“Basis of Natural Rights’) of 1786, Kant criticizes in Wolffian fashion, the principle of perfecting recessary through force, over that of respecting the obligations derived from the form of free will. Kant then wished mation and negatio of experience ~ Gegensiand ~ and then fin, ~ Objet thus producing a critically objective see svmecrive which preceded the obligation [Verbindlichkeit| see also carconi + psychology and theology. It was con- Ista, mre In GMM Kant define obligation atthe “dependence of a abwoltely good upon the principe of autanony aad specter ne tvemeceaty ofan action oo Obligation denotes the depen to the necesity of acting according neo ChvR where obligation f deh ontology was the ‘science of -dicates of things in general’ (84). For most of his profess ‘on metaphysics according to Baumgarten’s text, irposes he did not follow Baumgarten's order of expe ing with ontology (overwhelmingly the largest part of Baumgarten’s hnysies). As he explained in his Announcement of the Organisation of his for 1765-6, his lectures on metaphysics begin with empirical logy, proceed to cosmology and only then arrive at ontology and, >. 309, p. 295) ern with ontology in the lectures on metaphysics ensured that ‘al concerns ranked high on Kant’s critical agenda. Indeed, the y shadows that of Wolffian metaphysics, with ‘ce sections of special metaphysics considered in the “Transcenden- lectic’ and ontology in the ‘Transcendental Analytic’. Kant explic- of the understanding’ taking the place of logy that presumptuously claims to supply, in tic doctrinal form, synthetic a priori knowledge of things in gen- PR A 247/B 803). By this he means that the principles of transcen- lytic are ‘merely rules for the exposition of appearances’, and ‘med not with things in general, but only wit obligation action under a categorical someone is bound’. Kant 307omer ince Kant regards is he argues that we in order to perceive gives the concept of this undetermined igimitself’, using the term Ding an sich, as op- ce to Gegenstand oF Objekt an sich underlines the distinction between Di tes of empirical th ledge of a determined appearance or “the with laws of ings (substances) (Dasein der Dinge (Substanzen)|’ (A 297/ cannot be known. Once again, Ding is synonymous with distinguished from the ‘condition [of which we can only know from other con Rice Ding Objet, Gegentand} se aso armanasce, mane sree, Nore, GINTTSELE, TRANSCENDENTAL gtr ae Tost ne an object is extremely subtle, although its nuances ang in the indiscriminate and unsystematie (A 227/B 280). Kant's focus on the concept of the thing or object shifts Gegenstand and Objekt another's ends, ‘The thing i distinguished from the person in terms of its Passivity and. lack of autonomos and these are features which broadly t “the conditions for the possibility of experience in general are conditions of the possibilty of objects [Gegenstinde] of experience (CPR Big the complex relationship which this entails between Gegenstinde are objects of experience or appear- S which conform to the limits of the understanding and "od may be identified by the different im ~ Ding; Gegenstand, Objekt ~ and the ‘are not in any way 1 from their apprehension’ (A 190/B When objects {Gegenstinde] of experience are made into objects for ledge, they become Objekt. The knowledge of the understanding in the determinate relation ven representations to an object the concept of which the manifold 17). The ‘given i or Gegenstand ‘0 an Objekt under the condition of the unity of apperception. is accounts of the object may, at risk of underestimating s, be organized in terms of a consistent accou Objekt of knowledge knowable through the ¢: inderstanding requires an object of experience or Gegenstand. mntexts con- the discussion of transcendem mn (A 574/B 603). Here Kant argues first that “tablishes realty, and that only throug! 304 305,circles of faith and the historical and scriptural experience of revelati He chooses as his point of departure morality and its notion of a human being who gives themself the law. Mor: i le was then cleared for publication in 1793. The episode is indica- the political conditions under which Kant was working during the 1d the ways in which they affected the development of his happy outcome of this episode was the book CF, which was ived as a response to these events same time can and ought to be man’s final end’ (RL p. 6, pp. 6). The text explores the religious implications of this conception off highest good by means of an analysis of the relationship between the and evil principles in human . The first book accordingly disc ‘radical evil’ or the relagionship between human freedom and evil. leads to the contents of the second book, which presents the conflict good and evil principles, Here Kant ‘ostensibly modest lies the central importance of the concept of representation ‘titical philosophy. A better idea ofits scope may be gathered from tation of representations which appears later in CPR. The ge- resentation in general’ is divided into representations with or nations, pointing instead ;pted maxims which dé theologico-political imp! in discusses unconscious representations (NM p. 191, pp. 228-9), the former, and proposes a division of fc’ which is only conceivable in the shape of a church. Kant scribes the requirements of such a church in a particularly inspit application of the four headings of the table of categories: in terms iversal’; quality, pure; relation, freedom by an: the ‘unchangeableness of its constituti The fourth and final book distinguishes between the chu solely to the subject jons' or cognitions (CPR A 320/B 376). Kant had earlier criticized bnizian view that sensibility was the ‘confused representation of ngs’ and argued instead that sensibility and its sensations were ‘the ance of something, and the mode in which we are affected by that ing’ (A 44/B 51). Such subjective perception is “toto celo different” jective perception, peroeption is farther ede into ition and concept, the {while} the latter tenment fostered by Frederick ‘t a frosty reception from the ce initial plan was to publish the work in instalments in the Berlin ‘Monatsschrift. The first section received the imprimatur of the censor philosophy and was published in April 1792. For the subsequent sect however, the theology censor was consulted. He refused the impr and his decision was confirmed on appeal by the Censorship Commissi and the King with the result that remaining sections could not be pi lished in the Berlinische Monatsschrife. Kan as a representato dons into experience and knowledge. The appli on in judgement i nothing other than the “representation of resentation’ of an object (A 68/2 98). What is more, the“ think? Cnable such judgement to take place is ituelf described as ‘a rep- tation which must be capable of accompanying al other represent- {B 152). Concepts tenses are further distinguished according they ae empiial or pute, with pre concep am Menher place, being described as having 354 355