DiCharia1

Croatia: Progression toward Democracy

On the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, Croatia has experienced the political forces of non-democratic regimes and, most recently, a democratic regime. The ideologies of fascism, communism, federalism, semi-authoritarianism, and democracy have progressed from the time the Nazis invaded Yugoslavia in 1941 up until current day. Croatias time as a republic of

DiCharia2 Yugoslavia provided it with roots that would eventually transform it to its current, democratic state. In order to review the political maturation of the state, multiple factors shall be observed within a chronological analysis: the governments and political parties of each regime, the ethnic and cultural differences between Croatia and its neighbors, the legacies left by leaders of different regimes, and the economy during each political stage, which ignite regime changes within Croatia. When the German army invaded Yugoslavia in 1941, after an anti-German government was installed in Belgrade, Serbia (the capital of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), a fascist group of Croats, called the Ustache, took control of Croatia. The fascists wasted no time in planting the seeds that would lead to ethnic tensions and war in the 1990s. The Ustache killed minorities such as the Serbs and Muslims. The chaos ensued by the German occupation and the fascist, Croat regime sparked into a civil war between the Ustache, the Chetniks (Serbian paramilitary), and the communists led by Josip Broz Tito. Tito succeeded in the war and created the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia, opening up the franchise universally and winning the first election of the new Peoples Republic. Levack, Muir, and Veldman argue that three things kept Yugoslavia united up until the 1990s: Tito, Federalism, and Communism. A federal political structure comprising six equal republics prevented Serbia, or any other of the republics from dominating Yugoslavia. Communism served as unifying ideology, a cluster of ideas that transcended divisions of ethnicity, religion, and language (946). Indeed, Tito and his utilization of federalism and communism to unite the different ethnicities were successful, as Yugoslavia did not see another outbreak of ethnic warfare until 1991. Titos government structure allowed him to remain in power up to his death in 1980. Michael B. Petrovich, a professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, claims that

DiCharia3 Yugoslavias quick installment of Government was entirely in thanks to the Soviet government model (528). The new countys legislature was simply for show, only meeting once a year. The Presidium and Council of Ministers, which were controlled by communists, (comparable to the Politburo and Council of Ministers in the USSR) were in complete control over all government functions, and it was overwhelmingly clear that Tito was the authoritarian power. Tito and his party created an interlocking directorate which binds all the branches of the government under the direct control of the Yugoslav Communist Party (Petrovich 527). Tito led both political structures; He was premier of the government and chief executive of the communist party. The Communist party was not technically the only party in the new state; however, power and influence was spread so widely and strategically in favor of the Communists that other parties had no chance at obtaining real power. This practice of centralizing power within one party continued even to Franjo Tudjmans regime, independent Croatias first president who claimed that the countrys elections were democratic and multi-party elections, but worked to ensure his partys electoral victory at all costs. Titos communism was different from other Eastern European communist regimes in terms of its economy. Yugoslavias centrally planned economy differed from that of the USSR and its satellite states because the Yugoslav government did not maintain absolute control over the economy. The government owned the industries, but the workers of the industries were responsible for the success of their enterprises. Professor Nebojsa Stojcic believes that Croatias transition to its current day market economy began in Titos Yugoslavia during the 1950s. Overall, Croatias economy grew under Tito, with an average growth in GDP of 5.19 percent from 1952-1989 (Stojcic 64). Even with an overall economic growth under communism, it was

DiCharia4 not enough to calm the ethnic tensions that would flare up and the economic downturn that occurred after Tito died in 1980. Ominously, the year after his death saw the outbreak of riots between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in the province of Kosovo. Even more ominously, Titos death coincided with the onset of economic crisis. Rising oil prices undercut the Yugoslav economy as did its debt load. By 1987, inflation was raging at 200 percent per year; two years later it had burst through into hyperinflation200 percent per month (Levack, Muir, Veldman 947). Economic crisis would push tensions to an all-time high and Croatian nationalism gained immense popularity, rooted in Croatian resentment of the transfer of revenue from the relatively rich Croatia to other republics (Ottaway 112). The horrid economic state of Croatia, including the rest of Yugoslavia, allowed for the first non-communist to win a multi-party election in 1990. Franjo Tudjmans success on election day came at the cost of alienating the Serbian population within Croatia. Without Tito to provide a unifying leadership, federalism to create relatively equal power among the republics, and communism to still ethnic tensions, far-right nationalisms popularity among Croats allowed Tudjmans party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), to gain control of the Yugoslav republic of Croatia. The HDZs nationalism aimed for the separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia. And the extremists went further still, seeking the annexation by independent Croatia of Herzegovina, a Bosnian region with a substantial Croatian population (Ottaway 112). In result to this extreme nationalism, the Serbian minority created the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), scared of what an HDZ led nation would look like. Marcus Tanner writes in his book, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, that the SDS believed the HDZ was harboring Ustache sympathizers. Tudjmans grand political rallies featured the red and white

DiCharia5 checkered flag tattering in the hands of HDZ supporters, which was the symbol of the Ustache regime during WWII, not helping with the sentiment that Serbians may be at risk within Croatias borders. In the early 1990s, civil war erupted within Croatia between the Serbs and Croats in the Krajina region. Combined with the pressure of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav Army, the civil war brought Croatia to a declaration of independence in May of 1991. The countrys independence brought war to the Balkans. A war characterized by paramilitary groups and ethnic cleansing by both Serbians in the Croatian front and Croatians in the Bosnian front that lasted until 1995. The Yugoslav war affected Croatia the worst out of all the other countries involved. Over 6,000 were dead and nearly 13,000 were missing. Twelve percent of the entire housing stock, 30 percent of the industrial infrastructure, and 37 percent of Croatias railway lines were lost or not in use due to Serb occupation (Tanner 278). A lack of resources seen throughout the war set the loss of GDP growth at -10.21 percent and inflation at 807.46 percent from the outset of the war until 1993. Tudjmans regime saw the need to stabilize the economy and enacted a plan with four objectives: to curb inflation, to initiate restructuring of the real sector and to rehabilitate the financial sector, and to create foundations or sustainable growth (Stojcic 69). These economic reforms were enacted and practiced rather quickly thanks to Yugoslavias previous lenient centrally planned economy. From 1994-1999, the GDP regained positive growth and inflation went down to 43.16 percent (Stojcic 69). Through this attempt to stabilize the economy, it became evident that Tudjmans legacy would not be one of democracy but of a semi-authoritarian/hybrid regime. When the HDZ took power in 1990, they created a new constitution, which created a government with a bicameral legislature, the Sabor, (Chamber of Deputies and Chamber of

DiCharia6 Counties), which would be elected by a combination of proportional representation and plurality. The constitution also set up a semi-presidential system of a popularly elected president and a prime minister who was chosen by the president. Tudjmans presidential powers ensured that he would hold control over the fate of his country. He effectively centralized power to himself and his party, mimicking the exact same actions as Titos Communist party before him. Tudjman also had the right under the constitution of 1990 to bypass parliament and legislate by decree. The HDZ infiltrated the judicial system and military, placing loyal party members in both institutions. Even the HDZ economic reforms were full of corruption based on political association. Tudjman manipulated the privatization process, transferring companies to political allies on the basis of his vision of Croatia as a statelet that would be ruled by 100 rich families (Ottaway 115). The Tudjman regime also blatantly controlled the media outlets. Croatias founding leader stayed in power up to his death with the help of electoral manipulation. Ottaway wrote that elections were called by the Tudjman regime with short notice and in times of euphoria like summer holidays or successful military campaigns. The regime also gerrymandered districts in order to achieve the majority in parliament (Ottaway 113). The connections between Tito and Tudjmans regimes were so incredibl y close that it was a surprise democracy ever truly took root in the country; however, democracy prevailed, and immediately after Tudjmans death in 1999 other parties entered the political playing field. Tudjmans regime fell at a time where the economy began to recede with unemployment rates at nearly 20 percent and a decline in the countrys production. The economy is not the sole reason for the HDZ loss in the 2000 elections, but it provides a trend throughout the countrys history; regime change comes with economic downturn. Although the economys role in the 2000 elections helped the HDZ opponents, Tudjmans death was probably the coup de grace for

DiCharia7 the HDZ of the 90s (Ottaway 122). The elections of 2000 brought together the countrys first coalition between the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS). In order to look at the new political powers in control, the SDPs transformation from the communist party to a center-left party should be examined. Danijela Dolenec posits that if the former communists transform successfully and early on, this facilitates a competitive political party system, with main parties taking turns in power (32). Dolenec explains the political findings that point to political party competitiveness as one of the factors in creating a democracy out of a post-communist country (27). The SDP was able to enter into the political environment after it had transformed from its previous identity. Also, after 2000, an alternation of main party control did occur. In 2003, the HDZ came into power again, but only after they too experienced ideological reform, becoming a pro-European Christian Democratic Party (Dolenec 38). The HDZ and the SDP amended the constitution of Croatia in the early 2000s in order to create a more democratic society by abolishing the semi-presidential system and replacing it with a parliamentary system. The government was now responsible to the parliament. The presidency of Croatia still exists and is elected directly every 5 years, but the office only exists as the commander-in-chief of the military and the figurehead for the country in foreign affairs. The Croatian Sabor also abolished the chamber of counties, creating a unicameral legislature and a proportional representation system. The legislature is filled with members from 10 electoral districts within the country, one electoral district for the Croatia Diaspora, and one electoral district with eight members for ethnic minorities; there can be no less than 100 members and no more than 160 members within the Sabor. These forms of government are not completely new

DiCharia8 to Croatia. They are just more committed to democratic values than those of former regimes were, especially after the country applied for European Union membership in 2003. When the reformed-HDZ took over parliament in 2003, Ivo Sanader took over as Prime Minister. Sanader was the force behind the HDZs turn to Christian democrats. He and the HDZ firmly declared European integration as a top political priority, describing Croatia as a pillar in the European house (Dolenec 40). Both the SDP and the HDZ worked to meet the reformation requirements placed by the EU. The Croatian government originally had difficulty with old HDZ structures that survived in the media, military, and judiciary. From 2003-2013 the Croatian government worked to depoliticize the military, overhaul the judiciary, and create a more unbiased media. They also reached out to Bosnia-Herzegovina, agreeing to only aid the Croats in Herzegovina through the Bosnian government, and they became more willing to work on returning Serb refugees to their former homes (Ottaway 125-126). Croatias economic reforms, mainly correcting the corruption that came with the privatization of enterprises under Tudjman, stopping inflation, and bringing unemployment rates down allowed for their economy to begin a full-on recovery. The country dropped its inflation rate from 43.16 percent in the years of 1994-1999 to a minimal 2.26 percent in the years of 2000-2010 (Stojcic 69). Croatias economic, political, and foreign policy reforms paid off in 2011 when Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor signed Croatias accession treaty into the EU and in 2013 when Prime Minister Zoran Milanovi led the country to full-EU membership. The countrys acceptance in to the EU exemplifies its impressive progression of political power. From non-democratic to a democratic state in the EU, Croatia has done what many post-communist countries have not been able to do. The country did not suddenly become a democracy, though. Titos combined form

DiCharia9 of communism and federalism along with his unique centrally-planned economy allowed for Tudjmans hybrid regime to come into control after Tito died. Also, Tujdmans hybrid regime had to create democratic-like governmental structures in order to maintain their legitimacy, which laid way to an actual democratic regime when Tudjmans death and the economy allowed for the SDPs coalition to win a majority in parliament. Currently, Croatias government is controlled by the SDP, after the HDZ controlled it from 2003-2011. Their economy is importbased, coming as a result of a failure to correctly restructure enterprises, which brought down the competitiveness of exports; 69 percent of the economy is dominated by the service industry, a result of their tourist industry (Stojcic 70-71). Croatias political economy forced regime change under the communists and the old HDZ, therefore the question arrives whether another ideological regime change could occur and bring back a non-democratic authority. Once the institutions of democracy take root into the countrys political and cultural structure, turning away from a democracy becomes extremely difficult. In a true democracy, the citizens of the state realize their power to utilize social change through their vote, and an authoritarian power seems useless. Croatias likelihood of staying democratic is strong, and now as a member of the EU, its political and economic advances will only continue.

Works Cited Dolenec, Danijela. Europeanization as a Democratising Force in Post-Communist Europe: Croatia in Comparative Perspective. Politika Misao: Croatian Political Science Review 45.4 (2008): 23-46. Academic Search Complete. Web. 10 Dec. 2013. Levack, Brian, Edward Muir, and Meredith Veldman. The West: Encounters & Transformations Volume 2: Since 1550. New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2011. Print. 1 Dec. 2013.

DiCharia10 Ottaway, Marina. Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003. Print. 13 Dec. 2013. Petrovich, Michael B. The Central Government of Yugoslavia. Political Science Quarterly 62.4 December (1947): 504-530. JSTOR. Web. 5 Dec. 2013. Stojcic, Nebosja. Two Decades of Croatian Transition: A Retrospective Analysis. South East European Journal of Economics and Business 7.2 (2012): 63-76. Business Source Complete. Web. 13 Dec. 2013. Tanner, Marcus. Croatia: A Nation Forged in War. New Haven: Yale Nota Bene, 2001. eBook collection (EBSCOhost). Web. 6 Dec. 2013.