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............................................................................................................3
1
.........................................................................4
1.1 ........4
1.2 ...............8
1.3
...............................................................................................12
2 -
..............................15
2.1 .................15
2.2
...........................................................................................18
3 -
23
.1. ............23
3.2 ......25
3.3 .................................................27
3.4 .29
4 .............................................35
4.1
......................................................................................................................35
4.2
........................................................................................................39
5
..............................43
5.1 ............43
5.2 ...........45
5.3 ...................................................................49
5.4 ..........................................53
6 -
................................56
6.1 - ........................56
6.2 - ........61
7
.......................................................................66
7.1 .........66
7.2 ..........................................68
8 -
.....76
8.1
........................................................76
8.2
.................................................................................80

8.3 -
....................................................84
9
, , .....................................87
9.1 ......................................................87
9.2 ....................................................93
9.3 ................................................96
10
....................................102
10.1 ....................................102
10.2 ...................................104
10.3 ................................108
11
.....................................................................111
11.1 ........................................111
11.2
.....................................................................................................113
11.3 .........................................................................115
12
.....................................................................119
12.1 ....119
12.2
..............................................................................................121
12.3
...............................................................................125
13
.....................................................................132
13.1 .......132
13.2
..............................................................137
13.3
..............................................................142
14
........145
14.1 .....................145
14.2 : .......................148
14.3
...................................................................................................154
14.4 ...............................158
Chapter 14 INTERNATIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE
CONDITIONS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND INTEGRATION...163
14.1 Russian trade specialization on the global market.............................163
14.2 WTO and Russia: the basic access questions.....................................165
14.3 Russian accession into WTO and development of the Russian

agriculture...................................................................................................170
...................................................................................................178
................................................................................................179
.........................................................................184
............................................................................................186

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89

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. 435443
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1980 .
.

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.

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(firm offer)
,
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90

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(free offer) .

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93

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, . : GAFTA 80
.
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,
94

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( ,
inspected approved)
, , ;
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, . . ,
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).
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, , , ,
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100 %
);

, 95

.
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:
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96

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97

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98

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99

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(letter of credit)
-

.
:
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;
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I
. - 1

, .
- (collection of payment).


. :
;

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;

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100

, ,
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.
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. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^
(open account)
,
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.
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.
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(check)
.
. .
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. , .
;
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1

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(penalty)
.
(liquidated damages),
'
| .
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.



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102

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5.4
:
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.

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103

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104


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;
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;
.
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105

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.
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106

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1.
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107

6 -

6.1 -

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- , -

.
:
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108

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109

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50 % .

, :
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2 :
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-
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-.
, ,
.
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handled .

-
(stockholders). (operator),

(dealer),
(principal);
,

.
,

.
-,
, , ,
, ,
, .
-


111

. . ,
(distributor), (Vertragshandler),
(Eigenhandler),
(concessinaire),
(concession commerciale) (concession de vente).
, ,
(grantee). -,
, (grantor),
(manufacturer),
(supplier), (exporter).


-.


,
,
.

. ,
,

(
).
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,
, .

.


. 112

, ,
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1
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, - 1 .
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.

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114

,


. ,

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,
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, ,
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.
,


.

,
. ,

(agent, principal);
( ) (Vertreter,
Handelsvertreter, Unternemer);
() (representant, commentant en mandat).
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, , ,
.
.
, . ,
.
,
115

, . - 1
, (,
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( 10 %)
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116

. ,
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(indent). .
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.

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117


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.

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.

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.

118


.

,
.
(. (brokerage), .
(courtage), . (Provision)),
0,25 % 3 %.

, ,
.
: ,
.

-
- . ,
.

6.2
- ,
(,

). -
,

, , ,
.
,
(
),
, , . - , , 119

- , ,
.
,
.

- :
;
;
;
;
.


.
:
1. (merchant houses, merchants, trading
merchants)
,

,
,
.
- .

,
. 2. (export merchants, export firms)
, ,
.
,
,
.
:
- ,
120

(
, -
50 % ).
,
.
(, , , . .).
. ,
,
.


.
,
.
(quay exporter);

.
,
,
.
- .

.

, ;
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-, :
121

, . - : ,
,
-,
. 3. (import merchants)
,

.

. ,

. ,
, , ,
,
, .
, , , , , , .


.
,
,
.

. ,
.
,
,

.
,

. ,

. 122

4. (wholesaler, wholesale merchants)


.


,
.
.
,

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,
,
.

. -
, ,
-

.
5. (retailers)
,
.
,
.
, .
6. (distributors) ,

.
.

, , .
7. (stockists) , -
. 123

, ,
.
.
,
.
,
.

.
1. (export commission
houses) :
-
.
, , ,
,

;
- I

.

.

,
.

, ,
( ),

.
;
124

,
,
- .



( ). ,
, ,
. 2.
(import commission houses)
.

. ,
,
,
.
,

.

. .
.
,
.

.

:
1. - (resident agent) ,
. 125


,
.
2. (export agent, manufacturers export agent)
,

.
,
, ,
.

.
, ,
.
3. (sales agent) , .


.

, ,
.
,
.
-
,
.
4. (buying agent)
, . , .
5. (firms representative) ,
126

,
.
.

, (

).


.
,
.
,
.
,
.

,
.
.
,
, .
, , ,
,
.

,

().
, ,
.
,
.
, ( ,
), 127

. . ,
,
.
, . ,
,

.
, , , , .
.

,
.
.

1. ?
2. ?
3.
?

128

7

7.1


- ,
:

,
.
.
,
,
,
.

,
-
,
.
, ,
,
, . .
.
,
,
.
,
,
129


, ,
() -
(, - .).
,
,
. , ,

. 1970-
, , \
, , .


.
-- ,
,
,
,
,
,

. - \
,
, --
.

:
, .
,
, ,
130

, ;
,
.
,
, ,
,
, , ;
, :
, -,
, ,
,

;
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,
,
.

,
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;
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131

.
, . ,
,

. ,

.
,
,

.

.

,
.
, , . ,

.

7.2
: 1.
.
,
.

.
,
.
( -),
,
,
.
132

2. . ,


.
,
.
, , ,
,
.
,
.
, .
3. , . ,
, , ,
. .

() , ,
( )
, . 70 %
.
IBM
, 35 .
(, , - ) 1950- .
,
, , .
. .
-
.
4. . ,
, , ,
.
, ,

133

, , , . , .
- .
.
, . , ;

, , ,
. , .
,
,
.
5.
9 %.
,

.
/ --
, ,
- - ,
-,
.
, .
:
;
;
;
: ;

.
134


(
) .

, , .
:
, ;
;
,
;

(, ).
,
, .
:
;
;
;

.
,
,
(

).
6. .
, ,
, ()
. 8 %
135

. XVIII .
-
. :
, ;
;
, ;
;
.
7. ()
, ()
, . ,
, () .
,
,
.
-
, .

.

-
:

(product exchange agreements)
,

,
:
:
(barter transactions)
.
136

, ,
.
-

.
,


-
.



. .
1970- .
, ,



;
(direct compensation transactions) ,
,
,

.
,
.
:
, ,
,
.



.
, 137

.
.

, - ,
,

;
( global agreements,
global countertrade agreements).
,
,
,
.
,
, , .
.
,
.

, ,
, ,
, ,
.
:



;

,
;
(framework agreements) , , 138

.
,
,
- ,

.



( )

,
.

.
- (product exchange agreements
based on letter of intent)
,
(3 5 )
.

-, , ,
. -
-
.
,
,
.

, , . ,

. - 139



.
,
,
.
,

. , ,
;
(commercial
compensation, compensation transaction) ,
(delivery)
(counter delivery)
, -

.
,
.

,

(clearing claims).

.
, -

,
.
-,
,
,
, -
.

140

-;
(short-term
commercial compensation transactions):
(partial compensation)

,

;
(full compensation)
,
;
(triangular
compensation)
.
,
, ,
, .


,
.


,
.
,

,
.

,
,
,
(disagio).



;
141


(counter-purchase contracts, transactions based on
counterpurchase
agreements).

(counterpurchase) ,
.
,
, ,
, . , : , ,
,
; ,
,
(
) ,

;

,

, ;
(parallel deal)
:
, .

,

( )

, ,
;
(gentlemen agreement,
offset) 142

, ,

.
.
,
;
(switch transactions)
,
. ,
.
,
;
(advance purchase),
(-compensation),
(linked anticipatory
purchase) ,
.
.

1980- .
, ,
,
, ,
, ,

(compensation credit) .
-,
,


.
,
,
143

.
,
. , ,
,

, .
,

.
. ,
,

,
.
,
.


;
(compensation agreements of the buy-back
type, industrial compensation)
,
:

(large-scale &
long-term compensation agreements of the product buy-back
type) ,
,

, , , 144

,
. ,
,
(

),
,
.

:
,
;
,
.
,
-
,
; (production
sharing)

.


. 20 % 40 %.


, ,


.


.
,
- , 145



.
.
,
,

.
,
, ,
,
.

,
, ,

, :

.
.

,
,
-
. ,
,

, ,

,

,
;


.
,

- , . ,
,
. ,
,

. .
.

1.
?
2. ?
3. -
?

146
147

8.1


- . , , - , . , -
, .
, ,
.
- - , - I
- (),
( )
, -,

.
- ,
.


. , , 148

, ( ).
-
-, , -
, , -, , ,

.

, -
.
:
, , , , . ,
. . , ,
, , , ;
, , , , , - , , ,
, -
. -.
- , , , , , . - :
- ;
;
149

- \
;
.
- (,
, , , ),

( , - 1
). - !
, , - ]
. , j
,
.

, ]
( ) -1
.

:

- ;
;

;

;
;
,
;
'
;
.
:
1.
- . 150

- ,
. , ,
.
- ,
.
-
. - , ,
. - ,
- .
- ,


.
2. .
.
.
,

, .

35 %. 1980- .
,

- ,
151

,
. ,
, , , , . ,
-
,
. ,

, .

- . ,
.
- .
3. . , , : -
, ,
, .
-

,
.

,
,


.
, , 152

.
, , , .

. ,
,
.
, , .

, .

,
.

.
4.
.
,

.
,
.
,



, .

,
.

20 % . 60 %
.
80 %, 50 %.
153


,
- .
5.
. (-1
. ), ,
- ,
.
-


. - .
. , .

,

- .

.


. ,
,

,
,
.

.
,
,
, , 154

.
6. .
,

.
,
- ,
- .
,
,
- .

,
- .

,
, -
,

.
, . -
, .

. .
, .
7. . , ,
.

,

. , 155


,
.
,
, .
,
.
,
.

,
.

.
10 %
,
,
.

.
,
,

.

8.2

, ,
,
(. .
,
, ,
156

).
,


.
,
.
, . .

, ,
.
.
,
, -
,
.
, () () , ,
.
, . , ,
.
:

.

;

,
157

;
- , , , ,
,
, ;
- ,
.
,
,
.

, .
:
1) - ;
2)

,
, ;
3) ;
4) .
:
1) - ;
2) ;
3) ;
4) ,
.
158

:
.
, -,
;
-,
. , ;
;

;
- ;
.

:
. ,

.
. ,
.
( , , , ).
. :
() ,
,

;

,
.

.
159


;


.

, .

,
.
. :
,

:
()

. , , , . 210% ( 3
5%);

,
( 20 % 30 %
; 10 %
). ;
,
,

:


- ]
;
160

.
,
;
;
.


;

15 % . 5 % 20 %
;
,
.
.
, . :
,
,
,
.
.
. :
;
; , ,
,
, ,
; , , .
161

- . . , .
, , .
510 .
:
1) -
;
2) ,
- -
;
1) .

,
,
,
, - .

. , .
.
-,
. , , ,

.
,
-.
162

- .
- :
1) ,
, , ;
2) ;
3) ;
4) , ;
5) ,
, ;
6) .
- :
1) ;
2) ;
3) ;
4) ,
;
5) ;
6) ;
7) .
- ,

, . .
, ,
- , , ,
,
, ,
.

;
-;
-
.

( ) ,
163

, ,
. .
-
, - ,
.
-,

.
-
()
,
() , , .
-.
,
-. - ,
.
, .
. ,
,
.
-
. .
,
,
, .
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1.
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321

C h a p t e r 14 INTERNATIONAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE CONDITIONS OF
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND INTEGRATION
14.1 Russian trade specialization on the global market
For the definition of the modern place of Russia on the global
market and historical features of its trade specialization it is necessary
to consider:
the potential opportunities;
their real use.
Russia has the significant advantages in comparison with the majority
of other countries, traditionally considered as high developed. The
significant size of the territory, the number of historical and national
features have predetermined the character of its foreign economic
relations. These relations were developed under the greater influence of
the internal, than external factors. These circumstances are necessary for
the estimation of the foreign trade relations of the country on the basis
of the preliminary analysis of these factors, and actual level of Russian
economic development.
Russia occupies the first place in the world on the coal reserves and
iron ore and the second place on the oil reserves, precious metals
and diamonds. Russia has the significant area of woods (22 % of the
global forests) and agricultural land. There are the world largest
reserves of natural gas.
The Russian prosperity with natural resources has predetermined the
raw structure of its export not only in the Soviet period, but also much
earlier, in the period of the development of capitalism in Russia.
Nowadays, despite of the general tendencies of growth of trade by the
processed goods, various services, scientific and high-technology
goods, Russia keeps this feature of the export specialization.
The emphasis on the creation of the open economy in the
combination with the system of macroeconomic regulation has caused
the long and hard character of the crisis stage in 1990s and creation the
conditions for stabilization. The foreign trade
322

has played an ambiguous role at this stage of Russian economic


reforms:
1) the foreign trade became the tool of realization of the not optimal
model of Russian transition to the market economy, one of the
channels of flight of the domestic capitals abroad;
2) in frameworks of the really chosen way of the reforms the foreign
trade was one of the basic sources for maintaining of the national
economy. It also became the major tool to start the integration
into the system of global market;
3) import helped to solve one of the most significant problems of
the early period of economic reforms in 1990s the saturation
of the Russian consumer market.
In 1986-1991 Russia was still in the structure of USSR. During
these 5 years the foreign trade turnover reduced twice.
Only since 1993 the annual foreign trade volumes began to increase.
We can compare the GDP dynamics with the dynamics of the foreign
trade turnover in 19921995.
GDP decreased:
1992 - 14,5 %; 1993 - 8,7 %; 1994 - 12,6 %; 1995 - 4,0 %.
FTT decreased too during this period, but in lower rates, and in
1993 Russian export started to grow, and 1994 was the first year of
FTT increase. This increase was achieved because of the significant
activization of the Russian foreign trade relations with the CIS countries.
So, the so-called centralized import sharply decreased because of
the economic crisis and the lack of the financial resources. At the same
time export started to increase in the middle of the 1990s because of the
raw materials (oil and gas) and good prices for them on the global
market. The trade balance was positive.
The main Russian trade partners in 1990s were Germany, USA,
Italy and Great Britain. Among CIS countries: Ukraine, Belarus,
Kazakhstan. The expansion of the trade relations with the CIS countries
was one of the priorities of Russian foreign trade policy.
Russian export in 1990s:
oil (45-47%);
ferrous and precious metals (1517 %);
machinery, equipment and vehicles (8,510 %);
the chemical products (79 %);
wood (4-5 %);
agricultural products (2,53 %).
323

The share of other commodity groups in the Russian export remained


on the average level 1317 %.
The basic reasons of the low equipment share in total export:
decrease of machines and equipment manufacture at the end of
the 1980s;
low competitiveness of Russian equipment;
lack of credit recourses for manufacture and transportation;
the industrial backwardness of Russia;
long terms needed for development and implementation of
modern equipment;
non-payment problems;
absence of the insurance system and the system of bank guarantees.
Russian producers were not well protected from the competing import,
while the level of discrimination of Russian products on the global
market has increased. The country was not only limited in real
opportunities to deliver the competitive goods on the new global markets,
but it also considerably reduced its presence on many important
commodity markets.
Russian import in 1990s:
1) machinery (30 %);
2) food and raw material for its production (30 %);
3) chemical products (912 %);
4) textile, clothes, shoes (9-11 %);
5) ferrous and precious metals (34 %).
The share of food and agriculture products continued to grow. In 1995
the share of the import agriculture products on Russian market has
reached the critical point (40 %).
Devaluation of Russian currency and crisis of the Russian bank
system during 1990-1998 have resulted in significant reduction of import
volumes. Only in August, 1998, during the hardest Russian financial
crisis and default, the import decreased on 32 %, and in the next month
September, 1998 50 %. Total reduction of import during the three
last months in 1998 was 70 % in comparison with the similar periods of
1997.
So, it is necessary to note, that in last 25-30 years Russia had no
precise foreign trade policy. Our country participated in the
international foreign trade relations with the backward structure of its
foreign trade with the raw materials in export and agriculture and hightech products in import.
324

Of course, such trade specialization predetermined the character of


Russian foreign trade development in the modern period. .1998
The essential recession of foreign trade activity because of the
extremely adverse internal and external economic conditions.
FTT - $116,6 bin. It has decreased on 16,8 %.
Export $72,5 bin. Decrease on 16 %.
Import $44,1 bin. Decrease on 18 %.
The FTT decrease is a result of the aggravation of financial crisis in
August-December, 1998.
The decrease of the Russian foreign trade volumes can also be explained
with the low global prices for the main Russian export products (oil,
metals and chemical products). The losses of the country only on three
commodity positions (petroleum, diesel fuel and black oil) were $4,3 bin.
1999
FTT - $102,2 bin. Decrease on 11,2 %.
Export $71,8 bin. Decrease on 0,7 %.
Import $30,2 bin. Decrease on 30,7 %.
The growth of the global oil prices promoted the increase of the
Russian export.
2000
FTT $136,6 bin. Increase on 32,4 %.
Export $102,8 bin. Increase on 41,0 %.
Import $33,8 bin. Increase on 11,5 %.
The volume of the Russian export in 2000 has exceeded $100 bin.,
because of the growth of global prices on oil and other fuel and energy
goods, ferrous and precious metals.
2001
FTT - $149,1 bin. Increase on 3,6 %.
Export - $100,7 bin. Decrease on 2,3 %.
Import $41,2 bin. Increase on 21,7 %.
In 2001 the Russian FTT has reached the highest level for the
period of 1992 2001. This was promoted by the significant growth
of import volume, the increase of the internal demand, the growth of
the investments and level of the real incomes of the population.
2002
FTT - $151,8 bin. Increase on 7,0 %.
Export $105,8 bin. Increase on 5,8 %.
Import $46,0 bin. Increase on 9,8 %.
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The situation on the international markets was still favorable for the
Russian exporters. The export volume increasing has resulted in
strengthening of the national currency and growth of the internal
demand, that has caused the appropriate growth of the import volumes.
Russian export during 1998 2002 developed under the primary
orientation on the development of the foreign trade relations with the
EU countries and USA.
The growth of export volumes to the Western Countries was caused
by a number of reasons:
1) the consequences of the financial crisis of 1998. This crisis has
caused the devaluation of the national currency and the relative
increase of competitiveness of the external markets in comparison
with internal market;
2) the decrease of production costs that increased the competitiveness
of the Russian products on the global market. But in 2000-2002
the devaluation effect was exhausted;
3) oil prices growth.
Russia doesn't use the great potential of the trade relations with CIS
countries. It was the region of the traditional political and economic
influence of the USSR, but today we can see that Russia is loosing its
traditional power in this region.
In structure of Russian import during 1998-2002 we can also see the
tendency of prevalence of the Western Countries in comparison with
the CIS countries.
The devaluation effect after financial crisis in 1998 had the return
influence on the character of Russian import in comparison with export:
1) significant reduction of import volumes has created the favourable
conditions for the development of national manufacture to
substitute the lack of the expensive foreign products on the domestic
market;
2) the crisis has also caused the reorientation of import on cheaper
goods from the CIS countries;
3) The overcoming of the negative consequences for the importers
in the next years has caused the significant growth of import
volumes, basically because of the hi-tech products and new
advanced equipment;
4) import from the CIS countries decreased up to the level of 1998;
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5) it shows the essential dependence of Russian economy from the


import from Western Countries, especially on equipment, high
technologies, machinery.
So, it is necessary to note, that the tendencies of raw orientation of
Russian export and the high dependences of Russian economy on
import can not be favorable for the further development of the Russian
foreign trade.
It is necessary to diversify the Russian export, to develop the
national import substitute production. In Russia we should create the
world-standard legislative basis for international trade. We should work
on the optimization of the geographical structure of Russian foreign
trade relations, including the orientation on the perspective markets of
the CIS countries. And of course we should expand the Russian
participation in the integrated organizations and unions in the sphere of
international trade.

14.2 WTO and Russia: the basic access questions


The World Trade Organization (WTO) was created in 1995. It
continued the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
concluded after the Second World War. This system was created to
adjust global trade through the mechanism of restraint of the unilateral
actions. It worked almost 50 years and proved its effectiveness as a
legal basis of multilateral trade relations. In the years after the Second
World War there was the exclusive growth of global trade. The annual
growth of export was 6 %. The system developed during the series of
trade negotiation (rounds). On the first rounds the questions of tariffs
reduction were discussed, but later negotiations had captured other
areas, such as antidumping and non-tariff measures. The Uruguayan
round in 19861994 has resulted in creation of WTO. This organization
has considerably expanded the sphere of GATT, it included the trade of
services (GATS) and trade-related aspects of intellectual property right
(TRIPS). Thus, the GATT mechanism was advanced and adapted to the
present stage of development of international trade.
The main tasks of WTO:
1) liberalization of international trade;
2) maintenance of the validity and predictability of international
trade;
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3) providing the economic growth and increasing of the economic


wealth of the people.
Structure of WTO:
1. Ministerial Conference top-level decisions.
2. General Council performance of the current work.
3. Council on trade of goods supervision over the activity of the
specialized committees, control of observance of the WTO
principles in the sphere of trade of the goods.
4. Council on trade of services control of performance of the
General Agreement on Trade of Services. In its structure are the
Committee on trade in financial services and Working group on
professional services.
5. Council on trade-related aspects of intellectual property right
is engaged also in questions of prevention of occurrence of the
conflicts connected to international trade by the counterfeit goods.
The negotiation on Russian accession into WTO started in 1995.
The negotiation on the conditions of the products access to the market
is one of the four elements of conditions for any country to WTO (three
others are services, agriculture and so-called system questions). The
major part of such negotiations is the tariff negotiations on the
maximum allowable import rates levels. The country will have the
right to use these rates after the WTO accession. The tariff negotiations
are conducted on the bilateral basis with all interested countries in
WTO.
In 1998, Russia has presented its initial tariff offers to the WTO
partners. These offers had the obvious protectionist character and told
about the closing of the Russian market, not about opening. Though,
formally these offers were not rejected by the partners, were actually
considered as unacceptable, and tariff negotiation on their basis was not
conducted. Only by the end of 1998 on the basis of various concessions
from the Russian side it was possible to get the consent from EU and
USA and to enter the real tariff negotiation started in Moscow in
February, 1999. So, it was the first stage of tariff negotiation stage
of mutual acquaintance. It was finished in the beginning of 1999.
The second stage is 1999: negotiations were carried only with EU
and USA, but very intensively. But there were not the contours of the
probable compromise yet. There were the tariff inquiries from a number
of other WTO countries (Hungary, Korea, Poland, Switzerland,
328

Norway, Turkey etc.). But they were obviously directed on essential


opening of the market on a number of the products, therefore there
were no real negotiations with these countries during this period. So,
we can say, that the second stage is the beginning of practical tariff
negotiations with EU and USA and expansion of the circle participating
in tariff negotiations up to 15 countries.
The third stage started in 2000. The intensity of tariff negotiations
has essentially increased. For the first time there were designated the
contours of the probable compromise within the framework of negotiations
with EU and USA. The active tariff negotiations started with Canada
and Japan. The amount of tariff inquiries from the various WTO
countries had increased. 38 WTO countries already participated in the
negotiations. These countries were the major Russian trade partners.
With some of these countries the negotiations were structural enough,
and the share of the agreed tariff positions had exceeded 50 %.
The fourth stage (2004-2005), when under the initiative of the
Russian side the intensity of the tariff negotiations has increased even
more. With the largest WTO countries there were 6 negotiation rounds,
including the negotiations in the capitals of these countries, and with
others 40 countries not less than 4 rounds. It allowed to reach the
following results:
1) practically all Russian trade partners were involved in real
negotiations. It is important, that it was achieved at the given
stage, because some WTO countries try to set the maximum
tariff requirements directly ahead of the accession, and the
joining country has to meet these requirements to achieve the
final result and to access WTO;
2) the degree of the positions coordination with the overwhelming
majority of the partners has reached 80 %;
3) with some countries the negotiation already were on the final
stage with only 3-5 unmatched groups of the products.
The fifth stage 2006 and present time. Russia has agreed all the
positions with all trade partners, including USA and is ready to enter
WTO in 2008. At this stage Russia negotiated on the basis of the following
principles:
1) there are no terms of the Russian accession to WTO and finish of
the tariff negotiation. These negotiations will be completed only
with the achievement of all the results, necessary for Russia;
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2) at the moment of the Russian accession to WTO any tariff rate


will not be lowered. They will stay at the same level, as before
accession;
3) in the certain time after accession the tariff rates for the some
products can be unsignificantly reduced (3-5 %). These are
products in which extended admission on the Russian market the
country is interested itself (raw materials, not made in Russia, or
semifinished items, progressive process equipment, elements of
a furnish or components making Russian products competitive on
the global markets), or those products, the reduction of the
tariffs on which will not threat Russian producers (for example,
ferrous metals products);
4) on each product, on which there can be the tariff reduction, it is
obligatory to provide the transitive period of adaptation. Its
duration depending on the sensitivity of the appropriate Russian
products and fiscal factors will vary from 3 till 7 years from the
moment of Russian accession to WTO;
5) Russia does not consider the participation in the unessential
WTO tariff arrangements as the obligatory preliminary condition
of its WTO accession, but by the results of the bilateral
negotiation Russia can come closer to the some of these
unessential conditions that will not damage the Russian interests
or will promote the acceleration of its economic development
(tariff harmonization for the chemical goods, Agreement on the
information technologies).
The basic advantages of the any country accession to WTO can be
presented as the set of three following aspects:
the increase of the markets openness degree;
the simplification of the access to the foreign investments;
the unification of the domestic legislative base in the field of
international trade according to the global requirements.
The basic positive aspects of the Russian accession to WTO.
/. Today. The conditions of the Russian products and services
access to the basic international markets are worsened. More
than 90 discrimination measures are applied against Russian
products and services, the overall damage to the Russian
economy is estimated in $3-4 bin. The access on the
international markets becomes a problem of the economic safety
of the country.
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After. Russia will be able to negotiate on the improvement of the


access conditions for the Russian products and services on the
global markets tariffs reduction, restrictions removal. Russia
will get the access to the WTO judicial system and the opportunity
of the compulsory decisions execution.
2. Today. Russia is isolated from the participation in the
development of new rules of international trade. As a result
the new accepted trade decisions can threat the strategic
interests of the country.
After. Russia will be able to take part in the development of new
rules of international trade with its current and strategic interests.
3. Today. The EU expansion, Eastern European and Baltic countries
accession to the EU will worsen the access conditions on the
markets of these countries.
After. Russia and EU countries will act in the frameworks of one
trade system, it will provide the access for the Russian products
on the traditional markets.
4. Today. The Russian legislation is inconsistent and complicated. It
interferes with the normal development of the economic activity,
attraction of the foreign investments.
After. The participation in WTO assumes the stability of the
legislation based on the multilateral standards. It essentially raises
the attractiveness of the state for the foreign investments.
5. Today. The states of Russian Federation frequently apply the
measures interfering the normal economic exchanges.
After. According to the WTO standards norms, the participant
country should result all legislation, including the legislation at
the regional level, in conformity with the general and specific
WTO obligations.
6. Today. The lobbying of the interests of the separate companies
and groups can become the serious problem for government and
parliament.
After. The participation in WTO will essentially reduce the
lobbying opportunities since. Russia will be restricted by the rigid
obligations, including the obligation on non-discrimination.
7. Today. The Russian customs policy, as well as the policy of the
regulation of the market access, has inconsistent and complicated
character.
After. The participation in WTO will subordinate the policy of
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the regulation of the market access to the strict international


rules. 8. Today. The integration of Russia and other CIS countries is
extremely slow. Nowadays it is under the threat because of the
accession to WTO of Georgia and Kirghizia, and also Ukraine and
other CIS countries intention to join WTO.
After. The Russian participation in WTO will promote the
strengthening of the relations within the framework of CIS on
the basis of the agreements on free trade and creation of the
customs union.
Alongside with positive aspects of the Russian integration to the
system of the international trade on the basis WTO rules, there are
also some questions widely discussed by the domestic economists and
various mass media and considered as negative consequences of the
WTO accession:
1. Russia will lose the opportunity to protect the national producers,
since the tariff will be binded and the subsidies will be limited.
The level of the tariff binding is the question of negotiation.
Most likely, it will be possible for Russia to achieve the average
level of binding which is 12 %, that is higher, than expected
level of the tariff protection after the realization of last decisions
on the so-called harmonization. Russia will be able to actively
apply the tools of the selective protection from the damaging
foreign competition, which are practically not used till now. In
critical cases Russia can quit the tariff binding. As to the
subsidies, the interdictions concern mainly the export subsidies in
industry, which are ] practically not given in Russia. The
subsidizing of the agrarian sector is a separate question. All the
kinds of agricultural subsidizing are allowed by WTO. The task is
the coordination of the reasonable level of such subsidies.
2. Russia will be compelled to open the key services markets, that
will damage the national interests.
Any WTO partner does not require the complete liberalization
of services markets yet. There are some measures in the project
of the Russian obligations. The application of these measures can
remove the negative effect of the foreign competition even in
case of the complete opening of the certain services markets. The
access for the foreign suppliers is now
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limited only in 6 sectors of services. In critical cases Russia can


quit the obligations on access on the concrete services market.
3. Russia will lose the opportunity to carry out the independent
economic policy.
Already now the economic independence of Russia is limited by
more than 4000 international agreements, in which it participates.
A number of these agreements (for example, the Agreement on
partnership and cooperation with EU) contain the direct references
to the concrete clauses of the WTO agreements and obligations
identical or comparable to the obligations of the WTO participants.
On the other hand, the decision of the number of important
macroeconomic tasks is unreal without using the international
experience of other countries.
4. The participation in WTO will result in growth of the expenses of
the federal budget.
The annual charges of the country on participation in WTO
do not exceed $1-2 mln. (fees and payments).
5. The participation in WTO will require the serious changes in the
work of the Russian government and parliament.
In this case the uneasy task should be solved: the education
and training of the qualified specialists to work in the government
and parliament.
At accession to WTO the candidate country takes up the certain
obligations. It is possible to allocate two main directions of these
obligations:
1. the obligations on the necessity of unification of the national
legislation and practice of its application in conformity to the
WTO norms and rules;
2. coordination of the individual obligations during negotiations
(the conditions of liberalization of the market access for goods
and services).
The basic economic consequences of the WTO accession can be
connected to these obligations. The analysis of the WTO accession
consequences should be concentrated on:
1) the research of the consequences of the legislation change
according to the WTO norms and rules, as concerning the
reflection of the general principles, and performance of the
concrete requirements in the field of application of the trade
policy tools;
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2) the research of the consequences of the obligations on the market


access for goods and services;
3) the research of the opportunities of use the protection mechanisms
for the domestic market in the case of dumping or application of
the foreign subsidies.
Thus the consequences of the WTO obligations acceptance can carry
both qualitative character, for example the legislation change, and
quantitative character, for example manufacture and import dynamics
and ratio, which can be observed and estimated statistically.
The analysis of the probable Russian obligations in the field of the
legislation change and the application of the trade rules has shown, that
the acceptance of the WTO norms and rules will not create the essential
negative economic consequences for Russia. The application of Most
Favoured Nation Regime can result in some aggravation of the foreign
competition on the Russian market. However the probable difficulties
will be compensated due to the increase of the transparency, higher
predictability of the authorities' actions and the elimination of the
unjustified restrictions in the market.
As a whole, the substantial performance of the WTO norms and
rules in the given area will not result in basic changes of the trade
regulation mechanisms, and also will not cause the significant growth
of import and sharp change of the competition conditions of the foreign
and domestic goods on the Russian market.
On the contrary, the change of the legislation can become the factor
of the increase of the competitiveness of the Russian enterprises
because of the elimination of some excessive restrictions, formation of
the healthy competitive environment with equal and nondiscrimination
conditions of enterprise activity, and also increase of the transparency
level of the legislation and regulation measures.
The basic precondition of the successful overcoming of the problems
in the field of the legislation transformation and use of its advantages
in the frameworks of WTO is the effective continuation of the process
of the legislation perfection within the framework of the Russian
economic reforms. First of all, the excessive administrative pressure on
the enterprises should be eliminated and the degree of the legislation
transparency should be increased.
The results of the detailed quantitative analysis of the consequences
of the market access obligations show that the essential negative
consequences are improbable. The key factors, which will determine
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the rates of the industry development, will be the factors that are not
connected directly to the probable WTO obligations first of all, the
internal economic factors. It is possible to assume, that the probable
changes in the conditions of the market access for the foreign goods
will not significantly effect on the conditions of competition of the
domestic and foreign goods on the Russian market and will not result
in the essential negative consequences for the Russian economy.
The given conclusions are fair for all considered basic scripts of the
individual obligations acceptance: the establishment of the import tariffs
at the binding level according to the tariff offers during the transitive
period, freezing of the tariffs at the current level with the subsequent
reduction according to the tariff offers during the transitive period, the
variant with the probable changes of practice of VAT and customs taxes
collection.
All these scripts were compared to the base variant, which provides
the preservation of the current rates of the customs tariffs:
1) the first script initial. The economic development is carried
out proceeding from the current tariff, budget and tax policy. The
script corresponds to the preservation of the existing situation in
case of non-accession or accession at the preservation of the
current rates of the import customs tariffs;
2) the second script. The economic development was predicted in
view of the Russian offers on binding of the customs tariff rates.
It was assumed that in all cases the opportunities of the tariff
increase will be completely used within the framework of the
binded levels. Also it was assumed the gradual reduction of the
tariff rates during the transitive periods on the appropriate positions
of the customs tariff;
3) the third script similar to the second, but without the
assumption of the probable increase of the tariffs up to the
binded levels, i.e. the change of the tariffs was assumed only
in the way of downturn.
As a whole the forecasted changes of the trade regime will not cause
the more essential changes of the tariff system, than were observed in
last 67 years. It is obvious, that under the condition of the
preservation in the Russian economy the tendency to the economic
stabilization and further adaptation of the enterprises to the conditions
of the open market economy, the consequences of such changes of
tariff system will not be sensitive for the Russian economy.
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It is possible to make a conclusion, that in ten years' prospect the


factor of the WTO accession will not render the influence on the basic
proportions of the Russian economy. Irrespective of the accession
scripts, export volume of the industrial products will have some
tendency to decreasing. And the least significant this decreasing will be
in the case of non-accession (on 3,4 %), and most significant in the
case of accession on the conditions of the base tariff offer (3,6 %).
Such tendency is quite natural and it is the consequence of the
economic stabilization and economic growth, that is expressed in the
activization of the internal demand and expansion of the domestic
market volume. Thus the importance of export as the compensating
factor of the demand decreasing on the domestic market in the
conditions of recession, will be reduced.
The basic results according to the probable consequences of the
Russian accession to WTO can be formulated as follows:
1) the factors which can result in occurrence of the significant and
obvious negative consequences for the general trend of the
economic development are not revealed;
2) the WTO accession will not itself result in the occurrence of the
significant economic advantages, which can be expressed in the
quantitative form;
3) the basic tendencies and the rates of development of the Russian
economy as a whole and the separate branches and sectors both
in case of accession and non-accession to WTO will be
determined by the same factors, which are not directly connected
to the fact WTO accession;
4) the WTO accession will promote the occurrence of the structural,
political and other qualitative factors and changes, which can
favour to the creation of the conditions for increase of the
Russian enterprises competitiveness;
5) the obligations within the framework of WTO legal system do
not require the radical change of the legislation and regulation
system in Russia;
6) the WTO accession will not require the refusal of development
of the regional cooperation within the framework of CIS.
However, as a result of WTO accession the CIS countries will
receive the additional stimulus to the development of cooperation
with non-CIS countries. The legal forms of the regional cooperation
will become more precise and determined. In many ways it will
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relieve the cooperation within the framework of CIS of the political


elements and will require a concrete definition of its economic
components. It will result in rationalization of the regional
cooperation within the framework of CIS; 7) the foreign trade
partners will not receive the significant advantages in comparison
with the Russian enterprises. The policy concerning the Russian
enterprises and regulation policy on the domestic market will not
be more discriminative, than concerning the activity in the global
market. This policy will follow the general non-discriminative
principles incorporated in the WTO basis.

14.3 Russian accession into WTO and development of


the Russian agriculture
The integral part of the WTO negotiations on the markets access is
the negotiations on the agricultural problems. Besides tariff aspect, they
include also consideration of the Russian policy of the concerning state
support of agrarian sector and export subsidizing.
The agricultural negotiation are conducted from the end of 1998,
when the initial offers on the Russian obligations in agriculture were
submitted. The given document authorized by the Commission of the
Government of the Russian Federation on WTO problems fixed the
levels of internal support of agricultural producers (so-called Aggregated
Measure of Support) both subsidizing of the agricultural products export
and foodstuffs in format established by WTO.
It is necessary to note, that AMS includes the measures that have
the major influence on trade and manufacture (subsidies for animal
and plant production, indemnification of the part of expenses on
materials purchasing, preferential crediting, price support, privilege
for transportation).
The official declared Russian position submitted in WTO Secretary
in March, 2001, was based on the basic period on the level of internal
support of agriculture in 19911993, and under the export subsidies
on the period 19901992. The given position provided:
- AMS $16,2 bin. (the general average parameter of AMS, that
have to be binded), with reduction during 6 years up to $12,9
bin;
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export subsidies average size of export subsidizing that have to


be binded at a rate of $726 mln., with reduction during 6 years
up to $464,7 mln.
There are three-scripts at the WTO access negotiations concerning
the Russian agricultural market:
1) the complete liberalization of the market;
2) the partial liberalization of the market (the existing level of the
customs tariffs decreases on 36 % within 5 years, i.e. on 7,2 %
annually). Such variant is supposed under the WTO charter at
the accession of the new country;
3) a situation, when the Russian side will be successful in defending
the position with the optimum protection of the Russian agrarian
producers on the domestic agricultural market (tab. 14.1).

We created the model, which analyzes the matrix 6x6 (6 integrated


regions on 6 integrated commodity groups).
6 regions are Russia, CIS countries, EU, East Asia, NAFTA
countries, and others.
6 commodity groups are: sugar, meat (including poultry), grain,
industrial goods, services, other agricultural products.
For the analysis of the received results the following parameters
were used:
Dynamics of import and export on each commodity group;
Dynamics of manufacture on each commodity group;
Dynamics of the investments and GDP of the country;
Dynamics of the country wealth.
Using the given model, we shall carry out the analysis of
consequences of the Russian accession to WTO for the development
of Russian agriculture within the framework of three scripts.
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Script 1. Complete liberalization


It is obvious, that at complete liberalization of the agricultural
market the import of meat products in Russia will increase to the
greatest degree, since the given commodity group is under the greatest
quotas today (fig. 14.1). The import of meat at the Russian accession
to WTO will increase more than twice. The Russian producers provide
today not more than 50 % of all meat consumption in the country. It is
obvious that the cheap import will put appreciable impact on the
Russian meat producers.

The significant import growth will be observed in the case with


sugar. Today the sugar consumption in Russia on 75-80 % is provided
by the import.
By grain and other agricultural products we can predict the
insignificant import growth.
On agricultural export we can observe the growth on all the
commodity groups (fig. 14.2).
The significant reduction of trade barriers will cause the export
growth. But if we pay attention to the absolute parameters, it will be
possible to notice, that the export of agricultural products after the
WTO accession will not cover import even on 10 %.
The agricultural production will decrease, the GDP will decrease
on 3 %, the investments will be reduced on 0,8 % (fig. 14.3). But,
339

despite of such negative parameters, at complete liberalization of the


agricultural market the general wealth of the country will increase on
$1,3 bin. (because of the redistribution of the money resources to the
more profitable manufactures).

However, it is necessary to note, that the Script 1 of complete trade


liberalization is improbable. It is more theoretical model. In the greater
degree it is possible to expect the realization of the Script 2, i.e.partial
market liberalization.

Script 2. Partial market liberalization


The import of agricultural products in Russia is still increased, but
already in a smaller degree (fig. 14.4). The import of meat products will
increase by 29 %, import of sugar on 15 %. As well as in the Script
1, the import of grain will not change. It is expected, that the import
under the given script will grow gradually depending on the same
gradual reduction of trade barriers on 36 % during the five years'
transitive period.
The situation with export is similar the export grows, but by

smaller rates, than in the case of theoretical complete market


liberalization (fig. 14.5). It is connected, first of all, to the preservation
of counter higher requirements to the domestic export from the
importers.
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Script 3. Modern situation


Scri pt 3 can be considered as the close to the Scri pt 1, to theoretical
model. But the modern stage of the agricultural negotiations shows that
the Russian side had defended its trade positions in agriculture and the
trade barriers for agricultural products will not change significantly.
Import of agricultural products is reduced under such circumstances
(in particular, import of grain). On the other commodity groups import
grows unsignificantly (fig. 14.7).

Nevertheless, the volume of agricultural production is still decreasing


(fig. 14.6).

The fact of recession of manufacture at partial and gradual market


liberalization at the WTO accession tells that any attempt to free the
access to the domestic market leads to the reduction of own manufacture.
It has especially significant effect when the exporter is actively subsidized
by the government. At the Script 2 the GDP will decrease on 1 %, the
investments will decrease on 0,2 %.
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Export also grows (because of the back measures of the countries on


protection of their producers) (fig. 14.8).
The manufacture of agricultural products, as well as in the previous
scripts, is decreased, but unsignificant (fig. 14.9). The GDP and
investments at the Script 3 will stay constant.
So, the WTO accession will be positive for Russian agriculture only
if the conditions of the accession are favourable to Russia.
Russia should be allowed by WTO to provide the state support at the
level of other countries, for example, USA or EU countries.
In USA the annual state support of agriculture is $20 bin., in
Germany $10 bin.
A similar situation and with the import tariffs.
The import tariffs should provide Russia with the real protection tool
for internal agricultural producers from the expansion of import
agricultural products.
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14.4 Russia and global integration processes

There is no doubt that Russia will enter WTO, because nobody


able to break the global tendencies.
The preparation to the WTO accession today should proceed in a
practical way training of the staff, development of the appropriate
normative documents.
We should follow the words of the President of the Russian
Federation Vladimir Putin: WTO is not the absolute evil and not the
absolute benefit. It is the tool, and we should learn how to use it.
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The place and role of any country in global market depend on many
factors. Basic of them are:
1) level and dynamics of national economic development;
2) openness degree of the national economy;
1) character of its participation in the international economic
relations;
2) progressiveness and development of foreign economic relations;
3) flexibility of the national economy (its possibility to adapt to
the conditions of the international market and simultaneously to
influence on these conditions in the desirable way);
4) presence of the necessary legislative conditions for the foreign
investments;
3) presence of the international (transnational) corporations.
The basis of the integration process develops at a micro-level as
mutually advantageous cooperation of the concrete companies, banks,
financial and industrial groups, their joint investment projects, creation
of the transnational enterprises.
The historical and economic analysis shows, that Russia (USSR)
went through five stages in its interaction with global economy. These
stages have the following economic features:
Stage 1. 1917-1945. Political and economic isolation. The economic
and political situation in Europe at that time was characterized by the
several tendencies:
1. The activization of the national movements in the Slavic
countries started after the First World War.
2. USA, Great Britain and France had strengthened their positions,
they have accepted the basic rules of the Agreement on
Collective Safety.
3. Revolution in Russia (1917), Civil War (1917-1920), creation of
the Soviet Union (1921). The Russian contacts with other foreign
countries are minimal. Russia is in isolation.
4. The economic cooperation and development of the foreign trade
relations in not the priority for the Soviet government.
5. The power of Soviets is absolute. The Soviets try to create the
country of a new type. The country is closed, the
collectivization and industrialization plus the military and
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communist terror let to saturate the interior with all the


necessary products and services. 6. Such autonomy became one
of the factors of our victory in the
Second World War. Stage 2. 19451985. Cooperation with other
socialist countries (socialist camp):
1. Political expansion to the developing countries.
1. After the Second World War USSR has surrounded itself with
the countries with the socialist and soviet political regimes
(Eastern Europe). It allowed to realize the socialist model of the
international trade relations.
2. The opposition with USA and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). The Iron Curtain.
3. There was created the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) that has resulted in creation of the system of redistribution
of the production and services among participating countries.
4. The new economic system was actually created with the priority
of the political principles. It has resulted in decrease of the
economic efficiency and competitive advantages, that became
one of the reasons of destruction of this system.
Stage 3. 19851991. Disappearance of socialism as political system.
1. Destroy of the Soviet political system.
2. Liquidation of the CMEA.
1. Gorbatchev and new economic and external policy (Perestroyka).
3. The termination of the opposition with USA and NATO.
2. The decrease of the competitiveness in the international markets.
The economic crisis was caused by the structural factors. Import
had sharply decreased (45 % in 19891990). Export decreased
on 27 % during 8 months in 1989, mainly because of the
recession in oil production and low oil prices.
3. The investment activity has decreased. Total investments volume
decreased in 1991 on 20 %. The budget investments volume had
especially sharply decreased.
4. The incomes of the national budget decreased because of the
recession of manufacture, decreasing of foreign trade.
4. The gold and foreign currency reserves decreased.
5. Result the deficiency of the USSR budget in 1991 more
than $100 bin..
346

Stage 4. 1991-2000. Building the capitalism.


1. Destroy of the Soviet Union.
2. Creation of the CIS.
3. The shock therapy policy in economic.
4. Privatization.
1. Uncontrollable production and export of natural resources, absence
of the government control and legislation. Oligarchs.
2. The prevailing principle of personal enrichment among the
directors of the government enterprises has resulted in economic
decreasing, in the further weakening of the Russian positions on
the global market.
3. Financial crisis in 1998. Default of Russian economy and
devaluation of Russian currency.
Stage 5. 2000 present time. The economic pragmatism.
1. The attempt of the political stabilization and consolidation of the
Russian society.
2. The favourable conjuncture of the international market for the
major Russian export products.
3. The attempt of rehabilitation in global economy, the offers of
constructive and mutually advantageous economic partnership.
1. The struggle with the international terrorism.
2. EU and WTO.
Today the successful integration of our country to the global market
depends on the several factors:
1) the results of the Government activity on improvement of the
national economy, its structural reorganization and transition to
the market conditions;
2) the creation of the effective legislative, organizational and technical
preconditions for the economic development.
In the 1990s Russia was in the extremely difficult situation. As a
result of the radical economic reforms the country was rejected on
some decades back, while the majority of other countries quickly
advanced. If USSR occupied the 2nd place after USA on GDP, in 1998
Russia was on the 12th place, after, for example, China, India, Brasil
and Mexico.
Today Russia is deeply involved in the global economy. The share
of export in its GDP is about 27 %, even more than in Germany,
France and Italy. Russia already became the country
347

with the open economy. But the Russian export consists of energy
resources and raw material. Due to the orientation on the external
market these branches (oil, gas and metals) remained competitive,
while other branches, especially machinery production, decreased in 2
3 times.
The status of the high-developed country in the modern integrated
world is impossible without the structural changes in the Russian business.
The national economy should be based on the powerful integrated
corporate structures, first of all financial and industrial structures, capable
to compete on internal and global markets with the leading transnational
corporations.
Within the framework of the complex integrate strategy of TNC the
capital flows (direct investments) and trade come together. There are
diverse connections in production sphere: between the headquarter
company and its foreign branches, between different branches of the
corporation, between various TNCs and their branches or any other
companies. The international trade becomes the reflection, the
consequence and the stimulus of these connections.
Such new scheme has a number of differences from the former
scheme of international trade. According the former scheme, the
production was focused within the national economy, and then the '
products went abroad to the external markets, where they competed with
the products from other countries.
Nowadays this situation changed, there is the competition of the j
TNCs on the global market.
Europe was always one of the major priorities for Russian
integration. It is caused by a great number of reasons: historical,
political, economic. Europe was always the main source of the foreign
investments to Russia, Russia always used the newest science and
engineering achievements from Europe. For this reason in the Russia
external policy in 1990s the role of European direction has essentially
increased.
European Union today is one of the three main industrial, financial
and trade centers of the world. It is especially important for the
European part of Russia, where basic part of the population and
manufacture are concentrated.
EU is the basic trade partner of Russia. Its share in Russian trade
turnover is 35 %. Up to 60 % of all foreign investments come to Russia
from the EU. Though the share of Russia in the EU foreign
348

trade is only 3,5 %, Russia provides up to 20 % of gas and 16 % of oil


to EU. Also Russia is the main importer of the European agricultural
products.
The long-term development strategy of the EU-Russia relations
includes the cooperation in such spheres, as:
structural and industrial policy;
conversion of military manufacture;
environment protection;
scientific potential;
information technologies.
In 1997 was submitted the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation
(APC) between Russian Federation and European Union. This Agreement
is directed on creation of the necessary conditions for gradual Russian
participation in the European cooperation.The Agreement determines:
1 ) trade regime for goods and services;
2 ) the conditions of the business activity, capitals and labour
migration;
3 ) the basic directions of the economic cooperation;
4 ) the general legal frameworks of cooperation in various industries,
including raw and mining, energy supply, agriculture,
construction, standardization and certification, the realization of
the concrete industrial projects.
At the same time, this Agreement has the negative restrictive regime
for Russian export on a number of important commodity groups (ferrous
metals, textiles, nuclear fuel, agricultural production).
Because of the EU expansion and integration to the EU of East
European and Baltic countries the Russian export to the traditional for
our country markets can decrease (in particular, export of mineral
fertilizers, chemical products, agriculture products). There is still the
practice of antidumping procedures for Russian products.
Russian export to EU includes oil, gas, raw materials and other
low-processed products.
The important stimulus for the development of the mutually
advantageous cooperation between Russia and EU is the creation of the
legal environment by the unification and rapproachement of the Russian
and European legislations. The legislation of EU meets the international
requirements, in particular, WTO rules. The rapproachement of the
legislations will push the Russian businessmen to the necessity of the
flexibility and fast adaptation to the conditions of the European market.
349

Also it will speed up th - structural reorganization of the Russian


economy.
Alongside with the development of the trade relations Russia supports
the close connections with the European financial markets, with banks
and other credit organizations. There are Paris and London Credit
Clubs, and Russia participates them, and also there is the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The West-European investors
are active enough on the Russian market.
The relations with the CIS countries are the special problem for
Russian integration processes. Last years the traditional trade relations
with the CIS countries weakened because of the orientation of the
Russian trade flows to the West Europe and USA.
In the beginning of the 1990s the share of the East European and
CIS countries in Russian export was 60 %, in import 40 %. In the
middle of the 1990s their share decreased to 15,4 % in export and 16 %
in import. The main reason of this decrease was the aspiration of
Russian businessmen to export their production to the West Europe and
USA and to get the hard currency. At that time the contract prices with
CIS countries remained much below the global prices.
The markets of CIS countries is the traditional zone of influence for
Russia and more favorable conditions for the competition with western
producers. And also for the CIS countries Russia is a very attractive
trade partner. It is determined by the significant economic potential of
our country, cheaper mineral resources, the high level of industrial and
trade integration, technological interdependence of the enterprises.
The integration process in the frameworks of CIS started in 1993
with the Agreement on creation of the Economic Union. This Agreement
provides the legislative base for the gradual deepening of the integration
process through a number of stages:
creation of free trade association;
customs union;
common market of the goods, services, capitals and labour. The
Economic Union assumes:
free moving of the production factors;
coordinated credit, budget, tax, price, external, customs and
currency policy;
the national legal regime to the businessmen of the participating
countries;
350

the assistance to their direct economic relations;


the creation of the joint enterprises, transnational associations;
the coordinated investment policy, including the joint capital
investments and attraction of the foreign investments and credits.
In 1995 was submitted the governmental program on deepening of
economic integration with the CIS countries. This program determined
the main directions of the economic interaction with CIS:
1) trade;
2) the currency and credit policy;
3) joint activity, including joint investment programs;
4) the activity of the interstate economic structures.
Nowadays there is the active process of the construction on the basis
of CIS the economic and trade union of four countries: Russia, Belarus,
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. It is supposed:
to create the organization of regional integration on the basis of
the free trade union;
to unify the budget and tax policies, and also other branches of
economic legislation.
The creation of this union will:
facilitate the trade process between the participating countries;
increase the competitiveness of the national producers on the
common integrated market;
allow to unify the foreign trade legislation;
form the economic basis for closer interaction of the participating
countries on the EU example.
Another way of the development of integration process in the
frameworks of CIS is the creation of the united state of Russia and
Belarus. The free trade regime between these countries was established
in 1992. On the basis of the Agreement on Customs Union there was
created the customs regime which assumes both free trade regime and
joint protection of national economies. The development program also
includes the development of custom infrastructure. It is very important
for Russia, because the western borders of Belarus will be the customs
border of Russian Federation with EU. Unfortunately, in the last 2
years the Russia-Belarus integration process stopped because of the
political and economic reasons.
East Europe is also very important region for Russia. These countries
are the former members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
351

Slovakia. The share of these countries in the Russian foreign trade


decreased from 38,7 % in 1990 to 15 % in 2005.
This decrease of the foreign trade is followed by the deterioration of
its commodity structure. The share of oil, wood, aluminium and chemical
products increase. The significant part of import from these countries is
agricultural products, though the share of machinery and equipment in
import from Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic is 40 %.
Today the East European countries lost their role of the main
Russian economic and trade partners. However the revival of the economic
cooperation between Russia and the East European countries meets the
interests of both sides. In future Russia can become the significant
investor to the economy of the East European countries.
Also there is the interest from East European countries to invest in
Russia. And of course Russia has a great capacious market and a great
potential for the development of trade relations with East Europe.
Questions for self-control
1. What are the major directions of Russian trade specialization on
the global market?
2. What are the basic positive and negative aspects of the Russian
accession to WTO?
3. What are the main stages of Russian integration to the global
economy ?

352


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