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Radical Arist6telianismthe Faculties of Arts.
The case of Siger of Brabant
B. Carlos Baz ^n, F.R. S. C., Ottawa
k:.
I. Sense of the Expression
L.,
edievalists are currently in excellent position toassess the different forms of

' totelianismin the thirteenthand fourteenthcenturies. Many texts have

; been critically edited,' and the historians of philosophy have produced sur-
^
ys, monographs and general interpretations that give comprehensive and

tensive coverage tothe phenomenon. 2 It is not the purpose of this paper to

synthesize the results of this enormous amount of scholarly work. My way of
ayinghomage tothe work of my colleagues will be torely on their findings.
1 hope, however, tocontribute tothe scholarly dialogue by raisingsome
Jns concerningbasic issues that have intrigued me every time that I have
needed toexamine the subject. For practical reasons I will focus the attention
^ n issues pertainingonly tophilosophical anthropology.
First of all, there is the question concerningthe meaningof the expression
radical Aristotelianism, towhichis attached a certain connotation of ex-
4 emism, heterodoxy and (perceived) cultural danger ^ Neither the mere ad-
rence toAristotelian principles and the exclusion of theological interference
en doingnatural philosophy, nor the mere effort topresent faithfully the
thentic meaningof Aristotelian texts while they are object of teachingcan
ccount for that connotation.
IBibliography at the end of the article. -
! ,
limited 2 Bibliographical notemited tosome of the most important monographs that have
dealt withradical Aristotelianismin the last fifty years, the reader will find in the
works listed a more complete bibliographical information: VAN S^rrsERGHEN 1 977
(the most complete study on the Brabantine master); GAVrHt 1 951 ; Dusr 1 954 ; DA
PALMA1 955; NARni 1 960, part. 1 1 9-1 61 ; KuxsEwicz 1 968 (the most comprehensive
:study on the different representatives of Averroism); HissF=1 977; KRF:TZ MANN
H KEG/Pmi oRG 1 982part. the articles Garr 1 982, LoR1 982and WLE Aivn
1 982; WIPPFL 1 987; BiANCHi 1 990; DE LmsaA1 994 ; PUTALLAZ /IMBACH1 997; PrcH
1 999. Althoughnot monographs, the followingstudies by R. -A. GAUTHIERshould bel
mentioned: GAurHsR1 94 6-1 94 7; GAUTHIER1 983; GAurmER1 984 . On the four-
teenthand fifteenthcenturies, the classic monographs remain NAizni 1 94 5; NARDi6j'
1 958; they should be completed by the studies of MAHoNEY 1 968; MAHoNEY 1 976b;
MAHoNEY 1 976a; MAHoNEY 1 983; MAHONEY 1 986, MAHoNEY 1 991 ; BERNET2003.
I ^, I i i I
I'I'I
iI!
II
586B. Carlos Bazdn
As far as Aristotelian principles are concerned, they were pro
It could be argt
cepted, withdifferent levels of understandingand syncretism, by rnrs. . . ecause
they wer
arts whose orthodoxy is beyond any doubt. 3 Faithfulness tothe Aristot '
^
adingof Aristo
text was a main component of the basic i ntentti o of the masters of arts and
'"~ resent a more F
only hindered by their imperfect understandingof Aristotelian
do
ctrines ange the main
amples of remarkable courses on Aristotle's De ani ma
are not rare in the 'fir
fh{u1 1 y. My poi
half of the thirteenthcentury. This kind of exegetical work was an institu
ophical grounc
nal duty of the masters of arts. And this norm, as has been emphasized man-,
gain, it could
times by historians, found in Albert the Great an author whose orthodoy
rdi cal
insofar as
beyond doubt the strongest support: nihil ad me de Dei miraculis cumegos.
^w r
(equired by his 1
de naturalibus disseram. 5
Sholar or a hi:
value of texts); he
John 3Already at the very beginningof the thirteenthcentury,
ohn Blund, whostudied'
the expression
as
and taught bothin Paris and Oxford, adopted Aristotle's definition of the soul as
" tji
'ar'e beyond the i
p erfecti on of the body althoughwithin the general framework of anthroolo{ '
p
^ 1.'could
accepted,
dualismpervasive in the Latin West and demanded that theologians donot g
^ t '
applied totheolc
involved in the study of the nature of the soul (cf. IoANNEs BLONDUS,
Tractatus de's''
osophy as true<
c. II n. 21 -22, edd. Callus/Hunt, 7). Alittle bit later, Peter of Spain (the future po1
John XXI, whorequested the enquiry that led tothe Condemnation of 1 277
Jqq)^ t^ ^ch'=
d purely phile
ingprobably in Toulouse around 1 24 0, used liberally Aristotelian and Arabic
. `' }-
at
eir corporative
losophical sources, combined themin a syncretic anthropological dualism, and
ed, very muchin the same vein as John Blund, that the study of the nature
of the
soul as a substance belongs tothe metaphysician, the study of the nature of the s ^ l c^,s st s DE AQUINO,
the perfection of the body tothe natural philosopher, and only the study of the rewa raS DE BRABANTIA,
tl':
of the separated soul accordingtoits merits tothe theologian (cf. PETRus Hssrntvus, i Iostuas DE J^
De ani ma, ed. Alonso, esp. 76 and 78). These epistemological principles preside
vet
f. 25'. On Albe
Peter's personal work: his Sci enti a de ani ma (written probably between 1 250 and 1 26 Eclecticismwas
stays on the level of purely philosophical discourse even when he has todeal with' 1 , quired a privilc
jects as the origin, incorruptibility and immortality of the soul (cf. PETxus Hssr remained per
Sci enti a de ani ma, ed. Alonso). Except for a reference torewards granted tothe separate rcirculation of I
; s1 soul(ch. VIII, 333), noother theological subject is found in this treatise. There are n r . :been well estal:
quotations of theological authorities. Peter's philosophy is, of course, highly edec _ k ',the thirteenth
cal, withstronginfluence fromneoplatonic sources, particularly Avicenna. But thei F tonisant (cf.
F' ficulties toaccept his Sci enti a de ani ma as a truly philosophical treatise are not grease more recently
than the difficulties that could be found in writings of arabic authors.
bisme of thirt
4 The anonymous Commentary of Oxford, MSBodleian Lat. misc. C 70, is not onl . intellectual cris
the oldest complete exp osi ti o on Book III df that treatise, but alsoa true piece of iL aspect of the
I ,: totelian scholarship and pure philosophical exegesis (cf. ANot wMus, Sententi a sup er 114 Picii 1 999, 21
III De ani ma, ed. Baz ^n). The same can be said of the anonymous Commentary
^ Towrite arist<
Rome, MSNaz. V. E. 828, except for some reservations that its author made tosafe-
z ': duties. Why e
. . ' guard the area of competence of theologians out of personal concern more than ep
' and effortto t
temological or institutional conflict (cf. ANONYMUs, Lectura i n Li brum De ani ma, e
Pet'
:. lion that awaii
Dominica: the
Gauthier, see 1 8*-1 9* of the Introduction), and of the commentary of the Ps.
r:.
+r appointed
of Spain (Cf. Ps: PEnus Hisp u. us, Expositio li bri De ani ma, ed. Alonso).
men
i
5ALSEtrrus MAGNus, De gen. et corr. I, 1, c. 22(Ed. Colon. 5/1 ), 1 29, v. 1 5sq. ; cf. Tt,o
icussingstudies
4 ;Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts587
7 were progressively:
lcretism, by master's
Hess tothe Aristotel
masters of arts and
istotelian doctrines. 1
are not rare in the t
work was an institj
p een emphasized mz
hor whose orthodox
Dei miraculis cum
John Blund, whostudi,
lefinition of the soul as `d
aework of anthropologic
,at theologians donot
BLONDUS, Tractatus de thl
of Spain (the future Po
:emnation of 1 277), t
^ ac
istotelian and Arabic p]
ological dualism, and .
study of the nature ^ f
of the nature of the soul
sly the study of the rewai
3n (cf. PETRUSHlsPANps,
ical principles preside.
^ between 1 250 and 1 2f
=n he has todeal with 0
sa
soul (cf. PETRUSHlsp . ,
ds granted tothe separ^t
this treatise. There are',
s, of course, highly ecde
arly Avicenna. But the''_
cal treatise are not gr^ ^
authors.
at. misc. C 70, is not or
i t alsoa true piece of A
roNYMUS, Sententi a sup er 11
Ionymous Commentary'
at its author made t^ sa
al concern more than t!
'a i n Li brum De ani ma,
mmentary of the Ps. -Pe
3. Alonso).
'1 ), 1 29, v. 1 5 sq. ; cf. Tf
It could be argued that most of these masters were able toavoid radicalism
:because they were in fact eclectic Neoplatonists whoincorporated in their
readingof Aristotle many non-aristotelian principles that allowed themto
presen
t a more palatable Aristotle toChristian minds. 6 But that does not
'change the main intention of the masters, whichwas tounderstand Aristotle
; faithfully. My point is that the willingness toexplain Aristotle on strictly phi-
losophica
l grounds is not what could define radi cal aristotelianism.
Again, it could be argued that even if a master should not be considered
i adi cal
insofar as he remains at the level of philosophical analysis of texts as
requir
ed by his professional duties (he would then be just an Aristotelian
scholar
or a historian of philosophy whoneed not decide about the truth
value of texts); he would become a radi cal if he embraces Aristotelian thought
as the expression of a true philosophy that enlightens fields of knowledge that
are beyond the institutional borders of the faculties of arts. This criterion, if
accepted, could have some curious consequences. By extension it could be
applied totheologians who, like Thomas and Albert, valued Aristotelian phi-
losophy as true philosophy, devoted muchof their time towritingextensive
^
nd. purely philosophical commentaries on Aristotle's works, went beyond
(heir corporative duties in doingso, 7 and used Aristotelian principles as the
MASDE AQUINo, Summa theologi ae, I Pars, q. 76, a. 5 ad lm(Ed. Leon. 5), 228; SIGERUS
DE BRABANTmA, De ani ma i ntellecti va c. III, ed. Baz^n, 84 , v. 4 7-4 8. They are echoed by
'N' . . IO aNNESDE JANDUNo, Quaesti ones i n XII li bros Metap hysi cae, I q. 4 (Ed. Venice 1 553),
`. f. 25. On Albert, cf. VAN SmEENBERGEEN 1 966, 290-291 ; BtANclu1 990, 1 1 0-1 1 1 .
Eclecticismwas favoured by the fact that Avicenna was first toenter the scene, ac-
squired a privileged position amongthe auctori tates and exercised an influence which
remained pervasive throughout the Middle Ages. Eclecticismwas reinforced by the
circulation of pseudoaristotelian writings of neoplatonic inspiration. The point has
=<. been well established by Van Steenberghen, for whomphilosophy in the first half of
the thirteenthcentury should be considered as an aristot^ lisme eclectique n^ opla-
' ::. tonisant (cf. VAN STEEVBERGHEN 1 966, 1 81 -1 85). The same point has been shown
; 1 ' . more recently by DE LmERA1 993, 363. De Libera has alsoemphasized the ara-
bismee of thirteenthcentury Latin masters and shown the geopolitical context of the
. . intellectual crisis whichaffected medieval universities (cf. DE LLBERA1 991 , 1 1 7). This
. aspect of the crisis had already been underlined by D'Aivmu'w 1 94 9, 24 7. Cf. also
i:. `. PICHi 1 999, 24 8 n. 1 .
. 7 . Towrite aristotelian commentaries was not required of a theologian as one of his
duties. Why eminent theologians, like Albert and Thomas, devoted somuchtime
and effort tothis task while beingregent masters in theology remains an open ques-
tion that awaits a comprehensive study. Thoughthe need expressed by the Order at
the Dominican general chapter meetingat Valenciennes (1 259), where they were
appointed members of a special commission entrusted withthe responsibility of dis-
cussingstudies in the Order, should not be neglected as a possible explanation, nei-
588B. Carlos Bazdn
Radi i
foundation of their theological doctrines. They were suspects in their o'
,,' respect. His longComm,
time, but contemporary historiography has exonerated themfrom

radi e best exegetical intrur

ism, consideringthemrather as representatives of Christian aristote1 ian
teenthcentury: thoroug'
ism, thinkers whodid oeuvre de sagesse rather than scholarly anaiy
peripatetic tradition, anc
whosought concordism rather than showingin dramatic terms the
opp^ siY
text.
Nopedagogical to,
tion between the authentic Aristotelian thought and the Christian world-vision
that the masters recogni
Acknowledgment of the truthvalue of Aristotelianism(and of the
Peripa
tetic' y troversia
l doctrines (like
tradition)) did notrevent Christian thinkers toperceive the oppositions
PPPP
be; ' usingthis extraordinary
tween their world-vision and the pagan world-vision.
a
ence of the valde nota
Another element could be added tothe searchfor this definition. It is weii
1
accept it, and went on u
known that the writings of Aristotle were not the only ones that
invaded<r Is it possible that the
rF.
medieval universities. They were accompanied by an impressive ensemble of
? ' of philosophy in its own
Arabic commentaries and paraphrases that in some cases preceded the texts'
the mere analysis of text
of Aristotle, were vehicles of Aristotelian as well as of Neoplatonic ideas
anc
ft
' in
the light of natural re
carried withthemdifferent models of how toface the cultural crisis arisin". ,
case, a great number of
fromthe encounter of a monotheistic religion and pagan thought, how to
`ter of Spain, Albert the
harmonize faithand reason as well as Platoand Aristotle ( con
cordism<Z :
L whomI have already q
again! ). In the thirteenthcentury, the Latin West was in cultural, religious and
because they strongly as
geopolitical conflict withthe Islamic world. It is then quite possible that all'
analysis. Alternatively, tc
these forms of arabisme < were perceived as a clear and present danger <
of
t
identified - had defende
acculturation, not only by religious, but alsoby political authorities. The fact
1 r would not only be false
remains that very conservative Latin thinkers, whose orthodoxy was beyond:
gnificant representatives
doubt in their times, incorporated in their eclectic systems many of the ideas "
autonomous exercice of
9
found in Arabic writings, adaptingthemtotheir Latin background. We can;
Aristotelianism and, co
accuse all of themof eclecticism, syncretism, m^ tissage culturel, bu
-- not its definingcharacte
certainly not of radicalism. The case of Averroes is quite revealingin this ` .
There is still a final fe
totelianism, but it is with Ft
ther should be neglected the personal intellectual and cultural project of bothmas-; "' it has been disqualifiec
ters. Cf. WEISHEIPL 1 974 , 1 38, 1 95, 281 -285. _ double truth. Comrr
8 Thomas Aquinas recognized those oppositions and used toexcuse themby invoking
q^'PPYg ^'` ^ u>h^ t^ rodoxe< pour d^
weaknesses in the limited premises on whichAristotle built his system. Siger of Bra
. :r . ask ourselves following
bant struggled toshow that some conclusions of Aristotle's philosophy that opposed,.
but
; e'_
:,s. nor the masters of arts a
revealed truthwere not in fact necessary conclusions of natural reason, . only:
probable, and did not hesitate tosay that Aristotle i>humanus erat et errare potuit; r
towards the
; ^r, . :. .
relationshil
My point is that this critical acceptance of the truthvalue of Aristotle'sphilosophy,_ _ _ _ _ _ _

Y PP
.
x`'....
?^ ^^And they did not adopt
I`'`
does not define a radi cal Aristotelian. ''
ing. De Libera has point
' 9That was the case of those authors whofall under the label of augustinisme avi-
-
^' cennisant, whosimply adapted Avicenna's doctrine of the separate agent intellect to
Augustine's doctrine of God as source of illumination, but whoalsoadopted
many'
1 0 Cf. BAzAv 2000, where
! . ! other Avicennian theses. That was alsothe case of many masters of arts, who, m readers of Averroes, rec

. their efforts tounderstand Aristotle's texts and make themintelligible totheir stu; usinghis Commentary
dents, used Avicenna and Averroes as interpretive tools.
H
1 1 DE Lrsai t&1 991 , 1 24 .
Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts

589
y were suspects in their
:onerated themfromradii `
[ yes of Christian aristote
x
. ther than scholarly analys`
in dramatic terms the oppos:
and the Christian world-vision;
:lianism(and of the Peripate
operceive the oppositions
bk. .
i-vision. 83 :
-chfor this definition. It is
w^ ll
the only ones that invaded
I by an impressive ensemble.
some cases preceded the
text.
:ll as of Neoplatonic ideas
face the cultural crisis arisiii
. Z :
and pagan thought, ho. w'(o
oand Aristotle (concordism
st was in cultural, religious az`'
is then quite possible that 1 l
clear and present danger`
^f
y political authorities. The fac_
whose orthodoxy was beyond
:ctic systems many of the ideas
ir Latin background. 9 We c
3m, m^ tissage culturel,'. bI
. rroes is quite revealingin this:
and cultural project of both mas
I used toexcuse themby invokiri.
totle built his system. Siger of Bra-
Aristotle's philosophy that oppose,
isions of natural reason, but on!
. e humanus erat et errare potuiti
uthvalue of Aristotle's philosophy
ier the label of augustinisme. :a
ie of the separate agent intellect; t
ition, but whoalsoadopted many]
of many masters of arts, who, i
nake themintelligible totheir slim
tools.
.
respect. His longCommentary on De ani ma was, I have nodoubts about that,
^
best exegetical intrument that a master of arts could use in the mid-thir-
'Sae
^
nthcentury: thorough, detailed, enlighteningwithrespect tothe whole
Ieripatetic tradition, and inspired by the desire of beingfaithful toAristotle's
,text:
Nopedagogical tool could surpass Averroes' commentaries. The fact
at the masters recognized in the LongCommentary the existence of con-
. "' oversial doctrines (like the unicity of the intellect) did not deter themfrom
gthis extraordinary pedagogical tool. They simply acknowleged the pres-
s
^
nce of the valde notabilis doctrine (as AdamBocfeld put it), refused to
accept it, and went on usingAverroes' commentary. '
=' , Is it possible that the sign of radicalism is the assertion of the autonomy
of
philosophy in its own field? And for >>philosophy < I understand here not
P
the mere analysis of texts, but the examination of a problemfor its own sake
I:. in the light of natural reason. That would not be sufficient. If that were the
case, a great number of thinkers whose moderation is well known, like Pe-
'ter of Spain, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas tomention only those
whomI have already quoted in this paper would fall intothis category,
because they strongly asserted the specificity and autonomy of philosophical
analysis. Alternatively, tothink that only the >>radicals<( whostill need tobe
identified had defended the ideal of an autonomous philosophical activity
; would not only be false, but would alsodeprive us of some of the most si-
gnificant representatives of this autonomy. My point is that the ideal of an
autonomous exercice of philosophical thought is not the privilege of radical
Aristotelianism and, consequently, that this epistemological consideration is
not its definingcharacteristic.
There is still a final feature that might be used tocharacterize
radi cal Aris-
totehanism, but it is withhesitation that I include it intomy analysis, somuch
it has been disqualified by historians. It is the so-called doctrine of the
; idouble truth. Comment en est-on venu ^parler d'>aristot^ lisme radical<
^ u>h^ t^ rodoxe< pour d^ finir une doctrine qui n'a jamais exist^ ? ' < we could
ask ourselves followingAlain de Libera. "It is known that neither Averroes
not
the masters of arts adopted this illogical thesis (for different their attitudes
towards the relationship between religion and theology might have been).
And they did not adopt it because, precisely, of their Aristotelian logical train-
ing. De Libera has pointed out correctly that the doctrine was an invention
K .
1 0 C Bnz^rr 2000, where I hope tohave proved that masters of arts were not naive
readers of Averroes, recognized his doctrine of the unicity of the intellect, and kept
usinghis Commentary as the best exegetical tool available tothem.
': '1 1 : DE LmExA1 991 , 1 24 .
590B. Carlos Baz ^n
of Etienne Tempier, a trap intowhichhistorians fell at the beginningof our
j';
L"}
. material forms. Stabl,
century for lack of knowledge of the sophisticated epistemological principles ' ly there never has b^
that inspired the work of radi cal aristotelians suchas Boethius Dacus.
U
nder F_
r. ' sinse images. The in
those circumstances, historians believed Tempier rather than B
oethius. For; '
human beings partici
the conservative bishop - and the theologians whohelped himwiththe draf
t ' . ; . ship fits perfectly wit]
ingof the Condemnation of 1 277 - the mere idea of the relativity of points o
-.
view concerninga single truthcould not be understood otherwise than
ggas . ':
t
pure and simple relativism. The non-existent doctrine of double truth could ',
not be used then todefine radi cal aristotelianism.
Havingfailed sofar tofind at the level of general doctrines the key to
de
ough the unicity
fine this historical phenomenon, it would only seemappropriate tosearch
for ''
most all the repress
its essential characteristics at the level of particular doctrines of some masters,;
Avicenna beingthe i
Four suchdoctrines appear tooffer the best chances of findingthe defining`
West), the unicity of
features of radi cal Aristotelianism: unicity of the intellect, eternity of the world,
:posed it as the correc
intellectual determinism, and the idea of happiness attained throughphil
^ t
,; . his
conception of the

sophy as the most perfect state of human life. I will limit myself topresenting
' that it could not be
the thesis of the unicity of the intellect, its sources, its conditions of possibility
totle s general definiti
'` and its most influential representative in the thirteenthcentury, namely Si
Swei
Thoughbeinga sub.
of Brabant, whose doctrinal evolution affected the future development of
ra- ''t
^li qui d (t^de tOO. This e:
:. di cal Aristotelianism.
matter in their coml
ali qui d confirms the t
II. Unicity of the Intellect
,t..
ances that are a hoc ai
be multiple in numb,
1 Averroes develope
; ,:. . unicity of the intelle
t,::.
The receptive (materi ali s, p ossi bi li s) intellect, the lowest of the separate subst -3
knowledge. The key
. antes, is unique for all human beings. Its ontological lower status translates; -`
I .
1 2AvERRoES, In De ani
intoa divided intellectual attention, turned bothtowards the superior realmr
III, 5 (4 04 , v. 51 4 -51
of separate substances and towards the inferior realmof the material world: L
1 3Ibid. II, 32(1 78, v. 2
Withrespect tothe latter, the receptive intellect has a double operational.
1 4 Ibid. II, 7 (1 38, V. 11
F
dependency: it must acqui re knowledge of the material world usingsense ima ;
; . . . 1 5 In Michael Scotus' t
v. 23-25); ITI, 3 (38
es provided by human beings, and it requires that a superior agent intellect's
gpYgdPg natura non est ali qui ,
alsoseparate and unique, proceed to abstract the forms of material beings fromy tunc reciperet forma
those images where they are intelligible in potency, makingthemintelligible'i
existentes in ipsa ess
in act. Withrespect tothe superior realm, nosuchprocess takes place, given:
est ex demonstratioi
::i. the fact that spiritual substances are intelli intelligible in act by themselves. Umon:
P'^Yr !
neque virtus in corp.
1 6 Ibid. III, 5 (4 02, v. 4
between the separate intellect and humans is then operational, but intimate;
numeratus per num
^'! necessary and stable. Intimate and necessary, because without sense
images
aut corpus aut virtu
rovided by humans the intellect cannot performits act of intellection of
the provided
YP
potentia<; cf. ibid. (2
rr
s t`
Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts 591
al forms. Stable, because the human species is eternal and consequent-
e never has been, nor will ever be, a lack of individual providers of
images.
The intimacy of the union explains why and how individual
i'beings participate in " the act ofi ntellecti on. The stability of the relation-
s
perfectly withthe eternity of the intellect.
2. The source
:
l the unicity of the agent intellect is a thesis that can be found in
`ill the representatives of the Greek and Arabic Peripatetic tradition
n^
beingthe main vehicle of transmission of this doctrine tothe Latin
tiie
unicity of the receptive intellect is typical of Averroes, whopro-
it` ^s
the correct interpretation of Aristotle's De ani ma. 12 Consistent with
iception of the intellect as a separate substance, Averroes alsostated
could not be anima neque pars animeo, 1 3 and consequently that Aris-
g^
neral definition of the soul applies only equivocally tothis intellect. "
h
beinga substance, its spiritual nature prevents it frombeinga hoc
It^ de ti ). This expression, indeed, applies only tosubstances that include
in their composition. 1 5 The refusal toconsider the intellect as a hoc
confirms the thesis of the unicity of the intellect, because only subst-
hat are a hoc ali qui d possess the material component that allows themto
[ tipl^ in number within a species. 1 6
io^ s developed a sophisticated theory toexplain how, in spite of the
of the intellect, human beings participate in the act of intellectual
:dge. The key of his proposal is the special kind of intentionality that is
iiROES, In De ani ma In, 1 , ed. Crawford, 380, v. 4 4 -4 5; III, 5 (4 01 , v. 4 24 -4 25);
5 (4 04 , v. 51 4 -51 7); III, 5 (4 06, v. 576).
. II, 32(1 78, v. 33-35).
.II, 7 (1 38, v. 1 8-1 9); cf. II, 21 (1 60, v. 9).
3 fichael Scotus' translation, the expression reads aliquid hoc. Cf. Ibid. I, 34 (4 5, S'
3-25); III, 3 (382, v. 21 -23); III, 5 (388, v. 38-4 2): Et ex hoc apparet quod ista
ira'non est ali qui d hoc, neque corpus neque virtus mcorpore; quomam, si ita esset,
reciperet formal secundumquod sunt diversa et ista, et si ita esset, tunc forme
tentes in ipsa essent intellecte in potentia; (393, v. 1 91 -1 93): Et iamdeclaratum
ex demonstration Aristotelis predicta quod non est aliquid hoc, neque corpus
Lie virtus in corpore.
F
III; 5 (4 02, v. 4 32-4 34 ): Si enimposuerimus quod iste intellectus materialis est
ieratus per numerationemindividuorumhominum, continget ut sit aliquid hoc,
corpus aut virtus in corpore. Et cumfuerit aliquid hoc, exit intentiointellecta in
intia<c cf. ibid. (392, v. 1 69-1 71 ).
II
592

B. Carlos Baz ^n
ii
proper tothe lowest of intellectual substances: because of its proportio
material forms that are carried by images, the receptive intellect must com
intocontact withindividual human beings. This rapport results in establis]
ingan operational union, an operative comp osi te, whose fruit is actual unde
standing(i ntelli gere i n actu). There are three principles of this co
mposite: th
receptive and agent intellects, and the images that carry the forms. The higj
est sensitive faculty of the individual, i. e. the imaginative or the cogitative
faculty participates thus in the act of intellection as provider of images. Its ro]
is soimportant that it deserves tobe called intellect in the broadest sense c
the word. That is why it receives the name of i ntellectus p assi bi li s (or
p arsi uus l
James of Venise's translation), whichis corruptible, as Aristotle stated i
4 30a25. Throughthis, their highest faculty, human beings are united witht
intellect and participate in the act of intellection. Beingthe highest facult
the i ntellectus p assi bi li s defines the sensitive soul proper tohumans and assure
tothemtheir specific difference withrespect toother animals. "
In order tounderstand how this union between the separate intellect an
individuals by the intermediary of the imagination this cop ulati o p er p hant'
si am is possible, it is necessary tonote that the object known has, accordiii
toAverroes, a double support or subi ectum: the image and the receptivev
tellect. Fromthe first comes its truthcontent, fromthe second its bein
known. "In the act of intellection, the formprovided by images plays the rill
of formal cause specifyingthe act; the intellect plays the role of matter recer.
ingthe form. Individuals donot participate in the exercise of thought by th
intellect, whichis separate fromthem, but by the objects of knowledge pr
vided by images, whichare proper tothem. i9
This unique and, sofar, clear noetic doctrine was however not withdi
ambiguities. One of themis the relationship between the separate agent
material intellects. This relationship pertains toa kind of intentionality in whic"
humans donot participate. As a separate substance, the receptive intellect
1 7 Ibid. III, 20 (4 54 , v. 31 5-31 6): Et per istumintellectumdiffert homoabaliis
malibus. o
1 8 Ibid. III, 5 (4 1 2, v. 725-727): subiectumsecundumquod est vera, scilicet for
ymaginationis, et [ . . . ] subiectumper quod est intellectus ens (et est materialis)o.
1 9 Ibid. III, 5 (4 04 -4 05, v. 501 -520): Dicamus igitur quod manifestumest quod he
non est intelligens in actunisi propter continuationem i ntellecti cumeoin actual
impossibile est ut i ntellectum copuletur cumunoquoque hominumet numeretur.
numerationemeorumper partemque est de eoquasi materia, sc. intellectum_
terialem; remanet ut continuatiointellectorumcumnobis hominibus sit per Conti
tionemi ntenti ons i ntellecte cumnobis (et sunt intentiones ymaginate), sc. partis que e
nobis de eis aliquomodoquasi forma. For more on this subject, cf. Bnz^N 1 981 . 1 ,
Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts593
4
s
prop
owards the superior realmand knows the agent intellect without
:ellect F"es.
I n
this act of intellection the knower and the object known
sUl
n cal,
as Aristotle had stated (4 30a4 ). In referringtothis intentio-
't
Averroes used expressions that would cause problems of inter-
is c
^ m
not only for medieval masters, but alsofor contemporary historians,
forms ^
se expressions could give the appearance that for Averroes the
)r the , .
aterial intellect were faculties of one substance the intellective
of irnag
hiriwhichthey are related as matter and form, when in fact their
bro^d
t a substantial one, but one that obtains between knower and ob-
bi li s ( ^ ,
whichleaves intact the conception of the twointellects as two
arist
^
ubstances. 2 The other ambiguity concerns the rather lax way in
:r
re unit
rroes wrote about the intellect, referringtoit as a form. The
^e h
'h
g
e-`of thinkingis an immediate datum of our consciousness. Even if the
mans:
receptive principles of intellection are separate substances,, we
als. 1 at
ewe think when we want, as if those substances were under our
sate ^
ason for that, accordingtoAverroes, is that intellection takes
op ula s
accordingtothe images of our p hantasi a, whichare really in our I
mli^; s
; activate. But because we are part of the operational unity that
th^ . r
tellection, and nothingperforms an operation except by its form, Ef.
sec^ n
aid that bothintellects can be called our forms. 21 Obviously, by
Lges p a t f form Averroes understands a principle of operation rather
of na ciple of being. As we will see, this particular conception, and its
oft o- ` : biguities, found propitious grounds todevelop in the mid-thir-
>f kno fury. ' I^^
, ever t;
j '. j
; per
,`,,. . I
1 ,1 ,
itiori
epti of s- : in De ani ma III, 5, ed. Crawford, 4 06, v. 556-565. Siger of Brabant,
ple, thought initially that bothintellects were twofaculties of a single se-
1 ? stance, but later on recognized themas twosubstances. The doctrine
t ho`' gtowhichthe agent and material intellect are faculties of the human soul
'n amongmasters of arts duringthe first half of the thirteenthcentury.
very"; -
esu, certainly not an authentic Averroistic doctrine, should not be called
Ij
^. . . .
st m^- vrr^ ism, but must be considered instead as one of the most original con- I';
of the --Latin masters tothe interpretation of Aristotle's psychology. Cf. 'li
1 1 :urn ' 000, 4 3-4 5.
n :^ t:r
"
^s,-In De
ani ma i n, 18, ed. Crawford, 439-440. The op erati onal uni on be I'
sc.'
e sep arate i ntellects and i ndi vi dual human bei ngs conti nues throughout our
P.
bus
jt i s at the end, when all the forms ofour i magi nati on have been actuali zed
I..
stag
nt and recei ved bythe recep ti ve i ntellect, that i t reaches i ts p erfecti on and IIIi .!''
:f.B '.. :
eels achi eve thei r role offorms. (cf. i bi d. III 36, ed. Crawford, 499-500).
I^ I^11
594B. Carlos Baz ^n
'"
3. The condi ti ons ofp ossi bi li ty;` the speculative facult
,. . ''
texts is already reaso
What made itossible for this doctrine tobe adopted by Latin masters
in PPYthe
they are plat
thirteenthand fourteenthcenturies? It is, indeed, a strange doctrine, ^n
ge, ana
general doctrine of tf
I wonder if any of us would subscribe toit. 22 So, how can we explain that the,`
said is that these rest]
doctrine of the unicity of the intellect was accepted by people whomade
its instrument, the e^
the exercise of intelligence the supreme reason of their professional pride? ; ::
L
intellect
(o no^ s), it se
is not subject tocorn
kai to
theorei n) decline
a) The Ari stoteli an aporiae
^^;^;
^' intellect is impassible
`,. mind, but rather of
There were, first of all, theoretical reasons whose origin is tobe found in Aris "
does so. Memory an,
toile himself, the auctoritas that the masters of arts were supposed toex '
the mind, but of the
plain faithfully. The ontological status of the intellect is far frombeingclearly; ::
the
mind is somethir
defined in the Treatise On the Soul, and the difficulty of the task was ac=; ?
, ; son amongall these
knowledged by Aristotle himself (4 03a3-5). Every time that Aristotle makes a ? :`
; . source of the noeti<
step forward in the clarification of his hylomorphic theory, he would alsoadd.
: _ ' . commentators who
a restriction concerningthe intellect. After statingthat the subject of opera; ,
tions is man, he adds but mind seems tobe an independent substance en_
tf' gendered in us, and tobe imperishable (4 08b1 8-1 9). 23 After criticizing-the
' b) Aaerroes's deconstru
theory concerningthe parts of the soul, he adds: if the soul as a whole holds. `.
together the whole body, it is natural that eachof the parts should hold to,
By the time when A
gether some part of the body. But this seems impossible; for it is hard even to::
interpretation had e
st imagine what part the mind will hold together, or how it will doit (4 1 1 bI5='
intellect. He under
s'
10). After stating, as a consequence of hylomorphism, that the soul cannot be,"
; deconstructing< th
{ separated fromthe body, he adds: there is nothingtoprevent some parts;
what he considered
beingseparated, because they are not actualities of any bod << 4 1 3a7-8 . ,
`withcontroversial F
After explainingthat the soul is the principle of all the functions of the living.
resolvingthe aporia
beingthroughits faculties, he asks whether eachof these faculties is a soul,:
ciples of Aristotelian
and he observes that for some of themthe solution is easy, addinghowever
the priority of the f
; . :. that in the case of the mind and the thinkingfaculty nothingis yet clear; it
corollary, the impo^
seems tobe a distinct kind of soul, and it alone admits of beingseparated, as;
of understanding,26
the immortal fromthe perishable (4 1 3b1 3-1 6). Finally, after havingestab=
gnoseological level,
lished that the general definition of the soul is equivocal or at the most and=
logical like the definition of a rectilinear figure, he adds: the consideration of; :
_ 24 The materialismc
a, ism(mainly Avicei
22Even if we got used toAbsolute Spirits leadinghistory, Collective Unconscious'
gPgrY,
especially the theo:
^; . . PY
influencingour perception of reality, or horizons of understandig(social, economic,.
,: 25 AvERRoEs, In De a
cultural or linguistic) conditioningthe waywe think, we always presuppose that
. we major role in Th<
^{' ,'; :. have an intellectual principle of our own.
ani ma, q. 8 (Ed. Le
23 We use as translation: HEZ -r 1957.
) 26 AvERxoES, In De a
h^ I I

Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts595

Latin masters
i n
'ange doctrine,! ,
we explain that
people whomade
rofessionai nridl,
speculative faculty is another question < (4 1 5a1 1 -1 2). If every one of these
r:ts is already reason for concern, their location in the treatise is even more,
3
cause they are placed in sucha way that they seemtolimit the scope of the
eral doctrine of the soul that Aristotle has developed. The least that can be
^ . is
6'd ^ that these restrictions seemtocreate a distinction between the intellect,
instrume
nt
, the exercise of thought, and the subject of this operation. The
nt^ llect
(o no^ s),
it seems, exists in us as possessinga substantial existence and
,, . .
s not subject tocorruption. The exercise of thought and knowledge (to noei n d
i i i to
thi eorei n)
declines when some interior organ is destroyed, but in itself the
ritellec
t
is impassible. Thinking, lovingand hating, are affections not of the
hind, but rather of the individual whichpossesses the mind, in sofar as it
foes so.
Memory and love fail when this perishes; for they were never part of
he
mind, but of the whole entity (to^ koi no^ ) whichhas perished. Presumably
he
mind is somethingmore divine, and is unaffected (4 08b1 9-3Q). The ten-
ion amongall these elements created by suchparadoxical statements are the
urce of the noetic problem and of the conflict of interpretations between
ommentators whostruggled tosolve the aporiae of Aristotle's De ani ma.
Averroes's dleconstructi ve p roject
By the time when Averroes wrote his Commentari um magnum, layer after layer of
interpretation had enriched and obscured Aristotle's doctrine of the soul and
ntellect. He undertook, withconsiderable scholarship, the difficult task of
deconstructing<< the history of Peripateticismwitha view of recuperating
at he considered tobe the authentic Aristotelian doctrine. 24 Confronted
withcontroversial passages of De ani ma, he adopted a method consistingin
resolvingthe aporiae by placingthemunder the light of well-established prin-
'ciples of Aristotelian philosophy. Against Alexander's materialismhe opposed
the priority of the formal and final cause (materi a est p rop ter formam) 25 withits
corollary, the impossibility that the elements could generate a faculty capable
of understanding, 26 and he argued that the intellect, thoughin potency at the
gnoseological level, should be conceived as a substance at the ontological
24 The materialismof Alexander of Aphrodisias and the different forms of Neoplaton-
ism(mainly Avicenna's) had deformed, in his opinion, not only hylomorphism, but
especially the theory of the intellect.
25 AvExxoES, In De ani ma II, 36, ed. Crawford, 1 85, v. 26. This principle would play a
major role in Thomas's psychology; cf. THOMASDE AQuuvo, Quaesti ones di sp utatae de
ani ma, q. 8 (Ed. Leon. 24 /1 ), 66 adn. 1 77-1 78.
26 AvExxoES, In De ani ma III, 5, ed Crawford, 398, v. 31 9-320.
tobe found in
1
Ar
ere supposed to_ :
r frombeingclear
of the task
was
at Aristotle
makes
he would alsoa
ie subject of op ^r
ident substance :
After criticizing:I
nil as a whole h
^ li
arts should hold :t
or it is hard even
,vill doit (4 1 1 bl
t the soul cannot 1
prevent some pi,
y body (4 1 3a7--
actions of the li vi i
e faculties is a Si
sy, addinghow^ v
thingis yet clear;
beingseparated,''
after havingest^
or at the most an
:he consideration
:ollective Unconscio^s
idig(social, economic
ys presuppose that w<

Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts

597
tocriticize materialise
Dhilosophers seemed . 1
, v. 1 4 2-1 51 ).
an important role in
; al hylomorphism.
has a corollary, namel
1 4 1 , v. 63; 1 4 2, v. 80
homas Aquinas.
concep ti on ofthe soul as a sp i ri tual substance
'prevalent conception of the soul duringthe first half of the thirteenth
ri
ti
^ P
{^iry; amongboththeologians and masters of arts, is that the soul is a spi-
1 substance that alsoplays the role of perfection of the body. 32 The
: a

most commonly used toexpress the substantial nature of the intel-
C iv
^
soul was tosay that it was a hoc ali qui d, whichtranslates the greek t^ de ti ,
^ d
by Aristotle torefer toprimary substances, i. e. tosubstances in the
op r`sense of the word (not toparts or components of a substance). The
fiori
of the intellective soul as a spiritual substance is found very early in the
itings
of the masters of arts. 33 The substantial nature of the soul was also
ninon' doctrine amongtheologians: sp i ri tualem veri ssi me substanti am earn esse,
riliam
of Auvergne used tosay, and he was echoed by Philip the Chancel-
`, Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle and Bonaventure. Amongthe
r,
pminicans, Albert the Great, whohesitated for a moment in callingthe soul
hoc
ali qui d
probably under the pressure of Averroes' argument limitingtha
; . . . .
pression tomaterial substances - ended up embracingthe doctrine, and
^ n
Thomas Aquinas did soat the beginningof his career. ' Aspiritualistic
; On this subject, see my article: BAzAi 1 997. This doctrine, and the anthropological
; dualismthat is its necessary consequence, resulted fromthe influence of patristic
sources (Nemesius, Augustine, amongothers) and Arabic sources (mainly Avicenna),
s!
where the Latin thinkers learned toconsider the nature of the soul as that of a spi-
ritual substance, and froman insufficient understandingof Aristotle's hylomorphism
that led themtoconceive that beinga formwas simply a role or a function perfor-
^n^ ed by this substance.
tIt is present already in the treatise De ani ma et p otenei i s ei us, written around 1 225 by an
i. anonymous master. Peter of Spain, whoknew Averroes' Commentary, expressed the
:=idea in clear terms around 1 24 0: anima secundumomnemsui differentiamest sub-
_ stantia que est hoc aliquid. oPan us HispANus, In De ani ma, ed. Alonso, 51 8. Conse-
-. quently the name anima does not express this substantial characteristic, but only a
function, or an offi ci um: Dicit dyonisius et avicenna quod anima non est nomen sub-
Io'stancie set officii et ita anima intellectiva non debet dici intellectus nisi aboperatione
^ t :a posteriori. (Ibid. , 381 ) Peter repeated the same doctrine in his Sci enti a de ani ma
:: (cf. PE Rus HispANus, Sci enti a de ani ma, ed. Alonso, 1 7, v. 1 8-31 ). The same idea is
ofoiind again in the Ps. - Peter of Spain (cf. Ps. Pxntus HispANus, Exp osi ti o li bri De ani -
ma, ed. Alonso, 325; cf 327-328), in Roger Bacon, and in anonymous commentaries
on De ani ma written by masters of arts between 1 24 6 and 1 260, many of whichhave
Talready been published or are about tobe edited (cf. BAzkN 1 997, 1 07-1 09). The
fact that the masters of arts duringthe first half of the thirteenthcentury and bey-
ond considered the intellectual soul as a hoc ali qui d i s yet another argument against
labellingthemfirst averroists. Nothing, indeed, more opposite toAverroes' views
than consideringthe intellect tobe a hoc ali qui d; cf. supra, nt. 1 5 and 1 6.
BAZ AN 1 997, 1 1 0-1 1 2.
)ns that reserved
fors
nphasized the fact-4
ceptive intellect
jJ
:n and unicity that
tellect. 28
Acombin
4
e theoretical difcw
rightly pointed out1
tter is required only
transmutation, but
i the unicity of the'; ;
in the intellect hell
se matter is principle
akes of the intellect
God), because all
ft
ddity and substance
model of interpret
propositions of a'
a of whichthat tex
be rigorous in lq
a characteristic
aared the reve. ren. c
he thirteenth centt
Aristotle's writings
overcome the
ticularly appeal
inclusions that
ul^
`C'
598B. Carlos Baz ^n
Radi cal Ari l,
conception of the intellective soul presided over the eclectic
d
ualistic ,
hest operation of the comp
thropology a combination of Aristotelianismand Neoplatonism that
4 fis
not surprisingthat Latin tI
firmly entrenched in medieval circles since the very beginningof the '''
e. definition of the soul giver
teenthcentury.
' `1 1 ective soul only analogical)
Eclecticismrequires accomodation of sometimes mutually exclusive
i n
11e
the breedinggrounds c
ciples. Inevitably, that is done at the price of weakeningsome of therri.
V1
example, if the soul is considered tobe a spiritual substance, it becomes
cessary tointroduce in it a sort of composition in order todistinguishit "
^ n_
",.0
ogni ti ae extri nseci sm
tologically fromthe absolute simplicity of the First Cause. Latin thinkers
twomodels of composition that could ensure this distinction; one was
` tZ
; ; y ,
cognitive extrinsecismoI
Boethian composition between quod est and esse; the other, the Aristote ' '"
,knowledge that states in a r
composition of matter and form. Without muchconcern for the spec f#c
depends on the assistance of a
meaningof these compositions, some masters appealed tobothof themat di"
efficiency of the inmediate cai
same time. 35 The result of this accomodation is that a substance, itself co''-
the representatives of augusti
posed of matter and form, performs alsothe role of form or perfection `'
personal principle of intellecti
the body. The price paid for this syncretic solution is the weakening,of . tl'.
sic cause, creating a ft
^' ^
,

in gthus
Aristotelian notion of form36 and of the unity of the composite soul-body. . D^i `
gground for radi cal Aristotel
tothe prevalence of these doctrines, the Latin minds were trained tothink;
``fj
the intellective soul as a spiritual substance enjoyingan existence and an
or
^)
Resoluti on ofthe i nternal tensi on
ration of its own; of its role of formas an oji ci um quite far fromthe notion 'o
first act; of the union between soul and body not as the immediate union ; ^. r:.
obtains requires between matter and form, but as one that reques intermediaries; ' `
asters
^;
of arts were highly tra
. :
the soul as givingonly an esse comp leti vum in view of the performance of ; Eh
on the texts that were part of t
Wort toreachtheir authentic
ner. Some of these masters, c
35 That was the case of Peter of Spain, whostated that the soul is comp osi ta ex quo p si
quod est si cut queli bet substanci ali s vel ex materi a et forma sp i ri tuali (Pans Hisp tsms, In
ecturingon De ani ma, unsatisi
ani ma, ed. Alonso, 51 8, v. 1 5-1 7; cf. also51 0, v. 9-22). It must be underlined th their roach adopted by theprede
' matter that enters intothe composition of the soul is only a spiritual matte
hoc aliquid dicitur duobus modis: unomododicitur hoc aliquid quod est . comp) 7 Cf. PErRus H1 sPANus, In De an
turn, et hoc modorei que est hoc aliquid competit dare vitam[ . . . ] aliomododic'! pletivumcorpori et est principi
hoc aliquid illud quod est compositurn ex materia et forma et tali hoc aliquid ;r 38, % The existence of suchtheories
competit dare vitam. The weakeningof the notion of formis clear, regardless of: futation of extrinsecismcontai
distinction, because it is still stated that a complete substance can play the role q. 1 1 , a. 1 (Ed. Leon. 22/2), 3
form. The anonymous author of the Questi ons sup er li brum De ani ma of MSSi e trinsecismwas not only an ex
Bibl. Corn. L III. 21 introduced the composition of matter and formin the soul I . : r gustine, and withthe support
the anonymous author of the questions on De ani ma edited by Vennebuschintroduc . ! accept that the exercice of thoi
a composition between quoest and quod est as the potential and actual'c
^ in
intelligence and that the role o
ponents of the spiritual substance. The same can be said of many other masters ,. ; Spain put it: intellectus agen
arts and theologians (cf. BzAie 2000, 4 8-51 ).
+. -. inpressiones suscipit a suprem
orm'
36 Peter of Spain exemplified best this point when he asserted that duplex est f
`
: !
formas receptas possibili inpri
quedamest que est forma tantum; quedamque est forma et substantia
PE i s
377, v. 33-36. Cf. 385, v. 25
OFSPAN, In De ani ma, ed. Alonso, 83, v. 1 3-1 4 ; 84 , v. 31 -33; 88, v. 28-29;
77 ; ::gentia (separata), in qua in of
v. 1 7-20.
tarum.
1'
Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts

599
highes
t operation of the composite. 37 Under these theoretical circumstances,
it is not surprisingthat Latin thinkers were alsotrained toaccept the idea that
the definition of the soul given by Aristotle in his De ani ma applies tothe in-
tellective soul only analogically, if not equivocally. These circumstances are
one of the breedinggrounds of radi cal Aristotelianism.
d)
Cogni ti ve extri nseci sm
By cognitive extrinsecism 'I understand the characteristic of any theory of
knowledge that states in a number of ways that the exercise of thought
depends on the assistance of a separate source of intellection, limitingthus the
E
efficiency of the inmediate causes toa preparatory role. 38 Althoughnone of
the representatives of augustinisme avicennisant< denied the existence of a
personal principle of intellection, they subordinathd it nonetheless toan ex
trinsic cause, creatingthus a frame of mind that I consider the second breed-
ingground for radi cal Aristotelianism.
e)
Resoluti on ofthe i nternal tensi ons ofsyncreti sm
Masters of arts were highly trained in logic as well as in the art of lecturing<
on the texts that were part of the curriculumin arts, wichimplied for theman
effort toreachtheir authentic meaningand topresent it in a coherent man-
ner. Some of these masters, confronted withthe Aristotelian aporiae when
lecturingon De ani ma, unsatisfied withthe inconsistencies of the eclectic ap-
proachadopted by their predecessors, havingreached a better understanding
37 Cf. PErxus HisPAxus, In De ani ma, ed. Alonso, 231 , v. 30-32: anima dat esse com-
pletivumcorpori et est principiumoperationis in illo.
38 The existence of suchtheories in the thirteenthcentury is attested by the strongre-
futation of extrinsecismcontained in Thomas Aquinas'
Quaesti o di sp utata De veri tate,
q. 1 1 , a. 1 (Ed. Leon. 22/2), 34 7sqq. Althoughits main exponent was Avicenna, ex-
trinsecismwas not only an expressions of arabisme. Under the influence of Au-
gustine, and withthe support of some scriptural passages, Latin thinkers learned to
accept that the exercice of thought is made possible by the intervention of a superior
intelligence and that the role of secondary causes was a preparatory one. As Peter of
Spain put it: intellectus agens ad rerumsuperiorumcontemplationemelevatus est,
inpressiones suscipit a supremis causis rerumconsistentias percipiens, omnes vero
formas receptas possibili inprimit. PETxus HcsPANus, Sci enti a de ani ma, ed. Alonso,
. 377, v. 33-36. Cf. 385, v. 25-27: Causa igitur dandi ei has formas est hec intelli-
gentia (separata), in qua in effectusunt principia formarumintelligibiliumabstrac-
tarum.
ctic dualistic an-
onism that was
ringof the thin_
ly exclusive prin_
me of them. For .
e, it becomes ne- .
distinguishit on
atin thinkers had
. on; one was the
the Aristotelian . '
for the specific
,thof themat the
1 -
tance, itself Corn
-
or or perfection of '.
weakeningof. the
e soul-body. Due
-aired tothink of
ence and an ope
omthe notion of
ediate union that
ntermediaries1 of
rformance of the
somp osi ta ex quo est et
tus HtspANus, In De
underlined that the
spiritual matter:
d quod est comple-
. ] aliomododicitur
ali hoc aliquid non
ir, regardless of this
an play the role of
ani ma of MSSiena,
n in the soul, while
inebuschintroduces
al and actual corn-
y other masters of
I
duplex est forma:
substantia PETER
88, v. 28-29; 1 77,
i si I

..
i
:Ff
II:.
.!I
ji i
^I":III^
600B. Car1osBan
)i r.
Ra
of the Aristotelian systemas a whole, and beingacquainted with
Averroes' nothingprevents one fr
method of searchingthe meaningof a controversial text by appealing
to
the
r unique, is the perfe
logical consistency of the system, dared todraw the conclusions that allow us,; ; ; ; ;
_
are equally strongin b
todefine radi cal Aristotelianism.
.
sion: the general defini
Tobegin with, they knew that the property of beinga hoc ali qui d goes hand
, - Soul. But one - the posi
in hand withthe property of beingseparate<, as Aristotle has taught in
of its dramatic consequ
tap hysi cs V, 8 1 01 7b24 -26 and VII, 3 1 029a28-30. Hoc ali qui d,
for Aristotle, is
reassuringconfusion of
equivalent withindividuality. Separate (k'zori stn) refers mainly tothe pro-
This is the line of th
perty by whichsubstances have independent existence and consequently do.
representative theses, n
not need a subject of inherence; derivately it alsomeans that they are not
priate tocall it an Ari
received in matter. This connection of ideas was already acknowleged by Pe. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
insisted, the main pure
ter of Spain: substancie que sunt hoc aliquid distant per essentiama materia totle's authentic though
et per se fixe sunt. 39 But if the soul is a hoc ali qui d, as was widely accepted in
of Aristotle's De ani ma.
the Latin West, the inevitable consequence that follows fromthe aforemen
proponents advanced it
tioned principles is that the soul is a purely immaterial substance.
4 0 On the
rigorous inference cons
other hand, as matter was considered tobe the principle of numerical mul-
-Cause they did sobein
tiplication within a species, it was logical toconclude alsothat a
<Q fromit. It could alsob
substance could only be unique in its species.
flicts withprinciples of
The unicity of the intellective soul seems then tobe a logical development
nces: first, it would be
of the doctrine accordingtowhichthe soul is a spiritual substance. The an
when we speak of Chr
thropological dualismproper tomost Latin thinkers at the beginningof the
sonal beliefs of particuli
thirteenthcentury evolved intoanother, more metaphysical dualism. 4 ' If the One of themdealt with
separation of the Agent intellect was acceptable, why not accept alsothe se
rodox thesis a necessar
paration of the receptive intellect and make of the whole intellective soul a
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
alsobe called Avei-rojs
separate substance? That would require intermediaries, bi en entendu, but
source bothof the thesi
termediaries were alsorequired tounite the spiritual soul withits body, as
most of the theologians themselves have stated. Notrue hylomorphic unity
4 2In the hypothesis of un
would be established between man and the separate intellectual substance,
tional, and the hylomoi
but that was alsothe case in the previous, anthropological dualism. In a mi-,
be safeguarded; while i
lieuwhere the notion of substantial formhas lost its Aristotelian meanin pression that the union
the human beingis pe.
separate substance, whi
39 Pmus HIsPMus, In De ani ma, ed. Alonso, 330, v. 1 7-20.
whole perfection of ma
4 0 This conclusion, i. e. that the intellective soul is an individual and separate substance - humbly it might be
fits perfectly withthe passages of De ani ma where Aristotle states that the intellect
5
This position is nomor
separateo(4 29b5; 4 30a1 7; 4 30a22). rality of forms, than the
4 1 If the dualismof the first kind is somehow a return tothe Platonic tension between
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
principle of operation th
body and soul, eachconsidered tobe a substance, the second one is a return toall what is meant by fom
the tensions proper tothe Aristotelian noetic problem, whicharises when an hylor accordingtowhichthe
morphic and consequently corruptible composite - the human being- is said tobt ingthe separate intelle
related witha separate and consequently incorruptible intellect, in whose activit) notion of formthan
human beings participate. But Latin thinkers were used todeal withextrinsecism.
J1 1 1 0 :dentally (as an oji ci um) a
Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts601
l withAv
erroes'
nothingprevents one fromsayingthat an intellectual substance, be it multiple
ippealingtothe
'i
or unique, is the perfection of the sensitive body. The theoretical difficulties
ns that allow us ' are equally strongin bothcases. 4 2 Bothpositions arrive at the same conclu-
sion: the general definition of the soul applies equivocally tothe intellective
li qui d
goes hand . :
soul. But one the position assertingits unicity is aware of the problemand
as taught in
Me- . . s `
of its dramatic consequences; the other is not, workingas it does in the falsely
for Aristotle, is . . reassuringconfusion of syncretism.
^inltothero- ypro , :
This is the line of thought that defines radical Aristotelianismby one of its
'^ I
:onsequently do representative theses, namely the unicity of the intellective soul. It is appro- ^J
x ,
. at they are not :"
. priate tocall it an Aristotelianism because, as F. Van Steenberghen always
-lowleged by Pe_ insisted, the main purpose of the proponents of this thesis was toreachAris-
ntiama materia toile's authentic thought: the thesis was advanced as a faithful interpretation k1 . 1
lely accepted in . ,
.
^ . of Aristotle's De ani ma. It is appropriate tocall this thesis radi cal because its
a the aforemen proponents advanced it as a resolution of Aristotelian aporiae by means of a
tance. 4 0
On the ; :
+. rigorous inference consistent withthe Aristotelian systemas a whole, and be-
numerical mill- '
cause they did sobeingaware of the grave theoretical problems that derive
tat a separate . . ' from
it. It could alsobe called heterodox Aristotelianism, because it con- ; !
flicts withprinciples of Christian faith, but this would have twoinconveni-
-al development
'. 3` .
ences: first, it would be somehow an extrinsic qualification, like the one used
. stance. The . an=: when we speak of Christian philosophy; second, it would prejudge the per-
)eginningof the "' sonal beliefs of particular authors and oversimplify the problemof how each
dualism. '' If tl ` ' . one of themdealt withthe conflict at the epistemological level (is the hete-
cept alsothe 's^ - F:rodox<< thesis a necessary or just a probable conclusion? ). And finally it could
tellective soul alsobe called Averroism, but in a restricted sense. Averroes, indeed, is the
entendu, but`- source bothof the thesis and of the method that led toit; the unicity of the
vithits body, as:
lomorphic unit}
4 2In the hypothesis of unicity it will be known, at least, that the union is only opera-
:Ctual substan `
tional, and the hylomorphic unity of the human beingas a sensitive composite will';
ualism. In a be safeguarded; while in the hypothesis of multiplicity we would have the false im-
)telian meanie
pression that the union between twosubstances is a truly hylomorphic one. Again, if
the human beingis perfected bothby its sensitive soul, whichis its form, and by a
separate substance whichoperates in it and depends on it it can be said that the
whole perfection of man includes that separate substance, because by contributing !
separate substah
hat the intellect
(humbly it might be said, but necessarily - toits operation, we participate in it.
r' This position is nomore inconsistent withhylomorphismthan the theory of the plu-
rality of forms, than the notion of ani ma comp osi ta or than the loose notion of formas (:: i':`; ; I.
is tension between principle of operation that grants an esse comp leduum. And if it is argued that this is not
e is a return to? : what is meant by form< in the Aristotelian system, one could reply that the thesis
ses when an :hyl accordingtowhichthe conti nuati o i ntellectus nobi scum is sufficient ground for consider
inis said to g r:

mg separate intellect as our perfection is nomore inconsistent witha strict

:
^^L, . . ^
in whose 'active notion of formthan the idea that the soul is essentially a substance and only acci-
hextrinsecism. dentally (as an offci um) a form.
Radi cal A
rnonopsychismis the eclectic
th
inkers. For an eclectic
hags even worse, because 1 -
ristotelian
ismfromNeopla
the truthvalue of Aristotle
thought, pave the way for n
III. Th
8iger was not the only auth
trine of the unicity of the int
thesis was never extraordina
masters are found whokept
century. The particular do<
dzislaw Kuksewicz in a be
sive. study of Latin Averroisn
Siger of Brabant, by the cla
'. tothe theoretical challenge:
reexamination of his own d
roists, fromGiles of Orlea
. ,tellectual drama of radi cal 4
understandingthe fate of Ai
The unicity of the intelle
'.. ,pically Averroistic doctrine
they kept usingAverroes' cc
? ^ This is the situation till arot
master of arts whoembrac,
Quaesti ones i n IIIm De ani ma,
4 5 In this respect L. Bianchi's
of why John of Vercelli reca
4 6 KutcsEwicz 1 968.
4 7 Cf. BAznN 2000.
4 8 When I edited this text sor
Gauthier raised serious obji
cf. GAUrHIER1 983, esp. 20
the Nova translation of De a
:.: that Thomas Aquinas's Quc
1 269. My own researchha
602B. Carlos Baz ^n
material intellect is one of his most original contributions tothe history
. J
Peripateticism. However, for the masters whoadopted that thesis
around.
1 265 Averroes was the commentator, not the auctor whose authentic
thought they were tryingtodetermine. Nonetheless, given the originality;
this interpretation Averroes was the first topropose it , the termAver='
roist can be used adequately in the restrictive sense of partisan of the Vic:
ity of the intellective soul.
The effort torecover Aristotle's authentic thought proper tothese
ri di c(
Aristotelians has muchin common withThomas Aquinas' project. Thomas
alsowanted torecover the authentic sense of Aristotelian hylomorphism
whichhe considered tobe endangered by the Neoplatonic framework
wher7,
it has been placed, and where it played a subsidiary role destined toseciir
^ '_
some sort of unity in the human composite in spite of the inconsistency of
usinghylomorphismtounite twosubstances. Instead of acceptingthe premise
that the soul is a hoc ali qui d, he strongly emphasized that the soul is essentially,,
a substantial formand, througha careful analysis of what is required tobe
hoc ali qui d (i . e. subsistence and complete essence), he concluded that the sow",
i s not properly speakinga hoc ali qui d, and cannot be properly called a subst
ance, because it is only a part of the human essence. It could be called hoc:
ali qui d only p er reducti onem, in the same sense that the components of a subst-`
ance are called substances. 4 3 Boththe radicals and Thomas shared the same'
respect for the separation of the intellect and the immateriality of intellec=
Lion, but, in a similar effort tobe consistent withAristotelian principles, they:
draw different conclusions.
In a remarkable article published in 1 984 , Luca Bianchi called the atten''
tion tothe intervention of Williamof Baglione, holder of the Franciscan chair
of theology at the University of Paris, who, in his questions disputed between
1 266 and 1 267, denounced those whorefuse toaccept that the soul ex. . n
tura sua sit hoc aliquid, et cumhoc sit vera perfectiocorporis faciens cumeb,
unumesseoof beingresponsible for the pernicious error of monopsychisml
and of endangeringthe immortality of the soul. In unequivocal terms h
states that these thinkers whomaintain quod [ . . . ] anima rationalis non est
hoc aliquid, et quod non est prima perfectiohumani corporis, et sic non est
prima perfectiohominis (unfair criticism, if adressed toThomas), favent iJ1 i
perniciosissimoerrori Commentatoris de unitate intellectus, because both'"
theses sunt fundamentumillius erroris. "The only vaccine against the flu6f
4 3 The key text is THOMASDE AQuiNo, Qaaesti ones di sp utatae de ani ma, q. 1 (Ed. Leon. 24 /1 ),
3-1 2, and the parallel texts indicated in this critical edition. Cf. alsoBAZ AN 1 997.
4 4 BieNcsn 1 984 , part. 507. Cf. alsoVAN STEENBERGHEN 1 977, 33-34 and the writings
of Fr. I. Brady quoted by him.
1
f

604B. Carlos Baz ^n
Radi cal t
cease toevolve towards a more moderate view and ended up aban
donjrig Fad as statinga necessity o
monopsychism. Althoughit is widely recognized that Thomas Aq ^
de se est corruptibilis do
arguments played an important role in Siger's evolution, it must be
a
dded states that this incorruptibil
that Siger followed his own way and that his own noetic was in state of crisis
but. fromthe causality of its
before Thomas' intervention, as I will show further down. The presentation`
second thesis: the eternity c
of Siger's radical Aristotelianismwill follow, then, the various stages of h
'philosophical conclusion:
evolution.
sar. iUm (q. 5, p . 6, v. 64-6
The Quaesti ones i n Illm De ani ma are the expression of Siger's most radic '
on the will of the First Cai
position. The doctrinal content of this text has been the subject of m
agisteri ' fold scrutinize sucha trans
exposes by Van Steenberghen and other scholars. 4 9 Consequently I need cal.
f. the theologian, whose cc
topresent the main points related tothe subject at study. First of all, the unic
. - t'
as
he is toexplore withratio
ity of the intellect is firmly stated: unus est intellectus diversorum, una erg`,
^ anifested by Revelation t
est substantia intellectus, et similiter una potestas (q. 9, p. 28, v. 60-61). On" That is why Siger acknowle
the basis of the Aristotelian principle accordingtowhichevery direct effect of
'on the basis of an analysis
the First Cause is eternal, Siger concludes that for Aristotle the intellect
,departure, and consequent
should alsobe eternal precisely because, given its nature as a separate subst
, sicut ostensumest, ipsa tai
ance, it can only be a direct effect of the First Cause (q. 2, p. 5-6, v. 44
-52a-
v. 81 -83). I have always fot
For however corruptible the relationship between the unique intellect ari
PPq
"' :humility when dealingWitt
particular individuals may be, the intellect in itself and absolutely considered
The unique and separat
is eternal, as has been established by Aver-roes: intellectus speculativus in hoc; ;
wceptive intellects: grout e:
homine est corruptibilis, est tamen secundum se et si mp li ci ter aeternus, ut dicif
'sibilemet agentem (q. 1 3,
Averroes (q. 9, p. 29, v. 1 0-1 2). But this statement must be understodI
not Averroes' position, for
again, in the light of Siger's creationism. Fromthis creationismand them
intellects were twoseparat
taphysical transcendence of the First Cause that it implies derive twof
common amongthe maste
damental theses. First of all, and this time borrowingthe Avicennian notio
cause they are one in subs
of contingency, Siger states that althoughthe intellect has nocontrary in its
the agent intellect, but we
nature that would make it necessarily corruptible, it does not have either ^n
cf. q. 15, p . 54, v. 26). Witf
principle in its nature that would make it not necessarily corruptible. In fac
deceptive intellect is in pot(
intellectus de se est corrup ti bi li s; unde sicut eductus est de nihilo, sic p er naturai i
sculty whichcarries those
oam reducti bi li s est i n ni hi lumsoluma Prima Causa habet, scilicetuol
Pr p ri [ ..],, q makes them(agi t) intelligik
sit perpetuus (q. 5, p. 1 7, v. 8-1 6). This is a fundamental clarification of th
'(reap i t) them. This require
formula est secundumse et simpliciter aeternus of the previous quotation:,
hat exists between the se]
There, secundumse is relative toin respectuindividui, and should not be
themparticipate u
and 1 267 in Italy (Cf. Tuoat. s AQuiNAs, Quaesti ones di sp utatae De ani ma, Ed. Leon. .
-,50 Qui ergovoluerit scire u
24 /1 , Preface, 25*) arguments I proposed tojuslacinSiger's questions in: guppjustify pgq
oportet euminvestigare f<
1 269-1 270 havingbeen proved tobe without foundation, nothingprevents now' '. ' :
bit? (q. 2, p. 7, v. 72-75).
fromacceptingthe date of 1 265. tobase his conclusions on
'
4 9 Cf. VAN SzEENBERGHEN 1 977, esp. 339-34 7; cf. also MAHoNEY 1 974 . I have dealt
''`.
material substance can rev
withthe noetics of Siger's Q i n terti um De ani ma in my previous works: BAZ ^rr 1 974
^
. :: of absolute necessity, suspe
and BAzAN 1 975. 51 :Cf BAZ AN 2000.
Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts

605
led up aband
onj
r
ead as statinga necessity of nature. In the second quotation, the expression
Thomas Aquj5$ de se est corruptibilis does not deny the eternity of the intellect; it only
it must be added that this incorruptibility does not derive froma property of its nature
states
vas in state ofcrjsj- but fromthe causality of its creator: it is an eternity ab ali o. This leads tothe
i. The presentatio thesis: the eternity of the intellect cannot be advanced as a necessary
second
arious stages of
h
philosophical
conclusion: licet hoc sit probabile, non tamen hoc est neces-
arium
(q. 5, p. 6, v. 64 -65). Indeed, if the eternity of the intellect depends
iiger's most radical on the will of the First Cause, there are nomeans by whicha philosopher
ibject of magisterial could scrutinize sucha transcendent will. 5 But this applies as well tothe work
1
quently I need only the theologian, whose conclusions are alsoaffected by probability, limited
'irst of all, the
UfliL-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
as he is toexplore withrational instruments the infinite depthof God's life as
"ersorum, una enimn _ _ _ _ manifested by Revelation throughthe finite means of the human language.
. 28, v. 60-61 ). On
That is
why Siger acknowledged that the hypothesis advanced by philosophy
very direct effect ofi, - on the basis of an analysis of nature has at least a more verifiable point of
istotle the intellect departure, and consequently that licet non sit necessaria positioAristotelis,
as a separate subst- sicut ostensumest, ipsa tamen est p robabi li or quampositioAugustini (ibid. ,
2,
p.
5-6, v. 4 4 -52). 4 4 -52). . i I have always found healthy and refreshingthis call for respect and
nique intellect an humility when dealingwiththe will of God.
)solutely considered -. The unique and separate intellect has twoparts, the agent and the re-
speculativus in
ceptive intellects: prout est substantia separata in se habet intellectumpos-
i ter aeternus, ut dicit sibilemet agentem (q. 1 3, p. 4 4 , v. 31 -32; cf. q. 1 5, p. 58, v. 4 2-4 3). This was
ust be understood, -. . not Averroes' position, for whomthe agent and the receptive (or material)
ionismand the m4 intellects were twoseparate substances, but Siger followed here a doctrine
ies derive twofun- common amongthe masters of arts in the first half of the ITh century. 5 ' Be-
Avicennian notion
--cause they are one in substance, the receptive intellect has clear intuition of
,s nocontrary in its.
the agent intellect, but we donot share in this act (q. 1 3,
p.
4 5-4 6, v. 61 -64 ;
not have either aiii
cf. q. 1 5,
p.
54 , v. 26). Withrespect tomaterial forms, on the other hand, the
corruptible. In facti, receptive intellect is in potency and depends on the corporeal imaginative fa-
ihio, sic p er naturam
culty whichcarries those forms (q. 1 4 ,
p.
51 , v. 52-55). The agent intellect
Hnbet, scilicet, quod
makes them(agi t) intelligible in act sothat the possible intellect can receive
clarification of t}w (reczp i t) them. This requirement is the foundation of the operational union
previous quotation
.
. . . _ _ _ _ _ _
. that exists between the separate intellect and individual human beings and
<,and should not be makes themparticipate in the act of thinkingas providers of images (sub
e De ani ma, Ed. Leon.
50 Qui ergovoluerit scire utrumintellectus factus sit de novovel factus sit aeternus,
ngSiger's questions i4 '. .
oportet euminvestigare formamvoluntatis Primi. Sed quis erit qui earn investiga-
nothingprevents now bit? < (q. 2, P. 7, v. 72-75). Under those circumstances, the philosopher is constrained
tobase his conclusions on what the analysis of the nature of the intellect as an un-
ixy 1 974 . I have dealt material substance can reveal, knowingthat his conclusions will not reachthe degree
is works: BAZ AN 1 974 4
of absolute necessity, suspended as they are froman inscrutable will.
:51 Cf.
BAZ AI. 2000.
606B. Carlos Baz ^n
rati one i magi natorum) (q. 1 4 , p. 52-53), whichare the raw materials of the act. adaptingit toa typi,
Of course, this union co ulati oalthoughaccomplished withrespect to'
# ` fate of the debate o
viduals, is foremost and essentially related tothe human species. But although
r
. ; cultural identity anc
there is nosubstantial union between man and the intellect, the oper
ational . :. ^r
' ' The first adaptati
Y.
union mtellectus perficit corpus non per suamsubstantiamsedper su ('prpp
p. was toconsider the
otentiam7, 23 v. 38-39; cf. 8,25 v. 16-17) justifies calling
q.
P> P) Jgthe in=`: =. :. :.
intellective
i
ntellective soul. E
tellect the perfectio of man and, derivately, soul, insofar as the soul is a :.
:. logy,
had developpe
principle of operation in the body (operans in corpore, q. 8, p. 25,
v. 1 9) principles of intellec
The intellect, indeed, is for Siger the principle of movement and of i
ntellec= ; ; as hoc
ali qui d and fon
tion. As a mover, the intellect is in qualibet parte corporis; as a principle of : expression hoc ali qui
intellection, it relates only tothe imagination (ibid. , v. 20-28).
Human beings
himself fromhis pre,
have then a comosite soul ani ma com osi tamade of the sensitive solll `; P(p), arV. : point that the twou
whichis united substantially withthe body as its single substantial form
arid'
soul is not a substan
from the whichis extracted by natural agentsome potency of matter, and
se-
thropological dualist
parate intellect, whichdoes not have any kind of substantial union withh
^ - k Y':; :; dualism
and its equt
man beings or withthe sensitive soul, but only an operational one (q. 1 , p. 3,'. doctrine is marked 1
v. 58-61 ), and whichis, as stated, a direct creation of the First Cause. sF There is alsoa s
How original was Siger? Father Gauthier gave a very negative answer :td'
' :. :,
based on a semantic
this question. Accordingtohim, on chercherait en vain chez lui (Siger) iiri ^l ^; ,, ; :, t order to our
. . .
explain
id^ e originale, but he recognized that once Siger had borrowed an idea froii
:the union between t
someone else, il excelle ^en d^ velopper jusqu'aubout les cons^ quences. 5? ; .
Maybe Siger deserves more credit. It is true that the discovery of the real -t
='
ci lesone has to
P),
foundation of Averroes' noetics, namely the unicity of the material intellect;
^:; :.
_
commentary, but w
had been detected by Albert, Thomas, Bonaventure and some masters of arts':
i `
':,:: . ; : roes' principles. Ga
a few years before Siger wrote his Q. i n Elm De ani ma, but Siger was definitely"
=:.
:::
whichthe theolo'z
-. :^
the first toembrace Averroes' doctrine as the correct interpretation of Aril=
was noclear affirm

totle's De ani ma and that is precisely his originality. ali53 He did sonot without
PytY
parate substance. Si
ship (Hyman, Ivry
borrowed, which
52GAUTHIER1 983, 232.
53 Other masters of Arts, thoughrecognizingthe notabilis doctrine of the unicity o
That, in fact, increa
54 1 have tried toprow
the intellect in Averroes' commentary, did not adopt it. This should be seen as ; a.
interpretation of Ai
clear indication that they did not subscribe toit as a valid interpretation of Anstodes.
sidered a faculty of
text and that they did not consider the existence of this radical doctrine as a reason
of Averroes in supp
LI
todeprive themselves fromthe best interpretive tool available at their time and t
of context; and that
cease benefitingfrommany other interpretations proposed by the Arabcomme
-I , new interpretation i
tator. In the case of the theologians like Albert, Thomas and Bonaventure,
-they. ex[ ; :L. ''' undoubtedly, was u
plicitly denounced the doctrine as contrary toAristotle'sought, soit would
be
thought
' 'r^; ,. : leagues the idea th
strange that Siger had borrowed fromthemthis particular readin of Averroes i
ggPg. ,.
` same substance. Bu
that should be take
toinfer afterwards the opposite conclusion (i. e. that Averroes gives the correct Ill;
r
terpretation of Aristotle's text). In order tosay, like Gauthier did, that Siger professes
pretation of Aristotl
I I I. ; an averroisme de seconde main, whichis not an averroisme de philologue (i e.
dual and multiple hi
based
logic
ased on texts) but an averroisme dehilhe oso(i. e. based on the to
of. prn.
ll :;
)PP
a unique spiritual so
I I I ' ^`^o
Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts607
. aterials of the act. '',

adaptingit toa typical Latin context and not without takingintoaccount the
threspect toindi_ `

; ; state of the debate on the subject. I prefer toconsider bothfeatures as signs of

cies. But although':

cultural identity and of collegial responsibility.

t, the operational

The first adaptation that he 'imposed tothe authentic doctrine of Averroes

amsed per suarn'

; `was toconsider the receptive and agent intellects as parts of the unique
fies callingthe in,

intellective soul. As stated, many Latin masters, bothin arts and in theo-
^r as the soul is a'

logy, had developped this new readingof Aristotle's De ani ma, attributingboth
q. 8, p. 25, v. 1 9)-princip
les of intellection tothe individual human soul considered by them
nt and of in
tellec-; 4 Y
ras
hoc ali qui d and form. 54 By assertingthe unicity of intellects and not usingthe
as a principle of

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ expression hoc ali qui d tospeak of the intellective substance, Siger distanced
8). Human beings

-! himself fromhis predecessors and got closer toAverroes thoughmissingthe

the sensitive
soul,.
. point that the twointellects are twosubstances. By assertingthat the human
)stantial formand :'

soul is not a substance but a sensitive substantial formhe surmonted the an-
'atter, and the se'_

tluopological dualismof his colleagues thoughfallingintoa metaphysical

. al union withhn-

''dualismand its equally formidable problems. Thoughtipically Latin, Siger's

nal one (q. 1 , p. 3 j"
doctrine is marked by original features.
rirst Cause. . There is alsoa second adaptation of Averroes' doctrine, an adaptation
egative answer . t
^
based on a semantic modification that will leave Siger's noetics in disarray. In
zee lui (Siger) iii;
prder toexplain our participation in the act of understanding (i ntelli gere) and
)wed an idea froth'
the union between the intellect and the individuals by means of the images
consequences. 521
:overy of the .
material intel
me masters of
iger was aenm
rpretation of
lid sonot wi
-ine of the unicity:
should be seen as
retation of Aristotle
doctrine as a re,
at their time and
the Arabcomme
; onaventure, they e
fight, soit would . 1
l ing of Averroes j
^
gives the correct i
1 , that Siger profess
de philologue (i.
on the logic of pri
ciples), one has toassume that the unicity of the intellect is not found in Averroes'
commentary, but was only an inference made by the theologians fromsome of Aver-
roes' principles. Gauthier, indeed, embraced S. Gomez Nogales thesis accordingto
whichthe theologians had unduly hardened Averroes' thought, when in fact there
was noclear affirmation in Averroes' commentary that the intellect is a unique se-
parate substance. Suchis not the case, as has been proven by contemporary scholar-
ship (Hyman, Ivry, Taylor). Consequently it cannot be said that Siger's position was
borrowed, whichdoes not exclude that he alsoknew the theologians' warnings.
t`_ That, in fact, increases his originality and his exegetical courage.
54 . . I have tried toprove elsewhere that this is the first original Latin contribution tothe
fi interpretation of Aristotle's noetics (never before had the agent intellect been con-
sidered a faculty of the human soul); that some of those masters invoked the authority
of Averroes in support of their interpretation for dialectical reasons, quotinghimout
of context; and that this is insufficient tospeak of a First Averroism because their
new interpretation is foreign toAverroes' authentic thought (cf. BAZ AN 2000). Siger,
undoubtedly, was influenced by this new interpretation and accepted fromhis col-
leagues the idea that the agent and receptive intellects are faculties inherent in the
same substance. But there is between himand his colleagues a profound difference
that should be taken intoaccount when assessinghis originality. In Siger's inter-
' pretation of Aristotle, the agent and receptive intellects were not faculties of indivi-
dual and multiple human souls, eachone of whichis a hoc ali qui d, but twofaculties of
a
unique spiritual substance common toall human beings.
^'oh.
608
B. Carlos Baz ^n
(cop ulati o p er p hantasmata),
Averroes had proposed the theory of the double sub='
q_ ,- ; Y not studied by Gaut
ject or support of the intelligible object
(i ntellectum sp eculati aum). Siger had
gr
eat', :; Thomas Aquinas.
difficulties in acceptingor understandingthis theory, as is shown by the fact '
The first case conca
that he felt the need toanalyze Averroes's explanation of the union b
etween
proved that Siger owf
the intellect and the individuals in three of his Q de ani ma (q. 8,
q. 1 4 and
+authority attributed
q. 1 5). If we examine the way he presented the data of the problem, we real
bet suumquod est ei
ze that the roots of his difficulties are tobe found in the fact that he had '
=unquestionable. But I
shifted the Averroistic doctrine fromthe level of the object tothe level of the
lgrasp and underline
knowingsubjet (i ntellectus sp eculati vus), i. e. , the subject understandingin act. At i .
What Siger is empha
this level, Averroes' doctrine is completely incapable of explainingthe union
,creationism: only the
because the act of understanding, althoughhavingits point of departure in ' :
' ; creatures must have
images that are in us, does not reachcompletion until the intelligible formhas :
censors, he refused to
been sep arated
by abstraction fromthe images that are in us. Thus the act of
rement. He stated ye
understandingis accomplished by a subject that is separated fromus (the in- ;
separate substances ax
tellect), when it is actualized by a formthat is alsoseparated fromus by the :
composition between
i. '
operation required tomake it intelligible in act. The images, beingintelligible'
In potency) and anotl
in potency, cannot explain our participation in the
i ntellectus sp eculati vus
and
composition that he
consequently it would seemthat intelligere nunquamest nobis. Siger was ;
the specific forms (ibis

incapable of solvingthe objection he himself had raised. Curiously, he retur. =

totelianismthan any
ned toAverroes' doctrine, whichhe tried tojustify by sayingthat we share iri
shows Siger's original
; ,-,
the knowledge of intelligible forms not because the images are united toits,
This impression is
but because the intellect is united tous. This was a circular justification: his:;
A
close relationship b
point of departure had been that the intellect is united tous because the in-
ences. Examiningthe
telligible object is united tous. That Siger himself, well before Thomas' in-;
'tlie body, Thomas ela
tervention, had raised insoluble objections toAverroes' noetics is of great his-_ _ _ _ _
one: potentiae anima
torical significance and should be credited toSiger's critical mind.
ss_
esse simplicius princi
Father Gauthier has alsoshown that Siger had considerable knowledge
of
nuiiius cooris actus
theological writings, particularly of Thomas' Commentary on the Sentences,
animae raponalis.
s6
and that he had borrowed frequently fromthem, especially withrespect to ; r
suchan argument. Si;

the sources that he quotes. Siger's acquaintance withtheological writings is an

". it a centerpiece of hi
I
:
interestingcharacteristic of his intellectual personality, and maybe one of the; 1
V
simplicior sua substar
reasons why he indulged in subjects that were not quite philosophical'
corpus, eius operatio
suchas the question
non multum p hi losop hi ca regardingthe sufferingof the soul :
< cessarioutetur corpoi
`. ;
in hell. I donot see in this characteristic any motive tominimize Siger
s
plicior sua substantia<.
;
place in the history of thought. But I would like toseize this opportunity
to ;
turned intoa foundat
'
I
reexamine one case, already studied by Gauthier, in order toshow afun-
was not convinced b
damental characteristic of Siger's philosophy, and toexamine another one
56 V
TxoMas AQuuvas, In
V
55I have examined in detail this aspect ofSiger's noetics in myarticle: BAz^rr
V
xAS
Quaesti ones di sp ut
1 :
part. 439-445.
23-26.

k 'Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts609
'; I
not studied by Gauthier, in order toshow Siger's independence vis -a-visiit
Thomas Aquinas.

The first case concerns the composition of every finite being. Gauthier has
'I
proved that Siger owes toThomas the information concerninga well known
L
)
,authority
attributed toBoethius, namely omne quod est citra Primumha-
bet suumquod est et suumquoest (q. 6, p. 1 9, v. 39-4 0). This findingis
unquestionable. But I would like toput the quotation intocontext in order to
grasp and underline the basic orientation and originality of Siger's position.
What Siger is emphasizingis a principle that derives fromhis metaphysical
`. 'creationism: only the First Cause enjoys perfect ontological simplicity; all
' creatures must have some sort of composition. Against many of his prede-
cessors, he refused toembrace universal hylomorphismtosatisfy this requi-
rement. He stated very strongly the spiritual nature of the intellect and of
separate substances and finished by acceptingin thema kind of purely formal
composition between a principle that is similar tomatter (in the sense that is
in potency) and another that is similar toform(in the sense that is in act), a
` composition that he compared tothe relationship between the generic and
the specific forms (ibid. , p. 1 9-21 ). All this is by far more consistent with

Aris-
totelianismthan any of the previous solutions offered by eclectic thinkers andya
shows Siger's originality and critical independence.
}^
; ; . This impression is confirmed by the second case, where we can alsodetect
a close relationship between Siger and Thomas' Commentary on the Sent-
ences. -. { Examiningthe question whether the rational soul can be united with
't tl c body, Thomas elaborated a series of objections amongwhichwe read this
onc: potentiae animae fluunt abessentia ejus. Sed principiatumnon potest
cs r simplicius principioa quofluit. Cumergoquaedampotentia animae
udthus corporis actus sit, ut intellectus et voluntas, videtur quod nec essentia
imae rationalis. 56 Toour knowledge, Thomas was the first toelaborate
^ chan argument. Siger picked it up fromThomas' Commentary and made

t a centerpiece of his doctrine: potentia a qua egreditur operationon est I< <
plicior sua substantia; si igitur intellectus per suamsubstantiamperficiat
t ,
c^r-pus, eius operationon potest esse nisi mcorpore; quare in operandone-
arioutetur corpore, cumpotentia a qua egreditur operationon sit sim-
P1 i- for sua substantia (q. 7, p. 23 v. 1 8-22). The fact that Thomas' objection

turned intoa foundational principle of Siger's doctrine shows that the latter
r'
1 1 1 1111
'I I'I
not convinced by the theory of the emergence of forms by which
6 `
Txo . s AQunvas, In II Sent. d. 1 , q. 2a. 4 , arg. 4 . Cf. parallel texts in TxohfAs AQui
r . Nns,
Quaesti ones di sp utatae de ani ma q. 2, 1 3 (Ed. Leon. 24 /1 ), 20, app fontium, adn.
1 2326.
I^^4
1

iii

II IIII
)ry of the double sub
i vum). Siger had great.
is shown by the fact
af the union between
sni ma (q. 8, q. 1 4 and
he problem, we reap
the fact that he had
ect tothe level of the''`
lerstandingin act. A,
explainingthe uni,
Joint of departure iii''
intelligible formha
a us. Thus the act of
ated fromus (the iri
rated fromus by the
. ges, beingintelligible
-llectus sp eculati vus
and
est nobis. Siger w
Curiously, he rettir
yingthat we share
Lges are united tos
:ular justification:
tous because the
I before Thomas' in
ioetics is of great his
tical mind. 55
lerable knowledge
ry on the Sentence
; ially withrespect t
)logical writings is
nd maybe one of th
Iuite philosophical
sufferingof the so,,
tominimize Siger'
this opportunity to
)rder toshow a f
<amine another on
I
ny article: BrzAv 1
;t.
610

B. Carlos Baz ^n
Thomas tried torefute his own argument. He was not convinced even after'
Thomas gave more refined answers in his
De uni tate i ntellectus, as is proven by
/I
the fact that the argument reappears in Siger's
De ani ma i ntellecti va:
Non cori
tingit substantiamaliquamesse unitammateriae et potentiamillius substan_ '
UUU
tiae esse separatama materia (c. III, p. 82, v. 1 01 -1 02). This case shows that
even if Siger borrowed fromThomas, he did sowitha critical, independent`
mind and refined, in the light of Aristotelian hylomorphism, a principle that is'
one of the strongest arguments against Thomas' noetics.
Finally, the thesis of the unicity that Siger was the first toembrace as t 6
correct interpretation of Aristotle's De ani ma should be put in the context
of
Siger's basic professional project. My comments and questions are in=.
spired by a book published by my friends F. -X. Putallaz and R. Imbachun=:
der the suggestive title: Profession: Philosophe. Siger de Brabant (Paris, 1 997).
How did Siger himself conceive his profession? Nothingexplicit appears in"
his
Q
i n III De ani ma, but he made it clear in his De ani ma i ntellecti va:
nostra'
intentioprincipalis non est inquirere qualiter se habeat veritas de anima, sed
quae fuerit opinioPhilosophi de ea (c. VI, p. 99, v. 81 -83). One can take this. ,
affirmation as a mere dialectical gimmick toavoid troubles withthe author'
ities, but I prefer totake it as the expression of what a master of arts was:
supposed todoand of what masters of arts had been doingin the first half ^ f
the thirteenthcentury. It has become customary tooppose this project tothe
one expressed by Thomas Aquinas in his Commentary on
De caelo (I, 22
n. 228): studiumphilosophiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines sen`r
serint, sed qualiter se habeat veritas rerum. The difference between these"
twoequally valid,
intellectual projects could not be more significant, even`
more sowhen we learn that Siger alsoknew that the final goal of philosop}i^'
is toreachthe truthof being: philosophus intendit finaliter cognitionem
vel
ritatis (Qmorales, 4, p .
1 02v. 1 3-1 4 ). But whichone of the twofits the profil^
of a philosopher? I have nodoubt that Thomas' project defines muchbetter
the kind of searchthat is proper tophilosophers, i. e. the searchfor the trut i;
-of being. Siger's personal project (nostra intentio), however, points toa diffe
rent kind of truth, i. e. the truthof texts. What he has defined is the kind o
searchproper toa historian of philosophy. - That is why we like him, historians
of philosophy as we are. If we take Siger's statement at its face value a
in'
accept that his project was topresent Aristotle's psychology as faithfully
possible, we should grant himthe benefit of the doubt. I amnot thinkingin
terms of the benefit that a member of the Inquisition could have granted him'
had he accepted Siger's statement as a valid justification for the heterodoxy"
his doctrine. I amthinkingin terms of the benefit that we, as historiai _ .
should grant himwithrespect tohis method. We are used tothe sophisticated''
tools of researcht
handicapped. Und
Averroes' commer
penetrate the mea
one another: his re
for consistency. Sit
principle, had give
the notion of evolt
layers of r^ dactio
treatises were writi
was an averroism
gue, as Gauthier
^ requirement of con
other thinkers had
suhe showed that t
a philological one.
The problemret
oppositions betweer
rhentic Aristotelian
reconcile them? An(:
:. subject, again, we fi
ell as an undenial
tiophy as a great sc
'rporatingintothe
truthdoes not confl
^ lue of theology de
u
es. He was alsoaw
stian teachings and ti
telian philosophy o
It
>ed by some theolo1
; ions he applied a
3
- '
'n the one hand, it
st'-'it philosophical pi
1 -^lerns raised by some
L, explained, first of
^ I t
erminations of Ari;
57
BothAverroes and

Aristotle's texts, whit

written.
4
II.
i .
IC I
IIIII^'^^IIIII^^^! ^ ;
w
Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts61 1
convinced even a
V .
ols of researchthat are available tous: In comparison, Siger was seriously
'lectus,
as is proven
Under those circumstances it is not surprisingthat he privileged
i ntellecti va:
Non c^
yerroes' commentary as an interpretive tool. He alsohad another tool to
. entiamillius subs'
^
netrate the meaningof obscure texts whichsometimes seemtocontradict
This case shows tJ ,n^
'another: his reason. The searchfor the historical truthbecome the search
critical, indepen ^ ^
"r consistency. Siger, as most medieval thinkers, assumed that Aristotle, in
sm, a principle that
j
rinciple, had given a consistent system. 57 He had not learned fromJaeger
3. "^
notion of evolution, he had not learned fromGauthier the existence of
rst toembrace as
th
yers
of redaction, he did not know that the order in whichAristotle's
put in the 1 eatises
ea
es were written did not follow necessarily a logical order. Maybe his
d questions are ` .
{as an averroisme de philosophe rather that an averroIsme de philolo-
z and R. Imbach`. ' :
e, as Gauthier put it, but at least his efforts brought intofull light the
Brabant (Paris, 1 99. E
^:
quirement of consistency and the theoretical difficulties of a doctrine that
ngexplicit appears
ther thinkers had been solvingtooeasily by eclectic concordism. By doing
i ma i ntellecti va: nos . 'he
showed that the history of philosophy is a philosophical discipline, not
veritas de anima, s
philological one.
83). One can take
iJ
=The
problemremains that in his searchfor consistency Siger discovered
ibles withthe autl o
ppositions between his understandingof what he considered tobe the au-
a master of arts
entic Aristotelian doctrine and some of his Christian beliefs. Is it possible to
)ingin the first half' .
econcile them? And how important is it tofind sucha reconciliation? On this
ose this project to`0th
^ bject, again, we find significant differences between Siger and Thomas as
iry on De caelo (I,}
e1 1 as an undeniable common ground. Thomas considered Aristotle's phi-
tur quid homines l
as a great scientific achievement of human reason that was worthin-
erence between th
^ rporatingintothe body of Christian culture, he was convinced that rational
nore significant, . ei
4 ith does not conflict withrevealed truth, and he always thought that the
nal goal of philosog
ue of theology depends on the quality of the rational instrument that it
. aliter cognitioncin
s. He was alsoaware that some Aristotelian theses did not agree withChri-
the twofits the pro
fin teachings and that some theological doctrines were in opposition toAris-
:t defines muchbe
telian philosophy only because of the poor quality of the philosophical tool
se searchfor the
std by some theologians. In order tobuild a bridge between the twoworld
ever, points toa
ions he applied a model that includes a double and simultaneous critique.
defined is the kin
+. . n the one hand, it was necessary toclean Western theology of its inconsi-
we like him, histoiJ
nt philosophical principles, on the other, it was necessary tosolve the pro-
at its face value``
'ems raised by some of Aristotle's doctrines. Some Aristotelian theses could
hology as faithfully
e explained, first of all, as a result of a li mi ted p ersp ecti ve. Second, some in-
I amnot thinking
eterminations of Aristotelian philosophy could be clarified by i nternal cri ti ci sm,
ild have granted ^`
i for the heterodoxy: 7 .
BothAverroes and Thomas had totheir credit the perception of inconsistencies in
that we, as histon. : Aristotle's texts, whichthey attributed tothe different moments when they were
,ed tothe sophistic
written.
612

B. Carlos Baz ^n

Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i j

searching, in Aristotle's texts themselves, the principles that may solve
thf
aporiae in a way consistent bothwiththe Aristotelian systemand withphi
losophical truthtout court. Finally, some Aristotelian theses require a p hi
losop i cal develop ment ofthe system, provided that is done in a manner consisted
withits logical requirements. Siger ofBrabant did not have an epistemold
gical model sowell articulated when he wrote his Q i n IIIm De ani ma,
but
hi
developed one under the pressure ofThomas' arguments and the Cond
^ in
nation of1270. Those circumstances made himbecome aware of
the need }^
explain and justify his personal thought and his professional work. There is ni
reason todoubt his honesty when he claimed that in case
ofconflict betwedl
faithand reason, truthis on the side offaith, as there is noreason either tc
^ristotelis celanda, licet sit contraria
. 88), because philosophical proposition
Lecessary conclusions ofnatural reason.
ardingAristotle was that his authentic
of
oppose revealed truthand, conseque
hropology was a formidable and readil
zcorporated without major inconvenier
,hat is why he saw in radical Aristoteli
,ardizinghis intellectual project. Finally
isophical development ofthe system, ,
fell as fundamental differences betwee
think that he ever suscribed tothe double truth. He simply insisted onti '_ that Siger had denounced in some ofAr
autonomy ofphilosophy in its own field and worked a quite consistent ex
doubt that could only be overcome by a
planation ofthe antinomies between philosophy and revealed truth. . This`;

'this effort he chose toremain attachec

explanation can be resumed in these terms: philosophical propositions tha+ .
''nlains the difficulties experienced thrc
oppose faithare not necessary conclusions ofscientific reasoning, but
only
probable inferences; in many occasions the opposition arises fromthe liinil
ed premises and perspective adopted by philosophers, which, in turn, limi
the scope ofvalidity ofthe philosophical conclusion, makes it superfluous ti
deny it and deflates the conflict withfaith; when kept in its epistemologic ^,
field ofvalidity, natural reason does not contradict faith; Aristotle is not tl,
only authority in philosophy; all philosophers, includingAristotle, were hi
man and subject toerror; human reason is particularly weak in dealing wit]
the realmofseparate substances and the transcendence ofthe First Causf
and philosophy risks fallingmore easily in error in those domains; in man
cases common men donot have the instruments torefute probable conch
sions that oppose revealed truthand in suchcases it is legitimate toadhere t^
faith, because the authority ofphilosophers is not absolute. 58 This puts Sige
very close toThomas' first approachtoreconcile faithand reason, i. e. , th
recognition oftheir respective domains ofvalidity and ofthe relativity oftt
premises used by philosophers. There is alsosome common ground withrf
spect tothe second approach, i. e. , the need touse internal criticismto1 1 4
the solution ofcontroversial texts by appealingtoclear principles ofthe Art
totelian system, except that they did not cease tobe at odds witheachoth
^
as towhichprinciples take precedence in the solution ofthe aporiae. Th
different results at whichthey arrived explains alsosome other difference
Siger thought that the historical truthshould not be hidden: non est intents
58 I have explained in detail all these epistemological principles in my article: BAZ P
1 980.
ofthe notion ofsubsistent su
himas toquid via rations n
m, and why he ended up rev
ristic ofeclectic Aristotelianism
2. Si ger ofBrabant: Evoluti on
. In the case ofSiger, there were twomair
refine and adjust his position: Thomas
and Peripatetic doctrine on the intellect,
i. atter served as a reminder of orthodox I
oadhere as a Christian. The former 1 ,
'dition the debate for years tocome. Th
`deed, set the whole debate concerning
very specific grounds: the doctrine exF
o patetic texts had been corrupted by Ave;
F; ly, it was necessary torecuperate its ai
would show that the doctrine expressed
withChristian teachings. In brief, Thom
of Aristotelian texts would alsoyield the
truthwould be shown tocoincide withti
conceived his task as beinginitially an
59 :The final stage of this evolution, reached i
a complete return tothe pre-thomistic con
Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts61 3
Aristotelis celanda, licet sit contraria veritati (Q i n Metap h. III, 15, 1 32,
^. 88), because philosophical propositions that oppose revealed truthare not
necessary conclusions of natural reason.
For Thomas, the historical truthre-
gardingAristotle was that his 'authentic doctrine concerningthe intellect did
not oppose revealed truthand, consequently, that Aristotle's philosophical an-
'`''
thropology was a formidable and readily available instrument that could be
i
ncorporated without major inconvenience intoa Christian cultural synthesis.
That is why he saw in radical Aristotelianisma great danger capable of jeo-
:P
ardizinghis intellectual project. Finally, for the third approach, i. e. , the phi-
losophical development of the system, we can alsofind common ground as
well as fundamental differences between the twomasters. The weaknesses
that Siger had denounced in some of Aristotle's doctrines left himin a state of
doubt that could only be overcome by a personal philosophical effort. But in
this effort he chose toremain attached toAristotelian premises, whichex-
plains the difficulties experienced throughout his doctrinal evolution, his
rejection of the notion of subsistent substantial form, the doubts that kept
hautinghimas toquid via rationis naturalis in praedictoproblemate sit
tenendum, and why he ended up revertingtoa very traditional doctrine
characteristic of eclectic Aristotelianism. 59
2. Si ger ofBrabant: Evoluti on ofhi s radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm
In' the case of Siger, there were twomain circumstances that prompted himto
refine and adjust his position: Thomas Aquinas' analysis of the Aristotelian
and Peripatetic doctrine on the intellect, and the Condemnation of 1 270. The
latter served as a reminder of orthodox positions towhichSiger never ceased
toadhere as a Christian. The former launched a challenge that would con-
dition the debate for years tocome. Thomas Aquinas' De uni tate i ntellectus, in-
deed, set the whole debate concerningthe nature of the intellective soul on
very specific grounds: the doctrine expressed by the Aristotelian and Peri-
patetic texts had been corrupted by Averroes' interpretation and, consequent-
ly, it was necessary torecuperate its authentic meaning. Aproper exegesis
would show that the doctrine expressed in those texts was in perfect harmony
withChristian teachings. In brief, Thomas argued that the true interpretation
ofAristotelian texts would alsoyield the truth ofthe matter, that the historical
truthwould be shown tocoincide withthe philosophical truth. That is why he
conceived his task as beinginitially an exegetical one: ostendemus primo
59 The final stage of this evolution, reached in his Quaesti ones sup er li brum De causi s, marks
a complete return tothe pre-thomistic conception of the soul; cf. infra, nt. 76.
:hat may solve the
stemand withphi_
yeses require a
manner consistP. ,f.
ave an epistemol
^
rmDe anima, but
and the Condem-'
; vare of the need to. '
I work. There is
no
of conflict between
noreason either to
iply insisted on the
luite consistent ex-
:vealed truth. This
Ll propositions tha
but only~
ises fromthe limit=
hich, in turn, limit'
:es it superfluous t^ . . .
its epistemological? .
Aristotle is not the
Aristotle, were hu
eak in dealingwith-
of the First Cause,
domains; in many'
:e probable conclu; .
timate toadhere to
e. sa This puts Sig^ r'
ad reason, i. e. , the
the relativity of thy'
on ground withre-
ial criticismtofind
inciples of the Aris-
ids witheachother
f the aporiae. The
e other differences.
n: non est intentio
in my article:
61 4 B. Carlos Bazdn
positionempredictam(i. e. , the one advanced by Averroes and radical Ar
totelians) eius verbis et sententie (i. e. Aristotle's) repugnare omnino. 60
p t
end of his treatise, Thomas was proud todeclare that his analysis of texts had"
shown that none of the philosophers has stated the unicity of the intellect
(cap. V, 31 4 , v. 386-389) and that his refutation of this pernicious error hL`
been achieved non per documenta fidei, sed per ipsorumphilosophortitn
rationes et di cta (ibid. v. 4 31 -4 33).
Siger of Brabant accepted the challenge in its very terms, namely as a ch
^l:
lenge concerningthe historical meaningof Aristotle's texts. Although` it. . . . .
possible that Siger's first answer toThomas was his lost treatise
De i ntellectu,b:
the imprecise information that we have about this text makes it advisable to
concentrate our analysis on the survivingwritings. Siger's De ani ma i ntellecti ve,
written after the Condemnation of 1 270 but before the deathof Thomas,. . is
his most complete answer. When Siger said that in his treatise he would try t
determine quid circa praedicta sentiendumsit secundum documenta p hi losop i i .
rum probatorum, non aliquid ex nobis asserentes 62 he was not hidingbehind;
a methodological excuse; he was in fact acceptingthe terms that Thomas ha,.
established for this important hermeneutical debate. But acceptingthe chili
lenge did not mean that he should weaken his commitment tohistorical truth,
even if his exegetical work might not yield the same harmonious results as
60 Txott s AQuuvns, De uni tate i ntellectus, cap. 1 (Ed. Leon. 4 3), 291 , 37-38; cf. 293,
v. 21 8-222; 294 , v. 303-306; 296, v. 4 62-4 66; 297, v. 500-503 et v. 576-579; 298; ;
V. 620-621 ; 301 , v. 84 5-84 9 and cap. 4 , 308, v. 1 28-1 29. Concerningthe Peripate
tradition cf. cap. 2(301 , v. 1 -2; 302, v. 1 4 5-1 51 ).
61 AccordingtoAgostinoNifo, whotransmitted passages of this treatise together with
his own interpretation of them, Siger first reaction toThomas' criticismseem'
have been the reduction of the human intellective soul tothe receptive intellec
(keepinghowever its . unicity) and the affirmation that God is the agent intellect . f
human kind; cf. A. Nipsus, De i ntellectu, I, tr. 4 , c. 1 0, quoted by NARDI 194 5, 18..
ibid., 4 6-4 7 and KuxsEWIaz 1 968, 4 4 . For important adjustments toNardi's int,
pretation, cf. MP. xoNEY 1 974 , 538-539.
62SIGERUSDE BR. ssarrrin, De ani ma i ntellecti va, Prologus, ed. Baz ^n, 70, v. 1 3-1 5; `,
cap. 3 (83, v. 4 4 -4 8; 88, v. 50-53); cap. 6 (99, 81 -83); cap. 7 (1 01 , v. 7-9) Cf.
SIGERUSDE BRASarrrin, De aeterni tate mundi , cap. 4 , ed. Baz ^n, 1 32, v. 85-86. As,.
tallaz and Irnbachput it: Siger vise en premier lieuune correcte interpretation de
lettre d'Aristote ^Pencontre de 1 'attaque de Thomas qui lui reprochait justement
interpretation fallacieuse dutexte d'Aristote. (Pi-r u1 . z / IMBAcu 1 997, 52). SQ.
of these texts and others that goin different direction have been analysed by %
^
Wippel, whoconcludes that Siger, in fact, has distinguished between the way.
natural reason, on the one hand, and determiningthe mind of Aristotle, on the`
her, whichsuggests that Siger allows for twodistinct but complementary fun6ii
for a philosopher at the University of Paris in the 1 270s. Cf. WWEI. 1 998
achieved by Thomas. T
solumintentionemph
iophus senserit aliter q,
nemde anima Sint trad
(p. 83, V. 4 4 -4 8).
Withthese methodc
mine, througha carefu
Aristotelian psychology
sense can the intellect
(
:Aristotle's general defii
.,
; lion as the single subs
ontological correlative.
intermediaries, constitt
kellective soul without
^
ny other soul, or is it
Albert and Thomas, w
essendo and its v
withAristotle's intenti
live withrespect toth,
In fact, for Ari
. houghbeingunita u
only in opere, and
< ecto (a thesis that TI
Iltellection can be at
p, b^ dy (as should be cc
ause the images are i
intellective soul is op en
composite ex i ntri nseco
t^ llection should be a'
Siger has abandoned
,withan anthropologi
five soul cannot be u
pnly by extension: f
dicatur (ch. III). Sig(
soul
is not composite
the incorruptibility of
requires, accordingtc
the ! past. But Siger u
-,63 -
SIGERUSDE BRABANI
x^.
Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts61 5
and radical Aris

^ achieved by Thomas. That is why Siger stated that he would try todetermine
omnino. 60
At the. . ; :
solumintentionemphilosophorumet praecipue Aristotelis, etsi forte Philo-
aalysis of texts had ,; , sophus senserit aliter quamveritas se habeat et sapientia, quae per revelatio-
ity of the intellect '''
nemde anima sint tradita, quae per rationes naturales concludi non possunt
:rnicious error has
(p. 83, v. 4 4 -4 8).
imphilosophorum
,'
}
Withthese methodological principles in mind, Siger proceeded todeter-
mine, througha careful analysis of texts, what he thought was the authentic
; , namely as a chal- _
Aristotelian psychology. The most important problemis todetermine in what
xts. Althoughit . Is
sense can the intellective soul be separated fromthe body. 63 Accordingto
eatise De i ntellectu,6 1.".
Aristotle's general definition, the soul is the principle of beingand of opera-
akes it advisable to"
lion as the single substantial formof the hylomorphic livingcomposite; its
De ani ma i ntellecti va, t
ontological correlative principle is matter, towhichthe soul is united without
Leathof Thomas, Is
intermediaries, constituting unum ens (ch. 1 and 2). Can this be said of the in-
,tise he would try to':. s ; tellective soul without qualifications? Is it united tothe body in essgndo, like
documenta p hi losop ho-'
any other soul, or is it united toit only in operando? The interpretations of
s not hidingbehind
:: Albert and Thomas, whowanted the intellective soul tobe united tothe body
Is that Thomas had
win essendo and its intellectual faculty tobe separated is neither consistent
acceptingthe chal . , withAristotle's intention (deficiunt abintentione Philosophi), nor conclu-
it tohistorical truth truth4
sive withrespect tothe point they intended toprove (non concludunt inten-
xrnonious results ai
tum) . In fact, for Aristotle the intellective soul is separata in essendo, al-
thoughbeingunita in operando. The intellective soul is one withthe body
29 1 37 - 38 ; cf. 293,
only in opere, and depends on it non sicut ex subiecto, sed sicut ex ob-
{,I
,
03 et v. 576-579 2 ;
iecto (a thesis that Thomas had applied tothe intellective faculty). The act of
icerningthe Penpat^ d
intellection can be attributed tomen neither because it takes place in the
P
body (as should be concluded fromAlbert's and Thomas' position), nor be-
is treatise together with
'"cause the images are in the body (as Averroes had proposed), but because the
nas criticismseems
,. intellective soul is op erans i ntri nsecum ad corp us p er naturam. Man is consequently a
the receptive ^ntelle -
s the agent int ellect,o
composite ex zntrznseco op eranti et eo ad quod i ntri nsece op eratur and the act of in-
by NARDI 1 94 5,1 8 ;
tellection should be attributed tothis whole composite, not toany of its p arts.
tments to Nardi s In ; tiger has abandoned the original Averroistic interpretation onlytoreplace it
+^rl
withan anthropological dualismwhichforced himtostate that the intellec-
Baz ^n, 70, V. 1 3-1 5;
five soul cannot be united tothe body utfi gura cerae and can be called form ; I'
7 1 01 , v. 7-9 . Cf.
85 86 1 32, v.
. As.
Only by extension: forma extensive accipitur ut intrinsecumoperans forma
recte
interpretation de "
c3 catur (ch. III). Siger states alsothat accordingtoAristotle -the intellective
reprochait justemenf ul is not composite of matter and form, and infers fromthis immateriality
MBACH
1 997, 52).
S
the incorruptibilityof the soul in the future. He alsostates that this conclusion
been analysed by Jo
requires, accordingtoAristotelian principles, that the soul be incorruptible in
^d >>between the way.
d of Aristotle, on th,
he
S But B past. uiger insists that this thesis does not imply that the soul is not
y- t:!
i t
p ^yti o
comlementfunt-
WIPPEL 1 998.
A3
SIGERUSDE BRABANTIA, De ani ma i ntellecti va, Prologus, ed. Bazan, 70, v. 7-9.
i1 I
I
li i
i',i^ ilk
jl I
II
^ii . l_ I
61 6B. Carlos Baz ^nRadi cal Ari stoteli c
caused; on the contrary, as proven by Aristotle himself in Metaphysics V, . t-
soul is semper ens, abaliotamen< (ch. IVand V), a thesis that was alrea.
present in Siger's Q i n terti um De ani ma.
So, how is the soul sep arabi li s fromthe body? In chapter VII of his
D^ anjn
i ntellecti va Siger recognizes that it is difficult tofind a straight answer i
of Aristotle. On the one hand, the Philosopher seems toimply tl
the soul is not separable, because he clearly stated that there is nosoul witj
out a body, that the soul cannot be defined without the body, that it cannc
exercise its own operation without bodily images, and because there is n
evidence concerningthe separate state of the soul. If it is argued that Aristot
stated alsothat the soul separatur abaliis sicut perpetuuma corruptibili,;
could be said, secundumCommentatoremet forte i ntenti onem Phi losop hi ,
th^
the soul separates fromthis particular body, but not froma body simpli(
ter. Besides, accordingtoAristotle the soul is eternal, but the body has b
gun toexist; consequently if it were separable fromthe body, the soul wou.
have existed separated froma body duringan infinite time, whichis irratiori
tosay. Again, as an infinite number of men have pre-existed, if eachone hi
a personal soul whichremains separate fromthe body after the deathof ti
composite, there would be an infinite number of separate souls, which
against the Aristotelian principle that there is noinfinite in act. Finally,~.
Aristotle had thought that the soul was separable fromthe body, he woq
have written a treatise on separate souls and their state, but that is not. q
case, whichindicates consequently that nec animamsic separari verumes
opinari videtur. This is the conclusion that Siger proposed as an Aristoteli^
scholar whose responsibility is topresent as faithfully as possible the conel
of the texts. But he is alsoa philosopher and a Christian. As a philosopher
knows that by their very nature certain subjects are beyond the understandir
capabilities of human reason. That is why he alsoconcludes: Et ideo, lic
philosophi non experti operumapparentiumde animabus totaliter separ^'i
eas sic separatas non ponant, qui tamen experti sunt praedictamanimae. 'i
parationemnoverunt et alii revelaverunt. Under those epistemological co
ditions, nothingin nature prevents some prophetic men toreacha superi,
kind of knowledge whichis beyond the scope of human reason, and nothit
prevents common men toaccede tothose truths credendotestimoniopr
phetaeo. We arrive thus tc the same conclusion proposed by J. J. Duin wi
respect toSiger's doctrine in the Commentary on the Metaphysics. 64
As for the numerical multiplication of intellective soul, Siger's point of c
parture is twofold: a) accordingtotruth, whichcannot lie, the souls are multip'
64 Duu'r 1 954 , 4 22-4 29; cf. alsoBnz^rr 1 974 b, 32.
but his task is todetermine her(
ritas. The problemis that phil,
a the multiplicity on the basis
id he adds, in a clear rejection
:ent substantial form, that non
lividuata could be multiple, as
iarate forms), on the basis that
i matter can be multiple, and c
ier philosophers, like Avicenna
is of the multiplication of intell,
aced in favor of multiplication,
ility of explainingthe multiplicz
- hypothesis of the unicity of the
^etics was already in crisis in his
De ani ma i ntellecti va the crisis e
ep evolution of his thought: a) I
e intellect withmen by means
. te in the act of intellection anc
e intellect as i ntri nsecus op erans, at
ms of the receptive or possible
mthe agent intellect is a sepa'
65
-_ . . Another aspect of Siger's evolt
(Lisbonne). This text is contemp
slightly earlier. 66 Basically, the d
confirms that Siger considers the
by the receptive intellect, which,
had presented it in his Q i n terti u
this text, is not always understan
this affirmation is that the recept
because by nature suchsubstanc
act; our common experience, on
understandingin act (q. 3, 1 09,
agent intellect, defined by Arist<
65 That is the conclusion that can t
tellect found in chapter V(93, V. E
could performthe abstraction: i
matibus, agente intellectu, et tand
indication that the theory reporte(
x:66 Cf. Bnz^ty 1 974 b, 33-39.
Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts617
4 etaphysics V, the
s that was already`. '
VII of his
De ani ma`
ght answer in the
ems toimply that
re is nosoul with-'
)dy, that it cannot
:cause there is no
geed that Aristotle
i a corruptibili, it:
.rn Phi losop hi ,
that
a body simplici-:
t the body has be-.
:y, the soul would
whichis irrational
d, if eachone had
:r the deathof thy'
. te souls, whichis'
in act. Finally, if'
. e body, he would
)ut that is not the
:parari verumesse'
as an Aristoteliann
)ssible the content
s a philosopher h
the understanding
les: Et ideo, lic 1
totaliter separa. til
dictamanimae s
)istemological con
reacha superi^ i
ason, and nothing
dotestimoniopry;
by J. J. Duin witt
taphysics.
Siger's point of de
souls are multiple;
b) but his task is todetermine here the intentiophilosophorummagis quam
veritas. The problemis that philosophers are divided on this subject. Some
deny the multiplicity on the basis of the immateriality of the intellective soul
(and he adds, in a clear rejection of Thomas' doctrine of the soul as a sub-
sistent substantial form, that nonature whichis per se subsistens and per se
individuata could be multiple, as Aristotle has shown withrespect toPlato's
`. . separa
te forms), on the basis that only material forms or composites of form
and matter can be multiple, and on the impossibility of an infinite in act. But
-. other philosophers, like Avicenna, Algazel and Themistius are strongparti-
. sans of the multiplication of intellective souls. Other reasons, can alsobe ad-
vanced in favor of multiplication, the most important one beingthe impos-
sibility of explainingthe multiplication of the acts of intellection if one accepts
the hypothesis of the unicity of the intellect. Withrespect tothis point, Siger's
noetics was already in crisis in his Q i n terti um De ani ma, as we have shown. In
his
De ani ma i ntellecti va the crisis evolved intotwodevelopments that indicate a
'
deep evolution of his thought: a) he stated explicitly (ch. IV) that the union of
the intellect withmen by means of images cannot explain how men partici-
pate in the act of intellection and replaced this theory by his own theory of
the intellect as i ntri nsecus op erans, and b) he spoke of the intellective soul only in
terms of the receptive or possible intellect, givingthe clear impression that for
himthe agent intellect is a separate substance necessary for the abstractive
operation. 65
Another aspect of Siger's evolution is manifested by his Quaesti ones naturales
;: (Lisbonne). This text is contemporary with De ani ma i ntellecti va or might be
slightly earlier. 66 Basically, the doctrine presented in question 3 of this text
confirms that Siger considers the human intellective soul tobe defined only
: by the receptive intellect, which, contrary tothe opinion of Averroes as Siger
`had presented it in his Q. i n terti um De ani ma and as he synthetizes it again in
- this text, is not always understandingin act. The immediate consequence of
this affirmation is that the receptive intellect cannot be a separate substance,
because by nature suchsubstances are intellectual and always intelligent in
act; our common experience, on the contrary, attests that we are not always
understandingin act (q. 3, 1 09, v. 4 3-4 6): The next consequence is that the
agent intellect, defined by Aristotle as sciens in actu, must be a separate
65 That is the conclusion that can be inferred fromthe rare mention of the agent in-
tellect found in chapter V(93, v. 62-65), where Siger alsoseems toindicate that God
could performthe abstraction: intelligere animae intellectivae causatur ex phantas-
matibus, agente intellectu, et tandemabomniumPrimoPrincipio. This could be an
indication that the theory reported by A. Nifois authentic; c supra, nt. 61 .
66 Cf. BAZ nrr 1 974 b, 33-39.
p hi ,-1 t,. +,;
61 8B. Carlos Bazdn
'.,:. substance, distinct fromthe receptive intellect (ibid. , V.
52-53). Bothsubst-
own nature s
T.. antes the agent and the rece tive intellects, are defined b
different op
g
receptive

by
era united toma
tions, whichare still characterized by the Averroistic terms agere in
telligi were complet
bilia and recipere intelligibiliw< and they are not related toeachother, as ''
that are uniq
matter and form(ibid. , v. 4 5-4 6 and 1 1 0, v. 56-5 7). Curiously, Siger adds
as other mate
that the experience of understandingattests alsothat bothprinciples of Intel- -
time the perf
lection must belongtoour soul, because bothoperations required for in
tellec- :: , blemquality
tion are in voluntate nostra (1 09, v. 4 7-4 9). This is a significant r
einter- . ment. That is
pretation of Averroes' thought, whoalsoasserted that the agent and receptive
De causi s. The
intellects are part of our soul for the same reason, and in almost i
dentical ": towhichthe
terms, but in a very different ontological framework. 67
(a thesis that,
' We reachthus the last stage of Siger's evolution: his
Quaesti ones sup er
Li brum' accepted): if t
De Causi s.68 The importance of this work has been unanimously emphasized
operation car
by all historians, whoagree on the orthodoxy of Siger's position, concerning,:'
other means 1
the nature of the intellective soul, his dependency on Thomas' doctrine, the _ '; of the body, 1
deep reinterpretation that Siger made of Aristotle's texts, and his rejection of ; `:
Aristotle's alE
Averroes' exegesis on philosophical grounds. The text, then, deserves a care- ': be attributed
ful analysis. ed as if the ac
The first thingthat is noticeable is that Siger speaks of the intellective soul `; ' an objective c
as beingdefined by the receptive intellect (q. 22, v. 75-78; q. 26, v. 8 and 1 0; '3 modoquoin
the whole q. 27; q. 39). The question of the agent intellect is not examined , fantumsicut
is
directly. The second thingworthnoticingis that Siger strongly rejects um sensibilia ad s
versal hylomorphism. Neither the separate intelligences nor the human m- toroan, but no
tellective soul are composite of matter and form. Their finitude is expressed anima, intellif
by a composition of act and potency, whichSiger defined in terms close to. , naturaliter un
those used by Thomas: Intelligentia enimcumnon sit primoens, sic est ens h:: intelligit sin
quod esse habet et quod natura intelligentiae comparator ad esse eius sicut p o original, as Pt
tenti a ad actum
(q. 22, v. 64 -66). The third thingtonote is Siger's strongal- already in Sig
firmation that the intellective soul is the formor perfection of the body. This `; - himself. 7 But
fundamental thesis is presented as the true meaningof Aristotle's universal < the sensitive a
definition of the soul and as the result of a philosophical argument whichre
? _ the vegetative
,; . .
quires that the principle of operation that defines human beings specifically ;
the intellective
be their substantial form(q. 26, v. 4 7-64 ). _
However, Siger is extremely careful in explainingthe scope of this affir 69 Rrrnr rsz / I
mation and its implications bothfor the nature of the intellective soul and of
70 Cf. SIGERUS
THOMAS
the intellectual operation (i ntelli gere). He knows that forms that are by their '`
DE
tamen<<; Que
In De ani ma
67 AvERROES, In De ani ma III, 1 8, ed. Crawford, 4 39, v. 71 -75.
68 SrcExus DE BxnsaN'r'in,
Les Quaesti ones sup er Li brum De Causi s de Si ger de Brabant,
ed. ?
(Ed. Leon
these texts
Marlasca.
five, but nc
I ^ t1F e
I} i ll
^y-
Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts61 9
. 52-53). Bothsubst-:.
d by different opera_ '
erms agere intelligi-'
ted toeachother, as
^uriously, Siger adds
,thprinciples of Intel-
required for intellec=
a significant reinter-'
e agent and receptive
id in almost identical
)uaesti ones sup er Li brun
aimously emphasize(
s position concerning
'homas' doctrine, th,
and his rejection o
then, deserves a car('
)f the intellective "so
7 8; q. 26, v. 8 and 1
llect is not examini
strongly rejects Iii
:s nor the human i
finitude is express
ned in terms close;
primoens, sic est ^
ad esse eius sicut
:e is Siger's strong:
ion of the body. . T
f Aristotle's univer
d argument which
an beings specific
own nature separate frommatter are specifically different fromforms that are
united tomatter by their own nature (q. 1 8, v. 1 4 -1 5). If the intellective soul
were completely separated frommatter, it would be one of the separate forms
that are unique in their species; if it were the formof matter in the same way
asother material forms, it would be impossible for the soul tobe at the same
. time the perfection of the body and incorruptible (q. 1 8, v. 37-4 2). The pro-
blemqualiter intellectus materiamperficiat requires then a special treat-
ment. That is precisely the purpose of question 26 of Siger's commentary on
De causi s. The question begins witha rejection of Thomas' doctrine according
,
towhichthe soul is united tothe body but its intellectual faculty is separated
(a thesis that, as we saw when commentingDe ani ma i ntellecti va, Siger never
accepted): if the soul is the formof the body, si cut rei veri tas est, its faculty and -
operation cannot be separated (ibid. , v. 72-74 ). Siger undertakes toprove by
:
. Other means the truthof the matter, i. e. , that the intellective soul is the form
of the body, by analysingthe intellectual operation. His point of departure is
-Aristotle's affirmation (in book I of De ani ma) that the act of intellection should
be attributed tothe composite of body and soul. This should not be interpret-
ed as if the act of intellection had in the body its ontological subject, but only
'an objective dependence: non arguit ipsumintelligere esse commune ex hoc
nodoquointelligere egeat corpore sicut subiectoin quosit intelligere, sed
tantumsicut obiecto, cumphantasmata comparentur ad intellectumsicut
sensibilia ad sensum (ibid. , v. 89-93). The act of intellection can be attributed
Oman, but not for the same reasons as the act of sensation: dicitur homo, non
intelligere eoquod in ipsointelligere corpore egeat sicut obiectocui
t^ raliter unitur, cumcommune sit intelligere ex modoquointellectus nihil
lelligit sine phantasmata (q. 52, 1 82, v. 1 4 5-1 52). This terminology is not
ginal, as Putallaz and Imbachhave affirmed; 69 on the contrary, it is found
^ ady in Siger's De ani ma i ntellecti va and its origin must be traced toThomas
elf. 7 But for Siger the intellective act is not common tobody and soul as
sensitive act, and the soul must not be considered the formof the body as
vegetative and sensitive soul (ibid. , 1 06, v. 1 06-1 1 6). Fromthe fact that
e intellective soul operates without usingthe body as the subject of operation
he scope of this . a- z/ Ii&aAca 1 997, 1 55
atellective soul and.

70 . Cf. SI eExus DE Ba. . s rx. , De ani ma i ntellecti va, c. III, ed. Baz ^n, 85, v. 69-72. Cf.
rms that are by
iJN
THOMAS DE AQtmvo, Summa contra Genti les II, c. 81 (Ed. Leon 1 3), 506: Sciendum
tameno; Quaesti ones di sp utatae. de ani ma q. 1 ad urn (Ed. Leon. 24 /1 ), 1 2, v. 4 23-4 28;
. , In De ani ma 1 ,2(Ed. Leon. 4 5/1 ), 9, v. 4 8-69; Summa theologi ae, IPars, q. 75 a. 6 ad 3
`. ' (Ed. Leon. 1 5), 204 ; De unitate intellectus, c. 1(Ed. Leon. 4 3), 299, v. 676-680: in all
is de Si ger de Brabant,; these texts Thomas shows that the act of intellection depends on the body obiec-
tive, but not subiective, i. e. does not use a corporeal organ or instrument.
I. ;
620
B. Carlos Baz ^n
I Siger infers - as Thomas had done - that the intellective soul does not
s
ubsist objects because
in the body, but in itself and, subsequently, that the soul cannot be ge
nerated . species; but exp
. '. ' fromthe potency of matter, but must be created fromwithout (ibid. ,
V .
1 1 6 gtiently, if their
1 1 8 and 1 62-1 65: forma quae per se subsistit, sicut in suoesse non
depend
^ t . ' many objects, w
ex materia, sic per transmutationemet dispositionemmateriae ad actumnon ,^
the intellect mt
educitur, sed abextrinsecoest intellectus). Siger alsostates that, accordingto'; '
. thoughin itsel
Aristotle, this ontological independence does not prevent the intellective soul
V matter for its be
frombeingthe formof the body (1 07, v. 1 31 -1 32et v. 1 4 7-1 4 8), and Con-
indeed, a spirits:
r . versely that this role of perfection of the body does not make of the soul a. ''''
; lectus sit ens sin
material forma materia totaliter conclusa et materiae obligata (ibid. ;
; .
,'; : nemformae, et
v. 1 55-1 57). The terminological similarities withThomas' notion of forma ; -
1 1 4 , v. 202-204 )
per se subsistens are misleadingand one must consider other aspects of Si
unicity, its ratio
ger's explanation before jumpingintoconclusions.
cation (ibid. , v.
In question 27 of his commentary, Siger examines the problemof the mul
multiplication lei
tiplicity of the intellect. The nature of the soul as a subsistent form, indepen
given that for As
dent frommatter in its being, seems toindicate its unicity, because the nu
perpetual serie
merical multiplication is caused only by matter. Suchis the conclusion drawn'r "' the impossibility
by Averroes on the basis of principles quite similar tothose that define the
thought, and ho
nature of the soul accordingtoSi er. "But, Siger insists, Averroes' conclusion :'
gg^g^ " tion of the intelle
is not only heretical but alsoirrational (q. 27, 1 1 2, v. 1 4 7). Toprove the last
and consequent)
point he offers twoarguments, one based on Aristotle, the other on Algazel. '
multiple (v. 250-
The first runs like this: forms that are united tomatter in sucha way that if 'y
Averroes' doctrin
they keep their unicity it would be impossible for themtofulfill the union;
Aristotle's noetic:
must be multiplied followingthe multiplicity of matter; the intellective soul is
In order tore
united tobodies in sucha way that if it were uni ue it would not be able to
y
unique
the nature of the
fulfill this union; therefore it must be multiplied followingthe multiplication '
questions that art
of human bodies (ibid. , 1 52-1 62). The second argument is, in fact, presented troversy. This an<
as proof of the minor premise of the previous one, and althoughSiger invokes z
similarities, Siger'
the authority of Algazel, its origin can be traced back toAristotle and toTho' z object of whichis
mas. 72
Si ger's originality was touse this argument torefute monos chism ggin tygump y
essence, Siger stat
and its historical importance is reflected in the fact that later Averroists, like intelligences (i nfi m
!;. Thomas Wilton, John of Jandun and Matthew Gubbiohad todeal withit potency and conse
The argument runs like this: an intellect cannot think simultaneously many '_ , ingactualized by
alsoq. 4 9, 1 73, v.
be, this capability
71 The ressemblance between Si ger's definition of the soul and the principles on
which. '; ;
gpp
intellective soul is
; i
Averroes' position is based has been underlined by Pvzar raz / Iaex 1 997, 1 56.
notion of forma
72Cf. AtusTOTELES, Top ., 1 1 4 b34 , quoted by THoMns DE AQusro, Summa theologuu,
substance (ibid. , 1 7
I Pars, q. 85, a. 4 (Ed. Leon. 1 5), 339.
73 Cf. KuxsEwIcz 1 968, 1 91 -1 92(Thomas Wilton), 226 (John of Jandun), 34 9 (Mat
V
dependingoperatic
thew Gubbio).
$ level of objects of k
Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArts621
soul does not
s
ubsist
objects because it cannot be simultaneously actualized by many intelligible
cannot be genera'
species; but experience attests that human beings think many objects; conse-
ithout (ibid. , v 1 1 64
q^
ently, if their intellect is one, this intellect would be thinkingsimultaneously
ioesse non
depend.
objects, whichcontradicts the major premise. Siger infers fromthis that
teriae ad actum
he
e intellect must be multiplied followingthe multiplication of bodies, al-
es that, according
tb
'houghin itself it is per se subsistens, not a material formdependent on
t the intellective soul:
Iatter for its being(ibid. , 1 1 3, v. 1 84 -1 87). For Siger, the intellective soul is,
1 4 7-1 4 8), and con?
}ndeed, a spiritual substance whichis at the same time a form: licet intel-
make of the soul a'" :' lectus sit ens sine corpore quantumad eius substantiam, tamen habet ratio-
-iae obligatao(ibid
; ' nemformae, et ideobene dicitur quod anima non est sine corpore (ibid. ,
as' notion of forni
^'i. ''1 1 4 , v. 202-204 ). If its nature of spiritual substance would seemtosuggest its
r other aspects of
Si-fi
unicity, its ratioformae requires the union withthe body and its multipli-
; . cation (ibid. , v. 21 6-21 8 and 1 1 5, v. 228-230). And if it is argued that this
problemof the mul
multiplication leads tothe conclusion that there is an infinite number of souls,
istent form, indep
^ n
because
given that for Aristotle an infinite number of men has already existed in the
city,the n^ "' perpetual series of generations, one can reply that Aristotle seems tolimit
he conclusion drawn .
the impossibility of an infinite in act tomaterial entities. Whatever he
those that define the
1 thought, and however uncertain his words are concerningthe multiphca-
Averroes' conclusion
tion of the intellect, one must remember that Aristotle homo fai t et errare p otui t,
7). Toprove the last and consequently one must stick strongly tothe truth-that the intellect is
the other on Algazel:
multiple (v. 250-252). This statement implies the philosophical rejection of
in sucha way that if
Averroes' doctrine, but leaves open the question of the historical meaningof
a tofulfill the union, Aristotle's noetics.
he intellective soul is
In order toreacha complete understandingof Siger's position concerning
would not be able to
the nature of the intellective soul a final analysis must be made of a series of
rigthe multiplication
questions that are less related tothe polemic context of the Averroistic con-
is, in fact, presented
troversy. This analysis will allow me toshow that, in spite of terminological
thoughSiger invoke
="similarities, Siger's doctrine is quite different fromThomas's. In q. 39, the
Aristotle and toTh6
object of whichis todetermine whether separate intelligences know their own
efute monopsychism^,
essence, Siger states that the human intellective soul, beingthe last of these
later Averroists, like`
intelligences (infima in ordine intellectualis naturae) is defined by an intellect in
had todeal withit'd;
potency and consequently it can reachknowledge of its essence only after be-
simultaneously many'.
mgactualized by the knowledge of material things (q. 39, 1 4 9, v. 35-4 5; cf
alsoq. 4 9, 1 73, v. 1 9-20). However imperfect this kind of self=knowledge may
be, this capability toreturn completely toits own essence confirms that the
the principles on wh^cl
/ IMBwca 1997, 156.'''

intellective soul is by nature a subsistent form(q. 52, 1 81 , v. 1 37-1 39). The
. Qusro, Summa theologwe
'
notion , of forma subsistens is clarified as beinga synonymfor spiritual
substance (ibid. , 1 79, v. 69-72). Nothingprevents sucha spiritual nature from
n of Jandun), 34 9 ,(Mat
"
. . . dependingoperationally on the body as longas this dependence is kept at the
level of objects of knowledge (ibid. , 1 82, v. 1 56-1 58). And Siger concludes the
JI
^^III
ACC
622B. Carlos Baz^n

presentation of his anthropological views witha synthesis that represents

116.
.
an agreement withThomas, as sometimes has been thought, but a stunriitt
wh
return tothe traditional dualismcharacteristic of the first half of the
1 277, bec

teenthcentury: intellectus cumhoc quod est per se subsistens et

hoc al'
rYqP
a4 uid;
in
the 74
est eti am actus corporis et forma (ibid. , 1 82, v. 1 65-1 66). Williamof
Baglion
^ .
What 1
cue the
could not have asked for anythingmore! dig
anirony:
IV. Conclusion: the Legacy of Siger
` :' '
the exege:
': say tothe
egesis), by
The intellectual evolution of the most important radical Aristotelian of the -'
your own
thirteenthcentury followed thus a curious paththat started with Av
erroes' lian philo
metaphysical dualismas beingthe proper interpretation of Aristotle's
De ant-' , there is n
ma, moved to,an ambiguous anthropological dualismwhichconsiders the re ?
nas' cultw
ceptive intellect tobe the perfection of human beings as i ntri nsecus op erans
but s' Aristotle's
leaves in doubt the question whether Aristotle affirmed its multiplicity, and:`,
sound fou
ended up withthe traditional anthropological dualism criticised by Tho
s tutional m
mas that was characteristic of the immense majority of Christian theolo`
approach
gians and philosophers. Siger adopted this dualismas a doctrine whichwas
prudent a
accordance bothwithtruthand withAristotle< hylomorphismapplied tohu; ,
ship)76 anc
man beings (thoughthe uncertainty concerningAristotle's position on the pressed di
multiplicity of the intellect was never fully overcome). It must be said that nnderstan
duringthis longitinerary Siger never understood correctly Averroes' position Duns Scot
when he considered boththe agent and the receptive intellects as separate; ''. : analysis of
fromhuman beings, he made of themtwofaculties of the same separate spt-
ritual substance; when he considered themas twosubstances (as Avexrod
. .
75 This rep
did), he put themin different ontological levels. It must be added that Siger's
after thf
yes
I ; correct understandingof hylomorphismin all other respects was never fully'.
gPY.
a
ditionll
applied tothe human composite considered as a corporeal intellectual subst
ed that
ance: in his first stage he stated that the only substantial formof human
asserted
beings was the superior sensitive soul and that the intellect was a substance"'
quently
separated fromthem; fromthat stage he moved toa weaker notion of sub-
by whai
I i'! stantial formthat allowed himtoapply it extensive toan intellectual subst'.
formof
ance intrinsecus operans; at the end, when he clearly stated that the foundati
(receptive) intellect belongs in the human composite, he fell back intothe ,
not mul
infra-metaphysical conception of hylomorphismaccordingtowhichit is pos-
; '
willingt
! I
. . :.
I , sible for a spiritual substance toplayalsothe role of form. Finally,I
would
in order
ken 25'
like toremark that, paradoxically, the radical interpretation of Aristotle's
D^
this text
. 76 Cf. BIAI
I
II . ''' 74 For Thomas' criticismof this dualism, cf. Box 1 997. and the
1 1 i1 I',
3-
Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArtr623
at represents not 'i'
I:
ani ma,
whichmade of Siger one of the main targets of the Condemnation of li
. t, but a stunning
1 277, became the. standard interpretation even amongthose whoparticipatedl '
'I
half of the thin_ ;
in the draftingof the disciplinary measure. 75
tens et hoc
ali qui d, ` What began as an heterodox interpretation, deservingcondemnation, be-
hamof Ba lion
g
came the standard accepted understandingof Aristotle in theological circles
duringthe last quarter of the thirteenthcentury. More than a paradox this is
an irony: the radi cal Aristotelians provided the conservative theologians with
the exegesis they needed todiscredit Aristotle. In short, the theologian could
say tothe radicals: youare right (fromthe point of view of historical ex-
egesis), but youare wrong(fromthe point of view of the Christian truth) and
6'1
ristotelian of the` c
your own interpretation confirms your error and the limitations of Aristote-
d withAverroes' . ; :
lian philosophy. If the radicals have proposed the correct interpretation,
Aristotle's De ani
there is notruthvalue in Aristotle's De ani ma. Consequently, Thomas Aqui-
considers the re ; ;
nas' cultural project, whichwas based on the acceptance of the truthValue of
i nsecus op erans but ig
Aristotle's philosophy, should be set aside: Aristotle indeed cannot provide
multiplicity, arid ; .
sound foundations toChristian wisdom. It is not surprisingthen that insti-
riticised by Tho-
tutional measures were taken tocorrect Thomas, that many whoshared his
Christian theolo rye;
p roach like Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines adopted more {`
a PYP
. ine whichwas in
prudent attitudes when expressingtheir views (if not self-imposed censor-
mapplied tohis-
ship)76 and that great thinkers at the beginningof the fourteenthcentury ex-
position on the

distrust pressed disust vis--vis the contribution of the philosophers tothe correct
gust be said that j
understandingof the nature of man and the universe (as it is the case ofJohnI^
verroes' position:: `
Duns Scotus), or concentrated their efforts on the safer domaine of Logic and
Elects as separate ;
analysis of language.
sine separate spi ; r
ices (as Averroes "'
75 This remarkable text, written by none other than Henry of Ghent, only eight years
dried that Siger's
after the Condemnation proves the point: Everythingthat Aristotle said in his trea-
tiles of natural philosophy withrespect tothe soul as formof the body was said con-
s was never fully
ditionally and hypothetically, in sucha way that it cannot be inferred that he assert-
intellectual subst- '; ed that the soul was the formof the body; however fromother principles that he
formof human '! ::
asserted absolutely it follows that the soul is not the act of the body, and conse-
was a substance
quently that it does not multiply followingthe multiplication of bodies, as it is shown
er notion of sub- er
by what has been said previously. Therefore it must be stated absolutely that Aris-
!
intellectual subst
toile did not say nor did he determine anything certain about the intellect beingthe
YY^gg
formof the body and about its multiplication, that he refused tofollow-the principal
stated that the ='-. foundations of his doctrine, i. e. that the intellect is not the formof the body and does k .
^ 1 1 back intothe
not multiply. However, he did not believe in those foundations tothe point of being
owhichit is pos- . "
willingtoassert explicitly what follows fromthem; but he left the question in doubt
I ^. ,
Finally, I would
in order toavoid easy criticism. HENRICUs n GANDAvo, Quodli bet IX, q. 1 4 , ed. Maki^ ; I i ' .':'.
Aristotle's De
of
ken, 255,4 2-256,54 . I amthankful toKent Emery for havingcalled my attention to
dal
this text, whichhe analyses in his recent paper, c EMEStY 2000, part. 95-98.
76 C BUUVcxi 1 990, 27-32. This work is essential tounderstand the impact, the scope ^
. . and the final goal of the Condemnation of 1 277.
I
624B. Carlos Baz ^n
'
^.
As for the masters of Arts, they kept doing
q
the ke t doin what was required of them, i
. e
what ha,
they kept explainingAristotle's text. Not without feelingoppresed, thou
Aristotle
and censored, as L. Bianchi has underlined. "And perhaps not withouts6 ':,
5
domains) ti
`; feelingperplexed, may we add, because if there was somucherror in Arista
! '; thor desery
tie's texts, why should they be kept in the curriculum? Are they supposed to. :
r' =ingthe opF
be taught only as a means toprovide trainingin reasoningskills? Some mas_
f
those who
ter of Arts, however, dared toreiterate the pathfollowed by Siger and tokeep
; "for the syn.
searchingfor the exact meaningof Aristotle's De ani ma guided by
Av
erroes'
and Thom<
interpretation. But they were nolonger naive scholars. The dangers of Aver-:
di al Aristoi
roes' doctrine had already been denounced in the strongest terms in philo
philosophy
sophical documents and ecclesiastical condemnations. The focus of their at-. .
; : ; - were left in
tention shifted, then, fromthe mere exegesis of Aristotle's texts tothe analysis
between his
of Averroes' interpretation and its philosophical difficulties. More than
radi cal^ .. Siger share
Aristotelians, these masters can be called Averroistso. Amongthem, only the
`u I. Thomas, n^
Anonymous master edited by Giele did not hesitate tosay: quod homopro-; '
the truthak
F. . . :. priosermone intelligit, non concedo. <<" All the others tried tofind, in the
rational eff
complexity of Averroes' doctrines, and througha sophisticated analysis of his'l
reason tosu
texts, a satisfactory explanation for the participation of human beings in the
solid as Alb
s' act of intellection. The importance that I have given toSiger of Brabant in
God, Albert
this paper is justified by the fact that later Averroists, even when they donot`
cessity that:
quote their predecessor, benefited fromthe theoretical framework set by the'.
nation of I
Brabantine master. Many of the authors whorepresent the different phases of
emphasis or.
i. . . Latin Averroismdistinguished by Kuksewicz are witnesses tothe importance; ,
thingnot or.
of Siger's contribution tothe history of Averroism. 79 His doubts, his succesives
as a univers;
views and the intellectual honesty of his critical approachtothe problemfed
and became
the debate well intothe fourteenthcentury. God. 82Und(
But Siger's successors became progressively obsessed withtheir own ex = autonomous
^:-
egetical problems, centered more on solvingthe obscurities of Averroes' corn- theology
mentary than in enlighteningAristotle's De ani ma withan original interpre-
harmoniou
tation, and ended up beinga closed group affected by a kind of conservatism
so
of its own, paradoxical result of their inbreeding. Reflectingbackwards int^ '
; . :. 77 Bianchi quotes James of Dual (viri philosophici hiis diebus Bunt oppresi) and John
of Pouilly (hoc fuit quod volui dicere in aula, sed non potui, impeditus).
-----^
78 Anonymus, Quaesti ones i n Ari stoteli s Li bros I et II De ani ma II, 4 , ed. Giele, 75, v. 4 5. revolution,
79 What follows is based on KuxsEwicz 1 968: e. g. , Giles of Orleans (1 00-1 01 ),
the
dans l'hist
Anonymous master of Paris, MSBibl. Nat. lat. 1 6609 (1 05), John of Gottingen (1 28
'
m^ me [ . . . _
Anthony of Parma (1 50; 1 53-1 54 ; 1 63-1 65), Thomas Wilton, John of Jandun arc' d'assimiler
Matthew of Gubbio(1 97-1 98; 205-207; 237-238; cf supra, nt. 73), Taddeus of Par 81 C DE Li
ma (321 ) and James of Plaisance (360; 373; 398). . l'antiaristot
80 C GILSON 1 976, vol. 2, 688-689: [ . . . ] l'averroisme, malgr^ son aspect hardi e 82C Btnrren
I ^ ,
Radi cal Ari stoteli ani sm i n the Faculti es ofArtc625
uired of them, i. e. , what happened in mid-thirteenthcentury, it can be said that the authority of
oppresed, though, , Aristotle as source of truthin the field of human nature (as well as in other
)s not without also domains) was short-lived. $' It fell victimof those whorevered himas an au-
,icherror in Aristo- thor deservingfaithful historical exegesis, even if that could result in underlin-
e they supposed to
ingthe opposition between Aristotle and the Christian
Weltanschauung, and of
gskills? Some mas-
those whoalways distrusted himas a source of doctrines that were dangerous
y Siger and tokeep <
for the syncretic cultural project led by the conservative theologians. Albert
uided by Averroes' r ,'
and Thomas whoin many respects could be considered tobe the most
ra-
ie dangers of Aver
di cal Aristotelians because of the truthvalue that they granted toAristotle's
; est terms in philo-
philosophy if it was understood accordingtotheir hermeneutical principles -
ie focus of their at-
were left in an unconfortable position, caught as they were in the cross fire
texts tothe analysis '
between historical exegesis and doctrinal eclecticism. Radi cal Aristotelians like
s. More than radi cal Siger shared however somethingbasic and fundamental withAlbert and
longthem, only the
Thomas, namely the principle accordingtowhichphilosophy sh
^ uld search
: quod homopro-
the truthabout the nature of man and the universe throughan autonomous
vied tofind, in the ` rational effort althoughSiger 's confidence in the capability of natural
Gated analysis of his ` x - ; reason tosucceed in findingthat truthwithAristotelian principles was not as
''r
uman beings in the solid as Albert's or Thomas's. Thoughextremely respectful of the free will of
Siger of Brabant in God, Albert, Thomas and Siger were alsorespectful of the metaphysical ne-! I
n when they donot
cessity that follows the will of God, once He had decided. After the Condem-
amework set by the nation of 1 277 somethingdeep changed in that intellectual framework. The
gPg
e different phases of - emphasis on p otenti a absoluta made of God an infinite agent whocan doevery-
s tothe importance. : thingnot only freely but immediately, and the world ceased tobe thought of
oubts, his succesives as a universal structure presided over by laws based on essential connections,
tothe problemfed and became a structure whichholds only fromthe mysterious free will of
God. 82
Under those conditions, science and philosophy could not ascertain an
withtheir own ex- autonomous project and had toconsider themselves as intrinsecally subject to
IIiI^
^s of Averroes' corn- theology or brake entirely withtheology and abandon the searchfor an
i. n original interpre harmonious synthesis of faithand reason as part of the intellectual project
II
:ind of conservatism
:tingbackwards into
i!
unt oppresi) and John
I ^; .
impeditus).
ci. Giele, 75, v. 4 5. revolutionnaire, fut essentiellement conservateur. IIn'y a peut-etre pas d'exemple
! .
Drleans (1 00-1 01 ), the
`
dans I'histoire de Ia philosophie dune ecole aussi completement fermee sur elle
ohn of Gottingen (1 28), m^
me [ . . . ] C'est 1 'averrolsme, et non la scolastique en general, que Pon a le droit
z, John of Jandun and
d'assimiler a un aristotehsme obstine et borne .
it. 73), Taddeus of Par
81 Cf DE Ln3ERA1 993363: Jusqu'a un certain point on pourrait meme dire quejl1 l!
I antiaristotelisme a ete la tendance . predominante duMoyen Age . ! ^ ! ! I
! re son aspect hardi et
82Cf. BiANcfu1 990, ch. 2. I! 'I
M1 I
! I
II
i
[;RAJ

B. Carlos Baz ^n

Radi cal An
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Aristotle's De ani ma, in chronological order:
PETRUSHIsPANus, In De ani ma [c. 1 24 0? ], ed. Manuel Alonso, PedroHispano. Obras hio-
s^ ficas 2. Comentarioal De ani ma de Arist^ teles, Madrid 1 94 4 .
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filos^ ficas 3, Madrid 1 952.
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m^ di^ vaux 37), Louvain 1 998.
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naventurianum24 ), Grottaferrata 1 985.
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ra
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sur le Trait^ de l'ame d'Aristote, in: Revue Philosophique de Louvain 62(1 964 ), 4 21 -4 65:
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ings should be added tothe list:
ALBERTUSMAGNUS, De homi ne [ Secunda Pars Summae De Creaturis] [ c. 1 24 2], ed. A.
gnet (Ed. Paris. 35), 1 -704 .
THOMASDE AQurrro, De uni tate i ntellectus [ 1 270], Ed. Leon. 4 3, 289-31 4 .
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di^ vaux 1 3), Louvain 1 972, 70-1 1 2.
RADul. riius BRrro, Q, de ani ma (partial ed. of 2questions on sensus agens), i n: A. Pattin, I
l'histoire dulens agent. La controverse entre Barthelemy de Bruges et Jean de Jane
ses antecedents et son evolution, Louvain 1 988, 1 9-31 .
AI. BER-rus MAGNUS, De natura loci , I
ed. P. Hossfeld (Ed. Colon. 5/2
A. ONYMUS, Quaesti ones i n li bros Ari s;
Munich, Clm9559, f. 74 -82), cc
BAZ AN 1 971 , 1 21 -34 3.
; ANoNymus, Lectura i n Li brum De anh
24 ), Grottaferrata 1 985.
IANONYMUS, Quaesti ones i n Ari stotelss La
'i:
1 21 ), ed. M. Giele, in: GIEI. E / v
ANONYMUS, Quaesti ones sup er Arutoteli s
BERGHEN/BAZ AN 1 971 , 352-51 9
. "tlrroNYIUs, Magister Artium(c. 1 2"
leian Libr. , Lat. Misc. c. 70, I
1ed. B. C. Baz^n (Philosophes m^
AvERROEs, Commentari um magnum i n A
tariorumAverrois in Aristotelem.
HENRICUSAGANDAVO, Quodli bet IX.
i'tIoHANNESDE JANDUNO, Quaesti ones i n
IoKANNEs BLoNDUS(Blund), Tractat
Brittanici Medii Aevi 2), London
PErRUs HisPANus, In De ani ma, ed. I
: r tarioal De ani ma de Arist^ teles,
PETRUSHIsPANus, Sci enti a li bri De ac
miento, Colaboraci^ n 4 ) Barcelc
Ps. -PE'rRus HIspANus, In IIIII De as
,; Madrid 1 952.
'. . SIGERUSDE BRABANTTA, De ani ma i
. Louvain 1 972, 70-1 1 2.
r. Quaesti ones i n terti um De ani ma, e
:.' 1 972, 1 -69.
-' Les Quaesti ones sup er Li brum De Ca
,.:. di^ vaux 1 2), Louvain 1 972.
Tractatus de aeterni tate mundi , ed. B
x:. 1 1 3-1 36.
I'iIONIASDE AQ,uINo, De p ri nci p i i s nat
torum, De op erati oni bus occulti s natuc
ente et essenti a, ed. H. -F. Dondain
-:
Sentenci a li bri De ani ma, ed. R. -A.
Summa theologi ae (Ed. Leon. 4 -1 2,
-: Quaesti ones di sp utatae de ani ma, ed.
Quaesti ones di sp utatae de veri tate (Ed
Commentum i n secundum li brum sent
= Summa contra genti les (Ed. Leon. 1
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