Page 1 of 38

IV. Certificate of Title.

EMETERIA LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
G. R. No. 189755, July 04, 2012

FACTS:
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P.
Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to
Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision including the receivables from the lots already sold. As
the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the subdivision. The said
water facility has been the only source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years. In September 1995,
Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099
was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the
respondent Association demanding the removal of the over headwater tank over the parcel of land. The latter
refused and filed a case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty
Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in favor of the
respondent Association. One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an easement for water
system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep well and overhead tank
are situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11,
Block 5 was not an open space.


ISSUE:
Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an open space as defined in P. D. 1216.


RULING:
Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an open space.

The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine whether the area
falls under other similar facilities and amenities since P. D. 1216 makes no specific mention of areas reserved
for water facilities.

Ejusdem generis - states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific
words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or to be restricted to things
akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the
Court found out that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community.
Therefore, the phrase other similar facilities and amenities should be interpreted in like manner. It is without
a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic necessity, without which,
survival in the community would be impossible.








Page 2 of 38


(GINA MAE DULNUAN)
Oliveros vs. San Miguel Corp.
664 SCRA 618 (2012)

FACTS:
In 1986, Ramitex consolidated and subdivided its 17 lots including the disputed LOT 1131 into six lots. By
virtue of this consolidation, The Caloocan RD cancelled Ramitex individual title to Lot 1131 (TCT No. T-18460)
and issued a new title, TCT No. T-137261, for consolidated Lot 4 which included Lot 1131.

Meanwhile, Oliveros filed a petition before the RTC for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-17186, his alleged title
over Lot 1131. He claimed that the original copy was destroyed in the fire that gutted the office of the Bulacan
RD on March 7, 1987.

Ramitex filed its opposition to Oliveros petition*8+ asserting that TCT No. T-17186 never existed in the records
of the Bulacan RD and cannot therefore be reconstituted.

In light of Ramitex opposition and ownership claims over Lot 1131, Oliveros filed a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of Ramitex title over Lot 1131. Oliveros claimed that he bought the subject property
sometime in November 1956 from the spouses Domingo De Leon and Modesta Molina, and pursuant to such
sale, the Bulacan RD issued TCT No. T-17186 in his favor on November 14, 1956.

After trial, the trial court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Oliveros TCT No. T-17186
does not exist. It gave due credence to the certification of the LRA that Bulacan RD never possessed the
Judicial Form used in issuing Oloveros purported TCT.

The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision. After reviewing the factual findings of the trial court,
the CA agreed that there is no evidence that Oliveros title came from official sources.
Hence this petition.

Petitioners insist that the mere existence of Oliveros earlier title negates the conclusiveness of Ramitex
title.*75+ Oliveros TCT No. T-17186, as the older title, should enjoy presumptive conclusiveness of ownership
and indefeasibility of title. Corollarily, Ramitexs title being a later title should have the presumption of
invalidity. Thus, SMC has the burden of overcoming this presumption.[76] Oliveros argues that SMC failed to
prove the validity of its title, which should be cancelled accordingly.

Respondent SMC (which substituted Ramitex) argues that the principle of indefeasibility of titles applies only
to an existing valid title to the litigated property. In the instant case, SMC showed that Oliveros title, while
claiming priority, is actually spurious; thus, between SMC and Oliveros, it is only SMC which has a valid title and
in whose favor the doctrine of indefeasibility of title applies.


ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in applying the doctrines of indefeasibility and conclusiveness of title in favor of
respondent SMC;

2. Whether the decisions of the CA and the trial court allowed a collateral attack on Oliveros certificate
of title.


Page 3 of 38

RULING:
1. NO. The principle that the earlier title prevails over a subsequent one applies when there are two
apparently valid titles over a single property. The existence of the earlier valid title renders the
subsequent title void because a single property cannot be registered twice. As stated in Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of Appeals,[81] which petitioners themselves cite, a
certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been
registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence. Clearly, a mere allegation of an
earlier title will not suffice. Since petitioners allege that they have a title which was issued earlier than
SMCs title, it was their burden to prove the alleged existence and priority of their title. The trial and
appellate courts shared conclusion that petitioners TCT No. T-17186 does not exist in the official
records is a finding of fact that is binding on this Court. Without a title, petitioners cannot assert
priority or presumptive conclusiveness.

2. NO. The prohibition against collateral attack does not apply to spurious or non-existent titles, since
such titles do not enjoy indefeasibility. Well-settled is the rule that the indefeasibility of a title does
not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. In view of these circumstances, it was as
if no title was ever issued in this case to the petitioner and therefore this is hardly the occasion to talk
of collateral attack against a title.+

Moreover, the attack on Oliveros title was not a collateral attack. An action or proceeding is deemed
an attack on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment
pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul
or set aside such judgment, or to enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, it is indirect or collateral
when, in an action or proceeding to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless
made as an incident thereof.*86+

Here, SMC/Ramitex assailed the validity of Oliveros title as part of its counterclaim in an action to
declare SMC/Ramitexs title a nullity. A counterclaim is essentially a complaint filed by the defendant
against the plaintiff and stands on the same footing as an independent action.*87+ Thus, Ramitexs
counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on Oliveros title.





(FAITH ECLEO)
Durawood v. Bona
G.R. No. 179884, January 25, 2012



(JEREMY MAGPAYO)
Corpuz v. Agustin
G.R. No. 183822, January 18, 2012






Page 4 of 38


(EMYROSE REAS)
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION
vs.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 123346, December 14, 2007

FACTS:
The Petition involved properties covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 which in turn
encompasses 1,342 hectares of the Maysilo Estate. The vast tract of land stretches over three (3) cities within
Metropolitan Manila, comprising an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican.

CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate
Corporation (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. CLTs claim was anchored on Transfer
Certificate of Title derived from Estelita Hipolito. Hipolitos title emanated from Jose Dimson whose title
appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994.

For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT, claiming that Dimsons title,
the proximate source of CLTs title, was irregularly issued and, hence, the same and subsequent titles flowing
therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they derived
it from several awardees and/or vendees of the National Housing Authority. The Manotok title likewise traced
as its primary source OCT No. 994.

The trial court ruled for CLT. Manotoks appeal to the CA was denied.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the title issued in the name of CLT valid.


HELD:
It is evident from all three titlesCLTs, Hipolitos and Dimsonsthat the properties they purport to cover
were " originally registered on 19 April 1917 in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal." These titles could be affirmed only if it can be proven that OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 had
actually existed. CLT were given the opportunity to submit such proof but it did not.
The established legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it
should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the
land sought to be reconveyed is his. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.

Considering that CLT clearly failed to meet the burden of proof reposed in them as plaintiffs in the action for
annulment of title and recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for ordering the dismissal of their
original complaints before the trial court.

As it appears on the record, OCT No. 994, the mother title was received for transcription by the Register of
Deeds on 3 May 1917 based from the issuance of the decree of registration on 17 April 1917.
Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of inscription or the date of transcription of the decree into the
Original Certificate of Title. Thus, such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when the
title took effect. It appears that the transcription of the decree was done on the date it was received by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917.
Page 5 of 38


There is a marked distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate of title; the entry
of the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the certificate of title is made
by the register of deeds. The certificate of title is issued in pursuance of the decree of registration. It was
stressed that what stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by
the registrar of deeds in the registry.

Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the certificate of title is
to take effect.

Hence, any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is void, for such mother title is
inexistent. The fact that CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 casts doubt
on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to
invalidate the CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on the dates
appearing on their respective titles.

The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the case on remand.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is directed to make
further determinations based on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as may be presented
at the proceedings before it.

WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special Division of the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings.



























Page 6 of 38


(CZARINA MARTINEZ)
REPUBLIC vs. NILLAS
G.R. No. 159595, January 23, 2007

FACTS:
On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City.On 17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros
Oriental rendered a decision, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots, together with the
improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors who had established their title to their respective lots
and their continuous possession thereof since time immemorial and ordered the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, upon the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding decree of registration. One of
these lots was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion and Engracia Calingacion. Nillas' parents, Serapion and
Josefina A. Abierra, by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale, acquired the said lot through various purchases they
effected from the Eugenia and her heirs between the years 1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by
three separate Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor of the Spouses Abierra. In turn, Nillas acquired the lot from
her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision,
no decree of registration has ever been issued. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941Decision and the
issuance of the corresponding decree of registration.

On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision finding merit in the petition for revival of judgment, and
ordering the revival of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of confirmation and registration based on the 1941
Decision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by motion, refer to ordinary civil actions and
not to "special" proceedings such as land registration cases. In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues
that contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the principles of prescription and laches do apply to land
registration cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code establishes that an action upon judgment
must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it
is barred by statute of limitations.


ISSUE:
WON prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land registration case.


HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court denied certiorari and instead affirmed the assailed rulings of the lower courts.
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary
proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal
modality such as land registration cases.

Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration
proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of such
extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a
decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial
Page 7 of 38

duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the
decree of registration.

The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does not contain any provision on
execution of final judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in
suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does not specifically provide for
execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil cases, the reason being there is
no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to land registration cases in the first place.

Section 39 of PD No. 1529 lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the judgment
and the issuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing
applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the
Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner to
issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the
judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the
preparation of the decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these
obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their performance and thus generally beyond discretion
of amendment or review. The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the
issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the
failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can.

The ultimate goal of our land registration system is geared towards the final and definitive determination of
real property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an additional burden on the owner after the
judgment in the land registration case had attained finality would simply frustrate such goal. Clearly, the
peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the time decisions in land registration cases
become final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment
does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.





















Page 8 of 38


(DAN WILLIAM BADIQUE)
PADCOM CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION vs. ORTIGAS CENTER ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 146807, May 9, 2002

Facts:
Petitioner Padcom Condominium Corporation (hereafter PADCOM) owns and manages the Padilla Office
Condominium Building (PADCOM Building) located at Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City. The land on
which the building stands was originally acquired from the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (OCLP), by
Tierra Development Corporation (TDC). Among the terms and conditions in the deed of sale was the
requirement that the transferee and its successor-in-interest must become members of an association for
realty owners and long-term lessees in the area later known as the Ortigas Center. Subsequently, the said lot,
together with improvements thereon, was conveyed by TDC in favor of PADCOM. Respondent Ortigas Center
Association, Inc. (hereafter the Association) was organized to advance the interests and promote the general
welfare of the real estate owners and long-term lessees of lots in the Ortigas Center. It sought the collection of
membership dues from PADCOM, however, the latter refused to pay contending that it is a non-stock, non-
profit association, and for it to become a special member of the Association, it should first apply for and be
accepted for membership by the latters Board of Directors. No automatic membership was apparently
contemplated in the Associations By-laws. PADCOM added that it could not be compelled to become a
member without violating its right to freedom of association. And since it was not a member of the
Association, it was not liable for membership dues, interests and penalties. In view of PADCOMs failure and
refusal to pay its arrears in monthly dues, including interests and penalties thereon, the Association filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money.


Issue:
Whether PADCOM can be compelled to join the association pursuant to the provision on automatic
membership appearing as a condition in the Deed of Sale and the annotation thereof on Transfer Certificate of
Title.


Held:
After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court sees no reason to disturb the assailed
decision. The petition should be denied.

Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 mandates that:
SEC. 44. Statutory liens affecting title. Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a
certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except
those noted on said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting,
namely:
xxx

Under the Torrens system of registration, claims and liens of whatever character, except those mentioned by
law, existing against the land binds the holder of the title and the whole world. It is undisputed that when the
land in question was bought by PADCOMs predecessor-in-interest, TDC, from OCLP, the sale bound TDC to
comply with automatic membership with the association clause of the covenants, conditions and restrictions
of the Deed of Sale. This is so because any lien annotated on previous certificates of title should be
incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer certificates of title. Such lien is inseparable from the
property as it is a right in rem, a burden on the property whoever its owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding
Page 9 of 38

a change in ownership; in short, the personality of the owner is disregarded. As emphasized earlier, the
provision on automatic membership was annotated in the Certificate of Title and made a condition in the Deed
of Transfer in favor of PADCOM. Consequently, it is bound by and must comply with the covenant.

Moreover, Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides that contracts take effect between the parties, their assigns
and heirs. Since PADCOM is the successor-in-interest of TDC, it follows that the stipulation on automatic
membership with the Association is also binding on the former.











































Page 10 of 38


(CORA SEGUI)
SPOUSES RAMON and ESTRELLA RAGUDO vs. FABELLA ESTATE TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 146823, August 9, 2005

FACTS:
All the tenants occupying portions of the Fabella Estate were asked to join Fabella Estate Tenants Association,
Inc. (FETA) as a pre-condition for the loan from National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) under
the latters Community Mortgage Program. The spouses Ramon Ragudo and Estrella Ragudo who were
occupying the lot subject matter of this controversy, consisting of about 105 square meters of the Fabella
Estate, refused to join the Association. Consequently, the portion occupied by them was awarded to Mrs.
Miriam De Guzman, a qualified FETA member.Later, and with the help of the city government of Mandaluyong,
FETA became the registered owner of the entire Fabella Estate, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
2902 issued in its name by the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong in 1989.The spouses Ragudo continued to
occupy despite the earlier award thereof to Mrs. Miriam de Guzman, FETA filed against them a complaint for
unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City.

The MeTC dismissed the unlawful detainer case on the ground that it was an improper remedy because the
Ragudos had been occupying the subject portion for more than one (1) year prior to the filing of the complaint,
hence the proper action should have been one for recovery of possession before the proper regional trial
court. FETA appealed the dismissal to the Regional Trial Court at Pasig City, which affirmed the same. FETA
then filed with the RTC-Pasig a complaint for recovery of possession against the Ragudos. In their Answer, the
spouses interposed the defense that they have already acquired ownership of the disputed portion since they
have been in occupation thereof in the concept of an owner for more than forty (40) years. They further
argued that FETAs title over the entire Fabella Estate is fake because as appearing on TCT No. 2902, it was
originally registered as OCT No. 13, a title which has been previously adjudged null and void by RTC-Pasig in a
much earlier case involving different parties. Finally, they insist that FETAs right to recover has been barred by
laches in view of their more than 40-year occupancy of the portion in question.

The trial court rendered judgment in FETAs favor, ordering *spouses Ragudo+ to vacate the premises in
question and to turn over possession thereof to [FETA].

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ragudos appeal and affirmed with modification the RTC decision.


ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT "ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION AND EQUITABLE LACHES" HAD SET IN TO WARRANT THE
CONTINUED POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT BY RAGUDO AND WHETHER THE SAME PRINCIPLES HAD
CREATED A "VESTED RIGHT" IN FAVOR OF RAGUDO TO CONTINUE TO POSSESS AND OWN THE SUBJECT LOT.


HELD:
Petitioners next contend that acquisitive prescription and equitable laches had set in, thereby vesting them
with a right to a continued possession of the subject lot. The contention holds no water.
It is not disputed that at the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. In
a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession. Appellants claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless. Under Article 1126 of
the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed
by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the
Page 11 of 38

registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, proof of possession by the
defendants is both immaterial and inconsequential.

The lower court found that petitioners possession of the subject lot was merely at the tolerance of its former
lawful owner. As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any
person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were
aware of the petitioners occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the
lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was
unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.






(ANA BORCENA)
Ingusan v. Heirs of Reyes





(JAQUELINE RICASIO)
Fil-Estate v. Trono


























Page 12 of 38


(MARGREIN GREGANA)
Erasusta, Jr. vs CA
G.R. No. 149231, July 17, 2007

Facts:
A mix up in the identity of two of four lots occasioned by the fact that said two lots were then merely
identified by their respective locational street addresses on Maria Luisa Street, Sampaloc, Manila when
transfer of rights over one of said two lots was made; a mortgage conveyance in favor of a lender bank
executed by a convicted swindler who fraudulently succeeded in securing transfer certificates in his own name
over 3 of the 4 lots and using said titles as collaterals; and a foreclosure proceeding involving the three lots
spawned the present litigation. Benjamin Valenzuela deceived De Los Reyes into entrusting to the former the
documents evidencing her rights over the 3 lots. Valenzuela said that he would assist de los Reyes in
transferring the titles of said lots to her 3 children. Unfortunately Valenzuela, thru a forged deed of
assignment, fraudulently transferred the rights over three lots to his own name. Thereafter, Valenzuela
mortgaged the 3 lots to respondent Bank as collaterals for a loan obtained by him.


Issue:
Whether or not the Bank is a mortgagee/purchaser in good faith


Held:
No, while it is a familiar doctrine that a forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title if
the property has been transferred from the name of the owner to that of the forger, the same does not always
hold true. The doctrine likewise emphasizes that only a person who deals with registered property in good
faith will acquire good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a Torrens title. It is a matter of
judicial notice that a banking institution before approving a loan, sends its representative to the premises of
the land offered as collateral, and investigates who are the true owners and actual possessors thereof. At the
case at bar the evidence is wanting that the respondent Bank did make any such investigation. Neither
Valenzuela nor the seller was in possession of the lots mortgaged or sold to the respondent Bank. If anything
else, this should aroused the suspicion on the part of the respondent Bank. Thus the bank was guilty of gross
negligence amounting to bad faith bad was not a mortgagee in good faith within the contemplation of the law.

















Page 13 of 38


(ISIDRA ALON-ALON)
Heirs of Diaz v. Virata
498 SCRA 141

Facts:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners Heirs of Enrique Diaz, represented by Aurora T. Diaz, seek
the reversal of the Decision and Resolution

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72907, dated 27 August
2003 and 4 February 2004, respectively, which affirmed with modification the Decision
3
of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 22, Imus, Cavite, in Civil Case No. 1399-96, dated 25 May 2001.

On 13 September 1996, respondent Elinor Virata, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Antenor
Virata (Antenor), filed with the RTC a Complaint with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction against Enrique Diaz (Enrique), John Doe, Richard Doe, and all others taking rights or
title under him, praying for the declaration of the validity of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No.
4983, 4984, 4985, 4986, 5027, 5028, 5029, 5030, 5031, 5032, and 5033, all issued in the name of Antenor S.
Virata (Antenor) and registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cavite.

In her Complaint, respondent averred, inter alia, that: sometime in 1959, the deceased Antenor purchased
from Miguela Crisologo, in good faith and for consideration, two parcels of land located in Palico, Imus, Cavite,
covered by TCTs No. (T-3855) RT-2633 and NO. (T-11171) RT-1228, and registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite; by virtue of the sale, the specified titles were cancelled, and in its place were issued TCTs No. 517 and
No. 518, likewise, in the name of Antenor; the two lots covered by the aforementioned titles were thereafter
subdivided by Antenor into several lots, and titles were issued thereon in Antenors favor, viz: TCTs No. 4983,
4984, 4985, 4986, 5027, 5028, 5029, 5030, 5031, 5032, and 5033; and that sometime in March 1992, Enrique
filed a claim with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), alleging that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous possession of the same lots owned by Antenor. Respondent
further proffered that the claim of Enrique over the subject properties created a cloud which may be
prejudicial to the titles issued in the name of Antenor, and now managed by his Estate.

In support of her application for restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction, respondent alleged,
inter alia, that: Enrique had fenced the subject properties and had constructed a driveway thereon; despite
respondents demand to desist from fencing the properties and using the same as driveway, Enrique persisted
in his occupation of the subject properties; and respondent will suffer irreparable injury by the continued
occupation, use, and construction of the driveway traversing the subject properties.

In sum, respondent prayed that Enrique be ordered to pay jointly and severally with the other defendants
(herein petitioners), reasonable rental for the use of the subject properties from the time the suit before the
DENR was filed in April 1992, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and cost of suit.

On 23 October 1996, Enrique filed his Answer with Counter-Claim, and asserted, among others, that he filed
with the DENR a protest action to enforce his valid and legitimate rights over the subject properties. He denied
respondents allegation that the subject properties were purchased by Antenor. Moreover, he interposed that
his ancestors and predecessors-in-interest had been in actual and continuous possession of the subject
properties since time immemorial In opposition to respondents application for preliminary injunction, Enrique
argued that the driveway and the fence are within the boundaries of the lots exclusively owned by him and his
heirs, and covered by TCTs No. T-304191 and No. T-66120, respectively.

By way of special and affirmative defense, Enrique averred that the subject properties, since time immemorial,
was publicly recognized as their familys ancestral land; that their actual and peaceful occupation over the
Page 14 of 38

subject property was uninterrupted until sometime in 1962, when Antenor claimed a portion of the same, on
the ground that he purchased said portion from one Miguela Crisologo, who acquired the same from a certain
Simeon Marcial; and that both Miguela Crisologo and Simeon Marcial recognized and respected his ownership
over the subject properties.

Consequently, Enrique sought for the dismissal of the Complaint, and prayed that respondent be ordered to
pay attorneys fees, including moral, exemplary and actual damages.


Issues:
1. IS WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFFS TITLE*S ARE VALID AND WERE THE ONLY ONES ISSUED OVER THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES;

2. WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF SAID PROPERTIES;


Held
First. The determination of the circumstances leading to Antenors acquisition of the subject properties is a
factual matter.

The court a quo found that in 1959, Antenor purchased from Miguela Crisologo two parcels of land located at
Palico, Imus, Cavite, and covered by TCTs No. T-3855 and No. T-11171. Antenor paid for the aforesaid
properties in installment, and after having fully paid for the same, TCTs No. T-3855 and No. T-11171 in the
name of Miguela Crisologo were cancelled, and TCTs No. T-517 and No. T-518 were issued to Antenor. In 1963,
the properties were subdivided and, therefrom, TCTs No. T-4983, T-4984, T-4985, T-4986, T-5027, T-5028, T-
5029, T-5030, T-5031, T-5032 and T-5033, all in the name of Antenor were issued. On 4 May 1982, respondent
was appointed administratrix of the Estate of Antenor.
Second. Anteros certificates of title, as found by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court, were
issued as early as 22 October 1959. Time and again, we have upheld the fundamental principle in land
registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a
parcel of land. The validity of Anteros titles were upheld by the court a quo and the Court of Appeals and were
not found to be tainted with any defect. Even as Enrique possessed certificates of title over certain portions of
the subject properties, these were issued only on 7 March 1973 and 6 March 1991. On this matter, we do not
find basis to digress from the ruling articulated by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
Well-established is the principle that the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as
against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate. This rule refers to the date of the certificate of
title. Absent any muniment of title issued prior to 1959 in favor of appellants [Enrique, et al.] which
could prove their ownership over the contested lots, this Court is left with no other alternative but to
declare appellants claim over the properties as void.

A collateral attack on respondents title over the disputed properties cannot be allowed.

By express provision of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title cannot be subject to a
collateral attack, thus:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.

When is an action a direct attack and when is it collateral? This Court made a distinction, to wit:
Page 15 of 38

An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the
title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct
when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the
other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack
on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.

In the case at bar, petitioners sought to file an Amended Answer, attacking the validity of Antenors title.
Therein, it was alleged that Enrique discovered a certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite which
purports to signify that there was no valid reconstitution of Antenors title. Otherwise stated, they sought to
assert that the aforesaid certification shows that TCT No (T-11171) RT-1228, in the name of Miguela Crisologo,
appeared to have been reconstituted; however, no record in the Primary Entry Book of said Registry, relative
to such administrative reconstitution can be found. As submitted, petitioners maintained that the lack of
record is a vital defect, not only to the validity of the reconstitution of Miguela Crisologos title but also to
Antenors title, which was derived therefrom.

The Court of Appeals said that respondent could not be faulted for having instituted the action several years
after the dismissal of a case commenced by Antenor himself because it was only in 1982 that the
administratrix for his Estate was appointed, and respondent allowed petitioners to peacefully vacate the
premises. Moreover, the appellate court said that laches cannot lie against respondent on the ground that
petitioners cannot feign ignorance of the possibility of respondents action for quieting of title because from
the time of the dismissal of the case for recovery of possession in 1969, they knew that another action would
be instituted by respondent since the dismissal of the prior case was without prejudice to the filing of a
subsequent action.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 72907, dated 27 August 2003 and 4 February 2004 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
























Page 16 of 38


V. Subsequent Registration

A. Voluntary Dealings

1. General Provisions
Secs. 51-56, RA 1529


(LOREMER RECTO)
Manotok IV et. al. vs Heirs of Barque
G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, (2005)

FACTS:
Homer L. Barque, Sr. (Barque, Sr.') represented by Barque-Hernandez filed a petition for administrative
reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177. TCT was allegedly destroyed when a fire gutted the
Quezon City Hall. In support, Barque, Sr. submitted the owner's duplicate certificate of title, Real Estate Tax
Receipts and Tax Declaration and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property.

Manotok et al., filed their opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under reconstitution
forms part of the land covered by their reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177
in the name of petitioners predecessors-in-interest is spurious.

Atty. Bustos, Reconstituting Officer of LRA, denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 on the ground that
TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate TCT No. RT-22481 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al
and Fls-3168-D is a spurious document.

The Heirs of Barque filed an appeal with the LRA.

LRA ruled that under LRA Circular No. 13 only the owner's or co-owner's duplicate of an original or transfer
certificate of title could be used as a source of administrative reconstitution. Atty. Bustos erred in requiring the
submission of documents other than the owner's duplicate of the TCT.

However, LRA ruled that TCT No. 210177 could only be reconstituted after a court of competent jurisdiction
has cancelled TCT No.RT-22481.

Manotok, et al. filed a petition for review before CA praying for the immediate reconstitution of TCT No.
210177 without prior cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 by a court of competent jurisdiction.

CA ruled ordering the RD to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute
forthwith respondents' TCT No. T-210177.

Hence, this case Manotok, et. al., contended that the LRA has no authority to annul their title and the Court of
Appeals, in resolving the appeal from the LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners title


ISSUE:
Whether LRA and CA has jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners title.


Page 17 of 38

HELD:
Yes, LRA has authority to annul Manotok's title under RA 26 Sec 3 which provides that the reconstituting
officer should have confined himself to the owners duplicate certificate of title prior to the reconstitution.

The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution. It has the authority to review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting officer. The function is
adjudicatory in nature it can properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for reconstitution.
Logically, it can declare a title as sham or spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it cannot make such
declaration, then there would be no basis for its decision to grant or deny the reconstitution.

The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the LRA. Under
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court has jurisdiction on appeals from judgments
or final orders of the LRA, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law.

====================================

(2008)
After the promulgation of the decision, the Manotoks filed several motions for reconsideration with the 1st
Division but these were all DENIED.

When the Barques moved for the execution of the decision, the Manotoks sought the referral of the motion to
the Court en banc.

The Court promulgated an en banc and REVERSED the decisions and resolutions of the CA and the LRA, and
REMANDED the cases to the CA for further proceedings.

The Court ruled that the LRA and the CA had no jurisdiction to direct the annulment of the Manotoks title. It
reasoned under PD 1529 Sec 48 which provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for
reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake.
Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's administrative proceeding.

CA does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over
ownership of property for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the
course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title
in the first place.

================================

(2010)
In due time, the CA received evidence with primary focus on whether the Manotoks can trace their claim of
title to a valid alienation by the Government of the said lot, which was a Friar Land. The Barques and
Manahans were likewise allowed to present evidence on their respective claims that may have an impact on
the correct determination of the status of the Manotok title.

The core issue identified and resolved by the Court was: Does the absence of approval of the Secretary of
the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204
in favor of the Manotoks warrant the annulment of their title?
Page 18 of 38


The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE and held that the absence of approval of the Secretary of the
Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 in
favor of the Manotoks predecessor-in-interest warrants the annulment of the Manotok title.

Section 18 of Act No. 1120 provides: No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the
provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

The Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had no valid certificate of sale
issued to them by the Government in the first place. Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 10, 1919
purportedly on file with the DENR-LMB, conspicuously lacks the signature of the Director of Lands and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Considering that none of the parties has established a valid acquisition under the provisions of Act No. 1120, as
amended, the court adopted the recommendation of the CA declaring the Manotok title as null and void ab
initio, and Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate as still part of the patrimonial property of the Government.

=========================================

(2012)
The Court decided on the sole issue of whether SC has the power to cancel/annul the certificate of title

HELD:
Yes. Indeed, both the LRA and CA erred in ruling that the Barques had the right to seek reconstitution of their
purported title. Reevaluation of the evidence on record likewise indicated that the Manotoks claim to title is
just as flawed as that of the Barques. Following the approach on several cases, the majority resolved to
remand the case for reception of evidence on the parties competing claims of ownership. Given the
contentious factual issues, it was necessary for the Court to resolve the same for the complete determination
of the present controversy. It was thus not the first time the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual
matter pending before it to the CA.

The Court deemed it proper to give all the parties full opportunity to adduce further evidence, and in
particular, for the Manotoks to prove their presumed just title over the property also claimed by the Barques
and the Manahans. As it turned out, none of the parties were able to establish by clear and convincing
evidence a valid alienation from the Government of the subject friar land. The declaration of ownership in
favor of the Government was but the logical consequence of such finding.




(MARCK CAIDLANG)
Fernandez v. CA
189 SCRA 780







Page 19 of 38


(REY MALDO)
GURBAX SINGH PABLA & CO., GURBAX SINGH PABLA, BELA SINGH PABLA, OJAGAR SINGH,
DHARAM SINGH, TALOK SINGH and CIPRIANO TAN ENG KIAT
vs.
HERMOGENES REYES and TEODORA TANTOCO
G.R. No. L-3970, October 29, 1952

Facts:
John Tan Chin Eng is the owner of the land covered by Certificates of Title Nos. 8071 and 8072, and on July 23,
1948, he entered into a contract with the petitioner-appellees, under the terms of which petitioners-appellees
were to construct thereon a three-story building of concrete and of strong materials valued at from P80,000 to
P90,000. This contract of lease was filed and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila on
August 10, 1948. At the time that the contract was entered into there was an existing mortgage over the land
in favor of Jose Calvo and Carlos Calvo for the sum of P110,000. This mortgage in favor of the Calvos was
cancelled, and a new mortgage was executed by the owner in favor of respondents-appellants herein,
Honorable Hermogenes Reyes and his spouse Teodora Tantoco, dated March 8, 1949, which was registered on
the same date in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila.

On May 25, 1949, counsel for petitioners-appellees wrote respondents-appellants requesting them to allow
him to take the certificates of title to the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila for the annotation of the
contracts of lease entered into by the owner with them. On June 16, 1949, respondents-appellants' son wrote
the owner of the land (Exhibit M) demanding the payment of the overdue interest on the mortgage. The
petitioners-appellees filed a motion in the Court of First Instance of Manila praying that an order issue to the
owner for the delivery of the owner's duplicates of transfer certificates to the petitioners in order that the
Register of Deeds of Manila may be able to make the annotation thereon of the contract of lease. Against this
petition Hermogenes Reyes and Teodora Tantoco filed an opposition, alleging that they had no knowledge
whatsoever of the contract of lease or of its amendments and that the execution of the amendment violated
the express provision of the mortgage, to the effect that the owner could not sell, assign, or encumber the
mortgaged premises without the written consent of the mortgages.


Issue:
Whether petitioners have a right to have said deeds registered.


Held:
The purpose of registering an instrument is to give notice thereof to all persons (section 51, Act No. 496); it is
not intended by the proceedings for registration to seek to destroy or otherwise affect already registered
rights over the land, subsisting or existing at the time of the registration. The rights of these parties, who have
registered their rights, are not put in issue when an instrument is subsequently presented for registration; nor
are its effects on other instruments previously registered put in issue by the procedure of registration. Thus,
the objections raised by respondents-appellants that they had no knowledge of the contract of lease, before
the property was mortgaged to them, or that the same violates their contract of mortgage with the owner of
the land these are not passed upo\n by the order for the registration of petitioners-appellees' contract of
lease. The objections, as well as the relative rights of all parties who have registered their deeds, shall be
decided in the proper suit or proceeding when the opportune occasion arises; but they are not now in issue,
nor may they be adjudicated upon, simply because petitioners-appellees have applied for the registration of
their contract of lease.

Page 20 of 38




(REY MALDO)
PACIFICO GARCIA
vs.
BENJAMIN M. GOZON, TECLA GUTIERREZ, ROSARIO FELIX, PAULINO D. BUENAVENTURA,
RAYMUNDO DIONISIO, VIRGILIO AUSTRIA and MARCEON VICENCIO

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), CAROLINA LAPUZ- GOZON, assisted by her husband
BENJAMIN M. GOZON, TECLA GUTIERREZ, ROSARIO FELIX, PAULINO D. BUENAVENTURA,
RAYMUNDO DIONISIO, VIRGILIO AUSTRIA and MARCEON VICENCIO
G.R. Nos. L-48971 & 49011, January 22, 1980

Facts:
This case is about the issuance of two or more transfer certificates of title to different persons for the same
lots, or subdivisions thereof, due to the fact that the original title was allegedly not cancelled when the first
transfer certificates of title were issued to replace the original title.

On August 9, 1918, a deed of sale for two parcels of land, E and G of the Hacienda Maysilo, located in Malabon,
Rizal and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 983, was executed in favor of Ismael Lapus a bona fide
occupant thereof.

The deed of sale was presented for registration at two-twenty five in the afternoon of January 15, 1920 and
was recorded as Primary Entry No. 7710.

However, it seemed that, contrary to the foregoing entry and the official routine or standard operating
procedure, the deed of sale was not annotated on OCT No. 983 and that, consequently, that title was
apparently not cancelled. Why that annotation did not appear in OCT No. 983 and why there was no notation
of the cancellation of that title, as it appeared in 1962, is a mystifying circumstance in this case.

As a result of the registration of that deed of sale, Transfer Certificate of 'Title No. 4910 was issued to Lapus for
the two parcels of land, E and G, and I Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4911 was issued for the remaining five
lots covered by OCT No. 983.

Lapus on different occasions mortgaged the two parcels of land to secure his obligations to the Philippine
National Bank, the Government and the Philippine Trust Company. He died in 1951. The two parcels of land
were inherited by his daughter, Carolina Lapuz-Gozon. She became the registered owner of the two lots.

Lapus and his successors-in-interest have been in possession of the two parcels even before 1910 or for more
than seventy years.

Meanwhile, in 1962, certain. alleged heirs (collectively known as the Riveras filed a motion in Land
Registration Cases Nos. 4429 and 4496 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, alleging that they were deprived
of their participation in the Hacienda Maysilo covered by OCT No. 983 and for other titles and that, since only
OCT No. 983 was supposedly unencumbered, all the land covered by that title should be adjudicated to them.
The court granted the motion. It should be stressed that OCT No. 983 appears to have remained uncancelled
Page 21 of 38

notwithstanding the sale to Lapus of two parcels covered by it and the fact that it had been replaced by TCT
Nos. 4910 and 4911.

On June 7, 1963, OCT No. 983 was definitely cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No.
112236 was issued to the Riveras. Later, Lots 5 and 7 of the said title (corresponding to parcels E and G) were
assigned by Bartolome Rivera to Sergio Cruz and Pacifico Garcia and TCT Nos. 112743 and 112742 were issued
to Cruz and Garcia, respectively. Thus, two sets of transfer certificates of title for Lots E and G or 5 and 7,
originally covered by OCT No. 983, were issued, one to the heir of Ismael Lapus and another set to the
successors-in-interest of the Riveras.

The Riveras and their successors-in-interest have never set foot on the disputed lots.

Mrs. Gozon later learned that the Riveras and their successors-in-interest had acquired the land covered by
OCT No. 983. Her lawyer and a surveyor informed her that parcels E and G, which she inherited from her Land
Titles and Deeds RBM Page 2 of 4 pages father, were identical to Lots 5 and 7 which were conveyed to Cruz
and Garcia. She registered adverse claims on the titles covering Lots 5 and 7. On December 27, 1965 she and
the persons to whom she had transferred portions of parcels E and G filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal at Caloocan City against the Riveras and others an action to quiet title and for damages.

The trial court in its decision of July 30, 1975 declared valid TCT Nos. 141802 to 141855 and 143512 issued to
Mrs. Gozon and her co-plaintiffs. It voided TCT No. 112235 issued to the Riveras and all titles and transactions
emanating therefrom insofar as those titles covered the lots embraced in plaintiffs' titles. The Riveras were
ordered to pay the plaintiffs twenty thousand pesos as attorney's fees.

That judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision of May 25, 1978.


Issue:
Whether the 1920 title issued to Lapus and the titles derived therefrom should prevail over the 1963 title
issued to the Riveras and the subsequent titles derived from it.


Held:
The title of Lapus and the titles derived therefrom should be given effect. The title of the Riveras and the titles
springing from it are void. There can be no doubt that Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value.

"The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier
in date prevail, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the
earlier certificate" (Hogg, Australian Torrens System 823, citing cases and cited in Legarda and Prieto vs.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 595).

"Where two certificates (of title) purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive
registrations, where more than once certificate is issued in respect of a party estate or interest in land, the
Person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to
hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof " (Niblack, Analysis of the
Torrens System page 237, cited in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, supra, pages 595-6).

And the rule that in case of double registration the owner of the earlier certificate is the owner of the land
applies to the successive vendees of the owners of such certificates. "The vendee of the earlier certificate
Page 22 of 38

would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate" (Legarda and Prieto vs.
Saleeby, supra, pages 597-9). It is settled that in this jurisdiction the maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in
jure (he who is first in time is preferred in right) is followed in land registration matters (La Urbana vs.
Bernardo, 62 Phil. 790, 806).














































Page 23 of 38



(LOREMER RECTO)
Spouses Abrigo vs De Vera
G.R. No. 154409 June 21, 2004

FACTS:
Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located in Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration to Rosenda Tigno-
Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go.

RTC in Dagupan City rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties.
Gloria Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy back the house and
lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-
Go shall remain valid.

Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so the vendees declared the lot in their name.

Unknown to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel
of land.

Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo.

Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera and Romana registered the sale and transfer
cartificate if title was issued in her name.

Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not have transferred the property to Respondent De Vera
because it no longer belonged to her. They further claim that the sale could not be validated, since respondent
was not a purchaser in good faith and for value.

Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens system should prevail over that of
petitioners who recorded theirs under Act 3344. If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act, and it
is sold but the subsequent sale is registered not under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as
amended, such sale is not considered REGISTERED (Justice E. Paras)


ISSUE:
Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better title over the property in question?


HELD:
Respondent's registration under the Torrens system should prevail over that of petitioners who recorded
theirs under Act 3344.

It is undisputed that Villafania had been issued a free patent. It was later cancelled by TCT also in Villafanias
name. As a consequence of the sale, TCT under Villafania was subsequently cancelled and a new TCT
thereafter issued to respondent.

Registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the
present case was already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners registration of the sale under Act
3344 was not effective.
Page 24 of 38


Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the
latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was registered because the purchaser of
unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely
acquires the latters interest in the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.

Applying this principle, the execution sale of unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect because the
land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of the said execution sale.










































Page 25 of 38


(ARNOLD VALENZUELA)
CARMELITA FUDOT vs. CATTLEYA LAND, INC., VELASCO, JR.
533 SCRA 350

FACTS:
Respondent asked someone to check, on its behalf, the titles of nine (9) lots, the subject land included, which it
intended to buy from the spouses Troadio and Asuncion Tecson. Finding no defect on the titles, respondent
and the Tecsons executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties . The Register of Deeds, Atty.
Narciso dela Serna, refused to actually annotate the deed of sale on the titles because of the existing notice of
attachment in connection with Civil Case No. 3399 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The
attachment was eventually cancelled by virtue of a compromise agreement between the Tecsons and their
attaching creditor which was brokered by respondent. Titles to six (6) of the nine (9) lots were issued, but the
Register of Deeds refused to issue titles to the remaining three (3) lots , because the titles covering the same
were still unaccounted for.

On 23 January 1995, petitioner presented for registration before the Register of Deeds the owners copy of the
title of the subject property, together with the deed of sale purportedly executed by the Tecsons in favor of
petitioner on 19 December 1986

On 5 May 1995, respondent filed its Complaint6 for Quieting of Title &/Or Recovery Of Ownership,
Cancellation Of Title With Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City. On 26 June 1995,
Asuncion filed a complaint-in-intervention, claiming that she never signed any deed of sale covering any part of
their conjugal property in favor of petitioner. She averred that her signature in petitioners deed of sale was
forged thus, said deed should be declared null and void.

The trial court rendered its decision:
(i) quieting the title or ownership of the subject land in favor of respondent;
(ii) declaring the deed of sale between petitioner and spouses Tecson invalid;
(iii) ordering the registration of the subject land in favor of respondent;
(iv) dismissing respondents claim for damages against the Register of Deeds for insufficiency of
evidence;
(v) dismissing Asuncions claim for damages against petitioner for lack of factual basis; and
(vi) dismissing petitioners counterclaim for lack of the required preponderance of evidence.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied her motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.


ISSUES:
1. BETWEEN 2 BUYERS OF REGISTERED LAND, WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHT-IS IT THE FIRST BUYER WHO
WAS GIVEN THE OWNERS DUPLICATE TCT TOGETHER WITH A DEED OF SALE IN 1986, OR THE SECOND
BUYER IN 1992 WITH ONLY A DEED OF SALE.

2. IS A BUYER OF REGISTERED LAND WHO DID NOT DEMAND OR REQUIRE THE DELIVERY OF THE
OWNERS DUPLICATE TCT A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH.

3. IN SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION OF REGISTERED LANDS, AS BY SALE, WHICH LAW SHALL GOVERN,
ARTICLE 1455 OF CIVIL CODE OR P.D. 1529 OR TORRENS SYSTEM.
Page 26 of 38


HELD:
1. First issue : The Civil Law provision on double sale is not applicable where there is only one valid sale, the
previous sale having been found to be fraudulent. The Court held that despite the fact that one deed of
sale was registered ahead of the other, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code will not apply where said deed is found
to be a forgery, the result of this being that the right of the other vendee should prevail.

Thus, under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.

The act of registration does not validate petitioners otherwise void contract. Registration is a mere
ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the
Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land
subject of the deed, contract, or instrument.

2. On the second issue:
Art. 1544. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

The Court declared that the governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in
right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights, except
where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first as provided by the afore
quoted provision of the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar him from availing of his
rights under the law, among them to register first his purchase as against the second buyer. However,
knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the
second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith.

That respondent was a buyer in good faith, in its desire to finally have the title to the properties
transferred in its name, it persuaded the parties in the said case to settle the same so that the notice of
attachment could be cancelled.

3. Third issue: The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration under
Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD 1529) which considers the act of registration as the operative act
that binds the land. On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such rights and
interest as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance not noted
therein.

Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.












Page 27 of 38




(ARNOLD VALENZUELA)
ARLYN* PINEDA vs. JULIE C. ARCALAS
538 SCRA 596

FACTS:
The subject property consists of three parcels of land, which are described as Lot No. 3762-D with an area of
42,958 square meters, Lot No. 3762-E with an area of 4,436 square meters, and Lot No. 3762-F with an area of
2,606 square meters, the total area of which consists of 50,000 square meters. These three lots are portions of
Lot No. 3762, registered in the name of Spouses Mauro Lateo and Encarnacion Evangelista (spouses Lateo)
under TCT No. T-52319, with a total area of 74,708 square meters. A certain Victoria Tolentino bought the said
property from the Spouses Lateo. Sometime later, Civil Case No. Q-96-27884, for Sum of Money, was instituted
by Arcalas against Victoria Tolentino. This case stemmed from an indebtedness evidenced by a promissory
note and four post-dated checks later dishonored, which Victoria Tolentino owed Arcalas.

The Quezon City RTC, rendered judgment in favor of Arcalas and against Victoria Tolentino.

Pineda bought the subject property from Victoria L. Tolentino. Pineda alleged that upon payment of the
purchase price, she took possession of the subject property by allowing a tenant, Rodrigo Bautista to cultivate
the same. However, Pineda failed to register the subject property under her name.

Asserting ownership of the subject property, Pineda filed with the Deputy Sheriff of the Quezon City RTC an
Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim.

Arcalas filed a motion to set aside Pinedas Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim, which, the Quezon City RTC
granted.

Pineda filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna another Affidavit of Third Party Claim and
caused the inscription of a notice of adverse claim at the back of TCT No. T-52319 under Entry No. 324094.
Arcalas then filed an action for the cancellation of the entry of Pinedas adverse claim before the Laguna RTC.

The Laguna RTC ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Adverse Claim annotated as Entry No. 324094 at the
back of TCT No. 52319 on the ground of res judicata.

Pineda appealed the Order of the Laguna RTC before the Court of Appeals under Rule 44 of the Rules of Court.
In a Resolution dated 25 January 2005, the appellate court dismissed the appeal and considered it abandoned
when Pineda failed to file her appellants brief.


ISSUES:
1. WHETHER THE LEVY ON ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-96-27884 MAY EXEMPT THE PORTION BOUGHT BY [PINEDA] FROM VICTORIA
TOLENTINO; [and]

2. WHETHER THE POSSESSION OF [PINEDA] OF THE 5 HECTARES PORTION OF LOT 3762 IS ALREADY
EQUIVALENT TO A TITLE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF REGISTRATION.


Page 28 of 38

HELD:
Pineda avers that she is not a party to Civil Case No. Q-96-27884, heard before the Quezon City RTC, and that
the levy on the alias writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-96-27884 cannot affect her purchase of subject
property. Such position runs contrary to law and jurisprudence.

Sections 51 and 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
provide that:
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.An owner of registered land may
convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He
may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law.
But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or
affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a
contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make
registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or the city where the land lies.

Section 52. Constructive notice upon registration.Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment,
order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office
of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to
all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.

It is clear from these provisions that before a purchaser of land causes the registration of the transfer of the
subject property in her favor, third persons, such as Arcalas, cannot be bound thereby. Insofar as third persons
are concerned, what validly transfers or conveys a persons interest in real property is the registration of the
deed.

The doctrine is well settled that a levy on execution duly registered takes preference over a prior unregistered
sale. A registered lien is entitled to preferential consideration.

This is so because an attachment is a proceeding in rem. It is against the particular property, enforceable
against the whole world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing
can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself.

Thus, in the registry, the attachment in favor of respondent appeared in the nature of a real lien when
petitioner had his purchase recorded. The effect of the notation of said lien was to subject and subordinate the
right of petitioner, as purchaser, to the lien. Petitioner acquired ownership of the land only from the date of
the recording of his title in the register, and the right of ownership which he inscribed was not absolute but a
limited right, subject to a prior registered lien of respondent, a right which is preferred and superior to that of
petitioner.

Pineda did not even allege, much less prove, that Arcalas had actual knowledge of her claim of ownership and
possession of the property at the time the levy was registered. Hence, the mere possession of the subject
property by Pineda, absent any proof that Arcalas had knowledge of her possession and adverse claim of
ownership of the subject property, cannot be considered as equivalent to registration.
Petition is DISMISSED


Page 29 of 38


(RENZ MASCARDO)
Macadangdang v. Martinez



(RENZ MASCARDO)
Erea v. Querrer-Kauffman



(RENZ MASCARDO)
Heirs of Manlapat v. CA





































Page 30 of 38



(REY MALDO)
AUTOCORP GROUP and AUTOGRAPHICS, INC.
vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and KEPPEL MONTE BANK (formerly Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank)
G.R. No. 157553, September 8, 2004

Facts:
Respondent bank extended a loan of eighty-five million pesos (P85,000,000.00) in favor of petitioner Autocorp
Group (Autocorp). Petitioner Autocorp failed to pay the loan. Despite its failure, it asked for an additional loan
of P48,800,000.00 payable in one year at 20% interest per annum. Of this additional loan, P17,000,000.00 was
applied partially against the original loan. Autocorp was again unable to pay both accounts, despite repeated
demands and various requests for extension.

Hence, in a notarized letter dated September 8, 1997, addressed to the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Cebu
City, respondent bank requested for the sale of the six (6) mortgaged lots at a public auction, for the
satisfaction of petitioner Autocorps obligations.

Petitioners filed a complaint which the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, conditioned on
petitioners filing of a bond of two million pesos (P2,000,000.00). It also set the pre-trial hearing of the case.

The respondent bank sought a reconsideration of the order but in vain. Respondent bank filed a petition for
certiorari to annul the order and resolution of the trial court which the Court of Appeals granted.

The counsel for respondent bank immediately informed Deputy Sheriff Belarmino of the Court of Appeals
favorable Decision, furnished him with a copy of the Decision and requested him to proceed with the
foreclosure.

On January 21, 1999 at 4:30 p.m., respondent bank presented the sheriffs certificate of sale to the Register of
Deeds of Cebu City, involving the four (4) properties located in Cebu City covered by TCT Nos. 72002, 72132,
85737, and 102042. On the same date, the certificate was entered in the primary entry book of the Register of
Deeds of Cebu.

However, the entry fee of P30.00 and the registration fee of P154,923.00 were paid only the following day or
on January 22, 1999 as the cashier in charge of receiving payment had already left.

Respondent bank also presented the sheriffs certificate of sale to the Register of Deeds of Lapu-lapu City with
respect to the two (2) subject lots, covered by TCT Nos. 19135 and 19136, located therein.


Issue:
Whether or not the payment of the entry fee is a condition sine qua non before any valid entry can be made in
the primary entry book.


Held:
The objection as to the payment of the requisite fees is unavailing. There is no question that the fees were
paid, albeit belatedly. Respondent bank presented the certificate of sale to the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Cebu City for registration on January 21, 1999 at 4:30 p.m. As the cashier had already left, the Office could
Page 31 of 38

not receive the payment for entry and registration fees, but still, the certificate of sale was entered in the
primary entry book. The following day, respondent bank paid the requisite entry and registration fees.

Given the peculiar facts of the case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the payment of respondent bank
must be deemed to be substantial compliance with the law; and, the entry of the instrument the day before
should not be invalidated. In any case, even if we consider the entry to have been made on January 22, the
important fact is that the entry in the primary entry book was done prior to the issuance of the writ of
injunction by the trial court.

Section 56 of P.D. No. 1529 provides:
SEC. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified copies. Each Register of Deeds shall keep a primary entry
book in which, upon payment of the entry fee, he shall enter, in the order of their reception, all
instruments including copies of writs and processes filed with him relating to registered land. He shall,
as a preliminary process in registration, note in such book the date, hour and minute of reception of all
instruments, in the order in which they were received. They shall be regarded as registered from the
time so noted, and the memorandum of each instrument, when made on the certificate of title to which
it refers, shall bear the same date: Provided, that the national government as well as the provincial and
city governments shall be exempt from the payment of such fees in advance in order to be entitled to
entry and registration.




2. Specific Provisions
a. Conveyances and Transfers
Secs.57-59, PD 1529

b. Mortgages and Leases
Secs. 60-63 PD 1529


(KRISTINE MARTINEZ)
Joven v. CA 212 SCRA 700 (1992)


c. Powers of Attorney
Sec 64 PD 1529

d. Trusts
Sec. 65-68 PD 1529










Page 32 of 38


B. Involuntary Dealings
1. General Provisions
Secs.71, 74-75, PD 1529

(GRACIELLA MEDINA)
Heirs of Blancaflor v. CA



(KRISTINE MADRID)
Tagaytay-Taal v. CA




(TRISTAN GUZMAN)
PADILLA v. PHILIPPINE PRODUCERS
GR 141256, July 15, 2005

Facts:
Petitioner and his wife are the registered owners of the following real properties: Lot Nos. 2904-A (covered by
TCT No. T-36090), 2312-C-5 (covered by TCT No. T-3849), and 2654 (covered by TCT No. T-8053), all situated in
Bago City. Respondent is a marketing cooperative which had a money claim against petitioner.

On April 24, 1987, respondent filed a civil case against petitioner for collection of a sum of money in the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City. Despite receipt of summons on May 18, 1987, petitioner (then defendant)
opted not to file an answer. On March 3, 1988, respondent (then plaintiff) moved to have petitioner-defendant
declared in default, which the trial court granted on April 15, 1988. Respondent presented its evidence on
October 9, 1989. On November 28, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in respondents favor. Petitioner
was furnished a copy of this decision by mail on November 29, 1989 but because of his failure to claim it, the
copy was returned.

On May 31, 1990, the Court issued a writ of execution. On June 4, 1990, the three lots (Lot 2904-A, Lot 2312-
C-5 and Lot 2654), all of the Bago Cadastre and registered in petitioners name, were levied by virtue of that
writ. On July 4, 1990, sheriff Renato T. Arimas auctioned off the lots to satisfy the judgment, with respondent
as the only bidder. On July 10, 1990, ex-officio provincial sheriff and clerk of court Antonio Arbis executed a
certificate of sale in favor of respondent. On August 13, 1990, the certificate of sale was recorded in the
Register of Deeds.[12]

When petitioner failed to exercise his right of redemption within the 12-month period allowed by law, the
court, on motion of respondent, ordered on February 5, 1992 the issuance of a writ of possession for the
sheriff to cause the delivery of the physical possession of the properties in favor of respondent.[13]

On May 17, 1995, respondent filed a motion to direct the Register of Deeds to issue new titles over the
properties in its name, alleging that the Register of Deeds (RD) of Bago City would not issue new titles (in
respondents name) unless the owners copies were first surrendered to him. Respondent countered that such
surrender was impossible because this was an involuntary sale and the owners copies were with
petitioner.[14]

Page 33 of 38

On July 3, 1995, the trial court issued an order granting the motion. In a subsequent order dated August 8,
1995, it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner appealed. Four years later, the Court of
Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the order of the trial court.

Petitioner contends that respondents motion for the RD to cancel the existing certificates of title and issue
new ones in its name was in fact a real action and that the motion was procedurally infirm because respondent
did not furnish him a copy.[15] He also claims that under Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the execution of the judgment was barred by prescription, given that the motion was filed more
than 5 years after the writ of execution was issued on March 23, 1990.[16] He also argues that respondent
failed to follow the correct procedure for the cancellation of a certificate of title and the issuance of a new
one, which is contained in Section 107 of PD 1529.[17]


Issues:
1. WON respondents right to have new titles issued in its name is now barred by prescription; and

2. WON the motion in question is the proper remedy for cancelling petitioners certificates of title and
new ones issued in its name.


Held:
Respondents right to petition the court for the issuance of new certificates of title has not yet prescribed.

The fact of levy and sale constitutes execution, and not the action for the issuance of a new title. Here,
because the levy and sale of the properties took place in June and July of 1990, respectively, or less than a year
after the decision became final and executory, the respondent clearly exercised its rights in timely fashion.

On the other hand, the issue of whether to acquire new titles by mere motion or through a separate petition is
an entirely different matter.

Petitioner is correct in assailing as improper respondents filing of a mere motion for the cancellation of the old
TCTs and the issuance of new ones as a result of petitioners refusal to surrender his owners duplicate TCTs.

It is clear that PD 1529 provides the solution to respondents quandary. The reasons behind the law make a lot
of sense; it provides due process to a registered landowner (in this case the petitioner) and prevents the
fraudulent or mistaken conveyance of land, the value of which may exceed the judgment obligation.
Petitioner contends that only his interest in the subject lots, and not that of his wife who was not a party to the
suit, should have been subjected to execution, and he should have had the opportunity to prove as much.

While we certainly will not condone any attempt by petitioner to frustrate the ends of justice the only way
to describe his refusal to surrender his owners duplicates of the certificates of title despite the final and
executory judgment against him respondent, on the other hand, cannot simply disregard proper procedure
for the issuance to it of new certificates of title. There was a law on the matter and respondent should have
followed it.

In any event, respondent can still file the proper petition with the cadastral court for the issuance of new titles
in its name.

It is clear that PD 1529 provides the solution to respondents quandary. The reasons behind the law make a lot
of sense; it provides due process to a registered landowner (in this case the petitioner) and prevents the
Page 34 of 38

fraudulent or mistaken conveyance of land, the value of which may exceed the judgment obligation.
Petitioner contends that only his interest in the subject lots, and not that of his wife who was not a party to the
suit, should have been subjected to execution, and he should have had the opportunity to prove as much.

While we certainly will not condone any attempt by petitioner to frustrate the ends of justice the only way
to describe his refusal to surrender his owners duplicates of the certificates of title despite the final and
executory judgment against him respondent, on the other hand, cannot simply disregard proper procedure
for the issuance to it of new certificates of title. There was a law on the matter and respondent should have
followed it.

In any event, respondent can still file the proper petition with the cadastral court for the issuance of new titles
in its name.






2. Specific Provisions
a. Attachment
Sec. 69, 72-73 PD 1529



b. Adverse Claim
Sec 70 PD 1529



(GRACIELLA MEDINA)
Rodriguez v. CA



















Page 35 of 38



(YVONNE BASA)
Sajonas vs CA
GR 102377 July 5, 1996

FACTS:
Before the court is the case for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a
certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The inscription was caused to be made by the private
respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the
name of the spouses Uychocde, and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No.
N-109417 of the same registry, issued in the name of the spouses Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land
from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this case. The subject property was bought by Sajonas
spouses on September 1983 and caused the annotation of their adverse claim on August 1984. The Deed of
Sale was executed upon the full payment of the purchase price and the same was registered only on August
1985. Meanwhile, without the petitioners' knowledge, there has been a compromise agreement between the
spouses Uychocde and Pilares (Uychocde's judgment creditor), and a notice of levy on execution was issued on
February 12, 1985. On February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said
notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated at the back
of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.


ISSUE:
Which should be preferred between the notice of levy on execution and the deed of absolute sale?

The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 1984, but was registered only on August 28, 1985,
while the notice of levy on execution was annotated six (6) months prior to the registration of the sale on
February 12, 1985.


HELD:
The annotation of the adverse claim is equivalent to notice to third persons of the interest of the claimant. The
provision of the law (PD 1529) that the adverse claim is only valid for 30 days cannot be upheld. Clearly, the
intention of the law is otherwise as may be gleaned on the following discussion:
Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision
is made in this decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his
alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of certificate of
title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which
the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants residence, and a place at
which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim
on the certificate of title.

The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse
of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by
the party in interest.

Page 36 of 38

Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be
registered by the same claimant.

Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance
where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing
upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and
equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If,
in any case, the court, after notice and hearing shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it
may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos, nor more than five thousand pesos, in
its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the
Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect. Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the
apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law such that the provision on cancellation of adverse
claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken
together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective;
otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the
adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer
necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony. To interpret the effectivity period of
the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for
which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse
claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the
registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now
P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said
property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.
Petition was granted.

The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is CANCELLED.
























Page 37 of 38


c. Notice of Lis Pendens
Secs. 76-77 PD 1529

(JUAN PHAOLO BASE)
Dino vs. Court of Appeals
213 SCRA 422

Facts:
Consorcia Sombrio who owns a parcel of land was made to sign by Maria Ching to a document which was
purportedly a letter authorizing Ching to sell the land. It turns out that the document was a deed of sale in
favor of Ching. Sombrio, upon discovering of the fraud, filed an action against Ching and the notary public
Ciriaco Alcazar for notarizing the deed without her presence. Thereafter, Ching mortgage the said property to
spouses Robert and Crisitina Dino with the notice of lis pendens. Later on, Ching sold the property to the
spouses dino and from there on where the owners of the property peacefully.


Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are in good faith in acquiring the property.


Held:
The court held in favor of the petitioners.

As the registered owner of the subject property,petitioners are not bound by in decision Civil case no R-18073
for they were never summoned in said case and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. 73069 was
already cancelled at the time petitioners purchased the subject property. While it is true that petitioners are
indespensable parties in the above cited case, without whom no complete relief could be accorded to the
private respondents, the fact still remains that petitioners were never actually joined as defendants in said
case. Impleading petitioners as additional defendants only in the execution stage of said case violated
petitioners' right to due process as no notice of lis pendens was annotated on the existing certificate of title of
said property nor were petitioners remain strangers in said case and the Order of the trial court involving them
is null and void, considering that petitioners are innocent purchasers of the subject property for value.

Where the certificate of title was already in the name of the forger when the land sold to an innocent
purchaser, the vendee had the right to rely on what appeared in the certificate and, in the absence of anything
to excite suspicion, was under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. Under the Torrens System, registration is the operative act
that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A person dealing with registered land is not
required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with the
notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title.

Moreover,registration of land under the Torrens System extinguishes all claims, liens and encumbrances
asserted prior to registration except statutory liens and those noted in the certificate of title.



(GRACIELLA MEDINA)
Lopez v. Enriquez

Page 38 of 38



VI. Registration of Judgments, Orders, Petitions
Secs. 78-92 PD 1529



VII. Registration of Patents
Sec. 103, PD 1529

Lorzano v. Tabayag


Lahora v. Dayangdayang


Del Rosario-Igtiben v Republic


VIII. Certificate of Land Transfer, Emancipation Patent, Affidavit of Non-Tenancy
Sec. 104-106



IX. Petitions and Actions After Original Registration
Sec. 107-110, PD 1529

Barstowe Philippines v. Republic

Ligon V. CA

Dawson v. Register of Deeds

Life Homes v. CA

New Durawood v. CA

Republic v. Casimiro