)ttin# e"#e o+ a ne$ /in" o+ j)"icia practice -erhaps we can think of the practice of statutory interpretation as the j)"#es enterin# into some +orm o+ "ia o#)e $it% Par iament-

 This would certainly have the authority of ?ac/ Stra$& who& in a -arliamentary debate& argued that+ Par iament an" t%e j)"iciar! m)st en#a#e in a serio)s "ia o#)e about the operation and development of the rights in the .ill . . . this dialogue is t%e on ! $a! in which $e can ens)re t%e e#is ation is a i&in# "e&e opment t%at assists o)r citi@ens (f we accept that the idea of dialogue is useful then it is necessar! to "etermine t%e precise terms in which it operates.

)ialogue $ithin constitutional settlement"S*P (f this is a "emocratic "ia o#)e& then it cannot simp ! (e a j)"icia )s)rpation o+ e#is ati&e po$er in the name of human rights. As 2ord (rvine/s words *uoted in the introduction suggest& the dialogue must ta/e p ace $it%in a constit)tiona sett ement that stresses separation of powers.

)ialogue" proportionalit+ test sub ect to intention However& it is necessary to accept that the dialogue does open )p a ne$ j)"icia &oca() ar!. Eoes this take us back to the proportiona it! test, The proportionality test is a powerful mechanism that can allow either the (roa" interpretation of statutory language or the rea"in# in o+ $or"s in order to ma/e e#is ation Con&ention comp iant. However& t%e test& as shown by Bhaidan v. Bodin 'endoCa& must itself be s)(ject to some constraints& otherwise the courts would be moving far beyond the powers given to them by the Human Rights Act& as the

intention o+ t%e Act $as to preser&e par iamentar! so&erei#nt!.

 The approach in G%ai"an was legitimate because the interpretation propose" by the House of 2ords was consistent $it% t%e +)n"amenta po ic! objectives of the legislation& which were to pro&i"e sec)rit! o+ ten)re. That mean since the purpose of the Rental Act in Bhaidan is to secure tenure& so broad interpret still consistent with the policy

&egislati,e po$er of -ourt 1learly& where a judicial interpretation mo&e" (e!on" t%e po ic! of legislation& the co)rts co) " not e++ecti&e ! e#is ate in Par iament's p ace. (t could thus %esitatin# ! be suggested that a+ter t%e HRA judicial practice is c%an#in# to such an e5tent that j)"#es no$ %a&e an ac/no$ e"#e" e#is ati&e po$er This a o$s t%em to ma/e e#is ation Con&ention comp iant 1ompared to the e#is ati&e po$er of -arliament& it is imite"& but the interpretative provisions of the 9::< Act e++ecti&e ! ma/es

j)"#es t%e e#is ators o+ %)man ri#%ts This is perhaps coherent in some way with 7 )#'s interpretation of the Act. 7he argues that sections " and 4 (rin# an en" to 0j)"icia "e+erence to t%e e#is at)re'3 in particular& judges need to appreciate that s.4 allows them to enter into a dialogue with -arliament. (t would be a mista/e to see s-A as man"atin# a c%an#e o+ a$& rather the Act !was specifically structured to allow the courts to uphold rights while also retaining parliamentary authority/.

It is onl+ dialogue 7 )# suggests that the HRA was intended to !inject principles of parliamentary acco)nta(i it! and transparenc! into judicial proceedings without removing whole policy areas to judicial determination/. C%an#es in j)"icia practice would have to be seen as driven by the !ne$ "!namic' t%at t%e Act attempts to create This would suggest that the precise terms o+ t%e practice or "ia o#)e of statutory interpretation in the wake of the HRA are +oc)se" on sections 3 an" A 6avanagh has made similar points.

 )e can consider her response to the criticisms of R. v. A. )epart from intention. Parliament has / intentions0 Fn critical issue is of the nature of the o( i#ation )n"er s-38 9* and whether it a o$s or re,)ires t%e co)rt to "epart +rom t%e intention of -arliament e5pressed in the words of the statute. -lacing R. v. A. in the conte5t of 2ambert& 7a&ana#% asks why this authority has been singled out for criticism& when in Lam(ert t%e co)rt $ent a#ainst t%e c ear intention of -arliament. This begs the *uestion about how parliamentary intention is understood.

 Recent authorities on s."#9% suggest that there are t$o e#is ati&e intentions at play& namely+ that which is )n"er !in# t%e stat)te in *uestion that which is !e5pressed/ in s."#l%. Section 3859 on ! (ecomes re e&ant when there is a !con+ ict' (et$een t%ese t$o intentions-

Resol,e the conflict How should this conflict be resolved, (f one applies the "octrine o+ imp ie" repea & the later Act would repeal the earlier& but as the HRA app ies to e#is ation 0$%ene&er enacte"'& then it would apply to legislation after 9::<. The !effect/ of s."#l% is thus *uite specific+ Ordinarily& -arliament intends its legislation to be understood in accordance with its ordinary meaning. .y empowering judges to go beyond the ordinary meaning& s-38 9 instr)cts j)"#es to #o

a#ainst t%at e#is ati&e intention. This is supported by the AB reference 4 of $DD$ which describes s."#l% as !very strong and far reaching/ and can re*uire a departure from the !intention of -arliament/. T%is $o) " j)sti+! t%e approac% o+ Lor" Ste!n in R- &- A.& but also in his wider reflections on the justification for a more expanded role for the judiciary.

SI is no mechanical but a dialogue 0laborating these arguments is best left for Chapters "# and "" but $e nee" to mo&e a$a! +rom static )n"erstan"in#s o+ t%e co)rt some%o$ mec%anica ! tr!in# to "isco&er t%e intention o+ Par iament t%ro)#% a itera rea"in# o+ an Act. )e also need to understand the practice> of statutory interpretation as a "ia o#)e (n this dialogue the co)rts "o not )s)rp "ie e#is ati&e po$er of -arliament& ()t on a man"ate #i&en to t%em (! Par iament itself& engage in articulating legislation that is compliant with human rights.

New 7ection+ CONCLUSION SI as pragmatic practice 7tatutory interpretation is a pra#matic practice within constitutional limits. (n attempting to define the parameters of the contemporary practice of statutory interpretation $e %a&e a&oi"e" an! approac% that stresse" t%e centra it! o+ t%e r) es o+ interpretation and have attempted instead to see how& in important cases& j)"#es act)a ! interpret t%e stat)tor! an#)a#e $it% $%ic% t%e! %a&e (een presente". )e have haCarded a general thesis.

-onstitutional term limit the practice Alongside the presumptions of interpretations& which describe the concern with the general structure of the law as meaningful language& there is a str)ct)rin# concern $it% t%e parameters o+ t%e practice. This can only be described in constit)tiona terms.

&egitimac+ limit the udiciar+ create the la$ )here does the boundary lie between interpreting a statute and creating new law, This raises the issue of instit)tiona e#itimac!-

Ne$ )e,elopment Aor us the development of the practice is itself bound up with three important recent developments+ the ruling in Pepper &- Hart* the impact of E)ropean interpretati&e methods& and the powers of interpretation created by the H)man Ri#%ts Act-

&egal practice in realit+ As a general point& describing judicial practice re*uires an engagement+ with speci+ic e#a iss)es& the tensions in approach that show an interaction (et$een "i++erent j)"icia )n"erstan"in#s of practice& the spaces in t%e a$ that allow these arguments to be made.

-entral stand is )ialogue .uilding on the previous chapter& we could say that practices always allow for a degree of dispute over their centra terms and s)ppositions. Over time& these disputes may become resolved& or at least less !hot/& and the practice assumes a conventional form. Biven the impact of so man! recent e#a "e&e opments in statutory interpretation& it $o) " not (e s)rprisin# to +in" some "e#ree o+ "isp)te over the precise constitution of legitimate techni*ues. However& this can e5ist alongside a more or less settled understanding

of the fundamental orientation of the practice.

 )hat we find in recent stat)tor! interpretation is just this mi5ture of co%erence an" "isp)te. Thus a centra stran" in the emerging practice of statutory interpretation can be seen as an on#oin# "ia o#)e $it% Par iament o&er t%e re ations%ip (et$een "omestic e#is ation an" %)man ri#%ts.