0 11rlt/ rr

HUMANTES PRESS NTERNATONA], NC.

Atlantic Highlands, N|
First published IV In the Lmted tates ot America by
Humanities Press International, Inc., Atlantic Highlands, NJ 07716
91988 Humanities Press International, Inc.
Library of Congess Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Murray, Patrick, 1948-
Marx's theory of scientific knowledge.
Bibliography: p.
. Marx, Kari, 1818-1883. 2. Science-Philosophy
History-19th century. 3. Economics-History-
19th century. I. Title.
B3305.M74M84 1988 335.4'11 86-3052
ISBN 0-391-03371-9
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or
transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission.
MANl ACJlKL IN JHL lNIJL SJAJLS AMLKICA

Iscos 6slltas,{srMca;Rcssas

Conlenls
Acknowlcdgmcnts

71
Introduction

7111
Part One: Marx's Critique of Philosophy
Introduction 8
Division I Deciding to Pursue Science
Introduction
7
Chaptcr 1 Marx's octoral isscrtation. Proj ccting a
Post-Hcgclian 'Wisscnschal
Division II Breaking with Hegel
9
Introduction 25
Chaptcr 2 'Lxpcrimcntum Crucis' in]udging Hcgcl's
Spcculativc Scicncc
Chaptcr8 Jhc Paris Manuscripts: Political Lconomy and
thc Critiquc oHcgcl's Absolutc Idcalism
Division III
Introduction
Chaptcr1
Chaptcr5
Marx "Settles His Accounts" with German
Science
Snarcd in Hcgcl' s Logic. Baucr, Stirncr, and
thc Jruc Socialists
Historical Matcrialism. An Altcrnativc to
Idcalism' s iscmbodying oHistory

Il!
57
59
G7

VU!
Chaptcr G
Division IV
Introduction
Chaptcr 7
CONTENTS
Scicntinc Knowlcdgc, Practical Philosophics,
and Practicc
Marx's Shifting Focus: From Philosophy to
Political Economy
Proudhon' s]umblingoHcgcl and Kicardo
Part Two: Marx's Critique of Political Economy
Introduction
Division V
Introduction
Chaptcr 8
Chaptcr 9
Chaptcr l O
Chaptcr11
Division VI
Introduction
Chaptcr l 2
Chaptcr l 8
Chaptcr l 1
Chaptcr l 5
Marx's Mature Methodological Writings
Why id Marx Writc so Littlc on Mcthod?
Marx's Logically Wcll-BrcdLmpiricism
Marx' sistinction bctwccn Ccncral and
ctcrminatc Abstractions
Marx's Critiquc othcClassical
Lsscncc-Appcarancc Modcl and Its
Political-Lconomic Lmploymcnt
Marx's Mature Scientifc Practice: Ca/a! I,
Chapters +
Bcginning Marx's Critiquc oPolitical
Lconomy. JhcCommodity
Marx's JhcoryoValuc
Marx's Jhcory oMoncy
Capital's Logical and Lpochal Brcakwith
Simplc Commodity Circulation
79
87
89
l O8
l O7
l O9
l l 8
l 2l
l 8l
l 89
l 1l
l 17
l G8
l 77
Division VII The Theo-Iogical, Political, and Philosophical
Signifcance of Capitalist Economic Forms
Introduction l 89
Chaptcr l G Jhc Jhco-Logics oMoncy and Capital l 9l
Chaptcr l 7
Chaptcr l 8
Chaptcr l 9
Abbrcviations
Notcs
CONTENTS
Jhc Political ContcntoCapitalist
Lconomic orms
JhcKccollcction oMarx's Critiquc o
Philosophy in Capital
Conclusion. Jhc istinctivcncss oMarx's
JhcoryoScicntifc Knowlcdgc
Sclcctcd Bibliography
Sccondary Publications
Indcx

IX
l 95
2O9
22l
288
285
2G5
2G7
27l
Achnouledgmenls
n thc long coursc o prcparing this book, I havc bccn hclpcd and
supportcd by many pcrsons and institutions . or sparking my intcrcstin
Marx and criticalthcory, I amindcbtcdtoPaulPicconc. Jhc hrst pcriod
o sustaincd rcscarch or this book was undcrtakcn in rankurt, Wcst
Ccrmany, in l 975l 97G and was madc possiblc by a cllowship rom thc
Ccrman Acadcmic Lxchangc Scrvicc or AA) . I am gratcul to thc
Kopavicommunityoritscarcand supportduringtwoycarsowritingin
St. Louis. I apprcciatc thc criticisms and cncouragcmcnt o6crcd by thc
mcmbcrs o my disscrtation committcc at St. Louis lnivcrsity, ]amcs
Collins, Kichard Blackwcll, and]amcs Marsh. Jhcrc is noaccountingI
can givc owhat I owc Procssor Collins.
A numbcropcrsons rcad parts orallothc hrstdrat othis bookand
o6crcd criticisms and a good dcal o cncouragcmcnt. Among thcm, I
would likc to thank Jhomas crguson, ]ohn uggan, Michacl Slattcry,
andPaulMattick, ]r. , ormanyhcartcningwords.]oscph' Mallcymadc
many valuablc critical commcnts. anicl ahlstrom gavc thc hrst part
closc scrutiny and orccd mc to cxcrcisc morc carc in my discussion o
Hcgcl. Jhiswasalsoaconscqucnccothccxtrcmclycarculrcadingothc
manuscript by Pctcr uss, to whom I am dccply gratcul. I suspcct
ncithcrhc norahlstromwillbcsatishcdwith thctrcatmcnto
my rcading o Marx, but I hopc that I havc gaincd somc ground

,,

-
spcctymg thc complcx rclattonshtp bctwccn Hcgcl and Marx. Kobcrt

Cohcn gcncrously took an carly intcrcst in my work on this book. I
gratcul or his support and suggcstions. uring thc summcr o l 98O,
was awardcd a short-tcrm rcscarch grant rom thc Ccrman Acadcmic
Lxchangc Scrvicc to pursuc work on this book in rankurt again. I was
ablc to discuss thc hrstdral with thrcc omy ormcr tcachcrs, Kdigcr
Bubncr, Hcrbcrt Schnadclbach, and ]rgcn Kitscrt, as wcll as with
Albrccht Wcllmcr. ur convcrsations lcd to a numbcr o corrcctions,
clarihcations, and shils in pcrspcctivc, I apprcciatc thcir intcrcst and
c6orts.orthcirhnancial supportandwarmcncouragcmcnt, Iwouldlikc
to thank Kichard Andrcws, can o thc Craduatc School at Crcighton

Xl! ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Lnivcrsity, and William . Cunningham, jr. , canothcCollcgcoArts
and Scicnccs at Crcighton Lnivcrsity. Mrs. Kuth Southcrn, Cina Haus-
mann, and arlis Vaublc put in longhours at thc painstaking worko
typingvcrsions othc book, I apprcciatc all thcirlabors.
Sinccwc mct in rankurtin l 975, Moishc Postoncand I havc carricd
onancxtcndcd convcrsation onMarxandcritical thcory. Jhis bookowcs
muchto him and to ourconvcrsation. I look orward to its continuation.
Abovc all, I wantto thank mywic, jcannc Schulcr, or hcr imagination,
hcrpaticntcducationomywriting,orsomanywalks andconvcrsations,
andorhcrricndship andlovcthroughallthcycars owritingthisbook.
\
nlroduclion
anysparks havc Hown ovcr it, but thc issucoscicntihcknowlcdgc
in Marxhaslcd tocw carcul studics. ordccadcs partisans insistcd on
thc scicntihc charactcr oMarx's work, opponcnts mct that claim with
dcrision. Ironically, both partics to this cold war agrccd on a positivist
vicw oscicncc, and both assumcd as much o Marx. Whilc thc sym-
pathizcrshcldMarxupasaparadigmopositivism,thccriticsconsidcrcd
him an impostor, thc author o a mishmash o hal-bakcd cconomics,
Hcgclian philosophy, and moralism. Ncithcr sidc was prcparcd or thc
possibility thatMarxwould challcngc its own prcconccptions conccrning
thc naturc oscicntihc knowlcdgc.
AsprcviouslyunknownworksoMarx abovcall,thcParis Manuscripts
( 1 844) bccamc availablc, rcintcrprctations cmcrgcd, and thc issuc bc-
camc morc complicatcd. A kindodctcntc was achicvcd by splitting thc
imagc oMarx. thc hard-noscd scicntist was thc 'latc Marx', thc 'carly
Marx' was a humanist worthy o praisc or uncovcring alicnation in
capitalist socictics. Jhis biurcation allowcd libcralizcrs in Communist
countrics and Ncw Lclists clscwhcrc to scizc upon a palatablc 'carly
Marx,' whilc putting thc scicntihc 'latc Marx' on thc shcl Kobcrt
Juckcrcxprcsscdthcattitudccharactcristicothisapproach. "Capital . @

@
is an intcllcctual muscum-piccc or us now, whcrcas thc sixtccn-
manuscripto1 844 onthcuturcoacsthctics,whichhcprobablywro
a day and ncvcr cvcn saw ht to publish, contains much that is
signihcant.
, ,

Sinccthc latc sixtics, this bcnignncglcctothcscicntihcMarxhas

challcngcd by scholarly and political dcvclopmcnts. Continuing rcscarch

aidcd by acccss to thc Grundrisse qucstioncd thc tcxtual basis or thc

biurcation. Jhis madc it hardcr or admircrs o Marx's humanism to
shrugo6his scicntihc conccrns . As thcNcw Lclragmcntcd, arcvivalo
morc traditional Marxist groups pushcd thc scicntihc Marx to thc orc-
ground again. Jhis rcvival, along with thc practiccs othc Communist
countrics, undcrcut thc rapprochcmcnt with Marx. Ncw Lclists grcw
uncasy with Marx. Many bcgan to suspcct that whatthcy oncc thought
was onlya badspotwasinactindicativcoabadapplc. Suchsuspicions
. # #
Xlll

XlV INTRODUCTION
brought on a new rush o|interpretationsinwhich Marx`sinsistence on
scientinc thinking signined a |undamenta| contradiction in his work,
whichundercuthishumanism. Butthisnewdisi||usionmentwith Marx
restedontheo|dpremisethatheembracedgenericpositivism.AsChar|es
Tay|orputit. ThatMarx|ookedonCapital asaworko|science,andthat
theterm's

ience`cametoha

e|orhimverymuchthesenset

tithad|or
the|aternmeteenth centurym genera|, seems to mecorrect. 4
The debate over Marx and science, then, has been |ramed by the
comp|acentudgmentthat,whetherornotMarxwasagoodpractitioner
' o| science, he, too, adopted the positivist standard. What has been
over|ookedisthatthemeaningo| science' isnotunivoca||ypositivist-
ndeed, thatmeaning has |a||en on hard times and that Marx did not
I
ust adopt atheoryo| science that was ready to hand, he worked out a
istinctive view which constituted an ear|y rejection o| positivism. We
sha|| see how Marx`s theory o| scientinc know|edge anticipated many
'present critiques o|positivismin thatit l ) cha||enged the 'va|ue-|ree
,aura o| science and incorporated reection on the re|ationsnip between
jtheory and practice into the constitution o| science, 2) recognized a
dia|ectico|concept andfact andpaidc|oseattentiontothe|ogicandcontent
,|scientinc categories I wi|| ca|| this Marx`s 'empiricism in second
ntension and 8) thematized the subjective constitution o| scientinc
teoriespursuingtheirhistoricityandtheir|inksto|ogicso|practica||i|e
eenintothebasicstructuringso|scientinctheories.
Over recent decades, phi|osophers o| science |arge|y ignoring Marx-
'
'have ca||ed positivismintoquestion. Their dismant|ingo||ogica|empir-
lclsm in handwithThomas Kuhn`sbook The Structure Scientifc Revolu
l
tions, has provoked what might be ca||ed a rationa|ity crisis. The

,hermeneutica| re|ativism espoused by Richard Rorty in his wide|y read

{
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature indicatesthedeptho|thatcrisis.A|au|t
,|ine in this upheava|, one noted by Kuhn, concerns the capacity o|

positlvismtocopewiththeactua|ities o|scienceasahistorica|phenome-

non.
The searcn |or non-P|atonist mode|s o| science, mode|s in which
)istory and reason are not segregated, has|ed a |ew phi|osopherstoan
nterestinthehistorica||yminded Hege|andMarx.Thepromiseo|this
newdirectioninthephi|osophyo|sciencewasanimportantconsideration
behind my research |or this book. My purpose, however, isnotto enter
direct|yinto contemporarydebatesonthenatureo|scientincknow|edge
but rather to provide a sound basis |or the appropriation o| Marx by
phi|osopherso|science.
1hrougna c|ose, textua| study in|ormed by tneongoingtradition o|
|critica| theory, I show tba(the |ong-standing wisdom according to
'
I

INTRODUCTION xv
which Marx was a gardcn-varicty positivist is incorrcct. Sincc Marx`s
conccrn or scicntihc knowlcdgc was liclong, thc ncat division oMarx
nto humanist and sccntist ails . But my rcading also challcngcs thc
rcccntauthorswhoconsidcrMarx'spcrvasivcintcrcstinscicncca pcrvcr-

sion ohis humanism. Actually, Marx's humanism and his dcdication to

s ccncc workcd on onc anothcr, as did his studics oHcgcl and Kicardo.
Jhc rcsult was an original thcory oscicntibc knowlcdgc that cxplicitly
incorporatcshumanistcvalucs, which wcrc carcully scrutinizcdor thcir

spccibc social contcnt. Marx strovc or objcctivity not by dogmatically

asscrting thc indcpcndcncc oscicncc rom history but by cxposing thc,
various ways in which scicncc is cmbroilcd in socicty.
'
+ + +
Marx carly bcgan to pondcr thc naturc o scicntihc knowlcdgc, and
workcditintohiscritiqucsorcligion,philosophy,politicalcconomy, and
politics. Conscqucntly,thcintcrcstothis booksprcadsbcyondits ccntral
topic to qucstions conccrning Marx'srcccptionocucrbach's critiquco
rcligion, Marx's rcading omodcrn philosophcrs, cspccially Hcgcl, his
thcorics o valuc and surplus-valuc, his critiquc o libcral politics and
rcnch and Ccrmansocialism,and,bnally, thcdcvclopmcntand unityo
his thought.
Marx's advocacy oscicntihc thinking appcarcd alrcady at agc ninc-
tccn, whcnhcwrotctohisathcrohisconvcrsiontoHcgcl'sthoughtand
his abandonmcnt o an attcmptcd scicncc o law along Kantian lincs.
nlyacwycarslatcr ( 1 841 ) , in hisdisscrtationandnotcs,Marxbcganto
suspcctHcgcl'sprinciplcs and criticizcd thc Young Hcgclians ormaking
cxtcrnal, moralistic rathcr than immancnt, s cicntihc criticisms oHcgcl

In thc Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" ( 1 843) , Marx wcnt

suspicion to analyzc thc scicntihcshortcomingsoHcgcl's lastpu
work and his philosophy as a wholc. Marx continucd to ormulac-
criticismoJcgclinthcParis Manuscripts ( 1 844) andapplicditinthc
popular and polcmicalworks on thc Young Hcgclians ( The Ho(y
1 845, and The German Ideology
,
1 846) and on Proudhon ( The Poverfy
Philosophy
,
1 847) . A lcttcr to Lcskc documcnts thc importancc Marx
placcd on thcsc carly c6orts to dcvclop a thcory oscicntibc knowlcdgc:
'It sccmcd to mc vcryimportant tosend in advance othcpositive dcvclop-
mcnt, a polcmicalwriting against Ccrman philosophy and German social
ism up to now. Jhis is ncccssary in ordcr to prcparc thc public or thc
standpointomy 'Lconomy,'whichpositionsitscloppositcthcprcccding
Ccrman scicncc.

' Marx's 'Lconomy' book did not appcar or ovcr
twcnty ycars. But thc thcory oscicncc opcrativc in Capital sprang rom

X0l
INTRODUCTION
thosc carly critiqucs othc Young Hcgclians, Proudhon, and, abovc all,
Hcgcl.
Much o thc n rst part o this book and no small portion o thc
sccond is dcvotcd to cxamining Marx's rclationship to Hcgcl. Jhat
Hcgcl should bgurc so promincntly in a work on Marx's thcory o
scicntin cknowlcdgcmay sccmodd.Howcvcr, Marx trcatcd Hcgclnotas
a 'dcad dog' but as thc dircct anccstor ohis own thcory oscicntinc
knowlcdgc. ctcrminingprcciscly Marx's dcbts to Hcgcl, as wcll as his
dincrcnccswithhim, isamajorpartothcworkinvolvcdincvaluatingthc
distinctivcncssoMarx'snonpositivistconccptionoscicntibcknowlcdgc.
What drcw Marx to Hcgcl's idca oscicncc wcrc its immancncc, its
attcntiontothclogicothcorics, anditshistoricalscnsc. Indccd,itwasin
thcsc tcrms that Marx dcvclopcd his critiquc o Hcgcl. Jhc notion o
immancncc borc multiplc mcanings, it mcant that scicntibc progrcss
rcquircdintcrnalcriticism,anditdcmandcdthatconccptsbcgroundcdin
thcirsubjcctmattcr. InhisanalysisothcPhilosophy oJRight, Marxaultcd
Hcgcl or imposing prcabricatcd catcgorics on his subjcct mattcr

civil
socicty and thcstatc. With considcrablchclprom cucrbach and with a
sharp cyc or thc logic oa thcory, Marx conncctcd that lack oimma-
ncncc to a undamcntalinvcrsion in Hcgcl's philosophy. Hcgcl putlogic
bcorc cxpcricncc. In Marx's judgmcnt, Hcgcl cll victim to thc samc
Lnlightcnmcntsyndromc trcatingabstractions as actualitics whichhc
himscl had traccd through modcrn philosophy. Lnlikc thc woodcn
constructs ocscartcs mattcr) , Spinoza substancc) , and Kant things
in thcmsclvcs) , Hcgcl'slogical Idca wascndowcdwithlic and subjcctiv-
ity, a Pinocchio among thcsc thought-things. ButMarxrcalizcd that this
invcrsion rchcctcd thchistorical invcrsion olic undcr capitalism, whcrc
thc animatcd abstraction capital assumcd priority ovcr naturc and hu-
manity. Marx thus linkcd Hcgcl's philosophy to thc dccp structurcs o
capitalism, much as hc latcr linkcd political cconomic thcorics to thosc
dccp structurcs.
Marx'scritiqucoabsolutcidcalismurthcrinvolvcdarcturntocpistc-
mology, an cmphatic distinction bctwccn gcncral and dctcrminatc ab-
stractions, and a ncw undcrstanding othc logic ocsscncc. Jhcsc thrcc
movcs involvcd a rccovcry o ccrtain Kantian thcmcs . Jhc rcturn to
cpistcmology is pcrhaps clcarcst in thc introduction to thc Grundrisse,
whcrc Marx took Hcgcl to task or idcntiying proccsscs othoughtwith
rcalproccsscs . !or Marx, thinkingis oncomanyways in whichhumans
appropriatc anindcpcndcntlycxistingworld, and itsstructurcshould bc
cxamincd,notsimplyoistcd upon thcrcal world. Marx's uscogcncral
abstractions, suchas thc catcgory o usc-valuc or thcabor proccss in
gcncral, shows that hc was not an absolutc historicist. His naturalism
'
# .
INTRODUCTION

rccognizcd somcconstants in lic. As hc put it in thc Gennan Ieolog, his

approach,unlikc thcCcrman, procssorial scicncc, was not 'prcsupposi-
tionlcss. ' Such constants as thc human nccd to supply thc mcans o
matcrialsubsistcncccntcrintoscicnccas gcncralabstractionsandplay a
ncccssary, though vcry limitcd, rolc.
Marx has a lcss optimistic undcrstanding othc logic ocsscncc than
docs Hcgc| orHcgclcsscnccmustappcaras somcthingothcrthanitscl,
itslogicr oncoopposition,butnotantinomy, U in Kant.Jhcopposition
can achicvc rcconciliation through thc mcdiation o a third party. or
cxamplc, thc statc rcconcilcs thc oppositions within civil socicty. or
Marx thcvcryoppositionocsscnccandappcaranccnccdstobcuprootcd,
notmcdiatcd.Jhus, Marxcallsorrcvolutionizingcivilsocictyto putan
cndtoitsantagonisms.Jhirdpartics,suchashcavcn,thcstatc,ormoncy,
signal submcrgcd conhict, not achicvcd harmony. Marx's proposal to
rcvolutionizc civil socicty nccds to bc rccxamincd today, whcn c6orts to
climinatcsocialantagonismshavcgcncrallytakcn totalitarianorms. Jhis
rccxamination must, in turn, raisc qucstions conccrning thc logic that
undcrlics sucha radical proposa|
Marx's thrcc movcs awayromabsolutcidcalismrccurin hiscritiquco
political cconomy, which is cxamincd in thc sccond part ohis book. As
Marxmadc clcarin his 'NotcsonWagncr,'his dccision to bcgin Capital
with somcthing actual rathcr than a hypostatizcd abstraction, thc com-
modity rathcr than thc conccpt ovaluc, nowcd rom his rcjcction oa
'post-cpistcmological'idcalism. Marxdid notwishtoapc thcidcalistsby
prcscnting capitalism as thc unolding osomc ctcrnal conccpt, rathcr
than a historically dctcrminatc orm o socicty dominatcd by abstract
ormssuch as valuc and capita| istinctions bctwccngcncraland dctcr-
minatc abstractions, or cxamplc, usc-valucand cxchangc-valuc,providc
a structuring clcmcntoCapital and lay thc basis or Marx's

` '
cconomists who 'naturalizc' spccihc social orms. Marx's grasp ol
logic o csscncc opcncd up thc two most innovativc
. .

`
Capital: thc analysis o thc valuc-orm and thc thcory os
' '
Bccausc Marx rccognizcd that essence must appcar as something other . _
`

itseU; hc rcalizcd, unlikc Kicardo, that valuc must appcar as

othcr than itscll, namcly, moncy, and that surplus-valuc and thc ratcol
surplus-valuc could not bc idcntihcd with proht and thc ratc opront.
Suggcstions that Hcgcl only got in thc way oMarx's cconomic thought
clcarlyallwidcothcmark. Jhconlyway toollow Marx's trcatmcnto
political cconomy is to pay closc attcntion to his undcrlying thcory o
scicncc, which was shapcd largcly by thc cncountcrwith Hcgcl.

Jo apprcciatc thc way Marx's thcory oscicncc pcrvadcs not only his
philosophical and cconomic work but also his approach to politics,

INTRODUCTION xvm
considcr a urthcr connotation othc notion oimmancncc. Sccking out
thc 'ought' in thc 'is' was thc caturcoHcgcl's thought aboutwhich
Marxwrotcmostvividlyin his l 887 lcttcrtohis athcr. rom thctimco
his disscrtation, Marx showcd how thc sharpdualisms othcorctical and
practical rcason lcd to a ourold ncxus osubjcctivism, transccndcncc,
idolatry, and conscrvatism. or cxamplc, Marx conncctcd thc s ubjcctiv-
ismothc YoungHcgclians withthcirtcndcncytotransccnd thc world in
a way that madc idolsothciridcals and lclthcmpassivcin thcaccoa
socictythcyailcdtocomprchcnd. Sctinthccontcxtothiscyclc, cvcn thc
wcll-wornclcvcnththcsison cucrbachdisplaysncw accts.Changingthc
world is thc point, and thatrcquircsmorc than high idcalsand subj cctivc
'intcrprctation', itcallsorscicntinccomprchcnsion and apropcrthcory
os cicntin c knowlcdgc itscl. Political practicc that lacks adcquatc thco-
rcticaloundations is sccn to swing bctwccn tcrrorism and rcaction.
Within this dialcctic othcorctical and practical rcason, thc intcrplay
bctwccnscicntin candpoliticalconsidcrationsin Marxisconstant. Politi-
cal implications appcar in his rcturn to cpistcmology, his distinction
bctwccngcncraland dctcrminatcabstractions,andhislogicocsscncc.By
not idcntiying thc conccptual dialcctic o Capital with a dialcctic o
history,Marxrcmovcd himsclrominHatcd claims conccrningthcdcvcl-
opmcnt oprccapitalist socictics. Conscqucntly, Marx providcd no war-
rant or a politics thatworks romsomcimagincd historical blucprint in
ordcrto putsuchsocictics undcra orccd march.
By distinguishinggcncralcatcgorics such asuscul labor,instrumcnto
production, and land rom thc dctcrminatc catcgorics abstract labor,
capital,andlandcdpropcrty Marxpcnctratcdthcapparcntnaturalncss
and airncss o thc capitalist cconomy. In so doing hc cxpandcd thc
political horizon bcyond thc bounds sct by libcral thcory to includc thc
prospcct o a postcapitalist socicty, onc in which valuc, capital, wagc-
labor,andlandcdpropcrtywot:ld havc noplacc. urthcrmorc, itwas by
distinguishing wealth agcncral catcgory) rom value adctcrminatc onc)
that Marx discloscd thc latcnt bourgcois principlcs o thc Cotha Pro-
grammc othc Ccrman socialists. Whcn thc Cotha Programmcdcclarcd
labortobc thcsourccoall wcalth, rathcrthan ovaluc, itslippcdinto a
bourgcois idcalism akin to Hcgcl's philosophy) which ascribcs 'supcr-
naturalcrcativcpowcr' to laborand ignorcsthcnatural conditionsoall
wcalth. Marx's criticism points out thc ccological indicrcncc o thc
bourgcois point ovicw sharcd by an important working-class organiza-

tton.
By castingvaluc in tcrms othclogicocsscncc, Marx rccognizcd thc
ncccssary,rathcrthan nominal, dicrcncc bctwccn valucandricc. Jhis
discovcryundcrmincdthcsocialistproposalsoProudhon,whichattackcd
INTRODUCTION

77
valuc's appcarancc, moncy, rathcr than its csscncc, production bascd on
abstract labor. Many socialist and cvcn Marxist political programs arc
still 'Proudhonist' in this scnsc.
Jhis last point raiscs a broadcr, politically scnsitivc, qucstion. Was
Marx primarily a critic o capitalist production or a critic ocapitalist
pattcrns odistribution? Moishc Postonc argucs that thc traditional intcr-
prctationshavcstrcsscddistribution.
`
Jhcyhavcconccivcdothcdialcc-
tic oforces and relations oproduction as an cxtcrnal onc in which thc
rclations arc cttcrs on thc cvcr-progrcssivc orccs, which arcassumcdto
havc an inhcrcnt, tcchnologically dctcrmincd coursc. Jhis conccption
comports wcll with vicwing valuc as a ncutral, rathcr than a critical,
catcgory with rcspcct to production, placing propcrty rclations at thc
ccntcropolitics,andtakingthcgoalorcvolutiontobcthcdictatorshipo
thc prolctariat. Jo this ld Lcl rcading oMarx with its associatcd
politics, Postonc countcrposcs a Ncw Lclrcading which nnds thccttcrs
in capitalist production aswcllason itandsctsancw political agcnda. thc
climination ovalucas a social rcality, a ncw attitudctowardnaturcand
workcmbodicdinancwormoproduction,andancndto thcprolctariat.
What I havc lcarncd conccrning Marx`s thcory oscicntinc knowlcdgc
strongly supports thc cmphasison Marx as a critic oproduction.
I Marx is a critic oproduction, thc traditional dialcctic oorccs o
productionand rclationsoproductionbrcaksdown,thisinturndislodgcs
thcstockvcrsionsohistoricalmatcrialism. Jhcsc pcrcnnialvicwsrclyon
an cxtcrnal, mcchanical conccption othcrclationship bctwccn bcingand
consciousncss,bascand supcrstructurc, a tcchnologicaldctcrminismwith
rcspcctto production,and thcprcsumption thatcatcgoricssuch as orccs
and rclations o production, thc statc, and idcology along with thc
supposcd rulcs govcrning thcm) providc an algorithm which can b
applicdtoanyhistoricalpcriodwithwondcrulrcsults.Withhisdis
ohistorical matcrialism, Marx pcrcctcd Vico. hc truly madc
scicncc, orso thc story gocs. Quitc a di`crcnt picturc cmcrgcs rom
book.
Marxwaslcssintcrcstcdinrcvcrsingthcidcalistsubordinationobcin
to consciousncss than hc was in undcrmining this cnlightcncd dualism,
whichlcd as olcn tocrudc matcrialism as toidcalism. Wcwill abandon
any mcchanistic vicw othc dctcrmination opolitics and philosophy by
cconomics onccwc rccognizc howhcavily Marx's basic cconomiccatcgo-
rics arcalrcady rcightcd with political, philosophical, and cvcn thcologi-
cal signin cancc. Convcrscly, thc philosophical and political spccibcity o
thc cconomic catcgorics rulcs out tcchnological dctcrminism. Likcwisc,
thc tcxts do not support thc associatcd notion o natural scicncc as
politicallyncutral. Any 'rccipc' approach tohistoricalmatcrialismis not
xx INTRODUCTION
only inconsistcnt with statcmcnts by Marx, it nics H thc acc o his
painstaking criticisms o Hcgcl, Young Hcgclians, and Proudhon or
bringing thcir rcady-madc conccpts to thc study ohistory. Jhc propcr
analysisoMarx's distinction bctwccngcncraland dctcrminatc abstrac-
tions, madc inthc German Ieolog, thatlocus classicus or historical matcr-
ialism, supports an undcrstanding o historical matcrialism as a pro-
pacdcutictos cicncc,notits guarantcc. Marxol|crsnoscicnccohistory,
buthcdocs putuson noticc othc many andsubtlc wayshstorycntcrs
into thc constitutionoscicncc.
Attcntion to thc practical, historical rootcdncss o thc conccpts o
scicncc, as wcll as thc valucs which guidc it, distinguishcs Marx's thcory
oscicntihc knowlcdgc rom any positivist vcrsion. Morcovcr, it was a
passionorachicvinghumanulhllmcntthat hrcd Marx's scarch into thc
contradictionsothc actualworld. Marx, thcn, was noordinary scicntist,
or his scrious inquirics into thc naturc o scicncc placc him in thc
companyosuchphilosophcr-scicntistsasAristotlcandcscartcs.Jhisis
casily misscd, howcvcr, bccausc Marx providcd no organon, no handy
rulcs that govcrncd thc dircction o his mind. Jhis abscncc is itscl a
caturc othc particular approach to scicncc hc dcvclopcd. Jhcact that
Marx's sophisticatcd thcory oscicntihcknowlcdgcrcmainslargcly sub-
liminal in his bcttcr known works makcs thcm

cxtraordinarily dcnsc.
much turns on a word, a distinction, a bcginning. Manya scicntihc or
political insight islostor lackoundcrstanding Marx's mcthodological
innovations. Jhisbookshouldbothincrcascawarcncssothis dcmanding
quality olMarx's writing and hclp in mccting thosc dcmands. Jhcn wc
may bc ablc to movcbcyond Marxinstcad oaroundhim.

IJ |`1
MARX'S CRITIQUE OF
PHILOSOPHY
. I
*
1
#
+
Jh/0J0t/0h /0 1/ Lht
arx's thcorizing about thc naturc o scicntihc knowlcdgc takcs
shapcashccxamincsthc 'prcccdingCcrman scicncc' thatculminatcd in
thc philosophicsoHcgcl and thc Young Hcgclians. SinccMarx hnds thc
^
YoungHcgcliansdcrivativcoHc gcl morcsothanthcyrccognizcd thc
wcightothishrstpart rcsts on thcinvcstigationoMarx's dircctcritiquc
o Hcgcl division 2) . Marx cxpcricnccd hcad-splitting dimcultics with
Hcgcl's philosophy o thc absolutc, cvcn at thc timc o his dramatic
convcrsionto Hcgcliandialccticsin l 887, and, inhisdisscrtationnotcso
l 81 l , scthimsclol|rom thcYoungHcgclians bycallingor athorough-
goingand intcrnalcritiquc oHcgcl. Butitis not until l 818l811, in his
Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right andthcParis Manuscripts, thatMarx
actually dcvclops such a critiquc and, in so doing, takcs a giant stcp
orward in dcvcloping a distinctivc thcory oscicntihc knowlcdgc. Jwo
striking caturcs o this critiquc oHcgcl indicatc Marx's approach to
scicntihc knowlcdgc. irst, thc vcry act that Marx took Hcgcl and
Hcgclianism so scriously marks his commitmcnt to advancc scicntihc
knowlcdgc through an immancnt criticism o cxisting scicncc. And
Marx's criticismis ccrtainlyan immancntonc insoaras hccndcavors
show that Hcgclonly rcduplicatcsthc dualismsoLnlightcnmcnttho
that hc sought to ovcrcomc. ) Sccond, Marx bcgins to associatc
standpoint with thc dccpstructurcs omodcrn, capitalistsocicty.
Marx's criticism o thc Young Hcgclians in thc Hol Famil and
German Ieology coincidcs with thchrststatcmcnts ohishistoricalmatcr-
ialism. Inact,historicalmatcrialismshouldbcundcrstoodinthiscontcxt
ohis 'scttling accounts' with idcalist philosophy. I arguc that Marx is
morcintcrcstcdinbrcakingdown thcdualismobcingandconsciousncss,
basc and supcrstructurc, than in simply invcrting idcalism, and that
historicalmatcrialismisnotascicnccohistory. Kathcr, itisapropacdcu-
tic to actual historical work, a polcmic against an idcalism that turns
history into a paradc o thoughts and thinkcrs, whilc dchistoricizing
practical, matcriallic. Historicalmatcrialismprovidcs noall-purposcsct
ocatcgorics rcady tobc 'applicd' to any givcn historical phcnomcnon.
4
MARX'S CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHY
Marx spcnds too much timc bcrating Hcgcl, various Young Hcgclians,
and Proudhon or such 'applications' to makc that mcchanical vicw
plausiblc. In a urthcr movc away rom convcntional intcrprctations, I
callattcntiontothc ways inwhichMarx'shistoricalmatcrialism links thc
logics opractical, matcriallic, such as thc logic ocommodity cxchangc,
with thc logics o schools o thought, such as utilitarianism and carly
modcrnnatural scicncc.
JhatMarxsoughttochangc thcworldrathcr thanmcrcly 'intcrprct'
it is wcll known. But Marx's hnalthcsison cucrbachshould bc undcr-
stood in its ull contcxt, which cncompasscs a critiquc o thc idcalist
conccption oscicntihc knowlcdgc. Marx's thinking about thc rclations
bctwccn thcory and practicc rcachcs back to his univcrsity days. Marx
abandoncd his youthul Kantian-ichtcan corts bccausc thcy wcrc too
subjcctivistic, thcy ailcd to pcnctratc thc logic oactual things. In his
disscrtation work, Marx cxplicitly links subjcctivism in a ourold ncxus
withconscrvatism, transccndcncc, andidolatry. Hcsccsthcconscrvatism
oHcgclianism, its inability tochangcthcworld, asthcpracticalnipsidc
oits thcorcticalsubjcctivism, which ails to rcach thc logicothc actual
world and grasp its immancnt contradictions. Jhc Young Hcgclians
stubbornlydciythcirownidcalsandprcachtothcdcacarsothcworld.
I nthccascoProudhon,whoscdccctivcHcgclianismalsoallsintothis
ourold ncxus, Marx notcs ironically that Proudhon's own idcals arc
ill-undcrstood rcncctions o thc socicty hc thinks hc is undcrmining.
Proudhonprovidcsthcpcrcctoilor Marx, sincchisPhilosophy of Povert
is a parody oMarx's own lic' s work. Proudhon' s attcmptto synthcsizc
Hcgcl and Kicardo su crs rom a lack oany undamcntal critiquc o
cithcr. With timc, it bccomcs clcarcr to Marx that thc logic oHcgclian
philosophybcarsastrikingrcscmblancctothclogicocapitalistcconomic
orms. As his intcrcst shils to thc critiquc opolitical cconomy, Marx
sharpcns, rcormulatcs, and somctimcs rcshapcs his carly thcorizing
about scicntihc knowlcdgc, but hc ncvcr abandons it.

Division 1
Deciding to Pursue Science

.
Jh/000t/0h /0 J0h 1
arx's thought about thc naturc o scicntihc knowlcdgc and his
pursuitoa scicntihcgrasp ohis world mark no suddcn shiI awayrom
carly humanistic conccrns, indccd, thcy rcach back to thc bcginnings o
his dcvclopmcnt as an intcllcctual. At ninctccn Marx rcpudiatcd thc
subjcctivc dualism o Kant and ichtc whilc cnthusiastically adopting
Hcgcl's dialcctical conccption os cicntihc knowlcdgc. Marx`s disscrta-
tion, a study o thc di6crcnccs bctwccn thc philosophics o naturc o
cmocritus and Lpicurus, bcars thc marks oHcgcl in its attcntion to
orms o consciousncss, thcir links to historical orms, thc way thcir
undamcntallogics pcnctratc both thcorctical and practicalphilosophics,
and thcir nccd to bc altcrcd whcn rcstrictivc ohuman potcntials or
cxpcricncing thc world and acting in it. By uncovcring thc logic othc
isolatcdindividual as thc tcmplatc oLpicurus's philosophy, Marx scts
himsclo6rom thc Lnlightcnmcnt, or hc rcgards Lpicurus as its most
outstandingCrcckprccursor.Inhisnotcshclikcwiscassociatcsthc'lcl'
and thc 'right' Hcgclians with thc dualistic logic o Lnlightcnmcnt
thought, cvcn thcn hc is no ordinary young Hcgclian. In studying thc
courscophilosophyin thcwakcoonctotalphilosophcr,Aristotlc,
sccks insight into his own situation, living in thc alcrmath o
Kathcrthan complainaboutHcgcl'spoliticalaccommodations,asdid
Young Hcgclians, Marx concludcs hc should undcrtakc thc
proj cct o dcvcloping a ncw thcory o scicntihc knowlcdgc and a j
scicntihcundcrstandingothc modcrn world throughascarching,imma-
ncnt critiquc oHcgcl's systcm and a critiquc othc world whosc idcas
Hcgcl's philosophy cxprcsscd.

1
CHAPTER
Marx's Doctoral Dissertation:
Projecting a Post-Hegelian
((Wissenschajt "
MAKX' SCNVLKSINJ HLCLL' S IALLCJICS
In contrast with thc young Hcgcl's gradual discnchantmcnt with thc
Kantian-ichtcan tradition oidcalism, at ninctccn Marx wrotc to his
athcrohisconvcrsionromKantian-ichtcanidcalismtoHcgcl'sdialcc-
tics. Jwo vital scts o conccrns poctic-moral and s cicntihc surgcd
togcthcr in Marx's convcrsion. In thc hrst ycars away rom his amily,
Marx wrotc poctry prolihcally. Kcnccting on thc romantic idcalism o
thoscpocticstrainings,Marxsawthcnccdtospanthcscparationbctwccn
what is and what ought to bc. Likcwisc, his hrst indcpcndcnt scicntihc
c6orts inj urisprudcncc oundcr on thc split bctwccn 'is' and 'ought. '
Marx rcalizcd that in his poctry andin his hrstskctchcs oa systcm o
jurisprudcnccthcidcasrcmaincdpurclysubjcctivcconstructsthatskirtcd
an as yct nonrational actuality.
In thc artistic-moral sphcrc, thc subj cctivc positingoidcals providcs
only a nimsy and illusory shicld against an actuality that pays thcm no
mind. In idcalistscicncc,thcsubjcctivcautonomycnjoycdin

thc orm oa s cicncc contrasts sharply with thc uttcr hctcronomy o
cmpiricalcontcnt. Marxwritcsohisskctchorascicncco
Jhc mistakc lay in my bclicving that thc onc orm or mattcr|
could and must bc dcvclopcd in scparation rom thc othcr
mattcr or orm| , and conscqucntly I obtaincd no actual orm,
butonly a dcsk with drawcrs in which I thcn strcw sand. '
pposcd to thc constructivist-cmpiricistnotion oscicncc, Marx turns to
thc Hcgclian conccptothc conccpt. 'Jhcconccptis indccd thc mcdiat-
ing bctwccn orm and contcnt. '
Jo solvc this two-hcadcd problcm, Marx rcsolvcs that hc must scarch
O
10 MARX'S CRITIQUE OF PHiLOSOPHY
or thc idcas in thc actual, or thc rationality othings thcmsclvcs. With
this stratcgy, Marx mcrgcs his artistic-moral conccrns and hs scicntinc
pursuits into a ncw conccpt oscicncc,rcjccting mystcism, romanticism,
andothcrormsotransccndcncc,toachicvcarcconciliationwthhisown
actuality and its rcal potcntials. With this conccpt o scicncc as thc
mcdiationowhat isand whatoughtto bc, osubjcctivcconccpt with its
objcct,Marxsccks toovcrcomcthccltdiscrcpancicsoidcalistart,cthics ,
and scicncc.
In thc l 887 lcttcr to his athcr, Marx is thc convcrt to Hcgclian
philosophy, not its critic. Hcgcl'spassionor immancncclurcshim. Jhc
s ourccohumanthoughtmustbcrch cctivclylivcdhumancxpcricncc

not
dogmatic traditions or romantic antasics, Marx wholchcartcdly jons
Hcgcl in thc scarch or thc rational in thc actual, a task dcsigncd to
synthcsizc thc acsthctic-moral and thc scicntinc sphcrcs.
Howcvcr,Marxhasproblcmswith thcsynthcsisHcgclaccmplishcdin
hissystcmoabsolutcidcalism. Inadcscriptionohisimmcrsionnto that
systcm in his own dialoguc, 'Clcanthcs, or on thc Starting Point and
^cccssary Progrcs s oPhilosophy,' Marx commcnts on his rcsstancc.
Hcrc, to a ccrtain cxtcnt, art and knowing, which had bccn
.
complctcly sundcrcd rom onc anothcr, wcrc unitcd. A robust
wandcrcr, I strodc to thc work itscl, to a ph|losophcal-
dialcctica| dcvclopmcntothcgodhcad as itmanicstcditsclas
thc conccpt in itscl, as rcligion, as naturc, and as history. My
lastscntcnccwas thc bcginningothcHcgcliansystcm, and this
labor, or which I acquaintcd mysclto a ccrtain cxtcnt with
natural scicncc, Schclling, and history, and which causcd mc
uncnding hcad-splitting, isso. . . writtcn sincc it rcally ought
to bca ncwlogic) thatI mysclcannowscarccly think my way
back into it.

Jhcscyouthulhcadachcsprcsagc thc critiqucoHcgcl that Marx would

latcr uncoil.
Marx's impassioncd lcttcr to his athcr is a turning point in thc
dcvclopmcntoastormyyoungmind,agathcringohishumancintcrcsts
into a skctch o a ncwscicncc somcwhcrc bctwccn romantic, utopian
moralismand positivisticscicncc. Hcrc wchavc thcrudimcnts oMarx's
thcory oscicncc, butas yctinnoccntoany critiqucoHcgcl.

,
I

MARX'S DOCTORAL DISSERTATION 11

MARX'S DISSERTATION AND ASSOCIATED WRITINGS
Immanence, recognizing rationality in the actual state of afairs, is
stressed again by Marx's understanding of science in his dissertation and
related writings. In the notebooks for the dissertation, Marx replaces the
Kant-Fichte brand of idealism with Plato as the target of his critique of
transcendence. Marx unfavorably contrasts the unscientifc, subjectivistic
character of Plato's philosophy with the more intensive, more scientifc
philosophies of Aristotle, Spinoza, and Hegel. Whereas Plato's transcen
dent mythmaking can provide at best a "hot water bottle" for individual
souls, the immanent philosophies of Aristotle, Spinoza, and Hegel break
out of this subjectivism and capture the "animating spirit of world
historical developments. " According to Marx, Plato's transcendence, his
creation of a world of ideas, the Absolute paralleling the given sensible
world, stems from his uncritical acceptance of the given just as it presents
itself This acquiescence leads Plato to create a mythology that uses given
sense images as symbols and as myths for the Absolute, which lies
ensconced in an utterly separate world. These observations allow Marx to
identify the following set of relations:
This positive exposition of the Absolute and its mythic
allegorical garb is the fountainhead, the heartbeat of the philo
sophy of transcendence, of a transcendence which both has
essential relation to immanence and cuts itself of essentially
from the immanent . . . the positive exposition of the Absolute
hangs together with the subjective character of Greek philos
ophy.4
Here Marx links idolatry, the Janus-faced transcendence of a given
accepted on its own terms ( conservatism) , and subjectivism.
This fourfold nexus marks not just Plato's thought, but that ofE
.. ..
and the liberal Hegelians as well. The demonstration of this in the case"!<,,<
'
Epicurus is a major thesis of Marx's doctoral dissertation, The.u,
between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosopky of Nature ( 1 84 1 ) . There he
contends that the principle of the free, subjective individual organizes the
diferent facets of Epicurus's philosophy. This hypothesis guides Marx to
quite an original interpretation of the odd Epicurean doctrine of the
declination of the atom. Marx sees in this principle of natural philosophy
the alternation of transcendence and immanence, for the declination of the
atom is an immediate, abstract, and arbitrary transcendence of the
immanent de terminations of its path: "The atom frees itself from its
12 MARX'S CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHY
relative existence, the straight line, in that it abstracts from it, bends away
from it.
,
,5 This kind of freedom is like that of a stubborn toddler.
Epicurus's subj ectivistic critique of the mode of the given (the straight
line) is transcendent. He avoids the given rather than seize hold of its 'own
tendencies. But how does idolatry fit into this picture? Since Marx calls
Epicurus the greatest ancient representative of the Enlightenment, his
answer to this question represents an important step in Marx's relation
ship to the Enlightenment. The radical subjectivism of Epicurus is double
edged. Like Prometheus, Epicurus cuts down from their heaven all gods
elevated over and against human consciousness, but with the same stroke
he enthrones a dangerously abstract form of self-consciousness as the new
idol.
If Marx's intended ambiguity toward Epicurus and, by association,
toward the Enlightenment has often received short shrift from commen
tators, so too has the complexity of his stance toward the \iberal Hege
lians. Marx's appreciation of the structural similarities between the
post-Aristotelian period and his own post-Hegelian present inspired his
dissertation. His desire to learn about the present from an analogous
period in the past whetted Marx's appetite as a historical interpreter. The
analogy turns on the recourse to subjectivity taken in the wake of a total
philosophy, which seems to seal of hermetically all routes between
thought and reality. Thus, the subj ectivistic slant of the post-Aristotelian
philosophers, Epicurus in particular, returns in the subjectivism ofliberal
Hegelianism.
Marx refers to the liberal Hegelians (Bruno and Edgar Bauer, Ludwig
Feuerbach, August von Cieszkowski, and Arnold Ruge) as the "party of
the concept," as opposed to the conservative Hegelians ( Karl Rosen
kranz
,
Rudolph Haym, Johann Eduard Erdmann, and K. P. Fischer) ,
who are the party of the nonconcept, or the party of positive philosophy.
The liberal Hegelians uphold the ideals of the received philosophy, while
the conservative Hegelians cling to the received actuality. Here we have
the familiar unreconciled opposition of "ought" and "is. " Although Marx
obviously favors the liberal Hegelians, he .holds a principled dissatisfac
tion with them, and of their praxic turn toward the world writes:
However, the praxis of philosophy is itself theoretical. It is the
critique which measures the individual existent against the essence,
the particular actuality against the idea. However, this immediate
realization of philosophy is, in accord with its innermost essence,
burdened with contradictions, and this essence shapes itself in
appearance and imprints its stamp upon it.

MARX'S DOCTORAL DISSERTA TION

In that philosophy turns itself as will toward the appearing
world, the system is reduced to an abstract totality, i . e. , it has
become one side of the world, the side which stands opposite to
an other. Its relation to the world is a relation of refection. '
13
The language here of "critiq ue," "immediate," "will," "abstract," "one
side," and "relation of refection" signals Marx's eff ort to distance himself
from the "un philosophical," nonimmanent approach of the liberal Hege
lians. The liberal Hegelians turn the received Hegelian philosophy into
something other than what it was for Hegel himself. In their hands it
becomes an abstract, dead system of ideas, a fixed measuring stick with
which they gauge the given actuality. Marx's criticism of this approach
recalls Hegel's introduction to the Phenomenolog of Spirit, where he points
out that the experience of comparing concept and object is an act of
mediation which yields both a new concept and a new object. Conscious
ness is its own standard, but consciousness can change and mature
through experience. The liberal Hegelians, forgetting this central lesson,
fixate on their subjective ideals ( the concept) , while the conservative
Hegelians fasten onto the given actuality ( the object) .
Subjectivism, the Janus-faced transcendence of a given actuality ac
cepted on its own terms, and idolatry recur in the liberal Hegelian
philosophy in a less aggravated form than in Epicurus's philosophy. Their
subjective ideals are absolute for the liberal Hegelians, and form the basis
of their critique, which is a type of transcendence. Critique, as understood
by the liberal Hegelians, seeks not to avoid the actual (like Epicurus), but
to overcome a bad positivity by the imposition of an external standard.
Such critique does not plumb the immanent potentials of the actual; it
annuls it in thought alone. The idolatry of the liberal Hegelians lies in the
absolutizing of their subjective ideals.
Marx's dissertation and associated writings are under the sway .
Hegel's Phenomenolog in a way quite important for the issue of scien :'
Although Hegel's subject matter goes far beyond modern Europea
"
philosophy and society, the viewpoint from which he writes, the enigmatic

"we" or "us," is itself embedded in the Cartesian problematic oftranscen
dental subj ectivity. Hegel takes as his paradigm the problematic of
consciousness, perhaps the central problematic that unfolds in modern
European philosophy from Galileo and Descartes onwards. Consciousness
is a paradoxical two-in-one. It is subj ect and obj ect, or, still better,
subject-object. All the objects of human experience are objects for human
subj ects. With this Hegel wants to say that the character of the objects of
human experience tells us something about the human subj ects for whom
14 MARX'S CRITIQUE OF PHIOSOPHY
they are objects. We might call this the "method" of the Phenomenology,
whose conatus is the act of experience in which the subject recognizes
itself in its object. This experience transforms both subject and object,
although "transforms" understates the point. What Hegel has in mind is a
dialectic of subject-obj ect in terms of a selfconstitution whose telos is the
identity of subject and object in absolute knowledge. When the subject
recognizes itself in the obj ect, it recognizes that it has constituted, or
produced, its own object. The spiral path to absolute knowledge widens
this recognition to encompass all objects of human experience.
What does all this have to do with science? In one sense it confirms
Kant's point in the Critique of Pure Reason. We have no knowledge of
things-in-themselves, of objects which are not objects for us. But Hegel's
theory suggests something more science is also an expression of human
subjectivity, a form of consciousness. What a particular science "sees,"
the shape its object takes, intimates the shape of its owr subjectivity.
Marx expresses this point as follows: "In the general relationship which
the philosopher gives the world and thought to one another, he merely
makes objective how his particular consciousness relates itself to the real
world.

By "shape of subjectivity" or "form of consciousness, " Hegel refers to

individual consciousnesses only as they typify a particular epoch. Forms
of consciousness are forms of social existence, hence, historical and, in a
broad sense, political.
9
Since science describes an obj ect and is likewise an
object-producing shape of subjectivity, it follows that science must be
situated historically and politically ( again, in a broad sense) . Our science
reveals to us not only our objective world; if we follow Hegel's phenome
nological guidance, it can tell us something about ourselves and our
society.
Forms of consciousness have not only a historical and political charac
ter
,
but a logical character as well. Shapes of subjectivity depict logical
patterns of thinking that recur in religion, science, morality, and politics
(in the narrower sense) . 1 O Hegel's emphasis on labor in the Phenomenology
reveals this logical dimension. If the various aspects of culture share a
common source as products of consciousness, we may interrogate a
historically achieved form of consciousness to fnd the grammar (logic)
embedded in its various productions (scien tifc, moral, religious) .
All these tenets of Hegel's Phenomenology appear in Marx's dissertation
and accompanying writings. As noted earlier, the key to Marx's interpre
tation of Epicurus is the principle of the free individual self-consciousness,
pr6j ected s( clearly in 1nC declinating atom: "The declination of the atom
from the straight line is in fact not a particular determination occuring

MARX'S DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

15
accidentally in the Epicurean physics. Rather, the law which it expresses
runs through the whole Epicurean philosophy. " 1 1 "Law" ( Gesetz) indi
cates a subjective positing, a marshalling of mere immediacies into
something essential. The specifc form of positing can be thought of as a
particular logic. In the case of Epicurus, that specifc form is the logic of
radical "being-for-self; " of the abstract, free individual self-consciousness.
This logic expresses the consciousness and form of life of the epoch
following upon the total philosophy of Aristotle, the epoch of the dissolu
tion of classical Greek society. The principled subjectivism of post
Aristotelian philosophy represents at this logical level a rejection, a simple
negation, of the principle of substantialit, which was the logic of Aristote
lian and pre-Aristotelian Greek philosophy:
Antiquity was rooted in nature, in the substantial. Nature's
degradation, its profaning, marks basically the rupture of the
substantial, honorable life; the modern world is rooted in spirit,
and spirit can be free, other, nature set free of itself
1
2
The post-Aristotelian philosophers are precursors of the enlightened
modern world and its principle of subjective individualism.
The following text reveals something of Marx' s purpose in imitating
the Hegelian policy of decoding various manifestations of a form of
consciousness for their generative logical principle:
Indeed
.
Ep
.
icurus wants to proceed from the atom to further
determmatlOns, but because he will not allow the atom as such
to be dissolved, he does not get beyond atomistic arbitrary
determinations which are external to themselves. Th-skeptic on
the other hand takes up all de terminations, but in the determi
naten
:
ss of semblance; his occupation is just as arbitrary and
contams everywhere the same insufciency. To be sure he d . .
, oes
SWim in the whole wealth of the world, but he sticks to the same
poverty and is himself the living impotence that he sees
.
h
'
E
'
in
t mgs.

icurus empties the world from the outset, but he ends

up thus Wit-the entirely indeterminate, the self-reposing empti
ness, the otlOse god. 1 3
When Marx isolates determinate logical patterns, such as Epicurus's
principle of the atom or the universalizing of the category semblance
( Schein) by the Skeptics, he reveals deep fxations of our thinking that
16 MARX'S CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHY
impoverish human life. For Marx, science must join in the enrichment of
human experience.
Marx appropriated the most important lessons of the Phenomenolog. By
comprehending the dialectical relationship between subjectivity and ob
j ectivity, he acquired a great sensitivity to one-sided logics which reveal
the wealth of the human world only partially and with distortions, while
projecting the correlative feeling of loss and confnement onto the things
themselves. Marx's fascination with fetishism and character masks was
neither accidental nor ephemeral.
The emancipatory iconoclasm of Marx appears in his treatment of the
form of consciousness taken up in the frst chapter of Hegel's Phenomenol
og, namely, sense-certainty: "Whoever does not have the dialectical
power to totally negate this sphere [of sense-certainty], whoever will leave
it standing, must also be satisfed with the truth as it fnds itself within
that sphere. " 1 4 The whole logic of sense-certainty must fal,l to make way
for more adequate modes of experiencing the world. Living, embodied
human subj ectivity is more than a supreme court with a received meta
physical code; it is also the legislature that can call those very principles
into question when the need arises. This helps illuminate the famous
passage in the dissertation notes concerning total philosophies and their
aftermath. When Marx pleads, "Whoever does- not discern this historical
necessity [of the subjective turn after a total philosophy] , must conse
quently deny that men can still live at all after a total philosophy "1 5 he
rej ects Hegel's claim to have the absolute philosophy but also the claim to
absoluteness in principle. Human eforts at science operate in a context of
directed hope and are always open to revision.
Scientifc openness and revisability are for Marx guided by a concept
more specifc than the extension and intensification of human experience;
this is the concept of rationality. Hegel stated that reason is the unity of the
universal and the particular the concrete universal, if you like. We
touched on this concept of rationality in Marx's search for the "ought"
( universal) in the "is" ( particular). Marx's commitment to the concept of
rationality appears in his discussion of the theory of meteors in Epicurus's
natural philosophy.
Nothing is eternal which annihilates the ataraxy of the individ

al
.
self-consc
.
iou

ness. The heavenly bodies disturb its ataraxy,

ltS hkeness wlth ltself
,
because they are the existing universality,
because nature has become autonomous i n them. 1 6
The heavenly bodies cut to the quick of Epicurus's whole subjectivistic
philosophy; rationality can be found in the actual, not just in avoiding it.

MARX'S DOCTORAL DISSERTA TJON 17

As "existing universality," these heavenly bodies overcome the absolute
principle, the logic of Epicurus, which reduces rationality to free self
consciousness in the form of individuality.
Guided by his concept of rationality, Marx calls out the negative
implication for science that results from Epicurus's logic of absolutizing
free self-consciousness in the form of individuality. "If abstract-individual
self-consciousness is posited as an absolute principle, then certainly all
true and actual science is destroyed [aujehoben]
,
insofar as individuality
does not rule in the nature of things themselves. "1 7 If David Hume looms
large in this characterization of Epicurus, it should be no surprise, since
Marx reads Epicurus as the greatest Greek representative of the Enlight
enment Moreover, does not the logic of enlightened civil society resemble
this Epicurean principle that deifes the individual?
Marx's dissertation work goes beyond being a formal preparation for
his later studies of capitalism. It is a formal preparation in that Marx
exercises his skills at determining the logic of a form of consciousness and
displaying how ossifed, partial principles can restrict our experience. His
analysis of capitalism takes a similar form. He ferrets out the logic of
capitalism in. his theory of value and surplus-value, and declares this logic
to be a fetter on the enriching of human life. Since these potentials
are themselves products of capitalism, Marx speaks of the self
contradictory nature of capitalism. His dissertation work is more than a
formal preparation, however, in that Epicurus is a precursor of the
Enlightenment Epicurus's absolutizing of the individual anticipates (im
perfectly) the realized logic of civil society.
Marx's dissertation writings mark his frst studies of a topic that
characterizes his approach to science, i. e. , the history of science. Marx' s
approach to the history of science emphasizes its immanent development.
The continuity of science is seen as dialectical rather than linear, a
derived from the concepts of consciousness and experience which H
developed in the introduction to the Phenomenolog and used throughout
Linear continuity suggests a fxed measuring stick for science, but for
Hegel and Marx the development in science supersedes the old measuring " .. .
.
. .
.
.
stick, the old logic. 1 8
I f the model of a fxed, linear measuring stick i s inadequate for grasping
the continuity of science, what model will work? Marx employs models of
purposiveness, of teleology. In his dissertation notes, he compares the
continuity of science with an example of artistic fnality the way a hero's
life is retrospectively evaluated from his death. 1 9 Years later, in the
Grundrisse, Marx employs natural purposiveness as a model for the conti
nuity of science in his famous statement that human anatomy is the key to
the anatomy of the ape.
18
MAR'S CRITIQUE OF PHIOSOPHY
This teleological concept of dialectical continuity in the development of
science clarifes Marx's intentions in his dissertation. Marx writes in his
foreword to the dissertation:
These systems [ Epicurean, Stoic and Skeptic] are the key to the
true history of Greek philosophy.
2
0
Th
.
is
.
tre

tise i

to be regarded only as the forerunner to a larger
wn

mg m which I will present in detail the cycle of Epicurean,

StOlC, and Skeptical philosophy in connection with all Greek
speculation. The failings of this treatise, in form and the like, will
be corrected in that work.
2
1
Epicurus would unlock the whole of Greek philosophy.
I
When we consider the projected scope of Marx's study of Epicurus,
along with the fact that he explicitly compares his own situation with
Epicurus's philosophizing in the wake of Aristotle, we can draw some
implications for Marx's later work. We can expect Marx to concern
himself primarily with post-Hegelian philosophy, but to do so in order to
decipher the meaning of Hegel's philosophy and modern European philo
sophy as a whole. A concern for the totality typifes Marx's mind, as does
his failure to complete the projected task.
Like Marx's critical approach to the plural logics of thinkers and eras,
this whole approach to the history of philosophy aims to liberate living
human be
i
ngs from the shackles of dead principles and allow them to
move rationally into the future. Marx writes of the aftermath of a total
philosophy:
The other side, which is the more important for the historian of
philosophy, is that this turn-about of philosophy, its tran
substantiation into fesh and blood, always difers according to
the determinateness which a philosophy, in itself total and
concrete, carried with it at the time of its birth . . . because out of
the peculiar path of this turn-about, the immanent determinate
ness and the world-historical character of the course of a philo
sophy can be inferred.
22

The

oin t of nferring
.
the world -historical character of a total philosophy
from its praxic refex is, to overcome the historical limitations of that total
philosophy. We may use Marx's model of unpacking the hero's whole life

M ARX'S DOCTORAL DISSERTATION 19
from his death to say here that this approach to the history of philosophy
deduces the tragic faw of a total philosophy from its dissolution, in order
to free the new generation from the fate of its parents.
The liberation is twofold: from the past total philosophy, and from the
particular social formation in which it takes shape. The task of the
would-be liberator, then, is to criticize both the received science (philoso
phy) and society, in order to identify their shared, fawed logic and to
transform them. The young Marx longed to be this kind of liberator.
The term "world-historical" in the previous quotation recalls a central
tenet of Hegel's Phenomenolog, which we have neglected thus far in dealing
with the history of science. Science as a "form of consciousness" is
historically and (in the broad sense) politically determinate in form. This
is what Marx means with his reference to the distinctiveness or world
historical character of a total philosophy. It raises the specter of the
sociology of knowledge, relativism, and a theory of ideology that cannot
cope with the problem of self-reference.
Some contemporary philosophers of science attempt to quiet this fear
by making a capital distinction between the context of discover and the
context of justication.
2
3
The context of justifcation purports to provide a
fxed measuring stick insensible to the irritations of history ( the context of
discovery) . The ambiance of justifcation sees itself as the end of ideology.
However, it implies a radical dehistoricizing of science, for the context of
justifcation alone counts in determining the validity of a science and
locating it in the linearly continuous progress of science. In this division of
lab or, the historian of science is left with the context of discovery, a net full
of happen stances all quite irrelevant to the cognitive value of science.
24
At frst glance the following text from Marx seems to draw this distinc
tion between the context of discovery and the context of justifcation:
It is not so much the business of the philosophical writing of
history to fasten upon the personality, even that which pertains to
the spiritual in a philosopher, as if it were the focus and the
formation of his system; even less to the point is taking a stroll
through psychological trifes and smart-aleckery. Rather, the
philosophical writing of history has to separate in each system
the de terminations themselves: the thoroughgoing, actual crys
talizations of the proofs from the justifcations in discourse, and
from the presentations of the philosophers insofar as they know
themselves; the mutely progressing mole of actual philosophical
knowing from the talkative, exoteric, variously behaving phe
nomenological consciousness of the subj ect, who is the vessel
and energy of those developments.
2
5
20 MARX'S CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHY
Writing history philosophically to advance that mute mole of science
might seem to elevate historical material into the sublime context of
justifcation. The discourse and self-awareness of the scientists, their
"talkative, exoteric, variously behaving phenomenological conscious
ness," seem to belong to the context of discovery: grist for the ordinary
historian. But Marx's distinction does not completely dehistoricize sci
ence, as does the distinction between contexts of discovery and justifca
tion, for the material on which the "philosophical writer of history" works
is still historically specifc. But Marx diferentiates between surface levels of
historical determination and the deep structures, namely, the specifc forms
of consciousness which constitute science.
With his distinction Marx introduces a multiple-tiered approach to the
sociology of knowledge and the critique of ideology. Ideology can be a
matter of surface de terminations, whether of personal psychology or social
class. This approximates the popular meaning of "ideology. " Marx
certainly does not discount such garden-variety ideology, but his interests
here lie more with ideology at the level of ingrained patterns of thought,
epochal forms of consciousness with their formative logics. Progress in
science depends upon overcoming the ideology of this latter, more subtle
strain.
Marx invokes this diferentiated view of ideology in appraising Hegel.
In so doing he again removes himself from the liberal Hegelians, who
concern themselves only with surface levels of ideology. Where the liberal
Hegelians accuse Hegel of compromising himself before the exigencies of
the Prussian state, Marx cuts deeper, claiming that the most important
level of ideology in Hegel lies in the innermost principles of his system.
That a philosopher commits this or that seeming inconsistency
out of this or that accommodation is conceivable; he himself may
even have this in his consciousness. However, what he does not
have in his consciousness is that the possibility of this seeming
accommodation has its innermost root in an inadequacy or
inadequate fashioning of his principle itself. Therefore, if a
philosopher has actually accommodated himself, his students
have to clarify this out of his inner, essential consciousness, that hadjor
him, himselj; the form of an exoteric consciousness. In this way, that
which appeared as progress in conscience is likewise a progress
in knowledge. The particular conscience of the philosopher is
not placed under suspicion, but rather his essential form of
consciousness is reconstructed, raised into determinate shape,
and thereby is at the same time gone above and beyond.
2
6

1('--" '
1
M ARX'S DOCTORAL DISSERTi T/oN
21
Relativism and a knee-jerk theory of ideology are anathema to Marx, who
believes that the goal of a critical, scientifc approach to the history of
science is to free oneself from past inadequacies. The only way to do this is
to go to the heart of a past or existing science and unlock the shackles of its
logic.
2
7
This immanent approach is also the basis of dialectical continuity in
science. For the new science is the negation of precisely that prior science.
This in turn suggests the radical importance of the history of science per
se, since the former science is, by this via negationis, constitutive of the
new.
2
8 To describe the dialectical continuity in the constitution of science,
Hegel developed the concept of determinate negation.
29
As he emerges from his dissertation work, with its sustained analogy
between post-Aristotelian and post-Hegelian philosophy, Marx seeks to
overthrow the Hegelian fortress from within, to be the determinate
negation of Hegel's total philosophy. At the same time, Marx turns his
critical science toward the world, both to fnd in modern European society
the practical, historical roots of Hegel's epochal philosophy and to revolu
tionize that society on the basis of its immanent contradictions. Hegel's
Philosophy of Right, along with Marx's Kreuznach studies of law, politics,
and history, and his political experiences as editor of the Rheinische Zeitung,
spark Marx's frst serious and sustained efort at carrying out this project.

7
Division 11
Breaking with Hegel

Jh/0J0t/0h /0 J0h 11
In the brief period from the end of l 818 through l 811, Marx made great
strides in developing his theory of scientific knowledge. Though the
emphasis at this time was on the critique of He gel's system, Marx worked
simultaneously on his critique of modern society. His choice of targets for
a direct critique of He gel, i . e. , the Philosophy of Right and "Absolute Know
ledge, " the fnal chapter of the Phenomenolog of Spirit, allowed Marx to
sharpen his understanding of modern society: the Philosophy of Right is
Hegel's most systematic and detailed work on the subject, and the last
chapter of the Phenomenolog gave Marx occasion to place the role of
abstract thought in Hegel's philosophy in relation to the role of abstrac
tions in modern society. The two texts ofered points of entry to Hegel's
system as a whole, in the one case from the perspective of He gel's most fully
developed "real science" ( Realwissenschaji) , and in the other from the
threshold of Hegel's philosophical science proper.
In his dissertation notes, Marx states that, to make real progress
beyond what the Young Hegelians saw as Hegel's accommodation to an
unreasonable social and political actuality, it will be necessary to reveal
the accommodation latent in his basic principles through an immanent
critique. This is j ust what Marx does in analyzing the Philosophy of Right.
Drawing on Hegel' s own stress on immanence and the mediation of
concept and content in science, Marx charges that Hegel's concepts
' : "
pulled in from a hypostatized, abstract logic and fail to penetrate the
of the matter at hand. This indicates, according to Marx, abstract
own defectiveness, particularly the logic of mediation involved in
rational syllogism. Diferent concepts of mediation, especially Marx's
that the logic of essence is one of irreconcilable opposition rather than of a
diferentiation giving way to a higher unity, underlie the difering ap
proaches Hegel and Marx take toward civil society and the modern state.
Later, Marx's conception of the logic of essence proves central to his
diferences with Ricardo and the Proudhonians regarding the theory of
value and the value-form.
Known widely as "economic and philosophic," the Paris Manuscripts are
likewise "scientifc and humanistic." In neither case should "and" be
understood as an external connection, for Marx's studies of philosophy
25
26 BREAKING WITH HEGEL
and political economy stream together. The 'critique of Hegel's chapter
"Absolute Knowledge," which seems strictly philosophical, is shot through
with economic parallels
,
representing Marx's deepest exploration yet of
the logic of capitalist economic forms. What is dawning on Marx as he
lashes out at the egoism, abstractness, and alienation he finds in Hegel's
system is how much the logic of Hegel's thought and the logic of capital
ism align with one another. The Paris Manuscripts make clear that Marx's
critique of Hegel encompasses a humanistic dimension as well as logical
and methodological ones. Marx links Hegel's abstract and egoistic con
ception of the self with his conception of absolute knowing and logic as a
thing apart from the actual world. In the essay "Alienated Labor," Marx
binds up his humanistic critique of labor under capitalism and his
scientifc critique of the methodological horizon of the political econom
ists. We will see that this mutuality of philosophy and economics, human
ism and science
,
characterizes Capital as well.

1
CHAPTER 2
"Experimentum Crucis " in Judging
Hegel 's Speculative Science
pon quitting the editors hip of the Rheinische Zeitung, which he held
from October l 812 until March l 818, Marx had the frst opportunity
since his university days for sustained study and writing. He studied
contemporary legal, political, and historical works and criticized Hegel's
Philosophy of Right, tasks that composed a unity for Marx. l He intended
equally to criticize the modern state and to criticize Hegel, whom he
considered to be its consummate theorist.
The critique of the German philosophy ri right and of the state, which
received its most consistent, its richest, and its fnal comprehen
sion through Hegel
, is . . . the critical analysis of the modern state
and of the actuality connected with it.
2
It is also important to see that, in tackling Hegel's Philosopky of 1_
Marx took on Hegel's system as a whole. In fact, the Philosophy ofJl
gave Marx a unique opportunity to criticize Hegel's speculative sy
and thereby to make headway in coming to his own theory of
knowledge. To see why this is the case, we must briefy examine
overall philosophical strategy and the place of the Philosophy of ''',
within that scheme.
Hegel published only four books in his lifetime, and the sequence in
which they were published traces the unity of his life' s project. The
Phenomenology of Spirit pIa ys the role of John the Baptist for the philosophi
cal system that follows its call. As phenomenologist, Hegel tries to make
+
straight all the known paths of human knowing theoretical and practi-
cal. Once he has accomplished this, absolute knowledge is attained, and
the gate of philosophic science is frst opened. Hegel is very explicit in his
introduction to the Science ri Logic that it presupposes the desert disciplines
7
28
BREAKING WrH HEGEL
of the Phenomenology. Logic is both the frst of the philosophic sciences and
the secret of all the rest. By attaining the unity of concept and object at the
end of the Phenomenology, Hegel rids himself of the dualism of logic and

reality; his philosophical science of logic is the logic of reality.

This feature of his logic assures Hegel that he has the other sciences, the
real sciences ( Realwissenschajten) , in hand. As the science of the real, logic
will be the logic of the real sciences. Hegel was prepared a few years later
to present in encyclopedic fashion his system of philosophy: logic and the
real sciences of nature and spirit. Hegel's fnal published work, the
Philosophy of Right, attempted to present a real science of what Hegel called
objective spirit, in other than merely encyclopedic form. The Philosophy oJ
Right had an aspect of culmination that did not escape Marx's attention. 3
Marx reasonably found i n the PhilosoPky of Right the experimentum crucis for
judging the Hegelian system and coming to his own concept of science.4
CRITICIZING HEGEL' S USE OF LOGIC IN THE
"PHI LOSOPHY OF RIGHT"
J
The examination of the Philosophy oJ Right within Hegel's system as a
whole enriches our understanding of the purposes of Marx's critique.
Given Marx's sympathies for Feuerbach's empiricist critique of Hegel, his
steady employment of Feuerbach's "invertive method,
,,
5 and his close
examination of empirical studies of modern political life, we might think
that Marx's critique of Hegel is strictly an empirical refutation of Hegel's
purported science of society. The extent of Marx's concern with logic
would then be to scorn Hegel's mystifying use of a "theological" logic.
Such an interpretive shortcut mistakes the nature of Marx's concern with
logic, whose rejection of Hegel's usage of logical concepts in the Philosophy
oJRight is not that of a radical empiricist like Feuerbach. What troubles
Marx is not Hegel's concern with the logic of the concepts used to grasp
modern society. Marx shares Hegel's concern with getting the logic of
scientifc concepts right but rejects Hegel's appeal to an abstract, indepen-
..
dent science of logic to solve this problem.
In criticizing the way Hegel determines the logic of society, Marx seems
to have been particularly infl uenced by Feuerbach's "invertive method. "
I n Feuerbach's reading of Hegel, the logical concept is the subject. I t has
as its predicate a characteristic of empirical society. Marx pursues this
line of interpretation when he excerpts the following paragraph from the
Philosophy oJRight.
The actual Idea, spirit, which separates itself into the two ideal
spheres of its concept, the family and civil society, and comes out
:
' `~

'

1
.
"EXPERIMENTUM CRUCIS"
of its ideality into its fnitude in or
d
er to be, for itself, infnitely
actual spirit, therewith assigns to these spheres the material of
this its fnite a(tuality, viz. , the human multitude, such that the
share of the individual appears mediated by circumstances,
caprice, and the personal choice of his station in life. 6
29
Here the family and civil society appear to be predicates of "the actual
Idea," which fancies itself the real subject.
For Marx the systematic inversion of subj ect and predicate in the
Philosophy oJ Right raises questions of method concerning Hegel's use of
logic in this real science. Marx concludes that Hegel is applying a
preconstituted logic to the realities of modern European society.
He [Hegel] develops his thinking not out of the obj ect, rather he
develops the object in accordance with ready-made thinking put
together in the abstract sphere of logic.7
By starting with a prefabricated logic, Hegel never gets to the logic of the
things themselves; rather, he uncritically accepts empirical "facts" in
their givenness and shrouds them in a mystical cloak of logic. For Marx
this is no way to do science.
In his introduction to the Science oJ Logic, Hegel mercilessly attacks
formal, external logic, but Marx sees Hegel's logic in the Philosophy oJ Right
as yet another formal logic externally applied to the reality under scientific
scrutiny. Hegel fails in his own proj ect of bridging the gap between logic
and reality because there is an impasse between the abstract science of
logic and any real science of the state. Marx writes: "But there is
bridge built by which one can pass Jrom the general idea oJ the organism to
determinate idea oJ the organism oJ the state or oJ the constitution oJ the state, nor g
such a bridge ever be built. "s
In charging Hegel's science of society with externally relating logic
content, Marx suggests that it is stuck within the dualistic logic of the
Enlightenment. Marx believes that Hegel fails to accomplish the thorough
mediation of logical concepts and empirical reality that his purported
post-Enlightenment philosophy of reconciliation seeks. On the one hand,
Hegel's use of abstract logic places him in the idealist strain of the
Enlightenment; on the other hand, his accommodation of the given
involves him in the positivify characteristic of the polar opposite to Kantian
Fichtean idealism the historical school of law developed by Gustav
Hugo ( 1 764-1 844) .9
By teasing out the unreconciled extremes of Enlightenment dualism
30
BREAKING WITH HEGEL
in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Marx makes an immanent critique of his
teacher. Marx draws the inspiration of his critique from his early aban
donment of the enlightened position of Kant and Fichte in favor of He gel's
philosophy of reconciliation. I
0
It is the demand to search out reason in the
things of this world ( so attractive to Marx in his letter to his father) that
he now holds against Hegel. Marx believes that, despite Hegel's own most
profound aspirations, the Philosophy of Right lapses into heteronomy.
Finite, particular things are determined by a superimposed logic.
Not only is the inspiration of Marx's critique of Hegel itself Hegelian,
but much of the dialectical argument relies on Marx's internalization of
Hegel's logic. Marx thus finds a necessary relationship between Hegel's
one-sided logicism and his one-sided empiricism, which are related as
polar extremes of a common logic, that of Enlightenment dualism.
This inversion of the subjective into the objective' and the
objective into the subjective (which is the consequence of Hegel's
wanting to write the biography of the absolute Substance, of the
Idea, with human activity, etc. , having consequently to appear
as the activity and result of something other than man; a
consequence of Hegel's wanting to let the human essence take
eff ect for itself, as an imaginary individual, instead of letting it
take effect in its actual, human existence) has necessarily the result
that an empirical exi.tent is taken uncritically as the actual truth of
the Idea, for it h not a matter of bringing empirical existence to
its truth, but of bringing the Truth to an empirical existence,
and thereupon the given is developed as a real moment of the
Idea. [More later concerning this inevitable alteration of the
empirical into speculation and speculation into the empirical. ]
1
The necessary relationship between two apparent opposites (speculation
and empiricism) characterizes Hegelian argumentation.
Equally characteristic is Marx's further conclusion. IHegel's logic an
his treatment of empirical actuality compose a false, illusory, and ultI
mately contradictory totality, in that Hegel's logic is not the logc of th

t
empirical actuality, an inadequacy is immanent to botHege
.
l's logiC a

d hiS
use of data. Hegel himself uses this type of argument the IlltroductlO
.
n to
the Phenomenology with respect to the dialectic of concept and object.
Marx's critique is not just an attack on Hegel's strategy for doing real
science by starting with a metaphysical logic of reality, it is also a critiq

e
of Hegel's logic itself and his uncritical empiricism. These arguments will
be studied in the following sections.

'
.

"EXPERIMENTUM CRUCIS"
31
MARX'S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S LOGIC ITSELF
Marx is no less interested than Hegel in the logic of modern European
society. In criticizing Hegel's science of society, Marx criticizes Hegel's
logic and makes some progress in his own concept of logic. The crucial
point at issue is how to conceive of mediation. This should come as no
surprise since reconciliation is the heart and soul of Hegel's philosophical
synthesis. Mediation is called for in the face of conflicting extremes such
as Hegel perceived in the dualisms of the Enlightenment. Mediation is
likewise at the center of Marx's concept of science. Finding the "ought" in
the "is" involves mediation. Where Hegel finds reconciliation, Marx spots
contradiction. Hegel's science of society is cast in the mold of his logic; ifit
is a science of accommodation, it is because Hegel's logic is itself a logic of
accommodation. The mold is fawed.
In Hegel's political philosophy, the incarnation of mediation in the
state is the law-making power, where the monarch and attendant bureau
cracy come into contact with the people, the atoms of civil society, and
where the diverse and opposed needs and interests of monarch and
populace are to be reconciled. Marx gathers a host of arguments from the
political and empirical side against Hegel's theory of the law-making
power as mediator, but we are interested now in the logical implications of
Marx's discussion of the law-making power. Marx states them as follows:
The rational relation, the s yl/ogism, appears then to be complete.
The law-making power, the middle term, is a mixtum compositum of
both extremes: the sovereign principle and civil society, the
empirical singularity and empirical universality, the subject and
predicate. In general Hegel conceives of the syl/ogism as media
tor, as a mixtum compositum. One can say that in his development
of the rational syllogism the whole transcendence and mystical
dualism of his system comes to the surface. The middle term is
the wooden sword, the concealed opposition between universal
ity and singularity. 1
2
Here Marx traces the inadequacy of He gel's conception of the law-making
power as a mediator back to what he sees as a fundamental inadequacy in
Hegel's logic of mediation, typified in the rational syllogism. Marx sees
that logic's promise of reconciliation as an empty boast, a wooden sword.
For Marx, the accommodating and transcendent character of Hegel's
logic of mediation is that it passes beyond the inadequacy of a given
logical level, without revolutionizing that level itself. The relation be
tween civil society and the state is a case in po in t. Hegel's state transcends
32
BREAKING WIH HEGEL
the inadequacy of the sphere of civil society without revolutionizing its
logical atom, the abstract, egoistic individual. The contradictions of the
political sphere result from leaving behind, and not revolutionizing, the
unreconciled contradictions of the sphere of civil society.
The "law-making power" is the totality of the political state, and
precisely because of this it is the contradiction of the state driven to
appearance. I t h there by jus t U much the posited dissolu tion of the
political state. Wholly diferent principles collide in it [the
"law-making power"] . To be sure, it appears to be the opposition
between its elements, the sovereign principle and the Estates,
etc. But in truth it is the antinomy of the political state and civil
sociefY, the contradiction of the abstract political state with itself. 1 3
The law-making power is a third party that expresses, rather than reconciles,
the contradiction between the political state and civil society, and that
contradiction is of a piece with the self-contradictions of both the political
state and civil society.
Marx's point is that the enforced separation of state and civil society is
an institutionalized illusion. Civil society is political. The very severance
of civil society from the state of political act: "The Estates are the political
connotation ofthe private class, of the un political class, which is a contradictio in
adjecto. " ' ' Civil society ( the unofcial class) gains its "political" signif
cance precisely by being of itself unofcial, "non political. " But its very
"non political" character is consummately political. The existence and
functioning of the state as an abstract "political" sphere presupposes the
"de politicizing" of civil society. But the very act of "de politicizing" is
political. This is the reality which the abstract "political" state represses.
The modern state forgets the historical act that constitutes it as the
abstract "political" sphere over against the "non political" sphere of civil
society. 1 5
The antinomy of civil society and state i s the se{fcontradiction of the
abstract "political" state. It is the antinomy of the abstract "political"
state with its necessary presupposition, i. e. , civil society in the shape of a
"de politicized" sphere. The abstract "political" state necessarily posits
civil society and clashes with it, which is self-contradictory. 1 6
The antinomy of civil society and state, their enforced separation, is
equally the self-contradiction of civil society, for it could not exist in its
"un political" form if the abstract "political" sphere did not likewise exist
in seeming detachment from it. Marx insists that the problem of civil
society and the problem of the abstract state are the same: "For example
|
+
i
f

1
.
"EXPERIMENTUM CRUCIS"
33
hcrc,thccontradictionotbclaw-makingpowcrin itsown sclis nothing
othcr than thc contradction o thc political statc, and thus also thc
contradiction o civil socicty with its own sclt'
'
' or Marx, Hcgcl' s
rationalsyllogsmopolitical state-law-making power-civil societ glosscs ovcr
pcrsisting contradctons.
Lpitomizcd by thc doctrinc o thc rational syllogism, Hcgcl's logic o
mcdiationis, orMarx, alogicoaccommodation bccauscitis thc illusory
mcdiation orcal oppositcs thatncithcrcan bc noroughtto bcmcdiatcd.
It is notcworthy that Hcgcl, who rcduccs this absurdity o
mcdiation to its abstract, logical, and hcncc unadultcratcd and
intransigcnt cxprcssion, calls it at thc samc timc thc speculative
myster ologic, thc rational rclationship, thc rational syllogism.
Actual cxtrcmcs cannot bc mcdiatcd with cach othcr, prcciscly
bccauscthcyarcactualcxtrcmcs. Butncithcrarcthcyin nccdo
mcdiation, or thcy arc opposcd csscnccs . Jhcy havc nothing in
commonwithoncanothcr, thcydonotrcquirconcanothcr,thcy
do not complcmcnt onc anothcr. Jhc onc docs notcarry in its
ownwomb thcycarning, thcnccd, thc anticipation othc othcr.
ButwhcnHcgcltrcatsunivcrsalityandsingularity,thcabstract
momcnts osyllogism, as actual oppositcs, this is prcciscly thc
undamcntal dualism o his logic. Anything urthcr rcgarding
this bclongs in thc critiquc oHcgclian logic. )

Jhis 'undamcntal dualism' oHcgcl's logic undcrlics all thc particular
dualisms criticizcd by Marx.
.
I
"
qucstioning thc rational syllogism, Marx gocs to thc hcart o
crttquc oHcgcl. or Hcgcl's doctrinc othc rational syllogism is
.

tcly rclatcd toprcciscly thosc aspccts oHcgcl's philosophy that

rcj ccts. Jo Marx, thc rational syllogism rcprcscnts all thc htim
thcological, and absolutist caturcs oHcgcl 's mctaphysical systcm. It

thc vcry

odcloHc

cl' sown scicntihcmcthodin thcPhilosophy of Right.

I

thc r
.
attonal syllogtsm, all thc particularity oa spccics is containcd
wtth rational ncccssity in thcgcnus. Jhis is cxactly thc idcathat inorms
Hcgcl' sscicnccosocicty,sincchcholdsthatallthcdctcrminationsothc
sci

ncc osocicty thc spccics) arc implicitly containcd in thc scicncc o

ogtc
.
thc

gcnus) . His task as rcal scicntistis simply to makc thc propcr

idcntthcations, to show how thc timclcss logical Idcaunolds itsclinthc
particularitics osocial lic. ' '
Kantdcnicdthathumanintuitioncangraspallparticularsi naunivcr-
34 BREAKING WIH HEGEL
sal. Although hc lclopcn thc attributionointcllcctualintuition to Cod,
Kantwas quitcclcarthatsuchabasisorthcrationalsyllogismwas not a
human modc orcason. Indcpcndcntly oKant, Marx makcs much thc
samc point hcrc against Hcgcl. Hcgcl' s logic o thc rational syllogism
prcsupposcs an absolutc standpoint orcason, a standpoint which, or
Marx,humanrcasonccrtainlyhas notattaincdand,in vicwosomcohis
statcmcnts in thc disscrtation notcs and in thc Critique ofHegel's "Philos
ophy of Right, " cannot attain. Sincc Hcgcl's logic docs posit such a
standpoint, othcr than that ohuman rcason, his logic must bc a hctcro-
nomous onc.
Spurrcd on by cucrbach, Marx rccognizcs Hcgcl's rational syllogism
as a undamcntally theological schcma. Actually, Hcgcl is hardly lcss
cxplicit about thc thcological charactcr o thc rational syllogism than
Marx is in his criticism o it. In Hcgcl's Science of Logi, thc ratonal
syllogismacts asthctransitionrom 'Subjcctivity' to 'bjcctivity, 'and
Hcgclpointsoutinthcopcningpagcsothcscctionon 'bjcctivity' that
thcrationalsyllogismprcscntsthcontologicalprooinrationalorm. Jhc
rational syllogism schcmatizcs crcation as an act o rational ncccssity.
Marx'sdistastc or thc logicothc ontological prooprovokcs a couplco
sardonic intcijcctions whcn hc cxccrpts thc |ollowing scntcncc, which
Hcgclwrotcin thc Philosophy ofRight whilcjustiying thcmonarchy.
In thc so-callcd 'ontological' prooothc cxistcnccoCod, wc
havcthcsamcconvcrsionothc absolutc conccptintocxistcncc
thc samc mystihcation) , which convcrsion has constitutcd thc
dcpth othc Idcain thcmodcrnworld, although rcccntly and
rightly) ithas bccndcclarcdinconceivable. 2 1
SinccHcgcl'srccrcncci nthc hnalclausci s to Kant,wc havc corrobora-
tion oMarx's Kantian sympathics whcrc thc rational syllogism is con-
ccrncd.
It would bc intcrcsting to tracc gcnctically thc thcological ooting o
Hcgcl'slogicomcdiation, butthattasklicsoutsidcthclimitsothiswork.
Ncvcrthclcss, wc can say that thc climatc opost-Hcgclian conccrn with
thccritiqucorcligion,whichwassopromincntinthcworko . . Strauss,
Bruno Baucr, and Ludwig cucrbach, ccrtainly attuncd Marx to rcncct
onrcligionasalogicomcdiationandtobringthcscrcncctionstobcaron
his intcrprctation oHcgcl. cucrbach's critiquc indictcd rcligion as a
dchumanizing modc omcdiation. In his vicv, rcligion consists o con
structingothcrworldlyimagcs and idcals through which humanity mcdi-

.
"EXPERIMENTUM CRUCIS"
35
atesits this-wor|d|yexistence. InHege|'sphi|osophyIeuerbach saw
.
the
mostabstruseandsophisticatedinstanceo|re|igion.Hege|`smeta

hy
.
s:ca|
|ogic was just another a|ienation o| humanity`s concrete asp:rat:ons,
another |a|se mediation.
. .
Instructed by Ieuerbach`s critiques o| re|igio
.
n
.
and

ge|:an ph:|o

o-
phy, Marx sees the common |ogic o| those crt:ques. O

the )
"
:sh
Q t ` documents Marx'sattentiontotheembedded|og:co|re|ig:on. ues :on
.
| Max'sargumentagainstBrunoBauershowsthatthe
.
|

g:cO po:t:ca
,
emancipaton simp|y recyc|es the very |ogic o| re|:g:on that Bauers
po|itica|` emancipation wasdesigned toovercome.
The members o| the po|itica| state are re|igious by way o
.
| the
dua|ismbetween individua|and species |i|e, between the |:|eo|
civi| society and po|itica| |i|e, re|igious in t

at man re|at

s
himse||topo|itica||i|e, whichisotherwor|d|y:
.
thres

ecttoh:s
actua| individua|ity, as to his true |i|e, re|ig:ous,

nso|ar as
re|igionis here the spirit o|civi|society, the express:on o| the
dividinganddistancingo|man |rom man.
Ior Marxtheterm 're|igious`comestostand|orthe|ogica| |orm o|the
third-partytype o|mediation, whichmere|ycoversoverapersistingand
essentia| dua|ism. By interposing the third party o| a re|igious or a
metapnysico-|ogica| sphere between humanity and its own yearnings,
humanity never manages to execute its] own business. ` Because it
|ai|stomediatetherea| contradictionsbetweenuniversa|andparticu|ar,
this 're|igious` |ogic, whether in the |orm o| a natura| or a revea|ed
re|igion,orasHege|'sspecu|ativemetaphysics,mustre|yonthein
hand` o|Ood's providence ,or some corre|ate) toachievein an
wor|d|yway theharmony that is not attainedin this wor|d.
. .. .
The third partyin there|igious |ogic o|mediationis|orMarxasig
contradiction, not proo| o| mediation. Moreover, the third party is
necessary sign o|a contradictoryessence. The midd|e term is the |orm in
which the inner contradiction o| the essence necessari|y appears. Thus,
the|egis|ative powerand, more particu|ar|y, theEstates as the midd|e
term within the |egis|ative power itse||, are |or Marx necessaryappear-
ances o|the contradiction between civi| society and the po|itica| statein
modern Europeansociety. O|the Estates, Marxwrites
As|orthis "mediation," itisthere|ore,as Hege| right|ya

rgues,a||
themorenecessarythatthe middle term between the opposztes comes
36 BREAKING WfH HEGEL
into existence. " I t is itsclmuch morc thc cxistcncc o thc con-
tradiction than othc mcdiation.'
In thc logic o thc ncccssary appcarancc o a contradictory csscncc in
somcthing othcr than itscl, i. c. , thcthird party, Marxsccms to lcan on
Hcgcl's conccpt o thc logic of essence. Hcgcl thought thc csscncc must
appcar, and as somcthing othcr than itscl. Jhiskindological ngurc,
which Marx, thanks in part to cucrbach, comcs to scc as opcrativc in
rcligion,inLnlightcnmcntthought,inHcgcl' sownsystcm,andinmodcrn
Luropcan politics, plays a ccntral rolc in his latcr critiquc opolitical
cconomy as wcll.`
'n thc ]cwish Qucstion' orccully statcs Marx's solution to thc
problcm orcconciling thc individual ocivil socicty with thc 'political'
sphcrc,callingorthcradicaluphcavalocivilsocictyanditslogicalatom,
thcabstract,cgoisticindividual.Jhiswouldlikcwiscbcthcovcrcomingo
civil socicty' ship sidc, thc abstract 'political' sphcrc.
nly whcn thc actual individualman takcs thc abstract citizcn
backintohimscland asanindividualman inhiscmpiricallic,
in his individual labor, in his individual rclationships, has
bccomc a species-being; only whcn thc man has known and
organizcd his own ' :rorces propres" as social orccs, and thus no
longcrscparatcssocialorccromhimsclin thcshapco politicql
orcc, only thcn is human cmancipation brought to com-
plction.
'
Marx'sconccptohumancmancipationlooksto amcdiation ounivcrsal
'social') and particular 'as an individual in his cmpirical lic, in his
individual labor,inhisindividualrclationships') suchthatthcynolongcr
constitutcdistinctsphcrcs. Marxproposcsthislogicothcsocialindivid-
ualin contrast to thc cnlightcncd logic implicit in 'political' cmancipa-
tion through 'human rights'.
Jhc human right to privatc propcrty i s thus thc right to cnjoy
and disposc oonc' s asscts arbitrarily . . . without rccrcncc to
othcr mcn, indcpcndcnt rom socicty. It is thc right o scl-
intcrcst. . . It thc rccdom B bc scl-intcrcstcd| lcts cach man
nndinthcothcrnotthcactualization, butmuchmorcthcbounds o
his rccdom.''
.
'
J

"EXPERIMENTUM CRUCIS" 37
Lnlightcncd 'political' cmancipation puribcs thc political sphcrc oall
particularity 'human rights' arc univcrsal, rcc o thc prcjudiccs o
racc, crccd, scx, in short, all natural and traditional parochialisms only
toinsurcthccquallypurcparticularityand cgoismoindividuals' actions.
Itncgatcsnaturalandtraditionalhumanconh ictsonlybypositinghuman
conh ictasanaturalstatc. Marx' scritiqucothisironicsocial establishing of
asocial individualify maturcs with his political cconomic rcscarch. His
positivcstandpointcontrastssharplywithcnlightcncdpoliticalthcory,or
Marx sccksasocial establishment of social individuals who would rcgard thcir
cllow pcrsons as mcans o cxtcnding thcir own rccdom, rathcr than
stihing it.
As Marx would bc n rst to admit, Hcgcl undcrstood thc division
bctwccncivilsocicty thcsphcrcoparticularity) andthcstatc thcsphcrc
ounivcrsality) . Morcovcr, thc kind orcconciliation ol'homme and le
citayen which Hcgcl cnvisioncd was not thc kind o rcconciliation latcr
proposcd by Marx. In thc Philosophy of Right
,
Hcgcl cxplicitly rcjcctcd
Marx's dcsidcratum coincidcncc othc univcrsal and particular within
civil socicty.
Itmightsccm thatunivcrsalcndswouldbcmorcrcadilyattain-
ablc ithc univcrsalabsorbcd thcstrcngth othcparticularsin
thcwaydcscribcd, or instancc, in Plato'sRepublic. Butthis,too,
is onlyanillusion, sinccboth univcrsalandparticularturn into
oncanothcrandcxistonlyorandbymcansooncanothcr. I !
urthcrmycnds, I urthcr thc cnds othc univcrsal, and this in
turn urthcrs my cnd.'
Itwouldsccmthat,orHcgcl, Marx'sconccption orcconciliationwo
cntail thc loss othat most prccious ruit omodcrn timcs individ
libcrty.A latcrpassagcinthcPhilosopky of Right labclsas 'anaticism'
dcmandor thc coincidcncc othc univcrsal and thc particular.

Jhcwishtohavcthcwholcincvcryparticularcould bculnllcd
only by thc dcsruction othc particular, and anaticism isjust
thcrcusaltogivc scopc toparticulardi`crcnccs.
Jhcsc wcrc not idlc words. In coming to his conccption opolitical
mcdiations, Hcgclwas schoolcd in thc cxpcricncc othc rcnch Kcvolu-
38 BREAKING WITH HEGEL
tion. I t was prcciscly thc c6ortto imposc abstract univcrsals on a disor-
ganizcd,splintcrcdpopulaccwhich,Hcgclbclicvcd, lcdto thc tcrror.Jhc
ongoing cxpcricncc o rcnch politics goadcd him to makc thc many-
lcvclcd mcdiation oparticular and univcrsal a kcynotc o his politcal
philosophy.
rancc lacks Corporations and local govcrnmcnt, i . c. , associa-
tions whcrcin particular and univcrsal intcrcst mcct. . . or
somc timc past,organizations havc bccn ramcdwith avicw to
controlling thcsc particular sphcrcs rom abovc, and c6ort has
chicHy bccn cxpcndcd on organizations othat typc, whilc thc
lowcr classcs, thc massothc population, havc bccn lct morc or
lcssunorganizcd. And yctitis othcutmostimportancc that thc
masscs should bc organizcd bccausc only so do thcy bccomc
mighty and powcrul . ''
.
Hcgclsuggcststhatthcmodcrnstatcwhichhopcstoavoidtotalitarianism
should laminatc itscl with organizations that bind togcthcr particular
intcrcsts and approximatc univcrsality.
Hcgcl'scars arcmorcwidclyclttodaythanin thcwakcothc rcnch
Kcvolution, owing in no small part to thc cxpcricncc orcvolutions that
havc marchcd undcr thc banncr oMarxism. ' o Hcgcl's criticisms o
making thc particularplumbto thc univcrsal, takcn with thc cxpcricnccs
oso many rcvolutions in thc twcnticth ccntury, invalidatc Marx's con-
ccption othc rcconciliation ocivil socicty and thc statc
Jhc passagcs abovc suggcst that Hcgcl thought thc only way to align
thc particular and thc univcrsal was through thc imposition othc lattcr
on thcormcrby thc act oan clitc. Suchhasbccnthccharactcrsticlogic
oMarxistrcvolutionsinthis ccntury. ButMarx'sconccptionorcconcili-
ationsccms torun in thc oppositc dircction rcvolution mustcomc rom
bclow. In this scnsc Marx picks up whcrc Hcgcl's critiquc o rcnch
politics lcavcs o6, with thc organization o thc lowcr classcs. Marx
bclicvcs thatthc prolctariat is capablc odriving homc this cducation o
privatc intcrcst to thc point oidcntity with gcncral intcrcst. As L. H.
Hunthasshown,Marxonlyspcakso thc'dictatorshipo thcprolctariat'
on vcry rarc occasions, and what hc undcrstands by it is no anatic
totalitarianism.''MarxisnotLcnin,cvcnlcssishcStalin,KimilSung,or
Pol Pot. Jhc totalitarian rcpoliticization o civil socicty grotcsqucly
parodics Marx's conccption orcconciliation.
Marx intcnds his conccpt othc social individual not as a stcp back-
wardsromthcrccognitionoindividuallibcrty,whichboth hcandHcgel

'

|

|

|
.

V-

"EXPERIMENTUM CRUCIS"
39
sawas thc productothc riscothc bourg

oisic, buts a stcp cyond tc

limitationsobourgcois libcrty. Marx wouldhardlydtsagrccwtthHcgcls
statcmcnt.
What is othc utmost importancc is that thc l aw or
.
cason
h Id bc shot through and through by thc law oparttcular s ou
` d ` h d dom and that my particular cnd should bccomc cntt c rcc ,
. .
h
.

with thc univcrsal cnd, othcrwisc thc statc ts lcl t c atr

I
ButMarxisnotsosanguincarcadcroAdamSmithasHcgcl,whowrotc,
in thc sourcc citcd abovc, conccrningthcindividualocivilsocicty. 'II
urthcr my cnds, I urthcr thc cnds o thc univcrsal, and this in turn
urthcrsmycnd. 'ThcpointoMarx's critiquc othcPhilosophy ofRight is
that unlcss civil socicty is rcvolutionizcd, particular cnds will ncvcr bc
idcntical withunivcrsalcnds.
Lvcn iit is thccascthat Matx's conccption othc social individual
cannot bc idcntihcd with cithcr a Platonic or a Lcninist dispcnsation o
unvcrsality by an clitc, cvcn i Marx's conccption o rcconciliation
prcsupposcs a conccption o individual libcrty, and cvcn i Marx's
claims that a rcconcilcd socicty cannot bc bascd on a civil socicty
govcrncd by libcral political cconomic principlcs arc right, qucstions
rcmain. How is thc rcvolutionizingothc monads ocivil socicty to takc
placc How docs rcvolution rom bclow procccd? Marx attacks thc an-
tagonisticprcsuppositions osuch libcral human rights as libcrty, cqual-
ity, propcrty, and sccurity. What would a socicty look likc in which thc
positivc connotations othcsc rights wcrc rccd rom thcir antagonistic_ __ _
prcsuppositions A conscqucncc o Marx's conccpt omcdiation is
thc division bctwccn statc and civil socicty would bc abolishcd. Is tb
abolitionothcstatcpossiblcin amodcrnsocicty Isthcabolitiono
socicty dcsirablc
JhiscxcursionintoMarx'spositivcconccptoaloico
.
r
.
ahumancan

d
scicntihcrationalityconcludcs thcdiscussionoMarxs crttqucoHcgcs
.
turns to thc mirror imagc oHcgcl' s logtc,
logc. ^ow our attcntton
namcly, his uscodata.
SHAKI^C 'ACTS' LSL KM CMATISM
ddthoughitmustsccm, MarxconsidcrsHcgclacrudccmpiricist.Marx
occasionally points to a simplc actual crror by Hcgcl, but or thc most
.
.
40
BREAKING WITH HEGEL
parthc praiscsHcgcl'scmpiricalaccuracy.Yct,or Marx,mcrcly stating
thc 'acts' is a bad cmpiricism, a mislcading and potcntially dangcrous
approachto thc givcn, whichmisscs thclogical or conccptual sidc othc
'acts' thcmsclvcs.' Jhcrc arc no purc, prcconccptual, or prclogical
cmpirical atoms . But what is thc rclationship bctwccn thc conccptual
structurc or logic othc invcstigating scicntist and thc charactcr othc
objccts undcr scicntin c scrutiny. This is thc crucial qucstion that Marx
puts to Hcgcl, and in its light crudc cmpiricism may bc considcrcd
potcntially dangcrous .
Marx sccs Hcgcl's scicncc osocicty as dangcrously mislcading prc-
ciscly bccausc Hcgclhadnotworkcd through thc rclationship ohis logic
tothc cmpirical 'acts. 'Hcgcl' scmpiricistscizurcothcgivcnlcdhimto
a hcadlong collccting o'acts' undcr his own logical structurc. Marx
bclicvcs that Hcgcl did not sumcicntly cxaminc thc data in ordcr to
rcthink thc ncxus ologic and 'acts', conscqucntly, his logical rccon-
struction othc 'acts' omodcrn Luropcan socictics rcmains arbitrary.
Likc thc idcalist scicncc oj urisprudcncc that Marx rcjcctcd out o
cxaspcration, Hcgcl's scicnccoobjcctivcspiritstill pours thc undicrcn-
tiatcd 'sand' ocmpirical 'acts'intoahlingcabinctohisownmaking.
In a discussion oHcgcl's thcory othc cxccutivc ruling powcr) , Marx
cxplicitlyattacksHcgcl' s'sand-pouring' approachtothcsubsumptiono
particulars undcr univcrsals.
Jhcsinglcphilosophicaldctcrmination whichHcgclg|vcs to thc
ruling power, is that o"subsumption" othc individual and parti-
cularundcr thc univcrsal, ctc.
Hcgcl satisncs himsclwith that. n thc onc hand, thc catc-
gory 'subsumption' othc particular, ctc. It must bc actual-
izcd. Nowhctakcsanyothccmpiricalcxistcntsothc Prussian
ormodcrn

statc
.
uttcrlyj ustasitis) , whichamongothcrthings
also actualtzcs thts catcgory, cvcn though thiscatcgorydocs not
cxprcss its spccihc csscncc. Applicd mathcmatics is also sub-
sumption, ctc. Hcgcl docs not ask himsclwhcthcr this is thc
rational,thcadcquatcway osub sumpt ion.Hcholdsastonly to
thc one catcgory and satishcs himsclwith hnding a corrcspond-
ing cxistcncc or it.
'
Marx's words strcss thc arbitrary and hctcronomous cast oHcgcl's rcal
scicncc osocicty, hc sccs Hcgcl givingthc lic to hisown strivings. ncc
againHcgcl'smodclothcdialccticoconccptandobjcctin1hcintroduc-
tion to thc Phenomenolog scrvcs Marx's critical purposcs . Marx's point is

s
r
l

:
'
i
1

"EXPERIMENTUM CRUCIS"
41
that by clinging to his givcn catcgorics, Hcgcl balkcd at thc dialcctic o
cxpcricntialknowlcdgc, which looscns such rctcntivcdogmatism through
attcntion to thc logic othc objcct undcr study.
Wcscchcrc that Marxis associatingHcgcl with thc ourold ncxus o
subjcctivism, transccndcncc, conscrvatism, and idolatry which, in his
disscrtationwork,hchad idcntincd withPlato, Lpicurus, and thcYoung
Hcgclans . Inmaking idols ohis ownlogical catcgorics and imposing a
transccndcnt logic on thc actual world, Hcgcl unwittingly cll prcy to
subjcctivsm. or Marx, Hcgcl's 'rcal scicncc' ails to rcach thc logic o
modcrn socicty. Sincc itisunablctotrcatadcquatclythccontradictionso
modcrn socicty, Hcgcl's scicncc accommodatcs to thc modcrn world.
Marx's thcorizing about scicntinc knowlcdgc strcsscs autonomy and
necessiy, two qualitics which comc togcthcrin his argumcnts . Autonomy
mcans hcrc that Marx pursucs thc logic othc objcct ncld, its 'spccinc
csscncc,' rathcr than somc cxtcrnal, prcconccivcd logic. Altcrnativcly,
onc might callthis objcctivity. ) Jhis cntails ncccssity in that thc rclation
bctwccn thc 'acts' and thc logic that is todrawthcm togcthcrinto thc
shapc oa scicncc shcds its arbitrarincss. Jhc obj cct undcr study dctcr-
mincs thc scicncc now in second intension; it dctcrmincs thc logic o thc
'acts. ' Marx'scritiquc ocmpiricismis immancntin callingcmpiricism
to submit thc qucstion othc relation o'acts' and thcir logical rccon-
struction itscltocmpirical scrutiny Jhis critical approach to conccpts
and thcir logical intcrconncctions is onc othc caturcs thatscts Marx' s
thcory oscicntinc knowlcdgc apart rom positivist undcrstandings o
.
.
scicncc.
Jhc altcrcd rclationship bctwccn 'acts' and a logic o scicntinc
rcconstruction rcsults in abandoning thc vcry catcgory o'acts. ' Jhc
logic othc conccpt o'acts' is onc oscnsual immcdiacy. 'acts' arc
barc, onc-dimcnsional, and achicvc thcir scl-idcntity only through 1 _
tualcxclusion. 'acts'rclatc toonc anothcronlycxtcrnally.cachis wh
it s quitc apart rom thc othcr 'acts' it happcns to rclatc to.
havc thcnatncssobcingswithouthistoryandwithoutpotcntiality. It
this logico'acts' thatMarxis attacking in his proposal or a critical

scicncc.
Jhctruc critiquc as opposcdtovulgar critiquc|, howcvcr, shows
thc inncrgcncsis othc Blcsscd Jrinity in thc human brain It
dcscribcs thc actoits birth. Jhus, thc vcritablc philosophical
criticsm othcprcscnt statc-constitution notonly points upthc
contradictions as cxisting, but it clarifes thcm, it comprchcnds
thcir gcncsis, thcir ncccssity. It grasps thcm in thcir proper
mcaning.
42
BREAKING WITH HEGEL
Lct us takc Marx at his word hcrc and scc what hc docs in his own
critical thcory omodcrn Luropcan socicty. Jhccrucial 'act' omodcrn
Luropcan socictics is thc scparation opolitical unctions rom thosc o
cvcryday lic or, at thc individual lcvcl, thc division o le citien and
l'homme. Marx praiscs thc Philosophy ofRight ovcr and ovcr again or thc
wa y in which this basic 'act'omodcrn lic pcnctratcs thc work. Hcgcl
acccpts this 'act'asthcatcomodcrn Luropcansocictyandprocccdsto
construct a rational thcory osocicty that lcavcs thc 'act" intact. Hc is
morc sophisticatcd than modcrn political thinkcrs such as Hobbcs, who
considcr thc abstract, cgoistic pcrson ocivil socicty to bc thc 'natural
man.

,
' Ncvcrthclcss, such sophistication docs not satisy Marx, who
thinks that Hcgcl rctains thc 'act' o thc cgoistic individual o civil
socicty as a principlc ohis scicnccosocicty.
NcithcrHcgclnorHobbcs spotthcncccssitywithwhichthcindividual
o civil socicty appears as 'natural . ' Marx cxplains that, ncccssity as
ollows.
Butman, asamcmbcrocivilsocicty,asunpolitical man, appcars
ncccssarily as natural man. Jhc droits de l'homme appcar as droits
naturels or scl-conscious activity conccntratcs itscl on thc
,
.
political act. Lgoistic man is thcpassive, given rcsult odissolvcd
socicty, thcobjcctoimmediate certainfY, thcrcorcanatural objcct.
Jhcpolitical revolution dissolvcsbourgcoislicintoitscomponcnts
without rcvolutionizing or submitting to critiquc thcsc compo-
ncnts thcmsclvcs. Itrclatcsto civilsocicty, to thcworldonccds,
olabor,o privatcintcrcstandprivatcright,asthcgroundwork of
its existence, as to a presupposition without urthcr grounding,
thcrcorc, as its natural basis.4
0
Jhc political rcvolution institutionalizcs a 'dcpoliticizcd' sphcrc ocivil
socicty, which, strippcd o its political charactcr, appcars as a natural
rcalm.''
Marxcxplodcsthc 'act'o scnsc-ccrtainty.Jhcallcgcd'naturalact'
othc bourgcois individual, thc clcmcnt ocivilsocicty, is actually thc
historical rcsult othc dccatocudalism by thc political rcvolutions o
modcrnLuropc, classically, thcrcnchKcvolution. Jhis clcmcntocivil
socicty is mutablc, although it is thc pcculiar trait o such a political
rcvolution to makc thc bourgcois individual appcar to bc thc 'natural
man.
7
Jhcscpointsrclatct oMarx'sowndcmandsonacriticalscicncc. Marx
bringsoutthcgcncsisothc'act'othcdualismsstate vs. civil sociefy andle

i
"EXPERIMENTUM CRUCIS" 43
citien vs. l 'homme in thcbourgcoisrcvolutionsagainstthccudalordcr, and
hc dcmonstratcs thc ncccssityothc 'naturalncss'ocivil socicty and its
clcmcnt, thc cgoistic individual, on thc basis othcir pcculiar historical
gcncsis in thcpoliticalrcvolutions thatinstitutionalizcd thc contrad;ction
osocictyand individual. Jhus Marx'scritical scicnccshattcrs thcimmc-
diacyo'acts" through aprinciplcdinquiry into thcirhistoryand inncr
logic, an inquirywhich both rcspccts thc autonomy othc objcctstudicd
and dclvcs dccply into thc ncccssity oits movcmcnt.
SLMMAKY AN KLJKSPLCJIVL
Marx's study othc Philosophy of Right takcs up in carncstthctaskoan
immancnt critiqucothc Hcgclian philosophy, which hc idcntincd in his
disscrtation notcs as the philosophical-scicntibc task o his timc. Marx
hypothcsizcs thatthcormoatotalphilosophy' sdissolutionprovidcsthc
clucto itsintcrnalinadcquacy. Bycoming to sccHcgcl'sphilosophy as a
prcarrangcd marriagc o thc Lnlightcnmcnt cxtrcmcs o idcalism and
positivity, rathcr than thcir dialccticalovcrcoming, Marx traccs back to
Hcgcl's own philosophy thc unrcconcilcd dualism opost-Hcgclian ac-
tionalism. thc libcral party' s adhcrcncc to bcd abstract idcals and thc
conscrvativcparty' shxationonthc'badpositivity'oPrussian actuality.
In Hcgcl's Philosophy ofRight Marx hnds morc than thc accommoda-
tionsohis scicnccto thc dictatcs oPrussianRealpolitik; hc bnds Hcgcl's
to bc a scicncc o accommodation. In his disscrtation notcs, Marx ob-
scrvcsthata grcatphilosophcrmaywcllmakcaccommodations,pcrhaps
cvcn consciously, and Marx notcs that Hcgcl madc such accommoda-
tions. Morc important, though, his notcs claim that grcat philosophcrs
cannot bc conscious that thc corc principlcs othcir systcms thcmsclvcs
rcprcscnt an accommodation. Jo discovcr this is thc work othosc who
comc atcr. Bycharging Hcgclwithcxtcrnallyimposing a prcc
logiconcmpiricalrcality,MarxwantstoshowthatHcgcl'sscicnccis
which in principle accommodatcsitsclto thcgivcn actuality.
Having carlicr situatcd thc Philosophy of Right within Hcgcl's philo-

-
sophy, wc scc morc clcarly thc systcmatic conscqucnccs oMarx's cri-
tiquc. Jhc roots oHcgcl' s accommodation lic in thc domination ohis

systcm ophilosophical scicnccs by thc indcpcndcnt scicncc ologic. In

turn, that logic and thc systcm as a wholc prcsupposc thc attainmcnt o
absolutcknowlcdgc, thc cndpointothc Phenomenology. Jhcscconncctions
maycxplain ccrtaincaturcsoMar x' svicwsoHcgcl.namcly,thatinhis
dialoguc 'Clcanthcs' Marx is so troublcd by thc sphcrc o absolutc
knowlcdgc, and that in thc Paris Manuscripts hc ocuscs his attack on
absolutcknowlcdgcwhcn conronting Hcgcl's Phenomenology.

:
'

CHAPTER 3
The ((Paris Manuscripts ": Political
Econom and the Critique of Hegel 's
Absolute Idealism
hc continuity o Marx's hrst work in political cconomy with his
studics in thc Critique oJ Hegel's Philosophy oJRight" and 'nthc]cwish
Qucstion'providcsthcguidingthrcadordiscussingthcParis Manuscripts
l 811) and thc 'Lxccrpts rom Mill's Elements oJ Political Economy. " Sincc
thc critiquc opolitical cconomy will bc considcrcd at lcngth in latcr
chaptcrs, thcocushcrc wiL bc Marx's ncw trcatmcntoHcgcl's dialcc-
tics, onc bascd primarily on thc Phenomenology oJ Spirit. Wc should notc,
howcvcr, that Marx's critiqucs oHcgcl and opolitical cconomy intcr-
pcnctratc onc anothcr. Jhc sccond part o thc chaptcr will cxaminc
Marx's suggcstivc rcmarks on naturalism and humanismin ordcr to scc
whatkind oanticipatory consciousncss Marx's critical scicncc rcquircs.
Hcgclspokcophilosophyas'itstimcgraspcdinthoughts, 'anditwas
on such tcrms that Marxstrovc to criticizc Hcgcl. Marxrccognizcd thc
nccdormakinganimmancntcritiqucoHcgclthatwouldalsorcvcalthc
historical spccincity ohis philosophy. Jhis is thc task on which Marx's
carlywritingsccntcrcd.Jocarryoutthisprojcctrcquircdnotonlyaclosc
scrutinyoHcgcl butalso a carculstudyomodcrnsocicty. Marxou
thc kcy to thc lattcr in classicalpolitical cconomy. n thc basis ohi `
|
two-sidcd rcscarch, hc concludcd that Hcgcl's philosophy did indcc
graspitsowntimcinthoughts,oritcxprcsscdthclogicocapital.Marx's
vicw oHcgcl as thc consummatc philosophcr o thc capitalist social
ormationhndsits mostsophisticatcd,thoughsurrcptitious,cxprcssionin
Capital, butaprcliminaryvcrsionothis thcsiscanbcuncarthcdromthc
Paris Manuscripts ol 811.
JHL LJLKIJY MAKX' SCKIJIQLLHLCLL INJHL
'PAKIS MANLSCKIPJS'
thc scvcral Paris manuscripts, thc onc that appcars lcast conccrncd
with mattcrs opolitical cconomy is thc critiquc oHcgcl's dialcctic and
45
46 BREAKING WrH HEGEL
philosoph as a wholc, yct this cssay is scminal or Marx's dcvcloping
critiquc opolitical cconomy. In it Marx dcciphcrs thc logic oHcgcl's
philosophy in an amazing anticipation ohis latcr critiquc o political
cconomy. romthclogicoHcgcl' sabsolutcidcalism, Marx skctchcs thc
logicoIcapital.
Jhc Parisian critiquc o Hcgcl lics within thc contcxt othc projcct
Marxcstablishcdinhisdisscrtation.Jhcorcwordto thcParis Manuscripts
makcs itclcar that Marx still undcrstands thccritiqucoHcgclin tcrms o
thc syndromc o a total philosophy and its alcrmath. Hc writcs o
"critique's necessay coming to tcrms with its birthplaccHcgclian dialectic
and Ccrman philosophy altogcthcr' ando'thcncccssaryraisingupo
modcrn critiquc bcyond its ownlimitcdncss and raw natural statc '
`
Jhc
critiquc o Hcgcl also scrvcs a polcmical purposc against thc 'critical
thcologians' Ldgar and Bruno Baucr and Max Stirncr) among thc
Young Hcgclians. Marx rcissucs his complaint against thosc post-

Hcgclians who shirk rom turning thcircritical powcrs to thc springs o

thcir own thought, i . c. , to Hcgcl' sphilosophy.
Marxconsidcrs HcgclthcAristotlc omodcrn Luropcan thought.]ust
asMarxsccsthcspccihclogicoclassicalCrcckspcculation continuingto
dctcrminc thc post-Aristotclian philosophics, hc vicws thc work othc
YoungHcgclians withthc cxccption occrtain advanccs bycucrbach)
asvariantorms oHcgcl's spcculation, conhncdtothcsamclogic. Marx
sccks to chartncw ground by uprooting Hcgcl' s philosophy, rathcr than
bynailingitwith'criticism. 'ollowingthclcadohisdisscrtationnotcs,
hctracks Hcgcl's accommodation to thclogicohis philosophy.
Jhcmatizing thc logic o Hcgcl's philosophy as thc locus o Marx's
critiquc cnablcs usto survcythcscopcoMarx's projcct. Hisconccrnor
Hcgcl'sPhenomenology mustbc undcrstood in tcrms othcattcntion to this
logic. In thc Paris Manuscripts, Marx conccrns himsclwith Hcgcl's Phe
nomenology insoaras it is thc 'trucbirthplacc and mystcryothc Hcgclian
philosophy.
, ,
In it Hcgcl hrst prcscnts thc logic o absolutc idcalism,
which thcn inorms thc Science of Logic, thc Enyclopedia of the Philosophical
Sciences, and thc Philosophy ofRight. In his critiquc othc last work, Marx
cxtracts this logic rom an cndpoint oHcgcl's systcmatic dcvclopmcnt.
Now hc gocs back to thc bcginning o Hcgcl's systcm in ordcr to havc
anothcr portocntry to Hcgcl' sphilosophy as a whole.
What ollows is a point-by-point comparison othis ncw critiquc o
Hcgcl with a numbcr o kcy conccpts rom Marx's maturc critiquc o
political cconomy. Sincc Capital o6crs thc most promincnt and rchncd
statcmcnt othat maturc critiquc, it is a rcprcscntativc sourcc or thc
political cconomic conccpts in thc comparison. hc point is not to
prccmpt a dctailcd study o Capital, but to borrow only as much rom
l ' ''

THE PARIS MANUSCRIPTS
47
Capital as is ncccssary to clucidatc thc ull sco

c to
.

ic
.
h Marx a

tici-
patcs thc logic o capitalist cconomic orms whilc crttcizmg thc logic o
Hcgcl's idcalism.
Marxcxplicitly associatcs Hcgclwithclassical political cconomy.
Hcgclsharcs thc standpointothc modcrn national cconomists.
Hc grasps labor as thc essence, as thc scl-conh

ming cs

cnc

o
man,hcsccsonlythcpositivcsidco labor, n

tsncgativstc.
Labor is man's coming-to-be for himself withm exteralzzatlOn
[Entausserung] or as exteralized man.
Jhis passagc is dcccptivc bccausc as yct Marx lacks a rchncd and
di6crcntiatcd usc othc tcrm 'labor. ' As it rcads , Marx sccms to bc
saying that labor is by naturc bothositivc and ncgativc, that it always
involvcs cxtcrnalzaton. But Marx mcans hcrc not labor in gcncral to
intcrprct 'labor' in that way would makc Marx' s critiquc o Hcgcl
unintclligiblc-but alcnatcd labor, abstract labor, thc spccihc typc o
labor that cxsts undcrthc conditions ocapitalist production.'
Marx's rcmark is no morc a naivc congratulation oHcgcl ormaking
thcprinciplcohumanscl-crcationthroughlaborintothcprinciplcothc
Phenomenology than is Marx' s thcory o valuc an uncritical ccho o
Kicardo' slaborthcoryovaluc. JhcbarbisthatHcgclsccsthccsscncco
humanity undcr thc conditions o alicnatcd, abstract labor. Jhc double
character o capitalist socicty pcrmcatcs both classical political cconomy
and Hcgcl's phlosophy. Classical political cconomy and Hcgcl achicvc
undcniablc scicntihc insights, butalways 'within thcramcworkocxtcr-
nalization [Entausserung] . "
Jhchrstdistinctionopoliticalcconomy whichcxcmplihcs thisdou
charactcris that bctwccn usc-valuc and cxchangc-valuc. In thcpnuo
phical sphcrc, this distinction suraccsas that bctwccn 'scnsuous s

ousncss'and 'abstractthinking. 'Marxthinks Hcgcl ollowsthcclassical

political cconomists,whobrackctqucstionsousc-valucromthcrcalmo
political cconomy, bylikcwisc cmptying 'scnsuousscnsuousncss oany
philosophcalsignihcancc.]ust as usc-valucs arc vicwcdby thc political
cconomists as 'carrics ovaluc, ' scnsual objccts arc sccn by Hcgcl as
'carricrsoabstractthought. 'SinccMarxdocsnotscparatcconcrctcand
abstractlaborin hisParisianconccptoalicnatcdlabor,wcmustsaythat
thcproducts oalicnatcdlaborarcmatcrialobjcctsthathavcvalucs. But
in thclanguagcoCapital, wc can say morcprcciscly that thc producto
abstract laboris valuc.
48
BREAKING WITH HEGEL
or Marx tbcproductsoHcgclianabstracttbinkingarcabstracttbings
(Dinge) :
But tbat a scl-consciousncss tbrougb its cxtcrnalization can
posit only thinghood, i . c. , only an abstract tbing, a tbing o
abstraction,andnoactual tbing,isjustasclcar. Itisurtbcrclcar
tbattbctbingboodistbcrcbyinnowaysomctbingindependent
,
or
essential ovcr against scl-consciousncss, but a mcrc crcation,
somctbing tbatis posited by it jscl-consciousncss
Jbis passagcis a morc prccisc prcscntimcntoMarx's maturc tbcory o
valuc and abstract labor tban any otbc ovcrtly cconomic discussion n
tbcParis Manuscripts. Comparc tbcollowing tcxt rom tbc hrst cbaptcro
Capital:
1
!ctusnowconsidcrtbcrcsiducotbcproductsolabor alcrwc
bavc abstractcd away tbc usc-valuc| . Notbingotbcm rcmains
otbcr tban tbc samcgbostly objcctivity, a mcrc congclation o
undi`crcntiatcd buman labor. . . All tbat tbcsc tbings [Dinge]
nowprcscntis tbat in tbcirproductionLuman labor-powcrwas
cxpcndcd

bumanlaboris pilcd-up. Ascrystalsotbis common

social substancc, tbcy arc valucs commodity-valucs.
Marxrcpcats tbc languagco'tbing' (Ding) , wbicb complcmcntsctymo-
logically Marx's criticism oHcgcl and tbc logc ovaluc. ' Marx rcads
Hcgcl as rcducing obj cctivity to tbingbood, to tbc mcrc cxtcrnalizcd
product o scl-consciousncss, oabstract tbinkng

Marx bclicycs tbat

sucb a productis no actual obj cct at all. Valuc ollows tbc samc logc.
Hcrctbc productsolab orarc rcduccd to valucs, tomcrccongclations o
undicrcntiatcd buman labor abstract labor) . Marx labcls tbis crystal-
lizcd abstract labor a 'gbostly Objcctivity. '
In Capital Marx dcvclops tbc dialcctic o tbc value-orm i n ordcr to
dcmonstratc tbc ncccssity witb wbicb valuc drivcs toward an cxtcrnal,
indcpcndcnt cxprcssion o itscl. Jbat cxprcssion is mony. In Hcgcl's
pbilosopby,logic i stbccxtcrnal,indcpcndcntcxprcssionoabstracttbnk-
ing, it is tbc moncy o absolutc spirit. Jbc appcarancc ologic as an
indcpcndcntspbcrcisor Marx ancccssaryconscqucnccotbcactivtyo
abstract(alicnatcd) tbougbt.
_@
. @_ _ _ _
Jbcpositivc tbingtbatHcgclacbicvcd bcrc in bisspcculativc

: 1 -
THE PARIS MANUSCRIPTS
logic is toshow| that thcdeterminate concepts, thc univcrsal,xed
thought-orms in thcirindcpcndcnccovcragainstnaturc and spirit
arcancccssaryrcsultothcunivcrsalalicnation [Entremdung] o
thc human csscncc, hcncc also ohuman thinking.
49
Hcgcl'ssystcmoabsolutcidcalismdcmonstratcs orMarx thc ncccssary
conncctionbctwccnabstract,alicnatcdthinkinganditscxtcrnal,indcpcn-

dcnt cxprcssion in logic,just as Marx's latcr analysis othc valuc-orm

dcmonstratcs thc ncccssary conncction bctwccn abstract, alicnatcd labor
valuc-producing labor) and its cxtcrnal, indcpcndcnt cxprcssion in
moncy.
Bothmoncyand Hcgcl ' slogicarcuttcrlyindi6crcnt to thc spccihcitics
onaturcandhumanity.Jhisrcsultsin thcpcculiardominationohuman
pcrsons by abstract things or thoughts, rcspcctivcly. 'ollowingthc lcad
oHcgcl'sown chaptcr 'orcc and Lndcrstanding' in thcPhenomenology,
along with cucrbach' s critiquc orcligion, Marx intcrprcts moncy and
Hcgcl' s logic as cascs o invcsting abstractions with an indcpcndcnt
actuality. Jhis hypostatization installs abstractions as lords ovcr thc
concrctc actualitics rom which thcy wcrc originally abstractcd. Jhat is
indccd an invcrtcd world, and it dcscribcs what Marx undcrstands by a
rcligious logic.
`

Jhrough this lookingglass, notonly do thc abstractions money and logic

dominatcthc livcdscnsuoushumanworld, thcyappcartohavccrcatcdit.
Jhis is thc logical pattcrn othcontological prooF thc logos madcHcsh.
Marx thought that Hcgcl'slogic, cspccially thc transition romsubjcctiv-
itytoobj cctivity,was anc6ortto rchabilitatc thcontologicalproo. Inthc
discussionothc rational syllogism, which ollows thc logicalormothc
ontological proo by passing rom subjcctivity to objcctivity, Marx'
criticism oHcgcl on this pointhas alrcady bccn considcrcd.
`
n

basisothc claim thatmoncy andHcgcl's logic sharc thcsamclogic, WC
should cxpcct moncy to ollow thc pattcrn othc ontological proo.
In act, Marx had broachcd thc parallcl bctwccn moncy and
ontological prooin his disscrtation notcs. In this rumination on
criticism othc ontological proo, Marxgivcs it an unusual twist.
Jhcontologicalproomcansnothing but. thatwhich I actually
[realiter] prcscntto myscl, is an actualprcscntationor mc that
has its c6ccton mc, and in this scnscall gods, pagan as wcll as
Christian, posscss a rcal cxistcncc . . . Kant's cxamplc othc
onchundrcdtalcrs|couldhavcmadcthcontologicalproomorc
orccul. Actualtalcrs havcthcsamc cxistcncc as imagincdgods
havc| '
50 BREAKING WIH HEGEL
Moncy supports thc ontological proo in that it convcrts thc mcrcly
imagincd into thc actual. And cvcn rcal moncy is 'imagincd,' in thc
scnsc that its c`cctivcncss rcsts not in its own natural powcrs and
qualitics, but in powcrs that arc socially invcstcd in it) Marx notcs this
thcological trait o moncy in thc Paris Manuscripts, whcrc hc writcs .
'Moncy . . . transorms . . . presentation [ Vorstellung] into actualit.
, ,
1 3
Jhc thcmcs oCod, thc ontological proo, and thc rational syllogism
can also bc discusscd undcr Kant's rubric oan intcllcctual intuition.
Charactcristics oan intcllcctual intuition arc that imagination implics
actuality this iscxactlywhatMarxdcscribcs as thclogicothcontologi-
cal proo[, and that thc intuition oa univcrsal orgcnus includcs all thc
particulars or spccics . Wc havc alrcady sccn that moncy has this nrst
quality. Marx implics thc sccond charactcristic in thc opcning lincs o
Capital: 'Jhc wcalth osocictics in which capitalistmodcs oproduction
rcign, appcars as a 'hugc collcction ocommoditics. `
'
' Whatdocsitmcan
J
to say that all thc richcs oa socicty appcar as commoditics cxccpt to
claim that in thc gcnus, moncy, all particular richcs arc likcwisc givcn
Moncy is thc intcllcctual intuition, thcgod oa world ocommoditics.
Soar, wc havc discusscd two caturcs othc sharcd logic oclassical
politicalcconomyandHcgcl' sphilosophy. thcsubjcctivcactivity abstract,
alicnatcd labor and abstract, alicnatcd thinking) and thcproduct othat
activity valuc and thinghood) . Valuc and, ultimatcly, valuc cxisting
indcpcndcntlyasmoncy is thcncccssaryproductoabstractlabor,whilc
i
abstract thinghood and, ultimatcly, thc indcpcndcnt cxistcncc othis
abstractthinghoodinlogic isthcncccssary productoabstractthinking.
Butwhatormdocsthcsubject othcscactiviticstakcMarx'sanswcrto
thisqucstionnts inwithhispriorinvcstigationsothclogicocivilsocicty.
Jhc subjcct osuch abstract activity must itscl bc abstract, it is thc
abstractcgoist.Wcmct this pcculiarormohumansubjcctivityin its rolc
as thc atomocivil socicty. In thc Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right"
and 'n thc]cwish Qucstion,' Marx chastiscs Hcgclor not attacking
this vcry shapc ohuman subjcctivity. Now Marx claims that wc can
rccognizc this samc shapc osubjcctivity in Hcgcl's Phenomenology. 'Jhc
sclthat is abstractcd or itscland nxatcd is man as abstract egoist; it is
egoism thatinits purc abstractionis raiscdtothclcvclothought. '
'
' Jhc
scl that Marx discusscs hcrc is thc subjcct o thc Phenomenolog. Jhs
conccptosclorscl-consciousncss closcs thc dialccticalcirclcopcncdin
thc tcxt which bcgan, 'a scl-consciousncss through its cxtcrnalization
(Entiusserung) canpositonlythinghood. " 1 6 Jhis clauscashionsadialcctical
totalityosubject thcabstractcgoist) , activity cxtcrnalization) , andproduct
thinghood).

Jhc dialcctic in Capital ollows thc samc path. Jhcrc thc momcnts o

!
`
THE PARIS MANUSCRIPTS
51
activity in thc orm o abstract labor, and o thc product, in thc orm o
?
valuc, arcdcvclopcdin thc nrst chaptcr. Jhcmomcntothcsubject, in thc
shapc othc abstract cgoist, is most incisivcly dctailcd in thc chaptcr on
thc buying and sclling o labor-powcr Jhcrc Marx writcs o thc two
pcrsons cntcring into thcwagc contract.
or cach othc two is conccrncd only with himscl. Jhc singlc
powcrwhichbringsthcmtogcthcrandintooncrclationisthato
thcirscln shncss,thcirspccialadvantagc, thcirprivatcintcrcst.' '
Whcrc thc dialcctic o thc valuc-orm in thc n rst chaptcr o Capital
rcsults in moncy, thc dialcctic othc Phenomenology passcs ovcr into thc
Science of Logic. What Marxwritcs oHcgcl's logicapplics also to moncy.
'Jhc wholc logic is thus thc proothatabstract thinking is nothing or
itscl, that thc absolutc Idca is nothing or itscl, that nrst nature is
somcthing.' 'Likc logic,moncytakcnoritsclaloncis morc boringthan
King Midas' srcalm ogold. It docs not cvcn glittcr.
Hcgcl's proccdurccan now bc statcd in tcrms othc maindivisionso
thcEnyclopedia. utoborcdom with its own cmptincss, thc logicalidca
cxtcrnalizcs itscl as naturc and spirit, only to rcturn to itscl in thc
philosophy othc absolutc at thc cnd othc philosophy ospirit. Jhc
logicalidca's storyocxtcrnalization (Entiusserungsgeschichte) parallcls thc
dialcctic bywhich moncy is transormcd into capital, which cxtcrnalizcs
itscland rcturns to itsclin thc valorization proccss ( Verwertungsprocess) .
Jhc logical idca cxtcrnalizcs itscl in nature and human) spirit, but it
rccognizcs naturc and human) spirit only as rcprcscntations oitscl.
'Jhus thcwholc onaturc andwccouldadd 'spirit'hcrc| onlyrcpcats
or him Hcgcl| thc logical abstractions in a scnsuous, cxtcrnalorm. '' '
Absolutc idcalismi sabsolutc scl-prcoccupation.
Whcnmoncyistransormcd intocapital,itiscxtcrnalizcdinto
objccts, human labor-powcr, and products ohuman labors on natu

obj ccts. Capital docs this only insoar as it likcwisc posits thc earth
human labor-power naturc and human spirit) as valucs. At thc cnd oits
`
valorization proccss, capital rcturns to thc spiritualism o its starting
point moncy. Inthcramcworkocapital,thccarthascarth,andhuman
labor as human labor, arc both valueless, just as in absolutc idcalism' s
schcmc othings, "Nature as nature . . . is senseless . . .
, ,

By orgctting

thcir own sourccs, both thc logical idca's story ocxtcrnalization, which
trcads thc logical path othc ncgation othc ncgation on a grand scalc,
and capital' s cyclc oncgations in thc proccss ovalorization, condcmn
thcmsclvcs toa hcllish running in circlcs. '

52 BREAKING WITH HEGEL
JHL KLCIPKCIJY HLMANISM AN SCILNJIIC
KNWLLCL
Jhc Paris Manuscripts o6cr a particularly ruiuul placc to study thc
rcciprocityoMarx'srcncctionsonhumannaturcand his criticalscicncc.
Jhchumanismothcscmanuscriptshascrcatcda considcrablc stirsincc
thcirpublication somc dccadcs ago. Jhis studycanaddtothccnthusiasm
bycallingattcntionto how Marxrclatcshumanismandscicntihcknowl-
cdgc. Jhc spccihcs oMarx's humanism in thc Paris Manuscripts complc-
mcnt his criticisms that Hcgcl and thc classcal political cconomsts
claimcd to bcpracticing a human scicncc.
What is striking about Marx's dcscription o human naturc is his
cmphasis on human bcings as natural, scnsual, objcctivc, and social
bcings. Jhcsc qualitics countcrthc tcndcncy othcsharcd logic oabso-
lutc idcalism and capitalism to scc naturalncss, scnsualness, objcctivty,
andsocialityasconditions tobcovcrcomcbyan abstractcgoisticsubjcct,
in avor othc abstractions ologic orvaluc. Marxacccnts thc use-value
charactcr o naturc, human subjcctivity, and labor, togcthcr with thc
products ohuman labor, againstthcirrcduction to thc value charactcro
moncy or logic. Jhc cmphasismatchcs whatwchavc sccn carlicr rcgard-
ingMarx'spositivcconccptionohumanity. Marx, stillguidcdbythcidca
o cxpanding and cnhancing thc wcalth o human cxpcrcncc, rcjccts
Hcgcl'slogicalidcalismandcapitalism'sidcalismovaluc asimpovcrish-
mcntsohumancxpcricncc. Hcgcl'sphilosophicalscicnccandthcsccncc
opolitical cconomy ail as human scicnccs bccausc thcir constitutions
prcsupposc discmbodicd human pcrsons. Jhcy cnthronc abstract con-
ccpts othc human pcrson, o naturc, and ohuman activity as gods
dominating thc rcal, scnsuous pcrsons and naturc rom which thcsc
conccpts arc abstractcd.
Marx'spositivc skctchcs ohuman naturc spcak to thc thrcc impovcr-
ishmcnts ohumanity hc sccs cmbcddcd in thc logic oabsolutc idcalism
and capitalism. thc disrcgard or particularity, or thc nonconccptual
immcdiacy o scnsualncss and naturalncss, thc subjugation o human
pcrsons and naturc undcr thc abstractctishcs ologicor valuc, and tbc
dcnialohuman sociability by positing thc human subjcct as a monadic
cgoist.
Jhc dcnial oimmcdiatc human scnsuality is criticizcd by Marx in
conncction with having. 'In placc oall physical and spiritual scnscs,
thcrcorc, thc simplcalicnationoall thcsc scnscs, thc scnscohaving has
stcppcdin.
, ,
Having isthcpsychologicalcxprcssionothclogicovaluc,
and abstract, logical in Hcgcl'sscnsc) thinkingcxprcsscs thatsamclogic
oaggrandizcmcnt.Bothcxprcssions othclogicoLnlightcnmcntimpov-
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I
THE PARIS MANUSCRIPTS
53
crish human cxpcricncc by thcir impcrious rcductionism. By this critic-
ism, Marx docs not rccommcnd a simplc rcvcrsion to immcdiatc
gratihcation but rathcr a rccognition that thc tclos omcdiation is thc
rccovcry oan cnrichcd immcdiacy.
Jhc orgcttingand invcrtingothc tclos omcdiation charactcrizcs thc
third party, or rcligious, logic omcdiation. Marx vicws thc logical idca
and moncy as go-bctwccns bccomcctishcs. In thc upsidc-down logic o
absolutcidcalism and valuc, thc scnsualimmcdiacy ohuman labor and
naturc bccomc thc means to attaining thc mcdiators logic and moncy.
Jhis dcnics thc human conatus toward rccdom and ulhllmcnt
Man makcs his lic-activityitsclthcobjcctohiswillingand his
consciousncss. Hchas conscious lic-activity . . . nlythcrcbyis
his activityrcc activity. Alicnatcd labor turns thc tablcs othis
rclationship so that man, prcciscly bccausc hc is a conscious
bcing[ Wesen] , makcshislic-activity,hisessence, onlyamcansor
his existence. '
Jhc invcrsion o mcans and cnds ollows rom displacing thc locus o
autono
.
my rom human pcrsons to absolutc spirit or capital. isplacc-
mcnt, turn, corrcctly cxprcsscs thc law in thc conccpt oautonomy
sharcdbyHcgcland capitalism, aconccptwhoscrcnunciationofnatural-
ncss and scnsuality rcpudiatcs thc human condition obcing cmbodicd
and conditioncd by naturc.
.
varx carcully
.
cvclops this philosophical anthropology in both his
critiquc

thc
.
political
.
cconomy
.
ocapitalismand his critiqucoHcgcl's
absolutcidcaIism.Abricquotationromthclattcrillustratcsthccontrast
bctwccn Marx's conccptohumanautonomyand thc absolutc

capitalist conccpt.
7

Jhatmanisa bodify, naturallyorccul living actual scnsuous
obj cctivcbcing [ Wesen] mcans thathc-as as .hc objctivco hi
csscncc,

thc c
.
xprcssion o his lic [Lebensiusserung] , actual,
s
.
ensuous oJects, or othcr words, that hccanexpress [iusser] his
Lc only actual, scnsuous obj ccts.'
Jhc Hcgclian-capitalist projcct o absolutc scl-constitution is itscl a
misguidcddivinization ohumanity. Marx sccshumanrccdomas condi-
tioncd by thc natural, scnsuous objccts through which it is cxcrciscd.
Alicnatcdlaborandthcyokingohumanpcrsons to thcirownproducts
54 BREAKING WIH HEGEL
arc oapicccwiththc cxchangcothoscproducts through thc mcdiation
o moncy and thc markct. Mar\ sccms to havc lcarncd rom Hcgcl's
chaptcrinthcPhenomenology 'JhcSpiritualKcalmoAnimalsandcccp-
tion or thc Jhing Itscl' how to dcscribc thc typc ohuman rccognition
thattakcs placc in thc markct.
Jhcsocial conncction in which I stand to you, my labor oryour
nccd,isthusalsojustaguise, andourmutualsupplcmcntationis
likcwiscjust aguise or which mutual plundcring scrvcs as thc
groundwork. Jhc intcntion oplundering, odeception, ncccssarily
lay in wait, or wcscckncccssarily to dcccivc onc anothcr sincc
our cxchangc is a scl-intcrcstcd onc, rom your sidc as rom
minc, and cachscl-intcrcstattcmpts to outdo thc othcr.
'
-
Such a monadic, cgoistic lic dcnics thc humanity o cach and cvcry
markctparticipant. Whatcountsincxchangcrclationshipsarcthcrcspcc-
tivc valucs othc objccts, not thc humanity othc pcrsons making thc
cxchangc. Marx poscs an altcrnativc to thc cgoistic, asocial subjcctivity
positcd by producing or thc markct.
Supposcthatwchadproduccdashumans . . . I wouldhavc . . .
8
bccn or you thc mediator bctwccn you and thc spccics, thus
bccomcknownandcl tbyyouyoursclas acomplcmcnttoyour
owncsscnccandas ancccssarypartoyouyourscl, thusknown
myscl tobcconhrmcdinyourthoughtaswcllasinyourlovc. . .
havc madc my individual cxprcssion olic immcdiatcly your
cxprcssionolic, thusimmcdiatclyconfrmed andactualized inmy
individual activity, my truc csscncc, my human, my communal
essence.
ur productions would bc so many mirrors lighting up onc
anothcr's csscnccs. '
Jhis is thc logic othc humanc, scnsuallyrich, social individual

l
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Division III
M arx "Settles)) His Accounts with German
Science

+
\
Jh/0J0t/0h /0 10h 111
Civcn thcmctamorphosisoMarx'sintcrcstsromphilosophy B political
cconomy cvidcnccd by thc lattcr part o'n thc]cwish Qucstion', thc
cxccrpting oworks opolitical cconomy such as thc 'Lxccrpt-Notcs on
]amcs Mill',thcParis Manuscripts; andthcpolitical cconomic thrustohis
critiquc oHcgcl in thc lattcr, it may sccm odd that Marx dcvotcd so
muchcncrgyto thccriticismophilosophyinhis l 811l 81Gwritings, The
Hofy Famify, The German Ideology, and thc 'Jhcscsoncucrbach. 'Yct thc
movc ht Marx's unolding projcct or a ncw, critical scicncc. Marx had
scttlcduponthisprojcctalrcadyinhisdisscrtation, andthccritiqucothc
YoungHcgclians concludcd his trcatmcntothccyclcoHcgclianphilos-
ophy. Jhc immancnt charactcr o Marx's projcct or a critical scicncc
obligcd him not only to dcmonstratc thc logical limitations oHcgcl's
conccptoscicncc but also to provc that post-Hcgclian Ccrman scicncc
squirmcd in thc samc straiackct. Jhis painstaking stratcgy providcd a
basis or thc ncw scicncc bcyond mcrc asscrtion.
rom Marx's corrcspondcncc during this pcriod l 811l 81G) , wc
knowthat hcwasworking on a book on 'Lconomy,' which cvcntually
appcarcd as Capital. Noncthclcss, hc chosc to 'scttlc his accounts' with
prcvious and cxisting Ccrman scicncc bcorc going on to thc positivc
prcscntation ohis ncw, critical scicncc.
It sccmcd to mc vcryimportant tosend in advance othcpositive
dcvclopmcnt, a polcmical writing against Ccrman philosophy
and German socialism up to now. Jhis is ncccssary in ordcr to
prcparc thc public or thc standpoint omy 'Lconomy, 'which
positions itscloppositc thc prcccding Ccrman scicncc.I
I wctakc Marx at his wordhcrc,wcmustgo a stcpurthcr than Lcnin's
aphorism, 'Itisimpossiblccomplctclytoundcrstand Marx's Capital, and
cspcciallyitshrstchaptcr,withouthavingthoroughlystudicd and undcr-
stood thc whole oHcgcl's Logic.
, ,
2
A thorough undcrstanding o Capital
rcquircs thc study oHcgcl's philosophy, thc philosophy othc Young
Hcgclians, and Marx's critiquc othc cntirccyclcospcculativcthought.
58
SETTlNG ACCOUNTS WITH GERMAN SCIENCE
The Hoy Family, The German Ideology
,
and thc 'Jhcscs on cucrbach'
invcstigatc thc clustcr o problcms that motivatc Marx
'
s disscrtation
projcct.thcphilosophyoscl-consciousncss, whichisthcmostimmcdiatc
~ ~ - . .
link bctwccn Lpicurus and thc post-Hcgclians, thc Lnlightcnmcnt, ab-
stract individualism, dualism, thc rcIation oscicncc to thc world thc
praxic turn, andthcaccommodationinHcgcl' s logic. Manyothcscsamc
issucsspurrcdMarx'scritiqucopoliticalcconomy,butit iscvidcntrom
thc lcttcr quotcd abovc that Marx cltcompcllcd to criticizc thc cxtant
Ccrman scicncc bcorc dclvingtoo dccply into political cconomy.
Jhc hypothcscs oMarx' s disscrtation work lcad us to look or two
things in thc philosophy o thc Young Hcgclians. irst, thc shapc o
philosophyin thcwakcoHcgcl should providc somc intcrprctivcclucsto
thcaults oHcgcl
's own philosophy. Sccond, to thc cxtcnt thatthinkcrs
atcr Hcgcl ail to pursuc thcsc clucs and makc an in-dcpth critiquc o
Hcgcl himscl( thcy arc liablc to bc trappcd in thc uncriticizcd logic o
Hcgcl's absolutc idcalism.

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CHAPTER +
Snared in Hegel 's Logic: Bauer, Stirner,
and the True Socialists
cgclscholars mustccluncasy with much othc trcatmcntoHcgcl
and 'Hcgclian' or 'spcculativc' mcthod in thc H ofy Famify and thc
German Ideology. Jhis ccling is wcll-oundcd, inasmuch as Marx undcr-
takcs ahcad-on critiqucoHcgcl'swritings thcmsclvcs notin thcscworks
but in thc Critique of Hegel 's "Philosophy of Right " and thccritiqucoHcgcl
in thc Paris Manuscripts. I Jhc conclusions Marx rcachcs in thosc dircct
conrontations with Hcgcl's philosophy arc not substantially augmcntcd
in thc Hofy Famify or thc German Ideology, but unction as a rcsult to bc
applicdpolcmically to thc Young Hcgclians.
InthcphilosophyothcYoungHcgclians,whichMarxrcgardsasprimar-
ilyavulgarvcrsionoHcgcl'sthoughtalthoughoccasionally alcgitimatc
cxtcnsion oHcgcl to an cxtrcmc conclusion) , Marx sccs thc oiblcs o
Hcgcl's own spcculativc scicncc writ largc. All thc aults o Hcgcl that
Marx had spccihcd in his carlicr critiqucs wcrc magnihcd in thc hrst
gcncration o Hcgclians, including chargcs that Hcgcl's spcculativc
mcthod rcinstatcs thc logic o thc ontological proo and intclctu
intuition, thatthcthird-partytypcomcdiationisundamcntallyd
and conscrvativc, that thc catcgorics o Hcgcl' s absolutc scicncc

groundcdi naprccstablishcd logic amxcd to thc cmpirical actuality tht

purport to dcscribc, that 'prcsuppositionlcss' absolutc idcalism
thc natural and scnsuous qualitics ohuman cxistcncc, that thc logic of
consciousncssin thcPhenomenology is thc logicothcabstractcgoist, whom
Hcgcl had rccognizcd as thc atom ocivilsocictyin hisPhilosophy of Right;
and that all o this givcs spcculativc, philosophical cxprcssion to thc
dcvcloping logic o capital. Jhc act that hc tcstcd Hcgcl's philosophy
bcorc going on to thc lcss vcxing problcm o criticizing thc Young

HcgcliansshouldtcmpcranydismissaloMarx's critiquc asaby-product

opolcmics againstthcYoung Hcgclians. coursc, rcsponscs toMarx's
critiquc might bc dcvclopcd rom Hcgcl's pointovicw.
60 SETTLING ACCOUNTS WITH GERMAN SCIENCE
SPLCLLAJ!VL MLJH K LP!CNLS
Jhc Hofy Famify contains two locations whcrc 'critical critiquc' thc
philosophy o Baucr and ricnds) is idcntincd in dctail with Hcgcl's
spcculativc mcthod. nc othcsc, 'Jhc Mystcry o Spcculativc Con-
struction, ' aims at Szcliga's 'critical prcscntation' o Lugcnc Suc' s
popularnovclLes mysteres de Paris. Marxopcnshis criticismoSzcligaby
asscrting, 'Jhcmystcry othc critical prcscntation othc ' Mystcrcs dc
Paris' is thc mystcry othc speculative, Hegelian construction. `

Marx thcn
parodics thc mcthod ospcculation with thc cxamplc o thc abstract
catcgoryfruit and thc rcal particularspear, apple, and almond. Spcculativc
mcthod nxatcsfruit, thc abstract product othc undcrstanding, as thc
'rcalsubstancc'othcparticulars,whichthcrcorcmustbcspcculativcly
dcrivcd romfruit. Marx writcs othis proccdurc.
!
Jhc common man docs notbclicvcit to bcanythingoutothc
ordinarytosaythatthcrcarcapplcsand pcars.Butthcphiloso-
phcr, whcn hc cxprcsscs thcsc cxistcnts in spcculativc ashion,
has said somcthing extraordinary. Hc has achicvcd a miracle, hc
hasproduccdthcactualnatural being [ Wesen] , thcapplc, thcpcar,
ctc. outothcunactualbcing [ Wesen] othcundcrstanding, "the
ruit', i. c. , hc has made thcscruits out ohis own abstract under
standing [ Verstand] , which hc prcscnts to himscl as absolutc
subjcctoutsidc himscl, hcrc as "the ruit,' and in cachcxistcnt
that hc proclaims, hc cxccutcs an act ocrcation.'
All thc clcmcnts othc rcligious logic o Verstand arc prcscnt hcrc. Jhc
'crcation' o cxisting individuals out o thc abstract csscncc o thc
undcrstandingrcpcats thclogic oan intcllcctual intuition.
Marx's cmphatic usc othc tcrms Verstand and, in thc opcning quota-
tion, construction, in conncction with what is obviously a vcry invcrtcd
world, shows how Marx scl-consciously turns Hcgcl's own critical prc-
scntation oVerstand as in thc third chaptcr othcPhenomenology) against
him by subsuming what Hcgcl would scc as 'rational' ( vernunJtige)
abstractions undcr thc hcading Verstand. !n doing O Marx undcrcuts
Hcgcl'sstratcgyodcnigrating Verstand tothcadvantagcoVemunft, which
was cmpowcrcd with cstablishing absolutc knowlcdgc, thc idcntity o
thinking and bcing.
!n thcscction 'Jhc SpcculativcCirculation oAbsolutcCritiquc and
thcPhilosophyoScl-consciousncss, 'Marx 1inks 'criticalcritiquc'with
Hcgclian philosophy or a sccond timc. Marx idcntincs Bruno Baucr's
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SNARED IN HEGEL'S LOGIC
61
notion oscl-consciousncss with thc notion oscl-consciousncss H thc
Phenomenology, which Marx had attackcd in thcParis Manuscripts. Marx
thcn intcrprcts thc conhict bctwccn avid Strauss and Baucr in a way
thatilluminatcs his attcntivcncss to thclogicoascicntincposition.
JhcstrugglcbctwccnStrauss andBauer ovcrthcsubstance andthc
se(fconsciousness is a strugglc within Hegelian speculations. !n Hegel
thcrc arc three clcmcnts. thc SPinozistic substance; the Fichtean
selconsciousness; and| thc Hegelian, ncccssarily contradiction-
raught, unity oboth, i . c. , absolute spirit.5
What Marx mcans by "within Hegelian speculations" is that Strauss and
Baucrollowtwodi6crcntbandsothcsamclogic.Jhcrcarctwobccausc
thclogicatissucisthatothcLnlightcnmcnt,thcdualisticlogicoVerstand
orwhich Hcgclsoughta spcculativcrcconciliation. Jhus Hcgcl suraccs
hcrcinthcsphcrcospcculativcmctaphysicsjustashcdidinthcsphcrco
politicalphilosophy, asthcculmination oLnlightcnmcnt philosophy, in
whom thc dualistic cxtrcmcs oSpinozistic substanccand ichtcan scl-
consciousncssarc conh atcd, only to splitapartagain.
!n thc German Ideology, Marx portrays both Stirncr and thc Jruc
Socialists as captivcs o thc logic o absolutc idcalism. Marx ridiculcs
Stirncr's rcduction oall rcality to thoughts or conccpts as thc construc-
tion oan invcrtcd world.
Hc Stirncr| actuallybclicvcsin thcdomination othcabstract
thoughtsoidcologyinthcmodcrnworld,hcbclicvcsthatinhis
strugglcagainst 'prcdicatcs, ' against conccpts, hc isnolongcr
attacking an illusion, but thc actual dominant powcrs o thc
world hcncchis manncroturningcvcrythingon its hcad.
'
!n thc concluding scction o thc trcatmcnt o Stirncr's 'Apologctical
Commcntary, 'Marxconsidcrsthcabsolutcidcalistthcmcsoincarnation
andintcllcctualintuition, whichundcrlicStirncr'sapproachtothcoryand
practicc,and,inparticular,hisscarchorthc'word'thatwouldtranslatc
itsclimmcdiatclyinto actuality.
Sancho Stirncr| , who ollows thc philosophcrs through thick
and thin,mustincvitablyscckthcphilosopher's stone, thcsquaring
62
SETTLING ACCOUNTS WITH GERMAN SCIENCE
o thc circlc and thc clixir olic, or a "word" which U such
posscsscs thc miraculous powcr o Icading rom thc rcalm o
languagc through to actuallic. '
Such a transition is prcciscly that oincarnation or thc cmcacy o an
intcllcctualintuition.
JhccriticismsoStirncrshouldhavcasobcringc6cctontalkaboutthc
'unity othcory and practicc' in Marx. Marx cxplicitly disavows, as a
'rcligious' illusion o absolutc idcalism, thc human possblity o an
immediate conncction bctwccn thcory and practcc. Such an immcdiatc
linking would bc possiblc only or an intcllcctual intuition, in which
conccpt and objcct dircctly coincidc. Marx thus conhrms thc KantIan
split bctwccn conccpt and objcct or thcory and practicc that hc had
suggcstcd inhis disscrtation work.'
1
JKANSCLNLNCL, SLBSLKVILNCL, AN JHL SPLCL!AJIVL
CNSJKLCJINSJHLYLNC HLCL!!ANS
Inclosinghis discussionothc mystcry oSzcliga'sspcculativcconstruc-
tion, Marxtics togcthcrthcthcmcsotransccndcncc, dualism, conscrva-
tism, andloss oautonomy much ashchadoncinhisdisscrtationand
inhis criticism oHcgcl's Philosophy ofRight.
In Mr. Szcligawcalsosccabrilliantillustrationohowspccula-
tionon thconchandapparcntlyrcclycrcatcsitsobjccta priori
out oitscland, onthc othcr hand, prcciscly bccausc it wills to
gctrid, bysophistry, othcrationaland natural dcpcndcncc on
thc object, alls into thc most irrational and unnatural bondage to
thc objcct, whosc most accidcntal, most individual dctcrmina-
tions it is obligcd to construc as absolutcly ncccssary and
univcrsal.
1
.
Spcculation ccds on thc trcc o a priori) knowlcdgc at thc cost o its
autonomy. By orgctting thc sourccoits conccpts andimagining thcmto
bcpurc, autonomousproducts, spcculationalls dccpcrundcr thcspcllo
thc givcn than iit had scl-consciously acccptcd its lcan on thc obj cct
standingopposcdtoit.Jhcimpaticnttransccndcnccothcgivcninavor
othcrcalmothc conccptualdisarms thoscconccptsothcirpotcncy or
rcvolutionizing thc givcn.
Spcculationacquicsccs tothc givcn bccause itis notcmpirical cnough.
Spcculativcscl-consciousncsslooks atthcgivcn onlyorthcsatisactono
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SNARED IN HEGEL'S LOGIC
63
sccing its own rch cction. Marx criticizcs Hcgcl' s Philosophy of Right or
mimicking thc Science ofLogic, applying abstract, prcconccivcd catcgorics
to thc cmpirically givcn. Chaptcr8 othc Holy Fami[y sustains a polcmic
against Szcliga's usc othis mcthod ocxtcrnalimportationinrcvicwing
Suc' sLes mysteres de Paris. In thc German Ideology, Marxchidcs Stirncrovcr
andovcragainor his 'clarihcations' othc most divcrsc phcnomcnaby
appcaling to thc samc handul o abstract catcgorics borrowcd rom
Hcgcl . ' ' Jruc Socialist argumcntation turns 'round in its hccl,'just as
Stirncr docs, it conbncs itscl to thc most arid abstractions, such as
'univcrsality' and'individuality,'
-
whichitscrvcs upin morcorms than
a dormitory cook could dcvisc. Marx hits upon an apt imagc or this
cognitivc rcpctition-complcx. 'Likc a kalcidoscopc, this cssay [' Corncr-
stoncs oSocialism' byKudolphMattai|rchccts itsclin itscl,amanncro
dcvclopmcntcommon toallJrucSocialists.
,

' Kalcidoscopcsarcun,but
astronomcrs scldom usc thcm.
Awarcncss o thc ncxus otransccndcncc, dualism, conscrvatism, and
subscrvicncc that charactcrizcs thcsc Young Hcgclians in thcir usc o
spcculativcmcthod putsa ncw light onMarx'samousclcvcnththcsis on
cucrbach. 'Jhc philosophcrs havc only interpreted thc world in various
ways,thcpointistochange it. '' Inthc'cucrbach'scctionothc German
Ideology , Marx placcs thc tcrm 'intcrprct' in thc ramcworkothis specfc
criticism o thc Young Hcgclians.
Sincc, according to thcir antasy, thc rclations omcn, all thcir
doings and drivcs, thcir cttcrs and limitations, arc products o
thcir consciousncss, thc Young Hcgclians consistcntly put to
mcn thc moral postulatc ocxchanging thcir prcscntconscious-
ncssor human, critical, orcgoisticalconsciousncss,and thuso
rcmoving thcir limitations. Jhis dcmand to changc conscious-
ncss procccds rom thc dcmand to intcrprct di6crcntly thc
cstablishmcnt,i . c. , torccognizcitbymcansoanothcrintcrprc-
tation. JhcYoung Hcgclian idcologists, in spitc othcirallcgcdly
'word-shattcring" phrascs, arc thc staunchcstconscrvativcs.''
ncrc thc tcrms 'human,' 'critical,' and 'cgoistical' rcprcscnt, rcspcc-
tivcly, cucrbach and thc Jruc Socialists, thc 'Holy amily' hcadcd by
Bruno Baucr, and Max Stirncr thc 'Lniquc. ' Jhc Young Hcgclian
'intcrprct' thc world accordingto thclogicoabsolutcidcalism tashjon-
ingadua|ismoabstractconccptandgivcnobjcct,thcnasscrtthpriory

o
.
thc conccptual ovcr thc cmpiricallygivc

, which in turn lcads thcm

thmk thcy can changc thc world byattackmg conccpts. But this payin
64 SETTLING ACCOUNTS WITH GERMAN SCIENCE
with thcirown thought-things makcsthcm subscrvicntto thccmpirically

gtvcn.
Ithis is thc contcxt in which wc must undcrstand Marx's usc o
'intcrprct' in thc clcvcnth thcsis ocucrbach, Marx docs notintcnd a
simplcmindcdjuxtapositionoaction vs. thought. Jhc ullsgnncancco
this cryptic thcsis cmcrgcs whcn wc comprchcnd thc scopc o Marx' s
critiqucothc Young Hcgcliansas wc havc discusscdt. itcncompasscsa
critiquc o thc scientifc inadcquacy which complcmcnts thcr practical
barrcnncss.
YLNCHLCLLIAN PHILSPHICALANJHKPLCY
Spcculativc mcthod is not just cpistcmologically dualistic and subscr-
vicntly conscrvativc bchind its haughty scl-imagc opurc autonomous
rcasoning,itimplicsaspiritualisticvicwowhatitmcansO bchuman. In
4
histrcatmcntoHc gcl,Marxprocccdsromancpistcmologcallyoricntcd
critiquc o thc Philosopfy oJ Right to thc Paris Manuscripts' criticism o
Hcgcl'sphilosophicalanthropology. Marxsccsin thcPhenomenology' s drivc
to transccnd objcctivity aninhumanidcal at thc hcartoabsolutc idcal-
ism. Marxlcts this samcjudgmcntall on thcYoungHcgclians.
Boundto thclogicoabsolutcidcalism, thcYoungHcgclianscnvisagc
thcidcalhuman sclas 'rcc' romanyormoobjcctivity. Marx brings
outthis pointwith rccrcncc toBrunoBaucr'sconccptiono'Critiquc'.
Critiquc dctcrmincs thc charactcr oits abstraction as absolute
abstractionin that 'it detaches itscl[tmeveything
,
" andprcciscly
this dctachmcntonothing Jrom everything
,
romall thought, intui-
ton, ctc. , is absolute nonsense. '
]ustas Marx had obscrvcd, in thcParis Manuscripts
,
that Hcgcl's nonob-
jcctivc bcing is a nonbcng, hc now avcrs that 'Cri tical Criticism' s`
absolutc abstraction is absolutcnonscnsc.
In thc continuation o thc abovc tcxt, Marx undcrlincs thc illusory
charactcrothc 'rccdom'attaincdin 'Critiquc' s'absolutcdctachmcnt
bycomparingit to thc 'dctachmcnt' othc carly Christian thcologian
rigcn.
Morcovcr, thc solitudc which is attaincd through thc dctach-
mcnt, abstractionromeverything, is nomorcrccrom thcobjcct
romwhichitabstractsitsclthan Origen wasrccrom thcgenital
organ that hcdetached rom himscll
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SNARED IN HEGEL'S LOGIC 65
JhcrcfcrcncctoCrigcnhcrcisnoaccidcnt,sinccMarxtakcsituplatcri n
his cxtcndcd discussion of Szcliga's rcvicw of Les mysteres de Paris.
Jhcrchclinks Crigcn'scmasculationwith thc punishmcntofblinding,as
manifcstations ofthc pcrvcrsc asccticism ofcarly Christianity. ' '
Jhc association Of thc Young Hcgclians with thc patristic shapc of
Christian consciousncss takcs us back to thc hnal phasc of 'Sc|f-
Consciousncss` H Hcgcl'sPhenomenology, thcunhappyconsciousncss. Wc
hnd oursclvcs vcrymuch within thc framcwork outlincd by Marx in his
disscrtation and notcs, whcrc hc sct out to study thc cyclc of 'Sclf-
Consciousncss` in ordcr to comprchcnd thc currcnts ofpost-Hcgclian
philosophy. Morcovcr, what Marxwritcs of'critical critiquc`rcscmblcs
his intcrprctation ofthcLpicurcan thcory ofthcgods, who abstract from
and avoid thc scnsiblcworld in its cntircty. '
JHL 'CLKMAN !OLCLCCY` ANO CAP!JAL
!n thc Critique of Hegel's "Philosopy ofRight " and 'Cn thcjcwish_ucs-
tion, `Marxtakcstotaskh rstHcgclandthcnBrunoBaucrfor makingno
immancntcriticismofthc 'atom` ofcivilsocicty,thccgoisticindividual.
!t should comc as no surprisc that absolutc idcalists fail to do this, sincc
thcir own logic rcsults in thc most radical, cgoistic individualism. !n a
highly abstract and spcculativc manncr, absolutc idcalism prcscnts civil
socicty's idcology ofcgoistic individualism.
!or Marx thc cntanglcmcnt of thc Young Hcgclians i n thc logic of
absolutc idca|ism causcs thcm to givc anidcological mask to dcvcloping
capitalism. Byrcducing thc world to a thought-thing, a product ofthcir
own abstract thought proccsscs, Baucr and Stirncr mimic capitalism' s
rcal rcductionofhuman and nonhuman naturc to a world ofvalues.
Jhc following scntcncc from Marx's parody of spcculativc
points to a logic which turns up again in thc hrst chaptcr of
'Hcncc also thc valuc ofthc profancfruits consists no longer thcn in tht ,
natural propcrtics, but rather in thcir speculative propcrty, through wn
thcytakcupaspccihc position in thclifc-proccssof'the absolutcfruit. '
Jhc idcalismofthc YoungHcgclians and thc oricntationofcapital sharc
thc most invctcratc cgoccntricity, in thc 'profanc` objccts ofthc natural
world, thcy can scconlymirrorimagcs ofthcirownabstract undcrstand-
ings. thought-thingsin thccascofthcYoungHcgclians, and valucs inthc
casc ofcapitalism. What counts for capital is not thc usc-valuc ("natural
propcrtics`) ofan objcct but its cxchangc-valuc ( "speculative propcrty`) ,
thc rolcr t plays within thc lifc proccss ofcapital.
Larlicr in this chaptcr, wc lookcd at thc tcxt from thc parody of
spcculativc mcthod which follows thc onc immcdiatcly abovc. Jhc pur-
66
SETTLING ACCOUNTS WrH GERMAN SCIENCE
posc thcrc was to indicatc Marx`s idcntincation of thc rcligious logic of
Verstand anditscarmarks . crcation,incarnation,thcontologicalproof,and
intcllcctualintuition.Wcnccdonly obscrvc, aswcdidin thcdiscussionof
Marx`scritiqucofHcgclinthcParis Manuscripts, thatthis rcligious logicof
Verstand is also thc logic ofcapital.
!fMarxhcsitatcdtoidcntifythclogicofabsolutcidcalismwiththclogic
ofcapitalism, hc must havc bccn assurcd by thc publication ofStirncr`s
magnum opus, The Unique and His Properfy. Stirncr`s vcrsion ofabsolutc
idcalism makcs tangiblc thc conncction bctwccn thc story of thc !dca`s
cxtcrnalizationandprivatcpropcrty. HavingtakcnwithBaucrthcstcpof
idcntifyinghimsclfwithabsolutcspirit,hcgocsontoidcntify thc objcctivc
world as his product, and, by virtuc ofthc good Lockcan principlc that
onc`sproductis onc`s propcrty,hcclaims thcworldashispropcrty.Put in
tcrmsofCapital, Stirncr sccs himsclfasaunivcrsalcapitalistwhoproduccs
thcwholcworldofcommoditicsandis,thcrcforc, itsowner.Applyingthc
lcssons hc had lcarncd about owning commoditics, Marx points out thc
odd position in which Stirncrthcrcby placcs himsclf.
!nsofar as Saint Max burns with zcal, i. c. , insofar as zcal is an
actual propcrtyofhim, hc docs notrclatc himsclftoitas crcator,
and insofar as hc rclatcs himsclf as crcator, hc is not actually
zcalous, zcalisforcign to him, anon-propcrtyofhis. As long as
hcburnswith zcal, hcisnotthcowncrofzcal, andas soonashc
bccomcsitsowncr, hcccascs to burnwithzcal. Asthcaggrcgatc
complcx, hc is in cvcry instant, as crcator and owncr, thc
intcrnal conccpt [InbegrW' ] ofall his propcrtics, cxccpt thc onc
which hc brings, as crcation and propcrty, into oppositionwith
himsc|f, as thc totality of all thc othcrs, so that prcciscly thc
propcrtywhich hc strcsscs as his own is alwaysJoreign to him.
.
Whcn hc sccks to producc undcr thc logic ofcommodity production, for
thc sakc ofvalucs rathcr than usc-valucs, Stirncr rclatcs to his products
according to thc logic ofcommodity cxchangc, that is, thcir usc-valuc is
positcd asJor-another. !n othcr words, commoditics cxistfor thc produccr
onlyinsofarasthcyarcalicnatcdfromthcproduccr. SoStirncrandBruno
Baucr scrvcd Marx hcuristically not only in disccrning thc faults of
absolutc idcalism but also in linking it with capitalism. Jo criticizc
cxistingscicncconitsown tcrmsand simultancously linkittothclogicof
spccih c pattcrns olpractical social lifc is charactcristic of Marx`s ap-
proach to scicntihc knowlcdgc.

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CHAPTER 5
Historical Materialism: An
Alternative to Idealism's Disembodying
of History
hc intcrprctation of thc conccpt of historical matcrialism in thc
'Jhcscs on !cucrbach,` thc Hofy Famify, and thc German Ideology par-
tcularly thc'! cucrbach` scctionofthclattcrwork) isdi6cultfor scvcral
rcasons. Considcrthcpolcmicalcontcxt. MarxandLngclsarcstrainingto
sct thcmsclvcs ofrom thc 'Ccrman idcologists,` which may wcll lcad
thcm into cxaggcrations, simplihcations, and ironics that arc di6cult to
idcntify. Jhcn wc must takc into account thc cnthusiasm gcncratcd by
thisncwmatcrialist'thcory` ofhistory.OoMarxandLngclsfalltcmpo-
rarily into a constructionist fallacy, thinking that onc nccd only rcpcti-
tivcly apply thc samc simplc thcsis to all historical pcriods in ordcr to
attain a scicntihc account of thcm A furthcr di6culty can bc gathcrcd
from thc lcttcr ofMarx quotcd in thc introduction to division , along
with what hc writcs at thc cnd ofthc prcfacc to thcHofy Famify.
Wc thcrcforc prcscnt this polcmic bcforc thc autonomous writ-
ings in which wc cach of us for himsclf, of coursc shall
prcscntourpositivcvicwand thcrcbyourpositivc rclationtothc
morc rcccnt philosophical and social doctrincs. '
Wc may ask if thc 'thcory` ofhistorical matcrialism prcscntcd in thc
thrcc works mcntioncd abovc is itsclfpositivc scicncc or a critical prolc-
gomcna to that scicncc. !inally, with rcspcct to thc German Ideology, wc
havc thc addcd problcms of not knowing cxactly how and by whom
whcthcrbyMarx, by Lngcls, orjointly) thc various parts ofthc manu-
script wcrc writtcn, and ofcvaluating thc rcsponsibilitics in cascs ofrcal
coauthorship.
68
SETTLING ACCOUNTS WfH GERMAN SCIENCE
MAKX VS. SPLCILAJ!VL H! SJCK!CCKAPHY
Marx'scriticismsofspcculativcmcthodand thc philosophicalanthropol-
ogy ofabsolutc idcalism cstablish a contcxtfor hs attack on spcculativc
historiographyandforhisownhistoricalmatcralsm. Josccths conncc-
tions , lct us considcr a cclcbratcd passagc from thc German Ideology n
which Marx cxpounds his historicalmatcrialism atthc cxpcnsc ofspccu-
lativc historiography.
W
.
it-thcprcsuppositionlcssCcrmanswc mustbcginwithasccr-
tammgthchrstprcsuppositionsofallhumancxstcncc,thcrcforc
alsoofallhistory, namcly, thcprcsupposition thatmcn must bc
in a position to livc in ordcr to 'makc history.
, ,

!n d
.
iscus
.
sing thc Jruc Socialist Hcrmann Scmmig, Marx had attackcd
thc idcahst tcnct ofprcsuppositionlcssncss undcr thc rclatcd rubrcs of
human activity and human thought.
Cur author imprudcntly rcvcals to us that it frcc activity| is
activitywhich 'is notdctcrmincdbythings cxtcrnal to us, `i . c. ,
actus purus, thc purc, absolutc activity, which i s nothing but
activity, and is in thc lastinstancc tantamountto thcllusion of
purc thought. `
With itscxaggcratcd, misanthropic claim toabsolutc spiritual auton-
om
J
, spcculativc idcalism rcduccs human pcrsons to "carriers" of spirit.
Jhis fcaturc ofabsolutc idcalist historiography lcd Marx to takc a cr-
cumspcct stancc toward a tclcological approach to thc wholc ofhistory.
justas according to thc carlicr tclcologists, plants cxist in ordcr
tobccatcnbyanimals, andanimalscxistinordcrtobccatcnby
mcn, so history cxists to scrvc as thc act ofconsumption of
thcorctical cating, orproving . . .
Histoy thus bccomcs, as docs truth, a pcrson apart, a mcta-
physicalsubjcctofwhichthcactualhumanindividuals arcmcrc
carrcrs.'
rhcs

cculativctel

olog
.
ofhistorylookstoomuchlikcatheology ofhistory,
i n which thc providcntial purposcs ofthc god ofhstory arc hctcrono-
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HISTORICAL MA TERIALISM 69
mously imposcd on human pcrsons. Sincc Marx vicwcd capitalism as
rcd
ucing pcrsons to carricrs of valuc, bustling about thc busincss of
capital' suncndingaccumulation, hcmighthavctakcn thisYoungHcgc-
lian undcrstanding ofhistory as a rathcr insightful rcmark, not about
history pcr sc but abouthistorydominatcd by capital.
KL
JH!NK!NCJHLBL!NC SL!N) CCNSC!CISNLSS
BLWISSJSL!N) CCNNLCJ!CN
Polcmicsandironyha vcthcirdangcrs,andacascinpointisthchistoryin
Marxist thcoryofthc conccpts being (Sein) , consciousness (Bewusstsein) , and
reciprocal Oect ( Wechselwirkung) . What ! takc to bca polcmical and ironic
uscofthcsc conccpts, cspcciallyinthc '!cucrbach` scctionofthc German
Ideology, has bccnfor thc most part canonizcd as simplc truth in Marxist
accountsofhistoricalmatcrialism.AgainstthcYoungHcgclians' isolation
ofconsciousncss from thc wholc ofhuman cxistcncc, Marxidcntincs thc
practical, matcrial, cmbodicd charactcrofhuman historywith bcingand
asscrtsitspriority,somctimcs tothcpointofmakinghumanconsciousncss
ancpiphcnomcnonofthatsocialbcing,oratlcastitsrcciprocalccct,thc
cxtcrnal in ucncc ofindcpcndcnt cntitics upon onc anothcr, as in thc
gravitational forccs bctwccn thc sun and thc carth.
But this polcmical turning-upsidc-down of thc dualistic catcgorial
framcwork ofLnlightcnmcnt thought bcing-consciousncss) docs not do
justicctothcoriginalityofMar x' sthought.!tistrucrto thcoutlookofthc
!rcnch matcrialists ofthc cightccnthccntury,whomMarxplaccd in thc
camp ofLnlightcnmcnt thinkcrs Ccrtainly Marxapprcciatcd thc attcn-
tivcncss ofthc !rcnch matcrialists to thc matcrial, scnsuous qualitics of
human lifc, but thcy rcprcscntcd only an abstract ncgation, a mere
turning-upsidc-down, of thc idcalist position. Jhat is, thcy rctaincd

samclogicaldualism butaltcrcd thcordcrofpriority. !tisthcthcsisof

prcscntstudythat Marx wascxtrcmclyattcntivctothc logics of
'
scicnccs and that, in particular,hcsoughtto transccnd thc dualistic
'

ofLnlightcnmcntthoughtitsclf. Jhis thcsismakcsintclligiblcthcfacttha

Marx criticizcd both thc idcalistic and matcrialistic splintcrings of Ln

lightcnmcnt thought.
!n Marx' srcadingofthcphilosophyofHc gclandthcYoungHcgclians,
thc conccpts ofconsciousncss and bcing assumc a vcry spccihc scnsc.
Bcing is rcduccd to a mcrc 'carricr` ofconsciousncss, an ordcring of
prioritics which prcsupposcs thc dualism of consciousncss and bcing.
Marxopposcsboth thconc-sidcddominationofconsciousncssovcrbcing
and spcculation' sritbctwccn thctwo. Ccrtain ofMarx's statcmcnts and
phrascs kcy on this sccond, oIcnovcrlookcd, point. !or cxamplc, in thc
70 SETTLING ACCOUNTS WITH GERMAN SCIENCE
'Jhcscs on !cucrbach,' Marx strivcs, with such phrascs an 'scnsuous
human activity, ` 'praxis, ` 'obj cctivc activity,` and 'rcvolutionary,
practical-critical activity, ` to disrupt thc clcan dualism ofconsciousncss
andbcingthat thcmatcrialists and idcalists sharcd.
Marxintcnds muchthcsamccritiqucofthcbcing-consciousncss rit in
thcsc tcxts from thc German Ideology:
Consciousncss can ncvcr bc anything othcr than conscious
bcing, and thc bcingofmcn is thcir actualproccssoflifc.
Consciousncss docs notdctcrminc lifc, butlifc dctcrmincs con-
sciousncss. !n thcformcrwayof lookingatthingsoncstartsout
fromthcconsciousncssasthclivingindividual,inthclattcrway,
thcway corrcsponding toactual lifc, oncstarts outfrom actual
living individuals thcmsclvcs and takcs consciousncss into ac-
count only as thcir consciousncss.

Jhcsc tcxts twist thc prccxisting tcrminology ofconsciousncss and bcing

or lifc) out of its old composurc. !f wc stay within thc logic of thc
Lnlightcnmcnt, thcsc two tcxts simply turn thc tablcs and rcducc con-
sciousncss to an cpiphcnomcnon ofbcing or lifc) . But thc tcxts can bc
intcrprctcd dicrcntly ifwc attcnd thc logic ofthc catcgorics involvcd.
Jhcn thc point is not that consciousncss is just an cpiphcnomcnon of
bcing or lifc) butthatitncvcrcxistsapartfrom, as anindcpcndcntcntity
dctachcd from, bcing orlifc) . Consciousncss is alwaysthcconsciousness-of
somc dctcrminatc lifc practicc.
A way of looking at this that harkcns back to Marx's carly, ncvcr-
abandoncdmotivcs is to say that hc is trying to outdo Hcgcl. !n Marx' s
cycs, Hcgcl's absolutc idcalism rcvcrtcd to thcsubjcctivc dualism ofthc
Lnlightcnmcnt. Hcgclfailcd to achicvcprccisclythatwhich had inspircd
thcyouthfulMarx tohnd thc rational in thc rcal. Hcgcl's dialccticwas
too subjcctivc and cxtcrnal, hcdid notrcally gct at thc rcason ofactual
things. !nthis Marxsaw a failurcas a scicntihcpointofvicw, itwas thc
Hcgclian rcduction of thc dialcctic to an aair of consciousncss
abstractcd from thc lcss voluntary, natural, matcrial clcmcnts ofhuman
cxistcncc that Marx sought to corrcct with thc program of historical
matcrialism.
Jhc matcrialistdialccticofsubjcct and objcctand its di6crcnccfrom thc
Hcgclian dialcctic arc putrathcrclcarly in a passagc from thc Hofy Family,
whcrc Max argucs hat thc subjcct, thc 'mass` Baucr's tcrm for!hc
opprcsscd majority) , crcatcs its dialcctically oppositc objcct, its cncmy.
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HISTORICAL MA TERlALlSM
Jhccncmicsofprogrcssoutside thcmassarcprccisclythcproducts
of seljdebasement, selj:riection and seljextemalization of thc mass
which havcbccncndowcd with indcpcndcnt bcing and a lifc of
thcirown.Jhusthc mass dircctsitsclfagainsti tsown aw, whcn
it dirccts itsclfagainst thc indcpcndcntly cxistingproducts ofits
seUdebasement. '
71
1hu

far this dialcctic rcscmblcs thc sclf-constitution ofspirit m Hcgcl's

Phenomenology, thatis,whatsccmsath rsttobcanobjcctindcpcndcntof,
and cxtcrnal to, thc subj cct is sccn to bc its own product. But Marx

contmucs.
!t 'thc mass`j must in no way hold thcsc products of its
sclf-cxtcrnalization to bc only ideal phantasmagoria or mcrc
extemalizations ofself-consciousness, and itmust not wish toabolish
material alicnation througha purcly inward, spiritualistic action.
Jhcmass`alicnatcs itsclfin thc vcry actofproduction, thus its product
is alicn to it. Jhc charactcr of its own production is awcd, and any
changcfor'thcmass`mustinvolvcarcconstitutionofitsclfanditsmodcs
ofactivity. Butthis activity, thisproduction,isnotthcmcrcactivityofan
abstract consciousncss spinning its wcbs. !t is rcal, practical activity
takingplacc and shapc inancxtcrnalmatcrial world, which is notmcrcly
a product ofconsciousncss. Jhc altcringofcstablishcd pattcrns ofpracti-
cal activity involvcsmorc thana changcofconsciousncss. Jhc purposcof
matcrialist, scicntihc dialcctics is tocomprchcnd thcimmancntdynamic,
thc rcal potcntialitics of thcsc pattcrns ofpractical activity.
Such adialccticposcs a much morc ambitiousprojcctthanspccula
idcalism' sapproachtothcstudyofhistory.Marx`saccountofthcstra
ofidcalist historiography should show why this is thc casc. Jhc '!cite
bach` scction of thc German Ideology, distinguishcs thrcc stcps in
spcculativcrcconstruction ofhistory. !irst, idcas arc scparatcdfrom thc:
cmpirical grounds and arc positcd as thc ruling charactcristics of a
historicalpcriod, sccond, thcsc'rulingidcas` arc broughtinto somc kind

ofordcr as thc 'sclf-dctcrminations ofthcconccpt`, third, thcconccptis

incarnatcdasapcrson, 'sclf-consciousncss, `oras ahistorical scqucnccof
pcrsons, thcphilosophcrs andthinkcrs,whoarccnshrincdas thccrcators
ofhistory.

Jhis spcculativcarrangcmcntofthoughts as sclf-dctcrminations ofthc

conccptiscasicrthanMarx'sownproccdurc, butlcss scicntihc, bccauscit
pullsthcshadcofabstractiononthclivcd,practicalrcaliticsofhumanlifc.
72 SETTLING ACCOUNTS WITH GERMAN SCIENCE
Spcculation discmbodics history by transfcrring all signihcancc to thc
rcalm of idcas, which rcsults in dehistoricizing material factors in human
history. 'Jhc actual production oflifc appcars as a historical primitivc,
whilcthchistoricalappcars as thatwhichisscparatcdfrom common lifc,
that which is cxtra-worldly, abovc thc world.`' Jhis typc ofrchcctivc
dualism rcincs thc idcational and idcntihcs it as thc historical, whilc
tossing othc matcrial substancc ofhuman history as an cmpty husk.
!accd with such a dualism, a matcrialist dialcctic must grasp thc
ncccssitics in thcwcbbingofpractical, matcrial lifc and thc morc cxplic-
itly idcational faccts in history. Cr, in thc tcrminology ofthis study, wc
may say that thc task ofa matcrialistdialcctic is to cxplicatc thc logic of
practical lifc and to dcmonstratc thc mingling of that logic with thc
idcational rcalm. Jhis task dcmands attcntion to thc formal or logical
charactcristics ofpractical, matcrial lifc in a givcn historical pcriod.
INOLKSJANO!NC H!SJCK!CAL MAJLK!AL!SM

AS
MAJLK!AL!SJ PHLNCMLNCLCCY
!tmaybchclpfultothinkofMarx'sconccptofhistoricalmatcrialismasa
matcrialist rcconstitution of Hcgcl's scicncc of phcnomcnal knowlcdgc
alongwhatHcgclcallcdits 'highwayofdcspair,` arcconstitutionwhich
includcs aprinciplcd abandonmcntofabsolutc knowlcdgc. !orMarx thc
human world, social and natural, takcs shapc within ccrtain broad
paramctcrs, thcmsclvcs not historical, which arc sumcicntly mcagcr to
discouragc bcstowing thc tcrm 'scicncc` on thc busincss of tallying
thcm.
'
But thc rcality cxpcricnccd within thcsc constraints holds a
historical dialcctic of subjcct-obj cct co-constitution similar to that of
Hcgcl`s Phenomenology.
Human prcscncc in thc natural world is experience-constituting, as Marx
suggcsts withhisphrasc 'objcctivcorscnsuous-humanorpracticalactiv-
ity. `Humancxpcricncc isaproduct,thcworkofhumanactioninandon
naturc, with thc aid of hands, tools, scnscs, conccpts, and hypothcscs.
!urthcrmorc, thc 'practical activity` of human bcings always takcs a
dctcrminatcform, dcpcndcnt upon past and cxisting modcs ofpractical
lifc. Jhc notion that thc logics of scicncc arc thcmsclvcs historical was
discusscdcarlicr,thcmatcrialisttwistonthisaddsthatthcyarccmbroilcd
in thc logics ofpractical matcrial lifc.
A H!SJCK!CAL MAJLK!AL!SJACCCINJ C! IJ!L!JY
JHLCKY
!n thc Hofy Famify and thc German Ideology
,
Marx skctchcs historical
matcrialist accounts ofscvcral intcllcctual dcvclopmcnts. Kant's moral




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HISTORICAL MA TERIALISM
73
philosophy, utility thcory and political cconomy, Lnglish and !rcnch
matcrialism, and Young Hcgclianism. ' ' Lach ofthcsc analyscs holds its
intcrcst, butfor us thc most fruitful cxamplc ofhistoricalmatcrialism at
work sccms to bc thc trcatmcnt ofutility thcory and political cconomy.
As an asidc in his trcatmcnt of Stirncr`s usc ofinsights from utility
thcory,Marxoutlincsahistoricalmatcrialistprcscntationofutilitythcory
and political cconomy. Hc acccpts, apparcntly without rcscrvation,
Hcgcl`s claim in thc chaptcr of thc Phenomenology, 'Jhc Strugglc of
Lnlightcnmcnt with Supcrstition,` that utility thcory is thc logical out-
comc of thc Lnlightcnmcnt. But Marx givcs thc mattcr a matcrialist
intcrprctation by rclating utility to commcrcc.
Jhc sccming foolishncss which dissolvcs all thc manifold rcla-
tionships of mcn to onc anothcr into thc one rclationship of
uscfulncss, this sccmingly mctaphysical abstraction, comcs out
ofthcfactthatwithinmodcrncivilsocictyallrclationshipsarcin
practicc subsumcd undcr thc onc abstract monctary and com-
mcrcial rclationship.'

Jhc

dcc

cnin

of ncgcl`s thcory along matcrialist lincs has practical

ramifcations, implymg that to ovcrcomc thc logic ofutility rcquircs not
onlyanabandonmcntofthcutilitarian'mind-sct` butalsoarcvolutionof
thcsocialrclationships bascdoncxchangc-valucandmoncy.Jhcrcvolu-
tion, morcovcr, is much morc than a changc ofconsciousncss.
Whilc cxplicating Holbach's thcory ofutility, Marx shows how it hts
thc logic ofthc Lnlightcnmcnt. ' Jhc point was madc carlicrthatMarx
classihcd
.
thc logic of thc Lnlightcnmcnt as a spccial rcligious logic,
charactcrzcd by a third-party approach to mcdiation, which hc notcs
hcrc.

All activation ofindividuals through thcir mutual intcrcoursc,

c. g. , spccch, lovc, ctc. , is prcscntcd by Holbach as a rclationof
utility and utilization. Jhc actual rclations, which arc hcrc
prcsupposcd,arc,thcrcforc.spcaking,loving dctcrminatcacti-
vationsofdctcrminatc charactcristicsofindividuals. Jhcscrcla-
tionsarcnow supposcd not to havcthcirproper connotation, but
rathcr to bc thc cxprcssion and thc prcscntation of a third
rclation, which is shovcd undcr thcm, thc relation of utilify or
utilization. ' '
Jhis cxhibitsthcpcculiarlogicofthcLnlightcnmcntthroughthcspccihc
quality ofthc third party utility) and thc naturc ofits rclationship to
` ``
74 SETTLING ACCOUNTS WIH GERMAN SCIENCE
spccch, lovc, and thclikc. Jhcrclationshipmccts thcbasiccritcriaofthc
logic ofttLt as charactcrizcd by Hcgclin his trcatiscs onlogic. Itility
itsclfdocsnotappcar. !tis, rathcr, thcabstractsubstancc, thc csscncc, to
which all appcaranccs ofspccch and lovc arc commcnsurablc.
Politicalcconomy is thc 'rcalscicncc`
'
` ofthc thcoryofutilty,and, in
thc courscofafcwpagcs, Marxshuttlcs back and forth across thcLnglish
Channcl, comparingthcrclativcdcvclopmcntsin thcthcory ofutilityand
politicalcconomy in Lngland and !rancc with rcfcrcncc to thcirdicrng
cconomicandpoliticalhistorics. Marxjudgcsthatutility thcoryisthctruc

childofthc Lnlightcnmcnt, and thatpoliticalcconomyis thc truc scicncc

ofthc thcory ofutility, hcncc, scicntihc criticism of thc Lnlightcnmcnt
must turn its attcntion to thc 'dismal scicncc` itscll
!inally, Marx`s digrcssion on utility thcory lcads us into thc problcms
ofrclativismandhistoricism. Marx's historicalmatcrialistcxplanation of
utility thcory has an cvaluativc dimcnsion. !or thc pcriod whcn thc class
J
.
rcprcscntativcsofthclogicofutilityhavc notyctattaincdpoliticalpowcr,
Marxis sympathctic to utility thcory.
Hcncc, Holbach`s thcory is thchistoricallyjustihcd philosophi-
calillusion aboutthcbourgcoisicjustthcncomingupin!rancc,
whosc lustfor cxploitation couldstillbcsctforth as lustfor thc
fulldcvclopmcntofindividuals in an intcrcourscfrccdofthcold
fcudal bonds . '
Cncc thc bourgcoisic has cstablishcdits hcgcmony, howcvcr, thc logicof
utility provcs itsclf a logic of cxploitation. Indcr thcsc ncw historical
conditions, utility thcory assumcs a ncgativccast.
Jhccconomic contcnt gradually transformcd thc utility thcory
into amcrc apologyfor thc prcvailingconditions, into thc proof
thatundcrthccxisting conditions thc currcntrclationsofmcnto
onc anothcr arc thc most advantagcous and most gcncrally
uscful. ' '
!s such a wcdding ofthc cvaluation ofa thcory to its historical rolc an
unconscionablchistoricismWcshallrcturn to this qucstionatcrconsid-
cring thc signih cancc of Marx`s matcrialist phcnomcnology for natural

scicncc.

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HISTORICAL MA TERIALISM
NAJIKAL SC!LNCL L JHL L!CHJ C! MAJLK!AL!SJ
PHLNCMLNCLCCY
75
Marx disavows any radical scparation ofnatural scicncc from human,
social, or cultural scicncc. Any absolutc clcavagc would prcsupposc a
catcgorical distinction bctwccn naturc and culturc, bctwccn thing and
pcrson. Marx sccs this typc ofdistinction making as intimatcly ticd up
withthcdualisticlogicofthcLnlightcnmcnt. !dcalistssuchas Stirncrand
Bruno Baucr, as wcll as thc matcrialist !cucrbach, only rcpcat thc
8
distinction. Jhcsc cxtrcmcs ofidcalism and matcrialism sharc a lack of
.
mcdiationbctwccnthcmatcrialor scnsualand thc conccptualor thcorct-
ical. As notcdcarlicr,thc ccctoftcaringapartthcsctwodimcnsionsis to
dchistoricizc matcrial lifc. Jhc point ofMarx's historical matcrialism is
that, as long as thcrc arc humans, thcrc is an activc, co-constituting
rclation ofnaturc and history or culturc, and only a hxating ofabstrac-
tions typical ofthc logic ofVerstand allows thc catcgorical brcak bctwccn
naturc and history.
Naturalscicnccis sccnbymatcrialistphcnomcnologyto bchistorically
constitutcd in atlcasttwoways. Cn thconc hand, naturalscicncchasfor
its obj cct not thc immutablc, atomic 'facts` of!cucrbach's cmpiricism
buthistoricallyformcdobjccts. Cnthcothcrhand, naturalscicnccitsclfis
no purc spirit hovcring abovc thc bustlc of human aairs, it too is a
historically workcd up product. Jhcsc two fronts ofthc historical mcdia-
tion of natural scicncc thc constitution of its objcct and its own
constitution arc roughly indicatcd by Marx`s tcrms, 'matcrial` and
'purposc, ` inthis rcsponscto!cucrbach`s conccptionofnaturalscicncc.
!cucrbachspcaksnamclyofthc intuitivcncssofnaturalscicncc,
hcmcntionsmystcricswhichbccomcmanifcstonly to thccycof
thc physicist and chcmist, but whcrc would natural scicncc bc
without industry and tradc Lvcn this 'purc` natural scicncc
rcccivcs its purposc [Zweck] aswcllas its matcrialhrst through
tradc and industry, through scnsuous human activity.
'
Whcn, a pagc prior to this passagc, Marx points out that only thc
commcrcial importation ofchcrry trccs fromthc Cricnt allowcd thcm to
bc pcrccivcd in Ccrmany, ' ' wc arc dcaling with a constitution of thc
cxpcricnccdworldachicvcdthroughthcagcncicsofmanuallabor, thcarts
oftransportation,thcartsofgardcning, and, ofcoursc, thclcgal,hnancial,
and, pcrhaps, politicaland militaryinstitutions andactiviticsthatcondi-
tion tradc in chcrry trccs. Jhc prcviously quotcd tcxt conccrning thc
76
SETTING ACCOUNTS WITH GERMAN SCIENCE
.
historicalconditioningofnaturalscicnccsuggcsts similartypcsofhuman
activityasconstitutivcofnaturalscicncc.Activiticsofthcsortinvolvcdin
makingchcrrytrcsspartofthccxpcricnccofninctccnth-ccnturyCcrmans
maysccmcxtrinsicandunintcrcstingtophilosophcrsofscicncc,butMarx
ccrtainly would insist, against idcalist historiography ofnatural sccncc,
thatsuchactivitics play a rolc inconstitutingnatural scicncc.
Jhcinsistcncconthc rathcrmundanchistoricalconditioningofnatural
scicnccis a propcr conscqucncc ofhow matcrialistphcnomcnology rcdi-
rccts Ccrman idcalism`s notion ofsubjcctivity through thc human body
and its 'inorganic body, ` thcnaturalworld. Almostall ofwhatiscallcd
Marxist history of natural scicncc lcans cxclusivcly on rclating thc dc-
vclopmcnt ofnatural scicncc to thc cxpansion oftradc, to political and
militaryconqucsts,toclassstrugglcs,tothcpowcrofrcligions, tocxplora-
tions of rcgions formcrly inacccssiblc to scicncc, to dcvclopmcnts in
scicntihc instrumcnts, and thc likc. Whilc rcscarch along thcsc lincs has
J
its valuc, thcrc has bccn a tcndcncy to clamp onto thcsc mundanc
constitucnts of natural scicncc and to forgct that Marx`s conccpt of
historical matcrialism includcs thc appropriation of thc world through
languagc, conccpts, hypothcscs, and logics.
JobalanccthcwcightplaccdonthcmundancmodcsoIhumanactivty
inhishandlingof!cucrbach,lctuslookatMax`s attcntiontothclogicof
carlymodcrnnaturalscicnccin his critiquc ofBruno Baucr`s accountof
!rcnch matcrialism. !n skctching his own 'profanc` history of !rcnch
matcrialism, Marx discusscs !rancis Bacon and Jhomas Hobbcs as
matcrialistsandphilosophcrsofnaturalscicncc. Baconsccsscicnccasthc
scicnccofcxpcricncc, whichprovidcs rationalordcr to thc scnsibly givcn
'facts. ' Motion ranks as thc most important of mattcr`s qualitics, but
Bacondocsnotrcducc it to abstract, mcchanical, mathcmatical motion.
Jhough Bacon`s matcrialism and cxpcrimcntalism stridc away from
traditionalmctaphysicstowardthcrationalityofthcncwbourgcoisforms
ofpractical lifc, as Marx commcnts, Bacon`s 'aphoristic doctrinc itsclf
still tccms withthcologicalinconsistcncics.
"20
! nHobbcsnaturalscicnccrcccivcsaconccptualand logicalfoundation
that kccps pacc with thc incrcasing irrcligiosity and abstractncss ofhis
timcs. Marx sccs Hobbcs rcconccptualizing thc scnsualism of Bacon.
'Scnsuousncssloscsitshowcrsandbccomcs thcabstractscnsuousncss of
thc geometer. Physical movcmcnt is sacrihccd for thc mechanical or
mathematical.
"2
1 Against thc varicgatcd and individualizcd scnsuality of
Bacon`s scicntihc conccpts, Hobbcs institutcs an abstract, gcomctricizcd
scnsuality with appropriatc ncw scicntihc conccpts. Jhc logic of this
Hobbcsiannaturalscicnccisnotthatofthcartisanofobscrvation, butthc
logicofgcomctry, thclogicofVerstand. '!t Hobbcs`smatcrialism| cntcrs

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HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 77
thc sccnc as a being of the understanding, but it also dcvclops thc hccdlcss
consistcncyoIthcundcrstanding.
, ,
JhclogicoIVerstand canalso bcsccn
as alogicoIessence, Iorallscnsations,imagcs,andidcasarc'phantoms'oI
a world oIbodics strippcd oIall scnsiblc clothing, inshort, thc scnsuous
world bccomcs thc appearance oIthcessential world oIgcomctrical bodics.
! n thcsc charactcrizations oI Bacon and Hobbcs, Ior thc most part
MarxcovcrsgroundquitcIamiliartohimIrom thcchaptcrs'lcrccption'
and '!orcc and Indcrstanding' in Hcgcl`s Phenomenology. What dicr-
cncc thcrc is bctwccn Hcgcl and Marx on thcsc points lics in Marx`s
matcrialist insistcncc on giving thcprofane history oIBritish philosophy
and !rcnch matcralism. Although thc analysis oI utility thcory was
writtcnsomcwhatlatcr,thcrcsccmstobcnorcasonnottoIollowitslincoI
thought, only now with rcgard to thcorics oI natural scicncc such as
Hobbcs`sthcory,whichuscthcsamccnlightcncd logic. Wcmay rccallthc
kcy toMarx`s account oIutility thcory. thc logicoI Verstand is thclogicoI
commoditycxchangc. JhcunivcrsalizingoIcommoditycxchangcand thc
concomitant cmcrgcnccoIvaluc as a dominant social catcgory pavc thc
wayboth Ior utility thcoryand Ior modcrnnatural scicncc.
!rom Marx's history oI !rcnch matcrialism, wc can scc that thc
conccpts andlogicsoInatural scicncchavcnoprivilcgcdstatus ovcrand
aganst thosc o|thc philosophical orsocial scicnccs. Morcovcr, thc con-
ccpts and logics oInatural scicncc Iurnish as much grist Ior thc mill oI
matcrialistphcnomcnologyasdothcmorcmundancmatcrialconstitucnts
oInatural scicncc. Jhc cmphasis on thc lattcr in thc !cucrbach critiquc
and in thc latcr history oI Marxism arc distortions, whcn takcn as thc
wholc story. Jhc ambition oI Marx`s matcrialist phcnomcnology i s to
comprchcnd rationally thcfull scalc oIhuman activitics cngagcd in thc
constitution oInatural scicncc.
H!SJCK!CAL MAJLK!AL! SMANO lKACJICAL!JY
Jhc inclusionoInaturalscicncc undcr thc acgis oIhistoricalmatcrialism
maysccm to compound thcproblcm oIhistoricism that arosc inconncc-

tion with Marx`s account oIutility thcory. Without closurc in absolutc

knowlcdgc or a prcconsttutcd rcality

what dicrcntiatcs thc history oI

scicnccIromahistoryoIidcology !n a radicalscnsc,nothingdocs !Iby
'idcology' smcant anythngshortoIabsolutc knowlcdgc, thchistoryoI
scicnccsi sahistoryoIidcologcs. Hcgcl conccivcdoIabsolutcknowlcdgc
accordng to thcCartcsianproblcmatic oIccrtainty, indccd, thcPhenome
nology can bcrcad as a dialccticoIknowlcdgc and ccrtainty which rcsults
in thcir coincidcncc in absolutc knowlcdgc. Jo takc thc Cartcsian critc-
ron oIknowlcdgc-with-ccrtainty as normativc Ior scicncc is, in Marx`s
_ .,
78 SETTLING ACCOUNTS WIH GERMAN SCIENCE

vicw, to adopt a thcological, or suprahuman, standard Sucha scicnccis

thc provincc of an intcllcctual intuition, not of a human, dscursvc,
nonoriginativc intuition.
lragmatism, or 'pragmaticism, ' grcw out of vcry smlar thoughts
aboutthcstandardofscicncc. C. S. lcircctacklcdthcproblcmofabsolutc
knowlcdgc, not in its Hcgclian formulation, as Marx dd, but with
rcfcrcncc to Ocscartcs himsclf. Jhc thcory of scicnthc dcvclopmcnt
framcd by lcircc also sccs thc history of scicncc as a hstor\ of
idcologics whcn mcasurcd against thc Cartcsian norm. But lcircc dd
not rcst with this ncgativc rcsult, which proddcd him to dcvsc an
altcrnativc to thc Cartcsian critcrionofccrtainty, namcly, thc pragmatic
norm
Likc lcircc, Marx says that thc tcst of our knowlcdgc must bc
practical.
' 'lractical, ' for Marx, docs notjust mcan instrumcntal
'Oocs it work' or what Kantmight call 'tcchnical', nor docs Marx
mcanpracticalinKant'srchncdmoralscnsc, butpracticlwithrcfcrcncc
to thc comprchcnsivc and historical task ofbccoming morc human. tis
on this typc ofstandard that Marxis ablc both to a6rm uti|ity thcory as
thc idcology ofthc rcvolutionary bourgcoisic, and to condcmn t as thc
conscrvativc idcology of an cntrcnchcd bourgcoisic. 1hc chaptcr that
follows willcxaminc Marx's practical philosophy i nmorcdctail, taking
.
notc of its dicrcnccs with thc practical philosophics of idcalism and
matcrialism, and sccinghowitis intcgratcd into Marx's thcory ofsccn-
tihcLnowlcdgc.
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Scientic Knowledge) Practical
Philosophies) and Practice
arx' s rchcctions on thc rclationship bctwccn scicncc and practicc
form onc ofthc distinctivc fcaturcs ofhis thcory ofscicntihc knowlcdgc.
Jhis chaptcrwill considcrMarx's criticisms ofthcpracticalphilosophics
of idcalism and matcrialism, and it will skctch Marx' s own positivc
practical philosophy, placing cmphasis on his critiquc of 'morality, '
undcrstood as thc practical philosophy of idcalism. Max Stirncr and
Bruno Baucr arc thc primctargcts hcrc. JhchcartofMarx's critiquc of
both idcalist and matcrialistpractical philosophics lics in his rcjcction of
thcir dualistic foundations, in particular, thc dualism ofthcorctical and
practicalrcason. Sinccthclogicofdualismhndsitsclassicformulationsin
thcphilosophyof !mmanucl Kant,abricfprcscntationofhisvicwsonthc
rclation bctwccn thcorcticalandpracticalrcason will bc hclpful.
Jhc problcm of rclating scicncc to qucstions ofpracticc is a long-
standingphilosophical issuc. Kant' s criticalphilosophyis awatcrshcdin
modcrn dclibcrations on thc issuc. By thcmatizing thc unity ofrcason,
Kantrccognizcs thc intcrrclatcdncss ofthcvarious intcrcsts andfacultics
ofhumanrcason. ! ndccd,his Critique oJ Pure Reason showsawayoutoftu(
apparcnt contradiction bctwccn thc rcspcctivc claims ofthcorctical
practical moral) rcason. Kant' s hrsttwo critiqucs adducc a mosttcm
ous rclationship bctwccn thcorctical and practical rcason, dcmo
mcrclythcirpossible compatibility.Butin his third critiquc,Kantanalyzcs
acsthctic and tclcologicalj udgmcnt as activitics ofhuman rcason that in
somcway span thcravinc bctwccn knowlcdgc and morality.Jhc Critique
oJ Judgment culminatcs in thc primacyofthc practical moral) , a doctrinc
which had alrcady bccn acccptcd in thc hrst critiquc. Ycti n thc third
critiquc and associatcd writings on history, Kant cmploys thc notion of
culture to suggcsta middlcground bctwccn thc cxtrcmcs oftcchnical and
practical moral) rcason.
Kant' snotion ofculturc as a middlingarcaofhistorical cmbodimcnts
thatcan cncouragc ordiscouragcmoralitycomcs muchcloscr to Marx's

80
SEJLlNG A CCOUNTS WTH GERMAN SCIENCE
#
conccpt ofthcpractical thandocs thc notion ofpurc morality. Howcvcr,
MarxncvcrdrawsonKant`snotionofculturc,instcad,hcconccntratcson
undcrmining thc strict Kantian idcntincation of thc practical with thc
moral. Marx rcjccts thc vcry idcal ofKantian morality, thc absolutcly
autonomous act of a purc will. Such a rarcncd, 'moral` approach to
humanpracticc rcprcscnts,for Marx, an inhumancdcnialofthcnatural,
cmbodicd charactcrofhumanaction.
'MCKAL!JY` ANOKLVCLIJ!CN
BrunoBaucr and Max Stirncr cxcmplify for Marx thc shortcomings ofa
Kantian, 'moral` approach to practicc. Both divcst thcmsclvcs ofany
naturalor cvcn spiritualdctcrminations in an cort to whittlc thcirwills
down to thc purity of 'thc Critic` and 'thc Iniquc. ` !n this Marx
disccrns thc tcrrorism ofan abstract idcal ofautonomy against thc full
rcality ofthc human pcrson.

Jhc thcory ofrcbcllion promulgatcd by Stirncrfollows such an inhu-

manlogicofpurincation. Havingrcduccd thc humanpcrsontoabstract
sclf-consciousncss,Stirncrmustlikcwisccnvisionrcbcllionasa changcof
consciousncss-or him aItcring thc matcrial circumstanccs oflifc misscs
thcpointcntircly.Stirncrthcmatizcsthis inopposingrcbcllion to rcvolu-
tion.
Kcvolution aimcd at ncw arrangements; rcbcllion lcads to a posi-
tionwhcrcwcnolongcrallow othcrstoarrangcthingsforus

but
arrangc things for oursclvcs . . . !t is no strugglc against thc
cstablishmcnt, for ifrcbcllion thrivcs, thc cstablishmcnt wll
collapscofitsc|f, itisonly amattcrofworking Mysclfoutofthc
cstablishmcnt. !f! abandon thc cstablishmcnt, thcn itis dcad
andputrcncs. NowsinccMypurposcis notthcovcrthrowofan
cstablishmcnt, butMyrisingabovc it, Myintcntionandactarc
not political or social

but rathcr, as dircctcd to Mc and My

pcculiarity alonc, egoistical. 4
Rebellion, which is Stirncr`s 'cgoistical` altcrnativc to rcvolution, trans-
poscs thc spiritualism ofindividual morality ontosocicty as a wholc.
Marx`s rcsponsc gocs right to thc dualismthatframcs Stirncr`s thcory
ofrcbcllion and rcvolution.
!orhim jStirncr| , thcrcisthc'transformationofcxistingcondi-
tions` on thc onc sidc and 'mcn` on thcothcr, and both sidcs

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SCIENCE, PRACTICE, THEORY OF PRACTCE
arc cntirclyscparatcdfromoncanothcr. Jhcfurthcstthingfrom
Sancho`s thought is that thc 'cxistingconditions` wcrc always
thc conditions ofthcsc mcn and could ncvcr havc bccn trans-
formcd without mcn having transformcd thcmsclvcs , and, ifit
has to bc cxprcsscd oncc in this way, unlcss thcy bccamc
'drssatrsh cd with thcmsclvcs` in thc old conditions.
81
Whcrc Stirncr`s notion of rcbcllion dcpcnds upon his dcnial ofhuman
cmbodimcnt, Marx`s thcory ofrcvolution as thc concurrcnt changing of
circumstanccsandconsciousncssrclicsonthis thcoryofthchumanpcrson
U an 'objcctivc' agcnt.JoMarxthcradicalscparationofcircumstanccs
and consciousncss is a hxation ofidcalist philosophy.
Sincc thc targct ofMarx`s criticism in thc tcxt abovc is thcdualism
undcrlyingStirncr`s idcalisticposition, itscrvcs cqually to rcfutca matc-
rialism which drains subj cctivity from 'circumstanccs . ` Whcrc idcalist
morality onc-sidcdly acccntuatcs thc purc will, such a matcrialism rc-
duccs rcvolution tothcmcrcchangcofcircumstanccs socialcnginccring.
JhislcadsMarxtoinvcrthisargumcntagainstStirncr`sidcalismandaim
it at classical !rcnch matcrialism. 'Jhc matcrialist tcaching on thc
changingofcircumstanccsandcducationforgcts thatcircumstanccsmust
bc changcd by mcn and that thccducator must himsclfbc cducatcd. `

!dcalism and matcrialismpayhomagc to thc samctwo-faccd idol mircd

in thc cnlightcncd logic ofdualism, thcy arc condcmncd unccasingly to
battcr onc anothcr`s hcads.
HLCLL!AN KCCJS C! MAKX`S CK!J!_IL C! 'MCKAL!JY`
Lvaluating 'morality` s`cmcacyas apracticalphilosophyisasimportant
to Marx asjudging thcidcalof'morality,` whcthcrpcrsonal or
!or Marx 'morality` is similar to rcligion in that it cxprcsscs
against thc waythrngs arc, but,likc rcligion, it is afccklcssprotcst.
oftcn invokcs thc imagc of thc schoolmarm to dcscribc thc 'moral
consciousncss ofthcYoung Hcgclians. !or'morality` tolccturc rcality
on how it ought to bc rs a thanklcss task sincc, likc most childrcn, thc
world srmplygocs its own way.
JhislastphrascplaysonthctitlcofHcgcl`sscctioninthcPhenomenology
'Virtuc and thc Way ofthc World` in ordcr to sctstraight thc lincagc of
Marx's thinking. Jhc scctions ofthc Phenomenology dcaling with various
dispositions ofmoral consciousncss "Virtuc and thc Way ofthc World,`
'Jhc InhappyConscrousncss,` and Morality` rcccivc littlcattcntion in
studicsofMarx.Yctthcscscctionsarcofprofoundsignihcancc,inparticular,
for Marx`s thcory ofscrcntihc knowlcdgc.'
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82 SETTLING ACCOUNTS WrH GERMAN SCIENCE
Hcgclradicalizcsandhistorically spccihcs Kant`snotionofthcunityof
rcasonand thc dialcctic ofthcorcticalandpracticalrcason. Hc trcats this
dialcctic as a hcrmcncutical principlc for comprchcnding thc history of
thought. Lach historically achicvcd systcm ofthought unihcs thcorctical
andpracticalrcason in itsownparticularway. A historicalunihcationof
rcasonhas a particular historical logic. Jhc complcmcntarity ofthcorct-
icalandpracticalrcasonwithin thatunihcationcan bccxprcsscd,thcn,by
saying that thcorctical and practical rcason arc disposcd within that
particular systcm according to a common logic. Marx`s own disscrtaton
providcs a classic cxposition ofthis dialccticofthcorctical and practical
rcason within a common logic. Lpicurus`s natural thcorctical) phi

losophy and his moral (practical) philosophy arc shown by Marx to bc

informcd bythcsamclogicofthcabstractindividual sclf-conscousncss .

Marx`s thcory of scicntihc knowlcdgc, thcrcforc, ridcs thc wakc of

Hcgcl`s radicalization ofKant`s conccption ofthcunityofhuman rcason
and thc conscqucntdialccticofthcorcticalandpractical rcason. Scicntihc
knowlcdgc cncompasscs thc wholc dialcctic. Jhis mcans that Marx's
adoptionofHcgcliancritiqucsofvarious dispositionsofmoral conscous-
ncss, takcn with his own sundry critiqucs ofcontcmporancous and past
practical philosophics and hi s own positivc conccpt ofpractical philos-
ophy, arc no mcrc asidcs to his thcory ofscicntihc knowlcdgc. Jhcy arc
co-constitutive ofscicntihcknowlcdgc for Marx. JhisrcadingofMarx cuts
against thc grain of thosc intcrprctcrs who think that Marx had a
positivistic conccption ofscicncc, constitutcd in uttcr abstraction from
practical rcason."
Marx` s analysis of thc 'moral` philosophy of thc Young Hcgclans
addrcsscs thc dialcctical rclationship bctwccn thcorctical and practical
rcason. Marx analyzcs thc involvcmcnt ofthcphilosophics ofthc Young
Hcgclians in thc samc ncxus ofdualism, transccndcncc, positivity, ab-
stract sclf-consciousncss, and idolatry that hc had oncc outlncd in thc
notcs to his disscrtation. Jhc thcorctical philosophy of thc Young
Hcgclians fails to challcngcthcgivcn 'facts`, itdocsnot scc thcscnsiblc
worldasaspccihc,historicalproductinaproccsswhichhasdctcrmnatc
potcntialiti cs. Jhc Young Hcgclians prcfcr to soar abovc thc cmpirical
into a transccndcnt rcalm of 'idcas` ofpurc consciousncss. Jhcory`s
transccndcncc implics a dualism cvidcnt in Baucr'sjuxtaposition ofthc
'thc Critic` and 'thc mass,` or in Stirncr`s 'thc Iniquc` and 'its
propcrty.
, ,
' ' Baucr and Stirncr conccivc ofpracticc strictly in tcrms of
changingthcirownconsciousncss. 'Critiquc, ' `cgoism,`and 'rcbcllion`
all proposc a practicc httcd toabstract sclf-conscousncss . `Morality` i s
thc dialcctical countcrpart, i n thc rcalm olpractical philosophy, \L a
thcorctical philosophy whosc sights arc sct by thc givcn 'facts. `
Whcn scicncc takcs this uncritical, positivcform, construing rcality as

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SCIENCE, PRACTICE, THEORY OF PRA CTICE 83

an irrational othcr, thc possibilitics for practicc shapc up as Hcgcl
dcscribcd. Lrthcronctakcs thc 'bcautiful soul` routc closctoLpicurcan
morality) andavoids thchctcronomousworld dcscribcd byscicncc,oronc
cuts onc`s own trail ofvirtuc through thcjunglc ofthc world, wiclding
idcals likc a machctc.
Jhc conscqucnccs ofthcsc 'moral` approachcs to practicc rangc from
pitiful to fcarful. Cnc rcsponsc to thc world`s intransigcncc towardyour
moralidcalsis tohndconsolationinthcthoughtthatyouarcnotrcallyof
this world or that thc world is simply not rcady for sucha prophct) . Cr
thc tdc ofworldlycvcnts may simplywash awaystalwartvirtuc. !inally,
fyouarcsumcicntlysclf-assurcdofthcobj cctivcvalidityofyourmorality,
and you actually attain worldly powcr, you havc at hand thc tcrroristic
solution to thc incrtiaofthc world. !fthc world will not listcn, cut oits
cars. Jhc 'morality` ofidcalism tcnds toward thcpitifullyincmcacious,
whilc thc matcrialist ncgation of'morality` is pronc to tcrroristic man-
ifcstations. Marxrcfcrstothclatcntauthoritarianismofmatcrialisminhis
thirdthcsison!cucrbach. 'l t thcmatcrialisttcachingonthcchangingof
circumstanccs and cducation| must thcrcforc clcavc socicty into two
parts oncofwhich rs clcvatcd abovcsocicty. `'
Jhc rcspcctivc historics
oICcrmany idcalism) and !rancc matcrialism) in thc cightccnth and
ninctccnth ccnturcs illustratc thcsc cxtrcmcs ofincmcacy and tcrror.
'MCKAL!JY,` KLL!C!CN, ANO SC!LNCL
What Marx criticizcs in thc various practical philosophics that can bc
callcd 'moral` dcrivcs fromhisconccptionofthclogicofrcligion, which
cmbraccs transccndcncc, dualism, and attcmptcd mcdiation through a
thrd party. !n thc Hofy Famir and thc German Ideology, Marx uscs
rcligous mctaphors to crcatc thc ambiancc for criticizing thc

idcologists`, Baucrand company arc thc 'holyfamily,`forcxamplc,
in thc Geran Ideology wc arc sitting in on a Church Council.
frcqucntly obscrvcs that thc soul of thc 'Ccrman idcology` is
'Christan-Ccrmanic` princrplcoftransccndcncc. Histhcoryofscicntihc
knowlcdgc hrcs a broadsidc at rcligious othcrwordlincss, whcthcr that
rcligion bc judasm, carly Christianity, cnlightcncd utilitarianism,
Hcgcl`s absolutc idcalism, Baucr`s 'Critiquc,` or Stirncr`s 'Lgoism. `
Kadical sccularism, 'ths worldlincss, ` girds Marx`s wholc approach to
scicntrhc knowlcdgc.
But Marx strcsscs that idcals, unmct nccds, hopcs, wishcs, dcsircs-
thc wholc sprcad ofhuman unfulhllmcnt that urgcs rcconciliation arc
thcmsclvcs all ofthis world. Jhc horizon of Marxian scicncc is not 'thc
gvcn, `butrmmancntrcconciliation. So, inascnscdicrcntfromMarx` s,
it can bc said that Marxianscicnccis 'rcligious` or'idcalistic` inthatit
84 SETTLING ACCOUNTS WITH GERMAN SCIENCE

sccksrcconciliation. ! t h adircctdcsccndantofrcligionand 'morality`in

itsprotcstagainstthisworld, butitisaprotcstwhichtracksrcconciliation
bywayofhopcfultraccsinthisworld.Suchtrackingrcquircsathcorctical
countcnancc prcdisposcd to clucs ofcontradiction and rcal potcntialfor
changc in that which cxists . !n this contcxt of immancncc, scicncc is
carncstbusincss, sinccno third-party savior is forthcoming.
Scicncc, sccn as thc scarching out ofrcality' s capacitics for uphcaval
andfor thcsatisfactionofprcviouslyunmcthumannccdsandaspirations,
followscloscly thcmodclofchangcthroughsclf-contradictionthatimpcls
Hcgcl`sPhenomenology. 1 3 !t can also bc comparcd to Plato`s discussion,+n
thc Statesman, ofscparating rcality at itsjoints.
'
' Marxplays with such
imagcry in comparing thc practical potcncy of his typc of immancnt
scicncc to Ccrmanidcalism`s listlcssapprchcnsionofcmpiricalrcality.

But it sccms rathcr that philosophy, prcciscly bccausc it was

only thc transccndcnt, abstractcxprcssionofthc givcn statcof
aairs, on account of its transccndcncc and abstraction, its
imaginay diference from thc world, must havc fancicd itsclf to
havclctthc actual statc ofaairsand actual mcnfar bcncath it,
that on thc othcr hand, bccausc itdid not actualfy dicrcntiatc
itsclffrom thc world, philosophy could not lct fall any actual
judgment on it, could not bring to bcar any rcal dircntiating
forccagainstthcworld,andthuscouldnotpracticalfy intcrvcncin
thc world.15
"J udgmcnt` ( U rteil) linksupwiththcPlatonicimagcryofscparationand
capturcs in a word thcoricntation ofMarxian thcory to practicc, i . c. , to
scck, with practical intcnt, thc 'joints` contradictions) of rcality.
'
Kcgardingthc anatomyofrcality,idcalismhas ashortattcntionspanand
sccks its satisfactions clscwhcrc. Matcrialism, inasmuch as it mcrcly
invcrtsidcalism, iscquallyill-informcdaboutitssubjcct`sanatomy.Cftcn
thc onlyjointit can hnd is thc onc connccting hcad and shouldcrs.
!n Marx`s conccption, scicncc scarchcs out thc rcal and cxpcricnccd
contradictions ofrcality in which pcoplc and institutions think and say
onc thingwhilc thcy do anothcr. Sucha scicnccis attuncd to avision of
practicc morc promising than thc 'bcautiful souls` of idcalism or a
matcrialismthatbrcaksthcboncsofcstablishcdsocialrcalitics.Jhcrcis a
dialccticofthc thcorcticaland thc practicalinMarx, too, forhis strcss on
immancncc in thcory complcmcnts a practical philosophy gcarcd to fclt
contradiction.
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Division IV
Marx)s Shijting Focus: From Philosopy to
Political Economy
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Jh/0J0t/0h /0 J0h J
WiththcHofy Famify and thc German Ieology, Marxpartiallycomplctcd
thcprojcctforancwscicnccskctchcdinhisdoctoraldisscrtation. !n thcsc
works Marx analyzcdhow thc failurc ofthcYoung Hcgclians to criticizc
thc dccp logic ofHcgcl`s philosophy lcd thcm to parody thc man thcy
soughttoimprovcon.JakcnwiththcmorcsubstantialstudicsoHcgclin
thc Critique oJHegel's Philosophy oJ Right and thc Paris Manuscripts, thcsc
writings broughttoaclosc Marx`sprimaryfocuson thcclaimofCcrman
philosophy to bc scicntihc knowlcdgc. Jhc ycars l 81Gl 817 mark a
majorturningpointin thcdircctionofMarx`sinvcstigationsintoscicntihc
knowlcdgc, as his prcoccupation shits from criticism ofphilosophy to
criticsm ofpolitical cconomy.
Jhoughthis transitionis markcd,scvcralimportantpointsofcontinuity
rcmain.Aswcsawin 'Cnthcjcwish_ucstion`andthcParis Manuscripts,
Marx`s attcntion to political cconomyprcdatcs l 81Gl 817. Cn thc othcr
hand, Marx docs not lock thc door on philosophy atcr l 81Gl 817, but
showsinmanyofhiswritings atcrthatpcriod alivclyintcrcstin ancicnt
philosophy, as wcllasin Hcgcl, thc Young Hcgclians, thcBritishcmpiri-
cists and utilitarians, and othcr modcrn Luropcan philosophcrs. Most
important ofall, Marx`s critiquc ofphilosophy has a political-cconomic
charactcr, and,convcrscly, his critiqucofpoliticalcconomyisphilosophi-
cally signihcant. Jhc mutuality is cvidcnt from a comparison of
Parisian critiqucofHcgcl Marx`s maturccritiquc ofpoliticalcc
which dcmonstratcs that thc primary objcctivc ofMarx`s work is as
critiquc ofthc sharcd logic ofmodcrn philosophy and classica|
cconomy. !fthc Paris Manuscripts spcakatthc samc timc toHcgcl, Sn:ith,
and Kicardo, so will Capital.

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CHAPTER J
Proudhon 's Jumbling of Hegel and
Ricardo
ivcnthcintcrpcnctration ofMarx`sstudics m philosophyand politi-
cal cconomy, it is appropriatc that thc turning point in his studics was
markcd by thc publication ofThe Povert oJ Philosophy I B17) . Signsofthc
shit arc clcar in Marx`s forcword.
Mr. Proudhonhas thc misfortuncofbcingpcculiarly misundcr-
stood in Luropc. !n !rancc hc has thc right to bc a bad
cconomist bccausc hc is rcputcd to bc a good Ccrman philoso-
phcr. !n Ccrmany hc has thc right to bc a bad philosophcr
bccausc hc is rcputcd to bconcofthc ablcstof!rcnchcconom-
ists. !nour quality ofbcing a Ccrman and an cconomist at thc
samc timc, wc wantcd to protcstagainst this doublc crror.
Jhcrcadcrwillundcrstandthatin thisthanklcsstaskwchavc
otcn had to abandon thc critiquc ofMr. Proudhon in ordcr to
takcupthatofCcrmanphilosophy,andatthcsamc timcto givc
somc obscrvations on political cconomy. '
Proudhonj umblcs Hcgclian philosophy togcthcrwith political ccono
rathcr than probc thcir intcrnal, logical intcrrclation, to producc
philosophy and bad political cconomy.
The Povert oJ Philosopky
,
writtcninrcsponsctoProudhon` sThe Philosophy
oJ Povert I B1G) , alongwith thccritiqucofProudhoncontaincdin Marx`s
lcttcr toAnncnkov of2B Occcmbcr I B1G, will bc thctcxtual bascfor this
chaptcr. As transitionalwritings, thcy arc uniquc in dividing timc rathcr
cquallybctwccnphilosophyandpoliticalcconomy. Marxdrawsthcstring
ofhis critiqucofHcgcland thcYoungHcgclians through this critiqucof
Proudhon at thc samc timc that hc broachcs somc criticisms ofpolitical
cconomy that hc dcvclops morcfullyinhis latcr writings .
H
90 MARX'S SHIFTING FOCUS
PKCIOHCN` SPCL!J!CC-LCCNCM!C APPL!CAJ!CN C! JHL
JHLCLCCY C!ABSCLIJL KLASCN
!or Marx, Proudhon`srclationto classicalpoliticalcconomyrcscmblcs
thcrclationofthcYoungHcgclianstoHcgcl.Proudhontricsto patchup,
rcintcrprct, and cdit classical political cconomy in ordcr to sccurc his
dcsircd vision ofsocicty. Hcwants to rcsist what hc considcrs to bc thc
accommodations of classical political cconomy, without considcring
whcthcr thc vcry logic of political cconomy might bc onc of accommo-
dation. Proudhon' s failurc to criticizc thc logic of classical political
cconomyand his unrchcctivc adoption ofHcgclian philosophy countfor
Marx as a singlc crror, twicc committcd. Hcgcl's absolutc idcalism and
classicalpoliticalcconomyboth cxcmplify thclogicofthcLnlightcnmcnt,
both arcrchcctions oJ rathcr thanon) thc dcvclopmcntofcapitalism.
Jo rchcct on thc dcvclopmcnt ofcapitalism rcquircs scicntihc insight
intothcdialccticalintcrplayofcapitalistformsoflifc. Suchinsightcnablcs
onctosccthchistoricalspccihcityofthosccapitalistforms.Cncmightsay
that thc goal of a critical scicncc of capitalist socicty is to attain thc
mcta-lcvcl with rcspcct to thc logic of capitalism. Proudhon's failurc to
achicvcthis mcta-lcvcl licsatthc corcofMarx'sdisagrccmcnts with him.
!nkccpingwiththclcssonswhichlcdhimtohistoricalmatcrialism, Marx
sccs thcrootofProudhon'stwicc-committcdcrror lcss inhisphilosophical
incptitudc than in his shaky undcrstanding of thc actual dialcctics of
capitalist socicty.
Hcgcl`s philosophy of absolutc spirit providcs Proudhon with what
Marx considcrs a deus ex machina that acts as a surrogatc for critical

historical undcrstanding.
Mr. Proudhon sccs in history a ccrtain [certaine] scrics ofsocial
dcvclopmcnts, hc hnds progrcss actualizcd in history, hc hnds
hnally that mcn, takcn as individuals, did not know what thcy
did, that thcy dcccivcd thcmsclvcs about thcir own movcmcnt,
that is, that thcir social dcvclopmcnt appcars at hrst glancc as
somcthingdistinct,scparatcdandindcpcndcntfromthcirindivi-
dualdcvclopmcnt. Hcdocs notknowhowtocxplain thcscfacts,
and thcrcforc thchypothcsis ofthc sclf-rcvcaling univcrsal rca-
son comcs to him madc to ordcr. Nothing is| casicr than to
invcnt mystical causcs, that is phrascs, whcrc common scnsc
brcaksdown.'
Jo cxplain thc alicn charactcr of human history, Proudhon adduccs
Hcgcl's thcological schcmaofhistoryas thc unfoldingofunivcrsalrcason

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PROUDHON: JUMBLING HEGEL AND RICARDO
91
a thirdparty to rcalhumanbcings. Marxhnds thc appcal to ashadowy
univcrsal rcason, lurking bchind thc not so rcasonablc cvcnts ofhuman
history, to bc scicntihcally stcrilc.
At thc samc timc, Marxobj ccts to Proudhon`s thcory ofhistory as a
heteronomous onc, a hctcronomous varicty of tclcology. Wc havc alrcady
sccn Marx's disdain for such tclcology, but hc spclls it out again in thc
lcttcr to Anncnkov.
According to his Proudhon's| vicwpoint, man is mcrcly thc
instrumcntwhich thc idcaorthcctcrnalrcasonmakcs uscoffor
its dcvclopmcnt. Jhc evolutions, ofwhich Mr. Proudhon spcaks,
arc supposcd to bc thc sort ofcvolutions which occur in thc
mysticalwomb ofthc absolutc idca.

Jhis tclcologicalconccptionofhistoryinstrumcntalizcspcrsons,rcducing
thcm to mouthpicccs for a vcntriloquist.
!nblithcly adopting Hcgclian mcthod, Proudhon docs morcthan fall
into a thcological undcrstandingofhistory, his wholc mcthod takcs on a
thcologicalcast. According to Marx, Proudhon cnvisions thc rclationship
bctwccn catcgory and actuality as onc ofincaration.
Lconomic catcgorics arc only thc thcorctical cxprcssions, thc
abstractionsofthcsocial rclations ofproduction. Mr. Proudhon,
likc a truc philosophcr, holding things invcrtcdly, sccs in rcal
rclations nothing but thc incarnations of thcsc principlcs, of
thcsc catcgorics, which wcrc slumbcring so Mr. Proudhon thc
philosophcr tclls us again in thc womb of thc 'impcrsonal
rcason ofhumanity.

'
AsMarxobscrvcs, Proudhontrics todoforpoliticalcconomywhat
thinksHcgclhaddonc forrcligion andright,namcly,prcscntitas
metaphysics.
8
Morc than oncc wc havc discusscd Marx`s chargc thatabsolutc idcal-

ism rcduccs scicntihc knowlcdgc to applicd mctaphysics, in conncction

withwhatKantcalls anintcllcctualintuition. Marxchidcs Proudhonfor
cmploying thc abstract catcgory ofdivision, as ifhc wcrc an intcllcctual
intuition capablc of rcading o thc historically spccihc torms of thc
division oflaborwithout appcaling to cmpirical knowlcdgc.
Jhc division oflaboris,accordingto Mr. Proudhon, anctcrnal
law, a simplc, abstract catcgory. Jhcrcforc thc abstraction, thc
92 MARX'S SHIFTING FOCUS
idca,thcword,mustalsosumccforhim tocxplainthcdivisionof
laborindicrcnthistoricalcpochs. Castcs, corporations, manu-
facturc, largc-scalc industry must bc cxplaincd by thc singlc
word 'dividc. ` !irst study carcfully thc mcaning of'dividc,`
and you will havc no nccd to study thc numcrous inhucnccs
whichgivcthcdivisionoflaboradctcrminatc charactcrin cach
cpoch. '

Marx`s irony rcitcratcs Kant`s point that such nondiscursivc, dcductivc

rcasoningis notthc provincc ofhuman rcason.
AsinthccascsofBrunoBaucrandMaxStirncr,Marxisquicktopoint
outthcpoliticalconscqucnccsofthcclaim tosuch absolutcknowlcdgc. !t
produccs an immediate conncction of thcory and practicc that i s both

doctrinairc and clitist, not to mcntion illusory.

!t is thc lcarncd, thcrcforc, thc mcn who undcrstand how to
purloin [suspendre] Cod' s intimatc thought, who makc history.
Jhc littlc pcoplc nccd only apply thcir rcvclations. You undcr-
stand now why Mr. Proudhon is thc dcclarcd cncmy ofcvcry
political movcmcnt. Jhc solution to prcscnt problcms lics for
him not in public action, but in thc dialcctical rotations ofhis
hcad.Sinccforhimthccatcgoricsarcthcmotivcforccs,oncdocs
notnccd to changc practical lifc inordcr to changc thc catcgo-
rics. _uitc to thc contrary. !t is ncccssary to changc thc catcgo-
rics, and that will havc as a rcsult thc changc of thc rcal
socicty.

Marx bclicvcsthatProudhon`srationalisticmcthodscts him up asa high
pricstwhoscmysticalinsightinto Cod`s mind grantshimmagicalpowcrs
ovcr human history. Hc bccomcs a middlcman in a hctcronomous thco-
logic ofdomination ovcrhuman history
.
Jhis critiqucofProudhon`s uncontaincd rationalismpoints up Marx`s
attcntivcncsstothcpoliticalmodalityofscicntihcmcthodsandhisrcsolvc
to cstablish a scicntihc mcthod thatwould avoid thcscpitfalls ofdogmat-
ism and clitism. Such a mcthod has no placcforanimmcdiatc idcntity of
h d
.

t cory an practicc.
Asnotcdcarlicr, Marxvicws thcauthoritarianpoliticalimplicationsof
an immcdiatc linking ofthcory andpracticc as a conscqucncc notjustof
absolutc idcalism, thc third thcsis on !cucrbach shows that thc criticism
|

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PROUDHON: JUMBLING HEGEL AN D RICARDO
93
aims at mcchanical matcrialism U wcll. Marx's critiquc attcnds thc
common logic ofthcsc cxtrcmcs ofidcalism and matcrialism,' which it
idcntihcs asthclogicofVerstand, adualism rcsultingfromthccalcihcation
ofthcabstractionsspirit and matter. Jhatlinc ofthoughtrccursin Marx's
furthcrrcmarks to Anncnkov.
BccauscMr. Proudhonsctsonthconcsidcthcctcrnalidcasthc
catcgorics of purc rcason, on thc othcr sidc mcn and thcir
practicallifc, which accordingto him is thc applicationofthcsc
catcgorics, you nnd in him right from thc bcginning a dualism
bctwccn lifc and idcas, bctwccn thc soul and thc body a
dualismwhich is rcpcatcd undcrmany forms. You scc now that
this antagonism is nothing othcr than thc incapacity of Mr.
Proudhon to comprchcnd thcprofanc originand history ofthc
catcgorics,which hc divinizcs . '
Marx bclicvcs that Proudhon i s alrcady trcading thc path ofdualism,
bcforc hc makcs his choicc atthccrossingofidcalism and matcrialism.
PKCIOHCN` S !NJLKCCNNLCJLO SIBjLCJ!V!SM,
JKANSCLNOLNCL, CCNSLKVAJ!SM, ANO !OCLAJKY
Jhc cnlightcncd, dualistic logic of Verstand su`crs from a subjcctivistic
bias. !nits c`orts toscizcupon thcobjcctivcworldoutsidcitsclf, cnlight-
cncd thoughtcncountcrs thc misplaccd concrctcncss ofits own projcctcd
abstractions. As wchavcsccncarlicr, Marx`sorganizcdrccctions onthc
subjcctivismoflogics for scicncc go back to his lcttcrto his fathcrand to
his disscrtationwork. !nthc lattcr, Marxsawa constrictivc subcctivi ,
at work in Plato, Lpicurus, and thc Young Hcgclians, for whom,

argucd, subjectivism was only onc facct in a fourfold ncxus ofpro

includingtranscendence, conservatism, andidolaty. Jhiswcbofcharactcris
is sharcd by thc Lnlightcnmcnt and its forcrunncr, thc philosophy
Lpicurus. Proudhon`s scicnti ncc`orts fall prcy to thc samc dimcultics.
Proudhon's subj cctivism rcscmblcs that ofBruno Baucr, Max Stirncr,
and thc Jruc Socialists in bcing constructionistic and moralistic. Marx
sccs Proudhon`s Hcgclianism as a mask for thc subjcctivism ofhis systcm
of political cconomy. !n thc Poverfy of Philosophy, Marx cxplains his
criticism of thc subjcctivistic way in which Proudhon ordcrs cconomic
catcgorics. Marx chargcs that, dcspitc his Hcgclian vcrbiagc, Proudhon
fails to risc to thc lcvcl ofdialcctics.
94 MAR'S SHIFTING FOCUS
What constitutcs dialccticalmovcmcntis thc cocxistcnccoItwo
contradictory sidcs, thcir con ict and thcir fusion into a ncw
catcgory.just to posc thc problcm ofcliminating thc bad sidc
cutsshortthcdialccticalmovcmcnt. !tis notthccatcgorywhich
is poscd and opposcd to itsclfby its contradictory naturc, it is
:
Mr. Proudhonwhogcts cxcitcd, dcbatcs withhimsclf, andfrcts
and fumcs bctwccn thc two sidcs ofthc catcgory. ' '
!nstcad of cntcring int

t hc dctcrminations propcr t o thc catcgorics

thcmsclvcs, Proudhon trcs torcconcilc thcmi nhis own pcculiar way.

rxhnds thatProudhon`s subjcctivistic ordcringofthc catcgorics of

political cconomy lapscs into 'morality. `
Jhc scqucncc of catcgorics has bccomc a sort oI. scafolding.
Oialcctics has ccascd to bc thc movcmcnt of absolutc rcason.
Jhcrc is no longcr any dialcctics but only, at thcmost, com-
plctcly purc morality.' '
Marx`scmphaticuscofProudhon`sowntcrm ' scaolding` hcrcacccntu-
atcs thc wayin which 'morality` accompanics subjcctivc constructionism.
Jhc catcgorics of thc political cconomists arc likc bits oI glass in a
kalcidoscopc that Proudhon twists to gct thc arrangcmcnt that suits his
moral fancy
Jhc logic oI'morality` for Marx involvcs going bcyond thc givcn,
throughanappcal to onc`s own subjcctivcidcas,rathcr than byfcrrcting
outthc rcalpotcntialsorintcrnal contradictions ofthcgivcn. Proudhon`s
morality, supcrsocialism,issimplyautopianvcrsionofthcmoralityofthc
lnlightcnmcnt. Proudhontrulyrcprcscntsthclnlightcnmcnttraditionof
!rcnch politics. !rccly madc contracts, rcciprocity, cquality, and consti-
tutcd valuc what Marx would call 'valuc`) arc fundamcntals of his
socialism. !nbringingthcscidcalstobcaronpoliticalcconomy,Proudhon
cnvisions thcm as a radically ncw invcntory, whcrcas Marx caustically
obscrvcs that thcy arc takcn opolitical cconomy`s own shcl|

Kicardo takcs his starting point from prcscnt-day socicty to

dcmonstratctoushowitconstitutcsvaluc Mr.Proudhontakcs
constitutcd valuc as his starting point to constructa ncwsocial
world by mcans oIthis valuc. !or him, Mr. Proudhon, consti-
tutcd valuc must go round and bccomc oncc again constitutivc
for a world alrcady complctcly constitutcd according to this
modcoIcvaluation.Jhc dctcrmination ofvalucbylab ortimcis,
z
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PROUDHON: JUMBLING HEGEL AND RICARDO
orKicardo,thclawocxchangcablcvaluc,orMr. Proudhon,i t
is thc synthcsisousc-valuc and cxchangcablc valuc. Kicardo's
thcoryovalucisthcscicntihcintcrprctationoactualcconomic
lic,Mr. Proudhon'sthcoryovalucisthcutopianintcrprctation
oKicardo's thcory. '
'
95
Insclcctingconstitutcdvalucvaluc)asthccorncrstonco hisvisionothc
uturc, Proudhon struck upon somcthing undamcntal, but undamcntal
tothccxisting world. ' '
Jhc tcxt illustratcs an ironic conncction bctwccn transcendence and
conservatism. AccordingtoMarx,transccndcncc,bysatisyingitsclwithits
ownsubj cctivc, 'moral' proclamations tothcactualworld,ncvcrattains
a criticalgraspothatworldand its intcrnalconh icts. Asarcsult, itails
to rclatc to thc world in a scl-conscious and rcc manncr. Jransccn-
dcncc' signoranccothcactualworldbindsittothcvcryworlditsccksto
transccnd.
I all this sounds amiliar rom thc carlicr discussion othc Young
Hcgclians, t should. As wc obscrvcd at thc bcginning othis chaptcr,
Proudhon's rclationship to Kicardo rcpcats thc mistakc that thc Young
Hcgcliansmadcwith rcspcct toHcgcl. Ncithcr Proudhon northcYoung
Hcgclians camc to a criticalgrasp othcdccp logic othc grcatthinkcrs
whom thcy sought to transccnd. As Marx tclls Anncnkov, Proudhon
'docs notriscabovcthcbourgcoishorizon. '' Wcmightrcphrascthisto
say thatProudhonrcmainswithin thc logicothc Lnlightcnmcnt, orthc
logic oVerstand.
Joput this pointinpolitical tcrms, wcmight call Proudhon a 'bour-
gcois socialist' or a 'lct-wing Kicardian. ' Jhc lattcr tcrm hnds somc
tcxtualsupportatthcpointwhcrcMarxbrings inthc Lnglish Kicardian
socialist]ohn rancis Bray to unlock thc sccrcts oProudhon's thought.
What Marx says oBray applics to Proudhon, sincc both mcn scck to
rcmcdy thc wrongs o capitalism through a morc just application
Kicardo's labor thcory ovaluc, by urging that workcrs rcccivc all thc
valuc thcy producc.
Mr. Braydocsnotsccthatthiscgalitarianrclation,thiscorrective
ideal thathcwouldlikctoapplyto thcworld,isitsclnothingbut
thcrchcctionothcactual world, andthatthcrcorci tistotally
impossiblctorcconstitutcsocictyonabasiswhichisnothingbut
an cmbcllishcd shadow o it. In proportion as thc shadow
bccomcs cmbodicd again, wc pcrccivc that this body, ar rom
bcing thc drcamttranshguration, is thc actual body ocxisting
socicty. ' '
96
MAR'S SHIFTING FOCUS
JhccgalitarianidcaloBrayandProudhonis conscrvativcwithrcspcctto
thc logic ocxisting socicty, though notncccssarilywith rcspcct to cvcry
caturc othat socicty. Jhus Proudhon attacks thc droit d'aubaine, what
Marx rccrrcd to as thc orms oappcarancc osurplus-valuc intcrcst,
rcnt, andproht indccd this was thc rcal mcaningoProudhon' s phrasc
'Propcrtyisthct') buthcncvcrqucstionsthclogicovalucitscl. Quitc
thc contrary, hcand Bray think that thc cqualitarian applicationothc
law ovalucwould dry up thc sourccs osurplus-valuc.
Jhc languagc o'applying a corrective ideal" rccalls Marx's critiquc o
thcYoungHcgclians,whoalso sawcritiqucas anapplication oidcals toa
givcn actuality. As in thc casc o thc Young Hcgclians, Marx considcrs
Proudhon's 'hxcdidca'' tobc anidol, anobjcctoun rcncctivcworship,
whichisinacta productoProudhon's moralimaginationas a mcmbcr
o bourgcois socicty. Jhis orgctul idolatry brings us ull circlc to thc
opcning discussion oProudhon's cmploymcnt oHcgclian mcthod. By
construing political cconomy as 'applicd mctaphysics,' Proudhon puts
thccatcgoricsobourgcoispoliticalcconomy andcontracts,cquality,rcc
will,andvalucarcsuchcatcgorics) inthcctcrnalmindoabsolutcrcason,
orCod. Jhismakcs holyandctcrnal thc catcgoricsobourgcois socicty.
Mr. Proudhon docs not dircctly asscrt that bourgeois lre is an
eteral truth or him. Hcsays itindircctly, in that hcdivinizcs thc
catcgoricswhichcxprcss thcbourgcoisrclations undcrthcorm
othought mcaning hcrc, thc thought oabsolutc rcason|
lroudhon's idolatry lics in his orgctul hypostatizing in thattird

rty
tohumanhistory absolutcrcason thc catcgorics obourgcoispohttcal
cconomy.
PKLHN' S PLIJICALLCNMY. MLJH AN
MLJAlHYSI CS
Proudhon'smcthodi npoliticalcconomyi sthato purcabstractionbythc
undcrstanding ( Verstand) , thc mcthod othc Lnlightcnmcnt, and his mcta-
physics is thatovaluc. Marxwants to show thcdialcctical, orncccssary,
conncctcdncss o thc two. His dcscription o Proudhon's mcthod o
abstractionrccalls his critiquc oHcgcl's usc ologic in thc Philosophy oJ
Right and thc parody oHcgclian mcthod in thc Holy Famify using thc
cxamplcothccatcgoryruit. In thc Poverfy oJ Philosophy, Marxwritcs,
Iwcabstractthus romcvcry subj cctal l thcallcgcd accidcnts,
animatcorinanimatc,mcnorthings,wcarcrightinsayingthat

I
PROUDHON: JUMBLING HEGEL AND RICARDO
in thc nnal abstraction, thc only substancc lcl is thc logical
catcgorics . . . Allthings bcingrcduccdtoalogicalcatcgory,and
cvcry movcmcnt, cvcry actoproduction, to mcthod, it ollows
naturallythatcvcrywholcoproductsandproduction,oobjccts
and omovcmcnt, is rcduccd to an applicd mctaphysics. Jhat
which Hcgcldid or rcligion, right, ctc. , Mr. Proudhon sccks to
door political cconomy.
97
Jhc mcthod oVerstand that Proudhon invokcs or politicalcconomyis a
mcthod o invcrsion, alcr abstracting thc logical catcgorics rom rcal
things, itdcduccs thcsc samc things romthc purc catcgorics.
Proudhon'sapplicationothismcthodtopoliticalcconomyproduccs a
sct o abstract catcgorics constituting thc mctaphysics o valuc. I wc
considcr thc ccntral catcgorics o Proudhon's politico-cconomic
thought cquality, rccwill, division olabor, and, ocoursc, constitutcd
valuc orvaluc) wc n nd vcry abstract catcgorics indccd. Lquality and
divsionolaborarchardlymorcthanmathcmaticalcatcgoricsapplicdto
social lic. rcc will as Proudhon uscs it) mcans only thc simplc
ncgationoanypositivc, cxtcrnaldctcrminationothcwill, a conccption
o rccdom alrcady discusscd in conncction with 'thc Ccrman
idcology.'
,
'Jhc conccptovalucrcquircs ustothinkolaborsans phrase,
without any urthcr dctcrmination, a task rcscmbling Lockc's c6ort to
think oa trianglc dcvoid ospccihc qualitics. Catcgorics such as thcsc
ncccssarily appcar ctcrnal, or thcyarcstrippcd romthcconcrctcsitua-
tionswhichgivcrisc to thcm. Marxnotcs thisrclationshipinhislc
|
tcrto
Anncnkov.
or Mr. Proudhon on thc contrary, thc abstractions, thc cat-
cgorics, arc thc primitivc causcs. According to him, i tis thcy,
andnotmcn,whobringorth history. Jhcabstraction, the category
taken as such, that s, dctachcd rom mcn and thcir matcrial
activity,isnaturally immortal, inaltcrablc,impassivc,itisonlya
bcing o purc rcason, which mcrcly says that thc abstraction,
takcn as such, is abstract an admirablc tautology!

Proudhon' s unrcncctivc usc othc mcthod oabstraction, thc mcthod o

Verstand, ncccssarily rcsults in politico-cconomic catcgorics wbich arc
thcmsclvcs abstract, and sccmingly immutablc. Such arc thc catcgorics
constituting thc mctaphysics ovaluc.
Notthc mostimportanthgurcimplicatcd inthisdiscussionomcthod
and mctaphysics, Proudhon thc clumsy synthcsizcr o Ccrman philo-
sophy and Lnglish political cconomyis rathcr a oil in Marx's dclibcra-

98 MARX'S SHIFTING FOCUS

tions aboutHcgcland Kicardo. But as Marx indicatcs in his orcword to
thcbook, Proudhonis apoorHcgclian and apoorKicardian. Asarcsult,
Marx's ownbookbccomcsmuddlcdandworksatcrosspurposcsatthosc
points whcrc Proudhon is too ar out ostcp with thc looming scnior
hgurcs, Hcgcl and Kicardo. In act, alcr thc discussion o abstraction
rccapitulatcd in thc paragraphs abovc, Marx rcmarks, 'Lp to now wc
havccxpoundcdonlythcdialcctics oHcgcl. WcshallscclatcrhowMr.
Proudhonhas succccdcdinrcducingitto thcmcancstproportions.

,
'Wc
havc alrcady sccn that Marx rcgards Proudhon not as onc whoactivcly
cmploys thc mcthod oabstraction to achicvc ncw scicntihc insights, as
didKicardo, but rathcr as thc bricoleur oabs tractions alrcady on hand.
Conscqucntly, thc cnduringvalucothc critiqucoProudhonor Marx's
thcory o scicntihc knowlcdgc lics i n its charactcr as a proxy. In this
rcspcct, Proudhon' s casc is muchlikc thatoBruno Baucr, Max Stirncr,
andthc Jruc Socialists.
Animportantdi6crcnccbctwccnProudhonand thoscYoungHcgclians
is that Proudhon cndcavors to bridgc political cconomy and Ccrman
philosophy,inthcproccss ampliyingthcshortcomingsocach.Jhrough
hiscriticismoProudhon,Marxsccsmorcclcarlyhowhisowncritiquco
Hcgclianmcthod, undcrstood as thcmcthod oVerstand, carrics ovcrinto
thchcldopoliticalcconomy. Jhis musthavcstrcngthcncd Marx's prior
intimations about thc common logic oHcgclian philosophy, capitalist
socicty, and thc scicntihc account o that socicty in classical political
cconomy.' But othcr aspccts oMarx's critiquc oProudhon' s political
cconomyarcnotcxtcnsionsothccritiqucoHcgcltothchcldopolitical
cconomy. Jhcylaythc oundations or a positivc rcappraisaloHcgclin
Marx's latcr critiquc opolitical cconomy.
KLAPPKAISINC HLCLL' S SICNIICANCL KJHL
CKIJIQLL PLIJICAL LCNMY
Jhc aspccts o Marx's critiquc o Proudhon that spark a rcconsidcr-
ation o Hcgcl' s mcrits conccrn thc nondialcctical, nontotalistic, and
ahistorical charactcropolitical cconomy. Proudhon ails to scc that thc
catcgoricsopoliticalcconomy,suchaspropcrty, valuc, divisiono labor,
and wagcs, orm a dialcctical totality that ishistorically spccihc.
I nthc rcalworld, on thc contrary, thcdivision olaborand all
thcothcrcatcgoricsoMr. Proudhonarcsocialrclations,whosc
cntircty makcs up that which onc today callsrcsr, outsidc
thcsc rclations, bourgcois propcrty is nothing but a mcta-
physical orj udicial illusion.3
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PROUDHON: JUMBLING HEGEL AND RICARDO
99
Jhc lack odialcctical acumcn crcatcs thc political illusion that onc can
rctainthccnscmblcobourgcoiscconomiccatcgoricswhilcriddingoncscl
othcassociatcdsocialconhictsand incquitablc distributionowcalth.As
Marxstatcs latcrin thc lcttcrto Anncnkov.
Kcally hc Proudhon| docs nothing othcr than what all good
ourgcois pcoplc| do. Jhcyalltcll you thatcompctition,mono-
poly, ctc , in principlc, that is, takcn as abstract thoughts, arc
thc solc oundations olic, but in practicc lcavc much to bc
dcsircd . . . Jhcy allwantthcimpossiblc, thatis, thcconditions
o bourgcois lic without thc ncccssary conscqucnccs o thcsc
conditions. ' '
Likc thc classical political cconomists, Proudhon ails t ograsp cithcr thc
ncccssaryrclationsamongthcvariousormsobourgcois cconomiclicor
thchistoricallymutablccharactcrothctotalityothoscorms . Jhcrcsult
is a truncatcd, 'political' vision osocialism.'
In an l 8G5lcttcr to j. B. Schwcitzcr, Marx dcclarcs that Proudhon' s
bcstbookishishrst, What Is Propert?, inwhichhcrclicsonthcphilosophi-
cal mcthod o Kant rathcr than Hcgcl.'' Marx sccs Kant' s handling o
contradictions by way o antinomics and appcals to transccndcncc as
morc appropriatcor a pctit bourgcois thinkcrlikc Proudhon. Jhcsocial
position othc pctitc bourgcoisic, onc o'livingcontradiction,''is bcst
cxprcsscdinsuch antinomics. Marx' suscothcdi6crcnccsbctwccnKant
and Hcgclprcparcs thc way or a morc positivccmploymcnt oHcgcl's
own critiqucoKant's philosophyoVerstand.
Jhc critiquc oVerstand was a novcl philosophicalstratcgy dcvclopcd
Hcgcl in rcsponsc to cnlightcncd Luropcan thought and social lic
with particular attcntion to thc philosophy o Kant. Jwo `
'
caturcs oHcgcl's critiquc oKant' sphilosophyrclatc to Marx'scritiq
oProudhon as a rcprcscntativc opolitical cconomy. Hcgcl criticizcs
Kantorprcscntingcognitivc catcgorics, notablythctwclvc catcgorics of
thcundcrstanding,inanondialcctical, arbitraryashion. Similarly, Marx
chargcs thc political cconomists with ailing to prcscnt thc dialcctical
intcrrclationships o thcir catcgorics . Much as Hcgcl hnds ault with
Kant'sinability to sccthchistorical tcxturcocognitivccatcgorics, Marx
criticizcs thcclassicalpolitical cconomists or notrccognizingthc histori-
cal spccihcity othcir catcgorics.
As notcd inprcvious chaptcrs, Marx criticizcdHcgcl largcly by rcap-
plying thc critiquc oVerstand to Hcgcl' sown thought, at thc lcvcl othc
100 MAR'S SHIFTING FOCUS
logic o bis total systcm. Jbus, Marx saw in tbc Hcgclian pattcrn o
pbcnomcnology logic rcal scicncc, a mctbodologically trcacbcrous at-
traction to logicas tbc alpba and omcga oscicncc. In tbc rolc ologicin
Hcgcl' s systcm,MarxspottcdarcpctitionoKant' slogicoVerstand, only
now ata mcta-lcvcl witb rcspcctto Hcgcl' s own critiquc oVerstand.
Marx'scritiqucoHcgclaccomplisbcs tbc goals projcctcdinbis disscr-
tationwork, toscckouttbc accommodationoHcgcl' stbougbt lcss inits
cxplicitcontcnttbaninitsconstitutivcprinciplcs.Marx'scritiqucattcnds
not to wbat was ocal or Hcgcl, tbat is, bis own dcvclopmcnt o tbc
critiquco Verstand, but to Hcgcl's tacitstructuringotbatcritiquc. Jbc
systcmaticpattcrnsotbinkingtbrougbwbicbHcgclcriticizcdLnligbtcn-
mcnt ratiocination wcrc tbc vcry oncs on wbicb Marx rcncctcd. In tbis
way Marx camc to includc cvcn Hcgclwitbin tbc old oLnligbtcnmcnt
tbinkcrs.''
Incriticizing tbcYoung Hcgclians and tbcHcgcliai:ism oProudbon,
tbcmet a-critique otbctbco-logicoHcgcl'stbougbtbadscrvcdMarxwcll.
But as bc movcs into tbc scicntihc considcration oclassical political
cconomy largclyaproductoLnglisbsocictyandtbougbt Hcgcl'sown
focal critiquc o Verstand takcs on rcncwcd signihcancc. Many o tbc
cxplicitandscl-consciouslydcvclopcdcaturcsoHcgcl'swork,including
bis scnsitivity to tbc contcnt oorms, tbcir dialcctical intcrrclatcdncss,
andrbcirbistoricalspccihcity,arcrcbabilitatcdbyMarxaspowcrul tools
or criticizing tbc mctbods oclassicalpolitical cconomy. Wc can antici-
patca ccrtainrcadjustmcntoMarx's rclationsbip toHcgcl, acoolingo
tbc bcatcd polcmics accompanying bis own crcativc mcta-critiquc o
Hcgcl, and a rcncwcd apprcciationoHcgcl' sownocal critiquc oprior
Lnligbtcnmcnt tbougbt.

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IJ JY|
MARX'S CRITIQUE OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY

+ ! +
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Jh/0J0t/0h /0 1/ J0
Alcr l 85O Marx complctcd only onc book thatholds grcatimportancc
to an inquiry into his thcoryoscicntihcknowlcdgc thcb1stvolumc o
Capital. l HcandLngclsspokcothcircritiqucothcYoungHcgcliansasa
'scl-clarihcation, 'dcrivcdromthc undamcntalscl-clarihcationMarx
undcrtook in his carlicr critiqucs o Hcgcl in thc Critique oJ Hegel's
Philosophy oJ Right and thc Paris Manuscripts. In act, Marx ncvcr wrotc a
comprchcnsivc critiquc o Hcgclian philosophy an omission that un-
scttlcdhimthroughouthis lic. AlthoughMarxcamccloscrto achicving
a comprchcnsivc critiquc o political cconomy, cvcn this hc did not
achicvc, in that hc publishcd only thc b1st oour volumcs o Capital
counting Theories oJ Surplus- Value as thcourthvolumc) , and Capital itscl
wasonlythchrstpartoancnvisagcdtotalcritiqucopoliticalcconomy.
Noncthclcss,thcb1stvolumcoCapital docsrcprcscntasignihcantparto
a comprchcnsivc critiquc opolitical cconomy.'
Jhcdi6crcncc bctwccn a critiqucophilosophy, undcrtakcn primarily
or thc purposc oscl-clarihcation, and a critiquc opolitical cconomy,
oricntcd toward a complctc critical prcscntation both othc systcm o
political cconomyandthchistoryopoliticalcconomic thcory,suggcsts a
shitin thc tacticsothcprcscntstudy. Lp to this point,wchavc ollowcd
thchistoricalscqucnccoMar x' swritings,stoppingtointcrprctimportant
works,oncortwoatatimc. Inwhatollows,thcguidingthrcadwillbc
conccptual scqucncc oMarx'smaturc critiqucopoliticalcconomy.
ocal tcxt is Capital.
Jhis part othc book will takc two approachcs to thc study oMarx
thcory oscicntihc knowlcdgc, as it cmcrgcs rom his maturc critiquc
political cconomy. b1st, Marx's rathcr sparsc writings dircctly on scicn-
tihcmcthod in political cconomy, sccond, Marx's own scicntibc practicc
in his critiquc opolitical cconomy, with an cyc to its contribution to
undcrstandingMarx'sthcoryoscicntihcknowlcdgc.Bydrawingtogcthcr
what Marx said about scicncc with what hc did in his own scicntihc
practicc, wc will o`cr a cohcrcnt and pcculiarly Marxian thcory o
scicntihc knowlcdgc.
103

Division v
Marx)s Mature Methodological Writings
!
Jh/0J0t/0h /0 J0h
As notcd atthc cnd othc lastchaptcr, oncc Marx shilcd his ocus rom
philosophy to political cconomy wc cxpcctcd him to rccovcr and usc
Hcgcl's criticisms oordinary cmpirical scicncc Hcgcl' s critiquc o Ver
stand scicncc) .Jhisprovcsto bc thccascH Marx'smaturcmcthodological
writings, as wcll as inhis scicntihcpracticc whichwill bcthc subjcct o
division G) . Marx did not abandon his carly criticisms oHcgcl, which
workcdthcirwayintohismaturcapproachtoscicntihcmcthod.Botharc
involvcd in answcring thc qucstion, Why did Marx writc so littlc on
mcthod? Itwas thc insistcnccon immancnccand thc dialcctic oconccpt
and objcct, mcthod and subj cctmattcr, which Marx hrst adoptcd rom
Hcgcl and turncd against him in his criticism othc Philosophy oJ Right,
that lcl Marx prccous littlc opcrating room or gcncral mcthodological
rcncctions. cspitc thc scarcityoMarx's rcmarks on mcthod, howcvcr,
hc was mcthodologically most subtlc.
Hcgcl taught Marx to givc cxtraordinary attcntion to thc logic and
contcntoscicntihccatcgorics. Jhis undamcntal lcsson rccurs in many
orms . Marx's criticismoscnsc-data and scicntihccmpiricismturns on
thcirailurc torcncctonthccatcgorics thcycmploy. In this conncction, I
spcak again o Marx's empiricism in second intension. Marx distinguishcd
bctwccncatcgoricsthatarcconccptuallyabstract,orinstancc, valuc,and
thosc that arc conccptually concrctc, such as intcrcst. Hccmploycd this
distinction to makc mcthodological criticisms othc political cconomists

thcy rcducc concrctc catcgorics to abstractoncs, and thcy ailto ocvc

catcgorics in thc propcr ordcr. rawing a carcul distinction
gcncralanddctcrminatcabstractionscnablcdMarxtopointoutthcways
in which thc political cconomists naturalizc historically dctcrminatc
orms. Jhckcyto thcdistinctivcncss oMarx's criticalthcoryovaluc is
his critiquc othc traditional undcrstanding o thc rclation bctwccn
csscncc and appcarancc, which was adoptcd by classical political cco-
nomy.
Marx not only distinguishcd bctwccn thc conccptually abstract and
concrctc, hc also scparatcd that distinction rom thc onc bctwccn thc
abstract, in thc scnscothc conccptual, and thc concrctc, in thc scnsco
what is actual. Marx took Hcgcl to task or ailing to scparatc thcsc two

107

108
MARX'S CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
scnscs othc abstract and thc concrctc. !n sodoing Marxrcncwcd what
couldbccallcdancpistcmologicalpcrspcctivcinthcaccoHc gcl'sc`orts
toovcrcomccpistcmology. Scicntihcknowlcdgc movcsromthc abstract
to thc concrctc, but this cannot bc unrcstrictcdly idcntib cd with thc
movcmcnt orcality. Jhc distinction bctwccn gcncral and dctcrmnatc
abstractionsalsocutsagainstHcgcl,as!indicatcbytracing tbactothc
German Ideolog critiquc oprcsuppositionlcss scicncc, and to thc distinc-
tion in thc Paris Manuscripts bctwccn alicnation and objcctivity. !n con-
nccting what Marx says in thc German Ideolog with what hcdcvc|ops in
thc introductionto thc Grundrisse, ! urthcrundcrminc thc orthodoxvicw
ohistoricalmatcrialism. Jhcmodclothccsscncc-appcaranccrc|ationon
whichMarxrclicdorhisowncriticalthcoryovaluccarricsthrough thc
criticisms oHcgcl's conccption ologicalmcdiation which Marx dcvc-
lopcdin his critiqucothcPhilosoph of Right. Jhatis to say, thc logco
csscncc is a logic ounrcconcilcd opposton, a logic oalicnation, and
suchis thclogicovalucor Marx.

1
CHAPTER 8
Wi Did Marx Write so Little on
Method?
arx wrotc littlc on scicntibc mcthod. Lvcn whcn hcnirts with thc
issucomcthodinhisorcwordtothchrstcditionoCapital I andagainin
his alcrword to thcsccondcdition, hcis notparticularlyhclpul. I, as I
claim, Marx was onc othc mostmcthodologicallyscl-rcncctivc thinkcrs
in thc history oscicncc, wc must cxplain thc paucity ohis writings on
mcthod.
Although rigorous with himscl in tcrms o scicntihc mcthodology,
Marx submcrgcs thc mcthodological issucs ohis scicntibc writings. A
comparison othc rclcvant scctions othc Grundrisse and o thc Urtext o
Toward the Critique oJPolitical Economy to thc actual publishcd tcxt othc
lattcr indicatcs thc cxtcnt to which hc ccnsorcd many o thc morc
intcrcsting andmorcHcgclian) mcthodologicalcaturcsohisownrough
drals. In a lcttcr to Lngcls oB cccmbcr l BG l , Marx writcs that thc
continuation o Toward the Critique oJ Political Economy
,
namcly, Capital,
'will noncthclcss bc much morc popular and thc mcthod will bc much
morchiddcnthaninpart l . ` ' Histighthstcdncss abouthis ownscicntihc
mcthodhas traditionallymadcthc issuc addrcsscd bythisbooka thorny

oncandhas contributcdtoagrcat dcalomisundcrstandingaboutMarx

introspcction on qucstions oscicntihc mcthod.

Marx'schoicctoocushis cncrgicsonasubstantivccritiquco
economy, rathcr thanongcncral rchcctions conccrning mcthod,involvcs
morcthancatcring toa popular audicncc. Inrcconsidcringthc introduc-
tion hc had writtcn to thc Grundrisse, Marx dccidcs that such gcncral
rcncctions arc too prcsumptuous.
I amsupprcssinga gcncral introduction which I hadtosscdo6,
bccauscalcrthinkingitovcrmorccloscly,cvcryanticipationo
yctto bcprovcnrcsultssccmsdisrupting to mc, andthc rcadcr
who wants to ollow mc at all must rcsolvc to asccnd rom thc
particular to thc gcncral.
IH

110
MARX'S MATURE METHODOLOGICAL WRITINGS
Jhatintroduction containsthc mostcxtcnsivc trcatmcntomcthod to bc
ound in Marx's latcr writings, along with a prohlc o his political
cconomic hndings. But to prcscnt a gcncral prccis o production and
distribution, cxchangc and consumption, and mcthod as wcll, could bc
mislcading. It might appcar that thcdctailcd prcscntationothc scicncc
ollowcddcductivclyromthc gcncralrch cctions stationcdinaprcacc or
introduction,whcrcas thc dctailcdworkingoutothcparticularscicnccis
undamcntalor Marx.
Marx acccpts Hcgcl's dcmand or a unity o orm and contcnt in
scicntihc knowlcdgc. Mcthod ought not bc somc abstract, ormalizcd
proccdurchovcringovcrthcspccihccontcntoascicncc Kathcr, mcthod
nccds to takc its shapc rom thc spccihc objcct undcr scrutiny. Jo do
othcrwisc is, or Hcgcl, to cluttcr thc way to thc truth with onc' s own
subjcctivcormalisms. WchavcsccnthatMarxadoptcdthisvicwpointas
carly as thc l 887 lcttcr to his athcr, in which hc tclls oabandoning a
Kantian-ichtcan, ormalistic approach to a scicncc oj urisprudcncc.
romthatpointonward, Marxvicwsscicncc as amattcrogcttingatthc
logic othings thcmsclvcs . Sincc this logic is not asccrtainablc a priori,
purcly ormal mcthodologics havc no placc in Marx's conccption o
scicntihc knowlcdgc.
JhcscsamcconsidcrationslcadtoMarx' smcta-critiqucoHcgclinthc
Critique oJHegel's Philosopky oJ Right. Jhcrc,MarxsccsHcgclslippinginto
a ncw ormalismwithrcspcctto thc rclation othc scicnccologicto thc
particularrcalscicnccs, in this casc,thcscicnccosocicty. Jhcormalism
consists in applying thc logic cstablishcd in thc scicncc ologic to thc
particularconstcllationsosocial lic.Jhcrcsults othis rcncwcdormal-
ism arc no lcss abrasivc to Marx than thc mcthod that lcd to thcm. By
subsuming social rcalitics undcr his prccstablishcd logic, Hcgcl has lost
touchwiththclogicothcthings thcmsclvcs, in particular,withthclogic
ocivilsocicty and thc modcrn statc.
Marx criticizcs Hcgclianormalism again in its lattcr-day cxponcnts
thcBaucrbrothcrs, Max Stirncr, and thcJrucSocialists as wcllasi nits
application to political cconomy by Proudhon. In a lcttcr to Lngcls
writtcn in cbruary l 858, Marxundcrcuts crdinand Lassallc's attcmpt
to applyHcgclian logic to political cconomy.
I scc rom this oncnotcthatthccllowplans in his sccondgrcat
work to prcscntpolitical cconomy Hcgcl-likc. Jo his dctrimcnt,
hc willcomctolcarnthatit is a wholly othcr thingtobringa
scicnccor thc hrst timc to thc pointobcing ablc to prcscntit
dialcctically, through critiquc, than to apply an abs tract, hn-
ishcd systcmologic tohunchcso j ust such a systcm. '

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WHY MARX WROTE SO LITTLE ON METHOD 111
orMarxthcdialccticalprcscntationothcsystcmopoliticalcconomyis
possiblconlythrough thc most thoroughgoingcmpirical andconccptual
study o that systcm. ialcctcal prcscntation must cmcrgc rom a com-
p
rchcnsivcanalysisopolitical cconomy, notby applying a prcabricatcd
dialcctic.
MarxthinksHcgcl'slogicisbcinguscduncriticallyasa 'ncworganon'
orthcrcal scicnccs.orMarxtoredo Hcgcl'slogic, howcvcr,wouldbc to
runintothcaccohisown mcta-critiqucoHcgcl. In this scnsc, Marx' s
stricturcs againstlogicasa third party apartromthcspccihcobjcctoa
scicnccanditsspccin clogicallowhimlcssspaccor gcncralmcthodologi-
cal considcrations than Hcgcl cnjoycd.
LvcnthoughMarxobjcctstothcprcscntationothcscicnccologicasa
scparatc scicncc introducing thc rcal scicnccs o naturc and human
socicty, hc rccognizcs that Hcgcl's logic cxprcsscs ccrtain basics about
dialcctics.'Marx alwayspraiscsHcgclorhisgrcatcmpiricalandhistori-
cal scnsc, whichcnablcshimtocomposcalogicthatopcns upsomucho
thc truth othc spccihc scicnccs hc pursucd. Hcgcl's accomplishmcnts
provdcaurthcrsavingsinmcthodologicalwriting,sinccsomuchowhat
Marx nccds to producc his critiquc opolitical cconomy is alrcady on
hand in Hcgcl'swork.
HadMarxcvcrwrittcnaworkon Hcgcl's dialcctics, two points might
havcbccncstablishcdmorccohcrcntlyandorccully. l ) thatHcgcl'susc
ohislogicas anorganonorrcalscicnccsinvolvcs himin amystihcation
ologic, and 2) thatHcgcl' s logicnoncthclcss rcvcalsits grcatmcthodo-
logicalpowcrinthcactualworkingthroughospccihcrcals cicnccs. Jhis
mighthavcclarihcdthcrclativcabscnccocxplicitmcthodologicaldclib-
crationsin Marx'swritings. SinccMarxwrotcnosuchwork,wcmusta|l
backuponourownrcsourccs

. .
It might bc obj cctcd that Marx's critiquc oa priori mcthodologics i
itsclagcncralrchcctiononmcthodology. Jhisrcmindcrisaircnough,

long as wc kccp in mind thrcc pcculiaritics o Marx's rchcctions

mcthodology.irst, itis amcta-critiquc in thatit docs notcriticizconc

prioriormal mcthodology in ordcr torcplaccitwith an altcrnativc,

..
instcad undcrcuts thc wholc stratcgy oormal mcthodologics. Sccond,

oncc thc mcta-critiquc has bccn madc, vcry littlc is lct to say about

mcthodingcncral. Whatrcmains is to prcscnt thc particularscicncconc
ispursuing, inaccordanccwiththclogicothcobjcctsundcrstudy. Jhird,
thc positivc rcsult o Marx's rchcctions lics not in thc scl-silcncing
mcta-critiquc,butinthcactualormtakcnbythcparticularscicnccitscl.

'

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CHAPTER 9
Marx's Logically Well-Bred Empiricism
lancingovcrMarx'swritings romthc Critique oJ Hegel's Philosophy oJ
Right to The Poverty oJPhilosophy, oncmightconcludcthatMarxwasrathcr
inimicaltowardabstractions. Inthcworksothat pcriod, Marxcontinu-
ally cuts through thc wcltcr osomconc's abstractions, bc thcy thosc o
Hcgcl, Bruno Baucr,Stirncr, or Proudhon. nc might takc Marxor thc
typc ocmpiricistwho crics, Away with abstractions, givc mcthc acts|
But to intcrprct Marx in this way is to miss his point. Marx did not
criticizc thc catcgorics oabsolutc idcalism takcn to includc Hcgcl, thc
Ccrmanidcologists, and Proudhon) or bcingabstractwhcnthcy should
bccmpirical.Asascicntist,Marxwasintcrcstcdinthclogicothcmattcrs
hcstudicd, and this logic can only bc cxprcsscd in univcrsals, whicharc
abstractions. Marx's point was not to rcplacc catcgorics abstractions)
with cmpirical acts prcsumcd to bc not abstractions) , but to rcplacc
thosc abstractions which arc prcabricatcd and subjcctivcly applicd to a
particular objcct oscicntinc scrutiny with abstractions that takc shapc
accordingto thcspccihcityothatobjcctitscl. JhisiswhatI havccallcd
Marx' sempiricism in second intension.
Hcgcl dcscribcd thc study o logic as 'thc absolutc cducation and
brccdingoconsciousncss.
, ,
cspitchis critiqucoHcgcl' sapplicationoI
logic to thc rcal scicnccs o naturc and spirit) , Marx had a wcll-brc
consciousncss. His study o Hcgcl' s logic tcachcs him an
apprcciationor thccontcnt,spccihcdi6crcnccs, and intcrnal rclatcdn
oabstractions thcmsclvcs. Hcgcl' s logic cducatcs Marx to rcalizc
abstractionisthcmcdiumothought,andthatthcmcdiumhasamcssagc
which nccds to bc thoughtully hccdcd. Prcciscly such thoughtul trcat-
mcntothccatcgoricsopoliticalcconomydistinguishcs Marxromprior
political cconomists.
MAKX' S IMMANLNJCKIJIQLL SLNSL-AJA AN
SCILNJIIC LMPIKICISMS
Marxlargclyacccpts Hcgcl's criticismsobothradicalscnsc-datacmpir-
icismandscicntihc cmpiricism. JhcbrstchaptcroHcgcl' sPhenomenology
113
114 MARX'S MATURE METHODOLOGICAL WRITINGS
takcs up thcclaims oradicalscnsc-datacmpiricismandshowsthatwhat
appcars to bc thc most objcctivc and concrctc provcs to bc thc most
subjcctivc and abstract. Marx bcgins his scction on mcthod in thc
Grundrisse by making much thc samcpoint.
Itsccmstobc thccorrcctthingtobcginwith thcactualprcsup-
position, thc rcal and concrctc, thus, c. g. , in cconomics, with
population,whichisthcoundationandthcsubj cctothcwholc
social act oproduction. Noncthclcss, on closcr considcration
this shows itsclas alsc. Population is an abstraction, H, c. g. , I
lcavc out thc classcs outowhich it is constitutcd.'
I n this analysis oscnsc-data cmpiricism, Marx makcs critical usc o
'abstract. ' Inthctcxtabovc,hcdiscusscsthc catcgorypopulation, whichis
an abstraction. Jo say that 'population is an abstraction' mcans or
Marx that it is an abstractcatcgory, an abstract abstraction. A catcgory is
abstractiitis shortondctcrminations, thatis,iit is simplcor noncom-
plcx. Sincc scicncc conccrns itscl with thc ncccssary rclations among
actual, complcx things as thcy arc apprchcndcd in thought, it can ncvcr
bc satishcd with thc lcvcl o truth o6rcd by immcdiatc, conccptually
abstractscnsc-data.
Hcgclmakcs thccascagainstscientifc empiricism succinctlyina passagc
romthcEnyclopedia Logic:
Jhcundamcntalillusionin scicntihccmpiricismis always this,
thatituscs thcmctaphysicalcatcgoricso mattcr,orcc,thosco
onc, many, univcrsality, also inbnity, ctc. urthcrmorc, it|
cxtcndsimplications alongthcthrcadosuchcatcgorics,whcrcby
it| prcsupposcs andapplicssyllogisticorms, andin allthis it|
docs notknow thatititsclcarricsonand contains mctaphysics
anduscsthosccatcgoricsandthcirconncctionsinaullyuncriti-
cal and unconscious manncr.
Hcgcl'scritiqucoscicntihccmpiricismisimmancntin that hcshowshow
cmpiricism bccomcs its own opponcnt dogmatic mctaphysics. Whilc
rushing to thc acts, scicntihc cmpiricism thoughtlcssly trcads on thc
catcgorics it uscs to scicntihcally appropriatc thc acts.
A classiccxamplcoMarx
'
s immancntcritiqucoscicntihccmpiricism
conccrnsthcvaluc-orm. InaootnotctothchrstcditionoCapital, Marx
suggcsts1hcHcgclian inspirationorhisinnovativcanalysis olthc valuc-
orm.

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MARX'S LOGICALLY WELL-BRED EMPIRICISM
!t h hardly surprising that thc cconomists, wholly undcr thc
innucncc ocmpirical [stoficher] intcrcsts, havcovcrlookcd thc
contcnt o thc orm o thc rclativc cxprcssion ovaluc, whcn
bcorc Hegel, procssional logicians cvcnovcrlookcd thc contcnt
othc ormothcparadigms ojudgmcntand syllogism. '
115
Jhcclassicalpoliticalcconomists,wholackMarx'sHcgcliancducationin
thc disciplincs o abstract thinking, ncvcr movc bcyond a dogmatic
rclation to thc catcgorics opoliticalcconomy.
JW SLNSLS JHL ISJINCJIN BLJWLLN ABSJKACJ
AN CNCKLJL
WcsawabovcthatMarxapplicsthctcrms'abstract' and 'concrctc' to
catcgorics, or abstractions, thcmsclvcs. thc morcdctcrminatcorsynthctic
a catcgory, thc morc concrctc. But thcsc arc thought-determinations. A
scnsuously pcrccivcd objcct is indccd a 'comprchcnsion o many
dctcrminations, ' but it is not immcdiatcly such a unihcd maniold or
thought. Jhc conccptoascnsuousobjcctbccomcsconcrctconly through
thc labor othought.
Inthought, thcrcorc,it thcconcrctc| appcarsas thcproccsso
comprchcnsion,as rcsult,notas startingpoint,althoughitis thc
actualstartingpoint,andthusalsothcstartingpointointuition
[Anschauung] and prcscntation. '
Scicnccbcgins withthatwhich is concrctc in thcordcroactuality, wi
scnsuous pcrccption, but its cognitivc working up owhatis concrctc
actuality bcgins with conccptually abstract dctcrminations. n thc

hand, Marxuscs'concrctc'todistinguishthcactualromthcconc
whilconthcothcr,hcuscs'concrctc'and'abstract'withinthcsphcrc II
thc conccptual to distinguish conccpts that arc morc or lcss synthctic.
Marx aults absolutc idcalism or ailing to kccp thcsc two scnscs
scparatc,Hcgclsupcrimposcs ontorcalitythc movcmcntothoughtrom
thc abstract to thc concrctc.
Hcgcl cll thcrcorc into thc illusion ograsping thc rcal as thc
rcsult o thc scl-in-itscl-comprchcnding, in itscl dccpcning,
and out o itscl scl-moving thought, whilc thc mcthod o
climbingupromthc abstracttothcconcrctcisonlythcwayor
116 MARX'S MA TURE METHODOLOGICAL WRITINGS
thinking to appropriatc thc concrctc, to rcproducc it U somc-
thingconcrctcinthcmind. Butinnoway isit| thcorigination
proccss othc concrctc itscl. '
MarxchargcsHcgclwiththcultimatcinmisplaccdconcrctcncss,namcly,
proj cctingthcmodclothoughtontorcality. MarxgrantsthatHcgclhasa
grcat insight into thc logic oscicntihc thinking, but it is just that, an
insightintoscicntihcthought. Bcorc considcringinmorcdcpth thcsignih-
cancc oMarx's claim that Hcgcl conatcd thought and rcality, wcwill
cxaminc how Hcgcl's mcthod o procccding rom thc abstract to thc
concrctc hclpcd Marx uncovcr somc allacics o thc classical political
cconomists.
Marx's scicntihc mcthod is hcrcclyantircductionist. Jhclogicaltrain-
ingthatMarxglcancdromHcgcl, inparticularromthcScience oJLogic,
taughthim todcmanda clcar ordcringoscicntihc catcgorics intcrms o
thcirconccptualconcrctcncss, andtorcspcctthcdi6crcnccsamongthcm.
Jhc cmpirically drivcn classical political cconomists rcqucntly violatc
this rcspcctor di6crcnccs oorm. Pcrhaps thcirmost commonallacyis
torcduccmorcconcrctccatcgoricstothcabstractcatcgoricsothcsphcrc
osimplccommoditycxchangc.I I A cascinpointisinMarx'scriticismo
thc 'cconomicharmonics' orcdcrick Bastiat.
orcxamplc,thcrclationbctwccncapitalandintcrcstisrcduccd
tothccxchangcocxchangc-valucs. Jhus alcritisbrstcmpiri-
cally asccrtaincd that cxchangc-valuc cxists not only in this
simplc dctcrminatcncss but also in thc csscntially di6crcnt dc-
tcrminatcncss| ocapital, capitalisagain rcduccd to thcsimplc
conccptocxchangc-valuc, and intcrcst, whichcvcncxprcsscsa
dctcrminatc rclation ocapital as such, is likcwisc torn out o
its| dctcrminatcncss and cquatcd with cxchangc-valuc is ab-
stractcd rom thc wholc rclation in its spccihc dctcrminatcncss
andhasgoncbacktothcundcvclopcdrclationothccxchangco
commodity or commodity. '
Jhisvcductioncxtinguishcs thc spccihciticsothc morc concrctccatcgory
capital andthcyctmorcconcrctccatcgoryinterest inthcabstractncssothc
catcgory exchange-value.
Classicalpolitical cconomyurthcrcompounds itscductionistallacics
through obliviousncss to thc lcvcls oabstractncss oits scicntihc orms.
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MARX'S LOGICALLY WELL-BRED EMPIRICISM
117
Hcrcthc problcm isnotthc rcduction oconcrctc catcgorics toabstract
oncs, butthcmuddlingothcscicntihccxamination andprcscntation o
abstract catcgorics by admixing morc concrctc catcgorics. In a lcttcr to
Lngcls,Marxanticipatcssuchmuddlcdobj cctions tohisthcoryovaluc.
Allobj cctionsagainstthisdchnitionovalucarccithcrtakcnout
olcss dcvclopcd rclations o production, or thcy arc oundcd
upon thc conusion which makcs thc morc concrctc cconomic
dctcrminations romwhichvalucisabstractcd,andwhichcan
thus, on thc othcr hand, also bc rcgardcd as its urthcr
dcvclopmcnt countagainstitvaluc|inthis,itsabstract, undc-
vclopcd orm. '
Jhc dcvclopmcntohighly abstract catcgorics opoliticalcconomy, such
as valuc, mustcxcludc thc morc concrctccatcgorics rom considcration.
Iwc usc concrctc catcgorics to cxplain thc abstract catcgorics, why
cxplan thc concrctc on thc basis othc abstract?' Marx raiscsj ust this
problcmwhilc criticizingKicardo orintroducingvcrycomplcxcconomic
orms immcdiatcly alcrhchasdcvclopcd thcormovaluc. Marx writcs
to Kugclman.
Scicncc consists prcciscly in dcvcloping how thc law ovaluc
pushcs itscl through. So i onc wantcd rom thc outsct 'to
cxplain` all o thc phcnomcna sccmingly contradictory to thc
law,thcnoncwouldhavctosupplythcscicnccbiore thcscicncc.
It is prcciscly Kicardo's mistakc thatin his hrst chaptcr about
valuc hc prcsupposcs as given all possiblc catcgorics, which
should hrstbc dcvclopcd in ordcrtocstablish thciradcquation
to thc lawo valuc. ' '
Jopull concrctc catcgorics into thc scicntihc prcscntation omorc
stractcatcgoricsis to put 'thcscicnccbifore thc scicncc. `'
'
MAKX'S PSJ-HLCLLIANKLJLKN JLPISJLMLCY
nc way olooking at Marx's position is to undcrstand it as a rcturn to
thc critical,epistemological positionoKantianphilosophy,apositionwhich
Hcgclhaddcnounccdasa subj cctivisticdcnialothcpowcrothoughtto
grasp thc truc or absolutc . ' ' Kant stcadastly supports thc rcncction
which di6crcntiatcs actuality, as it is apprchcndcd in thought, rom
118 MARX'S MATURE METHODOLOGICAL WRITINGS
actuality U it h u itscl. Kant's sustaincd cpistcmological rchcction
crcatcs thc distinction bctwccn appcarancc and thc thinginitscl. Hcgcl
claims to rcconcilc this division ofor us and in itself through absolutc
knowlcdgc,whichisin andfor itse(t: Inovcrcomingthcdistinctionbctwccn
in itse(( andfor us, Hcgcl mcansto rcducc thc cpistcmologicalpositionto
an inadcquatcand passingphascospirit. Marxclcarlysidcs with Kant,
againstHcgcl,inadopting thc cpistcmological distinctionasa part ohis
philosophical anthropology.
Anothcrapproach to Marx'scritiqucoHcgcl'srcjcctionocpistcmol-
ogy cxists through naturalism. Marx points in this dircction whcn hc

writcs,
Jhcwholc, as i tappcars in thc hcad as a thought-wholc, is a
product othc thinking hcad, which appropriatcs thc world in
thc singlcpossiblcway or it, a way which is di6crcntrom thc
artistic, rcligious, or practical-spiritual appropriation o this
world. Jhcrcalsubjcctrcmains alcrwards, justas bcorchand,
subsisting in its indcpcndcncc outsidc thc hcad, to wit, just as
longas thc hcad rclatcs only spcculativcly, only thcorctically.

Hcrc Marx placcs thought in a naturalistic sctting. Jhinking is onc

particularactivityamong thc many undcrtakcn by a natural, intclligcnt
organisminitscngagcmcntwiththcrcalworldoutsidcit. Marxcmbraccs
a naturalisticargumcntationagainstHcgcl's critiquc ocpistcmology.
Hcgclobscrvcs thatcpistcmology rcsts on a distinction bctwccnthc way
things arc in themselves and thc waythings arcr. Hcthcn notcs that this
distinction is madc by thought itscl and thcrcorc alls wholly within
thought. Jhc naturalistic rcply to this insight rcjccts thc incrcncc that
subsumingthcdi6crcncc bctwccn 'initscl' and 'oruswithin thought rulcs
out a rcal di6crcncc bctwccn thcsc two, indcpcndcnt o thought. Jhis
countcrargumcnt can bc madc morc intuitivc as ollows. d, in thought, wc
distinguish applcs and pcars and thcn concludc that thc di6crcncc bc-
twccnapplcsandpcarsisadi6crcnccinthoughtalonc,wchavcmadcthc
samckind ocrrorthat Marx and naturalism chargcagainstHcgcl.

nc caturc o Marx's carly work which sccms to contradict thc

prcccdingparagraphs:s his hcavy uscoHcgcl'sdialccticoconccpt and
objcct, which appcars in thc introduction to thc Phenomenolog. I n that
introduction, Hcgcl makcs his most basic and dircct assault on thc
cpistcmological position csscntially thc argumcnt I havc outlincd and
criticizcdalongnaturalistclincs. Iwcsubstitutcthcobject orthcin itseU;
and thc concept or thc for us, wc can rcstatc Hcgcl's argumcnt. thc
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MARX'S LOGICALLY WELL-BRED EMPIRICISM
119
distinctionbctwccnobjcctand conccptis adistinctionwithinconscious-
ncss, within thought, and to makc this rchcction is to go bcyond thc
cpistcmological vicwpoint, which locatcs thc di6crcnccs bctwccn objcct
andconccptoutsidc consciousncss.

Jhc naturalistic and, I bclicvc, Marxian argumcntation o6crcd abovc

rcjccts Hcgcl's c6ort to transccndcpistcmology, not by dcnyingHcgcl ' s
point that thc di6crcncc bctwccn conccpt and objcct can bc rcncctcd
upon, and thcrcby rcsult in a dialccticoconccpt and objcct, but rathcr,
by vicwing Hcgcl's 'conccpt' and 'obj cct' as dialcctical categories oJ
thought, to bc distinguishcd rom thc indcpcndcntly cxisting rcality that
thought labors to appropriatc. I nthis way Hcgcl's own point, that both
thcconccptandthcobjcctallwithinconsciousncss ,isturncdagainsthim
inthc naturalistic claim thatthcrcis morc to rcality than consciousncss.
]ustas hcacccptsthcmcthodological stricturc oprocccdingrom thc
abstract to thc concrctc, Marx acccpts Hcgcl's dialcctic oconccpt and
objcct by prcdicating that dialcctic o thc way o thought, without
immcdiatcly and unrcstrictcdly prcdicating it orcality indcpcndcnt o
thought. MarxrcviscsHcgcl's intcndcdsupcrscssionocpistcmologyinto
a rcorm o cpistcmology, which clucidatcs thc dialcctical rclationship
bctwccnthcthought-dctcrminationsin itse{f andcrus, orobject andconcept.
I nsodoingMarxo6crsamodclorcomprchcndingprogrcssinknowlcdgc
dialcctically, but not absolutcly.
Jhc actthat Marx acccpts Hcgcl'sdialccticoconccptand obj cct,but
onlyina rclativiscdorm, suggcstshowMarxmightrcconcilcopposition
to ormal logics or mcthodologics with his rcturn to thc cpistcmological
position.cspitchis own mcta-lcvclprcscntationoaormallogicorrcal
scicnccs, Hcgclconsciouslylinks thc critiquc oormallogicor mcthodol-
ogy and thc dialcctic o conccpt and objcct with thc supcrscssion
cpistcmology. In Hcgcl's mind, cpistcmology'sradicaldistinction oco
ccptandobjcctunhingcsanydialccticothc two,and conscqucntly
thc way or a nondialcctical, ormal approach to conccpts or a
logic. Marx trics to dcrail this train o conscqucnccs by acccpting
dialcctic oconccptand obj cctwithin consciousncss or thought, yct hold-
ing out or thc distinction bctwccn consciousncss and rcality. Such a
uniqucand di6crcntiatcdvicw makcssomcscnscoutoMar x'ssccmingly
unrcconcilablcrcj cctionoormaltrcatiscsonmcthodorlogic,atthcsamc
timc that hc rcturns to thccpistcmological position.
Marx'scvidcntrcinstatcmcntocpistcmology,ovcrandagainstHcgcl's
claim to havc supcrscdcd thc cpistcmological point ovicw, ought not
comcasanygrcatsurprisc.KantianrcsonanccsinMarx'scarlycritiquco
Hcgclappcarmorcthanonccin thccarlicrchaptcrsothisbook. Marx's
120
MARX'S MATURE METHODOLOGICAL WRITINGS
carlycritiqucoHcgcladdrcsscsthoscidcas O whichHcgcl'srcjcctiono
cpistcmology turns. Wc may sclcct thrcc. irst is Hcgcl's culmination o
thc Phenomenology oJ Spirit inabsolutcknowlcdgc. In his Parisian critiquc,
Marxwritcs outthccntircchaptcronabsolutcknowlcdgc,andhctakcsit
as thc vantagc point rom which to criticizc Hcgcl's philosophy as a
wholc. In rcjccting thc Hcgclian claim to absolutc knowlcdgc, Marx
rcjccts Hcgcl's claim to havc supcrscdcd cpistcmology. Sccond, Hcgcl's
Science oJLogic rcsts uponthcachicvcmcntothclcvcl oabsolutcknow-
lcdgc. Jhc Logic cnvisions itsclas transpiring bcyond thc distinction o
consciousncss bctwccn 'in itscl' and 'or us' bcyond cpistcmology.
Hcgcl's prcscntation ologic as a scicncc unto itsclprcsumcs thc tran-
sccndcncc othc cpistcmologicalstandpoint, itprcsupposcs thc culmina-
tionothcPhenomenology inabsolutcknowlcdgc.WchavcsccnthatMarx's
mcta-critiqucoHcgcl dwclls on Hcgcl's independent prcscntation ologic
asascicncc.Jhird,asMarxvicwsit, Hcgcl'sprcscntationoaphilosophi-
cal rcalscicncc (Realwissenschaf) , suchas thcPhilosophy of Right, turns on
hisprior,indcpcndcntprcscntationothcscicnccologic.Jhusittoorcsts
on Hcgcl's critiquc ocpistcmology and is likcwisc rcj cctcd by Marx.

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CHAPTER 1 0
Marx's Distinction between General and
Determinate Abstractions
hough it has attractcd littlc attcntion rom commcntators thc dis-
tinctionbctwccngcncralanddctcrminatcabstractionsis undamcntalto
Marx's conccption oscicntihcknowlcdgc.1 It plays animportantrolcin
his critiquc oidcalismin thcParis Manuscripts andthc German Ideology; it
structurcs Marx's mastcrwork, Capital; and Marx rclics on ithcavily in
makingspccihc critcsms oprcviouspolitical cconomists . Jhis chaptcr
will considcr thc distinction intcrms othrcc issucs. thc limitcd valuc o
gcncral abstractions, somcparalogismsinvolvinggcncralanddctcrminatc
abstractions thatoccurinpoliticalcconomy, and thcdistinction bctwccn
thcsc two typcs oabstractions as itis madc in thc Geran Ideology.
JHLSCANJSCILNJIIC VALLL CLNLKAL
ABSJKACJINS
nc almost univcrsal ailing among political cconomists Marx cxccpts
only thc aristocrat Sir]amcs Stcuart and thc carly Physiocrats) is
naturalization oJ the capitalist mode oJ production. Jhis undamcntal naw
prcvious political cconomy is thc hrst issuc Marxaddrcsscs in thc
drisse introduction. Jo uncovcr thc sourcc othis dccct, Marx makcs
pivotal distinction bctwccn two typcs o abstractions. Hc makcs
distinction bascd on rcncctions about thc proccdurc o many
cconomists, notably]ohnStuartMill, who bcginwitha discussion othc

univcrsal conditions oproductin, in which gcncralizations about pro-

duction arc put orth as immutablc natural laws govcrning all human
socictics. Jhs lcads Marx to somc thoughts aboutthcscicntihc statusoI
suchgcncralizations . Hcwritcs, "Production in general is anabstraction,but
a rational [verstandige] abstraction, insoar as it actually brings out and
hxcswhatiscommon,andthcrcorcsparcsusthcrcpctition.
, ,
Hcrcisthc
hrst typc oabstraction, whatI callgeneral abstractions. Jhclimitations to
thcusculncssosuchabstractions arcsummarizcdatthc cnd othchrst
scction othc Grundrisse introduction.
W a
122
MARX'S MATURE METHODOLOGICAL WRITINGS
Common to a|| stages o| product|on, there are determ|nat|ons
wh|charenxedbythoughtasgenera|, but the so-ca||edgeneral
conditions o|a||product|onarenoth|ng otherthan these abstract
momentsw|thwh|chnoactua|h|stor|ca|stageo|product|on|s
grasped.
Oenera| abstract|ons prov|de at best a rough and ready substrate |or
sc|ent|nctheory,bythemse|vestheyproducenosc|ent|ncunderstand|ng.
Rea| sc|ent|nc understand|ng requ|res a second type o| abstract|on,
wh|chIca||determinate abstractions. Theprob|emw|thgenera|abstract|ons
|sthat,| nthe|rgenera||ty,theydescr|beoneobjectaswe||asthenext,and
donota||owthesc|ent|ncth|nkertotouchonthespec|ncd|erenceo|the
objectunderscrut|ny. S|ncesc|encedea|sw|thunderstand|ngtheactua|,
and s|nce the actua| |s a|waysdeterm|nate, genera| abstract|ons are |n
pr|nc|p|e |nadequate |or sc|ent|nc exp|anat|on. Marx |eds us to such
observat|onswhenhewr|tes o|mater|a|product|on.
I| there |s noproduct|on |n genera|, soa|sothere|snogenera|
product|on. Product|on |s a|ways a paricular branch o|
product|on e.g., agr|cu|ture, an|ma| bre
.
edu
.
g, manu|acture,
etc. or |t |s totality . . . I|na||y, product.on .s a|so not on|y
part|cu|ar,but |t|s
-
ever a certa|nsoc|a|bod, a soc|a| subject,
wh|ch |s act|ve |n a greater or sparser tota||ty o|brancheso|
d
.

pro uct.on.
I| |t |s to comprehend an actua| object, such as any human mater|a|
product|on, sc|ence cannot content |tse|| w|th thep|a
'
|tudes oere

by
genera| abstract|ons. Rather, |t must deve|op determuate abstract.ons
appropr|atetothespec|nc|t|eso||tsactua|object.
POLITICAL ECONOMICPARALOOISMSINVOLVINO
OENERALANDDETERMINATEABSTRACTIONS
W|th the d|st|nct|on between genera| and determ|nate abstract|ons |n
hand, we canrev|ew the aw o| c|ass|ca| po||t|ca|economy ment|oned
above. C|ass|ca| po||t|ca| econom|sts natura||ze spec|nca||y cap|ta||st
econom|c re|at|ons not by us|ng genera| abstract|ons but by oisus|ng
them. The po||t|ca| econom|sts |a|| prey to para|og|st|c reason|ng, or
categorym|stakes, whentheys||pdeterm|nateabstract|ons|ntothep|ace
o| genera| abstract|ons. When they subsumethe entire sphereo| produc-
t|on under the |og|c o| genera| abstract|ons, the po||t|ca| econom|sts
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GENERAL AND DETERMINATE ABSTRACTIONS 123
naturalizc, or dchistoricizc, this sphcrc. Whcnsubsumcd undcr thc logic
ogcncral abstractons, thc catcgorics oproduction appcar immutablc.
By imagining that gcncral abstractions can scicntibcally dctcrminc thc
sphcrc o production, thc political cconomists prcparc thcmsclvcs or a
paralogstic allacy conccrning production. Such is Marx's point in thc
ollowing.
Produciion is much morc scc, c. g. , Mill to bc prcscntcd in
dstincton rom distribution, ctc. , as grippcd in ctcrnallaws o
naturc, indcpcndcnt rom history, at which opportunity thcn,
bourgeois rclatons arc quitc surrcptitiously shovcd undcr as
irrcvcrsiblc natural laws osocicty in thc abstract.'
Marx's cxprcssion 'quitc surrcptitiously shovcd undcr' makcs it plain
that hc intcrprcts thc logc othc political cconomists as paralogistic, or
involving a catcgory mstakc. Jhcpolitical cconomists commita doublc
crror. on thc onc hand, limiting production to thc logic o gcncral
abstractons, on thc othcr hand, limiting distribution to thc logic o
dctcrminatc abstractons. Actually, both logics mustbc applicd in ordcr
to attain a propcr undcrstanding ocithcr production or distribution.
Marx gvcs an cxamplcowhat it mcans paralogisticallyto introducc
dctcrminatc hcrc, bourgcois) catcgorics oproduction undcrcovcrothc
logc ogcncral abstractions.
or cxamplc. No production would bc| possiblc without an
instrumcntoproduction, cvcn ithis instrumcntwcrc only thc
hand. No [productionwould bc| possiblc without past, hcapcd
uplabor,cvcnthislaborisonlythcdcxtcritywhichisgathcrcd
togcthcr and conccntratcd in thc hand othc savagc through
rcpcatcd practcc. Captal is among othcr things also jan| in-
strumcntoproduction,alsopast, objcctihcdlabor.Jhuscapital
is a univcrsal, ctcrnal natural rclation, i . c. , iIj ustlcavc asidc
thatwhich is spccihc, whathrstmakcs 'instrumcntoproduc-
tion,' 'hcapcd-up labor,' into capital.
Hcrc Marx puts thc argumcnt o thc political cconomists in almost
syllogistic orm i n ordcr to bring thc paralogism to promincncc. Jhc
logcalawnths argumcntationconsistsinsubstitutingthcdctcrminatc
abstractoncapital
,
orthcgcncralabstractioninstrument of production. Sincc
thsparalogsmmakcsuponc-thirdothcJrinitarian ormula thcothcr
124
MARX'S MATURE METHODOLOGICAL WRITINGS
two-thirds involvcthc catcgorics oflandcdpropcrty and wagc-labor) , wc
mightsay thatwhcrcKantcriticizcs thc thrccgrcatparalogisms ofpurc
rcason, Marx unvcils thc thrcc grcatparalogisms ofbourgcois political
cconomy.
CLNLKAL ANO OLJLKM!NAJLABSJKACJ!CNS !N 'JHL
CLKMAN !OLCLCCY`
c havcsccnhowMarx honcs thcdistinction bctwccngcncral abstrac-

ions a

d dctcrminatc abstractions inordcrtoscvcrthcparalogistic and

idcologi

cal)conncctions bctwccnthclogicsofthctwo di6crcnttypcs. But

MarxdidnothrstdcvclopthisdistnctioninthcGrundrisse, andhcddnot
hrst apply itin thc criticismofbourgcois political cconomy. Marxsccms
to havc thc samc distinction in mind in thc '!cucrbach` sccton ofthc
German Ideolog, whcrc hc uscs i tto criticizc spcculativc mcthod.' ! quotc
arx at lcng

h hcrc, ccausc this tcxt providcs such a strking antcpa-

tion ofthc pomts clucidatcd on thc basis ofthc Grundrisse scction.
Jhcrcforc,whcrcspcculationstops,withactuallifc, thcrc actual
positivc scicncc, thcprcscntation ofthcpracticalactivation, thc
practical proccss ofdcvclopmcnt of mc bcgins. Jhc phrascs
aboutconsciousncss stop,actualknowlcdgcmuststcp into thcr
placc. With thc prcscntation ofactuality, sclf-sumcicnt philo-
sophy loscs its mcdium ofcxistcncc. At bcst, a summing up of
thcmostgcncralrcsultswhichallow thcmsclvcs to bcabstractcd
from thc obscrvation ofthc historical dcvclopmcnt ofmcn can
stcpintoitsplacc. Cnthcirown [fr sich] scparatcdfromactual
history, thcsc abstractions havc no valuc whatsocvcr. Jhcy can
only scrvc to facilitatc thc ordcring of historical matcrial, to
indicatc thcscqucnccofitsindividuallaycrs. But thcyinno way
givc,asdocsphilosophy,arccipcorschcma,accordingtowhich
thc historical cpochs can bc trimmcd into ordcr. Cn thc con-
trary, thc dimculty hrst bcgins thcrc, whcrc onc givcs oncsclf
ovcr to thc obscrvation and ordcring ofthc matcrial, bc tofa
past cpoch or of thc prcscnt, to thc actual prcscntation. Jhc
sctting asidc ofthcsc dimcultics is conditioncd by prcsupposi-
tions which in no way can bcgivcn hcrc, but hrst givc thcm-
sclvcs
.
fromthc study ofthc actual lifc proccss andthc actionof
thc individuals ofcach cpoch.

Marx's point hcrc s thc samc as in thc 6rau4risst ntroduction . Ccncral
abstractions can bc dangcrously mislcading, for although thcy arc not

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GENERAL AND DETERMINA TE ABSTRA CTIONS 125

totallydcvoidoscicntibcworth,thcycannotpropcrlydcscribcany actual
obj cct, any social-historical actuality.
Marx'svicwthatspcculativcmcthodcannotdoscicnccwithinthclogic
ogcncralabstractions maybclabclcdhis 'scicntihc' critiqucoCcrman
idcology. Wc havc sccn how Marx applics this critiquc to bourgcois
political cconomy's c6ort to putorth a scicncc oproduction within thc
logical ramcwork o gcncral abstractions. Jhc scicntihc criticism o
spcculativcmcthodis, howcvcr,onlyoncsidcoMarx'stotalcritiquc, thc
othcr critical usc o thc distinction bctwccn gcncral and dctcrminatc
abstractions may bc tcrmcd 'philosophical. '
Jhc lcngthy quotation citcd abovc i s immcdiatcly ollowcd by this
statcmcnt. 'Wc takc outhcrc a cw othcsc abstractions, which wc usc
ovcr and against thc idcology and will cxplicatc through historical
cxamplcs. '' ' I mmcdiatcly alcr this transitional scntcncc is thc scction
cntitlcd 'History, ' ' somctimcstakcnasavcritablcgospcloMarx' s and
Lngcl's 'historical matcrialism, ' which bcgins with a statcmcnt quotcd
carlicr.
With thc prcsuppositionlcss Ccrmans wc mustbcgin bystating
thc lrst prcsupposition oall human cxistcncc, thus also oall
history, namcly, thc prcsupposition that mcn must bc in a
position to livc in othcr to 'makc history. ''
Jhcrcollowsalistourthcrprcsuppositions,cachowhichhas thcstatus
ogcncral abstraction. ' '
rom all othis wccan draw two importantpoints. Jhc hrstconccrns
thclabcl 'philosophical. 'Byprcscntingthistablcomatcrialprcsupposi-
tions ohistory, Marx intcnds a philosophical critiquc o 'prcsupposi-
tionlcss' absolutc idcalism. Hcrc Marx argucs or matcrialism
naturalism ovcr and against an idcalism that makcs no cxplicit
systcmatic rccognition othc natural or matcrial prcsuppositions o
tory. Jhis philosophicalargumcnthas its logical sidctoo,and rcscm
Marx's bric critiquc o bourgcois political cconomy's prcscntation
distribution. ' ' Against bourgcois political cconomy's subsumption of

distribution wholly undcrdctcrminatc abstractions, Marx argucs or thc

ncccssityousingbothdctcrminatcabstractionsandgcncralabstractions.
istribution,likcproduction,is charactcrizcd byccrtaingcncralabstrac-
tions. Against thc Ccrman idcologists, Marx is makingthc samc logical
argumcnt, butwithrcspcct tohistoryrathcrthancconomicdistribution. '
Spcculativc mcthod sccks t o prcscnt a scicncc o history within thc
catcgorialramcworkoasinglclogic,Marxmaintainsthatthisisphiloso-
phically and scicntibcallyunsound. ' '
126
MARX'S MATURE METHODOLOGICAL WRITINGS
Jhc sccond point to bc drawn romthc argumcntativc sctting o thc
amous'History' subscction othc 'cucrbach'chaptcrshouldbalancc
thcrcqucntovcrcstimationothatsubscction.'
In thchrstpoint,wcsaw
that this subscction makcs a philosophical critiquc oabsolutc idcalism
rom thc vicwpoint o matcrialism. urthcrmorc, wc saw a powcrul
logical critiquc that has ar-rcaching ramihcations or Marx's scicntihc
mcthodology. But this is thccxtcntothcsignihcanccothis subsccton.
I n particular, thc subscction docs not providc rcal, positivc scicntihc
knowlcdgc. Jhc 'prcsuppositions' sct orth in this subscction cannot bc
takcnas constitutingrcal scicntihcknowlcdgc,bccauscthcy allallwithn
thc logic ogcncral abstractions. Marx cxplains at lcngth that gcncral
abstractions, takcnindcpcndcntlyodctcrminatc abstractions, havc littlc
scicntihc worth. ' '
Sincc rcal scicnccbcgins only atthc ncxusothc two logics oabstrac-
tions, any notion that this rcnowncd subscction prcscnts us with a
'scicncc ohistory,
,

or cvcn a thumbnail skctch osuch a 'scicncc,'

rcstsonthcmostscriousmisundcrstandingoMarx'sconccptoscicncc. '
Morcovcr, givcn Marx's dcscription othc monumcntal task involvcd in
working out thc dctcrminatcabstractionsor a scicnccoasinglchistori-
cal pcriod

thc notion oa complctcly gcncral 'scicnccohistory' must

appcarabsurd to Marx or at lcastpractica|rcasons
SLMMAKY
Jhc prcscntationoarcalscicnccorMarx rcquircs thcuscobothlogics
oabstraction tocxplain anyactualobjcct. Absolutcidcalism' sprinciplcd
rcjcctionothistcnctprovcsitsscicntihcinadcquacy.Likcwisc,bourgcois
political cconomy crrs whcn itcmploys onc logic to undcrstand produc-
tion and anothcr to undcrstand distribution.
Iit is to dcal with actual objccts, scicncc must havc a placc in its
architcctonicorbothgcncralanddctcrminatcabstractions. Marxcxplic-
itlynotcsthcdcmand thisplaccsonhiss cicnccocapitalistsocicty.Atthc
cndothcmcthods cctionothc Grudrisse, hcjotsdownoncohis many
notations or that scicncc.
Soto makc thcdivisioninmanicstashionthat. l ) thcgcncral,
abstractdctcrminations, whichthuslypcrtainmorcorlcssto all
orms o socicty, but in thc scnsc sct orth abovc. 2) Jhc
cat

gorics which

akc up thc inncr articulation o bourgcois

soctcty, and on whtch thc undamcntal classcs arc oundcd.
Marx did not actually ollow tht

t` d ` h
s parLU ar pan or or crmg t c two

GENERAL AND DETERMINATE ABSTRACTIONS 127

logical typcs oabstractions in Capital. Jhcrc hcprcscntsthctwo typcs o
abstractions pairwisc, which has thc advantagc oavoiding any miscon-
ccptions that thc onc typc can dcscribc any actual objcct without thc
othcr. But thcrcquircmcntthatboth typcsoabstractionsbcprcscntcd in
anordcrlymanncrwithinthcscicnccis scl-consciouslyrccognizcdin this
Grundrisse tcxt.
Jhc propcr usc othcsc two logics, namcly, avoiding thcir paralogistic
misuscs, prcsupposcs that onc can distinguish abstractions o thc onc
logical typc rom thosc othc othcr. Hcrc wc must rcmcmbcr what wc
lcarncdconccrningMarx'scriticism thatcmpiricismpaysscantattcntion
to thc contcnt oits abstractions. Logical ncarsightcdncss is thc sort o
crror wc would cxpcct rom bourgcois political cconomy's cmpiricist
mcthods. Noncthclcss, cvcnalogicallyscnsitivcmindmayhnditdimcult
to dctcrminc thc logical typc oa catcgory.
A casc in point appcars in thc discussion othc catcgory o labor in
general inthcmcthodscctionothc Grundrisse introduction. Marx's turbid
ruminationsaboutlaborcanbcclcarcdupbylookingahcad tothcwayhc
handlcs this qucstion in Capital, whcrc hc morc clcarly dclincatcs thc
distinctionbctwccngcncralanddctcrminatcabstractionso labor. Butin
thc Grundrisse, Marxormulatcs thc problcm inmurkyways.
Laborsccmsacomplctclysimplccatcgory.Alsothcprcscntation
oit in this univcrsality as labor as such is old as thc hills.
Noncthclcss, graspcd cconomicallyin this simplicity, 'labor' is
just as modcrn a catcgory as thc rclations which producc this
simplc abstraction.
Jhc simplcst abstraction, thcrcorc, which modcrn cconomics
scts at thc pcak, and which cxprcsscs an ancicntrclation, valid
or all orms osocicty, appcars in this abstraction practically
truc,howcvcr,onlyas a| categoryothcmostmodcrnsocicty.'
Withqualihcrs suchas 'cconomicallyinthissimplicity,' 'in thisabstrac-
tion practically truc, ' and with thc scarc quotcs hc placcs around
'labor,' Marx is struggling to say, I think, that labor is not a singlc,
simplc catcgory, but actually two catcgorics . Jhc hrst, which may bc
callcdthcabstract categoy olabor,'cxprcsscsanancicntrclation,validor
allormsosocicty. 'Clcarly,itisagcncralabstraction,discusscdatsomc
lcngth in thc hth chaptcr o Capital's brst volumc, 'Labor Proccss and
Proccss oValorization, ' whcrc Marx summarizcs it as ollows.
128 MARX'S MATURE METHODOLOGICAL WRITINGS
Jhc labor proccss U wc havc prcscntcd it m its simplc and
abstractmomcnts,ispurposivcactivitytowardthcproductiono
usc-valucs, approprationothcnaturalorhumannccds,univcr-
sal condition o thc matcrial cxchangc [Stoifwechsels] bctwccn
man and naturc, ctcrnal natural condition o human lic and
thcrcorc indcpcndcnt ocvcry orm o this lic, or bcttcr yct,
cqually common to allits orms osocicty.

Jhc sccond catcgory that Marx's aorcmcntioncd qualihcrs try to

distinguish may bc callcd thc conccpt o abstract labor, a dctcrminatc
abstraction. ItappcarsinthchrstchaptcroCapital, whcrcabstractlabor
is charactcrizcd as thc 'valuc-constituting substancc.' Marx clcarly
distinguishcs this dctcrminatc conccptoabstractlaborromthcabstract
conccpt olabor, to sct o6his labor thcory ovaluc rom thc classical
thcory. Marxcalls this distinction'thcpivotalpoint [Sprngpunkt] around
which thc undcrstanding o political cconomy turns.' Jhc classical
laborthcoryovalucailstomakc thisdistinctionandthcrcbyallsintoa
paralogisticnaturalizationothc dctcrminatcconccptoabstractlabor.'
Jhc most dcmanding point oall is that Marx's conccpt oscicntihc
knowlcdgcrcquircsustoasccrtainwhicharcthcdctcrminatcabstractions
appropriatc or a particular objcct o study and how to ordcr thcm
propcrly among thcmsclvcs, moving rom thc abstract to thc concrctc.
ctcrminatcabstractionsmustalsobcrclatcdin anordcrlyashiontothc
gcncral abstractions. Jhc crcation othc gcncral abstractions is otcn a
mattcr ocommon scnsc, as thc list in thc German ideology indicatcs, and
sccms trivial in comparison to spcciying and propcrly ordcring thc
dctcrminatc abstractions.
inally, wc can scc a dircct rclationship bctwccn Marx's distinction
bctwccn gcncral and dctcrminatc abstractions and his rcinstatcmcnt o
cpistcmology. Marx's distinction is tailorcd to a naturalistic position.
Marxuscsgcncralabstractionsinhisscicnccocapitalistsocictyinordcr
tocallattcntiontothcnatural prcsuppositions ocapitalistsocicty. Indccd,
thc tcnability onaturalism, and, in particular, naturalist cpistcmology
would sccm to rcquirc a distinction such as that bctwccn gcncral and
dctcrminatc abstractions. thcrwisc it is dimcult to scc how onc can
maintain thc cpistcmological rcncction on thc nonidcntity othc way o
thought with actuality.'
Lvidcncc othc distinction bctwccn gcncral and dctcrminatc abstrac-
tions appcars inthcParis Manuscripts, whcrcwchndsomcoMarx's most
cxplicit ormulations o a naturalistic position. Jhc ollowing passagc
criticizcs Hcgcl

or collapsing thc two typcs o abstractions into onc

anothcr.

I
:
'
'

GENERAL AND DETERMINATE ABSTRACTIONS
Jhc appropriation o thc alicnatcd objcctivc bcing [ Wesen] , or
thc supcrscsson o obj cctivity in thc dctcrminatcncss o
alienation . & has or Hcgcl likcwisc, or cvcn primarily, thc
connotaton osupcrscding objectivifY, bccausc what is o6cnsivc
and alicnatingis not thc deterinate charactcrothc obj cct, but
ts objective charactcror scl-consciousncss. ''
129
Hcgcl ails to hold thc dctcrminatc abstraction alienation apart rom thc
gcncralabstractionobjectivify. WhyHcgclconuscsobjcctivitywithalicna-
tion is, or Marx, oa piccc with his rcusal to lcavc anything standing
ovcr against thought, as with thcdismissal ocpistcmology.

|
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CHAPTER 1 1
Marx's Critique of the Classical
Essence-Appearance Model and Its
Political-Economic Employment
JHL CLASSICAL VLKSJA^) MLLA^ IJS
LMPLYML^J BY JHL PLIJICAL LC^MISJS
Harking back to Marx's rccctions on rancis Bacon and Jhomas
Hobbcs in thc Hol Famil, wc may say that Adam Smith is political
cconomy's Bacon, and Kicardo its Hobbcs . ' Likc Bacon in natural sci-
cncc, Smith hcralds thc birth omodcrn scicncc and yct himsclmovcs
bctwccn dcscriptions o thc intcrnal workings csscncc) o bourgcois
socicty comparablctothcprimaryqualitics) andthcsuraccappcaranccs
othat socicty comparablc to thc sccondary qualitics) . Marx rccrs to
thcsc as thc csotcric and thc cxotcric approachcs, rcspcctivcly, and
obscrvcs thatSmithwasasintcrcstcdinthconcapproachashcwasinthc
othcr.
It is Kicardo who consistcntly sought to ollow thc outcr, thc appcar-
anccs, back to thc inncr, thc csscncc. Kicardo' s political cconomy scts
orththccsscnccocapitalistsocictyanddcmonstratcshow all
contradictory appcaranccs can bc cxplaincd on thc basis o thc
structurc ocapitalism thclawthatthcvaluc oa commodity is LC
mincd by thc quantity o labor timc cmbodicd in it. Marx writcs
Kicardo's proccdurc.
^ow Kicardo' s mcthod consists hcrcin. hc starts out rom thc
dctcrminationothcvaluc-magnitudcothccommoditythrough
labor-timc, andthcninvestigates whcthcrthcrcmainingcconomic
rclations, catcgorics, contradict this dctcrmination ovaluc, or to
whatcxtcntthcymodiy it. nc sccs at hrstglancc notonlythc
historical justihcation o this typc o proccdurc, its scicntihc
ncccssity in thc history occonomics, but at thc samc timc, its
scicntihcinadcquacy.
3
132
MARX'S MATURE METHODOLOGICAL WRITINGS
Kicardo's mcthod is historicallyjustincd u that it systcmatically rclatcs
thc cxotcric world oappcaranccs to thc csotcric world ocsscncc, a cat

lcl undonc by Smith ! maintain that, or Marx, thc inadcquacy o

icardo's mcthod lics in its rclianccon a traditional,prc-Hcgclianmodcl
|ocsscncc and appcarancc.
Jhc classical csscncc-appcarancc modcl ontologizcs csscncc as a rcal
thing hiddcn bchind thc curtain o appcaranccs and sccs no logical
rclationship bctwccn thc catcgorics ocsscncc and appcarancc !n tact,
thcsctwocaturcsothcclassicalmodclamounttomuchthc samc thing.
or ithc csscncc is rcincd, it stands alonc, logically indcpcndcnt othc
appcaranccs. Jhcrclationshipbctwccn csscnccand appcaranccs is thcn
takcn toconnccttwotypcsothings; onc, scnsuouslymanicst,yctcpiphc-
nomcnal, thcothcr, rcal, yct unobscrvablccxccpttopurchuman rcason.
Civcn this modclocsscncc and appcarancc, scicnccmustbc a onc-way
strcct thatcxtcrnally sincc thcrc is nointcrnal, logicalrclation bctwccn
twoindcpcndcntthings) rclatcsthcunrcal,olcndcccptivcappcaranccsto
thcirrcal basis inthc world ocsscncc.justwhythis csscncc should havc
these appcaranccs rcmains a mystcry.
An cxamplc o this modcl ocsscncc and appcarancc is providcd by
cscartcs' analysis o thc bit/blob o wax at thc cnd o his sccond
mcditation.Alcraskinghimsclhowitis thatwcknowa bitowaxtobc
thc samc thing alcr all its scnsuous appcaranccs havc bccn altcrcd,
cscartcs draws this conclusion.
Jhc truth othc mattcr pcrhaps, as ! now suspcct, is that this
wax was ncithcr that swcctncss o honcy, nor that plcasant|
odor o h owcrs, nor that whitcncss, nor that shapc, nor that
sound,butonlya bodywhicha littlcwhilc agoappcarcdto my
scnscs undcrthcscorms and which nowmakcs itsclclt undcr
othcrs.'
cscartcs attributcsthcqualitics cxtcnsion, h cxibility, and movabilityto
thcbodyothc wax. !nmakingthis amous distinction bctwccn primary
andsccondaryqualitics, cscartcscngagcsthcscicntincmodclocsscncc
andappcaranccthatwchavcdiscusscd.Jhismodclaccountsordi`cring
appcaranccs byrccrring thcm to a common undcrlying csscncc. Whcrc
Cartcsian naturalscicnccrccrs allappcaranccs to thccsscntialqualitics
omatter, Kicardo'sscicnccothccapitalistcconomyrccrsallappcaranccs
to thc csscntial qualitics ovalue.

I
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CRITIQUE OF CLASSICAL ESSENCE LOGIC
HEOEL' SCRITIQUE OI THEVERST AND MODELOI
ESSENCEANDAPPEARANCE
133
Inthe Cartesian mode| o| essence and appearance, Hege| recognizes a
c|assic caseo|En|ightenment reincationand |orget|u|ness. Hege| objects
thatDescartes recastprimaryqua|itiesinto the|ogico|secondaryqua|i-
ties,i.e.,intothe|ogico|immediacy, orbeing.Hege|takeshisc|ue|rom
Descartes' own words.
Butwhatishereimportanttonoticeis that perception orthe
action by which we perceive] is not a vision, a touch, nor an
imagination, and has neverbeen that, even though it |ormer|y
appeared so, but is so|e|y aninspection bythe mind.`
AccordingtoDescartes,perceptionisnotamattero|, sensuous) imagina-
tion,buto|theactivityo|thepureunderstanding.Descartes'observations
here are not |ar |rom Hege|'s own theory o|essence, |or in Descartes'
statements Hege| recognizes the admission that the distinction between
essence and appearance, or primary and secondaryqua|ities, rests on a
distinction between two |ogics o|thought, intuition and understanding.
Descartes errs by rei|ying the concepts o| the understanding ,primary
qua|ities) , |orcingthemintothesameonto-|ogicasimmediateintuitions
orsecondaryqua|ities.Descartes|ikewise|orgetsthattheconceptso|the
understandingnecessari|yareabstractions|rom,orrehectionson, sensu-
ousintuitions.
Hege|goesbeyond Kant'sdictum thatconceptswithoutintuitionsare
empty, tosaythattheyarenothing ata||.Therearenottwoonto|ogica||y
independentwor|dso|beings, one sensuous and theothersupersensuous,
butdi`ering|ogics |orappropriatingthewor|d.The |ogic o|being,VO `M
appropriatesthe wor|d as somethingimmediate, is the |ogico|intutio

The |ogic o|essence appropriates the wor|d by overcoming
throughrehection,itisthe|ogico|theunderstanding( Verstand) . Thus
|ogic o| essence and the appropriation o| the wor|d through the pure
understandingpresupposethe|ogico|beingand theintuitiveappropria-
tion o|thewor|d.
In this |ight we can see why Hege| writes that the essence must
appear. Itmustshowitse||insomethingthatisnotimmediatelyitse||,
precise|ybecause it has no immediate existence its |ogic is not the |ogic o|
being. Itis|ogica||ynecessary|ortheessencetoappear,becausewhat it is
rehects immediate being. Under this dia|ectica| ,or interna| |ogica|)
conception o| essence and appearance, science is no |onger a one-way
street that externa||yre|atesappearances totheessence, butworks both
134 MARX'S MATURE METHODOLOGICAL WRITINGS
rom thc appcaranccs thc csscncc and rom thc csscncc to thc appcar-
anccs. Jhc appcaranccs, no longcr vicwcd as cxtcrnal cpiphcnomcna o
thc csscncc, now sccm csscntial to thc csscncc. or this rcason Hcgcl
placcs thc catcgory oappcarancc within thc logic ocsscncc.
A NLW LSSLNCL-APPLAKANCL MLL K PLIJICAL
LCNMY
Jhis dip into Hcgcl's critquc o thc Verstand modcl o csscncc and
appcarancc providcs thc background to Marx's criticism o Kicardo's
mcthod. Contrary to Marx's glib statcmcnt, thc scicntihc inadcquacy o
Kicardo's mcthod is not obvious at hrst glancc. Lndcrstanding Hcgcl's
thcory ocsscncc as thc background to Marx's criticism oKicardo can
hclpus avoid somc othc mostcommon and basic misundcrstandings o
Marx's critiquc o political cconomy. or cxamplc, Hcgcl' s thcory o
csscncccan illuminatc Marx's spccibc criticismoKicardo'slaborthcory
ovaluc.'MarxtradcsonthisthcoryocsscnccwhcnhcwritcsoKi cardo.
'Hcthcrcorcdocsnotatallgraspthcconncctionbctwccnthcdctcrmina-
tionothc cxchangc-valuc othc commodity throughlabor-timcand thc
ncccssity o thc commoditics' going on to thc constitution omoncy.
, ,

Kicardo, working within thc traditional csscncc-appcarancc paradigm,

ailstorccognizcthatappcaranccssuchascxchangc-valucandmoncyarc
thcmsclvcs csscntially rclatcd to thccsscncc, valuc.
Kicardo's arbitrary rom thc vicwpoint othc csscncc) rclation o
appcaranccsto thccsscnccbccomcscvcnmorcunsatisactoryashc movcs
urthcr into his invcstigations. Marx writcs oKicardo's classicwork, thc
Principles oJ Political Economy and Taxation:
Jhc wholc Kicardian work is thus containcd in his hrst two
chaptcrs . . . But this thcorctical satisaction which thcsc brst
twochaptcrs a6ordbccauscothciroriginality,unityothcbasic
vicw, simplcncss, conccntration, dcpth, novclty, and com-
prchcnsivcncss, is ncccssarily lost in thc continuation o thc
work. . . Jhc continuation is no longcr a continucd dcvclop-
mcnt. Whcrcitdocs notconsistomonotonc,ormalapplication
othcsamcprinciplcs todi6crcnt, cxtcrnallydraggcd in matcri-
al,orpolcmicalvalidationothcscprinciplcs,thcrcisonlycithcr
rcpcatingor makinggood on carlicrclaimsj
Jhccrucialwordin this tcxtis 'ncccssarily. 'WhatMarxpcrccivcsas thc
borcdomandchaosothclatcrchaptcrsoKicardo'sgrcatwork,whcrchc
CRITIQUE OF CLASSICAL ESSENCE LOGIC
135
applics thc thcorctical principlcs othc opcning chaptcrs o thc work to
sundry problcms o political cconomy, ollows ncccssarily rom his in-
adcquatcconccptionoscicncc.AssuggcstcdbythccriticismoKicar do's
thcoryovaluc, this inadcquacy tarnishcs cvcn thc thcorctical principlcs
ohis work.
Kicardo's lack o logical acuity conccrning thc csscncc-appcarancc
modclhas cvcn morc scrious conscqucnccsinhis thcory osurplus-valuc
than in his thcoryovaluc. Lagcrto cxplain all appcaranccs thc ratc o
1
proht) in tcrms othc csscncc thcratcosurplus-vaIuc) , Kicardoails to
sccthatthccsscnccncccssarilyappcarsassomcthingothcrthanitscll,and
collapscs thc ratc oproht into thc ratc osurplus-valuc. 'Kicardo com-
mtsallthcscblundcrs bccauschcwants,throughorciblcabstractions, to
push through his idcntity oratc osurplus-valuc and ratc oproht.'

Jhough Marx considcrs Kicardo's work to bcraughtwith mcthodologi-
cal alings, Kicardo's rcliancc on thc traditional csscncc-appcarancc
modclisparticularlysgnibcantsincc it undcrcuthis all-important thco-
rics ovaluc and surplus-valuc.

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Division VI
M arx's Mature Scientic Practice:
Capital !, Chapters 1~T

i

`
i
Jh/0J0t/0h /0 J0h J
1o writc about scicntinc knowlcdgc is onc thing, to writc a scicntihc work,

quitc anothcr. Whcrcas thc last division dcalt with Marx's c tcxts on
scicntincmcthod, this division ccntcrs on his only publishcd scicntihcwork,
Capital I. I will dcmonstratc that, dcspitc thc paucity o his mcthod-
ological writings, Marx inormcd his scicntihc work with an cxtraordin-
ary mcthodological sophistication. Sincc cvcn Marx's sparsc mcthodologi-
cal pronounccmcnts provc quitc rich in contcnt, this division will also
cxaminc i Marx practiccd in his critiquc o political cconomy what hc
prcachcd in his mcthodological writings. Jhc divisionrcstricts itsclto thc
thcorctical dcvclopmcnts spanning thc introduction o thc commodity
through thc transition o moncy into capita| Jhcsc dcvclopmcnts takc
placc in thc bstour chaptcrs oCapital I, which arc cxtrcmcly dcnsc. Jhc
analysisothcscdcvclopmcntsprocccdsinourchaptcrs, whichdcalwiththc
commodity as Capital's starting point, Marx's thcory ovaluc, his thcory o
moncy, andhisconccptocapital U itcmcrgcsromthcbnalormomoncy.
Although Capital I is thc ocal and organizing tcxt or thc analysis, thc
Grndrisse, thc Urtext to Toward the Critique of Political Econo1Y, and Toward the
Critique oJPolitical Economy v also contributc.
139

CHAPTER 1 2
Beginning Marx 's Critique ofPolitical
Economy: the Commodit
hy docs Marx bcgin Capital withananalysis othc commodity? Jhc
opcning paragraph oCapital calls attcntion to thc immcdiacy, simplicity
abstractncss) , and actuality oits starting point, thc commodity.
Jhc wcalth othc socictics in which thc| capitalist modc o
production dominatcs, appcars as an 'immcnsc collcction o
commoditics, 'thcindividualcommodityasitsclcmcntaryorm.
ur invcstigation bcgins thcrcorc with thc analysis o thc
commodity. '
Jhc commodityis immediate; thcwcalthosocicticsinwhich thc capitalist
modcoproductiondominatcsquitcnaturallyappcars to anyobscrvcras
an 'immcnsc collcction ocommoditics', and it is simple conccptually
abstract) , in thatitis anclcmcntaryorm. inally, thc commodityis thc
actual unitobourgcoiswcalth.
Jhc hrst phasc othc analysis othc commodity points out its doublc
charactcr. n thc onc hand, thc commodity is a use-value, an cxtcrnal
obj cct that satishcs onc or morc human nccds. n thc othcr hand, a

commodityis cxchangcablcwith othcrcommoditics,and thcquantitativc

ratio ocxchangc with othcrcommoditics is its exchange-value. I maintain
that in rcspcct to thc distinction cxamincd in chaptcr l O, usc-valuc is a
gcncralabstraction and cxchangc-valuc is adctcrminatcabstraction. or
both abstractions, thc pointodcparturc is thc commodity.
In his bookAlienation, Bcrtcll llman rcjccts thc substanccothchrst
halomyclaim that thccatcgory usc-valuc is a gcncral rathcr than a
dctcrminatc abstraction. llman writcs, 'Jhc two accts o valuc
cxchangc-valuc and usc-valuc| prcsupposc onc anothcr, and rcally can-
not bc conccivcd o apart. Likc cxchangc-valuc, thcrcorc, usc-valuc
cxprcsscs capitalist production rclations.

` llman cnvisions cxchangc-

141
142 MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFC PRACTICE
valuc and usc-valuc U two spccics o dctcrminatc catcgorics stcmming
rom thc gcncricdctcrminatccatcgory value. Butiwcconsidcr tcxts rom
that part o Capital ! in which thc catcgory ousc-valuc is introduccd,
cvidcnccmounts that Marx's actual position s oppositc that ollman.
orcxamplc, Marx writcs.
Lsc-valucsconstitutc thcmatcrial contcnt owcalth, whichcvcr
c its
.
socialo

m. !nthcsocialormtobcconsidcrcd by usthcy
hkcwisc constitutc thc matcrial bcarcrs ol cxchangc-valuc.
Contrarytollman'sintcrprctation, Marxdocsnotintcndthccatcgoryo
usc-valuc to cxprcss spccincally capitalist production rclatons. Kathcr,
Marxdistinguishcsthccatcgoricsusc-valucandcxchangc-valucprccscly
in ordcr to scparatc thc natural, transhistorical chaactcristics o thc
commodity rom thc historically dctcrminatc oncs.
[
hc ormcr comc
togcthcrinthcgcncralabstractionuse-value, whilcthcdctcrminatccatcg-
oryexchange-value gathcrs thc lattcr.
|Iman's claim that cxchangc-valuc and usc-valuc 'prcsupposc onc
anothcrand rcallycannotbc conccivcd apart' likcwisc nnds no support
rom Marx. !xchangc-valuc can bc conccivcd oapart rom usc-valuc,
indccd it is thc concciving ocxchangc-valuc apart rom usc-valuc that
lcads to thc conccptovaluc.
t
Nowionclcavcsthcusc-valucothccommoditics [ Warenkorper]
out oconsidcration, all that islcl othcm isoncpropcrty, that
obcmgproductsolabor. . . Ascrystalsothis, thcir common
socials ubstancc, thcy arcvalucs commodity-valucs.'
Although cxchangc-valuc can bc conceived of apart rom usc-valuc, it
cannot exist apart rom usc-valuc. 'inally, no thing can bc a valuc
without bcing a uscul objcct. '' Howcvcr, usc-valuc cannot only bc
conceived of apart rom cxchangc-valuc, it can exist apart rom cxchangc-
valuc. 'A thing can bc a usc-valucwithoutbcinga val uc. '

.
Jhc act that thc ubiquity othc commodity which is among othcr
things a usc-valuc) is spccinc to capitalistsocictics, and as such cntails
alicnation, docs not mcan that thc catcgory o usc-valuc is a capitalist
catcgory. Yct llman draws this conclusion. Hcwritcs.
According to Marx, 'Jo bccomcusc-valucs commoditics must
bc univcrsally alicnatcd, thcy must cntcr thc sphcrc o
!
l
.

. ..
BEGINNING CAPITAL
cxchangc . . . Hcncc, inordcrto bc rcalizcd as usc-valucs, thcy
must bc rcalizcd as cxchangc-valucs. ' Putting thc uscoonc' s
ownproducts undcrthc control oothcrs, producing thcm with
this aim in mind, lics at thc corc not only o usc-valuc but o
alicnation. '
143
ButMarx docs not say that usc-valucs havc to bc alicnatcd inordcr to bc
rcalizcdas usc-valucs. Inact,hcsaysthattorcalizcausc-valuconcnccd
only consumc it. 'Lsc-valuc rcalizcs itsclonlyin uscor consumption.'
Jhc ncccssity oalicnating usc-valucs bycasting thcm into thc sphcrco
cxchangc bcorc consuming thcm is a ncccssity not or usc-valucs pcr sc
butor usc-valucs whicharccommoditics.
Ncxt,lctus considcr|lman' snotionovalucasa gcncricdctcrminatc
catcgorythatspccihcsitsclinthcdctcrminatccatcgoricsousc-valucand
cxchangc-valuc.Marxbcginshiscritiqucopoliticalcconomynot withthc
abstraction value but with thc commodity, or it is actual. As such, its
thoughtulapprchcnsionrcvcalsittobcajuncturcothctwologicaltypcs
oabstractions,gcncralanddctcrminatc. JhcchoiccoanactualObjcctas
thc bcginning othc critiquc opoliticalcconomyinvolvcs or Marx an
cxplicit rcj cction othc mcthodology oabsolutc idcalism. Jhc idcalist
opcncrwouldbcanabstractionwhichistakcntobcdctcrminatc, suchas
valuc.|lman' sposition thatvalucisagcnuswhichspccihcsitsclinthc
catcgorics o usc-valuc and cxchangc-valuc rcplaccs thc actual obj cct,
thc commodity, with thc abstraction value as thc subjcctwhichstandsat
thc bcginning o Capital. In making this movc, |lman slips in thc
dircction ospcculativc absolutc idcalist) political cconomy.
In his gloss on Adolph Wagncr's Textbook of Political Econ017Y, Marx
disclaims thc idcalistic vicw ovaluc as a subjcct that dividcs itsclinto
usc-valuc and cxchangc-valuc. 'I do not thcrcorc dividc the valuc
usc-valuc and cxchangc-valuc as though thcy wcrc oppositcs intow
whatisabstract,'thcvaluc, ' splitsitscl''Marx'scritiqucostarting Iro
a conccpt, an abstraction, thcrcby making it thc subjcct othc proccss
rccalls onc othc oldcst, mostamiliar cchocs i nhis critiquc oabsolutc
idcalism cucrbach' sinvcrtivcmcthod.Jhis comcs out quitcclcarlyin
anothcr passagc rom that gloss on Wagncr. 'Also Mr. Wagncr orgcts
thatncithcr 'thcvaluc' nor'thccxchangc-valuc' arcsubjcctsaccordingto
mc, but rathcrthe commodify. "1 O Jhccommodity, as thc ncxus ousc-valuc
andcxchangc-valuc,isnotpositcdbythcabstractionvalue anymorcthan
actualruitarcpositcdbythcabstractionthefruit. Valucisthcprcdicatco
thc commodity, notits subjcct.
Yct much, pcrhaps all, owhat |lman has to say aboutusc-valuc is
accuratc with rcspcct to usc-valucs as thy exist within the capitalist mode of

144 MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE

production. Jhcdimcultyh thatIlmanridcsroughshodovcrtwoimpor-
tantcaturcsoMarx'sscicntihcmcthod. JhchrstisMarx'sinsistcnccon
clcarly distinguishing bctwccn gcncral and dctcrminatc abstractions
llman misscs Marx's point that thc distinction bctwccn usc-valuc and
cxchangc-valuc is o this logical typc. Sccond, all thc ways in which
llman sccs usc-valucs as cxprcssivc o capitalist alicnation rcquirc an
appcal to morc concrctc catcgorics o political cconomy, such as thc
rclationship bctwccn capital and wagc-l abor, proht, and thc likc. Jhus,
|lmanviolatcs Marx'sdcmand that ascicntihcprcscntation movcs rom
thcabstracttothcconcrctc,rathcrthan putthcscicnccbcorcthcscicncc
by bringing concrctc conccpts into thc cxposition othc abstract oncs.
llman' smisintcrprctationousc-valucas adctcrminatcabstractiono
capitalismismuchlcss common among writcrs thanthcoppositcmistakc
ointcrprctingcxchangc-valucas agcncralabstraction. Wchavcalrcady
sccnhowMarx's analysis othc 'clcmcntary orm'othc capitalistmodc
<
oproductionscparatcsthcnaturalcontcntowcalth usc-valuc)romthc
spccinc social orm othat wcalth in thc capitalist modc o production
cxchangc-valuc). 1 2 Jhc urthcr analysis ocxchangc-valuc lcads to thc
catcgoryovalucand, inturn, tothc conccptoabstractlabor. !n chaptcr
1 0
,
wcsawthatthcconccptoabstractlaborisadctcrminatcabstraction,
i ncontrasttothcabstractconccptolabor,whichisagcncralabstracton.
Jhcintcrprctation ocxchangc-valucas agcncralabstraction naturalizcs
a historically dctcrminatc catcgory. Jhs charactcr:stic h aw oclassical
political cconomic thcory turns up whcrcvcr thc labor thcory ovaluc is
takcnin anontologicalscnsc,tomcanthatall products ohumanlaborarc
valucs.
Havingcomplctcd our discussionothc claim that thc commodity can
bcanalyzcdin tcrmsothcgcncralabstractionusc-valucandthcdctcrmi-
natc abstraction cxchangc-valuc, wc movc on to othcr considcrations i n
Ma' s choicc o thc commodity as thc bcginning o thc crtiquc o
pohttcal cconomy. Jhc ollowing tcxt, takcn .rom a ootnotc to thc
b1t-cdition vcrsion othc nrst chaptcroCapital
, brings togcthcr scvcral
pomts rclcvant to that choicc.
Jhc value:form of the product of labor is thc mostabstract, but also
thcmostgcncralform othcbourgeois modcoproduction, which
crc byischaractcrizcdas aspecic typcosocial modcoproduc-
tton, and accordingly, likcwisc historical. Jhus ionc mistakcs it
jthcvaluc-orm othc product olabor| or thc ctcrnal natural
orm osocialproduction,oncthcrcbyncccssarilyalsoovcrlooks

BEGINNING CAPITAL
thatwhichis spccihc to thcvaluc-{crm, thus, thcccmmcdi-orm,
urthcrdcvclopcd, thc mca-orm, capital-form ctc. ' '
145
Jhc valuc-orm is a historically dctcrminatcform o thc usc-valucs pro-
duccd in capitalistsocictics . Lxchangc-valuc is adctcrminatc catcgory o
thccapitalistmodcoproduction, morcovcr, itis thc most conccptually)
abstractothcdctcrminatccatcgoricsocapitalism.Lponurthcranalysis
this abstract dctcrminatc catcgory provcs bcholdcn to morc concrctc
dctcrminatc catcgorics such as thc moncy-orm and thc capital-orm.
Jhis act is doubly signihcant. n thc onc hand, wc scc thc abstract
catcgorybcingdisplaccdbyits progrcssivcanalysis,whichshowsthatthc
abstract catcgory prcsupposcs concrctc, csscntial catcgorics such as
moncy and capital n thcothcrhand,capitalis thcdominantcatcgoryo
thc capitalist modc o production, and thc act that thc analysis o thc
commodity-ormlcadstothccapital-orm conhrms thatMarxdctcrmincd
his bcginningby thc logic othcobjcct hc was studying.
Marx' s dccision to bcgin thc scicncc o political cconomy with thc
commodity scrvcs a numbcr o othcr cnds as wcll irst, thc doublc
charactcr o thc commodity carly cstablishcs thc thcmc o thc double
character of capitalism, Sccond, thc analysis ocxchangc-valuc shows that
thcspccihcsocial charactcrothccommodityisits abstractncss.Jhcact
that thc cxchangcogoodsin capitalism rcstson an abstraction suchas
valuccstablishcsthcthcmcothcdominationoabstractionsovcrcxisting
human bcings and nonhuman naturc. Jhird, by sctting up this thcmc,
Marx bcgins to intcgratc his critiquc o classical Lnlightcnmcnt phi-
losophy and absolutc idcalism with his critiquc o political cconomy.
Marx carly rccognizcdinthcscphilosophicsthcdominationoconccptual
abstractions ovcr scnsuous, livcd actuality. ourth, thc analysis o thc
commodity lcads quickly to thc ctish charactcr othc commodity,
thcrcby cstablishcs thc thcmcoctishismorrcihcation oralicnation,
thatmattcr) Jhis thcmcpcrmcatcs Capital andprovidcscvidcnccor
continuity o Marx's critiquc o rcligion with his maturc political

nomicwritings.' iIh, inscttingup thc thcmcothcdoublccharactcr

o!

capitalism, thc commodity insinuatcs thc contradictory naturc o this

doublc charactcr. By trying to cnorcc thc hcgcmony oabstractions in a
world whichis notabstract, capitalism provcs itsclcontradictory.' ' Jhc
commodity introduccs a undamcntal contradiction o capitalism and
cnlightcncd,absolutcidcalism) , namcly,thccontradictionbctwccnscnsu-
ous,objcctivc,livcdactualityandarcalmononscnsuousabstractions,or
thought-things. inally, thc thcmc o thc contradictory naturc o thc
capitalist modc oproduction, cstablishcd by bcginning Capital with thc
146
MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
commodity, indicatcs a practical ingrcdicnt in Marx's conccption. Jhc
contradictorincss implicdin thc doublccharactcrothccommodty, and
ocapitalismas awholc,dcmonstratcsboththchistorcaldctcrminatcncss
othccapitalistmodcoproductionandits transitorincss. Jhcdccisonto
bcgin Capital with thc commodityrathcrthanwithvaluccxprcsscsMarx' s
scicntibcally dctcrminablc hopc that capital's rulc ovcr humankind and
thc nonhuman world can bc brokcn. Jo start with valuc would bc to
surrcndcr thc dctcrminatc catcgoricsocapitalism, to abandon hopc n
any immancnt opposition to thc hcgcmony ocapital.
.
'
'
l
1

.' `

CHAPTER 1 3
Marx's Theory of Value
hcanalysisothccommodityintroduccs Marx's thcoryovaluc.Wc
havc sccnthatthc commodity has a doublc charactcr, dcscribcd by two
abstractions odi6cring logical typcs. usc-valuc, a gcncral abstraction,
and cxchangc-valuc, a dctcrminatc abstraction. Marx's thcory ovaluc
rcsts on thc cxchangc-valuc charactcr othc commodity alonc. Inact,
Marx dcrivcs thc catcgory o valuc rom thc dctcrminatc catcgory
cxchangc-valuc.
WLALJH I SNJVALLL
In thc hrst scntcncc o Capital, Marx writcs that thc wealth o thosc
socicticsinwhichthccapitalistmodcoproductiondominatcs appcars as
a collcction ocommoditics. Wcalthis agcncralabstraction,applicablcto
any human socicty, whic,in capitalism takcs thc orm o commoditics.
Capitalist socicty mcasurcs wcalth in tcrms ocxchangc-valuc. Marx's
thcoryovalucisathcoryothccapitalistmcasurcowcalth,notathcory
owcalth pcrsc. Jo mistakc thc thcory ovaluc or a thcoryowcalth is
tocollapsccatcgoricsotwodi6crcntlogicaltypcs,andthcrcbytonatural-
izcthcthcoryovaluc. Marxsccsthisnaturalizingrcductionothc
o valuc to a thcory o wcalth as charactcristic o classical bou_co
thought, but hc also hnds it cropping up in ccrtain working-class
mcnts. orcxamplc, Marx criticizcs thc Cotha Programmc othc
Workcrs' Party as ollows. 'Labor is not the source oall wcalth. Nature
justas much thcsourccousc-valucs anditissurclyosuch thatmatcrial
wcalth still consists | ) as is labor. ' ' Labor is thc sourcc oall valuc, thc
bourgcois mcasurcowcalth, butnot thc sourccoallwcalth pcr sc.
Classicalpoliticalcconomy'sidcntihcationothc thcory ovalucwitha
thcory o wcalth broachcs thc issuc o thc homology bctwccn classical
political cconomy and thc idcalism ocnlightcncd philosophy. By sys-
tcmaticallyncglcctingthcnaturalconditionsoallwcalth,classicalpoliti-
calcconomy and thc Cotha Programmcascribca 'supcrnatural crcativc
powcr' to labor.' Jhc wholc world oconcrctc usc-valucs thcwcalth o
ld
148
MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
nations) is cnvisioncd U thcproductoabstract) humanlabor, muchas
in absolutc idcalism thc wholc wcalthothc scnsuousworld is vicwcd U
thc incarnation o abstract) thought. ]ust as Marx had criticizcd thc
presuppositionlessness o absolutc idcalism in thc Geran Ideolog, now hc
takcsonthcprcsuppositionlcssncssobourgcois politicalcconomyandits
unwittingworking-classollowcrs. 'Buta socialistprogramcannotallow
such bourgcois phrascs namcly, ' Labor is thc sourcc oall wcalth'| to
causc thc conditions to bc ignorcd which alonc givc thcm a mcaning.

Although wc will say morc conccrning thc rclation oclassical political

cconomy and absolutc idcalism, two homologous caturcs cmcrgc rom
classical political cconomy's idcntihcation o labor valuc) and wcalth,
namcly,incarnation thc 'superatural creative power" o labor) andprcsup-
positionlcssncss.
JHL LBLL MVLMLNJ JHLCHJ IN MAKX'S
JHLKY VALLL
HavingcstablishcdthatMarx's thcoryovalucis a thcory notowcalth,
butothcspccihcallycapitalistmcasurcowcalth, namcly,valuc,wccan
considcrMarx's dcvclopmcntothcthcoryovalucinthchrstchaptcro
Capital I . Jakcn broadly, this chaptcr contains a doublc movcmcnt o
thought. Jhc hrst, going rom cxchangc-valuc, as an immcdiatc and
apparcntlyarbitrary prcdicatcothccommodity,tovalucasthcgroundo
cxchangc-valuc, is discusscdin thc opcning scction othc chaptcr and is
rchncd in thc succccding scction. Jhc sccond movcmcnt makcs up yct
anothcrscction, 'JhcValuc-ormorLxchangc-valuc, ' andmovcs inthc
oppositcdircction, romvalucto cxchangc-valuc,inordcrtodcmonstratc
thatcxchangc-valucis thc ncccssary orm oappcarancc ovaluc.'
By itscl, thc hrst movcmcnt contains nothing particularly dialcctical.
Valucisarrivcd atthrougha straightorwardproccssoabstractionrom
cxchangc-valuc. Marxbcgins thcdcrivationovalucby logicallyanalyz-
ing thccxchangcrclationship bctwccn two commoditics.
Lct us urthcrmorc takc two commoditics, c. g. , whcatand iron.
Whatcvcr thcir ratio ocxchangc, itis alwaysprcscntablc inan
cquationinwhichagivcnquantum owhcatis sct cqualtosomc
quantumoiron, c. g. , | quartcrowhcat cwt. oiron. What
docsthiscquationpurport?Jhatacommonclcmcnt[ein Gemein
sames] othc samc magnitudc cxists in twodi6crcnt things, in |
quartcr o whcat and likcwisc in cwt. o iron. Both arc
thcrcorccqualtoa third thing [einem Dritten] whichis in andor
itsclncithcrthc onc northc othcr. Lach othc two, insoaras it
MARX'S THEORY OF VALUE
is anexchange-value, mustthus be reducibleto this third thing
[dies Dritte.]
149
Marx underlines the nondialecticalnature othis roblem by comaring
it to the geometrical roblem odetermining the surace area oa recti-
linear closed lanehgure.
Whatmakes anytwocommoditiescommensurableMarx's answerto
this question yields the concet ovalue.
Nowi oneleavestheuse-valueothecommodities [ Warenkorper]
outoconsideration, they retain only oneroerty, thatobeing
roducts olabor. However, the roduct olabor has already
changed in our hands. ! we abstract rom its use-value, we
abstract also rom the material comonents [korperliche Bestand
teile] andormswhich make ita use-value. !t is nolongeradesk
or ahouseoryarnorany other useulthing. Alloits sensuous
qualities areextinguished. . .
Nowletusconsidertheresidueotheroductsoabor.Jhere
is nothing o them remaining other than the same ghostly
objectivity, a merecongelationoundi6erentiatedhumanlabor,
thatis, theexenditureohumanlabor-owerwithoutresectto
theorm oits exenditure . . . As crystals othis theircommon
social substance, they arevalues commodity-values.
\alue is what remains when we abstract rom all the natural, sensuous
qualities oa commodity. !t is the substance which makes commodities
commensurable, itis the nonsensuous ground oexchange-value.
Jhere is a striking arallel between this last text, the climax o
derivationovalue,and the textromescartes citedinchater | | )

'

comletes the derivation orimary qualities. escartes and Marx

the same logical dimculties. escartes is trying to understand how

obj ects which are comletely dissimilar in their sensuous qualio e.~UC
bitowax beore it comes near the lIame, and the blob owax ateritis
brought near the Hame can be said to be the same. He resolves the
aarent incommensurability o the two through the concet o the
rimary qualities omatter. Jhese qualities are nonsensuous, nonimagi-
native, they are concets othe ure understanding. !nshort, escartes
solves the equationwax before wax after byaealingtothethirdarty,
rimary quality matter, as the nonsensuous ground o the identity o
sensuously dissimilar obj ects. escartes' rimary quality matter and
Marx's value have a common logic.
150 MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
!n Marx's exosition o the theory o value the hrst movement o
thought oerates within the classical model oessence and aearance,
according towhich aearances are resolved into a nonsensuous essence
that exists 'behind the aearances. ' !n this nrst movement, Marx
presentsinaveryconciseand rehned mannertheKicardianlabortheory
ovalue. !the hrst movement o thought in Marx's exosition othe
theory is takenor his whole treatment, his theoryovalue is reduced to
that oKicardo.
Aswesawin chater 1 1 , theclassicalmodeloessenceandaearance,
which inorms Kicardo's theory ovalue, is a one-way street that moves
only rom aearance to essence. Jhe necessity oaearance is never
established rom the vantage oint oessence. Jhus it never ully deter-
mines therelationoessenceand aearance. !nthecaseothetheoryo
value, the question unanswered by Kicardo's theory is Why does value
appear in the form of exchange-value? Jhe second movement o Marx's
exositionanswersthisquestion. Butbeoreturningtothatdiscussion,we
need toconsider Marx's crucialreh nementsothe classicaltheoryothe
substance and measureovalue.
MAKX'S K!NMNJJH CNCFJ
\AL!-FK!C!NC LABK
Marx's rennement othe classical theory olabor and labor-time, the
substance and the measure ovalue, strictly arallels his analysis othe
doublecharacterothecommodity.Jodi6crentiate theconcets covered
in theterm 'labor, ' Marx reuses thedistinction inlogicaltyes between
general and determinate abstractions . Jhe category o actual labor in
caitalist society, like that othe commodty, yelds to an analysis oits
double character. !n the hrst edition o Capital !, Marx begins his
rennementotheconcetocommodity-roducinglaborwith this arallel
to the analysis othe commodity.
riginally, the commodit aeared to us as something sundered in
two, use-value and exchange-value. More closely considered, it
roves to bethecasethatthe labor contained in thecommodityis
also sundered in two. 8
Wewill considerthe doublecharacterocommodity-roducinglaborand
try to understand why Marx emhasizes it.
Jhe hrst characteristic ocommodity-roducing labor, corresonding
to the use-value othe commodity, is its secincity and useulness. Jhis

1 ,

MARX'S THEORY OF VALUE

151
categoryo usdul labor, like that ouse-value,Marxclearlyunderstandsto
be a general abstraction.
Asaconstituentouse-values,asusdul labor, laboris thereorea
condition o human existence indeendent rom all orms o
society, an eternal natural necessity needed to mediate the
material exchange [Stofwechsel] between man and nature, . e. ,
human lie.
Jhe second characterocommodity-roducing labor corresonds to the
exchange-value,orsimlyvalue,characterothecommodity. !tcontrasts
with useul labor.
Jailoringandweavingareconstituentelementsotheuse-values,
coatand linen,recisely through theirdfrent qualities, theyare
the substance o coat-ca/ac and linen-ca/ac only insoar as one
abstracts rom theirsecincqualityandboth ossessequal qualify,
the qualify oJhuman labor. 1 O
Commodities are values insoaras they areroductsothis abstract human
labor.
What does theroduct oabstract human laborlook like By itselit
does not looklike anything at all. Commodity-roducinglaboris recog-
nized as universal human labor only insoar as it is abstracted rom, and
oosed to, secihc useul labor. !nsoaraslaboris secihc and useul, it
is not recognized as human labor, and insoar as commodity-roducing
laborisrecognized ashumanlabor, itiscomletelyabstract. !seul labor
does aear, but not immediately as human labor. Conversely,
labor is immediately recognized as human labor, but it does not
aear, it remains an abstraction. !n commodity-roducing labor,
logical determinations, secinc and universal, are estranged rom,
oosed to, one another.
Jhisis theointoMarx's conclusiontohis rehnementothecategory
ocommodity-roducing labor in the nrst edition oCapital !.
rom the oregoing it ollows that two di6crent sorts o labor
certainly are not stuck in the commodity, but rather the same
labor is determined di6crently and even oositionally, just
accordingtowhetheritisrelatedtotheuse-value othecommod-
ity as itsproduct logically, the secinc| orto the commodiry-value
logically, the universal| as its mere objective exression.

152 MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
n thebasisothistext,wecan ursuethediscussioninchater olthe
Cartesian concetion o essence and aearance, as well as Hegel' s
critiqueoit. Jhe text movesus, on thebasisothecriticaldi6`erentiation
o useul labor rom abstract labor, rom the Cartesian concetion to
1egel's critique oit. !n terms oolitical economy, it moves us rom a
simlyKicardian theoryovaluetoMarx'stheory. Jheointothis text is
that use-value and value as well as useul labor and abstract labor) are
not two di6`erent things, any more than secondary qualities and rimary
qualities describe two di6`erent things. Kather, use-value and value or
useul laborandabstract labor) are,likesecondaryandrimaryqualities,
distinctdeterminationsothesameobject,resultingromdistinctivesocial
or cognitive modes o aproriating the object. !seul labor and use-
value, likesecondaryqualities,areimmediate, sensuous determinationsothe
object, whileabstractlaborandvalue,likerimaryqualities,arerfective,
abstract determinations o the obj ect. So Marx ollows escartes in the
latter's recognition that rimary qualities value and abstract labor or
Marx) are erceived not through immediate sensuous intuition, but
throughtheactivityoureunderstanding.However,Marxclearlyrejects
theCartesianreihcationothisdistinctionintoametahysical two-world
theory. Anyone trying to lay Berkeley to Marx's escartes has arrived
too late on the scene.
JwoointscrucialorcomrehendingMarx'stheoryoexchange-value
areound in his rehnements otheclassical theoryothe commodityand
commodity-roducing labor. Jhe hrst oint is that, as the essence o
exchange-value,valuecannotitselaearimmediately. Jhisollowsrom
the act thatvalue is rective categoy oa di6`erent logical tyethan a
categoryoaearance. Jhe second ointollows rom the act that, as a
categoryorehection,valueresuosessomeaearanceromwhichit is
abstracted. So value must aear. But, in keeing with the hrst oint,
valuemustaear as something other than itsefl Jhis necessary appearing in
something other is recisely whatHegelcalls the logic oJessence.
Z
Marx summarizes the results ohis rehnements othe classical labor
theoryovalueatthe outset othethirdsection othehrstchater, 'Jhe
\alue-orm or xchange-value. '
Jhe value-objectivity ocommodities di6`erentiates itsel rom
ameQuicklyin thatonedoes notknow whereitis tobe had.
!n exact oosition to the sensuously coarse objectivity o the
commodity-body, no atom o natural stu6` enters into their
value-obectivity. nemaythereore twist and turn an individ-

|
|
^+

1
1
|
!
l
|
l
7

+
8 .
i

.,.

^
+
MARX'S THEORY OF VALUE
ual commodity as one will, it remains incomrehensible as
value-thing. !we remember, however, that the commodities
only ossess value-objectivity insoar as they are exressions o
the same social unity, humanlabor, that their value-obj ectivity
is thereore urely social, then it is a|so sel-evident that it can
only aear in the social relationshi o commodity to com-
modity. '
153
!n the terms develoed above, value is a category o rehection. !ts
objectivityis not theimmediate,sensuousobjectivityouse-value.Sinceit
is abstract, it cannot itselaear immediately, but is maniested as a
rehective 'social ') relationshi o actual, sensuous objects commodi-
ties) . Jhe analysis o this necessarily rehective aearance ovalue in
exchange-value constitutes the second movementoMarx's exosition o
the theory ovalue.
JHK CL!S J JH !SJ!NCJ!\CHAKACJK
MAKX'S JHKY \AL!
Marxgivcshisreadcrssomeimortantcluesbywhichtomarkhissecial
contribution to olitical economy. We have already encountered his
statement that thedistinction between useul labor and abstract labor is
the ivot about which the understanding o olitical economy turns.' '
Withthisdistinction,Marxcallsattention to hisrehnementotheconcet
ocommodity-roducinglabor, which setsuthesecondmovementohis
exositionothetheoryovalue.Asecondclueis Marx'semhasisonthe
secondmovementitsel.
!t h one o the undamental ailings o classical olitical eco-
nomythatitwasnevergrantedtoittodiscoverromtheanalysis
othe commodity, and esecially othe commodity-value, the
orm ovalue,whichreciselymakesitexchange-value. ven in
itsbestreresentatives,suchasA.SmithandKicardo,ithandles
the value-orm as something entirely indi6`erent or external to
the nature othe commodityitsel.
D
!n contrast to classical theory, Marx's analysis shows that 'the value-
orm orthevalue-exressionothecommoditysringsoutothenatureo
commodity-value, not reversely, value and value-magnitude out o its
mode o exression as exchange-value.
, ,
' Marx's theory ovalue moves
beyond classical theory's deendence on the traditionalmodeloessence
andaearance, which leaves the relationshi between theessence value)
154
MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTCE
andtheaearance exchange-value) undeterminedrom theviewointo
the essence.
Another clue toward distinguishing Marx's theory ovalue rom the
classicaltheorycomesatthebeginningothesection'Jhe\alue-ormor
xchange-value.

Here, however, itisa matteroerorming what was not once

attemtedbybourgeoiseconomy,namely, to establish thegene-
sis othis money-orm, thus to ollow the develoment othe
value-exression contained in the value-relationshi, rom its
simlest, least visible shae u to the blinding money-orm.
Jherewith disaearslikewisetheriddleomoney.'
Marx declares his intenticn to dialectically bring the category omoney
within the extended scoe o the theory ovalue, rathcr than leave it
indeendent rom, hence undetermined with resect to, the theory o
value. Heseeksto shownotj ustthatexchange-valueis thenecessaryorm
oI value's aearance, but that money is the necessary end-orm o
exchange-value.
Howis this tosolvethe 'riddleomoney'! ndeedwhatis the'riddle
omoney'!tisnodi6`erentromtheroblem omoneyetishism, orthe
'magicomoney.

' Jhemagicomoneyisthatitaearsimmediately,
in its natural orm, to be the incarnation oabstract human labor. !t
aears immediately convertibleintoroductsoeveryvarietyohuman
labor,andseems tobej ustwhatwehadruledoutthroughtheanalysiso
value, namely, theimmediate, sensuousaearance ovalueitsel. Marx
claimsthatthisriddle 'isthereoreonlytheriddleothecommodityetish
become visible and blinding to our eyes.
, ,
' just why this is the case is
indicated by Marx in the ollowing e6`ort to exlicate the intention ohis
account othe value-orm.
We saw how already in the simlest exression o value,
commodity A _ commodity B, the thing within which the
value-magnitudeoanotherthingis resented, seemsto ossess
its equivalent-orm as a social natural-characteristic, indeen-
dent rom this relation. We ollowed the hxation othis alse
guise. !t is comleted as soon as the universal equivalent-orm
has grown together with the natural orm oa secinc tye o
commodity, or is crystallized into the money-orm. A commod-
ity does not seem to hrst become money

because the other

commodities universally resent their value in it, rather con-
versely, they seem universally to resent their values in it,
1
`



l

`+

MARX'S THEORY OF VALUE
becauseit is money. Jhe mediating movementdisaearsin its
own result and leaves no trace behind. Without their liting a
hnger, the commodities nnd, given and ready, their own value-
shae embodied as a commodity existing outside and next to
them. Jhese things, gold and silver, as they come out o the
bowelsotheearth, are at oncetheimmediateincarnation oall
human labor. Hence the magic omoney. '
155
Jhis text resuoses the categories o the analysis o the value-orm,
which we have not yet develoed. Nonetheless, the text makes clear the
telos o that analysis. Jhe magic o money can be diselled only by
comrehending thegenesis othe money-orm out othesimlest orm o
exchange-value. Keeing in mind that the telos othe analysis o the
value-orm is to gras the roots othe money etish, let us address that
analysis.
XCHANC-\AL! AS A FLAK XFKSS!N
Marx begins the analysis othe value-orm with its simlest orm, "x
commodity A values at_ commodity .
, ,
' Jhe seminal eature othis
value-exression is itspolarify. Commodity A exresses its value in com-
modity , A is active and h assive. Commodity is the 'value-
mirror
, ,
inwhich thecommodityA isnrstcaableorecognizingitselas
a value. Jhe value oA cannot aear to A in A itsell, it can only be
exressed relative to A in another commodity.
! cannot exress, e. g. , the value olinen in linen. 2O yards o
linen 2O yards o linen is no exression ovalue. Jhe equa-
tion says much more reversed. 2O yards o linen are nothing
other than 2O yards olinen, a secihc quantum o the useul
obj ect, linen. Jhe value o linen can then only be exressed
relatively, i . e. , in other commodities. '
Hence, Marx calls the orm in which commodityA nnds itselthe relative
value-orm. Commodity, inwhich thevalueoA is exressed mirrored)
,
nndsitselintheequivalent-orm. Jherecognitionothesetwoasnecessarily
olarormsothe exressionovalueistheessentialsteintheanalysiso
the value-orm.
Kelative value-orm and equivalent-orm are mutually condi-
tioning, indivisible moments belonging to one another, but
156 MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFC PRACTiCE
likewise

xtremes shutting one another out or oosed to one

another, i. e., oles o|thesamevalue-exression. "
Jo say that theexression o|value is necessarily aolar one means that
theexressiono|valuerequiresareHectiverelationshi. Marx'sreeated
use o| the term 'mirror, ` or 'value-mirror, ` to characterize the com-
modity in the equivalent-|ormhighlights this oint.

Jheolarityo|the
value-|orm, in Hegelian terms, indicates the essence logic o| Marx's
theory o| value. As the essence o| exchange-value, value must appear in
something other than itselj:
Civen the necessary olar oosition o| the relative and equivalent
|orms,thekeytoanalyzingthevalue-|orm,andultimatelythe|etishismo|
money,lies in theequivalent-|orm.Jhereh littleto say abouttherelative
value-|orm excet thatit is notitsel|the immediateaearance o|value.
Butmoneywillrovetobeint heuniversal) equivalent-!orm, andallits
essential traits are already |ound in the equivalent-|orm. What are these
traits o|the equivalent-|orm which end in themoney |etish
Marxbegins hisdiscussionwitha dennition o|the|orm andexamines
itseculiarities. Whatdennes theequivalent-|ormis immediate exchangeabil
ify. 'Jhustheequivalent-|ormo|acommodityis the|ormo|itsimmediate
exchangeability with janj other commodity.'
,
Marx then exlicates
three eculiarities o| the equivalent-|orm that can be understood as
imlications o|this denning characteristic.
irst, i| a commodity is immediately exchangeable, it must be the
immediate aearance o|that which makes all commodities exchange-
able, i. e. , value. 'Jhe nrst eculiaritywhich strikesonein theconsidera-
tion o| the equivalent-|orm is this . use-value becomes the |orm o|
aearance o| its oosite, value.
, ,
Jhe articular use-value o| the
commodity in the equivalent-|orm becomes the immediate incarnation o|
thereHectivc, abstract universal value.
Jhe second eculiarity o| the equivalent-|orm |ollows |rom Marx's
rennement o|the concet o|commodity-roducing labor. just as use-
value becomes the immediate incarnation o|value, so the use|ul labor
embodiedin thecommoditywhichis in theequivalent-|orm becomesthe
immediateincarnation o|thereHectiveabstractionabstractlabor. '! t is
there|ore a second eculiarityo|the equivalent-|orm thatconcretelabor
becomesthe|orm o|aearanceo|itsoosite, abstract human labor.
, ,

Since, in a commodity-roducing and commodity-cxchanging society,

concrete labor is the work o|rivatc individuals who nrst socialize their
roduct at the oint o|cxchangc, anothcr cculiarity o|the equivalent-
|orm ensues. '1t is then a third cculiarity o| thc cquivalcnt-|orm
, that
rivatelabor turns into thc|orm o|its oositc, to labor in immcdiately

MARX'S THEORY OF VALUE
157
social orm.' ! a commodity is to be immediately exchangeable, its
rivate character must likewise wear its social character onits sleeve.
Keeinginmind thatmoneytakes theequivalent-orm,weseerom the
ollowing how the di6erences between the relative value-orm and the
equivalent-orm relate to the 'riddle' omoney.
!n that the relative value-orm o a commodity, e. g. , linen,
exresses its value-being as something thoroughly distinct rom
its bodyanditsroerties,e. g. , ascoat-like,this exressionitsel
indicates that it conceals a social relation. Keversed with the
equivalent-orm. !t consists reciselyj ust therein, that a com-
modity, such as the coat, this thingj ust as it stands, exresses
vaIue, thusly ossesses the value-orm rom nature. Certainly
thisholdsonlywithin thevalue-relation,withinwhich thelinen
is related to thecoat-commodityas equivalent. But in that the
roerties oa thing do not sring out oits relation to other
things, but much more only activate themselves in such a
relation, likewise the coat seems to ossess its equivalent-orm

its roerty oimmediate exchangeability rom nature,j ust as

muchas its roertyobeing heavy orholdingwarmth. Hence,
the riddle character othe equivalent-orm, which nrst strikes
the bourgeois, raw glance othe olitical economist as soon as
thisorm stands oosite him and comlete in money. '
!n theequivalent-orm,determinationsoreHectionaearasimmediate,
or natural, characteristics o the commodity. Jhe olar, or reHective,
nature o the equivalent-orm itsel tends to disaear in the
immediacy o identiying the commodity in the equivalent-orm
)
alueitsel. Jhisisarticularly trueotheuniveral equivalent-orm

O
O themoredeveloedorm thatmoneytakes.Jhecommodityinthis!r
is immediatelyand unversallyexchangeable. JhereH ective social)
othis orm are nolonger to beound in it.
MoneyistheultimatedisguisedreHectionovalue,resentingitselasa
value-thing. !nmoney, value seems to bej ust another thing othe same
logical and ontological status as a naturally existing use-value. Money
etishism involves the ro ection othe secinc social character ocom-
modityroduction,value,onto anatural thing, gold. Logicallyseaking,
this reincation ol social relations arallels escartes' reincation o the
reective categories orimary qualities into a world o suersensible
things. !n both cases, reHective categories are mistaken or categories o
immediacy ornature.
158 MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
\AL! ASA CAJCKY AL!NAJ!N
JhcburdcnoFthcsccondmovcmcntoFthoughtin Marx's thcoryoFvaluc
is to show that thc valuc-Form, i . c. , cxchangc-valuc, is thc ncccssary
cxrcssionoFitsrchcctivccsscncc valuc. Butmoncyand thcFctishsmoF
commoditics arc dcvclocd cxrcssions oFan undcrlying roblcm, namc-
ly, valuc's inncr oosition to usc-valuc. ' Jhc valuc-Form is thc Form oF
movcmcntoFthis oosition.
Frcviouslywcrccognizcdin thc ncccssaryolarityoFthcvaluc-Formthc
charactcristic 'acaring in somcthingclsc' oFHcgcl's logic oFcsscncc.
Jo arcciatc Fully Marx's oint that thc logic oF valuc is thc logic oF
csscncc,wcmustrcalizcthatthe logic of essence ua logic of alienation. sscncc
acars onlybygiving itsclFovcr tosomcthing that isnotitscl!- through
alicnation. sscncc valuc) can rccognizc itsclFonly n its rchcction in
anothcrobjcct.

As a logic oFalicnation, thc logic oFcsscncc and such is thc logic oF

valuc is inhcrcntly religious. Jhc link bctwccn thc logic oFcsscncc thc
ncccssaryacaringinsomcthingothcr and arcligiouslogic, in Marx's
cxandcd scnsc, is suggcstcd by cucrbach' s critiqucoIrcligon. cucr-
bachrcgardcdrcligionasalicnation rcciscly bccausciti sthcacarancc
oFthc human csscncc in somcthing othcr thm thc human, namcly, thc
divinc. Marx, howcvcr, criticizcs cucrbach For not sccng that thc
alicnation was thc ncccssary rcsult oFthc contradictory charactcroFthc
human csscnccwhich so alicnatcs itsclF.
cucrbachstartsoutFromthcFactoFrcligioussclF-alicnation,thc
doublingoFthcworldintoarcligiousoncandasccularonc. His
labor consists thcrcin, to dissolvc thc rcligious world into its
sccularFoundation. ButthcFactthatthcsccularFoundationliIts
itsclFu From itsclFandbxatcs itsclFd d indccndcntrcalmin
thc clouds is only to bc cxlaincd out oF thc sclF-ruturc and
sclF-contradicting oFthis sccularFoundation. Jhis Foundation|
mustitsclFthcrcForcbcundcrstoodinitscontradictionaswcllas
bc rcvolutionizcd in racticc. '
!n discussing thc rclativc valuc-Form, Marx rcFcrs rathcr cxlicitly to
cucrbach's thcory oFrcligion and to his own critiqucoFcucrbach.
! ts that oF thc lincn, which is in thc rclativc valuc-Form|
cxistcncc as valuc acars in its cquality with thc coat as thc
shcc-naturc oF thc Christian docs| in his cquality with thc
Lamb oFCod.
MARX'S THEORY OF VALUE
159
JheChristianachievessel-recognitiononlym thealienateddivinemirror
othe Lamb oCod, but the nature or essence othe Christian which is
therebyrevealedisthatoashee.orMarxthereligiousalienationothe
Christian in Christ is the necessary exression othe sheeish nature o
theChristian.Likewise,theactthatthevaluenatureoacommoditycan
onlybeexressedthroughits alienationinanothercommodityindicatesa
ault with that value natureitsel.
We have seen that alienation, which Marx thinks od embedded m a
religious logic, involves the mediation ooosition by a third arty. !n
t heChristian religion, this role omediator i s taken u by Christ, the
Cod-man. !n theenlightened'religion' ovalue,moneyis thethirdarty
mediating value and use-value. Jhe analysis othe equivalent-orm has
indicated that money is the use-value which aears immediately as
value. Money tries to reconcile the dual ways o aroriating the
commodity. hrst, immediately, as use-value, and second, reH ectively, as
value.'
Marx's view othis third-arty mediation on the art omoney is no
di6`erent rom his view othird arty mediation in his Critique oJ Hegel's
Philosophy oJ Right and 'n thejewish Question. ' !n those works Marx
identihes the third arty not as a sign omediation, as Hegel and Bauer
did, butasasignoexistingcontradiction. Moneyisnot thereconcilia-
tion othe oosition between use-valueand val ue, it is theorm in which
the contradiction between the two appears.36 or Marx reconciliation lies not
in themediation oathirdartybutin revolutionizingtheessenceitsel.
!n the caseotheoliticaleconomyocaitalism, this meansthecessation
oroduction governed by the law oval ue.
!n this context weshould consider Hegel's statement 'theessencemu
aear.
, ,
! nlight oMarx's critique othird-arty mediation, we
emhasize the 'must. ' Jheessenceis constrained by its own in ad
appear; it must aear as something other than itsell, because it h
withinitselanunreconciledcontradictionbetweenimmediacyandrchc-

tion. Marx indicates the ractical oint to be drawn rom this in his
critiques oeuerbach, Hegel, and Bauer. Change must be e6`ected by
recognizing and resolving the contradiction immanent to the essence.
\AL! FK!CJ!N AS 'FSJSJ!M' M!AJ!N
Whatistheaultintheessencethatalienatesthevalueoacommodityin
thethirdarty, moneyJheroductionocommoditiesiseculiarinsoar
asits socialcharacteris reciselyits asociality. Commodityroductionis
carriedonbyrivate,indeendentersons,whoseroductshrstachievea
160 MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
'secih ca||ysocia|

characterwhentheygo tomarket. Whencommodi-

tiescometothemarket, theycomeasarticu|ars,whicharethen subjected
to the |awoFthe universa| . Marx exresses this Fact in his reh nementoF
theconcetsoFva|ueandva|ue-roducing|abor. Jhearticu|aruse-va|ue
and thearticu|ar urosive |aborembodied in a commodity cannot be
identihedwith its universa| , socia|determination. Sincethecommodityis
not roduced immediate|y as a socia|, universa| roduct, its socia| or
universa| qua|ity cannot be an immediatequa|ityoFthatcommodty. ! ts
socia| or universa| qua|ity must aear in something other than itse|F,
hence the necessari|y o|ar nature oFthe exression oFva|ue.
!n the Grundrisse, Marx contraoses the|ogicoFva|ue-roductiontothe
|ogicoFcommuna|roduction, a |ogicwe can identiFy as thatoFcommu-
nist society.
n the Foundation oFexchange-va|ue, |abor is hrst

posited as
universa| through exchange. n this Foundation jcommunistsoci-
etyj |abor wou|d beposited as such beFore exchange, i . e. , the
exchange oFroducts wou|d not at a|| be the medium through
which thearticiation oFtheindividua|in thegenera|roduc-
tionwou|dbemediated. Mediation mustocoursetake|ace. !n
thehrstcase,whichstartsout From the indeendentroduction
oFtheindi vidua| no matterhowmuch these indeendent ro-
ductions determine and modiFy each other post Iestum through
their interre|ations mediation takes |ace through the ex-
changeoFcommodities,exchange-va|ue,money,a|| oFwhich are
exressionsoFoneandthesamere|ationshi. !n thesecondcase,
the presupposition is itse(f mediated, i.e., communa| roduction, the
communa|ityasaFoundationoFroduction, isresuosed. Jhe
|abor oF the individua| is From the very beginning osited as
socia| |abor. Jhe roduct does nothrst havetobeconvertedinto
aarticu|arForminordertoreceiveauniversa|characterForthe
individua| .
!n
.
roduction governed by va| ue, the articu|ar i s mediated by the
un
.
tversa|, but on| y aer the Fact, on|y atter i t has hrst been roduced
rivate|y.JhetwodeterminationsFa|| asunderandmustbeForced into a
unitybyasystemoF'va|ue-mirrors, 'and u|timate|ybythe third arty
money.A|though mediationsti|| takes |acei ncommunalroduction,the
'midd|e man' i s avoided by the Fact that the determinations articu|ar
and universa| coinci de. Farticu|ar use-va|ues roduced communa|| are
a|readyuniversa|s inasmuch as theyare decided uonbythesocietyas a

.
-

MARX'S THEORY OF VALUE 161

whole. Jhere is no urther need to imose, at the level exchange, a
social determination on communally roduced use-values.
S!MMAKY
Marx'stheoryovalueisinormed byHegel'stheoryoessence. Jhelogic
ovaluesrelatedtothelogicoalienation,religiouslogic, thelogicothe
third arty,and thelogicothemediationoarticularanduniversal. Jhe
socallogic omediation imlied by roduction based on valuecontrasts
with thesociallogic ocommunistroduction.Jhesevariousconnections
suggestthatMarxinterretsthe Hegelian)logicoessenceascriticaland
evaluative.
Marxseesthelogicoessenceasalogicodivision, oalienation, it is a
religious logic. Jhis means that Marx's very constitution othe theory o
value, withinthelogic oessence,housesacriticalevaluationovalueasa
determinate category o social roduction. He does not aend the
critiqueovaluetoa 'neutral'scientihcresentationoatheoryovalue.
Kather, the vey logic oJthe scientic presentation oJthe theoy oJvalue is a critical
one. Jheoint oscientihcknowledgeor Marxis tocomrehendthelogic
othings themselves. His mature theory ovalueshows that thelogic o
value is the logic onecessarily aearing in something other, i. e. , the
logic oessence, which is a logic oalienation.
! wedwellon Marx's analysisovalueasadeterminatesocialormo
roduction, we recall his early critique ocivil society. Jhe logic othe
mediation oarticular and universal is the same in both cases. !n the
Critique oJ Hegel 's Philosopy oJRight and 'nthejewishQuestion,' Marx
identih es thelogic ocivic society as the enlightened logic othesocially
osited asocial individual. urthermore, hesees it as a religious logicin
which thestatenecessarilyentersasathirdartytomediatethedivisions
ocivil society. Jhus Marxgrounds thedualism ocivil societyand 8la .

in the contradictory essenceocivil society itsel.

W
.
Moreover

Marx's alternative to the logic ocivil society has the

logicasD)8alternativetoroductiononthebasisovalue communist,or

communal, roduction.
nlywhen the actualindividual man takes thestrat ctize
.
n
backintohimselandas an individualin hisemiricalhe, ) his
ndividual labor, in his individual relationshis, has become a
species-being, only when he has erceived and organized his o

n
' 'forces propres" associal orces,and thusnolongersearatessoci|
orce rom himselin the shae opolitical orce, only then is
human emanciation brought to comletion. ''
162 MARX'S MA TURE SCIENTIFC PRACTICE
Both thc logic of human cmanciation and thc logic of communist
roduction rcj cct thc third-arty aroach to mcdiating thc artcular
and thc univcrsal. !n thcsccondartofhiscssayon thccwish qucston,
Marxbcginstomakcconncctionsbctwccnthclogicofcivlsocctyandthc
logicofmoncy. Hc dcvclos this insightin thcParis Manuscripts whcn hc
rccognizcsvaluc as thc groundofmoncy. Jhis lcadsusto thc thrcsholdof
Marx' smaturcthcoryof valuc. Wc scc that Marx'smaturcthcoryofvaIuc
i shis maturc thcory ofcivil soccty.'

CHAPTER 1 4
Marx)s Theory of Money
nhiscritiqueoolitical economy, Marxlaced theconcetomoney
between valueand caital. Moneyis thenecessaryormoaearanceo
value, and, in its most comlex orm, it is transormed into the initial
disosition ocaital. Between the extremes oits logical determination,
several orms omoney are to be distinguished. !n the discussion othe
revious chater, money was imortant inasmuch as the end roducto
the value-orm analysis was the money-orm. Jhe ersective o the
theory ovalue was. rom the commodity to money by way ovalue, the
ersective othis chater is. rom money to caital.
Marx entitles the third chateroCapital 'Moneyor the Circulation o
Commodities, ' because the three basic orms o money he examines
corresond to three asects othe circulation ocommodities, or'simle
circulation,'ashecallsitin Toward the Critique ofPolitical Economy.
'
!ndeed
what dennes commodity circulation and di6crentiates it rom simle ex
change o commodities is recisely the mediation omoney. ! n terms o
Marx's methodological considerations, we may say that in his third
chater Marx investigates thecontent othis new and more comlex orm
oexchange.
Money mediates the circulation ocommodities hrst oall, ideally, J
the orm oprice. Second,inordertocarryout the circulationo
ties,moneyin theormomeans oJ circulation isrequired.Jhird,theprodu
o the actual rocess o commodity circulation is money, now in thc
determination omony as such, i. e. , money that sets itselo6rom the
circulationrocess. Moneyinthisorm,romwhichmoneyassesintothe
determination ocaital, is the end roduct o the orm ocommodity
circulation.AsMarxutsit, 'circulationconstantlysweatsoutmoney.
, ,

\AL! AS JH lAW FK!C

Marx's theoryorice insists that thedi6crence betweenvalueand rice
isnotnominal.Jocall thedistinctionbetweenvalueandricenominalis
to obliterate, or leave unexlained, the di6crences between these two
164 MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTCE
|orms. Marx's theory o|rice attemts to exlain the discreancies by
examining morecare|ullythelogico|the |ormsthemselves.Jhetheoryo|
rice is a good exam|e o|Marx's methodologica| need to avoid reduc-
tionism with resect to scientihc categories. Likewise, it exemlihes his
criticism o|the tendency toward categorial reductionism on the art o|
classicalolitical economy and 'unscientihc'socialism.
We have seen the hrst and decisive hase o| Marx's antinominalist
theoryo|ricein thetheoryo|value,whichshowsthelogical necessityo|
exressing value in mcney, that is, thenecessityo|settingarice. Marx's
considerable re|iance on Hegel' s theory o| essence in develoing that
theoryo|va|ueonlyintensihesinhisdevelomento| atheoryo|rice. We
shall see how Marx's concet o|valueas thelaw of price relies uon that
art o|Hegel's theory o|essence called the law of appearance.
Since the valueo|acommodityis exressed throughan alien,indeen-
dentobj ect money) , valueandricearenotimmediately, identical.Jheir
identityarisesonlybythecontinualnegationo|rice'sindeendence|rom
value. Jhenominalist theoryo|riceconcentrateson|yontheidentityo|
riceandvalue,itdisregards the|actthatthe refective identity o|riceand
valuein thelawo|riceoerates onlyontheunavoidableresuosition
o| theimmediate nonidentity o| rice andvalue. Marx'stheory, ontheother
hand, recognizes the rehective identity o|rice and value in the |aw o|
rice, and the immediate nonidentity o| rice and value, as equa|ly
essential.
!nboththe Grundrisse and Capital, Marxuses thenotion o|valueas the
law o|rice to rove, contrary to thenomina|ist theoryo|rice, that the

immediate nonidentity o| rice and value is a logical necessity. Marx

resists reducing rice to va|ue, and argues as |ollows in the Grundrisse:
Jhe market value o| the commodity constantly di6crs |rom its
averagevalueand standsconstantly eitherunderoroverit. Jhe
market value averages itsel| out to the real value through its
constant osci|Iations, never through an equation with the rea|
value as a third thing [DrittenJ , but through constant disequili-
brations o|itsel| not, as Hegel wou|d say, through abstract
identity, but through constant negation o|thenegation, i. e. , o|
itsel|as the negation o|the real value) . '
What Marx means by the determination o| rice 'market value') by
value being a negation o|the negation, rather than an abstract identity,
can beexlained|rom what we already know o|Marx's theory o|value.
Jheidentity o|rice and value cannot beabstract, immediate, because
.

j
+
_.



``
.
. . _
. ..
MARX'S THEORY OF MONEY
165
ricereresents atangible thing, money, whilevalue er se isintangible.
Jhe identity o rice with value must be achieved by the constant
negation oits immediate nonidentitywith value.Jheorm this negation
othenegation takes is the law-governed osciIlation orice.
With reerence to Hegel ' s logic oessence, we can say that both the
oscillation oriceandthelawothat oscillation areonthelogicallevelo
essence, and the roer comrchension oessence recognizes the neces-
sary unity othe two. Hegel writes in the section ohis Science oJLogic
entitled 'Jhe Law oAearance' .
Jhe law i s thereore not on the other sideo aearance, but
ratherimmediately present in it, therealmo laws is the stable
rehected image o the existing or aearing world. But even
more so are both ne Jotality, and the existing world is itsel
the realm olaws, which, as the simly identical, likewise is
identicalwith itselinositedness orinthesel-dissolvingauton-
omy oexistence.
!wereadorHegel's 'lawoaearance, ''laworice', or 'existing
or aearing world,' 'the actual oscillations o rice', and or 'the
sel-dissolvingauto nomyoexistence, ' 'theconstantnegationo. . . itsel
[rice| as the negation othe real value, ' we have the basics oMarx's
critical theoryorice. Hegel's emhasis on the immanence othe law o
aearancetotheaearances themselvescarriesoverintoMarx'stheory
orice.
.
Like his critical theory ovalue and the value-orm, Marx's theory o
rceseeks notto ontologizevalue. As thelaworice, valueis notsome
thing beyond or outside the actual movement orice, rather it is
sel-negation o the indeendence orice. \alue does not exist as
actual tangible thing, but as the rehection oactual things. So Marx
theoryoricereconhrms the nonmetahysical characterothetheory
value he uts orth in thehrst chater oCapital, justas it underlines his
debt to Hegel's logic.
Marx reminds us, in the third chater oCapital !, not only that the
distinction between rice and value is a logical necessity but also that it
indicates the social relations within a society characterized by these
categories.
Jhe ossibilityoquantitative incongruence between rice and
value-magnitudes. or the deviation othe rice rom the value-
166
MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
magnitude,liesthereIorein therice-Iormitsell. ItisnodeIectoI
this Iorm, butrather, quite the oosite, makes it the adequate
Iorm oIa mode oIroduction in which the rule can ush itselI
through only as the blindly oerating law oI averages oI ir-
regularity.
Jhe divergenceoIrice andvalueis not inexlicable,asin the nominalist
theory, rather, itis thenecessary consequenceoIthecommoditymodeoI
roduction.ByattendingtothemomentoInonidentityoIriceandvalue,
rather than abstractly nating on their reH ective identity in the law oI
rice, Marxdiscloses therice-Iorm as adeterminate categoryoIcaital-
ist roduction.
Marx's theory thatrice is the necessary, andnecessarilynot immedi-
ately identical, exression oIvalue counters the redi|ction oIclassical
olitical economy to view aralogistically a determinate category like
rice as a general abstraction. But classical olitical economy is not
Marx'sonlytarget,IorhistheoriesoIvalueandriceimlyalsoacritique
oItheutoianor 'bourgeois' socialismoIFroudhon andarimon,Bray
and Cray.
Since 'Froudhonism' was such a owcrIul Iorce within uroean
socialism, Marx was articularly leased with the olemical oints he
scoredinhistheoryoIrice.Writingtongelson22]uly 1 859, Marxlists
as the hrst outcome oI Toward the Critique oJ Political Economy, 'that
Froudhonismiseradicated.

Moreover, thebodyoItheGrundrisse begins

withanextensivecritiqueoIAlIredarimon, aIolloweroIFroudhonwho
wanted to sulant money with 'time-chits' issued on the basis oIhow
many hours an individual actually worked. How Marx relates this ro-
osal to the logic oItherice-Iorm aears Irom theollowing.
Jhe h rst Iundamental illusion oI the time-chitters consists
therein, thatbyannullingthenominal diversit betweenrealvalue
and market value, between exchange-value and ricethus
exressing thevalue in thelabor-time itselIinstead oIa secihc
objectihcation oIlabor-time,say,gold and silverthey also ut
aside the actualdi6`erence and contradiction betweenrice and
value.
Along with Froudhon and others, arimon takes the nominalist view oI
money,claimingthatas the mediatoroIcommodityexchange,moneyis a
troublesome buteliminable contrivance rather than a logicallynecessary
MARX'S THEORY OF MONEY
167
third arty. Such thinkers resent the interIerence oImoney at the same
time as they chamion commodity roduction and the egalitarianism
Ioundintheexchange oIequal values. Marx takes this to mean that the
utoianor'bourgeois'socialistswanttohavetheircakeandeatittoo,or,
asheutsitwithresectto]ohnCray,'Jheroductsaresuosedtobe
roducedas commodities,butarenottobeexchangedascommodities . ''
Jhese 'unscientihc socialists smly Iail to gras the logical relations
among thecategories oIcommodity, value, and rice.
MNYAS MANS CI KC!LAJIN. ACJ!ALIZINCJH
!ALISM!S-\AL!AN \AL!
Frice merely exresses ideallyt hevalueoIa commodity, e6`ectivemedia-
tion oI the exchange oIcommodities calls Ior actual money. With the
introductonoIactualmoneyasthemediatoroIcommodityexchange,we
enterwhat MarxreIers toas theshereoIsimle commoditycirculation.
As we have grown to exect Irom revious considerations oI Marx's
method, it is to the content oIthis Iorm simle commodity circulation)
that he draws secial attention. Writing about the rocess oI simle
commoditycirculation, hesays.
WeneedthereIoretoconsiderthewholerocessaccordingtoits
Iormal side, thusonlythechangein Iorm oIthemetamorhosis
oI the commodities, which mediates the social material ex-
change. ' '
arxanstosh

wthedi6`erencesbetweentheIormoIsimlecommodity
circulation, mediat

d by actual money, and the Iorm oI exchange oI

use-values, not mediated by money. At the same time, Marxcs
th
.
e necessary relationshi between this logically more concrete
sim

le commodity ci
.
rculation) and the logically simler Iorms

exammed. JheIollowmg text Irom Capital I seaks to both theseaim

Jhecommoditiesgoathrstungildedand unsweetenedintothe
exchange rocess, retaining their homegrown character. The
exchange rocess roduces a doubling oIthe commodity into
commodity and money, an external oosition within which
they exose their immanent oosition between use-value and
value. Jhecommodities,asuse-values,come u againstmoney,
as exchange-value, in this oosition. '
168
MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
Commodity exchange mediated by money di6ers rom the immediate
exchangeocommodities in that the internal oositionouse-valueand
exchange-value within the commodity has become hxed as an external
oositionocommodityandmoney.What beganasaconcetualdistinc-
tion between use-value and exchange-value has become an observable
distinctionbetweentwothings, commodityandmoney.Atthesametime,
Marx stresses the dialectical continuity between the inner oosition
within thecommodity as it goes into the exchangerocess and the outer
oosition ocommodity and money in simlecommodity circulation.
Jhedoublingothecommodity into thecommodityandmoneyisthe
actuality whose logical relationshi to the double characterothe com-
modityaearedin theanalysisothevalue-orm,whichshowed thatthe
value oa commodity could beexressedonly in aolarorm that made
one commodity the relative value-orm and the other commodity the
equivalent-orm. Jhevalue-orm distributes the double character o the
1
commoditytooositeolesothe value-mirror relationshi. use-value to
therelativevalue-orm, and exchange-valuetotheequivalent-lorm. In the
necessary olarization o use-value and exchange-value within the
value-orm lies the logical exlanation o the actual doubling o the
commodity into itselas use-value and money as exchange-value.
Marx rovides ormulas or the di6erence between the immediate
exchangeocommodities and simle commoditycirculation. Jhe ormer
isreresented by C C, andthelatterby C-M C, where C standsora
commodity and M ormoney. Jhe ormulaorsimlecommoditycircula-
tion consists otwo distinct rocesses, C M , selling) and M-C , buy-
ing) . Jhe immediate identity obuying and selling, characteristic othe
immediate exchangeocommodities,isbrokenbythemediationomoney
in simle commodity circulation. While in the immediate exchange o
commodities both exchangers werebuyers and sellersinthe same act, or
each circulator, simle commodity circulation divides the act obuying
rom theactoselling,thusintroducingnewossibilitiesoverand against
the immediateexchangeocommodities. A ersonwith commodities can
sell without buying, and a erson with money can buy without selling.
Jhisisadi6erencein contentbetweentheorm oimmediateexchangeo
commodities and theorm osimlecommoditycirculation.
Jhedislocationotheactsobuyingandsellingimliedbytheorm o
simle commodity circulation oens u a new ossibility, that ocrises.
No one can sell unless another buys. But no one needs to buy
immediately, because he himselsells. Circulation exlodes the
temoral, local, and individual barriers o tle exclange ol
MARX'S THEORY OF MONEY
roducts, reciselyin that it slits the immediateidentitygiven
herebetween the exchanging awayolone' sownand thetaking
in through exchange oalien roducts olabor, into the oosi-
tion osellng and buying. Jhat the rocesses which conront
oneanotherasindeendentconstitutean innerunity,meansj ust
as much that theirinner unity movesitselin external oosi-
tions. Should the external objectihcation o the innerly not
indeendent because they comlement one another) roces-
ses| go orward u to a certain oint, then the unity othe
rocesses| validates itselviolently through a crisis.
169
Jhecrisis-laden logicosimle commodity circulation may b comared
to thelogicorice.just astherehectiveidentityoriceandvalueinthe
law othe oscillation orice entails their immediate nonidentity, so the
identity o simle commodity circulation that selling ends in buying,
C M n M C) entailstheimmediate nonidentityobuyingand selling.
Where the immediate nonidentity o rice and value orms the logical
basisocommercialseculation buyingcommoditiesoacertainvalueat
onericeandsellingthematahigherrice,withouttheirundergoingany
changein value) , theimmediatenon identity obuying and sellingis the
logical basis or commercial crisis.
Likethedoublingothecommodityintothecommodityand money,the
sunderng oexchange into the two oosed acts o buying and selling
relates to thedoublecharacterothecommodityandtothecockeyedlogic
omediation in which rivately roduced use-values are determined as
universals,i . e. , as exchange-values, through the mediationothemarket.
Jhe commodity' simmanentoosition ouse-value and value,
orivate labor which must resent itsellikewise as immedi-
ately social labor, o articular, concrete labor which counts
likewise only as abstract, universal labor, oersonihcation o
the object [Sache] and objectihcation [ Versachlichung] oersons-
ths immanent contradiction obtains its develoed orms o
movement in the oositions o the metamorhosis o com-
modities.' '
!se-value/exchange-value value) , rice/exchange-value value) , com-
modity/actualmoney,and buying/sellingareincreasinglyconcretelogical
oositions thatexress the contradictory characterothecaitalistmode
oroduction.
170 MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFC PRACTICE
MNEY AS SUCH. CNENSlNCJHE CNJKAlCJlNS
KllE \ALUE
Money in its third determinationmoney as suchis the negation o
money as means o circulation. Money in the latter orm is always
disaearing, always in hux. As means ocirculation, money does not
stand on its own but is always a middle term in the exchange o two
use-values . Jhe division o the act o buying rom the act o selling,
however,whichresultsrom the mediation oexchangebymoney,makes
ossiblea thirddeterminationomoney. Moneyneed notalwaysvanish.
l ndeed, or the erson doing the selling in the second hase osmle
commodity circulation ( M-C) , themoneydoes notvanish. Sinceselling
can roceed without being ollowed by buying, the ow omoney as
means ocirculation can be interruted, and money can berozenin the
orm omoneyassuch. ln thisorm,moneyassertsitsindeendencerom
circulation. Actual money which does not circulate may be called the
negation o the second orm omoney, or it negates thedeendence o
money on circulation.
Li kethe nonidentity obuying and selling, introduced by the second
orm omoney, money as such is a urther consequence othe orm o
simle commodity circulation. ln its third determination money i s the
roduct othe orm osimle commodity circulation.
lwe abstract rom the material contentocommodity circula-
tion, ro

the exchange o the di6crent use-values, and ay

attentionustto the economicorm which thisrocessroduces
wehnd money to be its hnal roduct . '

'Such attention to theormsdealt with byolitical economydistinguishes

Marx's science oolitical economyrom that ohisredecessors, at the

,
same time as itrevealshis debtto Hegel. Marxdoesorthecategorieso
olitical economy what Hegel did i n his Science of Logic. Through his
attention to theimlcations othe simle orms otheolticaleconomy
ocaitalism, Marxshowsthatthesimlerormsarelogicalrecursorso
themorecomlexand morecontradictory ones . He overcomes the scien-

tincarbitrarinessoclassicalolitical economy' sblitheuseocategoriesas

so many givens, and simultaneously rovdes a critique ooltical eco-
omiccategories .
Asrice,moneyis merelythe idealreresentativeovalue.Asmeanso
circulation,moneyisthe actual embodimentovalue, butonlyinsoar as
it is continually in Hux and dominated by the exchange ouse-values. As
MARX'S THEORY OF MONEY 171
actual moneywhich has searated itselrom circulation and broken the
dominance o use-value, money is the immediate, actual, and nated
incarnation ovalue. Jhis third orm omoney condenses the contradic-
tions ouse-valueand valueto thebreaking oint, encasulating theull
madnessotheshereocirculation' sgoldenimageovalueas athing. It
istheointoreversal inwhichwegothrough thelookingglass into the
inverted world where value is lord and use-value its bond-servant.
WhatMarxhasinmind byconstruingmoneyastheurecontradiction
o use-value and value, which 'dissolves itsel, drives to its own
dissolution, '' becomes lainer in the ollowing assage rom the Urtext.
ntheotherhand, its money's| autonomous relatingoverand
against circulation, its ulling out ocirculation, robs it oboth
its use-value, or it is not suosed to serve as metal, and| its
exchange-value,oritossesses this exchange-value onlyj ustas
momentocirculation, as theabstractsymbolotheirownvalue,
whichis recirocallyoosed tothecommodities, as a moment
o the movement o the commodity's orm itsel. As long as it
remainsulledoutocirculation,itisjustasdevoidovalueasi
itlay buried in the deeest mountain sha!. However, iit goes
againinto circulation, then it isattheendoitsimerishability,
then the value contained in it erishes in the use-values othe
commodities against which it is exchanged, it| becomes once
again mere means ocirculation. '
Since it wants both to reserve indeed immortalize) itselas universal
wealth and ull itsel out o the circulation o use-values, this third
determinationomoneyis sel-contradictory. Jheorm burstsrom e
tensions. Money' sindeendencerom circulation is strictlyretense. t.u
o6rom circulation, its romises ouniversal wealtharecoldande
Moneyis a mere 'ghost owealth. ''

A urther contradiction roer to this third orm omoney ar

between the concet omoney and the bounds imosed by a articular
quantity omoney.
However as| quantitatively determinate value-magnitude,
money is also only the limited reresentative o the universal
wealthorreresentativeoalimitedwealth,whichgoesasar as
the magnitude oits exchange-value, which| is measured ex-
actlybyit. Jhereoreit money| has by nomeans thecaability
172
MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
which it h suosed to have according to its general concet,
i . e. , the caability| oFbuyingall enjoyments , al| commodities,
the totality oFmaterial wealth, it is not a 'recis oFall things.'
As wealth, as the universal Form oFwealth held Fast, as value
whichcountsasvalue, itmoney|isthustheconstantdrivetogo
Forward beyond its quantitative limits endless rocess. ' "
Jhis contradictionoFthe third FormoFmoney,liketheothercontradiction
between selF-reservation and indeendence From circulaton, bnds its
FormoFmovementin caital.
All e6` orts oFsimle commoditycirculation toin valuedown to some
concrete, sensuous thingrovemere guise. !n terms oFHegel's Science of
Logic, the reversal oF money which isolates itselF From the world oF
commodities into caital, which enters nto crculation without losing its
identity, is the reversal From being into essence. When .we comare the
relevantsections oFHegel'sScience ofLogic theclose oFthe logicoFbeng,
and the beginning oFthe logic oFessence) with Marx's account, articu-
larly in the Urtext, oFthe reversal From money as such into money U
caital,webndcomellingreasonstobelievethat Marxhasthosesections
oFtheScience of Logic in mind.
At the beginning oFthe bnal subsection oF his logc oF being, Hegel
makes the Followingstatement. 'Absoluteindt6erenceis thelastdetermi-
nation oFbeing beFore it becomes essence.
, ,
20
!n the Science of Logic, the
indi6`erenceoFbeingresultsinareversaloFbeingntoessence, determined
asguise (Schein) . Marxsees the indi6`erenceoFsimlecommoditycircula-
tion in moneyas such.
Circulation thereFore does not carry in itselF the rincile oF
selF-renewal. !t starts out From resuosed moments, not os
ited by itselF. Commodities must constantly be thrown into it
anew, and indeedFromwithout,likeFuel into thebre. therwise
it would extinguish itselFin indiBcrence. !t would extinguish
itselFin money as an indi6`erentresult.
2 1
Circulation'sinabilitytokeeitsownbresburning,andtheindi6`erenceoF
itsresult,money, underminethe immediacyoFthe entre shere oFsmle
commodity circulation.
Circulation considered in itselF is the mediation of presupposed
extremes. But it does not osit these extremes. As a| whole oF
MARX'S THEORY OF MONEY
mediation, as total rocessi tsel, i t must thereorebemediated.
Its immediate being is ther/ore pure guise. !t is thephenomenon oJ a
process going on behind its back.

173
Weshallsee inthe next chaterthatbehindthebackosimlecirculation
isoccurringtheroductionosurlus-valueandthecirculationocaital.
Hegel closes the logic obeing with a descrition othe logic othis
reversalromimmediate orresuosed extremes to a totalitymediated
and osited by another.
Jherewithhas beingaltogether,and beingortheimmediacyo
di6`erentiated determinations no less than being-in-itself, van-
ished,andtheunityisbeing,immediate presupposed totality,sothat
itis thissimple relation to itsel ony mediated through thesupesession
oJ this presupposition, andthis resuosedandimmediate beingis
itselonly a moment oits reelling, the original sel-sumciency
and identity with itsel is only as the resulting, infnite coming
together with itsel thus is being determined as essence, being,
simle being with itself, through thesuersession obeing.

'
Moresuccinctly,Hegelwrites at the startohis sectionon guise,"Being is
guise. ,
,
2
4 Moneyas such
,
the end roductwhichreellsitseloutosimle
circulation, is the guise oa simle sel-identical unity in which all the
di6`erentiated determinations o the totality o commodities the very
di6`erentiations resuosed by money) have vanished. Jhe truth othe
logicoimmediacy being) is thatimmediacy i smediated. Similarly
,
or
Marx, we can say that the immediacyosimlecirculation and money as
such is a guise or the rocesses ocaital accumulation.

As the indi6`erent result osimle circulation, money is itselin

initiallogicaldeterminationoessence,i . e. , guise(Schein) . 'Jheau
omoney over againstcirculation is ure guise. '

WhatHegelwrites
theureessence( reine Wesen) aliesto money inMarx'stheory. Jheure

essenceistheabstractionromalldeterminatebeings, justasmoneyisthe
abstractionrom all secih cuse-values .
!the ure essenceisdeterminedas the inner purport [InbegrW] oJ
all realities, then these realities are likewise subordinate to the
nature odeterminate nessand totheabstractive [abstrahierenden]
rehection, and this inner urort reduces to emty simlicity.
ssence i s i n this way only roduct, an artiact . . . !n its
174 MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
determination it is thereFore in-itselF dead, emty indetermi-
nateness .
According to the concet oFits third determination, money is 'theinner
urort [Inbegrif oF all use-value.
, ,

We have already seen a) that

money resuoses both the world oFactualriches and theirreH ectionin
the rocess oF circulation, b) that money is a product oF commodity
circulation, and c) that, i nmoney, these actual riches arereduced to an
emty shadowoFthemselves, so that d) money collases nto indetermi-
nateness. xcetFor theFactsthature essenceistherehectvenegationoF
immediate being and money as such is the reHective negation oFactual
riches,bothureessenceandmoneyareindeterminate. Jhereisnothing
moretosayabouteitherone.
WhatHegeldoessayabouttheureessencecanbeassociatedwithhis
critiqueoFKant'sconcetoFthe`thing-in-itself'Jhislink broadens the
textual basis For relating Marx's theory oFmoney to Hegel ' s logc, since
both theLogic and the Language oFHegel's and Marx' s resectiveaccounts
oF the thing-in-itselF and money as s uch coincide. Hegel regards the
thing-in-itselFasthelogicalcounterartmoreprecisely, thelogcalrehec-
tion) oFthe totality oFbeing determined as guise
.
Jhus guise is the henomenon oFskepticism; likewise aearance
isForidealismsuchanimmediay whichisnosomething, nothing,
notatallanindi6`erentbeingwhichwould stillexist,outsideits
determinateness andrelationto thesubject. Sketicismdoesnot
allowitselFtosay, 'itis _' theneweridealismdoesnotallowitselF
to look uon cognitions as a knowingoFthe thing-in-itsel|

Jhe thing-in-itselFis the cmty, abstract, reective negation oFall imme-

diate being, but is itselFtaken in the Form oFimmediacy) to be thereal
thing,theureessencebehind theguiseoFimmediacy.ButthisromiseoF
beingthereal thingisadeadletter,Forthethng-n-itseIFisamereghost,a
shadow oF the actual world. esite its osture as animmediate thing
behindimmediatehenomena,oraearances, thething-in-itselFis actu-
allyaroductorresidueoFtheactionoFtheurereectiveunderstanding.
WhatKanttakestobetheabsolute,themostrealthing,thething-in-itselF
is, For Hegel, the emty ghostoFabstract thinking.
Money in its third determination hts the same logical attern as the
thing-in-itselF. Money is thelogical reection oFtheindi6`erent totalityoF
': + . -
use-valuesi nsimlecommoditycirculation.FresentingtselFas theimme-

' '

MARX'S THEORY OF MONEY
1 75
diateembodimentovalue,moneyabstractsrom the immediatequalities
oall use-values. As value incarnate, money urorts to be the embodi-
ment ouniversal wealth, the essence oall riches, butsevered rom the
circulationoactual use-values,moneyis amere shadowowealth. Since
moneyseems tobevalueas an immediate thing, articularuse-valuesseem
to owe to money both their own value and their commensurability with
other use-values. Jhevalue omoney seems to be the immediate thing,
and the value ocommodities seems to bederivedrom money. But this
retense o money reihes rehective qualities and inverts use-value and
value. Money is the result, the product, o the actual social rocess o
rehectionwhichtakeslaceintheexchangeocommodities. !smoney,the
thing-in-itselothe commodity world, the mostreal thing Jhemyth o
Midas teaches usotherwise.
Jhe very language which Hegel emloys to characterize the thing-in-
itsel as the result o the abstract, rehective negation o all sensuous
aearanceisinvoked byMarxinhisdescritionomoney.Hegelsayso
thething-in-itsel. 'justassimle,however,istherehectionthatthiscaput
mortuum isitselonlythe product othought, reciselyothoughtrogressed
toure abstraction, otheemty !.' !ntheScience oJ Logic, Hegelreers
to the thing-in-itselas a 'lel-over ghost' and 'this abstract shadow,
searated o6rom all content.
,
' '

!nthe Urtext, Marxaints a ictureo

moneywithtwoothesesamewordhrases. "caput mortuum" and'ghost. '
!n simle circulation the exchange-value made autonomous,
money as such, aears always only as result, caput mortuum o
the movement. ' '
!n circulation it money| is always only actual insoar as it is
given away. !! want to hold on to it, then it evaorates in my
hand into a mereghosto wealth. '
Marx'schoiceolanguagetodescribemoney,and his accountothelogic
omoney, makeithighlylausible that,indeveloinghistheoryosimle
commodity circulation, culminatingin the thirddeterminationomoney,
hehadin mindHegel's resentation othelogicalreversalrombeingto
essence, as well as Hegel's critique oKant's thing-in-itsel.

1
CHAPTER 1 5
Capital 's Logical and Epochal Break
with Simple Commodit Circulation
CAF!JALAS JHKM M\MNJ K JH
CNJKA!CJ!NS MNY
Money's contradictions h nd some resolution in caital. Jhefrst contra
diction omoney is that between its claim to be universal wealth and the
act that it is merely an abstraction rom that wealth. !solated rom
circulation, money is reserved but desiccated. Caital overcomes this
sel-limitation omoney by breaking through the logic osimle circula-
tion. Jransitions within simle circulation take the orm oa disaear-
ing, or going-over transitions that tyiy the logic obeing in Hegel's
sense. Within simle commodity circulation, money seems to disaear
whenitgoesoverintoacommodity,somoneythatseekstoreserveitsel
asmoneyseemstohavenochoicebuttoabstainromcirculation. Butthis
is within the logic o being. With the concet o caital, a new logic
emerges rom the ailure omoney's attemt at sel-reservation.
!money cannot reserve itselthrough isolation rom circulation, it
mustreserveitselin theveryact ocirculating. Jhis is recisely what
the transition omoney as such intomoneyas caital e6ccts.
Jhe indeendentorms,the moneyorms,whichthevalueothe
commodity takes on in simle circulation, only mediate the
exchangeocommodities and disaearin theend resultothe
movement. !n the circulation M C M, however, both com-
modity and money unction merely as disaearing modes o
existenceovalueitsel. money its universalorm, the commod-
ity as its articular orm, its disguised orm oexistence, so to
seak. \alue goes constantly out othe one orm over into the
otherwithoutlosingitselin this rocess,anditthustransorms
itselinto an automatic subj ect. '
177
178 MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
Capital is money that enters circulation without disappearing, without
losingits identity. !ts identity ceases to be that oa thing and becomes
thatoaprocess. Money'sdisappearingandgoingoverintoanotherthing
a commodity) has becomethe 'remaining-with-itsel' ocapital. Capi-
tal,whichisnotmoneyandisnotthisorthatcommodity,istheprocessin
whichmoneyis thrown intocommoditycirculation,onlytoemergeagain
as money
Jhe ormula or money in the determination o capital, M C M,
inverts the ormulaor money as the means ocirculation. Jhe inversion
corresponds to the inversion opriorities in this orm ocirculation.
Jhe circuit C M C starts outrom the extreme oone com-
modity and closes o6with the extreme oan other commodity,
which alls out ocirculation and under the aegis o consump-
tion.Consumption,satisactiononeeds,in aword,ue-value,is
thereore its hnalpurpose. JhecircuitM C M, on theother
hand, starts out rom the extreme o money and turns back
hnally to thissameextreme. !tsdrivingmotiveand determining
purpose is thereore exchange-value itse|.
But no purpose whatever is ulhlled in the circuit M-CM, or one
amount omoney is qualitatively identical to any other amount. !the
amounts are also identical, as in the ormula M C M, there is abso-
lutely no di6erence on which to hang a purpose.
!n order to achieve a determinate purpose, the circulation ocapital
mustresultinadi6erence betweenitsendpoints, andthedi6erencemust
be quantitative since the end points are qualitatively identical. Jhe
complete ormuladescribing the circulation ocapital is, then, MC M',
where M' M /M. Jhis ormula describes Marx's concept osur-
plus-value represented by /M) through the dialectic o the orms o
circulation. Jhe concept o surplus-value explains the inversion o the
orm omoney as means ocirculationand alsocharacterizes theormo
movementor thesecond contrdiction omoney as money.
Hoarded away and securerom the risks ocirculation, money always
exists in a dehnite, hnite amount, a act which contradicts its logical
determination as theembodimentouniversalwealth.'Jhe third orm o
money does not respond to value's immanent drive to go beyond each
quantitative barrier. Hoarded money depends upon the golden drops
'sweated out' o simple commodity circulation without claiming the
process ocirculation orits own. Capital, on the other hand, resolves the
stagnatingcontradictionomoney as such bypositingitselas theprocess
_
-
_

CAPITAL: BREAK WITH SIMPLE CIRCULATION

o
.
valorization-the process ovalue going beyond
rer.
7

tts quantttattve
!se-value is thereore never to be treated as the immediate
purpose othe capitalist. Likewise not the individual gain, but
ratheronlytherestlessmovementothegaining. Jhisabsolute
driveorenrichment,thispassionatehuntalervalueiscommon
tothecapitalistandthehoarder,butwherethehoarder is| only
the crazy capitalist, the capitalist is the rational hoarder. Jhe
restless augmentation ovaluetowardwhich thehoarderstrives
inasmuch as he seeks to save his money rom circulation, the
cleverer capitalist achieves in that he constantly gives it over
anew to circulation.
179
bar-
!n capital, money repudiates its indi6erence to circulation and posits
circulation as a momentin theprocess ovalue's revaluation.
Actually, capital mediates the two contradictions omoney in a single
stroke.JheresolutionothesenselessormulaM C MintoM C M'
shows that, as circulating capital, money preserves itselonly by going
beyond its previous quantitative barrier, i . e. , byincreasing itselthrough
circulation.
Jhereore, orvaluewhich holdsonto itselasvalue, increasing
coincides with sel-maintenance, and it maintains itsel only
through constantly driving itsel out beyond its quantitative
limits, which contradict its inner universality.
Jhetruth

value, maniestedin themore concrete conceptocapital,

tat v
.
alue
.
ts not a crystallized thing as simple commodity
vtsuahzes t t) , but a process, and 'only surplus-value-positing value
active value. '
JH LC!C S!KFLLS-\AL!
Jheconceptosurplus-value raises a problem. !equivalent values are
beingexchangedin thetwophases othecirculationocapital ( M C and
C M' ) , how is surplus-value possible Marx rej ects any solution based
ontheoscillatorydivergencesopriceaboveandbelowvalue sincethey
tend to cancel one another out and reaches the ollowing conounding
conclusions. 'Jhus, capitalcannotspringromcirculation,anditcanjust
as little not spring rom circulation !t capital| must at thesame time
180 MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
originate H it circulation| and not in it. '' Simple circulation's law o
equivalent exchange is kept intact at the same time that the genesis o
surplus-value outside circulation is explained. As Marx says, "Hie Rho
dus, hie salt a!" '

Civen the need to preserve the law oequivalent exchange ovalues,

Marxarguesbyaprocessoeliminationthatthesourceotheincreasein
value, thesurplus-value, mustlie in theconsumptionothecommodity's
use-value.
Jhe change in value o the money which is to transorm itsel
into capitalcannottakeplaceat the pointo| thismoney itse|,
or U means opurchaseand means opaymentit only realizes
the price othe commodity which it buys or pays or, while, in
sticking to its own orm, it rigidihes into a pertrihcation o
unchangingvalue-magnitude. Jhechangecanarisejustas little
outothesecondactocirculation,theresaleothecommodity,
orthis actmerely transorms the commodity outothe natural
orm back into the money orm. Jhe change must thereore
happen with the commodity purchased in the hrst act, M-C,
but not with its value, or equivalents are exchanged, the com-
modity is paid or at its value. Jhe change thereore can only
arise out oits use-value as such, i . e. , out oits consumption. ' '
By singling out the consumption o the purchased commodity as the
sourceotheincrementinvalue,Marxtouchesaweakpointin thelogico
simplecommoditycirculation. Marx's argumentum ad absurdum requires us
to reexamine what the logic osimple circulation presupposes about the
relationship between use-value and value. ther than the act that use-
valueis thematerialcarrieroexchange-value value) , itis indi6erentto,
and independent rom, the abstract determinate orms osimple com-
moditycirculation. 'Withsimple circulation, thecontentotheuse-value
was indi6ereut, felloutside theeconomicorm relation.
,
' ' Jhe indepen-
denceouse-valueandvalueinthelogicosimplecommoditycirculation
yields,inthelogicocapital,totheirinterrelationship. ''Jheconsumption
oa use-valueresults in the productionovalue.
Whatuse-valueisitwhoseconsumption producesvalue,makingitthe
use-value-or-capitalJhecapitalisthndsjustwhatheislookingorinthe
labormarket,wherehumancapacitiesorlabor labor-power) areputup
or sale. When thecapitalisttakes thesepurchases backto his workplace,
heconsumes themin the orm oliving, value-producing labor. Like any
CAPITAL: BREAK WITH SIMPLE CIRCULATION
181
other buyer, he is entitled to all the enjoyments, including the surplus-
value, accruing to that consumption. The use-value-or-capital, then, is
tabor-power, whose consumption is tabor.
Since thelogicocapitalunderminestheindependenceouse-valueand
exchange-value, the categoryolabor-powerproves to be a determinate
abstraction. ' ' Jo see this, let us examine Marx's dehnition o the term
'labor-power.'
By labor-power or labor-capacity we understand the sum total
[Inbegrif] othe physical and spiritual capabilities which exist
in the bodiliness, thelivingpersonality oa man, andwhich he
setsintomotionasolenas heproducesuse-valuesoonesortor
another. ' '
Jhisdehnitionstronglyresemblesthedehnitiono t heconcepto abstract,
value-producinglabor. !ndeed,wemightwellsaythatlabor-poweris the
capacity toperorm abstractlabor. '
! this ormulation linking labor-power with the determinate category
abstract tabor leaves any doubt as to the logical status o the concept
tabor-power, Marx quickly dispells it. !n order or labor-power to be the
use-value that solves the capitalist's dilemma, it must ulhll certain
conditions. irst,
Labor-power as a commodity can only appear in the market
insoar as, and because, it is o6ered or sale or sold as a com-
modity byitsownpossessor,thepersonwhoselabor-poweritis.
!n order or its possessor to sell it as a commodity, he mustbe
able to havedisposal overit, thus be the ree possessor othis
labor-capacity, or his person`
Second, the possessorolabor-power,
instead o being able to sell commodities in which he had
objectihed his labor, mustrathero6er as a commodity or sale,
hislabor-poweritse|,whichonlyexistsinhislivingbodiliness. '
Clearly these presuppositions o the use-value-or-capital, labor-power,
arehistoricallyspecihc. Sincethe presuppositions belongwithinthescope
othe conceptolabor-power, thatis adeterminate concept.
182
MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFC PRACTICE
JH FCH CAF!JAL
When,inthe Urtext andin Capital !, Marx unolds theconceptocapital,
including the category o labor-power as the use-value-or-capital, he
inserts arehectionontherelationshipbetween these theoretical concepts
and actual human history.
Jhe question, why this ree laborer stands opposite him the
capitalist| in the sphere o circulation, does not interest the
possessor omoney, who hnds the labor market on hand as a
particulardivisionothecommoditymarket.Andorthepresent
itinterests usjustas little. Weholdastto theacttheoretically,
justas the possessoromoney does practically.'
Herewerecall that Marx'scritiqueothecapitalistmodeoproductionis
nota descriptive history othe genesis othatmode oproduction, but a
dialectical presentation o the logic o capital, which presupposes the
historicaldevelopmentocapitalism.
Because the critique othepoliticaleconomy ocapitalismlimitsitsel
toadialecticalpresentationothelogicocapital,given thestartingpoint
odeveloped industrial capitalism, the historical question othe actual
genesisothe 'ree laborer' can betakenupoutsidethestrictconceptual
development. Nevertheless, it is interesting to ollow Marx's briere-
marks on the history presupposed by the concept olabor-power, or the
'ree-laborer. 'He writes in Capital ! .
Nature does notproduceontheone sidemoneyor commodity
possessors and on the other side mere possessors otheir own
labor-power. Jhisrelationshipisnonatural-historicalonenoris
it a social one which is common to all periods ohistory. !t is
obviously itseltheresultoa oregoing historical development,
the product o many economic turn-abouts, the demise o a
whole series oolder ormations osocial production. '
Jhe relations or which Marx develops the concept olabor-power are
neither natural nor oa universal social-anthropological type, they are
determinate and historical. Yet this alone does not distinguish the rela-
tionspresupposedbytheconceptocapitalromthosepresupposed bythe
concepts osimple commodity circulation, which are also oa determi-
nate, historical type.

CAPITAL: BREAK WITH SIMPLE CIRCULATION
Also the economic categories which we observed earlier carry
their historical trace. eterminate historical conditions are
wrappedupinthe being [Dasein] otheproductascommodity.
183
Although both the concept o capital and the concepts o simple
circulation the commodity and the severalorms omoney) are histori-
callydeterminate, ahistoricalgullies betweenthehistoricalpresupposi-
tions othetwotypes oconcepts .
Jhe presentation othe productas commodity supposes a divi-
sion olaborwithin societysoar developed that the separation
betweenuse-valueandexchange-value,whichhrstbeginsin the
immediate activity oexchange, is already brought to comple-
tion. Such a level odevelopment is however common to the
historically most divergenteconomicsocialormations . . . Jhe
particularorms omoney. . . point . . . to quite di6erentlevels
othe social production process. Nonetheless, according to ex-
perience, a relatively weakly developed commodity circulation
sumcesortheshapingoalltheseorms. therwisewithcapital.
!ts historical conditions oexistence are not at all there with
commodity and money circulation. !t comes to be only where
the possessoromeansoproductionandolivinghnds theree
laborer presentin the market as sellerohis own labor-power,
and this, a historical condition, entails aworld-history. Capital,
thereore, proclaims rom the outset an epoch o the social
process oproduction.'
Jhe logical reversalromsimplecommodity circulation tocapitalpresu
poses a historical alteration oepochal signihcance.
Jwo observations seem appropriate here. irst, even the orms
simple circulation become hegemonicovereconomiclieonlywiththe
ocapitalism
Had weinvestigatedurther. underwhich circumstances doall,
or even only the majority, oproducts take on the orm othe
commodity, thenitwouldhave been ound that this takes place
only on the basis oa quite specihc, the capitalistic, mode o
production. '
Second, such an investigation would have beenirrelevantto the scientihc
analysis o the commodity and simple circulation, which Marx ap-
184 MARX'S MATURE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
proaches rom the viewpoint o the developed relations o capitalist
production.JhisiswhatMarxmeansintheclosingpagesothemethod-
ologysectionotheintroductionto the Grundrisse actually, rom thetime
ohisconversiontoHegel'sdialectics by thcdctcrminationoascientihc
presentationaccordingtothelogicothcobjcctunderscrutiny. !n Capital
that object is the political economy odevcloped capitalism, in which
simple circulation is a necessary guise.
S!MMAKY
Whatwehavelearnedconcerningthetransitionomoneyinto capitalcan
becondensed by making some substitutions in the opening statemento
thelogicoessence inHegel' s Science oJLogic. WhereHegelwrites, 'Jhe
truth obeing is essence,
,
,
2
5 we can rewrite, 'Jhe truth osimple commodify
circulation is capital. " r, as Marx puts it in the Urtext.
`
Simple circulation is rather an abstract sphere othe bourgeois
totalproductionprocess, which through its owndeterminations
revealsitselasamoment,amereormoappearanceoadeeper
process lying behind it, whichjust as much results rom it as
produces it.
Jhe postureovalueas an immediatething money) within the sphereo
simple circulation proves itselto be an imposture.
! this point receives the classical interpretation, which reduces the
appearance simple circulation) to an epiphenomenon o the essence
capital) , Marx's scientihc point is seriously misstated, and his method-
ologicalconsiderationsarecompletelyobscured.Capitalisnotsomeother
'thing'existingbehindtheappearancesosimplecirculation.Kather,it
is a logically more concreteprocess, whichpresupposes simple circulation,
preserves thetruthosimplecirculation only nowasapartialtruth and
at the same time introduces relations which transcend the logic osimple
circulation. Capital is the sublation orAujhebung osimple circulation
not its annihilation.
Jhe conceptual couplet labor-power-( value-producing) lab or, which shat-
ters the indi6erence ouse-value to value thatcharacterized the logico
simple circulation, represents a historical transition oepochal import.
With respect to Marx's scientihc presentation in Capital, the couplet
inaugurates alogical break between simple circulation and capital. Jhe
break together with the continuity osimple circulation with capital-
CAPITAL: BREAK WITH SIMPLE CIRCULATION
185
contains the answerto the Sphinx-likeriddle thatcapitalmustboth arise
and not ariseromsimple circulation. Marx demonstrates boththe break
and the continuity o the logics osimple circulation and capital in this
Grundrisse description othe exchange between capital and labor.
In the exchange between capital and lab or, thefrst act is an exchange, it|
falls entirefy within the ordinay circulation; the second is a process
qualitativefy diferent from exchange, and it u onfy y misuse thatit can
at all becalled exchange o any type. !t stands directlyopposite
exchange, itis an| essentially other category.
Simple commodity circulation can understand perectly well the buying
and sellingolabor-powerwhich initiates the exchange between capital
and labor, it is the consummation o that exchange in the production
process which leaves simple commodity circulation speechless. Simple
commoditycirculationprovesincapableoprovidingtheconceptualbasis
orthecomprehensionotheveryprocessthroughwhichthewholesphere
osimple circulation is posited. Jhe signihcance o this breakdown o
thelogic osimple commoditycirculationor Marx's matureviewothe
theology,politics,andphilosophyothenlightenmentis thetopicothe
nextdivision.
l

r .

.
Division VII
The Theo-Logical, Political, and
Philosophical Signifcance of Capitalist
Economic Forms

.
i
+

' 1'
`
Jh/0J0(/0h /0 J0h JJ
Cerman) philosophy, rench) politics, and nglish) political economy
weredescribedearlierasthreespheres thatMarxconcurrentlycriticized.
His conception omaterialist phenomenology spurred him to seek out a
common logic in the diBcrent spheres osocial activity. As a treatise on
modern uropean society, Capital merits urther study. Moreover,
togauge theullsignincanceoCapital, weshould remember Marx'sview
o religion. !n his critiques omodern philosophy, enlightened politics,
and the political economy o capitalism, Marx never contradicts his
statementat the beginning o'Joward theCritiqueoHegel'sPhilosophy
oJ Right: !ntroduction' that 'thecritique oreligion is the presupposition
oeverycritique.
,
' !nthepreviousourchaptersweocusedonthelogico
the basicorms othe capitalist economy, and in the next three chapters
we willinvestigate their theo-logical, political, andphilosophical signincance.
We will sense the continuity in Marx's lie' s work even as we bring
togetherthetwomainthreadsothisstudy. hiscritiqueophilosophy and
his critiqueopolitical economy. Atthesametime, wewillseehowdense
andtightlywoven a textis Capital.
189

CHAPTER 1 6
The Theo-Logics of Money and Capital
'
n thejewish Question' identihes mone as the god ojudaism. '
Although Marx likewise identihes money as the god othe commodity
world, atthattimehehadnodehnite conceptocapitalanditsrelationto
money. How does the introduction o the concept o capital a6`ect the
'theologyomoney, 'andwhatis thetheo-logicalsignihcanceocapital
We shall see how Marx continues to identiy mone as the god ofJudaism,
while pointing to capital as thegod oChristianit.
Hegel closely related Kant's philosophy and the theology ojudaism.
Kant's agnosticism with respect to absolute knowledge and his conse-
quentpositingoathing-in-itselremindedHegelothenegativetheology
ojudaism,whichposits aCodatthesame timethatitcommands usnot
to namethis Cod. Like theKantian thing-in-itsel, thejewishCodis 'to
the other side' othe world oexperience. As we have seen, the logic o
moneyas such parallels that oKant' sthing-in-itsel. So, too, money runs
in the same logical groove as thejewish Cod. Money as such is 'to the
other side' o the whole world oactual use-values. Moreover, money
loses its apparent quality as universal wealth when it leaves circulation.
just as the eternal identity othejewish Cod is preserved preciscly
remaining 'to the other side' othis world, so, too, does money seek
immortalize itselas value by stayingoutocirculation.
Butwehaveseenthatmoney'sretroversionrom the world o r cu
use-values commodity circulation) ends in sel-annihilation rather
sel-immortalization. Jo achieve immortality, money must be trans-
ormed into capital
Jhe immortality which money strives or insoar as it relates
itsel negatively toward circulation draws out o it) , capital
achieves in thatit maintains itselprecisely by givingitselover
to circulation. '
Jhe logic o capital is one o incarnational presence in the world o
use-values, as opposed to the divisive, two-world logic o money. Jhe

192
FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
theo-logicomoney'sgivingitselovertothecirculationocommodities is
thatotheChristian,incarnate, and trinitarianCod.justascapitalpasses
intotheworldocirculatinguse-valueswithoutlosingitsidentityasvalue,
so, too, the Christian Cod passes into the world o sensuous human
history withoutlossoidentity. Marxexplicitly bringsouttheseparallels
in Capital ! .
!t [value| di6erentiates itsel as original value rom itsel as
surplus-value, as Cod the ather rom Himselas Cod the Son,
and both are othe same age and constitute in act only one
person, oronlythroughthesurplus-valueo lO poundssterling
dotheadvance 1 00 poundssterlingbecomecapital,andassoon
as they have become this, as soon as the Son is created and
through the Son, the ather, their di6erence disappears again

and both are one, 1 0 1 [ iL| pounds sterling.'

Jheunity othe ather andtheSonis the Spirit,justas capital is the
unityothetwopoles otheprocessocapitalcirculation M C M' ) .
! napassageimmediatelyprecedingthetextcitedhere,Marxplaysona
passage rom the letter to the Komans 2. 29) by the Apostle to the
Centiles, St. Faul, inexplicitlyaligningjudaismwithmoney andChrist-
ianitywith capital.
Jhe capitalistknows that all commodities, nomatterhowrag-
gedly they always look, or how bad they always smell, are in
aith and in truth money, innerly circumcisedjews, and more-
overwonder-working means to make money outomoney.
Jhejewseesthegodo valueonly'totheotherside'oactualuse-values,
inmoney,whereastheChristianrecognizesthegodovalueinmoneyand
in use-values alike. or the sphere ocommodity circulation, the theo-
logic othejewish Cod is appropriate, but or the sphere ocapitalist
production,theadequatetheo-logicisoundin theincarnational, trinita-
rian CodoChristianity.judaismdescribes thetheo-logicothe abstract
value-thing money,whileChristianitycapturesthetheo-logicovaluein
process capital.
Marx's mature view o simple commodity exchange and capital and
theirrelationshiprepresentsadevelopmentohisearlythinkingaboutthe
relations ojudaism and Christianity to modern economic lie. 'nthe
jewishQuestion'buildsoneuerbach'sviewthatthecommonessenceo
THEOLOGICS OF MONEY AND CAPITAL 193
judaism and Christianity is egoism and utilitarianism. Marx shares
euerbach's view that Christianity is a theoretical generalization ojuda-
ism' spractical orientation. WhenMarxbrings this relationship to bearon
modern economic lie, he anticipates his mature view othe relationship
between simple commodity circulation and capital.
judaismreachesitshighpointwith theullcomingintobeingo
civilsociety, butcivilsociety nrstcomes ully into being in the
Christian world. nlyunderthedominionoChristianity,which
makesall national,natural,ethical,andtheoreticalrelationships
ohumanity, exteral, couldcivilsocietyullyseparateitselrom
the lie o the state, tear up all bonds o the human species,
putting egoism and selhsh need in their place, and dissolve the
humanworldinto aworldoatomistic, antagonisticindividuals
standing in opposition to one another.
! we read 'simple commodity circulation' or 'judaism' here, and
'capital' or 'Christianity, ' we see Marx approaching his mature view
thatsimplecommoditycirculationis universalizedonlywiththeadvento
capital. Moreover, Marx perceives an epochal di6-rence betweenjuda-
ismandChristianity "judaismcould createnonewworld' ustas, in
his mature critique o political economy, he underlines the epochal
characterocapital.
!n 'n thejewish Question, 'Marxormulates ratherimprecisely the
notion that Christianity is the supersession ojudaism. 'Christianity
sprangoutojudaism. !thas dissolveditselbackintojudaism . . . nly
inappearancehasChristianitysurpassedjudaism. ''!nthisearly
MarxviewsChristianity's overcoming o judaismas an entrenchment
the principle oegoism. Similarly, in Marx's mature critique opoli
.
economy, capitalovercomes the limitations osimple commoditycirc
tion's dualistic logic ovalue and use-value only by extending the
.

mony ovalue.Jhe capitalistis therationalhoarderomoney. Lackingas

yet the critical distinction between money as such and capital, Marx is
unable to give distinctive economicsense to his insight that Christianity
supersedesjudaism' s god omoney. Jhough he has intimations ohis
morematureviews,tobeabletonamecapital as thegodoChristianityis
beyond Marx in 1 843.
! have tried to indicate the points at which we can speak o the
theo-logical signihcance o Marx's mature theory osimple commodity
circulation and capitalasadevelopmentohisyouthulreHections onthe
economic signihcance ojudaism and Christianity. Nonetheless, Marx's
194 FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
thinking on thesematters retains somerough spots. Jowhatextent and
preciselyinwhich waysdojudaismand Chri stianitypavethewayorthe
developmentocapitalism !s anyteleologyatworkhereAreKothschild
and Carnegie the destinedospringoAbraham and St. Fauljustwhat
would a historical materialist accountojudaism and Christianity look
like, especiallyiMarxwants tolinkthetheo-logicoChristianitywith the
logicocapital When Marxwrites that'Christian blessed egoismneces-
sarily turns round in its completed praxis , into the bodily egoism othe
jews,heavenly need turnsround into the earthly need, subjectivisminto
selh shness, '' does he intend to associate this with the emergence o
Frotestantism as a sort ojudaism withn Christianity
1

LHA!JLK J
The Political Content of Capitalist
Economic Forms
hen Marx sent Toward the Critique oJ Political Economy ( 1 859) to the
publisher, he ended it shortothe conceptocapital, havingcovered, in
thetwochaptersothatpreliminarywork,thechoiceothecommodityas
the starting point, the analysis othe commodity and the theoryovalue,
and the presentation o the three main orms o simple commodity
circulation. !n a letter to Lassalle dated 28 March 1 859, Marxgives his
rationaleor notproceedingurther.
Youwillseethatthehrstdivisiondoesnotyetcontain themain
chapter, namely, thethird, oncapital. ! held this to beadvisable
outopolitical grounds,orwithchapter3 therealbattlebegins,
and it seemed advisable to me not to create shock right o6the
bat. '
!n order to understand Marx's point, we need to bring orward the
political contentotheorms othe capitalist mode oproduction.
ur study oMarx's mature critique opolitical economy has l el
political qualityin the background,concentratingratheron the logico
economic orms o the capitalist mode oproduction. or example,
study o Marx's theory ovalue taught us that value is a category
reHection, rather than a category o immediacy. Also we saw that we
must regard capital as a process, rather than as a thing or a simple
relation.Butthecategoriesthatwehaveinvestigatedthusararenotonly
determinatelogicalorms, but, ascategoriesocapitalistproduction,they
aredeterminatepoliticalorms.
We will take up the political signihcance othe economic categories at
three di6erentstages oMarx's scientihc presentation. hrst, simple com-
modity circulation, second, the capital relationship, third, the dialectical
reversal o simple circulation's law o appropriation into the law o
capitalist appropriation.
h
196 FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
JHNL!CHJN FL!J!CS S!MFLCMM!JY
C!KC!LAJ!N
!nthebodyotheGrundrisse, which is divided intotwochapters, oneon
moneyandoneoncapital, Marx beginsthehugechapteroncapitalwith
an eleven-page section on the political relations between exchangers in
simple circulation.

Actually, this section is less a part othe theory o

capital than a propaedeutic to it, a way to think back on the chapteron
money, to cull itspolitical signihcance and begin the transition rom the
logicosimple circulation to the logic ocapital.
Marx recognizes the transitional and propaedeutic nature othissec-
tion in thehrstversionohisownindexingothr Grundrisse manuscript.'
Hebreaks down the second main division, money, into six subheadings,
the hrst three owhich are the amiliar orms omoney as measure o
value, meansocirculation, andmoneyassuch. Jheourthdealswith the
relationship between precious metals and money. Jhe1th subheading,
" The Law oJAppropriation, as It Appears in Simple Circulation,'
,
4 isclearlythe
propaedeutic section mentioned above. Jhesixth, 'Jransition oMoney
intoCapital, ' is alreadygoing beyond the sphere osimple circulation.
Jhisoutline istheone Marx ollowed in the Urtext, which contains an
eighteen-pagesubsection entitled 'Appearanceothe Law oAppropria-
tion in Simple Circulation. '
! we compare this outline with what Marx published i n Toward the
Critique oJPolitical Economy, wehnd that the hrst our subheadings othe
index make up the our subtopics o the second chapter, 'Money or
SimpleCirculation. 'Jhehl`th andsixthsubheadingssimplydonotturn
upin thiswork. Since wehaveseen thatMarxhad political grounds or
not introducing the concept ocapitalinto this orerunneroCapital, it is
not surprisingthatthetwosubtopicsdo not appcar. But whathappensto
them in Capital ! itsel
Marx repeats the hrst three subtopics othe chapter on money and
omitstheourth oneonthepreciousmetalsbecauseitisnotasconceptu-
allyimportant as the hrst three, and he coversit in Toward the Critique oJ
Political Economy. 7 Jhe sixth subheadingothe Grundrisse index, 'Jransi-
tion oMoney into Capital,' is taken outothe chapter on money and
madeintoanindependent, one-chapterpart(Abschnitt) . !nthiswayMarx
calls attention both to the weightiness othis transition and to the act
that, as a transition, it is sui generis with respect to the logic osimple
circulation on the one hand and the logic ocapital on the other. Jhis
accounts or hve o the six subheadings o the Grundrisse index. What
happens to the subsection we are concerned with, the hth !tdoes not
appear as such in Capital .
POLITICS OF CAPITALIST ECONOMIC FORMS
197
!n Capital ! Marxabandonedtheideaopresentingthepoliticalcontent
otheormsosimplecirculationasadiscretesectionorchapter.!nstead,
hesprinklesmanyothepoints collected in the Urtext sectionthroughout
Capital !,notablyinthehrstchapter'ssectiononthecommodityetish,the
beginningothe second chapter, the end otheourth chapter, and most
explicitlyin thehrstsection othetwenty-second chapter. WhydidMarx
drop

theseparatesectiononsimplecirculation' slawoappropriationHe
mayhavedecidedthatitwasbetterto talk explicitlyaboutthatlawonly
when he had already reached the vantage point ocapitalist accumula-
tion, romwhich he could contrastsimple circulation'slawoappropria-
tion with its presupposition and dialectical reversal, the law ocapitalist
appropriation !n anycase,letusreturn to themain issueothissection,
thepolitics osimplecommoditycirculation.
!nasingleparagraphattheendotheourthchapteroCapital !,Marx
stateshisbasicviewsonthepoliticsosimplecirculation.Jheparagraph,
which will be a guideline or the present chapter, examines the relation-
ship between the capitalist and the wage-laborer as it appears within
simple circulation. !n it Marx condenses the key points that constitute
subtopichve in the Urtext.
Jhe sphereocirculation orcommodityexchange,withinwhose
boundaries purchase and saleolabor-powertakeplace, was in
acta true denoinnatehuman rights. Whataloneherereign
are reedom, equality, property, and Bentham. reedom! or
buyer and seller oa commodity, e. g. , labor-power, are deter-
minedonlybytheirreewills.Jheycontractasreepersonsborn
with equal rights. Jhe contract is the end result in which their
wills yield a common expression otright. quality! or they
relate to one another only as commodity possessors and ex-
change equivalent or equivalent. Froperty! or each disposes
onlyohisown. Bentham!oreachothetwoisconcernedonly
or himsel. Jhe single powerwhich brings them together and
into a relationship is that otheir selh shness, their particular
advantage, theirprivateinterest. And preciselybecauseeach so
looks outonlyor himseland noneor the others, allattain, in
consequenceoapreestablishedharmonyothings,orunderthe
auspices oan all-shrewd providence, only the work [ Werk] o
theirreciprocaladvantage,othecommonweal,othecombined
interest.
198
FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
Marxregisters thesecentralthemesonlightenmcntpoliticalthoughtin
order to identiy that thought with the sphere o simple commodity
circulation.
Jhe political principle oappropriation property principle) , which is
embedded in the orm othe circulation ocommodities, is the classical
bourgeois principle that one owns the product oone' s labors.
Initially, thesubjectsotheexchangeprocessappearasowners o
commodities. Since on the oundation osimple circulationjust
one method exists through which each becomes the owner oa
commodity,nameIy, through jexchangingora|newequivalent,
theownershipoacommodityprior to itsbeingexchanged,i. e. , a
commodity which has yet to go into circulation, thereore ap-
pears to spring directly rom the labor oits possessor. Labor
appears as theoriginal modeoappropriation.

At some point in a chain ocommodity exchanges, the possession o a

commoditybysomeonemustbepresupposed, and sinceitis presupposed
thatthatpropertyisnottheresultosomepriorexchange,itappearstobe
?
. .
theproductothat possessors own acttvtty.
Marxmovesromthislawoappropriationtotheothertwomemberso
the 'trinity' ' ' property, equality, and reedom) that govern the bour-
geois political realm.
Presupposing the law oJappropriation through one's own labor-and this
is a presupposition springing orth out othe consideration o
circulation itsel, not an arbitrary one a realm obourgeois
reedom and equalitygroundedon this law opens up incircula-
tion, oitsel.
Z
Jhe analysis o the orm o commodity circulation showed that all the
sensuous particularities o the commodities being exchanged must be
abstractedrom,inordertounderstandtheiridentity equality) as values.
Jhe implications othis ormocommodity exchange are similar or the
exchangers themselves.
Allparticularqualitiesothepersonsexchanging their commodities are
tobeabstractedaway. When the possessorsocommodities having equal
values meetin themarketplace, theorm oexchange demands that age,
race, creed, andsocialpositionbedisregarded. Commodity circulation,as
POLITICS OF CAPITALIST ECONOMIC FORMS 199
adeterminateeconomicorm,requires thatprejudicesalongtheselinesbe
put asideinavorogetting down to business.
ach o the subjects is an exchanger, i. e. , each has the same
socialrelationtotheotheras theotherhastohim. Assubjectso
the exchange, their relation is thereore that oequalit. !t is
impossible to turn up any kind odiBcrence, not to speak o
opposition among them, not even a variation [ Verschiedenheit] . ' '
No one subj ect in the realm ocommodity exchange has powerover any
other. All are ree to dispose otheir own property.
AlthoughindividualA eelsaneedorthecommodityoindivid-
ual, hedoes not takeitoverwithviolence, norviceversa, but
rather they mutually recognize one anotheras owners, as per-
sons whose wills penetrate their commodities. Accordingly, the
j uridical moment o the person enters here as well as that o
reedom, insoar as itis contained in theormer.' '
Jheworld ocommodityownersis a mostenlightenedone, populatedby
ree and equalpersons who sort outtheirrelationship to things according to
the law o bourgeois appropriation and the reely chosen contractual
exchange othings having equivalent values .
Hand in hand with the mutualrecognitionotwocommodityexchang-
ersasequals comestheirmutualindiBcrence. Sincetheequalityothetwo
arises byabstractingromallthespecihcsotheperson,onepossessoroa
given amountovalueis as good as the next. Marx'sstresson theterrib
abstractness otheconceptionoreeandequalpersons,containedin
ormal determinateness o the category osimple circulation, resembI
Hegel's criticism o the emptiness o Kant's categorical imperative
respect each person' sree will.
What Marx describes under the heading 'Bentham, 'in our guideline
textrom the end ochapter 4 oCapital !, is the sublime element in the
classicalnlightenmenttheoryocivilsociety. orMarx, Benthamrepre-
sents in terms o an ethical theory) Adam Smith's conception o the
'hiddenhand,'whichharmonizestheseeminglyruthlesssel-seekingand
indi6erence to others on the part othe persons meeting in the market-
place. With this theory, commodity exchangers bring to the market not
only their wares but also the sublime consciousness that, while single-
200
FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
mindedlypursuingtheirown singularinterests,theysynchronizewiththe
Leibnizian best oall possible worlds.
Jhe communal interest, which appears as the content o the
total act oexchange, is in act, in the consciousness oboth
sides,butitis notassuchthemotive, butratherexistssoto say,
onlybehindthebacksothesingularinterestsrehectingintoone
another. Jhe subject can, when it wants to, also still have the
sublimeconsciousnessthatthesatisaction oits ruthless,singu-
larinterestis precisely therealization othe elevated [auJgehobenen]
singular interest, the universal interest.'
Marxsuggestshisownviewothesepretensionstosublimitythroughhis
highlyironictoneinourguidelinepassagerom Capital ! andinaletterto
ngels, where he observes that Hegel labeled the realm ocivil society
'the spiritualrealm oanimals .
,
' '
!nder the guiding idea o historical materialism, which see

s the
sourcesoideasinhumansocialpractice, Marxdeclaresthatthepractice
ocommodity circulation is thelived historicaloundation oenlightened
political thought.
Jhe exchange-value process developed in circulation thereore
notonlyrespectsreedomandequality, buttheyareitsproduct,
itis theirrealbasis.Aspureideas they are idealizedexpressions
oitsdi6erentmoments, asdevelopedinjuridical, political, and
social relations, they are only reproduced in other powers. Jhis
has also conhrmed itselhistorically. Not only is tne trinity o
property,reedom, and equalityhrsttheoreticallyormulatedby
the!talian, nglish,andrencheconomistsothe | thand | 8th
centuries on this basis, they property, reedom and equality|
hrst realized themselves inmodernbourgeois society.'
Marx does notmerely identiy the contentothe orms osimple circula-
tion with the central tenets o bourgeois political thought, he sees the
practice ocommodity circulation as the oundation othose tenets. Jhe
latter partothis text anticipates a urther development by which Marx
identihed the political content o the orms o simple circulation with
nlightenmentpolitical theory.
We can approach this point through the distinction

between general
and determinate abstractions. just as the classical political economists

POLITICS OF CAPITALIST ECONOMIC FORMS 201

tended to dehistoricize categories such as value, capital, and surplus-
value, by construing them as generalpreconditions ohuman economic
productionandasgeneralabstractions, so,too,wereenlightenedpolitical
theorists quick to view their trinity oreedom, equality, and property in
terms oinnate human rights. By projecting these political conceptions
upon some primeval human situation, enlightened theorists lost sight o
their historical specihcity. Jhey ell into the paralogism, or category
mistake, oclassiying the historically determinate concepts othe bour-
geois person and the bourgeois rights o man as general categories o
philosophical anthropology.
Marx highlights the epochal, social-revolutionary character o the
orms osimple commodity circulation by identiying their political con-
tent with the watchwords othe nlightenment reedom, equality, and
property. !n attending to the political content othese economic orms,
Marx benehtsrom his Hegel studies. Jhe orms osimple circulation are
not 'neutral' rules reereesinatranshistoricalgame oeconomics but
prescribed new rules that create a di6erent game and di6erent players.
Marx brings this pointhomethrough various discussionsohow the rise
o the orms o money and simple circulation to economic hegemony
entails the demise otraditional, precapitalist economic ormations.

Jhe association onlightenment political views with the sphere o
simplecirculationidentihes themasthepoliticsothesurace phenomena
othe capitalistmodeoproduction and alerts us to lookor the political
content o the more concrete categories o the political economy o
capitalism. !n their projection o the realm o bourgeois reedom and
equality upon a presocietal, natural state ohumankind, Marx discerns
theelt,butunanswered,needonlightenmentthinkerstogobeyondthe
politics osimple circulation.
n the otherhand, since,in the consideration omore concrete
economic relationships the waysimple circulation presents them,
contradictory laws appear to result, all classical economists on
downtoKicardolovetoletthatperception, which itseff springs rom
bourgeois societ, count, to besureas a universal law, butto cast
outitsstrictrealityintothegolden times whereno propert asyet
existed.
Marx o6ers his theory ocapital as a solution to the riddle owhysucha
gap exists between the ideal image projected in the political theory o
simple circulation and the realities ocapitalist society.
202 FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
JHFLIJICS JHCAFIJAL KM. ABSJKACJ
KM AN M!NAJ!N
Jo become capital, money must meet the unique commodity whose
consumption is labor itsel. labor-power. Jhe very concept o capital
entailsarelationshipbetweentwotypesoeconomicactors.onewhobuys
labor-power thecapitalist) andanotherwho sells it thewage-laborer) .
ur questionis, Whatpolitical contenthas this relationship
As we saw in chapter l 5, Marx spells out two preconditions or
labor-power to appear as a commodity or sale on the open market.
or the transormation o money into capital the possessor o
moneymustthereorehndpresentinthe commoditymarketthe

ree laborer, ree in the double sense that he, as a ree person,
disposes over his labor-power as his commodity, and on the
*
otherhandthathehasnoothercommoditiestosell,to getrido,
and heis ree rom all things necessary or the actualization o
his labor-power.

Jhe hrst sense othe term 'ree laborer' points up the political signih-
canceoMar x' sinsistenceondistinguishingbetweentabor-power andtabor.
Jhis distinctionis rightlythoughtoas basic to Marx's theory osurplus-
value, butwhat makes surplus-value into surplus-ca/ac, rather than sur-
plus product osome other orm, is precisely the specinc orm ointer-
personal interaction between capitalists and wage-laborers. !n distinguish-
ing labor-powerromlabor, Marx has in mind the problem oexplaining
notonly thesourceosurplus product butalso the specihcpoliticalorm
inwhich this surplus is created. Jhedi6erentiation between labor-power
andlaborentailstherecognitionothelaborerasareeandequalmember
ocivilsociety,whoisentitledtohandlehiscommodity,hislabor-power,
with the same rights accorded any other person who comes to the
marketplace. ' A correlateothis principleis the sanction against selling
one' slabor-power or other than a specihed, limited amountotime. Jo
do otherwise would be to collapse the distinction between labor-power
and the laborer.

What has been said up to ths point concerning the relationship

betweencapitalistandlaborerisrelevanttothatrelationshiponlyinsoar
asitproceedswithintherameworkosimplecirculation.Jhiscoversonly
theleadingstepotheprocessthatgoesonbetweencapitalistandlaborer.
When they meetin thebrightlightothemarketplace, the capitalistand
the wage-laborerrecognizeoneanotheras reeand equal

butthis is not

POLITICS OF CAPITALIST ECONOMIC FORMS 203
theonlyplaceinwhichthey meet. Marx calls ourattention this m the
continuation oourguideline text rom the end ochapter4 oCapital ! .
I nseparatingromthissphereosimplecirculationor commod-
ity exchange, out owhich the ree-trader borrows vulgarper-
ceptions, concepts, and standards or hisjudgment concerning
the societyocapital andwage-labor, itseems that thephysiog-
nomies oour dramatis personae alter themselves somewhat. Jhe
ormerpossessoromoneystridesaheadas capitalist,theposses-
sorolabor-powerslinks behindhimas hisworker. theonewith
anairoimportance, smirkingand eageror business, the other
timidandholdingback,likeonewhohascarriedhisownhideto
the market and now has nothing to await but a skinning '
Jhe clueto these radically di6erentpostures othe equalsothemarket-
placeappearsinthesecondpreconditionorthesaleolabor-power that
thewage-laborer own no means oproduction.
Jhe second sense o the term 'ree laborer' is ironical. Jhe sale o
labor-power presumes the poverty othe laborer in terms omeans o
production. Labor-poweris sold when one has neithergoods on hand to
sellnorthewherewithaltoproduce them, eitherorsel-sustenanceoror
sale. Beore capitalism can get o6the ground, the labormarket must be
opened by divesting a mass opeople otheir means osustaining them-
l '' d'
.
d
.
se ves. ree rompossessmgmeans O pro ucttonorsustenance,one
mustsellone's owncapacityto laborto thecapitalist. Jheactualdistin-
guishingbetween labor-power and labor that occurs in capitalistwage-
lab or er relations connotes alienation o labor. Wage-laborers are lords
andmastersotheirown labor-powerandoverthewageexchanged or
but the capitalist is lord, master, and owner o the actual labor oI
wage-laborer and all products othat labor. Marx compares this IawIn
surrender o the wage-laborer's creative powers to the lordship o
capitalist to sau's saleohis birthright or a mess opottage.'
Marx emphasizes that the alienation o labor is presupposed by the
orm o 'exchange' between capitalist and wage-laborer. Jhis is the
seamierside othe complexpoliticalcontentothecategoryocapital.
He the wage-laborer| alienates his laboras productive powero
wealth,capitalappropriatesitassuch.Jhedivisionolaborand
ownership o the product o labor, o labor and wealth, is
thereore posited in this act oexchange itsel. What as result
204
FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
seems paradoxical, lies already H the pre-supposition itsel. . .
Jhus the productivity ohis labor as such, insoar as itis| not
capacify, but motion, actual labor, becomes an alien power opposite
the laborer, on the other hand capital valorizes itselthrough
appropriation oJalien labor.
2
6
Herewe see one othe amous themesotheParis Manuscripts resetinthe
contextoMarx's maturecritique othepoliticaleconomyocapitalism.
Chapter 1 5 presentedreasonswhycapitaldoes nothtthelogicoathing.
Nowwehavereasonsoapoliticalnaturewhich reinorcethatjud
]
ment.
Capitalisnotathing,itisaprocesswhichholdscertain politicalorms in
its sway, and these orms cannot be reduced to those 'innate human
rights' presented by simple commodity circulation.
Wehave seen that the conceptocapital breaks down the presupposi-
tion othe economic logicosimple circulation, whichregards theparti-
cularities o the use-values being exchanged as having no economic
signihcance. Jhe political theory osimple circulation makes a parallel
presupposition, namely, that the specihcs o the use-values being ex-
changed have no political signihcance. nce again, the sale o labor-
power, whichis necessarily positedin the conceptocapital, presents an
anomaly or the political) logic o simple circulation Jhe anomaly
requires the development o a new political theory adequate to com-
prehend the ull complexityothe social relations implied by capital.
S! MFLC! KC!LAJ!N' S LAW AFFKFK!AJ!N
K\KSS !JSL !NJ JHLAW CAF!JAL!SJ
AFFKFK!AJ!N
!nchapter 15 wesawthatthereversalromthelogicosimplecirculation
to the logic ocapital was dialectical, or immanent, arising rom simple
circulation' s inability to solve the problems raised by its own orms or
concepts. We saw that we could characterize this reversal as a super-
session, or Aufebung, inasmuch as the new logic o capital both pre-
served and transcended the logic osimple circulation. Specihcally, the
newlogicocapitalpreservedsimplecirculation' slawthatequalvaluesbe
exchanged, at the same time that it went beyond simple circulation' s
presupposition thatthe use-values othe commodities being exchanged
are o no economic signihcance. Jhe anomalous case or the logic o
simple circulation was that peculiar commodity, labor-power, whose
consumption produces newvalue. By di6erentiatingbetween labor-power,
which is a commodity and subject to the law osimple circulation, and
labor, which is the consumption o that commodity and thereby alls

i
|
1
l

POLITICS OF CAPITALIST ECONOMIC FORMS

205
outside the rule osimple circu|ation, Marx solves the riddle osurplus-
value's origin, without contradicting the law osimple circulation. Jhus
capital which entails surplus-value) is the result oollowing the law o
simple circulation, not an aberration rom it.
Jhis pattern likewise characterizes the reversal rom the politics o
simple circulation to thepolitics ocapital N!arx discusses thereversal
in connection with the accumulation process o capital. Jhe pertinent
section ochapter22 oCapital ! is entitled 'Capitalist Production Process on
an Expanded Scale. Reversal [ Umschlag] ofthe Law ofAppropriationfor Commod
ify Production into the Law of Capitalist Appropriation. "
28
Jhe general point
thatMarxdevelopsinconnectionwiththeexpandedscaleoproductionis
that no matter what the source o the capitalist's original unds, the
repeated conversion osurplus-value into capital tendentially results in
capitalbeingcomposedopastsurplus-value. Jhuscapital,which,atthe
pointoitsemergencerom thelogicosimplecirculation,appeared tobe
the product o the capitalist's own labor, appears at the end point o
repeated expanding accumulations to be the appropriated product o
wage-la borers. Jhus,
the law oappropriation based on commodity production and
commodity circulation, or the law o private property, mani-
estlyreverses through its own inner, unavoidable dialectic into
itsdirectopposite.Jheexchangeoequivalents,whichappeared
astheoriginaloperation, hassotwisteditselthatonly theguise
oexchange takes place, in that hrst oall, the part ocapital
exchanged or labor-power is itsel only a part o the alien
productolabor which is appropriatedwithout equivalent, and
secondly, it must be notj ustreplaced, butreplaced with a new
surplus by its producer, the laborer.
Jhe law ocapitalist appropriation reverses simple circulation's law
I
appropriation.
Nevertheless, Marx insists upon the dialectical truth that the law o
capitalist appropriation is not only consistent with simple circulation' s
law o appropriation but also thelogical result othat law, oncelabor-
poweris set ree on the market.
Jhus,nomatterhowmuchthecapitalistmodeoappropriation
seems to slap the original laws ocommodity production in the
ace,itnonetheless arisesinnowayoutotheirviolation,but,on
the contrary, out othe application othese laws.'

20
FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
Capitalist appropriation h the supersession, the Aujhebung, othe appropria-
tion presupposed by simple circulation. !tis the deeper political trutho
bourgeois society, butitdoesnotcancelthe truth osimple circulationfor
the marketplace.
By presenting the law o capitalist accumulation as the dialectical,
immanentandnecessary,reversalotheenlightenedlawoappropriation,
Marx undercuts and also explains theactual basis oclassical bourgeois
political theory and its socialist advocates. Marx writes othe classical
bourgeois theorists.
Jhe generaljuridical idea [ Vorstellung] rom Locke to Kicardo
thereore is| thatopetit-bourgeois propery, while the relations o
production presented by them belong to the capitalist mode of
production. What makes this possible is the relationship o buyer
and seller, whichremains orma/(y the same in bothlo:ms. ''
Bourgeois politicaltheory reects its reality,asdoes Froudhon' sbrando
socialism. Jhey each reect the abstract truth o the sphere o simple
commodity circulation, but they become ideological by positing this
perectlygood,butabstract,truthasthehnalwordoncapitalistsociety.
S!MMAKY

Marx's critique othe economic category ovalue and theothercatego-

riesosimplecirculation) isanimmanentcritique othepoliticalvalueso
therench Kevolution. ''His theoryocapital, whichtraces thenecessity
or thepure,abstractlawothesphereocirculation to reverseitselinto
the capitalistlawoalienatedlabor, recalls Hegel' sown treatmentothe
abstractidealsotherenchKevolutioninthesectionothePhenomenology
ofSpirit 'AbsolutereedomandJerror.
,
'''Writingto ngels, Marxeven
uses the term 'terror' in connection with the reversalothe enlightened
law oappropriation.
Appropriation through labor and| exchange o equivalents
appear as the law o appropriation in this sphere, so that
exchange only gives back the same value in other material !n
short, here all i s'dandy, ' ["Scheene"] but i t will end i nterror,
and indeed as a resultothe law oequivalence.''
'
'

!
.

POLITICS OF CAPITALIST ECONOMIC FORMS

207
Although Marx ocuses his critique on the abstract political economic
orms osimple circulation, while Hegel attends to the abstract political
willotheempowered revolutionaries, bothsee the necessityor the pure,
abstractidealsothe revolutionarybourgeoisie toreversethemselves into
a reign oterror
|

CHAPTER 1 8
The Recollection of Marx 's Critique of
Philosophy in ((Capital "
ur treatmentoMarx' s Farisian critique oHegel looked ahead to
the concepts oCapital in orderto recognize the politico-economic signih-
cance oMarx's critique oHegel' sphilosophy oabsolute idealism. Jhis
chapter reverses directions and recalls the philosophical signihcance o
Marx' s mature critique opolitical economy, in particular, how Capital
carries through Marx's critique o classical nlightenment philosophy,
Hegel'sphilosophy,andthephilosophyotheYoungHegelians. ' Weshall
see how in Capital Marx appreciates Hegel's own critique o classical
nlightenment philosophy, yetsituatesthatcritique within a morebroadly
construed conception onlightenment philosophy.
!n Capital Marx identines the logicosimple circulation with thelogic o
classical Enlightenment thought escartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, the rench
materialists, the British empiricists and utilitarians, Kant, and others) ,
and the logic o capital with the logic o Hegel's absolute idealism. Jhese
identihcations take into account Hegel's own critique onlightenment
thought or the logic ocapital is a proound critique o the logic o
simple circulation while placing Hegel' s own thought within the

panded horizon o bourgeois thought or Marx also presents a tellm

critique othe logic ocapital) .
! n Marx's critique o simple circulation's conception o value as
thinglike substance, and in his concept ocapital as a process in which
value is no longer a thinglike substance, butan automaticsubjectwhich
endlessly valorizes itsel, we should hear echoes o Hegel's critique o
Verstand thinking,whichnxatestheproductoitsownrehectionasathing,
andHegel'sownconceptionospiritassubstance thatislikewisesubject.
justas Marxsees thelogicosimplecirculation asthenecessarypresup-
position oits own dialectical product, i. e. , the logic ocapital, so, too,
Hegel sees classical nlightenment thoughtas the necessary presupposi-
tion oits dialecticalproduct, Hegel's ownphilosophyoabsolute spirit.
Jhrough these connections, Marx can even appropriate Hegel's own
2J
210 FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
association o classical nlightenment thought in particular
,
Kant's
thought) withthe logico judaism
,
andHegel's urtherassociation ohis
own philosophywith thelogicoCh

istianity, andthen turn thisagainst

Hegel.orMarxdoesidentiythesphereosimplecirculationwithjudaic
theology
,
andthesphereocapitalwithChristiantheology
,
whilemaking
theoverriding point that the logic ocapitalism is a new type oreligious
logic.
CLASS!CALNL!CHJNMNJJH!CHJAN JH LC!C
S!MFL C! KC!LAJ!N
Both simple circulation and classical nlightenment philosophy are
thoroughly dualistic, inormed by the logic oessence
,
which attempts to
reconcile di6erences through an appeal to a third party, and bothail in
their attempt to devise an ontological proo. Jhe analysis o the unda-
mental dualism osimple circulation
,
between use-value and exchange-
value
,
proceeds to increasingly complex orms. Jhese lead to he hnal
orm osimple circulation
,
money
,
which isolates itselrom the whole
world o commodities. Beginning with Calileo and escartes
,
classical
nlightenmentphilosophydrivesawedgebetweensensuousintuitionand
thepure understanding, itashions a dualism that may be thoughtoas
leading to Kant's concept othe thing-in-itsell, which sets itselo6rom
thewholeworldosensuously intuitedphenomena. Jheentities posited
by theunderstanding the thing-in-itsel) and byvalue money as such)
are abstract shades otheworlds oactual sensuous objects and actual
use-values.

Jhis type odualism

,
which reihes abstractions otheunderstanding
,
characterizeswhatHegelregards as thelogic oJ essence. Marxconcurswith
Hegel'sdiagnosisthatpre-Hegelianmodernphilosophywasdominatedat
thelogico-ontological levelbythecategoryoessence
,
andattheepistemic
level by the aculty ounderstanding ( Verstand) . Marx likewise sees the
enlightenedlogicoessence as being at root a logicoalienation
,
which
means or him areligious logic. !n Capital, and moreparticularly in the
chapters dealingwith the theoryovalueand simplecommoditycircula-
tion
,
Marxapplies his historicalmaterialism seriouslyin coming to grips
withclassicalnlightenmentphilosophy.Convincedthathumanthinkers
are notpure spirits and that their thoughts donotspringorth romthe
headoZeus
,
Marxtriestocomprehendhowmodernsocietybringsorth
andnurturesthisenlightened
,
religious logicoessence. Marxlookstothe
logic ohuman practices in bourgeois society and sees in the relations o
simple commodity circulation a lived
,
social metaphysics o value a
politico-economic logic oalienation
,
abstraction
,
and tCihCaI:On. n this

THE CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHY IN CAPITAL 211

practical soil the philosophical logic o essence could take root and
ourish.
Jhelogicothe third party and the logicoessenceis such a logic) is
endemic to both classical nlightenment philosophy and the sphere o
simple circulation. !n both cases
,
the appeal to a third party resolves
questions about the commensurability otwo sensuously appearing enti-
ties
,
such as a bitand a blob obeeswax on the onehand escartes)
,
or
wheatand bootwax on theother Marx) . Jhe third partyis an abstract
beingotheunderstanding
,
respectively
,
primary-qualitymatterorvalue.
!n his hrst edition version o chapter | o Capital !
,
Marx directs the
reader's attention to thisparallel5etween thetwo third parties.
!n orm ! ! ! the universal equivalent-orm
,
the orm money
takes| . . . ontheotherhand
,
thelinenappearsasthespecies-orm
o the equivalentor all other commodities. !t is as ioverand
beyond lions
,
tigers
,
rabbits
,
and all otheractual animals
,
which
,
grouped together
,
constitute the di6erent species
,
types
,
sub-
types
,
amilies
,
etc. o the realm o animals
,
there also still
existed the animal, the individual incarnation othewholerealm
oanimals. Such an individual
,
which comprehends in itselall
actual extant types o the same thing
,
is a universal, such as
animal, God, etc. '
HereMarxvirtuallystates the continuitybetween his critiqueoIthethird
partylogicovalueand hisearly critique ophilosophy.A readeramiliar
with thehighlysatirical treatmento"the ruit' in The Hofy Famify cou|d
notail to catch this implication. '
!nhismaturecritiqueopoliticaleconomyMarxdidnotorgethisearIy
insight into the logic o the ontological proo in the orm o money.
Money
,
whichunctions in the universalequivalent-orm
,
is the e
thatideallycontains allparticulars allparticularcommodities) . Like
philosopher'sstoneandthelogicotheontologicalproo
,
moneycan
merewish orthoughtintoactuality. !n hismatureworks
,
however
,
Marx
recognizes that the concept o money
,
which ollows the logic o the
ontologicalproo
,
contradicts the actuality omoneyas itunctionsin the
sphere o simple circulation. Any actual sum o hoarded money will
convert the universalintoj ustsomany particular commodities
,
and will
ulhlljustso many wishes.
!nderMarx's mature inspection
,
the logic othe ontological prooor
ormsomoneyin the sphereosimple circulation breaks down
,
much as
theontological prooitselbreaks downunderthescrutiny oKant. But
212 FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
1
\
the fate of the logic of the ontological proof for money as it functions in
simple circulation is no more the last word on the subject than was Kant's
refutation of that logic from the viewpoint of the philosophy of the
understanding. Rather, this logic is revived in a more sophisticated way:
in political economy by the concept of capital, in philosophy by the
concept of spirit. As we shall see in the following section, both cases
involve superseding a fxated dualism: money/commodities on the one
hand, ideas/sensuous actuality on the other.
HEGEL' S ABSOLUTE I DEALISM AS THE PHILOSOPHICAL
REFLECTION OF THE LOGIC OF CAPITAL
Hegel spoke of philosophy as "its time grasped in thoughts ,' and Marx
grants in his dissertation that Hegel's philosophy qualifes under this
description.s But from Marx's own historical situation, this character of
Hegel's philosophy assumes a twofold signifcance. On the one hand,
Marx judges that Hegel's philosophy contains a wealth of insight con
cerning bourgeois society and is an indispensable training ground for
post-Hegelian thought. On the other hand, Hegel's philosophy bears the
birthmarks of the historical period of its inception. 9 Already in his disser
tation, Marx explicitly conceives of Hegel's total philosophy, his efQrt at
philosophical science, as historically determinate. Marx claims that the
world-historical character of a total philosopher such as Hegel must reside
not in any external accommodations but in the innermost movements and
structurings of his system of thought.

In order to determine the nature of Hegel's accommodation, Marx
undertakes an immanent critique of Hegel' s philosophy while trying to
identify the historical specifcity of the period that Hegel's thoughts
grasped. From the way Marx apportioned his time in Kreuznach ( 1 843) ,
immersing himself in the study of modern European society while scratch
ing through a paragraph-by-paragraph critique of Hegel's Philosophy oJ
Right, we see the great scope of Marx's proj ect. In Capital Marx brings his
matured views on the political economy of capitalist society to bear on his
critique of Hegel's total philosophy, by presenting the logic of the capital
ist mode of production in a way that points up the historical basis of
Hegel's philosophy and delimits its historical bounds. The mutually
implicating and supporting character of Marx's critiques of philosophy
and political economy was nascent in the very life-project he set for
himself as early as his own doctoral dissertation.
Marx regards Hegel as the climactic Enlightenment thinker and the
consummate philosopher of capitaL ' ' In his early critique of Hegel ' s
philosophy, Marx concludes that Hegel' s eforts at superseding classical
'

'

THE CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHY IN CAPITAL

213
Enlightenment philosophy, by building a positive concept of speculative
thought on the ground of his critique of the refective understanding, only
absolutized a more subtly conceived Enlightened abstraction spirit. In
terms of Marx's mature critique of political economy, when capital
supersedes the dualistic, refective logic of the sphere of commodity
circulation, it merely absolutizes the rule of value (viewed now as a process
rather than a thing) . Before developing this association and others that
identify Hegel as the philosopher of capital, it will be useful to return to
the problem raised at the end of the last section and show how Hegel's
philosophy of spirit tries to answer the Kantian refutation of the ontologi
cal proof. The logic of capital will be seen to respond to money's failure,
within the sphere of simple circulation, to actually ft the logic of the
ontological proof. It will also be useful to study the import of Hegel's
critique of Spinoza with respect to the logic of capital, and to review the
main points of Marx's critique of Hegel's philosophy and draw out its
parallels in the critique of capital. 1
2
Hegel's unpublished eforts at a system of philosophy, prior to the
writing of the Phenomenology oJ Spirit, reveal that he knew both the theologi
cal signifcance of money and the limitations of that signifcance when
money is thought of as a thing (which is precisely the mode of its
appearance within the sphere of simple commodity circulation) . He
writes :
It is the formal principle of reason extant. (But this money,
which has the connotation of all needs, is itself only an immediate
thing) it is the abstraction from all particularity, character, etc. ,
skill of the individual 1 3
In money Hegel recognizes the merely formal or abstract principle
reason ( that faculty whose claims include, in Kant's critique of
reason, the ontological proof, and he recognizes that formal principle
reason in the logical determination of an immediate thing. The remarks
on money's abstractness and its thingness offer clues to Hegel's critique of
Kant's treatment of the ontological proof.
Kant's error, Hegel maintains, lies not in thinking that one cannot infer
existence from an idea, but in thinking of God on the model of a
sensuously appearing thing. Kant makes a category mistake. Hegel re
gards as inadequate any conceptualization of God that operates on the
logical levels of being or essence. Hegel judges the logical framework of
Kant's philosophy, and in particular his refections on God, to be a logic
214
FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS

of essence that embraces a thoroughgoing dualism of concepts and sen

sibilia, universal and particular. Hegel's revival of the cognitive claims
of reason, especially the logic of the ontological proof, rests not on a simple
rejection of Kant's critical arguments, but upon a supersession (Aujhe
bung) of Kant's conceptual framework. ' '
In the second part of his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, "The
Dialectic of the Finite, " Hegel justifes our knowledge of God by examin
ing three diffrent approaches to the fnite that are associated with the
three basic categories of Hegel's logic (being, essence, and concept) or
with the epistemological trio of sensation, refection ( understanding) , and
reason. Kant's philosophy falls under the second heading. Kant blocks the
passage of fnite human minds to the infnite God by conceiving of the
infnite as the not-fnite. Hegel criticizes the obstructive character of this
refective approach to the fnite and the infnite.
Precisely the relation of these two [the fnite and the
.
i

fnite]
.
is
the standpoint of refection; both belong to the OpposItiOn whIch
.
is proper to this s tandpoint. Namely, one goes ahead to the
infnite only as the abstract negation of the fnite, as the no

fnite
'
but since it does not have the fnite as itself in itself, thIs
remains an other over against the fnite and thereby itself
something fnite which again goes on to an infnite etc. , into
infinity. '
As the mere abstract negation of the fnite, the infnite-oj:rfection i s com
pletely determined by the fnite, and, in Hegel's view, is no true infnite at
all. Hegel suggests a way out of this dualistic approach of refection to the
infnite with his term "abstract negation. "
Against refection' s logical operator, abstract negation, Hegel opposes
his own device of speculative reason, determinate negation. Reason com
prehends the infnite as the determinate negation, or Aujhebung, of the
fnite. Rather than viewing the infnite as that which is refectively posited
as the abstract negation of the fnite, the true infnite of reason posits the
fnite and comprehends itself as the determinate negation of the fnite.
Only [erst] the veritable infnite, which posits itself as fnite,
reaches at the same time beyond itself as an other and remains
therein, because it is its other, in unity with itself. 1 6
Reason overcomes the dualism of refection by seeing the fnite not as the
absolute other of the infnite but as necessarily posited and negated by the

.
I

`
1
THE CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHY IN CAPITAL 215
inhnite. Hegel'sabsoluteis notanimmediate thingbut thenegation oits
own othemess, its own nnitude.Withthisconceptoreason, the absolute,or
Cod, as sel-negating process, Hegel revives the logic othe ontological
proo
Jhe logic otheseHegelian arguments appears in Marx' streatment o
theconceptocapitalas theresolutionotheapparentailureomoney,as
it unctions in the sphere o commodity circulation, to live up to the
promises otheontological proo. !nmoney as a standard-beareror the
absolute, Marx sees the same two dimculties noted by Hegelin hisjena
system. Money is a ormal abstraction rom the wealth onnite, sensuous
use-values, and its logical determination is that oan immediate thing.
HoardingmoneyisaSisyphysianlaborthatailsbecausetheaccumulated
wealth remains orever abstract and empty and is always an immediate
thing, a dehnite amount. Hoarding is structurally undermined by the
dualistic, reective ramework othesphere ocommodity exchange. An
adequate concept othe innnite or bourgeois wealth requires that we
supersedetheviewwhichseestheuniversal value) in moneyalone.Jhis
is what the concept ocapitaldoes.
Hoarding, like Kant, operates according to the logic oabstract nega-
tion. Money, universal wealth incarnate, is the not-commodity or the
hoarder, and to exchangeitora particular, sensuouscommoditymeans
to lose one' s money. Jo escape this morass, the rational hoarder, the
capitalist, shils logics rom abstract negation to determinate negation,
entailingashilromthelogicomoneyasan immediate thing, tocapital
as a process o the negation o its own otherness i . e. , particular use-
values).
!norder thatmoneymaintain itselas money, itmust,]ustas it
appearsasthesedimentandresultothecirculationprocess,be
capableo goingintoitagain,butnottobecomeameremeanso
circulation which disappears or mere use-value in the orm o
thecommodity. Money,insoarasitentersintheonedetermina-
tion, must not lose itselin the other, thus it must still remain
money in its presence as commodity, and in its presence as
money exist only as passing orm o the commodity, in its
presence as commodity it must not lose exchange-value, in its
presenceasmoneyit mustnot lose regard touse-value. !tsgoing
into crculation must itselbe a moment oits remaining-with-
itsel, and its remaining-with-itselmustbe agoingintocircula-
tion. xchange-value is thereore nowdetermined as a process,
no more as merely thedisappearingorm ouse-value whichis
itselindihcrentoveragainstthis use-value| as materialcontent'

216 FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS

Capital, or ear olosing itsel, does not shun the world ohnite useul
commodities, but explicitly posits that world oparticularity as its own
particularity, its own hnitude, which itis constantlynegating byrecon-
verting the use-values it purchased into money) . Like the rationally
comprehended inhnite in Hegel, capital is a process, not a thing. the
processive, sel-negating union o money with the whole wealth othe
commodity world.
Marx's description ocapital thus aligns itselwith Hegel's critiqueo
Kant's nlightenment philosophy,inparticular,withKant'sapproachto
the ontological proo. But Marx also employs language that echoes
Hegel's critique othe Cartesian, Leibnizian, and, above all, Spinozistic
traditions opre-Kantian enlightened metaphysics. !n thenrstsectiono
chapter4 oCapital !, Marxdescribes capitalwiththe phrases 'automatic
subject,' 'herevaluebecomes thesubjectoaprocess, ' 'theencompass-

ing subect osuch a process,' and 'tsel, sel-moving substance.

,
' ' !n
the theory o value developed or underpinning exchange-value as it
appears in commodity exchange and circulation, Marxreers to value as
'substance.'' !n the concept o capital, that substance reveals itsel as
sel-activating as subject. Capital is value which is both substance and
subject. Jhis ormulation resembles Hegel' s criticism o Spinoza or
conceiving othe absolute as substance, but not as subject. !n both the
Phenomenology oJ Spirit andtheEnyclopedia oJ the Philosophical Sciences, Hegel
4
maintains that the absolute spirit is substancc-subjcct
Marx denies that value taken simply as substance, as in the labor
theory ovalue, can be absolute and sel-realizing.
Simple human labor, expenditure o human labor-power, is
certainlycapableoeverydetermination,yetitisinandoritse|
undetermined. !t can actualize, obj ectiy itselonly as soon as
humanlabor-powerin determinate Jorm is expended as determinate
labor,oronlydeterminate laborstandsoppositeanaturalstu6, an
external material, within which it objectines itsel. nly the
Hegelian "concept" is able to objectiy itsel without external
stu6.

ButiweexamineHegel' scharacterizationothe 'concept' whichMarx

quo
.
tes
.
in ao

tnote to that passage. 'Jhe concept,whichathrst is only

subj ecttve, strdes orward, withoutneedingan external material or stu6
todoso,accordingtoits ownactivity,toobjectiyitsel') , ' andcompare
it to Marx's description o capital 'or the movement within which it
THE CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHY IN CAPITAL 217
valueas capital| addsonsurplus-valueis itsownmovement,itsvaloriza-
tion, thereore, sel-valorization') , it seems clear that the absolute,
sel-realizing logic othe Hegelian concept resembles the movement o
capital. As noted later, however, Marx considers illusory the supposed
pristine autonomyoboth capital and theHegelian concept.
Jhe presence othe term 'surplus-value' in the text invites a closer
look at the shapes othe sel-movementocapitaland oHegelian spirit.
Marx observes that the Kantian) hoarder and the cleverer Hegelian)
capitalist are both driven by the hunger or amassing an unlimited
quantityovalue. Buttheirdi6erentmethodsoseekingvaluesuggesttwo
distinct spatial representations, indicated in a passage rom the !talian
economistCaliani, which Marxootnotes in his discussion othis matter
in Capital !. ' 'Jheinh nitywhich things do nothavein stridingonward,
theyhave in the circuit. '
,
''Jhe straight-line approach is thatohoard-
ing,whilecapitaltakes thecirculation route, butbothspatial representa-
tions resemble Hegel's depiction o the di6erence between Kant's
approach to theinhniteand his own. Jhoughtheprocessbothocapital
andospiritinvolvescirculation,inneithercaseisthepathasimplecircle.
Here the conceptosurplus-valueenters.
Jhroughtheprocessoalienation moneygoing overintocommodities)
and the negation o that alienation the new product being sold or
money) , capital expands itsel, by adding surplus-value to its original
value. When this increment accumulates as capital and the circulation
process is repeated, the path described by the movement o capital is
spiral.
xchange-valuepositedastheunityocommodityandmoneyis
capital, and this positing itsel appears as the circulation o
capital. Whichis however aspiralline, asel-expandingcurve,
notsimplya circl e. ) '
Likewise or Hegel, spirit's purgatorial path o determinate negation
describes a spiral. !n capital' srestless, innnite driveor enrichment, and
in the spiral logic oits value-enthralled process, Marx recognizes the
practicalanddeterminatelyhistoricalsoilthatnourishesHegel' sconcept
ospirit, with its logic oinhnite sel-aggrandizement.
A conclusion to this discussion will benent romreconsideringseveral
pointsMarxmakesinhisearlycritiqueoHegel'sphilosophicalsystem,in
the light ohis maturecritiqueopolitical economy. Marxdevelops the
pointslargelyin the Critique oJ Hegel's Philosopky oJ Right and in thehnal
218 FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS

essayothe Paris Manuscripts. Jhrough his attention to the role ologic in

Hegel's attempt at a 'real science' o society and to the drive o the
Phenomenolog toward absolute knowledge, Marx convinces himsel that
Hegel's attempt to transcend theabstractionsoclassicalnlightenment
philosophy had succeeded only in absolutizing abstraction. Hegel re-
placed static abstractions with asel-activatingabstraction the absolute
idea. !n the terms o Capital, this compares with the transition rom
commodity ormoney) etishism to capital etishism and theJrinitarian
ormula.
J
!n the commodi|y ormoney etish,theabstractvalue-characteroa
product is naturalizedasathing money.Whenweshiltothelogicallevel
ocapital,wedonotabandontheabstractionvalue. Kather,valuestripso6
therestrictiveormothinghoodandinorms thewholeprocess of production.
At thelevel ocapital, this process appears as thework oan abstract-
ion value. Jhedescriptionoproduction underthedomination ovalue
U
is the task oalloCapital thatollows the introduction othe conce
.
pto
capital Jhe results, which constitute a study o the capital etish, are
collected in the Jrinitarian ormulaovolume 3 oCapital. Jhis ormula
naturalizesthecapitalistormsotheprocessoproduction,justasmoney
naturalizesthevalueoa commodity. Marxsets uparatiobetween the
classicalnlightenment' sreihcationotheprodwts otherehective under-
standing and the commodity or money) etish, on the one hand, and
Hegel's absolutizing o the processes o actuality as the process o the
Absolute !dea unolding itsel and the capital etish Jrinitarian or-
mula) , on the other. Jhe ratio extends to the transition rom the classical
nlightenmentdualism to Hegel's absolute idealism, and tothe transition
romsimplecommoditycirculation's commodityetishismtotheetishism
ocapital
Jhree urther points arise in Marx's immanent critique o Hegel' s
Philosophy of Right. ( 1 ) espite his emphasis on immanence, i . e. , upon
penetrating to the logic othe things themselves, Hegel created a new
dualism o a preestablished logic o the absolute idea and actuality.
2) espite his own emphasis on autonomy, in his philosophical system
Hegelcreatedaninvertedworldinwhichanabstract,heteronomouslogic
sets the course or actual objects, people, and institutions. ( 3) Hegel' s
concept o mediation, especially his theory o the rational syllogism,
constructed a logic oaccommodation in which real contradictions were
|
notresolved, butwereshiled tosomehigherplane.Analoguesto eacho
thesepointsoMarx'searlycritiqueoHegel existalso in Marx's mature
critique ocapital
( 1 ) just as Marx rejects Hegel's claim to havc prcscnted an absolute
logic oactuality, so, too, in his talk othc capital ctish and his ironic

,
-
`

'

, 1 +&
-
. ,
.
:
..\

~:

~ `
~
-
THE CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHY IN CAPITAL 219
description o the triad capital, wage-labor, and grounded propery as the
'Jrinitarian ormula,` does Marx undercut the claim o the logic o
capitalist production to be an absolute, ahistorical logic o material
production. just as Marx rejects as illusory the presupposed indepen-
denceromsensuousactualitythathehndsinHegel'sphilosophicallogic,
so, too, does Marxdenude the conceptocapitaloits seemingindepen-
dencerom naturalobjects and living human labor.
2) nMarx'sinterpretation, thealphaandomegaoHe gel'ssystemis
his abstract onto-logic. By placing the priority upon logic which or
Marx was always the product oabstraction rom actuality Hegel had
constructed a total 'inverted world,` in which abstractions dominated
actuality. !n his recognition o this point, Marx was greatly aided by
euerbach' s heuristic device o 'invertive method. ` But Marx goes be-
yond euerbach' s criticism by linking Hegel's inverted philosophical
systemtotheactualitiesocapitalistproduction'Capitalabsolutizes the
inversionopriorities thatbegins with thethirddetermination omoney,
when money the expression o value) becomes the end o circulation
ratherthan themeans Hegelwrotethat'Jhesystemo logicistherealm
oshades,
, ,
and Marx interprets Hegel's philosophical system as being
ruled by theseshades. When Marxdescribes the domination ocapitalist
productionbyvalue money)astheruleodeadlaboroverlivinglabor,he
expresses the same critical point and retains the same imagery."
3) I nhis Farisian critiqueoHegel, Marxwriteso 'logic-the mony o
spirit.
, ,
'

Jhis attribution reinorces the argument above, that in the

dominance oabstract logic within Hegel's philosophical system Marx
sees the expression othe dominance o the abstraction value money)
within the systemocapitalistproduction. !t also suggeststhe relationship
between Marx's critique othe logic omediation in Hegel's philosophy
logicasthemediatorospirit) andthelogicomediationinthecapitalist
mode oproduction money as the mediator ocapital) . Marx c
Hegel's logic o mediation, epitomized in his concept o the
syllogism, as a third party and, by implication, a religious approach to
mediation. '' JhesalientpointsoMar x's critiquewerethatHegeltriedto
mediate actual opposites which is impossible) , and that the mediator,
sinceitisnotreallyamediator, isinvertedintobeingtheend,ratherthan
themeans. !nHegel'ssystemas awhole,Marxsceslogic themediatoro
spirit) in the inverted role oend-all and be-all ospirit. Jhe ollowing
passageromtheGrundrisse picksupinpolitico-economictermsthethread
othe criticism.
!t is important to notice that wealth as such, i. e. , bourgeois
wealth, is always expressed in the highest power in exchange-
.~

,, . . ^-_
220 FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
value,whereit h positedas mediator, as theverymediationothe
extremes o exchange-value and use-value. Jhis middle term
always appears as the completed economic relation, because it
holds together the opposites and appears hnally as a one-sided
higherpoweroveragainst theextremes themselves, becausethe
movement or the relation whichoriginalfy appears as mediating
between the extremes, dialectically and necessarily proceeds to
appear as sel-mediating. Jhe mediator appears as the subj ect
whose moments are only the extremes whose independent pre-
supposition it overcomes in order to posit itsel through their
overcoming as itsel the only independent entity. So in the
religious sphere, Christ
,
the mediator between Cod and man-
mere instrument o circulation between them both becomes
their unity, Cod-man, and becomes as such more important
than Cod. '
.
J
Jhisremarkableormulationrevealstheidentityothethird party logico
mediationinChristiantheology, which Marxrecognizesas theorerunner
oHegel's rational syl|ogism, with capital' s invertivelogicomediation
through money. Here, in themidstoormulatinghis mature concepto
v
capital, Marx puts hesh on the skeletal ormula "logic the money o
spirit. '
.

.
CHAPTER 1 9
Conclusion: The Distinctiveness of
Marx's Theory of Scientic Knowledge
n the closing chapter ohis book Hegel, Charles Jaylor comments.
'Jhat Marx looked on Capital as a work oscience, and that the term
'science'cametohaveorhimverymuchthesense thatithadorthelater
nineteenth centuryin general, seems tome correct. ' ' Marxundoubtedly
considered Capital to be a work oscience albeit an incomplete one) , in
act,itwashisonlyscientihcwork.ButJaylor's j udgmentthatMarxsaw
his science as comparable to the contemporary view, with all its deter-
ministicandpositivisticconnotations, is unacceptable. !t ignores Marx's
lielong concern with questions about. l) the meaning and values o
science, 2) the relations oscience to morality, critique, and practice,
( 3) the relations between science and the actual world, and 1) proper
scientihc method. uring a lietimeorehection and scientihc endeavor,
Marx orged a highly distinctive theory oscientihc knowledge. !n this
task, Hegel was Marx's chie mentor and antagonist. ! we compare
Marx's science to any other, itmustbe to Hegel's philosophical sciencc a
ar cry rom the sciences othe late nineteenth century.
MAKX' SC!S!NJ F!KS!SC!NC
Asadissa6ectedyoungmanwithstrongaestheticandmoralsensibilities,
Marx chose to pursue scientihc knowledge rather than any romantic
alternative. Jhis decision, evident in his letter to his ather, where he
conessed his conversion to Hegel's concept oscientihc knowledge, is
conhrmedinhisdissertationwritings,whereheestablishedthetwo-sided
task o criticizing Hegel's total philosophy and the actual world that
created it. Marx'scommitmenttoachievinga scientihccomprehensiono
his world was no addition othe 'later Marx' over and above an early
humanist stage. Kather, in Capital Marx brings to partial) ruition the
projectodevelopingapost-Hegelianscienceomodernuropeansociety,
a proj ecthehadsel-consciously sketched in his dissertation writings.
VV l
222 FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS

LikeHegel's eventualdecision to work outa comprehensive, scientihc

system ophilosophy, Marx's decision or science is motivated by his
dissatisaction with the dualismopre-Hegelian nlightenmentthought,
inparticular, thedualismo'is'and'ought . 'Marxseesthisdualismas
ahightromtheactualworldanditspotentials.Marxseeksa science that
willhnd the 'ought,' the rational, in the actualworldandits immanent
contradictions, rather than dictate an abstract, external moral code to
that world. !n his conception o scientihc knowledge, the prescriptional
disposition is integral to the descriptive one, not an alerthought once
'whatis' has beenestablished. JherationaleoMarx's laterarguments
or 'scientihcsocialism' against'utopian socialism' emergesinhisearly
aversion tobothpre-Hegelian dualism and iherevivalothatdualism in
Hegelianism's splitintoliberalandconservativebranches.Asin thecase
ohis sel-proclaimed oreathers Aristotle, Spinoza, andHegel Marx
rests his commitment to science on the hope oreconciling reason and

actuality.
Marx develops his own concept o scientihc knowledge through his
early criticism othe modes ocognizing present in the religious and,
particularly, in the philosophical thought o his time ! nhuenced by
euerbach'scritiquesoreligionandoHe gel' sphilosophy,Marxseesthe
common thread oalienation in traditional natural and revealed) reli-
gion, pre-Hegelian modern philosophy, and Hegel's philosophy itse|.
ach othese modes o cognizing involves a reiying proj ection o the

products and/or processes o human cognition upon the actual world.

Fre-Hegelianmodernphilosophyand Hegel's philosophy, whichwere o
primary interest to Marx, involve, respectively, the reincation o the
abstractions othe pure understanding, suchas primary-quality matter,
orce, equality, andreedom,andthereincation,nototheproducts opure
thought,butotheprocess opurethought. Hegeldescribes thatprocessin
theScience oJLogic, and itisHegel's presentation ologic as an independent
science thatgoads Marx,in his Critique oJHegel's "Philosophy oJRight" and
in his hnal Faris manuscript, to accuse Hegel o alling into a more
sophisticatedtypeoreligiouslogicthanhadhisenlightenedpredecessors.
!n theprojectorapost-Hegelianscience,Marxcommitshimseltothe
mutual study othe modes ocognizing actuality and the actual world
itselF a commitment central to his understandingohistorical material-
ism. JhestudyothepoliticaleconomyocapitalismconvincesMarxthat
bourgeoissocietyisthehistorical,practicalbasisothealienatedcognitive
modes o pre-Hegelian and Hegelian and Young Hegelian, or that
matter) science. Marx'scritiqueso modern)philosophyand capitalist)
political economy meet in the demonstration o the common logic o
capitalistactuality and nlighten

ent includingHegelian) thought.'

'

'
CONCLUSION
223
Jhesegeneralconsiderations concerning Marx'spersonalc

mmitmcnt
to understandhisworldscientihcally,andtheway thatcommt
.
tmenttook
shape,provide the backgroundor discussing
.
threeclu

ter-pomts or he
elucidation o his theory o science. the relation oscience to morahty,
crtique,and practice, therelations between scienceandtheactualworld,
and the proper methodology or science.
SC!NC AN MKAL!JY, CK!J!Q!AN FKACJ!C
A generation orench thinkers brought up on the Hegel lectures o
Alexander Kojve has called our attention to the signihcance o the
section othe Phenomenology of Spirit 'Jhe Lord and the Bondsman' or
understanding Marx's thought.' Lenin advises us to read the whole o
Hegel'sScience of Logic iwewishtounderstandCapital;5 and Marxhimsel
draws particular attention to Hegel' s Philosophy of Right, to the hnal
chapterothePhenomenology ofSpirit on'AbsoluteKnowledge, `andtothe
Science ofLogic, Butto understand Marx'stheoryohowsciencerelatesto
morality, critique, and practice, we must examine his appropriation o
some other sections o the Phenomenology, Hegel' s critique o various
inadequate) orms o morality o the law o the heart, o virtue, o
enlightenedpureinsight,whichreversesitselin terror,andothe'beau-
tiul souls
, ,
constitutes an unspoken undamentoMarx's thoughts on
theinteracebetween science and morality. Jheourold nexuso subj ec-
tivsm, transcendence, conservatism, andidolatry, which Marx identihed
withthe'moral` pointoviewin Flato, YoungHegelians suchas Bruno
Bauer and Max Stirner, and the utopian socialist Froudhon, appears in
Hegel 'sidentincationotheinadequaciesothevariousormsomorality
thatheexamined in those sections othePhenomenology,
JhepreacetothePhilosophy ofRight oersurtherevidencethatMar's
theoryotherelationsoscienceandmoralityisindebtedtoHegel.Jherc,
Hegel makes an impassioned pleaor scientihcknowledge inparticular,

-
thescience othestate) againstthesub ectivistic, constructionistic'ought'-
7
philosophers suchas Froessorries. AsinthePhenomenology sections on

thelawotheheart and virtueandthecourseotheworld,Hegeldraws
attentiontotheperversityoasubjectivismthatdehnesitselinopposition
to theuniversal.
But howeverloly, howeverdivine, this right othought

ay
be, itis perverted into wrong [ Unrecht] iitisonly
.
this opmmgj
which passes or thinking d ithinking knows itselto

beree
onlywhen it diverges rom theuniversalfy-recognized and valtd, and
224
FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
when it has discovered how to invent or itselsomeparticular
character.
Jhis talkosubjectivereedomasthedivergence from the universal is amiliar,
and it takes Hegel only twomorepages to bring up the centralhgure o
Marx's doctoral dissertation picurus.
According to sucha view jtheviewosubjective morality| , the
ethicalworld picuruswouldhavesaid'theworldingen
.
era')
should be given over as ocourse iti s not to the sub ective
accident oopinion andcaprice. '
.
Jhe signihcanceoHegel'spointwith respectto scienceis wellexpressed
4
in Marx's doctoral dissertation. ' I the abstract-individual sel-
consciousness is posited as an absolute principle, then certainly all true
and actual science is destroyed [aufgehoben] , insoar as individuality does
notruleinthenatureothingsthemselves.
,
' ' ' orMarx,as or Hegel,the
pursuit oscience entails the criticism osubjectivistic ethics o'moral-
W
' ity.
Whythesubjectivisticor 'moral' pointoviewi s perverse is hintedat
i nHegel's remark above. 'ocourse itis not. ' A ew pages later Hegel
expands on the suggestion that the actual is never what the subjective
standard setters, the 'ought' philosophers, the 'moralists' imagine.
Sinceitjphilosophy| isthegrounding ofthe rational, itistherewith
preciselythecomprehending othepresent andactual, notthesetting
up of a byond. Cod knows where it is supposed to be L o
whichoneinactcanwellsaywhereitis, namelyintheerroroa
one-sided, empiy ratiocination. '

Hegel attacks the subj ectivistic construction oa moral 'beyond' i nthe

samewayheattacks Kant'snotionothething-in-itsel, orthesamelogic
is operating. While Kant poses the thing-in-itselas a kind o'I-know-
not-what-or-where,' Hegel pins it down. It is the empty residue othe
abstractive operations othe understanding. Likewise, Hegel sees moral
'oughts' as theempty productoa one-sided abstraction rom actuality
which proudly posits itsel as more real than that actuality itsel. or
Hegel scientihcknowledgeavoids the perils osubjectivistic abstractions
byrecollecting in thought all the importantacets othe actual.
'

^
CONCLUSION 225
Like Hegelin his throwaway line, 'ocourse it is not,' Marx stresses
thatsubj ectivisticmoralityabstractsromtheactualworldonlyinitsown
mind, not in reality. Jhus Marx writes oMax Stirner in the German
Ideology,
!Sanchoabstracts or amomentrom the wholerubbishohis
thoughts which with his meager assortment cannot overbur-
denhim therethenisletoverhisactualego,buthisactualego
withinactualworldrelations,whichexistorthemselves. !nthis
way he has divested himsel or a moment o all dogmatic
presuppositions, but now the actual presuppositions hrst begin
or him. And these actual presuppositions are also the presup-
positionsohis dogmatic presuppositions, which,whetherhelikesit
ornot,willrecurtohimtogetherwiththeactualpresuppositions
solongashedoesnotobtaindierentactualpresuppositions, or
solong as hedoes notrecognize in amaterialisticwaythatthe
actual presuppositions are the presuppositions ohis thinking,
whereby his dogmatic ones would disappear altogether. ' '
or Marx the interests ohuman reedom are best served neither by
buildingmoralorutopian sandcastles in one's ownmindorimagination
nor by holding ast to an abstract, absolutistic conception o human
reedomandwill,butbyasciencewhichcareullyrecollectstheactualities
o!, andreal potentialities or, concrete humanreedom.
!nsoar as Marxian science identihes actual contradictions, it o6ers
leveragepoints,hrst,orrecognizingthepossibilityoalteringtheexisting
world, and, second, or developing strategies or social and political
practices based on more than subjective 'oughts. ' But these .ctt` on
strategies arenotderivedromscience,likelemmataromamathema
theorem, Marxian science is not a cookbook or revolutionaries.
rebuked Stirner, Bruno Bauer, and Froudhon or taking such a view
science and political practice. Marx takes the notion oadirect, immediate .
.
.
.
.

relationotheorytopracticeas a sign oabsoluteidealistthinking. rom

the time ohis dissertation writings onward, Marx insists on the Kan-
tian) pointthatanineradicablegapexistsbetweenthoughtandactuality,
between theory and practice.
JhepositivewayostatingMarx's critiqueotranscendentmoralityis
to saythatthescienceotheactualsocialworldis also thecritique othat
world. Critiqueisnotsomethingappendedtoapositivescienceosociety,
noris themoralcomponentoMarxian science somethingto bedragged
in to the matter athand. that Marx writes,

226
FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
But a man who seeks to accommodate science not from science itsel (as
erroneous as it may be) , but rather rom an external, alien stand-
pointborrowed romexternal interests, I call "vulgar.
,
>1 4
Jhe evaluative dimension need not be imposed upon science, rather,
science needs to comprehend thc actual evaluative determinations othe
societyitis analyzing.
Marx'sscienceocapitalistsociety accomplishes this intwoways.he
hrstissimplytoattendtothedeterminatepoliticalcontentotheormso
capitalistpolitical economy. Jhis is the way studied in chapter 1 7. Jhe
second, more subtle way involves deciphering theevaluative component
in thelogic otheorms ocapitalistpolitical economy. Jhus wesawthat
Marx'sidentihcationothelogicovalueasalogic of essence itselentaileda
criticalevaluationoany societyor which valueis an operativecategory.
Jhekeyto theunityoMar x'scritiqueandscienceliesinhisattentiveness
to thecontent of scientfc forms.
SC!ENCEAN ACJ!AL!JY
Hegel can give the impression and this is surely the impression that
euerbach and Marx got that actual human history is simply the
instantiationinspaceand timeoa preestab|ishedscience,thescienceo
logic. Accordingto this view, Hegel's theoryproposes ascienceoactual
historyinaverystrongsense,oritwoulddemonstratethenecessityothe
various stages o history, o their coming to be and their perishing,
through a coherent science ologic. Marx rej ects such a conception, as
teleological, in the negative sense oimposing a heteronomous plan onto
actualhuman history. Moreover, Marx sees Hegel's teleological concep-
tion that history is determined by the logic othe absolute idea) as a
reHection othe shapingolbourgeois society by the logic ovalue.
Marx sees necessity in theunolding ocapitalist orms, once the capital
relation is established, that is, once labor-power appears en masse in the
markets oa commodity-producing society. ' ' But Marx does not try to
demonstrate the necessity that this relation beestablished. Chapter21o
Capital !, on the primitive accumulation o capital, gives a historical
accountothegenesisothetwopoIesothecapitalrelation inEngland) ,
but it could hardly be said to demonstrate the logical necessity othat
genesis. Marxis,however,attemptingtodemonstratethelogicalnecessity
orthecategory othecommoditytounoldintotheincreasinglycomplex
ormsocapitalistpoliticaleconomy. Hecareullyobservesthatthisisnot
a historical necessi:y, !ut is achicvedthrough a conceptualanalysis othe
orms oalready developed capitalism. '

R
.
.
CONCLUSION
227
urthermore, Marx criticizes as insumciently empirical Hegel's con-
ception oa science ohistory thatderives rom the logic othe absolute
idea. Jhis is thetypeocriticismwesawMarxlevelatHegel'sPhilosophy
oJRight and at Froudhon's warmed-over speculative history. A scientihc
comprehension oany historical period can be won, not by applying a
logical template, but through an exhaustive empirical and conceptual
examinationthatpenetratesintothelogicothethings themselves. Jhisis
thetypeostudyMarxundertook atleastpartially)orbourgeoissociety,
buthecouldnotclaimtohaveapproacheditoranyprebourgeoisperiod.
Jhough Marx lacks a science ohistory, he emphatically stresses the
historical component in the constitution oscience. His historical mate-
rialism, whichlooks to thepracticallieoasocietyorunderstandingthe
science thatarises in it, has been taken asan assault against theintegrity
and autonomy o science. But Marx strives to enhance, rather than
denigrate, the autonomy oscience, by attacking the absolutist view oI
science's autonomy rom society as an abstraction and a misrepresenta-
tion. !nMarx'sviewtheautonomyoscienceisbetterachievedthrougha
critical attention to the ways it is conditioned by the society in which it
takes shape.
Historicalactualitycandeterminescienceinmanyways. these,the
most attention has gone to the vulgar variety, the ways in which the
immediate interests othe capitalist class a6`ect the development oone
science or another. ! have tried to call attention not to these highly
external determinations othe actual development oscience, however,
buttothewaysinwhichthelogic ormetaphysics ) , thedeepstructure,or
conceptual ramework o a science can be unwittingly caught in the
restrictive logic oits times. Jhe paramount case that Marx sought to
demonstrate was the determination o the Iogic o pre-Hegelian, and,
ultimately, Hegel's, philosophy, by the logic ocapitalism.
MAKX' SSC!ENJ!!C MEJHLCY
At the beginning o this concluding chapter, against Charles Jaylor'
assessment that Marx had a conception oscience typical ohis day, !
proposed thatMarx's theory oscientihc knowledge more closely resem-
bles thatoHe gel, who, as Marxobserved in theaterword to thesecond
edition oCapital ! | 873) , was already beingtreated as a 'dead dog. ' '
Jhedistinctiveeatureso Mar x'stheoryoscientihcmethodappropriate
Hegelian insights atalmostevery point. Jhe emphasis on the similarities
betweenHegelandMarxshouldnotextinguishtheirdiBcrences however , ,
and requires that we pay special attention to that methodological point
which most clearly distinguishes Marxrom Hegel, the point in Marx's

228 FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
mature methodologicalwritings and in his scientihcpracticeatwhichhis
early critique o Hegel and the method o absolute idealism breaks
through.Jhisisthedistinction betweengeneralanddeterminateabstrac-
tions.
Marx's heavy debttoHegelappearsin theollowingeaturesoMarx's
theory oproper scientihc method. the critiques ovulgarandscientinc
empiricisms, theconcentrationon thecontent oscientihcorms, theprinci-
ples or presenting a science, namely, moving by means oa dialectic o
immanent contradiction rom the most abstract category to the most
concrete, and an antimetaphysical essence-appearance model in which
the necessity or theessence to appearisdemonstrated.
Marx'scritique osense-certaintyempiricismwas discussedinconnec-
tion withtheopeningargumentothemethod sectionotheintroduction
to the Grundrisse. 1
8
Jhecritiqueseekstodispel theseemingconcretenesso
sensuousobservations andin thisitdoes notdi6erromHegel ). rom the
viewpoint oscientinc knowing, sensuous observations are expressions o
immediacy posed in categories whichare conceptually abstract, undevel-
oped. !n science concreteness is a result, a product.'
Scientihc empiricism realizes the cognitive inadequacy o sensuous
observation. !t appeals to many abstract concepts, such as orce in
physics,orvalueinclassicalpoliticaleconomy,andittakesthoseabstract
entitiesotheunderstandingtobetheessence thatappears intheevidenceo
thesenses. BothHegelandMarxacceptthismethodotheunderstanding
( Verstand) as a great advance over the sense-certainty method ovulgar
empiricism. Yet theycriticizescientihcempiricism because it is as naive
and unquestioning with respect to its scientihc abstractions as vulgar
empiricismiswithrespectto its sense-data. Jhiscriticismappears in the
methodological imperative to examine careully the content oscientinc
orms. !nthis connection, ! havespoken oMarx's empiricismin second
intension, that is, his methodological requirement to include the content
andthelogicoscientihcorms within thescopeoscientihc investigation.
Z
Marx's attentiveness to the contentoorms, or categories, appears in
his distinctionbetweengeneralanddeterminateabstractions, and,again,
amongthedeterminate abstractions, between moreandlessconceptually
concretecategories. Jhesedistinctionspavethewayormanycriticismso
classicalpolitical economy. istinguishingbetween general and determi-
nate abstractions enables Marx to identiy a series o paralogisms, or
categorymistakes,whichserveto naturalize specincallycapitalistorms.
Jhe general/determinatedistinction gives Marx the methodologicallever
to 'de-naturalize' determinate categories ocapitalism. neothe best
examples is the way Marx uses the distinction as a wedge between the
generalabstractions thatcharacterizetheprocessoproduction laborer,
I

.
`

CONCLUSION
229
means o labor, and obj ect o labor and the determinate capitalist
categories, such as wage-labor, capital, and landed property, that had
been used together in the Jrinitarian ormula o classical political
economy. '
Marx' sinsight regarding thecontentoorms helped reveal the categ-
ory mistakes which naturalize capitalist orms, and also cured "inftion
ism," and, more especially, reductionism among the recurrent maladies o
classicalpolitical economy. Ferhaps the classic example ohis criticism is
the reduction othe category ocapital to the less concrete category o
money, ortovalueas itis determined within the limitsosimplecircula-
tion.
espite the emphasis on Marx's reliance on this and the previous
distinction in terms o negative criticisms, we should note that these
distinctionsalsosetupnumerouspositive breakthroughsorMarx'sscience
opolitical economy. or example, the clear distinctions between use-
valueandvalue,andbetweenconcreteandabstractlabor,makepossible
Marx' s quite novel analysis othevalueorm. With respect to more and
less concrete determinate categories, Marx's clear distinction between
surplus-valueandoproht, andbetween therateosurplus-valueandthe
rate oproht, solve many problems in Kicardian theory.
Marx'stheoryoscientihcpresentation callsorthedialecticaldevelop-
ment othe determinate categories o science, moving rom the most
abstract to the most concrete. An obvious implication is that the most
abstract determinate category will be the nrst one treated. !n Hegel's
Science oJ Logic, Enyclopedia oJ the Philosophical Sciences, and Philosopk
y
?
Right, we hnd the source o this Marxian methodological precept. Jhe
scientihcadvantagesothismethodare,hrst,thatitdialectically
' .
the more concrete categories rather than thoughtlessly taking them
granted, likesomanytoolsscatteredonaworkbench, and, second,
avoids putting 'thescience btore thescience, ' 'i. e. , itdoesnottack|e
complexproblemsothescienceattheverybeginningothepresenta
whenthebasisorthesolutionisnotyetprepared. Like theC
caldistinctions discussedabove, theseeatures oMarx's theory oscien-
tiLc presentation operate in many o his criticisms o, and positive
advancesin,politicaleconomy. orexample, byshowingmoneytobethe
necessaryormoappearanceovalue, Marxdeates theutopiansocialist
proposal to base society on the 'equalitarian' law ovalue, atthe same
time thatmoneywas to beeliminated. And thedemand notto put 'the
science btore thescience' grounds Marx's undamental criticism othe
construction o Kicardo' s Principles oJ Political Econo1y and Taxation,
namely, that immediately aler propounding the labor theory ovalue,

230
FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
Kicardo attempts to defend it againstobjections thatinvolve muchmore
concrete categories than j ust value. Marx points to the solution o the
dimculties that Kicardo's methodonlyexacerbated.
Jhe ascent rom the abstract to the concrete requires great patience
rom the reader. Marx is bound to disappoint those who wantto know
beore the endochapter 1 , hownaturally existingobjects untouched by
humanhandcanhaveaprice,orhowthelawovaluecanbereconciled
with realities such as di6`ering organic compositions ocapital coupled
with an average rate oproht, which would seem to indicate that the
exchangeocommoditiesisregulatednotbythevalues ocommodities,bu t
by their prices oproduction. ' Marx turns to such issues once he has
reachedthepointinthedevelopmentothecategoriesatwhichtheycan be
answered, when the abstractness andinadequacyotheinitialtheory o
valueis notj ustrecognized, butdemonstrated.
We saw in division 7 how intently Marx studied th theological,
political, and philosophical contents o the various categories o the
politicaleconomyocapitalism. Jhis, andthe previously discussedways
inwhichMarxapplied himselto thetaskopenetrating the 'givenness'
oscientihc categories, make his mature scientihc writings in political
economyverydemandingtexts, textswhich must bereadwiththeclosest
attentiontolanguageanddistinctivemeaningortcrms. Suchstudyorces
usto recognize the demanding qualityoMarx's texts and helps avoid a
ral oerrors rooted in a complacentattitude toward Marx's method.'
Wenoted above thatscientihcempiricism separates itselromvulgar,
or sense-data empiricism through a reusal to take the given as it is.
! nstead, scientihc empiricism thinks osense-dataas theappearance oan
essence that does notitselappear. Jhe nonsensuous essenceprovides the
law othe appearances. !t is the 'inner' to which scientihc empiricism
appeals in order to explain the 'outer,' the data oobservation. Jhe
essence-appearancerameworkexpandstheexplanatorypoweroscience,
yet it has some eatures which dissatished Hegel and Marx. ssence is
taken to be an independently existing, albeit abstract, 'thing,' hidden
behind the curtains osensuous appearances. bjectihcation o essence
obscurestheactthatitisaproductohumanunderstanding'srehections
on immediate sense-data. urthermore, itails torecognize thenecessary
connection between essence and appearance, concisely ormulated by
Hegel. 'Jheessencemustappear.
,
' ' Hegel'stheoryoessencerejectsthe
classicalmetaphysicalunderstandingandpresentsthelogicoessenceas
a logico'appearinginan other.
,
'
Marxappropriates thesecriticalaspectsoHegel' stheoryol essence1or
his scienceopoliticaleconomy.Classicalpoliticaleconomicscience,and

'
'

.'

'

'

CONCLUSION 231
Kicardo's work m particular, employs the classical essence-appearance
modelinits theoryovalueas theessencetowhich allpoliticaleconomic
phenomena are to be reerred or their proper explanation. Moreover,
classical political economy regards value as a thing behind the appear-
ances,andmakes no attempt to demonstrate thatvalue must appear No
analysis o the value-orm is made, and no necessary connection is
established between value and money. Jhose points are exactly the ones
thatMarx develops, and that distinguish his presentation othe theory.
Complaints suchasjoanKobinson' sabout the metaphysical character
oMarx's theory ovalue rest on a serious misunderstanding oMarx's
modeloessenceandappearance. !snottheburdenoMarx'scritiqueo
the 'etishism' o commodities precisely to attack the metaphysical
understandingovalue, thatis,theunderstandingovalueonthemodelo
a natural, sensuous object or quality Marx's theory o value is not
nonmetaphysical, itisantimetaphysical. !ncriticizingvalue,hecriticizesthe
unctioning ocapitalist society according to a logic o'appearingin an
other. ' Marxstresses that his theoryovalue is notintended to uncover
some abstract essence existingbehindtheveiloappearances, butrather
to characterize the relations o capitalist society as determined by the
dualistic, third party logic o'appearing in an other.
,
'
Marx's use o the logic o essence is one othe most distinctive and
consistent hgures ohis thought. We hnd this hgure as ar back as his
comments on Flato in the dissertation notes, where he views myth as a
necessary third party attempting to mediate the sensuous world and the
world othe orms. ButMarx took this third party to be not a mediator,
buta signocontradiction, an expressionothe needoroverturningthe
underlying dualism. !nthe Critique oJ Hegel's "Philosophy oJ Right,
"
Marx

uses this hgure to pick out the law-making power as the third
mediating between the state and civil society. Again Marx identihed
third party as a sign o contradiction and called or an end to
schizophreniaol'homme and le citqyen. !n that same work, Marx impu
this essence-logic hgure to Hegel's very logic o mediation, calling
middle term othe rational syllogism, a 'wooden sword. ' !n the Paris
Manuscripts, Marx brings the roleo logicin Hegel's philosophical system
under this hgure, by taking logic to be an independent third party
emerging necessarily rom the alienation o spirit and nature in the
persistingdualismoabstract thought-things andsensuous objects. Wesawthat
Marx anticipates the presence o the essence-logic hgure in capitalist
economicorms whenhe writes thatlogicis the money ospirit. Ferhaps
the most easily grasped case is Marx's critique oeuerbach's theoryo
religion. !n his ourth thesis oneuerbach, Marx points out that though
232 FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC FORMS
euerbach succeeds in recognizing Cod as a third party to humanity' s
e6orts at sel-understanding, he ails t o see that the third party i s a
necessary productothe divisivenessothe actualhumanworld, and that
thepoint is to end thatseculardivisiveness.
Marx'stheoryoscientinc methodcertainly attests to the inhuence o
Hegel, but, as! haveemphasized bycitingMarx'slettertoLeske,Marx
does somereshapingoHegelaswell. WhenWagnercharges Marx with
idealism or his dialectical advance rom abstract to concrete categories,
Marxappealstothedistinctionbetweengeneralanddeterminateabstrac-
tions. !ntermsreminiscentohis critiqueothemethodospeculation in
the Hofy Famify, Marx hrst stresses the distinction between value and
use-value the hrst a determinate, the latter a general abstraction) and
then insists that his starting point is not the abstraction, value, but the
actual subj ect, the commodity. Neither determinate norgeneral abstrac-
tions adequately characterize the actual on their own. \se-value and
value are abstractions romthe actual subject, thecommodity. !wekeep
inmindthesystematicandmethodological importanceoMarx'sdistinc-
tion between generalanddeterminate abstractions wewillavoid repeat-
ing Wagner-like criticisms.
Jhe distinction between general and determinate abstractions that is
undamental to Capital is thatbetween use-value andvalue. Couplets o
use-value andvalue categories turn up again and again throughout the
three volumes o Capital: labor process/valorization process, technical
composition ocapital/organic composition o capital, material, means,
and subject oproduction/landed property, capital, and wage-labor, to
cite a ew cases. Marxinsists upon grounding the increasingly concrete
categoriesoCapital inan actuality thatis notexhaustively described by
anydeterminate category. Marx'snaturalisticcritique withits Kantian
overtones) oHegel'sabsoluteidealismshowsorththroughoutthewhole
oCapital-not j ust atits starting point.
l

'Auszige'
Brife
Capital !
CHFK
Correspondence
H
!
Dissertation
Doktordissertation
'inleitung'
'xcerpts'
CdK
C!
'Cotha Frogramme'
'Hele'
H
!CHFK
jQ
Kant Werke
Kapital 1
KHS
Logic
M anuskrpte
00t/0h
>
'Auszige ausjames Mills Buch Etemens
d'economie politique"
Bride uber "Das Kapital"
Capital: Volume One
Critique oJ Hegel's "Philosophy oJ Right"
Kart Marx and Friederich Engels:
Correspondence: 1846- 18.5
Die Heilige Familie oder Kritik der kritischen
Kritik
Die deutsche Ideologie
The Dference between the Democritean and
Epicurean Philosophy oJ Nature
DWerenz der demokritischen und epikureischen
N atur-philoso phie
'ZurKritik derHegelschen
Kechtsphilosophie. inleitung'
'xcerpt-Notes o1 844"
Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie
The German Ideology
'Critiqueothe Cotha Frogramme'
'Hele zur epikureischen, stoischen und
skeptischen Fhilosophie'
The Hofy Famify, or Critique oJ Critical
Criticism
'AContribution to the CritiqueoHegel's
Philosophy oJRight: !ntroduction'
'n thejewish Question'
Kant Werke in Zwoi Binden
Das Kapital, vo|. 1
Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrecht
Hegel's Logic

Oekonomische-philosophische M anuskripte aus dem

Jahre 1844
V
234
MW
'Nodal Foints'
FC
FM
Povery
FK
FS
'Kandglossen'
Rechtsphiloso phie
Resultate
Results
SL
J
Theorien 2
Theorien J
Theories 2
Theories J
Toward the Critique
J!
WL
WL 2
Works
Writings
Zj
Zur Krilik
ABBREVIA TONS
Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Werke
'Nodal Foints u the evelopment o
Fhilosophy'
Phinomenologie des Geistes
The Economic and P hiloso phic Manuscripts oJ
1844
The Poverty oJ Philosophy
Hegel's Philosophy oJ Right
Phenomenolog oJ Spirit
'Kandglossen zum Frogramm der
deutschen Arbeiterpartei'
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts
Resultate des unmillelbaren Produktionspro;: esses
Results oJthe Immediate Process oJProduction
Hegel's Science oJLogic ,
'Jheses on euerbach'
Theorien iiber den M ehrwert, Fart 2
Theorien iiber den M ehrwert, Fart J
Theories oJSurplus- Value, Fart 2
Theories ofSurplus- Value, Fart J
A Contribution to the Critique oJ Political
Economy
'Jhesen iiber euerbach'
Wissenschajt der Logik, vo|.
Wissenschajt der Logik, vol. 2
K arl M arx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works
Writings oJ the Young Marx on Philosophy and
Society
'Zurjudenrage'
Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie
`

NOTES TO PAGES xiii-xx 235

Aoles
Jranslationsarcmyown unlcssothcrwiscindicatcd,in many cascs !havc altcrcd
transIations madc by othcrs. !n thc notcs, ! givcan abbrcviatcd citation lorworks
that arc also citcd in thc bibliography. Works Iistcd in thc tablc olabbrcviations
havc a shortcncd rclcrcncc in thcir brst appcarancc in thc notcs, abbrcviatcd
rclcrcnccs thcrcaltcr.
1nlroJuclion
I . !uscthctcrm 'scicntibcknowlcdgc,`inthctitlcandthroughoutthis book,with
thcGcrmanword Wisenschaft in mind. Wissenschajt may bc translatcd simplyas
'scicncc,` andattimcs ! do so. Butingcncral! spcakol'scicntibcknowlcdgc`
in ordcr to capturc thc morc gcncrous, lcss tcchnical scnsc ol Wissenschaft as
rccctivc, mcthodicalIy disciplincd knowIcdgc and to dcrail thc conncction,
which sccms natural to lnglish Ianguagc rcadcrs, bctwccn 'scicncc` and thc
positivisticaIIy undcrstood natural scicnccs.
2. Juckcr, Philosophy and Myth, p. 235.
3. Scc, lor cxampIc, Habcrmas, Knowledge and Human Inteests; WcIImcr, Critical
Theor; and Gouldncr, Two M arxisms.
1. Charlcs JayIor, Hegel Cambridgc. Cambridgc !nivcrsity lrcss, I 975), p. 55I .
5 . lvcn Lcrck Saycr is morc conccrncd to show that Marx was an cxccptional
scicntist than to prcscnt thc originaIity olhis thinking about thc naturc ol
scicntibc knowlcdgc. Scc Saycr, Max's Method, and my rcvicw cssay on thc
book in Philosophy ofthe Social Sciences, voI. I 3, no. 1 Lcccmbcr I 9B3) , pp.
1B7-199.
G. SccIcycrabcnd, Against Method, and !mrc Lakatos, Proofs and Reutations, cd.
john Worrall and llic Zahar Cambridgc. Cambridgc !nivcrsity lrcss,
I 97G).
7. 'Marx an Lcskc, I . August I B1G, ` in Marx and lngcls, Briefe uber "Das
Kapital" (Briefe), p. I 1.
B. MarxsawthcChristian rcIigion as a paradigm olthclogicolcsscnccin\vh
thc 'hoIy lamily` was to mcdiatc thc divisivcncss ol thc 'carthly !am:I
Marxwas lcss intcrcstcd in attacking thcthird party Icucrbach`s stratc
than inrcvolutionizingthc 'carthIy lamiIy. `
9. Scc,lorcxampIc, Howard, The Marxian Legay, pp. 32.,Cohcn, Class and
Society, cspccially chaptcr I , and thc writings olClaudc Lclort and CorIu
Castoriadis.
I O. ! argucd for this point olvicw in somc dctaiI in a papcr 'Was Marx a
HistoricaI Matcrialist Historian olScicncc!` dclivcrcd I1 Icbruary I 9B3 in
thcMarxSymposiumsponsorcdby thcBostonColloquiumlor thclhiIosophy
olScicncc.
I I . Scc lostonc, 'lcccssity, Labor and Jimc`, lostonc and Brick, 'CriticaI
lcssimism`, and lostonc, 'Jhc lrcscnt as lcccssity` lh. L. disscrtation) .

236
NOTES TO PAGES 9-]9
Chu]ler!
l . 'Lcttcr to His Iathcr,` in Marx, Writings ofthe Young M arx on Philosophy and
Sociey (Writings) , p. 43. Marx, 'Bricl an dcn Vatcr,` in Karl Marx, Friedrich
Engels: Werke MlW) , supplcmcntary voI. l , p. 5.
2. 'Lcttcrto His Iathcr,` Writings, p. 43. 'Briclan dcnVatcr,` MlW Suppl. l ,
p. 6.
3. 'LcttcrtoHisIathcr,` Writings, p. 47. 'BriclandcnVatcr,` MlWSuppl. l ,
p . 9 . lotc that thc manuscript is lost.
4. 'llatonismandChristianity` partol'lotcs to thcLoctoralLisscrtation`) ,
Writings, pp. 59-60. 'Hcfc zur cpikurcischcn, stoischcn und skcptischcn
lhilosophic 'Hcfc`) , ` MlW SuppI. l , p. 229. Jhc 'positivc cxposition ol
thcAbsoIutc` raiscs a thcmc that pcrvadcs Marx`s work, i. c. , fetishism.
5. Marx, Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy (Dissertation) , p. 82. Marx, Diferenz
der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie(Doktordissertation), MlW
SuppI. l , p. 282.
6. SccDissertation, p. 108. Doktordissertation, MlW SuppI. I, p. 304.
7. 'Anmcrkungcn zurLoktordisscrtation,` MlW Suppl. l, pp. 327-328.
8. Doktodissertation, MlWSuppI. l, p. 274.
9. BypoIitical'i nthcbroad scnsc` ! mcanaIIsociaI lormsolpowcr, authority,
and human rccognition. !ts scopc, thcn, is not limitcd to govcrnmcntaI or
lormal statcstructurcs.
1 0. !ncontcmporaryusagcthisIogicaldimcnsionollormsolconsciousncssmight
bc comparcd with Jhomas Kuhn`s notion ola paradigm orworldvicw. Scc
Kuhn, Scientifc Revolutions.
l l . Dissertation, p. 8 1 . Doktordissertation, MlW Suppl. l , p. 282.
12. 'Hcfc,` MlWSuppl. l , pp. 59-60.
1 3. ! bid. , p. 73.
14. ! bid. , p. I 25.
I 5. 'lodal lointsi nthc Lcvclopmcntollhilosophy` 'lodal Ioints`) part ol
'lotcs to thcLoctoralLisscrtation`) , Writings, p. 53. ' Hcc,` MlWSuppI. l ,
p . 2 1 7.
1 6. Dissertation, p. 108. Doktordissertation, MlW Suppl. l , p. 304.
1 7. !bid.
1 8. Scc'lodalloints,` Wrtings, p. 52, whcrcMarxdocsspcakolnodal pointsin
thcdcvcIopmcntolphilosophywhich brcak upitsIincarcontinuity. 'Hcltc, `
MlWSuppI. I , p. 2I 5.
I 9. 'lodal loints, ` Writings, p. 51. 'Hcc,` MlW Suppl. l , p. 2I 9.
20. Dissertation, p. 82. Doktordissertation, MlWSuppl. l , p. 2G2.
2 1 . Dissertation, p. 6 1 . Doktordissertation, MlWSuppI. l, p. 2GI .
22. 'lodaI loints, ` Writings p . 51. 'Hcc,` MlW SuppI. l , p . 21 9.
23. SccHans Kcichcnbach, Experience and Prediction Chicago. !nivcrsityolChi-
cagolrcss, 1 938) , pp. G-7. Ior a criticism ola similardistinctioninphiloso-
phy, scc Collins`s rcmarks on thc 'purist split` in Interpreting Modem
Philosophy, pp. 1 4-22.
24. Scc vol. 5 ol thc Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Historical and
Philosophical Perspectives ofScience, cd.KogcrH. Stucwcr Minncapolis. !nivcr-
sityol Minncsota lrcss, 1 970) .
25. 'Hcltc, ` MlW SuppI. l , p. 247.
J
'
:

NOTES TO PAGES 2029 237

2G. 'lhilosophyaltcr l ts CompIction' [part ol'lotcs to thc LoctoraI Lisscrta-
tion') , Writings, p. G I . 'AnmcrkungcnzurLoktordisscrtation,' MlWSuppI.
I , p. 327.
. #
27. Jhis pointisstrcsscdbyBubncrwithrcspccttoHcgcIand Marx1 htscssays,
'lrobIcmgcschichtc und systcmatischcr Sinn dcr ' lhanomcnologic` Hcgcls'
and 'Logik und Kapital,' in Dialektik und Wissenschaft.
. . . .
2B. Marx`sstandardlorcriticismis tructoHcgcI, whowrotcM htsSCIence of LogIC,
'Jhcgcnuinc rclutation mustpcnctratc thcopponcnt`sstronghold and mcct
himonhis ownground, noadvantagcisgaincd byattackinghimsomcwhcrc
clscand dclcating himwhcrc hc is not' (Hegel's Science of Logic SL|, p. 5BI .
Hcgcl, Wissenschaft de Logik, vol. 2 WL2| , p . 2 I B) .
29. Scc SL, p . 51. Hcgcl, Wissenschaji der Logik, voI. I [WL | ) , pp. 35-3G.
Chu]ler2
I . Jhis point is cmphasizcd by Kj azanov. Scc his '!ntroduction' to Marx and
lngcIs, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, voI. I .
2. 'A Contribution to thc CritiqucolHcgcI`s Philosophy of Right: !ntroduction'
[ !CHlK), in Marx, Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" [CHlK), pp.
I 3GI 3 7. 'Z urKritikdcrHcgcIschcnKcchtsphiIosophic. linlcitung' ['lin-
Icitung') , MlW I , p. 3B1.
3. '!n thcsc paragraphs thc whoIc mystcry ol thc phiIosophy ol right and
Hcgclian phiIosophy in gcncraI is laid down. ' CHlK, p. 9. Marx, Kritik des
Hegelschen Staatsrecht [ KHS), MlW I , p. 20B.
1. !nhiscssay, 'ZumVcrhaItnisvon1ogikundGcscIlschaltsthcoricbciHcgcl'
[in Aktualitit und Folgen der Philosophie Hegels, cd. Cskar lcgt Iranklurt am
Main. Suhrkamp VcrIag, I 97O| , pp. 5B-B1), Hcrbcrt SchnadcIbach givcs
grounds lor sccing in thc Philosophy ofRight an experimentum crucis lorjudging
Hcgc|`s systcm. SchnadcIbachargucs that thcviabiIityolHcgcI's conccptol
thcconccptccntraI toHcgcI`ssystcmis inscparabIclrom thcviabiIityola
harmonious, rational socicty bascd on thc principIcs olIibcraIism. SchnadcI-

bach acccpts Marx`s vicw that cIassicaI IibcraIism is irrcconciIabIc with:

harmonious, rational socicty and concIudcs that HcgcI`s
conccpt bctrays its bourgcois origins and is untcnabIc. Howcvcr,
bach holds thc vicw that Marx satishcd himscIlwith a critiquc olge
politicaI phiIosophyaIonc. Jhc pointolthcloIIowingscctionswiII bc to
that Marx`s critiquc olHcgcl took aim at HcgcI`s systcm as a whoIc.
5. Icucrbach urgcd invcrting thc ordcr ol HcgcIian prcdication, c. g. , '
+
crcatcs humanity' should bc translormcd to 'humanity crcatcs spirit. '
G. CHlK, p. 7. KHS, MlW I , p. 2O5.
7. CHlK, p. I 1. KHS, MlW I , p. 2I 3 .
B. CHlK, p. I 1. KHS, MlW I , pp. 2 I 22I 3. Jhc Kantian impIications olthis
tcxtarcworth mcntioning. MarxcIcarlycntcrsinto thc Kantian probIcmatic
olintcIIcctuaI intuition, i. c. , olanintcIIigcnccthatcanmovcdcductivcIylrom
gcnustospccics,lromunivcrsaItoparticular. !twasacorcdoctrincolKant`s
critiquc ol purc rcason that human rcason Iackcd this powcr olintc||cctuaI
intuition. Human rcason must procccd inductivcIy, throughanaIysis olcx-
pcricncc. !n tcrms olthis Kantian probIcmatic, Marx sccs HcgcI`s way ol
238 NOTES TO PAGES 2933
rcIating Iogic and rcaIity m thc Philosophy ofRight as thc way ol intcIcctuaI
intuition, and Marx`s rcjcction olths way s catcgorcaI.
9. lncriticizingHugo, Marxstrcsscs thclactthat thcsctwocxtrcmcsofabstract,
transccndcnt idcaIism and vuIgar positivity sharc a commonIogic, i dnti bd
asthatolthclnIightcnmcnt."Hugo isthus thccomplete skeptic. Jhcskepticism ol
thc 18th centur against thc established reason appcars n Hugo as thc skepticism
against thc establishment of reason. Hc adopts thc Enlightenment, he sees in the
positive factor nothing rational anymore, but onfy so that nothing positive may be seen
anymore in the rational" 'Jhc lhiIosophicaI Manlcstoolthc HistoricaI SchooI
olLaw,` Wrtings, p. 99. MlW | , p. 80) . !ronicaIIy, HcgcIraIcd aganstthc
lnIightcnmcnt opposition bctwccn 'thc positivc constitutionaI Iaw ola by-
goncsituation` and 'abstractthcorics andshaIIow chattcr` (Proceedings ofthe
Estates Assemb(y in the Kingdom of Wirttemberg, n Hegel 's Political Writings, pp.
281 -282) .
1 0. ln aII this thcrcis arcmarkabIc paraIIcI bctwccn thcyoungMarx`s rcccpton
ol HcgcI and thc young HcgcI's rcccption ol Kant. Ior t chyoung HcgcI,
Kant' sphiIosophy and thc Ircnch KcvoIution hcraIdcd a phIosophy and an
agcolhumanscIl-dctcrmination. Ashisthoughtmaturcd, Hcgcl bccamcvcry
criticaI, notolthcvaIucolhumanautonomyccntraItoKant`sphiIosophy, but
olthcduaIisticcharactcrolKant`sphiIosophy.Kant`sdualsmmadclrccdom
anabstractand othcrworIdIy aair unrcconciIcdwith a hctcronomous worId
olcmpiricaI actuaIity. lt was thc vaIuc olhuman lrccdom chcrshcd by his
lathcrandhisluturclathcr-in-IawthatattractcdMarxtothcdcalsmol Kant
andIichtc.AnditwasthissamcvaIucolautonomythatconvcrtcdMarxlrom
thc duaIism ol Kant and Iichtc to HcgcI's diaIccicaI phiIosophy. But hs
study ol thc Philosophy of Right Icd Marx to scc in HcgcI thc samc typc ol
unrcconciIcd duaIism that had Icd HcgcI to his critiquc olKant.
1 1 . CHlK, p. 39. KHS, MlW I , pp. 240-241 .
1 2. CHlK, p. 85. KHS, MlW | , p. 288. At thcbcginningolthc Science ofLogic,
HcgcI Iinks rationaIity with thc syIIogism as loIIows. '!t is only thus that
rcasonrises abovc thc hnitc, conditioncd, scnsuous, caII itwhatyou wII, and
in this ncgativity is csscntiaIIypregnant with content, it is thc unty oldctcrmi-
natc cxtrcmcs, as such, howcvcr, thc rational is nothng but thc yllogism . =
Jhc csscntiaIlcaturcolthcsyIIogismisthcuniy olthccxtrcmcs, thcmiddle term
whichunitcs thcm, and thc ground which supports thcm` SL, p. 665) .
Jhus HcgcI associatcs thc syIIogism with thc spccuIativc notion ol thc
scIl-sundcring-and-rcconciIing subj cct, and it is with such notions olHcgcI
that Marx is most at odds. Marx`s position sccms to laII undcr HcgcI`s
hcadingol'abstraction`. 'Abstraction,inhoIdingrigidIytothcseff-subsistence
olthccxtrcmcs,opposcs thcunityol thccxtrcmcsin thcsyIIogism| tothcmas
a dctcrminatcncss which Iikcwisc is bxcd and self-subsistent, and in this way
apprchcnds it rathcras non-uniy than as unity` SL, p. 665) .
1 3 . CHlK, p. 9 1 . KHS, MlW I , p. 295.
1 4. CHlK, p. 7 1 . KHS, MlW I, p. 274.
1 5. Scc CHlK, pp. 72-73. KHS, MlW |, pp. 275-276. Marx`s skctch ol thc
history ol thc duaIism olciviI socicty and statc is a prccursor to his bnaI
chaptcrolCapital, voI. | , 'Jhc So-caIIcd lrimitivc AccumuIationolCaptaI.`
I G. Scc Marx, 'CnJhcjcwish _ucston` j_) , Writings, p. 223. Marx, 'Zur
judcnlragc` Zj) , MlW I , p. 352.
I 7. CHlK, pp. 91-92. KHS, MlW | , p. 296.

i
l

'`
+

.
"

NOTES TO PAGES 33-38 239

1 8. CHlK, pp. 88-89. KHS, MlW | , p. 292. Jhis Iast scntcncc suggcsts that
Marx was writing, orintcndcd to writc, an cxpIicit critiquc olHcgcI`s Iogic.
Howcvcr, no such work has bccn lound.
1 9. Whcthcr or not a c|oscr study olHcgcI couId dclusc Marx`s criticisms is, !
bcIicvc, stiII anopcn qucstion. Ccrtain|y Marx scizcs upon somc vcry thorny
and important probIcms in HcgcI`s phi|osophy. Scc notc 5, chaptcr 8.
20. Jhat is to say, i t poscs a mcta-human standpoint i n Marx`s vicw. Hcgc|
himscIl wouId not havc considcrcd it so. Morcovcr, lor Hcgc|, abso|utc
knowIcdgc is thc product olthc most thoroughgoing IogicaI and cmpiricaI
invcstigation. !t is ccrtainIy not a priori knowIcdgc.
2 1 . CHlK, p. 35 .
22. JQ, Writings, p. 23 1 . ZJ, MlW | , p. 360.
23. CHlK, p. 88. KHS, MlW | , p. 292.
24. CHlK, p. 85. KHS, MlW I, p. 290.
25. ScccspcciaIIy chaptcr 13 bcIow.
26. JQ, Writings, p. 241 . ZJ, MlW | , p. 370.
27. JQ, Writings, p. 236. ZJ, MlW | , p. 365.
28. l think thcmaturc lormuIation olMarx`s dcmand that thcduaIismolstatc
and civiI socicty bc aboIishcd by rcvoIutionizing thc cgoistic individuaIs ol
civiIsocicty wouId bc 'aboIish vaIuc production. ` Scc chaptcr 1 3 bcIow.
29. Hegel's Philosophy of Right lK) , p. 267. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts
(Rechtsphilosophie) , inHcgc|,Simtliche Werke, voI. 6, cd. Gcorg Lasson Lcipzig.
IcIixMcincr, 1 930) , p. 335.
30. lK, p. 284. Rechtsphilosophie, p. 356.
3 1 . lK, p. 290. Rechtsphilosophie, p. 363. loticc that thc corporation standsasthc
highcst unibcation withinciviI socicty, yctrcprcscnts thcparticu|arwithinthc
sphcrc olthc statc.
!nhis18th Brumaire ofLouis Bonaparte, Marxnotcsthctop-downstructurcol
Ircnch socicty, in which statc controI suppIants IocaI organization. As did
Hcgc|lrom atIcast thc timcolhis German Constitution) , Marxassociatcd this
risc olthc 'statc machinc` with thc Ircnch KcvoIution.
Jhc brst Ircnch KcvoIution, with its task olbrcaking aII scparatc IocaI,

_
tcrritoria|, urban andprovinciaIpowcrs in ordcr to crcatc thcciviI
32.
ol thc nation, was bound to dcvc|op what thc abso|utc monarchy
bcgun. ccntraIization . . . lvcrycommon intcrcstwasstraightway -ver:
lromsoccty, countcrposcd toitasahighcrgeneral intcrcst,snatchcd

thc activity ol socicty's mcmbcrs thcmscIvcs and madc an objcct

govcrnmcnta| activity . . . AII rcvoIutions [sincc thcbrst Ircnch KcvoIi-

tion| pcrlcctcd this statc machinc instcad olsmashing it. As citcd in

Cohcn, Class and Civil Socier, p. 1 29)
Jhcrcgimcollo| lotin Cambodia mustrank as onc olthcmostgrucs

mc
rca|izations olHcgc|`s picturcolthc po|itica| |o
$
icolthc Ircnch Kcvo|utton.
'Howcvcr, in rcccnt thcorics, carricd partIy ir+to c` cct,
.
thc l

nd

mcntaI
prcsuppositionis thata statcis a machincwith asingIcsprmgwhi
.
ch

mp
.
arts
movcmcnt to aII thc rcst olthc inbnitc whccIwork, and that aII mstitutios
impIicit in thc naturc ol a socicty shouId procccd lrom thc suprcmc
.
ubhc
authorityand bcrcguIatcd, commandcd,

ovcrsccn, and conductcd bytt ( The

German Constitution in Hegel's Political Wrltmgs, p. 1 6 1 . )
.
~
.
240 NOTES TO PAGES 3849
33. Scc Hunt, Political Ideas.
34. lK, p. 281 . Rechtsphilosophie, p. 352.
35. Marx`s point rcscmbIcs thatolmany contcmporary phiIosophcrs olscicncc,
suchas Hanson, ScIIars, andIcycrabcnd, thatthcscicntist`sapprchcnsionol
cmpiricaI data is olncccssity conccptuaIIy mcdiatcd. Scc lorwood KusscII
Hanson, Patter ofDiscover Cambridgc.Cambridgc!nivcrsitylrcss, 1 958);
WiIlrcd ScIIars, Science, Perception, and Realiy lcw York. Humanitics lrcss,
1 963) ; and lauIIcycrabcnd,Against Method.
36. CHlK, p. 48. KHS, MlW | , p. 250.
37. MarxrcaIizcdthatHcgcIstrovclorthcsamctypcolscIl-rchcction. Jhcpoint
olMarx`s critiquc is to show that HcgcIlaiIcd to achicvc this.
38. CHlK, p. 92. KHS, MlW | , p. 296.
39. ln lact, as carIy as his poIiticaI tcxt Th German Constitution ( 1 800) , HcgcI
idcntibcd thc risc ol thc bourgcoisic as thc causc ol this sundcring olciviI
socicty and poIiticaI statc. Scc G. W. I. HcgcI, Th German Constitution in
Hegel's Political Wrtings, pp. 1 89-1 90.
40. j_, Writings p. 240. Zj, MlW | , p. 369.
41 . Latcr,inMarx`sstudyolpoIitcaIcconomy, aquitcsimiIarpoint ariscs intcrms
olthc radicaI distinction, madc by cconomists such asj. S. MiII, bctwccn thc
sphcrc olproduction and thc sphcrc oldistribution. Marx points out that this
distinction scrvcs to dcpoIiticizc thc sphcrcolproduction thus makingit appcar
asapurcIy naturaIrcaIm, whiIcaIIpoIiticaIdctcrminations arctranslcrrcdto
thc rcaIm oldistribution. Sccjohn Stuart MiII, Principles ofPolitical Economy
London. Longmans, Grccn, and Co. , 1 982) , Book | , chaptcr | .
.
Chu]lerJ
| . Marx, Philosophic Manuscripts lM) , p. 64. Marx, Oekonomisch-philosophische
Manuskripte aus dem}ahre !11 (Manuskripte) , MlW SuppI. | , p. 469.
2. lM, p. 1 73. Manuskripte, MlW SuppI. |, p. 57 1 .
3 . lM, p . 1 77. Manuskripte, MlW SuppI. | , p . 574.
4. lnthc Grundrisse, MarxunambiguousIypointsoutthchistoricaI spccibcityol
thc standpoint olcIassicaI poIiticaI cconomy, which idcntibcs objcctibcation
with aIicnation. Scc Mar, Grundrisse, p. 832. Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik
GdK) , p. 7 1 6.
5. lM, p. 1 80. Manuskripte, MlWSuppI. | , p. 577.
6. Marx, Capital: Volume One ( Capital, | ) , p. 1 28. Marx, Das Kapital, voI. |
(Kapital | ) , MlW 23, p. 52.
7. According tothcOxford English Dictionar, "Ding" and'thing` havcthcsamc
ctymoIogicaIroots, whichgobacktothcnotion olanasscmbIyolpcrsons lor
thc purposcolmakingj udiciaI, commcrciaI, or IcgisIativcstipuIations. Jhcsc
rootsobviousIyIink "Ding" and 'thing`with "setzen" toposit) and "Gesetz"
1
Iaw) .

8. lM, p. 1 89. Manuskripte, MlW SuppI. | , p. 585.

9. Scc Marx, 'lxccrpt-lotcs ol1 844" 'lxccrpts `) , Wrtings, p. 276 or Marx,

'Auszigc aus jamcs MiIIs Buch Elimens d'economie politique" 'Auszigc`) ,

MlW SuppI. | , p. 455; andlM, p. 1 88 orM anuskripte, MlW SuppI. | , p. 584,

NOTES TO PAGES 490 241

wnich Iinks up quitc cIcarIy with thc Icucrbachian taIk olinvcrsion in thc
CHlK.
1 0. Scc lM, pp. 1 68-1 69. M anuskripte, MlW SuppI. |, p. 566.
1 1 . Sccchaptcr 2.
1 2. 'Kcason and thc lroololGod` part ol'lotcs to thc LoctoraI Lisscrta-
tion`) , Wrtings, p. 65. MlW SuppI. I , p. 37 1 . Marx sccms to bcpIayingo6
Kant hcrc, rathcr than scriousIy criticizing him.
1 3. Scc lM, pp. 1 67-1 68. Manuskripte, MlW SuppI. l, p. 566.
14. Capital I , p. 1 25. Kapital |, MlW 23, p. 49.
1 5. Scc lM, p. 1 78. Manuskripte, MlW SuppI. | , p. 575.
1 6. Sccnotc 5.
1 7 . Capital | , p. 280. Kapital | , MlW 23, p. 1 90.
1 8. lM, p. 1 89. Manuskripte, MlW SuppI. |, p. 585.
1 9. lM, p. 1 91 . Manuskripte, MlW SuppI. | , p. 587.
20. lM, p. 1 90. Manuskripte, MlWSuppI. l, p. 587.
2 1 . lM, p. 1 88. Manuskripte, MlW SuppI. l, p. 584.
22. lM, p. 1 39 [cl p. 1 50) . Manuskripte, MlW SuppI. I, p. 540 cl. p. 549) .
23. 'ButmanisnotonIyanaturaI bcing, hcisahuman naturaIbcing,i .c. , abcing,
bcnglorhimscIl; thcrclorc aspecies-being. As such hcmust conbrm himscIlin
his bcing as wcII as in his knowing. Jhus, ncithcr naturaI objccts as thcy
immcdiatcIy ocr thcmscIvcs arc human objccts, nor is human being, as it
immcdiatcIy, obj cctvcIy is, human scnsuousncss, human ob|cctivity. lcithcr
naturc-obj cctivcIy-norsubj cctivcnaturcisimmcdiatcIygivcnadcquatclor
thc human csscncc` lM, p. 1 82. Manuskrifte, MlW SuppI. 1 , p. 579) .
24. lM, p. 1 1 3 . M anuskripte, MlW SuppI. 1 , p. 51 6.
25. lM, p. 1 81 . Manuskripte, MlWSuppI. l , p. 578. loticc that Marx uscs thc
tcrm "aussern" 'to cxprcss`) hcrc instcad ol thc tcrm "entiusser" 'to
cxtcrnaIizc`) , whch hchad associatcd with HcgcI.
26. 'lxccrpts,` Writings, p. 279. 'Ausztgc, ` MlW SuppI. 1 , p. 460.
27. 'lxccrpts, ` Writings, p. 28 1 . 'Auszigc,` MlW SuppI. 1 , p. 462-463.
1nlroJuclion loDivision 111
| . 'Marx an Lcskc, | . August 1 846," Briefe, p. 1 4.
2. 'ConspcctusolHcgcI'sBook The Science ofLogic, " inLenin: Collected Works, p.

Chu]ler1

| . lvcn in thc casc of thcsc c6` orts, it must bc admittcd that, dcspitc Marx`s
gIobaI intcntions, his tcxtuaIschoIarshiprcmainsat thcIcvcIolspot chccks.
2. Scc Marx and lngcIs, The Holy Famify, Critique of Critical Criticism HI),
trans.KichardLxonandCIcmcnsLutt,inKarIMarxand Iricdrich lngcIs,
Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works ( Works), voI.4 [lcwYork. lntcrna-
tonaI lubIishcrs, 1 975) , pp. 1 92-193. Marx and lngcIs, Die heilige Familie
od er Kritik der kritischen Kritik LHI), in MlW 2, pp. 203-205.
242 NOTES TO PAGES 6065
3. Scc HI, Works 4, p. 57. LHI, MlW 2 p 59. SzcIiga was a mcmbcr olthc
BaucrcircIcwhoscrcaInamcwas IranzZychIinvonZychIinski. lugcnc Suc
( 1 804-1 857) was a Ircnch novcIist bcst known lor his Les mysteres de Paris
( 1 842-1 843) and Le Jui errant ( 1 844-1 845) , pubIishcd in papcrs as feuilletons.
IorarcIativcIyrcccnt Ircnch cditionolthclormcrwork, scc lugcnc Suc,Les
mysteres de Paris, cd.jcan-Louis Bory [laris.j. j. lauvcrt, 1 963). Jhcsc two
scnsationaI novcIs ollarisian IowIilc havc bccn transIatcd into lngIish. Scc
The Mysteries of Paris [London. Chapman and HaII, 1 945-1946) and The
Wandering Je [lcw York. Jhc Modcrn Library, 1 940) . Jhc Amcrican So-
ciaIist LaborlartyIcadcr LanicI dc Lcon transIatcdthcstoricsolSuc` s Les
mysteres du peuple ( 1 849-1 855) into lngIish.
4. HI, Works 4, p. 60. LHI, MlW 2, p. 62. Jhis cxampIcispoorIychoscn asa
critiquc ol HcgcI, givcn what hc wrotc in Phenomenology: '. . . just as laturc
dispcrscs its Iilc into inbnitcIy various lormswithout thcgenus olthcsc lorms
having an actuaI cxistcncc` [ HcgcI, The Phenomenology ofSpirit [lS| , p. 355.
HcgcI, Phinomenologie des Geistes [lG| , p. 41 3) .
5. HI, Works 4, p. 1 39. LHI, MlW2, p. 147.
6. MarxandlngcIs, The German Ideology [Gl) , trans . CIcmcnsLutt[voI. 1, 'Jhc
Lcipzig CounciI` and 'Jhc Jruc SociaIists `) , W. Lough [voI. 1, chap. 1 ,
'Icucrbach`) , andC. l. MagiII [voI.2) , in Works 5 , p . 237. MarxandlngcIs,
Die deutsche ldeologie [ Ll) , MlW 3, p. 2 1 9.
Iorcommcntarics on Stirncr scc McCIcIIan, The Young Hegelians and Karl
Marx, pp. 1 1 7-1 36; BraziII, The Young Hegelians, pp. 208-225; Lwith, From
Hegel to Niet;: sche; K. W. K. latcrson, The Nihilistic Egoist: Max Stirer [Cxlord.
Cxlord !nivcrsity lrcss, 1 97 1 ) ; andjohn Hcnry Mackay, Max Stirer: sein
Leben und sein Werk [Jrcptow bci BcrIing. 1 91 0) .
7. Gl, Works 5, p. 447. Ll, MlW 3, p. 433.
8. SccHI, Works 4, pp. 1 41 , 1 93. LHI, MlW 2, pp. 1 50, 204.
9. Scc chaptcr 1 .
1 0. HI, Works 4, p . 6 1 . LHI, MlW2 , p . 63.
1 1 . HI, Works 4, p. 1 58. LHI, MlW2, pp. 1 67-1 68.
12. Gl, Works 5, p. 477. Ll, MlW3, 465.
1 3. Marx, 'Jhcscs on Icucrbach" [ JI) , Works 5, p. 5. Marx, 'Jhcscn ibcr
Icucrbach` [J!I), MlW 3, p. 7.
1 4. Gl, Works 5, p. 30. Ll , MlW3, p. 20. Comparcthist olroudhon`s 'translor-
mation` olKicardo`s thcory olvaIuc, discusscd in chaptcr 7.
1 5. HI, Works 4, p. 1 58. LHI, MlW2, p. 1 67.
1 6. HI, Works 4, p. 1 58. LHI,MlW2, p. 1 67-1 68.
1 7. 'Jhc punishmcnt that KudoIph carricd out onthc maitre d'ecole i s thc samc
punishmcntthatOrigen cxccutcdonhimscII HccmascuIatcshim,hcrobshim
olaproductive organ, thccyc . . . Cuttingmano6`lromthcscnsoryoutcrworId,
throwing him back into his abstract inncr worId in ordcr to bcttcr him-
bIinding-is a ncccssary conscqucncc ol Christian doctrinc, according to
which thc consummation olthiscuttingo6`, thc purc isoIation olman in his
spirituaIistic'ego,' isthcgood itself [HI, Works 4, p. 1 78. LHI,MlW2, p. 1 89).
1 8. Marx`s trcatmcnt ol 'criticaI critiquc` is aIso toncd with thc Ianguagc ol
mastcr and sIavc, againlromthc 'scIl-consciousncss` scction olthc P henome
nolog. 'JhcCritic` is thc mastcr, and thc worIdis his sIavc. But thatpassagc
abovcrcmakcs HcgcI`s point thatthcmastcris mastcronIybyvirtucolbcing
l
.
.
NOTES TO PAGES 65-76 243
rccognizcd by thc sIavc. Jhis is a mcasurc ol both thc tcnuousncss ol thc
mastcr's scIl-conccpt and his ironic subscrvicncc to thc bondsman.
1 9. HI, Works 4, p. 60. LHI, MlW 2, p. 62. Iora paraIIcIpassagclrom Capital,
scc chaptcr 1 8.
20. Gl, Works 5, p. 258. Ll, MlW 3, p. 241 .
ChuQler5
| . HI, Works 4, p. 8. 1HI, MlW 2, p. 8.
2. Gl, Works 5, p. 41 . Ll, MlW 3, p. 28.
3. Gl, Works 5, p. 465. Ll, MlW3, pp. 452-453. Cf., Gl, Woks 5, p. 459. Ll,
MlW 3, p. 446.
4. HI, Works 4, p. 79. LHI, MlW 2, p. 83.
5. Gl, Works 5, p. 36. Ll, MlW3, p. 26.
6. Gl, Works 5, p. 37. Ll, MlW 3, p. 27.
7. HI, Works 4, p. 82. LHI, MlW2, p. 86.
8. HI, Works 4, p. 82. LHI,MlW 2, pp. 86-87. lnthcParis Manuscripts, Marx
dcscrbcd this knd oldiaIcctc in thc rcIation olIabor to capitaI.
9. Gl, Works 5, p. 55. Ll, MlW3, p. 39. JhcduaIismMarxnotcshcrc, inwhich
thc idcationaI is idcntihcd as thc truIy historicaI,whiIc thc matcriaI produc-
tion and rcproduction ol|ilc appcars as an ahistoricaI primitivc, is quitcIikc
thc poIiticaI cconomc duaIism oldistribution and production. ln thc Grun
drisse, Marxattacks thosc poIiticaIcconomistswhoidcntilydistributionas thc
historcaI and production as its unchanging substratc. Scc chaptcr 10.
1 0. Jhcrc wiIIbcmorctosayaboutthiswhcnMarx`sdistinction bctwccn gcncraI
and dctcrminatc abstractions is discusscd in chaptcr 1 0.
1 1 . Bclorc thcsc writings, Marx had aIrcadyrcIatcd matcriaI historyt odcvcIop-
mcnts in intcIIcctuaI history. Scc his rcmarks on thc coursc ol Gcrman
intcIIcctuaI historyin thc lCHlK, CHlK.
1 2. Gl, Works 5, p. 409. Ll, MlW 3, p. 394.
1 3 . lauI-Hcnri Jhiry, Baron L`HoIbach ( 1 723-1 789) was a Icading lnIightcn-
mcnt proponcnt olathcistic matcriaIsm and wrotc voIuminous anonymous
poIcmcs against rcIigon. His cIassic cxposition olathcistic matcriaIism was
thc Systeme de la nature, ou des Lois du monde physique et du monde moral ( 1 770), :
transIatcd by H. L. Kobinson as The System oJNature subtitIcd, Laws oJthe .
Moral and Plsical World) , rcprintcdinlcwYorkbyBurt IrankIin ( 1 970) . or

morc on L'HoIbach, scc AIan CharIcs Kors, D'Holbach's Coterie lrinccton.

lrinccton !nivcrsity lrcss, 1 976) and l. laviIIc, Paul Thiry d'Holbach et la
philosophie scientifque au XVIle siecle laris, 1 943; ncw cd. , rcv. andaug., laris,
1 967) .
14. Gl, Works 5, p. 409. Ll, MlW3, p. 394.
1 5. SccGl, Works 5, p. 409. Ll, MlW 3, p. 394.
1 6. Gl, Works 5, p. 41 0. Ll, MlW 3, p. 395.
1 7 . Gl, Works 5, pp. 41 3-41 4. Ll, MlW 3, p. 399.
18. Gl, Works 5, p. 40. Ll, MlW 3, p. 44.
1 9. SccGl, Works 5, p. 39. Ll, MlW 3, p. 43.
20. HI, Works 4, p. 1 28. LHI, MlW 2, p. 1 36.

244 NOTES TO PAGES 789
21 . HI, Works 4, p. 1 28. LHI, MlW 2, p. 1 36.
22. HI, Woks 4, p. 1 28. LHI, MlW2, p. 1 36.
23. Scc, lorcampIc, CharIcsSandcrs lcircc, 'How toMakcCur!dcasCIcar,`
in Collected Papers i Charles Sanders Peirce, cd. CharIcs Hartshornc and lauI
Wciss Cambridgc. Harvard !nivcrsity lrcss, 1 934) , pp. 248-27 1 .
24. Scc thc sccond thcsis on Icucrbach, JI, Works 5 , p. 3. J!I, MlW3 , p.
5.
Chu]ler 6
l . Hcdocs this bydistinguishingbctwccn thingsas thcy appcar thcprovincc ol
thcorcticaI rcason`s cIaims) and things in thcmscIvcs thc rcaIm olpracticaI
rcason`s cIaims) .
2 . Scc Kant, Critique i Judgment, pp. 279-284; Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraji, in
Kant Werke in Zwi(( Binden (Kant Werke) , voI. 1 0, pp. 551-557; Kant, On
Histor, cspcciaIIy'ldcalora!nivcrsaIHistorylromaCosmopoIitanlointol
Vicw` pp. 1 1-26), and 'ConjccturaI Bcginning ol Human History` pp.
53-68) ; andKant Werke 1 1 , cspccialIy '!dcazucincr alIgcmcincn Gcschichtc
in wcItbrgcrIichcr Absicht` pp. 33-50) and 'MutmassIichcr Anlang dcr
Mcnschcngcschichtc` pp. 85-1 02) .
3. Scc HI, Work 4, p. 1 36. LHI, MlW 2, p. 1 44.
4. MaStirncrjohannKasparSchmidt) , The Ego and His Own, trans. StcvcnJ.
Byington, cd. jamcsj. Martin Ncw York. Libcrtarian Book CIub, 1 963),
p. 3 1 6. Ll , MlW 3, p. 361 .
.
5 . Gl, Works 5 , p . 379. L!, MlW 3 , p. 363.
6. JI, Works 5, p. 4. J!I, MlW 3, pp. 5-6.
7. ln cach olthosc scctions olthcPhenomenology, HcgcI brings toIight thcIogicaI
shortcomings ola common disposition olmoraI consciousncss.
8. Scc chaptcr l .

9. SccJayIor, Hegel, p . 551 . Ior a criticism olJayIor, scc thc concIusion.

1 0. Scc chaptcr | .

1 1 . Icucrbach`s matcriaIism is simiIarIy duaIistic, taking hight to a rcaIm ol

naturcsorcsscncc, c.g. , spccics-bcing. Scc G!, Works 5, pp. 38-39. L!, MlW3,
pp. 42-43.
1 2. JI, Works 5, p. 4. J!I, MlW 3, p. 6.
1 3. SccHcgcI`s 'lntroduction,` lS, pp. 46-57. lG, pp. 63-75.
14. Scc lIato, Statesman, trans, j. B. Skcmp, i n lIato, The Collected Dialogues of
Plato, cd. ldith HamiIton and Huntington Cairns lrinccton. lrinccton
!nivcrsity lrcss, 1 961 ) , pp. 1 022, 1 025-1 026.
1 5. HI, Works 4, pp. 39-40. LHI, MlW 2, p. 4J .
1 6. IorarccctiononthcctymoIogyof"Urteil," sccG. W. I. HcgcI,Hegel's Logic
(Logic) , trans. WilIiamWalIacc Clord.CIarcndon lrcss, 1 975), 1 66, p. 23 1 .
Chu]ler 7
l . Mar, Poverty of Philosophy (Povery) , Works 6, p. 1 09.
Jhc lact that thc authorwas a Ircnch poIiticaI bgurc is particuIarIybttng

NOTES TO PAGES 89-92 245

lrom Marx`s point olvicw. Marx`s thought is ofcn vicwcd as a mixturc ol
GcrmanphiIosophy,IrcnchpoIitics,andlngIishpoIiticaIcconomy. Butwhat
is uniquc about Marxis not his bcing inhucnccd by thcsc thrcc traditions-
that much can bc said ollroudhon. What distinguishcs Marx is his rccogni-
tionolthcsamclnIightcnmcntIogicin cach olthc thrcc. "Equaliy is nothing
othcrthanthcGcrmanI I transIatcdintoIrcnch,i . c. , poIiticaIlorm` lM,
p. 1 54. Manuskripte, MlWSuppI. 1 , 553) and 'JhcnationaI cconomist-just
asmuchas poIitcswthitshuman rightsrcduccs cvcrything tothcman, i . c. ,
tot hcindividuaI, lromwhom i tstrips aII dctcrminatcncss,i nordcrtohxatc
thcindividuaIascapitaIistorworkcr` lM, p. 1 59. Manuskripte, MlW SuppI.
1 , p. 557) . Aswc wiII scc in division 7, thcsc conncctions arc dcvcIopcd with
thcgrcatcst sophistication in Capital.
Ior morcon lroudhon sccHcnri dcLubac, S.j. , The Un-Marxian Socialist,
trans. K. l. ScantIcbury lcw York. Shccd & Ward, 1 948) ; Gcorgc Wood-
cock, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon lcw York. Jhc MacmiIIan Company, 1 956);
Arthur Lcsj ardns, P. j. Proudhon, 2 voIs. laris. lcrrin c t Cic, Libraircs-
lditcurs, 1 896); and Gcorgc Lichthcim, The Origins ofSocialism lcw York.
Ircdcrick A. lracgcr, 1 969) , pp. 83-98.
2. JhctitIcollroudhon`s bookinIrcnchis"Systeme des Contradictions Economiques
ou Philosophie de la Misere," hcncc it is aIso known as thc System ofEconomic
Contradictions. A two-voIumc lngIish transIation ol thc brst voIumc cxists
undcrthc titIcSystem ofEconomical Contradictions or the Philosophy ofMiser. Jhc
transIaton was voIumc 4 ol The Works of P. j. Proudhon, transIatcd by
BcnjaminK. Juckcr Boston, 1 888).
3. 'lnhis dcsirc to rcconciIc contradictions, Mr. lroudhon ncvcr asks himscIl
thc qucstion, whcthcr thc vcry basis ol thcsc contradictions ought not bc
turncd about. ` Marx, 'Lcttcr to l. V. Anncnkov,` Poverry, p. 1 91 .
4. 'Lcttcr to l. V. Anncnkov,` Povery, p. 1 80.
5. Sccchaptcr 5.
6. 'Lcttcrtol. V. Anncnkov,`Povery, pp. 1 82-1 83 . Marx`scmphaticuscol thc
tcrm 'cvoIution` inspcaking olhistory`scourscbcingprccstabIishcd in thc
wombolthcabsoIutcidcamakcsoncwondcrilhchasinmindKant`scritiquc
otcIcoIogy.Kantdscusscs thcthcoryolcvoIution asoncolthctwopossibiIi-
tcs lor thc thcory olprccstabIishcd harmony.
Jhcsystcmwhichrcgards gcncrationsasmcrccductsiscaIIcdthcthcory
olindividual prformation, orthcthcoryol evolution . . . Jhcadvocatcsolthc
theor ofevolution, whorcmovccvcry individuaIlrom thclormativc powcr
ol naturc in ordcr to makc it comc immcdiatcIy lrom thc hand olthc
Crcator, would notvcnturc, howcvcr, torcgardthisashappcningaccord-
ing to thc hypothcsis oloccasionaIism . . . Jhcy dccIarc thcmscIvcs lor
prclormation, as il itwcrc not aII thc samc whcthcrasupcrnaturaI modc
isassigncd to thcsc lorms in thc bcginning orin thc coursc olthc worId.
Kant, Critique ofJudgment, pp. 272-273. Kant,Kritik der Urteilskraf, Kant
Werke 1 0, pp. 543-544)
7. Povery, p. 1 65.
8. Sccpp. 96-97 bcIow.
9. Povery, p. 1 79.
10. 'Lcttcr tol. V. Anncnkov,` Povery, p. 1 91 .
246
NOTES TO PAGES 92-97
1 1 . Kant`s writings onhistory, inparticuIar, onthc phiIosophicaI undcrstanding
olhistory, rcvcaI a simiIar scnsitivity to thcprobIcms oldogmatic asscrtions
about thc tcIcoIogy olconcrctc human history and thc rcIatcd probIcm ol
cIitismonthcpartolthoscmakingsuchasscrtions. Kantcountcrsdogmatism
bydcnyingtheoretical vcritytocIaimsaboutthctcIcoIogyolactuaIhistory.And
cIitismisundcrcutbyundcrstandingthcprobIcmolthctcIcoIogyolhistoryas
a practical onc, about which thc common human undcrstanding can bc a
compctcntjudgc.
1 2. Sccin particuIar pp. 82-83 and p. 84, butaIso pp. 69-72 andpp. 80-8 1 .
1 3 . 'Lcttcrto l. V. Anncnkov, `Povery, p. 1 92.
14. Poverry, p. 1 68.
15. !bid. , p. 1 69.
1 6. !bid. , pp. 123-1 24.
1 7. Capital 1 sustainsthiscarIycritiqucollroudhon by showinghowthc prcscr-
vation ol thc principIcs olcquaIity, lrccdom, and harmony in thc sphcrc ol
commoditycircuIationisinpcrlcct accordwith thcIawolcapitaIistappropri-

ation.
1 8. 'Lcttcrto l. V. ^nncnkov,` Povery, p. 1 90.
+
1 9. Povery, p. 1 44. john Irancis Braywasa sociaIist agitatorand writcr, hcaviIy
inucnccd by Kobcrt Cwcn and Kicardian sociaIists such asjohn Gray and
Jhomas Hodgskin. Hcwas born in 1 809 in Washington, L. C. , and Iivcd in
lngIand lrom 1 822 untiI 1 842, whcn hc rcturncd to thc !nitcd Statcs. His
most important work was Labour's Wrongs and Labour's Remed Lccds, 1 839) .
BraystrcsscdthcnaturaI, humanrightolcquaIity,arightwhich hcsawbcing
dcnicd in thc uncquaI cxchangc bctwccn Iaborcr and capitaIist. Jo cnd this
inj usticc, Bray caIIcd lor thc aboIition olprivatc propcrty. As a stcp toward
this goaI, Bray conccivcd ol 'Iabor-moncy, ` i . c. , cxchangcabIc notcs bascd
1
on thc numbcr ol hours onc workcd. Ior morc on Bray, scc Max Bccr, A
Histor of British Socialism, voI. 1 London. G. BcII and Sons Ltd. , 1 92 1 ) ,
pp. 236-244; G. L. H. CoIc, A Histoy ofSocialist Thought, voI. 1 London.
MacmiIIan and Co. , Ltd. , 1 962), pp. 1 32-1 39; CarI Landaucr, European
Socialism, voI. 1 BcrkcIcy. !nivcrsity olCaIilornia lrcss, 1 959) , p. 70; and
Lichthcim, Th Origins ofSocialism, pp. 1 35-1 38. Jhcrcissomcdcbatc among
thcsc authors about whcthcr or not to considcr Bray a Kicardian. Jhc
wcighticr rcasons sccm to mc to Iic with thosc who do cIassly him as a
Kicardian.
20. Marx lound thc Iogic olvaIuc atwork in thc Iabor-timc moncy timc-chits)
proposaIolBrayand thclroudhonistAIlrcd Larimon, whomhc criticizcd at
grcat Icngth at thc bcginning ol thc Grundrisse. Ior a prcscntation ol that
critiquc, scc chaptcr 14 bcIow.
21 . Povery, p. 1 72 and 'Lcttcr to l. V. Anncnkov, ` Povery, p. 1 86.
22. 'Lcttcrto l. V. Anncnkov,` Povery, p. 1 89.
23. Povery, pp. 1 63-1 64.
24. !ndccd, in thc Philosophy ofPovery, lroudhon writcs that his own thcory ol
Mutualism 'mcrcIy mcans that socicty is rcturning . . . to its primitivc
practiccs as a rcsuItolasix-thousand-ycar-Iong mcditation onthclundamcn-
taI proposition that A A` licrrc-joscph lroudhon, Selected Wrtings of
Pierre-oseph Proudhon, cd. Stcward ldwards and trans. lIizabcth Irascr
[Gardcn City, lcvYork. Anchor Books, 1 969], p. 58) .
25. Scc chaptcr 4.
1

NOTE TO PAGES 97-103 247

2G. 'Lcttcrto. N. Anncnkov,` Povery, p. I B9.
27. Poverry, p. I G.
2B. Cnthcnotionolabricoleur, sccCIaudcLcvi-Strauss, The Savage Mind [Gardcn
Cty, l. Y. . LoubIcday and Co. , I 9GG) , pp. I G-3G.
29. SinccMarxconsidcrcd this common Iogic tobca religious Iogic, nodoubthc
wouId havc winkcd smugIy at lroudhon`s admission. 'My rcaI mastcrs, !
mcan thoscwhogvcrsc to thc mostlruitluI idcas in mc, arc thrccinnumbcr.
thc BbIc brst ol aII, thcn Adam Smith, and IastIy HcgcI` dc Lubac,
Un-Marxian Socialist, p. I 37) .
3O. 'Lcttcrtol. N. Anncnkov, `Povery, p. I B.
3 I . !bid. , p. I 9O.
32. Ior a critiquc olthc disIocation ol thc diaIcctic bctwccn thc catcgorics ol
production and oldstribution, whch Icads to a onc-sidcd locusing on thc
'po|iticaI' ssucs ol distributon, scc Barbara Brick and Moishc lostonc,
'Ircdrich loIIockand thc `lrimacyolthc loIiticaI` . A CriticaI Kccxamina-
ton," InterationalJoural ofPolitics, voI. G, no. 3, IaII I 97G.
33. ' Marx to j. B. Schwcitzcr` 21january l BG), Povery, pp. I 91-2O2. Ior thc
originaI sccMlW I G, pp. 2-32.
31. 'Marxtoj. B. Schwcitzcr,` Poverr, p. 2O2. MlW I G, p. 32. !ronicaIIy,ycars
Iatcrlroudhon hmscIlsaw thathis truc amnitics Iay morcwith a phiIosophy
olantinomy, such as Kant`s, than with HcgcI`s phiIosophy olsynthcsis. '!l
mySstem ofEconomic Contradictions ( The Philosophy ofPoverry) isnot, asrcgards
itsmcthod,acompIctcIysatislactorywork,itis bccausc ! hadadoptcd HcgcI`s
vicw olthc antnomy. ! thought that its two tcrms had to bc rcsoIvcdin a
supcriortcrm,synthcsis,distinctlromthcbrst two, thcsis and antithcsis.Jhis
waslauItyI ogic as wcII as alaiIurc toIcarn lromcxpcricncc, and ! havcsincc
abandoncd it. For there is no resolution ofthe antinomy. " Morcovcr, what lroud-
hon gocs on to say mplctIy undcrscorcs Marx's cIaim tbat lroudhon was a
supcrbcaI HcgcIian. 'Apart lromthisrcscrvation madc in thc namc olpurc
Iogic, ! uphoId today thc rcst olwhat ! said in my Contradictions." In othcr
words, thcHcgcIianmcthodolThe Philosophy ofPovery wasancasiIydiscardcd
wrappcr. Scc lroudhon, Selected Writings, p. 229.
3. Ior this dstinction bctwccn tacit and locaI, scc MichacI loIanyi, The Tacit
Dimension Gardcn Cty, l. Y. . Anchor Books, LoubIcday & Co. , !nc., I 9GG) ,
pp. I-2.
1nlroJuclion lo Furl11
I . ! omitToward the Critique of Political Economy, si

cc,asits tit|cconlcscs,it
.
is
.
a
prccursorolCapital, and mostolits mcthodoIogcaI contcnt b covcrc agaii+
Capital.
K
.
'k d l' t' h
2. Marx, Political Economy ( T07ard the Critique) , p. 22. Zur ntl er po J en
Oekonomie (Zur Kritik) , MlW I 3, p. I O.
.
.
3. HcrcpcatcdIyindicatcd adcsirctowritc such acom
I
_ p
d
r

h
I
cns
.
ivc a
S
cco

olh,
vicwsonHcgcIian phiIosophy, abovc aII, on Hcgc s :acct:cs. cc arx
lngcIs` [ I 1 january I BB) , in Marx and lngcIs, Corresponence ( Correspon
dence) , p. I O2. IorthcoriginaI scc MlW 29, p. 2GO, whcrcths Icttcr1b datcd

'

'

) `
248
NOTES TO PAGES 103-111
1 6 january 1 858. Scc aIso 'Marx an joscph Lictzgcn` (9 May 1 858), in
MlW 32, p. 547; and'lngcIsanljotrLawrowitsch Lawrow` (2 ApriI 1 883) ,
in MlW36, p . 3.
4. SccToward the Critique, p. 1 9, andZur Kritik, MlW1 3, p. 7. Ioradiscussionol
thc issucs invoIvcd hcrc, scc Lavid McLcIIan`s introduction to Marx`s The
Grundrisse, transIatcd and cditcd by McLcIIan lcw York. HarpcrJorchbooks,
1 97 1 ) ; KosdoIsky, Marxschen 'Kaital', voI. l , pp. 24-85; andchaptcrs 3 and4 ol
MaximiIicn KubcI, Rubel on Karl Marx: Five Essays, cd.joscph C` MaIIcy and
Kcith Algozin Cambridgc. Cambridgc !nivcrsity lrcss, 1 98 1 ) .
5 . Jo avoid anymisconccptions,i t mustbc addcd thatMarx chosctocompIctc
his critiquc olpoIiticaI cconomy as a rcsuItolhis carIicr critiqucolphiIoso-
phy. lnparticuIar, his critiqucolHcgcI`sPhilosophy ofRight scthimoon thc
studyolthcanatomy olciviIsocictypoIiticaI cconomy. Yct thc critiqucsol
phiIosophy and poIiticaI cconomy bcar hcaviIy on onc anothcr. Marx`s
larisian critiquc olHcgcI carrics impIications lor his cmcrging critiquc ol
poIiticaI cconomy, and Marx`s rccctions on phiIosophy continuc in his
critiquc olpoIiticaI cconomy. But thcsc lacts mcan ncithcr that thc writingol
Capital was supcrhuous altcr thc Paris Manuscripts, nor that a dircct, com-
prchcnsivc trcatmcnt olphiIosophy, strcssing HcgcI, wouIdhavcbccnwastcd
cort aIcr Capital.
Chu]ler
l . 'Marx an lngcIs` (9 Lcccmbcr 1 861 ) , MlW 30, p. 270.
2. Toward the Critique, p. 1 9. Zur Kritik, MlW 1 3, p. 7.
3. 'Marx tolngcIs` l Icbruary 1 858), Corespondence, p. 1 05. MlW29, p. 275.
SccaIso 'Marxto lngcIs` ( 9 Lcccmbcr 1 861 ) , Correspondence, p. 1 29, whcrc
Marxwritcs. 'HcgcI ncvcr caIIcd thc subsumption olamassol'cascs` undcr
a gcncraI principIc diaIcctics` MlW 30, p. 207) . Icrdinand LassaIIc
( 1 825-1 864) was bornol a middIc-cIassjcwish lamiIy in BrcsIau, SiIcsia. Hc
was an carIy and IilcIong convcrt to HcgcI`s idcas, undcr thc inucncc ol
which hcwrotc his 1 858 trcatisc on HcracIitus, Die Philosophie Herakleitos des
Dunklen von Ephesos. Activc m thcGcrmanrcvoIutionol1 848, LassaIIcbccamc
lricnds with Marx whiIc thc Iattcr was cditor olthc Neue Rheinische Zeitung.
Altcr Marx wcnt into cxiIc, hc and LassaIIc carricd on an up and down
corrcspondcncc, which brokc o shortIy bclorc LassaIIc`s dcath in a ducI.
LassaIIcispcrhapsbcstknownlorhis roIcinlounding thcAllgemeiner Deutscher
Arbeiterverein, to which thc Gcrman SociaI Lcmocratic larty traccs its origin.
Iurthcrinlormationon LassaIIc maybcloundinldwardBcrnstcin,Ferdinand
Lassalle as a Social Rformer, trans. lIcanor Marx AvcIing London. Swan
SonncnschcinSons, 1 893; rcprintcdinlcwYorkbyGrccnwoodlrcss, 1 969) ;
and Arno Schirokaucr, Lassalle: The Power ofIllusion and the Illusion ofPower,
trans. ldcn and Ccdar lauI London. G. AIIcn & !nwin, 1 93 1 ) .
4. `JhcmystibcationwhichdiaIccticsucrs in HcgcI`shand

innoway hind

rs
that hchas brst prcscntcd itsgcncraI lormsolmovcmcnt a comprchcnsvc
and conscious manncr` ( Capital I , p. 1 03. Kapital l , MlW 23, p. 27) .
5. ThcbrstolthcsctwopointshadbccnworkcdoutbyMarx inhiscarIycritiquc
olHcgcI, c. g. , inthcParis Manuscripts, whcrclogic asascparatcscicnccissccn
NOTES TO PAGES J11-1l7 249
to bc thc ncccssary rcsuIt olHcgcI`s spccuIativc, abstract modc olthought.
Jhcsccondpont,howcvcr, rcmainssomcwhatobscurcinMarx`scarIywork.
lt is not cIcarjust how it happcns that cvcn HcgcI`s Science of Logic is so
historcaIIy prcgnant and so rich in mcthodoIogicaI insight lor thc rcaI
scicnccs.l thinkthatthissccondpointcouIdhavcbccn bcttcrapprchcndcdby
Man il hc had had acccss to thc luII scopc olHcgcI`s own dcvcIopmcntaI
writings. ln thcmhcwouId havc bccn abIc to scc how HcgcI`s Iogi

itscIl

as
shapcd by his various thcoIogicaI, poIiticaI, acsthctic, and cconomc studcs.
Chu]ler
l . l havc aIrcady takcn somc pains to countcr this undcrstanding olMarx in
chaptcr 2.
2. SL, p. 5B. WL |, p. 1I .
3. Jhis point Ib wcII dclcndcd by KosdoIsky in his critiquc ol]oan Kobinson`s
objcctions to Marx`s 'HcgcIian stu6`and nonscnsc. `
1. Scc lS, pp. 5B-GG. lG, pp. 79-B9.
HcgcI`scritiqucolscnsc-ccrtaintybtsinwithhisovcraIIpointthatscicntibc
objcctvity isncrcascd through ahcightcncd s ubj cctivc mcdiation olwhat is
givcnworkingupolthcdata) . Joshowthis,HcgcIuscsthctraditionaIthcory
that thc csscncc is rcgardcd as cxprcssing a morc obj cctivc truth about an
objcct than its immcdiatc appcaranccs. Jhcn HcgcI points out that thc
di6`crcntconccptolthcobjcctwhichwchavcwhcnwctaIkaboutitscsscnccis
itscIlthc product olthc subj cctivc activity olthinking. Jhcrclorc, thc mcdia-
tionolthoughtrcsuItsingrcatcrobjcctivity thanisprcscntcd by thcimmcdi-
atc scnscdataitscIl. or this argumcnt sccLogic, #2I 25, pp. 331G.
5. Grundrisse, p. I OO. GdK, p. 2 I .
G . Logic, #3B, p. G2.
7. Marx, 'Warc und GcId,` lrom Kapital | [ I s t cd. ) , i n Marx and lngcIs,
Studienausgabe, p. 271.
Comparc Marx`s asscssmcnt olHcgcI`s advancc to HcgcI`sownrcmarki n
thcLogic, p. 22G. A dctaiIcd trcatmcnt olMarx`s anaIysis olthcvaIuc-lorm
may bclound in chaptcr I 3 bcIow.
B. Grundrisse, p. I OI . GdK, p. 2 I .
9. Grundrisse, p. I O I . GdK, pp. 2 I-22.
I O. Grundrisse, p. I OI . GdK, p. 22.
I I . Jhc oppositc laIIacy ol'inationism,`i . c. , inating abstract catcgorics into
morcconcrctccatcgorics,isaIsopointcdoutbyMarx.Scc,c. g. , Marx,Capital,
voI. 2, p. 3O. KarI Marx, Das Kapital, voI. 2, cd. ricdrich lngcIs BcrIin.
Lictz VcrIag, I 973) , p. 3B.
I 2. Grundrisse, p. 219. GdK, pp. I GO-I G I .
I 3 . 'MarxtolngcIs` 2ApriI I B5B) , Correspondence, p. I OG. Briie, p . BB.Jhis tcxt
can bc hcIpluI in undcrstandng thc lamous 'contradiction` bctwccn thc
IaborthcoryolvaIuc prcscntcd atthcbcginningolCapital l and thcthcoryol
priccs olproduction prcscntcd in Capital 3. Marx was quitc wcII awarcolthc
'contradiction" and cxprcsscd it with typicaI irony in thc third voIumc ol
Theories ofSurplus- Value: 'Jhc Iaw itscIl[Marx rclcrs to thc Iabor thcory ol
vaIuc|, |kc thccommodityasunvcrsaIlormolthcproduct, is abstractcd out

` : .` ~
+
'
ZJ0
NOTES TO PAGES 117-121
olcapitaIistproduction, andprcciscIyloritcapitaIistproduction| ought[solt]
it [thcIaw| not bcvaIid` Marx,Surplus- Value, part3 [Theories 3| , p. 71.Marx,
Theorien iber den Mehrwert, part 3 [ Theorien 3| , MlW 2G. 3, p. G9) .
Marx can bc accuscdol'contradiction` onIy by thosc wno misundcrstand
his scicntibc mcthod olmoving lrom thc abstract to thc concrctc, and who
thcrclorcthrowtogcthcrcatcgoricsasconccptuaIIydivcrscasvalue andprice q
production. Ior a discussion olthis point with rclcrcncc to Bhm-Bawcrk, scc
notc 23 to thc concIusion.
I 1. HcgcI`s contribution to this issuc is studicd by Bubncr in his cssay, 'Logik
und KapitaI,` inDialektik und Wissenschaji, pp. GG. Jhcrc wiII bcmorc to say
on this mattcr.
I . 'Marx to KugcIman` I I juIy I BaB) , Correspondence, pp. 215-217. BrieJe,
p. I B.
I G. SL, p. GB. WL I , pp. 2-3. A historicaI prcccdcnt lor Marx`s insistcncc on
kccpingmorcconcrctcconccpts to thc sidc whcn onc is brst dcvcIoping thc
abstract oncs can bc sccn in Lcscartcs` rchcctions on scicntibc mcthod.
Lcscartcsdistinguishcsthcordcrolsubjcctmattcrslromthcordcrolrcasons.
!

ltis to bcnotcd, i ncvcrythingl writc, that l do notloIIow thcordcrol

subjcct mattcrs, but onIy that olrcasons. Jhat is to say, l do not
undcrtakctosayinoncandthcsamcpIacccvcrythingwhichbcIongs toa
sujcct m

ttcr, bcca
}
:sc it wouId bc impossibIc lor mc to provc i t
sattslactorIy, thcrcbcmgsomcrcasonswhichmus t bcdrawnlrommuch
rcmotcr quartcrs than othcrs. Butin rcasoningin ordcrIylashion lrom
th

casicr to t
.
hc morcdimcuIt
:
l dcducclromtbcnccwhat l can [at this
po

nt| , som

tt
.
mcslor oncsub cctmattcr, somctimcs lor anothcr. ln my
cstmatc, thststhctrucpathlorsatislactoriIybndingandcxpIainingthc
truth. KcncLcscartcs, 'Lcttcr toIathcr Mcrscnnc 21Lcccmbcr I G1O
[!| , ` citcd lromCoIIins, Interpreting Moder Philosoph,, p. B)
I 7. jirgcn Habcrmas`s brst cssay in Knowledge and Human Interests takcs up thc
issucolHcgcI`s critiquc olcpistcmoIogy. Against HcgcI, Habcrmas s ntcr-
cstcdinarguinglorarcopcningolthccpistcmoIogicaI pcrspcctivc. Hcbndsin
Marx a rcturn to thc cpistcmoIogicaI pcrspcctivc. Scc Habcrmas, Knowledge
and Human Interests, pp. 7-21.
I B. Grundrisse, pp. I OI -I O2. GdK, p. 22.
l 9. l havcchoscn thccatcgoricsappIcsandpcars torccaII Marx`s critiqucolthc
mcthod ol absoIutc idcaIism in The Holy Fami(y, whcrc hc objccts to thc
HcgcIian rcduction olthc didercnccs bctwccn thc various lruits to didercnt
thought-dctcrminations positcd by thc abstract subjcct 'thc lruit. " Scc
chaptcr1.
Chu]ler !J
l . Saycrrccognizcs thcimportanccolthisdistinctioninhis bookMarx's Method.
2. Scc john Stuart MiII, Principles of Political Economy London. Longmans,
Grccn, and Co. , I 9B2), Book I , chaptcr I, cspcciaIIy p. I 3.

NOTES TO PAGES 121-126 251
3. Grundrisse, p. 85. GdK, p. 7 .
4. Grundrisse, p. 88. GdK, p. 1 0.
5. Grundrisse, p. 86. GdK, pp. 7-8.
6. ln tcrms olthccarIicrdistinction bctwccn abstract and concrctc conccpts, a
dctcrminatc catcgory can bc cithcrabstract or concrctc dcpcnding upon thc
conccptuaI compIcxity olthc spccibclcaturcs it cxprcsscs. A catcgory can bc
conccptuaIIysimpIc, hcncc, abstract,yct cxprcss adctcrminatccharactcristic
ol an objcct. VaIuc provcs to bc such a simpIc dctcrminatc catcgory, as
oposcd, say, to wagcs, which is a morc concrctc dctcrminatc catcgory.
7. Grundrisse, p. 87. GdK, pp. 8-9.
8. Grundrisse, pp. 85-86. GdK, 7. Scc aIso Grundrisse pp. 257-258. GdK, pp.
1 68-169.
9. AswcwiIIsccinthcncxtscction,Marx`suscolthisdistinctiongocsbackcvcn
larthcr than this.
1 0. Gl, Works 5, p. 37. Ll, MlW 3, p. 27.
1 1 . lbid.
1 2. Gl, Works 5, pp. 41-46. Ll, MlW 3, pp. 28-36.
1 3. Gl, Works 5, p. 41 . Ll, MlW 3, p. 28.
1 4. lot onIy arc thcy introduccd as gcncraI abstractions, Marx`s Ianguagc
thoughout thc scction aIso makcs it cIcar that this is how thcsc 'prcsupposi-
tions`arctobccomprchcndcd.IorcxampIc,Marxwritcsinsummarizingthc
brst thrcc 'prcsuppositions`. 'Morcovcr, thcthrccsidcs olsociaIactivityarc
not to bc graspcd as thrcc di6rcnt IcvcIs, butjustonIy as thrcc sidcs, or, in
ordcr to writc cIcarIy lor thc Gcrmans, thrcc 'momcnts` which havc cxistcd
simuItancousIy lrom thc outsct olhistory on, and sincc thc brst mcn, and
[which| stiII asscrt thcmscIvcs in history today` Gl, Works 5, p. 43. Ll,
MlW 3, p. 29) .
1 5. Latcr l wiII arguc that undcrstanding thc rcIation bctwccn thc IogicaI, or
scicntibc, and thc phiIosophicaI crrors ol absoIutc idcaIism cnabIcs us to
intcrprct Marx`s carcluI structuringolCapital, as a ncxusolthcsctwoIogics,
as itscIlan unspokcn critiquc olspccuIativc mcthod.
1 6. Scc Grundrisse, p. 87. GdK, p. 9.
1 7. lt sccms to loIIow lrom thc paraIIcI bctwccn bourgcois poIiticaI cconomy`s
account oldistribution and spccuIativc mcthod`s account olhistory that l
shouId say, 'within thc catcgoriaI lramcwork ol thc Iogic ol dctcrminatc
abstractions, `whcrcl havcsaid, 'withinthccatcgoriaIlramcworkolasng
Iogic. ` Jo say that wouId havc bccn accuratc, but rathcr odd, sinccwc !

j ustloIIowcd Marx`s Icngthy charactcrization olabsoIutc idcaIism` s abstrac-

tionsasbcinggcncraIabstractions. Howcvcr, thcscsccmingIyIoosccndscomc

togcthcr in thc notion ola singIc Iogic whosc catcgorics arc aII dctcrminatc
lromthc vicwpoint olabsoIutc idcaIism, but arcj udgcd by Marx to bc mcrc
gcncraI abstractions, gcncraIizations about history. lutting Marx`sjudgmcnt
to thcsidc, thcpointrcmains thatby choosingtoacccptasscicntibconIythat
which thcy took to bc within thc single logic oldctcrminatc abstractions, thc
Gcrman idcologists crrcd both phiIosophicaIIy and scicntibcaIIy.
18. AIthough its locus is morc dircctcd to thc prclacc ol Toward the Critique of
Political Economy which is inmanyways askctcholthcidcas prcscntcdinthc
'Icucrbach` chaptcr) , McMurtry`s book, The Structure ofM arx's World- View,
rcprcscnts this tcndcncytoward ovcrcstimation.
1 9. Scc Grundrisse, pp. 852-853. GdK, p. 736.

252 NOTES TO PAGES 126131
2O. G!, Works 5, p. 2B. L!, MlW 3, p. 1 8.
2 I . JhiscouIdcxpIainwhythcparagraphol thcmanuscriptol thcGerman Ideology
whichbcgins, 'WcknowonIy onc singIcscicncc, thc scicnccolhistory` G!,
Woks 5, p. 28) , wascrosscd out. lxpungingthatparagraphmight havc bccn
intcndcd to avoid a conlusion bctwccn two cIaims. a) that thcrc arc aIways
historicaI aspccts olany scicntibc anaIysis, and b) that thcrc is a distinctivc
and unibcd scicnccolhistory. Marxwas makingthclormcrcIaim, butnot thc
Iattcr. L!, MlW 3, p. 1 8.
22. ! t might bcaddcd that thca priori absurdityolthc proj cctolworkingout a
scicncc ol history was bornc out in Marx`s own Iilc. Hc was unabIc to
compIctc cvcn thc scicnccolthc poIiticaI cconomy olcapitaIist socicty.
23. Grundrisse, p. 1 08. GdK, p. 2B.
24. Grundrisse, p. 103. GdK, p. 24.
25. Grundrisse, p. 1 05. GdK, p. 2.
26. Capital |, p. 29O.JhcIcssdctaiIcd rcmarks byMarxonconcrctcIaborn thc
brst chaptcrolCapital | arc Iikcwisc to bcundcrstood undcrths hcading ol
thcabstract concept olIabor.
27. Capital , p. 1 29. Kapital |, MlW 23, p. 3.
I

28. Capital , p. 1 32. Kapital |, MlW23, p. G.

29. Jhrcc points conccrning dctcrminatc abstractions comc upi nthc coursc ol
Marx`srchcctionsonIabori nthcGrundrisse andarcworth noting. | ) Marx`s
skctch olthc historyolthc dcvcIopmcnt olthc conccpt olabstract Iabor up
throughAdamSmithiIIustratcs thcthcorcticaI birth pains invoIvcdin gcncr-
ating a dctcrminatc abstraction such as abstract Iabor. ( 2) Marx obscrvcs
that, sincc wc arc dcaIing with a dctcrminatc abstracton, thc sccntbc
dcvcIopmcnt olthc catcgory is rcIatcd to thc historicaIdcvcIopmcnt olthc
actuaI object lorwhich itis adctcrminatccatcgory. (3) Jhus, thcdctcrmnatc
catcgory is onIy appIicabIc to that actuaIity, c. g. , thc catcgory olabstract
Iabor isonIyluIIy appIicabIc to luII-bIown capitaIism.
3O. !nthis conncction scc chaptcr 9.
3 I . lM, p. 1 83. Manuskripte, MlW SuppI. | , pp. 579-580.
Chu]ler !!
| . Sccchaptcr 5.
2. 'Jhc onc work [Arbeit] intcrcsts himas much as thcothcr, and sincc both
procccd indcpcndcntIy lrom onc anothcr, a whoIIy contradictory manncr ol
prcscntationcomcs out hcrc, thconc, whch morcorIcsscorrcctIycnuncatcs
thcinncrconncction, thcothcr,whchwththcsamcjustibcatonand without
any inncr rcIation-dcvoid ol aII conncction with thc othcr manncr ol
conccption-cxprcsscs thc appearing conncction` Marx, Surplus- Value, part 2
[ Theories 2], p. I G1. Marx, Theorien iber den Mehrwert, part 2 [ Theorien 2] , MlW
26. 2, p. 1 62) .
3. Theories 2, p. 1 64. Theorien 2, MlW 26. 2, p. 1 61 .
4. Lcscartcs, Meditations, pp. 87-88.
5. Lcscartcs, Meditations, p. 88.
6. SL, p. 479. WL 2, p. 1 0 1 .
. . . .
7 . lcrhapscvcn morcimportantistosccthatlorHcgcI thc Wesenslogik i s simpIy
ancccssarystcp toward thcBegrifslogik, whcrc thcoppositionsolthc Wesens-

NOTES TO PAGES 131-117
253
logik arc rcconciIcd, whcrcas lor Marx, mcdiation bascd L Wesenslogik-type
opposition is mcrcIy thc ncccssary sign olrcaI contradiction, it is not rcaI
mcdiation.
8. Theories 2, p. 1 64. Theorien 2, MlW 26. 2, p. 1 61 .
9. Theories 2, p. 1 69. Theorien 2, MlW 26. 2, p. 1 66.
10. Theories 2, p. 437. Theorien 2, MlW26. 2, p. 440.
1 1 . !nthcdctaiIcdtrcatmcntolMarx`sthcoryolvaIucinchaptcr 1 3 bcIow, thcrc
wiIIbcmorc to sayabout Marx`s ncwcsscncc-appcaranccmodcI lorpoIiticaI
cconomy. !n particuIar, wc shaII scc how Marx modaIizcs thc HcgcIian
csscncc Iogic byidcntilyingit as pcrlorcc aIogicolaIicnation, arcIigious and
third-party Iogic.

Chu]ler!2
| . Capital | , p. 1 25. Kapital |, MlW23, p. 49.
2. CIIman,Alienation, p. 1 86.
3. Capital | , p. 1 26. Kapital | , MlW 23, p. 50. Jhcrc i sa lamiIy rcscmbIancc
bctwccn Marx`s usc olthc contcnt/lorm distinction and Kant`s usc olthc
samc distinction in thc Critique of Pure Reason. Kant uscs it to scparatc thc
simpIy givcn lrom thc action olthc knowing subj cct. Marx Iikcwisc distin-
guishcs that whichis naturaIIy givcn lrom that which is historicaIIylormcd.
4. Capital | , p. 1 28. Kapital l , MlW 23, p. 52.
5. Capital | , p. 1 3 1 . Kapital |, MlW 23, p. 55.
6. !bid.
7. CIIman,Alienation, p. 1 85.
8. Capital 1, p. 1 26. Kapital 1, MlW23, p. 50.
9. 'lotcs on AdoIph Wagncr,` in Marx, Texts on Method, p. 198. MlW 1 9,
p. 369.
1 0. Marx, Texts on Method, p. 1 83. MlW 1 9, p. 358.
1 1 . SccCIIman,Alienation, pp. 1 85-1 86.
1 2. Scc notc 3 abovc.
1 3. Marx, 'Warc und GcId, `Studienausgabe, p. 275.
1 4. ! th
.
ink
.
thatcapital can bcrcad asrcvoIving around thctwo grcat lctishcs ol

captaIst soccty. thc commodity, or moncy, lctish and thc capitaI fctish.
M

rx dcvcIops thc commodity lctish in a singIc chaptcr, whiIc thc capitaI

lctsh-cuIminating in thc Jrinitarian lormuIa at thc cIosc ol thc third
voIumcrcquircs thc whoIc olCapital lor its cxposition.
1 5. As HcgcI wrotc, 'to makc abstractions hoId in actuaIity mcans to dcstroy
actuaIity` G. W. I. HcgcI, Lectures on the Histoy of Philosopl 1, trans. l. S.
HaIdanc and Iranccs H. Simson [lcw York. Jhc Humanitics lrcss, !nc. ,
1 955] , p. 425) .
Chu]ler!J
|. 'CritiqucolthcGotha lrogrammc` 'Gotha lrogrammc`) , inMarx, Gotha
Programme, p. 3. Marx, 'KandgIosscn zum lrogramm dcrdcutschcrArbcitcr-
partci` Randglossen") in MlW, voI. 19, p. 1 5.
254
NOTES TO PAGES 117-156
1
2. Jhis distinction bctwccn vaIuc and wcalth prcparcs Marx's rcsponscs to thc
criticismolthcIaborthcoryolvaluc,whichpointsoutthatlandandothcrraw
matcrials havc a 'naturalvaluc.` Jhis criticism has a kcrncl oltruth, which
Marx anticipatcs hcrc, but itcolIapscs usc-valuc, orwcalth, intovaluc. Land
andothcrrawmatcrials havcausc-vaIuc, but thcyarcnotproducts olhuman
lab or. How it is that in capitalism thcy noncthclcss comc to bc
@
ivcn
cxchangc-valucs isdiscusscd by Marx in thc thcory olrcnt. Ior that, scc thc
third voIumc olCapital.
3. 'Gotha lrogrammc,` p. 3. "Randglossen, " MlW 1 9, p. 1 5.
4. Ibid.
5. Jhisdoublc movcmcnt is spcIIcd outby Marx in a paragraph lollowing thc
initiaI dcrivation olvaIuc.
In thc cxchangc rclation olcommoditics thcmsclvcs, thcir cxchangc-
vaIuc appcarcd to us as somcthing thoroughIy indcpcndcnt ol thcir
usc-vaIucs. Il onc now actuaIIy abstracts lrom thc usc-valuc ol thc
product olIabor, thcnoncobtains thcirvaluc, as itwasjustdctcrmincd.
Jhatwhichis common, which prcscntsitscIlin thc cxcha

gcrcIationor
cxchangc-vaIucolthccommodity,is thcrclorcitsvaIuc.Jhcscquclolthc
invcstigation wiII lcad us back to thc cxchangc-vaIuc as thc ncccssary
modc olcxprcssionorlorm olappcaranccolvaluc, whichisnoncthclcss
athrst to bc considcrcdindcpcndcnt lrom this lorm. ( Capital, | , p. 128
Kapital | , MlW23, p. 53)
.
6. Capital | , p. 1 27. Kapital l , MlW23, p. 5 1 .
7 . Capital | , p. 1 28. Kapital | , MlW 23, p . 52.
8. Marx, 'Warc undGcId,` Studienausgabe, p. 220.
9. Ibid. , p. 221 .
1 0. I bid. , p . 223.
1 1 . Ibid. , p. 224.
1 2. As wcshaIl scc shortly, this mcans that thc vcrysubstance olvaluc, abstract
labor, is lraught with alicnation. Jhat thc measure olvaIuc, abstract labor-
timc, is analicnatcd lormoltimc, is argucdby lostoncin thcblth chaptcr,
'Abstract Jimc,` olhis disscrtation, 'Jhc lrcscntas lcccssity.`
13. Capital | , pp. 1 38-1 39, Kapital | , MlW23, p. 62.
1 4. Scc pp. 1 50-1 5 1 .
1 5 . Capital | , p . 1 74. Kapital | , MlW 23, p . 95.
1 6. Capital |, p. 1 52. Kapital |, MlW23, p. 75.
1 7. Capital | , p. 1 39. Kapital l , MLW23, p. 62.
1 8. Sccnotc 34 bcIow.
1 9. Capital | , p. 1 87. Kapital l , MlW 23, p. 1 08.
20. Capital |, p. 1 87. Kapital l , MlW23, p. 1 07.
2 1 . Capital |, p. 1 39. Kapital |, MlW 23, p. 63.
22. Capital | , p. 1 55. Kapital l , MlW23, p. 77. SinccmoncywiIl cvcntuaIIy play
thcroIc olthc 'vaIuc-mirror,` it is intcrcsting to considcrin this conncction
Icucrbach's dictum that God is thc mirrorolhumanity.
23. Capital | , p. 1 40. Kapital | , MlW 23, p. 63.
24. Capital |, p. 1 39-1 40. Kapital |, MlW23, p. 63.
25. Sccnotc22 abovcandMarx, 'WarcundGcId,` Studienausgabe, p. 237.
NOTES TO PAGES 156-163 255
26. Capital | , p. 1 47. Kapital l , MlW23, p. 70.
27. Capital | , p. 1 48. Kapital |, MlW 23, p. 70.
28. Capital |, p. 1 50. Kapital |, MlW 23, p. 73.
29. I bid.
30. Capital | , p. 1 49. Kapital |, MlW 23, p. 7 1-72.
3 1 . Jhc inncr opposition olusc-valuc and valuc, which is cncapsulatcd in thc
commodity, is thcrclorc prcscntcd through an cxtcrnal opposition, i. c. ,
through thc rclaton oltwo commoditics, within which thc onccommodity
whose valucisupposcdtobccxprcsscd,countsimmcdiatclyasusc-valuconly,
thcothcrcommodity,onthcothcrhand, in which valuciscxprcsscd, countsas
cxchangc-vaIuc only. Jhc simplc valuc-lorm ola commodity is thcrclorc thc
smplc lorm olappcarancc ol thc opposition bctwccn usc-valuc and valuc
containcd in it. Scc Capital | , p. 1 53. Kapital | , MlW 23, p. 75-76.
32. JI, Works 5, p. 4. J!\, MlW 3, p. 6.
33. Capital | , p. 1 43. Kapital |, MlW23, p. 66.
34. Logically, thistaskolmcdiating catcgorics olscnsuousintuition andcatcgo-
rics ol thc abstract, rccctvc undcrstanding is not unlikc ccrtain problcms
which turn up in thc philosophics ol Lcscartcs and Kant. In tcrms ol
Lcscartcs,wccancomparcthcroIcolmoncytothatolLcscartcs'third party,
thc pincal gland, which mcdiatcs thc dualism olbody and mind. Kant hnds
thc nccd lor mcdiation prcciscly bctwccn thc purc, nonscnsuous conccpts ol
thcundcrstanding, and scnsuous appcarancc. His third partyis thc transccn-
dcntal schcma. 'low it is clcar that thcrc must bc a third thingwhich is on
thconc handhomogcncouswiththccatcgory, andonthcothcr handwiththc
appcarancc, and which makcs possiblc thc application olthc lormcr to thc
Iattcr. Jhis mcdiating prcscntation must bc purc void ol aII cmpiricaI
contcnt) andyctwhi|c:tmust in oncrcspcctbcintellectual, it must in anothcr
bcsensuous. Such a prcscntation is thc transcendental schema" Kant, Critique of
Pure Reason, p. 1 8 1 ) .
35. Scc chaptcr 2.
36. Scc Capital | , p. 1 98. Kapital | , MlW 23, pp. 1 1 8-1 1 9.
37. SL, p. 479. WL 2, p. 1 01 .
38. Scc Capital | , pp. 1 65-166. Kapital l , MlW23, p. 87.
39. Grundrisse, pp. |7 1-1 72. GdK, pp. 88-89.
40. A casc in point is thc communa| production olthc Cwcn communitics.
Capital | , pp. 1 88-1 89 (Kapital | , MlW 23, pp. 1 09-1 1 0) , whcrc Mar
contrasts Cwcn to thc utopian sociaIists who want to kccp
production yct cIiminatc moncy.
41 . Scc notc 26, chaptcr 2.
42. Atlcasti t i s thcopcning thcorctical movci nthat thcory. Jocomprchcnd thc
lull scopc olhs maturc thcory olcivil socicty wc nccd to considcr Marx's
accounts olmoncy and capital.
Chu]ler !1
1 . Toward the Critique, p. 64. Zur Kritik, MlW 1 3, p. 49.
2. In oncolthclootnotcstothis chaptcr, Marxcastigatcsjamcs Mill lorhislack
ol attcntivcncss to lorm in this mattcr. MiIl rcduccs thc morc concrctc
1 1
!
: .
ZJ0
NOTES TO PAGES 163167
catcgory ol commodity circulation to thc abstract catcgory ol commodity
cxchangc scc Capital l , p. 2O9, Kapital l , MlW 23, p. I 2B) . Marx lurthcr
cmphasizcs his intcrcst in thc contcnt olthc lorms olcommodity circulation
on pp. I 9B-I 99 olCapital I . Kapital l , MlW 23, p. I I 9.
3. Capital | , p. 2OB. Kapital | , MlW 23, p. I 27.
1. Grundrisse, p. I 37. GdK, p. 5G. ln thc tcrminology olCapital l , 'avcragc-
valuc` (Durchschnittswert) and 'rcal-valuc` (Realwert) , mcanvaluc ( Wert) ; and
'markct-valuc` (M arktwert) mcans pricc (Preis) .
5. SL, pp. 5O3-5O1. WL 2, pp. I 27-I 2B.
G. An carly bridgc lrom Marx`s thcory olpricc to Hcgcl i stobclound i n thc
opcning paragraph olMarx`s 'lxccrpts lromjamcs Mill`s Book, Elements of
Political Economy" I B11) . Although Marx talks about production costs rathcr
than valucs and conluscs thc mattcr cvcn morc by intcrchanging pricc and
valuc, thc logic olhis point is rclcvant to his maturc thcory ofpricc.
With thatcompcnsationolmoncyandmctalvaluc,aswitb thcprcscnta-
tion olthc production costs as thc only momcnts in thcdctcrminationol
valuc, Mill commits-as in gcncral docs| thc school oFKicardothc
crrorthatitcnunciatcs thcabstract law without thcchangcorthcconstant
annulling [Aujhebung] ofthislaw-throughwhichitbrstcomcstobc. llit
is a constant law that, c. g. , thc production costs in thc last instancc-or
cvcnmorcinthccasc olthcsporadic, accidcntal covcringoldcmandand
supply---ctcrminc thcpricc valuc) , soit isj ustas muchas constant law
thatthisrclationshipdocs notcovcritscll, thus thatvaluc andproduction
costs standin no ncccssary rclationship . . . Jbis actual movcmcnt, lrom
which thatlawis onlyan abstract,accidcntaland onc-sidcd momcnt, is
madc accidcntal, uncsscntial, by thc morc rcccnt national cconomy.
'lxccrpts , ` Writings, pp. 2G5-2GG. 'Ausztgc,` MlWSuppl. I , p. 115) .
Latcri nthis paragraph, Marxobscrvcs,ashcdocsi nhis maturcthcoryol
pricc, that thc crror ol onc-sidcdly abstracting thc law ol pricc lrom thc
actuality olthc oscillation olpricc is at oncc logical and ideological. Ior thc
pricc-lorm`scapitalistcolors arc tobcsccninthcncccssityolthcoscillationol
pricc, i. c. , in thclact olthc immcdiatcnonidcntity olpricc and valuc.
7. Capital | , p. I 9G. Kapital l , MlW 23, p. I I 7.
B. 'Marx an lngcls, 22. juli I B59, `Briefe, p. I OO.
9. Grundrisse, p. I 3B. GdK, p. 57. lnalootnotctohis translationolthcGrundrisse
p. I I 5) , Martinlicolausgivcs thc lollowingdcscriptionolLarimon. 'Allrcd
Larimon I B I 9-I 9O2) , a lollowcr ollroudhon. Hc cditcd lroudhonist ncws-
papcrs in I B1B,wrotcon bnancial qucstionsin thc I B5O`sandwas adcmocra-
tic opponcnt ol lapolcon l l l until I BG1 whcn hc wcnt ovcr to thc
Bonapartists.` ln thc Grundrisse, Marx criticizcs Larimon`s book, De la
Riorme des Banques laris. I B5G) .
I O . Toward the Critique, p. B5. Zur Kritik, MlW I 3, p. GB. john Gray I 799- I B5O)
wasancconomicpamphlctccranda utopiansocialist.His chiclwritingswcrc
The Social System: A Treatise on the Principles ofExchange ldinburgh. W. Jait,
I B3 I ) and Lectures on the Nature and Use ofMony ldinburgh. A & C Black,
I B1B).
I I . Capital ! , p. I 9B-I 99. Kapital ! , MlW23, p. I I 9.

NOTES TO PAGES 167-181

ZJ
1 2. Capital l , p. 1 99. Kapital l , MlW 23, p. 1 1 9.
1 3. Capital l , p. 208-209. Kapital l, MlW 23, p. 1 27-1 28.
14. Capital I , p. 209. Kapital I , MlW 23, p. 1 28.
1 5. Capital | , p. 247. Kapital l , MlW 23, p. 1 6 1 .
1 6. Grundrisse, pp. 233. GdK, p. 1 44.
1 7 . Kar| Marx, 'ragmcnt dcs !rtcxtcs von Zu Kritik der Politische Oekonomie
( 1 858)" ( Urtext) , in GdK, p. 929.
1 8. lbid. , p. 920.
19. lbid. , p. 936.
20. SL, p. 383. WL I , p. 397.
2 1 . Urtext, GdK, p. 920.
22. l bid. ,p. 920.
23. SL, p. 385. WL 1, p. 398.
24. SL, p. 395. WL 2, p. 9.
25. Urtxt, Gdk,p. 920.
26. SL, pp. 389-390. WL 2, p. 4.
27. Urtext, GdK, p. 936. Sincc Marx considcrs moncy to bc thc god ol thc
commodityworld,iti sintcrcsting tosccwhatHcgcl writcsolKant`s conccp-
tion ol God. 'Accordingly God, whcn Hc is dcbncd as thc inncr purport
[InbegriD] ol all rcalitics, thc most rcal ol bcings, turns into a mere abstract
thing|` (Logic, # 49, p. 79) . Likcwisc,cucrbach spcaksolGodas'thcinncr
purport [Inbegri.D] olallrcalitics` cucrbach,Essence ofChristianiy, p.38) . Cn
thc thco-logic olmoncy and capital, scc chaptcr 1 6 bclow.
28. SL, p. 396. WL 2, p. 9.
29. Logic, # 44, p. 72.
30. SL, p. 47. WL 1, p. 28.
3 1 . Urtext, GdK, p. 93 7.
32. l bid. , p. 920.
Chu]ler!5
I . Capital 1 , p. 255. Kapital 1 , MlW 23, pp. 1 68-1 69.
2. Urtext, GdK, p. 93 1 .
3 . Capital 1 , p . 250. Kapital 1 , MlW 23, p . 1 64.
4. Sccchaptcr 14.
5. Capital 1, pp. 254-255. Kapital 1, MlW23, p. 1 68.
6. Scc Capital 1 , n. 1 1 , p. 255; Kapital 1 , MlW23, n. | O, p. 1 68.
7. Urtext, GdK, p. 936.
8. lbid.
9. Capital 1 , p. 268. Kapital 1, MlW 23, p. 1 80.
1 0. lbid.
1 1 . Capital I , p. 270. Kapital | , MlW 23, p. 1 8 1 .
1 2. Urtext, GdK, p. 944.
1 3 . Wcmight comparc this to thc way rclativistic physcsbrings to an cnd thc
lcwtonianconccptionolthcindcpcndcnccolspacc and timc.
14. Jolollowupthcanalogy tothcswitchlromlcwtoniantorclativisticphysics,
wc may notc cycrabcnd` s vicw that thc conccpts ol spacc and timc in
rclativistic physics arc qualitativcly di6`crcnt conccpts than thc conccpts ol
~*~ .
`
. . _
258 NOTES TO PAGES 181-193
spaccand timcwiththc lcwton,ianlramcwork. Scchis Against Method, p. 27 1 .
1 5. Capital I , p. 270. Kapital l , MlW23, p. 1 8 1 .
1 6. Marx sccms to makc this idcntibcation cxp|icit in his own notcs on thc
Grudrisse as wcII as in his plan ol 1 859. Scc GdK, pp. 953 and 970.
1 7 . Capital I, p. 27 1 . Kapital l , MlW 23, p. 1 82.
1 8. Capital l , p. 273. Kapital l, MlW 23, p. 1 83. Jhcsc two conditions arc aIso
discusscd in thc Urtext, GdK, pp. 944-946. Marx sums thcm up in Capital l
whiIc making a pIay on thc tcrm ' 1rcc. ' ` Scc chaptcr 1 7.
1 9. Capital I , p. 273. Kapital I , MlW 23, p. 1 83.
20. !n lact, Marx`s |ong bnaI chaptcr ol Capital , 'Jhc So-callcd lrimitivc
Accumulation," makcs an cort to do this.
2 1 . Capital I , p. 273. Kapital l , MlW 23, p. 1 83.
22. l bid.
23. Capital I , pp. 273-274. Kapital l , MlW 23, p. 1 84.
24. Capital l, p. 273. Kapital l , MlW 23, pp. 1 83-1 84.
25. SL, p. 389. WL 2, p. 3.
'26. Urtext GdK, pp. 922-923. Cl. Urtext, GdK, p. 907.
27. SccBubncr, Dialektik und Wissenschajl, p. 84, and SL, p. 7 1 , W. I, p. 56.
28. Grundrisse, p. 275. GdK, p. 1 86.
29. SccKarINarx,Results of the Immediate Process of Production (Results) , inCapital I,
pp. 95 1-952. Marx, Resultate (Resultate) , p . 93.
1nlroJuclion lo Division \11
v'
l . Sccnotc I , chaptcr 7.
2. !CHK, CHlK, p. 1 3 1 . 'linIcitung,' MlW I , p. 378.
Chu]ler !6
I . Sccj_, Writings, p . 245. Zj, MlW l , p . 374.
2. cucrbach`scritiqucolrcIigion continucs t omakcitscIllcItin Marx`smaturc
dcpiction olthcthco-logicolmoncy, indccd Marx`s vcryphrasc'moncy as
moncy" ( Geld als Geld) mimics 'God as God,' thc phrasc cucrbach uscs to
dcscribc God thc athcr thcjcwish God) . Whcrc Marx writcs that 'thc
whoIc worId olactuaI wcaIth stands oppositc moncy as ' univcrsaI lorm ol
wcaIth`, cxchangc-vaIuc madc autonomous" ( Urtext, GdK, p. 920) , cucr-
bach writcs ol thcjcwish God as God. 'God HimscIl, as an othcrworIdIy
bcing, isnothingothcr thanthcinner essence o man whichisdrawn back into itsel
outolthc worId, is tom out ofall bonds and involvements with the world andplaces
itser to the far side of the world yct is posited as an objective being" [cucrbach,
Essence ofChristianit, p. 66) .
3. Cl. Grundrisse, p. 261 . GdK, p. 1 72.
4. Caital I , p. 256. Kapital I , MlW 23, pp. 1 61 70. lotc that thc "1 01 lld.
St. " shouId bc ' I I 0 lld. St . " CI Grundrisse, pp. 33 1-332. GdK, p. 237.
5. Capital , p. 256. Kapital , MlW23, p. 1 69.
6. j_, Writings, p. 247. Zj, MLW I, p. 376.

1&

NOTES TO PAGES 193-205 259
7. Scc chaptcr I 5, wclI as Urtext, GdK, p. 9O7 and Resultate, p. 9I .
B. j_, Writings, p. 217. Zj, MlW I , p. 37G.
9. ! bid.
I O. j_, Writings, p. 21B. Zj, MlW I , p. 377.
Chu]ler ! 7
l . ' Marx an LassaIlc, 2B. Marz I B59," Brife, p. 99.
2. Scc Grundrisse, pp. 239-25O.GdK, pp. I 5l -I G2.
3. Jhis indcx is printcd in thc Gcrman cdition olthc Grundrisse, but was not
transIatcd by Martin NicoIaus. Scc GdK, pp. B5G-B59.
1. GdK, p. B5B.
5. 'Marx to lngcIs, 2 April l B5B," Carespondence, p. I O9. 'Marx an lngcls, 2.
ApriI l B5B, "Bride, p. 9 I .
G . Toward the Critique, p . G1. Zur Kritik, MlW I 3, p. 19.
7. Marx docs say a lcw things about goId and siIvcr in thc sccond chaptcr ol
Capital I , 'Jhc lxchangc-lroccss. "
B. ! bcIicvc that thc Urtext supports this intcrprctation.
9. Capital I , p. 2BO. Kapital I , MlW 23, pp. I B9-I 9O.
l O. U rtext, GdK, p. 9O2.
I I . ! bid. , p. 9l 5.
l 2. ! bid. , p. 9O1.
I 3 . Grundrisse, p. 21l . GdK, p. I 53.
I 1. Grundrisse, p. 213. GdK, p. I 55.
I 5. Urtext, GdK, p. 9l 2.
I G. !nthc coursc ola vcry ironic rcmark about Larwin, Marx idcntibcs HcgcI`s
scctonolthcPhenomenology ofSpirit, 'JhcSpiritualKcaImolAnimaIsandthc
Jhing !tscl" as a trcatmcntolcivil socicty. Scc'Marx an lngcls, IBjunc
I BG2," Brile, p. I O5.
1 7. Urtext, GdK, pp. 9l 5-9I G.
I B. Scc Grundrisse, pp. 222-223, GdK, p. I 31, Urtext, GdK, p. 9I G.
l 9. Urtext, GdK, p. 9O1.
2O. Scc chaptcr l 5.
2 I . Scc Grundrisse, pp. 2BB-2B9. GdK, pp. I 99-2OO.
22. Scc Capital l , p. I B2, Grundrisse, pp. 293, 3O7. Kapital I , MlW 23, p.
GdK, pp. 2OI , 2l 1.
.
23. Capital I , p. 2BO. Kapital l , MlW 23, pp. I 9O-l 9I .
21. Marxstudics thcactuaIhistoryol this gcncrally brutal proccssi nchaptcr21
olCapital I, 'JhcSo-CaIIcd lrimitivc AccumuIation. "

25. Scc Grundrisse, p . 3O7. GdK, p. 2I 1.

2G. !bid.
27. ! nlact, Marxdraws this parallcI cxplicitly. '!n thcsamc mcasurc as [com-
modity producton| buiIds itscllup to capitaIist production according to its
own immancnt Iaws, in that samc mcasurc thc propcrty laws olcommodity
producton rcvcrsc [umschlagenJ thcmscIvcs into Iaws olcapitaIist appropria-
tion` ( Capital l , p. 733-731. Kapital l , MlW 23, p. G I 3) .
2B. Capital l , p. 725. Kapital I , MlW 23, p. GO5.
29. Capital I , p. 729. Kapital I, MlW 23, p. GO9.
Z00 NOTES TO PAGES 205 211
3O. Capital l , p. 73O. Kapital l , MlW 23, p. GI O. Cl. Grundrisse, pp. 15G-1GB.
GdK, pp. 3GO3G2.
3 I . Results, Capital I , p. I OB3. Resultate, p. I 33.
32. Marx uscs 'rccct`i ntalking about lroudhon. Scc Urtext, GdK, p. 9I G.
33. Marx cxplicitly associatcs lroudhon with thc Ircnch Kcvolution. Scc Urtext,
Gdk, p. 9I G.
31. lS, pp. 355-3G1. lG, pp. 1I 1-122.
35. 'Marx an lngcls, 2. April I B5B, `Brif, p. 9I . Cl. Urtext, GdK, p. 9I B.
Chu]ler!
I . Kcvicwingthatscction,'JhcIuturityolMarx`sCritiqucolHc gclinthcParis
Manuscripts," chaptcr 3, is a good prcparation lor thc lollowing.
2. Boththc Cartcsian motilin thcoriginal dcrivation olvaluc and thc rcsound-
ings olKant`s thing-in-itscllin thc analysisolthc bnal dctcrmination olthc
sphcrcolsimplc circulationhavcbccnprcviouslycxamincd. Jhclact that thc
allusionolLcscartcscomcs upatthcbcginning,whilcthattoKantappcarsat
thc cnd ol thc trcatmcnt ol thc sphcrc olsimplc circuIation, suggcsts that
Marx may cvcn havc intcndcd aroughparallcl bctwccn thcdevelopment olthc
logic olsimplc circulation lrom thc initial distinction bctwccn usc-valuc and
cxchangc-valuc to hc third dctcrmination ol moncy, and thc development ol
modcrn luropcan philosophy lrom Lcscartcs` distinction bctwccn primary
and sccondary qualitics to Kant`s thing-in-itsclI.
.
3. Marx, 'Warc und Gcld,` Studienausgabe, p. 231.
1. Scc chaptcr 1.
5. Sccchaptcr 3.
G. Jhisiswhatwasidcntibcdinchaptcr I1asthcsccondcontradictionolmoncy
in thc third lorm.
7. lK, p. I I . Rechtsphilosophie, p. I G.
B. Scc chaptcr I .
9 . Sccchaptcr l .
I O. Sccchaptcr I .
I I . By thisMarxmcans thatthclogicolHcgcl`stotalsystcmrcndcrsphilosophi-
cal cxprcssion to thc logic ol capital, not that Hcgcl accommodatcd his
philosophy to thc immcdiatc intcrcsts olGcrman capitalists.
I 2. CncwayolputtingMarx`spointaboutHcgclis tosaythatHcgcl`sconccptol
thcconccpt (Begrit modcls thcconccptolcapital. Soitisintcrcstingthatin
thc Science ofLogic, Hcgcl rcvicws his criticisms olKant and Spinoza at thc
outsctolhis trcatmcnt olthc conccpt (BegriU) . SccSL, pp. 5BO-595.
I 3 . G. W. I. Hcgcl,Jenaer Realphilosophie, cd.johanncs Homcistcr Hamburg.
Vcrlag von Iclix Mcincr, I 9G7) , p. 257. Citcd in Kcichclt, Kapitalbegrifs,
p. 7G.
I 1. Scc jamcs ColIins, God in Modem Philosophy Chicago. Hcnry Kcgncry Com-
pany, I 959) , p. 227.
I5. G. W. I. Hcgcl, Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, vol. ! , trans. l. B. Spcirs
and j. Burdon Sandcrson, cd. l. B. Spcirs lcw York. Humanitics lrcss,
!nc. , I 9G2), p. I B3.
I G. Hcgcl, Philoso Pky ofReligion, p. I B5.

NOTES TO PAGES 215 223 Z0J

I 7. / rtext, GdK, p. 93 I .
I B. Capital I , pp. I 55-I 5G. Kapital l , MlW 23, p . I G9.
1 9. Capital I, p. I 2B. Kapital l , MlW 23, p. 52.
2O. Marx'Warcund GcId,` Studienausgabe, p. 22B.
2 I . Marx, 'Warc und Gcld,` Studienausgabe, p. 271. Scc Logic,# I 91, p. 2GI .
22. Capital I , p . 255. Kapital l , MlW23, p . I G9.
23. Capital , p. 255. Kapital l , MlW23,p. I GB. Jhcoriginal !talianisaslollows.
'_ucstoinbnito chc lc cosc non hannoin progrcsso, hanno ingiro` Icrdi-
nando Galiani,Dello M oneta, inScrittori classici italiani di economia politica, Parte
modema, 3-1 MiIan, I BO3| , p. I 5G) . !n thc Grundrisse, Marx citcd this samc
scntcncclromGalianiwiththcrcmark,'bcautiluIstatcmcntbyGaliani . `Scc
Grundrisse, p. B57. GdK, p. 73 I .
W
24. Grundrisse, p. 2GG. GdK, p. I 77. Cl. Grundrisse, p. 71G. GdK, p. G32.
25. KobcrtJuckcr brings attcntion to this rclationship inhisbook,Philosophy and
Myth in Karl M arx. 'Jhc Hcgcliandialccticolaggrandizcmcnt,whcrcbyspirit
isdrivcntoinbnitizcitscllintcrmsolknowlcdgc,rcappcarsinMarx`s maturc
thought as a dialcctic olthc scll-cxpansion olcapital-a movcmcnt olscll-
inbnitizingin tcrms olmoncy` Juckcr,Philosophy and Myth, p. 2I 1) . Jhclinks
bctwccn this conccpt olcapital and thclogicolthc cgo`s scll-aggrandizcmcnt
in thcphiIosophicsolBrunoBaucrandMaxStirncrarccvcn morctranspar-
cnt. Scc chaptcr 1.
2G. Comparc thcsc points to thcdiscussion olthc Paris Manuscripts in chaptcr 3.
27. Scc Grundrisse, pp. I G1I G5. GdK,pp. B I-B2.
2B. SL, p. 5B. WL I, p. 1I .
29. Scc Grundrisse, p. G1G, GdK, p. 539, whcrc Marx brings in thc imagc olthc
vampirc to illustratcthcrcIation olcapitaltoIabor.
3O. lM, p. I 71. Manuskripte, MlW suppI. I , p. 57 I .
3 I . Scc chaptcr 2.
32. Grundrisse, pp. 33 I-332. GdK, p. 237.
Chu]ler!
I . Jaylor, Hegel, p . 55I .
2 . ! think that ! havcshown this by bringing out thc rccurrcncc olthc
ncxus ol transccndcncc, subjcctivism, conscrvatism, and idolatry in
thcscdicrcnt groups olthinkcrs.
3. Jhisj udgmcntwasspccibcdintcrmsollinkingthclogicolsimplccoinm
circuIation, which is conccrncd only with products, with thc static Iogic

prc-Hcgclian modcrn philosophy and thc logicolcapital,whichis

with thcprocess ol production olvaluc and surplus-vaIuc, with thc Iogic ol
Hcgcl`s philosophy olspirit. Sccchaptcr I B.
1. Scc Kojcvc, Hegel, pp. 3 l .
5. Scc division 3.
G. Sccthclollowingscctions lrom lS. 'JhcLawolthcHcartandthcIrcnzyol
Scll-conccit` pp. 22I -22B) , 'Virtuc and thc Way ol thc World`
[pp. 22B-23G) , 'Absolutc Irccdom and Jcrror` pp. 355-3G1), and 'Con-
sccncc. Jhc 'BcautiluI Soul, ` lvil and !ts Iorgivcncss` pp. 3B3-1O9) . Ior
thc Gcrman, scc lG. 'Las Gcsctz dcs Hcrzcns und dcr Wahnsinn dcs
Z0Z NOTES TO PAGES 223-230
ligcndunkcIs` pp. 2GG-272) , 'Lic Jugcnd und dcrWcItIaul" pp. 271-2B5) ,
'Lic absoIutc rcihcitunddcr Schrcckcn` pp. 1I 1-123) , and 'Las Gcwisscn.
Lic schnc SccIc, daa Bsc und scincVcrzcihing` pp. 115-173) .
7. J. M. Knoxgivcs thc loIIowing notc onlrolcssor rics in lK, p. 299. 'j. .
rics, I 773-I B13, lrolcssor at HcidcIbcrg whcrc hc was HcgcI`s prcdcccs-
sor) I BO5-I BI G, and thcrcaltcr at jcna. ln I B I 9 hc was suspcndcd by thc
govcrnmcnt lor his participation in thc Wartburg cstivaI . . . and lor his
uItra-IibcraIvicws. ln I B21hcwasaIIowcdtotcachmathcmaticsandphysics,
andhcwas rcstorcd to his phiIosophy chair in I B25. `
B. ScclS, pp. 22I -23G. lG, pp. 2GG-2B5.
9. lK,p. 1. Rechtsphilosophie, p. G.
I O. lK, p. G. Rechtsphilosophie, p. 9.
I I . Scc chaptcr l . Jhcsc scctions arc cxamincd in rcIation to corrcspondng
scctions dcaIing with thcorcticaI rcason in SchuIcr`s 'Logics olJhcorctcaI
and lracticaIKcason` lh. L. disscrtation) .
I 2. HcgcI, lK, p. I O . HcgcI, Rechtsphilosophie, p. !.
I 3. G|, Works 5, p. 131. Ll, MlW 3, p. 1I 9.
I 1. Theories 2, p. I I 9. Theorien 2, MlW 2G. 2, p. I I 2. .
I 5. Scc Capital l , p. 733. Kapital l , MlW23, p. GI 3 .
I G. Cnthis issuc, scc lostoncand Kcinickc, 'Cn licoIaus . `
I 7. Capital ! , p. I O2. Kapital 1 , MlW23, p. 27. Marx uscs thc quotation marks
hcrcbccauschciscomparingthctrcatmcntolHcgcItoMoscs McndcIssohn`s
trcatmcntolSpinoza.
I B. Sccchaptcr9.
I 9. Kichard Bcrnstcin brings out a rcIatcd lacct ol Marx`s critiquc ol vuIgar
cmpiricism, i. c. , that it is notjust a lauIty idcaI lor scicncc but that it is
Iikcwisca misrcprcscntationolwhatisinvoIvcd in scnsuousobscrvations . At
thc samc timc, BcrnstcinaptIy commcnts on thcsignibcanccolMarx`s vicw
with rcspcct torcccntdcvcIopmcntsin thc phiIosophy olscicncc. 'lnhisown
way, Marxis attacking thcnotion olthc'mytholthcgivcn`-thcidcathatwc
can sharpIy distinguish that which is immcdiatcIy givcn to us in cognition
lromwhatisconstructcd,inlcrrcd,orintcrprctcd byus. lnths rcspcct thcrcs
a strong lamiIy rcscmbIancc bctwccn what Marx is cIaiming and what has
bccn cIaimcd by many olthc most sophisticatcd contcmporary phiIosophcrs,
whcthcr olan anaIytic or phcnomcnoIogicaI oricntation` Bcrnstcin, Praxis
and Action, p. 72) .
2O. Scc chaptcrs 2 and 9.
2 I . SccMarx, Capital, voI. 3, pp. BI +B3 I . Marx, Das Kapital, voI. 3, MlW,voI.
25, pp. B22-B39.
22. Sccchaptcr9.
23. SccBhm-Bawcrk, Karl Marx and the Close ofHis System, chaps. l and 3 .
lnMarx`s thcoryolscicntibcprcscntation Iics thcanswcr to Bhm-Bawcrk`s
lamouschargcthatMarx`sthcoryolpriccsolproductioninCapital, voIumc 3,
'contradicts` thc thcory olvaIuc prcscntcd i nchaptcr l olCapital ! . Marx
kncwpcrlcctIywcIIwhcnhcwrotcthcthcoryolvaIucinthcbrstvoIumc that
thc cxchangc ol commoditics in dcvcIopcd capitaIism is rcguIatcd by thcr
priccs olproduction, andnot dircctIy by thcirvaIuc, asitwouIdappcarilyou
stoppcd rcading Capital aIcrchaptcr I . Hcsays as muchin thcthirdvoIumc
ol Theories ofSurplusc lalue, whichwas writtcn wcII bclorc thc pubIication ol
Capital l . 'Jhc Iaw itscIl i. c. , thc Iaw that commoditics cxchangc at thcr

NOTES TO PAGES 230-232 23

vaIucs|, Iikctbccommodity univcrsaIlorm otbcproduct, s abstractcdout
olcapitaIist production, and prcciscIy lor it is not vaIid` Theories 3, p. 71.
Theorien 3 MlW 2G. 3, p. G9.
Jbc point is tbis. Jo say tbat tbc cxcbangc olcommoditics isrcguIatcd by
tbcir priccs ol production, and not by tbcir vaIucs, prcsupposcs an undcr-
standingoltbctwocatcgoricsprice ofproduction andvalue. WbatMarxsbowcd
in Capital is, brst, tbat tbcsc two catcgorics arc at wiIdIy di6`crcnt IcvcIs ol
conccptuaI concrctcncss. VaIuc is an cxtrcmcIy abstract catcgory wbicb can
bc dcvcIopcd on tbc basis oltbc commodity, wbiIc pricc olproduction is an
cxtrcmcIyconcrctccatcgorywbicbprcsupposcsintcrmcdiaryconccpts sucbas
capitaI indccd, totaI sociaI capitaI ) , tbc circuIation ol capitaI, probt, and
otbcrs, conccpts wbicb Marx dcvcIops in tbc coursc ol Capital up to tbc
introduction ol tbc catcgory olpricc ol production. Sccond, Marx sbows in
Capital somctbing wbicb did notIikcIy occur to Bbm-Bawcrk, namcIy, tbc
necessiy, lrom tbcstandpointoldcvcIopcd capitaIism,lor tbccatcgoryolvaIuc
to bc translormcd into tbc catcgory olpricc olproduction.
21. lrrorssucbas tbconcin tbc loIIowing tcxtlrom Bcrnstcin'sPraxis and Action
arc onIy too common in tbc sccondary Iitcraturc on Marx. 'Jbc vaIuc ola
product tbat a man produccs is a crystaIIizcd lorm olIabor-powcr` p. 59) .
Labor, notIabor-powcr,wbicb is itscIlacommodity, is tbc sourccolaIIvaIuc.
25. Scccbaptcr I I .
2G. Logic, # I GI , p. 221.
27. Scc Kobinson, Marxian Economics, cbap. l .
2B. Jbus bc writcs to KugcImann. 'Jbc unIucky onc onc olMarx`s rcvicwcrs|
docs not scc tbat ilnot a singIc cbaptcr on ' vaIuc` stood n my book, tbc
anaIysis oltbc rcaI rcIations wbicb ! givc wouId contain tbc prooland tbc
cvidcncc ol tbc actuaI vaIuc-rcIations. Jbc prattIc ovcr tbc ncccssity ol
proving tbc vaIuc-conccptis loundcd onIyonuttcrIy compIctc IackolknowI-
cdgcoltbcmattcrwbicbitconccrns, aswcIIas tbcmctbodolscicncc` 'Marx
to KugcImann, London, l l juIy I BGB,' Corespondence, p. 21G. 'Marxan KugcI-
mann, I I . juIi I BGB,' Bn, pp. I B1~I B5.
29. Sccdivision 3.

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Avincri, ShIomo. The Social and Political Thought ofKarl Marx. Cambridgc. Cam-
bridgc !nivcrsity lrcss, I 97 I .
Backhaus, Hans-Gcorg. 'Z urLiaIcktikdcrWcrtlorm. `! nBeitrige zur marxistischen
Erkenntnistheorie, cditcd by AIlrcd Schmidt. Iranklurt am Main. Suhrkamp
VcrIag, I 97O.
Bcrnstcin, Kichard. Praxis and Action. lhiIadcIphia. !nivcrsity ollcnnsyIvania
lrcss, I 97 I .
Bhm-Bawcrk, lugcn von. Karl Marx and the Close ofHis System. lditcd by lauI
Swcczy. lcw York. Augustus M. KcIIcy, I 919.
BraziII, WiIIiamj. The Youg Hegelians. lcwHavcn. YaIc !nivcrsity lrcss, I 97O.
Brccht, BcrtoIt. Galileo. JransIatcd byCharIcs Laughton, cditcd bylric BcntIcy.
lcw York. Grovc lrcss, !nc. , I 9GG.
Bubncr, Kdigcr. Dialektik und Wissenschaji. Iranklurtam Main. SuhrkampVcr-
Iag, I 973.
Cohcn, jcannc L. Class and Civil Society. Amhcrst. !nivcrsity olMassachusctts
lrcss, I 9B2.
CoIIctti, Lucio.From Rousseau to Lenin. JransIatcd byjohnMcrringtonandjudith
Whitc. London. lLB, I 972.
CoIIins,jamcs.Interpreting Modem Philosophy. lrinccton, l. j. . lrinccton l
sity lrcss, I 972.
Lcscartcs, Kcnc. Discourse on Method and Meditations. JransIatcd by
Lahcur. !ndianapoIis. JhcBobbs-McrriII Company, !nc. , I 9GO.
IcigI, Hcrbcrt, andothcrs, cds. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy ofScience. VoI
Historical and Philosophical Perspectives ofScience. lditcdbyK. H. Stucwcr. Min-
ncapoIis.!nivcrsityolMinncsota lrcss, I 97O.
Icucrbach, Ludwig. The Essence of Christianity. JransIatcd byGcorgc lIiot. lcw
York. Harpcr and Kow, I 957.
. Kleine Schriften. IranklurtamMain. SuhrkampVcrIag, I 9GG.
-. Principles of the Philosophy of the Future. JransIatcd by Manlrcd H. VogcI.
!ndianapoIis. Jhc Bobbs-McrriII Co. , I 9GG.
Icycrabcnd, lauI K. Against Method. London. lLB, I 975.
GoIdmann, Lucicn. The Human Sciences and Philosophy. JransIatcd byHaydcn V.
WhitcandKobcrtAnchor. London. Capc, I 9G9.
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Z0d
SECONDARY PUBLICA TIONS
GouIdncr, AIvin W. The Two Marxisms. lcw York. Jhc Scabury lrcss, I 9BO.
Habcrmas, jirgcn. Knowledge and Human Interests. JransIatcd by jcrcmy j.
Shapiro. Boston. Bcacon lrcss, I 97 I .
. Legitimation Crises. JransIatcd byJhomasMcCarthy.Boston.Bcacon lrcss,
I 97a.
. Theor and Practice. JransIatcdby johnVicrtcI. Boston.Bcacon lrcss, I 973.
. Toward a Rational Sociey. JransIatcd byjcrcmyj. Shapiro. Boston. Bcacon
lrcss, I 97O.
HcgcI, Gcorg WiIhcIm Iricdrich. Simtliche Werke, voI. G ( Grundlinien der Philosophie
des Rechts) . lditcd by Gcorg Lasson. Lcipzig. IcIix Mcincr, I93O.
. Hegel's Philosophy ofRight. JransIatcd by J. M. Knox. London. Cxlord
!nivcrsity lrcss, I 9G7.
. Hegel's Political Writings. JransIatcd byJ. M. Knox. Cxlord. CIarcndon
lrcss, I 9G1.
. Hegel's Science ofLogic. JransIatcdbyA. V. MiIIcr.AtIanticHighIandsl. j. .
Humanitics lrcss, I 9G9.
. Phinomenologie des Geistes. lditcd byjohanncs Homcistcr. Lcipzig. IcIix
Mcincr, I 937.
. Phenomenology of Spirit. JransIatcdbyA. V. MiIIcr. Cxlord.CIarcndonlrcss,
I 977.
-. Wissenschaft der Logik. 2 voIs. Lcipzig. IcIix Mcincr, I 931.
Hook,Sidncy.From Hegel to M arx. AnnArbor. !nivcrsityolMichiganlrcss, I 9G2.
Horkhcimcr, Max. Eclipse ofReason. lcwYork. Scabury lrcss, I 971.
Howard, Lick, The Marxian Legay. lcw York. !rizcn Books, I 977.
Hunt, l. H. The Political Ideas ofMarx and Engels, VoI . I . littsburgh.!nivcrsityol
littsburgh lrcss, I 975.
HyppoIitc,jcan.Studies on Marx and Hegel. JransIatcdby johnC`lciII.lcwYork.
Harpcr & Kow, I 9G9.
Kant, lmmanucI. Critique ofJudgment. JransIatcd byj. H. Bcrnard. lcw York.
HalncrlubIishing Co. , I 9GB.
-. Critique of Pure Reason. JransIatcd by lorman Kcmp Smith. lcw York. St.
Martin`s lrcss, I 929.
-. Kant Werke in Zwilj Binden. I2 voIs. Iranklurt am Main. SuhrkampVcrIag,
I 9GOI 9G1.
. On Histor. lditcd by Lcwis Whitc Bcck, transIatcd by LcwisWhitc Bcck,
Kobcrt l. Anchor, and lmiI L. Iackcnhcim. lndianapoIis. Jhc Bobbs-McrriII
Co. , lnc. , I 9G3.
Kojcvc, AIcxandrc. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. JransIatcd byjamcs H.
lichoIs,jr. lcw York. Basic Books, I 9G9.
Korsch, KarI. Marxism and Philosophy. JransIatcd by Ircd HaIIiday. lcw York.
Modcrn Kcadcr, I 97O.
. Three Essays on Marxism. lcwYork. Modcrn Kcadcr, I 97 I .
KrahI, Hansjiirgcn. Konstitution und Klassenkampf Iranklurt am Main. VcrIag
lcuc Kritik, I 97 I .
Kuhn, Jhomas. The Structure of Scientic Revolutions. 2ndcd.Chicago.!nivcrsityol
Chicago lrcss, I 97O.
Lcnin, V. l. I. Lenin: Collected Works. VoI. 3B. JransIatcd by CIcmcns Lutt,
cditcd byStcwart Smth. Moscow. lrogrcss lubIishcrs, I 972.
Lcvi, AIbcrt WiIIiam. Philosophy as Social Expression. Chicago. !nivcrsity olChi-
cagolrcss, I 971.

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SECONDARY PUBLICATIONS 269
Lowith, KarI From Hegel to Nietzsche. JransIatcdbyLavidl. Grccn. GardcnCity,
l. Y. . Anchor Books, I 9G1.
Lukacs, Gcorg. Histor and Class Consciousness. JransIatcd byKodncy Livingstonc.
Cambridgc. Jhc MlJ lrcss, I 97 I .
Marcusc, Hcrbcrt. Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise ofSocial Theor. Boston.
Bcaconlrcss, I 9GO.
. Studies in Critical Philosophy. JransIatcd byjoris dc Brcs. Boston. Bcacon
lrcss, I 972.
Maukc, MicbacI Die Klassentheorie von Marx und Engels. Iranklurt am Main.
luropaischc VcrIagsanstaIt, I 97O.
McLcIIan, Lavid. 'lntroduction. ` KarI Marx, The Grundrisse, transIatcd and
cditcd by Lavid McLcIIan. lcw York. Harpcr Jorchbooks, I 97 I .
. Karl Marx: His Life and His Thought. lcwYork. Harpcr & Kow, I 971.
. The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx. London. MacmiIIan, I 9G9.
McMurtry,john. The Structure ofMarx's World- View. lrinccton, l. j. . lrinccton
!nivcrsity lrcss, I 97B.
Mcck, KonaId L. Studies in the Labor Theor of Value. 2nd cd. lcwYork. MonthIy
Kcvicw lrcss, I 975.
CIIman, BcrtcII Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Sociey. Cam-
bridgc. Cambridgc !nivcrsity lrcss, I 97 I .
KcichcIt, HcImut. Zur logische Struktur des Kapitalbegrif bei Karl Marx. Iranklurtam
Main. luropaischcVcrIagsanstaIt, I 97O.
Kitscrt,jirgcn. Probleme politisch-okonomischer Theoriebildung. Iranklurt am Main.
Athcnaum VcrIag, I 973.
Kjazanov, Lavid. Marx und Engels nicht nur fr Anfanger. JransIatcd by Kaincr
Jraub. BcrIin. Kotbuch VcrIag, I 973.
Kobinson,joan. An Essay on M arxian Economics. 2ndcd. lcwYork. St . Martin`s
lrcss, I 9G7.
KosdoIsky, Koman. Zur Enstehungsgeschichte des Marxschen "Kapital": der Rohentwui
des "Kapital" !-. Iranklurt am Main. luropaischcVcrIagsanstaIt, I 9GB.
Sartrc,jcan-lauI Search for a Method. JransIatcd byHazcI l. Barncs.lcwYork.
Vintagc Books, I 9G3.
Saycr, Lcrck. Marx's Method. Susscx. Jhc Harvcstcr lrcss, I 979.
Schmidt, AIlrcd. The Concept ofNature in Marx's Philosophy. JransIatcd by
Iowkcs. London. lLB, I 97 I .
SchnadcIbach, Hcrbcrt, 'ZumVcrhaItnisvon Logik und GcscIIschafsthcori
HcgcI` ln Aktualitit und Folgen der Philosophie Hegels, cditcd by Cskar
Iranklurt am Main. Suhrkamp VcrIag, I 97O.
Sohn-KcthcI, AIlrcd. Warenform und Denkform. Iranklurt am Main.
VcrIagsanstaIt, I 97 I .
Swcczy, lauIM. The Theor ofCapitalist Development. lcwYork.Cxlord !nivcrsity
lrcss, I 912.
Juckcr, Kobcrt C. Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. Cambridgc. Cambridgc
!nivcrsity lrcss, I 9G7.
. Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. 2ndcd. Cambridgc.Cambridgc!nivcrsity
lrcss, I972.
WcIImcr, AIbrccht. The Critical Theor ofSociey. JransIatcd byjohn Cumming.
lcwYork.Jhc Scabury lrcss Hcrdcr and Hcrdcr, lnc. ) , I 97 I .
ZcIcn,jindich. Die Wissenschaftslogik bei Marx und "Das Kapital." JransIatcd by
lctcr BoIIhagcn. Iranklurt am Main. luropaischc VcrIagsanstaIt, I 973.
Z0
Arlicles
ARTICLES
f
Brick, Barbara, and lostonc, Moishc. 'CriticaI lcssimism and thc Limits ol
JraditionaI Marxism,` Theor and Sociey I I I 9B2) . GI 7-G5B.
. 'Iricd richloIIockand thc' lrimacyolthcloIiticaI ` . ACriticaIKccxamina-
tion,` Interational Joural ofPolitics, G IaII I 97G) . 3-2B.
Lukacs, Gcorg. 'ZurphiIosophischcn lntwickIung dcsjungcn Marx. ` Deutsche
Zeitschri/t fur Philosophie 2 I 951) . 2BB313.
Marsh, jamcs. 'Irccdom, Kcccptivity, and God. ` Interational Joural for the
Philosophy ofReligion G Wintcr I 975) . 2I 9-233.
Murray, latrick. 'lnIightcnmcnt Koots olHabcrmas`s Critiquc olMarx. ` The
Modem Schoolman, 57 lovcmbcr I 979) . I21.
. 'Marx Minus HcgcI. Iurthcr LiscussionolSaycr,` Philosophy ofthe Social
Sciences I 3 Lcccmbcr I 9B3) . 1B7-199.
lostonc, Moishc. 'lcccssity, LaborandJimc,` Social Research 15 Wintcr I 97B) .
7397BB.
lostonc, Moishc, and Kcinickc, HcImut. 'Cn licoIaus, ` Telos 22 Wintcr
I 971-I 975) . I 3O-I 1B.

WinbcId, Kichard. 'JhcLogicolMarx`s Capital." Telos 27 Spring I 97G). I I I-I 39.

ZcIcn, jindrich. 'Kant und Marx aIs Kritikcr dcr Vcrnunlt. ` Kantstudien 5G
I 9GG) . 329-31I .
Disserlulions
LahIstrom,La.nicI C. 'lsscnccandSubj cctivityinHcgcI`sScience ofLogic. " lh. L.
diss . , St. Louis !nivcrsity, I 97B.
Kavanaugh, johnI. , S. j. 'WhoIcandlartinHcgcI,MarxandMarcusc. `lh. L.
diss . , Washington !nivcrsity, I 973.
lostonc, Moishc. 'Jhc lrcscnt as lcccssity. Jowards a Kcintcrprctationolthc
MarxianCritiqucolLaborandJimc. ` lh. L. diss . , Gocthc!nivcrsitat, Irank-
lurtamMain, I 9B3.
SchuIcr, jcannc A. 'Logics olJhcorcticaI and lracticaI Kcason in G. W. I.
HcgcI`sPhenomenolog ofSpirit." lh. L. diss. , Washington !nivcrsity, I 9B3.

+
!

ndex
Abraham, I 91
thc AbsoIutc. ollIato, I I
absoIutc knowIcdgc, I 1, 25-7, 33-1,
13, GO, 72, 77-B, 92, I 2O, I 9I , 2I B,
239
abstract conccpt olIabor, I 27-B, I 11,
252
abstractIabor, 17-5O, I 2B, I 11, I 17,
I 5I1, I 5G, I G9, I B I , 229, 252, 251
accommodation, 22G, inHcgcI, 7, 2O,
25, 29, 3 I , 33, 1I, 13, 1G, 5B, I OO,
2I 2, 2I B, 2GO
actus purus d. purc wiII ) , GB
aIicnatcd Iabor, 17, 19, 53, 2O3-1
aIicnation d. csscncc Iogic, lctish,
rcibcation, rcIigious Iogic, third-
party mcdiation) , I 29, I 13-5,
I 5B9, I G I , I B1, 2I O, 2I 7 , 222,
21O, 2531
Anncnkov, l. W. , B9, 9 I , 93, 95, 97,
99
anomaIy, 2O1
antinomy, 99
AristotIc, xx, 7, I I , I 5, I B, 1G, 222
automatic subjcct, I 77, 2O9, 2I G
Bacon, Irancis, 7G-7, I 3 I
Bastiat, Ircdcrick, I I G
Baucr, Bruno, I 2, 31-5, 1G, GOI ,
G3-G, 7O, 75-G, 79-BO, 92-3, 9B,
I I O, I I 3, I 59, 223, 225, 2GI
Baucr, ldgar, I 2, 1G, I I O
bcautiluI souI, B3-1, 223
Bcntham,jcrcmy, I 97, I 99
BcrkcIcy, Gcorgc, I 52
Bcrnstcin, Kichard, 2G2-3
bIinding, bIindncss, G5, I 51, I 57, I GG,
212
Bohm-Bawcrk, lugcn v., 25O, 2G2-3
bourgcois poIiticaI cconomy , c.
cIassicaI poIiticaI cconomy) , I 1B,

laiIings ol, I 51, I 57, 2OG

Brick, Barbara, 235, 217
Bray,john Irancis, 95-G, I GG, 21G
Bubncr, Kdigcr, 237, 25O
capitaI, G5, I 23, I 39, I 11, I G3, I 72,
I 7 7-B5, I 9I5, 2OI-7, 2O9,
2I 2-2O, 232, 2GO, 2G3, lctish, 2 I B,
253, lorm, I 15, 2O2-1
Capital, xiii-xv, xvii-xviii, 2G, 15-B,
5OI , 57, GG, B7, I O3, I O9, I I 1,
I 2I , I 27-B, I 39, I 1I 5 I , I G3-5,
I G7, I B2, I B1, I B9, I 92, I 9G-7,
I 99-2OO, 2O3, 2O5, 2O9-I 2,
2 I G-I B, 22I , 22G-7, 232, 219, 25I ,
253, 255G, 25B-9, 2G2-3,
altcrword to thc sccond cdition,
227,brst cdition, I 5O-I , 2I I ,
'Labor lroccss and lroccss ol
VaIorization,` I 27, 'Moncy or thc
CircuIation olCommoditics , ` I G3
caput mortuum, I75
Carncgic, Andrcw, I 91
Castoriadis, CorncIius, 235
catcgorics . conccptuaIIy abstract, | o ,
I I 17, I I 9, I 11-5, I G7, I 7O,
22B-9, 232, 25O-I , 255, 2G3,

conccptuaIIy concrctc, IO7, I|5
I I 9, I 1+5, I G7, I 7O, I 79, 2OI ,
22G, 22B-9, 232, 25O-I , 255-, 2G3

chcrry trccs, 75-G

Christianity, I 5B-9, I 9I-1, 2I O, 22O,
235, patristic, G1-5, B3, 212
civiI socicty cl. duaIisms) , xvii, I 7,
3I -3, 35-9, 12-3, 59, G5, 73,
I GI-2, I 93, 2OO, 2O2, 23B1O, 21B,
255, 259
cIassicaI poIiticaI cconomy d.
bourgcois poIiticaI cconomy) , 15,
17, 52, B7, 9O, 99-I OO, I O7, I I G,
I 17-B, I 53, 2OI , 22B-3O, and
ZZ
INDEX
lnlightcnmcnt thought, I 15,
I 17B, I 99, 222, accommodations
ol, 9O, lailings o, I 53, I 7O, lallacics
ol, I I G-7, I 22-1, I 11, I 17, I G1,
I GG, 22B9, as rccction ol
capitalism, 9O, 9B, 21O
'Clcanthcs, or on thc Starting loint
and lcccssary lrogrcss ol
lhilosophy, ` I O, 13
Cohcn,jcan L., 235, 239
Collins,jamcs, 23G, 25O, 2GO
commodity, I 39, I 1IG, I G7, 232,
255, lctish, I 15, I 5B, I 97, 2I B, 23 I ,
253, lorm, I 11 , I 11-5, I 7 I ,
producing labor, I 5O-3
communism, I GI-2
concrctcIabor, 17, 252
conscrvatism, xviii, 1, I I , 1I , 59,
G2-1, B1, 93-G, 223, 2GI
conscrvativc 'right`) Hcgclians, 7,
I 2-3, 13, 222
construction constructivism), 9,
GO-3, G7, 93-1, 223-1
contcxt oldiscovcry, I 92O
contcxtolj ustibcation, I 9-2O
contracts, 91, 9G, I 97
crisis, I GB-9
'criticaI critiquc,` GO-GI , G1
'Critiqucolthc Gotha lrogrammc, `
253
Critique ofHegel 's "Philosopky ofRight, "
xv, 31, 5O, G5, B7, I O3, I I O, I I 3,
I 59, I G I , 2I 7 , 222, 23 I
Critique ofJudgment, 79
Critique ofPure Reason, I 1, 79, 253
crystal, 1B, I 12, I 19, I 51, I 79, 2G3
Larimon, Allrcd, I GG, 21G, 25G
Larwin, Charlcs, 259
dchistoricization, xvii-xviii, 3, 9, 72,
75, olthccatcgorics olcapitalist
socicty, 9G-I OO, I O7, I 2I3, I 2B,
I 115, I 17, I 57, 2OI , 2 I B, 22B9,
olcognitivc catcgorics, 99, olthc
cgoistic individuaI, 12-3, 5O-52,
51, 59, G3, G5, I 93-1, 2OI , ol
scicncc, I 9-2I
Lcmocritus,7
Lcscartcs, Kcnc, xvi, xx, I 3, 77B,
I 32-3, I 19, I 52, I 57, 2O9-I I , 2 I G,
25O, 255, 2GO, bit/blob olwax, I 32,
I 19, 2I I
dctcrminatc abstractions, xvi-xviii,
? I O7B, I 2 I9, I 1I7, I 5O,
I GG, I B I3, 2OO-I , 22B-9, 232,
213, 25 I -2
dctcrminatc ncgation, 2 I , 2I 1-5, 2 I 7
dialcctic scc thcory and practicc) . ol
thc catcgorics olcapitalism,
9B-I OO, 2O1-5, 229, 232, olthc
catcgorics olthc undcrstanding,
99-I OO, olconccpt and lact, xiv,
9I O, I 3-1, 25, 2B, 3O, IO7, ol
conccpt and objcct, I I B2O, ol
mcthod and subjcct mattcr, I O7,
I I O, olsubjcctandobjcct, I 31,
I G, 1O-l , 7O, 72
!
dictatorship olthc prolctariat, 3B
The Diference between the Democritean
and Epicurean Philosophy ofNature, I I
division olIabor, 9I-2, 97-B, 2O3
domination by abstractions, 19, I 15
doublc charactcr. olcapitalism, 17,
I 15, olthccommodity, I 1I , I 15,
.
I O, I G7-9, olcommodity-
producing Iabor, I 5O-I
doublcmovcmcntolthcanalysis ol
cxchangc-valuc, I 1BI 5O, 251
duaIisms d. lnlightcnmcnt, thcory
and practicc) , 5B9, bascvs.
supcrstructurc, xix, 3, bcing vs.
consciousncss, xix, 3, G9-72, body
vs . mind, 255, civilsocictyvs . statc
( l'homme vs. le citoen) , 3 I-3, 3539,
12-3, I G I , I 93, 23 I , 23B-1O,
conccpt vs. objcct, I O, I 2, 29,
1O-l , G3, contcnt vs. lorm, 9, ol
lnlightcnmcnt, 3O, 3G37, 13, 52,
G9-7O, 75, 2I OI 2, 2I B, 222, ol
Kantandichtc, 7, 23B, ol
Spinozistic substanccandichtcan
scll-consciousncss, G I , olthc
undcrstanding ( Verstand) , G I , 93, ol
Young Hcgclian thought, G2-3,
G9-72, 222, 213, human subj cct vs.
social conditions, BOl , idcalism
vs. matcrialism, xix, G9-72, 75, BI ,
93, 'is` vs. 'ought,' 9

I O, I 2, 3 I ,
222, logic vs. 'lacts,` 1O-13, 2I B,
23 I , natural vs. social scicncc, 75,

,
+

t

INDEX
ZJ
naturc vs. history, 75, primary vs.
sccondary qualitics, I 3 I-3, I 52,
I 57, 222, 2GO, production vs.
distribution, 21O, 213, 217,
scnsuous intuition vs . thc
undcrstanding, 2 I O2I G, 255,
usc-valucvs. cxchangc-valuc
valuc) , xvii, I 59, I G7-9, I BOI ,
I B3, I 9I-3, 2I O-I2, 2 I 5, 23 I-2,
255, 2GO
'lconomy,` 57
cgoistic individual cgoism) , 3G-7,
123, I 97, 2OO
EighJeenth Brumaire i Louis Bonaparte,
239
cmpiricism. HcgcI' s, 3O3, 39-13, in
sccond intcnsion, xiv, 1I , I O7, I I 3,
22B, olpoIiticaI cconomy, I 27,
scicntibc, I I 35, 22B, 23O, vulgar
scnsc-data) , I I 3-1, 22B, 23O, 219,
2G2, Young Hcgclian, G2-3
cmpiricists, 2O9
Encclopedia ofthe Philosophical Sciences,
1G, 5 I , I I 1, 2I G, 229
lngcIs, ricdrich, G7, I O3, I O9-I O,
I I 7, I 25, I GG, 2OO, 2OG
lnlghtcnmcnt [cI. modcrn
phiIosophy, duaIisms) , xvi, 3, 7, I 2,
I 7, 293 I , 3G7, 52, 5B, GI , GU7O,
735, 9O, 93-G, I OO, I 33, I 15, I B5,
2O9-I 2, 222, 23B, 213, HcgcI as
phiIosophcr ol, 13, G I , 7O, 9O, 2O9,
2I 2-20, mcthod ol, 9G-I 00,
morality ol, 91G, political thought
ol, 37, 91, I 9G-2O7, 215
lpicurus, 7, I I-I B, 1I , 5B, G5, B23,
93, 221
cpistcmoIogy, xvi, xviii, I OB, I I 7-2O,
I 2B-9, 2 I 1, 25O
cquality, 91-7, I9B2O3, 222, 215-G,
right to, 39, I 97
cquivalcnt valuc-lorm, I 51-7, I GB,
univcrsal, 2 I I
lrdmann,johann lduard, I 2
lsau, 2O3
csscnccand appcarancc, xvii, I O7B,
I 3 I-I 35, 22B, 23O-I , 253, classical
Cartcsian) modcI ol, I 32-5, I 5O,
I 52, I B1, 23 I
csscncc logic ( Wesenslogik) , xvixviii,
25, 35-9, 71, 77, I OB, I 3 I-I 35,
I 52-1, I 5G, I 5B-GI , I 725,
2I O-I I , 2I 1, 22G, 22B, 23OI , 235,
219, 252-3, Iawolappcarancc,
I G1-GG, 23O
cvolution, 9I , 215
'lxccrpts lrom Mill`s Elements of
Political Econorr, " 15, 57, 21O, 25G
cxchangc-valuc, xvii, 17, 95, I I G, I 31,
I 1I5, I 1G-GO, I 7B, 2OO, : I 9-2O,
2515, 25B, as goal olcirculation,
I 7B, 22O
cxtcrnalization olthcIdca, 5I , GG
lacts, 39-13, 75G, B2
lanaticism, 37
lctishism cl. capital, commodity, and
moncy) , I G, 52-3, I 15, 2I B, 23G,
253
cucrbach, Ludwig, xvxvi, xviii, 1,
I 2, 2B, 31-G, 1G, 19, G3-1, 75-7,
B3, 92, I 21, I 2G, I 13, I 5B9,
I 923, 2I 9, 222, 22G, 23 I-2, 235,
237, 21I , 211, 251, 257-B
cycrabcnd, laul, 235, 21O, 257-B
ichtc,johann, 1, 7, 9, I I , 293O,
G I , I I 0, 23B
ischcr, K. l. , I 2
bxcd idca, 9G
lorccs olproducton, xix
lorms c. catcgorics, commodity,
moncy, pricc, valuc) . contcnt ol,
xix, I 0O, I 07, I I 35, I 27, I G3,
I G7-75, 2OO-I , 2O3, 22G, 22B32,
25G, olconsciousncss, 7, l 1-7,
I 9-2O, philosophical contcnt oI

cconomiclorms, I B9, 23O,

contcnt olcconomic lorms, I B9,
I 952O7, 22G, thco-logicol
cconomic lorms, I B9, I 9I-1, 230,
25B, olconsciousncss, 7
lourlold ncxus cI. conscrvatism,
idoIatry, subjcctivism,
transccndcncc), xviii, 1, I I I 3, 1I ,
G2-1, B2, 93-G, 223, 2GI
lrccdom, I 972O3, 222, 21G, 25B
rcnch politics, 91
rcnchKcvolution, 37B, 12, 2OG,
23B-9, 2GO
Z1 INDEX
rics,j. . , 223, 262
GaIiani, crdinando, 2 1 7, 26 1
GaIiIci, GaIiIco, 1 3, 21 0
gcncraI abstractions, xvi-xviii, ?
107-8, 1 21-9, 1 41 , 1 44, 147,
1 50-1 , 1 66, 200-1 , 228, 232, 243,
25 1
The German Ideology, xv, xvii, xx, 3,
57-59, 61 , 63, 67-72, 83, 87, 1 08,
1 21 , 1 24-6, 1 28, 1 48, 225;
'cucrbach` scction, 63, 67-72,
1 24-6, 251-2
ghost ghostIyobj cctivity) , 48, 1 49,
1 7 1 , 1 74-5
God, 50, 96, 1 91 -3, 2 1 1 , 2 1 3-1 5,
232, 254, 257-8; olhistory, 68, 92;
Lamb o, 1 58-9
Gotha lrogrammc cl 'Critiquc ol
thc Gotha lrogrammc`) , xviii, 1 47
Gou|dncr, A|vn, 235
Gray, johnrancis, 1 66-7, 246, 256
Grundrisse, xiii, xvi, 1 7, 1 08-9, 1 1 4,
1 21 , 1 24, 1 26-7, 1 39, 1 60, 1 64,
1 66, 1 84-5, 1 96, 2 1 9, 228, 252, 259
Habcrmas,jirgcn, 235, 250
Hanson, lorwood KusscII, 240
having, 52
Haym, KudoIph, 1 2
HcgcI, G. W. . spccihcwritings
Iistcd individuaIIy) . as crudc
cmpiricist, 39-43; as phiIosophcr ol
capitaI, 3, 7, 26, 45-54, 59, 65-6,
98, 1 45, 209, 2 1 2-20, 222, 227,
260; conccptolthcconccpt, 9,
21 6-7, 237, 260; conccpt olthc
scI, 26; critiquc olthc cIassicaI
Cartcsian) modcI olcsscncc and
appcarancc, 1 33-4, 1 52; critiquc ol
thc undcrstanding ( Verstand), 60,
99-1 00, 1 07, 1 33-4, 1 74-5, 209,
21 3-1 6, 224, 238; critiqucolvuIgar
scnsc-data) cmpiricism, 1 1 3-4;
Iogic ol, 30-1 , 34-6, 43, 5 1 , 74,
97, 1 00, 1 1 0-1 , 1 1 3, 1 1 6, 1 1 9-20,
1 33-4, 1 52, 1 58, 1 61 , 1 64-5,
1 70-5, 1 77-8, 1 84, 21 8-20, 222,
23 1 , 252-3, 260; on thcrcnch
KcvoIution, 3 7-8, 206-7, 238-9;
thcoIogicaIcharactcrolhis thought,
34-5, 90-1 , 1 00; thcoryolrcaI
scicncc (Realwissenschajt) , 25,
28-30, 33, 40-1 , 1 1 0-1, 1 1 3,
1 1 9-20, 2 1 8
historicaI matcriaIism, xix-xx, 3-4,
67-78, 90, 1 08, 1 25, 1 94, 200, 21 0,
222, 227
historicism, 74, 77
historicity cl. dctcrminatc
catcgorics ) , olcapitaIistlorms ol
Iilc, 90, 1 00, 1 446, 1 82-5, 252; ol
cIassicaI poIiticaI cconomy, 240,
252; ollorms olthc division ol
Iabor, 91-2; olHcgcI`s phiIosophy,
45-51 , 209, 21 2-20; olIabor-
powcr, 1 8 1 ; olscicntihc thcorics,
xiv-xviii, ?_ 1 4-5, 1 7, 1 9-21 , 72,
74-7, 1 00, 227, 252; olthcorcticaI
and practicaI rcason, 82
historiography: spccuIativc, 68-72, 76
Hobbcs, Jhomas, 42, 76-7, 1 3 1
hoard, 1 78-9, 1 93, 21 1 , 21 5, 2 1 7
Hodgskin, Jho mas, 246
Ho|bach, Baron d` [lau|-Hcnr
Jhiry), 73-4, 238, 243
The HOfy FamifY, xv, 3, 57-61 , 67, 70,
83, 87, 1 3 1 , 2 1 1 , 232, 250; 'Jhc
Mystcry olSpccu|atvc
Construction, ` 60-1 ; 'Jhc
SpccuIativcCircuIation olAbsoIutc
Critiquc and thc lhiIosophy ol
+
ScIl-conscousncss, ` 60
Howard, Lick, 235
Hugo, Gustav, 29
humanrights cl. Iibcrty, cquaIity,
propcrty, sccurity), 36-7, 39, 42,
1 97, 201 , 204, 245
Humc, Lavid, 1 7
Hunt, l. H. , 38, 240
ldca, xvi, 28-30, 33, 5 1 , 91
idee fxe (See bxcd idca)
idcoIogy cl The German Ideology) ,
1 9-2 1 , 77-8, 1 24-5; Gcrman, 67,
83, 97, 1 1 3, 1 25; YoungHcgcIian,
63, 65-6
idoIatry, xviii, 4, 1 1-1 3, 41 , 82,
93-6, 223, 261
immancncc, xvi, ? 3-4, 7, 1 0- 1 1 ,

'

.
.

!
INDEX ZJ
I 3, I G-B, 2O, 3O, 1I -3, 57, 7OI ,
B3-1, I O7, I 1G, I G5, 2I B, 222, 22B,
237
immancntcritiquc. o! cmpiricism,1I ,
I I 1, olHcgcI, 3 , 7 , 2O-I, 25,
27-13, 57, 2 l 2, 2 I B, olpoIiticaI
cconomy, I I I , 2O1, 2OG, olthc
poIiticaIvaIucs olthc rcnch
KcvoIution, 2OG
InbegriO; GG, I 731, I B I , 257
incarnation, G I-2, 9 I , I 1B, I 51-G,
I 7 I , I 75, I 9I-2, 2 I I , 2I 5
'inhationism, ` 229, 219
instrumcntolproduction, xviii, I 23
intcIIcctuaI intuition, 31, 5O, 59-G2,
7B, 9I , 237-B
intcrcst, 9G, I O7, I I G
invcrsion, 29-3O, 9I , 21I , undcr
capitaIism, xvi, 53, I 75, I 7B
invcrtcd worId, 19, GOI , I 7 I ,

2I B-2O
invcrtivc mcthod, 2B, 97, I 13, 2 I 9,
237, 21I
judaism, B3, I 9I-1, 2I O, 25B
Kant, !mmanucI cl. Critique of Pure
Reason, intcIIcctuaI intuition,
thing-in-itscIl), xvxvii, 1, 7, 9, I I ,
I 1, 2U-3O, 33-1, 19-5O, G2, 72,
7B-BO, B2, 9I -2, 99-I OO, I I O,
I I 79, I 21, I 71-5, I 9I , I 99,
2OU-I 7, 223, 225, 232, 237-B, 21I ,
215-7, 253, 255, 257
Kocvc, AIcxandcr, 223, 2GI
KugcImann, Ludwig, I I 7, 2G3
Kuhn, Jhomas, xiv, 23G
Iabor cl. abstract conccptolIabor,
abstractIabor, concrctcIabor) . as
consumption olIabor-powcr, I B I ,
as opposcd to Iabor-powcr, 2O2-3,
2G3, as originaI modcol
appropriation, I 9B, HcgcI`s conccpt
ol, 17-5I , ingcncraI, 17, I 27, not
thc sourccolaIIwcaIth, I 17-B,
sans phrase, 97, 'supcrnaturaI
crcativcpowcr` ol, I17-B
Iabor-powcr, 1B, 5I , I 19, I BOB5, I 97,
2O25, 2I G, 22G, 2G3
Iaborproccss,xvi, I 2B, 232
Iabor thcory olvaIuc, 17, 95, I 2B,
I 31, I 5O, 229, 219
Lakatos, ! mrc, 235
Iandcd propcrty, xviii, I 21, 2I 9, 229,
232
LassaIIc, crdinand, I I O, I 95, 21B
Iaw olappcarancc scc csscncc Iogic)
Iaw-making powcr, 3I -3, 35, 23 I
Lectures on the Histo) of Philosophy, 253
Lectures on the Philosophy ri Religion, 2 I 1
Lclort, CIaudc, 235
Lcibniz, Gottlricd, 2OO,2O9, 2I G
Lcnin, V. . Lcniust) , 3B-9, 57, 223
Lcskc, KarI WiIhcIm,xv, 232, 21I
'Lcttcr to hisathcr,` xviii, 9I O,
I I O, 22I
IibcraI or 'Iclt`) HcgcIians cl.
YoungHcgcIians) , 7, I I -3, 2O, 13,
222
Iibcrty. right to, 39
Lockc,john, GG, 97, 2OG
Iogic [clduaIisms, lorms, and
catcgorics) , as thc moncy olspirit,
1B-9, 52-3, 2 I 92O, 23 I , ol
abstractindividuaIs, 7, I 1-7, 221,
olactuaI things, 1, 1I , I I O, I I 3,
I 15, I B1, 2 I B, 227, olbcing, I 33,
I 72-3, I 75, I 77, olcapitaI, 15, GG,
9O, I 7 7-B5, I 9I-1, I 9G, 2O9,
2I 2-2O, 2GO-I , olcapitaIist
cconomiclorms, 1, 2G, 17, I B9, I 95,
222, 22G-7, olciviI socicty, I I O,
I GI-2, olcIassicaIpoIitical
cconomy, B7, 9O, olcommodity
production, GG, 77, olcommunaI
production, I GO-2, 255,ol
dctcrminatc abstractions, I 23-7,
lnIightcnmcnt, 52, G I , 7O, 73, 9O,
95, 2O9-I 2, 222, 23B, 215, ol


gcncraI abstractions, I 22-7, ol
HcgcIianphiIosophy, 1, 2G, 29,
1G-51, 5B, G I , G3-G, B7, I OO, I 59,
2O9, 2I 2-2O, 222, 23 I , 2GO-I , ol
modcrn phiIosophy, B7, 2O9-I 2,
2GI , olmodcrn socicty, 1I , I B9, ol
moncy, I 59, I G2, I 9I-3, 2I 5, ol
practicaI Iilc, 1, I 1-5, GG, 72, 9O,
2IO, olprimary quaIitics, I 19, ol
rcIigion, 3+G, 53, GO, GG, 73, B3,
I 5B-9, I G I , 2I O, 2 I 9-2O, 217, 253,
-
- --
Z0
|
INDEX
oscicncc, l17, l 92 l , G l , G9, 72,
93, I 07, 22B, olsccondary quaIitics,
I 33, olsimpIc commodity
circuIation, I 9G, 2015, 209-I 2,
25G, 2G0-I , olthcorics, xvi, ol
utiIity, 73-1, olvaIuc, 9G, I 0B, I 19,
I G0, 22G, 21G,olVerstand, G0-I , GG,
75-7, 93, 95, I 00, I 33
markct, 51, I G0, I G9, I BI -3, I 9B9,
202-3, 20-6, 22G, vaIuc, I G1
Marx, KarI spccihc writings Iistcd
individuaIIy) . artistic-moraI
conccrns, 9-I0, 22I , conccpt ol
rationaIity, I G, critiquc ol
cmpiricism, 1I , I 27, 22B, critiquc ol
Icucrbach, xv, 7-7, I 5B-9, 23 I2,
critiqucolHcgcI, xv, 27-13,
15-51, 9BI00, I I 0I , I I 5-I 20,
I 21-G, I15, I 59, 209, 2 I 222,
22G-B, 23 I2, 237-9, critiquc ol
modcrn phiIosophy, xv, I 15, I B9,
209-I 2, 222, 2G0, critiqucol
poIiticaI cconomy, xv, 222, critiquc
olpositivism, xiii-xvi, , 1I , B2,
225, 2G2, critiqucollroudhon,
B9-I 00, 20G, 2G0, critiquc ol
rcIigionxv, B I , B3-1, I 15, I 5B9,
I B9, I 9 I-1, 2I 0, 222, critiquc ol
scicntihccmpiricism, l 07, l l 3-5,
critiqucolscnsc-datacmpiricism,
I 07, I I 3-1, dcvcIopmcnt and unity
olhis thought, xv, 15-7, 5251,
57-59, B7, B9, 9B-l 00, l 07-B,
I I 0-I , I I 3, I I 9-20, I 13, I 15-G,
I B1, I B9, I 9I1, 201, 209-32, 21B,
255, doctoraI disscrtation, xv, xviii,
3-1, 7, l l-2l , 25, 1l , 13, 1G, 19,
57-B, G2, G5, B2, B7, 93, I UU, 2I 2,
22I , 2215, 23I , carIy systcm ol
j urisprudcncc, 9, 10, I I 0, gcnctic
mcthod,1l -3,humanismoI,xiv-xv,
, 7, I 0, 2-G, 31, 3G, 15, 52-51,
G1-5, GB, 7B, B0, I GI-2, 22I , 21I ,
naturaIism in, xvi, 15, I I B9, I 25,
I 2B, 232, ncw Iogicol, I 0, 3 I ,
3G-9, I I I
matcriaIistphcnomcnoIogy, 72-7, I B9
matcriaIists. lngIish, 73, 7 G-7,
Ircnch, G9, 73, 7G-7, B l , B3, 209,
213
Mattai, KudoIph, G3
McLcIIan, Lavid, 21B
McMurtry,john, 25l
McndcIssohn, Moscs, 2G2
mcthod, I G1, 22I2, 22732, 2G3,ol
Verstand, 9bI00
mirac|c, G0, G2
MiII,jamcs, 15, 57, 210, 255G
MiII,john Stuart, I 2l , I 23, 210, 250
modcrn phiIosophy cl.
lnIightcnmcnt), xv-xvi, I 3, l B, B7
moncy, xvii, xix, 5I1, I15, I G3-I 75,
255, andprcciousmctaIs, I 9G, and
thc ontoIogicaI prool, 1950,
2I 0I G, as cxprcssion olvaIuc,
1B50, I 31, I 51-G0, I G23, 229,
asmcansolcircuIation, I G3,
I G7-7 I , I 9G, 2 I 5, as mcasurcol
vaIuc, I 9G, as such moncyper se) ,
I G3, I 70-5, I 93, I 9G, 2I 0, 2 I 9,
25B, 2G0, contradictions ol, I 7 I2,
I 7 7-9, 2 I I , 2G0, lctish, 53, I 51-G,
2 I B, 253, form, I 15, I 51-5, I G3,
I 77 , magicol, I 51-5, riddIc o,
I51, I 57, thcoryol, I 39, translormcd
into capitaI, 5I , I 39, IG3, I 72-3,
I B1, I 9G, 202/, 2 I 5
moraIity, G3, 79, 22I-G
'moraIity,` 79-B1, 93-1, 2231
Les mysteres de Paris, G0, G3, G5, 212
myth ol Midas, 5 I , I 75
naturaI scicncc, xix, 1, I0, 717,
I 3 I2
naturaIization sccdchistoricization)
lcwLcI, xiii, xix
lcwtonian lramcwork, 257-B
'l otcs onWagncr,` xvii, I 13
C|d Lclt, xix
CIIman, BcrtcII, I 1I-1, 253
'Cn thcjcwish_ucstion,` 35-G, 15,
50, 57, G5, B7, I 59, I G 2, I 9 I-3
onto|ogica| proo, 31, 1950, 59,
2I 0I G
organic compositionolcapitaI, 230,
232

1
|

l
i

INDEX
Z
Crigcn, G1-5, 212
Cwcn, Kobcrt, 21G, 255
paraIogism, I 2 1, I 27B, I 17, I GG,
20 I , 22B9
Paris Manuscripts, xiii, xv, 3, 25G, 13,
1551, 57, 59, G I , G1, GG, B7, I 03,
I 0B, I 2 I , I 2B, I G2, 201, 2I B, 23 I ,
21B, 2GI
lauI, Saint, I 92, I 91
lcircc, C. S. , 7B, 211
pcrson, I 99, 20I
Phenomenology ofSpirit cf. HcgcI) ,
I 3-1, I G-7, I 9, 25-B, 1I , 13,
155I , 51, 59GI , 7 I-3, 77, B I ,
B1, I I 3, I I B, I 20, 2 I 3, 2 I G, 2 I B,
223, 211, 'AbsoIutcIrccdomand
Jcrror,` 20G, 223, 'AbsoIutc
KnowIcdgc,` 223, 'Conscicncc.
Jhc 'BcautiluI SouI,` lviI and !ts
Iorgivcncss,` 223, 'Iorcc and
!ndcrstanding,` 19, G0, 77, Iabor
in, I 1, 1751, 'Jhc Law olthc
Hcartand thc Ircnzy ol
ScIl-conccit,` 223, 'Jhc Lord and
thc Bondsman,` 223, 2123,
'MoraIity ` B I 'lcrccption ` 77
J J
'ScIl-Consciousncss,` G5, 'Jhc
SpirituaIKcaIm olAnimaIs and
Lcccption or thc Jhing !tscll,` 51,
200, 259, '1hc StruggIc ol
lnIightcnmcntwithSupcrstition,`
73, 'Jhc !nhappyConsciousncss,`
B I , 'Virtuc and thcWayolthc
WorId,` BI , 223
phiIosophcr`s stonc, GI , 2 I I
Philosophy ofRight, xvi, 2 I , 25, 2730,
331, 37, 39, 123, 1G, 59, G21,
9G, I 07B, I 20, 2 I B, 223, 227-9,
237B, 21B
lhysiocrats, I 2 I
pincaI gIand, 255
lIato, I I , 37, 39, 1I , B1, 93, 223, 23 I ,
Th Republic, 37, Th Statesman, B1
loIanyi, MichacI, 217
poIiticaI charactcr, olscicntibc
mctbods, 92
postfestum mcdiation, I 59-GI
lostonc,Moishc,xix,235,217,251,2G2
lot, loI, 3B, 239
positivism cl. Marx) , xiiixvi, xx,
22I , 235
The Povert o Philosophy, xv, 1, B9, 93,
9G, I I 3
practicaI phiIosophy, 7BB1
practicc, 79B1, 22I , 223, 225G
pragmatism, 7B
praxic turn, I B, 5B, olthc IibcraI
HcgcIians, I 2
prccstabIishcd harmony, I I G, I 97,
I 99200, 215
prclabricatcd prccstabIishcd) Iogicor
conccpts,29, 13 , 59, G3, I 0I ,
I I 3, 2I B, 22G
prcsuppositionIcssncss, xvii, 59, GB,
I 25, I 1B
pricc, I G37, I 70, 230, 25G,lorm,
I G37, 25G, Iawolpricc, G37,
I G9, 25G, ncccssary dircncc lrom
vaIuc, xviii, I G3-7, 25G, 2G3,
nominaIist thcoryolpricc, I G37,
olproduction, 230, 21950, 2G23
primitivc accumuIation, 22G, 23B,
25B9
production vs. distribution, xix, I 23,
I 25G
probt, 9G, I 11, 229, 2G3, ratc ol, xvii,
I 35, 229, 230
proIctariat, 3B
lromcthcus, I 2
propcrty cl. Iandcd propcrty) , GG, 9B,
I 9720I , petit-bourgeois, 20G,
principIcolappropriation, GG, I 5,
I 979, 2017, 21G, 259,right to,

3G, 39, I 97
lrotcstantism, I 91
lroudhon, xv-xvi, xviii-xx, 1,
B9I 00, I I 3, I GG, 20G, 223, 225,

227, 212, 215-7, 2G0, Th Philosoph .

ofPovert, B9, lroudhonians, 25,
I GG, What is Property?, 99
providcncc, I 97
purc wiII, B0-I
rationaI syIIogism, 25, 3 I ,
33-1,
1950, 2I B20, 23 I , 23B
rcbcIIion, B0-I
rcciprocaI ccct, G9
Zd INDl'
rcductionism, 97, I O7, I I G-7, I 17,
I G1, 2O1, 229, 251-G
Kcichclt, Hclmut, 2GO
Kcichcnbach, Hans, 23G
rcihcation cf. lctish), I 33, I 57, 2I B,
222, Cartcsian, I 52, I 57, I 75, 2 I O
Kcinickc, Hclmut, 2G2
rclations olproduction, xix
rclativc valuc-lorm, I I 5, I 55-7, I GB
rclation olrcbcction, I 2
rclativism, I 9, 2I , 71
rcligion, rcligious logic scclogic)
rcn t, 9G, 251
rcvcrsal d. propcrty) . olthc abstract
politicalidcals olthc rcnch
Kcvolutioninto tcrror, 2OG-7, 223,
olbcinginto csscncc, I 72, I 75, ol
moncy into capital, I 72, I B3, ol
simplc circulation`s lawol
appropriation into thclawol
capitalistappropriation, 2O1-G, 259
rcvolution, 3B-9, BO-I , 239, political
bourgcois ) , 12-3
Die Rheinische Zeitung, 2 I , 27
Kicardo, Lavid, xv, xvii, 1, 25, 17, B7,
B9, 91-5, 9B, I I 7, I 3 I -2, I 31-5,
I 5O, I 52-3, 2O2, 2OG, 229-3 I , 212,
25G, lclt-wing Kicardians, 95, 21G,
Principles ofPolitical Econom} and
Taxation, I 31, 229
rights olman scc humanrights)
Kjazanov, Lavid, 237
Kobinson,joan, 23 I , 219
Korty, Kichard, xiv
Kosdolsky, Koman, 21B-9
Koscnkranz, Karl, I 2
Kothschild, I 91
Kubcl, Maximilicn, 21B
Kugc, Arnold, I 2
Saycr, Lcrck, 235, 25O
SchcIling, . W. j. v. , I O
scicncc olhistory,7 3 , I 25-G,
22G-7, 252
Science ofLogic, 27, 31, 5I , 57, G3, I I G,
I 2O, I G5, I 7O-5, I B1, 222-3, 229,
237-B, 219, 2GO, 'JhcLa wol
Appcaranccs,` I G5
scicntibc prcscntation cl. mcthod) ,
I l O-I , I I 5-7, I I 9, I 21, I 11, I G I ,
I B1, I 95, 22B-32, 2G2-3
Schnadclbach, Hcrbcrt, 237
Schulcr,jcannc, 2G2
Schwcitzcr,j. B. , 99
sccurity, 39
Scllars, Willrcd, 21O
Scmmig, Hcrmann, GB
scnscccrtainty cl. cmpiricism), I G,
1I3
simplc commoditycirculation,
I G7-75, I 77-B5, I 9I-3, I 95-2O7,
229, 21G, 25G, 2GO
skcpticism, I5, IB, I 71
Smith, Adam, 39, B7, I 3 I-2, I 53,
I99, 217, 252
socialism, I 1B, I G1, I GG-7, 2OG, 222,
229, 255G, bourgcois, 95, I GG-7,
2OG, rcnch and/orGcrman, xv,
xviii, 57, I GG, Gcrman Workcrs`
larty, I 17, lroudhonian, 91, 99,
I GG, 2OG, 21G, Kcardian, 95, 21G,
Jruc, G I , G3, GB, 93, 9B, I I O,
utopian, 95, 222, 255-G
spccics-bcing, 3G, I GI , 21I , 211
Spinoza, Baruch, xvi, I I , G I , 2O9,
2I 3, 2I G, 222, 2GO, 2G2
Stalin,joscph, 3B
statc (see dualisms),
Stcuart, Sirjamcs, I 2I
Stirncr, Max johann Kaspar
Schmidt), 1G, 59, GI -G3, G5-G, 73,
75, 79-B3, 92-3, 9B, I I O, I I 3, 223,
225, 212, 2G I
Stoicism, I B
Strauss, L. . , 31, GI
subjcctivism cl. construction) , xviii,
1, 9-I 3, I 5-G, 1I , 93-G, I I O, I I 3,
223-5, 2GI
subscrvicncc, G2-1
substancc, GI , 71, 2O9, 2I G, inHcgcl,
3O, 2O9, 2 I G, valuc-constituting,
I 2B, I 12, I 19-5I , 2I G, 251
Suc, lugcn, GO, G3, 212
Sung, Kim il, 3B
surplus-valuc, 9G, I 73, I 79-BI , I 92,
2OI , 2O5, 2I 7 , 229, 2G I , as opposcd
to surplus product, 2O2, ratcol,
xvii, I 35, 229,riddlc ol, I79-B I ,
I B1-5, 2O5, thcory o[ xv, xvii, I 7,
I 35, I 7B-B I

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INDEX 279
SzcIiga [Iranz ZychIin von
Zychlinski), 60, 62-3, 65, 242
Jaylor, Charlcs, xiv, 22 1 , 227, 235
tcchnical composition olcapital, 232
tcchnological dctcrminism, xix
tclcology cl. cvolution), 1 7-8, 1 94; ol
history, 68, 91-3, 226, 246
tcrror, xviii, 38, 80, 83-4, 206-7, 223
'thcIruit,` 60, 65, 96, 1 1 8, 1 43, 2 1 1 ,
250
thcology cflorm) . olcapital, 1 91-4;
olhistory,68-9, 90-3; olmoncy,
49-50, 1 91-3, 21 3
The(ies ofSurplus- Value, 249-50, 252,
262
'Jhcscs onIcucrbach,` 57-8, 63-4,
67, 70; clcvcnth thcsis, xviii, 4,
63-4; lourth thcsis, 231-2; sccond
thcsis, 244; third thcsis, 83, 92
thcory and practicc, xiv, xviii, 4, 7,
61 -4, 79-84, 92-6, 225, 262
thing-in-itscllc Kant), 1 4, 1 74-5,
1 91 , 21 0, 224, 260
thinghood, 48, 50, 209, 2 1 3, 240
third-party mcdiation, xvii, 3 1-3,
35-6, 53, 59, 73, 83-4, 9 1 , 96,
1 1 1 , 1 48-9, 1 59-62, 1 67 , 21 O-1 1 ,
2 1 9-20, 23 1-2, 253, 255
third thing, 1 64-5
'timc-chits, ` 1 66, 246
totalitarianism, xvii, 38
'Joward thcCritiqucolHcgcl's
Philosophy ofRight: !ntroduction,`
1 89
Toward the Critique ofPolitical Economy,
1 09, 1 39, 1 63, 1 66, 195-6
transccndcncc, xviii, 4, 1 0-1 3, 82,
93-6, 223, 225, 261 ; in Hcgcl,
3 1-2, 41 , 62-3, 99
transccndcntal schcma, 255
Jrinitarian Iormula, 1 23, 21 8-9,
229, 253
Jrinity. Blcsscd, 41 , 1 92; olpropcrty,
cquality, and lrccdom, 1 98, 200-1
Juckcr, Kobcrt, xii, 235, 261

Urtext, 1 09, 1 39, 1 7 1-2, 1 75, 1 82,
1 84, 1 96-7
uscluI [concrctc) Iabor, xviii, 1 5 1-3,
1 56, 1 69
usc-valuc cl. dualisms), xvixvii,
47-8, 52, 65-6, 95, 1 28, 1 41-5,
1 47, 1 49-53, 1 57-61 , 1 70-1 ,
1 74-5, 1 78, 254-5; as goal ol
circulation, I78-9; as sourcc ol
surplus-valuc, 1 80-1 , 21 5-6
utilitarianism, 4, 72-4, 77-8, 83, 87,
193
utilitarians, 209
valorizationproccss, 5 1 , 1 78-9, 209,
21 6-7, 232
valuc, 52-3, 65, 69, 77, 94, 96-7,
1 07, 1 32, 1 42-85, 201 , 206,
209-20, 228-32, 239, 250-1 , 256;
cxprcssion, 1 53-7, 1 60; lorm, xvii,
25, 48-9, 5 1 , 1 1 4, 1 44-5, 1 48,
1 53-8, 1 63, 1 68, 229, 23 1 , 249,
254-5; lawo, 96, 1 1 7, 1 3 1 , 229-30;
magnitudc, 1 3 1 , 1 53, 1 65, 1 7 1 , 1 80;
mcasurcol, 1 50, 254; mctaphysics
o, 96-7, 21 0, 23 1 ; miror, 1 56,
1 60, 1 68, 254; producinglabor, 49,
1 50-3, 1 60, 1 80, 1 84; thcory ol, xv,
1 7, 25, 47-8, 95, 1 07, 1 1 7, 1 35, 1 39,
1 47-62, 1 95, 21 0, 231 , 253-4,
262-3
.
Vico, Giambattista, xix
von Cicszkowski, August, 1 2
wagc-labor, xviii, 5 1 , 1 24, 1 44,
202-3, 205, 21 9, 229, 232
wagcs, 98, 251
Wagncr, Adolph, 1 43, 232
wcalth, xviii, 141-2, 1 44, 147-8,
2 1 6, 254, 258
YoungHcgclians d Baucr,
Icucrbach, Strauss, von
Cicszkowski, libcral Hcgclians),
xv-xvi, xviii, ? 3-4, 7, 41 , 46,
57-66, 69, 73, 8 1-2, 89-90, 93,
95-6, 98, 1 00, 103, 209, 223;
philosophcrs olcapitalism, 65-6,
69, 1 45, 222, 261
Zcus, 21 0