University for Peace

Universidad para la Paz

INTERNATIONAL PEACE STUDIES

Thesis

Memory Bariyo

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE CONFLICT IN IVORY COAST:

INTERVENTION AS A METHOD OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

15 June 2007

ABSTRACT

This study which is exploratory and explanatory in nature examines the origins
of the Ivory Coast conflict, analyzes the current conflict trends and the
significance of intervention as a method of conflict resolution. The failure of the
2002 military coup in Ivory Coast resulted into a civil war which divided the
country into north controlled by the rebels and south controlled by the
government. Fighting between the disgruntled soldiers who later formed a
rebel group called “Forces Nouvelles” and the government forces known as
“Forces Armées Nationales de la Côte d’Ivoire” halted as early as 2003 after
the intervention of the Economic Community of West African States and
France. The African Union and the United Nations also later intervened in the
conflict. Different actors have mediated between the warring parties in order to
resolve the conflict peacefully however, this conflict still persists. The warring
parties have made several peace agreements monitored by the peacekeeping
mission and facilitated by mediators but their implementation has been
difficult. Efforts by the United Nations mission in the country and the French
troops mandated by the United Nations to restore peace have at times been
hampered by local politicians who incite the local groups such as the “Young
Patriots” and the government supported militia groups through the media to
attack the peacekeepers. Forces Nouvelles and Government forces Chiefs of
Staffs have tried on several occasions to resolve the conflict through dialogue
just like their political leaders have been doing without much success. This
case study addresses what motivated states to intervene into affairs of Ivory

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the Master of Arts, International Peace
Studies.
 DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to all who love a peaceful African continent.

ii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to the Uganda

Peoples Defense Forces administration that gave me the opportunity to
serve as a peacekeeper in Ivory Coast which is the backbone of my
writing this thesis.
I would also like to thank General Aronda Nyakairima, and
General Ivan Koreta of Uganda Peoples Defense Forces, Dr. Kirumira
and Dr. Simba Kayunga of Makerere University who recommended me
to pursue a Master of Arts degree in International Peace Studies at the
University for Peace in Costa Rica.
I must thank the University for Peace administration too, for
admitting me and Dr. Mahmoud El Zain for professionally advising me
during my thesis writing.
I further extend my exceptional gratitude to my wife Gloria
Kyampaire, children; Arnold, Anita and Peruth for enduring my absence
while in Ivory Coast and in Costa Rica.
More thanks go to my friends and relatives who supported me in
different ways during my mature formal studies and supporting my
family during my long absence from home.
Finally, I must thank God who has always been on my side to
give me courage and direction of fulfilling my undertakings.

Mucho gracias!

iii
 Table of contents

Abstract i

Dedication ii

Acknowledgement
iii

Table of contents iv

List of acronyms v

Map of Ivory Coast

vii

Map of Tribal Clusters in Ivory Coast

viii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1:1 Background Statement
1
1:2 Research Problem
4
1:3 Research Questions 4
1:4 Objectives/Purpose of the study
4
1:5 Methodology 5
1:5.1 Data Collection and Analysis
5
1:6 Limitation to the study
5
1:7 Organization of the study
5

CHAPTER 2: INTERVENTION IN A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

2:1 Introduction 6
2:2 Intervention for Conflict Resolution in a Realist perspective
6
2:3 Intervention for Conflict Resolution in a Liberal perspective
9
2:4 The Concept of Intervention
10
2:5. The Concept of Mediation
11

iv
2:6. The Concept of Peacekeeping Operations
11
2:7 The Concept of Peace-building
12
2:8 Conflict in a theoretical perspective
14
2:9 Causes of Conflict in a theoretical perspective
15
2:9.1 Economic factors as a source of Conflict
15
2:9.2 Social factors as a source of Conflict
16
2:9.3 Political factors as a source of Conflict
17
2:9.4 External factors as a source of Conflict
17
2:10 Effects of Conflict 18
2:11 Conclusion 18

CHAPTER 3: THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT IN IVORY COAST

3:1 Introduction 20
3:2 The trend of Conflict in Ivory Coast
20
3:3 Causes of Conflict in Ivory Coast
22
3:3.1 Economic factors as a source of Conflict in Ivory Coast
22
3:3.2 Social factors as a source of Conflict in Ivory Coast
23
3:3.3 Political factors as a source of Conflict in Ivory Coast
24
3:3.4 External factors as a source of Conflict in Ivory Coast
24
3:4 Media Effects on the Conflict in Ivory Coast
27
3:5 Challenges encountered by Peacekeepers
30
3:6 Effects of Conflict in Ivory Coast
32
3:7 Conclusion
33

CHAPTER 4: MEDIATION AS A TOOL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

4:1 Introduction 34
4:2 Mediation process in Ivory Coast
34

v
4:3 Peace agreements in Ivory Coast
39
4:4 International Intervention
44
4:5 Conclusion
45

CHAPTER 5: PEACE-BUILDING IN IVORY COAST CONFLICT

5:1 Introduction 47
5:2 Peace-building in Ivory Coast
47
5:2.1 Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration of ex-combatants
48
5:2.2 Reconciliation
50
5:2.3 Restoration of judicial system and rule of law
52
5:2.4 Protection of Human rights
52
5:2.5 Governance, state institutions and security sector reform
54
5:3 The role of civil society in peace-building
55
5:4 Conclusion
57

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6:1 Conclusion
58
6:2 Recommendations
59
Bibliography
61
Appendix A 71
Appendix B 72
Appendix C 73
Appendix D 81

vi
 LIST OF ACRONYMS

AU African Union
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration
ECOMICI ECOWAS Mission to Côte d’Ivoire
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
FAFN Forces Armées Force Nouvelles
FN Force Nouvelles
FANCI Forces Armées Nationales de la Côte d’Ivoire
FPI Ivorian Popular Front
IWG International Working Group
MINUCI United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
MFA Movement of the Forces of the Future
MPCI Popular Movement of Ivory Coast

MPIGO Greater West Patriotic Movement of Côte

d’Ivoire
MJP Movement for Justice and Peace
NGO Non Governmental Organization
ONUCI United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast
PDCI-RDA Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire - African
Democratic Rally
PIT Ivorian Worker's Party
RDR Rally of the Republicans
RUF Revolutionary United Front
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
UDPCI Union for Democracy and Peace in Ivory Coast
UDCY Democratic and Citizenship Union
UN United Nations
UNSC United Nations Security Council

vii
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
ZOC Zone of Confidence

viii
 MAP OF IVORY COAST

Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection (2004)

ix
 TRIBES OF IVORY COAST

Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection (1972).

x
 CHAPTER ONE
1:0 INTRODUCTION
1:1 Background Statement
Ivory Coast attained its political independence from French
colonial administrators on 7 August 19601. According to Retired
General Sakhawat Hussain, “Though direct colonial rule ended, the
French never left the country. President Houphouet Boigny favored
French military presence to provide security from external aggression.
A small national army was raised with ethnical representation but
gradually became factionalized as the political bickering widened the
ethnical divide within armed forces”.2
Houphouet Boigny maintained a single political party rule, an
authoritarian characteristic of governance for 30 years3 with the
central government dominated by southerners whose policies
neglected the northern regions. Boigny consolidated a north-south
division with the northern region being marginalized in terms of
economic development.4
President Boigny’s authoritarian rule coupled with economic set-
backs in the country resulting from the drop in prices of cocoa and
coffee5, culminated into political and social tensions and
demonstrations on the streets by student activists and politicians with
their supporters became a common activity. The national and
international pressure eventually forced Boigny’s regime to open up
the political arena in 19896 and presidential elections were organized
for the first time based on the multi-party politics in 1990 with Laurent
Gbagbo of Ivorian Popular Front party (FPI) challenging him. However,

1
Breuilly, John.Nationalism and the State, 435.
2
Sakhawat Hussain. Ivory Coast: History of a failed State, 2.
3
Anckar, Carsten. Determinants of Death Penalty,117.
4
Forrest, Joshua. Sub-nationalism in Africa, 62.
5
Victor T. Le Vine. Politics in Francophone Africa, 211.
6
Soludo, C., et al. The Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy in Africa, 326.

1
Houphouet Boigny’s political party, Democratic Party of Ivory Coast
(PDCI) managed to win the elections with 85% of votes.7
The multi-party regime in Ivory Coast started in a desperate
situation. The economy was suffering greatly, students and public
servants were on strike for better conditions and religious leaders were
criticizing the regime for human rights violations.8 President Houphouet
Boigny however, tried to control the situation through dialogue until he
passed away in December 1993.9
Henry Konan Bedie the then PDCI National Assembly Speaker
succeeded late Houphouet Boigny using the lever of the 1990
constitutional amendment that permitted the National Assembly
Speaker to become president in the event of vacancy.10
Unlike his predecessor, Bedie was against the foreign
immigrants who were favored by Boigny and he had given them voting
rights. Bedie advanced the notion of "Ivorité" or "Ivorian-ness" as an
identification means of a true citizen from a non-citizen of Ivory
Coast.11 He is further accused of having fuelled the divisions in
religions and rampant corruption with bad governance which led to the
European Union, World Bank and IMF suspension of economic aid to his
country in 1998.12
According to Victor T. Le Vine, “in 1994, Bedie amended the
constitution allegedly to block the candidature for presidency of his
main political rival Alassane Ouattara. Outtara was disqualified on
grounds that his mother was Ivorian and the father was Burkinabe
therefore he did not qualify to stand in accordance with the new law.” 13

7
Jessup, John. An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 351.
8
Manning, Patrick. Francophone Sub-Saharan 1880-1995, 195.
9
Guy, Martin. Africa in World Politics, 84.
10
Victor T. Le Vine. Politics in Francophone Africa, 210.
11
Gerd, Baumann, and Andre Gingrich. Grammars of Identity/Alterity, 124.
12
Ibid, 125.
13
Victor.T. Le Vine. Politics in Francophone Africa, 210.

2
This gave Bedie an opportunity to win elections and he took over the
office of the president for the second term.
Bedie’s second term of office was also characterized by
discontentment of the population.14 According to John Allan, during the
second half of 1999, the political atmosphere in Ivory Coast
deteriorated rapidly and that violent clashes between the security
forces and opposition Rally of Republicans (RDR) supporters led to the
arrest and detention of RDR leaders. Konan Bedie was overthrown on
24 December 1999 in a military coup led by his former Army Chief of
Staff, General Robert Guei.15 General Guei said he removed Konan
Bedie from power to restore the dignity of the military and because of
political problems in the country such as imprisonment of politicians at
the Abidjan central prison.16
General Guei later on formed a broad-based government
including members of Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) and Rally of
Republicans (RDR.)17 He organized a constitutional referendum which
was held in July 2000 and presidential election in the same year.
Presidential elections were held on 22 October 2000; however General
Guei attempted to rig by declaring himself winner which resulted into
massive public protests and subsequently he was driven out of power
by the people unfortunately, many of them were killed in this turmoil.18
When General Robert Guei was forced out of office, he fled the
country and Laurent Gbagbo took over as the president. However,
having spent merely two month in office, in January 2001, there was a
coup attempt on Gbagbo’s government which was repulsed.19

14
Ibid, 211.
15
Conteh-Morgan, Earl. Collective Political Violence,171.
16
Klay,George, and Ogaba Agbese. The Military and Politics in Africa, 62.
17
Gerd, Baumann, and Andre Gingrich. Grammars of Identity/Alterity: A Structural
Approach, 125.
18
Gabriel, Williams.The Heart of Darkness, 27.
19
Victor T. Le Vine Politics in Francophone Africa, 213.

3
 Gbagbo led the country under political tensions until 19
September 2002 when soldiers unhappy of being demobilized
mutinied. The disturbance grew into a full scale rebellion during which
the former military ruler General Robert Guei and his wife were
murdered20 This mutiny whose aim was to oust Gbagbo flopped
however mutineers ignited a rebellion that split the country into two
regions; the northern region controlled by the rebels and the south
region controlled by Gbagbo’s government up to today.
The rebel group, calling itself the "Patriotic Movement of Cote
d'Ivoire" (MPCI) which was behind the initial attacks and capture of
some towns in the northern region claimed to be protecting the
interests of northerners who are majority Moslems and accused
Gbagbo of discriminating against them.21 In November 2002, two new
rebel groups namely the Ivoirian Popular Movement for the Great West
(MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) emerged in the
west with the aim of avenging the death of General Guei and
defending the rights of Yacouba ethnic group22. MPIGO and MJP later
allied with the MPCI, and the three groups subsequently called
themselves the New Forces or Forces Nouvelles (FN).
Although regional organizations and international organizations
intervened in the conflict swiftly at its outbreak, efforts to resolve the
conflict peacefully are still frustrated by different factors such as the
failure to fully implement peace agreements and the sabotage of the
peace process by local activists however, the intervention helped in
securing a ceasefire agreement that halted armed attacks between the
warring parties as negotiations to reach a final settlement continues up
to today.

1:2 Research Problem

20
Ibid.
21
Francis, David. Civil Militia, 124.
22
Ibid.

4
 Despite concerted efforts, by the international community,
African union, regional organization, individual states and local actors
in Ivory Coast to terminate the conflict peacefully through negotiations
after the intervention, the conflict has persisted.
1.3 Research Questions
This study seeks to answer the main question of why the conflict
persists in Ivory Coast despite the effective involvement of regional
and international community. A number of sub-questions follow from
this main question, which include questions such as what were the
causes of the conflict in Ivory Coast? What is the significance of
intervention? What is the role of mediation? Does the impact of
mediation vary in accordance with the mediation style? What is the
significance of peace-building in conflicts?
1:4 Objectives/Purpose of the Study
The main objective of this study is to explore and explain the
origins of the conflict in Ivory Coast and to identify the contributory
factors that continue to sustain this conflict and the different actors
involved in the conflict and their immediate interests and how this
affected the peace process in this country. The study aims to figure out
the reasons that contributed to causing the conflict in Ivory Coast to
culminate into a civil war and explain the efforts so far undertaken by
all parties to the conflict to bring it to a peaceful end.
It is anticipated that this study will provide useful information
regarding the origins of the conflict to the United Nations peacekeeping
mission in Ivory Coast and other actors to the conflict who are pursuing
a peaceful resolution to the conflict. It is also hoped that Ivory Coast
people will understand why the conflict, that has divided them into two
hostile regions, is not ending and maybe they will try to establish other
contributory means of resolving it such as traditional methods of
conflict resolution so that they can co-exist harmoniously. The study is
also expected to provide useful information to academicians especially

5
about intervention methods in conflict and finally, the study may also
act as a source for conducting further research.
1:5 Methodology
This case study aims to explore as well as to explain the origins
of the conflict in Ivory Coast and to identify the contributory factors
that continue to sustain this conflict and the different actors involved in
the conflict and their immediate interests. It primarily seeks to figure
out why the conflict in Ivory Coast culminated into a civil war in the
country which attracted the regional and international intervention and
the subsequent involvement of third parties or mediators to pursue a
peaceful resolution. The study seek to explain the efforts so far
undertaken by all parties to the conflict such as the warring parties,
the civil society, the United Nation mission deployed in the country
along with French contingents, ECOWAS, African Union and the
mediators, to resolve the conflict peacefully.
1.5.1 Data Collection and Analysis
This case study is based on documentary survey whereby I will
study the available data in the university library and internet sources
which I will analyze by trying to explore and to get explanations that
led to the outbreak and trends of the conflict in Ivory Coast. To
supplement the secondary data, my experience as a military observer
in the Ivory Coast conflict will be utilized.
1:6 Limitation of the Study
The main limitation to this study is limited literature about Ivory
Coast conflict in the University library and beyond. The period allotted
for the submission of the thesis is also limited. My physical contact
with the Ivory Coast conflict, which is far from Costa Rica where iam
conducting the study from, could have enriched the information
however, it is still deemed that the study will meet its objectives in
spite of these limitations.
1:7 Organization of the Study

6
 This thesis is organized in six chapters namely; Chapter One
which is the Introduction discusses the background statement about
the Ivory Coast conflict, research problem, methodology, data
collection and analysis, limitation of the study, objective of the study
and organization of the study. Chapter Two discusses the intervention
in conflict in a theoretical perspective. Chapter Three discusses the
nature of conflict in Ivory Coast. Chapter Four discusses the role of
mediation tool in conflict resolution. Chapter Five is about peace-
building in the post-conflict period. Chapter Six is the conclusion and
recommendations. After the six chapters, there is a bibliography and
four appendices two of which are crucial peace agreements reached by
the parties to the Ivory Coast conflict.
CHAPTER TWO
2:0 INTERVENTION IN A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
2:1 Introduction
The idea of intervention discussed in this chapter denotes
interference in domestic affairs of an autonomous state by another
state or organization. Since the end of the Cold War, the world that was
expected to become peaceful instead came to be characterized by new
forms of intra-state conflicts instead of inter-state conflicts. These
internal conflicts have been principle sources of human suffering
through gross violation of human rights and destruction of property.
Because some sovereign states have at times failed to halt
such human suffering, foreign governments, organizations and
individual actors have found themselves compelled to intervene in
these internal conflicts to protect the population of troubled states
from human catastrophes and to provide the necessary assistance.
Among the methods of intervention into conflict there is
deployment of a peacekeeping mission in a country involved in a
conflict which can be conducted by the United Nations, African Union,
regional organizations, independent states and coalition forces with the

7
objective of facilitating a peaceful resolution to a conflict. Intervention
implies the existence of a third party or mediator who may intervene
primarily to help warring parties negotiate a deal, which should
ultimately lead to peace-building process. Peace-building activities are
finally introduced to sustain peace and prevent relapse to conflict.
This chapter will discuss the definitions of concepts associated
with intervention, namely “mediation”, “peacekeeping” and “peace-
building” and the concept of conflict and its causes and how as
processes they are perceived from within two broad theoretical
perspectives, namely realism and liberalism. These two perspectives
will be discussed here as the main frameworks from within which the
answer to why states intervene in foreign conflicts, could be developed
so that understanding the case study of this research would be
attainable.
2:2 Intervention for conflict resolution in a realist
perspective
Realist theory was developed by Hans J Morgenthau in the
twentieth century. The theory holds that relations between states are
dominated by the pursuit of rational self-interest combined with the
preservation and extension of power of the state to facilitate such
pursuits by its members.23 The theory emphasizes that political leaders
think and act in terms of interest defined as “power” and accordingly,
international politics is a process in which national interests are
accommodated or resolved on the basis of diplomacy or war24 Hans J
Morgenthau advances six principles of political realism used as follows;
(1) Politics like society in general is governed by objective laws
that have their roots in human nature which is unchanging,
therefore it is possible to develop a rational theory that reflects
these objectives; (2) The main signpost of political realism is the
concept of interest defined in terms of power which infuses
23
Keren, Michael, and Donald Sylvan. International Intervention, 14.
24
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, 75.

8
 rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes
the theoretical understanding of politics possible. Political
realism stresses the rational, objective and unemotional; (3)
Realism assumes that interest defined as power is an objective
category which is universally valid but not with a meaning that is
fixed once and for all. Power is the control of man over man; (4)
Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political
action. It is also aware of the tension between the moral
command and the requirement of a successful political action;
(5) Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a
particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.
It is the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves
us from the moral excess and political folly; (6) The political
realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere – he asks –
how does this policy affect the power of the nation? Political
realism is based on pluralistic conception of human nature.25
Hans Morgenthau holds that in power struggles, nations follow policies
designed to preserve the status quo, to achieve imperialistic
expansion, or to gain prestige. Hans Morgenthau further noted that,
“states pursue the policy of prestige with the aim of impressing other
nations with the power one’s own nation actually possesses or with the
power it believes or wants other nations to believe it possesses, a
policy that can be pursued through diplomacy or display of forces.”26
Hans Morgenthau, however, was not only concerned with the quest for
power but also international peace which he says is affected by pursuit
of national interests that are not essential to national survival.27 Hans
Morgenthau also asserted that the world is the result of forces inherent
in human nature and that moral principle can never be fully realized
but must at best be approximated through the ever temporary
balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts.28
25
Linklater, Andrew, International Relations, 1681.
26
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, 78.
27
Ibid.
28
Sheehan, Michael. The Balance of Power, 5

9
 However, a strong attachment to “power” by a state can
cause a security problem or a conflicting situation between states
especially neighboring states. Building up power involves building up
or increasing military capabilities and as a specific state embarks on
increasing military activities and build-up, a neighboring state may feel
threatened and eventually competition in military build-up may ensue
for the purpose of national security and defense. Such competition is
likely to end up in arms-race which does not only impact the economic
position of a country through procurement of military hardware but
also increases the availability of weapons which are means of conflict.
Hamdi Hassan pointed out that, “realists view state as the unit of
analysis in the world politics and international politics is understood
basing on actions and interests of the state. States are the dominant
and primary units of analysis in the international system and thus
exclude domestic politics from the analysis of world politics.”29
According to Torbjom Knutsen, “Realists see international
relations in terms of a hierarchy of issues with national security
concerns at the top and tend to examine the achievement and
maintenance of international stability or how stability breaks down”.30
“Realists anticipate conflict and war”;31 they warn that a world with
many powerful states, roughly equal in economic and military power
would be a particularly dangerous place.32 Realists use anarchy as their
primary metaphor for the international system. They stress that there
exists no central authority capable of creating and imposing order on
the interactions of states. Viewing countries as competitors, they argue
that the only order is that which emerges from competition under
anarchy.33

29
Hassan, Hamdi. The Iraq Invasion of Kuwait, 16.
30
Knutsen,Torbjorn. A History of International Relations Theory, 253.
31
Clemens, Walter. Dynamics of International Relations, 25.
32
Kaplan, Laura, and Laurence Bove. Philosophical Perspectives on Power and
Domination, 139.
33
Stein, Arthur. Why Nations Cooperate, 5.

10
 “Realists assume that sovereignty makes states
functionally similar”34. Buzan and Little further posit that state is
constituted by both internal and external sovereignty. The internal
sovereignty is defined by the hierarchical structures formed within the
state; state autonomy and equal status with respect to other states
constitute external sovereignty in the system.35
2:3 Interventions for conflict resolution in a liberal
perspective
As A-M Slaughter noted, “realists have no arguments for
humanitarian intervention per se. they can not include humanitarian
concerns in their security equation, however heart-wrenching they may
be. Stopping massive human rights violations or feeding the hungry
does not enhance national power.”36 Humanitarian intervention is
conceptualized more clearly by the liberals.
Liberalist underlying assumption is that human nature is
basically good. “While realists look at sovereignty as a basis for
international anarchy”37 in contrast liberalists say that, “sovereignty
serves a valuable human ends.”38 Although realists emphasizes that
power is the driving force behind intervention, there are situations
where humanitarian emergencies are the primary reason behind
intervention and this challenges the realists’ assertion that power is
the driving force to intervention. As Fernando Teson argues,
“humanitarian intervention is morally justified in appropriate cases. His
argument is based on liberal theory that the major purpose of states is
to protect and secure human rights”39
To liberalists, this is a contradicting situation as they emphasize
cooperation among states. The realist view of a state was originally in
34
Thakur,Ramesh, and Edward Newman. New Millennium, New Perspectives, 165.
35
Ferguson, Yale, et al. What is Polity? 17.
36
Slaughter, A.M. Recueil Des Cours, 82.
37
Lowenheim, O and Paltiel, J.T. Defining Sovereignty
38
Holzgrefe, Jeff, and Robert Keohane. Humanitarian Intervention, 93
39
Ibid.

11
contrast with the liberalist views however, “the neo-liberalism accepts
realist arguments that states are the major actors in the world affairs
and are unitary rational agents”40.
The liberals on humanitarian intervention argue that the exercise
of government tyranny and the behavior that typically takes place in
extreme anarchy situations are serious forms of injustice towards
persons and that, subject to important constraints, external
intervention is morally permissible to end that injustice.41
From the above discussion it is clear to me that the liberal
perspective provides more clear understanding of the current conflict
in Ivory Coast that this study is about. In the following section, I will
discuss the concept of conflict in relation to its causes and how the
liberal perspective would allow for viewing them differently as
compared to a realist perspective. This will be followed by a discussion
on the concepts of “mediation”, “peacekeeping” and “peace-building”,
necessary for understanding the current dynamics of the peace
process in Ivory Coast.
2:4 The concept of Intervention
Intervention means various forms of nonconsensual action
that are often thought to directly challenge the principle of state
sovereignty42and sovereignty denotes the competence, independence
and legal equality of states43. Intervention in a broader sense refers to
interference in the domestic affairs of a country through diplomatic,
economic, military or other means by another country, regional
organization or an international organization. To Holzgrefe, et al,
intervention refers to, “the threat or use of force across state borders
by a state or group of states aimed at preventing or ending widespread
and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals
40
Grieco, Joseph. Cooperation Among Nations, 29.
41
Ibid, 94.
42
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Responsibility
to Protect, 15.
43
Ibid.6.

12
other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within
whose territory force is applied”.44
Sovereignty ought to encompass responsibility of states. In
situations where a state can not protect or provide for its nationals
then it losses its legitimacy and therefore the international community
or regional bodies have to intervene in order to rescue the population
without giving attention to the sovereignty tradition of such a state.
Countries in conflict can not be ignored as their issues can impact
regional or international peace and security and this makes
intervention a necessity. Deng, et al noted that, “The sovereign states
responsibility and accountability to both domestic and external
constituencies must be affirmed as interconnected principles of the
national and international order”45.
General John Galvin who served as a peacekeeper with US
Army noted that, “Within law it is possible for nations to intervene
where another nation is incapable of handling specific problems
however, there is a provision within the UN Security Council that
provides legal and legitimized basis for action”.46 Antonio Tanca also
noted that, “Armed interventions maybe justified as a means for
promoting self-determination, for guaranteeing basic human rights or
for the protection of nationals abroad.”47
Jeong Ho-Won further pointed out that, “External intervention
aims at stopping the killing of the people where as humanitarian
intervention and international assistance are needed to relieve their
sufferings. International intervention aims at curbing aggression in
internal conflict whereby foreign forces are used to prevent massacres,
raping, looting and driving people away from their homes.”48

44
Holzgrefe, Jeff, and Robert Keohane.eds. Humanitarian Intervention,1
45
Deng, F., et al. Sovereignty as Responsibility, xvii.
46
Manwaring, Max, and Fishel John. eds. Toward Responsibility in the New World
Disorder, 3
47
Tanca, Antonio. Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 99
48
Jeong, Ho-Won. Peace and Conflict Studies, 136.

13
2:5 The concept of Mediation
Mediation is one of the methods or tools of conflict resolution
undertaken by a third party or mediator to peacefully terminate conflict
which complies with the liberalists’ culture of supporting non-violent
methods of handling conflicts. Mediating in conflict is not a new
undertaking but has been going on for a long time both in modern
societies such as the use of arbitration and adjudication, and in
traditional societies where groups of people utilize a third party in
search for a solution to disputes or conflicts.
According to Allan Stitt, “Mediation is simply facilitated
negotiation. A mediator attempts to help people negotiate more
effectively and efficiently than they could on their own. The mediator
helps the disputants to find solutions to their conflict that make more
sense to them than continuing with their disputes”. 49 Allan further
noted that, “Mediation can not guarantee a settlement though it takes
time and it’s costly. The best mediators are experts in the process of
negotiation and help disputants overcome obstacles in negotiations”.50
According to Jacob Bercovitch;
Mediation involves (1) a relationship between two protagonists
and a mediator,
(2) behavior of some sort within a context, and (3) the outcomes
consequent to that behavior. The outcomes may have been
caused by the direct mediator behavior or they may have been
facilitated indirectly by mediators removing barriers to their
occurrence, permitting them to occur or not preventing them
from occurring.51
2:6 The concept of Peacekeeping operations
The concept of peacekeeping is in line with liberal ideals that
emphasize peace; however, it’s among those concepts that have failed

49
Stitt, Allan. Mediation, 1.
50
Ibid, 7.
51
Bercovitch, Jacob. Resolving International Conflict, 3.

14
to get a single definition. Fetherston noted that, “The real difficulty in
providing a comprehensive functional definition of peacekeeping is
that, as peacekeeping takes on more and more functions the
definitions get longer, more general and less useful”52
Peacekeeping is a method of facilitating for countries torn by
conflict to restore peace and security. Peacekeepers monitor and
observe peace processes taking place in countries in conflict and assist
the conflicting parties to reach and implement peace agreements.
Peacekeeping is the prevention, containment, moderation and
termination of hostilities between states or within states through the
peaceful intervention of a third party neutral and employing an
international force composed of soldiers, policemen and civilians, in
order to restore and maintain peace.53
The term Peacekeeping is used to denote a military or a police
force deployed at the request of a government or a representative
group of political and military actor that enjoys wide international
recognition.54 Peacekeeping does not propose or enforce a particular
political solution but facilitates in confidence building or bridging the
gap between the conflicting parties and usually is based on the
principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force which
distinguishes it from peace-enforcement that involves intervention of
external forces into a situation of conflict with the aim of imposing
peace in the absence of these three principles.
Jeong also noted that, “Peacekeeping operations are temporary
measures and are intended to be provisional. Rather than determining
the outcome of conflict, their task is oriented towards creating
conditions in which conflict can be resolved by peaceful means.”55
Indeed one of the functions of peacekeeping operations is to create an
52
Fetherston A.B., Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping, 128.
53
Child, Jack. Regional Cooperation for Development and the Peaceful Settlement of
Conflict in Latin America, 136.
54
Barman, Eric, and Sams, Katie. Peacekeeping in Africa, 25.
55
Jeong, Ho-Won. Peace and Conflict Studies,124.

15
environment that allows conflicting parties to come to dialogue so that
they can settle their incompatibilities peacefully.
2:7 The concept of Peace-building
The concept of peace-building can be interpreted as the conduct
of activities that will restore significant social order and social justice in
a society that has been engaged in a conflict with the ultimate aim of
preventing the recurrence of the conflict in order to attain a durable
peace. Kofi Annan defined peace-building as actions undertaken at the
end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of
armed confrontation.56
According to Tom Keating, the idea of peace-building was raised
by the former United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali
in his document “An Agenda for Peace” released in 1992. He identified
peace-building as “action to identify and solidify peace in order to
avoid a relapse into conflict.”57
Peace-building is used in its broadest sense to refer to those
initiatives which foster and support sustainable structures and
processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful co-existence
and decrease the likelihood of outbreak, reoccurrence or continuation
of violent conflict.58 Genuine development is the best guarantee for
sustainable peace therefore, peace-building and development are
complementary and mutually inclusive processes that seek to promote
social justice, economic equity and political inclusion.59
Keating, et al, pointed out that, “Peace-building isn’t about
imposition of solutions but creation of opportunities. The challenge of
post-conflict peace-building is to identify and nurture the political,
economic and social space within which indigenous actors can identify
development and employ the resources necessary to build a peaceful,

56
Kumar, Chetan. Building Peace in Haiti,29.
57
Trudy Govier and Carol Prager. Dilemmas of Reconciliation,171.
58
Keating, Tom and Andy Knight. Building Sustainable Peace, 25.
59
Murithi, Timothy. The African Union, 40.

16
prosperous and just society.”60 According to Junne and Verkoren,
challenges of post-conflict development vary with the causes of the
conflict and they identified four root causes of conflict in four strata;
(1) external/international, whereby the root causes maybe found
outside the country in question, (2) characteristics of the state
which may be too strong or too weak, (3) characteristics of the
society which can make it more probable such as inequalities
and ethnicity, (4) individual orientations basically in ideologies61.
Although there are divergent opinions about the concept of peace-
building at least they all emphasize avoidance of conflict reemergence
and viable peace. The significance of peace-building process in conflict
situations is therefore the creation of structures and opportunities for
durable peace in a country that has been suffering from violent conflict
and ensuring that the conflict does not reoccur.

60
Keating, Tom and Andy Knight. Building Sustainable Peace, 25.
61
Junne, Gerd and Willemijn Verkoren. eds. Post-Conflict Development,7.

17
2:8 Conflict in a theoretical perspective
Conflict refers to any incompatible situation of individuals or
groups that may lead to antagonism. In situations where individuals or
groups fail to meet their goals in order to satisfy their material
interests, needs or values, conflict arises. Michael Lund noted that,
“Conflict is present when two or more parties perceive their interests
are incompatible, express hostile attitudes or pursue their interests
through actions that damage the other parties”.62
Conflicts have diverse characteristics or features normally
dictated by where they are taking place, their type and the reasons for
their eruption. With the end of the cold war which was characterized by
non-direct engagement in armed conflict by the super powers apart
from directly supporting their allies, the nature of conflict has mostly
changed from inter-state conflict to intra-state conflict. Conflicts
undergo changes in progression and as they change, their impact on
humanity or society in general also tends to change. One scholar Adam
Curle suggested that conflict moves along a continuum from non-
peaceful to peaceful relationship. Curle employs a matrix that
compares the level of power between the parties in conflict and the
level of awareness of conflicting interests and needs along a
continuum through four major stages or quadrants.63According to
Curle;
In the first quadrant, conflict is latent or hidden because people
are unaware of the imbalances of power and injustices that
affect them and this requires raising their awareness about the
unequal relationships and address the inequity. The second
quadrant which is the pursuit of change involves some form of
confrontation which brings the violent or nonviolent conflict to
surface. In the third quadrant, confrontation moves towards
negotiations if those involved recognize increase the level of

62
Lund, Michael. Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflict, 2.
63
Lederach, John P..Building Peace, 64.

18
 awareness of their interdependence through mutual recognition.
[That] negotiation means that the parties involved recognize
that they can neither simply impose their will nor eliminate the
other side but rather must work with one another to achieve
their goals. In quadrant four, successful negotiations and
mediation lead to a restructuring of the relationship that deals
with the fundamental substantive and procedural concerns of
those involved. This is what Curle refers to as “increased justice”
or “more peaceful relations” [that] conflicts can jump or cycle
between several of the quadrants for extensive periods of time
and negotiations do not always lead to restructured relationships
and confrontation does not automatically end in negotiation.64
2:9 Causes of Conflict in a theoretical perspective
Conflicts originate from different sources for different reasons in
different geographical areas and this section will discuss some sources
of conflict. Roderic Alley pointed out that, “root causes can arise from
poverty, political repression and marginalization, prolonged failure of
state functions and unequal distribution of resource benefits which in
combination provide the seedbeds to internal conflicts.”65 Realists
argue that conflict has always existed, conflict is present today and
that there will be conflict tomorrow. They consider conflict to be the
norm and view human nature as essentially egotistical, aggressive and
greedy. To liberalists, on the other hand, human nature is good and
they assumes that the development of humane and a peaceful society
can only occur when antagonist’s ideals are reformed.66
2:9.1 Economic factors as a source of Conflict
Paul Collier pointed out that, “Economic agendas appear to be
central to understanding why civil wars emerge following his
investigations. Collier emphasizes that if economic agendas are driving
conflict, then it is likely that some groups are benefiting from conflict
64
Ibid, 66
65
Alley, Roderic. Internal Conflicts and the International Community, 17.
66
Amstutz, Mark. The Healing of Nations, 173.

19
and they therefore have some interests in initiating and sustaining
conflict”.67
Tshitereke Clarence noted that “the possession of natural
resources within a particular country has often been a source of grief
and unhappiness to its citizens,”68 However, Clarence noted that in
countries such as Botswana where the possession of these natural
resources is properly managed, the state has brought affluence and
much more needed foreign exchange earnings. He attributes this
positive trend to the resource rents wide-distribution within the
Botswana population which has also prevented conflict from emerging
in the country.
Ted Gurr in his theory of ‘Relative deprivation’ argued that; “The
potential for collective violence depends on the level of frustrated
expectations, or discontent of members of a society as a result of the
perceived gap between what people have and what they think they
should have. This gap provides the motive for action (rebellion)
through the psychological ‘frustration-aggression’ mechanism.”69 In Ted
Gurr’s theory, individuals or groups will perceive themselves as unfairly
disadvantaged over a reference group perceived as having similar
attributes and receiving better rewards.
Frances Stewart addresses economic factors that cause conflict
by looking at group motivation, private motivation, failure of the social
contract and environmental degradation. Stewart emphasizes that,
“Group motives, resentments, and ambitions provide motivation to
fight over the distribution and exercise of economic power. In this
situation relatively deprived groups will seek or be persuaded by their
leaders to seek redress. Resentments inspired by group differences,
termed horizontal inequalities, are a major cause of war.”70

67
Collier, Paul. Doing Well out of War. 1.
68
Tshitereke, Clarence. African Security Review, 86.
69
Brush, Stephen. Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences, 527.
70
Frances Stewart. Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing Countries.

20
 Addressing economic factors by looking at private motivation,
Stewart says that; “individual benefits can motivate people to fight.
Young uneducated men gain employment as soldiers, war also
generates opportunities to loot; profiteer from shortages and from aid,
trade arms, and carry out illicit production and trade in drugs,
diamonds, timber, and other commodities.”71 On failure of the social
contract, Stewart holds that “social stability is based on a hypothetical
social contract between the people and the government. People accept
state authority so long as the state delivers services and provide
reasonable economic conditions. With economic decline and worsening
state services social contract breaks down and violence results”.72
Finally on environmental degradation as a source of poverty and
cause of conflict, Stewart says that “rising population pressure and
falling agricultural productivity may lead to land disputes and that
growing scarcity of water may provoke conflict”.73
2:9.2 Social factors as a source of Conflict
Some of the Social factors that are connected to the emergence
of conflict include ethnicity, religious dichotomies and inequality.
Where ethnic clashes have emerged, groups involved are found
to be pursuing the maintenance of their heritage and cultural values.
Some ethnic groups tend to dominate others and when such groups
attain political and economic power they may sideline or neglect the
minority groups. The inequalities caused by such regimes results into
grievances among the groups that feel disadvantaged or relatively
deprived of what they ought to be or get, thus creating a breeding
ground for conflict which may escalate into a rebellion. Gudrun Ostby
noted that “horizontal inequalities often have their origin in historical
circumstances, such as colonial policies, which privileged some groups
over others and he provides Uganda as one of the examples where
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
Frances, Stewart. Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing Countries.

21
horizontal inequality provoked civil war”.74 Ostby wrote that; “In
Uganda during the colonial period, the southern region was favored
than the northern and eastern regions. Southerners comprised the
majority of the civil service and of the educational elite while
northerners were recruited into military and police forces. This resulted
into ‘warrior’ and ‘educated’ perception of each other”.75
Religion can also cause or can stir other causes of conflict. In
situations where religious differences are stressed and can not be
accommodated by different religious groups, there is a likelihood of
hatred development based on religious affiliations and eventually
conflict may arise.
2:9.3 Political factors as a source of Conflict
Political factors that may lead to emergence of conflict include weak
state institutions, crises of state legitimacy, political repression and
bad governance. Michael E. Brown emphasized that “discriminatory
political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group
politics, and elite politics are underlying political factors that cause
conflict”.76 Brown continues to say that;
One of the fundamental roles of governments is to manage
conflict and resolve grievances in a peaceful and consensual
manner. The onset of violent conflict often involves conflict
management failures linked with shortfalls in state legitimacy
and weak state capacity. In addition, where states lack the
capacity to enforce the rule of law or control the use of violence,
there are opportunities for rebel groups and international
criminal networks to operate.77
2:9.4 External factors as a source of conflict

74
Ostby, Gudrun. Horizontal Inequalities and Civil Conflict, 7.
75
Ibid, 9.
76
Brown, Michael. The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, 573.
77
Governance and Social Development Resource Center. Conflict Causes and
Dynamics.

22
 Conflicts are hardly ever exclusively local incidents; they often
have various inter-connected dimensions ranging from national to
global linkages.78 Internal conflicts often spread across the national
borders. Among the greatest effects of internal conflicts across the
border are refugee problem and the proliferation of small arms and
light weapons through illicit trafficking or as personal weapons carried
by mercenaries which is common in the West African sub-region.
While small arms and light weapons do not cause conflict, they
soon become part of the conflict equation by exacerbating underlying
tensions, generating more insecurity, deepening the sense of crisis and
increasing casualties. These weapons contribute to human rights
violations; hamper peace-building efforts and sustainable
development.79 Tackling the problem of small arms requires multi-level
governance from the global to the local level. The most important
measures that can be developed are often national in nature but these
must be embedded in robust regional and global regimes to regulate
the cross-border or external consequences of national policies.80
2:10 Effects of Conflict
The effects of conflict can be positive/constructive or negative/
destructive on society. Conflict can be constructive or positive. They
can foster creative solutions to problems; they can facilitate personal
and social change and can maintain personal and social identities81.
Conflicts relays information, they expose incompatible situations and
therefore attract attention and enhance ground for solving them. Once
solved or managed effectively, conflicting parties will come to
understand each other properly and changes, reforms or new ideas will
come up. Conflicting situations may play a role of checks and balance.
A party in opposition may lead to the other party to be accountable to
78
International Peace Academy and Economic Community of West African States.
“Toward a Pax West Africana”, 6.
79
Adekeye Adebajo. West Africa’s Security Challenges, 224.
80
Heinbecker, Paul and Patricia Goff. Irrelevant or Indispensable, 6.
81
Fisk, Larry, and John Schellenberg. Patterns of Conflict, 26.

23
its actions. This is a common tendency with political parties where a
party in opposition keeps monitoring the actions of the other and
through public criticisms and common debates the party in power will
act responsibly which is a positive effect according to my own
experience. Conflict is destructive or negative if it’s violent, causes
death and destruction.
2:11 Conclusion
Nature of conflict changed from inter-state to intra-state with the
end of the cold war. The intra-state conflicts that ensued have been the
worst sources of human suffering and when states fail to manage
these conflicts, foreign entities are compelled to intervene.
Intervention is a big challenge as it basically involves interfering in
domestic affairs of an independent state. Realist theory attempts to
explain why states intervene in domestic affairs of other states by
looking at power or self-interests of states to be the reason behind
intervention however liberal theory challenges it by emphasizing that
intervention maybe based on humanitarian emergency also. Although
realists and liberalists have come up with different views about the
intervention, the neo-liberalists have come to accept the realist
argument that a state is a major actor in world affairs and a unitary
rational agent.
Conflicts arise from different sources for different reasons and
have different effects. Among the methods applied to resolve the
conflict there is mediation, peacekeeping and peace-building.
Mediation involves the intervention of a third party into the conflict
with the objective of terminating the conflict peacefully. Peacekeeping
operations are forms of intervention in domestic conflicts which are
normally conducted with the consent of the parties to a conflict but
may be conducted without their consent in some situations as a form
of peace-enforcement.

24
 With the current trends in most of African conflicts, the
intervention by deployment of peacekeeping missions have been
basically to prevent human catastrophes and to provide humanitarian
assistance therefore, liberal theorists addresses better the need for
intervention in sovereign states than realists who emphasizes self-
interest or power to be the reason behind intervention. As Donnelly
noted, “realists understand and correctly emphasize the fact that
power has been and will long remain a central part of international
relations.”82 Finally peace-building involves conducting activities in the
post-conflict period that aim at restoring durable peace and preventing
the recurrence of the conflict.

82
Donnelly, Jack. Realism and International Relations, 2.

25
 CHAPTER THREE
3:0 THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT IN IVORY COAST

3:1 Introduction
Little research has been conducted about the conflict in Ivory
Coast. The available limited literature however, associates the Ivorian
conflict with the post colonial administration and others attribute it to
socio-cultural factors. The conflict remained latent since independence
until late 1980s when it became manifest with the emergence of
confrontations between the regime, politicians and activists.
The authoritarian governance of Houphouet Boigny as pointed
out in Chapter One, had created a lot of grievances among Ivory Coast
people, which was an indicator of an impending political crisis. The
grievances coupled with continued social and economic tensions
culminated into political power struggles characterized by military
coups and eventually a civil war erupted in the country. Another
contributory factor to the origins of the conflict in Ivory Coast is the
overall security situation of West African sub-region where common
intra-state conflicts spread across the national borders thus affecting
neighboring countries’ security as discussed in details in the section
about the causes of conflict in Ivory Coast.
This chapter will discuss the trend of the conflict in Ivory Coast,
the causes of the conflict, how the media affects the conflict, the
challenges encountered by peacekeepers and the effects of the conflict
in Ivory Coast.
3:2 The Trend of Conflict in Ivory Coast
The protracted conflict in Ivory Coast precisely has passed
through Curle’s quadrants of conflict progression discussed in Chapter
Two despite its persistence and failure to reach a peaceful conclusion.
The post colonial authoritarian regime of President Felix Houphouet
Boigny was the latent stage whereby not all Ivorians were aware of the

26
critical social, economic and political problems that existed. As the
national and international communities pressurized President
Houphouet Boigny to open up political space and the eventual
adoption of liberal politics as earlier on discussed in Chapter One,
Ivorians started to know much about the problems that existed and
which affected them at this confrontational stage.
Although there were some dialogues with the government about
the discontentment of the population, the death of Felix Houphouet
Boigny in 1993 escalated the problems and the subsequent multiparty
politics that ensued came to be characterized by power struggles
inclined to religion and ethnic notions.
Negotiations to have a broad-based government that followed
could not restore calmness as Curle’s fourth quadrant holds, until civil
war erupted in the country. With the eruption of a civil war in 2002, the
Curle’s concept was adapted again. The confrontation between the
government of Laurent Gbagbo and Force Nouvelles (FN) rebels was
followed by several negotiations under the international and regional
organizations direction which culminated into ceasefire agreements
and the establishment of the Government of Reconciliation (GOR).
Currently, mediation with the objective of concluding the conflict
peacefully is going on as discussed in Chapter Four ahead.
The trends of similar conflicts for instance in Africa where they
are common are two fold. Firstly, some conflicts have become
protracted thus within the world conceptualized by the liberals
theorists, are becoming the biggest challenge to the international
peace and order and eventually calling for the international community
intervention. Examples of such conflicts include the Sudan (SPLA)
conflict, the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict, and the conflict in
Uganda, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Chad, and Central African Republic.
The second trend of conflict is in regard to ethnic clashes which
characterizes the conflict in Ivory Coast. Discussing the ethnical

27
problem in Ivory Coast would require a thesis of its own because it’s a
critical matter in the country therefore it is not addressed in this study
and it calls for future research.
Although some conflicts have been resolved peacefully in Africa
such as in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone and Liberia,
new conflicts have emerged for instance in Darfur in Sudan and Ivory
Coast. This trend is in compliance with Christopher Moore’s views that
conflict seems to be present in all human relationships and in all
societies.83 These intra-state conflicts do not only retard development
in a country but are the biggest root causes of human suffering in
Africa. Although some scholars emphasize that conflict is an intrinsic
and inevitable part of life84, there is a vital need for managing it by the
concerned parties through negotiations and grievance resolution so
that it does not become violent and destructive if it is inevitable in life.
3:3 Causes of Conflict in Ivory Coast
Conflicts originate from different sources and for different
reasons in a specific place or region. Ivory Coast is not a unique
country and it experiences conflict which exists somewhere else in the
world for diverse reasons. Studying literature on Ivory Coast conflict
leads me to categorize its causes into four. Three of the causes can be
figured at the internal level namely economic, social and political
causes and the fourth cause which is an external factor manifests in
the sub-regional security situation.
3:3.1 Economic factors as a source of Conflict in Ivory Coast.
The outbreak of the crisis in Ivory Coast is associated with the
unevenly distribution of economic development. The northern region is
aggrieved of the un-balanced economic development whereby the
southern region has been given much attention by successive
governments as earlier on discussed in Chapter One. Economic

83
Moore, Christopher.The Mediation Process, 3.
84
Best, Shedrack. Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa, 20.

28
inequalities therefore motivated the northerners to take up arms
against the government.
Though the northern region of Ivory Coast perceives the
southern region to be better-off with two cities of Abidjan and
Yamoussoukro, and oil refineries, the difference has roots not only in
the post-colonial administration that developed them but also in
association to nature of resources for instance, the availability of oil
deposits in the south and in the colonial days whereby the south being
on the Coast, benefited from early foreign traders and Christian
missionaries who settled along the coast where they would dock their
ships and as a result, the area started developing because of
commercial activities according to the local people I interacted with.
Therefore such are unavoidable circumstances that led to the
development of the southern region than the northern region of the
country.
However, the northern region also has mineral deposits, cotton is
grown in abundance and the region has forests that provide timber
which are essential for the development of the region. Forces Nouvelles
(FN) rebels who control the region from the government ought to
positively exploit these economic resources to enable them raise funds
that can develop the region but not to sustain the conflict since they
feel they were earlier economically marginalized by the southerners
who are in control of the political and economic power of the country.

29
3:3.2 Social factors as a source of Conflict in Ivory Coast
Some of the social factors that contribute to the conflict in Ivory
Coast include ethnic problems and religious problems. On the ethnic
problem in Ivory Coast which has multiple tribes and significant
immigrants from neighboring countries, there is a general feeling that
some tribes are privileged than others. Through my interactions with
the local people in both regions, I noticed that the northern tribes look
at the southern tribes of Baoule and Bete who have been ruling the
country to be advantaged and this causes grievances coupled with
hatred developed. The situation is aggravated by sectarian tendency of
the regimes. For instance northerners complain of being treated as
foreigners in their own country by southerners, marginalized and
discriminated against, denied passports and even national identity
papers despite being citizens.85 The country also has immigrants who
migrated to work on the coffee and cocoa plantations during late
Houphouet Boigny’s regime. These immigrants have been competing
with the local people over the resources such as land. Through my
observations , it is these tribal inequality perceptions of the Ivorian
communities and the competition between the local people and
immigrants over resources that have been causing tribal clashes that
have left hundreds of people dead especially in the western region of
Douakoue.
Religious problems in Ivory Coast are based on differences
between Moslems and Christians which are stressed by individuals and
by the authorities, a tendency that breaks down the social cohesion
within the Ivorians. Religion can cause and can also stir the already
existing causes such as inequalities. Inequalities in Ivory Coast
between the northern region and southern region were not caused by
religion but derive from socio-economic and political settings however,
since the north is mostly inhabited by the Moslems and the south
85
Todd, Pitman. Cocoa Industry is Booming in Ivory Coast.

30
mostly by the Christians, there is a tendency of connecting the existing
inequality problems with religion.
It’s common in Ivory Coast to hear that Christians are “better off”
than Moslems however, this is an unavoidable situation in which
religions that are not imposed on anybody, happen to be practiced
most in accordance with the geographical area. Inequality, whether
socio-economic or political in a society, breeds grievances and any
society which is organized in a way that some people are treated
differently and unjustly is doomed to explode into conflict more
especially if its leaders do not have the capacity to address such
inequalities and to equally represent all members of the society. Ivory
Coast plagued by the notion of "Ivorité" or "Ivorianness." as a means of
identifying a true citizen from a non-citizen of Ivory Coast, Northerner
or Southerner, Christian or Moslem was definitely a breeding ground
for the conflict that ensued on the basis of inequalities.
3:3.3 Political factors as a source of Conflict in Ivory Coast
Political competition and politics of exclusion dominate Ivory
Coast political arena. Since the liberalization of politics in 1990,
political power competition grew as it was evident between the leaders
of political parties and with the prevention of Alassane Ouattara from
standing for a political office as discussed in Chapter One. Repression
of the political opposition party members coupled with arrests and
detentions by the regime as earlier discussed in Chapter One also
characterized the countries politics. Discontentment and grievances
that normally arises from such political bickering and the failure to
control the behaviors of armed forces could have contributed to the
urge of military coups and the eventual eruption of the civil war in the
country.
The periodical mutinies by government soldiers in Ivory Coast
such as in December 1999 when soldiers were demanding payment for
peacekeeping duties in Central African Republic; March 2000 in Daloa

31
town, when soldiers were demanding salary increment; in July 2000
when soldiers were demanding a payment of 9000$ each for having
participated in 1999 coup86 and continued political tensions coupled
with rampant killings of the people as reported by the US State
department on human practices,87 were some of the indicators of the
government’s failure to address grievances, weakness of the regime
and lack of the capacity to enforce the rule of law in the country.
3:3.4 External factors as causes of conflict in Ivory Coast
The conflict in Ivory Coast is also attributable to the general
security situation in West African region. Not all West African States are
experiencing conflicts but some of them have been in conflict and
others are having some conflict. The conflicts in West Africa are not
unique; issues concerned are common in some other African regions
such as the Great Lakes Region, Horn of Africa, Central African region
and world wide such as; in the Balkans and Middle East and Asia.
Jessica Wyndham writes that, “West Africa has been heavily
affected by displacement. Internal conflicts based on ethnic tensions
and rivalries, political instability, disputes over the control of natural
resources, natural disasters, poverty, food insecurity and the
imperatives of development have all resulted in significant population
displacement”88
Some of West African countries have experienced the spill-over
conflicts from their neighbors such as the one in Liberia. The Liberian
violent conflict, which can be traced back to the 12 April 1980
assassination of President William Tolbert by Master Sergeant Samuel
Doe89 who became the President and the subsequent launching of a
rebellion on Samuel Doe’s government in 1989 by Charles Taylor and
his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), soon proved to be a West

86
Kamara, Tom. Piracy and Anarchy in West Africa.
87
US State Department. Ivory Coast: Country Report on Human Rights Practices.
88
Wyndham, Jessica. “The Challenges of Internal Displacement in West Africa”. 69.
89
Best, Shedrack. Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa, 254.

32
African regional problem as evident in the trans-border dynamics of the
conflict spilling into Ivory Coast among others.90
West Africa was described by Professor Adebayo Adedeji to be,
“moving backwards due to lack of essential ingredients necessary for
building peace i.e. good governance, integration, economic progress
and stability. Adebayo Adedeji attributes it to numerous reasons but
focuses on greed, grievance and governance as crucial to
understanding the security dilemma”.91 In the case of Ivory Coast,
greed can be associated with the struggle over natural resources for
economic benefits. This is a similar dilemma in Liberia, Nigeria, and
Sierra Leone just to mention a few countries where the fight over
natural resources has been common. Grievances as earlier on seen are
basically associated with political and economic exclusions in a
country. Weak governance contributes significantly to the failure of
addressing grievances and inequalities and thus leads to conflict
eruption.
When conflict erupts, it spreads to the neighborhoods. Matthew
Kirwin noted that, “the security dilemma in Ivory Coast is connected to
the destabilization of the sub-region, particularly in countries such as
Liberia and Sierra Leone. That there are still large numbers of rebels
who have not been reintegrated into society and are joining the conflict
in Ivory Coast.”92 Human Rights Watch also reported that, “armed
conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire have
reverberated across each country’s porous borders. Gliding back and
forth across these borders are young fighters, who view war as an
economic opportunity and identified poverty and hopelessness as
motivating factors to risk dying in armed conflicts”.93

90
Ibid, 255.
91
Adedeji, Adebayo. “West Africa is moving backwards faster”.
92
Kirwin, Mathew. “The Security Dilemma and Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire” 50.
93
Human Rights Watch, Youth, Blood and Poverty.

33
 There exist significant reports from the local population about the
border crossing of former fighters from Liberia into Ivory Coast with the
intention of joining the conflict as a way of their survival. Aid
organizations and United Nations officials working in Liberia say that
hundreds of demobilized combatants, including children, have since
2004 been re-recruited to fight in Côte d’Ivoire.94 The majority of these
regional turned warriors began their fighting careers after being
forcibly recruited by either the Liberian rebels or the Sierra Leonean
rebels, when they were still children. After fighting in their first war,
some of them went to fight in other wars. As these armed warmongers
cross into neighboring countries, the proliferation of light weapons is
elevated and this has lethal impact in the region. International Alert
reported that; “There are an estimated 7 million small arms and light
weapons (SALW) in West Africa, with 77,000 of them in the hands of
insurgents. West African states and civil society groups have
participated actively in arms control initiatives, particularly at the
regional level, but they still face major challenges.”95
Worth noting here is that in December 1999, the ECOWAS
authority of heads of states adopted a decision establishing national
commissions for the control of the proliferation and illicit circulation of
light weapons. According to the decision, each national commission
shall be composed of representatives of the ministries of defense,
internal affairs and security, justice, and foreign affairs and shall assist
the relevant government authorities in the design, elaboration and
implementation of national policies on the control of the proliferation
and illicit circulation of light weapons,96 however the decision has less
or no effect on the warriors who have infested the region with all sorts
of small arms and light weapons.

94
Ibid.
95
International Alert Publications. Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa.
96
Ayissi, Anatole. Cooperating for Peace in West Africa, 14.

34
 The rise of regional warriors is linked to the levels of economic
hardships, lack of education and lack of employment especially within
the youth. Long term strategies aimed at improving the severe socio-
economic conditions and efforts to manage political conflicts in the
region before they escalate into armed civil wars could be a remedy of
avoiding the endless troubles in the sub-region. However this calls for
concerted efforts of the states in the region, NGOs and the
international community in order to realize peace and tranquility in the
sub-region.
3:4 Media effects on the conflict in Ivory Coast
According to Absalom Mutere, the media has for long been
recognized as a catalyst in the many intra and inter-state conflicts that
have afflicted the African continent.97 In Ivory Coast, media have been
utilized for a long time for xenophobia hate messages not only against
the peacekeepers and the French forces in the country but even
against individual foreigners and the political opposition, a tendency
that the local population and the international community feared that it
could bring about a similar catastrophe that befell Rwanda during the
1994 genocide when the media especially the television and radio
stations were used to breed hatred, suspicion and accelerated the
genocide which resulted into the death of many local and foreign
individuals.
Shedrack Gaya Best pointed out that, “The media and all the
channels for the dissemination of information are the aggregate of
public opinion and the voice of the people. The media can promote
peace if it selects to but the media can also promote conflict if it
chooses to.”98 For a long time the media in Ivory Coast opted to
promote conflict instead of promoting peace which is lacking in the
country. The deliberate distortion of news in the Ivorian media for
97
Mutere, Absolom. Media Graduation from Potential to Actual Power in Africa’s
Conflict Resolution, 3.
98
, Best, Shedrack. Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa, 113.

35
specific interests continues to exacerbate the tensions between the
belligerents and parties to the conflict remain worried as it may trigger
more violence and affect the peace process. For instance On 8
November 2004, the national radio station announced that French
soldiers were conveying a "political leader" in one of their armoured
vehicles to Radiodiffusion Télévision Ivoirienne or Ivorian Radio
Television (RTI) headquarters so that he could publicly proclaim himself
president. This was false information and it triggered violence in the
streets of Abidjan and created more political tensions.99 Similarly on 22
December 2004, Madame Simone Gbagbo who is the wife of the
president through “Le Nouvel Observateur” newspaper stated that, “in
order to restore peace and tranquility in Cote d’Ivoire, France needs to
stop financing the rebels and supporting the rebellion.”100 Such
allegations from a prominent national person does not only reveal ones
attitude towards the country (France) that is part of the peace process
but also incites the public into violence which can result into human
catastrophe such as in Rwanda.
Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) in Rwanda, was
deliberately used by authorities to promote hate and violence101 which
eventually resulted into genocide. In a similar twist, Ivory Coast
authorities also took over the control of Radiodiffusion Télévision
Ivoirienne (RTI) and embarked on broadcasting hate messages and
inciting local people into violence which created fear of another
genocide outbreak on the continent.
According to international journalism watchdog reporters, Sans
Frontiers (RSF), religious rhetoric has also been used to incite the
public into violence in Ivory Coast through the media. For instance one
pastor declared over the radio in December 2004 that “the country
must be delivered from evil”. He said that President Jacques Chirac of
99
Reporters without borders, Abidjan State Media mix Propaganda.
100
Gbagbo, Simone, About France.
101
Mpambara, Ines, and Monique Alexis. IMS Assessment Mission.

36
France had been possessed by the spirit of Satan and that the country
was divided into two blocs, the devil’s bloc on one side and the God’s
bloc on the other.102 The pastor was referring to the Ivory Coast
northern region under the FN rebels to be the devil’s bloc while the
southern government controlled region to be God’s bloc. The pastor
like other local politicians was expressing his attitude towards France
however, such statements exacerbates the conflict and it may take a
religious form since the northern bloc which the pastor referred to as a
devil’s bloc is mostly inhabited by Moslems and the southern bloc of
God according to him, is mostly inhabited by Christians.
As one of the argument in the premise of “political contest
model” that the authorities’ level of control over the political
environment is one of the key variables that determine the role of the
news media in a political conflict, President Gbagbo’s government in
Ivory Coast took the advantage of taking over the control of the media
and used that chance to broadcast xenophobic hate messages against
the opposition, foreigners and peacekeepers. In the aftermath of the
conflict escalation, the government took over state television and radio
broadcaster and used it to broadcast virulent anti-foreign rhetoric,
while pro-government newspapers encouraged patriotic Ivorians to
attack foreigners103. National figures such as Charles Ble Goude, urged
thousands of President Gbabgo supporters called Young Patriots to rise
up against French imperialism, through state-run Ivorian Radio

102
Amnesty International, Clashes between Peacekeeping Forces and Civilians.

103
Human Rights Watch, Country on a Precipice.

37
Television, known as RTI. In such circumstances, the UN mission media
can be used to counter hate speeches from the host country.

The U.N. Security Council in its resolution no 1572 demanded

among others that the Ivorian authorities should stop all radio and
television broadcasting hatred, intolerance, and violence. The UN
mission in Ivory Coast (ONUCI) further set up a unit within the section
of Public affairs to track the media for hate speeches but all in vain.
At the beginning of the year 2006, the media was extensively
used to call upon Ivorian to arm them-selves and attack UN staff and
facilities along with the French Licorne forces. What triggered the call
for attacks using the media was a recommendation made by the UN-
backed International Working Group (IWG) in Ivory Coast which stated
that the mandate of Côte d'Ivoire's parliament which had expired
should not be extended. The demonstrators and their political backers
portrayed the IWG's proposal as a provocation.

Several UN facilities and residences of UN staff members in the

government controlled region in the south were attacked, vandalized
and looted by a group called “Young Patriots”, government supported
militia groups and some other security elements. Mostly affected
places were Abidjan City, Daloa town, San Pedro and Giuglo town in the
west which came under simultaneous attacks on the morning of the 16
January 2006. On the following day of 17 January 2006 demonstrators
attempted to overrun a radio station in Daloa but they were not
successful though they managed to vandalize and to loot the premises.

In Abidjan City, hundreds of Young Patriots overran the radio

station Radio-télévision ivoirienne (RTI) building on 18 January 2006
and forced technicians to broadcast calls for people to take to the
streets to liberate the country. They camped outside the RTI building
pledging to stay there until the UN peacekeepers and the French
Licorne forces left the country.

38
 In Daloa , looting and vandalizing of UN staff residences and
setting on fire of official UN vehicles was preceded by besieging the
headquarters by Young Patriots for ten days until non-essential UN staff
members in the situation, were rescued and taken to Abidjan to join
other UN staff who were eventually evacuated to Bangui city in Gambia
safe haven until the end February 2006 when they returned to Ivory
Coast.

Guiglo town in the west of Ivory Coast was the scene of the worst
violence. Bangladesh peacekeepers shot dead four demonstrators after
laying siege to the UN camp and as they attempted to grab weapons
from the soldiers. Demonstrators ransacked UN and NGOs offices
forcing the flight of UN personnel. UN base in San Pedro town in the
south suffered the same plight but peacekeepers managed to resist
the attack.

Although UN personnel were evacuated, negotiations with

leaders of the demonstrators and the call on them by their leaders
such as Ble Goude and President Gbagbo himself led to the end of the
demonstrations and attacks which could have ended into a
catastrophe. What I observed is that media are vital means of
information dissemination and can be used effectively and swiftly to
mobilize the population against a cause whether positive or negative.

3:5 Challenges encountered by peacekeepers104

“The challenges encountered by UN peacekeeping operations are

immense. Over the past few years, there is a high demand for United
Nations peace operations. New complex and multidimensional
missions, massive deployments of military and civilian personnel and

Some facts in this section were used in the previous paper “United Nations
104

Peacekeeping Operations in Ivory Cost: Peace process, Intervention and Challenges to

Peacekeepers” presented to the Peace Operations Class, April 2007 however, they
have been updated and expanded.

39
charges of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers are
challenging the organization.”105

Kofi Annan said, “Peacekeeping is one of the most important as

well as one of the most difficult responsibilities of the United Nations.
The end of the cold war and the rise in intra-state hostilities brought
many challenges to peacekeeping.”106 Traditional peacekeeping model
of the cold war era that involved deployment of unarmed or lightly
armed troops between disputants107came to be challenged by the post
cold war intra-state violent conflicts that required deployment of
multinational forces mandated to implement peace agreements
reached by the actors in the conflict. Adam Roberts attributes the
expansion of peacekeeping operations to three aspects:
Firstly, the capacity of the Security Council to agree on action in
particular crises has increased with the decline in the use of veto
powers. Secondly, there has been a wide spread mood of
optimism that UN can have a much more central role in
international security and that peacekeeping can tackle a very
wide range of urgent problems. Thirdly, the end of the cold war
led to situations where peacekeeping operations are called for
the conclusion of peace agreements108
The multiplicity of armed conflicts poses a big challenge not only to the
UN as an organization in terms of funding, logistics, personnel and
political trends but also to individual peacekeepers. This section of the
chapter will discuss the challenges encountered by peacekeepers
besides those encountered by the organization.
Thomas Britt and Amy Adler wrote that, “Individuals have been
called on from across the world to deploy to areas around the globe to
maintain peace among the former warring factions or nations. These
international peacekeepers often do their job in a chaotic and
105
United Nations, Meeting United Nations Peacekeeping New Challenges.
106
Kofi, Annan. Global Values, 2.
107
Doyle, Michael, and Nicholas Sambanis. Making War and Building Peace, 12.
108
Katayanagi, Mari. Human Rights Functions of UN Peacekeeping Operations,40.

40
uncertain environment and some of them have been killed in the
service of keeping the peace.”109 One such example is that of eight
Guatemalan peacekeepers who were killed by the Ugandan Lord
Resistance Army rebels in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
while on routine duties in January 2006 under the United Nations
Operation in Congo (MONUC) 110

Peacekeepers that are not part of military contingents are

seconded to UN missions from different countries world wide therefore
they have different military background since military organizations
and doctrines differ from one country to another. Having different
training background which is a fundamental requirement to model a
soldier or a military officer, creates conflicting situations in terms of
command, control and communication and the military principle of
unity is lost by peacekeepers which affects their uniform response to
the chain of command and military etiquettes, eventually it affects
individual conduct which is a serious challenge.
African peacekeepers are mostly divided between Francophone
and Anglophone whose etiquettes differ even when they are from one
continent. Other countries use military establishments and doctrines
derived from developed countries such as United Kingdom, France,
Russia and United States of America which further sets apart the
peacekeepers in terms of individual conduct. Multi-military cultures
pose a very big challenge to peacekeepers and they encompass
conduct of individuals which is at times unbecoming to other
peacekeepers for instance in the respect to the chain of command
which happens to be different among the peacekeepers since they are
from different military background.
Peacekeepers are trained military personnel who through quick
appreciation of the situation usually react to what’s confronting them.

109
Britt, Thomas, and Adler Amy. The Psychology of the Peacekeeper, 3.
110
Lewis, David. “Eight UN Peacekeepers Killed in Congo Fighting.”

41
In peacekeeping operations, they are required to adhere to the mission
mandates and rules of engagement which hampers individual decision
making. This situation poses a big challenge to peacekeepers and
frustrates them more especially when they are attacked and they are
required to refrain from any response except in vaguely defined self-
defense or in accordance with rules of engagement which may require
securing permission in order to react to an urgent problem.
3:6 Effects of Conflict in Ivory Coast
Violence has been common in the country even during President
Houphouet Boigny’s regime. Street demonstrations and election
violence have left many people dead and property destroyed on
several occasions. The outbreak of the rebellion brought the worst
human rights violations among the Ivorian people. Several people were
arbitrarily murdered, tortured, women were raped and sexually
abused, other people were arrested and detained for long without trial,
others disappeared completely and others got displaced from their
homes. This situation does not only lead to loss of people and property
but it traumatizes the population in the conflict area.
The conflict destroyed the infrastructure to some extent,
government institutions broke down, rule of law broke down, and
fundamental human requirements have been deprived of the most
Ivorians in the country thus leading to more political and socio-
economic unrest which negatively affects the population. The
population is languishing in abject poverty and most of the social
services have collapsed especially in the northern region. Poverty
situation has not only negatively affected the population but is also
one of the contributory factors that have motivated some people to
join the rebellion especially the youth searching for survival as they
hope to be better like the rebels they see roaming in the northern
region of Ivory Coast. “Conflict is not totally negative but can be

42
positive too depending on how it is handled”.111 In the case of Ivory
Coast, the conflict was overlooked and neglected at its early stages
instead of managing it properly so that it can be helpful to identify the
problem, thus leading to its escalation and subsequent eruption into a
civil war that bisected the country into two hostile regions.
3:7 Conclusion
Conflict is not static but undergoes changes with the situation.
The conflict in Ivory Coast has been undergoing changes with the
situation at hand. Conflicts originate from different sources for different
reasons in different regions of the world. Ivory Coast conflict can be
attributed to internal and external factors that characterized the
country in the post-colonial period. Media in Ivory Coast have been
utilized to broadcast xenophobia speeches and provision of wrong
information to the audience which stirs the conflict and incites the local
people against the peacekeepers, foreigners and the opposition. The
United Nations peacekeeping operations encounter some challenges at
both organizational level and individual level. There are differing
effects of conflict on the population and the conflict in Ivory Coast
brought about human suffering and destruction of property than any
other constructive effect on the population.

111
Best, Shedrack. Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa, 36

43
 CHAPTER FOUR
4:0 MEDIATION AS A TOOL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
4:1 Introduction
African traditional societies have for so long been handling
conflicts by applying the mediation tool even today. Conflicts related to
land disputes, domestic violence, disputes between neighbors,
disputes over assets claims and inheritance, damage to property,
personal conduct are some of the examples of conflicts that traditional
society continues to handle through a third party or mediator in most
cases who is the elder or village chief.
In modern world, the intervention in national or international
conflicts in search for a peaceful resolution using the mediation tool is
conducted by different actors and this chapter will discuss about the
mediation process in the Ivory Coast conflict.
4:2 Mediation process in Ivory Coast.
Soon after the civil war erupted in Ivory Coast, different actors
attempted to restore peace in the country through mediation besides
other methods of restoring peace in the country such as the
deployment of a peacekeeping force. Most of the mediators were from
the West African sub-region and they could have been motivated by
self-interests, moral authority or bilateral agreements.
For example, Nigeria being the most powerful country in terms of
its military and economic capabilities in the region, has been
attempting to impose its hegemony in the West African region. The
military intervention in Sierra Leone conflict, Chad conflict and in
Liberia conflict were spearheaded by Nigeria as it happened in Ivory
Coast.
One of the assumptions of realist theory is that power is the
most important concept in explaining and predicting behaviors of
states therefore the actions of Nigeria towards the Ivory Coast conflict
could be explained from its hegemonic position however, there are

44
other reasons that could explain Nigeria’s intervention like other
states.
The population in Ivory Coast was going under worst violations
of human rights by both government agents and the rebels as
discussed in Chapter Three therefore regional states got involved to
save a neighboring country from human catastrophe. Then the sub-
region has bilateral agreements that bind member states to jointly
react to conflict situation as precisely explained in this section ahead
about ECOWAS.
The rest of the mediators fall under the African Union umbrella
and this could have been the reason why they got involved in the
conflict in order to save a member state of the union from calamity or
to advance self-interests.
French involvement in Ivory Coast conflict could be associated
with the long time ties as a former colonial master with bilateral
agreements and self interests in the country. Ever since Ivory Coast
attained independence, it remained a quasi-colony of France which
maintains its physical presence in the country. The country’s economy
is dictated by France and the French power is visible almost in all
institutions. Therefore to protect its interests in Ivory Coast can be an
explanation for the French intervention in the conflict in order to
preserve the status quo, to achieve imperialistic expansion ambitions
or to gain prestige as realists upholds. Although, “France demonstrates
its hegemonic role in West Africa, Nigeria also possesses military and
economic resources for its potential to dominate the sub-region”.112
When it became evident that a major humanitarian catastrophe
loomed, “France quickly reinforced its 600-strong permanent military
presence in the country to a 4000 strong force (Licorne), which
deployed to separate the warring parties.”113 Initially, the aim of
112
Adekeye Adebajo. Liberia’s Civil War, 7.
113
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre with Zentrum fur
Internationale Friedenseinsatze, Challenges of Peace Implementation in Cote d’Ivoire,

45
Licorne was, “to evacuate French nationals but it changed when
President Gbagbo accepted a cease-fire of 17 October 2002 and further
requested France to assign forces to monitor the ceasefire pending
deployment of ECOWAS troops.”114 The French intervention was
followed by the deployment of army contingents from West African
states acting under the auspices of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), known as the ECOWAS Mission in Côte
d’Ivoire (ECOMICI).115
Concurrent with the ECOWAS and France intervention, the
mediation process was taking place. According to Deverin, between 19
September 2002 when the civil war broke out, and March 2006 the
following actors participated at different points in the mediation
process:
CEDEAO (Economic Community of West African States), the
African Union, France, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal,
President Eyadema Gnasingbe of Togo, President Alpha Oumar
Konare, former President of Mali, President Amani Toumani Toure
of Mali, President John Kuofor of Ghana, President Omar Bongo of
Gabon, President Mamadou Tandja of Niger, President Olusegun
Obasanjo of Nigeria, President Abdou Diouf former President of
Senegal, President Thabo Mbeki of the South African Republic,
King Mohamed VI of Morocco and President Denis Sassou
Nguesso of the Congo.116
Although various actors have participated in the mediation process
without successfully terminating the conflict, the mediation process
has had a significant impact on the trend of the conflict and this leads
to address one of the study questions that; what is the role of
mediation as an alternative means of conflict resolution?

7.
114
UN Security Council, Report of the UN Secretary General on Cote d’Ivoire, 4.
115
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre with Zentrum fur
Internationale Friedenseinsatze, Challenges of Peace Implementation in Cote d’Ivoire,
7.
116
Yveline, Deverin. “The dynamics of mediation in Ivory Coast.”

46
 Prompt intervention in the conflict by the mediator resulted into
securing a cease-fire truce between the warring parties. Senegalese
Foreign Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio who intervened under the
auspices of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as
a third party negotiated a cease-fire agreement which was signed by
the warring parties on 17 October 2002117. The significance of this
initial mediation is that the cease-fire truce which was secured
controlled the relationship and attitude of the warring parties towards
each other, and prevented the deterioration in the violence and served
as a springboard for further peace negotiations and intervention for
instance by ECOWAS troops.
Why did ECOWAS change its economic role to get involved in the
sub-regional security and politics then? The genesis of ECOWAS
formation has roots in the proposals for creating a West African
common market that encompassed all states in West Africa, envisioned
by the then Nigerian Governor-General Nnandi Azikiwe in 1961.118 The
ideas of Azikiwe were revived by leaders of Togo and Nigeria and
ECOWAS was formed in 1975. Under the 1975 treaty, ECOWAS aims
were to promote cooperation and development in industry,
telecommunication, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce,
monetary and financial issues, and in social and cultural matters.119
This initially economic oriented organization came to be involved in
regional politics and security matters when regional leaders met and
adapted additional protocols to the treaty.
In 1976, Heads of States and Governments under ECOWAS
umbrella met at a summit in Lome, Togo and signed a protocol on non-
aggression which was to guarantee regional peace seen as essential

117
Global Security Organisation.org, Ivory Coast.
118
Oteng, Kufuor.The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West
Africa States, 21.
119
Ibid, 23.

47
for rapid integration and development and refrained member states
from threat, use of force or aggression.120
Although member states were under obligations to refrain from
threat, use of force and aggression, another protocol relating to
mutual assistance on defense deepened military relations within
the community by establishing the ECOWAS defense council and
the defense commission. In case of armed intervention, the
defense council assisted by the defense commission is to
supervise with the authority of the states or states concerned,
all measures taken by ECOWAS force commander and ensure
that all necessary means for the intervention are made available
to him.121
Article 16 of 1981 ECOWAS protocol about mutual assistance in
defense states that when an external armed threat or aggression is
directed against a member state, the Head of State shall send a
written request for assistance to the chairman of ECOWAS copied to
members.122 ECOWAS was empowered to intervene when there was an
internal conflict in a member state of the community that was actively
maintained and sustained from outside under article 18 of the treaty
however, ECOWAS forces were prevented from intervening if the
conflict remained purely internal.123Chapter VIII, article 40 of ECOWAS
protocol signed on 10 December 1999 states that, “ECOWAS shall
intervene to alleviate the suffering of the populations and restore life
to normalcy in the event of crises, conflict and disaster.”124
It was within this new atmosphere that successive mediators
were able to bring the belligerents to negotiating table and this helped
to keep them busy in negotiations instead of fighting which could have
left more people dead and property destroyed. The then Togolese
120
Ibid, 25.
121
Ibid.
122
Edouard,Benjamin. Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defense,7
123
Ibid.
124
ECOWAS, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

48
President Gnassingbe Eyadema also intervened as a mediator in the
conflict before his death and his intervention yielded an agreement on
31 October 2002. Rebels vowed to disarm if they receive guarantee
that new elections will be held within six months and further made a
series of demands concerning the armed forces such as uniting all the
armed factions and granting of amnesty. The warring parties agreed in
principle on military matters but failed to strike a political deal125
France also secured a peace agreement signed by all parties to the
conflict in January 2003 at Linas-Marcoussis. This agreement is
available in full at appendix C of the thesis. My argument therefore is
that, the mediation processes that involved different actors played the
role of containing a conflict from escalation in a peaceful manner and
enabled an environment for pursuing further peace negotiations.
President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa designated as a mediator
by the African Union on 7 November 2004 served longer than the rest
of the mediators in the Ivory Coast conflict.126 Through his mediation,
some peace agreements were endorsed by the warring parties as
discussed in the next section, although the implementation has been
problematic presumably because of lack of political will on the part of
local politicians and maybe the warring parties were still capable of
sustaining the conflict in other words, the conflict was not yet ripe for
resolution.
President Thabo Mbeki’s mediation was eventually turned down
by the Force Nouvelles rebels (FN) on accusation of engaging in
commercial transactions with the government. The rebels accused
Thabo Mbeki of being more of a partner to President Gbabgo instead of
a mediator by selling him weapons which violated an imposed arms
embargo on both parties and further accused Thabo Mbeki of his
involvement in the establishment of a telephone company in the

125
Peace Negotiation Watch, Ivory Coast rebels call for new polls.
126
Yveline, Deverin. “The dynamics of mediation in Ivory Coast.”

49
country. Sadiki Konate, FN rebels spokesman blamed Thabo Mbeki for
the collapse of the mediation process by getting involved in Ivory
Coast economy.127 A mediator ought not to take sides but remain
impartial so that he or she does not facilitate the mediation process
with bias.
Thabo Mbeki overlooked the principle of impartiality and
neutrality according to FN rebels, hence loosing integrity as a mediator
and he had to step down from the mediation process. He was replaced
by the President of Burkina Faso Blaise Compaore, who successfully
secured an agreement between the incumbent president Laurent
Gbagbo and the rebel leader Guillaume Soro in March 2007, as
discussed in details in the next section.
Rejection of Thabo Mbeki’s mediation leads to address another
study question that; does the impact of mediation vary in accordance
with mediator style? Mediation process varies with the mediator or
third party. Not all mediators in Ivory Coast succeeded, only a few
managed to secure peace agreements though they all contributed in
containing the conflict through negotiations. Mediation involves
persuasion which varies with individuals capabilities therefore the style
applied by a mediator, in other words how the mediator facilitates the
process; determines the outcome of the mediation process.
4:3 Peace Agreements in Ivory Coast128.
Peace Agreements are joint decisions by parties to the conflict
reached during dialogue or negotiations for the purpose of resolving
the conflict peacefully. Actors in Ivory Coast conflict resorted to
negotiations as a tool of securing peace agreements or ceasefires in
order to stop violence that was taking place and to avoid further
negative consequences of the civil war.

Colombant, Nico “ Ivory Coast Rebels Reject South African Mediation”

127

These peace agreements in Ivory Coast were also mentioned in my previous essay
128

presented in the Peace Operations course on 23 April 2007.

50
 When the military coup flopped and Ivory Coast plunged into a
civil war, the conflict in Ivory Coast invited an increased involvement of
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member states
which reflects the wider regional concern with an internal conflict along
liberalists’ characteristics. ECOWAS convened an emergency summit in
Accra which set up a “contact group” composed of Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo supported by African Union to
promote dialogue between rebels and the government in order to
resolve the crisis peacefully through negotiations.129 This was the first
peace agreement code named Accra I.
Attempts to end the fighting and initiate negotiations were
further made at the end of September 2002 when the “contact group”
met President Gbagbo in Abidjan. Talks were held and rebels were
willing to cooperate although there was no agreement that was
signed.130 Another attempt to restore peace was made in mid October
when Senegalese foreign minister held talks with the rebels that led to
the signing of a cease-fire agreement between Forces Armées Force
Nouvelles (FAFN) rebels and the government on 17 October 2002.131
Further negotiations were held on 30 October 2002 in Lome, Togo,
where the Togolese president Gnassingbe Eyadema was appointed
coordinator of the mediating efforts and both parties agreed to create
a climate favorable for dialogue and reconciliation.132
In January 2003 rebel groups of the Ivorian Patriotic Movement of
the Far West (MPIGO) and the Ivorian Movement for Justice and Peace
(MJP) active in the west of the country also signed a ceasefire with the
government.133 After the signing of the ceasefire agreements, actors in
the Ivorian conflict met at Linas-Marcoussis in France on the invitation
129
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre with Zentrum fur
Internationale Friedenseinsatze, Challenges of Peace Implementation in Cote d’Ivoire,
21.
130
UPPSALAConflict Database, Negotiations.
131
Ibid.
132
UPPSALA Conflict Database, Negotiations.
133
Ibid.

51
of the President of France, from 15 to 23 January 2003 and reached
another peace agreement codenamed Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.134
The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement established a Government of
National Reconciliation composed of ministers from the main political
parties and the rebel groups. Gbagbo was to remain President, but a
Prime Minister with wide-ranging powers was to be appointed in
agreement with the other groups.135 The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement
also defined the main tasks of the new government of national
reconciliation, which included preparing a timetable for credible and
transparent national elections, restructuring the defense and security
forces, and organizing the regrouping and disarmament of all armed
groups.136
Linas-marcoussis agreement was marred with disputes over
ministerial positions prompting Ghana to initiate another round of
negotiation which was held on 7 March 2003 to search for a solution to
ministerial posts. This Accra II Agreement was a continuation of the
process begun with the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.137 In order to
ease the formation of a government of national reconciliation Accra II
agreement provided for the formation of a national security council
(NSC) comprising of representatives from each signatory of the Linas-
Marcoussis Agreement. NSC was tasked to appoint a minister of
defense and a minister of national security. The agreement also more
closely specified some aspects of the power-sharing arrangements,
clearly stating that two state ministries (the ministry of territorial
administration and the ministry of communication) were to be
attributed to the MPCI.138 Following Accra II agreement, a total
ceasefire agreement for the whole country between the main rebel

134
United States Institute of Peace, Peace Agreements Digital Collection.
135
Gberie, Lansana. “The Crisis in Ivory Coast.”
136
United Nations Mission in Cote d’ivoire, Background.
137
Sengupta, Somini. “As Peace Accord is Fleshed Our, Ivory Coast Fighting Resumes”
138
UPPSALAConflict Database, Agreements.

52
groups and the government was signed on 3 May 2003 to pave the
way for deployment of peacekeepers.139
Negotiations continued and on 30 July 2004, Accra III agreement
which set a timetable for political reform and disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration was signed and rebels and the
opposition who had withdrawn from the government of reconciliation
following violent repression of the opposition were called upon to rejoin
the government.140
The implementation of all concluded multiple agreements
initiated by different mediators remained difficult; the obstacle among
others being the unwillingness of President Gbagbo to accommodate
rebels in his administration and mistrust that could not let any of the
group disarm first. The cease-fire agreements which were reached
would be violated occasionally by both sides, for instance in November
2004, government broke the ceasefire agreement and launched new
air attacks on the rebel territory.141
To break the impasse in the peace process, African Union
appointed the South African President Thambo Mbeki to spearhead the
mediation role.142 Under mediation of President Mbeki, talks between
the government and rebels were convened in November and again in
December 2004 and the disputants promised to implement the Linas-
Marcoussis agreement. On 11 January 2005, Thabo Mbeki met the
warring parties at Yamoussoukro city but the group failed to reach any
agreement.143 President Mbeki further met both sides in the conflict in
Pretoria, between 2 and 6 April 2005 accomplishing what was known
as the Pretoria agreement that was signed by President Gbagbo, FAFN
leader Guillaume Soro, former Prime Ministers Seydou Diarra and

139
Ibid.
140
Ibid.
141
Human Rights Watch, Country on a Precipice
142
Banjo, Adewale. “Restoring the jewel of West Africa.”
143
GlobalSecurity.org, Ivory Coast Conflict.

53
Alassane Outtara declaring an immediate and final cessation of
hostilities.144
Under the Pretoria agreement, the rebel politicians pledged to
rejoin the government of national reconciliation and the disputants
agreed to immediately start disarming and dismantling militia groups.
In line with the Pretoria agreement, government and rebel chiefs
initiated a round of talks aiming at settling the question of
disarmament and uniting the forces. These talks led to an agreement
on the disarmament timetable and the withdrawal of heavy weapons
from the frontline. Heavy weapons were removed from the purported
front-lines however disarmament and unification of forces have never
been implemented to date.
Although efforts were made to hold elections at the end of
October 2005 as provided for in the Pretoria agreement, they couldn’t
be conducted on ground that all requirements were not available and
President Gbagbo also insisted that rebels had not disarmed while
rebels also insisted that pro-Gbagbo militias had to lay down their
weapons first. President Gbagbo was allowed to stay in power till
October 2006 by UN and AU on the recommendation of ECOWAS
leaders to avoid a constitutional crisis in the country.
The search for a peaceful solution to the conflict continued with
the dialogue between Chiefs of Staff Brigadier General Philippe Mangou
of FANCI and Soumaila Bakayoko of FAFN. These chiefs met on several
occasions in Bouake town and Yamoussoukro city with the aim of
finding a solution especially about how the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process can be implemented
and belligerent forces be united. Following continued dialoguing of the
chiefs of staff, soldiers due for DDR started gathering at identified sites
for DDR exercise in both sides of the rebel’s territory and government’s
territory.

Banjo, Adewale. “Restoring the jewel of West Africa”

144

54
 To strengthen the peace process, the UN Secretary General, the
Mediator in the conflict President Mbeki and all actors in the conflict
further met at Yamoussoukro city in June 2006. Meanwhile the
identification exercise to support registration of voters in anticipation
of end of year elections was sabotaged by government supporters and
eventually Presidential elections which were scheduled for October
2006 were postponed for another year for the second time and AU and
UN granted President Gbagbo another extension of one year in office.
145
Presidential elections have failed to takeoff on two occasions and the
reasons given have been lack of preparations. In accordance with the
Linas-Marcoussis and Pretoria agreements, disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration is required to be conducted prior to
presidential elections however it had not taken off on those occasions,
thus affecting elections schedules. The then, UN chief Kofi Annan
stated that, “elections for October 2005 could not take place because
political leaders and parties were not cooperating and the electoral
commission had not been constituted.”146
At the beginning of the year 2007, President Blaise Compaore of
Burkina Faso in his capacity as the conflict mediator invited the warring
parties to his country. President Laurent Gbagbo and rebel leader
Guillaume Soro met the mediator President Blaise Compaore in
Ouagadougou on 4 March 2007 and after negotiations, they signed an
agreement to form a new unity government and create a new joint
military command that would include FAFN and FANCI officials. They
also agreed on the implementation of DDR process before the end of
the year and to issue identification papers to those who lack them in
preparation of elections.147

145
Global Policy Forum, Security Council Reiterates Full Support for Ivory Coast’s
Prime Minister and Elections by next October.
146
Global Policy Forum, October Elections 'Not Possible,' Annan.
147
United Nations Security Council, Update Report No. 1 Cote d'Ivoire.

55
 The agreement – reached in Ouagadougou, capital of
neighbouring Burkina Faso, on 4 March – between President Laurent
Gbagbo and Forces Nouvelles Secretary-General Guillaume Soro
commits both sides to honoring all Security Council resolutions on the
issue, including the need to abide by free, fair and transparent
elections. It also tackles other key issues such as disarmament, reform
and restructuring of the armed forces and the restoration of State
authority throughout the country. A full version of the Ouagadougou
agreement is available at appendix D of this thesis.
President Gbagbo named rebel leader Guillaume Soro as Prime
Minister on 29 March 2007 in a major step towards implementing
Ouagadougou accord.148 The buffer zone (ZOC) between the
government controlled south and rebel controlled north was lifted on
the 16 April 2007 in accordance with the Ouagadougou accord. France
also announced that it would pull out 500 of its 3,500 peacekeepers
from Ivory Coast following the new peace deal.149
Multiple peace agreements have failed to conclude the civil
war in Ivory Coast even with the involvement of international actors
and mediators however, the Ouagadougou accord which brought about
the appointing of the former rebel leader as the Prime minister, the
establishment of a joint command center composed of government
military officers and former rebel commanders and the lifting of the
ZOC is a significant move towards the direction of achieving peace in
the country so long as the accord is fully implemented. The
implementation of the several agreements reached under the
facilitation of different mediators has been difficult apart from the
Ouagadougou Agreement and I would argue that the conflict had not
reached a stalemate and the warring parties have realized that the

Tran, Phuong. “Rebel Leader Takes Over as Ivory Coast's New Prime Minister”
148

Aboa, Ange, and Coulibaly Loucoumane. “UN to leave Ivory Coast buffer zone from
149

April 16.”

56
conflict is retarding the development of the country and it’s the source
of the prevalent human suffering.
4:4 International Intervention
Following the initial intervention of France and ECOWAS, the
international community also got concerned. On 13 May 2003, UN
Security Council adopted resolution 1479 which established the United
Nations mission in Cote d’Ivoire (MINUCI) for an initial period of twelve
months with the mandate to facilitate the implementation by the
Ivorian parties, of Linas-Marcoussis agreement and complementing the
operations of the French and ECOWAS forces.150
Initially, MINUCI had few liaison officers, who advised the Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) on military matters,
they monitored the military situation, they established liaison with the
French, ECOWAS, FANCI and FN, in order to build confidence and trust
between the armed groups, provided input to planning for
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and
reported to the Special Representative of the Secretary General
(SRSG).151
The UN mission in Cote d'Ivoire (MINUCI) and ECOWAS forces
were replaced by United Nations operation in Ivory Coast (ONUCI) on 4
April 2004 which was established under UNSC Resolution 1528 of 27
February 2004 for an initial 12 month under chapter VII of the UN
Charter.152 The mandate for ONUCI has been changing with time, for
instance the originally mandate stipulated in resolution 1528 was
developed to resolution 1609 of 24 June 2005 which was also
developed to resolution 1739 of 10 January 2007 and shall be
implemented in coordination with French forces-Licorne stationed in
Ivory Coast.

150
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1479.
151
United Nations Mission in Cote d’Ivoire mandate.
152
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1528.

57
 Because the UN missions are deployed after the Security Council
has passed the resolution and on temporary basis, whenever the
period for the mission granted in the resolution expires before the
mission achieves its objective or mandate, the mission is extended for
another period in a new resolution. ONUCI has been getting extensions
since its initial deployment of a 12 months period under new
resolutions to enable the mission to achieve its objective. Secondly,
the situation in a mission area may change and therefore call for
developing of the existing resolution by the Security Council to a new
resolution.
Approximately 9,200 uniformed personnel and approximately
1,150 civilian personnel of United Nations are currently involved in the
peace process153 and supported by approximately 4,000 French troops.
According to the latest Security Council resolution 1739, the mandate
of ONUCI shall be the following: 154

(1)Monitoring of the cessation of hostilities and movements of

armed groups, (2)Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration,
repatriation and resettlement, (3)Disarmament and dismantling
of militias, (4)Operations of identification of the population and
registration of voters, (5)Reform of the security sector,
(6)Protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and
civilians, (7)Monitoring of the arms embargo, (8)Support for
humanitarian assistance, (9)Support for the redeployment of
State administration, (10)Support for the organization of open,
free, fair and transparent elections, (11)Assistance in the field of
human rights, (12)Public information, (13)Law and order.155
Different mediators through facilitating negotiations between the
warring parties in conjunction with the UN mission have managed to
control the hostilities through confidence building. ONUCI and Licorne
forces have managed to implement almost all their mandates so far
153
United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast facts.
154
Ibid.
155
Ibid.

58
and DDR which had failed to take off, finally started as scheduled in
the Ouagadougou agreement and as I write, some militia groups have
already handed over their weapons.
4:5 Conclusion
Mediation is one of the methods of conflict resolution
through peaceful means conducted by a third party or mediator which
has been in use for a long time and at different levels. The mediator
facilitates the warring parties to reach a decision about the conflict.
The method is applicable in both modern and traditional societies. Not
only politicians and military practitioners are involved in the mediation
process in conflicts but also community leaders play a big role of
mediation at their level. The mediator and the situation, both dictate
the outcomes of the mediation process.
Mediation process in Ivory Coast began concurrently with
peacekeeping operations by the ECOWAS and the French troops.
ECOWAS formerly an economic organization changed its objectives
after adapting new protocols to its treaty to get involved in the sub-
regional politics and security. France got involved because of its long
relationship with Ivory Coast as its former colonial master. Mediation
has been carried out by different actors at different periods and some
have been successful and others have not. Some mediators have been
able to secure peace agreements between warring parties and others
have failed however, both mediators facilitated the containment of the
conflict from escalation by engaging the conflicting parties into
negotiations.
Through mediation processes, some peace agreements were
reached in Ivory Coast and abroad between the warring parties
however, the implementation of these peace agreements has been
problematic apart from the latest agreement reached in Ouagadougou
that is currently under implementation.

59
 The international community i.e. the United Nations also
intervened in the conflict by establishing a peacekeeping mission in
Ivory Coast to facilitate the peace process that was being pursued by
the mediators, France and sub-regional organization.

60
 CHAPTER FIVE
5:0 PEACE-BUILDING IN IVORY COAST CONFLICT
5:1 Introduction
Peace-building encompasses activities carried out either by the
primary parties to the conflict, the civil society, the government,
international organizations, independent states and donor
organizations to ensure a long lasting peaceful situation in the post
conflict period and also prevent the recurrence of conflict.
These activities may include disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of former combatants, reconciliation, restoration of
judicial system and the rule of law, protection of human rights, good
governance, state institutions building , security sector reforms; they
will be discussed in detail in the ensuing sections of this chapter.
Peace-building activities may be conducted during the
progression of the conflict or after the conflict has been terminated. In
Ivory Coast despite the fact that the civil war has not yet ended,
reconstruction activities as part of peace-building have been going on.
For instance, Bangladesh peacekeepers under the United Nations
Mission in the country (ONUCI) have been reconstructing roads in
Daloa region and the French military engineering company at
Yamoussoukro has been repairing feeder roads. ONUCI has also been
involved in quick impact projects commonly known as QIPs, which were
coordinated by the military observers and as a result of this, local
schools have been constructed.
This chapter while analyzing the conflict in Ivory Coast will
attempt to address two research questions; what is the significance of
peace-building in Ivory Coast’s conflict? How can the international
community prevent reoccurrence of the conflict in Ivory Coast conflict?
5:2 Peace-building in Ivory Coast conflict
Unlike other African destructive conflicts such as in Liberia, Sierra
Leone and Somalia, the conflict in Ivory Coast received prompt

61
intervention by foreign troops therefore there wasn’t much destruction
especially in the southern region such as the administrative capital
Yamoussoukro and Abidjan capital city. Although the northern region
lacks equivalent infrastructure it was not rampantly destroyed too
except that basic social services are lacking. Therefore, the country
has the potential of healing from civil war in a short time of
reconstruction, provided the essential requirements such as the
political will and the funds are available.
With the current positive signal of concluding the conflict, peace-
building projects or activities, besides those which have been going on
amid the civil war, ought to be established to rejuvenate the society
which has suffered for more than four years of crisis.
Although Peter Batchelor, et al. are against the international
organizations and foreign powers involvement in resolving African
intra-state crises,156 the Ivorian conflict requires the involvement of the
international, regional, the civil society and local actors to work hand in
hand if peace is to be restored and be sustained in the country. Part of
the infrastructure was destroyed by the civil war and peace-building
activities requires funding, therefore the international and regional
organizations ought to give financial support towards the conduct of
peace-building activities such disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of former combatants which has failed to take off for a
long time and the reason among others which are given happens to be
financial constraints. The civil society and local actors have been
instrumental in the post-conflict peace-building activities in other
regions such as in the Liberia post-conflict period and in the Uganda’s
northern region conflict; therefore they can play a big role in the Ivory
Coast post-conflict period. These parties have already been part of the
on-going peace processes therefore it’s important that they continue to
give a hand to the country in its efforts to realize a viable peace.
156
Batchelor, P., et al., Demilitarization and Peace-building in Southern Africa, 53.

62
 To address the last research question of how can the
international community prevent the recurrence of conflict in Ivory
Coast, the following peace-building activities ought to be established in
such a country emerging from civil war and normally characterized by
a number of problems that must be dealt with successfully if the
recurrence of conflict is to be prevented.
5:2.1 Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration of ex-
combatants (DDR).
The objective of disarmament is to take away weapons, which
are means of violence from former combatants and illegal owners.
Disarmament should therefore target recovering all arms from former
combatants and be destroyed or registered for official use.
Demobilization in this section refers to a process of reducing the
number of personnel and equipment normally which are non-essential
in the post-conflict period and when restructuring armed forces, and
reintegration refers to the absorbing of the ex-combatants into the
society or into the national forces for those who are eligible.
The 1998 report by the United Nations Secretary General on the
causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable
development in Africa, lists the reintegration of ex-combatants and
others into productive society as one of the priorities of post-conflict or
peace-building.157 When ex-combatants are neglected and are not
reintegrated to settle within the community, they are likely to get
involved in conflict again. Therefore, there is a need to resettle these
former combatants to where they prefer to live and employ or
reintegrate them into developmental activities to avoid their idleness
which can motivate them back into violence. These demobilized
combatants also deserve to get education and psychological
counseling as at times some of them are traumatized by the war
situation. Other ex-combatants come out when they are already
157
Newman, Edward, and Albrecht Schnabel. Recovering from Civil Conflict, 181.

63
casualties or disabled and some are ill therefore they deserve
additional benefits and care since they are not in position of taking
care of themselves.
African countries such as Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Somalia, Sudan and Ivory Coast which have abundant illegal small
arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation requires DDR programs so
that these weapons can be recovered from ex-combatants and illegal
owners to prevent their further utilization in conflicts so that viable
peace can be achieved. Several conflicts in Africa are thriving on
weapons that are smuggled across national borders of the countries
recovering from conflict therefore disarmament after conflict
settlement or de-escalation is very important in order to have
accountability for these weapons and control their misuse.
DDR programs have been conducted successfully twice in
Uganda in 1990s; where by soldiers were retrenched after fighting for
so long in internal insurgencies and to give way for the
professionalizing the armed forces and reduce military expenditure.
DDR was also conducted successfully in Sierra Leone after the civil war
in 2001with the support of United Nations Mission in the country
(UNAMSIL). In Liberia, DDR was also successfully conducted after the
conclusion of the armed conflict but as earlier discussed in chapter 2
about the external causes of conflict in Ivory Coast; some soldiers
crossed the national border to fight in the Ivory Coast conflict, a
tendency that is promoting mercenarism in the West African sub-
region. If these ex-combatants had been disarmed and reintegrated
into society they wouldn’t be reinforcing factors to the sub-region’s
conflicts and armed violence.
DDR in the Ivory Coast conflict has been a contentious issue ever
since the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement which clearly
stated the need to conduct disarmament and demobilization of the
forces. The DDR process in Ivory Coast is a national program called;

64
National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilization,
Reinsertion/Reintegration, Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement (NPDDR/RRR) and it’s supported by the international and
regional communities and local actors.
All combatants recruited after the failed coup of September 2002
in Ivory Coast, are expected to be affected by the process and
gathering places named DDR sites were selected in both rebel and
government controlled regions. By mid 2006, the affected fighters of
Forces Armées Nationales de la Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) and Forces
Armées Force Nouvelles (FAFN) had started to assemble in pre-
grouping sites in preparation to proceed to the DDR sites for final send-
off. According to ONUCI daily news of 15 July 2006158, thirty thousand
FAFN combatants had already reported to forty-five pre-regrouping
sites in the rebel territory. The affected government soldiers had also
started to assemble in the pre-regrouping sites in the southern region
although the numbers of those who had arrived at the sites were not
available. DDR programs deserve adequate funding and monitoring to
ensure proper implementation. Although DDR process in Ivory Coast
has not been concluded, when it is successfully completed, it will lead
to the reduction in military expenditure and funds that are saved could
be utilized in other developmental or peace-building activities. The
facilitators of the process ought to provide alternative way of living to
the former combatants, rehabilitation and employment opportunities
so that they do not get involved in violence after resettlement.
5:2.2 Reconciliation
Reconciliation may involve trials for persons accused of
committing war crimes and other abuses to give justice to the victims,
the conducting of truth commissions such as in South Africa in the
aftermath of apartheid, the issuing of public apologies as the former

ONUCI daily news is dispatched to the intra-net which can only be accessed by
158

staff members.

65
FAFN rebel leader Guillieme Soro did when he was appointed the prime
minister in March 2007, the establishment of various public courts such
as gacaca in Rwanda which were established to handle genocide cases
and Mato Oput in northern Uganda which is used by Acholis. These are
some of the examples applied to handle post-conflict reconciliation.
In Africa, there are other traditional methods of reconciliation for
the purpose of maintaining peace and harmonious relations or social
solidarity. Okusasira (to forgive) has been in use by Bakiga of southern
Uganda for centuries. Okusasira promotes truth and forgiveness
through direct confrontation between victims and perpetrators after
disputes or violent conflicts. It may take place in private or publicly at
an individual or group level whereby the perpetrator apologizes and
the victim forgives on humanitarian basis. The significance of this
mechanism is that it helps the victim to heal the pain or emotional
wounds and redress grievances that caused the dispute or the conflict
and the perpetrator will be accepted back in the community. Almost
similar to okusasira mechanism, there is another African indigenous
mechanism known as ubuntu mostly used by the Bantu tribe. The term
ubuntu generally expresses humanistic principles that portray social
values which are fundamental requirements of social solidarity. Such
social values include dignity, respect, compassion, conformity,
hospitality, unity, and friendship. The main impression about ubuntu is
that people don’t live in isolation but with and through others. This co-
existence promotes peace in society and these humanistic principles
are a basis of controlling ones actions. In times of reconciliation, it is
upon ones feeling of ubuntu that he/she forgives or he/she accepts
responsibility for the wrong doings inflicted on others for the purpose
of social cohesion.
Ivory Coast ought to emphasize the application of traditional
mechanisms of reconciliation which have been effective in other
African societies. There have been significant disputes and hatred

66
within the local population which contributed to ethnic clashes that
have left hundreds of local people and foreigners dead and others
displaced besides the national crisis. Since the victims have mostly
been the common local people and who are mostly illiterate, there is a
need of sensitizing them about the essence of co-existence and the
use of traditional means of reconciliation such as reconciliation
dialogues conducted by the local village chiefs, should be emphasized
as an alternative means to the modern methods of reconciliation.

67
5:2.3 Restoration of Judicial system and Rule of law.
Rama Mani pointed out that, “Law is a prerequisite for peace,
security and stability. A society without law will inevitably be a society
without peace.”159 Since the objective of peace building is to create
durable peace, it’s important to establish or reestablish the judicial
system in a country and restructure the police in the case of Ivory
Coast during the post-conflict period.
It’s a common phenomenon for the judicial system to collapse or
become corrupt and inefficient during civil wars in Africa and Ivory
Coast is an example of a country where the judicial system collapsed
with the outbreak of the civil war. There is a need of reestablishing
proper functioning courts of law in the country with competent judges,
prosecutors and lawyers to efficiently run the judicial system. Most
crimes in Ivory Coast go unpunished which increases the rate at which
they are committed since the perpetrators know that they may not be
apprehended. On 16 January 2006 for instance my residence in Daloa
town was looted and local people were moving in public putting on my
lost clothes. When I reported the matter to the police in Daloa town, I
was told that they were in a war situation and therefore they could not
arrest the suspects. Laws require a competent police force to enforce
them. The current corrupt and inefficient national police needs
reshuffling in the post-conflict era if law and order are to be restored in
the country and durable peace to be attained in the country.
5:2.4 Protection of Human rights
This section will try to analyze the general idea of human rights
as provided for by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
and how Ivory Coast ought to respect human rights as a source of
stability and durable peace.
Human rights are international norms that help to protect all
people everywhere from severe political, legal, and social abuses. The
159
Wohlgemuth, L., et al., Common Security and Civil Society in Africa, 146.

68
connection between peace and human rights is obvious and the two
are inextricably glued together, where they are separated then conflict
emerges.
Francesca Marotta wrote that, “History has repeatedly
demonstrated the link between peace and human rights. Where
massive violations of human rights occur, conflict prevails. Lasting
peace can not be achieved without respect for human rights and any
effort to restore peace must incorporate efforts to promote and protect
human rights”.160 Human rights have a direct influence on the stability
of a country therefore they should be protected in the post-conflict
period.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets out a list of
specific human rights that countries should respect and protect. These
specific rights can be divided into six;
security rights that protect people against crimes such as
murder, massacre, torture, and rape; due process rights that
protect against abuses of the legal system such as
imprisonment without trial, secret trials, and excessive
punishments; liberty rights that protect freedoms in areas such
as belief, expression, association, assembly, and movement;
political rights that protect the liberty to participate in politics
through actions such as communicating, assembling, protesting,
voting, and serving in public office; equality rights that
guarantee equal citizenship, equality before the law, and
nondiscrimination; and social (or "welfare") rights that require
provision of education to all children and protections against
severe poverty and starvation.161
Since the beginning of the conflict in Ivory Coast, both government
security forces and rebels have committed serious human rights
abuses162with very few of the perpetrators being held accountable for
160
Ibid, 69.
161
Nickel, James. “Human Rights.”
162
The Human Rights Cost of the Political Impasse.

69
their acts before a national or an international court. Government
forces have been responsible for extrajudicial executions, torture, and
detention without trial. The rebels have also committed human rights
abuses particularly in the west and in the north of the country where
they have terrorized the population and carried out arbitrary killings.
Indeed in few months after the out break of the war, Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) news reported that government
soldiers had killed at least 120 civilians in Monoko-Zohi village on 8
November 2002163. Amnesty International (AI) also reported that on 6
October 2002, rebels had killed 60 gendarmes with about 50 of their
children in Bouake town.164 Other killings were reported at Daloa town
in October 2002 where the Anti-riot Brigade killed 50 civilians from the
north. In March 2003, Greater West Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire
rebels (MPIGO) murdered 40 civilians at Dah and in the same months
60 civilians were killed at Bangalo.165 These were isolated cases that
were reported but people were being killed almost in every region even
in the north especially at Korhogo, a rebel dominated town.
Establishment of sound legal framework and fostering human
rights awareness in war-torn countries is one way of protecting human
rights.166 Law enforcement officers need to undergo under human
rights training besides the ongoing efforts of United Nations mission in
the country in sensitizing the population and promoting human rights
through advocacy such as distribution of reading materials about
human rights, use of ONUCI FM radio to sensitize the local people
about human rights and conducting workshops.
It is through understanding human rights that they will be
protected. As earlier discussed, there is an urgent need of restoration
of the rule of law to protect human rights violations in Ivory Coast and
163
CBC, “Ivory Coast villagers buried 120 after massacre.”
164
Amnesty International, Cote d’Ivoire: A Succession of Unpunished Crimes from the
Massacre of Gendarmes at Bouake to the Mass Graves of Daloa.
165
Fiact, “Ivory Coast: No Impunity for War Crime and Crimes against Humanity”.
166
Tor Tanke Holm, and Espen Barth Eide, Peace-building and Police Reform, 70.

70
the government ought to come up with commissions to protect human
rights. Civil societies have also been active in the protection of human
rights though they can not enforce laws and apprehend the culprits.
They carry out activities such as sensitizing the people on human
rights, promoting human rights through advocacy and advising the
government and belligerents about the human rights. Some of these
organizations include, the Christian Association for the Abolition of
Torture and the Respect of Human Rights, the Ivorian division of
Amnesty International, and the Ivorian League of Human Rights. These
societies are doing a tremendous job in coordination with the
peacekeeping mission in Ivory Coast although they are at times
frustrated by the local authorities who deny them freedom of
movement to both regions in the country. State security forces, militias
and pro-government groups also regularly threaten and intimidate
these human rights activists.167
5:2.5 Governance, State institutions and Security sector
reform.
Governance, state institutions, and security sector reforms are of
significant importance for Ivory Coast to consider in peace-building
processes. In post-conflict period, restoration or reformation of state
institutions occurs following the establishment of a broad-based regime
that ought to prevent the state from slipping back into armed conflict.
The education sector needs reinstallation or reinforcement to provide
formal and civic education, crisis and conflict management knowledge
to eligible persons without any discrimination against. The military and
other security organs are restructured towards the goal of
professionalization so that the security of the state is assured. Ivory
Coast state security forces and elements of Force Nouvelles (FN) rebels
who might be absorbed in national forces in the post-conflict period
ought to go under refresher training in their respective specializations
167
Human Rights Watch. The Human Rights Cost of the Political Impasse.

71
incorporated with human rights training following rampant violations of
human rights during the conflict. Some of them have been accused of
Killings, sexual violence against women, use of child soldiers, torture
and intimidation; 168
the culprit should face the law instead of staying in
the forces which won’t please the population and for the purpose of
justice provision.
Political institution building, decentralization of power and
constitutional reform are also important activities of peace-building
required in Ivory Coast situation. Conducting elections is also an
important step in the process of peace-building. However , in Ivory
Coast badly designed or poorly managed elections have often been the
cause of violence and subsequent violation of human rights, a
tendency that should be avoided in the post-conflict era that looks
forward to attaining durable peace. The establishment of good
governance, restoring state institutions and legitimate political order
based on democratic, transparent and participatory governance is
central to post-conflict peace, security and development in Ivory Coast.
5:3 The role of civil society in peace-building
Peace-building is not an activity restricted to politicians and
military practitioners involved in peace operations but civil society
organizations too have important roles they carry out in their efforts
towards peace-building world wide.
For Ivory Coast which is on the verge of recovering from a four
year civil war, the roles played by the civil society organizations
towards peace-building activities should not be neglected. The
activities they carry out are prerequisites for transforming a society
from a conflict situation to a post-conflict situation and they contribute
towards the realization of durable peace and development.
Civil society organizations have been at the forefront of peace
initiatives in most of the African countries that suffered conflict such as
168
Human Rights Watch. Country on a precipice.

72
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda where they demonstrated their
potential to transform conflicts; Ivory Coast ought to similarly utilize
them instead of frustrating them by sabotaging their activities as
discussed in the previous section.
Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff argues that among the strategies and
approaches being proposed and adopted in efforts to manage conflicts
in West Africa are a greater recognition and use of civil society in these
efforts. Some positive developments in democratization and conflict
management in West Africa have been attributed to civil society.169
Beyond West Africa, civil society organizations are doing a tremendous
job in peace-building also.
Civil society organizations in African perspective contribute
significantly towards peace-building activities. For instance in Uganda
whose conflict has some similarities with that in Ivory Coast
particularly in the root causes as previously discussed in Chapter Two,
several civil society organizations are playing big roles towards
restoration of peace in the northern region which for more than two
decades has suffered under the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) rebels.
These civil society organizations or NGOs monitor and report on human
rights violations e.g. Human Rights Focus (HURIFO), they are taking
care of the refugees from neighboring countries of Sudan and
Democratic Republic of Congo and Ugandan internally displaced people
by the LRA conflict e.g. Oxfam, they are involved in humanitarian and
relief provisions, they are involved in public sensitization about post-
conflict trauma, diseases and other people-centered developmental
issues, they pursue conflict resolution activities such as reintegrating
ex-combatants in the community, mediating between the government
and the rebels e.g. Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI)
and The Sant Egidio Community, they are involved in issues of
reconciliation e.g. Mato Oput in northern Uganda.
169
Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid. West Africa’s Security Challenges, 265.

73
 ARLPI is a local organization of all religious leaders in northern
Uganda which was formed in 1997 to promote dialogue between the
government and LRA rebels. It has been involved in the on-going
negotiations between the government and LRA rebels in Juba-Sudan
and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Sant Egidio Community
is an Italian religious community based in northern Uganda and
specialized in peace mediation. It helped to secure peace talks
between the LRA and the Ugandan government in 1999 which resulted
into granting amnesty to the LRA leadership. Mato Oput is a local
society specialized in conflict resolution and reconciliation which is
based in Gulu.
Generally, civil society organizations have emerged as crucial
entities that complement efforts of the government towards peace-
building activities and they have proved to be efficient having realized
some positive developments in the region.
5:4 Conclusion
Peace-building in post-conflict situations is significant for the
prevention of conflict recurrence and creating a long lasting peaceful
situation which are the main objectives of peace-building as a phase of
conflict management.
Although there are divergent views about the concept of peace-
building, they all encompass prevention of conflict recurrence and the
quest for viable peace. Peace-building activities may be carried out
during the conflict progression or after the conflict termination
depending on the conflict situation and they are carried out by
different actors such as civil society organizations, governments,
regional organizations, donors or the international community.
African methods of carrying out some of the peace-building
activities such as reconciliation have proved to be effective
mechanisms and they ought to be emphasized when handling African
conflicts.

74
 Peace as the cardinal goal of peace-building is associated with
the rule of law and human rights respect therefore Ivory Coast parties
to the conflict ought to emphasize them in the post-conflict era.

75
 CHAPTER SIX
6:0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6:1 Conclusion
The crisis that erupted in Ivory Coast in the new millennium
which made the focus of this study is the outcome of both historical
and current factors that contributed equally to bringing it to surface
and to reshaping its consequences. Despite of Ivory Coast getting its
political autonomy, the former colonial master France, maintained
presence in the country up to today. The post-colonial authoritarian
political leadership of President Houphouet Boigny in Ivory Coast
created a breeding ground for the crisis in the country that escalated
with the liberalization of the politics when multiparty politics were
adopted in the country. Ivorians had been deprived of their rights and
this brought about discontentment with the regime. Discontentment of
some people coupled with socio-economic problems and political
power struggles, culminated into a motivating factor to overthrow by
military means, successive regimes in Ivory Coast. Politics of exclusion
and cultural problems associated with religion, tribal divisions and
ethnical identity problems significantly contributed to the emerging of
different armed rebellions that eventually transformed into a civil war
in the country.
The crisis that erupted in the country brought about the
destruction of the infrastructures, human suffering and demise and this
prompted neighbouring countries to intervene in the conflict. The
intervention of foreign states in the conflict whether it was stimulated
by state-selfish interests or moral responsibility prevented a
humanistic catastrophe though the conflict has not yet been
concluded.
The conflict in ivory Coast has not been stagnant but has been
going through changes with different actors. The peacekeeping force
that was deployed after the eruption of the armed rebellion managed

76
to keep apart the belligerents by establishing a buffer zone and in
conjunction with the sub-regional political leaders who intervened as
third parties, a ceasefire agreement was secured and this has
contained the warring parties from engaging in battles although on
some occasions, the agreement would be violated by both warring
parties. Peacekeepers together with French Licorne forces besides the
challenges they encounter, have so far done a good job by
implementing their mandates which has drastically contributed to the
general efforts of returning peace to the country. This initial
intervention in the conflict by a peacekeeping force also created an
environment for further negotiations with the aim of resolving the
conflict peacefully. Different actors have intervened as mediators
besides the efforts of the United Nations mission which is deployed in
the country.
Mediation is an important tool in settling conflicts. Mediation may
be conducted successfully or unsuccessfully depending on the
mediator and the situation. When a mediator gets derailed from the
principles of mediation the process is doomed to fail and vice versa.
The mediation process in Ivory Coast yielded multiple peace
agreements although the implementation has been difficult mainly
because the conflict had not reached a stalemate and there was lack of
the political will among the local Ivorian politicians. However, the
mediation process demonstrated its greatness when it kept the
belligerents busy in dialogue thus creating a period without skirmishes
and when finally the rebel leader got united into the government
following the mediation of President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso.
Currently the implementation of the latest Ouagadougou peace accord
is on the right track and hopefully peace will be restored in the country
soon.
Peace-building activities and certainly the one in Ivory Coast is
prominent among them not only prevent recurrence of conflict after its

77
settlement but create durable social order in a post-conflict period.
Civil society, the government and the international community all play
a vital role in peace-building efforts and at this stage of the conflict
there is a need to double efforts in establishing all the necessary
peace-building activities so that the peace process does not relapse.
The peace-building activities discussed in chapter five ought to address
the root causes of the conflict and their contributory factors such as
poverty and ethnicity which are associated with the causes of conflict
in Ivory Coast. These are crucial factors in the country that call for
extensive research. Finally as one of the objectives of the study was to
provide information about the origins of the conflict in Ivory Coast to
peacekeepers and other actors in the conflict, there could be some
areas of interest that the study did not address basically because of
geographical limitations, time limitation and the number of words
required for this specific study. Incase there are such areas left in the
open they should be a basis for further research.
6:2 Recommendations
All parties to the conflict in Ivory Coast ought to support the
implementation of the Linnas-marcoussis agreement, the March 2007
Ouagadougou peace agreement and the United Nations mission’s
mandate in the country so that the Ivory Coast conflict can be
resolved. The current situation indicates positive measures towards
concluding the conflict following the implementation of disarmament
process, establishment of a joint command center that is composed of
former belligerents and lifting of the buffer zone which was commonly
known as the zone of confidence.
ONUCI and Licorne French forces have done a tremendous job
since their intervention to create an environment suitable for peace
negotiations they should hold to the ground until peace is completely
established in the country.

78
 To the challenges the UN peacekeepers encounter, firstly there
should be a similar pre-deployment training so that all the participants
in the prospective mission are equipped with the same concept of the
mission and if possible UN should have its own Army which has the
same military etiquettes in future. The mandates and rules of
engagement should precisely match with the situation on the ground in
a sense that when the situation changes, the rules of engagement also
changes. Peacekeepers in volatile conflict zones are vulnerable to
hostilities therefore they should be armed or accompanied by armed
troops in order to avoid their being attacked by armed people and
hostile populations.
There is also a need to sensitize the local population about the
role of peacekeepers in their country so that they can stop looking at
them as occupational forces and all components in the peacekeeping
mission should endeavor to share available information as the aim of
their involvement in the conflict is the same.
Now that there are signs of settling the conflict at the national
level with some of the peace-building activities taking place, the local
people need to engage in reconciliation processes following the divide
that developed between their relationships during the conflict.
Indigenous ways of reconciliation have demonstrated to be workable in
other regions in Africa during the post-conflict period therefore they
should be employed to mend relationships. The objectives of such
traditional initiatives of resolving conflicts have mostly been to
reconcile the parties in conflict for the purpose of harmonious co-
existence in the society which strengthens social solidarity but not
necessarily to punish individuals. These traditional conflict resolution
mechanisms have been very effective and encompass local support
and are respected. Conflicts resolved at this level, rarely reoccur.
However, in some cases where the perpetrators committed mass

79
atrocities and war crimes they should be brought forward to face law
so that justice is administered.
Number of words = 21415
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Lewis, David.” Eight UN Peacekeepers Killed in Congo Fighting.” Global

Security Org. 23 January 2006.
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060123-voa04.htm (accessed 13 April 2007).

Lowenheim, O. and Paltiel, J. T. Defining Sovereignty Paper presented

at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association,
Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2004.
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p72391_index.html

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State: Failure and the Fate of the State,” Third World Quaterly:
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Manuel, Susan. United Nations Department of Public Information: UN

Media and Post Conflict Peace-keeping. Article Prepared for
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Mpambara, Ines, and Monique Alexis. “International Media Support

Assessment Mission: The Rwanda Media Experience from the
Genocide.” March 2003.
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ereportJune03.pdf (accessed 10 June 2007).

Mutere, Absalom. “Media Graduation from Potential to Actual Power in

Africa’s Conflict Resolution: Experience from the East and Horn of
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Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 2006.
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Nickel, James. “Human Rights” The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy (Fall 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed)
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prepared for the 46th Annual Convention of the International
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Peace Negotiation Watch. “Ivory Coast rebels call for new polls:
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91
 Appendix A

Declaration of Academic Honesty

I hereby declare that this thesis is entirely my own work and

that it has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at
any other University.

Signed

Memory Bariyo

Place_________________________________________________________________
__

Date___________________________________________________________________

92
 Appendix B

PERMISSION FOR USE OF THESIS OR MASTER’S DEGREE

PROJECT

Full name of author……………………………………………………..

Full title of Thesis or Master’s Degree Project

…………………………………………………………………………….

……………………………………………………………………………

Degree:……………………………….. Year of submission:……………

University Department:…………………………………………………..

I do/do not* agree to this Thesis or Master’s Degree Project being

consulted, for research or study purposes only, provided that due
acknowledgement of its use is made where appropriate.

I do/ do not* consent to single copies of this Thesis or Master’s Degree

Project, in part or as whole, being made for research or study purposes
at another institution, at the discretion of the University Librarian.

I wish the following limitations to apply, for the period of time

specified, to the use of this Thesis or Master’s Degree Project:

Signature of author:……………………………………………………………

Date:………………………………….

• delete as appropriate.

93
 Appendix C

LINAS-MARCOUSSIS AGREEMENT170

1. At the invitation of the President of the French Republic, a Round

Table of the Ivorian political forces met in Linas-Marcoussis from
15 to 23 January 2003. It brought together the following parties:
FPI, MFA, MJP, MPCI, MPIGO, PDCI-RDA, PIT, RDR, UDCY
and UDPCI. The conference was chaired by Mr. Pierre MAZEAUD,
assisted by Judge Keba Mbaye, former Prime Minister Seydou
Diarra and facilitators appointed by the UN, the African Union
and ECOWAS.

Each delegation gave its analysis of the situation in Cote d'lvoire

and made proposals aimed at restoring confidence and
overcoming the crisis. The vision shown by delegations enabled
the Round Table to bring the positions together and arrive at the
consensus described below, in which all elements - principles and
annexes - have the same status:

2. The Round Table welcomes the cease-fire made possible and

guaranteed by the deployment of ECOWAS forces supported by
French forces, and demands strict compliance with it. The Round
Table calls on all parties immediately to put a stop to all
exactions and consecrate the peace. It calls for the immediate
release of all political prisoners.

3. The Round Table reiterates the need to maintain the territorial

integrity of Cote d'lvoire and respect for its institutions and to
restore the authority of the State. It recalls its commitment to the
principle of democratic accession to and exercise of power. To
this end it agrees as follows:

a) A Government of National Reconciliation will be set up

immediately after the conclusion of the Paris Conference to
ensure a return to peace and stability. It will be charged with
strengthening the independence of the justice system, restoring
the administration and public services and rebuilding the country.
It will implement the appended Round Table program which
includes, in particular, provisions in the constitutional, legislative
and regulatory spheres.

United States Institute of Peace. Peace Agreements Digital Collection: Côte d'Ivoire.
170

Washington, DC, 2003.

http://www.usip.org/library/pa/cote_divoire/cote_divoire_01242003en.html

94
 b) It will prepare an electoral timetable with a view to holding
credible and transparent elections and set dates for them.

c) The Government of National Reconciliation will be led by a

consensus Prime Minister who will remain in office until the next
Presidential election, in which he will not be able to stand as a
candidate.

d) This government will be made up of representatives

appointed by each of the Ivorian delegations taking part in the
Round Table. In assigning Ministries a balance will be struck
among the parties throughout the term of office of the
government.

e) To discharge its duties the government will have executive

powers in accordance with the delegation of authority provided
for in the Constitution. The political parties represented in the
National Assembly which took part in the Round Table undertake
to guarantee the support of their Members of Parliament for the
implementation of the government's programme.

f) The Government of National Reconciliation will, immediately

upon taking office, attend to rebuilding an army committed to
the values of integrity and republican morality. The government
will restructure the defence and security forces and may, for this
purpose, receive the counsel of outside advisers and in particular
the assistance offered by France.

g) In order to contribute to restoring security of persons and

property throughout the national territory, the Government of
National Reconciliation will organise the regrouping and
subsequent disarming of all forces. It will ensure that no
mercenaries remain within the country's borders.

h) The Government of National Reconciliation will seek the help

of ECOWAS, France and the United Nations to arrange for their
forces to guarantee these operations.

i) The Government of National Reconciliation will take the

necessary steps to ensure release and amnesty for all military
personnel being held on charges of threatening State security
and will extend this measure to soldiers living in exile.

4. The Round Table decides to set up a committee to monitor

implementation of the Paris Agreements on Cote d'lvoire in

95
 charge of ensuring compliance with commitments made. This
committee will report to national, regional and international
authorities all cases of obstruction of the Agreements and failure
to apply them, to ensure that appropriate remedies are
implemented.

The Round Table recommends to the Conference of Heads of

State that the monitoring committee be set up in Abidjan and
made up of representatives of the countries and organizations
called on to guarantee implementation of the Paris Agreements,
and in particular:

 the representative of the European Union,

 the representative of the Commission of the African Union,

 the representative of the Executive Secretariat of ECOWAS,

 the Special Representative of the Secretary-General who

will co-ordinate UN bodies,

 the representative of the International Francophone

Organization,

 the representatives of the IMF and the World Bank,

 a representative of the G8 countries,

 the representative of France.

5. The Round Table calls on the French government, ECOWAS and

the international community to provide for the security of the
persons who took part in it and if need be for that of the
members of the Government of National Reconciliation until such
time as the latter is in a position to fully perform this task.

6. The Round Table pays tribute to the mediation provided by

ECOWAS and to the endeavours of the African Union and the UN,
and thanks France for its role in organizing this meeting and
achieving this consensus.

Done at Linas-Marcoussis, 23 January 2003

FOR THE FPI FOR THE MFA

96
Pascal AFFI N'GUESSAN Innocent KOBENA ANAKY

FOR THE MJP FOR THE MPCI

Gaspard DELI Guillaume SORO

FOR THE MPIGO FOR THE PDCI-RDA

Felix DOH Henri KONAN BEDIE

FOR THE PIT FOR THE RDR

Francis WODIE Alassane Dramane OUATTARA

FOR THE UDCY FOR THE UDPCI

Theodore MEL EG Paul AKOTO YAO

THE CHAIRMAN
Pierre MAZEAUD

97
Programme of the Government of National Reconciliation

I- Citizenship, identity, status of foreign nationals

1. The Round Table considers that Law 61-415 of 14 December

1961 on Ivorian citizenship, as amended by Law 72-852 of 21
December 1972, which is based on complementarity between jus
sanguinis and jus soli and makes broad provision for
naturalization by certificate issued by the public authorities, is a
generous and well-drafted text.

The Round Table considers on the other hand that there are
many difficulties in implementing the law, as a result either of
lack of awareness among populations or of administration and
police and security force practices which disregard the law and
human rights.

The Round Table has observed a degree of legal difficulty in

applying Articles 6 and 7 of the Citizenship Code. This difficulty is
compounded by the fact that in practice the certificate of
citizenship is valid for three months only and that the person
holding it must prove his citizenship each time it is renewed by
producing a number of documents. However, the Code has
heretofore been applied.

Therefore the Government of National Reconciliation will:

a. immediately promote increased recourse to existing

naturalization procedures, based on better information and
possibly co-operation projects implemented with the support of
international development partners;

b. submit, on an exceptional basis and within six months, a

naturalization bill aimed at settling in a simple and accessible
manner the cases of those persons deemed ineligible and
considered to be in the country illegally (in particular cases
concerning persons formerly covered by Articles 17 to 23 of Law
61-415 as repealed by Law 72-852 and persons residing in Cote
d'lvoire prior to 7 August 1960 who did not exercise their option
within the prescribed deadline), and supplement the existing text
by including in new Article 12 foreign men married to Ivorian
women.

2. To cope with the uncertainty and slow pace of the identification

process and with the mistakes and abuses to which security

98
 checks can give rise, the Government of National Reconciliation
will take further action with respect to registration and
identification of individuals, in particular:

a. Suspension of the current identification process pending

decrees implementing the Law and timely establishment of a
National Identification Commission, headed by a judge and made
up of representatives of the political parties, to be charged with
supervising and overseeing the National Identification Office.

b. Ensuring strict consistency of the Law on Identification with

the Citizenship Code regarding proof of citizenship.

3. The Round Table finds that the foreign nationals residing in large
numbers in Cote d'lvoire have made a major contribution to
national wealth and helped confer on Cote d'lvoire its special
position and responsibility within the sub-region, which has also
benefited the countries of origin of these foreign nationals, and
considers that the petty annoyances perpetrated by the
administration and the police and security forces, which often
disregard the law and human rights and which often affect
foreign nationals, can be caused by wilful misapplication of
identification provisions.

a. The Government of National Reconciliation will therefore

immediately eliminate the residence permit requirement under
Article 8 paragraph 2 of Law 2002-03 of 3 January 2002 for
nationals of ECOWAS countries and will carry out the immigration
inspection needed by using means of identification not subject to
fraudulent misuse.

b. Moreover the Government of National Reconciliation will

consider introducing legislative and regulatory provisions to
improve the status of foreign nationals and protect their property
and persons.

c. The Round Table also calls on all ECOWAS Member States to

ratify, in a timely manner, the existing protocols concerning free
circulation of persons and goods, to practice strengthened co-
operation in controlling migratory flows, to respect the
fundamental rights of immigrants and to diversify areas of
development. These actions can be implemented with the
support of international development partners.

II- Electoral system

99
 1. The Round Table considers that Law 2000-514 of 1 August 2000
on the Election Code raises no difficulties and reflects efforts to
improve the text of the laws and that Law 2001-634 of 9 January
2001 creating the Independent Electoral Commission constitutes
significant progress in ensuring the organization of transparent
elections.

2. The Government of National Reconciliation:

a. will ensure impartiality of the measures taken to identify

voters and draw up voter lists;

b. will submit several amendments to Law 2001-634 aimed at

achieving better representation of the parties taking part in the
Round Table within the central committee of the Independent
Electoral Commission, including its Officers;

c. will submit, within 6 months, a bill relating to the status of the

opposition and to the public funding of political parties and
election campaigns;

d. will submit within one year a bill on illicit personal enrichment

and will organize effective inspection of the personal asset
disclosures filed by those elected;

e. take all appropriate measures to ensure the independence of

the justice system and the impartiality of the media with respect
to both election disputes and election propaganda.

III- Eligibility to the Presidency of the Republic

1. The Round Table considers that Article 35 of the Constitution on

the Election of the President of the Republic must avoid referring
to concepts without legal content or deriving from legislation.
The Government of National Reconciliation will therefore propose
that the conditions governing eligibility to the Presidency of the
Republic be laid down as follows:

"The President of the Republic is elected by universal suffrage to

a five year term of office. He can be re-elected only once. The
candidate must be in possession of his civil and political rights
and be at least thirty-five years of age. He must have only
Ivorian citizenship and have a father or a mother born Ivorian."

100
 2. The Citizenship Code will be amended by adding to the
conditions under which Ivorian citizenship can be revoked, under
Article 53, the following words: "holding elective office abroad or
serving as a member of a foreign government".

3. The President of the Republic shall publish a report on his state

of health once a year.

IV- Land tenure regime

1. The Round Table considers that Law 98-750 of 23 December

1998 on Rural Land Tenure, adopted unanimously by the National
Assembly, constitutes a reference in a field that is legally difficult
and economically crucial.

2. Nevertheless the Government of National Reconciliation:

a. will support the progressive implementation of this regime by

carrying out a campaign to explain it to rural populations in such
a way as to work toward true security of tenure.

b. will submit an amendment to better protect acquired rights

under Article 26 of the law on heirs of landowners holding rights
predating the enactment of the law but not fulfilling the
conditions of ownership set out in Article 1.

101
 V- Media

1. The Round Table condemns the incitement to hatred and

xenophobia propagated by certain media.

2. The Government of National Reconciliation will within one year

overhaul the general regime governing the press so as to
strengthen the role of the regulatory authorities, guarantee
neutrality and impartiality of the State broadcasters and foster
the financial independence of the media. These measures may
receive the support of international development partners.

3. The Government of National Reconciliation will immediately

restore free broadcasting of the international radio and television
media.

VI- Rights and freedoms of the individual

1. The Government of National Reconciliation will immediately set

up a National Human Rights Commission to ensure protection of
rights and freedoms in Cote d'lvoire. The Commission will be
made up of delegates of all Round Table parties and be chaired
by a person accepted by all.

2. The Government of National Reconciliation will call for the

establishment of an international board of enquiry to investigate
and establish the facts throughout the national territory in order
to identify cases of serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law since 19 September 2002.

3. Based on the report by the international board of enquiry, the

Government of National Reconciliation will determine which
cases should be brought to justice in order to put an end to
impunity. The Round Table particularly condemns the actions of
the "death squads" and those giving them orders as well as
those carrying out summary executions throughout the country,
and considers that those guilty of and those aiding and abetting
these acts must be brought to justice before an international
criminal jurisdiction.

4. The Government of National Reconciliation will endeavour to

facilitate humanitarian operations to aid the victims of the
conflict throughout the country. Based on the report of the
National Human Rights Commission, it will take steps to
compensate and rehabilitate victims.

102
VII Regrouping, disarming and demobilizing

1. Immediately after assuming office, the Government of National

Reconciliation will undertake the process of concomitant
regrouping of the forces on the ground, under the supervision of
ECOWAS and French forces.

2. In a second phase it will set out the measures to be taken with

respect to disarming and demobilizing these forces, also under
ECOWAS and French force supervision.

3. All recruits enlisted after 19 September will be immediately

demobilized.

4. The Government of National Reconciliation shall ensure the social

reintegration of military personnel of every origin with the help of
Disarmament - Demobilization - Repatriation - Resettlement -
Reintegration (DDRRR) type programmes which can be
implemented with the support of international development
partners.

5. The Government of National Reconciliation will take the

necessary steps to ensure the release and amnesty of all military
personnel detained on charges of threatening State security and
will extend the benefit of these measures to soldiers living in
exile. The amnesty law will under no circumstances mean that
those having committed serious economic violations and serious
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law will
go unpunished.

6. The Government of National Reconciliation will carry out an audit

of its armed forces and determine, in a difficult economic
context, the level of sacrifice which it can accept in order to meet
its obligations with respect to national defence. It will on that
basis restructure the armed forces and request, for this purpose,
outside assistance.

VIII- Economic recovery and the need for social cohesion

1. The Government of National Reconciliation will restore free

circulation of persons and goods throughout the national territory
and facilitate the resumption of educational, administrative,
economic and social activity.

103
 2. It will prepare, in a timely fashion, a plan for infrastructure
reconstruction and development, national economic recovery
and strengthening of social cohesion.

3. The Round Table recommends to international institutions and

international development partners that they provide support for
the process of rebuilding Cote d'lvoire.

IX- Implementation

The Government of National Reconciliation will ensure that the

constitutional, legislative and regulatory reforms arising from the
decisions it is required to make are introduced without delay

104
 Appendix D

OUAGADOUGOU PEACE AGREEMENT171

At the invitation of His Excellency Mr. Blaise Compaoré, President

of Burkina Faso, acting in his capacity as current Chairman of the
Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and with an express
mandate from this organization, two delegations from the Republic of
Côte d’Ivoire, one representing the President of the Republic and the
other representing Forces nouvelles, met in Ouagadougou from 5
February to 3 March 2007.
The meeting followed the announcement on 19 December 2006
of the peace plan presented by President Laurent Gbagbo, who on 23
January 2007 invited the current Chairman of ECOWAS to facilitate
direct talks between the former belligerents in the armed conflict in
Côte d’Ivoire.
President Blaise Compaoré, after consulting with the Secretary-
General of Forces nouvelles, Mr. Guillaume Soro, with the various
political stakeholders in Côte d’Ivoire and with the Prime Minister, Mr.
Charles Konan Banny, acceded to the request and recommended that
the direct talks should be held within the framework of resolution 1721
(2006), adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 1 November
2006.
During their discussions, the delegation of the Presidency of the
Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, headed by Mr. Désiré Tagro, Special Advisor
to President Laurent Gbagbo and spokesman for the Presidency of the
Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, and the delegation of Forces nouvelles, led by
Mr. Louis-André Dacoury Tabley, Deputy Secretary-General of Forces
nouvelles and Minister of Solidarity and War Victims, both of which are
deeply committed to a successful resolution of the crisis in Côte
d’Ivoire, reviewed the situation in the country.
Participants stressed the urgent need to restore peace and
stability, to combat the growing insecurity, unemployment and
poverty, to re-establish the authority of the State throughout the
national territory, and to guarantee freedom of movement of people
and goods throughout the national territory.
Because of their special responsibility in the peace process, the two
Parties to the armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire have agreed on the urgent
need for them to work together to restore peace, promote genuine
national reconciliation and achieve political and institutional

Reliefweb. Cote d’Ivoire: Ouagadougou Peace Agreement. 2007.

171

http://reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2007.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/4BAC3D01773964
79492572C600074702-Full_Report.pdf/$File/Full_Report.pdf

105
normalization in the country through permanent dialogue and mutual
trust.
After identifying the problems encountered in the
implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra and Pretoria
Agreements and the United Nations resolutions on Côte d’Ivoire and
before taking any decisions, the Parties reaffirmed the following:
– Their commitment to respect the sovereignty, independence,
territorial integrity and unity of Côted’Ivoire;
– Their respect for the Constitution;
– Their commitment to the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra and Pretoria
Agreements;
--Their commitment to all United Nations resolutions on Côte d’Ivoire,
particularly resolutions 1633 (2005) and 1721 (2006) of the Security
Council;
– Their determination to create conditions conducive to free, open,
transparent and democratic elections;
– Their willingness to combine their efforts and energies with a view to
ensuring the normal functioning of Côte d’Ivoire and achieving political,
administrative and military normalization in the country.
In order to facilitate the implementation of the above-mentioned
agreements and resolutions, in particular Security Council resolution
1721 (2006), the Parties have agreed as follows:
I. General identification of the population
The Parties signatories to this Agreement recognize that the
identification of the Ivorian and foreign populations living in Côte
d’Ivoire is a major concern. The absence of a clear and standard
identity document and of individual administrative documents
attesting to the identity and nationality of persons is a source of
conflict. They have therefore decided to put an end to this situation by
adopting the following measures:
1.1. Redeployment of mobile courts (audiences foraines) for
the issuance of substitute birth certificates (jugements
supplétifs)
1.1.1. Mobile courts shall be redeployed throughout the national
territory as soon as the new Government is formed pursuant to the
present Agreement. In order to expedite the issuance of substitute
birth certificates, the judges in charge of the new jurisdictions created
specifically for the mobile courts shall be appointed by
presidential decree and provided with the necessary resources for the
discharge of their mandate.
1.1.2. These exceptional mobile court hearings, which shall take place
over a period of three months, shall issue substitute birth certificates
only to individuals born in Côte d’Ivoire who have never been
registered in a registry office.
1.1.3. The redeployment of the mobile courts shall be accompanied by
a public awareness, information and mobilization campaign involving

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political stakeholders, the military high command and civil society,
during which affected individuals will be invited to go before the mobile
courts corresponding to their place of birth so that they could be issued
with a substitute birth certificate.
1.1.4 The Parties pledge to guarantee the security of the mobile court
hearings throughout the national territory.
1.2. Reconstruction of lost or destroyed birth registers
In parallel with the mobile court hearings for the issuance of
substitute birth certificates, registers that were lost or destroyed in
certain registry offices shall be reconstructed in accordance with the
provisions of the ordinance of 17 January 2007 and its implementation
decree, which must be enacted as soon as possible.
1.3. Launching of an operation for the issuance of new identity
documents (national
identity cards and residence permits)
The Parties undertake to conduct a special operation for the
issuance of new identity cards in accordance with the following
modalities:
1.3.1. Standard identification
1.3.1.1. Ivorians who are required to carry a national identity card and
who have been issued with a certificate of nationality and a birth
certificate or substitute birth certificate shall be entitled to be issued
with the new national identity card.
1.3.1.2. Non-Ivorians who have been issued with a substitute birth
certificate and a document from their consulate stating their
nationality shall be entitled to be issued with a new identity card
consistent with their legal status in the country.
1.3.2. Identification on the basis of the new electoral roll
1.3.2.1. In order to expedite the process of identification and given the
current situation of the administration in Côte d’Ivoire and the
consequent need to end the crisis, the Parties agree to accredit
identification based on the electoral roll.
1.3.2.2. At the conclusion of the mobile court hearings and based on
the 2000 electoral roll, the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI)
shall conduct an electoral census during which biometrical data shall
be collected throughout the national territory. Ivorians at least 18 years
of age who are holders of a birth certificate or a substitute birth
certificate shall be entitled to register on the electoral roll.
1.3.2.3. All citizens registered on the electoral roll shall be issued with
a receipt bearing their personal identification number. This receipt
must be presented when uplifting voter registration cards and the new
national identity cards.
1.3.2.4. Upon completion of the procedure for validation of the
electoral roll by the Independent Electoral Commission, the Council of
Ministers shall adopt a decree authorizing the issuance of the new
national identity card to all persons whose names appear on the final

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electoral roll, which will serve as a common database for the issuance
of the new national identity card and voter registration card.
1.3.3. Characteristics of the new identity documents
1.3.3.1. The new identity documents shall be forgery-proof and shall
contain many security features and a personal identification number
for each holder.
1.3.3.2. The new identity documents shall be manufactured and issued
by the National Identification Office (ONI) under the supervision of the
National Commission for the Supervision of Identification (CNSI).
1.3.3.3. With the agreement of both Parties, the Government shall
engage the services of a technical agency which shall be appointed by
a decree of the Council of Ministers to undertake the identification
operation.
II. Electoral process
The Parties to the direct dialogue, determined to achieve without
delay a lasting peace and political and institutional normalization in
Côte d’Ivoire, reaffirm their commitment to prepare for open,
democratic and transparent presidential elections upon completion of
the identification process, in accordance with the Linas-Marcoussis,
Accra and Pretoria Agreements. To this end, they have decided as
follows:
2.1. Registration on the electoral roll
2.1.1. The Parties agree that registration on the electoral roll shall be
undertaken by the National Institute of Statistics (INS) and the
technical agency designated by the Government for the identification
operation. These two agencies shall discharge their mandate under the
supervision of the Independent Electoral Commission.
2.1.2. All Ivorian citizens of voting age may be registered on the
electoral roll. In order to register, they must be in possession of the
following documents: a birth certificate or substitute birth certificate.
2.1.3. A decree by the Council of Ministers shall establish the
modalities for registration on the electoral roll, in accordance with the
provisions of the electoral code.
2.2. Publication of the definitive electoral roll
2.2.1. The definitive electoral roll, validated by the Independent
Electoral Commission, shall be published in accordance with the
provisions of article 11, paragraph 2, of the electoral code, or in any
other manner agreed upon by the Parties.
2.3. Preparation and issuance of voter registration cards
2.3.1. Voter registration cards shall be prepared under the supervision
of the Independent Electoral Commission once the definitive electoral
roll has been published.
2.3.2. Voter registration cards shall be issued by the Independent
Electoral Commission through its various branches at least two weeks
prior to the date of the elections, in accordance with article 5 of the
electoral code.

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2.3.3. Voters who fail to uplift their voter registration cards before the
deadline laid down in the above paragraph may nevertheless vote with
their new national identity cards if they are duly registered on the
electoral roll.
2.4. Collaboration between agencies involved in the electoral
process
2.4.1. In order to ensure transparency and efficiency, the National
Institute of Statistics and the technical agency designated by the
Government shall work together under the supervision of the
Independent Electoral Commission to prepare the voter registration
cards.
2.4.2. The modalities of such collaboration shall be set out in a decree
by the Council of Ministers.
III. Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire
The Parties to this Agreement, recognizing that the national army
must be the symbol of the unity and cohesion of the nation and the
guarantor of the stability of the institutions of the Republic, have
undertaken to restructure and reorganize their two armed forces with a
view to the creation of new defence and security forces that are
committed to the values of integrity and republican morality. A special
mechanism for the restructuring and reorganization of the army shall
be created by law to establish the general framework for the
organization, composition and operation of the new defence and
security forces. The two Parties have therefore decided to merge their
two forces by creating an integrated operational structure.
3.1. Establishment of an Integrated Command Centre (CCI)
3.1.1. In keeping with the spirit of joint handling of issues related to
defence and security, the two former belligerent Parties agree to
create an Integrated Command Centre for the purpose of integrating
the two fighting forces and implementing measures for the
restructuring of the Defence and Security Forces (FDS) of Côte d’Ivoire.
3.1.2. The Integrated Command Centre shall adopt its organizational
chart and shall be placed under the joint command of the Chief of Staff
of the National Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI)
and the Chief of Staff of Forces nouvelles (FAFN). It shall be comprised
of equal numbers of officers designated by the two Chiefs of Staff.
3.1.3. The core missions of the Integrated Command Centre shall be to:
– Contribute to the elaboration of defence and security policy;
– Implement the National Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) Programme under the supervision of the impartial
forces;
– Operationalize the military and security tasks associated with the
peace process;
– Provide security for the mobile courts, for identification operations
and for the electoral process;
– Create joint military and paramilitary units; and

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– Coordinate measures designed to ensure the protection and free
movement of people and goods throughout the national territory.
3.2. National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Programme
3.2.1. The Parties to this Agreement undertake to disarm their
respective forces as soon as possible, in accordance with the
recommendations of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the
modalities laid down in the following military agreements:
– The Joint Plan for DDR Operations (PCO) signed on 9 January 2004
and updated at the seminar on disarmament held from 2 to 6 May
2005 in Yamoussoukro under the auspices of the South African
mediation;
– The National DDR Programme and its accompanying timetable
adopted on 9 July 2005 in Yamassoukro;
– The conclusions of the working meeting held in Yamoussoukro on
Saturday 14 May 2005 between the Chiefs of Staff of FANCI and FAFN.
3.2.2. The Parties agree to accelerate the disbanding and disarmament
of militias.
3.2.3. The Parties agree to accelerate the process of assembly of the
combatants on the 17 previously identified sites and to abide by the
updated DDR timetable.
3.3. Civic Service
3.3.1. The two Parties agree that the Civic Service, which was
established for the purpose of providing guidance and job training to
all young people in Côte d’Ivoire, shall also accept all young people
who have been trained in the use of weapons of war with a view to
providing them with guidance and training for future civilian or military
jobs.
3.3.2. The modalities of the organization and functioning of the Civic
Service shall be defined by decree of the Council of Ministers.
IV. Restoration of the authority of the State and redeployment
of the administration throughout the national territory
4.1. Resolutely determined to bring about political and institutional
normalization in Côte d’Ivoire, the Parties to this Agreement pledge to
restore the authority of the State and to redeploy the administration
and all public services throughout the national territory.
4.2. The redeployment of the administration and of public services
shall be done by all ministries concerned, under the authority of the
Prime Minister, as soon as the zone of confidence is dismantled and
observation posts established. The redeployment of the administration
shall involve all public services, including the basic social services in
such sectors as education, health, water and sanitation.
4.3. Heads of the main administrative services shall be appointed after
consultations between the two Parties.
4.4. The National Police and Gendarmerie Forces, including the 600
members integrated pursuant to the Pretoria Agreement, shall be

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responsible for providing security for the entire prefectural corps and
technical services deployed.
V. Institutional framework for implementation
5.1. The two Parties to the direct dialogue, exercising effective
administrative and military control on both sides of the zone of
confidence, conscious of their heavy responsibilities for the functioning
of the State and determined to bring about political and institutional
normalization based on the joint exercise of political power and on
national reconciliation, have decided to establish a new institutional
framework for implementation.
5.2. The Government of Transition shall work in a spirit of permanent
consultation, complementarity and openness to the other political
forces in Côte d’Ivoire to bring about national reunification,
disarmament and the organization of open, transparent and
democratic elections, as provided for in the various agreements and
resolutions for overcoming the crisis.
VI. Measures to promote national reconciliation, peace,
security and the free movement of people and goods
In order to promote peace, national reconciliation and the free
movement of people and goods, the Parties to the direct dialogue
agree on the following measures:
6.1. Embargo on the importation of arms
6.1.1. The two Parties to the direct dialogue agree to request the
United Nations Security Council, with the support of the Facilitator and
of ECOWAS, to lift the arms embargo imposed on Côte d’Ivoire within
three months after the holding of presidential elections.
6.1.2. The Parties also agree to request from the United Nations
Security Council, with the support of the Facilitator and of ECOWAS,
immediate special authorization to import the light arms necessary for
the maintenance of law and order, under the supervision of the
Integrated Command Centre referred to in paragraph 3.1 above.
6.2. Zone of confidence
6.2.1. In order to allow the free movement of people and goods, the
two Parties to the direct dialogue agree to request the impartial forces
of Licorne and UNOCI to dismantle the zone of confidence, in
accordance with paragraph A.4 of the document on “Management of
the zone of confidence”, referred to as Code 14.
6.2.2. On a transitional basis, an imaginary line to be referred to as the
green line, going from east to west along the median line of the zone of
confidence, shall be established and punctuated by observation posts
situated on the main infiltration routes. The observation posts shall be
occupied by the impartial forces and their number shall be reduced by
half every two months until all of them are removed.
6.2.3. Joint units comprised of equal numbers of FAFN and FDS
members and with responsibility for conducting police and security
missions shall be deployed in the zone of confidence. These units shall

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be abolished when the process of reform and restructuring of the army
is complete.
6.3. Amnesty law
In order to promote forgiveness and national reconciliation and to
restore social cohesion and solidarity among Ivorians, the two Parties
to the direct dialogue agree to extend the scope of the amnesty law
passed in 2003. To this end, they have decided to adopt, by ordinance,
a new amnesty law covering crimes and offences related to national
security and arising from the conflict that shook Côte d’Ivoire and
which were committed between 17 September 2000 and the date of
entry into force of the present Agreement, with the exception of
economic crimes, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
6.4. Sanctions
The Parties to the present Agreement agree to request the
African Union, through the intermediary of ECOWAS, to petition the
United Nations Security Council for the immediate lifting of the
personal sanctions in force against the actors in the Ivorian crisis.
6.5. Programme of assistance for the return of persons
displaced by the war
With a view to promoting national reconciliation and political and
institutional normalization, the Parties to the direct dialogue agree to
establish as early as possible a programme to provide assistance for
the return of persons displaced by the war. This programme is intended
to facilitate the social reintegration of individuals and families who
abandoned their homes or their property on account of the war. The
two Parties undertake to provide the relevant technical ministry with
the resources necessary for the implementation of this programme.
6.6. Code of conduct
In view of the urgent need to restore calm and integrity to public
life, to create a new political environment in Côte d’Ivoire and to
eschew any partisan and demagogic interpretation of the present
Agreement, the Parties pledge to observe a code of conduct.
6.6.1. The Parties undertake to organize a vast information and public
awareness campaign targeted to the population of Côte d’Ivoire to
seek their full support for the peace and national reconciliation
process.
6.6.2. The Parties pledge to refrain from any propaganda, particularly
in the media, that is likely to undermine the spirit of national cohesion
and unity. They appeal to the national and international press for their
constructive support in promoting peace and a spirit of tolerance.
6.6.3. The Parties pledge to maintain a spirit of permanent dialogue
based on trust in each other, to refrain from any belligerent and
offensive attitude and to call upon their respective supporters to
conduct themselves with respect and decorum.
6.6.4. The Parties agree to combine their efforts aimed at promoting
Republican ethics and morality within their respective forces, with

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respect for human dignity and fundamental rights. The Parties pledge
to encourage their respective forces to work together with mutual
understanding.
6.6.5. The Parties pledge to refrain from any use of civil society and
trade union organizations that is abusive and contrary to the spirit of
the present Agreement.
VII. Follow-up and consultation mechanisms
In order to ensure follow-up to this Agreement and continuation
of the direct dialogue, the Parties agree to establish a permanent
consultation mechanism (CPC) and an evaluation and monitoring
committee (CEA).
7.1. Permanent consultation mechanism (CPC)
The permanent consultation mechanism is an organ for
monitoring and permanent dialogue aimed at strengthening national
unity. Its membership is as follows:
– Mr. Laurent GBAGBO, President of the Republic
– Mr. Guillaume K. SORO, Secretary-General of Forces nouvelles
– Mr. Alassane Dramane OUATTARA, leader of RDR
– Mr. Henri Konan BEDIE, leader of PDCI
– Mr. Blaise COMPAORE, current Chairman of ECOWAS, in his capacity
as Facilitator.
Except for President Laurent GBAGBO and the current Chairman of
ECOWAS, the other members of CPC are all heads of institutions. CPC is
competent to consider any issue related to this Agreement.
7.2. Evaluation and monitoring committee (CEA)
The evaluation and monitoring committee is responsible for the
periodic evaluation of the implementation of the measures provided for
in this Agreement. The committee may also make any practical and
necessary suggestions for the effective implementation of this
Agreement. Its membership is as follows:
– Chairman: the Facilitator or his representative
– Members: three representatives for each of the two Parties
signatories to this Agreement.
The two Parties shall jointly agree on the enlargement of the
committee to include other members of the Ivorian political class. The
Facilitator may also call upon any other observer representing a
country or an international or inter-African organization, should he
deem it necessary. CEA shall be chaired by the Facilitator or his
representative. It shall meet at least once a month in ordinary session
and, where necessary, in extraordinary session convened by the
Chairman. In fulfilment of its mandate, CEA shall report to CPC on the
implementation of the Agreement and shall so advise the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
VIII. Miscellaneous and final provisions

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8.1. The Parties agree to refer to arbitration by the Facilitator any
dispute that may arise from the interpretation or implementation of the
present Agreement.
8.2. The Parties agree to request additional African troops to
participate in the peacekeeping mission of the impartial forces in Côte
d’Ivoire.
8.3. The timetable attached to the present Agreement is an integral
part hereof. The Parties agree to carry out the operations agreed upon
in accordance with this timetable.
8.4. The present Agreement shall enter into force upon its signing by
the Parties. The Parties agree to request the Facilitator, in his capacity
as current Chairman of ECOWAS, to refer the present Agreement to the
United Nations Security Council through the African Union for the
purpose of ratification.
Done at Ouagadougou, 4 March
2007
(Signed) Laurent Gbagbo
President of the Republic of Côte
d’Ivoire
(Signed) Guillaume Kigbafori Soro
Secretary-General of Forces
nouvelles of the
Republic of Côte d’Ivoire
(Signed) Blaise Compaoré
President of Burkina Faso
Current Chairman of ECOWAS
Facilitator

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Timetable of implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement

1. Signing of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement

Day 1
2. Establishment of the Integrated Command Centre
Beginning two weeks after Day l
3. Establishment of the institutional framework for implementation
Four weeks after the signing of the Agreement
4. Formation of the Government
Five weeks after the signing of the Agreement
5. Dismantling of the zone of confidence and creation of joint units
Beginning one week after the formation of the Government
6. Disbanding of militias
Beginning two weeks after the formation of the Government
and lasting
two weeks
7. Assembly (assembly by units of ex-combatants in assembly sites
and
stockpiling of weapons under the supervision of the impartial forces)
– Redeployment of the administration
– Beginning of mobile court hearings (audiences foraines)
Beginning two weeks after the formation of the Government
and lasting
three months
8. Registration for the purpose of inclusion in the electoral roll and
identification
Beginning one month after the redeployment of the mobile
courts
9. Unification of the opposing forces and enlistment in the Civic Service
Beginning two weeks after the commencement of enlistment
10. Preparation and issuance of the new national identity cards and
voter
registration cards based on the electoral roll
Beginning when the definitive electoral roll is officially
adopted
11. End of the DDR process and holding of elections
All measures provided for in the above timetable shall be completed
within a
period of 10 (ten) months.

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