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The document discusses three cases related to property donations:
1) Genato vs. De Lorenzo - There was no valid donation of shares from a mother to her sons because acceptance of a joint donation requires both donees to be present, and one son accepted the shares without the other son present.
2) Cruz vs. CA - A donation of property did not need to be revoked after the donor's adoption of a child, because the donation did not impair the child's legitime based on the donor's other property.
3) Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Court of Appeals - A condition in a donation for automatic reversion of property if sold within 100 years was void as against public policy,
The document discusses three cases related to property donations:
1) Genato vs. De Lorenzo - There was no valid donation of shares from a mother to her sons because acceptance of a joint donation requires both donees to be present, and one son accepted the shares without the other son present.
2) Cruz vs. CA - A donation of property did not need to be revoked after the donor's adoption of a child, because the donation did not impair the child's legitime based on the donor's other property.
3) Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Court of Appeals - A condition in a donation for automatic reversion of property if sold within 100 years was void as against public policy,
The document discusses three cases related to property donations:
1) Genato vs. De Lorenzo - There was no valid donation of shares from a mother to her sons because acceptance of a joint donation requires both donees to be present, and one son accepted the shares without the other son present.
2) Cruz vs. CA - A donation of property did not need to be revoked after the donor's adoption of a child, because the donation did not impair the child's legitime based on the donor's other property.
3) Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Court of Appeals - A condition in a donation for automatic reversion of property if sold within 100 years was void as against public policy,
Aika G. Manliclic 2D 1 1. Genato vs. De Lorenzo If the donation was a joint one to both donees, one could not accept independently of his co-donee, for there is no accretion among donees unless expressly so provided or unless the are husband and wife Facts: The Genato Commercial Corporation is a family corporation, founded by the spouses Vicente Genato and Simona B. de Genato. The spouses had six children named Francisco, Florentino, Manuel, Carmen, Felisa and Juan. One day, majority of the members of the Board of Directors composed of Francisco G. Genato, President, Simona B. Vda. de Genato, Director and Secretary-Treasurer, and Florentino Genato, Vice-President and Director, held a meeting at Hidalgo, Manila. It appears in the minutes of said meeting that Doa Simona Vda. de Genato explained that due to her advanced age it is more convenient that Florentino Genato, now Vice-President of the corporation, act as Assistant Secretary- Treasurer as, as a matter of fact, he has heretofore been acting as such, since the work is rather strenuous. Four or five days thereafter, Florentino cancelled share certificates Nos. 7 and 18 belonging to his mother and in lieu thereof issued share certificate No. 118 for 265 shares in favor of Florentino Genato and share certificate No. 119 for 265 shares in favor of Francisco G. Genato. Simona Genato died. The Philippine Trust Company, judicial administrator of the intestate estate, and the legal heirs Manuel Genato, Felisa Genato de Lorenzo and Juan Genato filed the complaint in the case at bar to recover from the other two legal heirs, Florentino Genato and Francisco G. Genato, the 530 shares of stock in order that they may be included in the inventory of the intestate estate of their deceased mother and in due course distributed among all the surviving children of the decedent. In their answer, the defendant Florentino Genato and Francisco G. Genato alleged that they had acquired the ownership of the 530 shares by simple donation from their mother. The trial court found that defendants Francisco G. Genato and Florentino Genato had acquired the ownership of the 530 shares by simple donation from their widowed mother. Finding that there had been neither consideration for the sale of shares nor valid donation of the same, due to lack of proper acceptance and non- compliance with statutory requirements, and that the appeal of respondent Felisa Genato de Lorenzo inured to the benefit of her other co-plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals, as previously related, invalidated the transfer of the shares to Florentino and Francisco Genato, and decreed that said stock remained a part of the estate of the transferor. Issue: W/N there was a valid donation Held: No. There was none. There was a lack of proper acceptance because one of the joint donees was not present Ratio: Assuming, ad arguendo, that the late Simona Vda. de Genato gave the Certificates of Stock Nos. 7 and 18 to Florentino with instructions to transfer the same to him and his brother, this act did not constitute a valid manual donation in law for lack of proper acceptance. Incontestably, one of the two donees was not present at the delivery, and there is no showing that he, Francisco Genato, had authorized his brother, Florentino to accept for both of them. the delivery by the donor and the acceptance by donee must be simultaneous, and the acceptance by a person other than the true donee must be authorized by a proper power of attorney set forth in a public document. None has been claimed to exist in this case. the donation intended was a joint one to both donees, one could not accept independently of his co-donee, for there is no accretion among donees unless expressly so provided (Art. 637) or unless they be husband and wife. 2. CRUZ vs. CA - The donation may not be revoked or reduced if there is no adequate allegation that the legitime would be impaired and if there has been no inventory submitted.
Facts: Eduvigis Cruz, a childless widow, donated a 235.5 sq.m residential lot in San Isidro, Taytay Rizal together with the two-door apartment erected thereon to her grandnieces (private respondents, names not mentioned), in a deed of donation entitled "Kasulatan Sa Kaloobpala". The property was accordingly transferred to the names of private respondents.
In 1974, Eduvigis Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor, after which Eduvigis extrajudicially tried to revoke the donation, but the donees resisted, alleging that (a) the property in question was co-owned by Eduvigis Cruz and her brother, the late Maximo Cruz, grandfather of the donees, hence the latter own 1/2 of the property by inheritance; and (b) Eduvigis Cruz owns another property, an agricultural land of more than 2ha situated in Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, hence the donation did not impair the presumptive legitime of the adopted child.
In 1975, Cruz filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of donation invoking Article 760, paragraph 3 of CC Property Digests WEEK 16 Dela Torre, Manliclic, Pasquil| AMPIL Aika G. Manliclic 2D 2 Art. 760, Every donation inter vivos made by a person having no children or descendants, legitimate or legitimated by subsequent marriage, or illegitimate, may be revoked or reduced (3) If the donor should subsequently adopt a minor child.
TC revoked the donation to the grandnieces. CA reversed and held that: (a) the trial court took into consideration only Article 760 and ignored Article 761 which states: "In the cases referred to in the preceding article, the donation shall be revoked or reduced insofar as it exceeds the portion that may be freely disposed of by will, taking into account the whole estate of the donor of by will, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the birth, appearance or adoption of a child. (b) Eduvigis Cruz owns another lot in Dolores Taytay Rizal, although the subject of a pending litigation valued at P273k in 1977. (c) The donated lot did not belong entirely to Eduvigis as ! thereof belonged to her brother Maximo Cruz, grandfather of defendants. 1974 it had a total market value of P17k. One-half thereof was P8,500. Adding thereto a P50,000 value of the apartment house constructed thereon, the total value of the donation would still be within the free portion of donor's estate and therefore would not impair the legitime of the adopted child. (d) In an action for revocation of donation, the donor has the burden to show that the donation has impaired the legitime of the subsequent child; but in this case, Eduvigis did not even allege it in her complaint.
Issue: Whether donation may be revoked? - NO
Held: Private respondents won.
Ratio: In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated some or all of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within four years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child. (Civil Code, Articles 760, 761 and 763). The burden of proof is on the donor, who must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction of the donation can be adjudged.
In the case at bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that the subject donation impairs the legitime of the adopted child. It contains no indication at all of the total assets of the donor.
Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the contrary, there is unrebutted evidence that the donor has another piece of land P273k 1977, although then subject to litigation.
The legal situation of the donor is made worse by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that the grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of the donated land, the effect of which is to reduce the value of the donation which can then more easily be taken from the portion of the estate within the free disposal of donor
3. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA vs. COURT OF APPEALS -- There is no need for prescription to be applied in cases where there is stipulation for automatic reversion. Nonetheless, the stipulation is against public policy and thus, is void.
FACTS Respondent spouses filed a complaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission of contract, and reconveyance of real property against the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCA). The complainants alleged that spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta (both dead) executyed a deed of donation in favour of RCA Manila covering a parcel of land. The deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of one hundred (100) years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such condition would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the property would revert to the estate of the donors.
However, while still within the prohibitive period to dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of Manila was allegedly transferred, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the donation in favor of Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114,000.00. As a consequence of the sale, a TCT was issued in the name of the Ignao Spouses.
The Ignao spouses said that the donors had no cause of action and the Church said that the action to recover the property has already prescribed. The trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that the cause of action has prescribed. Upon appeal, the CA held that the action had not yet prescribed and ordered to remand the case to the lower courts.
ISSUE/HELD Whether or not the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) has prescribed NO. ! But the decision of the CA is set aside and the decision of the RTC is also dismissed. The 100 year prohibition is an illegal condition. ! Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary ! It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts involved therein, but we see no reason why the same should not apply to the donation in the present case. Article 732 of the Civil Code provides that donations inter vivos shall be governed by the general Property Digests WEEK 16 Dela Torre, Manliclic, Pasquil| AMPIL Aika G. Manliclic 2D 3 provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Now, said Title III does not have an explicit provision on the matter of a donation with a resolutory condition and which is subject to an express provision that the same shall be considered ipso facto revoked upon the breach of said resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as is the case of the deed presently in question. The suppletory application of the foregoing doctrinal rulings to the present controversy is consequently justified. ! When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act. ! Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is an indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation, in order to be valid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time. ! In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of the property for an entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for private respondents must fail. ! It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation against alienation of the land for one hundred (100) years was the very basis for the action to nullify the deed of d donation. At the same time, it was likewise the controverted fundament of the motion to dismiss the case a quo, which motion was sustained by the trial court and set aside by respondent court, both on the issue of prescription. That ruling of respondent court interpreting said provision was assigned as an error in the present petition. While the issue of the validity of the same provision was not squarely raised, it is ineluctably related to petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error since both issues are grounded on and refer to the very same provision.
4. De Luna vs. Abrigo Art 764 does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. Facts: Prudencio de Luna donated a parcel of land to the Luzonian Colleges, Inc., (now Luzonian University Foundation, Inc., herein referred to as the foundation). The donation, embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos was subject to certain terms and conditions and provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated property in case of violation or non- compliance The foundation failed to comply with the conditions of the donation. On April 9, 1971, Prudencio de Luna "revived" the said donation in favor of the foundation, in a document entitled "Revival of Donation Intervivos" (Annex "B" of Petition) subject to terms and conditions which among others, required: 3. That the DONEE shall construct at its own expense a Chapel, a Nursery and Kindergarten School, to be named after St. Veronica. As in the original deed of donation, the "Revival of Donation Intenrivos" also provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated area in case of violation of the conditions. The foundation, through its president, accepted the donation in the same document, subject to all the terms and conditions stated in the donation. Prudencio de Luna and the foundation executed a 'Deed of Segregation whereby the area donated was adjudicated to the foundation. herein petitioners, Evelyn, Rosalina, Prudencio, Jr., Willard, Antonio and Joselito, all surnamed de Luna, who claim to be the children and only heirs of the late Prudencio de Luna filed a complaint with the RTC alleging that the terms and conditions of the donation were not complied with by the foundation. Among others, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation and the reversion of the donated land to the heirs. respondent foundation claimed that it had partially and substantially complied with the conditions of the donation and that the donor has granted the foundation an indefinite extension of time to complete the construction of the Property Digests WEEK 16 Dela Torre, Manliclic, Pasquil| AMPIL Aika G. Manliclic 2D 4 chapel. It also invoked the affirmative defense of prescription of action and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. On the other hand, petitioners argue that Article 764 of the New Civil Code was adopted to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment of conditions when revocation of the donation has not been agreed upon by the parties. By way of contrast, when there is a stipulation agreed upon by the parties providing for revocation in case of non-compliance, no judicial action is necessary. It is then petitioners' claim that the action filed before the Court of First Instance of Quezon is not one for revocation of the donation under Article 764 of the New Civil Code which prescribes in four (4) years, but one to enforce a written contract which prescribes in ten (10) years. Issue: W/N the stipulation for automatic revocation of donation was valid W/N the action to revoke had prescribed Held: Yes. The stipulation is VALID No. The action has NOT prescribed Ratio: It is the finding of the trial court, which is not disputed by the parties, that the donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. It was made subject to the burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated property within five years from execution of the deed of donation. It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, it is Our opinion that said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar. Under Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, the parties to a contract have the right "to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." Paragraph 11 of the "Revival of Donation Intervivos, has provided that "violation of any of the conditions (herein) shall cause the automatic reversion of the donated area to the donor, his heirs, . . ., without the need of executing any other document for that purpose and without obligation on the part of the DONOR". Said stipulation not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding upon the foundation who voluntarily consented thereto. Judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the recession was proper. The trial court was therefore not correct in holding that the complaint in the case at bar is barred by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code because Article 764 does not apply to onerous donations. As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971, complaince with the terms and conditions of the contract of donation, shall be made within five (5) years from its execution. The complaint which was filed on September 23, 1980 was then well within the ten (10) year prescriptive period to enforce a written contract
5. CENTRAL PHIL UNIVERSITY vs. CA - If there has been no compliance with the resolutory condition, the donation may now be revoked and all rights which have been acquired under it shall be deemed lost and extinguished.
Facts: Sometime in 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., who was then a member of the Board of Trustees of the Central Philippine College (now Central Philippine University [CPU]), executed a deed of donation in favor of CPU of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3174-B-1, then a portion of Lot No. 3174-B, for which a TCT was issued in the name of the donee CPU with the following annotations copied from the deed of donation: 1. The land shall be utilized by the CPU exclusively for the establishment and use of a medical college 2. The said college shall not sell to any third party nor in any way encumber said land; 3. The said land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS", and the said college shall be under obligation to erect a cornerstone bearing that name. Any net income from the land shall be put in a fund to be known as the "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS FUND" to be used for improvements of said campus
In 1989, private respondents, who are the heirs of Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., filed an action for annulment of donation against CPU alleging that since 1939 up to present, CPU had not complied with the conditions of the donation. And that CPU had negotiated with NHA to exchange the property donated to the land owned by NHA
CPU avers that the Heirs of Ramon are barred by prescription
TC ruled that CPU failed to comply with the conditions of the donation and declared it null and void ordered CPU to execute a deed of reconveyance of the property in favor of the heirs of Don Ramon
Property Digests WEEK 16 Dela Torre, Manliclic, Pasquil| AMPIL Aika G. Manliclic 2D 5 CA ruled that the annotations at the back of CPUs certificate of title were resolutory conditions breach of which should terminate the rights of the donee thus making the donation revocable. However, CA found that that while the first condition mandated CPU to utilize the donated property for the establishment of a medical school, the donor did not fix a period within which the condition must be fulfilled, hence, until a period was fixed for the fulfillment of the condition, CPU could not be considered as having failed to comply with its part of the bargain. CA then remanded the case back to TC to fix a period
Issue: 1. Whether there is a resolutory condition? YES 2. Whether there is a need to fix the period? - NO
Held: TC ruling reinstated revoking the deed of donation and ordering CPU to reconvey the property to Heirs of Ramon. Heirs of Ramon won
Ratio: The donation is onerous when a donation imposes a burden equivalent to the value of the donation Don Ramon Lopez donated the subject parcel of land to CPU but imposed an obligation upon the latter to establish a medical college, thus it is onerous
1. Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed is a resolutory one If there was no fulfillment or compliance with the condition, such as the case at bar, the donation may be revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall be deemed lost and extinguished.
Prescription NOT applicable. Since the time within which the condition to build the medical college should be fulfilled depended upon the exclusive will of CPU, it has been held that its absolute acceptance and the acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed of donation were sufficient to prevent the prescription from running
2. The period of time for the establishment of a medical college and the necessary buildings and improvements on the property be quantified in a specific number of years because of the presence of several factors and circumstances involved in the erection of an educational institution, such as government laws and regulations pertaining to education, building requirements and property restrictions which are beyond the control of the donee. The general rule that a court can fix the period when the obligation provides for none is NOT applicable. Why? o More than 50 yrs has lapsed since the execution of the Deed of Donation and for CPU to comply with the condition, yet it failed to do so o To allow the court to fix a period would just delay the fulfillment of CPU of its obligation
Dissenting opinion (Davide) There is no conditional obligation to speak of in this case. Conditions in obligations is different from conditions in donations. Conditions in donations does not refer to uncertain events on which the birth or extinguishment of a juridical relation depends, but is used as charges imposed by the donor on the donee, which would characterize the donation as onerous
In the present case, the donation is onerous, but it is more properly called a "modal donation." A modal donation - one in which the donor imposes a prestation upon the donee. The establishment of the medical college as the condition of the donation is such prestation
The conditions imposed by the donor Don Ramon Lopez determines neither the existence nor the extinguishment of the obligations of the donor and the donee with respect to the donation. The conditions imposed by Don Ramon Lopez upon the donee are the very obligations of the donation to build the medical college and use the property for the purposes specified in the deed of donation. These obligations are unconditional, the fulfillment, performance, existence or extinguishment of which is NOT dependent on any future or uncertain event or past and unknown event
Re fixing of the period by the court: Since the donation is an onerous one, it is governed by the law on contracts (oblicon) and as such it has to comply with Art 1197 where courts have to fix a period
Prescription is APPLICABLE the mere fact that there is no time fixed as to when the conditions of the donation are to be fulfilled does NOT ipso facto mean that the statute of limitations will not apply anymore and the action to revoke the donation becomes imprescriptible Artt 764 provides that actions for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation o However, Art 764 does NOT apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. Property Digests WEEK 16 Dela Torre, Manliclic, Pasquil| AMPIL Aika G. Manliclic 2D 6 " In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar. The prescriptive period is ten years from the time the cause of action accrues, and that is, from the expiration of the time within which the donee must comply with the conditions/obligations of the donation. As to when this exactly is remains to be determined, and that is for the courts to do as reposed upon them by Article 1197.
6. PARKS vs. PROVINCE OF TARLAC -- The characteristic of a condition precedent is that the acquisition of the right is not effected while said condition is not complied with or is not deemed complied with. Meanwhile nothing is acquired and there is only an expectancy of right. Consequently, when a condition is imposed, the compliance of which cannot be effected except when the right is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a condition precedent.
FACTS Cirer and Hill owned a parcel of land. They donated this to the municipality of Tarlac, under certain conditions specified in a public document evidencing the donation. The donation was accepted by the municipal president on behalf of the municipal of Tarlac. The parcel thus donated was later registered in the name of the donee, the municipality of Tarlac.
Later, sellers sold this parcel to the herein plaintiff George L. Parks. Then, the municipality of Tarlac transferred the parcel to the Province of Tarlac which, by reason of this transfer, applied for and obtained the registration thereof in its name, the corresponding certificate of title having been issued to it.
The plaintiff, George L. Parks, alleging that the conditions of the donation had not been complied with and invoking the sale of this parcel of land made in his favor, brought this action against the Province of Tarlac, the municipality of Tarlac, sellers and prayed that he be declared the absolute owner entitled to the possession of this parcel, that the transfer of the same by the municipality of Tarlac to the Province of Tarlac be annulled, and the transfer certificate issued to the Province of Tarlac cancelled. The lower court dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE/HELD Whether Parks has a right of action in this case ! NONE ! Even supposing that causes existed for the revocation of this donation, still, it was necessary, in order to consider it revoked, either that the revocation had been consented to by the donee, the municipality of Tarlac, or that it had been judicially decreed. None of these circumstances existed when Concepcion Cirer and James Hill sold this parcel to the plaintiff. Consequently, when the sale was made Concepcion Cirer and James Hill were no longer the owners of this parcel and could not have sold it to the plaintiff, nor could the latter have acquired it from them. ! But the appellant contends that a condition precedent having been imposed in the donation and the same not having been complied with, the donation never became effective. We find no merit in this contention. The appellant refers to the condition imposed that one of the parcels donated was to be used absolutely and exclusively for the erection of a central school and the other for a public park, the work to commence in both cases within the period of six months from the date of the ratification by the partes of the document evidencing the donation. It is true that this condition has not been complied with. The allegation, however, that it is a condition precedent is erroneous. The characteristic of a condition precedent is that the acquisition of the right is not effected while said condition is not complied with or is not deemed complied with. Meanwhile nothing is acquired and there is only an expectancy of right. Consequently, when a condition is imposed, the compliance of which cannot be effected except when the right is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a condition precedent. In the present case the condition that a public school be erected and a public park made of the donated land, work on the same to commence within six months from the date of the ratification of the donation by the parties, could not be complied with except after giving effect to the donation. The donee could not do any work on the donated land if the donation had not really been effected, because it would be an invasion of another's title, for the land would have continued to belong to the donor so long as the condition imposed was not complied with. ! The appellant also contends that, in any event, the condition not having been complied with, even supposing that it was not a condition precedent but subsequent, the non-compliance thereof is sufficient cause for the revocation of the donation. This is correct. But the period for bringing an action for the revocation of the donation has prescribed. That this action is prescriptible, there is no doubt. There is no legal provision which excludes this class of action from the statute of limitations. And not only this, the law itself recognizes the prescriptibility of the action for the revocation of a donation, providing a special period of five years for the revocation by the subsequent birth of children (art. 646, Civil Code), and one year for the revocation by reason of ingratitude. If no special period is provided for the prescription of the action for revocation for noncompliance of the conditions of the donation (art. 647, Civil Code), it is because in this respect the donation is considered onerous and is governed by the law of contracts and the general rules of prescription. Under the law in force (sec. 43, Code of Civ. Proc.) the period of prescription of this class of action is ten years. The action for the revocation of the donation for this cause arose on April 19, 1911, that is six months after the ratification of the instrument of donation of October 18, 1910. The complaint in this action was presented July 5, 1924, more than ten years after this cause accrued. Property Digests WEEK 16 Dela Torre, Manliclic, Pasquil| AMPIL Aika G. Manliclic 2D 7 7. Austria-Magat vs. CA - The act of selling the subject property to petitioner herein CANNOT be considered as a valid act of revocation of the deed of donation for the reason that a formal case to revoke must be filed in court.
Facts: Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of five (5) children, namely, Rosario Austria, Consolacion Austria, herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat, Leonardo, and one of herein respondents, Florentino Lumubos. Leonardo died in a Japanese concentration camp at Tarlac during World War II. In 1953, Basilisa bought a parcel of residential land together which she donated to her children, Rosario, Consolacion, Apolinaria and Florentino. Basilisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject house and lot in favor of herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat for Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). As the result of the registration of that sale, (TCT for brevity) in the name of the donor was cancelled and in lieu thereof BWQ TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite City in favor of petitioner Apolinaria Austria- Magat. Herein respondents Teodora Carampot, Domingo Comia, and Ernesto Apolo (representing their deceased mother Consolacion Austria), Ricardo, Mamerto and Segunda, all surnamed Sumpelo (representing their deceased mother Rosario Austria) and Florentino Lumubos filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite an action, to annul the TCT in favor of Petitioner. Petitioner claims that in interpreting a document, the other relevant provisions therein must be read in conjunction with the rest. While the document indeed stated that the donation was irrevocable, that must be interpreted in the light of the provisions providing that the donation cannot be encumbered, alienated or sold by anyone, that the property donated shall remain in the possession of the donor while she is alive, and that the donation shall take effect only when she dies. Also, the petitioner claims that the donation is mortis causa for the reason that the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the donor, Basilisa Comerciante, showed such intention. Petitioner cites the testimony of Atty. Viniegra, who notarized the deed of donation, that it was the intent of the donor to maintain control over the property while she was alive According to the trial court, the donation is a donation mortis causa pursuant to Article 728 of the New Civil Code inasmuch as the same expressly provides that it would take effect upon the death of the donor; that the provision stating that the donor reserved the right to revoke the donation is a feature of a donation mortis causa which must comply with the formalities of a will; and that inasmuch as the donation did not follow the formalities pertaining to wills, the same is void and produced no effect whatsoever. Hence, the sale by the donor of the said property was valid since she remained to be the absolute owner thereof during the time of the said transaction. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed by the Court of Appeals Issue: W/N donation was inter vivos or mortis causa (pertinent!) W/ the donation was validly revoked Held: The donation was INTER VIVOS The revocation was NO VALIDLY done. Ratio: Issue 1: The donation was inter vivos because 1. The deed of donation provided that the donor will not dispose or take away the property donated. 2. An acceptance clause is found in the donation. An acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos
Issue 2: (pertinent) The act of selling the subject property to the petitioner herein cannot be considered as a valid act of revocation of the deed of donation for the reason that a formal case to revoke the donation must be filed pursuant to Article 764 of the Civil Code[19] which speaks of an action that has a prescriptive period of four (4) years from non-compliance with the condition stated in the deed of donation. The rule that there can be automatic revocation without benefit of a court action does not apply to the case at bar for the reason that the subject deed of donation is devoid of any provision providing for automatic revocation in event of non-compliance with the any of the conditions set forth therein. Thus, a court action is necessary to be filed within four (4) years from the non- compliance of the condition violated. As regards the ground of estoppel, the donor, Basilisa, cannot invoke the violation of the provision on the prohibition to encumber the subject property as a basis to revoke the donation thereof inasmuch as she acknowledged the validity of the mortgage executed by the donee, Consolacion Austria, when the said donor asked respondent Domingo Comia to redeem the same. Thereafter, the donor, Basilisa likewise asked respondent Florentino Lumubos and the petitioner herein to redeem the same.[20] Those acts implied that the donees have the right of control and naked title of ownership over the property considering that the donor, Basilisa condoned and acknowledged the validity of the mortgage executed by one of the donees, Consolacion Austria. Property Digests WEEK 16 Dela Torre, Manliclic, Pasquil| AMPIL Aika G. Manliclic 2D 8 8. EDUARTE vs. CA - All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation.
Facts: Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San Cristobal, San Pablo City, with an area of 12k sqm. On April 1984, he executed a deed entitled "Pagbibigay-Pala (Donacion InterVivos)" ceding one-half portion to his niece Helen S. Doria
On July 1984, another deed identically entitled was purportedly executed by Pedro Calapine ceding unto Helen S. Doria the whole of the parcel of land, on the basis of which said original certificate was cancelled and a TCT was issued in favor of Helen
In1986, Helen S. Doria donated a portion of 157sqm the parcel of land to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. A TCT was issued to the church and another to Helen covering the remaining portion of original 12ksqm lot.
In 1988, Helen S. Doria sold unto the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte the remaining parcel of land after the donation to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church except for about 700sqm where Helen built her house.
Claiming that his signature to the deed of donation was a forgery and that she was unworthy of his liberality, Pedro Calapine seeks to revoke the donation to Helen and declare null and void the deeds of donation and sale executed by Helen to the Calauan Church and Spouses Eduarte.
Spouses Eduared denied knowledge of the first deed of donation and alleged that after a part of the property was donated to Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc., the remaining portion thereof was sold to them by Helen S. Doria.
Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. manifested its willingness to reconvey to Pedro Calapine that part of the property donated to it by Helen S. Doria. And having executed the corresponding deed of reconveyance, the case as against it was dismissed
During the pendency of the case, Pedro died and was substituted by his nephews Alexander and Artemis Calapine.
TC held that the second deed of donation of Pedro to Helen was void and the subsequent sale to Spouses Eduarte also void. CA upheld and ruled that the signature of Pedro in the 2 nd deed was void. It also held that Spouses Eduarte are buyers in bad faith because they should have ascertained the ownership of the property in question because of a house w strong materials built on the land and fruit bearing trees found therein.
Issue: Whether Pedro can revoke the donation in favor of Helen? YES Whether Pedro/his nephew can get back the property? -NO
Held: 1. Yes, Helen Doria committed an act of ingratitude which is a valid ground for revocation of the donation 2. No. Spouses Eduarte are innocent purchases for value who got their title from a forged deed. Rights of an innocent purchaser for value must be respected and protected notwithstanding the fraud employed by the seller in securing his title
Ratio: 1. Pedro Calapine's signature in the second deed of donation to be a forgery after examination by NBI handwriting expert. By falsifying Pedro Calapine's signature, Helen Doria committed an act of ingratitude which is a valid ground for revocation of the donation made in her favor in accordance with Article 765.
Spouses Eduarte allege that Art 765 is not applicable to the case because it only mentions offenses against the property or person of the donor as the cause of revocation; and that forgery is a crime against public interest and not property or person, and thus is not a ground for revocaion
In Tolentino's Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, the book states that: All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation. Spouses Eduartes attempt to categorize the offenses according to their classification under the RPC is unwarranted considering that threats and coercion are considered as crimes against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against personal liberty and security under the RPC
2. Spouses Eduarte are buyers in good faith based on the doctrine that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title One such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate. When Spouses Eduarte purchased the subject property from Helen Doria, the same was already covered by by a new TCT under Helens name. And although Helen Doria's title was fraudulently secured, such fact cannot prejudice the rights of Spouses Eduarte absent any showing that they had any knowledge or participation in such irregularity. # they cannot be obliged to look beyond the certificate of title which appeared to be valid on its face the rights of an innocent purchaser for value must be respected and protected notwithstanding the fraud employed by the seller in securing his title
Proper recourse of the true owner of the property (Calapine) who was prejudiced and fraudulently dispossessed of the same is to bring an action for damages against Helen who caused or employed the fraud
Property Digests WEEK 16 Dela Torre, Manliclic, Pasquil| AMPIL Aika G. Manliclic 2D 9 9. NOCEDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS & DIRECTO The act of usurpation by the donee of the donors land is an act of ingratitude. The law does NOT require conviction in order to revoke the donation; only preponderance of evidence is needed in action to revoke.
An action for revocation based on ingratitude must be filed within 1 yr from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the donee.
Facts Directo (daughter), Noceda (grandson), and Arbizo (widow) of the late Celestino Arbizo, extrajudicially settled a parcel of land.
Directo donated a portion of his share to Noceda who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister. However, another extrajudicial partition was made on the same subject land by Directo, Noceda and Arbiso. 3/5 of the land went to the widow, and 1/5 each went to Directo and Noceda.
Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But 4 years after building this house, defendant Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied the three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused. Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda before the lower court. A relocation survey was conducted and it was shown that the area of the land in the later partition was smaller than the actual area of the subject property.
The RTC ruled that the deed of donation as revoked and upheld the validity of the later extrajudicial settlement partition. CA affirmed
ISSUE/HELD Whether the donation in this case is valid ! NO. The decision of the RTC and the CA is affirmed. The case is dismissed. ! The discrepancies between the extrajudicial settlements executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo on June 1, 1981 and August 17, 1981 only meant that the latter was intended to supersede the former. The signature of defendant Noceda in the extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 would show his conformity to the new apportionment of Lot 1121 among the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo. The fact that defendant Noceda occupied the portion allotted to him in the extrajudicial settlement, as well as the donated portion of the share of plaintiff Directo, presupposes his knowledge of the extent of boundaries of the portion of Lot 1121 allotted to him. Moreover, the statement in the extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 with respect to the area of Lot 1121, which was 29,845 square meters, is not conclusive because it was found out, after the relocation survey was conducted on Lot 1121, that the parties therein occupied an area larger than what they were supposed to possess per the extrajudicial settlement- partition of August 17, 1981. ! Although in the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981 the heirs of Celestino Arbizo partitioned only a 29,845 square meter lot to conform with the area declared under tax declaration 16-0032 yet the heirs were each actually occupying a bigger portion the total area of which exceeded 29,845 square meters. This was confirmed by Geodetic Engineer Quejada in his report submitted to the trial court where he stated among other things: o 7. that upon computation of actual survey, it is informed (sic) that the area dated (sic) as per extrajudicial settlement- partition in the name of Celestino Arbizo was smaller than the computed lots of their actual occupancy as per survey on the ground; o 8. The Lot A, Lot B, and Lot C as appearing on prepared plan for ready reference was subdivided, base (sic) on stated sharing as per EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT-PARTITION base (sic) on actual occupancy. ! The survey conducted on Lot 1121 was only a confirmation of the actual areas being occupied by the heirs taking into account the percentage proportion adjudicated to each heir on the basis of their August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement. ! Petitioner further alleges that the said partition tries to vest in favor of a third person, Maria Arbizo, a right over the said property notwithstanding the absence of evidence establishing that she is an heir of the late Celestino Arbizo since Maria Arbizo was never impleaded as a party in this case and her interest over Lot 1121 was not established. ! Such contention deserves scant consideration. We find no compelling basis to disturb the finding of the trial court on this factual issue, as follows: o In effect, the defendant denies the allegation of the plaintiff that Maria Arbizo was the third wife of Celestino Arbizo and Agripina is her half sister with a common father. On this point, the Court believes the version of the plaintiff. The Court observes that in the Extra-Judicial Settlement- Partition(Exhibit C), Maria Arbizo is named one of the co- heirs of the defendant, being the widow of his grandfather, Celestino Arbizo. The names of Anacleto and Agripina do not also appear in the Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition because according to the plaintiff, they had sold their shares to Maria Arbizo. And the defendant is one of the signatories to the said Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement-Partition acknowledged before Notary Public Artemio Maranon. Under the circumstances, the Court is convinced that the defendant knew that Maria Arbizo was the widow of Celestino Arbizo and he knew of the sale of the share of Anacleto Arbizo his share, as well as that of Agripina. When the defendant signed the Extra-Judicial Settlement, he was already an adult Property Digests WEEK 16 Dela Torre, Manliclic, Pasquil| AMPIL Aika G. Manliclic 2D 10 since when he testified in 1989, he gave his age as 50 years old. So that in 1981, he was already 41 years old. If he did not know all of these, the defendant would have not agreed to the sharing and signed this document and acknowledged it before the Notary Public. And who could have a better knowledge of the relationship of Agripina and Maria Arbizo to Celestino Arbizo than the latters daughter? Besides, at the time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement- Partition by the plaintiff and defendant, they were still in good terms. There was no reason for the plaintiff to favor Maria Arbizo and Agripina Arbizo over the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant had failed to support his allegation that when his grandfather died he had no wife and child. ! We likewise find unmeritorious petitioners claim that there exist no factual and legal basis for the adjudication of Lot C of Lot 1121 to private respondent Aurora Directo. It bears stress that the relocation survey plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Quejada was based on the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981, and the actual possession by the parties and the technical description of Lot 1121. It was established by the survey plan that based on the actual possession of the parties, and the extrajudicial settlement among the heirs the portion denominated as Lot C of Lot 1121 of the survey plan was being occupied by private respondent Aurora Directo and it was also shown that it is in Lot C where the 625 square meter area donated by private respondent Directo to petitioner is located. There is no obstacle to adjudicate Lot C to private respondent as her rightful share allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement. ! In this case the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate succession. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interest of each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. And one way of effecting a partition of the decedents estate is by the heirs themselves extrajudicially. The heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo namely Maria Arbizo, Aurora A. Directo (private respondent) and Rodolfo Noceda (petitioner) entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate on August 17, 1981 and agreed to adjudicate among themselves the property left by their predecessor-in-interest in the following manner: o To Rodolfo Noceda goes the northern one-fifth (1/5) portion containing an area of 5,989 sq. meters; o To Maria Arbizo goes the middle three-fifths (3/5) portion; o and To Aurora Arbizo goes the southern one-fifth (1/5) portion. ! We also find unmeritorious petitioners argument that since there was no effective and real partition of the subject lot there exists no basis for the charge of usurpation and hence there is also no basis for finding ingratitude against him. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioners act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo without the latters knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation. ! Finally, petitioner contends that granting revocation is proper, the right to enforce the same had already prescribed since as admitted by private respondent, petitioner usurped her property in the first week of September 1985 while the complaint for revocation was filed on September 16, 1986, thus more than one (1) year had passed from the alleged usurpation by petitioner of private respondents share in Lot 1121. We are not persuaded. The respondent Court rejected such argument in this wise: o Article 769 of the New Civil Code states that: The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This action prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action. As expressly stated, the donor must file the action to revoke his donation within one year from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the donee. Also, it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to institute the said action within the same period. The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by defendant Noceda in order to bar the present action. Defendant Noceda failed to do so. He reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation of the property of plaintiff Directo in the first week of September, 1985, and not from the time the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation. Moreover, defendant Noceda failed to prove that at the time plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an action for revocation of her donation. o The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the action. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one (1) year period for bringing the action be considered to have already prescribed. Property Digests WEEK 16 Dela Torre, Manliclic, Pasquil| AMPIL Aika G. Manliclic 2D 11 o No competent proof was adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation. In Civil Cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
10. Imperial vs. CA The 10 year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations required under Art 771, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs which shall be reckoned from the death of the donor-decedent. Facts: Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 45. Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the contract's designation as one of "Absolute Sale", the transaction was in fact a donation. arely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein into signing the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement, approved by the Court of First Instance of Albay under which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter portion of the donated land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of Leoncio's death, it was agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial costs. ending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-mentioned case, and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. On March 15, 1962, the motion for execution was duly granted. Fifteen years thereafter, Victor died single and without issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four years hence, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon. Five years thereafter Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of the donation with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. esar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same case, Civil Case No. 7646, for "Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession" with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, seeking the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting the above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the amended complaint, it was alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue advantage of the latter's physical weakness and mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired the legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest. In his Answer, petitioner: (1) alleged that Leoncio had conveyed sufficient property to Victor to cover his legitime, consisting of 563 hectares of agricultural land in Manito, Albay; (2) reiterated the defense of res judicata, and (3) raised the additional defenses of prescription and laches. The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime of Victor, on the basis of its finding that at the time of Leoncio's death, he left no property other than the 32,837-square meter parcel of land which he had donated to petitioner. The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years under Article 1141 of the Civil Code 7 , reckoned from when the writ of execution of the compromise judgment in Civil Case 1177 was issued, and that the original complaint having been filed in 1986, the action has not yet prescribed. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
Issue: W/N action to declare donation inofficous had prescribed W/N there was res judicata No
Held: Yes. The action had prescribed
Ratio: Having ascertained this action as one for reduction of an inofficious donation, we cannot sustain the holding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the applicable prescriptive period is thirty years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code. The sense of both courts that this case is a "real action over an immovable" allots undue credence to private respondents' description of their complaint, as one for "Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of Property", which suggests the action to be, in part, a real action enforced by those with claim of title over the disputed land.1wphi1.nt What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an inofficious donation? The Civil Code specifies the following instances of reduction or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; 16 (2) four years, for non- compliance with conditions of the donation; 17 and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their support. 18 Interestingly, donations as Property Digests WEEK 16 Dela Torre, Manliclic, Pasquil| AMPIL Aika G. Manliclic 2D 12 in the instant case, 19 the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs. From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined. It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed.
11. RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ - Object and cause are two separate elements of a donation and the illegality of either element gives rise to the application of the doctrine of pari delicto. Object is the subject matter of the donation, while cause is the essential reason which moves the parties to enter into the transaction.
Facts: **petitioner and respondent are father and daughter!
Potenciano Ramirez filed a complaint against respondent Ma. Cecilia Ramirez for annulment of: 1) a Deed of Donation; 2) Waiver of Possessory Rights; 3) 2 Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Potenciano claimed that Cecilia caused the execution of the Deed of Donation and Waiver of Possessory Rights to acquire ownership over the land and improvements then covered the 2 TCTs. Using the Deed of Donation, Cecilia allegedly succeeded in having the 2 TCTs cancelled and replace a new one in her name. Furthermore, Potenciano alleged that with the Waiver of Possessory Rights, Cecilia was able to cause the Office of the City Assessor to transfer to her name the tax declarations on the improvements in the land.
The Deed of Donation and Waiver of Possessory Rights were allegedly executed by Potenciano and his wife, Dolores Ramirez, in 1993 and 1995, respectively. However, the death certificate presented showed that Dolores died in 1991 and, consequently, could not have executed the assailed documents. Potenciano repudiated the other signatures appearing on the two documents that were purportedly his and insisted that he did not intend to transfer the properties to Cecilia
In her Answer, Cecilia alleged that her father, Potenciano, would not have filed the case were it not for the fact that he remarried despite his age of 84 years. She further claimed that it was her fathers idea to cause the preparation of the Deed of Donation and Waiver of Possessory Rights to save on expenses for publication and inheritance taxes.
TC ruled that the signature of Dolores on the Deed of Donation was a forgery while her signature on the Waiver of Possessory Rights was genuine. It also found Potencianos signatures on both documents to be genuine. It then held Potenciano (petitioner) and Cecilia (respondent) are in pari delicto, as participants to the forgery, and ruled that they must bear the consequences of their acts without cause of action against each other in accordance with Article 1412 of the Civil Code. RTC then dismissed the complaint. CA upheld ruling
Issue: Whether Potenciano and Cecilia are in pari delicto? - YES
Held: Petition denied
Ratio: As one of the modes of acquiring ownership, donations are governed by Title 3, Book III, of the Civil Code. Donations inter vivos are additionally governed by the general provisions on obligations and contracts in all that is not determined by the title governing donations.
Hence, the rule on pari delicto under the general provisions of contracts is applicable to the present case.
Potenciano alleged that the signatures of Dolores on the Deed of Donation and on the Waiver of Possessory Rights are a forgery. Cecilia does not deny this allegation. Forging a persons signature corresponds to the felony of falsification under Section 4, Title IV of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the act of forging Doloress signature constitutes a criminal offense under the terms of Article 1411 of the Civil Code.
ARTICLE 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted.
Under this article, it must be shown that the nullity of the contract proceeds from: 1. an illegal cause or object 2. the act of executing said contract constitutes a criminal offense. # The second requirement has already been discussed and is found to be present.
Potencianos claims that the "object or cause" of the Deed of Donation and of the Waiver of Possessory Rights is the transferred real properties and that the Property Digests WEEK 16 Dela Torre, Manliclic, Pasquil| AMPIL Aika G. Manliclic 2D 13 illegality stems from the act of forgery which pertains to consent, which is not material to the application of Article 1411. # WRONG! Object and cause are two separate elements of a donation and the illegality of either element gives rise to the application of the doctrine of pari delicto. Object is the subject matter of the donation, while cause is the essential reason which moves the parties to enter into the transaction. Potenciano wrongly asserts that the donated real properties are both the object and cause of the donation. In fact, the donated properties pertain only to the object. Therefore, while he is correct in stating that the object of the donation is legal, his argument misses the point insofar as the cause is concerned. o The cause which moved the parties to execute the Deed of Donation and the Waiver of Possessory Rights, the motive behind the forgery, is the desire to evade the payment of publication expenses and inheritance taxes, which became due upon the death of Dolores.
Undeniably, the Deed of Donation and the Waiver of Possessory Rights were executed for an illegal cause, thus completing all the requisites for the application of Article 1411.