Civil Law 1 (A)

A2013
PersonsandFamilyRelations
DigestCompilation
Prof.ElizabethAguilingPangalangan
1stSem,AY20092010
This is a compilation of case digests penned by members of Block A2013 for Persons and Family Relations under Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan and compiled by Wenky Yang.
A2013 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof. Aguiling-Pangalangan
Compiled by Wenky Yang | Page 2 of 200

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
First Semester, SY 2008-2009

I. Introduction
A. Intersection of Modern Constitutional Developments and Traditional Family Law
1. Provisions of the 1987 Constitution
2. Overview of Due Process and Equal Protection Cases

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479

Facts: State passed a law prohibiting the use of contraceptives
by married couples. Griswold was part of the Planned
arenthood League of Connecticut. P

Held: Against the due process clause. State was impinging on
their individual right to privacy of married individuals w/o any
justification. The Due process clause protects a penumbra of
rights & included in that is the right of married couples to
privacy. Zhai Garcia

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438

Facts: State prohibited the distribution of contraceptives except
for married persons and for therapeutic purposes. Baird
lectured & allegedly handed a contraceptive to a single
oman. w

Held: Against the equal protection clause (unequal treatment to
married women, unmarried women, and those who will use it
for therapeutic ends). Constitutional rights may be curtailed if
there is a compelling state interest. State irrationally &
unwittingly imposes unwanted pregnancies from unsafe sex as
a form of punishment. Zhai Garcia

Facts: Appellants were convicted of violating a Connecticut
statute which makes it a crime for any person to use any
rug or article to prevent conception. d
Held: The statute is unconstitutional because it violates the
right to marital privacy which is a right under the penumbra of
the Bill of Rights. Janz Serrano

II. Civil Personality
A. Concept and Classes of Persons

Geluz v. CA, 2 SCRA 801 (1961)

Facts: Couple has had babies aborted. Father did not know of
the 3
rd
abortion & he wishes to receive damages from the
hysician-abortionist. p
Held: Fetus was already dead (below the 24-hour mark) thus, it
did not have a personality through w/c a right to sue on the
fetus behalf can accrue. Zhai Garcia

Facts: Wife had abortion three times; the first two known to the
husband, but he didnt know of the third. Husband sued for
amages against the physician. d
Held: Husband cannot be awarded for damages in behalf of his
unborn child because the child did not acquire juridical
capacity. Janz Serrano

People v. Tirol, 102 SCRA 558 (1981)

Facts: Accused died when he was in jail w/ a co-accused for
illing a family. k

Held: Only the criminal liability was extinguished upon his
death, the civil liability will be recovered from his estate. For
this purpose, personality is deemed to continue in the estate of
the deceased w/ a personality separate from the heirs. Zhai
Garcia

Facts: During the pendency of the appeal, one of the accused
ied. d

Held: The death of the accused extinguished his juridical
personality. As such, he cannot be held liable criminally.
However, the civil liabilities incurred by him remains to be
determined which can be recovered from his estates. Janz
Serrano

Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil 257 (1953)

Facts: The son was shot dead while his mother was trapped
side the burning building. The question is who outlived who? in

Held: The mother outlived the son: this theory is more tenable
since this is based on facts. The theory that the son outlived
the mother is merely presumptive. As such, inference that is
based on evidence prevails over presumptions made by law
[Rule 123 , Rules of Court] Janz Serrano

B. Capacity to Act and Restrictions Thereon
1. Presumption of Capacity

Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas, 19 Phil 363 (1911)

Facts: Wife wishes that her husband be exempt from paying a
liability w/c he incurred before he was pronounced to be insane
for a monomania of great wealth.

Held: Husbands extravagance was not habitual & he was of
sound mind when he entered into the contract. Capacity is
presumed to attach to a person who is not previously declared
incapacitated and until the contrary is proven. Zhai Garcia

Facts: One of the suretys wife was pleading that the mental
incapacity of her husband at the time of the assumption of the
obligation to pay, and as such, should be relieved from
compliance with the earlier decision of the court to fulfill the
obligation.

Held: For insanity to be a valid restriction on the capacity to
act, it should meet the ff. requirements: (1) that the insanity is
habitual; (2) that the person was insane at the time the act was
done; (3) that the act done directly arose from the person's
insanity. Otherwise, the person is presumed to be capacitated.
In this case, the facts do not prove that Villanueva did not
possess the necessary capacity to give efficient consent with
respect to the bond which he freely executed. Janz Serrano

2. Restrictions
a. Minority
i. Effect on Contracts

Mercado v. Espiritu, 37 Phil 215 (1917)

Facts: Mercado seeks to have a contract of sale of a real
estate property annulled as they were just minors when they
contracted w/ Espiritu. They manifested to be of legal age in
the contract signed before a notary public
Held: Contract of sale made by minors who feigned their age is
valid & they will not be excused from the performance of the
obligation in the contract due to estoppel. Zhai Garcia

Facts: The appellants, when they entered into a contract of
sale of estate with the appellee, actively misrepresented
themselves as having reached the age of majority, when in fact
they were still minors.
Held: The sale of the estate is valid, and they cannot be
permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance
with the obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment.
Janz Serrano

Bambalan v. Maramba, 51 Phil 417

Facts: The minor, sole heir of a land, signed a sales contract
transferring the land to a party to whom his mother owed a
sum of money. The other party knew his real age but procured
a cedula for the minor indicating that he was of legal age.
Held: Mercado ruling not applicable because the minor here
did not feign his age. The other party even knew of his
minority. Zhai Garcia

Facts: Bambalan, when he was still a minor, was coerced and
intimidated by his mother to sign the sale of the land he
inherited from his deceased father.
Held: The minor did not pretend to be of age (as opposed to
Mercado), and his minority was well known to the purchaser
(defendant). When this is the case, the contract is voidable.
Janz Serrano

Braganza v. Villa Abrille, 105 Phil. 456 (1959)
L-12471 | April 13, 1959

Facts:
Petitioners received amount of P70,000 in J ap War
Notes, and signed promissory note to pay P10,000 in
legal currency after war.
Respondent sued in 1949.
Petitioners Rodolfo and Guillermo were minors at the
time of signing of the promissory note, but failed to
disclose their age.
Issue:
Can the petitioners be held liable?

Held:
The mother is liable (1/3). The children are not as
they were minors.
Ratio:
The minors did not make any active
misrepresentation. They merely failed to make their
age known. This is a passive/constructive
misrepresentation, which is not sufficient to prevent
their being excused from liability.
The minors must pay back an amount equal to that
received as they benefited from the money they
received. Karl King

b. Prodigality

Martinez v. Martinez, 1 Phil 182 (1902)
March 31, 1902

FACTS:
Pedro Martinez is the son and compulsory legal heir of
Francisco Martinez
Allegations: Francisco is squandering his estate by making
donations to his second wife, Anastacia Ilustre and to her
parents; Anastacia manages Franciscos estate; Francisco
had taken legal actions to transfer the property held in
common with Pedro to his wife and her relatives
Defendant denies the allegations: Pedro was given the
general power of attorney but his mismanagement of the
property of the estate compelled Francisco to revoke the
power of attorney; the suit against Pedro was grounded on
his refusal to render an account of administration despite
of the cancellation of the power of attorney
Court of First instance rendered judgment against Pedro

ISSUE:
WON Francisco Martinezs administration of his estates
and his acts constitute prodigality.

HELD:
NO. Francisco Martinez is still fit to administer his own
affairs and is still in full exercise of his faculties. The
testimony of the plaintiff is insufficient to support his
allegations and it was vague and indefinite. There is no
evidence that there has been a diminution of the
defendants property.

DECISION:
J udgment of the Court of First Instance affirmed. Cha Latorre
III. Pre-Marital Controversy
Breach of Promise to Marry

Wassmer v. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 (1964)

Facts: 2 days before the planned wedding, Velez sent a note to
Wassmer saying that he will not push through w/ the wedding
due to his mothers objection. The next day, he sent a note
saying that the wedding will push through. On the wedding day
and the succeeding days, he did not appear.
Held: Although breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong, Art 21CC says that when a person willfully causes loss
or injury to a person contrary to morals, good customs, or
public policy, he shall compensate the injured person for
damages. Velez is liable for the cost of wedding preparations.
Zhai Garcia

Tanjanco v. CA 18 SCRA 994 (1966)

Facts: Because of the Tanjancos promise of marriage to
Santos, he was able to maintain a sexual relationship with her
for 1 year. When she got pregnant, he refused to marry her.
Held: Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
She cant recover damages for the alleged seduction as there
was none involved when they maintained sexual relations for 1
year. Zhai Garcia

Facts: Tanjanco succeeded in having sexual intercourse for a
year with Santos after he promised to marry her. When Santos
got pregnant, Tanjanco refused to marry her.
Held: Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
There was no seduction involved. Sexual intercourse for a year
does not constitute seduction but mutual passion. Janz
Serrano


De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil 866 (1933)

Facts:
- Antonia Loanco, an unmarried girl of 20 years, was
hired as a cashier in a barbershop in Tondo owned by
one Vicente Mendoza.
- Cesar Syquia, an unmarried man of 23 years, brother-
in-law to Mendoza, made Antonias acquaintance and
began amorous relations with her.
- Antonia was impregnated and the defendant became
a constant visitor in the formers home. The defendant
wrote several letters to the plaintiff while he was
abroad. These letters showed his paternal interest in
Antonias pregnancy, going so far as proclaiming his
desire to name the child after himself.
- J une 17, 1931- a baby boy was born. Syquia made
arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in
Saint J osephs Hospital of the City of Manila.
- When Antonia was discharged from the hospital,
Syquia took the mother and the baby to live with him
at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived
together for a year through the support of the
defendant.
- When the time for the christening of the child came,
the defendant gave the name Ismael Loanco instead
of the planned Cesar Syquia, J r.
- When the plaintiff started showing signs of a second
pregnancy, the defendant decamped and married
another woman.
- Antonia filed for damages against defendant Syquia
on the basis of a breach of a marriage promise. The
damages sought are as follows:
o 30,000.00 pesos as damages
o recognition that Ismael and Pacita Loanco
are natural children of de J esus and Syquia
o 500.00 pesos per month for living expenses
o compensation for the costs of filing the case

Procedure:
- This action was instituted in the Court of First
Instance in Manila by Antonia de J esus against
Cesar Syquia on the basis of a breach of a
marriage promise.
- The trial court gave a judgment from which both
parties appealed.
- The judgment appealed from is in all respects
affirmed, without costs.

Issues:
- WON the note to the padre, in connection with
the letters written by the defendant to the mother
during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of
paternity; and WON this acknowledgment, taking
the form of multiple documents, is sufficient
- WON the trial court erred in holding that the
defendant should recognize Ismael Loanco as his
natural child based on the conduct of the
defendant himself and based on the childs
uninterrupted possession of the status of a
natural child
- WON the plaintiff is due damages for the breach
of promise to marry

Decision:
- The trial court entered into a decree requiring the
defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his
natural child and to pay maintenance for him at
the rate of 50.00 pesos per month, without costs.

Reasons:
- YES; the note to the padre, in connection with the
letters written by the defendant to the mother
during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of
paternity. Recognition can be had from putting
together the indubitable admissions of more than
1 document.
- NO; there is sufficient evidence to justify that the
child was under the uninterrupted possession of
the defendant as a natural child. The duration of
this possession was long enough to manifest the
fathers resolution to concede the status.

Art. 135 of the Civil Code: The father may be
compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the
following cases:
(1) When an indisputable paper written by him,
expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in
existence.
(2) When the child has been in the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child of
the defendant father, justified by the conduct
of the father himself or that of his family.

- NO; there is not enough evidence that there was
a promise to marry. Andre Kwan

Piccininni v. Hajus 180 Conn. 369, 429 A2d. 886 (1980)
April 22 1980 | Bogdanski, J. | Appeal from the judgment of the TC granting motion to strike

Facts:
Plaintiff alleges that he was induced to transfer money to the
respondent after the latter misled him to believe that she will
marry him and that the transferred money shall be used for
their mutual benefit and enjoyment. But there was no marriage
that transpired, hence, plaintiff instituted an action against
respondent for damages for breach of contract, fraudulent
representation, and unjust enrichment, to which the defendant
filed a motion to strike the second count since it is outlawed by
the Heart Balm Act. Trial court granted motion. Plaintiff
appealed.

Issue:
Whether or not an action for damages due to fraudulent
misrepresentation arising from breach of marriage promise is
also barred by the Heart Balm Act

Holding: No.

The cause for action, although arising from the respondents
breach of marriage promise has its own, is can be subject to
judicial remedy since the Heart Balm Act only bars actions for
damages suffered from loss of marriage, humiliation, and other
direct consequences of the breach and should not affect the
rights and duties determinable by common law. The petitioner
never hinged the action on the effects of breach of marriage
promise enumerated above but only sought to recover from the
respondent the things transferred in expectation of the
fraudulent representation.
The action sought restitution for the wrong the defendant did,
and not for what she refused to do. If the Heart Balm Act shall
be construed to also prohibit actions to recover property for
fraudulent representation, then it allows persons to make
promises they are not willing to perform in the first place and
yet retain properties bestowed in anticipation of performance of
the promise, which in itself is an evil of almost similar nature
that the Act sought to avoid. Francis Guiang

IV. Definition and Nature of Marriage

Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1, 12 (1967)
12 JUNE 1967

FACTS
A husband (white) and a wife (black) were sentenced
to 1 yr. in prison for violating Virginias ban on
interracial marriages
They were married in the District of Columbia but
returned to Virginia after their marriage
The judge suspended the sentence of a period of 25
years on the condition that the Lovings leave the
State and not return to Virginia together for 25 years.
ISSUE
WON a statutory scheme adopted by the State of
Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely
on the basis of racial classifications violates the Equal
Protection and Due process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
HELD
NO. These statutes cannot stand consistently with the
Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry, or not
marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.

RATIO
The SC of the US reversed the sentence and held
that Virginias statutory ban on interracial marriages
violated both the equal protection and the due
process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
Stewart, J . a state law making the criminality of the
act depend upon the race of the actor is
invalid/unconstitutional
Syllabus: The Supreme Court has consistently
denied the constitutionality of measures which restrict
the rights of citizens on account of race; restricting the
freedom to marry solely because of racial
classification violates the central meaning of the equal
protection clause.
The central purpose of the 14
th
Amendment was to
eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial
discrimination in the States.
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry are odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.
Wenky Yang


Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US 374, 384 (1978)
January 1978 | Marshall, J. | Appeal from judgment of United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
declaring unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute

FACTS
Under the terms of a Wisconsin statute (245.10), any
Wisconsin resident who has children not under his
custody and which he is under obligation to
support by court order may not marry within the
State or elsewhere without first obtaining a court order
granting permission to marry.
The statute further specifies that the court
permission cannot be granted unless the
marriage applicant submits proof of compliance
with his support obligations and, in addition, he is
able to demonstrate that the children are not
anymore wards of the States social welfare
programs
Appellee Redhail, a Wisconsin resident who was
under court order to support his illegitimate child, was
denied a marriage license by appellant Zablocki, the
County Clerk of Milwaukee, because he had not
obtained a court order granting him permission to
marry
Appellee, who would not be able to satisfy the
statutory prerequisite due to his inability to pay the
support money from 1972-1974 brought a civil rights
class suit in the US District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin asserting that the statute violated
the Constitution.
District Court held that the statute was
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoined its
enforcement
ISSUE: W/N District Court erred or, simply put, W/N the
Wisconsin statute (Wis Stat 245.10, 1973) is truly
unconstitutional
HELD: J udgment Affirmed, Wis Stat 245.10, 1973 is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
RATIO:
Statute violated the Fourteenth Amendments equal
protection clause since:
o the statutory classification interfered with the
exercise of the fundamental right to marry;
o and the classification nonetheless could not
be justified on the basis of any of the
statutes purposes, either for:
Counseling marriage applicants as
to the necessity of fulfilling prior
support obligations;
Protection of the welfare of out-of-
custody children;
Or protection of the ability of
marriage applicants to meet support
applications
The statute intentionally and substantially interfered
with the right to marry
It exceeded the bounds of permissible state regulation
of marriage and invaded the sphere of liberty
protected by the due process clause
The statute is over-inclusive, denying the right to
marriage solely because of indigence thus cannot
withstand the scrutiny of the Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection clause. Amin Julkipli


A. Marriage Models
1. Traditional Marriage

Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936 (1940)
Tuttle, J. | July 15, 1940
James Sebastian (a.k.a. Sidney) Graham plaintiff
Margrethe Hanson Graham defendant

FACTS:
On Sept. 17, 1932, Sidney and Margrethe Graham,
husband and wife, allegedly entered into an agreement
adjusting financial matters between the parties. Margrethe
agreed to pay to Sidney the sum of $300 per month every
month until the parties no longer desire such arrangement to
continue. Sidney and Margrethe were divorced on J uly 11,
1933. Sidney filed a suit against Margrethe in order to claim
the remaining amount due him per contract.
Sidney alleges that per Margrethes solicitation he quit
his job in order to accompany the latter in her travels and that
Margrethe entered into this agreement to stop Sidney from
returning to work.
Margrethe alleges that she knew nothing of the
aforementioned agreement and that she did not induce Sidney
to give up his job. She also alleges that under the Michigan
law, the contract was not within the power of a married woman
& that the divorce already terminated the said contract.

ISSUE/S:
Can Sidney recover the remaining amount due him
per contract between husband and wife adjusting
financial matters?
Alternative issue: Is this contract fixing financial
matters between a husband and wife enforceable?

RATIO:
As a general rule, married women have no capacity to
contract w/ the exception of those which relate to the benefit of
her separate property. In this case, the court held that the
contract was beyond the capacity of a married woman under
Michigan law to make.
Regardless thereof, the contract between Sidney & Margrethe
would still be void since it runs counter with public policy.
Marriage confers a status wherein certain rights and duties
incident to the relationship come into being, irrespective of the
wish of the parties. A private agreement between persons
married or about to be married, which attempts to change the
essential obligations of the marriage contract is contrary to
public policy and unenforceable. The contract in the case at
bar alters the essential obligations of the marriage contract in
that the husband is obliged to accompany the wife upon her
travels (instead of the law of marriage that the wife shall follow
husbands choice of domicile) and that the husband is released
from his duty to support the wife. To enforce contracts such as
this would destroy the element of flexibility needed in making
adjustments to the new conditions of marital life. Zhai Garcia

Bradwell v. Illinois, 93 US (16 Wall) 130

Facts: Mrs. Bradwell has met all the requirements to become
admitted as a lawyer in the State of Illinois but her application
was denied on account of her gender and marital status. Illinois
SC said that her gender & marital status would destroy her
femininity and render her incapable of performing her marriage
& familial obligations.
Held: The right to practice law is not guaranteed by the Equal
Rights Amendment. The SC said, the paramount destiny and
mission of women are to fulfill the noble & benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. Zhai Garcia

Facts: Illinois refused to grant a married woman a license to
practice law. Woman assails the constitutionality of the
decision.

Held: Such decision violates no provision of the Constitution,
since the WIFE'S PRIMARY ROLE is the provider of
household and child-care services, thus preventing a married
woman's entry into the Bar. Also, the inherent legal
incapacities of a wife makes the entering of contracts difficult,
thus making the legal profession also difficult. Janz Serrano


2. Challenges to the Traditional Marriage Model
a. The Changing Status of Women

Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W. 2d 679 (1975)

Facts: When Palermo got married, she continued to use her
maiden name. For this reason, her name was purged from the
ennessee Registration Records. T
Held: The maiden name may be used as there is no statute in
Tennessee requiring the use of the Hs surname upon
marriage. The use of Hs surname upon marriage is a tradition.
The acquisition of the Hs name is only in fact, and not in law. It
does not mean a total rejection of own names. The woman has
a choice to adopt or not the Hs name. Zhai Garcia

Facts: Palermo retained using her maiden name even after she
got married. The Registrar asserts that she is required under
Tennessee statute to assume the name of her husband.
Held: Woman upon marriage may elect to retain her own
surname or she may adopt the surname of her husband and
the choice is hers. So long as a persons name remains
constant and consistent, and unless until changed in
prescribed manner, and in absence of any fraudulent or legally
impermissible intent, state has no legitimate concern as to
name used. Janz Serrano

b. By Private Contract: When Valid? When Void?

In Re Santiago, 70 Phil 66 (1940)
June 21, 1940

Facts:
The Solicitor General charged the respondent Atty. Roque
Santiago with malpractice and prayed that disciplinary action
be taken against him. The respondent gave legal advice to one
Ernesto Baniquit who was living separately from his wife for
some nine consecutive years and seeking to contract a second
marriage. The respondent assured Baniquit that he could
secure a separation from his wife and marry again. He
prepared a document stating that the contracting parties, who
are husband and wife authorized each other to marry again, at
the same time renouncing or waiving their right against the
party marrying. He let the husband and wife execute and
acknowledge the document and declared that they were again
single and as such could contract another marriage. Relying on
this document, Baniquit contracted a second marriage. The
respondent, upon realizing his mistake, sent for the parties and
let them sign the deed of cancellation a month later but after
the second marriage of Baniquit.
Issue:
1. Did the advice and action of the lawyer constitute
malpractice of law?
2. Is the document executed by the married couple
valid?

Held:
1. Yes. The advice given by the respondent, the
preparation and acknowledgment by him of the
contract constitute malpractice which justifies
disbarment from the practice of law.
No. Marriage separation should have a judicial declaration
from the proper court. The document violates the sanctity of
marriage and is contrary to law, morals and public policy.
Elaine de Guzman

Selanova v. Mendoza, 64 SCRA 69 (1975)

Facts: J udge Mendoza prepared & ratified a document
executed by a married couple to dissolve their conjugal
partnership & to waive any action for acts of infidelity which
they may commit in the future.
Held: The contract is void. Marriage is a special contract.
Contracts of personal separation between H & W and
extrajudicial agreements during the marriage dissolving the
conjugal property are void. Zhai Garcia

Facts: J udge Mendoza prepared and later ratified a document
liquidating extra-judicially the CPG of Selanova and his wife. A
condition imposed was that the spouses would waive the right
to prosecute each other for acts of infidelity.
Held: The contract was invalid. Marriage is a special contract.
The law provides that any contract of personal separation
between husband and wife and every extra-judicial agreement
during marriage for the dissolution of conjugal property are
void. Janz Serrano


B. Requisites of Marriage
1. Essential Requisites
a. Legal Capacity; male and female

Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W. 2d 588 (1973)
1973 | Vance, Commissioner | Appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson County Court
Marjorie JONES, Appellants
James HALLAHAN, Clerk of the Jefferson County Court, Appellee

Facts:
Appellants are both females who tried to acquire a license to
marry, which was denied to them by the County Court, hence
the appeal from the judgment at the Court Appeals.

Issue:
WON two persons of the same sex can enter marriage.

Decision: No.
In the absence of a specific provision in Kentucky statutes
whether marriage can be enjoyed between a man and a
woman only or not, the Court of Appeals turned to customs
and concluded that marriage has been defined and understood
through time as a union between a man and a woman only.
THUS, appellants cannot avail for themselves of a license to
marry because they are not trying to enter marriage at all.
Moreover, the right to marry of two persons of the same sex is
not constitutionally guaranteed and cannot be invoked in
connection with religious freedom. Francis Guiang

Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003)
Nov. 18, 2003

Facts
Same-sex couples denied marriage license file action
for declaratory judgment
Plaintiffs:
1. Marriage licensing statute does not explicitly
exclude same-sex couples
2. Bar to same-sex marriage an
unconstitutional exercise of state authority or
police power
Defendant:
1. Favorable setting for procreation
2. Optimal setting for child rearing
3. Conservation of resources
Issue
WON the ban is a legitimate exercise of police power.

Decision:
No. The constitution does not permit the use of police
power where it infringes upon basic civil rights,
whether it enjoys public support or not.
Ratio:
The right to marry necessarily includes the right to
choose who to marry.
It is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the
spouses to one another, not procreation, that is the
essence of marriage. Other ways of creating a family
are not inferior to heterosexual marriage.
Optimal child rearing setting not necessarily limited
to families headed by heterosexual couples.
No one to one relationship between conservation of
resources and heterosexual marriages.
Concurring: violative of due process and equal
protection
Remedy: civil marriage the voluntary union of two persons as
spouses, to the exclusion of all others. Karl King
Silverio v. Republic, 537 SCRA 373 (2007)

FACTS: Rommel J acinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and se in his birth certificate in RTC
Manila. Being a male transsexual, he attempted to completely
transform himself to a woman through sex reassignment
surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. When he arrived here in the
Philippines, a plastic and reconstruction surgeon issued a
medical certificate attesting that he had in fact undergone the
procedure.
The petitioner now sought to be married and he wants
to have his birth certificate changed from Rommel J acinto to
Mely and his sex from male to female.
RTC: petition was granted.
But the Republic of the Philippines through the OSG filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
CA: rendered a decision in favor of the Republic

ISSUES: WON the petitioner should be granted the changes
in name and sex on the basis of his sex reassignment.
DECISION: No. Petition Denied.
RATIO:
A change of name does not alter ones legal capacity
or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of
first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Furthermore, there is no law authorizing the change
of entry as to sex in the civil registry using the sex
reassignment as the legal basis.
Granting this petition would substantially reconfigure
and alter the laws on marriage and family relations. In
this note, doing so would mean allowing the union of
a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment.
Refer to the definition of marriage: Marriage as a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.
One of the essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.
Krizel Malabanan

b. Consent Freely Given

People v. Santiago, 51 Phil 68 (1927)
Street, J. | 31 October 1927 | Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Nueva Ecija

FACTS
- The defendant was convicted for the crime of rape by
the Court of First Instance
- On November 1926, he committed rape on his
deceased wifes niece, who calls him uncle
- Subsequently, he conducted Felicita Masilang to the
house of his uncle, Agaton Santiago.
- In the afternoon, Agaton Santiago brought a
protestant minister who thereafter married the
Santiago and Masilang
- After which, the defendant gave Masilang a few pesos
and sent her home
- The defendant dealt with the girl after the marriage,
as well as before, showing that he had no bona fide
intention of making her his wife.
- The marriage was void [annullable] for lack of
essential consent, and It supplies no impediment to
the prosecution of the defendant
ISSUE: WON the marriage in question is void due to lack of
intent by defendant
HELD: YES.
RATIO
That the consent of the girl to the performance of the marriage
was vitiated by duress and that the marriage ceremony had
been performed as a mere device of the accused to escape
punishment. Such marriage is therefore illegal and constitutes
no obstacle to the prosecution of the accused for the offense.
He had no intention on his part of living martially with the girl.
Wenky Yang

Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat, 72 Phil 19 (1941)
Translated Text by Paolo Celeridad

[No. 47101 April 25, 1941]

GODOFREDO BUCCAT, plaintiff-appellant, v. LUIDA
MANGONON DE BUCCAT, defendant-appellee

Marriage; Validity Marriage is a most sacred institution. It is
the foundation upon which society rests. To nullify it would
need clear and authentic proof. In this case no such proof
exists.

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio.
Carlos, J .

Feliciano Leviste, Toms P. Paganiban and Sotera N. Megia
for appellants
Luida Mangonon de Buccat on her own behalf.

The facts are stated in the decision of the court.

Horrilleno, J .:

This case has been elevated to this court from the
Court of First Instance of Baguio, since it only raises a question
purely of law.
On March 20, 1939 the plaintiff initiated the present
case, in which the defendant did not appear, despite being duly
summoned. On account of this, plaintiff was permitted to
present his proof, and the lower court decided in favor of the
defendant. Thus this appeal.
The plaintiff prays for the annulment of his marriage to
Luida Mangonon de Buccat on November 26, 1938 in the City
of Baguio, on the grounds that when agreeing to the marriage
promise, he did so because the defendant assured him that
she was a virgin.
From the decision of the lower court, the following
facts are given:
The plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938. After
several meetings, they became engaged in September 19 of
the same year. In November 26, the plaintiff married the
defendant in the Catholic cathedral of Baguio City. After living
together for eighty-nine days, the defendant gave birth to a son
(of nine months) in February 23, 1939. As a result of this event,
the plaintiff left the defendant and never returned to married life
with her.
We see no reason to revoke the appealed sentence.
In effect, it is unlikely that the allegation of the plaintiff-
appellant that he did not even suspect the serious situation of
the defendant, being as it is proven, an advanced pregnant
condition. On account of this, there is no reason to consider
the fraud of which the plaintiff-appellant speaks. The allegation
that it is not rare to find persons with developed abdomens,
seems to us childish to deserve our consideration, all the more
that the plaintiff is a first-year student of law.
Marriage is a most sacred institution. It is the
foundation upon which society rests. To nullify it would need
clear and authentic proof. In this case no such proof exist.
Finding the appealed sentence reconciled to law, it
must be affirmed, and we hereby affirm it in toto. Costs to
plaintiff-appellant. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J ., Imperial, Daz, and Laurel, J J .,
concur.

Decision affirmed.


Facts:
+ Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in
March 1938, became engaged in September, and got
married in Nov 26.
+ On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida,
who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son.
+ Godofredo left Luida and on March 23, 1939, he filed for
an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when
he agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was
a virgin.
+ The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
WON Luidas concealment of her pregnancy constituted a
ground for the annulment of marriage (fraud)

Held:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a
marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was
concealment of pregnancy constituting a ground for annulment;
it was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not
suspect anything about Luidas condition considering that she
was in an advanced stage of pregnancy when they got
married.

Decision:
SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Zhai Garcia
Eigenmannn v. Guerra, 5 C.A. Rep. 836 (1964)
May 11, 1964
Eduardo Eigenmann, plaintiff and appellant
Maryden Guerra and Froilan Guerra, defendants and appellees

Facts:
1957 Eigenmann (actor singer) met Maryden(dancer in
the theatre) in Clover Theatre Manila; afterwards the two
fell in love and decided to get married.
October 25, 1957 They filed applications for a marriage
license where Eigenmann stated that he was 25 years old
and was born on February 17, 1932.
November 3, 1957 - Eigenmanns parents and Marydens
parents discussed the marriage
November 5, 1959 Eigenmann and Maryden were
married by J udge Prudencio Encomienda of the Municipal
Court of Quezon City
They lived in the house of Marydens parents for a year
and transferred to the house of Eigenmanns mother and
stayed there for 3 or 4 months
August 29, 1959 Eigenmann filed a case for the
annulment of his marriage to Guerra on the following
grounds:
He was more than 16 but less than 20 years old upon the
execution of the marriage and was not given the consent
of his mother to enter such contract.
Eigenmanns consent was obtained through threats made
by Froilan Gueera, Marydens father.
Applications for marriage license were sworn before an
officer not legally authorized to administer oaths
Defendants denied the allegations:
Eigenmann presented himself to be over 25 years old
Eigenmanns mother was present during the ceremony
Eigenmann should not now be permitted to excuse himself
from his marital obligation to preserve the institution of
marriage
Court of First Instance dismissed the case

Issues:
WON Eigenmann and Guerras marriage could be
annulled based on the fact that Eigenmann was at the
time of execution of marriage was more than 16 years old
and less than 20 years old.
WON Guerras fathers action towards Eigenmann is
tantamount to forcing him to marry his daughter hence
consent was not freely given.
WON a marriage licence wrongfully obtained could
invalidate a marriage.
WON Eigenmann was provided with parental consent to
enter such contract.

Ratio:
No. During the application for a marriage license,
Eigenmann presented himself to be over 25 years old;
thus, under the doctrine of estoppel, he coulndt assert
otherwise.
No. The remark made by Froilan Guerra against
Eigenmann could not be considered as a threat because it
was only an admonition thus there was no reasonable fear
that would force Eigenmann to marry Maryden.
No. The marriage license is valid even if the applications
were sworn before an unauthorized officer because the
law states that marriages solemnized without a marriage
license are the ones declared to be void.
No. The remark made by Froilan Guerra against
Eigenmann could not be considered as a threat because it
was only an admonition thus there was no reasonable fear
that would force Eigenmann to marry Maryden.
Yes. The mere presence of Eigenmanns mother during
the celebration implies that consent was given by a
parental authority.

Decision of the lower court is affirmed. Cha Latorre


2. Formal Requisites
a. Authority of Solemnizing Officer

Navarro v. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129 (1996)

Facts: Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Navarro, submitted evidence
in relation to 2 specific acts committed by respondent MCTCC
J udge Domagtoy, which he contends, exhibits gross
misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of
the law. First one is that respondent judge solemnized wedding
between Tagadan and Borga, with knowledge that Tagadan is
merely separated from his first wife for almost 7 years.
Respondent merely let Tagadan and Borga sign an affidavit
stating that Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each
other for almost 7 years.
Second, that respondent solemnized a marriage
outside of his jurisdiction to Sumaylo and Rosario. The
wedding was solemnized in respondents residence in Dapa,
40 to 50 kilometers away from where he holds office and has
jurisdiction in MCTC of Sta. Monica-Burgos.

Issue: WON respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law
for: 1) solemnizing marriage without securing a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee wife of the present spouse and 2) solemnizing a
marriage which is outside the solemnizing officials jurisdiction.

Held: 1) NO. A summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a
subsequent marriage. In absence of it, Tagadan remains
married to his first wife. As a result, the marriage to Borga is
bigamous and void; 2) YES. Non compliance of the provision
providing the venue of marriage ceremony to be conducted by
a judge does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer. However, this results in an irregularity in
the formal requisites laid down in Art. 3 of FC, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.

Decision: Respondent was suspended for 6 months and given
a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely. Kat Maniquis

Araes v. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402 (2002)

Facts:
The petitioner, Mercedita Mata Aranes charged the
respondent J udge Salvador Occiano with Gross Ignorance of
the Law. The judge solemnized the petitioners marriage to
Dominidor Orobia without a valid marriage license and outside
his territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner and Orobia lived
together as husband and wife until the latter passed away.
Because the marriage was null, petitioner was not able to
inherit the vast properties of Orobia as well as receive his
pension. According to the respondent judge, he solemnized the
marriage only out of human compassion and as a regard to
Orobias health who suffered a stroke. Upon reading the
Comment of the respondent, the petitioner filed an Affidavit of
Desistance attesting that the judge initially refused to
solemnize the marriage due to want of a valid marriage license
but only proceeded due to her prodding and reassurance.

Issues:
1. Whether or not marriage solemnized without a
marriage license is valid.
2. Whether or not a judge can solemnize marriage
outside his jurisdiction.

Held:
1. No. A valid marriage license is one of the formal
requisites of marriage and therefore absence of it
makes marriage void.
2. No. J udges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions
may only officiate weddings within said areas and not
beyond.

Decision:
Respondent was found GUILTY, fined Php5000.00 with
STERN WARNING against repetition of same offense. Elaine
de Guzman

b. Marriage License

Republic v. CA, 236 SCRA 257 (1994)
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Facts / Procedural History:
- J une 24, 1970 - Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were
secretly married in a civil ceremony. Cardenas attended to the
processing of the documents required for the marriage,
including marriage license number 3196182. The couple only
decided to live together in March 1971 when they discovered
that Castro was pregnant. Cohabitation only lasted for 4
months and the couple parted ways. The baby is currently in
the United States and Castro wanted to put her marital status
in order before following. She discovered that there was no
marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of
their marriage. After a fruitless search, a certification from the
Civil Registrar of Pasig was issued to prove its absence.
- The trial court denied the petition for a judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground that the certification was
inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of the license
prior to the wedding.
- Upon appeal, the respondent appellate court reversed the
decision of the trial court, hence, this appeal.


Issues:
- WON the documentary and testimonial evidence presented
by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no
marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig
prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to
Edwin Cardenas

Decision:
- Petition DENIED.
Reason:
- YES; the presentation of such certification is sanctioned by
Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The rule authorizes
the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document cannot be found in a register.
This sufficiently proves that the office did not issue the
marriage license to the contracting parties. Andre Kwan

Moreno v. Bernabe, 246 SCRA 120 (1995)
Administrati ve matter in the Supreme Court. Grave misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law.

Facts:
Marilou Moreno filed a complaint against J udge
Bernabe for solemnizing her marriage to Marcelo Moreno even
without a marriage license. Bernabe assured Moreno that the
marriage contract will be released ten days after they got
married. But when Bernabe visited the J udges office, he was
informed that he could not get the marriage contract because
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage
license.
Respondent claims that he solemnized the marriage
in good faith as he was moved only by a desire to give the
complainant an assurance or security as she was pregnant
during that time.

Issue:
WON the judge committed a gross ignorance of the law by
solemnizing the marriage without the formal requisite of a
marriage license.

Decision: Yes.

Ratio:
Respondent must be held liable for misconduct for
solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and that the
appropriate administrative sanctions be imposed against him.
As a judge, he is presumed to be aware that one of the formal
requisites of a marriage is a valid marriage license. Absence of
said requisite will make the marriage void from the beginning.
Furthermore,
The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the
administrative case against the respondent judge will not
necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Krizel Malabanan

People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 (1984)

Facts: H killed his W thus he was found guilty of parricide. H
claims that he is not validly & legally married to the W because
although there was a ceremony, there was no marriage
contract executed; thus he must be made guilty only of
homicide.

Held: The marriage is valid. The mere fact of non-existence of
a marriage contract does not invalidate a marriage as long as
all the requisites of the validity are present. Cohabitation as H
& W after a marriage ceremony warrants the presumption of a
valid marriage even though there is no proof of a marriage
certificate. Zhai Garcia

Facts: Borromeo killed his wife and was convicted of parricide.
He appealed that he should have been convicted of homicide
since he and the deceased were not legally married.
Held: There is no better proof of marriage than the admission
of the accused of the existence of marriage. Persons living
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married. The mere fact that no record of the marriage
exists in the registry of the marriage does not invalidate said
marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for
its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites.
Janz Serrano

Seguisabal v. Cabrera, 106 SCRA 670 (1981)
Administrati ve matter in the Supreme Court.

FACTS:
Seguisabal charged J udge Cabrera with gross
misconduct in office and gross ignorance of the law for
solemnizing the marriage without the requisite marriage
license.
On the day when J aime Sayson and Marlyn J agonoy
appeared before Cabreras office to be solemnized in
marriage, the couple told the J udge that the Local Civil
Registrar of Toledo City cannot issue a marriage license
because the one- in- charge was not in his office. Despite this,
the J udge still solemnized the marriage but asked the parties
to come back in the afternoon and bring along with them the
marriage license. The parties did not come in the afternoon
and thus, the J udge failed to transmit a copy of the marriage
contract, signed by him and the parties, to the office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Toledo city within 15 days from the date
of solemnization.

ISSUE: WON the respondent J udge must be held liable for
solemnizing marriage without requiring a marriage license.

DECISION: Yes.

REASONING:
Respondent should be held liable for solemnizing
marriage without the essential prerequisite of a marriage
license in the absence of any showing that the subject
marriage falls under marriages of an exceptional character
wherein a license is not mandatorily required. Respondent was
likewise remiss in his duty to transmit to the Local Civil
Registrar of Toledo City, within 15 days from the date of
solemnization of the marriage in question, a copy of the
marriage contract duly signed by him as the solemnizing officer
and by the contracting parties.
As a judicial officer, he is expected to know the law on
the solemnization of marriages. Sympathy cannot serve as a
license for him to deliberately dispense with legal requisites.
Krizel Malabanan

Alcantara v. Alcantara, 531 SCRA 446 (2007)
GR No. 167746 | 28 August 2007 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS
Petitioner assails the decision of the CA denying his
appeal, thereby affirming the decision of the Makati
RTC which dismissed his petition for annulment of
marriage
On December 8, 1982 petitioner and respondent went
to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a
fixer who could arrange their marriage, without first
securing a marriage license
The fixer consequently arranged for the couple to be
wedded before a certain minister on that same day.
On March 26, 1983, the couple went through another
marriage ceremony, this time a church wedding,
likewise without the parties securing a marriage
license
In their marriage contract, however, a marriage
license is indicated supposedly procured from
Carmona, Cavite. This is evidenced by a certification
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona,
Cavite that such a license under their names were on
file.
Neither party was a resident of Carmona and they
never went there to apply for a license with the local
civil registrar
In 1988, petitioner and respondent parted ways and
lived separate lives. Thereafter, petitioner prays that
judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and
cancel their corresponding marriage contract
RTC dismissed petitioner's prayer for lack of merit
and CA, on appeal, affirmed RTC's judgment. CA held
that the marriage license is presumed to be regularly
issued and petitioner failed to present evidence to
overcome this presumption
ISSUES
W/N their marriage is void because:
there was no marriage license at the precise
moment of solemnization of the marriage
marriage license on entry at the Carmona Civil
Registry is a sham since neither of the party lived
in Carmona and that they never went there to
apply for the license
marriage license number on entry at Carmona
civil registry and the marriage license number
indicated in their marriage contract did not match
their marriage was not conducted in good faith
and the authority of the solemnizing officer is
questionable

RULING/RATIO
NO. For a marriage to be considered void ab initio on
the ground of absence of a marriage license, that
absence must be apparent on the marriage contract
or must be supported by a certification from the local
civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage
contract between the petitioner and the respondent
indicated a marriage license number. A certification
from the local civil registrar of Carmona has likewise
been issued where it identified petitioner and
respondent as the parties to whom the marriage
license was issued.
NO. the issuance of a marriage license enjoys the
presumption of regularity of official acts. This means
that official duty has been regularly performed and
that it was done in the regular conduct of official
business. Unless rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty or that officer
had acted unlawfully, this presumption prevails.
Moreover, issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality not the residence of either of the
contracting parties is considered a mere irregularity
that does not affect the validity of the marriage.
NO. Discrepancy between the marriage license
number (7054133) indicated in the Carmona civil
registry and the marriage license number (7054033)
in their marriage contract could be assumed to be a
mere typographical error. This does not affect the fact
that a marriage license exists and was duly issued.
NO. Obviously, petitioner was amenable and willing to
participate to both marriage ceremonies. Likewise, the
authority of the solemnizing officer will be presumed
in the absence of any indication of the contrary. All
the solemnizing officer has to do is ask if a marriage
license has been duly issued and from such issuance
he has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the
contracting parties fulfilled the requirements of the
law. It is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage.

Dispositive: Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

-NOTE-
Marriage (in 1982) took place before the promulgation
of the Family Code so the Civil Code which was the
law in effect at that time shall be applicable
Principle: Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio --- the
presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.
And the courts look upon this presumption with great favor.
Amin Julkipli

c. Ceremony

Martinez v. Tan, 12 Phil 731 (1909)
February 5, 1909 | Willard, J.
Plaintiff-appellant Rosalia Martinez (wife)
Defendant-appellee Angel Tan (husband)

Facts: A File of Civil Marriage received at the trial included the
ff:
+ On Sept 25, 1907, Martinez and Tan signed a petition
directed to the justice of peace (J osel Ballori) that
they agree to marry each other, asking that the justice
solemnize the marriage
+ On that same day, a document signed by the couple,
the justice of peace, and 2 witnesses (Zacarias and
Pacita) stating that the signatories were present in the
office of the justice on that day & that they ratify the
oath in the petition
+ Certificate of Marriage signed by the justice and the
witness where it is stated that Martinez & Tan were
legally married on that day, in the office of the justice,
and in the presence of those witnesses.

Plaintiff Defendant
- Martinez denies appearing before the justice to
contract marriage
- Martinez signed the contract in her own home
- What took place was not a legal marriage
Tan disputes the denial of Martinez

Witness claims that Martinez never left the house
without her except for an occasion where Martinez
left for church
Pacita claims that one afternoon, after meeting at
the church, she accompanied Martinez to the office
of the justice where the ceremony took place
Letters of Martinez addressed to Tan revealed both of them intended to be married.

Court ruled in favor of defendant

Issues: WON what took place (on Sept 25, 1907) was a legal
marriage

Ratio: Yes
+ Rule of law No particular form for the ceremony of
marriage is required. It is sufficient that the parties, in
the presence of the solemnizing officer, declare that
they take each other as husband and wife, in the
presence of at least 2 witnesses.
+ Fact
o The justice & the couple signed a marriage
certificate w/c gives rise to the presumption
that the officer authorized the marriage in
due form
o Martinez admitted signing the document
o The couple understood what they signed
+ Therefore, what took place was a valid marriage

Decision:
+ Affirmed lower courts judgment
+ Costs against Martinez Zhai Garcia

Madridejo v. de Leon, 55 Phil 1 (1930)

Facts: W had a 1
st
H who died. W got married to 2
nd
H in
articulo mortis. The priest failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary.
Held: The marriage is valid. The essential requisites are
present; there was no legal impediment. Furthermore, the
failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate
does not affect the validity of the marriage. Zhai Garcia

Facts: Madrilejo and Perez got married in articulo mortis. The
priest who solemnized the marriage failed to send a copy of
the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary.
Held: The marriage was valid. Failure of the priest to send a
copy of the marriage certificate does not affect the validity of
the marriage. Janz Serrano


3. Presumption of Marriage

Trinidad v. CA, 289 SCRA 188 (1998)
Petition for review on Certiorari

Facts:
On August 10, 1978, Arturio Trinidad, being an heir to
the property, filed with the court of First Instance of
Aklan, Kalibo, AKlan, an act for partition of 4 parcels
of land
Petitioner, who wanted to have the land partitioned
into 3, claimed to be the son of Inocentes Trinidad,
brother of Lourdes and Trinidad, children of Patricio
Trinidad (deceased), owner of the said parcels of land
Lourdes and Felix both denied that their brother had a
son or that he ever got married
While Arturio claimed that his father died in 1944,
Lourdes and Felix claimed that Inocentes died in 1941
and was buried in their land because of the roaming
J apanese at the time
Arturio further claimed that he lived with Lourdes and
Felix when his mother died and moved out when he
was 19
When Arturio had a family, they were invited by his
aunt and uncle to live with them, but were asked to
move out when he asked to have the 4 parcels of land
partitioned
Arturio secured an affidavit issued by the Civil
Registrar that the records of birth, death and marriage
were destroyed because of the war and presented
witness who was not related to him by blood; on the
other hand, the witnesses presented by the private
respondents have blood relationship with them
The trial court sustained the petition of Arturio, but
upon appeal of private respondents, the decision was
reversed by the Court of Appeals
Hence, this appeal to SC

Issue:
1. WON petitioner presented sufficient evidence of his
parents marriage and his filiation
2. WON peitioners status as a legitimate child subject to
collateral attack in the action for partition
3. WON petitioners claim time-barred under the rules on
acquisitive prescription

Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The testimony of the witness to the matrimony,
the couples public and open cohabitation as husband
and wife after the alleged wedlock the birth and the
baptismal certificates of children born during the
union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents constitute COMPTENCE EVIDENCE.
Although marriage contract was not presented, it is
not a proof that no marriage took place, as other
forms of relevant evidence may take its place.

His filiation was supported by the family pictures
taken before petitioner asked for land partition and his
consistent use of Inocentes surname without the
objection from the private respondents is a
presumption proof of his status as Inocentes
legitimate son

2. NO. A collateral attack on filiation is not permitted and
petitioner chose to present evidence on his filiation
and of his parents marriage
NO. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the
property in question by acquisitive prescription. Prior to the
action for partition, petitioner, in the concept of co-owner, was
receiving from private respondents his share of the produce of
the land in dispute. Hence, recognition of petitioner as co-
owner is beyond in question. Katrina Maniquis

Vda. de Jacob v. CA, 312 SCRA 772 (1999)

Facts: Couple was married but no copy of the marriage
contract was sent to the LCR and no record of marriage
existed. Their solemnizing officer, who admitted that he lost the
original, made a reconstructed marriage contract. In that
reconstructed MC, the H affixed only his thumbmark.
Held: Since the couple has cohabited for more than 5 years, no
marriage license is required. Furthermore, failure to send a
copy of the MC does not invalidate the marriage. Secondary
evidence prove that there was a ceremony held. The name of
the couple was also recorded in the Church record. In the
absence of a marriage contract, there should be a proof of due
execution w/c can be given by witnesses. Zhai Garcia

Sevilla v. Cardenas, 497 SCRA 428 (2006)
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals

Facts:
- On May 19, 1969, Sevilla and Cardenas executed a Marriage
Contract at the city hall in Manila. The marriage license
number allegedly issued in Rizal on the same date was
fictitious for the petitioner never applied for a marriage license.
On May 31, 1969, the parties were again wed in church rites at
the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Quezon City using
the same license number.
- Upon request, certifications dated March 4, 1994, March 11,
1994, and September 20, 1994 were issued from the Local
Civil Registrar stating that no marriage license was ever issued
by the office.

Procedural History:
- The trial court, in its decision on J anuary 25, 2002, declared
the nullity of the marriage between the parties for lack of the
requisite marriage license.

- Cardenas filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which
decided on December 20, 2004 to reverse the decision of the
trial court on the ground that the certification from the local civil
registrar was issued not because the marriage license wasnt
issued, but because of a failure to locate the said license.
- Sevilla filed for a motion of Reconsideration on J anuary 6,
2005 which was denied by the Court of Appeals on April 6,
2005. This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by
Sevilla.

Issues:
- WON the certifications from the local civil registrar of San
J uan stating that no marriage license was issued are sufficient
to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio
- WON the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the
presumption of regularity of officials acts arising solely from the
contents of the marriage contracts in question
- WON respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the
presumption of validity of a marriage arising from the admitted
fact of marriage

Reasons:
- NO; the certification from the Local Civil Registrar must state
that the document doesnt exist in the office or the particular
entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search
(Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court). The first 2
certifications failed to state with absolute certainty WON such
license was issued. This was strengthened by the testimony of
a representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that
they could not find the logbook due to the fact that the person
in charge of said logbook had already retired. All efforts to look
for the records were not employed. Besides, the absence of
the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of
marriage license.
- YES; the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the 1
st
and
2
nd
certifications
- YES; the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or
fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility
of the marriage bonds.

Decision:
- Petition DENIED. Costs against the petitioner. Andre Kwan

V. Void and Voidable Marriages
A. Void Marriages
1. Grounds
a. Art. 4, 35, 37-39, 40, 41 and 44, FC; Art. 390 and 391, CC

People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954)

Facts: During the subsistence of the Hs 1
st
marriage, he
contracted a marriage w/ 2
nd
W. After the death of the 1
st
W, he
contracted marriage w/ a 3
rd
W.

Held: The 2
nd
marriage is void because it was contracted
during the subsistence of the 1
st
marriage. The 3
rd
marriage is
valid because it was contracted after the death of the 1
st
W.
Zhai Garcia

Facts: During the subsistence of Mendozas marriage to his
first wife, he contracted a second marriage. After the death of
the first wife, he contracted a third marriage. Mendoza was
prosecuted for bigamy on his last marriage.
Held: Mendoza is not guilty of bigamy for his third marriage. He
contracted this marriage after the death of his first wife. The
second marriage is void because it was contracted during the
subsistence of a prior marriage. It is the second marriage that
is bigamous. He need not ask for judicial declaration of nullity
of the second marriage since before the Family Code, it was
not required. Janz Serrano

Tolentino v. Paras, 122 SCRA 525 (1983)
No. L-43905 | May 30, 1983

Facts:
Deceased previously convicted of bigamy. Upon
serving sentence, he lived with Paras (2
nd
wife from
bigamous marriage).
At death of husband, death certificate indicated
defendant as spouse.
Petitioner seeking to correct entry in death certificate
for purposes of benefits to be received.
Issue:
WON entry may be corrected.
Decision:
Yes. J udgment reversed.
Ratio:
The second marriage was already bigamous. The entry may
be corrected because the entry of the second wife as the
surviving spouse is incorrect. The first wife is the surviving
spouse. Karl King

Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986)

Facts: H & W got married believing that the Ws 1
st
marriage
was void as she was just forced to marry the 1
st
H.
Held: The 1
st
marriage is merely voidable for vitiated consent.
The 2
nd
marriage is void because it was contracted when the
1
st
marriage was still subsisting. There has to be a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment first before a 2
nd

marriage can be contracted. Zhai Garcia

Facts: Wiegel and Olivia got married under the belief that
Olivias prior marriage to Maxion was void because the latter
forced Olivia to marry him.
Held: Olivias first marriage is merely voidable, her consent
being vitiated by force. Her second marriage is void because it
was contracted while a prior marriage was subsisting. Janz
Serrano

Terre v. Terre, 211 SCRA 6 (1992)

Facts: Terre, a law student, married W when she was already
married. He convinced her that her 1
st
marriage to her first
cousin is void. After they got married & had a child, he
abandoned her and contracted a 2
nd
marriage.
Held: There must first be a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage before a 2
nd
marriage can be legally contracted. The
Ws 1
st
marriage to her first cousin is void for being bigamous.
Terre was disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, he shouldve
known that a judicial declaration was essential. Zhai Garcia

Facts: Terre, a law student, married Dorothy. Dorothy was
already married but Terre convinced her that the first marriage
to her first cousin was void. After their first child was born,
Terre abandoned Dorothy and contracted a second marriage.
Held: A judicial declaration that the first marriage is void is
essential for contracting a subsequent marriage. Dorothys
marriage to Terre is void for being bigamous. Terre
demonstrated grossly immoral conduct. He should have known
that a declaration was essential. Terre was disbarred. Janz
Serrano

Atienza v. Brillantes, 243 SCRA 32 (1995)
Admin Matter | Quiason | March 29, 1995

Parties:
Lupo Atienza complainant
J udge Francisco Brillantes, J r respondent
**Yolanda de Castro Brillantes 2
nd
wife; Atienzas wife
**Zenaida Ongkiko Brillantes 1
st
wife

Facts:
+ Atienza found Brillantes sleeping in his bed, in his
home. He found out that Brillantes had been
cohabiting w/ his wife. Atienza left de Castro & their
kids.
+ Atienza filed a complaint against Brillantes for grossly
immoral conduct
+ Brillantes was married twice to Ongkiko, they have 5
kids.
+ Brillantes assertions:
o Marriage with Ongkiko was void because
they had no marriage license
o Art. 40 of the Family Code (effective 1988)
does not apply to him because his marriage
w/ Ongkiko was held in 1965.

Issu e:
1.
2. WON the rule requiring declaration of nullity for the
purpose of remarriage retroacts
WON the 1
st
marriage is void

Ratio:
1. Article 40 - There has to be a declaration of nullity w/
respect to the first marriage.
2. The Rule in the Family Code retroacts and aplies to
remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on Aug 2, 1988 regardless of the date of
the first marriage.
a. Even if the 1
st
marriage was entered into
before the Family Code, the remarriage w/c
happened after the Family Code is covered
by Art 40.
b. The Family Code retroacts as long as vested
rights will not be impaired by its application.
Brillantes did not show that any vested right
was impaired by the application of Art 40.

Decision: Brillantes is dismissed
Rule: Even if the 1
st
marriage was contracted before the Family
Code, a remarriage w/c happened after the Family Code is
covered by Art 40 (there has to be a declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage first before one can remarry) Zhai Garcia


Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1 (2001)

Facts: J udge Sanchez married a man and a woman who each
were merely separated in fact from their respective spouses.
The marriage was contracted w/o the requisite marriage
license & the marriage contract states that the parties were
separated.
Held: J udge Sanchez should have known that the parties were
still validly married before he solemnized their marriage.
Separation in fact does not dissolve the marriage.
Although the marriage license requirement may be
done away with if the couple had freely cohabited for at least 5
years, they must be legally capacitated to marry. In this case,
there was a legal impediment in their marriage.
The marriage that he celebrated is therefore void ab
initio not because of the lack of marriage license but because it
is a bigamous marriage. Zhai Garcia

Facts: In 1993, J udge Sanchez solemnized a marriage
between Manzano and Payao despite the fact that they
indicated in the affidavits sworn before the judge that they are
both separated. Manzanos widow who he married in 1966,
filed a case against the judge.
Held: Sanchez should have known that the marriage was void
for being bigamous since Manzano had a previous subsisting
marriage. The fact that they had been living apart from their
respective spouses for years did not dissolve the marriage
bonds. Although the law exempts individuals who have freely
and voluntarily cohabited for at least 5 years from securing a
marriage license, they must be legally capacitated to marry
each other. Manzano and Payaos marriage is void for being
bigamous, not because of the absence of the formal requisite
of a marriage license. Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance
of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
Janz Serrano

Apiag v. Cantero, 268 SCRA 47 (1997)

Facts: J udge Cantero & Apiag feigned their marriage and did
not cohabit afterwards. The J udge, believing that the 1
st

marriage was void, contracted 2
nd
marriage w/ another woman.
Held: The remarriage of J udge Cantero happened before the
FC and the Wiegel ruling; therefore the CC (w/c does not
require a judicial declaration of nullity) applies to him. The 1
st

marriage is void, the 2
nd
is not bigamous. Zhai Garcia

Facts: the 1st marriage was only dramatized, for the families of
the man and first wife to save face. Boy did not seek judicial
declaration of nullity. 2nd marriage happened before effectivity
of Family Code.
Held: Old law will apply to petitioner since both marriages were
celebrated under the old Civil Code. Thus, no judicial decree of
nullity is needed to establish the invalidity of void marriages.
Janz Serrano

b. Art. 36 (Read annotations in Sempio-Diy, Handbook on The Family Code of the Philippines)

Santos v. Bedia-Santos 240 SCRA 20 (1995)

Facts: After giving birth, W left for the US & had no contact w/
the H. H filed for a nullity of marriage under Art. 36.
Held: The existing laws on marriage require that PI be proven
by gravity, antecedence, and incurability. PI refers to the
mental incapacity of a party to the marriage to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants. The facts do not
show PI, only lack of willingness to comply w/ the marital
obligations. Zhai Garcia

Facts: After giving birth, J ulia Bedia-Santos left for the US and
did not contact her husband anymore. Leouel filed for the
nullity of marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
Held: Art. 36 of the FC cannot be taken independently of but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts and laws on
marriage. Psychological incapacity refers to the mental
capacity of a party to the marriage to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants [gravity, jurisprudence, incurability].
The facts were not enough to show psychological incapacity.
What was shown was lack of willingness to comply with marital
obligations. Janz Serrano


Rep. v. CA & Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997)
Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Facts:
Roridel Molina and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14,
1985. A son was born to them on J uly 29, 1986. After a year of
marriage Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility as a husband and father based on the following:
- He squandered his money on friends whom he
spent more time with
- He was never honest with his wife regarding their
finances
- He depended on his parents for financial assistance
- Roridel had been the breadwinner of the family since
February 1986 when Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila
- Reynaldo abandoned his wife and child

Procedural History:
The regional trial court declared the marriage void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the
family code. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the
decision of the trial court. Hence this petition.

Issue:
- WON psychological difficulty and opposing and conflicting
personalities constitute grounds for annulment based on the
psychological incapacity of a person

Decision:
Petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Reason:
- NO; there is no clear showing that the psychological defect of
the husband is an incapacity. This is more of an incompatibility
and difficulty, if not outsight refusal or neglect in the
performance of some marital obligations.

Notes:
Guidelines for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of
the Family Code:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
A. medically or clinically identified
B. alleged in the complaint
C. sufficiently proven by experts
D. clearly explained in the decision
3. The incapacity must be proved to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by ART. 68 - 71, 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
Andre Kwan

Tsoi v. CA, 266 SCRA 324

Facts: After 9 months of getting married, still no sexual
intercourse or any attempt to do so happened between Chi
Ming Tsoi & his wife. They are not impotent. The W wanted to
nullify the marriage but the H did not.
Held: Senseless & protracted refusal to consummate the
marriage and fulfill marital obligations amounts to
psychological incapacity. It shows that he was unable to give
meaning & significance to the marriage. Zhai Garcia

Facts: After 9 months of marriage, there has been no sexual
intercourse or any attempt at it between Tsoi and his wife.
Neither party is impotent. The wife wanted to annul the
marriage but the husband did not.
Held: Abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder.
It demonstrates utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. Senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill marital obligations is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Janz Serrano


Choa v. Choa, 392 SCRA 198
GR No 143376 | November 26, 2002

Facts:
Wife filing petition for certiorari for denying demurrer
to evidence. She contends that the evidence
submitted by the husband is not sufficient to warrant
her psychological incapacity.
Evidence of the husband:
1. Filing of cases by wife
2. Personal testimony as to her immaturity, lack
of attention, lack of procreative intention
3. Testimony of doctor to their being
incompatible
Issue:
WON certiorari is a proper remedy.
WON evidence is sufficient to deem the wife
psychologically incapacitated.
Decision:
Yes.
No.
Ratio:
Certiorari is a proper remedy since there is a clear
error in the appreciation of evidence.
As to the evidence:
1. The evidence as to the filing of cases in no
way proves psychological incapacity; it only
proves the existence of these cases.
2. The personal testimony did not show any
psychological incapacity; it merely shows
conflicting and incompatible personalities.
3. The doctors testimony shows the same
thing. Karl King

Antonio v. Reyes

Facts: W disclosed about having a child born of a wedlock.
She also lied about stints as a singer, her rank, and fortune.
The Church annulled their marriage.
Held: All elements in the Molina guidelines were present. The
W, a pathological liar, was pronounced psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill the marital obligation, especially that of
mutual respect and fidelity. Zhai Garcia

Facts: Wife persistently lied about herself, the people around
her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other
events or things.
Held: A person unable to distinguish between fantasy and
reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal
nature of the marital bond and the corresponding obligations
attached to marriage. In persistently and constantly lying to
petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and
respect. Janz Serrano

Republic v. Melgar
Austria-Martinez, J. | March 31, 2006 | OSG filed a petition for certiorari on the previous decision of the RTC affirmed by the
CA leading to the nullity of the marriage of Norma Melgar and Eulogio Melgar

Facts:
Norma (complainant in previous case) and Eulogio
(respondent in previous case) married in 1965.
They had 5 children.
Norma admitted that after the first child was born and
after he lost his job, respondent manifested abusive
behavior to his wife and children and became a
habitual alcoholic. He mode no effort to get a new
job.
On 1985, respondent beat up his wife at home after
dragging her away from the office. Complainants
brothers stopped him and sent him away. He never
returned to the family.
Norma Melgar filed the case for declaration of nullity
of her marriage on the grounds of psychological
incapacity (based on her husbands abandonment of
his family, his abusive behavior, his habitual
alcoholism, and the fact that he made no effort to get
a new job to support his family) pursuant to Art. 26 FC
in 1996
RTC ruled in her favor and their marriage was
annulled.
OSG filed an appeal with the CA contending lack of
evidence to declare marriage void under Art. 26.
CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Hence OSG filed this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of
respondent is in the nature contemplated by Art. 26 FC

Held:
No. Petition GRANTED. RTC and CA decisions REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Marriage valid.

Ratio:
State has to actively participate in the prosecution of
the case via the OSG to ensure that there is no
collusion among the parties. This is stipulated in Art.
48 FC. This is because the State holds the institution
of marriage in high regard and takes all the steps
necessary to uphold it.
Regardless of the States absence in the earlier trials,
the evidence presented by complainant was not
sufficient to prove that respondent was
psychologically incapable.
Abusive as he was, even she admitted that it started
only after their first child was born and after he lost his
job. Thus being counter-intuitive to the requirement of
the state of psychological incapacity being present at
marriage.

While medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination is not required, an expert witness would
have strengthened complainants case. The lack of
one made her personal testimony weak and was fatal
to her case.
There must be a clear showing that it is a
psychological incapacity that renders the accused
individual incapable of fulfilling marital duties. Nate
Pico

Paras v. Paras, 529 SCRA 81 (2007)
Certiorari | Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. | Aug 2, 2007

Facts:
+ Rosa & J usto got married in 1964 and had 4 children.
+ 29 years after, Rosa file a complaint for annulment of
marriage w/ J usto because he was psychologically
incapacitated. The same was dismissed by RTC & CA

Rosa Paras J usto Paras
He dissipated her
business assets &
forged her signature in
one mortgage
transaction
Denied the forgery.
He abandoned his
family and lived w/ a
concubine & with
whom he had a child.
Rosa had him kicked-out of their
house.
The concubine was a secretary in
the law office & the child wasnt his.
Did not give financial
support to his children
The conjugal assets were enough to
support the family.
His salary was not enough.

+ J usto, in an Admin Case, was found guilty of forgery,
immorality, & abandonment of family
o Rosa hopes to rely on these findings
o Court cited Molina case that findings of
experts would have to be obtained

Issues:
1. WON the findings in the Admin Case are conclusive
in the present case
2. WON findings of experts would have to be obtained in
order to prove the existence of psychological
incapacity
3. Does the totality of the evidence show psychological
incapacity on the party of J usto?

Ratio
1. No if the findings were true, they do not necessarily
mean that J usto was psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill his marital obligations. J ustos unfitness as a
lawyer does not mean his unfitness as a husband.
Admin cases and criminal/civil cases are of different
natures.
2. No
a. In the Molina case, Guideline no. 2
necessitated the medical/clinical
identification of the root cause of
psychological incapacity. It states the need
for the root cause of the psychological
incapacity to be proven by experts.
b. In the recent Marcos v. Marco case, the
Court explained that the Molina Guideline
does not require an examination by a
physician or a psychologist. The
psychological incapacity must be established
by the TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE
presented during the trial
c. In 2003, the Court laid down new rules
regarding Art 36 in that the complete facts
should allege the physical manifestations
indicative of psychological incapacity at the
time of the marriage BUT EXPERT OPINION
NEED NOT BE ALLEGED.
3. No the totality of evidence is not sufficient to show
that J usto is psychologically incapacitate to fulfill his
essential marital obligations
a. There was no evidence leading to a
conclusion that J ustos defects was present
at the time of the celebration of marriage,
that it was incurable, and that it was grave.
Therefore, Molina guideline no. 3 was not
present.
b. Sexual infidelity, irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, and abandonment per
se do not warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity

Decision: Petition denied. RTC & CA decisions affirmed.
Rule:
The findings of psychiatrists or psychologists were not needed
to prove the psychological incapacity. The totality of evidence
does not prove that there was psychological incapacity was
present at the time the marriage was celebrated. Zhai Garcia

Tongol v. Tongol, 537 SCRA 135 (2007)

Facts: H left the conjugal home because of the Ws jealousy &
unreasonable contempt. Expert findings show that she had a
psychological disorder.

Held: Although there was psychological disorder, there was no
showing that it was related to the fulfillment of marital &
parental obligations. Not all findings of psychological disorder
may point to PI because the totality of the evidence must prove
that the disorder incapacitates the person from performing the
essential marital covenants, even though there was a remiss in
obligations in other aspects e.g. business or occupation. Zhai
Garcia

Facts: husband says their marriage was not a happy one
because of her parents' continued interference and attempt to
break up their union. Examining psychiatrist concluded that
respondent is suffering from Inadequate Personality Disorder
[does not function in the way that she feels or she is confident;
very much in doubt of her own capabilities; exaggerated
emotional reactions; feeling of rejection].

Held: The behavior exhibited by the respondent does not
amount to psychological incapacity as contemplated under Art.
36. Psychological incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. In this case, the testimonies revolve
around disagreement regarding the management of their
business. Disagreement on money matters is not a sufficient
ground to declare the marriage null and void. Janz Serrano

Dimayuga-Laurena v. CA, GR No. 159220 (2008)

Facts: W accuses H of infidelity, irresponsibility, and
immaturity, as he tends to lead a bachelors life. Expert
findings show that there was personality disorder.
Held: The findings do not show that the personality disorder
was grave, of juridical transcendence & was incurable. Zhai
Garcia

Facts: Wife alleges that husband was psychologically
incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
Husband gave priority to parents, would come home very late,
tried to convert her to his religion, womanizer such manifest
husbands psychological incapacity.
Held: Petitioner fails to prove psychological incapacity of
husband, much less its existence at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. (failed to conform with Molina guidelines).
Janz Serrano

Te v. Te, GR No. 161793 (2009)
Feb. 13, 2009

Facts:
Edward Kenneth Ngo- Te filed a petition for certiorari
as the CA reversed the decision of the trial court granting him
annulment of his marriage to Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te.
The petitioner and respondent met in college and eloped after
3 months of meeting. The couple went to Cebu where they
tried to find jobs. When they have spent the money of
petitioner, they returned to Manila and stayed at respondents
uncles house. On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the
two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and
she, 20. Petitioner claims that he lived like a prisoner and was
threatened by both wife and uncle. Petitioner managed to
escape and live with his parents who hid him from Rowena. He
filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage after four
years. The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found
both parties psychologically incapacitated. The trial court
rendered marriage null and void. The CA reversed and set
aside the RTCs decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the psychological incapacity of the
contracting parties was proven by the clinical psychologist
even without personally examining the respondent.
If yes, whether or not the marriage is void.

Held:
Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. In this
case, there is an expert opinion declaring both parties as
psychologically incapacitated. There is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.
Yes. Marriage is void under Art. 36 of the family
Code.

Decision:
The petition is GRANTED. The CA decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The RTC decision is
REINSTATED. Elaine de Guzman

Ting v. Velez-Ting, GR No. 166562 (2009)

Facts: Husband has been having drinking and gambling
problems, and has violent outbursts against his wife. Doctor
concluded that such behavior of husband are clear indications
that petitioner suffers from personality disorder. Second
opinion was contrary to first, Doctor stating that there is nothing
wrong with petitioners personality, considering latters good
relations with coworkers. Janz Serrano


2. Period to file action or raise defense
3. Effects of Nullity
Ninal v. Badayong, 328 SCRA 122 (2000)

Facts: Nial shot his 1
st
H causing his death. After 20 months,
she married Badayog but w/o a valid marriage license as they
were cohabiting for 5 years already. They secured an affidavit
stating these facts. The heirs contest the validity of their
marriage.
Held: 5 year cohabitation contemplated by the law is that w/c is
in the nature of a perfect union valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by absence of the marriage contracts.
Of the 5 years they cohabited, only 20 months were w/o any
legal impediment.
For purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For purposes, such as
but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy of child,
settlement of estate, property regimes, or criminal cases, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential
to the determination of the case. Zhai Garcia
Facts: Nial and Bellones were married in 1974. Nial shot
Bellones in 1985, causing her death. After a year and a half,
Nial contracted a second marriage with Badayog without a
marriage license. They executed an affidavit stating that they
have cohabited for at least five years. Nial died in 1997. His
children with Bellones seek a declaration of nullity of Nials
marriage with
Badayog.

Held: Second marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
They are not exempt from acquiring marriage license because
their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by
the absence of the marriage contract. Of the five years they
had cohabited, only 20 months were without any legal
impediment. For purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case. Janz Serrano

Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993)

Facts: The couple were married even though the H still had a
valid & subsisting marriage. When she was abroad, he
squandered the conjugal properties. She filed a petition for
Declaration of Nullity and Separation of Property. Husband
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that since their
marriage was void ab initio for being bigamous, the declaration
of nullity was unnecessary
Held: J udicial declaration of nullity can be invoked for purposes
other than remarriage. Separation of property is also one of the
effects of judicial declaration of nullity. Zhai Garcia

Facts: Delia Domingo filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity
and Separation of Property. Her husband filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the petition was unnecessary since
their marriage was void ab initio because of Robertos previous
marriage.
Held: J udicial declaration of nullity can be invoked for purposes
other than remarriage. Separation of property is also one of the
effects of judicial declaration of nullity. Janz Serrano

De Castro v. Assidao-de Castro, 545 SCRA 162 (2008)

Facts: The couple had been sweethearts but when they went
to the LCR, their marriage license had already expired. They
were able to secure a fake affidavit of 5-year cohabitation.
After the marriage, they were estranged. The H was in remiss
for child support & denies to be the childs father although he
had stated the contrary in his tax exemption affidavit.

Held: The validity of the marriage can be revoked in the child
support case. The court may decide on the validity of the
marriage collaterally as long as it is needed in order to resolve
the case.
The child is illegitimate since it was borne out of a void ab initio
marriage but was identified by the father to be his. Zhai
Garcia

Facts: couple applied for marriage license. Marriage license
was granted but already expired when they were planning to
get married. They executed an affidavit stating they had been
living together as husband and wife for at least 5 years

Held: Trial court may declare the marriage void ab initio in the
case filed by the wife for support of their illegitimate child. The
Court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Also, the
falsity of an affidavit cannot be considered as a mere
irregularity in the formal requisite of marriage. Janz Serrano


B. Voidable Marriages
1. Grounds for Annulment

Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623

Facts: The State of NY prohibit the marriage between males
(16 to 18) and females (14 to 16) w/o parental consent. The
plaintiffs claim that the law is unconstitutional

Held: Rights may be infringed only if a) there is a compelling
interest that the State enables to achieve and b) the means to
infringe the right is reasonable & there is minimal intrusion
only. The reasons why parental consent is sought is because
a) the state wants to protect the society from unstable
marriages, b) the inherent immaturity of minors, and c)
recognition of the parents right and duty to the children. Zhai
Garcia

Facts: Petitioners not allowed to marry by virtue of state statute
prohibiting marriages between minors without parental
consent.
Held: It is the states interest to protect the minors from
immature decision-making and preventing unstable marriages.
The law presumes that the parents possess what the child
lacks in maturity, and that parents are more capable to act in
their best interests, thus the parental consent requirement.
Besides, there is no denial to marry. Marriage is only delayed.
Janz Serrano

Katipunan v. Tenorio, 38 OG 171 (1937)
Imperial, J. | Sept 29, 1937

Facts:
+ Katipunan wants his marriage with Tenorio to be
annulled on the ground that Tenorio because of her
mental incapacity.
+ Witnesses during the marriage attest that Tenorio was
of sound mind when the marriage was contracted.
During the course of action, she has been
represented by her guardian ad litem.
+ He also admitted that she would have lucid intervals
frequently during their 7 years of cohabitation as
husband & wife after the marriage. She received no
medical assistance from the plaintiff.

Issue: WON the marriage should be annulled on the ground of
mental incapacity.

Held/Ratio: NO
Presumption is always in favor of sanity. The burden of
proof in showing that the other party was of unsound mind
at the time of marriage lies on Katipunan.
1. Nothing establishes that she was of unsound mind
when the marriage was contracted. The mental
incapacity was shown to have been present AFTER
the marriage when she received no medical
assistance from the plaintiff.
2. The marriage was even ratified they have cohabited
for at least 7 years and in that time, wife had frequent
lucid intervals.

Rules cited.
+ GO 68 & RA 3613 insanity as a ground for
annulment w/c can be ratified by free cohabitation
+ Engle vs. Doe Insanity once proved to exist is
presumed to continue. Sanity must be shown as
existing as of the very time of the marriage
+ Insanity a manifestation, in language or conduct, of
disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less
permanently diseased or disordered condition of the
mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by
perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the
sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired
or disordered volition.

Decision: Preponderance of Tenorios evidence is greater.
Petition denied. Zhai Garcia

Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998)
Special civil action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Facts:
Emilio Suntay was suffering from schizophrenia which had
been manifest prior to his marriage to Isabel in 9 J uly 1958.
Isabel filed a criminal case against Emilio, while Emilio filed for
legal separation charging her with infidelity. The trial court
declared the marriage null and void but in the body of the
decision, the ground used was for annulment.

Issue: WON the marriage was void or merely voidable

Decision: Petition dismissed. No grave abuse of discretion.

Reason:
The marriage is voidable. Being of unsound mind is a ground
only for annulment and not for declaration of nullity. Andre
Kwan


Notes:
VOID Marriages VOIDABLE Marriages
Definition Null and void does not exist from the beginning Annul to reduce to nothing, to make
void or of no effect
Characteristics Deemed never to have taken place at all Considered valid and produces all its
civil effects until it is set aside by final
judgment in an action for annulment
Annulment abolishes legal character
of spouses but maintains juridical
consequences.
Effects on children Natural children they have the same status,
rights, and obligations as acknowledged natural
children
Children conceived before the decree
of annulment are legitimate.
Children conceived after are natural
children and receive the rights thereof.

Aquino v. Delizo, 109 Phil 21 (1960)
July 27, 1960 | Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Facts:
Conchita Delizo concealed her 4-month pregnancy from
Fernando Aquino during their marriage on September 6, 1955.
Aquino claimed that this was the child of another man and that
he wants the marriage annulled because of this fraud.
Defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful
wedlock between her and the plaintiff.

Issues:
- WON concealment of pregnancy at time of marriage
constitutes fraud as ground for annulment
- WON mere failure to answer motion is evidence of
collusion and ground for denial for new trial, in this
case

Decision: Decision complained of is set aside and the case
remanded to the court a quo for new trial. Without costs.

Reason:
- YES; concealment of the wife of the fact that at the
time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a
ground for annulment of marriage

Then:
Art. 85, par. 4; Art. 86, par. 3 of the New Civil Code

Now:
Art. 45 (3) (FC): That the consent of either party was obtained
by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of
the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other
as husband and wife.

Art. 46 (2) (FC): Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the
time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than
her husband.

NO; such is not evidence of collusion especially since a
provincial fiscal as been ordered to represent the government
to prevent such collusion. The evidence sought to be
introduced at the new trial along with what has already been
adduced is sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by the
plaintiff. Andre Kwan

Anaya v. Palaroan, 36 SCRA 97 (1970)
November 26, 1970 | Appeal from an order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court

Facts:
- Plaintiff and defendant were married on December 4, 1953.
On J anuary 7, 1954, Palaroan filed an action for the annulment
of the marriage based on the ground that his consent was
obtained through force. Complaint was dismissed and while
the amount of the counterclaim was being settled, Fernando
divulged to Aurora that months prior to their wedding, he had
pre-marital sexual relations with a close relative of his. Plaintiff
alleges that her consent was obtained through fraud.

Issue:
- WON the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of
his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a
ground for annulment of marriage based on fraud

Decision: Appealed order is affirmed. No costs.

Reason:
- NO; non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital sexual
relations with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a
ground for annulment; the law also states that no
other misrepresentation or deceit as to chastity
shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.

Then:
Art. 85 and 86 of the Civil Code

Now:
Art. 46 (FC): No other misrepresentations or deceit as to
character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage. Andre Kwan


Ruiz v. Atienza, 40 O.G. 1903 (1941)
March 18, 1941 | Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila

Facts:
- Both unmarried, plaintiff impregnated defendant.
- On November 14, 1938, after the birth of the child,
Pelagias father, her cousin-in-law, and 3 other
persons visited J ose Ruiz at the boarding house
where he lived and convinced him to marry Pelagia.
Along with the plaintiffs cousin and defendant, the
party went to the Aglipayan church, procured a
marriage license in Manila, and returned to the church
to celebrate the wedding.
- 4 days later, Ruiz filed for annulment alleging that he
had been forced into wedlock by means of the
following: threats of the defendants father; and
intimidation by the defendants cousin-in-law
regarding rejection of admission to the bar on grounds
of immorality.

Issue:
- WON intimidation amounts to force or violence and is
a ground for annulment

Decision:
- J udgment affirmed with costs against the appellant.

Reason:
NO; the provision of the marriage law referring to force or
violence does not seem to include mere intimidation, at least
where it does not in legal effect amount to force or violence.
Also, neither violence nor duress attended the marriage
celebration. For force or intimidation to be considered as a
ground for annulment, it must be proven to be SUFFICIENTLY
GRAVE as to leave the injured party with no other alternatives.
Andre Kwan

Jimenez v. Republic and Canizares, 109 Phil. 273 (1960)
August 31, 1960 | Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City

Facts:
- On 7 J une 1955, J oel J imenez filed an annulment suit
against Remedios Caizares, whom he married on 3
August 1950, upon the ground that the orifice of her
genitals or vagina was too small to allow penetration
of the penis for copulation; that the condition existed
before marriage; and that he left the conjugal home
two nights and one day after the wedding. Remedios
refused to undergo a physical examination to
determine her condition.

Issue:
- WON the marriage in question may be annulled on
the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband
who claimed and testified that his wife was and is
impotent
Decision:
- Decree appealed from is set aside and the case
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision, without pronouncement
as to costs.

Reason:
NO; Legal grounds for annulment must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence. WON the wife was and is really impotent
has not been satisfactorily established because from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the
decree, she had abstained from taking part therein. Andre
Kwan

Sarao v. Guevara, 40 O.G. 15 Supp. 263 (1940)
May 31, 1940 | Appeal from a judgment of Court of First Instance of Laguna

Facts:
- The couple was married on 3 J une 1936. At the night
of the wedding, they were not able to copulate
because of pains in her private part and an oozing
therefrom some purulent matter offensive to the smell.
- Upon examination, a tumor was found and her
ovaries and uterus were removed making her
incapable of procreation, but capable of engaging in
sexual intercourse. Sarao, however, claimed to have
lost all desire to have access to his wife ever since
and thus pursued the filing for annulment.

Issue:
- WON the marriage in this case may be annulled.

Decision:
- Decision of lower court that marriage cannot be
annulled is confirmed. Costs against appellant.

Reason:
- NO; a temporary or occasional incapacity for
copulation is not a ground for a decree of nullity. The
defect must exist at the time of marriage and must be
permanent. Defendant was not necessarily incapable
of copulation when she married the plaintiff.
Impotency is the ability to copulate, not to procreate.

Under Philippine law, marriage may be annulled if the other
party was, at the time of the marriage, physically incapable of
entering into the married state, and such incapacity continues,
and appears to be incurable (Art. 45, sec. 5 FC) Andre Kwan


People v. Santiago, 52 Phil. 68 (1927)

Facts: The uncle raped her 6-year old niece. That same
afternoon, a minister solemnized the marriage between them.
Then, he gave the niece a few pesos so she could go home.

Held: The marriage, atop all, is void. The uncle merely used
the marriage as a ruse to evade criminal liability for rape thus,
he did not have the consent to marry the girl. Zhai Garcia
Facts: Santiago raped his niece Felicita. He married her the
same afternoon before a protestant minister. Santiago then
gave her a few pesos and sent her home.
Held: The ceremony cannot be considered binding on her
because of duress and would make it voidable had it not been
already considered void. Janz Serrano


2. Marriage When One Spouse is Absent

Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 (1937)

Facts: The W & the 1
st
husband were married but the H soon
left for the US in 1916 and was never heard from again. She
instituted a summary proceeding of declaration of presumptive
death. In 1921, the declaration of absence became effective.
She now married 2
nd
husband in 1927.
Held: The 2
nd
marriage wasnt entered in the 7-year bar. The
point of reckoning will be the last day that the spouse absent
was heard from. Zhai Garcia

3. Effects of pending action/decree

Yu v. Yu

Facts: The H filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus over their
daughter. He also filed a petition for declaration of nullity. The
W filed a separate writ of habeas corpus.
Held: During the pendency of the action, the court shall
determine the support & custody of the children and the
support of the other spouse unless an agreement has been
made by the spouses. The decree of nullity already has
accessory pronouncements effecting custody, support, and
visitation rights. Zhai Garcia

4. J urisdiction

Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998)

Facts: The spouses, Moslems, were estranged from each
other. A petition for nullity was filed in the RTC.

Held: The RTC has jurisdiction over the marriage as the
spouses were married under the Civil Code. It was found out
that they were not married according to Moslem rites. The RTC
has exclusive & original jurisdiction over cases involving
marriage and marital relations. The Sharia court shall have
jurisdiction over marriages celebrated under Moslem laws.

VI. Legal Separation
A. Grounds

People v. Zapata and Bondoc, 88 Phil. 688 (1951)

Facts: Bondoc filed a complaint of adultery against his wife
Zapata and her paramour in 1947. The wife pleaded guilty.
After a year, Bondoc filed a second complaint for adultery
committed between 1947-1948.
Held: The offenses are considered separate. Each sexual
intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery. Janz Serrano

Munoz v. del Barrio, 51 OG 5217 (1955)

Facts: J ose del Barrio physically maltreated his wife three
times. She was hit in the abdomen and face, her hair was
pulled and her neck twisted.
Held: There is no ground for legal separation. The husbands
action must be calculated to produce death of his wife. Intent to
kill must be established with clear and convincing evidence.
Maltreatment does not constitute an attempt to kill. [Case wad
decided under Civil Code. Under Family Code, there is ground
for legal separation under Art. 55(1)] Janz Serrano

Gandionco v. Penaranda, 155 SCRA 725 (1987)

Facts: Pearanda filed a case for legal separation against
Gandionco on the ground of concubinage. Several months
later, she filed a criminal case for concubinage.
Held: The civil action may proceed. The civil action is not one
to enforce civil liability but is aimed at conjugal rights of the
spouses. No criminal conviction is necessary to issue a decree
of legal separation. In legal separation, preponderance of
evidence is enough. Janz Serrano


Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177 (1972)

Facts: Lapuz filed for legal separation on the ground of
abandonment. Eufemio filed a counterclaim for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Before trial was completed, she died in a
vehicular accident.
Held: Death of the plaintiff before decree of legal separation
abates the action. There is no more need for legal separation
because the marriage is already dissolved by the death of one
of the parties. (1) The petition for legal separation and the
counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same marriage
can stand independent and separate adjudication. Legal
separation was not converted into declaration for nullity by a
counterclaim, for legal separation presupposes a valid
marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage
as a precondition. (2) An action for legal separation is purely
personal. Being personal in character, it follows that the death
of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself.
Death abates the action for legal separation. Janz Serrano

Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz, 22 SCRA 333 (1968)

Facts: de la Cruz began to live away from his wife and six
children. He never visited the conjugal home for three years.
Held: There is no abandonment but only physical
estrangement. Abandonment consists of financial and moral
desertion in addition to physical estrangement. Husband
continued to give support to his family even while he was
away. In this case, there was no voluntary act to forsake the
marital vows or to cause perpetual separation. Janz Serrano

Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong, 505 SCRA 76 (2006)

Facts: The H maltreats the W and their children. One time, she
physically maltreated the W and told her to leave the house.
The W filed an action for LS but the H gave a defense, that she
abandoned the family.
Held: The FC contemplates abandonment w/o justifiable cause
as a ground for annulment and also as a defense for mutual
guilt. Here, the Ws act of abandonment was justified the H
asked her to leave & he also maltreated her. Zhai Garcia

B. Defenses

People v. Sansano, 58 Phil. 73 (1933)

Facts: Ventura left Sansano for 3 years without writing to her or
sending support. Sansano began to live with Ramos. When
Ventura returned, he filed adultery charges against Sansano
and Ramos. Both were convicted. After serving sentence
Sansano asked Ventura to take her back but he told her to do
what she wanted. She again lived with Ramos. Ventura went
abroad for 7 years. When he returned to the Philippines, he
filed a second charge of adultery and filed a case for legal
separation.
Held: Ventura consented to the adulterous relations of his wife.
He is therefore barred from instituting a case for adultery. The
sole purpose of filing the charge is to use it as a ground for
legal separation. Janz Serrano

Ocampo v. Florenciano, 107 Phil 35 (1960)

Facts: de Ocampo and Florenciano were married in 1938. De
Ocampo discovered that his wife was maintaining illicit
relations. He sent her to Manila but she continued going out
with other men. In 1955, de Ocampo caught Florenciano in the
act of having illicit relations.
Held: There was no collusion despite the confession made by
the guilty spouse outside the court. What is prohibited is a
decree of legal separation based solely on such confession. In
this case, there was other evidence to prove adultery. Janz
Serrano

Sargent v. Sargent, 114 A. 428 (1920)

Facts: Evidence collated the whole time that spies and agents
were in the Sargents house did not prove that the W was
committing adultery w/ the driver.
Held: There was connivance in that the detectives themselves
and even the H took active part in producing the circumstances
that would make it appear that there was a cause of LS and
would facilitate the commission of the offense. There was
consent in that the H did not forewarn or inquire to his wife
about the illicit relations or when he did not fire the driver when
he was suspecting that there was an illicit relationship between
those w. Zhai Garcia


Brown v. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168 (1957)

Facts: Brown filed for legal separation on the ground that
Yambao begot a child from an adulterous relationship. Yambao
failed to submit answer on time. During cross-examination, it
was revealed that Brown also lived with another woman with
whom he has begotten children.
Held: Legal separation cannot be claimed where both spouses
are offenders. One must come to court with clean hands.
Moreover, failure of wife to raise a defense may be considered
circumstantial evidence of collusion between her and her
husband. Lastly, the CC, action for legal separation should be
filed within one year from the time the time the plaintiff
becomes cognizant of the cause and within five years from and
after the date when such cause occurred. [Under FC, an action
for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time
of the occurrence of the cause.] Janz Serrano

Willan v. Willan, 2 A11 E.R. 463 (1960)

Facts: H claims that his W physically and verbally assaults him
and asks him to perform sexual intercourse even when he
didnt want to. Before he finally left, they had sexual
intercourse.
Held: The last sexual intercourse w/ the W constitutes
condonation. Willan was free to either submit or resist his
wifes pleadings. He may have been reluctant to submit himself
to his wife but this does not mean that the act was involuntary.
Zhai Garcia

Bugayong v. Ginez, 100 Phil 616 (1956)

Facts: The W committed adultery so the H took her home &
they stayed as husband and wife for quite some time. When H
confronted the W as to the illicit relations, she packed her bags
and left w/o saying a word.
Held: Any cohabitation and sexual intercourse w/ the guilty
party after the commission of the offense & w/ knowledge of
the offense is evidence of condonation. Zhai Garcia

Matubis v. Praxedes, 109 Phil. 789 (1960)

Facts: Matubis and Praxedes made an agreement waving the
right to sue for adultery/concubinage among others.
Held: There was consent to the commission of the marital
offense. The condonation and consent are not only implied but
expressed. Legal separation cannot be claimed. Janz
Serrano

C. When to file/try actions

Contreras v. Macaraig, 33 SCRA 222 (1970)

Facts: The W had knowledge of rumors regarding Hs sexual
relations w/ another woman when he would leave home for
some time and come back. However, she didnt confront the H
in the hopes of saving the marriage. She extended efforts to
ascertain the illicit relations, asked relatives for help, and even
requested the paramour to steer clear of the relationship.
Held: The 1 year prescription should be counted from the time
that H admitted of having illicit relations w/ another woman.
Zhai Garcia

Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta, Jr., 46 SCRA 110 (1972)

Facts: Somosa-Ramos filed for legal separation on the ground
of concubinage and attempt on her life. She also sought the
issuance of a writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction for
the return of her paraphernal and exclusive properties. Ramos
opposed, stating that the court cannot try cases within the 6-
month cooling off period.
Held: The 6-month cooling off period is not an absolute bar to
the hearing of a motion of preliminary injunction prior to the
expiration of the period. The law remains cognizant of the need
in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself. Janz
Serrano

D. Effects of Filing of Petition

De La Vina v. Villareal, 41 Phil 13 (1920)

Facts: Geopano filed for legal separation on the ground of
concubinage by her husband, de la Vina
Held: a married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband, where the husband has
given cause for divorce or consents. In an action for divorce, a
wife can seek an injunction to curtail the husbands power of
administration over the conjugal property to protect her
interest. Janz Serrano

Reyes v. Ines-Luciano, 88 SCRA 803 (1979)

Facts: Reyes filed for legal separation on the ground that her
husband attempted to kill her. She was granted alimony
pendente lite by the judge. Husband claims that wife is not
entitled to support because she is facing a charge of adultery.
Held: Mere allegation will not deprive the wife of her right to
receive support pendente lite. Adultery must be established by
competent evidence. Support pendente lite comes from the
conjugal funds and not the personal funds of the husband.
Janz Serrano

E. Effects of Decree

Baez v. Baez, 374 SCRA 340 (2002)

Facts: there was an action pending for legal separation;
petitioner contends that multiple appeals are allowed.
Held: (1) Execution pending appeal is allowed when superior
circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that
may result from the issuance of the writ. (2) The effects of the
decree, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and
liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership,
and custody of the minor children follow from the decree of
legal separation. They are not separate or distinct matters,
rather they are mere incidents of legal separation. Thus they
may not be subject to multiple appeals. Janz Serrano

1. Dissolution and liquidation of ACP or CPG

La Rue v. La Rue, 304 S.E. 2d 312 (1983)

Facts: Wife sought and was granted divorce. Marriage was a
traditional one in that husband works while wife stays at home.
Held: Wife was entitled to equitable distribution in a no-fault
divorce especially since she contributed her earnings during
the early years of marriage to conjugal property and since her
homemaker services were contributed over a considerable
period of time, which also contributed to the economic well-
being of the family unit. According to the theory of equitable
distribution homemaker services are valid contributions to the
conjugal properties, subject to the following conditions: (1) that
it is NOT LIMITED to the possessory interest of a real estate;
(2) that it depends on the QUALITY of the services rendered,
whether the wife has been frugal or excessive in her expenses;
(3) the age and health of the wife, as well as the LENGTH of
the marriage. Janz Serrano

2. Custody Art. 213
3. Other Effects

Matute v. Macadaeg, 99 Phil 340 (1956)

Facts: Husband brought action for legal separation against wife
and brother on grounds of adultery. The action was granted
and the father was given custody of four minor children. Father
went abroad and left children under care of sister. Upon his
return, mother asked permission to bring children to Manila for
two weeks. Mother did not return children and is no custody
now asking of them.
Held: Even though children wish to be with their mother, the
children's choice of parent is overruled because the parent is
UNABLE TO SUPPORT HERSELF. Janz Serrano

Laperal v. Republic, 6 SCRA 357 (1962)

Facts: Laperal and husband has been legally separated. Held: A womans married status is not affected by a decree of
legal separation, there being no severance of the vinculum.
Thus she should continue to use the name employed before
legal separation. Janz Serrano


VII. Divorces
A. Foreign Divorces
B. Muslim Divorces
VIII. De Facto Separation
IX. Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife
A. Cohabitation, mutual love and respect
B. Fixing the Family Domicile
C. Mutual Help and Support
D. Management of the Household
E. Exercise of profession
F. Use of Surname
G. Relief from Courts

X. Property Relations Between Spouses

A. General Provisions

Collector v. Fisher, 110 Phil 686 (1961)
Certiorari | Barrera, J. | Jan 28, 1961

Facts:
+ The case is mainly about Walter Stevensons hereditary estate settlement & the determination of the applicable laws.
o Walter Stevenson was born in the Philippines & of British parents. He was married in Manila to Beatrice Mauricia on
J an 23, 1909 but they established permanent residence in San Francisco, California.
o He executed a will there on May 22, 1947 whereas he died on Feb 22, 1951. In his will, he instituted Beatrice
1
as his
sole heiress to the properties
2
in the Philippines w/c they acquired during their marriage and while residing in the
Philippines.
+ Ian Murray Scott was appointed as ancillary administrator
3
of the estate. On J ul 11, 1951, he filed a preliminary estate and
inheritance tax return w/ the reservation of having the properties declared finally appraised at their values 6 months after
Stevensons death. After certain increments and deductions, the assessments paid by the estate amounted to P16, 023.23
4
.
+ Scott filed an amended estate & inheritance tax return in order to avail of the right granted by 91 of the NIRC. He based the
value of the share of stock at the San Francisco Stock Exchange 6 months from Stevensons death. He also claimed a few
deductions
5
.
+ Scott filed a 2
nd
amended estate & inheritance tax return claiming for exemptions under the reciprocity proviso of the NIRC
6
,
claiming further that the estate had overpaid the government; thus, tax refunds were requested. The Collector denied the
claim. Beatrice, through the Fishers, filed an action in the CFI of Manila for said refund. The case was forwarded to the CTA.

Issues:
1. WON, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, of the net estate should be deducted as the share of the surviving
spouse in accordance w/ Phil laws on conjugal partnership & the NIRC 89. [Yes.]
2. WON estate can avail of inheritance and estate taxes on shares of stock per reciprocity proviso in the NIRC 122 [No.]
3. WON estate is entitled P4,000 deduction per US Internal Revenue Code 861 in relation to NIRC 122. [No.]
4. WON real estate properties of decedent and shares of stock were correctly appraised. [Yes w/ reservations.]
5. WON estate is entitled to deductions for judicial, administration, funeral expenses and real estate taxes and amount representing
indebtedness incurred by decedent during his lifetime. [Yes.]
6. WON estate is entitled to payment of interest of amt it claims to have overpaid the govt and to be refundable to it. [No.]

Held/Ratio: Decision affirmed with modifications.
1. [Yes.] Applicable law In the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are presumed to have adopted the
system of conjugal partnership as to the properties acquired during their marriage.
a. CIR: The CIR avers that pursuant to Art 124-NCC
7
, the property relations of the spouses shouldnt be determined by Phil
law but by the national law of the decedent husband (England)
8
. CIR invokes Art 16-NCC
9
.
b. Ruling: Since the marriage occurred in 1909, the applicable law is Art 1325
10
of the old Civil Code because the NCC
became applicable only in 1950. Art 1325-OCC and Art 124-NCC pertain to the nationality theory in determining the
property relation of spouses where 1 is an alien and no agreement as to properties was made.

1
BeatriceassignedherrightsandinterestsintheestatetothespousesFisher.
2
IncludesarealpropertyinBaguio,sharesofstocks,cashcredits,andcashtotalingtoP130,792.85.
3
Ancillaryadministration=Inasituationwhenadecedentlivedinaforeigncountry&therewasinitialprobateinthatcountrybutthedecedentownedrealproperty
in the Phils, an ancillary administration serves to distinguish one administration from the other because the 2 proceedings are separate and independent. It is the
managementofadecedent'spropertyinthestatewherethatpropertysituated,whichisotherthanthestateinwhichthedecedentpermanentlyresided.
4
Inclusiveofbothinheritanceandestatetaxes
5
Funeralexpenses,judicialexpenses,administrationexpenses,etc.
6
Wxemption based on the US Federal Internal Revenue Code by way of reciprocity granted by the NIRC AND exemption from the imposition of the estate &
inheritancetaxesonthesharesofstockbyreciprocityoftheNIRC
7
Art. 124, NCC. If the marriage is between a citizen of the Philippines and a foreigner, whether celebrated in the Philippines or abroad, the following rules shall
prevail:
(1)IfthehusbandisacitizenofthePhilippineswhilethewifeisaforeigner,theprovisionsofthisCodeshallgoverntheirrelations;
(2)IfthehusbandisaforeignerandthewifeisacitizenofthePhilippines,thelawsofthehusband'scountryshallbefollowed,withoutprejudicetotheprovisionsof
thisCodewithregardtoimmovableproperty.(1325a)
8
Englanddoesntrecognizelegalpartnershipbetweenspouses.Thepropertiesacquiredduringthemarriagepertain&exclusivelybelongtothehusband.
9
Art.16,NCC.Realpropertyaswellaspersonalpropertyissubjecttothelawofthecountrywhereitisstipulated.
However,intestateandtestamentarysuccessions,bothwithrespecttotheorderofsuccessionandtotheamountofsuccessionalrightsandtotheintrinsicvalidityof
testamentaryprovisions,shallberegulatedbythenationallawofthepersonwhosesuccessionisunderconsideration,whatevermaybethenatureoftheproperty
andregardlessofthecountrywhereinsaidpropertymaybefound.(10a)
10
Art1325,OCC.Shouldthemarriagebecontractedinaforeigncountry,betweenaSpaniardandaforeignwomanorbetaforeignerandaSpanishwoman,andthe
contracting parties should not make any statement or stipulation with respect to their property, it shall be understood, when the husband is a Spaniard, that he
marriesunderthesystemoflegalconjugalpartnership,andwhenthewifeisaSpaniard,thatshemarriesunderthesystemoflawinforceinthehusbandscountry,
allw/oprejudicetotheprovisionsofthiscodew/respecttorealproperty.

Art 124, NCC Art 1325
Applicable regardless of the place where the marriage was
celebrated
Applicable only to marriages contracted abroad.

c. Thus, the English law will be applicable even if the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines, both of them being
foreigners and applying Processual Presumption.
11
Furthermore, successional rights of spouses is governed by the NCC.

2. [No.] There is no total reciprocity between the law of the Phils and the law of California.
122 NIRC 13851 California Inheritance Tax Law
and, provided, further, that no tax shall be collected
under this Title in respect of intangible personal
property
(a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a
resident of a foreign country w/c at the time of his
death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of
any character in respect of intangible personal
property of citizens of the Phils not residing in that
foreign country or
(b) if the laws of the foreign country of w/c the
decedent was a resident at the time of his death
allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or
death taxes of every character in respect to
intangible personal property owned by citizens.
"SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: Conditions. Intangible
personal property is exempt from the tax imposed by this part if the
decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a territory or
another State of the United States or of a foreign state or country
which then imposed a legacy, succession, or death tax in respect to
intangible personal property of its own residents, but either:.
(a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any
character in respect to intangible personal property of residents of
this State, or
(b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible
personal property of a non-resident was exempt from legacy,
succession, or death taxes of every character if the Territory or other
State of the United States or foreign state or country in which the
nonresident resided allowed a similar exemption in respect to
intangible personal property of residents of the Territory or State of
the United States or foreign state or country of residence of the
decedent."
+ Reciprocity must be total re transfer or death taxes of any and every character in Phil laws and in legacy, succession, or
death taxes of every character in California laws. Thus, if the 2 laws collect/impose and does not exempt any transfer,
death, legacy, or succession tax of any character, there is no reciprocity.
+ In the Phils, both estate and inheritance tax is imposed. In California, only inheritance tax is imposed. The SC finds that
the lower court erred in exempting the estate from payment of the inheritance tax.

3. [No.] The amount allowed under the Federal Estate Tax Law is in the nature of a deduction and not of an exemption regarding w/c
reciprocity cannot be claimed under the NIRC or the Federal Law.

4. [Yes.] Properties should be appraised at their fair market value (FMV). The assessed value of the estate shall be considered as
their FMV only if evidence to the contrary is not shown. The situs of the shares of stock for purposes of taxation, for purposes of
taxation, being located herein the Phils & sought to be taxed in this jurisdiction, their FMV should be fixed on the basis of the
price prevailing in our country. Since counsel has never been questioned nor refuted as to the price of the stocks in the Manila
Stock Exchange, the SC is constrained to reverse the Tax Court on this point.

5. [Yes. ]The judicial, administrators, attorneys, and administrative fees were considered deductible by the Tax Court on the basis of
their approval by the probate court. The SC did not pass upon the claim for funeral expenses w/c was disapproved by court a quo
for lack of evidence.

6. [No.] The respondents offered a duly certified claim that while still living Mr. Stevenson obtained a loan of $5,000 pledging on
140,000 shares of stock. The court disallowed this item since it constituted an indebtedness in respect to intangible personal
property w/ the Tax court held to be exempt frm inheritance tax.
a. The approval of the Phil. Probate court is necessary although there was only ancillary administration here. Before a will
duly probated outside the Philippines can have an effect here, it must first be proved and allowed before our courts. There
is regular administration under the control of the court, where claims must be presented and approved, and expenses of
administration allowed before deductions from the estate can be authorized.
In NIRC 68
12
, no such statement of the gross estate of Stevenson not situated in the Phils appears in the 3 returns submitted to the
court/the CIR. The purpose of this statement is to determine how much of the indebtedness may be allowed to be deducted. The
allowable deduction pertains the portion of the indebtedness equivalent to the proportion of the estate in the Phils bears to the total
estate wherever situated. But since there is no such statement of the value of the estates outside the Phils, then no part of the
indebtedness can be allowed to be deducted. KEBABdigest

11
PresumingthatthelawofEnglandregardingthismatteristhesameasPhil.Laws
12
(d)Miscellaneousprovisions(1)NodeductionsshallbeallowedinthecaseofanonresidentnotacitizenofthePhilippinesunlesstheexecutor,administratoror
anyoneoftheheirs,asthecasemaybe,includesinthereturnrequiredtobefiledundersectionninetythreethevalueatthetimeofhisdeathofthatpartofthe
grossestateofthenonresidentnotsituatedinthePhilippines."

1. Requisites for donations

Domalagan v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471 (1916)
8 February 1916 | Johnson, J. | Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Misamis

Facts:
On November 1909, J orge Domalagan and Carlos Bolifer orally agreed that Domalagan will pay Bolifer P500 upon the
marriage of Domalagans son to Bolifers daughter. On August 2010, he completed his obligation with a bonus of P16 as a token of
future marriage. On that same month, Bolifers daughter was married to someone else, a certain Laureano Sisi. Domalagan is now
suing Bolifer to recover his P516 and P350 as damages because to raise the P500, Domalagan had to sell his property in Bohol at a
great sacrifice.
The CFI found that Domalagan did deliver the said amount to Bolifer and that the latter received it but did not return it. The CFI
ordered Bolifer to pay P516 and interest but did not award damages because the CFI did not find any evidence that Domalagan
suffered any additional damages. The defendant Bolifer is appealing the decision of the CFI.

Issues:
1) W/N the CFI erred in finding the delivery of P516 as proven fact;
2) W/N the CFI erred in holding the verbal contact entered into by plaintiff and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the
money by reason of a prospective marriage to be valid and effective.

Held/Ratio:
1) NO. This is a question of fact. The SC was not inclined to disturb the findings of the CFI because they were based on
uncontradicted proof. And as usual the SC opined, taking into consideration that the lower court saw and heard the
witnesses, they did not find any reason to disturb its findings.
2) NO. The defendants appeal rested on the following provision:
335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.
In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action unless the same, or some note
or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of
the agreement cannot be recei ved without the writing or secondary evi dence of its contents:
1. * * *
2. * * *
3. An agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry.
However, the SC found that the defendant did not raise any objection to the evidence relating to the agreement. The defendant
contends that this oral contract is invalid because of provisions of the aforesaid section. But the SC said that the said provision only
pertains to the method in which the contract may be proved. It does not invalidate oral contracts. And because the defendant did not
raise a proper objection to the evidence to prove the existence of their oral contract, he waived his right to the protection provided by
335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.
13
KEBABdigest

Serrano v. Solomon, 105 Phil 998 (1959)
Appeal from decision of CFI of Ilocos Sur | Montemayor, J.

Facts:
Alejandria Feliciano was left by her father to his friend Estanislao Serrano, who took care of her and raised her from the age of
12 until the time of the action. Her father went to Hawaii and resided there.
Melchor Solomon, the soon-to-be husband of Feliciano executed a document stating the following:
o Solomon will be donating all his exclusive properties to Feliciano
o If they will be blessed with children, his properties and those which they shall have earned, shall be inherited by the
children equally
o If no children:
If husband died first, of the properties will be given to the husbands siblings and their heirs
If wife died first, of the properties will be given to the one who raised her as token of his love to her
Solomon and Feliciano were married but less than nine months before marriage, Feliciano died
Serrano filed an action to the court to enforce the said donation alleging that since Feliciano died first, then he, as the one who
took care of her, should have inherited of the spouses properties
The CFI dismissed the said petition on the ground that it was not donation propter nuptiae

13
Ifthepartiestoanaction,duringthetrialofthecause,makenoobjectiontotheadmissibilityoforalevidencetosupportcontractsliketheoneinquestionand
permitthecontracttobeproved,byevidenceotherthanawriting,itwillbejustasbindinguponthepartiesasifithadbeenreducedtowriting.

Issue: W/N said donation was in consideration of marriage, hence, donation propter nuptiae?

Decision: (decision affirmed)
No, it was not what the law contemplates as donation propter nuptiae. Art. 1327 of the Old CC, and Art. 126 of New CC states,
Donations by reasons of marriage are those bestowed before its celebration in consideration of the same, upon one or both of
the spouses.
o Yes, it was executed before the celebration of marriage
o But, it donation was not in consideration of marriage, but rather of (a) being childless, and (b) distribution of properties
after their death
o It was not also in favour of either of the or both spouses, but rather of (a) husbands siblings, and (b) one who took
care of his wife.
Notes:
* The Court also compared the document with a donation inter vivos (during life=this is the ordinary form of donation). But it held that,
said donation could not be considered as such since it was never accepted by the donee either in writing or in separate document
required by law.
** It was not also a donation mortis causa (death bed gift=equivalent to donations through last will and testament) because it was
executed in accordance with laws governing said donation. And moreover, since the donor is still living at that time, the proper time and
occasion has not arrived for its operation and implementation KEBABdigest

Solis v. Barroso, 53 Phil 912 (1928)
GR # 27939 | October 30, 1928 | Zandueta, J.

Facts:
- The spouses J uan Lambino and Maria Barroso made a donation propter nuptias of land, evidenced only by a private
document
14
, to their son Alejo Lambino and his bride-to-be Fortunata Solis.
- The donation propter nuptias contained a condition which says that in case of the death of one of the donees (either Alejo or
Fortunata), one-half of the donated lands would revert back to the donors.
- Alejo Lambino and Fortunata Solis were married soon after and Alejos parents delivered to them possession of the lands as
promised.
- Unfortunately, two months after the wedding Alejo died. His father J uan also died soon after Alejo. The mother Maria Barroso
thus recovered possession of ALL the donated lands from Forunata Solis.
- Fortunata thus files a petition in the Pangasinan CFI to compel Maria Barroso and her other children (Alejos siblingsheirs of
J uan Lambino) to execute the proper deed of donation, transfer one-half of the property to her as originally promised, and to
partition the donated property and its fruits.
- The CFI ruled in favor of Fortunata Solis and granted her petition. Maria Barroso and the other children appeals to the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not the donation propter nuptias made by the spouses J uan Lambino and Maria Barroso is valid

Held: NO

Ratio:
According to the SC, for a donation propter nuptias to be valid, Article 633 of the old civil code provides that it must be made in a
public instrument
15
. Such a requirement goes into the formal validity of the donation made, without which the donation would be
invalid and not create any right. The donation made to Alejo and Fortunata failed to comply with the requirement of being made in a
public instrument hence it is invalid and did not create any rights.

Result:
Petition granted, CFI decision reversed. Fortunata doesnt get anything
16
.

Obiter:
The only exceptions to the rule in Article 633 regarding having to be made in a public instrument are:

1. Onerous
17
and Remuneratory
18
donations, in so far as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed. These are
governed by the rules on contracts.
14
AdocumentthatisnotNotarized.
15
AdocumentthatisNotarized=)
16
DuraLexSedLex=SUCKSTOBEYOU
17
Thoseimposingaburden;entailingobligationsthatexceedadvantages
18
Thosewhichcompensateservicesrendered

2. Donations taking effect upon the death of the donor

19
, which are governed by the rules on testamentary succession.
The CFI ruled that a donation propter nuptias was an onerous donation, i.e. it imposes a burden of having to enter into marriage, hence
exempt from the notarization requirement. The SC reversed that, saying that although entering into marriage may be considered an
onerous consideration, it is not necessary to give birth to the obligation. SC says that this may be inferred from article 1333 of the
old civil code where the event of the marriage NOT taking place is considered merely a resolutory condition
20
which authorizes the
revocation of the donation made. The happening of the marriage itself does not create the obligation to deliver the object of the
donation (the land in this case), such an obligation already existed even prior to the marriage. The event of marriage NOT taking place
authorizes the donor to revoke the donation, but if the donor does not revoke it or allows the action for revocation to prescribe, the
donation would be deemed valid. Hence, a donation propter nuptias cannot be considered an onerous donation. KEBABdigest

Mateo v. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864 (1969)
October 30, 1969|Petition for review of a decision of the CA | J.B.L. Reyes, J.

Facts:
Parents (Cipriano Lagua and Alejandra Dumlao) donated to their son, Alejandro Lagua, 3 parcels of land in a public document in
consideration of his marriage (15 May 1917) to Bonifacia Mateo. Even if the land was under the new spouses possession, the
Certificates of Title remained in the donors name (which would later cause problem).
When Alejandro Lagua died (1923), his wife lived with his father (Cipriano Lagua) who undertook the farming of the donated lots.
At first, the share of the harvest went to Mateo. However, Cipriano Lagua later refused to deliver her share (1926), which
prompted her to resort to the J ustice of the Peace of Court of Pangasinan, where she was awarded the two lots.
However, Cipriano Lagua later (1941) sold the two lots to his son Gervasio. But only in 1956 did Mateo know of this when her
share of the harvest totally ceased to be delivered. She then sought annulment of the deed of sale and for recovery of properties
at the CFI (1957), which installed her in possession of the lots.
Gervasio commenced at J ustice of Peace an action (1957) against Mateo for the reimbursement of the improvements he made
on the lots plus damages. At the same time, in another action, Gervasio sought annulment of the donation insofar as one-half
portion of it is concerned since it is his legitime, the lots allegedly being the only properties of Cipriano Lagua. During the action
The first action was dismissed because Gervasio was declared possessor bad faith and therefore not entitled to
reimbursements. The second action was likewise dismissed on the ground of prescription since it was brought only after the
lapse of 41 (from the time of donation). Cipriano Lagua died pending the resolution.
Upon appeal, CA affirmed decision in denying reimbursement to Gervasio. But CA declared the donation as inofficious (contrary
to natural/moral duty) and ordered Mateo to reconvey a portion of the lots to Gervasio as his legitime. Hence, the petition in SC
by Mateo.

Issue:
WON the CA acted correctly in ordering the reduction of the donation and to reconvey a portion of the land to Gervasio.

Held:
The donation propter nuptial property may be reduced for being inofficious (according to New Civil Code; since Cipriano died
in 1958).
Donations propter nuptias are not onerous contracts (marriage is merely an occasion or motive, and not causa). Therefore,
being liberalities, they remain subject to reduction for officiousness if they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir.
However, The CA in rendering the decision acted on several unsupported assumptions: 1) the lots were the only properties of
Cipriano Lagua, 2) alejandro Lagua and Gervasio are his only heirs, and 3) that he had no unpaid debts. All of these should be
ascertained (according to art 908 of Civil Code). Only thereafter can it be ascertained WON the donation infringed on the
legitimes of Gervasio.

Judgment: CA judgment is set aside. RTC dismissals of Gervasio actions sustained. Without prejudice to the parties litigating the
issue of inofficiousness in a proper proceeding. KEBABdigest

19
Alsoknownasdonatiomortiscausa
20
Afutureanduncertaineventwhichifitoccursterminatesanobligationorgivesoccasiontorevokeabenefitgiven/beinggiven.

2. Donation propter nuptias of present or future property
3. Grounds for Revocation of Donation propter nuptias
4. Void Donations

Nazareno v. Birog, 45 OG 11 Supp 268 (1947)
45 OG Supp No. 5 268 (1949) | Labrador, J.

Plaintiff/appellant: Bonifacio Melaa Nazareno
Defendants/appellees: Francisco Birog and Apoloniano Ariola
Keywords: Donation to a grandchild

Facts:
JuanAben AndreaRodriguez CiriloBraganza
AlbertaAben MarianoMaleoNazareno
BonifacioMelaoNazareno

In 1917, Cirilo Braganza donated a land property to his step grandson Bonifacio Nazareno.
Braganza subsequently sold parcels of land to Francisco Birog and Apolonio Ariola, who took possession and cultivated the
said parcels of land. Bonifacio Nazareno was even a witness to one of the deed of sale.
Appellant filed an action for recovery of title and possession to the CFI, which decided in favor of the defendants.

Issue: WON the donation is void.

Held: YES

Ratio: Appeal must be dismissed for the simple reason that the plaintiff has no cause of action. The deed of donation, upon which he
bases his claim to the land, is null and void, as it is made by the donor to a grandchild of his wife by the latter previous
marriage. The donation clearly falls under the prohibition contained in Article 1335 of he Civil Code. Although the plaintiff is not
a child but a grandchild, the prohibition applies to him as well (9 Manresa 236)

Dispositive: J udgment affirmed. KEBABdigest

Matabuena v. Cervantes, 38 SCRA 284 (1971)
Fernando, J. | No. L-28771 | March 31, 1971 |Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Sorsogon

FACTS:
Felix Matabuena owned a parcel of land and executed a Deed of Donation inter vi vos in favor of Petronila Cervantes on
February 20, 1956. The Donation was accepted by Cervantes.
The donation of land to Cervantes was made during the common-law relationship between Cervantes (donee) and
Matabuena (donor), who were later married on March 28, 1962 (6 years after the donation).
Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962.
Cornelia Matabuena, the plaintiff, claims the donated property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative
of the deceased (by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her and had the land declared in her name and paid
the estate and inheritance taxes.)
The plaintiff also maintains that the donation made during a common law relationship was void.
RTC: The donation is valid since Cervantes and Felix Matabuena was only married six years after the donation. A donation
under the terms of A133 of the Civil Code is only void if made between the spouses during marriage.
Hence the appeal.


ISSUE:
WON the ban on a donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationships?

HELD/ RATIO:
YES. RTC decision reversed. The questioned donation is declared void. The case is remanded to the lower court for appropriate
disposition.

A donation between common-law spouses falls within the prohibition of A133 and is null and void as contrary to public policy.
In Buenaventura v. Bautista the court held that to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants
because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law, then it was held that there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.
But since Cervantes was married to Felix Matabuena, hence their relationship is legitimized, she is considered his widow and
entitled to one-half of the inheritance. Petronila Matabuena is also entitled to the other half of the inheritance as the surviving
sister. KEBABdigest

Plaintiff/appellant: Cornelia Matabuena
Defendant/appellee: Petronila Cervantes
Keywords: Donation between spouses

FACTS:
Felix Matabuena owned the parcel of land in question. He executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila
Cervantes in 1956 while they were living together as husband and wife in common law relationship. They were subsequently
married on March 28, 1962. Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962. Cornelia Matabuena claims the property
by reson of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit self-adjudication, and
had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance tax.
CFI upheld the validity of the donation noting that it was made at the time before marriage of the donor to the donee.

ISSUE: WON the ban on a donation between spouses during marriage applies to a common law relationship.

HELD: YES

RATIO: While Art 133
21
of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy considerations of
the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship.

Donation between common-law spouses falls within the prohibition and is null and void as contrary to public policy.
(Buenaventura v Bautista)

So long as the marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities
attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.

Lack of validity of the donation however does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property.
Legitimation by marriage entitled defendant as widow, to one-half of the inheritance as provided for by the Civil Code.

Reason for prohibition on common-law marriage (Tolentino/Sempio-Diy):
The condition of those living in guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

DISPOSITIVE: J udgment reversed. The questioned donation declared void, with rights of the plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso
heirs to the property in question recognized. Case remanded. KEBABdigest

Harding v. Commercial Union, 38 Phil 464 (1918)

Facts:
Husband Harding donated a car to his wife.The said car was sold many times. Henry Harding himself first bought it, sold it,
bought it back again for 2,800, had it repaired and repainted for a cost of 900, and finally gave it to his wife. The automobile
was given to Mrs. Harding shortly after the issuance of the insurance policy worth 3000 pesos after paying the premium of 150
pesos. Mechanics and experts valued the car at 3000.
The car was totally destroyed in a fire.
Mrs. Harding claimed the insurance benefits.
21
Art133CC:Everydonationbetweenspousesduringthemarriageshallbevoid.Thisprohibitiondoesnotapplywhenthedonationtakeseffectafterthedeathof
thedonor.Neitherdoesthisprohibitionapplytomoderategiftswhichthespousesmaygiveeachotherontheoccasionofanyfamilyrejoicing.

Defendant refused to pay Mrs. Harding, citing the fact that she did not own the automobile.
Lower Court ruled in favor of Harding and ordered defendant to pay the benefits plus interest.

Art. 133. Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply
when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor.
Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion
of any family rejoicing. (1334a)

Issues: WoN Mrs. Harding owned the car and had an insurable interest.

Held: Yes and Yes.
In our opinion the position taken by appellants is untenable. They are not in a position to challenge the validity of the transfer, if
it may be called such. They bore absolutely no relation to the parties to the transfer at the time it occurred and had no rights or interests
inchoate, present, remote, or otherwise, in the property in question at the time the transfer occurred. Although certain transfers from
husband to wife or from wife to husband are prohibited in the article referred to, such prohibition can be taken advantage of only by
persons who bear such a relation to the parties making the transfer or to the property itself that such transfer interferes with their rights
or interests. Unless such a relationship appears the transfer cannot be attacked.
Even if the defendant can use Art. 1334 as a defense, the burden of proving that the donation did not fall within the
exemptions is theirs.
Defendant contends that the statement regarding the cost of the automobile was a warranty, that the statement was false, and
that, therefore, the policy never attached to the risk. We are of the opinion that it has not been shown by the evidence that the
statement was false on the contrary we believe that it shows that the automobile had in fact cost more than the amount mentioned.
(Insurance was only for 3000. Harding spent 3700.)
The defendant, upon the information given by plaintiff, and after an inspection of the automobile by its examiner, having
agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in the absence of fraud on the part of the insured.
Section 163 of the Insurance Law (Act No. 2427) provides that "the effect of a valuation in a policy of fire insurance is the
same as in a policy of marine insurance." By the terms of section 149 of the Act cited, the valuation in a policy of marine insurance is
conclusive if the insured had an insurable interest and was not guilty of fraud.

Decision: Lower Court Decision AFFIRMED. KEBABdigest

Sumbad v. CA, 308 SCRA 575 (1999)
22

Certiorari| Mendoza | June 21, 1999

Facts:
+ Complaint for quieting of title, annulment of sale, and recovery of possession by Prs against Rps dismissed by Mt. Province RTC.
Affirmed w/ modification by CA.
+ George Tait, Sr., after the death of his wife in 1936, lived with his common law wife, Maria Tait.
o George donated a parcel of unregistered land in Bontoc to Maria Apr 2, 1974 by virtue of a deed of donation.
o George died and after that, Maria sold the lots from 1982 to 1983 to the other Rps on the strength of a Tax Declaration
showing Maria as the owner of the properties.
+ Prs instituted civil actions against Maria.
Petitioners Respondents
o They claim to be children & compulsory heirs of George,
that their parents owned real property in Mt. Province,
that George sold a property to buy a residential lot.
o They further allege that Maria, w/o their knowledge &
consent, sold lots although the said properties belonged
to the heirs of George thus she has no right to sell the
same.
o They purportedly knew of the transactions in 1988 & then
communicated w/ Rps.
o They denied having been informed of the Prs claim for the
lot and that Prs learned of the sales only 1988
o The properties were bought on the strength of the Tax
Declaration. They say that the property did not belong to
the conjugal partnership of George & Agata because
Agata died 30 yrs before the issuance of Tax
Declaration.
o They deny the need for the consent of the Prs to sell the
property. They claim that they are purchasers in good
faith.
22
Parties:
Petitioners(Prs) Respondents(Rps)
EmilieSumbad
BeatriceTait
CA,Eduard Okoren, OliviaAkoking, EvelyinSaclangen,MaryAtiwag,JaimeFronda, BarbaraTallongen,
FuliaPiyes,GlenPaquito,FelicitasAlinao


+ RTC ruled in favor of the Rps. CA affirmed w/ modifications.
+ The Prs are now claiming that the deed of donation was void because:
o It originated from a void document and transaction (there was forgery involved)
o It was made in contravention of Art 729
23
NCCnotarized by a person who had no authority to act as notary public.
o It was made in contravention of Art 133, NCC (now Art 87, FC)
24

Issues: WON the donation was void.

Held/Ratio: Affirmed.
1. The forgery, as testified by Shirley Eillenger, boardmate of Raquel Tait (Georges ward) wasnt proven. Shirley testified that Raquel
typed the Deed of Donation in the dorm when George had already died ^& that the other male boarders forged the signatures of
Maria and George, in a span of 20-30 minutes. The SC said that the testimony of Shirley is vague and incredible.
a. It wouldnt have been possible for Shirley, who was then 20 y/o, to prepare the document in all its legal form copying only
from a format for only 20-30 minutes.
b. The allegation regarding the forgery was not proven by the Prs through handwriting experts.
2. The petitioners allege that the person who notarized the deed of donation had not authority to do so. In the acknowledgment
clause, it was the deputy clerk of court who notarized for & in the absence of the clerk of court. This is allowable under Revised
Admin Code of 1917, 21 and CA 270 & 641. The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty was not defeated.
3. Petitioners argue that the deed of donation contravenes Art 133, NCC in view of the ruling in Matabuena v. Cervantes that the said
provision extends to common-law relations. This provision is now Art 87, FC. However, this issue on the contravention of 133 was
raised only for the 1
st
time on appeal. Even if they were raised before, the Prs werent able to prove such claim based on evidence
on record. There wasnt any evidence showing that the George and Maria were in a common-law relp when the donation was
made. The testimony of the daughter merely states that Maria became her stepmother. Thus, the FC cant be applied.
4. Accdg to the Prs, they had knowledge of the sales in 1988 when they visited Maria because she was ill. They waited for 12 yrs
before claiming their inheritance, thus they are guilty of laches
25
. It wouldnt have been possible to notice that the said land had
been occupied by Maria and the other defendants even if they werent aware of the deed of donation. KEBABdigest

Ching v. Goyanko
10 September 2006 | Carpio-Morales, J. | Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA

Petitioner: Maria Ching
Respondents: J oseph C. Goyanko, J r., J erry Goyanko, Imelda Goyanko, J ulius Goyanko, Mary Ellen Goyanko and J ess Goyanko

Facts:
Maria Ching is the common-law wife of the respondents father. Their father, J oseph Goyanko, Sr., sold a 661m
2
property at
Cebu City to Maria Ching.
The respondents claim that said property was acquired by their parents during their marriage. It was registered under the
name of their aunt, Sulpicia Ventura because their parents were Chinese citizens at that time and could not own property in
the Philippines. They were married on 30 December 1947.
1 May 1993, their father buys it back from their aunt and on 12 Oct of the same year, executes a dead of sale in favor of his
common-law wife, Maria Ching as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title.
Goyanko, Sr. died on 11 March 1996. Only then did the respondents discover that the aforesaid property had already been
transferred to Maria Ching.
They had the signature of their father analyzed; PNP-Crime Lab found it a forgery.
They filed a case with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.

The Proceedings in the RTC
The signature on the deed of sale was found to be valid by the RTC because Maria Ching presented the notary public that
testified to its authenticity and the two document examiners gave conflicting testimonies.
23
Art.749,NCC.Inorderthatthedonationofanimmovablemaybevalid,itmustbemadeinapublicdocument,specifyingthereinthepropertydonatedandthe
valueofthechargeswhichthedoneemustsatisfy.Theacceptancemaybemadeinthesamedeedofdonationorinaseparatepublicdocument,butitshallnottake
effectunlessitisdoneduringthelifetimeofthedonor.Iftheacceptanceismadeinaseparateinstrument,thedonorshallbenotifiedthereofinanauthenticform,
andthisstepshallbenotedinbothinstruments.
24
Comparison:
Art133,NCC Art87,FC
Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. This
prohibitiondoesnotapplywhenthedonationtakeseffectafterthedeathofthe
donor.
Neitherdoesthisprohibitionapplytomoderategiftswhichthespousesmaygive
eachotherontheoccasionofanyfamilyrejoicing.
Everydonationorgrantofgratuitousadvantage,directorindirect,betweenthe
spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the
spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The
prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife
withoutavalidmarriage.
25
Failureorneglectforanunreasonablelengthoftimetodothatw/c,byexertingduediligence,couldorshouldhavebeendoneearlier.

The RTC also found that J oseph Goyanko, Sr. ownership was only temporary and transitory, therefore the property cannot be
considered as a part of the conjugal property of the original Spouses J oseph C. Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz
(respondents mother) or the exclusive capital property of the husband.
Moreover, Maria Ching claims that it was her money that Goyanko, Sr. used to purchase the property and proved her financial
capability to purchase the same.
Furthermore, the title of the property is in Chings name. A Torrens title is not subject to collateral attack. Unless bad faith can
be established, there is no other owner except the person whose name appears on the title.
Round 1 goes to Maria Ching

The Proceedings in the CA
The CA held that since the property was acquired during the existence of a valid marriage between Goyanko, Sr. and Epifania
dela Cruz, it is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. There is no clear and convincing proof to the contrary.
Although the two have been physically estranged for years, their conjugal partnership has not been dissolved.
Even if the said property is deemed not conjugal, the contract of sale would still be null and void because Maria Ching and
Goyanko, Sr. have been living together as common-law husband and wife. The CA invokes Art. 1352 of the Civil Code which
provides, that Contracts w/o cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The contract is against morals and public policy and
undermines the stability of the family. Further still, since transfers or conveyances between validly married couples is not
allowed (to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other), it shall apply to common-law relationships
as well. Otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
Round 2 goes to Goyanko children

Issues:
1) W/N the sale of the property is valid
2) W/N there was a trust bet. Goyanko, Sr. and Ching
3) W/N the change of theory by respondents put petitioners in undue disadvantage.

Held/Ratio:
1) NO. Goyanko, Sr.s sale of the property to Maria Ching, his concubine, is INVALID.
P
Art. 1352. Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
ertinent provisions:
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
XXX
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.
The SC found that the contract is null and void for being contrary to marls and public policy. The sale was made by a husband
in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and
from whence they derived their support. The sale was subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution which
public policy cherishes and protects.
Art. 1490. The husband and wife cannot sell property to each other, except:
1. When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements; or
2. When there has been a judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, the condition of those
who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
As the CA said, it was designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence of one spouse to the other.
Donations between spouses during marriage are also prohibited because it destroys the system of conjugal partnership.
2) NO. The petitioners contention that there was a trust relationship between her and Goyanko, banking on her uncorroborated
testimony that she provided the money for the purchase price does not persuade the Court.
26

3) NO. The respondents change of theory from that of forgery in the deed of sale to sale contrary to public policy did no put the
petitioner in undue disadvantage or result to her having been denied the chance to refute all allegations against her because
the nullification of the sale is anchored on its illegality per se, as it violates Art. 1352, 1409 and 1490 of the Civil Code.

Petition denied for lack of merit.
3
rd
and Final Round goes to the Goyanko children. KEBABdigest
26
Art.1448.Thereisanimpliedtrustwhenpropertyissold,andthelegalestateisgrantedtoonepartybutthepriceispaidbyanotherforthepurposeofhavingthe
beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child,
legitimateorillegitimate,oftheonepayingthepriceofthesale,notrustisimpliedbylaw,itbeingdisputablypresumedthatthereisagiftinfavorofthechild;
Art.1450.Ifthepriceofasaleofpropertyisloanedorpaidbyonepersonforthebenefitofanotherandtheconveyanceismadetothelenderorpayortosecurethe
payment of the debt, a trust arises by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the money is loaned or for whom it is paid. The latter may redeem the
propertyandcompelaconveyancethereoftohim.

B. System of Absolute Community

1. General Provisions Art. 88-90
2. What Constitutes Community Property Art. 91-93
3. Charges Upon the ACP Art. 94-95
4. Ownership and Disposition of the ACP Art. 96-98
5. Dissolution Art. 99-101
6. Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities Art. 102-104

Onas v. Javillo, 59 Phil 733 (1934)
Appeal from order of CFI of Capiz | Goddard, J.

FACTS:
Crispulo J avillo contracted two marriages:
o Ramona Levis, whom he begot five children
o Rosario Onas, whom he begot four children (after Leviss death)
Crispulo had 11 parcels of land during his first marriage while 20 parcels on the subsequent
Crispulo died intestate; a petition was filed for appointment of an administrator. After hearing, Santiago Andrada was
appointed
Andrada submitted two projects of partition. The first was disapproved by the lower court. Some of the heirs appealed on this
court regarding said project but was dismissed
The lower court approved the second project on which this appeal is based

ISSUE: W/N the properties acquired during the second marriage were acquired with the products of the properties of the first marriage?

DECISION: (decision reversed and remanded)
No, It would take a person with a very vivid imagination to believe that the product of eleven parcels of land acquired during
the first marriage supplied all of the capital used in acquiring the twenty parcels of the second marriage. Such a claim is
preposterous.
o The project of partition approved by the lower court is based on the above-mentioned absurd claim and furthermore
is not in conformity to law.
o ...it does not appear that there was a liquidation of the partnership of the first marriage nor does it appear that they
asked for such a liquidation.
Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the dissolution of the partnership by death... it forms a part of his or her own
capital, in which the other consort, or his or her heirs, can claim no share.
o of all the conjugal property of both marriages corresponds to deceased Crispulo and must be divided in equal
shares among all his children
o of the conjugal property pertaining to the first marriage should be divided among the five children of that marriage
o of the conjugal property of the second marriage must be adjudicated to the widow, Onas, and she has the right of
usufruct over the property of her deceased husband equal to 1/9 of the 2/3 of that property (constitutes the legitime of
children of both marriages) =2/27 of the property corresponding to her husband. KEBABdigest

Vda. de Delizo v. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216 (1976)
GR # L-32820-21 | January 30, 1976 | Antonio, J.

Facts:
- Nicolas Delizo married twice. He was first married to Rosa Villasfer, from 1891 until Rosas death in 1909. Then he married
Dorotea de Ocampo in 1911. This second marriage lasted until 1957 when Nicolas Delizo himself died.
- The children of the first marriage instituted an action to partition the vast properties of Nicolas Delizo a few weeks before he
died. The heirs of the second marriage opposed the proposed partition of the children of the first marriage claiming that the
properties described in the complaint were those of the second marriage, as indicated by the fact that the titles were issued in
the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo.
- The CFI awarded of the properties to the heirs of the first marriage, to the surviving spouse Dorotea, and to the
children of both marriages.
- The decision was appealed to the CA by Dorotea and kids. Like the CFI, the CA found that the phrase married to in the land
title, is not an indication of ownership but merely descriptive of the civil status of Nicolas Delizo.
- The CA noted that since people rarely ever keep records of the produce of the property of a deceased spouse, it would be
impossible to determine with mathematical precision what portion of the property goes to whom.
- The CA took into consideration that while most of the properties were acquired during the second marriage, the property of the
first marriage was used as capital to make those subsequent property acquisitions of the second marriage; but nonetheless,
the bulk of the property should go to Dorotea and kids. The CFI modified the award giving only 20% to the heirs of the first
marriage and the remaining 80% to the second. The CA based its conclusion on several circumstances
27
.
27
1.Atthetimeofthedissolutionofthefirstmarriageoraboutfiveyearsafteracquisition,accordingtoplaintiffs'evidence,onlyabout20hectaresoftheCaanawan
propertyhadbeencultivated,theremaining47hectareswerethereforeclearedandimprovedduringthesecondmarriagethruthelaborandindustryofthespouses
Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo for 46 years (19111967). These improvements were made in good faith considering that Nicolas Delizo administered the

- Still unsatisfied with the CA decision, Dorotea de Ocampo and her children appeal further to the SC, alleging that a certain
portion of the property, the agricultural lands in Nueva Ecija, could not have been the property of the first marriage because at
the time of the first marriage, the lands in question were still public lands; Nicolas Delizo only acquired title over them during
his second marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA partition of the property was correct

Held: NO well, not exactly

Ratio:
- Although the SC never categorically stated that the CA decision was wrong, it nonetheless modified the award made by the
appellate court.
- The SC agreed with Dorotea et al that the Nueva Ecija agricultural lands could not have been co-owned by the first marriage
because Nicolas only acquired them during the time of the second marriage. However, the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage had exerted effort and resources on the land even before Nicolas acquired it hence the first marriage should be
entitled to a portion of it.
- The SC stated that although the legal presumption that properties acquired during the regime of the second conjugal
partnership belong to said partnership has not been rebutted by the heirs of the first marriage and, therefore, that such after-
acquired properties should belong to the second conjugal partnership
28
, to deny the kids of the first marriage a share in such
properties would exacerbate discord instead of enhancing family solidarity and understanding.
- The SC concluded by determining the share of the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration
29
of each
partnership.
o 9/64 of the estate goes to the heirs of the first marriage
o 23/64 of the estate goes to Dorotea de Ocampo
o 32/64 or goes to the children of both marriages with Dorotea de Ocampo getting a 1/64 share here as well.
KEBABdigest

properties of the first marriage. The second marriage is entitled to reimbursement for the increase in value of these 47 hectares (Art. 516, NCC Even the Muoz
propertyacquiredduringthesecondmarriagehadtobeimprovedbythespousesNicolasDelizoandDoroteaOcampo.
2. The onehalf of the fruits of the Caanawan property which should pertain to the heirs of Rosa Villasfer refers only to onehalf o f the net after deducting the
expenses of clearing the land, cultivating, gathering and preservation. Fortyseven hectares of the Caanawan property were cleared and cultivated only during the
secondmarriage.Evenunderaliberalapportionmentoftheproduce,theheirsofthesecondmarriagecouldnotbeentitledtomorethan30%oftheproduce.
3.Partofthepriceusedinthepurchaseofthepropertiesacquiredduringthesecondmarriageweretheproceedsofaloan.Thisisconjugalpropertyofthe"second
marriage(Palancavs.Smith,BellandCo.,9Phil.131,133;CastilloJr.vs.Pasco,11SCRA102,1067).
4.Theimprovementson47hectaresoftheCaanawanpropertyandontheMuozpropertyweremadeattheexpenseofthesecondconjugalpartnershipofNicolas
DelizoandDoroteaOcampo,andthrutheirlaborandindustrywhichlastedfor46years,whereasthefirstconjugalpartnershiphadtheCaanawanpropertyforless
than6years.
28
Citingarticle1407oftheCivilCodewhichsaysthatallthepropertyof thespousesshall bedeemedpartnershippropertyintheabsenceofproofthatitbelongs
exclusivelytothehusbandorthewife.
29
Basedonarticle189oftheCivilCode

C. Conjugal Partnership of Gains
1. General Provisions Art. 105-108
2. Exclusive Property Art. 109-115

Lim v. Garcia, 7 Phil 320 (1907)
January 11, 1907 | Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Zamboanga | Carson, J.

FACTS:
Hilario Lim died intestate on 1903 leaving a widow and nine children an estate with a value 50,000 pesos. (yaman)
Trial court considered most of the estate as conjugal property except for some properties which were proven brought as
separate property of the deceased. However, his children claimed that none of the properties should be considered belonging
to conjugal partnership property since his widow (which I presume is his second wife already; not the mother of the protesting
children) did not bring anything to the conjugal partnership.
Appellant also claim that a certain 3 parcels of land should be included in the conjugal property and not a separate property of
Garcia since such were conveyed to the latter during their coverture, and hence void.

ISSUE:
1. WON the contested properties are conjugal properties
2. WON the 3 parcels of land are separate properties of Garcia

HELD:
1. No. Article 1407 of the Civil Code (Old) provides that all the estate of the married couple will be considered as conjugal
partnership property unless and until it is proven that it is a part of the separate estate of the husband or the wife. The SC
affirms the Trial Court findings.
o Also, there was 700 pesos set aside as separate property of the husband since the same is the amount of the lot
brought by Lim to the marriage. The lot, as well as the improvements therein, was sold during the administration of
the estate. According to the court, the value of the land sold belongs to the husband as separate property, but the
improvements made thereon erected during coverture will be considered as conjugal partnership property (article
1404 of old CC).
2. Yes. The Court found that the properties were conveyed to Garcia not by her husband but by third parties in exchange for
certain properties she inherited from her father. Par 3, article 1396 of Civil Code (Old) provides that the property acquired by
exchange for other property belonging separately to one of the married couple is the separate property of the owner of the
property for which it is exchanged.

JUDGMENT: Trial Court decision affirmed. Costs against appellants.

Obiter: WON the separate property of the wife is in fact a dowry. The evidence strongly supports the presumption that it was and
continued to be a part of her separate estate which never acquired the dotal character. KEBABdigest

Rodriguez v. De la Cruz, 8 Phil. 665 (1907)
Johnson, J.
Plaintiff/appellant: Matea E. Rodriguez
Defendants/appellees: Susana De La Cruz, Escolastico De La Cruz and Procesa De La Cruz
Keywords: administration of wifes property

FACTS:
Matea E. Rodriguez acquired lands in question by
inheritance from her father, Alejo Rodriguez during
her first marriage. Hilarion De La Cruz, her second
husband, administered the said lands soon after their
marriage.
CFI in a separate action for partition, where the
plaintiff was not made a party to, adjudged ownership
and possession of the lands in question in favor of the
defendants against Hilarion De La Cruz.
Plaintiff filed a separate action for recovery where the
CFI rendered a judgment in favor of the defendants,
hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the plaintiff retained ownership of the land
administered by her husband.

HELD: YES

RATIO: There is no provision in the Civil Code which prohibits
a husband from administering the property of his wife.
Article 1382 of the Civil Code provides that the wife
shall retain the ownership pf her property which she
brings to the marriage relation. Article 1384
prescribes that she shall have the management of the
property, unless she has delivered the same to her
husband by means of public document, providing that
he may administer said property; but it cannot be
claimed from the mere fact that she has permitted her
husband to administer property, that she has thereby
lost her property and that the same has become the
property of her husband.

DISPOSITIVE: J udgment reversed. KEBABdigest


Peoples Bank and Trust Co. v. Register of Deeds, 60 Phil 167 (1934)
Imperial, J. | No. 41278 | May 5, 1934 | Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila

Facts:
Dominga Angeles is married to Manuel Sandoval but they live separately and apart.
October 26, 1933 she executed an instrument entitled Agreement and Declaration of Trust in favor of Peoples Bank
and Trust Co.
In the agreement, she conveyed in trust her paraphernal property consisting of 3 parcels of land w/ 2 buildings in J uan
Luna, Manila.
The trust was constituted that:
o the lands would be subdivided into small lots,
o the said lots would be sold either for cash or by installments,
o the trustee (Peoples Bank) would redeem mortgage constituted from rent/sale of property,
o the trustee would grant Php 10,000 loan to redeem mortgage,
o the trustee would collect the rents from property while unsold.
Upon presentation for registration, the Register of Deeds of Manila denied it.
When it was brought in consulta before the CFI in Manila, the court denied it because the instrument stipulated that the
trustee was authorized to collect the fruits of paraphernal property which are considered conjugal property by Arts.
1385 and 1401 (3) of the Civil Code. The aforementioned articles state that such fruits are considered conjugal partnership
property and the management of which corresponds to the husband (Art 1412).
CFI furthered that the husband did not intervene nor give his consent to the instrument in question, making it null and void and
not susceptible of registration.
Hence the appeal. Appellant contends that pursuant to the provisions of Art. 1387 of the Civil Code, as amended by Act No.
3922 of the Philippine Legislature, the grantor Dominga Angeles does not need consent and the instrument is valid and
susceptible of registration.

Issue:
WON instrument is null and void due to lack of consent.

Held/Ratio:
NO. Reversed. Register of deeds for City of Manila ordered to register instrument upon payment of corresponding legal fees.

Instrument is merely voidable and right of action exclusively belongs to husband or his heirs. Art. 62 declares null and void acts
executed by wife w/o consent of husband in cases where such a consent is a necessary requisite which in this case, consent is not a
necessary requisite as per Article 1384 which states that the wife shall have the management of the paraphernal property unless
she has delivered the same to her husband before a notary, for the purpose of conferring its management upon him. In such
cases it shall be the duty of the husband to execute a mortgage for the value of any personalty which may be so deli vered to
him or otherwise secure it in the manner prescribed with respect to dowry property.

Since the administration of her paraphernal property belongs to the wife, it is therefore within her rights to execute such an agreement.
Until the property is liquidated by her, the husband cannot claim the fruits in question since they answer for the necessary and
indispensable expenses of administrating and preserving the property.

Plus, deed of trust doesnt part or convey rents of the paraphernal property; it only allows the trustee to collect them during the time the
lots remained unsold. The agreement merely allows an act of administration.

According to Manresa, Article 1384 also gives wife power to enter into contracts regarding paraphernal property. Acts performed by a
married woman without permission of her husband are not null and void but merely voidable, in which exclusive right of action belongs
to husband or his heirs, on the ground that the legal prohibition in question was not established in favor of third persons.
KEBABdigest

Philippine Sugar Estates v. Poizat, 48 Phil 536 (1925)

Facts:
Garbiela Coster executed, with his consent, to and in favor of her husband, J uan Poizat a power of attorney that allowed him
to make use of her rights and actions such as loaning or borrowing cash or fungible things in her name, place, and stead, and
making these transactions with or without mortgages, pledges or securities.
Poizat obtained a loan from plaintiff worth 10,000 Pounds Sterling and to secure the payment of the loan, mortgaged his wifes
real, separate property.
For the purpose of constructing a new building on the said property, the warehouses there were demolished.
Because Poizat failed to pay back the plaintiff, action was filed against him. The court ruled in favor of plaintiff and his wifes
property, worth 342,685 pesos was sold to plaintiff for 100,000 pesos.
Gabriela contests the decision alleging that her husband acted beyond his authority when he contracted with plaintiff and that
plaintiff had full knowledge of the fact that her husband was acting beyond his authority.

She further alleges that she was absent from the Philippines at the time of the filing of the action and the rendering of the
decision.
Issue:
WoN the contract is binding on Gabriela de Costers property.

Held:
No. It appears upon the face of the instrument that Poizat was personally a party to the contract and that he was the only one
who signed the mortgage. There is no evidence to show that, in signing the contract, he was actually signing for his wife that he was
merely acting as the agent or attorney of this wife.
If this was the case, Poizat needed to sign twice: first, in his behalf, to authorize his wife to enter into a contract or give his
consent to said contract and second, to sign in his wifes behalf, as her agent or attorney (if she did not sign it herself).
Poizat may have had authority to borrow money and mortgage her real property, but the law specifies how and in what
manner this must be done. The mortgage was executed by him and him only and for such reason, it is not binding upon the wife.
(Court uses Mechem on Agency, volume 1. It is a general rule in the law of agency that in order to bind the principal by a
deed executed by an agent, the deed upon its face must purport to be made, signed and sealed in the name of the principal. If, on the
contrary, though the agent describes himself as agent or though he add the word agent to his name, the words of grant, covenant and
the like, purport upon the face of the instrument to be his, and the seal purports to be his seal, the deed will bind the agent if anyone
and not the principal.)

Dissenting:
If Poizat were not a party to the contract and had no interest in the property mortgaged the document would be sufficient to
bind the appellant as the document would show. The four justices see no reason why the document should not have full effect merely
because it says that Poizat was acting on his behalf and that of the appellant. They invoked Article 1278 of the Civil Code which states
that contracts shall be binding whatever may be the form in which they may have been entered into, provided that the essential
requisites for their validity are present. The court holds that de Coster was not bound because the contract is signed J uan M. Poizat,
instead of Gabriela Andrea de Coster, by J uan M. Poizat. But the document expressly recites in its preamble that it is executed by
J uan M. Poizat, acting both in representation of himself and in the character of attorney of his wife.

Rehearing:
Plaintiffs allege that because the buildings constructed on de Costers land was conjugal, the land itself must also be conjugal,
citing Art. 1404 of the CC.
The buildings, (warehouses) however, cannot be construed to be the buildings described in the law.
Even if the Article does apply, the mortgage still cannot be seen as conjugal. All debts and obligations contracted during the
marriage by the husband, the legal representative of the partnership in the normal condition thereof, are deemed contracted by the
partnership because it is presumed that they are contracted for the common benefit of both. This can be overthrown by evidence. The
said mortgage can be deemed prejudicial to the property of the wife.
(They repeat what they said earlier)

Dissenting: They emphasize that contracts shall be binding whatever may be the form in which they may have been entered into,
provided that the essential requisites for their validity are present. KEBABdigest

Castro
30
v. Miat
31
, 397 SCRA 271 (2003)
Certiorari of a CA decision | Puno, J. | Feb 11, 2003

Facts: Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought a piece of land on installment basis on May 17, 1977. Concordia died in 1978.
However, it was only on Dec 14, 1984 that Moises was able to pay its balance. He secured his title over the property in his name as
widower.
Held: Since the spouses were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, the provisions of the New Civil Code apply. The records
show that the Paco property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of common fund. It is clearly conjugal. Art 160 of the
Cc provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the H or the W. The presumption applies even when the manner in w/c the property was acquired does not appear.

Facts:
1. Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought 2 parcels of land during coverture: a) at Paraaque, b) at Paco
2. Concordia died in 1978. While at UAE, Moises agreed
to give the 2 properties to their 2 sons per original agreement when Concordia was still alive. When he came back home, he
renegotiated that the Paraaque property will be for himself and the Paco property will be shared by the 2 sons.
30
SpousesVirgilio&MichelleCastro,MoisesMiat,andAlexanderMiat
31
RomeoMiat

3. The Paco property:
a. It was bought on installment basis on May 17, 1877 but the balance of 12K was paid by Moises (because Concordia already
died) in 1981 and in 1984.
b. He secured the title in his name as widower but the 2 sons said that Moises violated the agreement that the property would be
registered in their (2 sons) names once the balance was paid.
c. Moises gave the duplicate of the Paco property to Romeo per his request as he would mortgage it to a friend.
4. The 2 sons lived in the Paco property, paid taxes, as well as insurance premiums. They orally divided the property but later on,
Alexander agreed to sell to Romeo (son B) his share in the property for P42, 750.00 for whom Romeo paid P6,000 already but a
deed was never executed.
5. Romeo learned that the Paco property had already been sold by virtue of a deed of sale on Dec 5, 1988 for P95,000.00
6. When Moises had financial difficulties, he mortgaged the Paco property to Virgilios parents. He also sold the property to the
spouses Castro. From the proceeds:
a. 1/3 went to Moises
b. 2/3 went to Alexander
c. Romeo had none but was given the right to till their property in Nueva Ecija.
d. Alexander intended to return 6K to Romeo (see 4).
7. Buyer Virgilio said that he informed Romeo as to the sale of the property twice. He also consulted a judge as to who has more right
over the property. Although he knew that the title was with Romeo, Virgilio still continued w/ the sale.
8. The case:
32

Action by Romeo RTC ruling CA ruling
In favor of Romeo Modified
To nullify the sale
bet Virgilio &
Moises
Sale by Moises is
valid
Sale by Moises to
Virgilio is nullified
Moises &
Alexander must
execute a deed of
conveyance in
favor of Romeo
Alexander must
execute a deed of
sale to romeo
Moises &
Alexander
executes a deed of
conveyance to
Romeo
Payment of
damages
Costs to Romeo;
counterclaim
dismissed
Costs to Romeo

Issues:
1. WON the Paco property is conjugal [Yes.]
2. WON there was a valid oral partition covering the said property (see 4) [Yes.]
3. WON the spouses Castro were buyers in good faith [No.]

Held/Ratio:
1. Anent the proposition of Castro & Moises that the property is capital (since Moises & Concordia purchased the property but it was
Moises who paid the installment), the Court said that since the spouses were married before the effectivity of the FC, the provisions
of the NCC applies.
a. The Paco property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of the common funds following Art 153 of the NCC
33

b. Petitioners overlooked at Art 160, NCC
34

c. The case is different from Lorenzo v. Nicolas (see separate digest) where the property purchased & paid on installments by
the wife both BEFORE she was married was held to be a paraphernal property
35
. In the case at bar, the spouses bought &
started paying the installments when they got married already; hence conjugal
32
Illustration
Properties Paraaque Paco
Agreement ToMoises Tosons
Renegotiation ToMoises Tosons
Situation Moises Sold to Virgilio but Romeo got no share in
theproceeds
33
Art.153.Thefollowingareconjugalpartnershipproperty:
(1)Thatwhichisacquiredbyoneroustitleduringthemarriageattheexpenseofthecommonfund,whethertheacquisitionbeforthepartnership,orforonlyoneof
thespouses;
34
Art.160.Allpropertyofthemarriageispresumedtobelongtotheconjugalpartnership,unlessitbeprovedthatitpertainsexclusivelytothehusbandortothe
wife.(1407)
35
Propertybelongingexclusivelytothewoman/wife(althoughonewebsitesaysitalsoreferstoapropertyexclusivelybelongingtothehusbandIbelieveitsmore
ofthewifes,asfarasIcanrememberfromundergrad&fromthereadings,aswell.Thinkingaloud)

d. The case is also different from J ovellanos v. CA where the husband entered into a contract of lease and conditional sale of
property the property while in the 1
st
marriage and finished paying until the 2
nd
marriage & the property was held to be
conjugal
36
. In the case at bar, the spouses executed a Deed of Sale w/ Mortgage thus one of sale. Thus, title was passed
during the conjugal partnership.

2. The oral agreement of partitioning the Paco property is valid.
a. The agreement has been subsisting even before the death of Concordia, at her deathbed, after Moises arrival from UAE, in a
sinumpaang salaysay, and in a letter from Moises to Romeo.
b. This oral agreement is not covered by the Statute of Frauds
37
and is enforceable because a downpayment was made and
since witnesses attesting to the sale were questioned by counsel for petitioners. Court also cited Kilario v. CA (see emphasis
in footnotes on partition of heirs in relation to conveyance of property
38
)
3. The Castro spouses were not buyers in good faith
39
. The principle is that buyers must be wary and investigate w/ regards to the
thing being sold and the rights of those who sell them as well.
a. There was a showing that Virgilio admitted that Romeo told him that Moises had given the Paco property to them (sons)
already.
b. They even consulted a judge on who had the right to the property. Virgilio knew, therefore, of the adverse claims of Romeo but
still continued w/ the sale.
c. He is also aware that the property is in possession of Romeo; they were also neighbors.

CA decision affirmed (See 8). Costs against petitioners. KEBABdigest

36
Because it was only until the whole amount was paid that the deed of absolute sale was executed. (Contract of Sale = one of the contracting parties obligates
himself to transfer ownership & to deliver a determinate thing, and the other obligates himself to pay a price certain in money or in its equivalent; sale may be
absoluteorconditional).Thedeedofabsolutesalepassestitletothebuyer;thisisnotthecaseinthecontractoflease&conditionalsale.
37
Art1403,CC,(2)(StatuteofFrauds)
Inthefollowingcasesanagreementhereafter made shallbeunenforceablebyaction,unlessthesame, orsomenoteormemorandum,thereof,beinwriting,and
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its
contents:
(a)Anagreementthatbyitstermsisnottobeperformedwithinayearfromthemakingthereof;
(b)Aspecialpromisetoanswerforthedebt,default,ormiscarriageofanother;
(c)Anagreementmadeinconsiderationofmarriage,otherthanamutualpromisetomarry;
(d)Anagreementforthesaleofgoods,chattelsorthingsinaction,atapricenotlessthanfivehundredpesos,unlessthebuyeracceptandreceivepartofsuchgoods
andchattels,ortheevidences,orsomeofthem,ofsuchthingsinactionorpayatthetimesomepartofthepurchasemoney;butwhenasaleismadebyauctionand
entryismadebytheauctioneerinhissalesbook,atthetimeofthesale,oftheamountandkindofpropertysold,termsofsale,price,namesofthepurchasersand
persononwhoseaccountthesaleismade,itisasufficientmemorandum;
(e)Anagreementoftheleasingforalongerperiodthanoneyear,orforthesaleofrealpropertyorofaninteresttherein;
(f)Arepresentationastothecreditofathirdperson.
38
Nolawrequirespartitionamongheirstobeinwritingandberegisteredinordertobevalid.TherequirementinSec.1,Rule74oftheRevisedRulesofCourtthata
partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not
undermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distributionthereofinamanneranduponaplandifferentfromthoseprovidedbytherulesfromwhich,inthefirstplace,nothingcanbeinferredthatawritingor
other formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as
regards the heirs that participated therein. The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modificationorextinguishmentofrealrightsoverimmovableproperty,mustappearinapublicinstrument,isonlyforconvenience,noncompliancewithwhichdoes
not affectthevalidityorenforceabilityoftheactsofthepartiesasamongthemselves.Andneither doestheStatuteofFraudsunderArticle1403 of theNewCivil
Codeapplybecausepartitionamongheirsisnotlegallydeemedaconveyanceofrealproperty,consideringthatitinvolvesnotatransferofpropertyfromoneto
the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the
inheritance.
39
Onewhobuyspropertyandpaysafullandfairpriceforitatthetimeofthepurchaseorbeforeanynoticeofsomeotherpersonsclaimonorinterestinit.

3. CPG
a. Presumption that property is conjugal

Jocson v. CA, 170 SCRA 333 (1989)
16 February 1989 | Medialdea, J. | Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA

Petitioner: Moises J ocson
Respondents: CA, Agustina J ocson-Vasquez, Ernesto Vasquez (husband of Agustina)

Facts:
Moises and Agustina are siblings. They are the only surviving children of Emilio J ocson and Alejandra Poblete.
Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled. Emilio J ocson also died intestate on April 1,
1972
Moises is questioning the validity of three documents; they are deeds of sale executed by their father selling their property to
Agustina. Emilio, sold almost all his properties, including his 1/3 share to the exclusive property of his wife, to Agustina.
The Documents
40

1) Emilio J ocson sold 6 parcels of land in Naic, Cavite to Agustina J ocson-Valdez for P10,000.
41

2) Emilio J ocson sold two rice mills and a camarin to Agustina for P5,000.
42

3) Extrajudicial settlement of Alejandra Pobletes unsettled estate. It was divided into three among the heirs: Emilio, Agustina, and
Moises. Then Emilio sold his share to Agustina for P8,000. But left Moises 1/3 untouched.
Petitioners Submissions
Petitioner contends that the documents were null and void because they were executed through fraud, deceit, undue pressure and
influence to induce their father to sign the contract for the aforementioned simulated prices because the respondents have no
work or livelihood of their own.
And that no real sale can happen between a father and a daughter living under the same roof, especially when the father has no
use for the money allegedly coming from the sale because all the properties he sold were income-producing.
He claims that the properties sold in the first two documents are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio J ocson and
Alejandra Poblete, which the former cannot validly sell.
With regard to the third document, he does not contest the extrajudicial settlement of his mothers intestate estate but his fathers
sale of his 1/3 share of the property to Agustina.
The Trial Court
Sustained the Petitioners claim that the documents were simulated and fictitious on the following grounds:
1) There was no showing that Agustina J ocson-Vasquez paid for the properties
2) The prices were grossly inadequate which is tantamount to lack of consideration at all
3) The sale was improbable and the real intention behind it was to exclude Moises J ocson from participating in the estate of his
parents.
4) The properties sold in the first two documents were conjugal properties, because they were registered in the name of Emilio
J ocson, married to Alejandra Poblete.
Moises Jocson Prevails.

The Court of Appeals
1) Complaint for annulment of the first two documents, being based on the undisputed fraud and undue influence is barred by
prescription.
43

2) They were no simulated or fictitious contracts because Emilio J ocson really intended to be bound by the contract as proven by
having his titles cancelled and new ones issued to Agustina.
3) Third document is valid and subsisting because the partition was in accordance with Art. 996 of the Civil Code on intestate
succession and that the petitioners share has not been prejudiced.
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez Prevails.
Assignment of Errors of CA by Petitioner
1. CAs ruling that the annulment of contracts filed is based on fraud and not on its inexistence and nullity
2. CA ruled that the action is barred by prescription
3. CA did not declare the contracts in question null and void

Issues:
1) W/N petitioners right to court action has prescribed
2) W/N the contracts are null and void

Held/Ratio:
1) NO. Because the petitioner assails the deeds of conveyance on the ground that they were without consideration, meaning there
was no payment and the contracts were simulations, his action is imprescriptible.
44

40
Allthreecontractsstatedthatthefatherwassellinghispropertyformuchlessitsvaluebecauseoffiliallovebetweenhimandhisdaughter.
41
RecordedintheRegisterofDeeds
42
RecordedintheRegisterofDeeds
43
Mustbefiledwithinfouryears,titleswereregisteredonJuly29,1968,actionfiledJune20,1973,clearlybeyondfouryears.

2) NO. They are valid contracts.

The petitioner has not sufficiently proven that the documents are without consideration.
The petitioner himself testified that he did not know if the respondents were engaged in any other business. They did in fact
engage in the buy and sell of palay and rice.
There is no showing that the prices were grossly inadequate. Assessed values are as follows (1) P8,920; (2) P3,500; (3) P8,240.
(Overpriced pa nga eh)
Difference in market value and purchase price is not shocking because of the filial love bet. father and daughter.
The improbability of a sale bet. a father and a daughter is purely speculative and has no relevance to a contract where all the
essential requisites of consent, object and cause are present.
Properties sold in first two documents were not proved to be conjugal properties of Emilio J ocson and Alejandra Poblete. Emilio
J ocson may have acquired the properties when he was still a bachelor but only registered them after his marriage to Alejandra
Poblete.
The words married to Alejandra Poblete only describe his civil status. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different
acts.
Despite Article 160, CC stating the presumption that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
Moises J ocson must have proved that these properties were acquired during the marriage, but he did not.
45
Had he sufficiently
proved thus, he wouldve won the case.
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez Prevails. KEBABdigest

Francisco v. CA, 299 SCRA 188 (1998)
Petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse CA decision | Quisumbing, J.

FACTS:
Teresita Francisco, petitioner, second wife of Eusebio Francisco, claims the following:
o She and Eusebio acquired a sarisari store, a residential house and lot and an apartment house at Col. S. Cruz st.,
Rodriquez, Rizal
o These were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated by tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer making him
unfit to administer
o The respondents, children of Eusebio by first marriage, convinced their father to sign a general power of attorney
authorizing Conchita Evangelista (one of the children) to administer said properties
Petitioner filed a damage and annulment of said power of attorney and to declare herself as sole administratix of disputed
properties
RTC decided in favor of respondents; CA affirmed said decision
ISSUE: W/N respondent court erred in declaring these assets as separate property of Eusebio and not part of his conjugal partnership
with petitioner?
DECISION: (petition denied, decision affirmed)
Petitioner made use of art. 116 of the FC (presumption of conjugal property) because it expressly repealed arts. 158 and 160
of CC.
o Court held that, although it is true that said provisions were repealed, depowering those will prejudice vested rights
incurred from the CC
o Rights accrued and vested while the cited articles were in effect survive their repeal
Although there exists a presumption that all properties in marriage belong to the conjugal partnership, it should be shown
that these were acquired during the marriage to avail of said presumption
o Land at Col. Cruz, Rodriguez, Rizal:
Even if land is acquired during marriage, it shall be excluded from conjugal partnership if acquired by
lucrati ve title
It was shown that this was inherited by Eusebio from his parents and petitioner even admitted that it was
brought by Eusebio to the marriage, although not yet registered in his name
o House, apartment and sarisari store:
Building permits in the name of Eusebio with her as applicant and business license issued in her name are
not determinative of these being a part of conjugal partnership or not
There was no showing that it was acquired during marriage or, at least, constructed at the expense of
partnership
o Property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal:
The phrase, Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco, indicated to the registration of said title, is
not a proof of acquisition/ ownership but only describing his civil status
Acquisition and registration are two different acts. Registration does not confer titles but merely confirms one
already existing
Eusebio shall retain all these properties because these are part of his separate property
44
Art.1352,CC.Contractswithoutcauseproducenoeffectwhatsoever.Acontractofsalewithasimulatedpriceisvoidandanactionforthedeclarationofitsnullity
doesnotprescribe.
45
Proofofacquisitionduringthecovertureisaconditionsinequanonfortheoperationofthepresumptioninfavorofconjugalownership.

Even assuming that these are part of the conjugal partnership, petitioner could not administer them as he is not incapacitated. Contrary
to allegation of petitioner, Eusebio, as found by the lower court, is not suffering from any serious illnesses rendering him unfit to
administer. KEBABdigest

b. Properties that compose the CPG

Zulueta v. Pan Am, 49 SCRA 1 (1973)
GR # L-28589
46
| February 29, 1973 | Concepcion, C.J.

Facts:
- Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta, along w/ their daughter, were about to board a plane back to the Philippines from the airport at Wake
Island
47
when Mr. Zulueta felt the call of nature. The CR at the airport was full so he had to go to the beach to relieve himself.
- Mr. Zuluetas answering the call of nature delayed the departure of the plane. When he went to the plane, he was confronted
by Pan Am staff, especially the pilot, Captain Zentner, for his delaying the departure of the plane.
- Mr. Zulueta and the Captain had a heated exchange of words. The Zuluetas were racially insulted by the Pan Am staff as
monkeys and they were forced to submit their luggage for inspection. When Mr. Zulueta refused to let his baggage be
inspected, he was left behind by the plane on the pretense that there was a bomb threat and that he was a suspect.
- Fortunately, his wife and daughter were allowed to return to Manila on that plane and it was only Mr. Zulueta who was left
behind. He was informed that he would be stranded in that island for at least a week and that he would be charged an
exorbitant price for staying at their premises
48
.
- When he got back to Manila, the Zuluetas (Dad, Mom, and daughter) filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage plus
damages against Pan Am. The trial court ruled in favor of the Zuluetas and ordered Pan Am to pay them actual, moral, and
exemplary damages plus attorneys fees.
- Pan Am appealed to the SC. While the appeal was pending, Mrs. Zulueta made a motion to dismiss the case in so far
as she is concerned because according to her, she and her husband have been living apart from each other for two
years already and that she has reached a compromise with Pan Am, the latter paying her Php 50,000.
- The SC affirmed the ruling of the trial court, albeit reducing the amount of damages awarded. SC also dismissed Mrs.
Zuluetas motion.
- Hence both parties make this motion for reconsideration
49

Persons & Family Relations Issue
50
:
Whether or not Mrs. Zulueta may be allowed to have the case dismissed as far as she is concerned
51

Held: NO

Ratio:
- The award of damages was made in favor of the defendants collectively. This money belongs to the conjugal partnership
because in the absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption is that the family trip was for the benefit of the family and that
the money to buy their air fare came from the conjugal funds. The SC held that such money falls under conjugal partnership
property by virtue of article 153 of the Civil Code paragraph 1: that which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at
the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses. Said money
also does not belong to the exemptions from conjugal partnership property as enumerated by article 148.
- Because the money is conjugal partnership property and because according to article 173 of the Civil Code the wife cannot
bind the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the husband, except in cases provided by law
52
, Mrs Zulueta
cannot perform an act which will presumably prejudice the conjugal partnership property
53
.
- SC notes that for obvious reasons of public policy, she is not allowed by law to waive her share in the conjugal partnership,
before the dissolution thereof.

Result: Decision affirmed. The Php 50,000 is merely deducted from the total award given to the plaintiffs. KEBABdigest

46
ThiscaseisaMotionforReconsiderationfiledbybothparties
47
AsmallislandinthePacificOcean.TerritoryoftheUnitedStates.
48
FortunatelyforMr.Zulueta,hewasabletocatchanotherflightoutofWakeIslandandreturntothePhilippines2dayslater,albeitthroughconnectingflights.
49
Mr.Zuluetaforhispart,insistsonlythattheawardofdamagesmadebytheCFIbeaffirmedintoto.
50
ThereweremanyissuesraisedbyPanAm,e.g.jurisdictionoftheCFI,thecorrectnessofissuanceofthevariousdamagesawarded,aswellassomeofthefactual
findingsofthecourt.TheseissuestookupthebulkofthedecisionbuttheyarentdirectlyrelevanttoPersons&FamilyLawandwillnotbediscussed.
51
Theeffectofthisisthatshewaiveshershareintheaward;PanAmprobablyhopesthatthedamagesawardedwillbereducedinlightofthefactthatthereisone
lessplaintiffMYOPINIONONLY
52
Andthecourtsaidthatthiscaseisclearlynotoneofthosecasesfallingundertheexception
53
AsIopined,theeffectofhavingthecasedismissedasfarassheisconcernedisperhapstoreducetheamountofthedamagesawarded,ifsuchamotiontodismiss
wasgranted

Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154 (1983)

August 17, 1983 / L-31618 / Petitions for certiorari to review the decisions of CA / Gutierrez, Jr.

FACTS:
J ulia R. Reyes and Ponciano S. Reyes were married in 1915. They bought from Gregorio Araneto two lots using money
loaned from RFC
54
. A deed of sale was executed by Araneta with J ulia de Reyes name and signature over the caption
vendee and those of Ponciano under the phrase: with my marital consent. Then a Transfer Certificates of Title were issued
in the name of J ULIA REYES married to PONCIANO REYES. Also, the mortgage contracts with RFC were duly annotated in
the title.
Consequently, the spouses built a house on the lots and a camarin, which they leased to a school first then to the Mendoza
spouses for ten years. The contract of the lease was signed by J ulia as lessor with the marital consent of Ponciano. Despite
the good rentals, the Reyes spouses failed to pay DBP, the successor of RFC, of their remaining balance, which prompted the
spouses to seek for extension of five years.
On March 1961, while Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Pampanga, J ulia sold absolutely the lots in question,
together with their improvements to the Mendoza spouses without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. During this time,
the spouses were living separately and were not in speaking terms.
Ponciano then filed a complaint with the CFI of Rizal for the annulment of the deed of sale of the two lots averring that those
properties were conjugal properties of himself and his wife and that she sold them to the petitioners all by herself and without
his knowledge and consent.
CFI dismissed the complaint and declared the properties in question as paraphernal property of J ulia, thus, she could validly
dispose of them without the consent of her husband and that the Mendoza are innocent purchasers. However, the CA
reversed the CFI decision declaring the deed of sale void (with respect to one half share of Ponciano).

ISSUES:
1. WON the properties/lots are part of the conjugal property
2. WON Ponciano Reyes is estopped (since there was a case before where he declared that he and her wife never had
any kind of fund which could be called a conjugal partnership fund).
3. WON the Mendoza spouses may be considered buyers in good faith
4. WON there will be unjust enrichment if the deed of sale is nullified

HELD:
1. YES. According to Article 160 of CC, all properties of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or wife. Article 153 of CC also states that that which is acquired
by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for
only one spouse is a conjugal property.

There is no question that the property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage. The strong presumption was
not rebutted by the sole testimonies of Julia.

As regards the question if the property was bought using the common funds, contrary to the claim of J ulia that she bought the
lots using her money, records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses from the RFC as shown in
the mortgage contracts. According to Art 161 (NCC), all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership. Therefore, the funds used to buy the lot and build the
improvements thereon are conjugal in nature.

2. No. There is no proof that Ponciano intentionally led the petitioner Mendozas to believe what was contained in his pleadings in
the earlier case. More importantly, the Mendozas were not even a party in the case were the pleading was filed nor is there
proof that the Mendozas was shown the pleading before they bought the lots in question.
3. No. The fact that the Mendozas demanded the consent of Ponciano to the lease of the properties shows that the Mendoza
spouses were aware of the conjugal nature of the properties. Hence, they should have known that the sale of the lots required
the consent of Ponciano. Also, the mortgage contract with the RFC was already annotated at the back of the TCTs before the
Mendoza spouses leased the lots. Therefore, the Mendoza spouses are unquestionably charged with notice of the joint
execution by the Reyes spouses of the contract and also the conjugal nature of the property.
4. No. Ponciano did not receive any part of the proceeds of the sale. KEBABdigest

54
RehabilitationFinanceCorporation

Villanueva v. IAC, 192 SCRA 21 (1990)
Narvasa, J.
PETITIONER: Consolacion Villanueva
RESPONDENTS: Intermediate Appelate Court (IAC), Jesus Bernas and Remedios Q. Bernas
Keywords: exclusive property, lucrati ve title

FACTS:
Property in question, Lot13C was inherited by Modesto Aranas from his parents. He was predeceased by his wife Victoria
Comorro. Upon his death, he left two illegitimate children, Dorothea Aranas Ado and Teodoro Aranas. They entered into a Loan
Agreement with Real Estate Mortgage with J esus Bernas (P18,000:Lot13C) where Raymundo Aranas, a relative, signed as a
witness. Failure to pay caused extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and Bernas acquired the land by auction sale.
A month later, upon alleged discovery of (2) wills by Victoria Comorro: bequeathing to Consolacion and Raymundo and
Dorothea and Teodoro her interest, rights and properties xx, as her net share from conjugal partnership with her husband,
Modesto Aranas x x and by Modesto Aranas: bequeathing to Dorothea and Teodoro all his interests in his conjugal partnership,
petitioner and Raymundo filed an action against private respondent spouses, praying that latters title to the land be cancelled and
they be declared co-owners. Trial court ruled in favor of the respondents awarding attorneys fees, actual and moral damages,
upholding the legality and validity of loan agreement with real estate mortgage.
Upon appeal to the IAC, RTC decision was otherwise affirmed in toto, except for the actual and moral damages, hence this
appeal.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner acquired rights from the will of Victoria Comorro.

HELD: NO

RATIO: Lot 13C was not conjugal partnership property of Victoria Comorro and her husband. It is Modesto Aranas exclusive, private
property, which he inherited from his parents and registered solely in his name. Article 148 CC clearly decrees: that to be
considered as the exclusive property of each spouse is inter alia that which is brought to the marriage as his or her own, or
that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.

Moreover, Victoria Comorro died before her husband, hence had nothing of Lot 13C to bequeath by will or otherwise to
Consolacion Villanueva or anybody else.

Bernas mode of acquisition of ownership over the property by mortgage sale, appears in all respects to be regular, untainted
by any defects. He must therefore be deemed to have acquired indefeasible and clear title to Lot13C.

DISPOSITIVE: J udgment affirmed. KEBABdigest

c. Property purchased by installment

Castillo v. Pasco, 11 SCRA 102 (1964)
Reyes, J.B.L., J. | No. L-16857 | May 29, 1964

Facts:
In October 1931, Marcelo Castillo Sr., being a widower, married Macaria Pasco, a widow who had survived 2 previous
husbands.
In Dec 1932, the Gonzales couple, as co-owners of the litigated fishpond, executed a deed of sale conveying said property
to spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco for Php6,000 (which was payable in 3 installments: Php 1,000 upon
execution of the deed, Php 2,000 within 1 month without interest and Php 3,000 after 1 year with 11% interest).
In April 1933, Marcelo died and his widow married her 4
th
husband, Luis San J uan in J une 1934.
The petitioners, children and grandchildren of Marcelo by his previous marriage, filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the fishpond in CFI of Bulacan. The lower court declared the fishpond as paraphernal property, since
even before the marriage, Macaria was a woman of means while Marcelo had a salary of only Php 80 a month.
CA affirmed the CFI decision.
Installments were paid in the following manner:
1) 1
st
installment was paid by Macaria with her exclusi ve money (Php 1,000)
2) 2
nd
installment paid with proceeds from a loan from Dr. Jacinto, to who the fishpond was mortgaged by both
spouses
3) 3
rd
installment was paid from a load secured by a mortgage on 2 parcels of land assessed in the name of Macaria

Issue:
WON the 2
nd
and 3
rd
installments were paid with conjugal funds.


Held/ Ratio:
YES. Dismissal of the original complaint was revoked and set aside, and the record of the case was remanded for further proceedings
conformable to the opinion.

Under the Spanish Civil Code
55
(Art. 1396) which was applicable in 1932, the property acquired for onerous consideration during
the marriage was deemed conjugal or separate property depending on the source of the funds employed for its acquisition,
irrespecti ve of in whose name the property was acquired.

Sources of funds:
The initial Php 1,000 payment was paid exclusi vely from money belonging to Macaria.
But the 2 other payments were paid by conjugal funds. The deeds show that the loans used to pay both installments
were made out to both spouses as joint borrowers. Loans thus become obligations of CPG and money loaned is conjugal
property.

While the mortgage is on Macarias paraphernal property, the mortgage to secure the loan is a purely accessory obligation that
the lenders could waive if they so chose, without affecting the principal debt which was owned by the conjugal partnership, and
which the creditors can enforce exclusively against the conjugal property if they so desired.
Division:
Since the fishpond was purchased partly with conjugal and partly with separate funds, justice requires that the
property be held to belong to both patrimonies in common, in proportion to the contributions of each to the total
purchase price.
o An undivided 1/6 is paraphernal and
o the remaining 5/6 is conjugal.

Payment by the widow of the mortgage debt after Marcelos death doesnt result in an increase in her share in the property but merely
creates a lien in her favor.

Since the fishpond is undivided property of Macaria and the conjugal partnership with Marcelo, his heirs are entitled to ask for its
partition and liquidation. The ultimate interest of each party must be resolved after due hearing, taking into acoount:
a) Macarias 1/6 direct share
b) Her half of the community property
c) Her successional rights to a part of Marcelos share pursuant to the governing law of succession when he died
Her right to reimbursement for any amount advance by her in paying the mortgage debt. KEBABdigest

Lorenzo v. Nicolas, 91 Phil 686 (1952)

Facts:
Magdalena Clemente was the surviving widow of Gregorio Nicolas. Manuel Lorenzo was the surviving widower of Carlosa Santamaria.
Clemente and Lorenzo were married and did not have any children.
From his first marriage, Lorenzo had three children who, along with their heirs are the Plaintiffs. The Defendants are Clementes
grandchildren from her only son, Gerardo Nicolas, who was deceased.
As a widow and not yet married to Lorenzo, Clemente bought two parcels of land which she paid for on an installment basis. She paid
the downpayments and continued to pay the installments after she was married to Lorenzo.
Magdalena completed the payment for one of the lands (land No. 6) during her second marriage when Lorenzo was still alive and it was
registered under the Torrens system, under in the exclusive name of Magdalena Clemente. The real estate tax receipts covering the
parcel was also under her exclusive name. Lorenzo undoubtedly recognized her sole ownership of the land and did not even as much
as care to place the title to the land in the name of the conjugal partnership.
The payments for the second piece of land (land No. 5) was completed after Lorenzos death. Again, it was placed under Clementes
exclusive name.
After about 3 years after Lorenzos death, Clemente sold the parcels of land to Defendants. Defendants did not have any notice of
the claim or interest of the Plaintiffs. The sale was completed, the price paid and duly registered. Plaintiffs did not dispute the sale and it
was only after two years of Clementes death that they filed their claim.
RTC ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs. The two lands were deemed conjugal and as such, Plaintiffs had a right to the said properties.
CA reversed the ruling (and the case is pretty much a copy-paste of the CA ruling), saying that the properties were paraphernal and
thus, the sale was valid. Plaintiffs appealed.
55
Art.1396:Theffareseparatepropertyforeitherspouse(4)Thatboughtwithmoneybelongingexclusivelytothewifeorhusband.

Issues:
WoN CA was correct in ruling that properties were paraphernal.
WoN there was fraud/bad faith in the sale of the lands.
(The SC did not actually say anything, may parang obiter pa nga. CA lahat.)
Held:
CA was correct. No fraud.
Ratio:
Parcels were registered under Clementes exclusive name as where the taxes. The presumption of continuity of condition is also in
favor of Clemente. The status of the land from the time she acquired before her marriage to Lorenzo, continued until it is otherwise
changed. The acts mentioned are also acts of ownership. It is to be presumed that a person is the owner of a property from exercising
acts of ownership.
The properties are thus paraphernal. However, it is unsure whether, at the time of her second marriage, Clemente paid the installments
using her separate properties. All the court can be sure of is that the downpayments were paid by Clementes separate properties. Any
useful expenditures made for the benefit of the separate property of either one of the spouses by means of advances made by the
partnership, or by the industry of the husband or wife, are partnership property. (Art. 1404 CC) The payment of installments during the
marriage are useful expenditures and is, therefore, a credit to the conjugal property and must be reimbursed to it by Clemente.
Otherwise, Clemente had sole and exclusive rights to the properties.
The fraud alleged by the plaintiffs was pertaining to land No. 7, in favor of a Martina Rodrigo which the RTC dismissed. It cannot affect
the validity of the sales of lands Nos. 5 and 6.
(All above is CA.)
Supreme Court: The two parcels of land in question were part of the Friar Lands the alienation of which is provided for in Act No. 1120.
Sec. 11 provides that should a person who is the bona fide settler and occupant of said land desire to purchase the land, he shall be
entitled to do so at the actual cost of the Govt and he has ten years to pay the Govt in installments with interest.
Sec. 12 provides that when the cost of the land has been ascertained, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall issue to settler and
occupant a certificate which shall state that the Govt has agreed to sell to the settler said land and upon final and complete payment,
the Govt shall convey the said land him.
Sec. 16 provides that in the event of the death of a holder of a certificate prior to the execution of the deed by the Govt, his widow shall
be entitled to receive a deed of the land stated in the certificate. If there is no widow, it shall be the heirs according to Philippine law.
From the above provisions, it is apparent that the pervading legislative intent is to sell the friar lands acquired by the Government to
actual settlers and occupants of the same. In case of a death of a holder, it is the widow and not the heirs who shall succeed.
The fact that all receipts for installments paid even during the lifetime (I think they mean marriage) if the late husband Lorenzo were
issued to Clemente and that the deed of sale or conveyance of parcel No. 6 was made in her name in spite of the fact that Lorenzo was
still alive sows that the two parcels belonged to Clemente. The Plaintiffs then, as heirs of Lorenzo are not entitled to one-half of the
lands.
The sale between Clemente and her heirs is valid.
Ruling: CA ruling AFFIRMED. KEBABdigest


d. Rules on Improvement

Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun, 129 SCRA 675 (1984)
Certiorari of CFI Pangasinan decision; Melencio-Herrera; June 22, 1984

Short summary
Facts: Canullas inherited his fathers house. He later abandoned his family to live w/ his concubine. Canullas sold the land to his
concubine.
Held: The sale to the concubine is void. The husband cannot alienate conjugal property w/o his wifes consent.

Facts:
+ Mercedes & Fernando were married in 1962, had 5 children, & resided on the disputed real estate property in Pangasinan.
After Fernandos father died in 1965, he inherited this said land.
+ In 1978, Fernando abandoned the family & lived w/ his concubine
56
and then sold the disputed property to the concubine for
2K. Fernando described the house as also inherited by me from my deceased parents.
+ And because the family (Mercedes & 5 children) was living in the property, concubine cant take possession of the house & lot.
For this reason, she filed for quieting of title.
+ Mercedes resisted and further claimed that the house was built and coconut trees on the land were planted w/ conjugal funds
& through her industry. She further claimed that the sale between Fernando & concubine was null and void as the object of the
sale is part of the conjugal properties over w/c sale Mercedes did not give her consent to.
+ Rulings of the lower courts:
o CFI ruled in favor of concubine she is the lawful owner of the land and of the house on it
o On MR, the lower court amended the decision
Concubine is the true & lawful owner of the land & 10 coconut trees
Sale of the house, 3 coconut trees, and crops planted during the conjugal relation bet Fernando & Mercedes
is null and void

Issue:
1. WON the construction of the conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of
conjugal property [Yes.]
2. Won the sale of the lot, together w/ the house & improvements on it, was valid under the present circumstances [No.]

Ratio/Held:
1. The Court explained Art 158, 2, CC
57
and said that wherein both land and bldg belong to the conjugal partnership but the
conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse-owner becomes a creditor of the
conjugal partnership for the value of the lot. This value will be reimbursed during liquidation. Furthermore, Fernando couldnt
have alienated the house & lot to the concubine since Mercedes did not consent to it.

2. The contract of sale was null and void as being contrary to morals and public policy.
58
The sale was made by husband to
concubine after the husband had abandoned his family in the conjugal home where the wife & kids lived and from where they
derived their support. The sale is subversive to the stability of the family.
a. Donations between spouses are prohibited
b. Sale of properties bet spouses are prohibited w/ certain exceptions
o Why?
Conveyances bet spouses during the marriage would destroy the system of conjugal partnership
To prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other
To protect the institution of marriage, the cornerstone of family law
o These prohibitions apply also to couple living as H & W w/o the benefit of marriage, dictated by public interest (due to
policy considerations and dictates of morality)

Decision of J udge Fortun & Resolution on MR are set aside (the rulings in favor of the concubine).
Sale of lot, house, and improvements is declared null and void. KEBABdigest

56
ConcubineCorazonDaquines&Fernandowereconvictedofconcubinagein1981
57
xxxBuildingsconstructed,attheexpenseofthepartnership,duringthemarriageonlandbelongingtooneofthespouses,alsopertaintothepartnership,butthe
valueofthelandshallbereimbursedtothespousewhoownsthesame.
58
Art1409whereincontractswhosecause,object,orpurposeiscontrarytolaw,morals,goodcustoms,publicorder,orpublicpolicyarevoidandinexistentfromthe
verybeginningANDArt1352whereincontractsw/ocauseorw/unlawfulcause,producenoeffectwhatsoever.Thecauseisunlawfulifitiscontrarytolaw,morals,
goodcustoms,publicorder,orpublicpolicy.

e. Charges upon the CPG

Javier v. Osmea, 34 Phil 336 (1916)
23 March 1916 | Arellano, C.J. | from a judgment of the CFI of Manila

Plaintiff and Appellee: Petrona J avier
Defendant and Appellant: Lazaro Osmea

Facts:
Source of all the Commotion
Florentino Collantes and Petrona J avier were married in 1890. In 1892, Collantes was employed at Felix J aviers commission
business in Manila. When Felix retired in 1902, Collantes succeeded Felix in the business but also assumed the P4,000-5,000 debt
of the latter to Tomas Osmea, a merchant of Cebu, one of their chief clients.
In 1908, Collantes rendered a statement to Osmea that his debt has amounted to fourteen or fifteen thousand pesos. Tomas
Osmea never collected this debt but upon his death, the respondent obtained a judgment to recover the said amount with interest
at 12% p.a.
Back Story
Petrona J avier is the only daughter of Felix J avier and Matea Corunan. Both are deceased. Matea died in 1901 while Felix died in
1908. After Matea died, Felix married Pascuala Santos.
Petrona J avier inherited two urban properties in Manila upon the death of her father, 1 in Calle Carriedo and 1 in Calle San
Sebastian. Petrona, to consolidate her full ownership, acquired Pascualas usufructuary right in the estate for P3,000 on March 20,
1911. J avier was obliged to borrow this amount.
The Fight! (Im not sure if this happened at the CFI, but it looks like it)
To recover the debt of Collantes, the sheriff sold at public auction all the right, title, interest or share which Collantes had or
might have in the two urban parcels of land that his wife inherited and also the usufructuary interest of Pascuala Santos. The
winning bidder was Osmeas estate, buying each parcel of property at P500.
The plaintiff contends that her husband Collantes does not have any right to her exclusive paraphernal property, nor does he have
a right to the usufructuary interest which she acquired from her fathers 2
nd
wife. The sale of the sheriff should be thus annulled and
her ownership of the property and acquired usufructuary right be returned to her.
The defendant admits that the plaintiff has exclusive right of ownership in the two properties but the usufructuary interest was
bought with money from the conjugal partnership.
The defendant prayed to the CFI to hold that:
1. Revenues from both properties are conjugal partnership of J avier and Collantes;
2. That said revenues be made liable to pay the debt to the Osmea estate; and
3. That a receiver be appointed to take charge of the two properties to collect the revenues and apply it to the debt of Collantes.

CFI: The sale of the two properties is annulled and their registration at the property registry is cancelled.
59

Partial win for Petrona Javier.

Issues:
1. W/N the fruits and revenues of the property that the wife exclusively owns can be used to pay for the debt owed by the
husband.
2. W/N a receiver should be appointed to take charge of the management of the two properties and apply their revenue to the
debt to the Osmea estate.

Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The debt must be paid out of the community property of marriage as set forth in Art. 1401, 1385, and 1408, CC:
Art 1401. Inasmuch as the fruits, revenue, or interest collected or accrued during the marriage coming from the partnership property, or
from that which belongs to either one of the spouses is community property.
Art. 1385. The fruits of the paraphernal property form a part of the assets of the conjugal partnership, and are liable for the payment of
the marriage expenses.
Art. 1408. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for all the debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband
The plaintiffs contention based on Article 1386 stating that the personal obligation of the husband cannot be paid out of the
fruits of the paraphernal property unless it be proven that they were incurred for the benefit of the family is without merit
because
The plaintiff herself admits that the debt arose out of the business conducted by her father and subsequently by her husband.
And that whatever the husband contributed toward the support of his family, he gave out of what he earned from his
commissions and profession [but it has not been proven than Collantes incurred the debt to Osmea to defray family expenses
(the source of the debt is unknown)].
The debts contracted by the husband during the marriage, for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he
supports his family, cannot be deemed his personal and private debts. To further this point, it cannot be assumed that
Collantes assumed the debt of his father-in-law purely for his personal satisfaction.
59
Thecreditorofthehusbandmaybringhisaction,notagainsttheparaphernalproperty,butagainstthefruitsandrevenuesofthisprivatepropertyofthewife.

Had the P26,000 been a gain, Collantes would not have been permitted to call the amount his personal and private gain; in the
same way, the debts or losses resulting from the business cannot be called his personal and private debts or losses.
2. NO. To confide the management of the property and of its revenue to a receiver would be to deprive the husband and the wife
of their respective rights. Petition for the appointment of a receiver must be denied.

Dispositive: J udgment of CFI modified. KEBABdigest

In Maam Beths book:
32. Who will pay for the expenses of the family?
Facts: Collantes, husband of J avier, contracted a debt with Osmea as a commission merchant. Collantes assumed this debt as he
succeeded J aviers father in the business. The exclusive property of the wife consisting of two parcels of land and usufructuary interest
was auctioned to cover the debt.

Held: The fruits of the exclusive property of the wife belong to the conjugal partnership and are liable for the payment of the debt. The
debts contracted by Collantes during the marriage, for and in the exercise of his industry or profession are not his personal and private
debts. It is through his industry that Collantes contributes toward the support of his family.

Cobb-Perez v. Lantin, 23 SCRA 637 (1968)
Petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction | Castro, J.

FACTS:
Ricardo Hermoso, private respondent, filed a civil case against Damaso Perez, petitioner, and Gregorio Subong for recovery of
unpaid purchases of leather materials used in shoe business of petitioner worth P17,309.44
Because the petitioner nor his counsel did not go, even with due notice, private respondent was allowed to present his evidence;
respondent court rendered judgment in favor of the latter
Petitioner and Subong appealed to the CA but was dismissed because it was filed beyond the reglementary period; they elevated it
to the SC but was dismissed for lack of merit
Thereafter, several actions were commenced by said petitioner to no avail:
o After the respondent court granted writ of execution filed by Hermoso, respondent Sheriff of Manila, levied upon 3,573 shares
of stocks registered in the name of Perez with the Republic Bank, Perez interposed an urgent motion to stay execution on the
ground that total value of stocks is P357,300 compared to his P17,309.44 worth of obligation. The Sheriff published FIRST
notice of sale
o CA sustained Perezs position with regard to the extent of the levy. Case was remanded back again to respondent court. A
SECOND and THIRD notices of sale were commenced by the Sheriff as consequence of these actions
Perezs wife, Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez filed with the CFI of Rizal a complaint for injunction on the ground that said stocks were
part of conjugal partnership, hence, it cannot be levied because the obligation/ debt contracted was not for the benefit/interest of
the partnership
o CFI issued a writ of injunction but was later lifted due to the doctrine enunciated in Acosta v. Alvendia, CFIs do not have
power to restrain acts outside their jurisdiction.
o After the lifting, the Sheriff again scheduled a FOURTH notice of sale
Together, the spouses filed with the respondent sheriff a third-party claim over the said stocks, but the latter was determined to
proceed upon the bond posted by Hermoso; they also filed an action to vindicate third-party claim to CFI in Manila, but was
dismissed on the ground that it cannot interfere by injunction with the judgment of a court concurrent/ coordinate jurisdiction
On a motion for reconsideration, Perez adopted his wifes previous motion to recall the writ of execution. He also asked for the
suspension of the FIFTH notice of sale
After the sheriff scheduled for the SIXTH time a notice of sale, the petitioners brought this case at bar upon posting a bond for
preliminary injunction

Shorter version:
Ricardo Hermoso, private respondent, filed a civil case against Damaso Perez, petitioner, and Gregorio Subong for recovery of
unpaid purchases of leather materials used in shoe business of petitioner worth P17,309.44
After the SC remanded this case to the respondent court, a writ of execution was granted to Hermoso and the respondent sheriff
was instructed to levy stocks registered in Perezs name in the Republic Bank
A series of actions later commenced opposing said writ of execution making the respondent Sheriff issue SIX notices of sale after
several injunctions
Perezs wife, Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez filed a motion to stop said execution on the ground that the stocks disputed are part of
the conjugal partnership, hence, the debt incurred by the spouse, inasmuch as it did not benefit the family, should not be charged
from the partnership

ISSUE: W/N debt incurred is a personal obligation only to Perez?

DECISION: (petition dismissed)
Respondent judged correctly acted in refusing to quash the writ in dispute because the spouses did not question its intrinsic validity
or regularity of the

Perez is estopped to allege that said shares are part of the conjugal property since:
o He nurtured the impression that the shares are his
o Said shares are registered only in his name
o He never raised the question of conjugal nature of levied shares
o He represented himself before the court that he is the exclusive owner of said shares
It is impossible also for Cobb-Perez to be ignorant of his husbands affairs to justify the delay of her questioning the legality of the
levy
o Said shares are presumed to be part of the separate property of Perez since they are all registered in his name alone and no
evidence as to when these are acquired was presented
o Assuming that these are part of the conjugal partnership, it is well-settled that debts contracted by the husband in his exercise
of profession or industry by which he contributes to the support of the family, cannot be seen as a personal or exclusive
obligation. Here, the debt contracted is for the shoe manufacturing business of the husband which, obviously, will also benefit
the family.
Actions made by the petitioners are for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of simple money judgment which has long been
final and executor
o They tried to use the courts to subvert the very ends of justice. KEBABdigest

DBP v. Adil, 161 SCRA 307 (1988)
Development Bank of the Philippines v. RTC Judge Adil and spouses Confesor
GR # L-48889 | May 11, 1989 | Gancayco, J.

Facts:
- Spouses Patricio Confesor and J ovita Villafuerte got a Php 2,000 loan, evidenced by a promissory note, from Agricultural and
Industrial Bank (which is now known as the Development Bank of the Philippines) in 1940, payable in 10 equal yearly
amortizations.
- The obligation remained unpaid even after the 10 year period promised; but on April 1961, Mr. Confesor executed a second
promissory note expressly acknowledging the first loan and promising to pay it off on or before J une 15, 1961.
- They still didnt pay the loan. DBP thus files an action in the Iloilo City Court (MTC) to compel the spouses Confesor to pay up.
- The inferior court ruled in favor of DBP and ordered the spouses to pay, but that decision was reversed by the Iloilo CFI; the
CFI ruled that the action to enforce the payment of the debt has already prescribed
60
and that the husband alone cannot bind
the conjugal partnership.
- DBP thus appeals to the SC.

Issue:
- whether or not the action to compel the payment of the debt has already prescribed
- whether or not the husband can, by himself, bind the conjugal partnership

Held:
- prescribed?: NO
- husband bind CPG?: YES

Ratio:
1. Article 1112 of the CC says that persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already obtained xxx,
therefore, even if the action to collect on the first debt has already prescribed, by Mr. Confesors acknowledgment of the debt
and promise to pay it he has in fact waived his right to the prescription.
2. Article 165 of the CC says that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership while Article 161 (1) says that all
debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are chargeable to the conjugal
partnership. Based on these two provisions, and the fact that Mr. Confesor signed the second promissory note for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership, it is clear that his lone act is able to bind the conjugal partnership property and make it liable for
the outstanding debt. KEBABdigest

60
Actionforspecificperformanceprescribesin10years

Luzon Surety v. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 (1969)

Oct 31, 1969 / Petition for review of a CA decision / Fernando, J.

FACTS:
There are two contracts involved.
o First, there was a surety bond
61
in favor of the PNB (first party) and Chavez and Luzon Surety Co., Inc (second
party or the principal) for a crop loan (P 9,000.00). The Chavez wanted to borrow money from PNB, hence Luzon Surety
Co., Inc granted the surety bond.
o The second is an indemnity agreement
62
between Vicente Garcia (with Ladislao Chavez and Ramon Lacson) and
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. wherein the former has bound themselves to pay for damages that the latter may incur in
consequence of having become guarantor of the surety bond. In case Chavez cannot pay the crop loan to PNB, Luzon
Surety Co., Inc shall pay the amount (P 9,000) to PNB (as stipulated in the surety bond). Consequently, Garcia, Chavez,
and Ramon, shall be held liable to pay whatever Luzon Surety Co., Inc, paid to PNB. So we have a situation where a
surety company is partially insured by the one (Chavez) it contracted a surety bond with. (But the important person here is
Garcia as far as his liability to Luzon Co., Inc. is concerned).
Later, PNB filed complaint against Chavez and Luzon Surety Co., Inc. for the recovery of P 4,577.95 before the CFI of Negros
(consistent with the surety bond or first contract). Consequently, a third party complaint was filed by Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
against Garcia, Chavez, and Lacson based on the indemnity agreement (the second contract).
The CFI, condemned Chavez and Luzon Surety Co., Inc. to pay the amount (consistent with the first contract). Also, the CFI
ordered third party defendants, Garcia et al, to pay Luzon Surety Co., Inc. the amount it shall pay to PNB (consistent with the
second contract).
Pursuant to the decision, CFI ordered writ of execution, to which a writ of garnishment
63
was issued by Provincial Sheriff of
Negros to levy the sugar quedans owned by the Garcia spouses which shall be used as payment to Luzon Co., Inc.
The Garcia spouses then filed a petition for injunction enjoining said sheriff from levying their property as it was contrary to
(par 1) Article 161 of the Civil Code
64
. The trial court was with the opinion that the husband in signing the indemnity
contract did not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership decided in favor of De Garcia. CA affirmed trial court
decision.
But according to Luzon Surety Co., Inc., the husband by signing the agreement earned the trust of the business community,
thereby giving him the benefit to secure money for the purposes their conjugal property.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership of the De Garcia spouses could be held liable

HELD/ DECISION: No. There is no benefit that accrued to the conjugal partnership. Hence, it cannot be held liable for the damages
sought. Judgment of lower court and CA affirmed.
The civil code provision (Article 161) only allows the conjugal property to be bound to a debt contract if the benefits accrue to
such property or to the welfare of the spouses. In the case at bar, the benefit was clearly intended to a third party. The
benefit allegedly gained by the husband (added reputation or esteem) does not come within the express terms of the
provisions (too remote and fanciful).If the conjugal property will be held liable, instead of conserving the property, the
husband would in effect be dissipating the property.
Even if Art 163 provides that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property, the only obligations incurred by the
husband chargeable to the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession, or business
with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family.

Obiter:
J urisdiction of the lower court to entertain petition for injunction should have been raised earlier in the lower court or CA.
The language of the law (Art 161, Civil Code) is clear. The process of interpretation and construction need not be resorted to.
KEBABdigest

61
Asuretybondisissuedbyanentityonbehalfofasecondparty,guaranteeingthatthesecondpartywillfulfillanobligationorseriesofobligationstoathirdparty.
Intheeventthattheobligationsarenotmet,thethirdpartywillrecoveritslossesviathebond
62
Indemnityagreementisapolicyprovisiondesignedtorestoreaninsuredtohisorheroriginalfinancialpositionafteraloss.Theinsuredshouldneitherprofitnorbe
putatamonetarydisadvantagebyincurringtheloss.
63
A writ of garnishment is a process by which the court orders the seizure or attachment of the property of a defendant or judgment debtor in the possession or
controlofathirdparty.Thegarnisheeisthepersonorcorporationinpossessionofthepropertyofthedefendantorjudgmentdebtor.
64
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and
thosecontractedbythewife,alsoforthesamepurpose,inthecaseswhereshemaylegallybindthepartnership;


Ayala Investment v. CA 286 SCRA 272 (1998)
Martinez, J.

PETITIONERS: Ayala Investment & Development Corp. and Abelardo Magsajo
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Spouses Alfredo & Encarnacion Ching
Keywords: surety, benefit

FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) got a P50M loan from Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Alfredo Ching,
Exec VP of PBM, executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to
AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. AIDC filed a case. CFI rendered judgment ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to pay principal amount
with interests.
Pending appeal, lower court issued a writ of execution with AIDCs bond. Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy Sheriff gave notice of
sheriff sale on three (3) of their conjugal properties levied.
Auction sale took place. After primary injunction secured by respondent from CFI was override by CA. AIDC being the only bidder,
was issued a Certificate of Sale.
AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction of the CFI of Rizal (Pasig) on the ground that the same had become moot
and academic with the consummation of the sale. Respondents filed their opposition to the motion arguing, among others, that
where a third party who claims ownership of the property attached or levied upon, a different legal situation is presented; and that
in this case, two (2) of the real properties are actually in the name of Encarnacion Ching, a non-party to Case
Motion to dismiss denied. Private respondents presented several witnesses. On the other hand, petitioners did not present any
evidence. Trial court declared the sale on execution null and void. Petitioners appealed to the CA, which affirmed the decision of
the RTC.

"The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees.

As to the applicable law, whether it is Article 161 of the New Civil Code or Article 1211 of the Family Code-suffice it to say that the
two provisions are substantially the same. Nevertheless, We agree with the trial court that the Family Code is the applicable law on
the matter . . .

Article 121 of the Family Code provides that 'The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (2) All debts and obligations
contracted during the marriage by the designated Administrator-Spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains . . 'The
burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the debt was contracted by appellee-husband,
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains."

The petitioner assails the decision of CA upholding the decision of the RTC, which ruled that the conjugal partnership of gains of
respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching is not liable for the payment of the debts secured by respondent-husband
Alfredo Ching.

ISSUE: WON the surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer is considered as debts and obligation which is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership under Art 161 of the Civil Code.

HELD: NO

RATIO: "The wordings of Article 161 of the Civil Code is very clear: for the partnership to be held liable, the husband must have
contracted the debt 'for the benefit of' the partnership, thus:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
1) all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership . . .'

We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms "redounded to the benefit of" or "benefited from" on
the one hand; and "for the benefit of" on the other. They mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121
(2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term "for the benefit of." On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family
Code provides that "The payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to
the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family." As can be seen, the terms are used
interchangeably.

"In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the new Civil Code is liable only for such 'debts
and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.' There must be the requisite showing then of
some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a
liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show
the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume
unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership." (Luzon Surety, Inc.)

From the jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can derive the following conclusions:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or
for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing
of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services
to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does
not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and
rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his
family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is
"for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.

Benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a
by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.

"No matter how one looks at it, the debt/credit extended by respondents is purely a corporate debt granted to PBM, with husband
merely signing as surety. While such husband, as such surety, is solidarily liable with the principal debtor AIDC, such liability under the
Civil Code provisions is specifically restricted by Article 122 (par. 1) of the Family Code, so that debts for which the husband is liable
may not be charged against conjugal partnership properties. Article 122 of the Family Code is explicit 'The payment of personal
debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.' These provisions highlight the underlying concern of the law for the conservation
of the conjugal partnership; for the husband's duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate it. These are all in keeping
with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of the Civil Code which prohibits any of the spouses to donate or convey gratuitously
any part of the conjugal property. Thus, when co-respondent Alfredo Ching entered into a surety agreement he, from then on, definitely
put in peril the conjugal property (in this case, including the family home) and placed it in danger of being taken gratuitously as in cases
of donation.

The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did not require the signature of the wife and the husband signed alone does
not mean that being a surety became part of his profession. Neither could he be presumed to have acted for the conjugal partnership.

On the basis of the facts, the rules, the law and equity, the assailed decision should be upheld as we now uphold it. This is, of course,
without prejudice to petitioner's right to enforce the obligation in its favor against the PBM receiver in accordance with the rehabilitation
program and payment schedule approved or to be approved by the Securities & Exchange Commission.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied. KEBABdigest

Carlos v. Abelardo, 380 SCRA 361 (2002)
Kapunan, J. | G.R. No. 146504 | April 9, 2002

Facts:
Oct 1989: Respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached the petitioner, Honorio L. Carlos and
requested him to advance US$ 25,000 for the purchase of house and lot in Paraaque.

Petitioner issued a check in the said full amount to the seller of the property to enable and assist the spouses to conduct their
married life independently and on their own

J uly 1991: Petitioner inquired about the status of the loan. The spouses acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that
they were not yet ready to settle it. Respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioners inquiries by making various
threats against the petitioner.

August 1994: formal demand was made by Carlos but spouses failed to comply with their oligations.

October 1994: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of the sum and damages against spouses in RTC of Valenzuela.

As they were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint, respondent and his wife filed separate
answers.
o Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband, from petitioner.

She claimed,
however, that said loan was payable on a staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded
immediate payment of the full amount.

o Defendant claimed that sum was not a loan but his share of income on contracts in reviving the petitioners
construction business

RTC: ruled in favor of petitioner Carlos, ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of US$25,000.
CA: reversed decision and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed
loaned by petitioner to respondent and his wife. The Court of Appeals found that the amount of US$25,000.00 was
respondents share in the profits of H.L. Carlos Construction.

Issues:
WON US$25,000 or its equivalent Php 625,000 was in the nature of a loan.
WON loan is liability of both spouses.

Held/ Ratio:
The petition is granted and the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified in that respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the
amounts of (1) US$25,000 or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the time of payment, plus legal interest from August 4,
1994, until fully paid; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) P50,000.00 as attorneys
fees.

YES. The petitioner sufficiently proved by a preponderance of evidence that the amount of US$25,000.00 was really in the nature of a
loan: (1) in providing the check he issued the acknowledgement of the wife of their accountability, and (2) the petitioners demand letter
sent and received by respondent.

The husbands claim that it is his rightful share as income, profit or salary is untenable because there is no showing that he is a
stockholder, an employee or an agent of the corporation.

YES. While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan
redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of
respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he
shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.

Pursuant to Art 121 No. 2 and 3 of the Family Code
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, even with the alleged lack of consent of respondent-husband, defendant-
husband and wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.

Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, 508 SCRA 469 (2006)

Facts:
Spouses Arcadio and Luisa Carandang and Quirino de Guzman are stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay
Broadcasting System (MBS) with equities at 46% and 54% respectively.
On November 26, 1983, the capital stock of MBS was increased from 500,000 to 1.5 million pesos and 345,000 pesos of this increase
was subscribed by the Spouses.
On March 3, 1989, the capital stock was again increased, this time from 1.5 million to 3 million pesos. The Spouses subscribed to
93,750 pesos.
De Guzman claims that part of the subscriptions were paid by him which amounted to a total of 336,375 pesos. Thus, on March 31,
1992, de Guzman sent a demand letter to the Spouses.
The Spouses refused to pay the amount contending that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed between Arcadio Carandang and
de Guzman, whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock subscriptions of the former without cost, in consideration of the formers
technical expertise, his newly purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communications equipment.
De Guzman filed suit and the RTC ruled in his favor, ordering the Spouses to jointly and severally pay de Guzman 336,375 pesos
representing the Spouses loan, 12% interest starting from J une 5, 1992 when de Guzman filed his complaint, 20,000 for attorneys
fees, and the cost.
CA affirmed the decision.
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Article121.Theconjugalpartnershipshallbeliablefor:
(2)Alldebtsandobligationscontractedduringthemarriagebythedesignatedadministratorspouseforthebenefitoftheconjugalpartnershipofgains,orbyboth
spousesorbyoneofthemwiththeconsentoftheother;
(3)Debtsandobligationscontractedbyeitherspousewithouttheconsentoftheothertotheextentthatthefamilymayhavebeenbenefited;
Iftheconjugalpartnershipisinsufficienttocovertheforegoingliabilities,thespousesshallbesolidarilyliablefortheunpaidbalancewiththeirseparateproperties.

The Spouses submitted the following issues:
1. WoN the CA erred in failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. WoN the CA erred in its finding that there is an alleged loan for which petitioners are liable, contrary to the provisions of Book
IV, Title XI, of the New Civil Code.
3. WoN the CA erred in finding that the Respondents were able to discharge their burden of proof in complete disregard of the
rules on evidence.
4. WoN the CA erred when it failed to apply Sections 2 and 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
5. WoN the CA erred in finding that the purported liability of petitioners are joint and solidary, in violation of Art. 1207 of the New
Civil Code.
Issues:
Questions passed upon by the Court:
1. WoN RTC decision should have been void for failure to comply with Section 16, Rule 3, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. WoN RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action, considering that Milagros de Guzman,
allegedly an indispensable party was not included as party-plaintiff.
3. WoN respondents were able to prove the loan sought to be collected from the petitioners.
4. WoN the liability of the Spouses is joint and solidary.
Held:
First
No. Section 16, Rule 3 states that in case of death of a party to the pending action dies, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the
court within thirty days and to give the name and address of his legal representative. Failure of counsel to do so shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.
Failure to comply would void the decision for two reasons as cited through two cases: The court acquired no jurisdiction over the legal
representatives or the heirs and the lawyers of the party ceased to be his lawyers upon his death.
Neither can be used in the present case. Not only did the legal representatives not question the power of the court over them, they
embraced it. On the second reason, the case had already been submitted to the court for decision months before the death of the party,
hence no further proceedings required the appearance of the counsel.
Second
No. Spouses claim that the fact that three of four of the checks used to pay the subscriptions were issued in the name of Mrs. de
Guzman, she should be an indispensable party. They claim that failure to join Mrs. de Guzman as party-plaintiff should cause the
dismissal of the action because if a suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss
the case may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action.
The CA disagreed and said that the joint account from which the checks were drawn is part of the conjugal property of the de Guzmans
and under the CC and FC, only the husband may institute actions for the recovery or protection of the spouses conjugal property.
Spouses erroneously interchange real party in interest with indispensable party . Real party in interest means someone who
stands to be benefited or injured by the decision while indispensable means a party without whom there can be no decision, in contrast
to necessary which is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party of complete relief is to be accorded to the
parties. Non-joinder of necessary parties does not cause the dismissal of the case while non-joinder of indispensable parties does. The
rule cited by the Spouses (above in italics and bold) only means that the suit must be brought in the name of a real party in interest and
not necessarily all the parties interested. Therefore, failure to include Mrs. de Guzman is not grounds for dismissal. The checks, being
from the conjugal property makes Mrs. de Guzman a real party in interest.
Aside from indispensable and necessary parties, there is also the pro forma parties which are those who are required to be joined as
co-parties in suits by or against another party as may be provided by the applicable substantive or procedural law. Example is found in
Section 4, Rule 3 of Rules of Court which is as follows: Spouses as parties Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as
provided by law.
Pro forma parties can either be indispensable, necessary or neither. An example of neither would be when a husband files an action
concerning exclusive property. Since the said payments for the subscriptions are conjugal property, Mrs. de Guzman must necessarily
be either indispensable or necessary.
Art. 108 of the FC and Art. 147 of the CC are practically the same in saying that the conjugal property shall be governed by the rules on
the contracts of partnership that is not in conflict with this Chapter.

Pursuant to said articles, Art. 1811 can be used which states: a partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership
property. Being co-owners, Mr. and Mrs. de Guzman may separately bring in action for the recovery of their property. If one does so, it
is presumed to be for the benefit of the partnership.
Pursuant to Art. 487 and jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action. Therefore, only one of the co-owners is the indispensable
party which should be Mr. de Guzman. Mrs. de Guzman is only a necessary party.
Third
Spouses claim that de Guzmans failed to prove the alleged loan for which the spoused Carandang were held liable.
Art. 1236 states that whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid. If the debtor did not know or did not
consent to such, he can recover only as much as the debtor benefited.
Art. 1237 states that whoever pays on behalf of the debtor without the knowledge or against the will of the latter cannot compel the
creditor to subrogate him in his rights, such as those arising from a mortgage, guarantee or penalty.
The de Guzmans have successfully proven their payment of the Spouses subscriptions. At the very least then, the Spouses must pay
as far as they have benefited.
There is however a possibility of an exception such as when it is paid through generosity or through a mutual agreement. The de
Guzmans having successfully proven their payment of the subscriptions, it is up to the Spouses to prove that there was such an
agreement which they failed to do. Their testimonies even contradicted the existence of such an agreement when they said that they
have paid for the check payments issued by the de Guzmans negating the idea that they are exempt from paying the latter.
Fourth:
The CA is correct insofar as it held that when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of the obligation entered into by them, they are
being impleaded in their capacities as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors. Hence, either of
them may be sued for the whole amount, similar to that of a solidary liability, although the amount is chargeable against their conjugal
property.
Decision: RTC and CA decision AFFIRMED and MODIFIED.
1. 336,375 pesos.
2. Interest of 12% starting J une 5, 1992; and
3. 20,000 attorneys fees
No costs. KEBABdigest

f. Administration and Disposition of the CPG

Felipe v. Heirs of Maximo Aldon, 120 SCRA 628 (1983)
[Review of CA decision; Abad Santos; Feb 16, 1963]

Facts:
+ This case is about the alleged disposition of the conjugal properties (several pieces of land) by the W w/o the Hs consent.
+ Mr. Maximo Aldon and Mrs. Gimena got married in 1936 (thus Civil Code provisions apply). They bought several pieces of land
during their marriage (thus presumed to be conjugal). In 1951, Mrs. Aldon purportedly sold the lots to the spouses Felipe without
the consent of Mr. Aldon.
+ In 1976, when Mr. Aldon had already died, Mrs. Aldon and her children instituted an action against the spouses Felipe in order to
recover the lots.
o Mrs. Aldon claims that she had orally mortgaged the properties in question to the Felipes & that the Felipes refused the offer to
redeem the mortgage
o The Felipes aver that they acquired the lots from Mrs. Aldon through purchase & subsequent delivery
+ The RTC ruled in favor of the Felipes. The CA ruled in favor of the Aldons by saying that the sale of the disputed properties is
invalid because, being conjugal properties, they were sold without the consent of the husband.

Issue: What is the legal effect of a sale of lands belonging to the conjugal partnership made by the W w/o the consent of the H?

Held/Ratio:
+ The SC reiterated Articles 165, 166, and 172 of the New Civil Code (see provisions below )

+ The CA said that the contract of sale was invalid but the SC ruled that the use of such term is imprecise because the terms in the
Civil Code w/ regards to the kinds of defective contracts are as follows: a) rescissible
66
, b) voidable, c) unenforceable
67
, d) void or
inexistent. By the process of elimination, the contract is a voidable one.
o Art 1390 of the CC makes voidable those contracts whereby 1 of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract. Mrs.
Aldon had no capacity to give consent to the contract. The capacity to give consent belonged not even to the husband alone
but to both spouses.
o Contracts entered into by the H w/o the consent of the W when such consent is required are ANNULABLE at her instance
during the marriage and w/in 10 years from the transaction questioned (Art 173, CC).

Obiter:
1. Who may assail the validity of the contract? The voidable contract can be annulled only by the husband during the marriage
because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract
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The children cant seek the annulment while the marriage
subsisted because they merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold. The rights of the children to seek the annulment of the
contract accrued from the death of their father and they had 30 years to file such action.
2. Have the spouses Felipe acquired the land by acquisitive prescription? No. The SC ruled that, in the first place, they were
purchasers in bad faith. They attempted in 1970 to make Mrs. Aldon sign a document purporting to sell the lots to them, proof
therefore that they knew that the lots did not belong to them yet. Furthermore, extraordinary prescription in the Civil Code is 30
years. The possession started in 1951, the 30 yr period has not elapsed yet.
Concurring opinion, J ustice Aquino:
1. The contract is void, not voidable, for being contrary to law having been executed w/o the Hs consent. Thus, action does not
prescribed.
2. Contracts entered into by H w/o Ws consent when such consent is required is annullable. All the more that a W cant make such
disposition w/o Hs consent because the H is the administrator of the conjugal property. KEBABdigest

Civil Code provisions:
Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. (1412a)
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a
leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's
consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before the effective date of this Code. (1413a)
Art. 167. In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, the courts, on petition of the
wife, may provide for receivership, or administration by the wife, or separation of property.
Art. 168. The wife may, by express authority of the husband embodied in a public instrument, administer the conjugal partnership
property. (n)
Art. 169. The wife may also by express authority of the husband appearing in a public instrument, administer the latter's estate. (n)
Art. 170. The husband or the wife may dispose by will of his or her half of the conjugal partnership profits. (1414a)
Art. 171. The husband may dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes specified in Articles 161 and 162. (1415a)
Art. 172. The wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent except in cases provided by law. (1416a)
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of
any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the
husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise
this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by
the husband. (n)
Art. 174. With the exception of moderate donations for charity, neither husband nor wife can donate any property of the conjugal
partnership without the consent of the other. (n)

66
Rescissible contracts are those validly agreed upon because all the essential elements [of a contract] exist and, therefore, legally effective, but in the cases
establishedbylaw[byreasonofeconomicinjuryordamagetooneofthepartiesortothirdpersons],theremedyofrescissionisgrantedintheinterestofequity.
AccordingtoManresa,Rescissionisaremedygrantedbylawbymeansoftherestorationofthingstotheirconditioninwhichtheywerepriortothecelebrationof
saidcontract.deLeon,HectorS.,TheLawonObligationsandContracts,(2008),384385.
67
Unenforceablecontractsarethosethatcannotbeenforcedincourtorsueduponbyreasonofcertaindefectsprovidedbylawuntilandunlesstheyareratified
accordingtolaw.Supra.
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Inotherwords,itwashewhoseconsentwasnotobtainedintheexecutionofthecontract&itwasthewifewhowasresponsibleforthedefect.

Tinitigan v. Tinitigan, Sr., 100 SCRA 619 (1980)
Makasiar, J. | Petition for certiorari of the decision of the CA

1
st
petition:
Petitioners: Tesofista Tinitigan and her three children
Respondents: Severino Tinitigan, Sr. and CA

2
nd
petition:
Petitioners: Pentel Merchandising Co., Inc.
Respondents: CA, Hon. Navarro, Chiu Chin Siong and Severino Tinitigan Sr.

FACTS:
Teofista Payuran Tinitigan and Severino Tinitigan are married.
Payuran and her three children leased two conjugal properties without the consent of the husband Severino.
1. Residential house in Loring St., Pasay City to Pentel Merchangising (4-yr lease w/ option to purchase)
2. Factory building together with the portion of the land on which it is erected situated in Paranaque City to United Electronic
Corporation (UEC)
Severino later on sought to annul the contract of lease executed by Payuran in favor of UEC in the CFI of Rizal in Pasig. This was
settled amicably.
However, Severino filed a motion seeking judicial approval of sale of the residential house and lot in Loring St. to Quintin Lim,
President and GM of Pentel for P300k.
Severino contends that the proposed sale of the property was necessary to pay outstanding conjugal obligations of more than
P256k that were overdue to forestall the foreclosure of mortgaged conjugal properties.
The CFI of Rizal issued an order granting Severino the authority to sell said house and lot in favor of Quintin Lim for P300k
Payuran later on filed for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership before the Pasay Court wherein she was
appointed as the administratix of the conjugal properties.
Payuran and their children also filed a motion for reconsideration of the CFI decision because they contend that the property is a
choice lot and a suitable condominium/hotel site and would sell for much higher, but was denied because they failed to prove that
there were other offers to buy the property for more than P300k.
Severino, on the other hand, sold the property to Chiu Chin Song instead of Quintin Lim for P315k. The sale was approved by the
CFI of Rizal in Pasig.
Petitioners filed a petition in CA assailing the order of respondent judge giving authority to Severino to sell the property and to
declare the sale made in favor of Chiu Chin Song null and void.
CA upheld the order and likewise approved the sale of the said property.
Hence these petitions.
ISSUE: WON the order issued by respondent judge of CFI of Rizal in Pasig is valid
HELD: Yes.
1. The contention of the petitioners that Severino has no authority to sell the said property because it is under the administration of
Payuran is without basis.
Art 165 of the NCC provides that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and Art 168 provides that the
wife may administer only through an express authority of the husband embodied in a public instrument. Other provisions
provide power of administration to the wife through a judicial decree. The absence of a public instrument or a judicial decree in
this case shows that the administration still pertains to Severino, the husband. The judicial decree appointing Payuran the
administrator during the pendency of the Legal Separation case cannot be merited. It was only issued AFTER the CFI of Rizal
in Pasig had granted to Severino the authority to sell the property. Besides, the appointment was not absolute as it was made
subject to certain conditions, particularly the pending decision of the CFI on the Loring Property.
2. However, Severino, being administrator, does not possess an outright authority to alienate or encumber conjugal assets except
through an expressed or implied consent of his wife. However, if the wife refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may
intervene. This is exactly true in this case.
Actually, this case does not even call for judicial intervention. Evidence warrants that the sale was necessary to answer for a
big conjugal liability which might endanger the familys economic status. In cases where the disposition is to pay for obligations
of the conjugal partnerships as provided in Art 161 and 162, the wifes consent is not required.
DISPOSITIVE: Two petitions denied. Decision of CA affirmed.

Minor Issues:
1) The sale of the property was expressly made in favor of Quintin Lim not Chiu
Held: The motion was filed in order to secure judicial approval of sale in lieu of marital consent. It intended to grant Severino the
right to sell the property and not to vest Quintin Lim exclusive right to purchase the Loring property.
2) Pentel, whose Pres. and GM is Quintin Lim, had the option to buy the premises.
Held: He did not manifest ability and willingness to buy the property. Moreover, the contract of lease that Payuran and Pentel entered
into was in violation of Art. 172 of the Civil Code, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent, except
in cases provided by law. Payurans unauthorized transaction cannot be invoked as a source of right or valid defense. Also, their
contract does not bind Chiu because a transaction between two parties ought not to operate to the prejudice of a third person.
KEBABdigest

Guiang v. CA, 291 SCRA 372 (1998)
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA | Panganiban, J. | June 26, 1998

FACTS:
Spouses Gilda Corpuz, private respondent and J udie Corpuz were married; they bought a 421 sq. m. lot located in Koronadal,
South Cotabato (payable in instalment, there was a conditional deed of sale where Gilda signed as vendee and Manuel Callejo, the
owner, as vendor)
The Corpuz couple sold one-half of this lot to spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The Guiang couple then built a house and
occupied said portion (they are adjoining neighbours of the Corpuzes.
Gilda, with her husbands consent, left for Manila to look for a work abroad in the Middle East but she became a victim of an illegal
recruiter.
Harriet Corpuz, their daughter, who was also working as a household help learned of his fathers intention to sell the remaining
portion of the lot to the Guiangs. She informed her mother and the latter replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet gave the
letter to Luzviminda.
J udie pushed through and sold the said portion to the Guiangs in a Deed of Transfer of Rights. To cure whatever defect, the
Guiang couple, vendee, executed another agreement, with Manuela J imenez Callejo, widow of Manuel who signed as vendor, and
paid the remaining balance.
Gilda returned home, gathered her children who were now staying in the house where Harriet was working as a helper, and went to
live to their house. Because of that, the Guiangs complained before the barangay, and a trespassing case against Gilda was
docketed. They reached an amicable settlement where Gilda is to voluntarily leave the place, though, she questioned her signature
believing that she was disadvantaged.
The Guiangs moved for the execution of the amicable settlement with the Municipal Trial Court. The MTC ruled in favour of Gilda.
The couple appealed to the CA, but it affirmed the lower courts decision.

ISSUE: W/N the contract of sale was merely voidable?
W/N the defect was cured when Gilda entered into an amicable settlement with them?

DECISION: (petition denied, judgment and resolutions affirmed)
The Guiangs insisted that the contract they entered into was merely voidable due to lack of Gildas consent based on the provision
of Art. 1390 (2) of the Civil Code.
69

o But this provision talks about consent obtained through the fraud, mistake, violence, etc.
o It is clear, however, that there is an absence of consent in Gildas part. It is totally inexistent.
o Since the transaction was made on March 1, 1990 after the effectivity of the Family Code, its provision regarding this will be
followed, particularly Art, 124 where it says that, the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to
both spouses jointly... In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
70

o Fraud and intimidation were present not during the sale of property but during the amicable settlement where the barangay
officials made her sign the document through coercion and misrepresentation.
o To be valid, contracts should have the following concurring elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent.
71
The latter was
lacking in this case.
The Guiangs insisting that the contract was merely voidable claimed that it was ratified when Gilda signed the amicable settlement.
o Doctrinally, a void contract could not be ratified.
o The amicable settlement entered into is another contract, a direct offshoot of the Deed of Transfer of Rights. By express
provision, such contract is also void.
72

o Neither could it be considered as a continuing offer (last paragraph of Art. 124) since the settlement does not mention a
continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such continuing offer. It was only to vacate the said property. By no
stretch of imagination can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Art. 124. KEBABdigest

69
Art.1390Thefollowingcontractsarevoidableorannullable,eventhoughtheremayhavebeennodamagetothecontractingparties.(2)Thosewhoseconsentis
vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are
susceptibleofratification.
70
ThelowercourtcomparedthistotheprovisionoftheCivilCode(Art.166) whereitsaysthatthehusbandcannotalienateorencumberanyrealpropertyofthe
conjugalpartnershipwithoutthewifesconsent.Butitsabsencerendersthecontractannullableandnotnullandvoid.
71
Art.1318(CC)
72
Art,1422Acontractwhichisthedirectresultofapreviousillegalcontract,isalsovoidandinexistent.

Relucio v. Lopez 373 SCRA 578 (2001)

GR # 138497 | January 16, 2002 | Pardo, J.

Facts:
- Alberto Lopez and Angelina Lopez are husband and wife. Alberto left the conjugal home and lived with his concubine Imelda
Relucio. Alberto also arrogated to himself the full and exclusive control of the conjugal properties to the exclusion of Angelina
and their common children.
- Years later, Alberto and his concubine Imelda amassed a fortune. The properties were mostly acquired through the industry of
Alberto with minimal contribution from Imelda, although the properties are in the names of Alberto and Imelda, or sometimes,
in the name of Imelda only.
- Albertos legal wife Angelina eventually brought suit in court to be declared as the sole administrator of her and Albertos
conjugal partnership properties. In this lawsuit, she impleaded both Alberto and Imelda. Imelda was impleaded on the theory
that some of the properties which were acquired as the fruits of Albertos labor were purposefully put under the name of Imelda
in order to hide them from Angelina.
- Imelda filed a motion to dismiss the case as against her, alleging that Angelina has no cause of action against her. However,
her motion was denied by the RTC as well as the CA on appeal. These courts sustained Angelinas theory that Imelda is
impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party to the case.
- Imelda appeals the issue to the SC

Issue
73
:
Whether or not Angelina has a cause of action
74
against Imelda or if Imeldas inclusion as a party defendant to the case is essential for
a complete adjudication of the controversy

Held: NO

Ratio:
- None of the elements
75
of a cause of action exists between Angelina and Imelda
- The complaint is mainly an action by an aggrieved wife against her husband. The relief sought by Angelina is to be judicially
appointed as sole administrator of her and Albertos conjugal partnership. Such administration is entirely between the spouses,
to the exclusion of all other persons.
- There is no right-duty relationship between Angelina and Imelda
- Another relief sought by Angelina is for Alberto to do an accounting of the conjugal partnership properties. Again, Imelda has
no part to play here.
- Angelinas prayer for support and moral damages are also directed at Alberto; again, Imelda has nothing to do with the action.
- Finally, Angelinas alternative cause of action is for their conjugal partnership properties be liquidated and Albertos share be
forfeited. Again, this cause of action pertains to Alberto only and not Imelda
- References to Imelda in the common and specific allegations of fact in the complaint are merely incidental
Result:
Petition granted. CA decision which affirmed the RTC is reversed and Angelinas case against Imelda is dismissed, but with
respect to Imelda only. KEBABdigest

Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, 374 SCRA 498 (2002)
JADER-MANALO (Thelma) v CAMAISA (Edilberto and Norma)
Jan 23, 2002 | Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA | Kapunan, J:

FACTS:
Thelma J ader-Manalo wished to buy a 10-door apartment (in Makati as well as in Rizal) that she saw advertised on a
classified ads. The properties belong to spouses Edilberto Camaisa and Norma Fernandez Camaisa. She then negotiated for
the purchase through a broker first and then with the respondent spouses when she was sure she wanted to buy the
properties after inspecting them.
Edilberto made a handwritten agreement containing the installment payment scheme for the sale of the properties. Norma did
not sign this agreement. Edilberto merely assured Thelma of his wifes consent. Then, petitioner made a formal typewritten
Contracts to Sell, which Edilberto signed before receiving the P200, 000 and P100,000 down-payment for the properties.
The following day, Norma, called Thelma that they have to settle some provisions of the contract so Thelma met with the
spouses the following day and arranged to incorporate the revisions and to meet for the formal signing of the contracts.
However, when the parties met for the signing, the respondent spouses said that they want to back out of the contract
because they need spot cash for the full amount. Thelma asserted that the contracts have been duly perfected already and
Normas refusal to sign shall unduly prejudice the former. Still, Norma refused to sign the contacts.
73
Procedural
74
Acauseofactionisanactoromissionofonepartythedefendantinviolationofthelegalrightoftheother
75
arightinfavoroftheplaintiffbywhatevermeansandunderwhateverlawitarisesoriscreated
b.anobligationonthepartofthenameddefendanttorespectornottoviolatesuchright
c. an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiffforwhichthelattermaymaintainanactionforrecoveryofdamage

Thelma filed a complaint before the RTC of Makati to compel Norma to sign the contracts. Then, Norma filed a motion for
summary judgment since there was no genuine issue as to any material fact from the pleadins. Since there was admission
from both parties that the signature of the wife was not obtained in the contract to sell conjugal properties the contract was null
and void.
RTC dismissed the complaint saying under art 124
76
of FC, the courts cannot intervene to authorize transactions in the
absence of the consent of the wife since said wife who refused to give consent had not been shown to be
incapacitated.
CA affirmed RTC decision removing costs.

ISSUE:
WON the RTC erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of the spouses
WON the contracts to sell between the parties were already perfected
WON the court can authorize the contracts

HELD:
1. No. The respondent spouses are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law when there is no genuine controversy as to the
facts involved in the case, which was shown by the pleadings submitted by both parties. (there was an agreement to sell, a
downpayment, a refusal to sign by the wife)
2. No. The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate case requires
the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. The wife may have been aware of the contracts, but merely
being aware of a transaction is not consent.
3. No. FC 124 provides for court authorization only in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated.

JUDGMENT: CA judgment affirmed. KEBABdigest

Villanueva v. Chiong, GR No. 159889 (2008)
June 5, 2008 | QUISUMBING, J.

PETITIONER: WALTER VILLANUEVA AND AURORA VILLANUEVA
RESPONDENTS: FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ELISERA CHIONG

FACTS:
Respondents were married but have been separated in fact since 1975. Lot in question was acquired and duly registered during
their marriage.
In 1985, Florentino sold portion of the lot to petitioners who occupied the lot and build a store, a shop, and a house thereon. After
completion of payment, petitioners demanded execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of
sale.
Elisera filed with the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages. Petitioners also filed with Complaint for Specific
Performance with Damages. Meanwhile, Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners.
RTC, in its J oint Decision, annulled the deed of absolute sale and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all
improvements therein. RTC dismissed case file by petitioners but ordered Florentino to return to them the consideration (P8000) of
the sale with interest
On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC's decision, MR denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: (1) WON the subject lot is exclusive property of Florentino or conjugal property.
(2) WON the sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent is void.

HELD: (1) conjugal property
(2) NO, but voidable

RATIO:
(1) Respondents' separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced Elisera's interest over it. Under
Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal
partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature.

Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

Elisera presented a real property tax declaration acknowledging her and Florentino as owners of the lot. In addition, Florentino and
Elisera categorically declared in the Memorandum of agreement they executed that the lot is a conjugal property. Moreover, the
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Art.124.Theadministrationandenjoymentoftheconjugalpartnershipshallbelongtobothspousesjointly.Incaseofdisagreement,thehusband'sdecisionshall
prevail,subjecttorecoursetothecourtbythewifeforproperremedy,whichmustbeavailedofwithinfiveyearsfromthedateofthecontractimplementingsuch
decision.

conjugal nature of the lot was admitted by Florentino in the Deed of Absolute Sale, where he declared his capacity to sell as a co-
owner of the subject lot.

(2) The sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent is not, however, void ab initio. Without the wife's consent, the husband's
alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely
voidable. Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code provide:

ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in
a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's
consentThis article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before the effective date of this Code.

ART. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or
contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife
fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently
alienated by the husband.

Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is necessary for the sale of a conjugal property to be valid. In this
case, the requisite consent of Elisera was not obtained when Florentino verbally sold the lot in 1985 and executed the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Accordingly, the contract entered by Florentino is annullable at Elisera's instance, during the marriage and within ten
years from the transaction questioned, conformably with Article 173.

The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the
wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall
"prejudice" the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute. It is not the legitimate concern of this Court to recast
the law. As Mr. J ustice J ose B. L. Reyes of this Court and J udge Ricardo C. Puno of the Court of First Instance correctly stated,
"[t]he rule (in the first sentence of Article 173) revokes Baello vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 213 and Coque vs. Navas Sioca, 45 Phil. 430,"
in which cases annulment was held to refer only to the extent of the one-half interest of the wife .

Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper.

Article 1398 of the Civil Code: An obligation having been annulled, the contracting parties shall restore to each other the things
which have been the subject matter of the contract, with their fruits, and the price with its interest, except in cases provided by
law.

In obligations to render service, the value thereof shall be the basis for damages. The effect of annulment of the contract is to wipe it
out of existence, and to restore the parties, insofar as legally and equitably possible, to their original situation before the contract was
entered into. Strictly applying Article 1398 to the instant case, petitioners should return to respondents the land with its fruits and
respondent Florentino should return to petitioners the sum of P8,000, which he received as the price of the land, together with
interest thereon. On the matter of fruits and interests, we take into consideration that petitioners have been using the land and have
derived benefit from it just as respondent Florentino has used the price of the land in the sum of P8,000. Hence, if, as ordered by the
lower court, Florentino is to pay a reasonable amount or legal interest for the use of the money then petitioners should also be
required to pay a reasonable amount for the use of the land. Under the particular circumstances of this case, however, it would be
equitable to consider the two amounts as offsetting each other. Hence, the award of the trial court for the payment of interest should
be deleted.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied. J udgment affirmed with modification (payment of interest deleted). KEBABdigest

g. Dissolution of the CPG

h. Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities

Santero
77
v. CFI of Cavite, 153 SCRA 728 (1987)
Paras, J. | Nos. L-61700-03 | September 14, 1987 | Petition for certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, Br. V.

Facts:
Pablo Santero had two common-law wives, Felixberta Pacursa and Anselma Diaz, respectively. Of the first he had 3 children and
of the second, 7 children.
Anselma petitioned CFI of Cavite to grant four of her children with Pablo Santero support which included educational, expenses,
clothing and medical necessities (Motion for Allowance).
Children of Pablo with Felixberta contend that the wards are not entitled to any allowance since they are no longer
schooling, have already attained majority age, two are gainfully employed, one is married, and as such are no longer under
the guardianship of Anselma Diaz. Also, oppositors claim that the funds from which allowance would be derived are trust funds
from for whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit property.
Petitioner admitted that some of her children are of age and not enrolled for the first semester due to lack of funds but will be
enrolled as soon as they are given the requested allowances.
The trial court granted an allowance of P2,000 each, given that the estate of the Santeros are quite big and the requested
allowance is insignificant and can easily be replaced from its general fund.
Anselma further filed another Motion for Allowance to include her other 3 children among those to receive support from the
administrator of Pablos intestate estate, which the trial court granted. This is in exercise of her childrens rights to receive
allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero.

Issue:
WON the children of Pablo with Anselma are entitled to receive support from the intestate estate of Pablo?

Held/ Ratio:
YES. Petition is dismissed. Assailed decision of CFI affirmed.

The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New Rules of Court but Arts. 290 and 188.
78

The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the
determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence,
the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their
shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Ci vil Code, a substantive law, gives the
survi ving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such
right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect
to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).
KEBABdigest

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FULL CASE NAME: PRINCESITA SANTERO, FEDERICO SANTERO AND WILLIE SANTERO V. HON. CFI OF CAVITE, ANSELMA DIAZ, VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA,
MIGUELSANTERO,REYNALDOEVARISTO,INHISCAPACITYASADMINISTRATOROFTHEINTESTATEESTATEOFPABLOSANTEROETAL.
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CCprovisions:
Art.290.Supportiseverythingthatisindispensableforsustenance,dwelling,clothingandmedicalattendance,accordingtothesocialpositionofthefamily.
Supportalsoincludestheeducationofthepersonentitledtobesupporteduntilhecompleteshiseducationortrainingforsomeprofession,tradeorvocation,even
beyondtheageofmajority.
Art.188.Fromthecommonmassofpropertysupportshallbegiventothesurvivingspouseandtothechildrenduringtheliquidationoftheinventoriedpropertyand
untilwhatbelongstothemisdelivered;butfromthisshallbedeductedthatamountreceivedforsupportwhichexceedsthefruitsorrentspertainingtothem.
RelevantprovisionfromFC:
Art.133.Fromthecommonmassofpropertysupportshallbegiventothesurvivingspouseandtothechildrenduringtheliquidationoftheinventoriedpropertyand
untilwhatbelongstothemisdelivered;butfromthisshallbedeductedthatamountreceivedforsupportwhichexceedsthefruitsorrentspertainingtothem.

D. Separation of Property and Administration of Common Property by one spouse
1. J udicial separation of property for Sufficient Cause

Garcia v. Manzano, 103 Phil 798 (1958)

Facts:
Action filed by Gonzalo Garcia against his wife Consolacion Manzano for a judicial declaration of the separation of their conjugal family.
Plaintiff alleges that he and his wife have been living separately since 1948 (the date on the case is 1958). Attempts on reconciliation
have failed. Upon separating, the defendant assumed all management and administration of the conjugal property.
Defendant has enjoyed the fruits of the property to the exclusion and prejudice of plaintiff and has even fictitiously transferred or
alienated property.
Defendant moved to dismiss the case there being a failure to state a cause of action since a judicial declaration of separation of
property can only be awarded or given on certain grounds provided for in Article 191 of the New Civil Code.
RTC ruled in favor of defendant, dismissing the case because it does not allege any of the grounds recognized by Article 191 of the
New Civil Code for decreeing a judicial separation of properties.
Article 191 provides for only grounds which are:
1. One spouse is sentenced with a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
2. One spouse is declared absent
3. Legal Separation
4. Abuse of powers of administration by the husband (according to Arts. 167 and 178, no. 3)
5. Abandonment by the husband (according to Arts. 167 and 178, no. 3)
6. The husband and wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal property during the marriage, subject to judicial
declaration.
Article 167 provides that in case of abuse of powers of administration of conjugal property by the husband, the courts, on petition for
the wife may provide for a receivership, administration by the wife, or separation of property.
Article 178 provides that during de facto separation, the conjugal property shall not be affected except that 1) the absent spouse shall
not have a right to be supported, 2) when consent of one spouse is needed for a transaction, judicial authorization shall be necessary,
and 3) for unjustified abandonment for at least one year of the husband, the wife may petition the court for receivership, administration
of the property, or separation of the property.
Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to some relief, legal or equitable. Whatever reliefs given to the wife in Arts. 167 and 178 must also be
applicable to the husband. Otherwise, there would be a void in the law.
Issue: WoN the RTC was correct in deciding that husbands predicament does not fall under any of the grounds for judicial separation
of property.
Held: Yes.
Article 191 is an exclusive list. It stems from a policy of discouraging separation of property because it is not in harmony with the unity
of the family and mutual affection.
Husbands contention ignores the philosophy or the reason behind the law. The wife is given relief against mismanagement of conjugal
property because, by express provision of the law, it is the husband who administers the property and the wife may only do so if she is
given consent.
Art. 165 provides that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property and Art. 172 provides that the wife cannot bind the
conjugal property without the husbands consent, except in case provided by law.
Legally, therefore, the wife cannot mismanage the property.
What husband should do is to revoke the power granted to the wife and resume the administration of the properties. He may enforce
his right of possession and control over the conjugal property against his wife. He may even annul the transactions made by his wife,
upon proper action filed for that purpose.
Decision: RTC AFFIRMED, costs against appellant. Without prejudice to proper action by husband.
Others: Averments regarding fictitious or fraudulent transfers are incompatible with an action between wife and husband alone because
the legality of such transfers cannot be pass upon without giving the transferees or third parties an opportunity to be heard.

Partosa-Jo v. CA & Ho Hang, 216 SCRA 692 (1992)

[Review of CA Decision; Cruz; Dec 18, 1992]

Facts
+ This case concerns the application of the Art 135 (6) of the Family Code in conjunction with the rules on separation de facto
and abandonment.
+ The husband had cohabited w/ 3 women & fathered 15 children. The 1
st
of these women is the legal wife, the petitioner in this
case.
+ The W filed an action for support and another action for judicial separation of property. During the trial, the W gave a
testimony that for a certain period, she left the conjugal home because that was our agreement. The 2 cases were
consolidated and the dispositive portion or the RTC did not contain anything about the judicial separation of property, only
about the complaint for support.
+ The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It also dismissed the complaint for judicial separation of property because of lack of
merit and because separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178
79

Issues:
1. Is the judicial separation of property in the case at bar allowed under Art 175
80
, 178, and 191
81
of the CC (separation by
agreement)? [Yes.]

Obiter:
2. Was there a judicial separation of property decreed by the RTC? [Yes.]
3. Applicability of the FC provision since the marriage occurred under the CC.

Held/Ratio:
1. Their separation fits the separation contemplated in Art 135 of the Family Code.
a. The trial court based the decision on the testimony of the W (because that was our agreement statement) so that
the their separation agreement was void as without any just cause. W clarified the matter by saying that the
agreement was for her to temporarily stay with her parents during the first few months of her pregnancy and for the H
to visit and support her.
b. The separation could be granted on the ground of abandonment =If there was also separation that occurred, it
was repudiated in 1942 when she returned to the conjugal home but the H refused to accept her. The H also did not
give financial support to her.
c. The separation could be granted on the ground of failure to comply w/ obligations to family =
- Art 175, CC was superseded by Art 128 of the Family Code wherein a spouse may petition the court for a judicial
separation on the grounds of abandonment
82
and failure to comply w/ obligations to the family w/o just cause.
- Since the husband failed to comply w/ his obligations as a parent and as husband when he fathered 15 children
out of 3 relationships. He did not give any justification for his refusal to comply w/ these obligations
2. The last paragraph of the RTC decision decreed a legal separation of property but the dispositive portion itself did not contain
any such disposition. The SC admonished her counsel for not having taken immediate steps for the rectification of the
omission in the decretal portion. But the SC disregarded this technicality for the purpose of substantive justice.
3. An appellate court, in reviewing a judgment on appeal, will dispose of a question accdg to the law prevailing at the time of
such disposition, and not accdg to the law prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed judgment.

Petition granted. CA decision Modified. Conjugal property is ordered divided bet the spouses, share and share alike. The division shall
be implemented by the RTC after determination of all the properties of the CPG, including those that may be illegally registered in the
name of other persons.
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KEBABdigest

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Art.178.Theseparationinfactbetweenhusbandandwifewithoutjudicialapproval,shallnotaffecttheconjugalpartnership,exceptthat:
(1)Thespousewholeavestheconjugalhomeorrefusestolivetherein,withoutjustcause,shallnothavearighttobesupported;
(2)Whentheconsentofonespousetoanytransactionoftheotherisrequiredbylaw,judicialauthorizationshallbenecessary;
(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the
conjugalpartnershipproperty,orseparationofproperty.(n)
80
TerminationofCPG
81
Separationofpropertyonthegroundofcivilinterdiction,absence,legalseparation,abuseofpowersofadminbythehusband,andabandonmentbythehusband
w/ojustcauseforatleast1year.
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TolentinosannotationsonabandonmentandthedelaCruzv.delaCruzdefinitionofabandonmentwereusedtodefineabandonmentinthecaseatbar.
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Theyhaveconjugalpropertiesinthenameofdummies.

Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz, 22 SCRA 333 (1968)
Castro, J. | Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Negros Occ.

Note: This is the same case we had before RE: abandonment.
The husband slept in their factory; their business has been expanding; the wife played mah jong all the time; she claims abandonment
but she received P1,000-P1,500 every month from defendant husband.

FACTS:
Estrella and Severino dela Cruz were married on Feb 1, 1938 & they had six children. They acquired seven parcels of land at
Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels at Silay Cadastre. These are all registered in their names. They are also engaged in various
business ventures.
On J uly 22, 1958 she filed a complaint praying for the sep of prop, monthly support & payment of attorney fees & costs.
In 1949, she claims that she already suspected that Severino was having an affair w/ a certain Nenita Hernandez. W/c was only
confirmed by a note she found in his shirt in 1951. She confronted him about it & he promised her to forsake his mistress. W/c he
didnt.
Since 1955, he never slept in conjugal dwelling, but only paid short visits. She contends that he abandoned her & their children to
live in Mla w/ his mistress; and that after 1955 until the time of the trial, he had visited the conjugal abode only once & that when he was
in Bacolod, she was denied communication w/ him.
RTC ordered separation & division of the conjugal assets (valued at 500,000), directing Severino to pay to Estrella 20k as
attorneys fees, with legal interest from date of original complaint (J uly 22, 1958) until fully paid plus costs.

ISSUE:
1) WON separation of husband from his wife constitutes abandonment in law that would justify the separation of conjugal
partnership property. NO
2) WON the husbands failure and/or refusal to inform his wife of the state of their business (or his alleged silence) is an abuse
of his powers of administration of the CP as to warrant a division of matrimonial assets. NO

RATIO:
1) In the case at bar, there was only mere physical separation & not real abandonment. Abandonment contemplated by the law must be
of physical estrangement, moral and FINANCIAL desertion. Based on how abandonment was used in A.178 & in Gay v State in order
for desertion of one spouses to constitute abandonment, there must be absolute cessation of marital relations & duties & rights with
intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is to forsake entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence it means giving up absolutely and
with intent never again to resume or claim ones rights or interests.
Here, Severino didnt seem to have the intention to leave his family permanently since he continued to give support despite his
absence w/c thus negates any intent not to return & resume his marital duties & rights.
Since separation in fact between spouses doesnt affect the CP except if the husband abandons his wife w/o just cause, (A178,
CC)...claims of the Estrella of concubinage on part of Severino must be regarded as efforts at bolstering her claim of abandonment w/c
shall justify, under the law, a judicial separation of conjugal assets. There is no strong corroborated evidence that demonstrates the
existence of illicit relations btwn Nenita & Severino.
Neither has he been mismanaging funds since he actually increased the value of their assets by over a million pesos.

2) For abuse to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform acts prejudicial to his wife or commit acts injurious to the partnership.
There must be an act willfully performed & w/ utter disregard of the partnership by the husband that would be prejudicial to the wife,
evidenced by the repetition of deliberate acts &/or omissions.

COURT says theyre not condoning the husbands separation from his wife. What theyre saying is that there is an insufficiency or
absence of cause of action. Remedies of A. 167 and 178 are aimed at protecting the CP. And they must exercise restraint since theyre
trying to preserve union of spouses: a judgment ordering a separation of assets where theres no real abandonment may eradicate the
possibility of reconciliation.
Alimony increased from 2000 to 3000. Attorneys fees must also be borne by defendant since he left the conjugal abode and has given
cause for plaintiff to seek redress in courts. KEBABdigest


2. Voluntary Separation of Property

In re: Voluntary Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Spouses Bermas, 14 SCRA 327 (1965)
In re Voluntary Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of Jose Bermas, Sr. And Pilar Manuel Bermas
Appeal from a decision of CFI | Montejo, J. | June 22, 1965

FACTS:
J ose Bermas, Sr. And his wife Pilar Manuel Bermas executed an Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and
Separation of Property, which contains:
o Enumeration of the properties that shall belong to them exclusively.
o Stipulation concerning the income derived from rentals, as well as quitclaim by each party in favour of the other.
o Provision that any party acquired by any or both of them, shall pertain to their exclusive property, pr to both as co-
owners (separation of property).
They allege:
o During their marriage, they acquired 12 parcels of lands and two buildings
o They have two children (of legal age and married)
o This will redound to their mutual advantage, benefit and gain, and preserve peace and harmony in the family, and
prevent friction, dissension and confusion among their respective heirs in the future (because J ose has two sets of
children, from a previous marriage and with Pilar).
o Voluntary dissolution of property during marriage is allowed, under Art, 191 of the Civil Code, subject to judicial
approval
o They and their conjugal partnership have no outstanding debts and obligation
o This would not prejudice any creditors or third persons
Upon filing, the court issued an order setting for a hearing and caused the notice to be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in Zamboanga City once a week for three consecutive weeks.
The court denied the petition on the ground that dissolution of conjugal partnership during marriage shall only be allowed once
legal separation has been ordered.

ISSUE: W/N spouses Bermas can voluntarily dissolve their conjugal partnership?

DECISION: (decision set aside, case remanded to the lower court)
It should be noted that in the said document, the names of J oses children of his former marriage were not included despite the
fact that his children with co-petitioner were named.
Consequently, these children were not notified personally of the filing of the petition and its date of hearing; no similar notices
were given to the present ones (although the danger of substantial injury to their rights would seem to be remote).
This dissolution, should not and cannot be affected with a liquidation of the conjugal partnership between J ose and his first
wife. In which children by first marriage shall have interest.
This dissolution should not and cannot be affected with a liquidation of the conjugal partnership between J ose and his first
wife. In which children by first marriage shall have interest.
Hence, it is essential that the children should be notified of the instant proceedings. KEBABdigest


Lacson v. San Jose, 24 SCRA 837 (1968)

Alfonso Lacson v. Carmen San Jose-Lacson
GR # L-23482 | August 30, 1968 | Castro, J.

Facts:
- Alfonso and Carmen are husband and wife. They have four children together. Carmen eventually left their conjugal home in
Bacolod and settled in Manila, leaving Alfonso and the kids.
- She then filed a petition in the J uvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a petition for custody of their children as well
as support.
- However, a compromise between her and Alfonso was reached and they later submitted a joint petition in the Negros CFI,
agreeing to separate their property, providing support for Carmen from Alfonso, as well as settling the issue of custody over
their four children.
- The 2 older ones go to Alfonso while the 2 younger ones go to Carmen. They also agreed on visitation rights, as well as
temporarily allowing Carmen to have all the children for that summer.
- Their agreement was accepted by the Negros CFI and judgment was entered ratifying this agreement.
- However, Carmen filed a motion in the J uvenile and Domestic Relations Court asking the court to relieve her of her obligation
to abide by the terms of the agreement pertaining to custody of their children and visitation rights.
- She alleged that she only entered into the agreement in order to immediately get custody of all their children and now she
wants to be relieved of the obligation to give the other 2 kids back to Alfonso.
- Alfonso filed a motion to dismiss Carmens action due to res judicata
84
and lis pendens
85
which was sustained by the CFI.
Carmens motion was dismissed.
- When Carmen sought to have the agreement annulled, Alfonso moved for an execution
86
of the judgement and to have
Carmen charged for contempt. The CFI denied Carmens action to reconsider the agreement and granted Alfonsos motion for
execution.
- Carmen appealed these decisions to the CA but they were certified to the SC directly because only questions of law were
involved.
- However, Carmens certiorari petition to the CA challenging the CFIs immediate execution of judgment was granted. The CA
voided the CFI challenged CFI order. This CA decision was appealed by Alfonso to the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by Alfonso and Carmen, as well as the CFI decision ratifying it are conformable
to law

Held:
YES with respect to the separation of property and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership property but NOT with the issue of
custody of the children.

Ratio:
- The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership provided judicial
sanction is secured beforehand. Articles 190 and 191 of the CC are exactly to that effect.
- Plus, the spouses have been separated for so long that the propriety of severing their financial and proprietary interests is
manifest. Moreover, the court cannot compel the husband and wife to live together
87
.
- However, with respect to the custody of the two older children (both then below 7 yrs. old), the lower court erred in allowing
them to be separated from their mother. Article 363 of the CC provides that children below 7 years shall not be separated
from their mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
- The CFI decision disregarded the mandatory character of the ord shall in Article 363 of the CC. Such use of the word, plus
the observations of the Code Commission on the matter underscores its mandatory nature.
- The CFI decision based its decision to award custody of the children solely on the agreement of the spouses
88
. Courts cannot
proceed on mere insinuations; they must be confronted with facts before they can properly adjudicate.
- However, because 5 years have passed since the original petitions, only one of the four kids is below the age of 7, thus the
issue of the custody award becomes moot and academic. Plus, the oldest kid is now over 10, and his decision as to which
parent hed like to stay with should be given consideration by the court pursuant to sec. 6 Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Result:
84
Latinforalreadyjudged,meaningtheactionisbarredbypriorjudgment;sincetheissuehasalreadybeendecidedbythecourt,nopartycanresubmitthesame
toquestiontothecourtforredetermination.
85
Latinforsuitpending,meaningtheactionmustbebarredbecausethesameissueisstillpendinglitigationinanothertribunal
86
Meaningthattheorderofthecourtbeimmediatelyenforcedunderpainofcontemptofthosewhodonotheedthecourtsorder
87
CitingtheSCdecisioninArroyovsVasquezdeArroyo
88
TheCFInotedthatthespousesdeclinedtogivereasonsfortheirproposedchildcustodyarrangement,alludingonlytothelikelihoodthatitcouldbethesourcefor
succulentmorselforscandalmongersandidlegossipersandsotheywishedtosavetheirchildrenfromembarrassmentandaresultinginferioritycomplexbecause
ofthese.

All the appealed decisions are affirmed except the issue of custody which is remanded to the CFI for further proceedings. The
CFI must receive evidence concerning which parent is best suited to have custody of the children, if there are compelling reasons
to deprive the mother of custody over the child below 7, and which parent the child over 10 prefers to stay with. KEBABdigest

Maquilan v. Maquilan 524 SCRA 166 (2007)

MAQUILAN (Virgilio) v. MAQUILAN (Dita)
June 8, 2007 | Petition for Review on certiorari of the decision of CA | Austria-Martinez, J:

FACTS:
Parties are spouses. The wife was convicted of adultery and sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of prision correccional
89
.
Thereafter, the wife filed for Declaration of Nullity of marriage, dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the husband.
During the pre-trial of the petition for nullity, the spouses entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, which was given by the RTC
judge a judicial imprimatur
90
. The husband, in an Omnibus Motion, later sought to repudiate the contract on the grounds that his
previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of that agreement.
RTC denied the omnibus motion and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Upon petition for certiorari and prohibition of the husband to the CA, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Compromise Agreement was valid
2. WON the participation of the Solicitor General/ Provincial Prosecutor is necessary in the proceedings for the Compromise
Agreement
3. WON the wife convicted of adultery is disqualified from sharing in the CP
4. WON the Compromise Agreement can repudiated on the grounds that the husband was not intelligently and judiciously
informed of its consequences by his lawyer

HELD:
1. YES.
a. Art 43 (2)
91
of FC and Art 63
92
are inapplicable to this case. The present case involves a proceeding where the
nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared on the ground of psychological incapacity (not legal separation or
reappearance of an absent spouse).
b. Existing law and jurisprudence do not prohibit the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties.
c. Under Art 143 of Family Code, a separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause subject to
judicial approval even if there is a pending proceeding for the declaration of nullity of marriage (granted that the rights
of creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest shall be protected)
2. No. Art 48
93
shall not apply. SolGen not necessary. Nothing in the compromise agreement touched into the very merits of the
case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of any possible collusion between the parties.
3. No. Based from Art 34
94
and Art 43
95
, the crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction, which
deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.
4. No. Aside from the claim of the husband is hardly evident, it is well-settled that the negligence of a counsel binds the client.
The act of the lawyer is regarded as an act of the client. There may be exceptions when there is gross negligence of counsel
resulting to deprivation of property of his client. No such exception exists in the case.

JUDGMENT: Petition is DENIED. Compromise Agreement is VALID. KEBABdigest

89
From1year8mo.to3years6mo.and21days.
90
,Used to indicate official approval by whatever authorities or powers are pertinent to the field in question but is commonly referred to as an official declaration
from the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church that a literary or similar work is free from error in matters of Roman Catholic doctrine, and hence acceptable
readingforfaithfulRomanCatholics.
91
The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said
marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common
children,or,iftherearenone,thechildrenoftheguiltyspousebyapreviousmarriageorindefaultofchildren,theinnocentspouse.
92
Thedecreeoflegalseparationshallhavethefollowingeffects:
(2)theabsolutecommunityortheconjugalpartnershipshallbedissolvedandliquidatedbuttheoffendingspouseshallhavenorighttoanyshareofthenet
profitsearnedbytheabsolutecommunityortheconjugalpartnership,whichshallbeforfeitedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofarticle43(2).
93
Inallcasesofannulmentordeclarationofabsolutenullityofmarriage,theCourtshallordertheprosecutingattorneyorthefiscalassignedtoittoappearonbehalf
oftheStatetotakestepstopreventcollusionbetweenthepartiesandtotakecarethatevidenceisnotfabricatedorsuppressed.
94
CivilInterdictionshalldeprivetheoffenderduringthetimeofhissentenceoftherightsofparentalauthority,orguardianship,eitherastothepersonorpropertyof
anyward,ormaritalauthority,oftherighttomanagehispropertyandoftherighttodisposeofsuchpropertybyanyactoranyconveyanceintervivos.
95
The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification
providedinthisarticlealthoughpardonedastotheprincipalpenalty,unlessthesameshallhavebeenexpresslyremittedinthepardon.

E. Regime of Separate Property
F. Property Regimes of Unions without Marriage

Yaptinchay v. Torres, 28 SCRA 489 (1969)
28 SCRA 489 | June 9, 1969 | Sanchez, J.

PETITIONER: Teresita C. Yaptinchay
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Guillermo Torres, CFI Rizal, Pasig Branch, Virginia Y. Yaptinchay et al

FACTS:
Petitioner cohabited with Isidro Yaptinchay for 19 years. Upon the death of Isidro, she filed a petition for appointment as
Administratrix of estate of the deceased in CFI Rizal, Pasay. Deceased left 3 daughters: Virginia, Mary and Asuncion. Court
appointed Teresita as special administratrix.
J osefina Yaptinchay, alleged legitimate wife and other children of the deceased opposed Teresitas petition claiming that she had
no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement much less to procure appointment as administratrix being not qualified for
want of integrity. At the same time, oppositors counter-petitioned for the appointment of Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, daughter of the
deceased, as special administratrix and of J osefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged surviving spouse, as regular administratrix. After
hearing, probate court named Virginia Y. Yaptinchay special administratrix
Inventory done by the admistratrix included the North Forbes Park property being claimed by petitioner.
Petitioner filed an action for replevin and for liquidation of the partnership supposedly formed during the period of her cohabitation
with CFI Rizal, Pasig. Pending hearing, respondent judge issued a TRO against respondents from disposing of North Forbes Park
property. Defendants resisted the action, opposed the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction.
Court denied petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to the Forbes Park property and lifted TRO. Court then
amended its order and enjoined defendants and/or their duly authorized agents or representatives from selling, disposing or
otherwise encumbering said property pending the termination of case. MR denied, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON petitioner can claim co-ownership of North Forbes Park property

HELD/RATIO: NO, Loans presented by petitioner stated different purpose other than for the North Forbes Park property

Article 144 "When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void
from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership."
The creation of the civil relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, existence of which must first be
shown before rights to accrue.

One such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation,
really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests
in the property cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of
injunction. Injunction is not to protect contingent or future rights;

nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right.

The interests of the parties would be better safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes Park property be in the hands of the
bonded administratrix in the estate proceedings. For then, her acts would be subject to the control of the probate court.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed. Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dissolved and set aside. KEBABdigest

Juaniza v. Jose, 89 SCRA 306 (1979)
VICTOR JUANIZA V. EUGENIO JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. and ROSALIA ARROYO
De Castro, J. | Nos. L-50127-28 | March 30, 1979 | Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Laguna

Facts:
Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-appelant Rosalia Arroyo for 16
years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
J ose was the registered owner and operator of a passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train
resulting in the death of 7 and physical injuries to 5 of its passengers.
In the resulting case for damages, the Court of First Instance rendered decision ordering Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo
to jointly and severally pay.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia praying that she should not be liable to pay for damages since the
decision was based on the erroneous theory that she was living together with Jose as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, are co-owners of the jeepney.
The motion was denied. The court based their decision on Article 144 of the CC, which provides that:

When a man and a woman living together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage
is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.


Issues:
WON A144 is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry. (NO)

WON Rosalia, who is not a registered owner of the jeep can be held solidarily liable for damages w/ the registered owner. (NO)

Held/ Ratio:
NO. It has been consistently ruled that the co-ownership contemplated in A144, requires that the man and woman living together must
not be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since J ose is legally married to Socorro, there is an impediment for him to contract
marriage with Rosalia. Thus, Rosalia cant be a co-owner of the jeep. The jeep belongs to the conjugal partnership of J ose and
Socorro. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Rosalia for damages arising from the death of & physical injuries suffered by the
passengers.

NO. Rosalia, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney, can neither be held liable for damages caused by its operation, because
only the registered owner of a public service is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or
maybe caused to any passengers therein. KEBABdigest

Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315 (1971)

Facts:
An appeal on purely questions of law.
J ose Consuguera contracted two marriages, the first with respondent Rosario Diaz, and he second, which was contracted in good faith,
while the first marriage was subsisting, with petitioner Basilia Berdin. Consuguera had no children with Diaz and seven with Berdin.
Consuguera died on September 26, 1965, and being a member of the GSIS, the proceeds of his life insurance were paid by the GSIS
to petitioner Basilia Berdin and her children who were the beneficiaries of said insurance.
Having been in service for 22.5028 years, Consuguera was entitled to retirement insurance benefits in the sum of 6,304.47 pesos,
pursuant to Section 12(c) of Commonwealth Act 186 as amended by RA 1616 and 3386. Unlike the life insurance however,
Consuguera did not name any beneficiaries to his retirement benefits.
Rosario Diaz, the first wife, filed a claim with GSIS, asking that the retirement benefits be paid to her, as the only legal heir of
Consuguera. Berdin and her children likewise claimed the retirement benefits. They claim that they are the beneficiaries of the
retirement benefits by virtue of being beneficiaries to the life insurance.
GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of Consuguera were, on one hand, Diaz, who deserved 8/16 of the retirement benefits should go to Diaz,
while 8/16 would go to Berdin and her seven children with Consuguera. Berdin thus, had 1/16 of the benefits.
Berdin and her children filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction, naming as respondents GSIS, the Commissioner of
Public Highways, the Highway District Engineer of Surigao del Norte, the Commissioner of Civil Service and Rosario Diaz, praying that
petitioners be declared the legal heirs and exclusive beneficiaries and that GSIS should be restrained from implementing their
adjudication.
RTC refrained from issuing the writ of preliminary injunction and rendered judgment, affirming the actions of GSIS. When two women
innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of said wedlock, will be
regarded as legitimate children and each family will be entitled to one half of the estate.
Issues: WoN Berdin and children are beneficiaries of retirement benefits by virtue of being beneficiaries to the life insurance.
WoN RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that each family is entitled to one-half of the estate.
Held:
No. Originally, Commonwealth Act 186, the law creating GSIS only provided for life insurance which would be automatically given to
their employees. The retirement benefits were only added later on. In RA 660, there is a chapter on life insurance and a different
chapter on retirement benefits. Later amendments provided for benefits for an employee who has served for at least 20 years.
When Consuguera named Berdin and their children as the beneficiaries of his life insurance when he started to work for GSIS
sometime in 1943, he could not have intended to name them as benefits of his retirement benefits as well because the provisions on
retirement benefits only came in 1951.
Retirement benefits are primarily intended for the benefit of the employee. Thus, if the person reaches retirement age, the benefits are
given to him, and not his wife or children. The only way for his heirs to receive the said benefits are if he dies. If that happens, the

benefits would accrue to his estate which will eventually be inherited by his heirs. Thus, by its nature, there is no need to even name
beneficiaries to the retirement benefits.
It cannot be said then, that Berdin and her children were also the exclusive beneficiaries of the retirement benefits.
GSIS and the RTC ruled correctly on the matter.
In construing the rights of two women married to the same man, a situation more or less similar to this case, it was held that since the
defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void, the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not
ceased. Nor has the first wife lost her status as putative heir of her husband. With respect to the second wife, although the second
marriage can be deemed as void ab initio, still there is need for a judicial declaration of such nullity. And since the conjugal property
was dissolved before the judicial declaration, it would only be just and equitable to recognize the right of the second wife to one-half of
the estate, and the other half to the first wife.
Decision: RTC decision AFFIRMED. Each family is entitled to half of the estate of the deceased. KEBABdigest

Maxey v. CA
96
, 129 SCRA 187 (1984)
[Certiorari; Gutierrez, Jr.; May 11, 1984]

Short Summary: The marriage law of 1903 does not recognize the validity of a marriage that is celebrated in "military fashion". In this
case, the couple got married only on Feb. 16, 1919 after living as common-law spouses before that. Under Art. 144 of the NCC, co-
ownership arises even if the common-law wife is not gainfully employed, or does not work.
Notes: as in the case of Maxey, a common-law wife who is not gainfully employed contributes to the co-ownership as a homemaker.
The law in this case provides for a special kind of co- ownership...which cannot be terminated, and wherein the share may not be
encumbered or disposed of without the consent of the other.

Facts:
+ Melbourne & Regina were common-law spouses since 1903. Their children claim that they were married in a military
fashion. During this time, Melbourne acquired lands through purchase. A church marriage occurred in 1919 but W died
afterwards
+ Melbourne remarried. Through 2
nd
W as an attorney-in-fact, H sold the properties to the defendants-spouses.
+ During the period of their cohabitation, man acquired a lands through purchase. After womans death, man sold the property
to the defendant-spouses through an atty-in-fact.
+ The children of the common-law spouses want the sale documents annulled & for the properties to be recovered on the
grounds that the land was a common property of their parents, that the property was acquired through the joint effort of their
parents, and that their consent to the sale was not obtained by H.Defendant-spouses claim that they are purchasers in good
faith, believing that H was the real and exclusive owner of the properties. They also claimed to have open, exclusive, and
continuous possession of the properties.
+ Lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs upon invocation of Art 144, CC
97
and that when a man and woman lived together as
H&W, the woman should be entitled to share in the property.
+ CA ruled that the man was the exclusive owner of the property since there was no CLEAR showing that the woman had
contributed to the common property.
o H was the Deputy Governor of Zamboanga, provincial treasurer, district supervisor and school superintendent in
Davao
o W did not have a property of her on.

Issues:
1. WON the spouses were married in 1903 (military fashion) or in 1919. [1919, cite marriage law in 1903]
2. W ON the lands are the Hs exclusive property
3. WON joint efforts was used in a limited sense

Held/Ratio: Properties were co-owned by the spouses
1. Act No. 3613 or the Revised Marriage Law was approved in 1929 and took effect 6 months after that. It couldnt have applied
to the Maxeys and it also didnt have any provision on military fashion marriages. The marriage law in 1903 was GO 70 and it
also doesnt allow military fashion marriages. Thus, the couple married in 1919.
+ The CA opined that the law contemplates money contributions and not homemaker services, following therefore the
ruling of the trial court in saying that the woman could not have contributed in order to acquire said property. (given the
Old Civil Code)
96
Petitioners:Margaret,Florence,andLucilleMaxey
Respondents:CA,SpousesBeatoMacayraandAlacopueMonday
97
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquiredbyeitherorbothofthemthroughtheirworkorindustryortheirwagesandsalariesshallbegovernedbytherulesoncoownership.(n)

+ The SC opined otherwise by applying the New Civil Code provisions retroactively per considerations of justice. The NCC
provision recognizes that it would be unjust and abnormal if a woman who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship
except for a valid marriage must abandone her home and children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to
earn a living or engage in business before the rules on co-ownership would apply. The SC went on to say that in the
traditional Filipino family setup, the wife holds the purse even if she does not contribute to the funds in that purse.
98

+ The real contribution does not consist solely of earnings from a profession, occupation or business but also her
contribution to the familys material and spiritual goods thru caring for the children, administering the household,
husbanding scarce resources, freeing her H from household tasks, and performance the duties of a housewife.
+ The law was applied retroactively. KEBABdigest

Valdes v. RTC & Gomez-Valdes, 260 SCRA 221 (1996)
31 July 1996 | Vitug, J. | Petition for review of a decision of the RTC of QC, Br. 102
Facts:
Antonio Valdes (petitioner) and Consuelo Gomez (private respondent) were married in 1971.
In 1992, Antonio filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage due to mutual psychological incapacity (Art. 36)
The RTC granted his petition in 1994 and stipulated that
o their 3 older kids may choose with whom they want to live while their 2 younger kids will be under the custody of
Consuelo and that
o they are directed to start the proceeding on the liquidation of their common properties in compliance with Art. 147
and Arts. 50-52
99
of the Family Code
Consuelo sought clarification w/ regard to the applicability of Arts. 50-52 and in the same proceedings, their 3 older kids
expressed their desire to live with Antonio.
The RTC ruled that Arts. 50-52 do not apply to their case and that the prevailing property regime is that of co-ownership
Antonio filed an MR and was denied, so he appealed to the SC

Issues:
1) W/N Arts. 50-52 apply to void marriages whose cause is psychological incapacity [NO]
2) W/N the family home or conjugal dwelling should go to the spouse with the custody of majority of the common children (i.e.
Antonio) [NO]

Held/Ratio:
1) NO. Article 50 talks about Art. 43 and Art. 40, the 1
st
one applies only to voidable marriages and the 2
nd
refers to the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially
declared void
100
.
2) Since the marriage is void, Art. 147 applies, so that the parties co-own their conjugal house and lot which should be divided
equally between them. Thus, Arts. 102 and 129 providing that said house and lot should be adjudicated to the spouse with
whom the majority of the children choose to remain, do not apply.
101

The fruits of the separate properties of the spouses do not become part of the co-ownership between them, whether under Art.
147 or 148.
102
KEBABdigest
98
EvencitedDeanIreneCortes(wifeholdsthepurse)andGGLeonardWood(thebestmanisawoman).
99
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriagevoid.(n)
Art.45.Causesforannulment
Art.50.Theeffectsprovidedforbyparagraphs(2),(3),(4)and(5)ofArticle43andbyArticle44shallalsoapplyinthepropercasestomarriageswhicharedeclared
abinitioorannulledbyfinaljudgmentunderArticles40and45.
Thefinaljudgmentinsuchcasesshallprovidefortheliquidation,partitionanddistributionofthepropertiesofthespouses,thecustodyandsupportofthecommon
children,andthedeliveryofthirdpresumptivelegitimes,unlesssuchmattershadbeenadjudicatedinpreviousjudicialproceedings.
Allcreditorsofthespousesaswellasoftheabsolutecommunityortheconjugalpartnershipshallbenotifiedoftheproceedingsforliquidation.
Inthepartition,theconjugaldwellingandthelotonwhichitissituated,shallbeadjudicatedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofArticles102and129.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
deliveredincash,propertyorsoundsecurities,unlesstheparties,bymutualagreementjudiciallyapproved,hadalreadyprovidedforsuchmatters.
Thechildrenortheirguardianorthetrusteeoftheirpropertymayaskfortheenforcementofthejudgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of
eitherofbothoftheparents;butthevalueofthepropertiesalreadyreceivedunderthedecreeofannulmentorabsolutenullityshallbeconsideredasadvanceson
theirlegitime.(n)
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the
children'spresumptivelegitimesshallberecordedintheappropriatecivilregistryandregistriesofproperty;otherwise,thesameshallnotaffectthirdpersons.(n)
Art.102.DissolutionofACP(6)Conjugaldwellingandlotgotospousewithcustodyofmajorityofthecommonchildren.
Art.129.DissolutionofCPG(9)Conjugaldwellingandlotgotospousewithcustodyofmajorityofthecommonchildren.
100
TheprinciplebehindArt.40istodoawaywithanycontinuinguncertaintyonthestatusofthesecondmarriage
101
SempioDiycommentingonthiscase.
102
Id.

Carino v. Carino, 351 SCRA 127 (2001)
Petition for review on certiorari | Ynares-Santiago, J. | February 2, 2001

Petitioner: Susan Nicdao
Respondent: Susan Yee

FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Carino has contracted two marriages:
o The first one was with Susan Nicdao whom he begot two children (1969)
o Second was with Susan Yee (1992). But they do not have any children in their ten-year cohabitation since 1982
Carino died in 1992 due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis; until his death, Susan Yee took care of him, and
his medical and burial expenses
Upon his death, both filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance:
o Susan Nicdao: P146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig
o Susan Yee: P21,000 from GSIS Life, GSIS and SSS for burial
Susan Yee filed a case to collect one-half of the P146,000 collected by Susan Nicdao
She admitted that her marriage with Carino was CONTRACTED DURING THE SUBSISTENCE of the latters prior marriage to
Susan Nicdao, but, she presented evidence that the PRIOR MARRIAGE WAS CONTRACTED WITHOUT MARIAGE
LICENSE. As evidences, she presented:
o Marriage certificate of Carino and Susan Nicdao without license number
o Certification from civil registry in San J uan certifying that they have no record of marriage license
The trial court and CA ruled in favour of the respondent

ISSUE: W/N the prior marriage was valid?
W/N second spouse can get of the share in benefits?

DECISION: (petition granted, decision is reversed and set aside)
Basing from the decision in Republic v. CA, the court held that such certification from the civil registry of San J uan is sufficient
to prove the non-issuance of marriage license because of its probative value
o But it does not follow that the second marriage is valid, since, under art. 40 (FC), a judicial declaration of nullity is
needed to contract second marriage. Absent the declaration, said marriage is void ab initio.
Since both marriages are void, the provisions in Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage should be followed.
o SUSAN YEE: Under art. 148 (property regime of bigamous, adulterous marriages, etc.)- only properties through their
actual contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective contributions. Hence, because said
benefits are earned by the deceased as a police officer, they are not owned in common but BELONG TO CARINO
ALONE. She has no right to claim the same.
o SUSAN NICDAO: Under art. 147 (parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by impediment to contract
marriage, but the marriage was void)- wages and salaries are owned by them in equal shares. Hence, even if the
said benefits are earned by the deceased alone, because of the mandate of CO-OWNERSHIP under said article, and
there is NO ALLEGATION OF BAD-FAITH, of the death benefits should go to the petitioner.
o In the case used by the RTC and CA in favour of respondent, the Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS case is premised on
the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This was clarified in the case
Domingo v. CA. KEBABdigest


Rivera v. Heirs of Villanueva
GR # 141501 | July 21, 2006 | Corona, J.

Facts:
- Romualdo Villanueva cohabited with Pacita Gonzales w/o the benefit of marriage because he was legally married to Amanda
Musngi. Villanueva and Gonzales relationship lasted from 1927 to Gonzales death in 1980. Villanuevas legal wife died in
1963.
- The two acquired a lot of properties during their cohabitation. When Gonzales died, Villanueva and his supposed daughter
with Gonzales, Angelina, executed a deed of extra-judicial partition, dividing up Gonzales estate. Villanueva sold his interests
in the estate to Angelina.
- Epifanio Rivera, Gonzales half-brother, and company filed a case for partition of Gonzales estate and annulment of titles +
damages against Villanueva and Angelina. The case is dismissed by the RTC, and in doing so, made two findings:
o That Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and;
o Angelina was the illegitimate child of Gonzales and Villanueva, therefore Gonzales sole heir to the exclusion of
Rivera et al.
- The CA affirms the RTC decision on appeal.
- Rivera et al appeal to the SC alleging that both the RTC and CA erred because they ruled Angelina to be Gonzales
illegitimate child and sole heir when that issue was supposedly settled in another case where the trial court ruled that Angelina
was neither an illegitimate nor adopted child of Gonzales

Issues:
1. Whether or not Angelina is an either illegitimate or adopted child of Gonzales
2. Whether or not the properties acquired by Gonzales and Villanueva during their cohabitation was equally owned by them.

Held:
1. NO. She is neither an illegitimate nor adopted child of Gonzales.
2. NO. The properties acquired by the two during the time when their relationship was still adulterous (i.e. when Villanuevas legal
wife was still alive) is not covered by the CC provisions on co-ownership.

Ratio:
1. The only proof that the RTC and the CA considered to rule that Angelina was an illegitimate child of Gonzales and Villanueva
was her birth certificate which said so. However, a closer examination of the birth certificate actually reveals that Angelina was
supposedly adopted by the couple. Unfortunately, Angelina never presented any other evidence to prove that she was
indeed adopted by the couple. Angelina could not have been the biological daughter of Gonzales either because Gonzales
was already 44 years old and on the verge of menopause when she allegedly begot Angelina; Gonzales and Villanueva had
also been living childless together for 20 years already, therefore it is highly unlikely that Angelina is Gonzales biological
daughter.
2. The cohabitation of Gonzales and Villanueva from 1927 to 1963 was adulterous because Villanuevas legal wife was still alive
at the time. According to the SC decisions in J uaniza vs J ose and Agapay vs Palang, the provisions of Article 144 of the CC
establishing co-ownership as the property regime of couples living together as husband and wife w/o marriage do not apply
when the parties are incapacitated from getting married; because of this, it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or
her actual contribution to the acquisition of the property to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Thus, only the properties
acquired by the couple after 1963 (when their relationship was no longer adulterous) would be covered by the provisions of art
144 CC.

Result:
Case remanded to RTC for further proceedings because Rivera et als relationship to Gonzales was not sufficiently proven.

Angelina is disqualified from inheriting from Gonzales, thus the extra-judicial partition she and Villanueva made is rendered null and
void.

Obiter:
Res J udicata -- a matter adjudged; a thing or matter settled by judgement.

Requisites of Res J udicata:

1. the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final
2. the decision must be rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties
3. the disposition of the case must be on the merits
4. there must be identity of the parties, subject matter, and causes if action between the first and second action.

The earlier case ruling that Angelina was neither an illegitimate nor adopted child of Gonzales does not have a res judicata effect on
this case because there was no identity of parties (Angelina was not a party in the first case), there was no identity of cause of action,
and the first court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Angelina. KEBABdigest


Saguid v. CA, 403 SCRA 678 (2003)

JACINTO SAGUID V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC,
MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY
Ynares-Santiago, J. | G.R. No. 150611 | June 10, 2003 | Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Facts:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met petitioner J acinto
Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in J uly 1987. After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a
house built on a lot owned by J acintos father.
J acinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel Saguid Brothers. Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer,
but decided to work as an entertainer in J apan from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with J acintos relatives turned sour.
In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation.
Gina Rey filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner with the
Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque. She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan,
she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an
entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household
effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties
and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to
her.
RTC: Rendered decision in favor of Gina Rey, ordered Saguid t reimburse her P70,000. Deliver personal properties to her.
CA: Decision affirmed, however, the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages was deleted for lack of basis.
Hence the appeal.

Issue:
WON the lower court erred in allowing private respondent to present evidence ex parte (NO)
WON the lower courts decision (in favor of Gina Rey) is supported by evidence (NO)

Held/ Ratio:
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64166 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Private respondent Gina S. Rey
is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal
properties to the extent of P55,687.50.

NO. The fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules. There is
nothing in the Constitution which mandates that a party in a non-criminal proceeding be represented by counsel and that the absence of
such representation amounts to a denial of due process. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession is not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed
ignored or violated.

However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically, Section 6, Rule 18
thereof, rendered moot and academic the issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to present evidence ex parte for failure of
the defendant to file a pre-trial brief. While the rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the same is not called for in the case at
bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on J uly 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was required under Circular
No. 1-89 which became effective on February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the said circular, [f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the
same effect as the failure to appear at the pre-trial, that is, the party may be declared non-suited or considered as in default.

NO.
Article 148 applies:
It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly married to another
man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148
103
of the Family
Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships
where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime,
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ... Proof of actual contribution is required.

Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effecti vity of the Famil y
Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in
103
Art. 148.In cases of cohabitation not falling under [Article 147], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributionsandcorrespondingsharesarepresumedtobeequal.Thesameruleandpresumptionshallapplytojointdepositsofmoneyandevidencesofcredit.
Ifoneofthepartiesisvalidlymarriedtoanother,hisorhershareinthecoownershipshallaccruetotheabsolutecommunityorconjugalpartnershipexistinginsuch
validmarriage.Ifthepartywhoactedinbadfaithisnotvalidlymarriedtoanother,hisorhershareshallbeforfeitedinthemannerprovidedinthelastparagraphof
theprecedingArticle.


Article 144 of the Ci vil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations
of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before
the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.

Gina Reys share clarified:
The controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Gina Rey alleged in her complaint that she contributed
P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What
appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and December 23,
1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00.

On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal properties came partly from their joint
account with First Allied Development Bank. While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account
deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148
of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respecti ve contribution, their share shall be presumed to
be equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not questioned
by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.

The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which granted the reliefs prayed for by pri vate
respondent. On the basis of the evidence established, the extent of private respondents co-ownership over the disputed house is only
up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the construction thereof. Anent the personal properties, her participation
therein should be limited only to the amount of P55,687.50. KEBABdigest

San Luis v. Sagalongos, 514 SCRA 294 (2007)
(Feb 6, 2007) | Ynares-Santiago, J.

PETITIONER: EDGAR SAN LUIS (GR No 133743); RODOLFO SAN LUIS (GR No. 134029)
RESPONDENTS: FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS-SAN LUIS
Keywords: co-ownership, residence, domicile

FACTS:
Case for settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, former governor of Laguna.
Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
1
st
Virginia Sulit (1942) six children (Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, et al) Virginia died (1963).
2
nd
Merry Lee Corwin, American (1968): son, Tobias. Divorced, Hawaii (1973)
3
rd
Felicidad Sagalongos (1974), no child, 18 years
Felicisimo died in 1992; Respondent filed a petition for letters of administration in RTC Makati City
Rodolfo and Linda San Luis filed a motion to dismiss(ground: improper venue; lack of standing: their father still married to Corwin),
denied
RTC dismissed the petition for letters of administration. Felicisimo was governor and resident of the Laguna at the time of his
death. Petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen.
It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested
rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
On appeal, CA reversed orders of the RTC
CA ruled Sec 1, Rule 73 RoC: "place of residence" fixing the venue of settlement of estate, refers to the personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted
that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the
petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
CA also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of par 2, Art 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, J r. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly
dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result,
under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
MR denied, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: (1)WON venue was properly laid.
(2)WON respondent has legal capacity to file petition for letters of administration


HELD/RATIO:
(1) YES; The petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in
which he resides at the time of his death."
In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor. "Resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary.
It is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the case, Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale of aforesaid property.
She also presented billing statements from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San J uanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented
proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association and Ayala Country Club, Inc., letter-envelopes from
1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San J uanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna."
(2) Yes; We find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The
ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to
remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr.
Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law."
More than twenty centuries ago, J ustinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. J ustice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that
it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.
69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo
to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However,
the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,
70
the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading
and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent.
However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person
and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of
their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144
76
of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of
the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples
living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.
78
In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,
79
we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
80
The Court described the
property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but
who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their
respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry.
Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied. Case remanded to trial court for further proceedings. KEBABdigest


XI. The Family
A. Members of a Family
1. Nature and Scope of Family Relations Art. 149-151, FC
2. Support Art. 195-208, CC; Art. 207, FC

Lacson v. Lacson, 499 SCRA 677 (2006)
EDWARD LACSON V. MAOWEE DABAN LACSON and MAONAA DABAN LACSON, represented by their mother and guardian
ad-litem, LEA DABAN LACSON
Garcia, J. | G.R. No. 150644 | August 28, 2006 | Petition for review of a decision from the CA

FACTS:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and
his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long
after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to
seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia
Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to
return later to the house of Leas mother.
It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for support, relying initially on his
commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however,
Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though,
that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses.
Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom
eventually took up nursing at St. Pauls College in Iloilo City.
Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother filed a complaint for support
Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their needs. He explained, however, that his
lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at
times to give regular support.
RTC rendered on J une 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment, the
trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum
which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears.
CA dismissed Edwards appeal.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred when it affirmed the grant of support in arrears from 1976 1994
HELD/ RATIO:
NO. Petition is DENIED and the appealed CA decision and resolution are AFFIRMED.

Edward invokes the following provision of the Family Code:
Article 203 The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to
receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand.

To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the aforequoted provision starts from the filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from
that moment can it be said that an effective demand for support was made upon him.

Petitioners above posture has little to commend itself. For one, it conveniently glossed over the fact that he veritably abandoned the
respondent sisters even before the elder of the two could celebrate her second birthday. To be sure, petitioner could not plausibly
expect any of the sisters during their tender years to go through the motion of demanding support from him, what with the
fact that even their mother (his wife) found it difficult during the period material to get in touch with him. For another, the
requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime in 1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in
the sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor commonly used by legal advocates in a demand
letter. Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was, however, definitely made.

CA decision reads:
We could not confer judicial approval upon [petitioners] posture of trying to evade his responsibility to give support to his daughters
simply because their mother did not make a "formal" demand therefor from him. [Petitioners] insistence on requiring a formal demand
from his wife is truly pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and commitment to comply with such obligation through a note in
his own handwriting. Said note [stating that he will "sustain his two daughters Maowee and Maonaa"] also stated "as requested by their
mother" thus practically confirming the fact of such demand having been made by [respondents] mother. The trial court thus correctly
ruled that [petitioners] obligation to pay support in arrears should commence from 1976. (Words in bracket added).


Also, Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner.
The provision reads:

When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the
latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person
obliged to give support.

As for the amount of support in arrears, the Court held that there is also no reason to disturb the absolute figures arrived at by
the two courts below. KEBABdigest

3. Funerals Art. 305-310, CC

Penobscot Area Housing Development Corp. v. City of Brewer, 438 A.2d. 14 (1981)

Facts:
PAHDC is an private, non-profit organization that caters to the needs of mentally-retarded persons, especially adults.
PAHDC negotiated to buy a house and lot in a district of the City of Brewer which was zoned for low density single family residential
use under the citys zoning ordinance.
PAHDC applied to the City code enforcement officer for an occupancy certificate and described the proposed use as group home for 6
mentally-retarded adults or older minors which group home would be licensed as a Boarding by the State. The group home would be
supervised by approximately two full-time employees.
The officer denied the application since it did not meet the terms of the City of Brewers zoning ordinance as a single family. He
suggested that PAHD comply with the zoning ordinance by applying for a nursing home instead and by meeting the additional
requirements of a nursing home.
PAHDC insist on their application and appealed to the Citys Board of Appeals. The Board of Appeals agreed with the reasoning of the
officer (Whetherbee).
PAHDC filed a complaint with Superior Court of Kennebee County.
Issue: Procedural issue of WoN Kennebee County Superior Court is the right venue
WoN the group of mentally-retarded adults and minor children was a single family.
WoN the ordinance is Constitutional.
Held:
(Wag na siguro recite to) First, Moot and Academic. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has no standing and that Superior Court was not
the proper venue. The SC feels no need to review the decision of the Superior Court to dismiss Defendants motion to dismiss because
Plaintiff has put forward three incompetent wards of the state, chosen to live in the proposed home, who under state legislation and the
mandate of the federal court, are entitled to living accommodations in an environment least restrictive to their liberty. There is now a
distinct interest that would fulfill the requirement of standing.
Second, No.
Definition of Family: A family is a single individual doing his own cooking, and living upon the premises as a separate housekeeping
unit, or a collective body of persons, doing their own cooking, and living together upon the premises as a separate housekeeping unit in
a domestic relationship, based upon birth, marriage or other domestic bond as distinguished from a group occupying a boarding house,
lodging house, club, fraternity or hotel.
Plaintiff cites many cases where unique groups were regarded as families. Plaintiff asserts that the domestic bonds formed by the
mentally-retarded occupants is sufficient to be called a family. The cases cited by plaintiff cannot be used in the instant case. The
groups in the cases had permanent resident authoritative figures (i.e. a resident married couple as surrogate parents to several
children).
Plaintiff asserts that the employees serve as resident heads. They, however, do not live in the house and would serve in a rotation-
basis. Indeed, where the domestic bonds are not by virtue of blood or marriage, a permanent resident authoritative figure is even more
important.

Lastly, the definition of the family requires that the household must do its own cooking and live as a separate housekeeping unit. The
employees, however, are the ones who are in charge of the cooking. They shall plan and manage the activities of the residents and
they are also responsible for other things like cleaning. Such arrangement fails to comply with the requirements found in the definition.
Third, Yes, it is Constitutional.
Firstly, PAHDC failed to allege any fundamental rights that were infringed. Assuming arguendo that there were rights that were
infringed, the ordinance would still be valid if it was pursuant to a valid state interest. Such zoning ordinance is indeed for the valid state
interest of laying out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a
sanctuary for people.
Plaintiff asserts that the ordinance is improperly directed at relations among persons instead of land use. The language of the ordinance
itself refutes plaintiffs claim since the ordinance includes and recognizes domestic bonds other than those by virtue of blood and
marriage.
We find it unnecessary to determine WoN mentally-retarded people are a class.
Lastly, ordinance cannot be sweeping or overbroad. By the very definition of zoning class, it cannot be seen as having prohibited the
group home that plaintiff proposes in all districts of the City of Brewer. (Pwede naman ibang lugar eh.)
Decision: Petition denied. KEBABdigest
Mendoza v. CA, 19 SCRA 756 (1967)

Facts:
+ Luisa and Cecilio were married. They lived together as husband & wife, until Cecilio left for further studies in the US after a
year. Since then, Cecilio w/o justifiable cause or reason deliberately abandoned & neglected her despite repeated demands.
Moreover, he has failed & refused to provide for her maintenance & support. She is alleged to be pregnant, sickly & w/o any
source of revenue while Cecilio is now employed in a US hospital earning USD200/mo on the average and a part-owner of
lands assessed at around PhP32k in 1955.
+ Cecilio moved for the dismissal of Luisas complaint putting in issue the validity of the marriage & that such complaint
contained no allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made before the filing of the suit pursuant to
Article 222 of the Civil Code.
+ CFI & CA dismissed his case and denied his motions. He holds that failure of the complaint to plead that he previously tried in
earnest to reach a settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be so attacked at any
stage of the case even on appeal.

ISSUE: WON the lack of compromise asserted by Cecilio applies to dismiss the claim for support against him?

RATIO:
NO. The court ruled that the claim involved future support which is within the purview of Art. 2035 of the CC, stating that such support
is not subject to compromise, clearly within the express exception also stated by Art. 222. Furthermore, in attacking the validity of their
marriage in one of his motions, Cecilio again falls within a non-comporomisable issue within Art. 2035 (haha!). KEBABdigest


Mendez v. Eugenia, 80 SCRA 82 (1977)
28 October 1977 | Fernandez, J. | Petition for review of the summary judgment of the CFI of Cebu

Facts:
Petitioners and defendants are collateral relatives (cousins, uncles and nephews). Zoila Mendez et al, filed a case against
Maximo Eugenia et al, for partition of 2 parcels of land located in Cebu. The defendants in this case alleged in their
answer that they are the absolute and exclusive owners of the 2 parcels of land and that plaintiffs have no cause of action
against them. The CFI of Cebu ruled in favor of the defendants.
But the defendants (Maximo Eugenia, et al) filed a subsequent case praying for the recovery of possession and ownership
of one of the parcels of land in the first case litigated because although the case was decided in their favor, the dispositive
portion of which did not state that Zoila Mendez group should vacate the premises. The lower court again ruled in favor of
the Maximo group.
The Zoila group assailing the two decisions of the lower court filed an appeal saying that the lower court erred in not
dismissing the complaint of Maximos group for lack of earnest efforts being exerted by the parties to arrive at an amicable
settlement before the action was instituted, the parties being members of the same family.

Issue: WON the relationship of petitioners and defendants are considered to be under the family relations specified in the Family Code
or the Civil Code (w/c was then in force).

Held/Ratio:
NO. The parties are not members of the same family as provided in Art. 217 of the CC (Art.150 of FC). Under this article,
family relations include:
a. between husband and wife,
b. between parent and child,
c. among other ascendants and their descendants and
d. among brothers and sisters.
They are collateral relatives thus said article does not apply to them. An amicable settlement is not a prerequisite before
the case can be pursued before them.
Dispositive: Appealed decision is affirmed. KEBABdigest

Guerrero v. RTC, 229 SCRA 274 (1994)
Petition for review of the orders of RTC | Belosillo, J. | January 10, 1994

Petitioner: Gaudencio Guerrero
Respondent: RTC of Ilocos Norte, Pedro Hernando

FACTS:
The case assumed another dimension when respondent court dismissed petition on the ground that the parties, being
brothers-in-law, should have alleged that earnest efforts were executed towards a compromise (art. 151 of FC)
Hernando overlooked this defect since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground
Said court in the pre-trial conference noted Guerrero and Hernando that they, being married to half-sisters, hence, brothers-in-
law, should file a motion and amended complaint stating that they have made earnest efforts to compromise but to no avail.
J udge considered this as jurisdictional defect.
Guerrero moved to reconsider said order on the ground that since brothers by affinity are not members of the family, he was
not required to exert effort. But this was denied.
He warned that he will be dismissing the complaint if they failed to file amended complaint within 5 days.
Guerrero did not file said complaint; hence, the judge dismissed it.

ISSUE: W/N brothers-in-law are considered members of the family contemplated in art. 217(4) and 222 (CC) and Sec.1(j), Rule 16 in
Rules of Court?
W/N absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted, which efforts failed, is
a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction?

DECISION: (petition granted, decision set aside)
The reason why earnest efforts towards a compromise are needed is due to the difficulty to imagine litigation between family
members. Because this breeds hatred and passion in family and generates deeper bitterness compared to lawsuits between
strangers.
No. In Gayon v. Gayon, said provisions regarding brothers and sisters as members of the family does not comprehend
brothers- or sisters-in law.
o Hernando argued that although their wives are not impleaded, it remains a truism that being spouses of contending
parties, then their interests in the real property in question cannot be denied.
o But Guerrero countered this and said that his wife has no actual interest and participation in the land subject to the
suit.
o Hence, this factual controversy must be left to the lower court to decide.

The attempt to compromise and inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of suit between members of the
family. (OLaco v, Co Cho Chit in Mendoza v. CA). It is not therefore correct that private respondent, as petitioner contends,
waived this defect in failing to move to dismiss or raise the same in the Answer. A review of the assailed orders does not show
any directive which Guerrero supposedly defied.
o The first one gave him 5 days to file motion and amended complaint with a reminder that required earnest efforts
were failed to allege
o The second one denying his motion for reconsideration stated if the plaintiff does not amend said complaint, the court
will dismiss it
o The third order dismissing the complaint without prejudice only made reference to an earlier order admonishing
counsel for Guerrero to amend the complaint, admonition is not synonymous to order
o And even so, since said orders do not find support in the jurisprudence and are only based on erroneous
interpretation and application of law, petitioner is not bound to comply with them. KEBABdigest

Hontiveros v. RTC, 309 SCRA 340 (1999)
GR # 125465 | June 29, 1999 | Mendoza, J.

Facts:
- The spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against Augustos brother Gregorio and Teodora
Ayson, allegedly Gregorios wife.
- In the course of submission of pleadings and other documents to the trial court, the spouses made a motion for a judgement
on the pleadings. The trial court denied that motion and at the same time, dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint
was not verified as required by art 151 of the FC
- The spouses appealed the dismissal of the case to the SC

Issue
104
:
Whether or not the trial court was correct in dismissing the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required by art 151
of the FC

Held: NO

Ratio:
- The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
complaint. The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are
true and correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations regarding efforts made to settle the case among members
of the same family, it could simply have ordered petitioners to verify them. As this Court has already ruled, the court may
simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends
of justice may be served Only if it is later shown that such efforts had not really been exerted would the court be justified in
dismissing the action.
Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is not exclusively among the family members. Whenever a
stranger is a party in the case involving the family members, the requisite showing the earnest efforts to compromise is no longer
mandatory. The inclusion of Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151
of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and
children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. Relationship by affinity is not given any
legal effect in this jurisdiction. Spouses are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151. KEBABdigest

104
Therewasanotherissueregardingjudgmentonthepleadings,howeveritsnotrelevanttoourcurrentsubject

B. The Family Home

Siari Valley Estates v. Lucasan, 109 Phil 294 (1960)
Aug 31, 1960 | Original Action in the SC. Certiorari and mandamus | Bautista, J.

Fast facts: During the pendency of an appeal of a case, wherein Lucasan is demanded to pay (P80,000) Siari Valley, he built a house
worth P23,000 on a parcel of land, which would later be levied
105
and sold to Siari Valley Estates. He claims that this house and lot is
his family home. It is obvious that he wanted to put his money beyond the reach of judicial execution. On the issue of the exception of
family home Lucasan lost but he won the case because of some error in the procedure of levy by the sheriff.

There was a prior case. Lucasan was ordered by CFI to deliver to Siari Valley Estates (hereafter referred to as the
corporation) the cattle inside the formers pasture or pay its value (P40,000) and damages (P40,000).SC affirmed the CFI
decision and issued a writ of execution in favor of the corporation.
Thus, lands owned by Lucasan was levied by a sheriff, who sold the lands in a public auction. The corporation was the highest
bidder so the sheriff issued to the former a final certificate of sale. However this certificate did not put the corporation in
possession of the lands so it petitioned for a writ of ownership.
An opposition was raised by Lucasan, contending that one of the parcels of land sold at the public auction is where his family
home is constituted, and therefore should be exempted from the execution. The CFI decided to exclude the parcel of land
where Lucasans family home was constituted because the levy and sale made by the sheriff with regard to said parcel was
not made in accordance with the law and so are null and void (not because it is where the family home was situated).
Hence, the corporation interposed the present petition to the SC.

ISSUES:
1. WON the levy made by the sheriff was legally ineffective
2. WON the family home extrajudicially established by respondent on the house and lot in question exempt from
execution

HELD:
1. Yes. The sheriff should have filed with the register of deeds not only a copy of the order (writ of execution) with the description
of the property, but also a notice that it is attached. The notice of sale given to Lucasan should have contained a reference to
the number of the certificate of title and the volume and page of registration book where the certificate is registered so that the
Lucanan (a debtor) shall be properly informed of the particular land or property that is under the custody of the court.
2. No. According to Article 243
106
(2) of CC, The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution except for
debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property. In the present case, the SC considered a
judgment for a sum of money even if said judgment is still pending in appeal a debt. The purpose of the provision is to
protect creditors. Hence, it is immaterial if the debt incurred is undisputed or inchoate. If Lucanan acted in good faith, he
should have waited for the decision of the appeal before he spent his money and built a house on the lot.

JUDGMENT: Order by CFI affirmed only because the levy was illegal. Without prejudice to petitioner who can file a new petition for
execution. KEBABdigest

105
Inlaw,toseizepropertyinordertosatisfypayment.
106
NowArt.155ofFC:Thefamilyhomeshallbeexemptfromexecution,forcedsaleorattachmentexcept:
(2)Fordebtsincurredpriortotheconstitutionofthefamilyhome.

Modequillo v. Breva, 185 SCRA 766 (1990)

May 31, 1990 | Gancayco, J.

PETITIONER: J ose Modequillo
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Augusto V. Breva, et al

FACTS:
In J anuary 1998, petitioner was convicted to pay damages involving a vehicular accident, which happened in 1976.
Included in the levied properties was a residential land, which he claimed be his family home since 1969, citing Art 152
107
, 153
108
,
155
109
and 162
110
of the Family Code.
Motion to quash to set aside levy on the said property was denied by trial court.

ISSUE: WON family home of petitioner is exempt from execution
HELD: NO
RATIO: The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose and was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on 1976
and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court in J anuary 1988. Both preceded the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The case does not fall under the exemptions from execution in the Family Code
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed. KEBABdigest

Taneo v. CA, 304 SCRA 308 (1999)
PABLITO TANEO, JR. ET. AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS AND ABDON GILIG
Kapunan, J. | G.R. No. 108532 | March 9, 1999 | Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Facts:
As a result of judgment in a civil case, Pablo Taneo lost a 13-year lawsuit for recovery of property against Abdon Gilig.
The decision of June 1964 ordered Pablo to pay Abdon P5,000.
The sheriff levied two of the Taneo properties: a fi ve-hectare lot in Opol, Misamis Oriental and the family home in Igpit
barrio of the same town.
- The lot in Opol was acquired by the father Pablito Sr. from Lazaro Ba-a in 1941. Despite being private land, the family
files an application for free patent (eventually approved in 1973) per the Homestead Act. This law is designated to
distribute disposable, public agricultural lots to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pablo inherited
the land after his father died.
- The Taneo family home was built on a lot owned by Plutarco Vacalares, three months before the decision was
handed down. The house was only registered in June 1966.
These properties were sold at a public auction in February 1966, where Abdon Gilig emerged highest bidder. Pablo failed to
redeem the property, and the final deed of sale was executed on February 1968.
Abdons ownership is disputed: by Pablo and by Rufino Arriola, and the validity of the sale was even confirmed in a CA case
Arriola vs Gilig.
Pablo formally raises an appeal in November 1985, claiming that the land as homestead property and the family home both
cannot be encumbered.
RTC: The free patent was declared void, and Abdon Gilig awarded the land and the house. Pablo must also pay rental of P500
per month from February 1968 until transfer.
CA: Affirmed RTC decision in toto
Hence this appeal.

Issues:
WON the family home is exempt from execution
WON land covered by the Homestead Act may be encumbered

Held/ Ratio:
Petition is denied for lack of merit.
107
Art.152.Thefamilyhome,constitutedjointlybythehusbandandthewifeorbyanunmarriedheadofafamily,isthedwellinghousewheretheyandtheirfamily
reside,andthelandonwhichitissituated.(223a)
108
Art.153.Thefamilyhomeisdeemedconstitutedonahouseandlotfromthetimeitisoccupiedasafamilyresidence.Fromthetimeofitsconstitutionandsolong
as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafterprovidedandtotheextentofthevalueallowedbylaw.(223a)
109
Art.155.Thefamilyhomeshallbeexemptfromexecution,forcedsaleorattachmentexcept:
(1)Fornonpaymentoftaxes;
(2)Fordebtsincurredpriortotheconstitutionofthefamilyhome;
(3)Fordebtssecuredbymortgagesonthepremisesbeforeoraftersuchconstitution;and
(4)Fordebtsdue tolaborers, mechanics,architects,builders,materialmenandothers whohave renderedserviceorfurnishedmaterialforthe construction ofthe
building.(243a)
110
Art.162.TheprovisionsinthisChaptershallalsogovernexistingfamilyresidencesinsofarassaidprovisionsareapplicable.(n)

NO. The family home is the dwelling place of the family and rights to its enjoyment cannot be seized by creditors. However,
the Taneo house was constituted at a time the Ci vil Code still covered family homes; hence, it requires judicial
registration. In the Family Code, the family home is deemed constituted from the time it was occupied as a family residence,
and prospectively entitled to the benefits of that presumption.

It was registered only in 1966, but the money judgment was rendered two years before (1964).

The family home does not fall under the exceptions to encumbrance in Art. 243 of the CC:
o for non-payment of taxes
o for debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property
(in the FC, the instance is at the constitution of the family home)
o for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such record of the declaration, and
o for debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material-men and others

Moreover, the family home was not erected on personal or family-owned land. By definition, it is understood that the house
and the lot constitute the family home.

NO. For the agricultural land, the intent of the law is indisputable. Lands acquired by homestead or free patent cannot be
alienated for five years starting from the issuance of the patent. But in the dates established by the court, Pablo Taneo lost
ownership of the property before the free patent was given. KEBABdigest

Versola v. Madolaria

Facts:
Dolores Ledesma secured a P1m loan from private respondent Dr. Victoria Ong Oh. As security, they issued a check for the
same amount and promised to execute a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot. Execution of mortgage did not
materialize but Ledesma delivered a duplicate copy of the land title.
Ledesma sold the house and lot to petitioners Eduardo and Elsa Versola for 2.5m with a downpayment of 1m. The rest was to
be paid on an installment basis. Even before the Petitioners were required to pay based on the payment plan, Ledesma asked
for the rest of the payment. Petitioners were only able to give 50k.
Petitioners secured a loan from Asiatrust Bank to pay for their remaining balance. To secure the loan, the bank settled an
agreement between parties that Dr. Oh will give another 450k to Ledesma making her debt 1.45m, and it will be credited to
spouses as full payment. Upon transference of title and deed of sale, spouses would execute mortgage to secure a loan of
2m.
Said agreement was done accordingly, but when Asiatrust tried to register the mortgage of the spouses, it discovered a notice
of levy of execution annotated on the title in connection with another of Ledesmas obligation amounting to 200k to Miladays
J ewels, Inc. Asiatrust refused to grant 2m loan to the spouses. When respondent presented Ledesmas check, it was
dishonored, as well as the check issued by the petitioners.
Respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Asiatrust, Ledesma, and petitioners. RTC ruled in favor of private
respondent Dr. Victoria Ong Oh. CA affirmed RTC.
April 2000: Private respondent filed Motion for Execution in TC. Sheriff sold property at auction where respondent was the
highest bidder (2.385m) but not before the Versola spouses filed with the sheriff an Objection/Exception to the Sheriffs Sale of
Defendant Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versolas Family Home Pending Court Order or Clearance.
Having failed to redeem the property during the redemption period, a Sheriffs Deed of Final Sale was issued in favor of Oh.
Oh filed with the RTC for an Ex parte Motion for issuance of Confirmation of J udicial Sale of Real Party of Sps. Eduardo and
Elsa Versola.
The Sps. Versola objected on 3 grounds: 1) Said property was family home and exempt from forced sale pursuant to Art. 155
of FC, 2) There was no determination of real value of property pursuant to Art. 160, and 3) there were serious defects in the
conduct of the execution sale.
RTC ruled in favor of Oh and confirmed the sale. CA Affirmed.

Issue: WON petitioners timely raised and proved that their property is exempt from execution

Held: NO. The right to exemption or forced sale under A153 FC must be claimed not by the sheriff but by the debtor himself before the
sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family
home. The claim must be proved to the Sheriff. Failure to do so would estop the party from further claiming the exemption.

The records in the case do not disclose that petitioners proved that the property to be sold was FH. They simply alleged it, and
presupposed that the sheriff already knew of such. They did not set forth any evidence to substantiate their claim. Their assertion for
exemption, therefore, is a mere afterthought, a sheer artifice to deprive private respondent of the fruits of the verdict of her case.
KEBABdigest


Patricio v. Dario III
[Certiorari; Ynares-Santiago; Nov 20, 2006]

Facts:
+ This case is about the partitioning of the family home after the death of the H when a minor was still residing there.
+ Mr. Marcelino Dario (H) died intestate in 1987 but was survived by his wife
111
& 2 sons. The properties he left included a lot in
Ermin Garcia, Cubao where a house and a pre-school building are situated. The 2 sons settled the estate extra-judicially so that
the original TCT of the property was cancelled and then named after both of them.
+ After that, W and the son 1 told son 2 that they wanted to partition the property and terminate the co-ownership. Son 2 refused
thus an action for partition was instituted by W and son 1.
o RTC Decision: 4/6 to W, 1/6 to each son
o MR by son 1: denied
o CA: initially denied but upon MR, CA partially reconsidered the case the family home should continue despite the death
of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the
court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise the minor son of (of son 2) was a minor beneficiary of the family home.
The CA thus ruled that the property cant be partitioned because there is still a minor beneficiary of the family home.

Issue: WON the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to acceed to such partition on the ground that a minor
beneficiary still resides in the said home.

Held/Ratio:
Petitioner (W) Respondent (son 2)
The property in question remained as
the family home of H & W as long as his
minor son still resides there.
The property remained as a family home of the surviving spouse only up to 10 years after
the death (J uly 4, 1997). She claims further that the 2 sons were already of age at the time
of the fathers death so that there were no more minor beneficiaries to speak of

+ To be a beneficiary of the family home, 3 requisites must concur:
a) they must be among the relps enumerated in Art 154 FC
112

b) they li ve in the family home
c) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

A. Among the relps enumerated - -
o The son of son 2, being the grandson of the original head of the family (H) is therefore contemplated in the term
descendants.
113
He is a beneficiary.
B. Living in the family home - -
o The minor in this case has been living in the family home since 1994. H died in 1987, thus he has lived within the 10-year
period.
C. Dependent for Legal support upon the head -
o With the death of H, the head of the family is now the W (or the minors grandmother). In view of the legal provisions on
support, the minor cannot demand support from W if his parents are capable of giving him support.
o Minor in this case has to be supported by his parents following the order of support in Art 199. It wasnt proved that
minors father is not capable of supporting him. There is also no evidence that the grandmother wanted to support him.
On a final note, there is no legal impediment to partition the property in question. But since the parties werent able to agree on a
partition, the court a quo should have ordered a partition by commissioners in accordance with Art 996, CC.

OBITER Partition (Rule 996):
+ If the Widow and the legitimate children survive, the widow has the same share as that of the children. Since only of the CPG is
to be allocated to the compulsory heirs, the widow will have the same share as the 2 surviving heirs.
+ Thus W =4/6 (because half of the CPG is hers); Son 1 =1/6; Son 2 =1/6

Decision: Petition for certiorari granted. Case is remanded to the RTC in order to partition the property through commissioners.
KEBABdigest

111
PerlaPatricio=W;Son1=MarcelinoMarc;Son2=MarcelinoIII(respondent).
112
H&W,oranunmarriedpersonwhoistheheadofthefamily;theirparentsascendants,descendants,brothers&sisters
113
Courtappliedubilexnondistinguisitnecnosdistinguiredebemos.

Veneracion v. Mancilla, 495 SCRA 712 (2006)
20 July 2006 | Callejo, Sr., J. | Petition for review on certiorari of a resolution of the CA

Facts:
On Feb 14, 1995, Elizabeth Mendinueta, mother of
the petitioner, got a loan of P1.2M from Charlie
Mancilla due and demandable by August 14, 1995
with 5% monthly interest
Elizabeth mortgaged her house, the title to which said
that she was single
However, Elizabeth and Geronimo Veneracion were
then already married. Charlie Mancilla had knowledge
of such fact because Geronimo was there when
Charlie loaned the money
The title was only in the name of Elizabeth although it
was Geronimo who paid the remaining installments
on the property because at the time, they were not yet
married. It was only in 1993 that they got married
Their children were born out of wedlock but were
eventually legitimated
Mancilla filed a case to foreclose the property
mortgaged. He died during litigation but were survived
by his heirs
During the case, Elizabeth did not claim that the
property was conjugal or a family home but only
asked that the interest of 5% be lowered to 3%, her
petition was denied. Final judgment became
executory.
Elizabeth did not say anything about it to her kids
because at the time of the litigation, they were still
minors.
Their house was sold through auction, the Mancillas
were the winning bidders
Mary Grace instituted a case to partially annul the
judgment stating that the house is a family home and
that their fathers written consent was not obtained
when it was mortgaged

Issue: W/N the judgment against Elizabeth be partially
annulled

Held/Ratio:
No. The mother did not allege that the property was a
family home and was only asking the court to lower
the interest rate of the debt.
There were a lot of procedural issues that eventually
led the SC to say that their proper recourse would be
to the CA, the CA previously dismissed their case due
to violation of a certain provision of the Rules of Court

FACTS
Elizabeth Mendinueta married to Geronimo Veneracion secured a Php1,200,000 loan from Charlie Mancilla. To secure
the payment thereof, Elizabeth executed a real estate mortgage over her residential lot which includes the house thereon.
Elizabeth failed to pay the loan thus Charlie filed a case to foreclose the said property mortgaged by Elizabeth. The RTC
ruled in favor of Charlie and said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Elizabeth was replaced by her children. In their petition, they alleged that Elizabeth and Geronimo are common law
spouses. They bought the said property during their union but the title of said property was registered under the name of
Elizabeth whose status therein was indicated to be single. They further alleged that Elizabeth has no source of income
and that Geronimo paid for the monthly installments of the property. According to petitioners, the assailed property is their
family home and that it is conjugal in nature. Because of this petitioners are asserting that by virtue of Art.155, their family
home should be exempted from forced sale.
ISSUE: WON said property is a family home and it is conjugal in nature.
HELD NO.
In this case, petitioners failed to prove that property in question is their family home and that it is conjugal in nature. They failed to
append to their petition copies of the receipts for the installment of the property allegedly paid by their father Geronimo which will
support their assertion. Moreover, it seems that their allegation that Elizabeth has no source of income is not true since it is not
possible that shell be able to secure a loan from Banco Filipino if she has no visible means income. On its face therefore,
petitioners annulment petition in the CA has no substantive merit.


Arriola v. Arriola, 542 SCRA 666 (2008)

Petitioner: Vilma G. Arriola, Anthony Ronald Arriola
Respondent: J ohn Nabor Arriola
FACTS:
Family Love:
Fidel Arriola Victoria Calabia (first wife) =J ohn
Fidel Arriola Vilma G. Arriola (second wife) =Anthony
When Fidel Arriola died, he left a parcel of land.
RTC ordered the partition thereof among Vilma, Anthony, and J ohn, in equal shares of 1/3 each.
The said parties failed to agree on how to partition the land, thus, respondent J ohn sought its sale through a public auction.
Petitioners, Vilma and Anthony, opposed to include the house standing on the subject land.

ISSUE: W/N the public auction should include the subject house.
HELD: NO.
Examining the NATURE of the subject house: Petitioners claim that said house has been their residence for 20 years.
Art. 153, FC: The Family Home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence xxx [it]
is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Art. 159, FC: The Family Home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses xxx for a period of 10 years xxx.
Thus, the Family Home consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has
passed to the co-ownership of the parties, herein. Fidel Arriola died on March 10, 2003. Thus for 10 years from said date (until March
10, 2013), or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be
partitioned, MUCH LESS when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of
the property. KEBABdigest

Spouses Kelly v. Planters Products Inc., GR No. 172263 (2009)
GR # 172263 | July 9, 2008 | Corona, J.

Facts:
- Auther Kelley acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. When he
failed to pay, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him.
- The Makati RTC decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution against Mr. Kelly. The court sheriff sold on execution
Mr. Kelleys real property to satisfy the judgment.
- The spouses Kelly filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the Makati RTC on the ground that the subject
property was their family home which was exempt from execution. It was dismissed on procedural grounds
114
.
- The spouses Kelly then filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of levy and sale of the alleged family home with damages in
the Naga RTC. The case was, however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
115
and lack of cause of action
- This was affirmed by the CA.
- They appeal to the SC, alleging that Mrs Kelly was a stranger to the action (i.e. the one between Mr. Kelly and PPI) in the
Makati RTC, thus she could not be forced to litigate therein
116
.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over the case (i.e. whether the Naga RTC can review and possibly annul an action by a co-
equal RTC)
2. Whether or not the property sold off to satisfy the judgment against Mr Kelly was in fact their family home and thus exempt from
execution

Held:
1. Yes
2. Cannot be determined from the evidence at hand. Case must be remanded to Naga RTC for reception of evidence in this regard.

Ratio:
1. Following the SC ruling in Gomez v. Sta. Ines, family members who were not original parties to the action are considered
strangers to it and cannot be compelled to present their claims to the court which issued the writ of execution. Therefore, the
trial court wherein these family members file a case to annul the writ of execution has jurisdiction over the case and these
family members can vindicate their claims there.
The spouses hadnt adduced evidence to prove that the property in question was indeed their family home. They hadnt had the
opportunity because their case was dismissed from the outset. KEBABdigest
114
failuretocomplywiththethreedaynoticerequirement
115
MostprobablybecauseanRTCgenerallycannotreviewthedecisionofanotherRTC;theseRTCsarepresumedtobeequalsofoneanother.Whatthespousesdid
herewastoasktheNagaRTCtoannulwhattheMakatiRTCdid.
116
Ineffect,herrightswouldbeprejudicedbyadecisioninaproceedingwhereherrightswerenotrepresentedunfair

Albino Josef v. Santos, GR No. 165060 (2009)

GR # 165060 | November 27, 2008 | Ynares-Santiago, J.

Facts:
- Santos filed a case for collection of sum of money against J osef, claiming that J osef failed to pay the shoe materials which he
bought on credit from Santos on various dates in 1994.
- The RTC ruled in favor of Santos. J osef appealed this decision to the CA but the RTC was affirmed. On appeal to the SC, the
decision was again affirmed. The judgment thus became final.
- Santos moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. It was opposed by J osef, saying that the real property in question was
their family home and the personal properties were not his but his childrens.
- Nonetheless, the RTC granted the writ of execution and the aforementioned real and personal properties were auctioned off.
- J osef filed a certiorari petition in the CA questioning the levying of the properties, reiterating that the real property in question
was their family home and the personal properties were not his but his childrens
- The CA dismissed the certiorari petition on procedural grounds, mainly because he didnt file a motion for reconsideration with
the RTC first, as required by the Rules of Court.
- J osef appeals this CA decision to the SC

Issue:
1. Whether or not the RTC erred in having the subject real & personal properties levied
2. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing J osefs petition on procedural grounds

Held:
1. YES
2. YES

Ratio:
1. As early as during proceedings prior to the issuance of the writ of execution, J osef brought to the fore the issue of exemption
from execution of his home, which he claimed to be a family home. He also claimed that the personal properties were not his
but his childrens. The trial court seriously erred when it completely ignored these allegations of J osef and proceeded to order
the writ of execution. It should have taken proper steps
117
in response to these. By failing to do that, the RTC order and the
writs of execution arising out of the order are null and void.
2. J osefs certiorari petition to the CA was belated and without the requisite motion for reconsideration, however, considering the
gravity of the issue, involving as it does matters that strike at the very heart of that basic social institution which the State has a
constitutional and moral duty to preserve and protect, as well as petitioners constitutional right to abode, all procedural
infirmities occasioned upon this case must take a back seat to the substantive questions which deserve to be answered in full.

Obiter:
Upon being apprised that the property subject of execution allegedly constitutes petitioners family home, the trial court should
have observed the following procedure:
1. Determine if petitioners obligation to respondent falls under either of the exceptions under Article 155
of the Family Code;
2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioners claim that the property was his family home; conduct
an ocular inspection of the premises; an examination of the title; an interview of members of the community where the
alleged family home is located, in order to determine if petitioner actually resided within the premises of the claimed
family home; order a submission of photographs of the premises, depositions, and/or affidavits of proper
individuals/parties; or a solemn examination of the petitioner, his children and other witnesses. At the same time, the
respondent is given the opportunity to cross-examine and present evidence to the contrary;
3. If the property is accordingly found to constitute petitioners family home, the court should determine:
a) if the obligation sued upon was contracted or incurred prior to, or after, the effectivity of the
Family Code;
b) if petitioners spouse is still alive, as well as if there are other beneficiaries of the family
home;
c) if the petitioner has more than one residence for the purpose of determining which of them, if
any, is his family home; and
d) its actual location and value, for the purpose of applying the provisions of Articles 157 and
160 of the Family Code. KEBABdigest

117
Seeobiter

XII. Paternity and Filiation
A. Legitimate Children
1. Kinds of Filiation
a. Biological-Natural

Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975)
63 SCRA 97 (1975) | Makalintal, J.

PETITIONER: LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO, ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO
PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ,
EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO,
MARGARITA PERIDO, ROLANDO SALDE and EDUARDO SALDE
(Heirs of the 1st marriage)
RESPONDENTS: MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, J UAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO, MAGDALENA
PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO, J OSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO, TERESA PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO (Heirs of the 2nd) marriage
Keywords: legitimacy

FACTS:
Heir of the first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition," wherein
they partiotioned the estate of their late father.
Heirs of the first had second thoughts about the partition and filed a complaint in the CFI of Negros Occidental, claiming that the
five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to the estate.
Lower court annulled the "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-J udicial Partition." With findings that the five children of the 2
nd

marriage were legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot
No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of second marriage.
CA affirmed the decision in toto

ISSUE: WON the heirs of the 2
nd
marriage are legitimate
HELD: YES
RATIO: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themsel ves out as
being, they would he living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is " that a man and woman deporting themsel ves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio - Always presume marriage."

Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao, 378 SCRA 563 (2002)
WILLIAM BILLY LIYAO, JR. represented by his mother CORAZON GARCIA V. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO ET. AL.
De Leon, Jr., J. | G.R. No. 138961 | March 7, 2002 | Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA

Facts:
Corazon Garcia is legally married to one Ramon Yulo, but are allegedly living separately from each other for more than
10 years while the former cohabitated with William Liyao (with Garcias two legitimate children from the first marriage) from
1965 until Williams death in 1965
On J une 9, 1975 gave birth to William Liyao J r (Billy). Evidences were presented by both sides, establishing two different
accounts.
o Petitioners: That the deceased has been living with them and has provided them with support, and in fact pays for the
house they are occupying. It was also alleged that deceased has acknowledged his paternity toward Billy through
overt acts as witnesses for the petitioners assert.
o Respondents: Counter claimed that for the aforementioned time, their father who was legally married to their mother
has been sick and has been a number of times have been bed ridden. They claim that he regularly comes home and
that likewise they have seen Corazon still seeing her husband Ramon
Petitioner represented by his mother filed for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of the late William Liyao.
RTC: Ruled in favor of petitioner convinced with the preponderance of evidence presented by the petitioners.
CA: Reversed ruling of the trial court stating that the law favors legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child.
o The presumption of legitimacy is disproved only by a clear showing that marital intimacy between husband and wife is
impossible at the period cited in Art 257 CC.
o Birth certificates are not conclusive proof of filiations.
Issue:
WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy, consequently acquire a cause of action. (NO)
WON the petitioner is the illegitimate son of the deceased William Liyao. (NO)

Held/ Ratio:
Petition is denied. The assailed CA decision is affirmed.

NO, petitioner cannot impugn his own legitimacy, a child cannot choose his filiation especially when the husband has not
questioned his legitimacy, consequently petitioner, not being the proper party to assail his legitimacy has no cause
of action
o Presumption of Legitimacy in Art 225 is not conclusive and may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Evidence
to the physical inability of the husband having access to the wife is the only rebuttal afforded to those who wish to
quash the presumption
o Moreover the grounds mentioned in Art 255 CC may be invoked by the husband or his heirs in proper cases, it is a
personal right.
o Therefore, petitioner has no cause of action

NO, again the presumption is for legitimacy, this is to protect the rights of the child. In the instant case the legal husband of
Corazon, there be no showing that there is impossibility for him to have access to his wife did not impugn Billys legitimacy,
that being the case he is considered a legitimate son. KEBABdigest

Social Security System v. Aguas, 483 SCRA 383

Facts:
Pablo Aguas (SSS member and pensioner) died and his surviving spouse Rosanna Aguas filed a claim with the SSS for death
benefits. Rosanna indicated in the claim that Pablo was survived by his minor child J eylnn/J enelyn. Rosanna received monthly
pension from Feb. 1997.
Pablos sister, Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, contested Rosannas claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned
the family abode and lived with a certain Romeo dela Pena. Leticia enclosed a copy of the BC of a certain J efren dela Pena,
child of Rosanna and Romeo.
SSS suspended payment of monthy pension in Sept. 1997 and conducted investigations. They found that Pablo was infertile
and that the deceased had no legal children. SSS denied Rosannas request to resume the payment of their pensions and she
was advised to refund the amount of P10k.
Rosanna and J eylynn filed a petition to the Social Security Commission (SSC) for the restoration of their pensions. J anet
Aguas joined as claimant, claiming to a child of Pablo.
SSC denied the claims for lack of merit and ordered Rosanna to refund the 10k. It also ruled that Rosanna is not entitled as a
primary beneficiary because she contracted a bigamous marriage with Romeo.
CA reversed the ruling of SSC, stating that the BC of J anet and J eylynn showed that they were the children of the deceased.

Issue: WON Rosanna, J eylynn, and J anet are entitled to SSS benefits accruing from the death of Pablo

Held: NO. Only J eylynn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension, through an authenticated birth certificated which
was signed by Pablo (born 1991). Rosanna and Pablos marriage (in 1977) subsisted until the latters death in 1996 and thus J eylynn
was born during this marriage. Under Art 164 FC, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
There is no showing, furthermore, that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of J eylynn during his lifetime.

This presumption, however, does not extend to Janet because her BC was not authenticated. The date of birth was also not
substantially proven. Rosanna, meanwhile, must prove that (1) she is the legitimate spouse and (2) she is dependent upon her
husband for support. While there is no question on the first requirement, the fact that the spouses had been living separately
shows that Rosanna is not dependent upon support on Pablo, absent any showing to the contrary. KEBABdigest


b. Biological-Assisted reproductive technology

In Re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d. 1227 (1988)

Facts:
+ Sterns had foregone having their own children after the wife learned that she had a medical condition that could get
complicated if she would become pregnant. They initially sought adoption but preferred to go to a surrogacy center
instead.
118
There, they were matched with the Whiteheads. Mrs. Whitehead wanted to help childless couples & needed the
$10, 000 consideration to help her family.
119

+ The Stern-Whitehead contract on Feb 1985 has it that:
o Mrs. Whitehead will become pregnant using Mr. Sterns sperm & she will carry the baby to term.
o She will deliver the baby to the Sterns & terminate maternal rights so Mrs. Stern can adopt baby
o In case of Mr. Sterns death, Mrs. Stern will have sole custody of the child.
o $10, 000.00 will be paid to Mrs. Whitehead after the childs birth, upon delivery to Mr. Stern.
o Mr. Stern, Mr. Whitehead, and Mrs. Whitehead were parties to the contract; not Mrs. Stern.
+ The Stern-ICNY contract Sterns to pay ICNY $7, 500 for matching parties, explaining the process, furnishing the contracts,
and providing legal counsel,
+ Several attempts at AI were made. On March 27, 1986, Baby M was born.
120
Mrs. Whitehead had realized even during
pregnancy that she could not part with the child. She had difficulty giving it up to the Sterns. True to her word, although
against her inclinations, she turned the baby over to the Sterns who then named her Melissa on March 30.
+ In the evening of March 30, Mrs. Whitehead became distrubed. She went to the Sterns the next day and asked if she could
have the child at least for a week. However, it wasnt until after 4 months and through forcible removal from the grandparents
house that the baby was returned to the Sterns.
121

+ Because Mrs. Whitehead doesnt want to relinquish the baby, Mr. Sterns filed a case in order to enforce the surrogacy
contract. After 4 months of evading the possibility of the Sterns obtaining custody, the court awarded custody to the Sterns.
The Trial court reaffirmed the same. Mrs. Whitehead was awarded limited visitation. In addition to the enforcement of the
contract, the Sterns sought to have custody over the baby, to terminate the parental rights of Mrs. Whitehead, and to allow
Mrs. Stern to adopt the child.
+ The Trial Courts decision:
o The surrogacy contract was valid
o Mrs. Whiteheads parental rights be terminated
o Sole custody of the child granted to Mrs. Stern who shall be allowed to adopt Melissa
+ Whiteheads contentions:
o The surrogacy contract is not valid because it a) conflicts w/ public policy
122
; and b) is unconstitutional
123

o The child must be placed w/ the mother through the tender age doctrine
o The courts decision giving custody to the Sterns put tremendous pressure on Mrs. Whitehead

+ Sterns contentions:
o They invoked the constitutional right of privacy the right of consenting adults to deal w/ matters of reproduction as
they see fit
o The child is better off in the Sterns custody

+ Guardian ad litems findings There must be no parental rights for the Whiteheads & visitation rights will be allowed only when
Baby M reaches majority.

Issues:
1. WON the surrogacy contract is valid. [No.]
2. WON the custody should be given to the Sterns [No.]
3. WON visitation rights must be granted.

118
Mr.&Mrs.Sterngotmarriedin1974butdeferredstartingafamilyuntil1981duetofinancialconstraintsandforthewifetobeabletopursuehermedicaldegree
&residency.Before1981,shehadbeendiagnosedtohavemultiplesclerosiswithminimalrisksofblindness,paraplegia,orotherformsofdebilitationifshebecomes
pregnant. For this reason, they decided to forego having children. Mr. Stern wanted to have a child as his relatives were killed in the Holocaust. They considered
adoptioninitiallybutsincetheywereeagertohavechildren,theycametotheICNYsotheycouldbematchedwithawouldbesurrogatemother.
119
Shehadbeeninvolvedinapreviousartificialinseminationprocedureforsurrogacybuttonoavail.WhenmatchedwiththeSternsandafterseveralattemptsto
inseminate,BabyMwasborninMarch27,1986.
120
TheWhiteheadsappearedtoallastheparentsallowingtheSternstovisitthehospital.ThenameinthebabysbirthcertificatewasSaraElizabethWhitehead
withRichardWhiteheadasthefather.
121
Uponfilinganactionfortheenforcementofthecontract,WhiteheadsfledtoFloridawiththebaby.Theylivedatdifferenthotels,motels,andhomes.Theyfinally
wenttotheparentsoftheWhiteheads.TheSterns,uponlearningwherethebabywas,obtainedanordertoturnoverthechildtothem.
122
thechildwonthavethenurturingofbothnaturalparents
123
itdeprivesMrs.Whiteheadoftheconstitutionalrighttothecompanionshipofherchild

Ratio/Held:
1. The surrogacy contract violates provision in existing laws and with public policy
+ The use of money for the purpose of the AI is illegal and perhaps criminal. There is coercion of contracts.
+ If the adoption way is being simulated in surrogacy contracts, then the formal agreement to surrender occurs only
after the birth of the child only after the birth mother had been offered counseling. Furthermore, laws in that state
prohibit the use of money as a consideration for adoption.
a. Statutes
i. Law prohibiting the use of money for adoptions s
The surrogate mother accepted money so that the child will be adopted as well as the ICNY which
paved way (and was paid for) the adoption
ii. Law requiring proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of parental rights is ordered or
an a option is granted
s
d
The termination of the natural mothers parental rights thru the surrogate contract does not comply
w/ the state law requirements i.e. voluntary surrender to an approved agency or family services;
acknowledge termination of parental rights; or abandonment or unfitness by the parents.
In adoption there can be no termination of parental rights when there is no proof that the same is
extinguished.
iii. Law that make surrender of custody and consent to adoption revocable in private placement adoptions. s
When there is no written surrender of parental rights, termination of parental rights may be granted
provided that there is abandonment or neglect by the parents of the child.
Thus if the adoption is based not on the fulfillment of the requirements of adoption but on the
ground of the surrogacy contract, the adoption shouldnt be granted.
Thus the termination of maternal rights is an irrevocable consent to surrender the child
b. Public Policy surrogate mothers consent is not dispositive given that the arrangements violate statutes on adoption
& public policy

2. The trial court gave custody to Mr. Stern based on the determination of the best interest. The court thus finds it that the
custody should be properly given to the natural mother/surrogate mother of the child as this is for the best interest of the child.
Granting custody & right to adopt to the wife of the natural father (Mrs. Stern) will be thus, voided.

3. Visitation rights issue was remanded to the trial court as this was not passed upon by the said court.

Surrogacy contract invalid. KEBABdigest

IN THE MATTER OF BABY M, A PSEUDONYM FOR AN ACTUAL PERSON.
Superior Court of New J ersey, Chancery Division,
Family Part, Bergen County.
Decided April 6, 1988.

Gary N. Skoloff and Francis W. Donahue for plaintiffs
(Skoloff & Wolfe, attorneys).

Harold J. Cassidy and Joel Siegal for defendants (Cassidy,
Foss & SanFilipo, attorneys).

SWEEN, J .S.C.

Prior court proceedings have adjudicated the parties' rights in this case. Melissa will be in the custody of William Stern and have
visitation with Mary Beth Whitehead Gould. The sole purpose of this proceeding is to define the visitation, taking into consideration the
particular circumstances of Melissa, her parents, stepparents, and extended families. The court finds that Melissa's best interests will be
served by unsupervised, uninterrupted, liberal visitation with her mother.

I.
The initial supervised visitation order was entered by the court after Mary Beth Whitehead Gould had fled New J ersey with her baby
and threatened the baby's life. Family and financial crises engulfed her marriage, and she was under the stress of having lost custody
of her newborn baby. Since that time her marital problems have been resolved through divorce; she has attained family stability with
her new husband, and has come to the realization that she will never have custody of Melissa, who will be raised by her father and
stepmother. The court finds, and the parties and their expert witnesses agree, there is no present evidence of any risk that Mary Beth
Whitehead Gould will again flee with Melissa or cause her any physical harm.

II.
Mary Beth Whitehead Gould had custody of Melissa and nurtured her for four months after her birth. Thereafter, she has seen Melissa
on a regular, periodic basis until the present time. They have a warm and loving relationship, interact well and appropriately, and stay
engaged with each other over two-hour periods under restrictive and confining circumstances.


Melissa has no problems separating from her father or stepmother when brought to visitation, no separation anxiety during the two
hours she is left with her mother, and no adverse reactions to visitation after she has returned to her father and stepmother. The court
finds no credible evidence or expert opinion that Melissa will suffer any psychological or emotional harm by continued and expanded
visitation with her mother.

William and Elizabeth Stern offered no evidence to support their fears that Melissa's continued relationship with her mother will
somehow adversely affect her development or jeopardize their parent-child relationship. Their expert witness offered no clinical studies
or personal observations of children under his care in similar circumstances to support his opinion that there should be no visitation until
Melissa expresses a desire to meet her mother or until she is 12 years old. Neither the Sterns nor their expert seemed able to
comprehend that this is no longer a termination of parental rights or adoption case and it no longer matters how Melissa was legally
conceived. She and her mother have the right to develop their own special relationship.

William and Elizabeth Stern are extraordinarily good parents who are devoting themselves to the nurturing and development of their
daughter and their daughter is firmly bonded to them.
Melissa is a resilient child who is no less capable than thousands of children of broken marriages who successfully adjust to complex
family relationships when their parents remarry.

III.
Melissa's adjustment and the quality of her relationships with her parents and step-parents will depend largely on how well they accept
and adjust to their respective roles. Mary Beth Whitehead Gould must accept and understand that Melissa is not Sarah and that her
father and stepmother will be her parental-role models and provide the day-to-day, parent-child interaction which will largely determine
what kind of person
Melissa will become. They will make the parental decisions concerning her religion, education, and moral standards. William and
Elizabeth Stern must accept and understand that Melissa will develop a different and special relationship with her mother, stepfather,
siblings, and extended family, and that these relationships need not diminish their parent-child relationship with Melissa.

The court does not underestimate the great difficulty the parties will have in accepting the others' role in Melissa's life. Family dreams
have been shattered, insults and false accusations have been exchanged, and lies and deceptions made in the heat of litigation.
However, family tragedies in our society are not uncommon and parents often are called upon to make sacrifices arising from
unforeseen circumstances. In the context of family problems frequently seen by Family Court judges, the causes of the parties'
estrangement do not appear insurmountable.

Melissa is a healthy, bright, attractive child with a mother, father, and stepmother who love her dearly and are obviously willing to
make great sacrifices on her behalf. Her tender age has protected her from the notoriety of the much publicized trial and her parents
have the opportunity to plan for her further protection in the future should the need arise. She has not suffered the agony of a broken
marriage of parents and will be able to develop individual relationships with her parents and stepparents from infancy.

The parties do not have the emotional scars of a failure of an intimate relationship intertwined with that of their child. They have never
been emotionally involved and should be able to make rational decisions in their mutual best interests and the best interest of Melissa.
The parties are financially able to provide for themselves and
Melissa and both have good homes in good communities with facilities and programs for children.

Melissa's best interests require that the parties do more than merely comply with the court's orders concerning visitation. It is
imperative that the parties communicate freely with one another concerning Melissa's needs, not contradict one another concerning
parent-child decisions, and maintain a flexible attitude toward visitation to meet the changing needs. The court finds that the parties will
benefit by counseling in overcoming initial communication barriers, establishing visitation guidelines, and receiving necessary
professional advice.
Therefore, the court will appoint a mental health professional and direct that the parties participate in such counseling as the mental
health professional shall deem advisable.

IV.
The parties and their expert witnesses all agree that publicity concerning Melissa should be avoided. The court's decision is based, in
part, on the parties' representations that they will not discuss publicly their relationship with Melissa and her personal activities. Each of
the parties has a right to rely on the others' representation concerning their and Melissa's right to privacy and, therefore, the court will
enter an order enjoining and restraining each of the parties from publicly discussing their relationship with Melissa or her personal
activities without prior approval of the court. In like manner, the parties have represented that they have no intention of selling any
"movie rights" they may have concerning "Baby M" as the sale of such rights may permit the parties, Melissa, or their activities to be
fictionally portrayed. Therefore, the court will restrain and enjoin the parties from the sale of any such rights they may have without prior
approval of the court. The court will not infringe on the parties' right to communicate publicly on the issue of surrogate parenting and
their personal experiences so long as they do not affect Melissa's right to privacy.


V.
Mary Beth Whitehead Gould is a full-time homemaker allowing more flexibility in the scheduling of visitation. The court suggests that
the parties take advantage of this situation and schedule visitation to meet their individual and family needs. If they cannot otherwise
mutually agree, visitation shall take place in the following manner:

Weekly Visitation. Mary Beth Whitehead Gould shall have unsupervised visitation one day each week between the hours of 10:30 a.m.
and 4:30 p.m. commencing immediately. In order to provide a transition from supervised to unsupervised visitation, William Stern shall
take Melissa to the Edna Conklin Youth Center on the initial three visits and give her directly to her mother.
Her mother can then take her home and return her to the Sterns' residence. Thereafter, Melissa's father shall take Melissa to her
mother's residence and the mother shall return Melissa to her father's residence. Commencing in September 1988, the weekly visitation
shall be increased by one additional day every other week.

Overnight Visitation. Commencing April 1989, the additional biweekly visitation days shall be expanded to two days and
Melissa shall remain overnight with her mother.

Holiday Visitation. The court recognizes that the parties have two distinct family units and finds that it is in Melissa's best interest that
she spend Christmas Day, Mother's Day, and Father's Day with the Sterns. Because children normally have birthday parties with their
friends, Melissa shall also spend her birthdays with the Sterns. Melissa shall spend one day during the Christmas holidays and the
following alternate holidays with her mother: Easter Day, Memorial Day, Fourth of J uly, Labor Day, and Thanksgiving Day. Melissa shall
spend J ewish holidays of her father's choice with him. When a conflict occurs between a regular visitation day and a holiday Melissa will
spend with her father, a mutually-convenient day for visiting with her mother shall be substituted.

Vacation Visitation. Commencing with the summer of 1989,
Melissa shall spend one two-week vacation period with her mother which shall be selected no later than March 1 each year.

The court finds that it is in Melissa's best interest that the specific dates of visitation and arrangements for court-ordered
counselling shall not be revealed publicly and shall be contained in a sealed order of the court. Should the need arise in the future to
make application to the court concerning visitation, it shall be on petition and order to show cause in order to protect Melissa's best
interest and any necessary hearings will be closed pursuant to R. 5:3-2.

Johnson v. Cal vert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal 1993)

A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1990, a trial judge faced an issue that no American court had previously addressed. The issue was the legal maternity of a child born
by gestational surrogacy. The case involved a married couple that contracted with a surrogate mother to conceive a child genetically
related to the couple.

The couple, Mark and Crispina Calvert, was unable to have a child because Crispina had undergone a hysterectomy. Because
Crispina's ovaries could still produce eggs, however, the couple tried gestational surrogacy. The Calverts entered into a surrogacy
agreement with Anna J ohnson. The parties signed a contract in which the Calverts agreed to pay Anna $10,000 and purchase an
insurance policy on her life. In return, Anna agreed to relinquish her parental rights to the Calverts after the birth of the child. A doctor
fertilized Crispina's egg with Mark's sperm and implanted the resulting zygote into Anna's uterus. Soon after a doctor confirmed that
Anna was pregnant, relations between the parties began to deteriorate.

While still pregnant, Anna demanded immediate payment under the contract and threatened not to relinquish the child after birth. The
Calverts responded by filing a lawsuit seeking a judicial determination that Anna had no parental rights in the baby. In response, Anna
filed her own lawsuit, and the court consolidated the two cases. The parties agreed to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the
interests of the unborn child.

The trial court found for the Calverts. It found that the Calverts were the child's "natural parents" and held that Anna had no parental
rights in the child. Both the appellate court and the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

B. The Holding in Johnson
On appeal, the California Supreme Court decided two issues. The court first determined the identity of the natural mother by examining
the parties' original intent. The court then evaluated the validity of the surrogacy contract in light of public policy.

Under California Family Code section 7610, a woman may establish maternity by one of three methods: proof of having given birth to
the child; proof of a genetic relationship with the child; or proof of adoption. Anna J ohnson stipulated at the beginning of the trial that
Mark and Crispina Calvert were the genetic parents. Crispina Calvert qualified as the child's legal mother by virtue of the genetic
relationship. Anna J ohnson also qualified as the child's legal mother because she gave birth to the child. Thus both women had
legitimate maternity claims under Family Code section 7610.

Without explanation, the California Supreme Court decided that two women cannot have the rights of the natural mother. Instead, the
court decided to break the "tie" in favor of the parent who, prior to conception, intended to raise the child and care for it during its
minority. On the basis of Crispina's intent, the California Supreme Court determined that Crispina was the child's natural mother.

The court next decided whether the parties' contract comported with public policy. Anna argued that the contract violated public policy
because California Penal Code section 273 prohibits payment for consent to adoption. The court held, however, that a gestational
surrogacy contract is not subject to adoption statutes because the parties contracted prior to conception. The court also found that the
Calverts did not intend to induce Anna to consent to an adoption. Rather, the Calverts compensated Anna for her services as a
surrogate mother. Thus, the court found that the agreement resembled an employment contract rather than a contract for consent to
adoption and did not violate California law.

Anna further argued that surrogate motherhood was a form of involuntary servitude and thus against public policy. The court rejected
this argument because the surrogacy contract specifically gave her the right to abort the fetus. The court reasoned that Anna's
servitude was discretionary rather than involuntary. Since the contract did not call for involuntary servitude, it was not against public
policy.

In sum, the Johnson court decided that persons who enter into a gestational surrogacy agreement intending to care for the resulting
child during its minority will be the child's legal parents. As a result, California courts must now look to the parties' pre-conception intent
to determine who is the natural mother. Since the intent to care for a child at the time of the contract will always lie with the prospective
parents, the Johnson holding created a decision-making process that ignores other pertinent factors.

In Re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S. 2d 430 (1973)

FACTS:
- During the first marriage, husband A and wife B had a baby born of consensual AID (Artificial Insemination Donor). Husband A and
wife B were registered parents in the birth certificate.
- A and B separated and later divorced but their decree declared the child to be legitimate. Wife B and child got support while
husband A had visitation rights. They were not remiss on their parental duties.
- Wife B later remarried husband D. Husband D wanted to adopt wife Bs daughter but husband a refused to give consent.

ISSUE: WON husband As consent is required for husband Ds petition for adoption considering that the child was conceived through
artificial insemination from an unknown third party donor.

HELD: Yes. The Domestic Relations Law requires consent of both parents over the adoption of a child born in wedlock. The
dispensary circumstances (abandonment, divorce due to adultery, insanity, etc.) were not present in the case. The term father is not
limited to the biological or natural father, for what is considered is the legal relationship of father and child and vice versa. The child
cannot be considered illegitimate since it was born during the marriage and not in circumstances of infidelity since it was a medically-
assisted procedure where the husband and wife freely consented. KEBABdigest


2. Impugned Legitimacy

Andal v. Macaraig, 89 Phil 165 (1951)
Andal and Duenas v. Macaraig
GR # L-2474 | May 30, 1951 | Bautista Angelo, J.

Facts:
- Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas are husband and wife. Emiliano was given a parcel of land by his mom, Eduvigis Macaraig,
through a donation propter nuptias in 1938.
- Emiliano became ill with tuberculosis in J anuray 1941. Shortly after that, Emilianos brother Felix came to live w/ him and his
wife to help w/ the farm.
- Felix and Maria started an adulterous relationship in May 1942.
- Emilianos tuberculosis got worse in September 10, 1942, so much so that he could hardly move and get off his bed. On the
same day, Maria and Felix eloped and went to live in Marias fathers house as husband and wife.
- Taking advantage of the chaos and confusion brought on by WW2, Emilianos mom, Eduvigis, re-took possession of the land
she gave to Emiliano donation propter nuptias.
- Emiliano died on J anuary 1, 1943. His wife didnt even attend his funeral, much less visit him on his death bed.
- Maria gave birth to a baby boy on J une 17, 1943 named Mariano Andal. It was Mariano, represented by his mom, Maria, who
filed a case to recover ownership and possession of the land Eduvigis took from them.
- The trial court ruled in favor of Mariano, adjudging him to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and Maria, thus entitled to the land
in question.
- Eduvigis appealed to the SC, apparently questioning the legitimacy of Mariano, inasmuch as Felix and Maria were known to
be cohabiting around the time he was conceived and that Emiliano was afflicted w/ tuberculosis at the time, claiming that
Mariano could not have been the legitimate son of Maria and Emiliano.

Issue:
Whether or not Mariano is the legitimate son of Maria and Emiliano

Held: YES. CFI decision affirmed.

Ratio:
- Since Mariano was born on J une 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on J anuary 1, 1943, he is presumed to be the legitimate
son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage.
- This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his
wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. There was no such proof in this case.

o There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial period of conception, specially
during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of
the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to show that
during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother,
was living in the same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not
preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife
o Although Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly
move and get up from bed, experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where
persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are more
inclined to sexual intercourse.
o There is neither evidence to show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable.
o With no proof to rebut the presumption, Mariano must be deemed legitimate. KEBABdigest

Jao v. CA, 152 SCRA 359 (1987)
Jao (J anice) v CA and Perico Jao
Jul 28, 1987 | Appeal by certiorari to review the decision of the CA | Padilla, J:

FACTS:
Arlene Salgado gave birth to J anice Marie J ao, who is alleged by Arlene as Perico J aos child. Thus, Arlene instituted an
action for support and recognition against Perico. Perico denied the paternity and both parties agreed to a blood grouping test
which was conducted by the NBI upon order of the court. The test result indicated that J anice could not have been the child of
Perico. At first, the trial court found the result legally conclusive but upon a second motion for reconsideration considered
J anice as the child of Perico and hence, entitled to support.
J ao appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial courts decision as there was no showing that there was any irregularity or
mistake in the conduct of the test.
Arlene gave birth on August 16, 1968 (after 36 weeks of pregnancy) thus, she conceived J anice on or about the first week of
December. However there was conflicting claims regarding the time of their first sexual intercourse (Perico- J anuary 18, Arlene
Dec 14) which emphasizes the importance of the result of the blood grouping test, which was recognized as competent as
early as the 1950s.

Arlene alleged that J aos action before and after the birth of J anice is tantamount to recognition. But the CA found it is
otherwise since Perico filed a petition that his name as father of J anice be deleted from her birth certificate. The assistance
Perico rendered to Arlene during her pregnancy cannot overcome the result of the test. Also, there is a claim that at the critical
time of conception, Arlene had carnal knowledge with two other men, which was not even rebutted. Also, the testimony of
Arlene being straightforward and candid may be attributed to her being an actress.
ISSUE:
WON the result of the blood grouping test is legally admissible

HELD:
Yes. J anice not a child of Perico.
Although blood test can only conclude the possibility of being a father of a child, it is conclusive as to non-paternity. The fact
that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and the alleged father does not conclusively prove that the
child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the blood type when the blood of the mother and that of
the alleged father is crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father. Blood testing has already been
recognized in US and European jurisprudence.
Also, the fact that J anice was only 5 months old at the time of the test does not the credit its results as it was conducted six
times by a serologist who had an extensive practice in the area using two scientifically recognized blood grouping systems
(MN test and ABO System). Also, the mother refused to repeat the test when J anice was nearly two years old.
The result of the blood grouping tests ate admissible and conclusive upon the non-paternity of respondent vis--vis petitioner.
No evidence was presented showing any defect in the testing methods employed or failure to provide adequate safeguards to
proper conduct of the tests and therefore reflects scientific fact.

JUDGMENT: Petition denied. KEBABdigest

Macadangdang v. CA, 100 SCRA 73 (1980)
100 SCRA 73 (1980) | Makalintal, J.

PETITIONER: ANTONIO MACADANGDANG
RESPONDENTS: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH MEJ IAS
Keywords: legitimacy

FACTS:
Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. She had illicit sexual intercourse with Antonio Macadangdang in March, 1967 that
caused her separation with her husband.
On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy baptized as Rolando
Macadandang.
She then filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner.
CFI dismissed the complaint. CA reversed, declared minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang CA denied
MR hence this petitioner

ISSUES:
1. WON the child Rolando is presumed legitimate child of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw;
2. WON the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an
opportunity to be heard.

HELD/RATIO:
1. YES, The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. This presumption becomes conclusive
in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which
preceded the birth of the child. This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence
the physical impossibility of access between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the
child. This physical impossibility of access may be caused by any of these:
1. Impotence of the husband;
2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible and
3. Serious illness of the husband.
This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of
conception. Hence, proof of the physical impossibility of such sexual union prevents the application of the presumption (Tolentino,
Commentaries & J urisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p. 513 citing Bevilaqua, Familia)

Separation of the spouses is immaterial. What should really matter is the fact that during the initial 120 days of the 300 days which
preceded the birth of the renamed child, no concrete or even substantial proof was presented to establish physical
impossibility of access between respondent and her spouse.


Under Article 255

124
of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her
husband.
The fact that the child was born a mere seven (7) months after the initial sexual contact between petitioner and respondent is
another proof that the said child was not of petitioner since, from indications, he came out as a normal full-term baby.
It must be stressed that Article 256 of the Civil Code which provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress has been adopted for two solid reasons.
a) in a fit of anger, or to arouse jealousy in the husband, the wife may have made this declaration
b) as a guaranty in favor of the children whose condition should not be under the mercy of the passions of their parents.

2. NO. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral
or economic interest involved.(Id)

The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock belongs only to the alleged father, who is the
husband of the mother and can be exercised only by him or his heirs, within a fixed time, and in certain cases, and only in a
direct suit brought for the purpose

This Court finds no other recourse except to deny respondent's claim to declare her son Rolando the illegitimate child of petitioner.
From all indications, respondent has paraded herself as a woman of highly questionable character. A married woman who, on first
meeting, rides with a total stranger who is married towards nightfall, sleeps in his house in the presence of his children, then lives with
him after their initial sexual contact the atmosphere for which she herself provided is patently immoral and hedonistic. Although
her husband was a very potent man, she readily indulged in an instant illicit relationship with a married man she had never known
before.

Respondent had shown total lack of or genuine concern for her child (Rolando) for, even after birth, she left him in the care of a yaya for
several months. This is not the normal instinct and behavior of a mother who has the safety and welfare of her child foremost in her
mind. The filing of this case itself shows how she is capable of sacrificing the psycho-social future (reputation) of the child in exchange
for some monetary consideration. This is blatant shamelessness.
It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of her reckless
behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all her own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the
bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate
scheming married women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during such immoral
relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wrecking the stability of two families. This
would be a severe assault on morality.
And as between the paternity by the husband and the paternity by the paramour, all the circumstances being equal, the law is inclined
to follow the former; hence, the child is thus given the benefit of legitimacy.

124
Art.255.Childrenbornafteronehundredandeightydaysfollowingthecelebrationofthemarriage,andbeforethreehundreddaysfollowingitsdissolution
ortheseparationofthespousesshallbepresumedtobelegitimate.
Againstthispresumption,noevidenceshallbeadmittedotherthanthatofthephysicalimpossibilityofthehusband'shavingaccesstohiswifewithinthefirst
onehundredandtwentydaysofthethreehundredwhichprecededthebirthofthechild.
Thisphysicalimpossibilitymaybecaused:
(1)Bytheimpotenceofthehusband;
(2)Bythefactthatthehusbandandwifewereseparately,insuchawaythataccesswasnotpossible;
(3)Bytheseriousillnessofthehusband.
Art.256.Thechildshallbepresumedlegitimate,althoughthemothermayhavedeclaredagainstitslegitimacyormayhavebeensentencedasanadulteress.
Art.257.Shouldthewifecommitadulteryatoraboutthetimeoftheconceptionofthechild,buttherewasnophysicalimpossibilityofaccessbetweenherand
herhusbandassetforthinarticle255,thechildisprimafaciepresumedtobeillegitimateifitappearshighlyimprobable,forethnicreasons,thatthechildis
thatofthehusband.Forthepurposesofthisarticle,thewife'sadulteryneednotbeprovedinacriminalcase.
Sec.4.Quasiconclusivepresumptionsoflegitimacy
(a) Children born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separationofthespousesshallbepresumedlegitimate.
Against presumption no evidence be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one
hundredandtwentydaysofthethreehundredwhichprecededthebirthofthechild.
[1]Bytheimpotenceofthehusband
[2]Bythefactthatthehusbandandthewifewerelivingseparately,insuchawaythataccesswasnotpossible;
[3]Bytheseriousillnessofthehusband;
(b)Thechildshallbepresumedlegitimatealthoughthemothermayhavedeclaredagainstitslegitimacyormayhavebeensentencedasanadulteress.
(c)Shouldthewifecommitadulteryatoraboutthetimeoftheconceptionofthechild,buttherewasnophysicalimpossibilityofaccessbetweenherandher
husbandassetforthabove,thechildispresumedlegitimate,unlessitappearshighlyimprobable,forethnicreasons,thatthechildisthatofthehusband.For
thepurposeoftherule,thewife'sadulteryneednotbeprovedinacriminalcase....(Rule131,RulesofCourt).

Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every of law or facts leans toward the
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children the community of property during
marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of
unlawful aggression.

DISPOSITIVE: DECISION REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. KEBABdigest

Chua Keng Giap v. IAC and Chua Lian King, 158 SCRA 18 (1988)
Feb 17, 1988 | Petition to review the decision of the IAC | Cruz, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner insists that he is the son of deceased Sy Kao (female). In May 19, 1983, Chua Keng Giap filed a petition for the
settlement of the estate of Sy Kao. Actually there was already a prior case wherein Chua was declared not the son of the
spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao for the settlement of the estate of Chua Bing Guan.
While the present case was in the RTC, a motion to dismiss was filed by private respondent saying that this case has already
been long decided, but it was denied by that court saying that what was answered before was the question of paternity and not
of maternity. Upon appeal, IAC reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the motion to dismiss. A subsequent motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied for late filing. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.
In Sy Kao v CA decided on Sept 28, 1984 (a case that lasted for ten years +appeal), Sy Kao flatly and unequivocally declared
that she was not the petitioners mother and that he was the son of Chua Eng Kun and Tan Kuy. Therefore, he had no lawful
interest in the estate of the Chua Bing Guan (deceased husband of Sy Kiap) and no right to institute the intestacy proceedings.

ISSUES:
WON the petitioners motion for reconsideration was timely
WON Chua Keng Giap is the son of Sy Kiap.

HELD:
No and No. The motion would have been denied if it was filed on time. The mother is in the best position to know whether petitioner
was really her son.

JUDGMENT: Petition denied. KEBABdigest

Cabatbat Lim v. IAC, 166 SCRA 451 (1988)

Facts:
Dr. Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat died without issue on April 23, 1977. She was survived by her husband, Proceso Cabatbat,
her sisters, and the children of her deceased brothers Daniel and Domingo.
Part of her estate was her interest in the business partnership known as Calasiao Bijon Factory, in the possession of Violeta
Cabatbat Lim who claims to be the child of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat.
Private respondents alleged that Violeta was only the ward (ampon) of the spouses, without the benefit of formal adoption
proceedings.
Respondents present the ff. evidence:
1) Absence of any record that Esperanza Cabatbat was admitted in the hospital where Violeta was born or that she gave
birth on the day Violeta was born;
2) The absence of a birth certificate of Violeta in the files of certificates of live births of the Pangasian Provincial Hospital for
the years of 1947 and 1948 when she was supposedly born;
3) Certification from Civil Registry coordinator Eugenio Venal of the Office of the Civil Registrar General that his office has no
birth record on May 26, 1948 or 1949 in Calasiao, Pangasinan;
4) Certification from Romeo Grabian, Principal II, that when Violeta studied in the Calasiao Pilot Central School, Esperanza
and Proceso were listed only as her guardians and not her parents; and
5) Testimony of Amparo Reside that she was in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital on May 21, 1948 to watch her cousin
give birth and there became acquainted with a patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth on May 26, 1948 to a baby
girl who later on grew up to be known as Violeta.
Violeta presents the ff. evidence:
1) Her birth record which was filed on J une 15, 1948 showing that she was born on May 6, 1948 and that she is a legitimate
child of the spouses Proceso and Esperanza Cabatbat;
2) Testimony of Proceso that she is his child with his wife;
3) Testimony of Benita Lastimosa denying tht she delivered a child in Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that Violeta is that
child;
4) Marriage contract of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao where Esperanza appeared as the mother of the bride;
5) Deed of Sale wherein vendee, then a minor, was assisted by her mother Esperanza;
6) Deed of sale where Violeta was assisted by her father Proceso.

RTC ruled in favor of respondents and against Violeta. CA affirmed. Violeta appealed to SC listing as errors of the CA as
finding that she is not the daughter, in ignoring Section 22 of Rule 132, Rules of Court, in not considering Art. 263 of the New
Civil Code, and in disregarding her evidences.
Issue: WoN Violeta is the daughter of the spouses Cabatbat.
Held: No.
Ratio: The finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that Violeta Cabatbat was not born of Esperanza is a factual finding based
on the evidence presented on trial and is conclusive upon Us.
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
125
does not apply to the supposed birth registry record of Violeta Cabatbat. Trial
Court observed that Esperanza was never admitted in the hospital as an obstetrics case from December 1, 1947 to J une 15, 1948. The
only woman to give birth on May 26, 1948 was Benita Lastimosa. (In other words, evidence to the contrary was stronger than evidence
presented by Violeta).
The absence of a record of the birth of petitioner Violeta in the Office of the Civil Registrar General puts a cloud on the
genuiness of her birth record.
Art. 263 of the New Civil Code
126
is inapplicable. It refers to illegitimacy. Respondents are not attacking the legitimacy of
Violeta. They are claiming she is not even a child of Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat.
Decision: Lower court decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION excluding the widows of Esperanzas deceased brothers because
they are not legal heirs of Esperanza. KEBABdigest

Republic v. Labrador, 305 SCRA 438 (1999)
[Certiorari; Panganiban; March 25, 1999]

Facts:
+ Sarah Zita was born out of a common-law relationship between Maria Rosario Caon and DegobertoErasmo.
+ It was her aunt, Gladys Labrador (petitioner herein) who reported the birth to the Local Civil Registrar.
o Instead of being surnamed Caon, Sarah was surnamed Erasmo in her birth record.
o Sarahs mother was also named Rosemarie in the birth record.
+ Since Sarahs mother is now in the US, Gladys filed a petition to the RTC for the correction of entries in the record of birth of Sarah
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
+ Gladys Labrador filed w/ the RTC a petition for the correction of entries in the record of birth of Sarah ZitaErasmo, her niece (and
also the name of Sarahs mother).
+ The notice of hearing was published. Evidence was presented
127
. The Trial Court granted the petition.
+ Petitioner now claims that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
128
cant be used to modify, alter, or increase substantive rights such as
those involving the il/legitimacy of the child. The change in this case is a substantial one and it also involved the rights of the child.

Issues:
1. WON the change in the record of birth in a civil registry affecting the status of a person (from legitimate to illegitimate) may be
granted in a summary proceeding. [No]
WON Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be used to change the entry in a birth cert regarding the filiation of the child. [No]
125
Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any
alterationsorcircumstancesofsuspicion,nootherevidenceifitsexecutionandauthenticityneedbegiven.
126
TheactiontoimpugnthelegitimacyofthechildshallbebroughtwithinoneyearfromtherecordingofthebirthintheCivilRegister,ifthehusbandshouldbein
thesameplace,orinapropercase,anyofhisheirs.
Ifheorhisheirsareabsent,theperiodshallbeeighteenmonthsiftheyshouldresideinthePhilippines;andtwoyearsifabroad.Ifthebirthofthechildhasbeen
concealed,thetermshallbecountedfromthediscoveryofthefraud.(113a)
127
BirthcertofSarah&CertificationofnorecordofmarriagebetSarahsmomanddad
128
Rule108:CancellationorCorrectionofEntriesintheCivilRegistry
Sec.1.Whomayfilepetition.Anypersoninterestedinanyact,event,orderordecreeconcerningthecivilstatusofpersonswhichhasbeenrecordedinthecivil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Court of First Instance of the province where the
correspondingcivilregistryislocated.
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a)
births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determinationoffiliation;(n)voluntaryemancipationofaminor;and(o)changesofname.
Sec. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
wouldbeaffectedtherebyshallbemadepartiestotheproceeding.
Sec.4.Noticeandpublication.Uponthefilingofthepetition,thecourtshall,byanorder,fixthetimeandplaceforthehearingofthesame,andcausereasonable
noticethereoftobegiventothepersonsnamedinthepetition.Thecourtshallalsocausetheordertobepublishedonceaweekforthree(3)consecutiveweeksina
newspaperofgeneralcirculationintheprovince.
Sec.5.Opposition.Thecivilregistrarandanypersonhavingorclaiminganyinterestundertheentrywhosecancellationorcorrectionissoughtmay,withinfifteen
(15)daysfromnoticeofthepetition,orfromthelastdateofpublicationofsuchnotice,filehisoppositionthereto.
Sec.6.Expeditingproceedings.Thecourtinwhichtheproceedingisbroughtmaymakeordersexpeditingtheproceedings,andmayalsograntpreliminaryinjunction
forthepreservationoftherightsofthepartiespendingsuchproceedings.
Sec.7.Order.Afterhearing,thecourtmayeitherdismissthepetitionorissueanordergrantingthecancellationorcorrectionprayedfor.Ineithercase,acertified
copyofthejudgmentshallbeserveduponthecivilregistrarconcernedwhoshallannotatethesameinhisrecord.

Held/Ratio:
1. The effect of a correction of an entry in this case will change Sarahs status
129
from legitimate to illegitimate. Hence, this cant be
granted in a summary proceeding Substantial changes could not be effected except in adversarial proceedings
130
. A full hearing is
thus mandatory. (Republic v. Valencia)
a. he change of surname from Erasmo to Cannon would transform the filiation. T
Sarah and her parents would have been the proper parties to this case. There was no legal explanation why it was
the aunt of the child was the petitioner absent any appointement as guardian.
The rights of her parents over her and over each other will be affected
The change of name will also affect creditors

b. The change of name of the Sarahs mother also required adversarial proceedings.

2. Rule 108 doesnt contemplate an ordinary civil action but a special proceeding. To enforce Art 176 of the FC on the use of the
surname of the mother, there must be an adversarial contest. The nature of the action will grant or deny substantial rights, thus it
would be improper to institute said action in the form of a summary proceeding (merely to correct clerical errors).
a. The publication and the hearing conducted was not sufficient
3. The evidence didnt fully substantiate the claim that Sarah was illegitimate. KEBABdigest

Tan v. Trocio, 191 SCRA 764 (1990)
27 November 1990 | Melencio-Herrera, J . | Administrative case in the SC. Disbarment, immorality and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.

Facts:
The complainant is Felicidad Barian Tan, owner and directress of Harlyn Vocational School in Lanao del Norte. She is
alleging that Atty. Galileo Trocio, herein respondent and legal counsel of said school, overpowered her inside the office and
raped her. It was at about 8:30 PM, after classes sometime in April 1971. As a result, she begot a son on 02/05/1972, which
she named Jewel Tan. She did not file criminal charges immediately after. She alleges that after 8 years and thorough soul-
searching, she decided to file this administrative complaint.
Tan put up the following reasons for not pressing charges and for establishing filiation between her son J ewel and Trocio:
1. She alleges that the respondent threatened her with the deportation of her alien husband if she complained to the
authorities since she was violating the Anti-Dummy Law in operating the vocational school.
2. Tan contends that Trocio continued supporting Jewel for several years (w/c eventually stopped) for which reason
she desisted from charging him criminally.
3. Tans house help, Eleuteria Garcia testifies that she heard Tans cries for help during the rape to which she
responded.
4. Tan, Eleuteria and Tans other house help Marilou claims unusual closeness of Trocio to J ewel (giving toys, playing
with kid).
5. Tan presented pictures that were supposed to show the physical likeness of Trocio and J ewel.
The respondent vehemently denies that he had sexually assaulted Tan. In 1978, Trocio handled an inheritance case for Tans
family. Trocio alleges that Tan insisted that he report to Tans mother and sisters that he had charged a fee of P15k instead of
the P2.5k so Tan could pocket the difference. He argues that her motivation in filing this charge was to get even with him after
having been humiliated when he declined her request. Furthermore, Trocio contends that Tan filed the case to escape her
indebtedness to him representing his services as legal counsel of the school which were unpaid since 1974 and the
accumulated honoraria from her fire insurance claims
131
.

Issue: W/N there is adequate and convincing proof to overcome the presumption of legitimacy of Tans son, which was conceived and
born during Tans valid marriage with her alien husband.

Held/Ratio:
NO. Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock of Tan and her husband and the presumption should be in favor of
legitimacy unless physical access between the couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, that presumption
has not been overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth certificate as the
legitimate child of Tan and her husband, Tan Le Pok.
Tans explanation of fear of deportation of her alien husband is not credible because she claims to have lost contact with her
husband when he learned of the Trocios transgression that very same evening. The fear that she speaks of had become
inexistent.
The numerous subsequent dealings of Tan with Trocio (see footnote 1) is far from being the normal reaction of a woman
who has been wronged.
129
RefertopreviousdiscussiononSTATUSOFPERSONS
130
one having opposing parties, contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one in w/c the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party,andaffordedthelatteranopportunitytocontestit.Excludesanadoptionproceeding.
131
1971,TrociohelpedprosecuteacaseforrobberycommittedagainstTansmotherandsisters;1976,afireguttedtheschoolandTrocioassistedTanincollecting
indemnitiesfrom3insurancecompanies;1978,TrociowasretainedasacollaboratingattorneybyTansfamilyinaninheritancecase

Claim of support of Jewel by Trocio was not substantiated. And her having kept her peace for several years can even be
construed as condonation. Besides, J ewel is a strange name for an unwanted son.
The testimony of the Eleuteria does not have credibility because the rape occurred in school premises and it has not been
established how near she was from the crime scene.
Unusual closeness is not convincing enough to prove paternity; Pictures as evidence of paternity are inconclusive to prove
paternity, much less violation of Tans honor.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, this Complaint for disbarment must be, and is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of convincing substantiation.
KEBABdigest

People v. Tumimpad, 235 SCRA 483 (1994)
Appeal from a decision of RTC | Kapunan, J. | August 19, 1994

Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Moreno Tumimbad

FACTS:
Col. Teofisto Salcedo, Provincial Commander of Misamis Occidental were assigned with four security men, two of them were
the accused Moreno Tumimbad and Ruel Prieto
Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son Alexander and his wife, his daughter Sandra, a 15-year old mongoloid, together with
said security were living in a two storey officers headquarters.
o Upper storey was occupied by Col. Salcedo, his wife and daughter
o Lower storey has two rooms and were occupied by the security men and Alexander and his wife
Sandra complained of constipation. She was brought to a doctor and was given medication, but her condition did not improve.
She became irritable and moddy. She felt sick and unhappy.
Sandra saw the accused and said, Mama, patayin mo yan, bastos.
Worried of her daughters condition, she brought her again to a hospital. Yet, she still remained moody and irritable. She
refused to take a bath and eat.
She was again brought to a hospital for check-up and was ordered to undergo a urinalysis. The MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIST
(si doc ata to, 1994 eh) conducted the urinalysis and found out that she was pregnant
She brought her to DR. KHO, ob-gyne specialist and subjected her to a pelvic ultrasound examination. Result was positive,
she was pregnant for 17.1 weeks. Another examination was conducted in QC, and the result was the same; Sandra gave birth
to a boy, J acob Salcedo
She identified Moreno Tumimbad and Ruel Prieto:
o From 30 pictures of different persons laid on the table and asked to pick up
o From a police line-up of ten people
o In open court during the hearing
Accused moved that a blood test be conducted (major blood grouping test and phenol blood typing); Makati Medical Center
(siyempre, may plug) showed that Tumimbad is O, Prieto is A, Sandra is B and son is O
Trial court convicted Tumimbad and acquitted Prieto based on the findings

ISSUE: W/N erred in convicting Tumimbad on major blood grouping test (ABO and RHS), not a paternal test known as chromosomes
or HLA (because both were found to be O)?

DECISION: (judgment affirmed)
No, the blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one of many others of the same blood
type may have been the father of the child as held in Jao v. CA.
Culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence given by the victim and her relatives:
o Identified thrice by Sandra; she even GRAPHICALLY recalled how she was raped
o Allegation that it is impossible to rape her because she was always with her mother and he was always with Col.
Salcedo during inspection tours is untenable. They were sometimes left behind with Sandra and play pingpong or
card games. KEBABdigest


Benitez-Badua v. CA, 229 SCRA 468 (1994)
GR # 105625 | January 24, 1994 | Puno, J.

Facts:
- Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chiongpian are husband and wife. They own various properties. Marissa Benitez-Badua is
allegedly their daughter.
- Isabel died in 1982. Vicente died in 1989. A petition for issuance of letters of administration of their estate was filed by
Vicentes sister and nephew. Their petition was opposed by Marissa who claims to be the legitimate only daughter of the
spouses, thus the only legal heir under the law.
- The sister and nephew countered saying that Marissa is not really the biological daughter of Vicente and Isabel. They claim
that she is a mere ward or ampon who isnt even legally adopted; therefore, she cannot be a legal heir and entitled to
administer the property.
- To prove her status as daughter of Vicente and Isabel, Marissa presented her certificate of live birth, baptismal certificate, ITR
and GSIS Info sheet of Vicente naming Marissa as his daughter, school records, and the like. She also testified that the
spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter.
- The sister and nephew on the other hand, used testimonial evidence from several people to prove that the spouses failed to
beget a child during their marriage, that Isabel was even referred to an OB-Gyne for treatment.
- The then 77 year old sister of Vicente also categorically stated that Marissa is not the biological child of the spouses.
- The deed of extrajudicial partition of Isabels estate was done by Vicente and Isabels brother. In it, they declared that they two
are the only heirs of Isabel because she died w/o any ascendants or descendants.
- Nonetheless, the trial court ruled in favor of Marissa. The CA reversed the trial court.
- Marissa appeals to the SC, alleging that the statutory presumption of legitimacy in articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the FC
has not been applied by the CA and that her legitimacy cannot be impugned in a petition for issuance of letters of
administration but only through an action directly instituted for that purpose.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the statutory presumption of legitimacy in articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 applies in this case
2. Whether or not her legitimacy can be questioned in a case not directly instituted for that purpose as the present case
3. Whether or not Marissa is the daughter of Isabel and Vicente

Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Those only apply in cases where the status of a person as a legitimate child is impugned, not in cases where the child is
alleged not to be a natural or biological child of a certain couple.
2. NO. But then again, its not her legitimacy which is being questioned but her being a natural or biological child of the
decedents.
3. NO. The totality of evidence proves that she is not the daughter of Isabel and Vicente.
a. The evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel never became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child.
This is attested to by several disinterested persons such as neighbors. The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant
and growing big with child, as well as her delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be hidden from the public eye,
and so is the fact that a woman never became pregnant and could not have, therefore, delivered a baby at all
b. Vicentess 77 year old sister Victoria also categorically testified that Marissa was only an ampon. Her testimony is
highly trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be called by her Creator at any time, she would hardly be
interested in material things anymore and can be expected not to lie, especially under oath as a witness.
c. Marissas birth certificate with Vicente appearing as the informant, is highly questionable and suspicious. For Isabel,
who was already 36 years old at the time of the child's supposed birth, was truly the mother of that child, as reported
by Vicente in her birth certificate, should the child not have been born in a hospital under the experienced, skillful and
caring hands of doctors, since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to
her health and even life? How come, then, that as appearing in her birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at
the Benitez home in Avenida, Rizal with no physician or even a midwife attending?
d. If Marissa is truly the real, biological daughter of Vicente and Isabel, why did Vicente and Isabel's only sibling Dr. Nilo
Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April 25, 1982, state in the extrajudicial settlement
that they executed her estate, "that we are the sole heirs of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died
without descendants or ascendants?
e. It is strange that if Marissa was truly the daughter of Isabel and Vicente, why would Isabel, at her death bed, have to
write a note to her husband exhorting him to make their daughter his sole heir when he too dies? It would not have
been necessary for Isabel to write and plead for the foregoing requests to her husband, since Marissa would be their
legal heir by operation of law.
f. Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria Benitez Lirio even testified that her brother Vicente
gave the date December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate because that date is the birthday of their
(Victoria and Vicente's) mother. It is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the mother of Vicente
and Victoria to have the same birthday unless it is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was only registered by
Vicente as his and his wife's child and that they gave her the birth date of Vicente's mother. KEBABdigest


De Aparicio v. Paraguya, 150 SCRA 279 (1987)

May 29, 1987 | Appeal from the judgment of the CFI | Gancayco, J.

FACTS:
Trinidad Montilde conceived a child by Father Felipe Lumain. When she was 4 months pregnant, she married Anatacio
Mambura to conceal her disgrace but they never lived as man and wife. 192 days after the marriage Consolacion Lumain was
born. 12 years later, Fr. Lumain died leaving a last will acknowledging consolacion as his and instituting her as the sole and
universal heir of his property. Upon reaching the age of majority, she instituted an action for recovery of land from Hipolito
Paraguya that she claims she inherited from her father. The CFI decided in favor of her. Upon appeal to CA, the CA forwarded
the case to SC as there were no questions of facts but only correctness of the CFI decision.
Upon appeal, Paranguya pointed out that Consolacion is the legitimate child of the Trinidad and Anastacio since she was born
192 days after the marriage (According to Art 255 of CC)
132
. Also, there is no evidence of physical incapacity on the part of
Anastacio to have access to his wife Trinidad in the first 120 days of the 300 days which preceded the birth of the child. He
also averred that the declarations of Trinidad Montilde against the legitimacy of Consolacion cannot prevail over the
presumption of legitimacy under the provisions of to 265 of CC
133
.

ISSUES:
1. WON appellee is entitled to the possession of the land granted to him.
2. WON the RTC is correct in considering appellee a natural child of the deceased

HELD:
1. YES. Evidence presented supported the claim of Paranguya that the land in question is not included in the deceaseds estate
as it did not belong to him at all. Consolacion cannot recover the land.

OBITER. The court finds it unnecessary to determine the paternity of Consolacion since in the last will, she was not only acknowledged
as his natural daughter but also designated as his only heir. Having no other compulsory heir, the deceased could dispose of his estate
in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

JUDGMENT: J udgment affirmed. KEBABdigest

B. Proof of Filiation
1. How to Prove Filiation

Constantino v. Mendez, 209 SCRA 18 (1992)
(May 14, 1992)
PETITIONER: AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO
RESPONDENTS: IVAN MENDEZ; COURT OF APPEALS
Ponente: BIDIN, J.
Keywords: filiation

FACTS:
In August 1974, Amelita Constantino met Ivan Mendez. She claims to have had consensual sexual intercourse with him from then
until November, knowing that Ivan was a married man. Apparently she got pregnant and eventually gave birth to a Michael on
August 3, 1975. Ivan denies having illicit sexual relation with her.
In J une 5, 1975, petitioner filed a suit with CFI Davao which decided in her favor ordering Ivan Mendez to (1) acknowledge the
minor Michael Constantino as his illegitimate child; (2) give monthly support and (3) pay actual and moral damages and attorneys
fee.
On appeal, CA set aside decision and dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in setting aside decision of the trial court and dismissing the complaint
HELD: NO
132
Art.255.Childrenbornafteronehundredandeightydaysfollowingthecelebrationofthemarriage,andbeforethreehundreddaysfollowingitsdissolutionorthe
separationofthespousesshallbepresumedtobelegitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physicalimpossibility of the husband's having access to his wife withinthe first one
hundredandtwentydaysofthreehundredwhichprecededthebirthofthechild.
(1)Bytheimpotenceofthehusband;
(2)Bythefactthatthehusbandandwifewerelivingseparately,insuchawaythataccesswasnotpossible;
(3)Bytheseriousillnessofthehusband.(108a)
133
Art.265.ThefiliationoflegitimatechildrenisprovedbytherecordofbirthappearingintheCivilRegister,orbyanauthenticdocumentorafinaljudgment.

RATIO: CA, based on the evidence on record, that Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that
Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Amelitas testimony as to her sexual contact with Ivan during the 1
st
or 2
nd

week of November is inconsistent with her letter in February 1975 informing Ivan that she was 4 months pregnant.
An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties
so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proof is on Amelita
to establish her affirmative allegations that Ivan is the father of her son.
As regards the claim for damages based on Artcles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a
basis for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. Their
repeated sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her
submit to Ivan.


Mendoza v. Mella, 17 SCRA 788 (1966)
CATALINA MENDOZA AND RODOLFO PAREJA V. TEMISTOCLES MELLA
Makalintal, J. | No. L-18752 | July 30 1966 | Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Facts:
Paciano Pareja donated to his son litigated property in 1939. 1943 his son disappeared and nothing was heard of him
anymore.
He left his common law spouse Catalina Mendoza and their son Rodolfo, herein petitioners.
In 1948, Paciano sold said lot to respondent Mella who notified petitioners to vacate the same.
Petitioners refused and claimed ownership by virtue of inheritance and prescription.
RTC rejected petitioners defenses.
CA affirmed lower court decision.

Issue:
WON Rodolfo may be considered as an acknowledged natural child of deceased and thus acquire successional rights.

Held/ Ratio:
Court affirmed RTC and CA decision.

NO. Since Rodolfo was born in 1935 after the civil registry law
134
was enacted, the question is whether his birth certificate may be relied
upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. His certificate, however, failed to show that his parents signed
the original, let alone swore
135
to its contents as required by law. There must be a clear statement in the document that the parent
recognizes the child as his or her own.

For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register.
Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child
may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case there must be a clear statement in the
document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own (Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1); and in the birth certificate no such
statement appears. The claim of voluntary recognition is without basis. KEBABdigest

Lim v. CA, 65 SCRA 160 (1975)

Facts:
In 1962 Felisa Lim brought suit against Francisco Miguel Romualdez Uy Cheng Hong for 1) declaration of nullity of the affidavit
Uy executed in which he adjudicated to himself, as the only son and heir of Susana Lim, a lot with the house thereon at
Tayabas St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, 2) cancellation of the certificate of title issued in the name of Uy, and 3) issuance of a new
transfer certificate of title in her favor.
Both Uy and Felisa claimed that they inherited, to the exclusion of the other, the property in question from Susana.
Felisa claimed she is the natural daughter and sole heir of Susana. To prove it, she produced her certificate of baptism, which
states that Felisa Lim is the natural daughter of Susana Lim and her marriage contract which states that Susana Lim gave her
consent. She also alleged continuous possession of the status of a natural child.
Uy claimed to be the only son and heir of Susana Lim. To support this, he produces 1) his application for alien registration in
the Bureau of Immigration, which names his mother as Susana Lim, 2)the order of the Bureau of Immigration cancelling his
alien registration, which order describes Uy as a Filipino citizen by derivation from his mother, Susana Lim, and 3)his
identification certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration, which certificate describes Uy as a Filipino citizen by derivation
from his mother Susana Lim.
134
CivilRegistryLawwaspassedin1930(ActNo.3753)containingprovisionsfortheregistrationofbirths,includingthoseofillegitimateparentage;andtherecordof
birthundersuchlaw,ifsufficientincontentsforthepurpose,wouldmeettherequisitesforvoluntaryrecognitionevenunderArt.131.
135
AsrequiredinSec.5ofActNo.3753.

RTC ruled in favor of Susan Lim, declaring her as Susana Lims only heir. Uys motion for reconsideration was denied. Uy then
appealed to the CA but during the pendency of the case, he died and his wife Guadalupe Uy substituted for him. CA reversed
the decision but also dismissed Uys complaint and ruled that neither Uy nor Lim is entitled to inheritance because neither of
them had been recognized by Susana Lim as her child by any of the means provided for by law; and neither have been
declared in a judicial proceeding to be the child of Susana Lim.
In the appeal to the SC Lim asserts that her marriage contract proves she is the daughter of Susana Lim, that it is a public
document and thus fulfills the provisions of the old Civil Code (re recognition in some other public document) and the new
Civil Code (re recognition in any authentic writing).
On the other hand, Guadalupe Enriquez Uy, claims that the CAs ruling that he is not an heir of Susana makes no difference
because her husband purchased said land with his own money prior to Susana Lims death and took conveyance and title
thereof in his mothers name in deference to her since she gave him a little amount to complete the purchase price.
Issues: WoN either one is an heir of Susana Lim.
Held: NO.
Lim claims her recognition as Susanas daughter took place in 1943. Since the recognition allegedly took place during the
effectivity of the Civil Code of 1889, such recognition should be reckoned in accordance with the requisites established by said
Civil Code. For the law at force at the time of the recognition governs the act of recognition.
Article131 of the Civil Code of 1889 requires that recognition of a natural child be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in
some other public document.
According to Article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889, public documents are those authenticated by a notary or by a competent
public official, with the formalities required by law. There are two classes of public documents, those executed by private
individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office.
The public document in Article 131 belongs to the first class.
Lims marriage contract does not satisfy the requirements of Article 131 since it was not executed before a notary and
authenticated by him. A marriage contract is a declaration that two people take each other as husband and wife, in the
presence of two witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer who is also present. Under the old Civil Code, the
recognition must be precise, express, and solemn.
Mrs. Uy claims that there was an implied trust between her husband and Susana Lim. An implied trust arises where a person
purchases land with his own money and takes conveyance thereof in the name of another. In such a case, the property is held
on a resulting trust in favor of the one furnishing the consideration for the transfer, unless a different intention or understanding
appears. The trust which results under such circumstances does not arise from contract or agreement of the parties, but from
the facts and circumstances, that is to say, it results because of equity and arises by implication or operation of law.
In support of this implied trust, Mrs. Uy presents evidence that shows that Mr. Uy received a 10,000 peso legacy from his
father, that he purchased the property in question, and that the name of Susana Lim appeared in the sale.
The SC disagreed because 1) the theory was raised for the first time in her motion for reconsideration filed with the CA and 2)
the evidence regarding the alleged purchase is altogether unconvincing.
Decision: CA AFFIRMED. NEITHER are heirs. KEBABdigest

Heirs of R. Banas v. Heirs of Bibiano Banas, 134 SCRA 260 (1985)
[Appeal; Makasiar; Jan 31, 1985]

Short summary:
+ Heirs of RaymundoBaas (RB for brevity) claim that RB is a recognized natural child of BibianoBaas (BB for brevity) based on a
number of pieces of evidence. Heirs of BB claim that BB executed certain documents saying that Pedro Baas (PB for brevity), his
brother, is the real father of RB.
+ The Court held that the evidence put forward by heirs of RB (specifically the letter from BB to RB w/ a complementary closing of
Su Padre) is not a conclusive evidence of voluntary acknowledgment of paternity because
a) Voluntary acknowledgment is contemplated only in public documents (the letter is a private document)
b) The su padre merely indicates paternal solicitude on the part of BB since the real father, PB, cant support RB
Codal Provisions:
Spanish Civil Code New Civil Code
Art 115. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record
of birth entered in the Civil Registry or by an authentic
instrument or final judgment in the cases to w/c Articles 110
to 113 of the precedeng chapter refer
Art 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record
of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic
document or a final judgment
Art 131. The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in
the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document
Art 278. Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing
Art 135. The father is obligated to acknowledge his natural child in
the following case:
1) When there exists an indubitable writing of his in w/c he
expressly acknowledges his paternity
Art 283. In any of the ff cases, the father is obliged to recognize
the child as his natural child:
4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father


FACTS:
+ Heirs of RB RB is an acknowledged natural son of BB thus they, as descents, are entitled to the share in the estate of BB
+ Heirs of BB RB was never acknowledged by BB and by BBs family as a natural son. RB is the son of PB.
+ RB was a natural child of Dolores Castillo, an insane woman, and an unknown father. RB was born on March 15, 1984. BB was
the one who shouldered the school expenses of RB. Raymundo visited BB often and there he met his present wife Trinidad, the
niece of BBs wife.
1926 RB married Trinidad. In their Marriage Cert (Exh H), the name of the father of RB was stated to be BB.
1930 + RB and PB each executed sworn statements (Exh 1) before Atty. Faustino wishing to correct the entry in the
marriage certificate since RB found out already that it was PB who is his natural father. A handwritten remark
to this effect was placed in the marriage certificate
+ BB executed a sworn statement (Exh 2) stating that RB is PBs child w/ Dolores Castillo
+ PB also wrote to the Archbishop of Manila (Exh 3) in order to correct the entry in RBs baptismal certificate to
reflect that PB is RBsfater
1931 RB and his family moved to Santa Cruz, Mla. This property was transferred through sale from BB to RB.
1954 BB died
1955 + RB wrote 2 letters to Atty. Faustino regarding the alleged injustices of BBs wife (Exh J )
+ Heirs of BB extra judicially settled BBs estate amongst themselves
+ RB & wife executed a mortgage over the Sta. Cruz property in favor of 1 of the defendants; mortgage was
cancelled by defendant
1962 RB died
1965 Heirs of RB filed a complaint for partition or recovery of hereditary share of BBs property.
RBs wife put forward pieces of evidence that were purportedly discovered by her in the aparadoronly after the death
of her husband.
136
+ The trial court dismissed heirs of RBs complaint.

ISSUE: WON BB voluntarily acknowledged RB as his natural son. [NO]

RATIO:
1. Exhibit A
137
does not constitute a precise, express, & solemn acknowledgment
o In the Padilla annotation the voluntary recognition of a natural child to be effective under Art 278, NCC must be made
expressly by the recognizing parent
o In the Reyes annotation the recognition shall be express
o In the Intestate Estate of Pareja v. Pareja, citing Sanchez Roman the recognition must be precise, express, and solemn
o The words SU PADRE is not sufficient to constitute an intent to recognize.The complimentary ending, taken in the
context of the letter, is not an indubitable acknowledgment, merely indicative of paternal solicitude.Filipinos are known
for close family ties & are fond of children so that children of relatives or of strangers are supported if their parents are not
capable to do so

2. The letter does not fall under documents contemplated under the rule of incidental acknowledgment
o Rule of incidental acknowledgment the law inclines favorably to an acknowledgment in a public document made incidentally
or in any terms, so long as the intention to acknowledge sufficiently appears
o The plaintiffs failed to note that the rule of incidental acknowledgment is used only in cases of voluntary recognition made in a
public document. The rule is so because people would be more careful in what they write or say in a public document that is
why anything mentioned therein deserves full faith & credit
136
Evidence:
HeirsofRB HeirsofBB
a) HandwrittennoteofBBtoRBw/asupadrecomplementaryclosing
b) Directory&homecomingsouvenirprogramofSanBedaCollegein1956
c) 2copiesofmatriculationreceipts
d) 1904matriculationcertificatew/fathersnameBB
e) Samebutin1905
f) Grade 5 report cards of RB signed by BB in the blank space provided for parents/guardians; the
signatureswereerasedbutitcanstillbeseenthatitwasBBssignature
g) SamebutinGrade6
h) MarriagecertificateofRB&TrinidadwherebytheRBsfathersnamewasstatedtobeBBandPBwasa
sponsor
i) TypewrittendocumentofRBin1958statinghispersonalcircumstances
j) LettersofRBtoAtty.FaustinoontheallegedinjusticesofBBswifeagainsthim
k) AutobiographiesofRB
l) AutobiographiesofRBw/intercalations,alterations,&spoliations
1) Declaracion Jurada of RB & PB that PB is the
naturalfatherofRB
2) Declaracion Jurada of BB that PB is the natural
fatherofRB
3) LetterofPBtotheArchbishopofManila
4) Envelope containing Exh 1 3 theres a
typewritten annotation outside regarding its
contents
137
Mundohoyalas10y45.Tunoestasencasanoquierestuobedecerloquetedije,queenestashorasestudiar,descansaryayudarconsumadre.Quenoveomas
otravesasi.
23/5/7 Supadre,B.Banas

o There are 2 kinds of acknowledgment

a. Voluntary may be made incidental; made in a record of birth, will or other public document; acknowledgment has been
legally & formally accomplished
b. Compulsory must be direct & express; in the cases of indubitable writing; recognition is yet to be ordered by the courts;
it is not self-executory
o Exh A is just a note admonishing the young RB because he stayed out late instead of studying and helping his mother. There
was no intent to recognize apparent in the document. It was merely indicative of paternal concern for the son of his
brother.

3. The school records and the marriage certificate are not sufficient proofs because they werent prepared by BB himself but by
authorities concerned. For documents to be effecti ve as proof of filiation, they must be made by the putative father
himself& made in his writing.
o The signature of BB in Exh H & G may be made as a guardian and not as a parent
o It could also be that BB adopted RB de facto
o Furthermore, the signatures can hardly be read

4. There was no voluntary recognition on the part of BB. Exh 2 shows that BB had no intention to recognize RB as his natural son,
nor had he ever treated him as such. If BB did acknowledge RB as his natural son, he had repudiated it by Exhibit 2.
o The theory of the plaintiffs is that Exh 2 was executed in exchange for another property to be given by BB to RB. This is
untenable because it RB did not receive any lot from BB, in fact it was sold to him.
o RB executed Exh 1. If its contents werent true, the fact that RB didnt repudiate his statement is proof of his own
acknowledgment that PB is indeed his father

5. RB, because he wasnt given a share in the estate, however failed to demand his share during 8-yr period between BBs
death and his own death. The fact that he didnt establish his filiation after BBs death knowing that it would benefit him and his
family shows that the plaintiffs complaint is w/o merit.

6. The contention of RBs wife that she discovered the alleged proof-documents only after RBs death is untenable.
o It would be difficult to imagine that RB didnt share these things with his wife
138
i.e. his school records, his memorabilia,
autobiography, letters, and the fact of the dispute as to the property.
o Also RBs testimony is unreliable because she admitted of not knowing anything about the claim against BBs estate and then
admitted later on that she knew about it.
o RB could have been harboring hidden motives aside from merely establishing his filiation.

7. RB shouldve filed an action for compulsory recognition during BBs lifetime alleging continuous possession of the
status of a natural child through direct acts of BB or his family, and that he has in his favor proof that Bibiano is his father given
Art 185 & 283, NCC
o The action prescribes if not taken during the lifetime of the alleged parents, but subject to certain exceptions
o In the case at bar, the facts do not fall under the exceptions specifically 285 (2)
139
bec the documents were known to RB and
because there wasnt an express acknowledgement by BB
o This action is a personal to the natural child

Conclusion: The evidence by the heirs of RB do not constitute sufficient act of voluntary recognition. To add, since the right to compel
acknowledgement is personal to the natural child, it cant be inherited & exercised by heirs.
Disposition: Lower courts decision is affirmed.
Separate opinion to the Baas case:
140

Facts:
+ RB was born in March 15, 1984 to Dolores Castillo, single. It would appear that BB was also single
+ May 23, 1907, when RB was still 13 y/o, BB sent him a handwritten letter (Exh H).
+ Dec 1, 1928, RB who was 34 y/o, executed Exh 1 wherein he stated that he was PBs son. On the same date PB executed a
document confirming that RB is his own son. PB died in 1939
+ J uly 1, 1930, BB executed an affidavit saying that RB is PBs son
+ In 1930, RB allegedly wrote an autobiography pointing to Exh H given by my father, a surgeon No mention was made declaring
that he was PBs son
+ Apr 25, 1954, BB died intestate, survived by widow & legitimate children
+ J une 24, 1955, heirs of BB extrajudicially partitioned the estate
+ Feb 25, 1962, RB died survived by his widow & legitimate children.
138
Feelfreetocomment
139
ExceptionsforprescriptionofactionforrecognitionIfafterthedeathoftheForoftheMadocumentshouldappearofw/cnothinghadbeenheardandinw/c
eitherorbothparentsrecognizethechild.w/in4yrs
140
ByJusticeMelencioHerrera(Ithinkthisisaclearerversionofthedecision)

+ Feb 11, 1965, heirs of RB filed a complaint against heirs of BB and their family corporations to the CFI of Manila asking for
participation in the estate BB, alleging that RB was a voluntarily acknowledged natural child.
+ J an 5, 1966, CFI dismissed the complaint of RBs heirs

Issue: Was BBs note an authentic writing w/in the meaning of Art 278 of the NCC so that it can be used as an effective voluntary
acknowledgment in such that RBs heirs can participate in the partitioning of the estate of BB?

Ratio:
1. Relationship BB married FaustinaVecino, whose brother was the father of RBs spouse & her brother Angel Vecino. BB was PBs
brother, PB lived w/ him. Given this setup, it wouldnt have been strange that the children of BBs spouse would cal RB kuya and
for RB to call BB papa.

2. Documento, Document, Instrument, and Writing
a. documentoautentico in the Spanish CC was translated as authentic instrument
b. documentopublico was public document
c. excritosuyoindubitado was indubitable writing
d. Manresa equated escrito with documento while Scaevola equated documento with escritura
e. Conclusion In Art 278, CC, writing can be equated with escritura or document such that authentic writing =authentic
document.
3. Meaning of authentic writing
Authentic writing doesnt have to be a public document. A public document can be an authentic writing. Authentic means genuine
or indubitable even if it is only a private document. The writing must not only be an evidence of paternity & filiation but must
indicate intent to confer status on a child. Mere evidence of paternity needs a suit to compel recognition while a document w/ an
intent to confer status is a self-executory act.
4. Express & Tacit Recognition
a. Under the Spanish Code, tacit recognition whether voluntary or obligatory is not allowable. There is a requirement for express
recognition.
b. Under Ley II de Toro, voluntary recognition could be express or tacit. But this was changed under the Spanish Code which
limited voluntary recognition to express recognition.
c. Tacit recognition under Art 278 should be ruled because it can easily bring forth controversy. The indubitable writing tacitly
recognizes a child and it can be used to for obligatory recognition.
5. Childs consent
a. Under Art 133 of the Spanish Civil Code, a son of legal cant be recognized w/o his consent. That consent is positively
necessary. This is also copied in Art 281, NCC.
b. There is nothing in the facts that show that RB had given his consent to his recognition by BB. He even repudiated it in Exh 1.
6. Intendment of Art 2260, OCC
141
w/c was incorporated into the NCC was to preclude a possible claim being litigated prior to Aug
30, 1950 under the Spanish code. The law governing the act of voluntary recognition is the law in force at the time of the voluntary
rec.
7. Non-mention of Art 278 in Art 2266 w/c gives retroactive effect to certain articles of the OCC but not to Art 278. The omission is
ecognition. Also the
any consent, it was already repudiated by him in Exh 1
n the body of the note. He was a doctor who studied the medicine course in Spanish, he
roof of BBs handwriting or it could be that different persons
signed it already & subsequently erased them. KEBABdigest

deliberate, cant be supplied by the court.

8. Conclusions The letter is not an authentic writing and even if it were, it is only an evidence for compulsory r
recognition must be consented to by RB. If there was
9. Last consideration The Note is a suspicious writing
a. RB didnt produce the document immediately after BBs death
b. The complimentary ending used the formal Spanish word Su instead of tu. He should have written tu if it were a note to a
13 y/o son after writing te or tu i
shouldve known what to use.
c. Why does Exh F have erasures? It couldve been to evade p

141
i)AnaturalchildwasbornpriortoAug20,1950,thedateoftheeffectivityoftheNewCode
ii)ThenaturalchildwasnotvoluntarilyrecognizedundertheSpanishCode

Uyguangco v. CA, 178 SCRA 684 (1989)

26 October 1989 | Cruz, J. | Petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners: Dorotea, Virgilio, Apolinario J r., Sulpicio and Dominador, all surnamed Uyguangco
Respondent: Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco

Facts:
- Apolinario Uyguangco (decedent) died intestate, leaving his wife Dorotea and his four legitimate children considerable properties
which they divided amongst themselves extrajudicially. Graciano, herein respondent, claims that he is the illegitimate son of the
decedent, thus he should have been included in the extrajudicial settlement. So, he filed a complaint for partition against all the
petitioners.
- He alleged that he was born in 1952 to the decedent and Anastacia Bacjao. However, he admitted that he did not have any
document (record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or (in) any authentic writing) that will show that he is the
illegitimate son of Apolinario. Because of this, the petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that private
respondent could neither prove his alleged filiation under Art. 278 of the Civil Code
142
nor Article 285, because he is already an
adult and he did not fall under any of the exceptions of the said provision.
143

- However, the respondent contends that has been in continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of the
decedent by the direct acts of the latter or his family . He recei ved support from his father and eventually worked for the
familys business.
144, 145
Because the Family Code now allows the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child as admissible evidence of filiation, the trial court and the Court of Appeals allowed the respondent to prove his
filiation with the deceased. Hence, the petitioners instituted this action to ask for the reversal of these rulings on the ground that
they are not in accordance with law and jurisprudence. This is a petition to dismiss the respondents complaint for the partition of
Apolinario Uyguangcos estate.
Issue: W/N Graciano should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of Apolinario, who is already dead, in the absence of the
documentary evidence required by the Civil Code.

Held/Ratio: NO.
- In the FC, ones establishment of filiation is not limited to documentary evidence. However, Graciano still cannot pursue his case
since the 2
nd
paragraph of Art. 175 of the FC which he relies on says that:
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Art.173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph
of Art. 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
- Since Apolinario is already dead when Graciano tried to establish his filiation, then his case cannot prosper. According to J ustice
Sempio-Diy, the reason for this addition in the provision is to give the putative parent the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs
alleged filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead. This is to protect the parent from persons who are not
really illegitimate children but are claiming to be such for the perks of it.
- Furthermore, if his actions for partition based on his contention that he is the illegitimate child of the decedent will not prosper. If his
claim of filiation can no longer be proved in an action for recognition, with more reason should it be rejected in the said complaint,
where the issue of Gracianos filiation is being raised only collaterally.
- The Court found that Graciano was able to establish prima facie proof of his alleged filiation and found it regrettable that his action
is barred by the law.
146
And opines as follows:

Even so, the Court expresses the hope that the parties will arrive at some kind of rapprochement, based on fraternal and moral ties if
not the strict language of the law, that will allow the private respondent an equitable share in the disputed estate. Blood should tell.
Dispositive: Petition to dismiss granted. KEBABdigest

142
Art.175.Illegitimatechildrenmayestablishtheirillegitimatefiliationinthesamewayandonthesameevidenceaslegitimatechildren.
Art.172.Thefiliationoflegitimatechildrenisestablishedbyanyofthefollowing:
1) Therecordofbirthappearinginthecivilregisterorafinaljudgment;or
2) Anadmissionoflegitimatefiliationinapublicdocumentoraprivatehandwritteninstrumentandsignedbytheparentconcerned.
Intheabsenceoftheforegoingevidence,thelegitimatefiliationshallbeprovedby:
1) Theopenandcontinuouspossessionofthestatusofalegitimatechild;or
2) AnyothermeansallowedbytheRulesofCourtandspeciallaws
143
Applythedoctrineoflastantecedentonthatsentence.
144
Attheageof15,hemovedtothedecedentshometownatthelattersurgingandalsoofDoroteaandhishalfbrothers.Thedecedentsupportedhiseducationin
MedinaHighSchoolandevengavehimajobasastorekeeperattheUyguangcostorefrom19671973w/oobjectionfromhishalfbrothers.
145
Hefurtherclaimsthefollowing:
1) Helivedwithhisfatherfrom1967until1973,receivingsupportfromhimduringthattime
2) ThehehasbeenusingthesurnameUyguangcowithoutobjectionfromhisfatherandthepetitionersasshowninhishighschooldiploma
3) AspecialpowerofattorneyexecutedinfavorbyDoroteaUyguangco,andanotheronebySulpicioUyguangco
4) ThehehassharedintheprofitsofthecoprabusinessoftheUyguangcos,whichisastrictlyfamilybusiness
5) Thathewasadirector,togetherwiththepetiotioners,oftheAluandSonsDevelopmentCorporation,afamilycorporation
6) Thataddendumtotheoriginalextrajudicialsettlementconcludedbythepetitionershewasgivenashareinhisdeceasedfathersestate
146
Duralex,sedlex.Evidently,thelawisunjustinthiscase.SCsaysso,too.

Mariategui v. CA, 205 SCRA 337 (1992)
Petition for review on certiorari | Bidin, J | January 24, 1992

Petitioner: Maria Del Rosasrio Mariategui et. al.
Respondent: CA, J acinto, J ulian and Paulina Mariategui

FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages:
Eusebia Montellano: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo
Flaviana Montellano: Cresenciana
Felipa Velasco: J acinto, J ulian and Paulina
Lupo died without a will on J une 26, 1953; he left some properties acquired when he was not still married
Baldomera died and was survived by her children: Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico
Ireneo also died and left a son: Ruperto
December 2, 1967- descendants on his first and second marriages: Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, and Cresenciana
(Mariategui), and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico (Espina) executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot 163 of the Muntunglupa Estates
April 1, 1971- land titles were issued in the name of the abobe-mentioned heirs and caused its subdivision into Lots 163-A to 163-H
April 23, 1971- Lupo's children by third marriage filed a complaint that they were deprived of respective shares in the lots with the
adjudication of said Lot 163
Cresenciana, Flaviana and Isabel were impleaded as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs;
defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action and the complaint was for the recognition of natural children
The complaint and the motion were dismissed by the trial court
CA declared all descendants and children of Lupo entitled to equal shares in the estate
execute deeds to reconvey shares in favor of J acinto, J ulian and Paulina
reimburse the fair market value of the shares
Defendants file a motion for reconsideration but was denied

ISSUE: W/N prescription barred respondent's right to demand the partition?

The allegation with respect to the respondents status was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate, hence, it is
principally one of partition.
There exist a presumption of marriage if all requisites are present even if no record exists if they deport themselves as man
and wife. Especially if the facts are not controverted.
But because this fall after the effectivity of the Family Code, it should be decided under this:
Art. 172 provides that filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil
register. J acinto's birth certificate is a record of birth refereed to in this article. Though, his two other siblings have not
presented their evidence, the continuouly enjoyed the status of children of Lupo like their brother. There was no
evidence to disprove this fact
At a considerable length of time, they lived with Lupo until his death despite the death of their mother Felipa.
Petitioners also admitted that respondents were kapatid sa ama.
Because they are legitimate children, action for partition does not prescribe nor barred by laches unless there is a valid
repudiation by the co-owner
Excluding respondents in an extrajudicial partition and registration of properties in their name can not be considered
as valid repudiation.
In spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their relationship with the respondents, they fraudulently witheld the
latter's share in the estate because since 1962, J acinto has been inquiring from Maria del Rosario about their share
(he was told not to worry because they will get their shares); in fact, J acinto constructed his own house uncontested
by any of the petitioners
In as much as there was fraud, prescription should start at the time of the discovery of fraud. Hence, the action was
not barred since only two months have lapsed after respondents' learned of the registration in the name of the
petitioners. KEBABdigest


Acebedo v. Arquero, 399 SCRA 10 (2003)

Administrati ve Matter (AM) # 94-1054 | March 11, 2003 | Carpio-Morales, J.

Facts:
- Dedjie Acebedo, an MTC
147
stenographer, and her husband Edwin Acebedo executed a notarized agreement saying that
inasmuch as they are unable to reconcile certain difference, they agree to live separately from each other and that they
release each other to seek any other partner to have sexual relations with and to cohabit with such partner.
- Dedjie Acebedo then proceeded to maintain illicit relations with Eddie Arquero, a process server of the MTC and a co-worker
of hers. They maintained this relationship for a period of 8-9 months, after which they parted ways.
- A child was born to Dedjie soon after. In the childs baptismal certificate, Eddie Arquero was designated as the father.
- Edwin Acebedo filed an administrative complaint against Eddie Arquero on the ground of immorality for scandalously
cohabiting with his (Edwins) wife and fathering a child off of her.
- The RTC judge to whom the case was assigned for investigation recommended that the case be dismissed because of an
apparent loss of interest on Edwins part, with the court not being able to reach him at his given address, ergo Edwin not being
able to adduce adequate evidence to show Eddies guilt.
- The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in the SC, to whom the RTC recommendation was forwarded, disagreed w/ the
recommendation and recommended that Eddie be disciplined for the acts complained of because despite of the lack of
additional evidence adduced by Edwin, Eddie admitted in his testimony to the RTC that he cohabited and had sexual relations
with Edwins wife Dedjie. His testimony also did not categorically rule out that the child borne by Dedjie was not his; he could
thus be the father after all.
- Eddie justified cohabiting and having sexual relations with Dedjie with the aforementioned agreement executed between the
spouses and the fact that Edwin himself has been cohabiting w/ another woman. The OCA said that Eddie, as a court
employee, should have known better that such an agreement was void for being contrary to law and therefore he should be
punished.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Eddie Arquero should be disciplined for the acts complained of
2. Whether or not the birth certificate of the child can be used to prove her filiation to Eddie thus prove Eddies illicit relations with
Dedjie

Held:
1. YES.
2. NO.

Ratio:
1. Even absent any other evidence submitted by Edwin the complainant, Eddie is clearly liable for maintaining illicit relations with
Dedjie because he plainly admitted it in his testimony. His defense that there was this agreement between the spouses
releasing each other to seek new partners is untenable because as the OCA said, as a court employee, should have known
better that such an agreement was void for being contrary to law
148
and therefore he should be punished.
2. The entry of respondent's name as father in the baptismal certificate of Desiree May I. Arquero cannot be used to prove for her
filiation and, therefore, cannot be availed of to imply that respondent maintained illicit relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo. A
canonical certificate is conclusi ve proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic
Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein which concern the relationship of the person baptized. It merely attests to the fact which gave rise to
its issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of the administration of the sacrament on the date stated, but not the truth of the
statement therein as to the percentage of the child baptized.

Obiter:
Complainants loss of interest in the prosecution of an administrative case does not ipso facto warrant the cases dismissal.
Once administrative charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the
truth of the facts complained of. For it has an interest in the conduct of those in the service of the J udiciary and in improving the delivery
of justice to the people, and its efforts in the direction may not be derailed by the complainant's desistance from prosecuting the case
he initiated. KEBABdigest

147
MunicipalTrialCourtofBrookesPoint,Palawan
148
Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is "an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subjecttostipulation."Itisaninstitutionofpublicorderorpolicy,governedbyrulesestablishedbylawwhichcannotbemadeinoperativebythestipulationofthe
parties

2. Action to Claim Legitimacy

3. Rights of Legitimate Children

Republic v. CA & Vicencio, 300 SCRA 138 (1998)
G.R. No. 88202. December 14, 1998

PETITIONER: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS and CYNTHIA VICENCIO
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.
Keywords: surname

FACTS:
The appealed decision granted private respondent Cynthia Vicencios petition for change of surname, from Vicencio to Yu.
Petitioner is a legitimate child of spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. Pablo Vicencio left their
conjugal abode, never reappeared nor sent support to his family.Ernesto Yu eversince supported them.
Conjugal partnership has bee dissolved and change of surname for her mother has been granted
Pablo Vicencio was declared an absentee. In1986, petitioners mother and Ernesto Yu were married.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in affirming the trial courts decision allowing the change of private respondents surname to that of her step-
fathers surname.
HELD: YES
RATIO
149
: There is no proper and reasonable cause to warrant private respondents change of surname. Such change might even
cause confusion and give rise to legal complications due to the fact that private respondents step-father has two (2) children with her
mother. In the event of her step-fathers death, it is possible that private respondent may even claim inheritance rights as a legitimate
daughter. Ernesto Yu has no intention of making Cynthia as an heir because despite the suggestion made before the petition for
change of name was heard by the trial court that the change of family name to Yu could very easily be achieved by adoption, he has
not opted for such a remedy.
Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres and Pablo Vicencio. A legitimate child generally
bears the surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the
sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same
unless weighty reasons are shown.
Legal constraints lead us to reject private respondents desire to use her stepfathers surname. Further, there is no assurance the
end result would not be even more detrimental to her person, for instead of bringing a stop to questions, the very change of name, if
granted, could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage.
Lastly, when this case was decided by the appellate court, private respondent was already 18 years old but still considered a
minor because RA 6809, lowering the age of majority, was then in effect. However, regardless of private respondents age, our
conclusion remains considering the circumstances before us and the lack of any legally justifiable cause for allowing the change of her
surname.
DISPOSITIVE: Appealed decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE; petition GRANTED. KEBABdigest

De Asis
150
v. CA
151
, 303 SCRA 176 (1999)
Purisima | Feb 15, 1999 | Certiorari

FACTS:
Vircel Andres, mother and legal guardian of the minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support
against Manuel de Asis, alleging that the latter is the father of the minor. Petitioner denied his paternity. Thereafter, both plaintiff and
defendant agreed to move for the dismissal of the case.

Subsequently, another Complaint for Maintenance and support was filed, now in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis praying for the
support from the alleged father. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata or by the agreed dismissal by both parties.
152

The CA dismissed putative fathers petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not res judicata can be raised in this case.
149
Wehaverecognizedthefollowingassufficientgroundstowarrantachangeofname:
(a)whenthenameisridiculous,dishonorableorextremelydifficulttowriteorpronounce;
(b)whenthechangeisalegalconsequenceoflegitimationoradoption;
(c)whenthechangewillavoidconfusion;
(d)whenonehascontinuouslyusedandbeenknownsincechildhoodbyaFilipinonameandwasunawareofalienparentage;
(e)whenthechangeisbasedonasinceredesiretoadoptaFilipinonametoerasesignsofformeralienage,allingoodfaithandwithoutprejudicetoanybody;and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name
wouldprejudicepublicinterest.
150
ManueldeAsis,putativefather
151
plusRTCJudge&GlenCamildeAsis(son)representedbymother/guardianVircelAndres
152
Themanifestation(todismiss)admittedthelackoffiliationbetweenhimandtheminorchild,whichadmissionbindsthecomplainant,andsincetheobligationto
givesupportisbasedontheexistenceofpaternityandfiliationbetweenthechildandtheputativeparent,thelackthereofnegatestherighttoclaimforsupport

RULING: The Supreme Court said no. The petition is not impressed with merit. The right to receive support can neither be renounce
nor transmitted to a third person.
153
Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.
154
The right to life cannot be
renounced; hence, support, which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.

Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.

Thus, in the case at bar, the agreement for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal
of the counterclaim was in the nature of a compromise. It is not allowed by the law therefore it cant bar the filing of a subsequent
action.

Petition dismissed. CA decision Affirmed. KEBABdigest

153
Art.301,NCC.Therighttoreceivesupportcannotberenounced,norcanitbetransmittedtoathirdperson.Neithercanitbecompensatedwithwhattherecipient
owestheobligor
154
Art2305,NCC.Nocompromiseuponthefollowingquestionsshallbevalid:
(1)Thecivilstatusofpersons;
(2)Thevalidityofamarriageorlegalseparation;
(3)Anygroundforlegalseparation
(4)Futuresupport;
(5)Thejurisdictionofcourts;
(6)Futurelegitime.

C. Illegitimate Filiation
1. Proof of Filiation

Leuterio v. CA, 197 SCRA 369 (1991)

(The case was decided by the SC in 1991 but the events happened in the 1950s, during the effectivity of the old Civil Code)
Quick Facts:
Maria claims to be legitimated daughter of Ana, a former servant of Pablo, and Pablo. She presented her birth certificate, baptismal
certificate and pictures which the CA held insufficient and unpersuasive. The nature of her petition, whether voluntary or compulsory
recognition was confusing. This was important because the value of the evidence presented depended on the nature. CA was correct in
ruling it was compulsory. In any case, her evidence was still not enough, either way. Other issues presented by Maria were pointless
because it was the evidence itself that she was relying on that was the problem. *bow*
Facts:
Maria Alicia Leuterio claims to be the natural daughter of Ana Maglangue and Pablo Leuterio, having been conceived at the
time when her parents were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other. She further claims that she was
legitimated by her parents subsequent marriage.
Ana Maglangue was the former domestic servant and later mistress and finally wife of Pablo whom he married a few months
before his death. Being the widow, she took possession of his estate and administered it.
On J uly 23, 1957, Patrocinio Apostol, a niece of Pablo Leuterio, filed a petition for her appointment as guardian of Maria Alicia
Leuterio, then 16 years of age, alleged to be the legitimated daughter of Pablo Leuterio.
On November 20, 1957, Benito Leuterio, brother of Pablo, instituted proceedings for the settlement of the decedents intestate
estate and prayed for his appointment as administrator. Benito also gave a list of heirs of Pablo which included the children of
two of his deceased sisters. He also claimed that Pablo died a widower and that Maria Alicias claim of being Pablos daughter
was without foundation in fact and in law.
Both Ana Maglangue (Pablos widow) and Maria Alicia Leuterio (alleged daughter and petitioner) opposed Benitos petition.
After hearing, the Probate Court appointed Ana Maglangue as administratrix.
Maria Alicia then filed in the settlement proceeding (probably of Pablos estate in the Probate Court) a pleading entitled
Assertion of Rights in which she claimed that she was the only forced heir of Pablo and entitled to succeed the latters estate,
subject only to the successional rights of her mother, Ana Maglangue.
In respect to the claim, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts which identified the relatives of the deceased as well as
the nature of the deceaseds properties which was deemed to be his own separate, exclusive properties and, therefore, his
capital. The only issues left to determine were whether Vincent Leuterio was the legitimate child of one of Pablos deceased
sisters and whether Maria Alicia was the legitimated daughter of Pablo and Ana.
Maria Alicia claimed that since her birth and up to the death of Pablo, she was in the uninterrupted possession of the status of
a natural child of the decedent and her mother. To prove this, she detailed facts that she considered as confirming or
establishing her possession of said status, including indubitable writings discovered only a month ago, wherein the decedent
expressly acknowledged his being her father.
The issue of the legitimacy of Vincent was mooted by the withdrawal of Vicente of his application as a prospective heir.
After an extensive and lengthy analysis of the evidence Maria Alicia presented, the Probate Court dismissed her petition for
confirmation of acknowledgment and legitimation of Maria Alicia Leuterio for lack of basis and merit.
Maria appealed to the CA and gave the following errors of the Probate Court: 1) rejecting as spurious her certificate of the
record of birth in the Civil Registry of San Luis, Pampanga; 2) in not giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of
Gervacio Bagtas and Paula Punzalan who are disinterested witnesses and school teachers at the San Luis Elementary School
were Maria Alicia was studying; 3) holding that the testimony of Don Sotero Baluyut given in the form of a deposition appears
to be in the form of an accommodation and 4) in not declaring that she has been in the possession of a status of a natural child
before and after the marriage of her parents.
The CA found that the birth certificate, baptismal certificate and photographs presented by Maria Alicia did not bear the
signatures of Pablo expressing his acknowledgment of Maria Alicia as his daughter.
It also ruled that Pablo did not have a child with his previous child and it was natural for him to treat Maria Alicia as if she were
his own daughter.
The CA found conclusive the fact of an absolute lack of a document or writing, such as receipts of payment of school fees in
the name of Pablo, signatures in school cards, or a letter to relatives or friends naming Maria Alicia as his daughter, despite
the lapse of nine years from the birth of Maria Alicia in 1941 up to his death in 1950.
Maria Alicia appealed to the SC and in sum, alleged the following: that the CA erred in surmising that the action of the
petitioner for legitimation is based on voluntary recognition and the CA further erred in not giving Article 283 of the new Civil
Code. (Article 283 states that the father is obliged to recognize the child as a natural child in four cases. Maria relies on the
fourth which states: When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.)
Issues: WoN Maria Alicia is the natural daughter of Pablo Leuterio
Held: No.
Ratio:
Applicable laws:
a. Father of a natural child may recognize it in 2 different ways: by voluntary recognition (CC Art. 131) or by an involuntary
recognition enforced by either a civil or criminal action (CC Art. 135)
b. Voluntary recognition may be made: a) in the record of births, b) by will, c) by any other pub instrument. (CC Art. 131)

c. Involuntary recognition may be made by: a)an incontrovertible paper written by parent expressly recognizing his paternity, b)
giving child status of a natural child of father justified by direct act of the dad or his family, [CC Art. 135] and c) a criminal
action for rape, seduction or abduction [RPC Art. 440, par. 2]
It seems that the Probate Court and the Court of Appeals were aware of the precise nature of the petition which is compulsory and
not voluntary although Maria Alicias counsel seemed to be confused with what they actually wanted when he said that the desired relief
was not voluntary in the sense that the decedent did not execute a public document expressly acknowledging the petitioner Maria
Alicia as his natural child. Because we believe a public document is one of compulsory acknowledgment. (This is not true as seen
above.)
In any case, whether the petition was that of proving voluntary recognition or that of instituting compulsory recognition, the SC held
that the findings of the Probate Court and the CA on the factual merits of the case was to be respected. Her evidence was held to be
insufficient, unpersuasive, and spurious. In short, Maria Alicias evidence failed to prove either way her filiation.
The SC also did not see the need to decide whether Art. 283 had retroactive effect since the evidence, in any case, was deemed
insufficient.
Decision: CA AFFIRMED. Not the daughter. KEBABdigest

Rodriguez v. CA, 245 SCRA 150 (1995)
[Certiorari; Quiason; June 19, 1995]

Facts: Clarito Agbulos (respondent) filed an action for compulsory recognition and support in Baguio RTC against Bienvenido
Rodriguez (petitioner). During the trial, Clarito presented his mother as a witness. During direct examination, counsel asked mother to
say who was the father of Clarito. However, defendants counsel raised a timely objection which was sustained. The CA allowed the
testimony of the mother of Clarito (a natural child) on the identity of the putative father.
Issue: WON the testimony of a mother of a natural child on the identity of the putative is allowable in an action for compulsory
recognition [Yes.]
Ratio:
+ Article 280, CC
155
prohibits the identification of the parent of a child only in compulsory recognition. The Navarro
156
case to w/c the
petitioner relied on is not applicable in this case because Navarro corresponds to voluntary recognition. The Court thus traced the
history of this prohibition (eeeekkk!!!)
o Art 280, NCC was taken from Art 132, Spanish Civil Code of 1889
157
. The Span CC provision points directly to the previous
articles w/c speak of voluntary acknowledgment (the record of birth, will, public document one)
o Tolentino, posited that the prohibition in Art 280 doesnt apply to compulsory acknowledgment
158
; so did J ustice
Caguioa
159

o Reyes & Puno InFrance before, there was a free inquiry into the paternity of the children but the investigation was forbidden
by their Revolutionary Government to repress blackmail and scandal. This prohibition was assed from the French Civil Code,
to the Spanish Civil Code, and to the New Civil Code.
+ The prohibition in Art 280, CC was omitted in the FC.
160
This is more in keeping w/ the intention of the Code Commission to
liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity for illegitimate children.
o FC now allows establishment of filiation in the same way & evidence as legitimate children. The FC therefore repealed CC,
Art 276 to 280.
161

o FC also allows any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father thus adopting Art 283, CC.
162

+ CA J udgment affirmed. KEBABdigest
155
Art.280.Whenthefatherorthemothermakestherecognitionseparately,heorsheshallnotrevealthenameofthepersonwithwhomheorshehadthechild;neithershallheorshe
stateanycircumstancewherebytheotherparentmaybeidentified.
156
Wearenotrulingwhetherthemeretestimonyofthemother,withoutmore,issufficienttoprovethepaternityofthechild.NeitherarewerulingonthescopeofArt.280,NCCw/c
enjoins the mothering making a separate and voluntary recognition of a child from revealing the name of the father, specifically, as to whether the mothers testimony identifying the
fatherisadmissibleinanactiontocompelrecognitionifandwhenatimelyobjectiontosuchoralevidenceisinterposed.(emphasissupplied).
157
WhentheacknowledgmentismadeseparatelybytheFortheM,thenameofthechildsotherparentshallnotbementionedbyw/csuchpersonmightberecognized.
No public officer shall authenticate any document drawn in violation of this provision and should he do so notwithstanding this prohibition shall be liable to a fine of from 125 to 500
pesetas,andthewordscontainingsuchrevelationshallbestrikenout.
158
Theprohibitiontorevealthenameorcircumstanceoftheparentwhodoesnotinterveneintheseparaterecognitionislimitedonlytotheveryactofmakingsuchseparaterecognition.It
doesnotextendtoanyotheractortocasesallowedbylaw.Thus,whenarecognitionhasbeenmadebyoneparent,thenameoftheotherparentmayberevealedinanactionbythechild
tocompelsuchotherparenttorecognizehimalso(ICommentariesandJurisprudenceontheCivilCodeofthePhilippines590[1985])
159
"Itdoespreventinquiryintotheidentityoftheotherpartyincaseanactionisbroughtincourttocontestrecognitiononthegroundthatthechildisnotreallynaturalbecausetheother
parenthadnolegalcapacitytocontractmarriage"(ICommentsandCasesonCivilLaw380[1967]citingInreEstateofEnriquez,29Phil.167[1915])
160
Cassusomissusproomissohabendusest
161
Art.276.Anaturalchildmayberecognizedbythefatherandmotherjointly,orbyonlyoneofthem.(129)
Art.277.Incasetherecognitionismadebyonlyoneoftheparents,itshallbepresumedthatthechildisnatural,iftheparentrecognizingithadlegalcapacitytocontractmarriageatthe
timeoftheconception.(130)
Art.278.Recognitionshallbemadeintherecordofbirth,awill,astatementbeforeacourtofrecord,orinanyauthenticwriting.(131a)
Art.279.Aminorwhomaynotcontractmarriagewithoutparentalconsentcannotacknowledgeanaturalchild,unlesstheparentorguardianapprovestheacknowledgmentorunlessthe
recognitionismadeinawill.(n)
Art.280.Whenthefatherorthemothermakestherecognitionseparately,heorsheshallnotrevealthenameofthepersonwithwhomheorshehadthechild;neithershallheorshe
stateanycircumstancewherebytheotherparentmaybeidentified.(132a)
162
Art.283.Inanyofthefollowingcases,thefatherisobligedtorecognizethechildashisnaturalchild:
(1)Incasesofrape,abductionorseduction,whentheperiodoftheoffensecoincidesmoreorlesswiththatoftheconception;
(2)Whenthechildisincontinuouspossessionofstatusofachildoftheallegedfatherbythedirectactsofthelatterorofhisfamily;
(3)Whenthechildwasconceivedduringthetimewhenthemothercohabitedwiththesupposedfather;
(4)Whenthechildhasinhisfavoranyevidenceorproofthatthedefendantishisfather.

Aruego, Jr. v. CA, 254 SCRA 711 (1996)
13 March 1996 | Hermosisima, Jr., J. | Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Facts:
J ose M. Aruego, a married man, had an ardent relationship with Luz M. Fabian from 1959. Out of this relationship, Antonia (born
Oct. 5, 1962) and Evelyn (born Sept. 3, 1963) were born. On March 30, 1982 he died.
Minor respondent Antonia & her alleged sister Evelyn filed a complaint for Compulsory Recognition & Enforcement of Successional
Rights before Manila RTC on March 7, 1983 on the basis of their open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children,
they prayed to be:
declared illegitimate children of Aruego, Sr.
recognized and acknowledged as compulsory heirs of Aruego Sr. by the defendants (Aruego, J r. and five minor children of
Gloria Torres)
Respondents stated that Aruego Sr.
1) verbally recognized them among family friends,
2) allowed them to use his surname
3) shouldered their educational expenses
4) attended to their school problems
5) allowed them to visit him in his office every now and then.
RTC declared Antonia, the elder of the two sisters, as an illegitimate daughter of Aruego, Sr. Defendants were ordered to
recognize her, deliver her share in estate of Aruego, Sr. (1/2 of portion of share of legitimate children).
Petitioners filed MFR but it was filed out of time. CA also refused to grant them a petition for prohibition or preliminary injunction;
hence, this petition.
Petitioners allege that since EO 209 or FC took effect on 3 Aug 1988, CA decided the claim of illegitimacy in a way not in accord
with law. They argue that Art. 175
163
should be applied. They contend that the action should have been filed prior to the death of their
father because they are trying to prove filiation through open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.

Issue: W/N the provisions of the FC should be applied to the case of compulsory recognition. NO
W/N such application prejudice or impair any vested right of private respondent if the FC is given retroactive effect. YES

Held/Ratio:
The Court cited Tayag v. CA where the Court held that the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the
complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the FC. Art. 175 of the FC finds no proper application
to the instant case since it will ineluctable affect adversely a right of private respondent who have been vested with the filing of the
complain in court.
Art. 285
164
of the Civil Code is controlling.

Dispositive: Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed. KEBABdigest

163
TheactionmustbebroughtwithinthesameperiodspecifiedinArticle173,exceptwhentheactionisbasedonthesecondparagraphofArticle172,inwhichcasethe
actionmaybebroughtduringthelifetimeoftheallegedparent.(289a)
164
Art.285.Theactionfortherecognitionofnaturalchildrenmaybebroughtonlyduringthelifetimeofthepresumedparents,exceptinthefollowingcases:
(1)Ifthefatherormotherdiedduringtheminorityofthechild,inwhichcasethelattermayfiletheactionbeforetheexpirationoffouryearsfromtheattainmentof
hismajority;
(2)Ifafterthedeathofthefatherorofthemotheradocumentshouldappearofwhichnothinghadbeenheardandinwhicheitherorbothparentsrecognizethe
child.
Inthiscase,theactionmustbecommencedwithinfouryearsfromthefindingofthedocument.(137a)

Jison v. CA, 286 SCRA 495 (1998)
Petition for review on certiorari | Davide, Jr., J. | February 24, 1998

Petitioner: Francisco J ison
Respondent: CA and Monina J ison

FACTS:
Monina J ison alleged that Francisco, married to Lilia Lopez-J ison, impregnated Esperanza Amolar (who was then working as
yaya of one of Franciscos daughter). She was the result.
She was forced to sign an affidavit declaring that she was not a daughter of Francisco by Atty. Tirol because of lack of money
to support herself and finish her studies.
She filed an action for compulsory recognition. Francisco denied all her allegations.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit assailing some of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses for being
hearsay evidences, and barred by estoppels due to an affidavit she signed. CA ruled in her favor
ISSUE: W/N Monina is an illegitimate child of Francisco

Yes. Since no vested rights shall be impaired, the provisions in FC shall be given retroactive effect. Hence, her filiation as an
illegitimate child may be proven as that of a legitimate child.
Since childhood, she has enjoyed a continuous and implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and
that of the family:
o Several former employees and labourers of the J ison family testified that Monina frequent the house of Francisco in
Bacolod; but since Lilia did not want to see her, some of the labourers were instructed by Francisco to conceal the
presence of Monina whenever she was in the J ison residence and to treat her like his other daughters
o Francisco introduced her to other family relatives as her daughter including the former Vice-President Fernando
Lopez; as a result, she became very close to the Lopez family (relative of Franciscos wife) who regarded her as a
member of them by reputation and by actual perception; even his cousin introduced Monina as a daughter of him
o Francisco paid for the long distance telephone bills she incurred when she made calls at his own office
o Francisco also ordered some of the labourers to give her allowance, shouldered her expenses for education (tuition
fee, uniforms, books, lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado Corazon de J esus) even attended some of her graduation
o She used the surname of Francisco in scholastic records and he would often be listed as her guardian
o He would also give money whenever the mother of Monina would ask for support and would say that it is for the
child. He also paid for her hospitalization
o When Esperanza died, Francisco paid for her burial
o She even stayed at Franciscos house in Forbes for vacation
o He acknowledge her with paternal greetings and called her, hija
Certifications of the Local Civil registrar and baptismal certificate with his name as father serve as circumstantial evidences of
her being an illegitimate daughter. School records, though inadmissible, may be used to corroborate her testimony
As she was preparing to go abroad, she procured letters of introduction from several cousins, an uncle (elder brother of
Francisco), and even the Vice-President Lopez addressed to then US Consul Vernon McAnnich that she was the daughter of
Francsico
It is also quite impossible, assuming that she is not a daughter, to have her sign an affidavit of being not a daughter and be
paid afterwards. It would have been unnecessary for him to gone to such great lengths. KEBABdigest

Alberto v. CA, 232 SCRA 745 (1994)
GR # 86639 | June 2, 1994 | Romero, J.

Facts:
- Maria Theresa Alberto was born in 1953 to J uan Alberto and Aurora Reniva out of wedlock.
- When J uan Alberto died intestate in 1967, his widow Yolanda Alberto filed a petition for the administration of the estate. She
was eventually appointed administratrix of the estate and the proceedings were terminated in 1971.
- In 1978, Maria Theresa Alberto filed a motion to intervene in the case as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings, praying
that she be declared to have acquired the status of an illegitimate child and thus entitled to share in the estate.
- The trial court ruled in favor of Maria Theresa Alberto and granted her petition. The trial court found that she had been in
continuous possession of the status of a natural child.
- However, on appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts ruling. The CA, aside from not giving much credence to the findings of
the RTC, based its decision on a letter written by Maria Theresa Alberto herself to one of her fathers friends at the time of her
fathers death.
- It was alleged by the CA that the letter betrayed a lack of association between the deceased and Maria Theresa such as
normally characterizes the relationship between father and child, that the letter gave the impression that J uan Alberto
studiously distanced himself from Maria Theresa, and that he had no intention to recognize her as his child.
- Maria Theresa Alberto thus appeals the CA findings to the SC


Issue:
Whether or not the estate and heirs of J uan Alberto may be ordered to recognize Maria Theresa as J uans natural daughter on the
basis of her evidence trying to establish her claim that she has been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child

Held: YES

Ratio:
1. J uans own acts show that he recognized Maria Theresa as his daughter.
a. He allowed her from birth to use his family name
b. He gave her and her mother monetary support
c. He openly introduced her to members of his family, relatives, and friends as his daughter.
2. J uans own family recognized
165
Maria Theresa as J uans daughter
The letter cited by the CA cannot be given the significance accorded it by the CA because other more compelling evidence does point
to the fact that J uan did recognize Maria Theresa as his daughter, that he supported her whenever he could, and that if there was any
lack of association between them, it cannot be helped for the relationship was far from normal. KEBABdigest

Guy v. CA, 502 SCRA 151 (2006)
Guy (Michael) v CA and Karen and Kamille Danes Wei, represented by their mother, Remedios Wei/ Sept 15, 2006 / G.R. 163707
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision & resolution of the CA / Ynares-Santiago

NO EVIDENCE RECEIVED YET SO THE CASE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED

FACTS:
Karen and Kamille Danes Wei, represented by their mother, Remedios Wei, filed a petition for letters of administration. They
allege that that they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim), with Shirley Guy
(spouse) and their 5 children as his known surviving heirs. One of Guy children is Michael who prays for Special
Administratorship of the estate. He argued that the private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate
children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Civil Code
166
.
Before the RTC, petitioners filed a J oint Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of forum shopping, and that Remedios should have
executed the certification on behalf of her minors as daughters. Also, it is alleged that Remedios had been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios Release of Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the
financial and educational assistance received from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of
Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
RTC denied Motion to dismiss. A motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed. Upon appeal, RTC was affirmed.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with rules on certification of non-forum shopping [no]
2. WON the Release of Waiver of Claim precludes the private respondents from claiming successional rights. [no]
3. WON the respondents are barred by prescription. [no]
Held:
1. No. The procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice
2. No. The waiver
167
does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights because they are yet to prove their
status as acknowledged illegitimate children. Actually, the petitioner himself consistently denied that the private respondents
are his co heirs.
Also, according to the Article 1044 CC
168
parents and guardians may not repudiate the inheritance of their wards without
judicial approval because such repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the courts scrutiny in order to
protect the interest of the ward. In any case, the waiver did not clearly its purpose of execution. It did not mention private
respondents hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei.

3. No. The resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in
proving their filiation. GIVEN THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE RECEIVED YET, THE ISSUE OF PRESCRIPTION IS
165
A.thatwhenpetitionerandhermotherwenttothePGHontheoccasionofJuanM.Albertosdeath,Fr.Arcilla,1
st
cousinofJaun,heldherbythehandandasked
theguardtomakewayforherasshewasadaughterofJuanM.Alberto;
B.thatafterthewakefordeceasedJuanM.Alberto,hisstepmother,SaturninaAlbertointroducedpetitionertoJoyAlbertoasthelatterssister;
C.thatthesiblingsofJuanM.AlbertoregardedpetitionerastheirnieceandintroducedhertotheirchildrenastheeldestdaughterofJuanM.Alberto;
D.thatthechildrenofJuanM.Albertossiblingsregardedherastheircousin;
C.thatwhenpetitionerwasaboutnine(9)yearsold,Mrs.AuritaSolidum,theyoungestsisterofJuanM.Alberto,arrangedthefirstmeetingbetweenpetitionerand
JuanM.AlbertoattheMOPCandduringsaidmeeting,theytalkedaboutpetitioner,thedeceasedgavepetitionerP500.00andtwotelephonenumbers
166
TheactionmustbebroughtwithinthesameperiodspecifiedinArticle173,exceptwhentheactionisbasedonthesecondparagraphofArticle172,inwhichcasethe
actionmaybebroughtduringthelifetimeoftheallegedparent.
167
Thewaiverissupposedtobearelinquishmentofaknownrightandcannotbeestablishedbyaconsentgivenunderamistakeoffactorapprehensionoffact.
168
Art 1044 Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the
inheritancelefttotheirwardsonlybyjudicialauthorization.


IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE. Based on Art 175, if the evidence include the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment or an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, the action may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. But if the proof of filation is based on the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
DECISION: Petition denied. Records remanded to RTC for further proceedings.

OBITER:
The RTC should is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents filiation even if the original action was a petition for
letters of administration because its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental sand collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in
handling the settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status of each child. So in this case, there are two causes of
action: one to compel recognition and the other is to claim inheritance, which is not new in our jurisdiction. KEBABdigest

Agustin v. CA, 460 SCRA 315 (2005)
AGUSTIN V CA, G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005

PETITIONER: Arnel L. Agustin
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS and minor Martin J ose Prollamante, Fe Angela Prollamante
Ponente: Corona, J.
Keywords: DNA paternity testing

FACTS:
Fe Angela and her illegitimate son, Martin, sued Arnel (alleged biological father) for support.
Petitioner is married and has a family. He refuses to recognize Martin and denies genuineness and authenticity of the childs birth
certificate, claiming forgery of his signature.
Trial court ordered parties to submit to DNA paternity testing.
CA affirmed the trial court, hence this petition

ISSUE:
(1) WON a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition.
(2) WON DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating constitutional right to privacy and right to
self incrimination.
HELD/RATIO:
(1) YES, Whether or not Martin is entitled for support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only
result in a multiplicity of suits. The declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings.

(2)YES, If, in criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why,
in this civil case, petitioner, who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.

For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of
DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed
in the merits of DNA testing and repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has
finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate
our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed.


In re Matter of the Intestate Estates of Deceased Del Gado
DELGADO VDA. DE DELA AND OTHER HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO V. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN |
Corona, J . | G.R. No. 155733 | J anuary 27, 2006 | Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

On illegitimate filiation

Proof Court held
Open and continuous possession of the status YES. But already prescribed upon death of Guillermo
School records NO. No participation by Guillermo in the preparation of
the document.
Published obituary NO. Would have been admitted as an authentic writing
had the original manuscript of the notice, in the
handwriting of Guillermo himself and signed by him,
been submitted

Facts:
Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings for letters of administration of the Estate of Spouses Guillermo
Rustia and J osefa Delgado, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo (as his illegitimate
child).
Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds:
o A claim for compulsory recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate child
o Voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
RTC declared intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus,
entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
CA earlier declared her as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia

Issue:
WON Guillermas evidences proves her filiation

Held/ Ratio:
NO.
There was no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father
Guillermo. But this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere GROUND for compulsory acknowledgment through
the courts. It has a dual limitation, the lifetime of the child, and of the PARENT. Thus, this action prescribed upon the
death of Guillermo.
The authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable piece of writing of the
parent, such as a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
o Guillermas report card does not qualify, because even if Guillermos name appears there, it holds no weight
since he had no participation in the preparation of the document;
o The obituary of J osefa acknowledging Guillerma as a child, which Guillerma claims to have been written by Guillermo
and published on the Sunday Times, would have been admitted as an authentic writing had the original manuscript of
the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo himself and signed by him, been submitted, instead of the mere newspaper
clipping.

Other facts with other issues

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
Main issue is the determination of who between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and J osefa Delgado may be divided into two groups:
o the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, and
o the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and
the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
There are issues as to marriage between Guillermo Rustia and J osefa Delgado and
Marriage between J osefas mother and certain Ramon Osorio this will affect the claim of J osefas half-blood siblings.


Cases
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the
intestate estates of the "spouses J osefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55. Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died.
o This petition was opposed by the following:
the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;
the heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and
the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia.

The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred
under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the
direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.
RTC: Appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates.
CA: First denied appeal but subsequently reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors appeal in the interest of
substantial justice.
SC: ordered CA to act on the appeal.
CA decided:
o Dr. Guillermo Rustia and J osefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married;
o the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, J acoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo)
entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate of J osefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion
referred to in this decision;
o the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his
estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and
o the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus
revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.
Hence the appeal.

Issues:

WON there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and J osefa Delgado;
Who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and J osefa Delgado are;
Who should be issued letters of administratio

Held/ Ratio:

YES. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and J osefa Delgado.
Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as
husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975
referred to them as "spouses."

Heirs of Josefa Delgado

Resolution of marriage between Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio
Court ruled certain factors
169
sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio
were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo,
namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, J ose, J acoba, Gorgonio and the decedent J osefa, all surnamed
Delgado, were her natural children.
The above-named siblings of J osefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother.
Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgado.
The Court noted, however, that the petitioners are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of
Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in
favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews
and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relati ves of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate
estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8,
1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the
trial court to determine who were the survi ving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time
of her death.

169
(1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad ConcepcionsPartida de
Casamiento
identifyingLuisas"hijonaturaldeFelisaDelgado"(thenaturalchildofFelisaDelgado).


Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if
there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of
his sisters, nieces and nephews.
DISPOSITIVE:
CA affirmed with modifications
Guillermo Rustias J une 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of J osefa Delgado. The remaining half shall
pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of J osefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of J osefa Delgados full-
or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. J osefa Delgados grandnephews and
grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the
relatives of J osefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of J osefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda.
deDamian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia,
Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and J osefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court. KEBABdigest

Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz, 540 SCRA 480 (2007)

Quick Facts:
Rogelio Ong and J inky Diaz cohabited while J inky was still married to a J apanese who lived outside the country. J inky got pregnant and
Rogelio shouldered the hospital expenses and even picked up J inky at the hospital. Even after they stopped dating and cohabiting,
Rogelio met with J inky at motels and visited the child. RTC ruled in favor of J inky and J oanne (the baby) and ordered support. Rogelio
appealed to CA. Rogelio died and was substituted by his estate. CA remanded for DNA testing. J inky opposed DNA testing and wanted
RTC decision to be made final. Rogelios estate also opposed CA decision and appealed to the SC. SC ruled that DNA testing was ok
since even before Rogelio suggested to a DNA test and the fact that he died doesnt make the DNA testing inconclusive.
Facts:
J inky Diaz and Rogelio Ong cohabited while J inky was still married to a J apanese who lived outside the country. J inky became
pregnant and Rogelio took care of the hospital bills. Rogelio admits to seeing J inky in motels even after they broke up and
even visited J oanne, his alleged daughter.
J inky Diaz filed a complaint and prayed for the recognition of J oanne as Rogelio Ongs natural daughter, support, attorneys
fees and other equitable reliefs.
Rogelio was deemed in default. RTC ruled in favor of Diaz.
Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that previous decision be reversed and that the case be considered trial de
novo.
170
RTC granted and a new trial started.
Since J inky was married to Hasegawa Katsuo, J oanne was presumed to be his legitimate daughter. The child is still legitimate
even if the mother declared against her legitimacy. It may be impugned only if it was proven that it was physically impossible
for the husband to have intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days following the birth of the child
because of: a) physical incapacity b) separation and c) serious illness.
Since her husband lived in outside the country and visited only once a year and there was no evidence that he visited the
Philippines on the year J oanne was conceived, the presumption was rebutted.
There was also no proof that J inky had other sexual partners other than Rogelio.
RTC ruled that Rogelios admissions of paying for the hospital bills was evidence of admission that he is the real father. He
also admitted to seeing J inky in motels after they stopped dating and visited her and J oanne.
RTC once again ruled in favor of J inky.
Rogelio appealed to CA. During pendency, Rogelio died. He was substituted by his estate. CA remanded to RTC for DNA
testing. CA said that Rogelio had actually suggested DNA testing and that RTC did not consider resorting to the testing despite
Rogelios insistence that he was not the father. Considering Rogelios death, RTC can, in consultation with out laboratories
and experts, avail of whatever remaining DNA samples.
170
IfanewtrialisgrantedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthisRule,theoriginaljudgmentorfinalordershallbevacated,andtheactionshallstandfortrialde
novo; but the recorded evidence taken upon the former trial, in so far as the same is material and competent to establishthe issues shall beused at the new trial
withoutretakingthesame.

Both parties opposed the decision. Rogelios estate gave the ff. errors: a) in not dismissing J inky Diazs complaint when it
found that the compulsory evidence failed to prove filiation, b) in not declaring J oanne was legitimate child of J inky with her
husband and c) in ordering DNA testing despite death of Rogelio which made it no longer feasible.

Issues: WoN DNA testing may still be done.
Held: Yes. Death does not ipso facto negate DNA Testing.
Court first gave a brief history of Philippine jurisprudence on DNA and its value as evidence.
SC also gave the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case,
affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child. SC also reiterated
importance of presumption, that it flows out, not just of a declaration in the statute but on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of
legitimacy.
Coming now to the issue of the appropriateness of the order of the CA for DNA testing, the SC believes that the alleged impossibility of
complying with the order is more ostensible than real. The New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu
proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter of litigation thus:
Sec. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or an application of any person
who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties
upon a showing of the ff.:
a) a biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
b) the biological sample was 1) not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or 2) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;
c) the DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
d) the DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
e) the existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of DNA
testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate DNA testing as long as there exist
appropriate biological samples of his DNA. Biological sample may include inanimate objects that is susceptible to DNA testing and
includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples
may be used to prove filiation. Too long have illegitimate children been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The
growing sophistication of DNA testing provides a much needed equalizer.
Decision: CA Affirmed. Petition is denied. KEBABdigest

2. Rights of Illegitimate Children

David v. CA, 250 SCRA 82 (1995)
[Review; Mendoza; Nov 16, 1995]

Facts:
+ Petitioner Daisie was a secretary of Respondent Ramon, a married businessman and father of 4 children.
+ As a result of the relationship between Daisie& Ramon, 3 children were born.
171

+ Ramons wife and family eventually accepted Daisies children.
+ One summer, Ramon asked Daisie if he could bring Christopher J . with Ramons family to Boracay.Daisie agreed but then Ramon
didnt give Christopher J . back to Daisie.
+ Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus. The Angeles City RTC rendered judgment in favor of Daisie.
+ CA reversed the ruling stating that the rights of legitimate children does not hold true for adulterous relationships. The question of
custody and support must be brought in a separate case.

Issue: WON the action by Petitioner (the 1
st
one) would prosper

Ratio:
+ The determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases wherein both parents, married to each other,
separated for some reasons.
+ Under Art 176, FC, Christopher J . must be under the authority of his mother. Thus, petitioner was correct in saying that she was
deprived of her rightful custody over the child.
+ The fact that the father of an illegitimate child has recognized that the minor child may be a ground for ordering father to support
the child. This principle is not inclusive of custody.
+ Her asking for help from the parents and the sister for compassion, over and concern, the theory of support is strengthened
+ As a general rule, there must be a distinct and separate document to prove illegitimate filiation
+ The order of payment of support based on Art 204. KEBABdigest

People v. Namayan, 246 SCRA 646 (1995)
18 July 1995 | Francisco, J. | Appeal from a decision of the RTC of Dumaguete City

Facts:
+ Tortillano Namayan was convicted for the rape of Margie Pagaygay who was 21 years old at the time of the offense. She was
moderately retarded with a mental age comparable to that of a 3 to 7 year old child.
+ J uly 30 1991 Estelita Pagaygay (mother) noticed the bulging stomach of Margie and she brought her daughter to the hospital.
They found out that Margie was 4 to 5 months pregnant.
+ Margie claims that Namayan raped her on several occasions.
+ March 1991 she went to fetch water from the artesian well and Namayan pulled her and threatened her with a hunting knife on
her neck. Namayan had intercourse with her. This incident was followed when Namayan was taking a bath and saw her fetching
water from the artesian well and when she was asked by her mother to buy beer.
+ Namayan denied all the allegations. His alibi was that he was in prison from February 5, 1991 to April 12, 1991 due to a pending
case of illegal discharge of firearms. Ruben Gadayan, jailer, attested that he was confined in the prison for that time but he also
stated that he was not responsible only for the records of prisoners and not for guarding the detainees. It was also proven that
some detainees are allowed to go outside which would depend on the discretion of the outgoing guard, not Gadayan the jailer.
+ Prosecution presented Lilian Gomez who saw Namayan during the town fiesta on March 19, 1991. Gaudencio Pagaygay also
testified that he played mahjong with Namayan in March of 1991.
+ RTC found Namayan guilty of Rape

Issues/Held/Ratio:
1) W/N the defense proved that it was physically impossible for Namayan to be the father of the child. NO
+ On J uly 30, 1991 Margie was found to be 4-5 months pregnant therefore sexual intercourse might have happened during the
period between March 15, 1991 and April 15, 1991.
+ It was proven and unrebutted by the defense that Namayan was seen outside the Municipal J ail during the town fiesta (March 19,
1991). Namayan was detained in a minimum security prison and it was also stated that some prisoners were able to go out
depending on the discretion of the guard. These facts disprove the claim of Namayan that it could not have physically possible for
him to commit the act.
+ Also, even if he was released only on April 12, 1991 it would have still been possible for him to impregnate Margie.
+ There is no question that the child then being conceived by the complainant resulted from the act of sexual intercourse complained
of.

171
ChristopherJ.,ChristineandCathy

2) WON compulsory acknowledgement and support for the child is a proper remedy in this case. YES
+ No legal impediment because it appears that complainant and appellant are both single.
+ The crime of rape committed by Namayan carries with it, among others, the obligation to acknowledge the offspring if the character
of its origin does not prevent it and to support the same.

On a side note:
The defense cautions that the testimony of the complainant betrays the normal behavior of a girl whose virtue was threatened.
Having allegedly been raped several times, she did not shout or did nothing to prevent the sexual assaults; nor did she complain or tell
anyone about her plight.
Held: Because of her mental condition, complainant is incapable of giving consent to the sexual intercourse. She is in the same class
as woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. Appellant therefore committed rape in having sexual intercourse with her.
KEBABdigest

Mossesgeld v. CA 300 SCRA 464 (1998)
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA| Pardo, J. | December 23, 1998

Petitioner: Marissa Mossesgeld
Respondent: CA and Civil Registrar General

FACTS:
Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld gave birth to a baby boy. The presumed father, Atty. Eleazar Calasan, married, signed a birth
certificate as informant. He indicated the name as J onathan Mossesgeld Calasan. Both completed the dorsal side of the birth
certificate stating the truthfulness of the information.
Calasan executed an affidavit admitting paternity of his child
The person in charge at the hospital refused to place his surname at the said certificate
So, petitioner himself submitted it to the local civil registrar; his request was rejected on the basis of Circular No. 4, pursuant to
Art. 176 of FC, stating that illegitimate children should use the surname of their mother
He personally inquired about this and was given a letter by the civil register general denying registration in his name for being
contrary to law
He filed a mandamus to compel the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong to register said child using his name
RTC denied the petition, CA affirmed

ISSUE: W/N mandamus lies to compel the local civil registrar to register the child using his surname?

Art. 176 of the FC provides that illegitimate children should use the surname of their mother.
This rule is regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity; although, the putative father can adopt said child and give
him legitimacy
Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law. KEBABdigest

Republic v. Abadilla, 302 SCRA 358 (1999)
GR # 133054 | January 28, 1999 | Quisumbing, J.

Facts:
- Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife w/o the benefit of marriage. During
their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children, Emerson and Rafael, both using the surname Abadilla.
- In their birth certificates, it was indicated that their father was Herson Abadilla and that their parents were married J une 19,
1987 in Ilocos Norte.
- The four of them (father, mother, and two minor sons) filed a petition for correction of entry of the two sons birth certificates.
They wanted to correct the first name of Gerson which was indicated as Herson and they wanted to delete the entry where it
stated that the parents of the kids were married.
- The trial court granted their petition.
- The Solicitor General appealed the order simply because the trial court judge failed to order the changing of the kids surname
in their birth certificates from their fathers surname, Abadilla, to that of their mothers, Celestino.
Issue:
Whether or not Emerson and Rafael should use their mothers surname instead of their fathers

Held/Ratio:
YES. Article 176 of the Family Code states that Illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother There is no question
that Emerson and Rafael are the illegitimate children of Gerson and Luzviminda, the couple still not being married. Ergo, they fall within
the command of article 176 FC; and with the deletion of entry in their birth certificates that their parents were married, their last names
should have been also ordered changed to that of their mother. KEBABdigest


Gonzales v. CA, 298 SCRA 322 (1998)

Gonzales (Carolina) v CA, and Cecilia, Marian, and Rosemarie Abad / Oct 30, 1998 /
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA / Romero, J:

FACTS:
Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of
their brother, Ricardo de Mesa. They alleged that Ricardo died a bachelor and that they, as collateral blood relatives, are the
only heirs left as heirs. But Honoria Empado (common-law wife of Ricardo), Cecilia Abad Empado, and Marian Abad Empado
(their children) filed a motion to set aside the proceedings alleging that they should be awarded the estates to the exclusion of
the collateral relatives. They also disclosed the existence of another Rosemarie Abad, a child of Ricardo by another woman.
The petitioners contested the respondents filiation to Ricardo by alleging that the husband of Honoria Empaydo, J ose
Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia (1948), and Marian (1954) were born. In that case, Cecilia and Marian shall be considered
legitimate children of Libunao according to Art 167 of the FC
172
. However, respondents claim that Libunao died in 1943 and
not 1971.
RTC acknowledged Cecilia, Marian, and Rosemarie Abad as the natural children and the only legal heirs of Ricardo Abad to
the exclusion of the collateral blood relatives. Honoria was appointed the administratrix of the intestate estate.
A motion for reconsideration was denied by RTC. A petition to CA was also denied.

ISSUES:
WON Cecilia, Marian, and Rosemarie are the natural children of Ricardo [Yes]

HELD: YES.
The petitioners failed to prove that Libunao lived past 1943 and that Ricardo was sterile. The petitioners evidence:
o Application for enrollment at Mapua Institute of Technology (1956) which contained J ose Libunaos name as father
(without indication as deceased).
Failure to indicate on an enrollment form that ones parent is deceased is not necessarily proof that said
parent was still living during the time said for was accomplished.
o J oint Affidavit of Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos stating to their knowledge that Libunao died on 1971.
It is not a competent evidence to prove Libunaos death being merely a secondary evidence thereof. They
should have produced Libunaos death certificate, which is not shown to be lost or destroyed during the war.
Also, the records of Loyolo Memorial Park is erroneous as it is not J ose Bautista Libunao that was actually
buried there but J ose Santos Libunao (with a different wife).
o Affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, Ricardo Abads physician, declaring that in 1935, he examined and found Ricardo with
gonorrhea that caused his sterility.
Being privileged communications, it is inadmissible.
173
It is a confidential communication between physician
and patient, the disclosure of which would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient (his sterility was
caused by an STD. Actually the sterility alone is sufficient to blacken the reputation of the man),
notwithstanding the death of Ricardo because the living are not permitted to impair the name of the dead
and disgrace his memory by dragging to light privileged communications and disclosures.

Respondents, on the other hand, prove that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo by the following proofs:
o The individual statements of income and assets (1958, 1970) and all his individual income tax returns (1964-1970)
wherein he declared Honoria Empaynado as his wife and Cecilia and Marian as his children.
o An insurance plan for Cecilia and Marian (Insurance Life Assurance Co.)
o Separate trust funds (P 100,000 each) with the Peoples Bank and Trust company in favor of Cecilia and Marian.
o Agreement between Ricardo and his sister, Dolores, that the income of the trust fund shall be given to Cecilia.
o A deposit with the Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank in the name of his daughter Marian, represented by him, as
father.
Thus, in accordance with the CC
174
, the illegitimate children of Ricardo are the heirs, which precludes the petitioners from
inheriting the estate

JUDGMENT: Petition denied. J udgment affirmed with modification. KEBABdigest

172
Thechildrenshallbeconsideredlegitimatealthoughthemothermayhavedeclaredagainstitslegitimacyormayhavebeensentencedasanadulteress.
173
Sec24,Rule30oftheRulesofCourt.
Thefollowingpersonscannottestifyastomatterslearnedinconfidenceinthefollowingcases:
xxx
c) a person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any evidence or
treatmentbyhimoranyinformationwhichhemayhaveacquiredinattendingsuchpatientinaprofessionalcapacity,whichinformationwasnecessarytoenablehim
toactinthatcapacity,andwhichwouldblackenthereputationofthepatient.
174
Art988.Intheabsenceoflegitimatedescendantsorascendants,theillegitimatechildrenshallsucceedtotheentireestateofthedeceased
Art1003.iftherearenoillegitimatechildren,orsurvivingspouse,thecollateralrelativesshallsucceedtotheentireestateofthedeceasedinaccordancewiththe
followingarticles.

Gan v. Reyes, 382 SCRA 357 (2002)

May 28, 2002 | Bellosillo, J.

PETITIONER: Augustus Caezar Gan
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Antonio Reyes, (Baguio RTC), Albert Tolentino (Sheriff), Francheska J oy Pondevida and Bernadette Pondevida
(mother)
Keywords: rights of illegitimate children

FACTS:
Bernadette Pondevida wrote to petitioner demanding for support and schooling of their love child, Francheska. Petitioner denied
paternity.
Bernadette then instituted complaint for support and support pendente elite.
Petitoner file motion to dismiss claiming that the childs birth certificate indicated her father as Unknown.
Motion to dismiss denied. Petitioner was then held in default.
Trial court finding that the claim for filiation and support adequately proved, rendered decision that for petitioner to recognize
Francheska as his illegitimate child and support and plus alimony pendent elite should he desire to pursue further remedies. With
writ of execution, Sheriff levied on his properties.
CA dismissed petition for certiorari, hence this petition

ISSUE: WON judgment for support subject to an appeal can be executed.

HELD: Yes

RATIO: 4 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are
immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal.
In all cases invol ving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in
view of poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trail court attains finality while
time continues to slip away.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied. J udgement affirmed. KEBABdigest

Tonog v. CA, 376 SCRA 523 (2002)
DINAH B. TONOG V. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR DAGUIMOL | De leon, J r., J .
G.R. No. 122906 | February 7, 2002 | Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Dinah Tonog gave birth to Gardin Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar Dahguimol, on Sept. 23,
1989.
The couple cohabited for a while until a year after Gardins birth, Dinah left for the US to work as a nurse.
Gardin was left with her father and paternal grandparents.
On J an 10, 1992 private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin which was granted. When Dinah
learned of this, she filed a petition for relief from judgment. The trial court set aside its original decision and allowed Dinah to
file her opposition.
Edgar filed a motion of reconderation. She later filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin to her.
Trial Court: Issued a resolution denying Edgars motion for reconsideration, granting Dinahs motion for custody of Gardin.
CA (First round): Edgar the filed for certiorari with the CA which dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
CA (Second round): He then filed a motion for reconsideration and the CA modified its decision giving physical custody of
Gardin to Edgard until the custody proceedings have been decided.
Dinah then appealed which was denied by the CA.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in granting physical custody of Gardin to her father while the custody case was still pending.
HELD/ RATIO:
NO. Petition denied. Trial court ordered to proceed with hearing.
Relevant provisions
Art. 220
175
of the Family Code speaks of the parents right to custody over their kids.
Art. 176
176
provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. KEBABdigest
175
Art.220.Theparentsandthoseexercisingparentalauthorityshallhavewiththerespecttotheirunemancipatedchildrenonwardsthefollowingrightsandduties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with
theirmeans;


De Guzman v. Perez

Quick Facts:
Shirley Aberde and Roberto de Guzman were sweethearts while studying law in UST. Shirley became pregnant and gave birth to
Robby. Petitioner gave tuition money only twice and once gave 7k for hospital bills when Robby became sick. Roberto married
someone else and now lives a luxurious life. Shirley files criminal action under Article 59(4) of PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare
Code for neglect of child as well as abandonment. Roberto claims he is poor. City Prosecutor of Lipa finds there is prima facie case
against him, dismisses abandonment but finds cause for neglect of child of PD 603 in relation to RA 7610 (galing ni Feliciano). Before
he could be arraigned, petitioner filed petition for review with the Secretary of J ustice. It was dismissed. He appealed to SC which held
that SOJ did not act with grave abuse of discretion and that there was a prima facie case and that Robertos defenses are better said in
the RTC.

Facts:
Shirley Aberde and Roberto de Guzman were sweethearts in UST as law students. Shirley became pregnant, gave birth to Robby and
took care of him on her own. Roberto only gave her tuition money twice and 7k for hospital bills when Robby was sick at one point.
Roberto de Guzman is married and lives a luxurious life with his wife and kids, has at least five luxury cars, lives in a palatial house and
goes on trips around the world. Shirley also presented a notarized GIS of the RNCD Development Corporation that indicates that
Roberto owns P750,000 worth of paid-up shares in the company.
Shirley sends Roberto a letter asking for help in order to send Robby to a good school. He ignored her. With some help,
Shirley was able to send Robby to La Salle Lipa (best school, I would think, sa Lipa). Shirley files a criminal complaint of neglect of child
under Article 59(4) of PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code as well as abandonment.
Roberto objects on the ground that he does not have any money to give to Robby. That all the averred wealth belongs to his
father. He could not use, withdraw, assign or alienate his shares in his company and that they were actually his fathers.
The Prosecutor of Lipa finds probable cause for neglect of child under Article 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to RA 7610 and a
criminal case is instituted against Roberto. Before Roberto can be arraigned, he files a petition for review with the Secretary of J ustice.
SOJ dismissed his petition and allowed Prosecutor to continue.
Roberto complains that SOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion because: first, he does not have money one can only be
charged with neglect if one has money and second, Robby is not a neglected child, albeit it is only Shirley who takes care of him.

Issue: WoN Secretary of J ustice acted with grave abuse of discretion

Held: No.
Courts are without power to substitute their judgment for that of the executive branch. They may only look into the question of
whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment which amounts to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. If it is shown that the actions were not wholly void of
evidentiary support or that they are patently erroneous, the findings must be sustained.
According to PD 603, criminal liability attaches to any parent who xxx 4) neglects the child by not giving him the education
which the familys station in life and financial conditions permit. xxx
The crime has the ff. elements: 1) offender is a parent, 2) he or she neglects his or her child, 3) the neglect consists in not
giving his or her child education, 4) that the offenders station in life and financial condition permit him to give an appropriate education
to the child.
It is not denied by Roberto that Robby is his child or that he has not given support except for three occasions already
mentioned.
There is then, a prima facie case against Roberto. His claims and defenses are factual and evidentiary which should be
presented during trial. Until then, Roberto is still given the benefit of the doubt and presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Finally, while Roberto can be indicted for violation of Article 59(4) of PD 603, if found guilty, the charge against him cannot be
made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 which provides that any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty, or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those covered by Article 59 of PD 603,
but not covered by RPC, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum periods.
The neglect of child in PD 603 is also covered in Article 277 of the RPC known as indifference of parents.
What has been ascertained her is simply the existence of probable cause for petitioners indictment. Again, petitioner enjoys
the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Trial should push through.
Decision: Petition denied. KEBABdigest

176
Art.176.Illegitimatechildrenshallusethesurnameandshallbeundertheparentalauthorityoftheirmother,andshallbeentitledtosupportinconformitywith
thisCode.Thelegitimeofeachillegitimatechildshallconsistofonehalfofthelegitimeofalegitimatechild.Exceptforthismodification,allotherprovisionsinthe
CivilCodegoverningsuccessionalrightsshallremaininforce.


Zepeda (son) v. Zepeda

177
(father), 41 Ill. App. 2d. 240, 190 N.E. 2d. 849 (1963)
[Appeal from Circuit Court decision
178
; 1963; Dempsey]
Facts:
+ Father seduced mother to have sex w/ him by promising to marry her but they couldnt marry because, as it turns out, father was
already married. Thus, son instituted an action for damages from father for being an illegitimate child.
+ Son claims damages because he has been deprived of his right to be a legitimate child, to have a normal home, to have a
legal father, to inherit from his father, to inherit from his paternal ancestors, and for being stigmatized as a bastard.
+ Circuit court dismissed the case because of lack of cause of action. Now on appeal, father didnt contest but was represented by
an amicus curiae
+ Amicus curiae said that this is a significant case because in Illinois, there has been no law or jurisprudence recognizing or
discarding such a claim.
Issues:
1. Constitutional questions WON there are constitutional questions involved (due process and equal protection clauses). [None]
2. Contract theory WON son is a 3
rd
party beneficiary to the agreement made by his father and mother to marry each other. [No]
3. Tort theory WON a tort was committed upon the child simultaneously with its conception.
a. Is there a cause of action? [Yes.]
b. What injury has the son sustained?
c. Can the son claim damages? [Maybe, but]
Ratio:
1. The constitutional issues were elevated to the Supreme Court but they were transferred back to the Appellate Court. Thus, it is
presumed that the SC either finds no constitutional issue involved in this case or that these questions arent the very lismota of the
case.
2. The court dumped the Contract Theory because the complaint leans more towards torts.
3. Tort Theory:
a. Cause of action
o In the decision, there was a short discussion on when life starts since in torts, the child is usually not regarded as a being
separate from the mother until born.
o The court said that if there is human life proved by subsequent birth, then that human life has the same rights at the time of
conception as it has at any time thereafter. Court called this a conditional prospective liability in tort to one not yet in being
o The court also reviewed adjudicated cases as well as hypothetical cases showing that a wrong done before a child is born and
subsequently injuring said child is actionable.
o Indeed, father committed adultery. Thus from a moral wrong and a criminal act (adultery), it became a legal wrong and tortuous
act against the individual (son).
b. Kind of injury
o The Court considered tort and now it is considering the kind of injury that son must have suffered. The court is of the belief that
he suffered injury of mental suffering & defamation
o The court said that the nearest possible allegation could be that the father wronged him in stigmatizing him as an adulterine
bastard. But there was no averment to this effect in the sons complaint.
o There was also no cause of action for defamation or that a derogatory statement was communicated by the father to 3
rd

persons.
o Plaintiff complains of being deprived of the normal home that a legitimate child could have had. The court said that a legitimate
child cant file an action against his parents for lack of affection, failure to provide a pleasant home, for disrupting the family life,
or for being responsible for divorce that broke up the home. An illegitimate child cant be given rights superior to a
legitimate child.
Before, an illegitimate child was called filius nullius (child of no one) or filiuspopuli (child of the people). He would only have
rights (for support, inheritance, custody, etc.) through a special act of the Parliament.
Illinois has liberalized the matter by giving the illegitimate child right to use the fathers surname, support, custody,
legitimatization, inheritance etc.
o The court said that even though the injury sustained by the son isnt physical, there is still an injury. His birth places
him under a disability.
c. Awarding of damages
o The court is aware that an action for damages is implicit in any injury or wrong that is called a tort. It proceeded w/ caution as to
the awarding of damages.
o The court feared that this case would stand as a precedent to similar or related cases, being a cause of action for wrongful
life.
E.g. A child through sperm injections in the future can maintain such action
E.g. A product of an abiogenesis of human life can also maintain such action
Conclusion & Disposition:
The wrong done was designated as a tort but the Court still affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
The court believed that the making of a law/doctrine of this nature (such that it would create sweeping results) must be left to the
lawmakers who has popular mandate since it involves public policy. KEBABdigest
177
JosephDennisZepeda(minorrepresentedbyIrmaFlores,hisnextfriend)versusLouisRaulZepeda(father)
178
ThisisanIllinoisappellatecourtdecision

Alba v. CA
29 July 2005 | Ynares-Santiago, J. | Special civil action in the SC. Certiorari.

Facts:
In October 1996, private respondent Rosendo Herrera filed a petition for cancellation of the following entries in the birth certificate of
Rosendo Herrera, J r.
(a) surname Herrera as appended to the name of the child;
(b) reference to the private respondent as the father of the child;
(c) alleged marriage of private respondent to the childs mother, Armi Alba on 4 August 1982.
Herrera claims that all of the aforecited entries in the birth certificate are false. It was only in September 1996 that he learned of the
existence of the said birth certificate.
He denied the marriage with Armi Alba and his paternity to Rosendo Herrera, J r.
The RTC issued an Order setting the petition for hearing, including the publication and service of said order to Armi at her address
(Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila) appearing in the birth certificate in question. Copies were also sent to the civil registry and the OSG. It
was also published three times in Today.
179

During the hearing, Armi Alba did not present any evidence to quash the claim of Herrera because she did not show up. Hence, the
trial court ruled in favor of Herrera.
The ruling ordered the change of entries in Rosendo J r.s birth certificate. This includes the deletion of the surname Herrera, alleged
date of marriage of J uniors
180
parents and whatever implications that private respondent is the father of the child.
After knowing of the decision through San Beda College where J unior was enrolled (a copy was furnished for the schools perusal),
petitioners filed for the annulment of the said judgment on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over their
person.
Armi averred that Rosendo Herrera knew that her address is not the one indicated in the birth certificate anymore. She alleged that
Rosendo knows that her present address is in a condominium unit in Guerrero St., Ermita Manila where they cohabited from 1982 to
1988 and where J unior was born in 1985. And that Herrera purposefully sent it to the address in the birth certificate, her sisters, to
deny her her day in court.

Issue:
1) WON there is lack of jurisdiction over the petitioners persons and extrinsic fraud [NO]
2) WON the change of Rosendo, J r.s surname in the birth certificate is tenable [YES]

Held/Ratio:
1) NO. Among the three nature of action, private respondent falls under in rem because it attacks not the person itself but his status.
J urisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer a jurisdiction in court. J urisdiction over the res can be
attained through the institution of legal proceedings, in which the court is recognized and made effective.
The service of summons or notice to the defendant is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but to satisfy due
process requirements.
The service of summons at the Arquiza house is merely done to comply with due process requirements. Since Armi signed J uniors
birth certificate, it is presumed that all the entries in that document have been entered with her approval.
Moreover, even if petitioners were not able to be informed about it, it has already been cured by the courts compliance of Sec 4
Rule 108 which requires the publication of the courts order setting the petition for hearing.
There is no extrinsic fraud either. Petitioners contend that Herrera knew about the present address as it is where they lived
together. Moreover, it was actually Herrera who originally owned the condominium unit which he later sold to Armi. A photocopy of
the deed of sale was presented but it was inadmissible evidence because petitioners failed to show the original and because
Herrera questioned its authenticity. Moreover, the act of sale is not sufficient prove to establish the fact that Armi and Herrera had
intimate relations.

2) YES. Under Art 176 of the Family Code as amended by RA 9255, illegitimate children shall bear the surname of their
mother, unless the father recognizes their filiation. In this case, Herrera does not recognize such filiation so Junior is
compelled to bear his mothers surname. KEBABdigest

179
InaccordancewithSec.4ofRule108,RulesofCourt
180
IjustmadethenicknameupbecauseIdontknowwhattocallhim.

Republic v. Capote, 514 SCRA 76 (2007)

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA| Corona, J. | February 2, 2007

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Trinidad Capote

FACTS:
Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores
o Giovanni is the illegitimate child of Corazon Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso, prior to FC, his mother used the
surname of the father though they were not really married
o The father failed to take up his responsibilities on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns
o Giovannis mother might petition him to join her in the US, continued use of the surname of his father may complicate
his status as a natural child
The lower court caused for publication of this petition in a newspaper of general circulation in Leyte. Since there was no
opposition, respondent presented her evidence. The OSG did not object. Trial court allowed the change of name
OSG filed a petition on the ground that it was only in a summary proceeding; CA affirmed RTC decision

ISSUE: W/N the child can change his name and use her mothers surname?

DECISION: (petition denied, judgment affirmed)
Since Giovanni was born in 1982, prior to FC, the CC shall govern (Art. 386, a natural child shall employ the surname of the
recognizing parent). But since, the records do not reveal any intention from the father to recognize him, he should have carried
his mothers surname.
Meanwhile in the FC, though it was provided that an illegitimate child should use his mothers surname, he could use his
fathers surname if the former was recognized by the latter through the provisions on evidences.
In the procedural issues, the court held that Giovanni availed of proper remedy, a petition for a change of name under Rule
103 and complied with all procedural requirements. While the OSG is correct that the proceedings should be adversarial
181
, it
cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on the account of its own failure to participate therein. Moreover, the petition was
published in a news paper of general circulation.
It is also his best interest as this will facilitate his mothers intended position to join her in the US. KEBABdigest

D. Legitimated Children

Estate of De Los Santos v. Luciano, 60 Phil 328 (1934)
GR # 40958 | August 11, 1934 | Villa-Real, J.

Facts:
- Tomasa Escobar was born in 1837 to Leon Escobar and J osefa Esguerra. The couple was not yet married at the time. They
married the following year and had several legitimate children, Antonio Escobar being one of them.
- Leon and J osefa treated Tomasa like all their other legitimate children and she was publicly known as such. Tomasa
eventually married and gave birth to her only child, Maria Luciano in 1864.
- When Tomasa died, Leon took care of Maria until she married and moved w/ her husband to the province. Leon died in 1887.
When one of her uncles, Fortunato Escobar, was sick, his other uncle Antonio Escobar sent for her to take care of the sick
uncle.
- When Fortunato died, Antonio took Maria in and supported her, until Antonio himself died.
- During the judicial settlement of Antonios estate, Antonios widow Luciana de los Santos was petitioning to be declared the
sole heir of Antonio since they apparently didnt have kids. Maria opposed that and claimed that she too was entitled to
Antonios estate, being a legitimate niece.
- The Manila CFI ruled against Maria and declared the widow Luciana as the sole heir, although by the time of the decision
Luciana too was dead and so she was succeeded by her own heirs.
- The Manila CFI based its decision on article 943 of the Civil Code which provides that "a natural or legitimated child shall have
no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall
such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child," interpreting the word "legitimated" to mean a child
legitimated by royal concession as well as one legitimated by subsequent marriage
- Maria appealed the decision to the SC

Issue:
Whether or not Maria Luciano is also entitled to the estate of Antonio Escobar

Held: YES

181
Aproceedingisadversarialwherethepartyseekingreliefhasgivenlegalwarningtotheotherpartyandaffordedthelatteranopportunitytocontestit.

Ratio:
1. Maria Luciano is the daughter of Tomasa Escobar, who in turn is the legitimated sister of Antonio Escobar. Tomasas status as
legitimated daughter of Leon and J osefa is determined by the law at the time, Law I, Title XIII, Partida IV
182
and Law 11 of
Toro
183
. And because Antonio died in 1932, his estate shall be disposed of according to the Civil Code of 1889. Article 953 of
the Civil Code provides that should children of brothers or sisters exist, the survi ving spouse shall, concurrently with
said children, be entitled to recei ve the part of the inheritance in usufruct assigned him or her in article 837, that is,
one-half of the estate in usufruct.
2. The trial court reading of article 943 of Civil Code, interpreting the word "legitimated" to mean a child legitimated by royal
concession as well as one legitimated by subsequent marriage is wrong. Such interpretation could not have been the
intention of the legislator, inasmuch as article 122 of said Code considers a child legitimated by subsequent marriage to be in
party with a legitimate child and grants the former the same rights as those of the latter, while article 127 of the same Code
grants a child legitimated by royal concession only those rights conferred upon acknowledged natural children by article 134. If
children legitimate by subsequent marriage have the same rights as legitimate children, and those legitimated by royal
concession only have the same rights as acknowledge natural children, the word "legitimated" employed in article 943 et seq.
of Section III, Chapter IV of Book Three of the Civil Code, alternately with the word "natural", with reference to the heredity
portion to which the child of one class or another is entitled, refers only to a child legitimated by royal concession and not to
one legitimated by subsequent marriage. KEBABdigest

Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil 855 (1918)
Ramirez (Ana) v Gmur (Otto)
184
/ Aug 5, 1918
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Iloilo / Street, J:

FACTS:
Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller died leaving an estate of which he disposed by will. In the will his widow Doa Ana M. Ramirez
was to inherit almost all of the estate since according to him he had no children by his marriage with Ana and therefore had no
forced heirs.
However, Samuel actually had a child, Leona Castro, with Felisa Castro (issue of filiation).
Leona Castro is already dead, therefore she cannot inherit, but her filiation with Samuel is nonetheless important since Leona
left behind children from two different marriages (issue of succession). If proven that Leona is a natural child of Samuel, she
will be considered a forced heir to the estate. Consequently, her children shall also have a right to inherit from the estate of
Samuel.
The first marriage of Leona is with Kaufman and the second is with Doctor Mory, after the first marriage was divorced in
France (issue of validity of marriage). If the divorce is valid, the second marriage is valid and the children of that marriage shall
also be allowed to inherit from the estate.
In the first marriage, two children were born. During the second marriage, three children were born. However, the first child of
Felisa with Doctor Mory, Leontina Elizabeth, was born before the celebration of the second marriage (issue of filiation again).
However, it is contended that the subsequent marriage of Felisa and Doctor Mory legitimized Leontina Elizabeth status (MAIN
ISSUE).
ISSUES:
1. WON Leona is a natural child of Samuel [yes]
2. WON the divorce was valid [no]
3. WON Leontina Elizatbeth was legitimated [no]
HELD:

1. Yes. The court believed that Leona was a recognized daughter of Samuel. Leona was taken into the family of Samuel and
brought up by him and his wife as a member of the family. It is therefore evident that she was tacitly recognized as his
daughter and treated her as such. Moreover, Father Ferrero, in a deposed in the court that there was an annotation on the
original baptismal record of Leona which indicated that Samuel recognized her as daughter in a public instrument,
which was authenticated in a notarial act. Since the original public document cannot be found, the testimony of the priest
is sufficient as proof of that there had been a recognition. Moreover, the annotation (memorandum) already constitutes
original and substantive proof of the facts cited thein.
Since the recognition was made before the old civil code, the Novisima Recopilacion applies, which provides that
recognition could be established by proof of acts on the part of the parent unequivocally recognizing the status of his
offspring.
2. No. The divorce was procured in France where neither Kaufman nor Leona had a domicile. Therefore, it cannot have effect
under Philippine jurisdiction. Therefore, the marriage of Doctor Mory is also invalid. As marriage can only be dissolved by
182
LawI,TitleXIII,PartidaIV.Moreover,thechildrenwhichamanhasbyawomanwhomhekeepsasaconcubinewillbelegitimate,ifhemarriesherafterwards;
for although children of this kind are not legitimate when they are born, marriage has such force that, as soon as the father and mother are married, the children
become for that reason, legitimate. This same rule applies where a man has a child by his female slave and afterwards marries her; for marriage has such
extraordinarypowerthat,assoonasthisisdone,themotherbecomesfree,andthechildrenlegitimate,forthisreason.
183
Achildisconsiderednaturalwhenatthetimeofitsconceptionorbirthitsparentscouldhavemarriedwithoutdispensationandwhenthefatherhasexpresslyor
tacitlyacknowledgedit
184
GuardianofthechildrenofLeonaCastroinhersecondmarriage.

death during that time, the children born of the second marriage cannot inherit from the estate of Samual since they are born
of an adulterous relationship.
3. No. She was an offspring of an adulterous intercourse (not because the second marriage was invalidated later on, but
because she was born during the validity of the first marriage) and as such was incapable of legitimation (Art 119 of old
civil code). Also, he cannot be legitimized as a child of the first marriage since originally she claimed to be legitimate child of
the second marriage. Therefore, she cannot inherit.

JUDGMENT: The children of the first marriage shall share equally in one-third of the estate of Samuel. Ana was entitled to the other
two-thirds. The children of the second marriage are totally barred from participation in the estate as they are all illegitimate.
KEBABdigest

In re Julian Wang, 454 SCRA 155 (2005)
In Re: Petition Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, G.R. No. 159966, March 20, 2005

PETITIONER: J ULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG
RESPONDENTS: CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO,
Ponente: TINGA, J.
Keywords: change of name

FACTS:
Child was born to parents who were then not yet married to each other. Parents subsequently got married and executed a
deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from J ulian Lin Carulasan to J ulian Lin Carulasan
Wang
The family plans to stay in Singapore where the children would study
The trial court denied petition and added that when petitioner J ulian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide
whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to
giving due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling. That the
change of name would not prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the
petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable.
CA affirm the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name?
HELD: No
RATIO: The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities
for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to
change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling
reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody;
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of
the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not
a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications
advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts.
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at
large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of indicating the identity
of persons; they are descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently
been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the surname or family name.
The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals.
The name or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics:
(1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused with others.

(2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name.
(3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial
proceedings.
(4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa.
(5) It is imprescriptible.
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that middle names have no practical or legal
significance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others
who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. The
Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use
the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mothers
surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only
when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document
or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the
certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a
middle name, and a surname.
The only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name
would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his
middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered
complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is
best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of
tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may
just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.


XIII. Adoption
A. Pre-Adoption and Adoption Procedure Art. 184 and 187
B. Who may adopt/be adopted

In re: Adoption of Edwin Villa, 21 SCRA 399 (1967)
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA | Angeles, J .
No. L-22523 | September 29, 1967| Appeal from a decision of the J uvenile Domestic Relations Court of Manila

Facts:
Spouses Luis Santos Jr. and Edipola Villa, having no child of their own, filed a petition praying that the minor Edwin Villa, a
younger brother of Edipola, be declared their son by adoption.
The natural parents of the minor voluntarily gave their consent and written conformity to the adoption.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that relatives by blood or by affinity are prohibited from adopting one
another because of the incongruous dual relationship that will result.
Trial Court: Dismissed the petition for adoption since the adoption will result in an incongruous situation
Hence this appeal.

Issue:
WON an elder sister may adopt her younger brother.

Held/ Ratio:
YES. Petition of the subject minor grant

There is no provision in the law prohibiting relatives by blood from adopting one another.
o Article 335
185
NCC enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that petitioners arent among
those prohibited from adopting.
o Article 339
186
NCC names those who cant be adopted and the minor Edwin isnt one of those excluded by law.
o Article 338
187
NCC on the other hand allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other
illegitimate kids by their father or mother, and a stepchild by the stepdad or stepmom.

To say that adoption shouldnt be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in those
cases enumerated Article 338 NCC is to preclude adoption among relatives no matter how removed or in whatever
degree that relationship might be, which isnt the policy of the law.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children,
should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by persons who can properly rear and educate them.
The fact that adoption in this case will result in a dual relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be
the son of the adopting sister, shouldnt prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law.
The relationship established by adoption is limited to the adopting parents and doesnt extend to their other relatives, except as
expressly provided by law. KEBABdigest

185
Art.335.Thefollowingcannotadopt:
(1)Thosewhohavelegitimate,legitimated,acknowledgednaturalchildren,ornaturalchildrenbylegalfiction;
(2)Theguardian,withrespecttotheward,beforethefinalapprovalofhisaccounts;
(3)Amarriedperson,withouttheconsentoftheotherspouse;
(4)Nonresidentaliens;
(5)ResidentalienswithwhosegovernmenttheRepublicofthePhilippineshasbrokendiplomaticrelations;
(6)Anypersonwhohasbeenconvictedofacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude,whenthepenaltyimposedwassixmonths'imprisonmentormore.
186
Art.339.Thefollowingcannotbeadopted:
(1)Amarriedperson,withoutthewrittenconsentoftheotherspouse;
(2)AnalienwithwhosegovernmenttheRepublicofthePhilippineshasbrokendiplomaticrelations;
(3)Apersonwhohasalreadybeenadopted.
187
Art.338.Thefollowingmaybeadopted:
(1)Thenaturalchild,bythenaturalfatherormother;
(2)Otherillegitimatechildren,bythefatherormother;
(3)Astepchild,bythestepfatherorstepmother.


Republic v. CA & Bobiles, 205 SCRA 356 (1992)

FACTS:
- Private respondent Zenaida Bobiles filed a petition to adopt J ason Condat, then 6 yo and who had been living with her family since
he was 4 mos old.
- The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued and order setting the petition for hearing. The
order was duly published and posted with copies seasonably served to interested parties. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition.
Subsequently, the RTC granted the petition which was affirmed by the CA.
- During the pendency of her petition, the FC took effect which makes mandatory the joint adoption of spouses.
- Petitioner now contends that the petition for adoption should have been dismissed outright as it was filed solely by private
respondent without joining her husband Dioscoro Bobiles, in violation of Art 185 FC. It argues that FC must be applied retroactively
to the petition of Mrs. Bobiles. And that even if the FC is not applied, the court still erred by granting adoption to both the spouses
instead of Zenaida alone.

ISSUE: WON the FC provision regarding joint adoption of spouses should apply

HELD: No. Art 256 FC provides for the retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof subject to the qualification that such
retroactive application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. Zenaida had rightfully commenced the petition prior to the
effectivity of the FC. Her right to that action is not subject to subsequent modification of the law.
Art 185 FC is remedial in nature. Technical rules should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings because it involves the
future condition and paramount welfare of the adoptee. Petition for adoption granted. KEBABdigest

Republic v. Toledano, 233 SCRA 9 (1994)
Republic v. Judge Toledano and Clouse Spouses
[Certiorari; Puno; June 8, 1994]

FACTS:
+ Spouses Alvin and Evelyn Clouse wanted to adopt Solomon J oseph Alcala, the 12 y/o younger brother of Evelyn.
+ Alvin is a natural born US citizen. Evelyn was naturalized 7 yrs after their marriage.
+ They filed a petition for adoption, the same was published as required, J oseph gave his consent, the natural mother also
consented, and the social worker also gave a favorable recommendation.
+ The petition was granted by J udge Toledano but the OSG opposed in that the spouses are not qualified to adopt under the
Philippine Laws
ISSUE: WON spouses Clouse, aliens, may adopt under the Phil. Law [No.]
RATIO:
+ Alvin Close cant adopt Solomon:
o Alvin Clouse is not a former Filipino citizen. Solomon is not his relative by consanguinity (under 3-a).
o Evelyn isnt a Filipino citizen anymore in order to fall under either 3-b or 3-c
+ Evelyn cant adopt Solomon either.
o She was a former Filipino citizen but granting the adoption under 3-a, in her case, would violate Art 185 w/c mandates joint
adoption by spouses
o Solomon is not w/in exceptions provided in 185
o History of the joint adoption provision
PD 603 spouses MAY jointly adopt
EO 91 spouses SHALL jointly adopt
FC spouses MUST jointly adopt
Concept joint parental authority is the best of the child; to insure harmony between spouses
+ Court, speaking through ponente Adoption laws are construed in favor of adoption, EO 91 treats adoption as a way to promote
the best interests of the child.
+ Petition granted. Decision reversed & set aside.
NOTES: Provisions in point -
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:
(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the
final accounts rendered upon the termination of their guardianship
relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the
latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino
children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoptions as
may be provided by law. (28a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
(29a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

SEMPIODIY: Through RA 8552, those disqualified before like in the case of Toledano, may now adopt as long as they meet the
requirements set forth in the said law. KEBABdigest

Republic v. Miller
188
, 306 SCRA 183 (1999)
21 April 1999 | Pardo, J. | Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
189

Facts:
Claude Miller and J umrus Miller
190
are American citizens residing in Angeles City. They have been married since 12 J une
1982. They are attempting to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag. The minor was born on J uly 14, 1987 and has been
living with the spouses since the first week of August of the same year.
The minors biological parents gave him up for adoption because of poverty. They executed affidavits giving their irrevocable
consent to the adoption by the Millers. DSWD also recommended that approval of the adoption by the Millers, seeing that they
are morally, emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive parents.

Issue: W/N the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under Art. 184 of the Family Code, effective on
August 3, 1988 when the petition for adoption was filed on J uly 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code
which allowed aliens to adopt.

Held/Ratio:
YES. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the
petitioner, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.

Vested Right
Present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action
Innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot
deny
Include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created
after the right has vested

Jurisdiction
The establish rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action.
As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time
it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction
191
and retains it until it fully disposes of the case.

Adoption Statutes
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are
designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family in the person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood
and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. KEBABdigest

188
ItssimilartoRepublicvCA&Bobiles.JusticePardoevenquotesfromsaidcase.
189
UmepallangulityungmeanSolGen.
190
Seriously?Jumrusisagirlsname?
191
Thejurisdictionofthecourtisdeterminedbythestatuteinforceatthetimeofthecommencementoftheaction.Suchjurisdictionofacourt,whetherincriminal
orcivilcases,onceitattachescannotbeoustedbysubsequenthappeningsorevents,althoughofacharacterwhichwouldhavepreventedjurisdictionfromattaching
inthefirstinstance.

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, GR Nos. 168992-83 (2009)

Petition for review on certiorari | Carpio, J. | May 21, 2009

Petitioner: Monina Lim

FACTS:
Petitioner is an optometrist and was married to Primo Lim. But, they were childess.
A certaon Lucia Ayuban entrusted unto them two children: A baby girl was 11 days old when she was brought to petitioner's
clinic (born: 15 March, 1977). A baby boy was also 11 days old when brought to the clinic (born: 1 August, 1983).
Being so eager to have a child of their own, they registered the children to make it appear that they were the parents; the
children were named Michelle and Michael J ude Lim, respectively.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They
used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents.
In 1998, the husband died, petitioner married Angel Olario, a US citizen.
When the RA 8852 was passed, she decided to avail of the 5-year amnesty period to those who simulated the birth of a child.
At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18
years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. Michael also gave
his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. Petitioners husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of
Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael; DSWD issued a certification stating that both children were abandoned.
RTC dismissed said petition since there was no joint adoption made by the spouses as required by RA 8552 and Article 185 of
the Family Code.

ISSUE: W/N the consent of husband is no longer needed?
W/N the emancipation of children may do away with said parental consent since there is no parental authority?

No. Dura lex sed lex. Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8852 IS explicit.
192
Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain
requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA
8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have
been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must
maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the
adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were show and
proved during the trial.
No. parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552
193
enumerates the effects of
adoption. Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the
adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy
all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights. KEBABdigest

192
SEC.7.WhoMayAdopt.Thefollowingmayadopt:
(c)Theguardianwithrespecttothewardaftertheterminationoftheguardianshipandclearanceofhis/herfinancialaccountabilities.Husbandandwifeshalljointly
adopt,exceptinthefollowingcases:
(i)ifonespouseseekstoadoptthelegitimateson/daughteroftheother;or
(ii)ifonespouseseekstoadopthis/herownillegitimateson/daughter:Provided,however,Thattheotherspousehassignifiedhis/herconsentthereto;or
(iii)ifthespousesarelegallyseparatedfromeachother.Incasehusbandandwifejointlyadopt,oronespouseadoptstheillegitimateson/daughteroftheother,joint
parentalauthorityshallbeexercisedbythespouses.
193
EFFECTSOFADOPTION
SEC.16.ParentalAuthority.Exceptincaseswherethebiologicalparentisthespouseoftheadopter,alllegaltiesbetweenthebiologicalparent(s)andtheadoptee
shallbeseveredandthesameshallthenbevestedontheadopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the
rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love,
guidance,andsupportinkeepingwiththemeansofthefamily.
SEC.18.Succession.Inlegalandintestatesuccession,theadopter(s)andtheadopteeshallhavereciprocalrightsofsuccessionwithoutdistinctionfromlegitimate
filiation.However,iftheadopteeandhis/herbiologicalparent(s)hadleftawill,thelawontestamentarysuccessionshallgovern.

C. Nature of Adoption Proceedings

Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250 (1979)
GR # L-43955-56 | July 30, 1979 | Teehankee, J.

Abstract:
Lazatin wants to participate in the settlement of estate proceedings of his alleged adoptive mother. However, he never
presented the judicial decree of his adoption (claiming it was lost during the war), and all the other evidence he presented was of the
same kind used to prove illegitimate filiation. He was thus disallowed by CFI J udge Campos from participating in said court
proceedings.

Facts:
- When Dr Mariano Lazatin died, his wife, Margarita de Asis, instituted intestate proceedings regarding his estate. However, she
too died shortly after her husband.
- She left a holographic will which her adopted daughters petitioned the Pasay CFI, presided over by J udge Campos, to
probate.
- Renato Lazatin intervened in the proceedings regarding the estate of Dr Lazatin, claiming that he was an admitted illegitimate
child of the deceased.
- Renato Lazatin also intervened in the estate of Margarita de Asis claiming that he was an adopted child, on the basis of an
affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr Lazatin, that Renato was an "illegitimate son" of Dr.
Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified to state that Renato was adopted by both Dr Lazatin
and his wife Margarita de Asis.
- Unfortunately, Renato could not present the judicial order of his adoption. He attempted to prove that he was really
adopted, over private respondents' objections, through other means
194
.
- The CFI discontinued the hearing on Renatos motion to intervene, saying that all the evidence presented by him did not prove
or does not tend to prove the existence of any judicial proceeding where his adoption was taken up by any court; on
the contrary his evidence is akin to proving a status of a recognized natural child which, however, is not the legal basis for
which he seeks to intervene in this proceedings. The CFI thus barred him from presenting any more evidence.
- Renato thus files a certiorari petition w/ the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not CFI J udge Campos erred in barring Renato from participating any further in the estate proceedings
Held: NO. J udge Campos decision was in conformity w/ law and jurisprudence

Ratio:
- Only an adoption made through the court is valid in this jurisdiction. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. Because adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such
court constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established. In this case, Renato never presented such judicial
order, and as the CFI noted, all his evidence was akin to evidence tending to prove illegitimate filiation which is obviously
totally different.

Result: CFI decision affirmed. Renato Lazatin is barred from participating in the estate proceedings of
Margarita de Asis, not being a child (natural or adoptive) of the latter.

Obiter: On the Nature of Adoption Proceedings
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results
from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down
under the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish
the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of
adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmati vely proved by the person claiming its existence. The destruction by fire of a
public building in which the adoption papers would have been filed if existent does not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is the
destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been
said to evol ve a presumption of its non-existence. Where, under the provisions of the statute, an adoption is effected by a court
order, the records of such court constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established. KEBABdigest

194
A.thathehadrecognizedthedeceasedspousesashisparents;
B.hehadbeensupportedbythemuntiltheirdeath;
C.heformerlyhewasknownas"RenatoLazatin"butwascompelledtochangehissurnameto"Sta.Clara"whenthedeceasedspousesrefusedtogiveconsenttohis
marriagetohispresentwife;
D.thatatfirst,heandhiswifestayedattheresidenceofEngraciodeAsis,fatherofMargarita,butafewmonthslater,theytransferredtotheMercyHospitalatTaft
Avenue,Manila,ownedbythedeceasedspouses,wheretheycontinuouslyresideduptothepresent.
E.photographswerealsopresented,e.g.,photographofIrmaVelosowheresheaddressedherselfassisterofpetitioner;photographofdeceasedMargaritadeAsis
andpetitionerwhenhewasaboy;documentshowingthatpetitionersrealnameis"RenatoLazatin.

Santos v. Aranzanso, 16 SCRA 344 (1966)

Santos, et al. (Paulina and Aurora Santos) v. Aranzanso, et al. (Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetrio Ventura) / Feb 28, 1966 /
No. L-23828 / Petition for review by way of certiorari of the decision of CA / Bengzon, J .P., J:

FACTS:
Simplicito Santos and J uliana Reyes (married for 27 years w/o children) adopted Paulina Santos (17 yrs old.) and Aurora
Santos (8 yrs old) who have been living under their care and custody since their infancy. The whereabouts of their parents or
of their nearest kin were unknown. Thus, in their absence, a guardian ad litem appointed by court gave his written consent to
the adoption. Paulina Santos also gave her written consent thereto. Also, the petition for adoption was published (National
Weekly) once a week for three consecutive weeks before the case was set for trial.
8 yrs later, J uliana Reyes died intestate. Simplicito Santos then filed for settlement of the estate, with only three surviving
heirs, him and the two adoptees. He also asked to be appointed administrator.
An opposition to the appointment of administrator was raised by Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura (later joined by the
Pasion sisters), alleging that the marriage of Santos and Reyes were bigamous and void and that the adoption of Paulina and
Aurora were likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents who were then living and had not abandoned
them. That they are the heirs of Reyes.
CFI ruled that the validity of adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in the intestate proceedings. CA reversed the order and
declared the adoption void in the absence of the consent of natural parents, which it deemed a jurisdictional defect still open to
collateral attack (insufficient evidence to support a finding that the parents abandoned their children and the failure to
expressly and specifically find that such abandonment in fact occurred).
ISSUES:
1. WON the adoption is valid despite the absence of consent of the natural parents [no]
2. WON the CA can review the evidence in the adoption case [no]
3. WON the CA can set aside the judgment obtained from the adoption proceeding as null and void being secured from extrinsic fraud
[no]
4. WON the CFI erred in not requiring notice to the natural parents[no]
5. WON the validity of marriage of Santos and Reyes can affect the validity of the adoption [no]
HELD:
1. No. Unlike in American jurisprudence, consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite under Philippine laws
195
. If
the natural parents abandoned the children, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.
2. No. The CFI made a determination of the fact of abandonment
196
based from the facts presented by the adopting parents in during
the hearing. When the jurisdiction of an inferior or special tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to be established before it,
the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon its order.
3. No. There is a well recognized rule that a judgment can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud only in a separate action
brought for that purpose.
4. No. Notice is not required in adoption cases in regard to the abandoning parent. Also, a publication duly made is enough where the
residence of parents is unknown.
5. No. In the case that the marriage is void, it may be deemed that J uliana Reyes have filed the petition for adoption as a person whose
status is single. And it being the estate of J uliana Reyes that is the subject matter of settlement, the flaw in the marriage will not
affect the right of Paulina and Aurora to succeed as adopted children, to the exclusion of respondents.
197

JUDGMENT: Judgment of CA reversed. Respondents have no right to intervene as heirs of the intestate estate of Juliana
Reyes.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
A strong basis for finding of the parents abandonment of his or her child is found in the case where the parent has left the
child permanently or indefinitely in the care of others, given it to another, or surrendered it entirely.
The CAs pronounce that there the finding of abandonment had totally no support cannot be upheld since it was an appeal
from an order of the settlement proceedings and not in a direct suit assailing the validity of the adoption order.
The movants claim that the parental ties are too noble and sacred to be lightly severed in the absence of a written consent of
the parents is rather something remarkable since the natural parents of the children paid no heed to the sanctity and nobility of
the selfsame parental ties for almost 20 years. Only when a fortune was bequeathed did said parents come to the fore
The fact that only Simplicio Santos signed the adoption cannot render the adoption invalid since he can be deemed to have
signed in behalf of J uliana Reyes (if ever their marriage be found later on as bigamous and void).
The Courts decision shall not hinder respondents from instituting a direct action assailing the validity of the adoption.
KEBABdigest

195
Rule100ofOldRulesofCourt
ConsenttoadoptionThereshallbefiledwiththepetitionawrittenconsenttotheadoptinsignedbythechildifoverfourteenyearsofageandnotincompetent,and
byeachofitsownlivingparentswhoisnotinsaneorhopelesslytemperateorhasnotabandonedsuchchild,orifthreearenosuchparentsbythegeneralguardian
orguardianadlitemofthechild,orifthechildisinthecustodyofanorphanasylum,childrenshome,orbenevolentsocietyorperson,bytheproperofficersofsuch
asylum,home,orsociety,orbysuchperson;byifthechildisillegitimateandhasnotbeenrecognized
196
neglectorrefusaltoperformthenaturalandlegalobligationsofcareandsupportwhichparentsowetotheirchildren
197
Intheorderofintestatesuccession,adoptedchildrenexcludefirstcousins(art979and1003ofNewCivilCode)

DSWD v. Belen, 275 SCRA 645 (1997)
July 18, 1997

PETITIONER: DSWD, Corazon Layug
RESPONDENTS: RTC J udge Antonio Belen(Pangasinan), Elma P. Vedaa
Ponente: Regalado, J.
Keywords: case study

FACTS: Administrative Case
Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo, naturalized American citizens, filed a petition to adopt their niece, Zhedelle
Bernardo Ibea.
Petition was granted by respondent judge with the recommendation of Elma Vedaa, social welfare officer.
Upon seeking travel clearance from DSWD, it was found out that DSWD was not informed of the adoption proceedings nor of
the granting of the petition for adoption.
DSWD filed an administrative case against judge and social worker.

ISSUE:WON the requirement of DSWD case study can be dispensed off in an adoption proceeding?
HELD:No
RATIO: DSWD has to be notified of the adoption procedings. Adoptive Home Study Report and Child Study Report is mandatory
before adoption is finalized. Adoption is a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child.
Article 33 PD 603, Child and Youth Welfare Code provides that:
No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social Work and Counselling
Division, in case of J uvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of the child to be adopted, his natural
parents as well as the prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the
court hearing such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case
study, that the petition should be denied.
Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure, was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by
judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance with Article 33 of Presidential Decree
No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively directs
Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases:
"(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the
pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed;
(2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree
The Staff Assistant V (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services
and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such case study. x x x
We are, however, persuaded that respondent judge acted in good faith when he stated in his decision that the DSWD submitted the
required reports to his court through respondent Vedaa, presumably in the belief that it was standard procedure for the Social Welfare
Officer II of a Regional Trial Court to do so in coordination with the DSWD. We also agree with the findings of the OCA that there is no
evidence whatsoever that respondent Vedaa sought to obtain any amount from the adopting parents. In fact, this is belied by the
affidavit of the childs natural mother, Loreta Ibea. We are, therefore, inclined to adopt a liberal view on the charges against
respondents
DISPOSITIVE: Respondent judge censured and warned against repetition of similar acts while respondent Elma Vedaa reprimanded.
KEBABdigest


ecognized.
D. Consent Necessary for Adoption

Duncan v. CFI, 69 SCRA 298 (1976)
ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN and MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN V. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL
Esguerra, J . | No. L-30576 | February 10, 1976 | Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CFI of Rizal

Facts:
Petitioner spouses, Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen
198
, having no children of their own, wanted
to adopt a child previously baptized and named by them as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan.
Lower court: dismissed the petition for adoption principally because the parental consent required under Article 340
199

NCC was allegedly lacking.
Atty. Corazon de Leon-Velasquez, under whose care the newly-born child was entrusted by the unwedded mother, wouldnt
reveal the identity of the mother as it would allegedly violate the privileged communications between attorney and client.
Lower court opined, nonetheless that the case wasnt only a question of revealing the identity of the mother but that of
obtaining her consent to the adoption, Furthermore, lower court ruled that Atty. Velasquez couldnt give the required
written consent.
Hence this appeal.

Issue:
WON the mother is deemed to have abandoned the child so as to consider Atty. Velasquez the guardian of the child, with the legal
capacity to give the required written consent to the adoption.

Held/ Ratio:

YES. CFI decision reversed. Subject minor is declared the adopted child of the petitioners.

Only 1 of 2 persons particularly described by law may be considered here as legally capable of giving the required written
consent: under Article 340 NCC, the parent, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted, while the other
one is that mentioned in Rule 99, sec 3 ROC
200
, describing it as each of the known living parents who hasnt
abandoned such child. The fathers consent here is out of the question as the child is illegitimate & unr
The natural and unwedded mother hasnt bothered to inquire into the condition of the child, much less to contribute to the
livelihood, maintenance and care of the same. Abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental claims to the child. Applying this yardstick, the unidentified mother of the child in this
case is declared as having abandoned her child with all legal consequences attached thereto.
The unknown parent having abandoned the child, theres no more legal need to require the written consent of such parent of
the child to the adoption.
There clearly appears only 1 person who could be considered as the guardian exercising patria potestas over such
abandoned child. Since there was no guardian ad litem appointed by the court, and the child no being in the custody of an
orphan asylum, childrens home or any benevolent society, there couldnt have been anyone other than Atty. Velasquez
who could, with reason, be called the guardian of said infant.
It was she who actually had physical custody of the infant and who, out of compassion and motherly instinct,
extended the mantle of protection over the hapless and helpless infant who otherwise couldve suffered a tragic fate, like
being thrown unto some garbage heap as had often happened to some unwanted illegitimate babies.
The least the court could do to recognize and acknowledge her good Samaritan deed is to extend to her the
recognition that she was a de facto guardian exercising patria potestas over the abandoned child. KEBABdigest

198
ThisisapreFCcase.Botharealiens,butareallowedtoadoptunderformerlaw.
199
Art.340.Thewrittenconsentofthefollowingtotheadoptionshallbenecessary:
(1)Thepersontobeadopted,iffourteenyearsofageorover;
(2)Theparents,guardianorpersoninchargeofthepersontobeadopted.
200
Rule99,Sec.3.Consenttoadoption.Thereshallbefiledwiththepetitionawrittenconsenttotheadoptionsignedbythechild,iffourteenyearsofageorover
andnotincompetent,andbythechild'sspouse,ifany,andbyeachofitsknownlivingparentswhoisnotinsaneorhopelesslyintemperateorhasnotabandoned
suchchild,oriftherearenosuchparentsbythegeneralguardianorguardianadlitemofthechild,orifthechildisinthecustodyofanorphanasylum,children's
home,orbenevolentsocietyorperson,bytheproperofficerorofficersofsuchasylum,home,orsociety,orbysuchperson;butifthechildisillegitimateandhas
notbeenrecognized,theconsentofitsfathertotheadoptionshallnotberequired.

Diwata Landingin v. Republic
[Certiorari; Certiorari; J une 27, 2006]
FACTS:
+ Pet.wants to adopt thekids& bring them to Guam
+ When the biological father of these children died, they were left with their
paternal grandmother, Maria. Their biological mother left for Italy to work.
She now has a family there.
201

+ When the grandmother died, petitioner, a 57 y/o widow &US citizen,
wanted to adopt the kids.
o She is of Filipino parentage.
o Petitioner has children who are all married, employed, & living apart
from her. They gave consent to the adoption, notarized in Guam
o She has her own house in Guam & she works as a restaurant server.
o Petitioner said that the kids biological mother has, since leaving for Italy, failed to communicate & support the 3 children.
+ Findings in DSWD case study by Elizabeth Pagbilao.
o Pagbilao was able to interview the biological mother during her vacation.
o The biological mother had supported the kids, although in limited amounts.
202

o The eldest child, Elaine, also admitted that in serious probs, she consults Amelia & petitioner
o The biological mother consents to the adoption but petitioner failed to present the written consent and also failed to
present Pagbilao as witness to prove the voluntary consent.
+ Lower Court granted the petition. CA reversed.
ISSUES:
1. WON adoption can be decreed w/o the written consent of the biological mother [No.]
2. WON the affidavit of consent executed by the children of petitioner-adopter complies w/ the law [No.]
3. WON petitioner-adopter is financially capable of supporting the adoptees. [No.]
HELD/RATIO: Petition denied.
1. The written consent of the natural parent/s is needed to insure that the best interests of the children are safeguarded. Petitioner
failed to present the written consent of the biological mother.
a. RA 8552 was already in effect. RA 8552 requires the written consent of a guardian absent a written consent of the
biological parent/s.
However, the written consent requirement is relaxed if the parent/s abandoned
203
the children. Petitioner failed to prove that the
mother had abandoned the children.
b. Mother did not abandon the children by merely permitting the children to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others.
c. Adoption will not be decreed based solely on the incapability or insufficiency of the financial support that the biological parent/s
give. It would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in
deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children.
2. The purported written consent of petitioners children notarized in Guam failed to comply w/ 2, Act No. 2103 w/c gives the
requirements before a document/instrument acknowledged in a foreign country shall be considered as authentic in the
Philippines.
204
The instrument was not authenticated thus inadmissible as evidence.
3. Petitioner has limited income, per case study.
a. She only has a part-time job & she is rather of age.
b. Petitioner said that her children and relatives in Guam would back her. However, the court said that the ability to support the
adoptees is personal to the adopter since adoption creates a legal relation only between the adopter and the adoptees. She is
also failed to prove that her children & siblings are financially able & are willing to support the adoptees. KEBABdigest

201
Shehadbeenlivinginw/anothermarriedFilipinoinItaly.
202
ShesendsP1015K/motoparentsofw/cP35Kissharedtothekids
203
Neglectandrefusaltoperformthefilialandlegalobligationsofloveandsupport
204
(a)Theacknowledgmentshallbemadebefore(1)anambassador, minister,secretaryoflegation,chargdaffaires,consul,viceconsul,orconsularagentofthe
RepublicofthePhilippines,actingwithinthecountryorplacetowhichheisaccredited,or(2)anotarypublicorofficerdulyauthorizedbylawofthecountrytotake
acknowledgmentsofinstrumentsordocumentsintheplacewheretheactisdone.
(b)Thepersontakingtheacknowledgmentshallcertifythatthepersonacknowledgingtheinstrumentordocumentisknowntohim,andthatheisthesameperson
whoexecutedit,andacknowledgedthatthesameishisfreeactanddeed.Thecertificateshallbeunderhisofficialseal,ifheisbylawrequiredtokeepaseal,andif
not,hiscertificateshallsostate.Incasetheacknowledgmentismadebeforeanotarypublicoranofficermentionedinsubdivision(2)oftheprecedingparagraph,
the certificate of the notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg de
affaires,consul,viceconsul,orconsularagentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,actingwithinthecountryorplacetowhichheisaccredited.Theofficermaking
theauthenticationshallcertifyunderhisofficialsealthatthepersonwhotooktheacknowledgmentwasatthetimedulyauthorizedtoactasnotarypublicorthathe
was duly exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as such he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of
instrumentsordocumentsintheplacewheretheacknowledgmentwastaken,andthathissignatureandseal,ifany,aregenuine.

E. Effects of Adoption

Tamargo v. CA, 209 SCRA 518 (1992)
3 J une 1992 | Feliciano, J . | Petition for review of the decision of the CA
FACTS:
On Oct. 20, 1982, 10 yr old Adelberto Bundoc shot J ennifer Tamargo with an air rifle which resulted in her death.
Macario Tamargo, J ennifers adopting parent & spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, J ennifers natural parents, filed a civil
complaint for damages against spouses Victor & Clara Bundoc, Adelbertos natural parents w/whom he was living at the time of the
incident.
Adelberto was acquitted in the criminal case filed against him for acting w/o discernment.
Prior to the incident or on Dec. 10, 1981, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto such was granted
on Nov. 18, 1982.
Bundocs claim that the Rapisuras should be the proper parties (indispensable) in this suit since parental authority shifted to the
adopting parent from the moment the petition for adoption was filed.
Tamargos claim that since Adelberto was staying with the Bundocs at the time of the incident, their parental authority over the child
had not ceased.
Trial court: dismissed petition claiming Bundocs were not proper parties. Tamargos filed MFR but denied for failure to give notice to
all parties 3 days before the hearing. Appeal was likewise dismissed for being filed out of time.
CA: dismissed. Petitioners lost their right to appeal.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
1. W/N petitioners, despite losing their right to appeal, may still file this petition. YES
Since MFR did not comply with the notice requirement, its only considered pro forma & it did not interrupt/suspend
reglementary period to appeal. Whats mandatory is the service of motion on the opposing counsel indicating time & place of hearing.
The SC said that technical rules should be suspended in order that substantial justice may be served. Rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a rigid technical sense. Theyre only used to help secure not override substantial justice. Rigid enforcement
would defeat the aim.
2. W/N effects of adoption in so far as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the
adopting parents the proper party in a damage suit filed against their adopted child. NO
Not disputed that Adelbertos act gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. CC Art. 2176: Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence if theres no pre-existing contractual relation bet parties is called a quasi-delict.
CC ART. 2180: Obligations under Art. 2176 are demandable not only from ones own acts or omissions but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Responsibility will cease if they prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
CC Art. 2180 is frequently called as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed negligence. Parental liability is a natural or logical
consequence of the parents duties & responsibilities (includes instructing, controlling & disciplining of child).
Civil liability is based on parental authority vested by CC upon parents. It assumes that parents were negligent in the performance
of their legal & natural duty to supervise the child whos in their custody & control. Presumption may be overturned by proof that
they exercised all diligence to prevent damage.
Bundocs had parental authority over Adelberto when incident occurred. Its logical that the natural parents who had actual custody
of the minor are the proper parties to the suit for damages. But they rely on Art. 36 of the Child & Youth Welfare Code, which
provides that a decree of adoption shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed. Further, they rely on Art. 39 of the
same code which provides that adoption shall dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents except where adopter is the
spouse of the surviving natural parent.
But CC provides that the basis of parental liability for torts of a minor child is the relationship existing bet parents & minor child
LIVING with them & over whom law presumes the parents exercise supervision & control. Art. 58 of the Child & Youth Welfare
Code provides that parents & guardian responsible for damages caused by child under their parental authority in accordance with
the CC. FC Art. 221 likewise provides that parents are responsible for damages & injuries caused by minors living in their company
& under their parental authority.
Retroacti vity may be allowed if it will permit the accrual of benefits/advantages in favor of the adopted child. But it wont
be proper to retroacti vely apply a liability incurred when adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the
child. It is unfair to burden them w/ liability they could not have foreseen or prevented especially in this case where they
were in the US at the time of the incident. Holding them liable would be inconsistent w/ the philosophy & policy
underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Art. 35 of the Child & Youth Welfare Code provides that no petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless adopting parents are
given a supervised trial custody period of at least 6 mos to assess their readiness. During the period of trial custody, parental
authority shall be vested in adopting parents. Parental authority is vested in the adopting parents during this trial period
precisely because they have actual custody of the child during this period. In this case, trial custody period had not yet
begun or had already been completed at the time the incident took place and actual custody and parental authority was still lodged
with the natural parents of Adelberto. Therefore, the Bundocs are the indispensable parties to this case.
DISPOSITIVE:
Petition granted. Decision of the CA is reversed and set aside. Complaint reinstated and remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. KEBABdigest


Sayson v. CA, 205 SCRA 321 (1992)
Petition for review on certiorari | Cruz, J. | January 23, 1992

Petitioner: Mauricio Sayson, Rosario Sayson-Malonda, Basilisa Sayson-Lirio, Remedios Sayson-Reyes and J uana Bautista
Respondent: Court of Appeals; Delia Sayson, Edmundo Sayson and Doribel Sayson

FACTS:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson had five children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. The spouses died.
Teodoro married Isabel Bautista. Teodoro died first and Isabel, after nine years, followed her husband.
Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel who claim to be their children.
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and J uana Bautista (Isabels mother) filed a complaint for partition and accounting of
intestate estate of spouses Teodoro and Isabel. This action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, who alleged
successional rights
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of their alleged
grandparents, Eleno and Rafael.
RTC and CA ruled in favour of respondents.

ISSUE: W/N respondents can inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents?

DECISION: (petition denied, judgment affirmed)
Yes. Petitioners contentions were conflicting:
o On one hand, they contend that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel has already been born
of February 27, 1967 and the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. Adoption is prohibited by law
when the prospecti ve adopter already has a legitimate child.
205

o On the other hand, they also argue that Doribel herself is not a legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but
was born to a certain Edita Abila (who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was the natural
mother).
Since, it was established that Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted and Doribel is a legitimate daughter:
o They are exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple Teodoro and Isabel.
206

o BUT, only Doribel has the right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her
grandparents.
207
She is entitled to the share her father would have had he survived (equal to the shares of her
uncles/aunts). The adoptees Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers, do not have the
right of representation. The relationship created by adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted
child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

NOTES:
The Court also held that it is now too late to challenge the decree of adoption of Edmundo and Delia (assuming that they
were illegally adopted). Since, they argue that the birth of Doribel bars the couple from adopting, they could have filed a
petition for the revocation of adoption decree. Hence, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the adoption since the
adopting parents were not disqualified.
The validity of adoption cannot be attacked collaterally (as incidental to their action for partition). Because if allowed, the status
of the adopted would always be uncertain.
Doribels birth certificate is also a formidable evidence of her legitimacy. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under
Art. 265 (CC) and Art. 172 (FC). Though it is only a prima facie evidence and may be refuted by contrary evidence, in this
case, such evidence is lacking. The evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong,
complete and conclusive proof of its falsity.
Legitimacy could not also be questioned collaterally or as a way of defense in another action for a different purpose.
KEBABdigest

205
Art.335(CC)talksaboutthosepeoplewhocannotadopt.Itincludesthosewhohavelegitimate,legitimated,acknowledgednaturalchildrenornaturalchildrenby
legalfiction.
206
Art.979(CC)legitimatechildrenandtheirdescendantssucceedtheparentsandotherascendantsandadoptedchildsucceedstothepropertyoftheadopting
parentsinthesamemannerasalegitimatechild.
207
Art.981(CC)Shouldchildrenofthedeceasedanddescendantsofotherchildrenwhoaredead,survive,theformershallinheritintheirownright,andthelatter
byrightofrepresentation.

Johnston v. Republic, 7 SCRA 1040 (1963)

GR # L-18284 | April 30, 1963 | Labrador, J.

Lesson: Wife who adopts alone cannot have the adopted child use the surname of her husband

Facts:
- Isabel Valdes J ohnston, w/ her husbands consent, filed a petition to adopt Ana Georgiana. The adoption was granted but the
judge ordered the surname of Ana to be changed to Valdes instead of Valdes J ohnston
- Isabel asked the lower court to reconsider and have Anas surname be Valdes J ohnston, as this is Isabels surname ever
since she got married.
- The lower court denied her motion, hence Isabel appeals to the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not the child adopted by the wife alone
208
can use the surname of the husband

Held/Ratio: NO
- The provision of law
209
which entitles the adopted minor to use the adopters surname, refers to the adopters own surname
and not to her surname acquired by virtue of marriage. After all, Valdes is the wifes legal surname, J ohnston was just added
by marriage.
- The adoption created a personal relationship between the adopter and the adopted only, and the consent of the husband to
the adoption done by the wife individually, did not have the effect of making him an adopting father so as to entitle the child to
use his surname.
- Since adoption gives the person adopted the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter, much
confusion would result if the minor child were allowed to use the surname of the spouse who did not join in the adoption.
- To allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter, would mislead the public into believing that he had
also been adopted by the husband, which is not the case. And when later, questions of successional rights arise, the
husband's consent to the adoption might be presented to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption. KEBABdigest

Republic v. CA & Wong, 209 SCRA 189 (1992)
May 21, 1992 / G.R. No. 97906 / Petition for Review of the decision of the CA / Regalado, J:

FACTS:
Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundia Alcala. He was known as Maximo Alcala, J r. before he
was adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos.
Upon reaching the age of 22, he filed for a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, J r. because he averred that his use of
the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends. The surname suggests a Chinese ancestry but in
fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community. Also, he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus
hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother (his adoptive father already dead) does not oppose his desire
to revert to his former surname.
RTC granted the petition and CA affirmed the decision upon appeal by the Solicitor General. Hence, the present petition is
instituted before the SC.
SolGen contends that private respondents excuse for name change were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition; that it is
crass ingratitude to his adoptive parents and that it violates article 341 and 365 of the civil code
210
. His change of name would give
the impression that he has severed his relationship with his adoptive parents.

ISSUE:
WON Maximo Wong can revert to his former name prior his adoption. [yes]

HELD: Yes
The state has interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for the purpose of identification, and a change of name is not
a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of reasons adduced and the consequences that will
likely follow. However, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, which governs the special proceeding for name change, allows a person an
opportunity to improve his personality and to improve his best interest as long as fraud is prevented.
208
UndertheCivilCode(1950)andtheoriginalChildandYouthWelfareCode(PD6031974),aspousemayadoptbyhimself/herself,andonlytheotherspouses
consentisnecessary.EO91byPresidentAquinowhichamendedPD603wasthefirstlawthatrequiredjointadoptionbyhusbandandwife.
209
Art341par4CC
210
Art.341.Theadoptionshall:
(1)Givetotheadoptedpersonthesamerightsanddutiesasifhewerealegitimatechildoftheadopter:
(2)Dissolvetheauthorityvestedintheparentsbynature;
(3)Maketheadoptedpersonalegalheiroftheadopter;
(4)Entitletheadoptedpersontousetheadopter'ssurname.
Art.365.Anadoptedchildshallbearthesurnameoftheadopter.


The evidence presented in a petition for name change need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available
is required. The testimony of the Wong bears out the existence of valid cause in his bid for name change: he was embarrassed to
his friends and relatives, he could not speak Chinese when he went out with Chinese friends, he lived in a Muslim community
where no one believed he is a Muslim, and he has a little furniture shop which only has few customers since no one believes that
he is a Muslim.
Also, while it is true that the application of Article 365 has the effect that an adopted child shall bear the name of the adopter, it
must be borne in mind that the change of surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than an object of adoption
proceedings. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect a new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive
parents. The change of name will not run counter to the purpose of adoption.
Sec 1 of Rule 103 uses the term persons to signify all natural persons regardless of status. Thus, if a legitimate person for a name
change then there is no legal basis or logic in discriminating against the availment of such remedy by an adopted child. It would be
too harsh to suggest that the adopted child revoke his adoption first before he can have a change of name.
Also, the proof that Wong asked her adoptive mothers consent before the filing for the petition of change of name shows that he
has parental respect and reverence to her adoptive parents. And the fact the her adoptive mother gave her consent through and
affidavit and through her testimony at the hearing shows that she sympathizes with her adoptive sons predicament and would like
the petition to be granted in his favor without affecting the legal adoption.

JUDGMENT: Petition denied. RTC and CA decisions affirmed.

Notes:
Names have two parts: proper or given name and surname or family name. The proper name (freely selected) is that which is
given to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The family name (governed by law, Art 364-380
of CC) is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child.
A name has the following characteristics: 1) it is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused with others, 2)
obligatory in certain aspects, for nobody can be without a name, 3) it is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and
may be changed for good cause and by judicial proceedings, 4) it is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and
intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. 5) It is imprescriptible.
The special proceeding for a change of name is to establish the status of the person involving his relation with others, that is, his
legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. It is proceeding in rem (property of status), thus publication is
necessary as jurisdictional requirement. This special proceeding should not be confused with a summary proceeding which refers
only to correction of clerical errors.
Grounds for change of name: 1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce, 2) when
the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation, 3) when the change will avoid confusion, 4) having continuously
used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage, 5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody and, 6) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change would
prejudice public interest. KEBABdigest

Republic v. CA & Caranto, 255 SCRA 99 (1996)
(March 15, 1996)

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent:Court of Appeals, J aime Caranto and Zenaida Caranto
Ponente: Mendoza, J

FACTS:
Spouses J aime and Zenaida filed petition for adoption of Midael Mazon with prayer to change his first name from Midael to
Michael.
Petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and with service order of DSWD and OSG.
OSG opposed to correction of the name arguing that it should be heard on a separate proceeding.
RTC granted petition for adoption and change of name.
CA affirmed in toto, hence this certiorari.

ISSUES: WON the lower court erred in granting correction in name in the same proceeding as that of the petition for adoption

HELD/RATIO: NO
Rule 108
211
of the Rules of Court applies to this case and because its provision was not complied with, the decision in so far
as the correction of the name of the minor, is VOID with out force or effect.
211
2.Entriessubjecttocancellationorcorrection.Upongoodandvalidgrounds,thefollowingentriesinthecivilregistermaybecancelledorcorrected:(a)births;
(b)marriages;(c)deaths;(d)legalseparation;(e)judgmentsofannulmentsofmarriage;(f)judgmentsdeclaringmarriagesvoidfromthebeginning;(g)legitimations;
(h)adoptions;(i)acknowledgmentsofnaturalchildren;(j)naturalization;(k)election,lossorrecoveryofcitizenship;(l)civilinterdiction;(m)judicialdeterminationof
filiation(n)voluntaryemancipationofaminor;and(o)changesofname.

Indeed, it has been the uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code to implement which Rule 108 was inserted
in the Rules of Court in 1964 covers "those harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly misspelled."
The local civil registrar is also required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom no
final determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision
of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable party in a case
renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment.

Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required by Rule 108, 4. While there was notice given by
publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that notice only the prayer for
adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being
sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by
publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was
concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.

DISPOSITIVE: J udgment affirmed with Modification (deleting order to change name Midael to Michael) KEBABdigest

Republic v. Hernandez, 253 SCRA 509 (1996)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA
MUNSON y ANDRADE
Regalado, J . | G.R. No. 117209 | February 9, 1996 | Appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig city

Facts:
Spouses Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome
Moran.
In the very same petition, the spouses prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the
same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by his
adoptive family, relati ves and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents residence.
RTC: Approved the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the
change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired
consequent to his adoption.

Issue:
WON the RTC erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the
petition for adoption

Held/ Ratio:

YES. The change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to
or include the proper or given name. However, the decision does not entirely foreclose and is without prejudice to the spouses privilege
to legally change the proper or given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is exercised via a proper petition for change of
name.

Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree
of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a
grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally
registered in the ci vil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change
the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus
granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption
proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be
granted.

The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or
proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in ones official or legal name and cannot be authorized
without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a
record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its
decree recording such change)

3Parties.Whencancellationorcorrectionofanentryinthecivilregisterissought,thecivilregistrarandallpersonswhohaveorclaimanyinterestwhichwould
beaffectedtherebyshallbemadepartiestotheproceeding.
4.Noticeandpublication.Uponfilingofthepetition,thecourtshall,byanorder,fixthetimeandplaceforthehearingofthesame,andcausereasonablenotice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaperofgeneralcirculationintheprovince.

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein, If a change in ones name is
desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding
for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed
out and accordingly determined.

By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a persons birth must be entered in the ci vil register. The official name of a person is that given
him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of the law.

And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil
register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities
for purposes of identification.

By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a petition for change of name under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and
correlati vely implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil
register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict
compliance with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the
proceedings a nullity.

It must likewise be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court
which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are
shown. Before a person can be authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which appears in his birth
certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may
justify such change

Notes:
There should be 2 petitions since adoption is governed by FC and change of name is governed by Rule 103 of ROC. The
incidental effect of adoption in FC is that only of the use of surname of adopter by the adoptee.
J oinder of causes of action is permissive only when there is substantial unity among the causes. However, evidences
presented in adoption proceedings (such as fitness of adoptive parents) have nothing to do with those that must be proven in
change of name cases (such as proof of existence of the valid grounds ex. humiliating)
Based ito sa notes: Change of first name now allowed to be included in petition for adoption under RA 8552 sec.13
Decree of Adoption should state name by which child is to be known . KEBABdigest


XIV. Parents and Children
A. Parental Authority General Provisions
1. Custody
a. Determining the Best Interest of the Child
i. Gender and Tender Years Presumption

Ex Parte Devine, 398 So. 2d. 686 (1981)
(March 27, 1981)

Petitioner: Christopher Devine
Respondent: Alice Beth Clark Devine
Supreme Court of Alabama; Maddox, J

FACTS:
Christopher and Alice were married in 1966, had 2 children, Matthew(1972),8y/o and Timothy(1975),5y/o
Both are employed teacher/faculty.
They separated and divorced in 1979. Custody was awarded to Alice with liberal visitation rights for Christopher.
The facts clearly show that either parent would be fit and proper person to be vested with care and custody of their minor children.
However, in Alabama law a presumption that when dealing with children in tender years, the natural mother is presumed, to be the
proper person to be vested with custody of such children.
ISSUES: WON tender years presumption deprived the father of his constitutional entitlement to equal protection of the law(14
th

Amendment)
HELD/RATIO: YES
Natural rights of the father vs instictive role of the mother.
Paternal preference rule
Common Law: Father held virtual absolute right to custody of minor children; feudalistic notion of natural responsibility; By marriage,
husband and wife become one person: custodial rights: mother was entitled to no power, but only reverence and respect.
Presumption: father could best provide for the necessity of his children
Mid 19
th
century: Paternal preference rule questioned;J ustice Talfourds Act: in cases of divorce and separation the court could award
custody of minor children to the mother if the children were less than seven years old.
Tender years presumption
1830 Maryland Decision(Helms case): it would violate the laws of nature to snatch an infant from the care of its mother
1858 Alabam (Cornelius): Where there is no unfitness in the mother, evidently the child should remain with her, until he has reached an
age when he can dispense with those tender offices which only a mother can bestow.
1873 Alabama Act No. 79: custodial rights of the father only for children who have attained the age of seven years OR if the mother
voluntarily abandons them.
1924 (Thomas) ..during the very tender years of a child the husband has not an unqualified right for custody, even when the wife is at
fault in separation. Mothering of a young child is one of its rights. None but the real mother can meet this high duty in full
measure.

Gender-based classification sensitivity of the court to arbitrary legislati ve choice forbidden by the Equal Protection clause:
1971 (Reed): preference for the men over women in administration of a decedents estate
1973 (Frontiero):presumption of dependency of uniformed services, wife could not claim her husband as dependent unless he was in
fact for over of his support. administrative convinience
1979 (Orr): alimony obligations on husbands but not the wives
1979(Caban): law permitting an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the adoption of their minor child simply by withholding
consent.
Gender is an inaccurate proxy for other more germane bases of classification(archaic and overbroad).

Tender years presumption represents an unconstitutional gender-based classification.
The sex and age of the children are indeed very important considerations; however, the court must go beyond these to consider
the ff for the best interest of the children:
1. characteristics and needs of each child, including their emotional, social, moral, material and educational needs;
2. respective home environments offered by the parties;
3. charcteristics of those seeking custody, including age, character, stability, mental and physical health;
4. capacity and interest of each parent to provide for needs of their children;
5. interpersonal relationship between each child each parent;
6. interpersonal relationship between the children;
7. effect on the child of disrupting or continuing an existing custodial status;
8. preference of each child, if of sufficient age and maturity;
9. report and recommendation of any expert witnesses or other independent investigator;
10. available alternatives;
11. other relevant matter the evidence may disclose.
DISPOSITIVE: J udgment reversed and remanded with directions. KEBABdigest

Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575 (1989)
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE CERVANTES aka
(CERVANTES V. FAJARDO) | Padilla, J .
G.R. No. 79955 | J anuary 27, 1989

Nature: Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus re: Angelie Anne Cervantes

Facts:

The minor Angelie Anne Cervantes was born to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon who are in a common
law relationship. They offered the child for adoption to Ginas sister and brother-in-law, Zenaida and Nelson Cervantes
[petitioners].
Gina also executed an Affidavit of Consent to the adoption. RTC granted the petition for adoption. The childs name was then
changed from Angelie Anne Fajardo to Angelie Anne Cervantes.
Sometime in March or April 1987, respondents sent a letter to the petitioners demanding Php 150,000, threatening them
that if they dont pay, they would get back their child.
On September 11, Gina Carreon took the child from her yaya at the petitioners residence and brought the child to her
house.
Afterwards, she refused to return the child claiming that she never wanted to give up her child for adoption and that the
affidavit to the consent was never really explained to her. BUT, if she would receive the payment of Php 150,000, she will
return the child.

Issue:
WON the adoptive parents should have custody over Angelie Anne

Held / Ratio:
YES. Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus granted. Custody and care of Angelie Anne are granted to adoptive parents.

In the first place, Gina had already expressed her desire to gi ve up Angelie for adoption in an interview by Felisa
Tansingco, a social worker. Hence, Angelie has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of the
respondents.
Also, Angelie Annes welfare must be gi ven paramount consideration. The provision that no mother shall be separated
from a child under 5 years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The Court must
consider the moral, physical and social welfare of the child, taking into account the resources and moral as well as
social standing of the contending parents.
Conrados [married to another woman] open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere
where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Gina had also previously given birth to a girl
by a different man. This may also affect Angelies moral outlook in life.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are legally married and appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of
supporting the minor and giving her a future way better than what the natural mother can give her. KEBABdigest

Espiritu v. CA, 242 SCRA 362 (1995)
Petition for review of a decision of CA | Melo, J. | March 15, 1995

Petitioner: Reynaldo Espiritu and Guillerma Layug
Respondent: CA and Teresita Masauding

FACTS:
Reynaldo Espiritu first met Teresita Masauding in Iligan City in 1976. He was working for the National Steel Corporation (NSC)
and she was employed as a nurse in a local hospital.
In 1977, she went to California to work as a nurse. In 1984, Espiritu was sent by NSC to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison
officer. They began to maintain a common law relationship and in 1986, their first child, Rosalind Therese was born.
They went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation in 1987. Upon their return to the US in 1988, their second child, Reginald
Vince was born.
In 1990, they separated. Teresita went back to California instead of giving their marriage a second chance.
Reynaldo brought the children to the Philippines, but because his assignment was not yet complete, he was sent back by NSC
to Pittsburgh, forcing him to leave his children to his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug.
In 1992, she decided to go back to the Philippines. There she file a writ of habeas corpus against petitioners to gain custody of
her children.
In 1993, the trial court rendered a decision in favour of petitioners. It suspended Teresitas parental authority over the children
and declared that Reynaldo has the sole parental authority; nevertheless, the lower court also granted visitation rights to
respondent.
In February, 1994, CA reversed said decision and awarded the custody to Teresita.

In Septmber, 1994, respondent was convicted of bigamy filed by Reynaldo as she has still a valid subsisting marriage when
she married petitioner.

ISSUE: W/N CA ruled correctly by awarding the right of custody to Teresita?

DECISION: (petition granted, CA decision reversed and set aside, RTC decision reinstated)
No. CA resolved the issue through an automatic and blind application of the age provisos.
212
The seven year age limit was
mechanically treated as an arbitrary cut-off period and not a guide based on a strong presumption. The task of choosing the
parent to whom the custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the
age of the minor child.
It is not so much the suffering, pride and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration.
o In this case, both children are now over 7 years of age. Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the
Court to investigate if the parent thus chosen is unfit.
o Both children are now over 7 years of age, they now understand the difference between right and wrong, ethical
behaviour and deviant immorality. The choice of their parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child psychologist. All of the 8
recommendations by the psychologist show that Rosalind chose petitioner over her mother.
The responses of Rosalind to her mother were very negative.
The anxiety was caused, among other things, when she saw her mother hugging and kissing a
bad man who lived in their house and worked for her father.
She refused to talk to her mother even on the telephone.
She was emotionally emblazed because of constant fears that she may have to leave school and
her aunts family to go back with her mother to the US.
A social welfare case study was conducted to secure travel clearance required before minors may go
abroad. The application for travel clearance was denied.
A social welfare officer testified that Rosalind refused to go abroad and be reunited with her
mother.
She felt unloved an uncared for.
Rosalind was more attached to her yaya who did everything for her and her brother.
She was found to be suffering from emotional shock due to her mothers infidelity.
o Their best interest would be served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and material sufficiency.
Teresita contends that the 7 year age reference should apply to the date when a petition for habeas corpus was filed and not
on the date when decision was rendered.
o Considerations involving the choice of the child must be ascertained at the time that either parent was given custody.
o Custody is not permanent and unalterable. It may be re-examined and adjusted (Unson III v. Navarro).
Teresita also contends that the findings regarding her morality do not constitute a compelling reason that would justify her
being deprived of custody and authority. But the record shows that Rosalind has suffered emotional disturbance caused by the
traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a boarder in their house. The children understand the shortcomings
of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behaviour.
o She did not deny having a subsisting marriage when she married Reynaldo. Her allegation that Reynaldo raped her
to dilute this disadvantage in her part is not convincing.
Rape is an insidious crime against privacy. Confiding to ones potential rapist about a prior marriage is not a
very convincing indication that the potential victim is adverse to the act.
It is unlikely for her to be raped because she had driven three days and three nights from California to
Pennsylvania and went straight to the house of Reynaldo and upon arriving, went to bed and immediately
lived with him in a common-law relationship.
o While she was married to Reynaldo, she had an illicit relationship with Perdencio Gonzales, the bad man, assigned
by NSC to work with petitioner, and stayed in the latters house.
o She was the one who even left the conjugal home and the children to follow Gonzales, who was reassigned to the
Philippines where she was seen with him staying in a room and having breakfast in a hotel in Cebu.
Teresita contends the competence and partiality of the expert testimonies. The examinations made by the experts were
conducted over a year before the filing by Teresita of the petition for habeas corpus. Hence, these were at that time not
intended to support petitioners position.
o Although Reynaldo shouldered the cost of examination, the psychologists services were secured by Assumption
College for school purposes to determine the effects of uprooting her from the school where she was studying and
not because of the litigation.
o The testimony of the social worker officer was for the purpose of foreign travel since Rosalind and her aunt were off-
loaded because there was no required clearance for the minor to travel abroad. It has nothing to do with any litigation.
212
Art.363(CC)Inallquestionsonthecare,custody,educationandpropertyofthechildren,thelatterswelfareshallbeparamount.Nomothershallbeseparated
fromherchildundersevenyearsofage,unlessthecourtfindscompellingreasonsforsuchmeasure.
Art.213(FC)Incaseofseparationoftheparents,parentalauthorityshallbeexercisedbytheparentdesignatedbytheCourt.TheCourtshalltakeintoaccountall
relevantconsiderations,especiallythechoiceofthechildoversevenyearsofage,unlesstheparentchosenisunfit.

o It would also be inconceivable that the two professionals
213
would compromise their position, ethics and trust by
falsely testifying in favour of petitioner.
Teresita also contends that the father could not very well perform the sole authority of a parent since his job is in the US and
the children will stay with the aunt in the Philippines. But, there is nothing in the record showing that Reynaldo is an unfit
person under Art. 213 (FC).
o The reassignment to US to oversee the purchase of a steel mill component and various equipment needed b the
NSC is only temporary.
o Once the purchase is completed, there is nothing to keep him there anymore. KEBABdigest

Celis v. Cafuir, 86 Phil 554 (1950)
GR # L-3352 | June 12, 1950 | Montemayor, J.

Facts:
- Ileana Celis gave birth to J oel/J ohn out of wedlock. Her dad was angry at her for this and would not allow her to live in the
family home w/ that child.
- Ileana thus gave J oel to Soledad Caifur, nine days after giving birth to the child. Ileana herself spent some days in Soledads
house to recuperate.
- Thereafter, Ileana visited J oel in Soledads house every weekend and gave money and supplies for him; but Soledad was now
the de facto caregiver of the child.
- J oel was christened J ohn Caifur in a catholic church and Soledad was listed in the parish records as J ohns mother, and
Soledads parents as the maternal grandparents
- Ileana executed two documents. In a nutshell, the first
214
says that Ileana is entrusting to Soledad, her son J ohn Caifur
because she doesnt have the means to raise the child. The second
215
says that Ileana designates Soledad as J ohns
guardian. Both documents also say that no one else has the right to claim for adoption w/ respect to J ohn except Soledad.
- However, 2 years later, Ileana got married and decided to recover custody of J oel/J ohn. She and her new husband asked
Soledad to return the child, but she adamantly refused. The couple then filed a petition for habeas corpus over the child.
- The trial court ruled in favor of Ileana, stating that there is no basis to rule that she had renounced the custody of her child.
- Soledad appeals to the SC

Issue:
Whether or not Ileana renounced custody and parental authority over J oel/J ohn

Held/Ratio: NO (CFI Decision affirmed. Custody of the boy goes to natural mother Ileana)
- SC notes that while patria potestas or parental authority may be waived, it is not the case here. The two documents w/c
purportedly evidenced Ileanas renunciation of parental authority over J oel/J ohn in favor of Soledad, dont really do such a
thing. All they do is entrust the child to Soledad and make her its guardian. The word entrust cannot convey the idea of
definite and permanent renunciation of a mothers custody of a child and guardianship is always understood to be temporary,
i.e. during minority, incompetence, etc. Neither document proves that she definitely and permanently relinquished custody and
parental authority over her child in favor of Soledad.
- The last paragraphs of the documents say that "no one has the right to claim for adoption except Mrs. Soledad Cafuir". They
envisage a future act; it means that no one else may adopt the boy except Soledad. It does not mean, however, that she has
already adopted him. She may or may not adopt him. It is something yet to be done in the future; but this she has not done.
- Moreover, now that Ileana has been emancipated from the parental authority of her father and now that she has already been
married and is now in a position to care for and support her own child, this with the consent and desire of her husband, who
joins her in the petition, there can no longer be any reason for depriving her of the custody of her boy. In her legitimate efforts,
and to have her realize her natural desire in this respect, the law and this court should give her every help.
- MOTHERHOOD STATEMENT: This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived mother and son
of the beautiful associations and tender, imperishable memories engendered by the relationship of parent and child. We
should not take away from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to
poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride and a sense of satisfaction at her
sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come true. We should not forget that the
relationship between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to be a failure or forgetful of
213
OneofSocialWorkerLopezsregularjobsistointerviewminorswholeaveforabroadwiththeirparentsorotherpersons.Thechildpsychologist,Ms.Macabulos,
isaBSmagnacumlaudegraduateinPsychology,anMAdegreeholderwhosethesiswasratedexcellentandacandidateforthedoctoraldegree.
214TOWHOMITMAYCONCERN:
IherebyentrustedtoMrs.SoledadCafuirof131Limasana,Quiapo,Manila,mysonnamedJohnCafuir,forthereasonthatIdon'thavethemeanstobringthechild
up.
Anybodywhomayclaimmysonforadoptioninthefuturewithouttheconsentoftheundersignedisherebyignored.
215TOWHOMITMAYCONCERN:
I, Nenita Celis, of 1196 Singalong, Malate, Manila, is hereby designate Mrs. Soledad Cafuir, residing at 131 Limasana, R. Hidalgo, Quiapo, Manila to be the real
guardianofmyson,namedJohnnyCafuir.
NoonehastherighttoclaimforadoptionexceptMrs.SoledadCafuir.


what its foster parents had done for him, said parents might yet count and appraise all that they have done and spent for him
and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into their
hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring
memories of her associations with her child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and blood count.

Dissenting Opinion of J ustice Tuason:

The dissent mainly states that the documents executed by Ileana are vague, it being uncertain what the parties really intended when
they had the documents executed. J ustice Tuason argues that the contemporaneous acts of Ileana (and Ileanas mom) indicate that
she indeed permanently relinquished custody and parental authority over J oel/J ohn in favor of Soledad. These acts are: (1) the
baptismal of J oel into J ohn w/ Soledad indicated as the mom although Ileana denies knowledge of the christening, J ustice Tuason
doubts the truthfulness of such denial because at the time of the baptismal, Ileana was still living w/ Soledad, recuperating from
childbirth; (2) Ileanas mom testified that the reason they didnt try to recover custody over the child sooner was because they wanted
Soledad to have more time w/ the child, in order to show her some gratitude J ustice Tuason considers this balony. He speculates
that it is more sensible to suppose that the realization of an injustice, or shame and embarrassment at having to break a formal
commitment, i.e. transferring custody and authority over the child, deterred the Ileanaor her parents. (3) J ustice Tuason argues that the
sole reason the plaintiff has given for not having her baby with her was that her father was furious over the disgrace she had brought
upon the family and that she alone would be unable to support her child outside her parents' dwelling. But her parents' home was not
the only place where she could live and give her son the care that she owed him before God and before the law, and she had the
wherewithal to perform that duty. She could live in a separate house with her child as she has been doing with her husband. She lived
with the defendants for more than one month after she left the hospital, and when she moved from Soledad's house after that period,
"she had landed a job." That was as early as September 1946, more than one month before she signed Exhibit 1, which is dated
November 2, 1946. The dissent then attacks the truthfulness of Ileanas other testimonies as unreliable and inconsistent, going so far
as to speculate that the reason they want the child back now is because the boy will soon be big enough, if he is not already, to help in
the chores about the house. Plaintiff's husband who is earning a meager salary is not in a financial condition to hire help.
KEBABdigest

Gamboa v. CA, 527 SCRA 380 (2007)
Velasco, Jr., J.:

Facts:
Husband and wife married Dec 23 2000 and established their conjugal dwelling in Boracay Island, Aklan. A child was born to
them on Dec 21 2002. In 2005, they started having marital problems since the wife wanted to live in Makati, while the husband
insisted that they stay.
On Mar 23 2006, the wife asked for money and for permission to bring their daughter to Makati for a vacation. Wife never returned.
Husband filed before the CA a petition for habeas corpus; CA granted joint custody of the daughter.
Issues:
Is the CA correct in awarding joint custody of the child (less than 7) to the parents?
Held:
The tender age presumption under Art 213 FC may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. Here, the
mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable for caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been
adduced to wrench the child from the mothers custody.

*Yun lang e, wala talaga sinabing reasons yung dad. KEBABdigest

Sy v. CA, 541 SCRA 371 (2007)
GR 124518 (December 27, 2007)

Petitioner: Wilson Sy
Respondent: CA; Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy
Ponente: Tinga, J

FACTS:
Wilson and Mercedes are married and have 2 children Vanessa(6y/o) and J eremiah(4y/o).
When they separated, the children were left with Wilson, while Mercedes went to Taiwan to work.
Upon her return she filed a writ of habeas corpus in RTC.
RTC then awarded Mercedes custody of their 2 minor children and granted support.
Wilson appealed claiming Mercedes abandoned their children and support was not pleaded.
CA upheld the decision of RTC, finding that Mercedes did not abandoned her children, but was driven away by petitioners family
because of religious differences.

ISSUES:
(1) WON CA erred in awarding sole custody of their minor children to Mercedes.
(2) WON support may be awarded in a habeas corpus case.

HELD/RATIO:
(1) NO. When the husband and wife are living separately and apart from each other, without decree of the court, the court shall award
the care, custody, and control of each child as will be for his best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent he prefers to
live with if he is over seven (7) years of age unless the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral
depravity, habitual drunkenness or poverty.
216

In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and
moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending
parents.

The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man
can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for
compelling reasons for the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has
erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for
her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation. This
preference favoring the mother over the father is even reiterated in Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court
217

(1) YES. Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation to give support is demandable from the time the person who has a
right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
As intimated earlier, the Court agrees with the courts below that Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court permits the ventilation of
the question regarding the care and custody of the children as an incident to any proceeding, even a habeas corpus proceeding.

Applying Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, since the issue of support was tried with the implied consent of
the parties, it should be treated in all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. And since there was implied consent, even if no
motion had been filed and no amendment had been ordered, the Court holds that the trial court validly rendered a judgment on the
issue.

DISPOSITIVE: J udgment and resolution affirmed. KEBABdigest

216
FCSection213.Incaseofseparationoftheparents,parentalauthorityshallbeexercisedbytheparentdesignatedbytheCourt.TheCourtshalltake
intoaccountallrelevantconsiderations,especiallythechoiceofthechildoversevenyearsofage,unlesstheparentisunfit.
Nochildundersevenyearsofageshallbeseparatedfromthemother,unlessthecourtfindscompellingreasonstoorderotherwise.
217
RuleonAdoptionandCustodyofMinorsSEC.6.Proceedingsastochildwhoseparentsareseparated.Appeal.Whenhusbandandwifearedivorced
or living separately and apart from each other, and the question as to the care, custody and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought
before a Regional Trial Court by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall
awardthecare,custodyandcontrolofeachsuchchildaswillbeforitsbestinterest,permittingthechildtochoosewhichparentitpreferstolivewithifit
beovertenyearsofage,unlesstheparentsochosenbeunfittotakechargeofthechildbyreasonofmoraldepravity,habitualdrunkenness,incapacity,or
poverty.Ifuponsuchhearing,itappearsthatbothparentsareimproperpersonstohavethecare,custody,andcontrolofthechild,thecourtmayeither
designatethepaternalormaternalgrandparentofthechild,orhisoldestbrotherorsister,orsomereputableanddiscreetpersontotakechargeofsuch
child,orcommitittoanysuitableasylum,childrenshome,orbenevolentsociety.ThecourtmayinconformitywiththeprovisionsoftheCivilCodeorder
eitherorbothparentstosupportorhelpsupportsaidchild,irrespectiveofwhomaybeitscustodian,andmaymakeanyorderthatisjustandreasonable
permittingtheparentwhoisdeprivedofitscareandcustodytovisitthechildorhavetemporarycustodythereof.Eitherparentmayappealfromanorder
madeinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthissection.Nochildundersevenyearsofageshallbeseparatedfromitsmother,unlessthecourtfindsthere
arecompellingreasonstherefor.

ii. Parental Unfitness

Feldman v. Feldman, 358 NYS 2d 507 (1974)
IN THE MATTER OF PHILIP FELDMAN V. MADY FELDMAN | Benjamin, J .
J uly 15, 1974

Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court, Special Term, Nassau County

Facts:
Parties were married when woman was 18 and man was 19.
Husband, a part-time musician, was involved in extramarital affairs.
Wife filed petition for divorce, which was subsequently granted based on husbands cruel and inhuman treatment. Custody of
two minor children awarded to the wife because of the parties separation agreement.
Subsequently after the divorce, wife started seeing somebody who was already married. At one time, ex-husband visited the
womans house and found a copy of SCREW magazine a hard-core pornographic magazine on the table and letters
(answering an AD which ex-wife and new partner made in the magazine) with explicit photographs attached.
Husband filed a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus seeking custody on the children on the ground that his ex-wife was
unfit. Petition was granted.
Hence this appeal.

Issue:
WON acts of the mother
218
made her unfit to retain custody of the children

Held / Ratio:

NO. Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by husband denied. Custody remains with wife.

Amorality, immorality, sexual deviation and aberrant sexual practices do not ipso facto constitute unfitness for
custody. The right of a divorced woman to engage in private sexual activities which in no way involve her minor children is
within the penumbra of her right to privacy. Even adulterous acts do not ipso facto present sufficient basis for denying
continued custody of the mother. A divorced person has a right to engage in sexual intercourse with another without affecting
his/her right to custody of his/her children.
It is within the best interests of the children to stay with the mother since a change of custody this late would be
untenable there being no showing that the mother was unfit or that the promiscuous behavior of the mother affected
or invol ved the children.
Finally, the traumatic psychological dislocation of minors would render them as tragic casualties to their parents
marital conflict.

Separate opinions:

Shapiro, J.:
Articles and letters of prurient nature find no support in either testimony heard by court or Probation department report. Sole
evidence is from the father.
There is no evidence, or even a claim, that the publications or pictures or letter contents were ever seen by the children.
Children well provided emotionally and physically by the mother.

TRIAL COURT ERRED: (1) No evidence to sustain findings of Lower court, rather it reflects application of a discriminatory sexual
standard based on the mothers evincing an interest in pornography and sexual freedom. (2) Decision contradicts trial courts statement
that a divorced person has a right to engaged in intercourse with another without affecting his or her right to custody of their children.
(plus right to privacy Grisworld v. Connecticut).

Christ, J.:
Mothers action is contrary to good morals, however, question is deeper than that which is to determine where the children
will be best situated.
Children are well behaved and well cared in the mothers charge.
To transfer them to the uncertainty of the accommodations provided by the father would not be in the best interest of the
children.
The basis of the award to the father which is that he would be married and would thereafter have a suitable home was not indicated
in the records. KEBABdigest

218
WhichtheCourtdescribedasasexuallyliberateddivorcedwoman

Pablo Gualberto v. Gualberto V, 416 SCRA 450 (2005)
Panganiban, J.:
FACTS:
Crisanto Gualberto V filed a petition for declaration of nullity his marriage with Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto of their marriage
and prayed for custody pendent elite of their almost 4 y.o. son Rafaello.
The child was with the wife, for she allegedly took him away with her when she abandoned the husband.
The trial court granted custody to him pendent lite noting that:
1. the wife had been maintaining lesbian relations
2. She does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house
3. The maid saw her slap the child once (hindina-tackle sa dispositive)
TC reversed itself upon motion of the wife and granted custody to her
CA said the TC committed grave abuse of discretion because custody was not an issue raised in the wifes motion (to dismiss).
TC was directed to consider the issue of custody pendent elite, but custody should remain with the father in the meantime.
Both husband (65) and wife (45) petition to the Supreme Court.
Wife: Art 213 says that my child of less than 7 years may not be separated from me.
Husband: You are maintaining lesbian relations, which renders you unfit. This is a compelling reason to divest custody
from you.
ISSUES:
1. Can the court decide an issue even without a proper motion by the parties?
2. Is there a need for the judge to clearly state the reasons for the disposition?
3. Is the order (first) which gave custody to the father final and executory?
4. Who should get custody pendent lite? Is her maintaining lesbian relations a compelling reason to overcome Art 213
FC?
HELD:
CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the TC to hear the issue of custody even without a proper motion by the
parties. A court of competent jurisdiction has authority to resolve even unassigned issues. It can do so when such a step is
indispensable to the resolution of the case or where an issue is inextricably linked or germane to those that have been pleaded.
Sec. 1 Rule 36 only refers to decisions and final orders on the merits of the case, not to matters incidental to the main issue. Art 49
FC says that custody and support of common children may be ruled upon by the court while the action is pending. Thus, it is only
incidental to the main case which is the declaration of nullity.
This order of custody is not final and executory, as what is awarded is temporary custody. It is provisional and subject to change as
circumstances may warrant.
Under certain circumstances, immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody. Sexual
preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a
prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive her
of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child
or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care.
Here, it is not enough to show that the wife is a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported
relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the
childs proper moral development.
Since no such circumstances to this effect have been shown in this case, there is no compelling reason to wrench the
child from the mothers custody. KEBABdigest


b. Role of the Childs Preference

Pizarro v. Vasquez (CA) 36 OG 449 (1938)
24 February 1938 | Bengzon, J. | Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Cavite
FACTS:
This suit for obtaining support from defendant was instituted by Maria Pizarro and her minor children, Gloria, J ulita and
Lorenzo.
Plaintiff and defendant separated on the ground that the latter committed acts of infidelity and cruelty.
Defendant denied the claim and alleged that there is no contract of separation and that Maria Pizarro committed acts of
adultery. The evidence of said adulterous relations was the birth of Lorenzo 11 months after the couple separated. Petitioner
explained that they had sexual intercourse sometime in November 1933 during the town fiesta in the belief that defendant had
changed.
The Court found that the strong presumption of legitimacy re: Lorenzo was not overcome.
ISSUE: W/N custody should be granted to Maria
HELD: YES. The Court awarded custody to Maria. Claims of plaintiff that defendant had kept a mistress and had maltreated her were
not contradicted. Also, absent any evidence that plaintiff indeed committed adultery
219
and considering the prima facie presumption of
innocence, plaintiff should be given support by the defendant.
DISPOSITIVE: Appealed judgment must be reversed.
220
Court ordered defendant to pay support of P30/month and P200 as attorneys
fees. Custody of the kids was granted to Maria. KEBABdigest

Goldstein v. Goldstein, 115 R.I. 152, 341 A. 2d. 51 (1975)
Appeal from a Family Court decree | Joslin, J. | July 17, 1975

Petitioner: Claire Goldstein
Respondent: Edward Goldstein

FACTS:
The court granted the husbands cross-petition and denied the wifes petition for divorce. The court also awarded custody of
Ann Robin, their 9 year old daughter, to respondent husband and visitation rights to petitioner wife.
Shortly after, the husband and child left Rhode Island to reside in Israel.
The wife initiated several proceedings to compel the return of the child to said state. Aided by cooperation of the Supreme
Court of Israel, the husband and child returned, almost 3 years after the decree. A proceeding begun:
o The trial justice determined that an attempt to re-establish a mother-daughter relationship was advisable and ordered
the child to be placed with her mother.
o A record psychiatric evidence disclosing that Ann is a very intelligent girl who has had more burdens placed upon her
at a very young age but she has been able to cope with those problems and suffers no emotional damage.
o At the wifes request, the justice took judicial notice of wars and terrorist activities in Israel and the husbands
contention that this country has been engaged in more violent was than Israel for the past 25 years. The wife also
testified that although Ann was reared in the J ewish religion, she is not yet considered a member of this faith inless
she had converted as her mother.
o The trial judge engaged Ann Robin in a conversation (initially in open court but child refrained and said that it is
difficult for her to say which parent she wished to reside).
There, she said that she love her father more than her mother and wanted to go to Israel with him.
Though she had no desire to visit with her mother, the judge urged her that it would be a fair bargaining if
he were to allow her to live with her father and visit her mother willingly for 4 weeks every summer.
The trial judge announced that it is in the best interest of the child to remain in the fathers custody and ordered that the father
should require transportation costs of those visits and a $1,000 bond to insure that he did so.

ISSUE: W/N the decision of the trial judge is correct?

DECISION: (petition denied, decree affirmed)
Although the wife agreed with the principle that the best interest of the child should be the concern, she argues that other
circumstances were disregarded (like the policy favouring the awarding of young children especially girls to a fit mother) and
allowed the choice of the child to take control.
It is true that the judge did not refer to these factors in his decision, but that oversight alone would not be controlling.
This factors would be simply placed on the scales together with the relevant considerations weighed by the judge, such as:
o Parties equal suitability
o Psychiatric evidence of childs emotional stability
o Chance to observe the daughters demeanour, appearance and attitude; the conclusion that her desire to be with the
father was not a mere whim and was entitled to substantial weight.
219
Nofinaljudgmentwasrenderedre:adulteryofMaria
220
CFI said that Maria is not entitled to support because of adultery and gave custody of Gloria and Julita to Marianos parents, he being under indictment for
adultery

The trial judges extreme solicitude that the child should be a willing participant in the wifes exercise of her visitation rights and
his further concern that the entire question of custody and visitation be re-examined.
The awarding of custody for a period of three years was so nearly a state of equipoise as to make it extremely difficult for the
judge to decide. It does not seem that he abused his discretion when he gave substantial weight to the childs preference.
KEBABdigest

Laxamana v. Laxamana, 388 SCRA 296 (2002)
GR # 144763 | September 3, 2002 | Ynares-Santiago, J.

Facts:
- Reymond and Lourdes Laxamana are husband and wife. They have 3 minor kids. Sometime during their marriage, Reymond
became a drug addict. He was in and out of rehab.
- Although there was a court order declaring him already drug-free, it was alleged by the wife that he physically assaulted her.
She thus abandoned him, taking w/ her the three kids.
- Reymond filed a petition for habeas corpus to get custody of the three kids. Lourdes opposed the petition, citing Reymonds
drug dependence.
- Before the trial court, the parties agreed to undergo psychiatric/psychological examination and to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the results of such exam.
- The report of the psychiatrist basically found both of them normal, except that the Psychiatrist made the critical observation
that based on such scientific and observable critera , Reymond is not yet completely cured of his drug addiction
despite getting a negative result for shabu in his urine test.
- The trial court thus ruled in favor of Lourdes, allowing her to retain custody of the children but giving Reymond some visitation
rights.
- Reymond appeals the decision to the SC

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in resolving the case solely on the basis of the psychiatrists report and w/o any trial whatsoever

Held/Ratio: YES (case remanded to trial court for further proceedings)
- The psychiatric report, which was the courts primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the
decision. The trial court was remiss in the fulfillment of its duties when it approved the agreement of the parties to submit the
case for decision on the basis of sketchy findings of facts.
- While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-
being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not yet completely cured may render him unfit to take
custody of the children, but there is no evidence to show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with
adequate support, education, as well as moral and intellectual training and development.
- The children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not
ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to live with. There is no showing that the court ascertained the
categorical choice of the children.
- These inadequacies could have been remedied by an exhaustive trial probing into the accuracy of Dr. Ocampos report and
the capacity of both parties to raise their children. KEBABdigest


c. Presumption for Primary Caretaker

Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E. 2d. 357 (1981)

Facts:
McCoy (15 y.o. at the time) moved in with her mom in Feb 1978. Her mom had then been living with Garska. By Mar 1978, McCoy
had become pregnant by Garska. She moved back to her grandparents home.
During pregnancy, no support came from the father. When she gave birth, a package of baby food and diapers were sent.
When the baby got sick, the grandfather of McCoy wanted to apply for benefits through his medical insurance. This was denied. In
order for this to push through, the grandparents of the mother should first adopt the baby. The mother then consented to her
grandparents adoption of the baby.
During the pendency of the adoption proceedings, the putative father filed a petition for habeas corpus, wanting to secure custody of
the child. At the same time, the father started sending $15 per week as support.
The adoption was dismissed because the baby had not resided with the grandparents for the requisite 6 months.
Custody was awarded to the father based on the following: 1) he was the natural father, 2) was better educated, 3) more intelligent,
4) better able to provide financial support, 5) better social and economic environment, 6) better command of English language, 7)
better appearance and demeanor, 8) highly motivated in keeping custody while the mom gave the child up for adoption.
Issues:
1. Were the standards used correct in awarding custody of the child to the father?
2. Was the consent to the adoption indicative of an intent to abandon the child?
Held:
The law now obliterates the presumption that children of tender years should be awarded to the mother because this is a
presumption based on sex and amounts to putting the fathers at a disadvantageous position. Instead (by our ruling), the
presumption is now in favor of the primary caretaker parent, regardless of sex. This would serve the best interests of the child.
However, the parent must also meet the minimum objective standard for being a fit parent.
This applies only to children of tender years. Where a child is able to formulate his own opinion, the court is entitled to receive such
opinion and accord it such weight as he feels appropriate.
In this case, it is clear that the mother was the primary caretaker. She was responsible for the caring and nurturing of the child.
Moreover, there is no finding on the part of the trial court that she is an unfit parent.
While the fathers economic and educational position of the father is superior to that of the mother, those factors alone pale in
comparison to love, affection, concern, tolerance, and the willingness to sacrifice factors about which conclusions can be made for
the future most intelligently upon a course of conduct in the past. courts rationale for the primary caretaker argument
The consent given by the mother to the chilids adoption cannot be construed to be an indication of her intention to abandon her.
Mothers in penurious circumstances often resort to adoption in order to make the child eligible for social security or union welfare
benefits, all of which significantly enhance the childs opportunities in life. KEBABdigest


2. Other Rights and Duties in Exercise of Parental Authority

Salientes v. Abanilla, 500 SCRA 128 (2006)
[GR No 162734 | Aug 29, 2006 | Quisumbing | Certiorari of CA decision]

Petitioners: Marie Antonette (mom), Orlando and Rosario Salientes (parents of mom)
Respondents: Loran Abanilla (dad); RTC J udge Sabundayo

Summary:
Facts - The husband and wife had a child, their family stayed with the wifes parents. The husband left because he wanted out but the
wife wanted to stay. Wife & her parents prevented husband from seeing child.
Husband filed a habeas corpus & custody case. RTC decided only the habeas corpus petition & not the custody petition. CA said that
the RTC didnt award custody to anyone & still has to conduct proceedings on that matter.
Ratio - Habeas corpus is the correct remedy since the cause of action is the deprivation of the fathers right to see his child vis-a-vis the
Family Code provision that the father & mother has J OINT parental custody over a child absent a judicial grant to one parent.
The order didnt grant custody to either parent but just followed a habeas corpus rule in relation to the custody of minors. Art 213 (7 y/o
kids must go to the mother) cant be a basis for preventing the father to see or visit his child because it is used only for custody cases.
Facts:
+ Marie Antonette & Loran had a son, Lorenzo Emmanuel Abanilla (2 y/o). They lived w/ Maries parents.
+ Loran wanted to move out because of in-laws problems but Marie refused. Thus, Loran left the house alone. As a result, he was
prevented from seeing their son.
+ Loran filed a PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND CUSTODY (in his personal capacity & as a representative of his son)Case:
+ RTC decision: respondents were ordered
a)
T
To bring before the Court the body of the son on J an 31, 2003 AND
b)
D
o show cause why the said child should not be discharged from RESTRAINT
+ CA denied respondents certiorari and said that the RTC decision
a)
b)
idnt award the custody of the son to any one
It was just a standard order issued for the production of restrained persons
Issue: Did the CA err in dismissing the certiorari against the RTC decision? No.
1) Is habeas corpus the correct remedy? Yes.
2) Did the order grant custody to any of the parties? No.
Petitioners Respondent father
Art. 213 no child below 7 y/o
shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order
otherwise
Art 213 applies only the
custody cases not habeas
corpus cases.
The habeas corpus remedy is
unavailable becasuse the
mom is the rightful custodian
of the minor below 7 y/o. He
shouldve filed an action for
custody.
Habeas corpus is available
aginst a father who is
restrained from seeing his
son, vice versa. The father &
mother has joint custody of
the child(ren).
Ratio:
The trial court didnt err in issuing its orders. The CA properly dismissed the certiorari against the said orders.
1) A habeas corpus petition may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto
221
. In Art
211 FC,

the father & mother has joint parental authority & joint custody over their children.
Since Marie & Loran are only separated de facto & no judicial grant of custody has been given to either of them, both of them
are entitled to the custody of their son.
In a habeas corpus petition, the paramount consideration is the childs weflare pursuant to PD 603 (Child & Youth Welfare
Code)
2) The order didnt grant custody of the minor to either party. It simply directed the petitioners to produce the minor in court & show
why father is prevented from seeing his child.
The court merely followed AM 03-04-04-SC, sec 9
222
by issuing an order to present the minor before the court.
Reliance on Art 213 FC is untenable since the said provision can only be used in custody cases. It cant be a basis for
preventing the father to see his own child.
221
Rules of Court, Rule 102, sec 1 = ...the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by w/c any person is deprived of his
liberty,orbyw/ctherightfulcustodyofanypersoniswithheldfromthepersonentitledthereto.
222
RulesonCustodyofMinors&WritofHabeasCorpusinRelationtoCustodyofMinors.
Sec9=Within15daysafterthefilingoftheanswerortheexpirationoftheperiodtofileanswer,thecourtshallissueanorder
(a) Fixingthedatefortehpretrialconference
(b) Directingtehpartiestofileandservetheirrespective pretrialbriefsinsuchmannerasshallensurereceipt thereofbytheadversepartyatleast 3days
beforethepretrialdate;and
(c) Requiringtherespondenttopresenttheminorbeforethecourt.

Petition for certiorari of RTC decision denied. CA decision affirmed. Costs against petitioners. KEBABdigest
Cabanas v. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94 (1974)
No. L-25843 | 25 July 1974 | Fernando, J. | Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Cebu

Plaintiff-appellee: Melchora Cabanas
Defendant-appellant: Francisco Pilapil

Facts:
In this case, the mother and the uncle are in court to determine who should be the trustee for the proceeds of an insurance
policy on the life of the deceased father of a minor.
Florentino Pilapil and Melchora Cabanas, a married woman, had a child Millian Pilapil.
Florentino Pilapil had their daughter as the beneficiary of the insurance policy. The policy also stated that the uncle, the
deceaseds brother, Francisco Pilapil (herein defendant) shall act as the trustee during her minority.
When the father died, the child was 10 years old and the proceeds of the policy were paid to the defendant, Francisco.
The mother filed a complaint claiming that the defendant should turn over the proceeds of the insurance policy to her. The trial
court decided in the mothers favor, invoking Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code.
223

Issue: Who between the uncle and the mother is the rightful administrator of the childs property?

Ratio: The mother!
The mother has the best interest of her child. Theres no contesting codal provisions cited because they are clear in what it
demands from the situation. The terms of the insurance policy must be superseded. The court has no choice to apply the law
because it clearly establishes the special bond of parent and child.
This is also in line with the State acting as parens patriae. Since the case at bar involves a minor, it has to uphold the strength
of the family, and see to it the best interest of the childs property is with her mother.

Dispositive: Decision Affirmed KEBABdigest

Libi v. IAC, 214 SCRA 16 (1992)
Petition for review of the decision of IAC | Regalado, J. | September 18, 1992

Petitioner: Cresencio Libi and Amelia Yap Libi
Respondent: IAC; Felipe Gotiong and Shirley Gotiong

FACTS:
Respondents are parents of J ulie Ann Gotiong, 18 y/o first year commerce student. Petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi
a minor between 18-19 y/o.
More than 2 years before their death, J ulie and Wendell were sweethearts until December 1978 when the former broke up with
the latter for being sadistic and irresponsible; Wendell kept pestering J ulie to reconcile to no avail.
On J anuary, 1979, both died each from a single gunshot from the same firearm licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio.
Due to absence of eyewitness account, both parties had their own theories drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial
evidences.
o Respondents theorized that Wendell killed their daughter and, thereafter, committed suicide.
o Petitioners argued that a third party, whom Wendell may have displeased as he was a narcotics informer of the
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), have killed him. And to avoid identification, J ulie was also killed.
Parents of J ulie Ann filed a civil case in the CFI to recover damages against the parents of Wendell arising from the latters
vicarious liability. It dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence.
The IAC rendered another decision against the petitioners and set aside the CFI judgment.

ISSUE: W/N Wendell killed J ulie so as to make his parents civilly liable?

223
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is
worthmorethantwothousandpesos,thefatherormothershallgiveabondsubjecttotheapprovaloftheCourtofFirstInstance.(159a)
Art. 321. The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in
ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and in whose company he lives; but if the child, with the parent's
consent,shouldliveindependentlyfromthem,heshallbeconsideredasemancipatedforallpurposesrelativetosaidproperty,andheshallhaveoveritdominion,
usufructandadministration.(160)

DECISION: (petition denied, IAC decision affirmed)

Yes. Wendell killed J ulie.
224

Because the killer was still a minor, petitioners are civilly liable for the act.
o Petitioners defense that they had exercise due diligence of a good father of a family is belied by evidence.
The mother testified that the gun was inside a safety deposit box, which only they have the keys. She
averred that she always put her key inside her bag. On that fateful night, she testified that the gun was not
there anymore.
Their contention is doubtful since if they really exercised due diligence, Wendell could not have gotten hold
of the gun. Only if the keys were negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of the mother,
could he have possession of it.
A photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten declaration to J ulie, where he was holding upright what clearly
appears to be a revolver is unanswered on how he was in possession of that firearm.
The due diligence required by law involves the instruction and supervision of their children. Had they been
supervising Wendell, they should have known that he was working for CANU, and not only during the time of
his death. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the
activities of their child.
o The court held that petitioners are primary and not subsidiary liable (as what has been rendered in the IAC decision).
The vicarious liability of petitioners covers their obligations arising from both quasi-delict and criminal
offenses (Art. 2180, CC). In Art. 101 (RPC), parents assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their
minor children.
If the liability is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the
defense that they acted with diligence. If it is primary, then diligence would constitute a valid and substantial
defense.
Applying Art. 2194 (CC), there is a concept such as joint tortfeasors (persons responsible for the act or
omission), in this case the minor and the father, and in case of death or incapacity, the mother. Here, the
joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable. Hence, they are primary liable.
This is buttressed by the corresponding provisions that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall
respond with his own property only in the absence or insolvency of the parents (Art. 2182, CC). If civil
liability would only apply to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses, then, it would result to absurdity that
parents would be liable in actions of negligence and not those caused with criminal intent.
Subsidiary liability is only for persons causing damaged due to irresistible force or uncontrollable fear (Art.
101), innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments (Art. 102), employers, teachers, persons
and corporations engaged in industry (Art. 103), and principals, accomplices and accessories for the unpaid
civil liability of their co-accussed (Art. 110).
With the enactment of the Family Code, civil liability is the responsibility of both parents who exercise
parental authority over the minor offender (compared to Art. 2180 of CC, and the CYWC). KEBABdigest

224
UndueemphasiswasplacedbytheCFIontheabsenceofgunpowderortattooingaroundthewoundatthepointofentry.Althoughtherewasnogunpowder,the
body of Wendell could, before the autopsy, washed and wiped in the funeral parlor. The officer who examined his body cannot categorically state that it was
untouchedforhearrived8hrs,20minafterthedeath.
Thereweretwousedbulletsfoundinthescene,eachofwhichwerethebulletsthathitthedeceased.
Althoughtherewere witnesswhoallegedlysawashadowjumpingfromthegate,theiraccuracyisquestionedsincetheirvisionfromtheir respectivehouseswere
obstructed by high walls in relation the house where the crime scene is. In fact, witnesses, Manolo and Malou, testified that they were waiting for Julie. When he
heardascream,heclimbedthefencetoseewhatwasgoingoninside(headmittedthathewastheshadowthepetitionerswitnessessaw),andthenheardashot.
Notlongafterthat,heheardanothershot.

Lindain v. CA, 212 SCRA 725 (1992)

GR # 95305 | August 20, 1992 | Grino-Aquino, J.

Facts:
- When the Lindain siblings were still minors they were already registered owners of a parcel of land w/ Torrens Title. Their
mother, who was a widow, was acting as their legal
225
guardian.
- Their mother sold this land for P2,000. The buyers were apprehensive at first, knowing that the owners were still minors, but
they were eventually convinced by their lawyer(s) that the sale would be legal since the amount involved was only P2,000. The
sale was thus consummated, as evidenced by a deed of sale.
- Later on, when the siblings were no longer minors, they challenged the sale in the RTC. The alleged that the sale was void
because it was made w/o judicial authority.
- The buyers contended that the sale was valid because the value of the property was less than P2,000 and that the action had
already prescribed since at the time of the filing of the complaint, the youngest of the siblings was already 31 years old. Their
right to rescind the contract should have been exercised 4 years after attaining the age of majority.
- The RTC ruled in favor of the siblings. The CA, on appeal, reversed the RTC and ruled in favor of the buyers, citing the ruling
in Ortanez vs Dela Cruz where the SC held that when the property of the children is less than or equal to P2,000, the parents
may sell the property even w/o judicial approval.
- The siblings appeal to the SC

Issue
226
:
Whether or not the mother validly sold the siblings property w/o judicial approval

Held/Ratio: NO (Petition is granted. RTC decision declaring the sale void is reinstated)
- Ortanez vs Dela Cruz was decided under the Old Civil Code
227
, where its art 1810 authorizes parents to alienate their
childrens property w/o judicial approval. The New Civil Code was already in force at the time of the transaction in question,
hence the cited case was erroneously invoked.
- Under the current laws, a guardian may not sell the property of the ward w/o judicial approval, regardless of the value of the
property. SC mentions Rules 84 and 89
228
of the Rules of Court, stating that all an administrator may do concerning the
property being administered, is to possess and manage the same. Selling, mortgaging, encumbering, or disposing of the
property requires prior judicial approval. KEBABdigest

Shields v. Gross, 58 NY 2d 338
(March 29, 1983)

Petitioner: Brooke Shields
Respondent: Garry Gross

FACTS:
Brooke Shields, when she was just 10 years old did modeling job with photographer Garry Gross. One such photo of her was in
nude in a bathtub, supposedly for Playboy series.
Teri Shields, her mother, executed two consents(copyright & waiver to inspect/approve) in favor of the defendant.
Photographs were then used in different print media(magazine, billboards and even in different countries).
Plaintiff Brooke Shields did not contend that the photographs were obscene or pornographic, but only because she was
embarrassed because they [the photographs] were not me now.
The trial court found the photos not pornographic and it enjoined the use of them in pornographic publications.

ISSUE: W/N a minor may disaffirm a prior unrestriced consent executed on her behalf by her parent (and maintain an action pursuant
to Sec. 51 of the Civil Rights Law) against her photographer for republication of photographs of her.

HELD: NO
225
Aguardianw/onecessityofcourtappointment;Rule93section7oftheRulesofCourtprovide,interalia,thatparentsshallactaslegalguardiansoftheirchildren
if the property of the latter is less than or equal to P2,000, while if the property is more than said amount, the parents will have to file a petition in court to be
appointedjudicialguardian(orgeneralguardianasusedintheRules)oftheirchildrensproperty.
226
There is another issue concerning prescription. There the court simply said that the action had not prescribed since real actions on immovables prescribe in 30
years.Suchtimehadnotyetlapsedatthetimetheactionwasfiled.
227
Not expressly stated in the decision; only my inference from the language used by the court, i.e. New Civil Code was already in force at the time of the
transaction,aswellasitsrelianceonthecaseofVisayavsSuguitanw/cdiscussesart1810oftheOldCivilCode.
228
Thesedealw/theexecutorsoradministratorsofadeadpersonsestate.Useoftheseprovisionsleadsmetobelievethatthechildrenmusthaveinheritedtheland
inquestionfromtheirdeadfatherthroughwill(therewasalsomentionofthemombeingalreadyawidow).TheprovisionsonGuardianshiparefoundinRules93
97oftheRulesofCourt.Whynotusetheseprovisionsinsteadofthoseconcerningadecedentsestate?

LEGISLATIVE INTENT:
1. Parents Consent is BINDING on the infant:
1909: Civil Rights Law: Sec 50 is PENAL and makes it a misdemeanor to use a living persons name, portrait or picture for
advertising purposes w/o written consent. Sec. 51 is remedial and creates a civil cause of action on behalf of the injured party
permitting relief by injunction or damages. The written consent required includes that of the parent or guardian, if the
person is a minor.
The Legislature may abrogate an infants common-law right to disaffirm or, conversely, it may confer upon infants the right to
make binding contracts. Where a statute expressly permits a certain class of agreements to be made by infants, that settles the
question and makes the agreement valid and enforceable.
The Legislature by adopting Sec. 51, created a new cause of action and it provided the method for obtaining an infants
consent to avoid liability. PARENTs CONSENT is BINDING on the infant and NO WORDS PROHIBITING DISAFFIRMANCE
ARE NECESSARY to effectuate legislative intent.
2. Child Model is different from Child Performer:
The consents CANNOT be considered VOID, because the parties failed to comply with General Obligations Law Sec. 3-105,
which requires PRIOR COURT APPROVAL of infants contracts. By its terms, the section applies only to performing artists, such
as actors, musicians, dancers, and professional athletes. It is apparent by comparing other statutes with it that the Legislature
knowingly has differentiated between child performers and child models. Child models are recognized as a separate work
classification in Sec. 172 of the Labor Law.
Realistically, the procedures of PRIOR COURT APPROVAL set forth while entirely appropriate and necessary for CHILD
PERFORMERS, are impractical for a CHILD MODEL who, whether employed regularly or sporadically, works from session to
session, with many different photographers, and work for fees, which are relatively modest, hardly sufficient to warrant elaborate
court proceedings required by the assailed section.
3. Substitute parents judgment and approval of what is best for their child.

DISPOSITIVE: Parents consent is binding on the minor.

[DISSENTING OPINION] J ASEN, J .
A minor enjoys an almost absolute right to disaffirm a contract entered into either by the minor or by the minors parent. An infant is
incapable of contracting because he does not understand the scope of his rights and he cannot appreciate the consequences and
ramifications of his decisions. Also, it is feared that an infant he may well be under the complete influence of an adult or may be
unable to defend his rights and interests.
The argument of the majority opinion that the Legislature intended to abrogate that minors right to disaffirm a contract at some
future date is unfounded because the requirement of parental consent, like the brad right to disaffirm a contract, was granted to
afford the minor as much protection against exploitation. A parent would protect the childs interests, but if that assumption proves
wrong, then upon reaching the age of maturity and he/she realizes that the parent has been exploiting him/her too, and/or failed to
adequately guard his/her interest by giving consent for pictures w/c caused humiliation, embarrassment and distress, then the child
should be able to cure the problem, by disaffirming the parents consent. Otherwise, the CHILD becomes forever bound to parents
decisions, even if they turn out to be detrimental and exploitative of the childs best interests.
The fact that when an infant disaffirms a contract, there may be harsh results to the person/commercial enterprise attempting to
exploit the child has never caused the courts to alter the scope of the protection that right affords the child. KEBABdigest

Silva v. CA & Gonzales, 275 SCRA 60 (1997)
CARLITOS SILVA V. CA and SUZANNE GONZALES |Vitug, J .
G.R. No. 114742 | J uly 17, 1997

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Facts:
Carlitos Silva (married businessman) and Suzanne Gonzales (unmarried actress) cohabitated without the benefit of
marriage. Out of this relationship, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia were born.
Silva and Gonzales parted ways due to disagreement in relation to Gonzaless acting career. Gonzales refused to allow
Silva to have the children in his company during weekends.
Silva then filed with the RTC a petition for custodial rights over his children. Gonzales opposed this, saying that Silva
engaged in gambling and womanizing, which could affect the moral and social values of the children
RTC: Allowed Silva to have visitorial rights to the children during weekends but in no case can he take out his children
without the written consent of Gonzales. Gonzales appealed this order to the CA. Meanwhile, she got married to a Dutch
national and emigrated to Holland with Ramon and Rica.
CA: Ruled in favor of Gonzales, stating that allowing the children to stay with their mother on weekdays and then with their
father and the latters li ve in partner on weekends may not be conducive to the childrens moral upbringing. The CA
denied Silvas visitorial rights.
Hence this appeal.

Issue:
WON the petitioner should be denied of his visitorial rights (right of access) to his children

Held / Ratio:
NO. RTC decision is reinstated, CA decision set aside.

Despite the lack of specific legal provisions, there is enough recognition on the inherent and natural rights of parents over their
children (e.g. articles 150
229
, 209
230
, 220
231
). There is nothing conclusive to indicate that the provisions are meant to
solely address themsel ves to legitimate relationships. The Court also said that, clearly, laws on support and successional
rights go beyond the legitimate members of family and encompass illegitimate relationships. Court cited as an example, in the
declaration of nullity of marriages which presupposes a void and inexistent marriage Art. 49 grants visitation rights to
parents not granted custody of their children.
A few hours spent by the petitioner with the children could not at all be that detrimental to the children. The
allegations against the petitioner cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render the petitioner an unfit father. No man, bereft of
all moral persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a legal action for the
purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It seems unlikely that the petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue
designs more than a parents natural desire to be able to call on, even if only on brief visits, his own children. KEBABdigest

B. Substitute and Special Parental Authority

Amadora v. CA, 160 SCRA 315 (1988)
No. L-47745 | April 15, 1988 | Cruz, J. | Petition for Review Rule 45

Petitioner(s): The parents and the many relatives of the deceased student
Respondent(s): CA, Colegio de San J ose-Recoletos, Physics Teacher, Rector of the School, Dean of Boys, High School Principal

Quick Facts: Question on application of parts of Art 2180
232
. Student shot and killed in school by another student. Art 2180 applies
even if regular classes had already ended and the school is academic, but only teachers-in charge may be held liable. In this case, no
evidence of negligence or that due diligence was exerted.

Facts:
School had already ended. Amadora nevertheless is in the schools auditorium completing his physics experiment which is a
requirement for the coming graduation.
He is shot and killed by a fellow student.
Parents and relatives sue the school itself, the physics teacher, the rector of the school, the dean of boys, and the high school
principal.
In the criminal case, shooter convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence

Issues: *these are the defenses put up
1. Will Art 2180 apply even if the school is just an academic institution and not an instution of arts and trade?*
2. Will Art 2180 apply even if regular classes had already ended?*
3. Which officers of the school may be held liable?
4. So is anyone liable?

Ratio:
1. There is no substantial distinction between an academic and a non-academic school insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the person in authority over the students, whatever the nature
of the school or the subject he is teaching.
2. The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and
within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. As long as he is in pursuit of or in
enjoyment of a legitimate student objective or right, school authorities may be held liable.
3. By the principle reddendosingulasingulis, teachers should apply to the words pupils and students and heads of
establishments of arts and trades to the word apprentices. In the case of academic schools, only the teacher may be held
liable. He is the one in close interaction with the student and in charge of supervision and discipline. In the case of schools of
229
Art.150FC:(f)amilyrelationsincludethose(2)(b)etweenparentsandchildren.
230
Art.209FC:Pursuanttothenaturalrightanddutyofparentsoverthepersonandpropertyoftheirunemancipatedchildren,parentalauthorityandresponsibility
shallincludethecaringforandrearingthemforcivicconsciousnessandefficiencyandthedevelopmentoftheirmoral,mentalandphysicalcharacterandwellbeing.
231
Art. 220 FC: The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children on wards the following rights and
duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with
theirmeans;
(2)Togivethemloveandaffection,adviceandcounsel,companionshipandunderstanding;
(38)xxx
232
Art.2180.XXX
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be held liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remainintheircustody.

arts and trades or technical or vocational schools, it is the head of the establishment that may be held liable since the head
usually has close interaction with the apprentices. (In this case, it is the TEACHER IN CHARGE).
4. In this case, no teacher in charge has been identified. Even if the student was in the school completing his physics
experiment, it cannot be said that the physics teacher was the one in charge of him during this time. And even if he
was the teacher in charge, there is no showing that he was negligent in the performance of his duties. His not being in
attendance could not be construed as fault as he was not required to report to school at the time of the incident.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs.

Obiter: ATA
The dean of boys, who earlier confiscated a gun but returned it without any disciplinary sanction may be held liable. But there
was no showing that the same gun he returned was the one used in the incident.

Guttierez, J . (concurring)
I agree with the result but this provision should be amended or repealed. It has outlived its usefulness. Nowadays, Students
who are grown up usually are out of the control of teachers. Also, there are no more master-apprentice setups. Apprentices usually
work in shops with employer-employee regulations governing. KEBABdigest

St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos
[GR 143363 | Feb 6, 2002 | Pardo | Certiorari of CA decision]

Petitioner: St. Marys Academy [school for brevity]
Respondents:
William & Lucia Carpitanos (parents of the minor victim Sherwin Carpitanos)
J ames Daniel, II (minor child who committed the tortious act) and his parents Guada & J ames
Vivencio Villaneuva (jeepney owner)

Summary:
Facts - Participants in the enrollment campaign of St. Marys in Dipolog were riding a jeepney owned by Villanueva and driven by
J ames Daniel II, a minor. The minor allegedly drove recklessly. The steering wheel was detached to the jeepney thereby causing the
vehicle to turn turtle. As a result, Sherwin Carpitanos died. RTC & CA ruled that the school should be liable for indemnity & damages
since they had special authority over the deceased minor. The minor-drivers parents were held subsidiarily liable in case of the
schools insolvency.
Held The act/ommission of the school wasnt the proximate cause of the injury caused. The school couldnt have controlled the
recklessness of the minor-driver nor the mechanical defect. The case was remanded to determine the liability of the parents of the
minor and the owner.

Facts:
+ St. Marys Academy had an enrollment campaign in Dipolog City. The participants were riding a jeepney owned by Villanueva.
The jeep was driven by J ames Daniel, II, student of that school, 15 y/o.
+ J ames allegedly drove recklessly. The traffic investigator, Villanueva, the Daniels & the Carpitanos agree that the cause of the
accident was the detachment of the steering wheel. In any case, the jeepney turned turtle. Sherwin, a participant, died as a result
of the accident.
+ RTC ruled in favor of the Carpitanos:
a) The school is primarily liable must pay indemnity for loss of life, actual damages, attys fees, & moral damages
b) The parents of J ames II are only subsidiary liable in case of the schools insolvency
c) J ames II is absolved from paying since he was under special authority of the school
d) Villanueva is absolved of any liability
+ CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

Issues:
1. WON the school liable for damages for Sherwins death. No.
2. WON the school is liable for moral damages. No.

Ratio:
1. The main contention of the respondents was that the school was negligent in allowing a minor to drive & in not having a teacher
accompny the minor students in the jeep.
The Court cited Arts 218 & 219 FC but for a person having special parental authority under a minor to be liable, there must be a
finding that the negligence was the proximate cause of the injury caused. The neglience must have a causal connection to the
accident.
233

233
SanitarySteamLaundryInc.V.CA

The connection between the negligenc & the inquiry must be a direct & natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening
efficient causes.
234

a. The Daniels & Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel
b. Respondents presented no evidence showing that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school or the
reckless driving of J ames II
c. It was Villanuevas grandson (the supposed driver) who allowed J ames II to drive at the time of the accident.

- The liability must be pinned on J ames parents primarily, WON the accident was caused by the mechanical defect or by
J ames IIs negligence
- The negligence of J ames II and the detachment of the steering wheel cant be controlled by the school, the school may
not be held liable for the death resulting from the accident.

2. Moral damages may be recovered if the schools negligence was the proximate cause of the wrongful act. But since the school
was not directly liable for the accident, the payment of indemnity and attorneys fees must be deleted.

Obiter the registered owner of any vehicle would be primarily liable for injuries caused while the vehicle was being driven
235
. Thus,
Villaneuva shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

RTC & CA decisions reversed & set aside.
Case remanded to the RTC to determine the liability of the Villanueva and the Daniels, excluding St. Marys. KEBABdigest

Vancil v. Belmes, 358 SCRA 707 (2001)
G.R. No. 132223 | 19 June 2001 | Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. | Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA

Petitioner: Bonifacia Vancil
Respondent: Helen Belmes

Facts:
This is a battle between a paternal grandmother and a mother concerning who should be the guardian of 2 minor children. The
father (deceased) was a US Navy serviceman. He had two children with his former common law wife, herein respondent. The
deceaseds mother lives in Colorado but she wants to have guardianship over the two minors because allegedly, the
respondent allowed her minor daughter to be raped by her live-in partner (point raised only on appeal to the SC).
At the time of the institution of the proceedings, Valerie was 6 y/o and Vincent was 2 y/o.
The trial court appointed Bonifacia Vancil, the paternal grandmother, as the legal and judicial guardian over the persons and
estate
236
of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil, J r.
On appeal to the CA, the trial courts decision was reversed invoking the law on parental authority under PD 603, Art. 225 of
the Family Code,
237
and Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court.
238

The CA ruled that the petitioner-grandma did not state any reason why Helen Belmes, the biological mother, should be
stripped of her legal right as natural guardian to her minor children.
On appeal to the SC, petitioner-grandma raised three points of contention.
1. CA erred in ruling that the preferential right of parents as absolute regarding guardianship of their children
2. CA erred in appointing Helen Belmes as guardian when there is undisputed proof that Valerie Vancil was raped 7 times by
Belmes live-in partner while she was in their custody
3. CA erred by disqualifying her solely on the basis of her U.S. Citizenship
Unfortunately, during the pendency of the case, Valerie Vancil turned 18, making the 2
nd
point raised moot. The Court
proceeded re: guardianship over Vincent

Issue: Who should be given guardianship; the natural mother or the grandmother?

Ratio: The natural mother.
Court based the decision on Art. 211 of the Family Code
239

Respondent-mother was held to have the natural and legal right to the custody of minor Vincent. While the petitioner-grandma
contends that she is more qualified to be a guardian, she may only become the childs guardian by way of substitute parental
234
Cruzv.CA
235
AguilarSr.V.CommercialSavingsBank;Erezov.Jepte
236
ProceedsfromtheirfathersdeathpensionbenefitsamounttoaboutP100,000.
237
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a
courtappointment.Incaseofdisagreement,thefather'sdecisionshallprevail,unlessthereisajudicialordertothecontrary.
238
Designatetheparentsasipsofactoguardianoftheirminorchildrenwithoutneedofacourtappointmentandonlyforgoodreasonmayanotherpersonbenamed.
239
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's
decisionshallprevail,unlessthereisajudicialordertothecontrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental
authority.(311a)

authority
240
and because the mother is not dead, has actual custody of the child, the grandparent cannot exercise substitute
parental authority.
Neither has petitioner proved that the respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent.
Even if the respondent is unfit, the petitioner still cannot be appointed as the guardian because she is an American citizen
241
,
who has not returned to the Philippines since 1987, and she is a resident of Colorado. She is also of old age, adding to the
difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian. She admitted that she will merely delegate the duties to someone else.
Apparently, she was also convicted of libel.

Dispositive: J udgment affirmed with modification.
242

Concurring Opinion:
Vitug, J .
There is in law and jurisprudence a recognition of deep ties that bind parents and child. Parents are thus placed first in rank in
matters of parental authority, unless parent is dead, absent or declared unfit.
The law speaks of family relations, hence it must apply to both legitimate and illegitimate filiation.
Art. 176, FC states that an illegitimate child shall be under the parental authority and custody of the mom. KEBABdigest

240
Art.214.Incaseofdeath,absenceorunsuitabilityoftheparents,substituteparentalauthorityshallbeexercisedbythesurvivinggrandparent,xxx.
241
Thus, she is not subject to this jurisdiction, making protection of the wards difficult. The courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as
administratorsandguardianswhoarenotpersonallysubjecttothejurisdictionofourcourtshere.
242
ValerieisnolongerunderguardianshipofHelenBelmesduetoattainmentofageofmajority.

C. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority

Chua v. Cabangbang, 27 SCRA 791 (1969)
Appeal from a decision of CFI | Castro, J. | March 28, 1969

Petitioner: Pacita Chua
Respondent: Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang

FACTS:
Petitioner Chua supported herself by working as a hostess. She had sex with man after man without the benefit of marriage.
o She first lived with Chua Ben and had a child who died in infancy
o Cohabited with Sy Sia Lay whom she had two children: Robert and Betty
o She met Victor Tan Villareal and became his mistress. A girl was born to her.
The Cabangbang couple acquired the custody of the child Betty. But there were some testimonial conflicts on how this came
to be.
o Pacita avers that while she was living in with Villareal, the latter surreptitiously took the child away from her and gave
her to the Cabangbangs. She came to know about this when the girl was already three years old. Betty was brought
to her by Villareal but due to threats, intimidation, fraud and decit of the Cabangbangs, he returned Betty to them.
o On the other hand, the Cabangbang said that they found the baby wrapped in a bundle in the gate of their residence
and reared her as if she was their own. She christened Betty and named her Grace Cabangbang.
A petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed by petitioner. Although it was issued, the child was not produced before the lower
court as ordered.
The CFI ruled in favour of the Cabangbangs and found that Betty was given to them by Villareal with the knowledge and
consent of Pacita.

ISSUE: W/N Pacita has the right to custody if Betty?

No. Although the Court affirmed the CFI decision, it gave a different reason.
o Petitioner contends that Art. 363 (CC) provides that no child under 7 years old shall be separated from the mother.
But this has become moot and academic since, at that time, Betty was already 11 years old.
o Although not being an upright woman is not a sole ground for unfitness to deprive her of parental authority, the Court
resolved the dispute on this ground.
The CFI found that Betty was given to them by Villareal with the knowledge and consent of Pacita. But, she
did not report the alleged disappearance of her daughter nor took any steps to see the child when she
allegedly discovered that Betty was with them. Having appealed directly to the Court, she has waived her
right to resolve this fact.
Mere acquiescence is not sufficient for abandonment, but a host of circumstances unmistakably betrayed
petitioners contentions.
She surrendered the child in 1958 and waited for five long years on 1963 to bring an action for
custody. Abandonment took place when the child was barely four months old at the most fragile
stage of life. And for five long years, she did not once move to recover the child. Her silence and
inaction have been prolonged.
Her claim that she did not make any move because the couple was influential and powerful was
discounted because a mother who really loves her children would go to any extent to be reunited
with her. She would have been to move heaven and earth to recover her. Yet she lifted no finger.
According to her, she wanted the child so the alleged father, Sy Sia Lay, would resume providing
the petitioner the support which he peremptorily withheld and ceased to give when she gave the
child away. But she desired to recover the child as a means of embarrassing Villareal who retrieved
the jeepney he gave her and who stopped living with her. In fact, she expressed willingness that
the child remains with the couple so long as they provide her money and a jeepney.
These reasons are selfish for she needs the child as leverage to obtain concessions. Nowhere in
the course of petitioners testimony that she ever expressed a genuine desire to recover Betty
because she loves her, cares for her and wants her to smother with motherly affection.
On the other hand, the Cabangbangs reared her as she were their own flesh and blood, baptized her, and
enrolled her in a reputable and exclusive school for girls. It would be more heart-breaking to take away Betty
from Cabangbangs.
She also admitted that she had no regular source of income. There is no assurance that Sy SIa Lay would
resume giving back support once she and the child are reunited.
The petitioner also assails that is illegal to award custody to a non-relative and a stranger and the prayer of the spouses
contains nothing for custody.
o Absence of kinship does not bar the Court to award the child to the couple. Indeed, the law provides in certain cases
the custody of the child to stangers, if both parents are improper persons. Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court where the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration apply only when the litigation is between the
father and the mother. It is error to argue that in a suit involving a parent and stranger, the child should only be

awarded to the former. For if it is the best interest of the child to take him away from the parents, then the court may
do so and award custody to a benevolent person.
o The respondents also included custody in their prayers for they added a general prayer for other reliefs just and
equitable in the premises. They also asked for custody pendente lite and sough for the dismissal of the case. Clearly,
they wanted the custody of Betty.
Habeas Corpus is only issued provided that the petitioner is entitled to rightful custody. Contrary to that, she wantonly and
completely shunt aside her legal and moral obligations, hence she forfeited all her legal and moral claims to her custody.
KEBABdigest

Abiera v. Orin, 8 Phil. 193 (1907)
GR # 3236 | March 27, 1907 | Mapa, J.

FACTS:
- Vicenta, Mariano, and Petra, all surnamed Cacao, are brothers and sisters. Vicenta married Miguel Orin while Petra married
J uan Abiera.
- Vicenta died w/o any descendants or ascendants
243
. Miguel Orin, Mariano Cacao, and J uan Abiera, in representation
244
of his
children, entered into an agreement in writing, partitioning Vicentas property.
- Among other things in the agreement/contract, Miguel Orin was bound to pay P1,000 J uan Abiera for the latters children.
There was a deadline for this payment.
- Unfortunately, J uan Abiera died as well. Sebastian Abiera
245
was appointed administrator of J uans estate. When Miguel Orin
wasnt able to comply w/ his obligation to pay P1,000 w/ in the deadline, Sebastian sued him in court to compel payment.
- The trial court ruled in favor of Sebastian Abiera and so Miguel Orin appealed to the SC
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sebastian Abiera had the right of action to bring this suit
HELD/RATIO: NO
- J uan Abiera entered into the contract not in his own right but in the name and representation of his children. The true
interested parties in the contract are J uans children and not J uan himself because the obligation to pay the P1,000 was not
executed in his favor but for the children.
- Sebastians position as administrator of J uans estate does not entitle him to ask for compliance w/ the obligation because all
said position empowers him to do is to institute such actions as correspond and pertain to the estate which he is administering.
- The right to represent his children in the contract is an exclusive personal right of J uan which stems from his being the father
and guardian of his children. Such a right cannot be transferred to anyone, not even to the administrator of his estate, and it
was also a right which died w/ him
246
. Parental authority and guardianship is extinguished by death.
RESULT:
Because Sebastian had no right or authority to bring the action to court, the complaint should have been dismissed in the first place.
Trial court decision reversed. Complaint dismissed. Case remanded to trial court for proper action. KEBABdigest

Cortes v. Castillo, 41 Phil 466 (1921)
CORTES V CASTILLO AND HERRERA / Mar 18, 1921 / No. 16903
Appeal from a judgment of CFI. Malcolm, J.

FACTS:
Spouses were Maria Cortes and Alejandro Herrera. The wife was convicted of adultery and sentenced to 3yrs and 6mos and 20ds.
The husband later condoned the wife and secured her pardon and lived with her for the second time. Not long after, the husband
grew suspicious of his wife so he took the two elder children
247
and lived with his mother, Candida Castillo.
A divorce action was instituted by the husband but he died pending the case while in the performance of his duties as member of
the police force. Thus, the mother sought to obtain the return of her children from the custody of their grandmother.
CFI dismissed the petition and declared the grandmother as the guardian of minors.
ISSUE:
WON the mother has uncontrollable authority over her children
HELD:
The unfitness of the mother, who was convicted of adultery, warrants the grant of custody of the children to their grandmother. Article
171 of the Old Civil Code provides that parents who, by the example set by them, tend to corrupt their offsprings, may be
deprived by the courts of their parental authority. This provision of the law imposes discretionary power on the courts, which should
be made use of, with a primary regard for the welfare of the minor. KEBABdigest

243
Itseemsheronlyheirswouldbeherbrother,sister,andhusband
244
Apparently, Juans wife and Vicentas sister, Petra, was also already dead; and so it would be Petra and Juans children who would inherit from Vicenta, in
representationoftheirmother.
245
RelationtoJuanAbierawasnotstated,buthesdefinitelynotJuanschild
246
Itsnotstated,butitislikelythatatthispoint,itwouldonlybeJuanschildrenthemselveswhocouldcompeltheperformanceoftheobligationtopaytheP1,000,
oncetheyattaintheageofmajority.
247
Arcadio6andBernardo4

D. Rights and Duties of Children
E. Parents v. Children When rights clash

Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W. 2d. 145 (Ky. 1969)

Appelant: J erry Strunk thru Morris E. Burton
Appelleess: Ava Strunk, Committee for J erry Strunk
Ponencia: Osborne, J .
Keywords: SUBSTITUTE J UDGEMENT

FACTS:
J erry Strunk is a 27 y/o incompetent (IQ 35 =6y/o mental age) speech-handicapped committed in a state hospital.
Tommy Strunk, his 28 y/o brother is suffering from chronic glomerulonephritis, a fatal kidney disease, being maintained on dialysis
was advised to have kidney transplant to survive.
After entire family was tested, none were medically acceptable as living donors. J erry tested to be highly acceptable. All members of
the family recommended transplant.
Ava Strunk, his mother as a committee petitioned the county court for authority to proceed with the operation.
Psychiatrist opinion: death of Tommy would have an extremely traumatic effect upon J erry
Department of Mental Health recommended authorization of operation. (seriousness of operation <traumatic effect of Tom death to
J erry)
County Court found operation to be necessary, and would be beneficial to both because J erry was greatly dependent upon Tommy,
emotionally and psychologically; approved operation.
Circuit Court: best interest of the ward that procedure (legal proceeding) be carried out.
Guardian ad litem appealed.

ISSUE: Does the court have the power to permit kidney transplant from an incompetent?

HELD: YES

RATIO: parens patriae
It is a universal rule of equity that where a person is not equal to protecting himself in a particular case, the court will protect him.
As part of the inherent power of equity, a court of equity has full and complete jurisdiction over the person of those who labor under the
legal disability and also over their property.
Where legal disability of individual is shown, the jurisdiction of the court is plenary and potent to afford whatever relief may be
necessary to protect his interest and preserve his estate.
The right to act for the incompetent is recognized as the doctrine of substituted judgment and is broad enough not only to cover
property but also to cover all matters touching on the well-being of the ward.
Operative risk to a healthy donor has been calculated to be low. Operative procedures, in this instance are to the best interest of
J erry Strunk.

DISPOSITIVE: J udgment affirmed.

Dissenting Opinion of STEINFIELD, J :
The authority and duty have been:
to protect and maintain the ward
to secure that to which he is entitled
to preserve that which he has.
KEBABdigest

Conservatorship of Valeria N., 707 P. 2d. 760 (Cal 1985)
CONSERVATORSHIP OF THE PERSON OF VALERIE N. aka. MILDRED G. ET. AL. v. VALERIE N. | Grodin, J .
S.F. 24745 | October 21, 1985 | Appeal from a decision by the Superior Court, Santa Clara County which denied conservators petition

Quick Summary:
Conservators of Valerie N. filed a petition for additional powers to sterilize Valerie via tubal ligation, primarily for habilitation. The
Superior Court of Santa Clara County denied the application, hence this appeal.
The Court held that:
a. Statute prohibiting sterilization of person under conservator ship in proceedings pertaining to guardianship and
conservatorship impermissibly deprives developmentally disabled persons of privacy and liberty interests protected by federal
and State Constitutions.
b. Conservators - in absence of evidence to support sterilization, however, were not entitled to have conservatee sterilized.
This is without prejudice to them filing another petition, with the required evidence to support application.


Facts:
Mother and stepfather of Valerie N., a developmentally disabled (Down Syndrome with IQ of 30) 29-year-old woman, seek
to sterilize Valerie via tubal ligation, primarily for habilitation.
As conservators of their daughter, the parents have the power to make her get an abortion if she did become pregnant, to
make her take other kinds of birth control and to take from her any child she might bear.
Valerie is not sexually active, but is sexually aggressive toward men.
o She was aggressive and affectionate towards boys, hugging and kissing them and wanting to sit on their laps.
Parents efforts:
o Behavior modification has not worked;
o Birth control pills make Valerie ill;
o She is not cooperative to pelvic contraptions.
o Her parents physically keep her away from other males, but are looking at a time when they will not be there to make
certain that she does not engage in sexual relations.
Valeries physician and psychologist recommended a tubal ligation, a form of permanent sterilization, both saying a pregnancy
will be psychologically devastating to her.
Californias probate code sec. 2356 (d)
248
prohibits sterilization of wards or conservatees. This was passed precisely to
overturn old policy of castration for prisoners and mentally disabled.
The probate court ruled that the parents could be conservators, but said it did not have the jurisdiction to approve the ligation.
Under state law, neither the probate court nor state hospital personnel were to retain authority to permit a non-therapeutic
sterilization of a conservatee who is unable to personally consent to the procedure. The parents appealed to the Supreme
Court.

Issue:
WON Section 2356 (d) precludes sterilization of a retarded conservatee [YES]
WON the application of that provision to Valerie denies her the benefits of the constitutional guarantees of privacy, equal protection,
and due process [YES]
WON Valerie can be sterilized [NO]

Held:

First issue:
YES. The court concludes that the legislation does not presently afford a mechanism by which sterilization of Valerie may be
authorized.
A discussion of the history of section 2356 supports the parties.

a. In 1909, California enacted first statute permitting sterilization of developmentally-disabled individuals. Law was repealed in
1913, replaced with authority to asexualize mental patients prior to their release from state institutions. In 1917, it was
amended to include developmentally-disabled adults. No hearing procedure was provided and no judicial approval was
required under these statutes.
b. 22 states enacted similar legislations, although challenged on constitutional grounds. These statutes were upheld given that
there are procedural safeguards for the patient.
c. Codified as Sec. 6624 of a 1937 statute, the law remained unchanged over the next 40 years. It was finally repealed in 1979,
operative J anuary 1980.
d. The repealing statute afforded safeguards, rather than barred sterilization. Sterilization would be available given that the
conservatoree were admitted to a state hospital.
e. Thus, the intent of legislature is clear. Neither the probate court nor state hospital was to retain authority to permit a non-
therapeutic sterilization of a conservatoree who is unable to personally consent the procedure.
f. The Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act (LDDSA) in 1977 recommended that sterilization should be made
available when necessary to achieve the purpose of facilitating a normal family and neighborly relationships for the
incompetents. However, it contained no provision by which sterilization of a conservatee could be included among the services
provided by the regional centers to non-consenting clients.
g. It did, however, provided preventi ve services needed by persons identified as being at risk of parenting a developmentally-
disabled infant.
h. Thus, although Valerie might qualify, she is incapable of consenting to the procedure. LLDSA contains no provision for the
consent by a conservator.
i. Neither the provision on preventive services nor the LLDSA authorizes sterilization of non-consenting persons even when
necessary to achieve these goals.

248
Section2356,subdivisiond:Nowardorconservateemaybesterilizedundertheprovisionsofthisdivision

Second issue:
YES. The statute is unconstitutional.

Appellants Valeries Counsel
Section 2356 deprives Valerie of the right
of procreative choice, precluding the only
means of contraception realistically
available to her
Legislation furthers that right by
protecting her against sterilization forced
upon her by the will of others

Parents arguments (Parents rights): The facts lead them to believe that a tubal ligation is the only means of contraception
realistically available to Valerie, that it is the best choice. As conservators, they have substantial control over Valerie's reproductive
rights and choices. Denying them this right is like denying Valerie the right to choose to have a tubal ligation and is therefore in violation
of her due process and equal protection rights. There is an implicit assumption that she may elect to have children in the future.

Arguments for Valerie (Valeries rights): The law is the law, and the legislative intent is to make such sterilizations illegal and to take
from the probate court any authority it has in granting such sterilizations. Although she may never be competent to make the decision, it
is forced upon her by others.

Truth is, Valerie will never be competent to choose between bearing or not bearing children. The real question is whether she
has a constitutional right to have these decisions made for her in order to protect her interests.
The present legislative scheme deprives developmentally disabled persons on privacy and liberty of interests protected by the
14
th
Amendment. Sterilization is encompassed within the right to privacy, and the Legislature has denied incompetent women
the procreative choice that is a fundamental constitutional right of all other adult women.
Incompetent women cannot choose whether they would use contraception or not, she still has a right to a satisfying and
fulfilling life free from the burdens of unwanted pregnancy as that of her competent sister. If the state withholds her from
the only safe and reliable contraception suitable to her condition, it necessarily limits her opportunity for habilitation and
freedom to pursue a fulfilling life.
The right to elect sterilization as a method of contraception is generally available to women, and the restriction must be
justified by a compelling state interest.
o State interest: right to procreative choice. Sterilization is an irreversible procedure and must be precluded, on an
assumption that the conservatee may in the future elect to bear children
o Means: prohibit sterilization to protect this right
o Was the means necessary to accomplish the state purpose? NO. It sweeps too broadly for it extends to individuals
who cannot make that choice and will not be able to do so in the future.

The right to procreative choice has been taken from her both by nature that rendered her incapable of making a voluntary choice and by
the state through the powers conferred upon the conservator.

Sterilization should not be denied to incompetent women when necessary to their habilitation if that determination is made in
proceedings which accord safeguards adequate to prevent the abuses feared by respondent. Furthermore, respondents argument fails
to prove that Section 2356 is necessary to or does in fact protect the rights of incompetent developmentally disabled persons.

Thus, the section cannot be invoked to deny the probate court authority to grant a conservator the power to consent to
sterilization in cases in which no less intrusive method of contraception is available to a severely retarded conservatee.

Third issue:
NO. The records in the case are inadequate to establish that the trial court erred in denying the application by the appellants, nor would
the evidence support an order granting the application. There is no evidence that she is capable of conceiving. There is also no
evidence that sterilization is the no other alternatives available. She merely refused a certain kind of pill and IUD. There was no
indication that she tried other kinds of pills or other types of contraceptive devices. Medical finding also did not require but merely
recommended medical treatment.

Dissenting Opinions:

(Reynoso, J ., who also concurred with majority on lack of evidence): The legislature has already declared that these official operations
should end. That was a prudent and constitutionally permitted legislative action.

(Lucas, J .): There was analytical fallacy in In re Hop, where substituted choice is circumscribed by limitations. There is no constitutional
right to substituted choice. Focus is on parents fears, and the restrictions have been implemented by the parents, not the state. Good
intentions are not enough to support the constitutional framework of the majority opinion.

(Bird, CJ .): Because choice and consent are meaningless concepts when applied to incompetents, the majority's invocation of the
theory of procreative choice and the fiction of substituted consent cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. The decision to be sterilized
is not on the same plane as the constitutionally-protected decision to procreate.


Procreation natural function, constitution protects physical integrity
Sterilization artificial; only a result of rational choice (in an incompetent this logic has no place); is only a derivative right

The state has a compelling interest in protecting the fundamental right of its citizens to bear children, and the prohibition on sterilization
of incompetent conservatees is necessary to effectuate that interest. Sec. 2356 (d) is constitutional, necessary.

Dispositive:
In as much as neither evidence of necessity for contraception, nor sufficient evidence that less intrusive means of contraception are not
presently available to Valerie, the judgment is affirmed. This is, however, without prejudice to a renewed application for additional
powers at such time as appellants have available adequate supporting evidence. (A minor setback for the parents although
they can file another petition with required evidence.) KEBABdigest

Gillick v. West Norwalk,
Gillick vs Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and another

(British courts dont seem to make a majority opinion. Separate opinion sila lahat so its a little hard to get what they really decided on.
Also keep in mind that British Courts dont have the power of judicial review. They spent a lot of time arguing whether they can even
order the Department of Health and Social Security and Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority.)
The Gillick competence is now the term used to determine whether a child is mature enough to consent to medical treatment
(apparently doesnt distinguish what treatment anton.)

Summary: Gillick, a mother of ten, five sons and five daughters, sought the declaration of a circular as unlawful which advised doctors
that they would be able to give contraceptives to a girl younger than 16 as long as it was done in good faith and that he found that she
was intelligent enough to understand. They should urge them to involve their parents but ultimately, the confidentiality between doctor
and patient would mean that the parents consent and even knowledge was not needed. It gave almost full discretion to the doctor. The
lower court held the circular lawful and said that a parent did not really have a right to his or her children and its more of a duty and that
the doctor cannot be criminally liable for encouraging a girl below sixteen to have sex. Court of Appeals reversed and held that a girl
below sixteen cannot properly give her consent. British House of Lords reversed CA and affirmed lower court saying that parents rights
over their child were recognized only so far as to protect the child and such rights yielded to the child's right to make his own decisions
when he reached a sufficient understanding and intelligence to be capable of making up his own mind. They cited the reality of a
minors independence as he or she grew up. In other words, a girl under 16 did not, merely by reason of her age, lack legal capacity to
consent to contraceptive advice and treatment by a doctor

Facts:
1. The Department of Health and Social Security issued a circular to area health authorities containing, inter alia, advice to the
effect that a doctor consulted at a family planning clinic by a girl under 16 would not be acting unlawfully if he prescribed
contraceptives for the girl, so long as in doing so he was acting in good faith to protect her against the harmful effects of sexual
intercourse.
2. The circular further stated that, although a doctor should proceed on the assumption that advice and treatment on
contraception should not be given to a girl under 16 without parental consent and that he should try to persuade the girl to
involve her parents in the matter, nevertheless the principle of confidentiality between doctor and patient applied to a girl under
16 seeking contraceptives and therefore in exceptional cases the doctor could prescribe contraceptives without consulting the
girl's parents or obtaining their consent if in the doctor's clinical judgment it was desirable to prescribe contraceptives.
3. The plaintiff, who had five daughters under the age of 16, sought an assurance from her local area health authority that her
daughters would not be given advice and treatment on contraception without the plaintiff 's prior knowledge and consent while
they were under 16. When the authority refused to give such an assurance the plaintiff brought an action against the authority
and the department seeking (i) as against both the department and the area health authority a declaration that the advice
contained in the circular was unlawful, because it amounted to advice to doctors to commit the offence of causing or
encouraging unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under 16, contrary to s 28(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, or the
offence of being an accessory to unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under 16, contrary to s 6(1) of that Act, and (ii) as
against the area health authority a declaration that a doctor or other professional person employed by it in its family planning
service could not give advice and treatment on contraception to any child of the plaintiff below the age of 16 without the
plaintiff 's consent, because to do so would be unlawful as being inconsistent with the plaintiff 's parental rights.
4. The judge held (i) that a doctor prescribing contraceptives to a girl under 16 in accordance with the advice contained in the
department's circular would not thereby be committing an offence of causing or encouraging unlawful sexual intercourse with
the girl, contrary to s 28(1) of the 1956 Act, and (ii) that a parent's interest in his or her child did not amount to a 'right'
but was more accurately described as a responsibility or duty, and accordingly giving advice to a girl under 16 on
contraception without her parent's consent was not unlawful interference with parental 'rights'. He accordingly dismissed the
plaintiff's action. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal, which allowed her appeal and granted the declarations sought,
on the grounds that a child under 16 could not validly consent to contraceptive treatment without her parents' consent and that
therefore the circular was unlawful. The department appealed to the House of Lords against the grant of the first declaration.
The area health authority did not appeal against the granting of the second declaration.


Issues: WoN doctor may give advice and treatment on contraception to girl under 16 without parental consent
WoN that doctor would be committing a criminal offence or acting unlawfully by giving advice on contraception to girl under 16
WoN the doctor interfered with the parents rights.

Held:
1. Yes. (Lord Templeman dissenting) Having regard to the reality that a child became increasingly independent as it grew older
and that parental authority dwindled correspondingly, the law did not recognize any rule of absolute parental authority until a
fixed age. Instead, parental rights were recognized by the law only as long as they were needed for the protection of the child
and such rights yielded to the child's right to make his own decisions when he reached a sufficient understanding and
intelligence to be capable of making up his own mind. Accordingly, a girl under 16 did not, merely by reason of her age, lack
legal capacity to consent to contraceptive advice and treatment by a doctor.
2. No. A doctor who in the exercise of his clinical judgment gave contraceptive advice and treatment to a girl under 16 without her
parents' consent did not commit an offence under s 6(1) or s 28(1) of the 1956 Act, because the bona fide exercise by the
doctor of his clinical judgment negated the mens rea which was an essential ingredient of those offences.
3. No. Like in number 1, parental rights were recognized by the law only as long as they were needed for the protection of the
child and such rights yielded to the child's right to make his own decisions when he reached a sufficient understanding and
intelligence to be capable of making up his own mind. It is, as the lower court said, more of a duty. The principle is that
parental right or power of control of the person and property of his child exists primarily to enable the parent to
discharge his duty of maintenance, protection and education until he reaches such an age as to be able to look after
himself and make his own decisions.

Decision: CA REVERSED. Girl may, on the sound discretion of the doctor, be given contraceptives if it is found that she is intelligent
enough to understand.

What are the remedies for the parents?
Parents are not totally without remedies. While they cannot assail the validity of the circular they may file an ordinary suit (and not a
declaration as in the instant case, but I couldnt really find what this ordinary suit would entail or even mean.)

Dissenting: British law finds it illegal to have intercourse with a girl below 16. The law does not take into consideration consent. As
long as it is below sixteen, it is illegal. By that principle, the law does not regard an unmarried girl below sixteen to have the proper
capacity to give consent.

Another argument in favor of the validity of the circular is that people will still have sex even without contraceptives. But the mere fact
that a girl seeks or asks for contraceptives necessarily means that if one does give her contraceptives, one is encouraging her to have
sex. (In other words, it is precisely the fact that she sought contraceptives that shows the rationale for prohibiting it anton.)

(It is also just the man who commits the crime of having sex with the girl even if the girl gave her consent or even if she aids, abets or
incites the having of such intercourse. The reason for this, as explained earlier, is that the relevant statutory provisions have been
enacted by Parliament for the purpose of protecting the girl from herself.

The law:
1. Any person who unlawfully and carnally knows any girl under the age of thirteen years shall be guilty of felony, and being
convicted thereof shall be liable at the discretion of the court to be kept in penal servitude for life, or for any term not less than five
years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour . . .

2. Any person who--(1.) Unlawfully and carnally knows or attempts to have unlawful carnal knowledge of any girl being of or above
the age of thirteen years and under the age of sixteen years . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof
shall be liable at the discretion of the court to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour . . .
KEBABdigest


Curtis v. School Committee, 652 N.E. 2d. 580 (Mass. 1995)
Curtis v. School Committee of Falmouth
Liacos, CJ . | J uly 17 1995

Petitioner: Elizabeth Curtis and others (students and parents)
Respondent: School Committee

FACTS:
Plaintiffs students and parents of students in Falmouth public school system seek to enjoin implementation of a program of
condom availability established in junior and senior high schools. Program makes available condoms to students through
request from the school nurse or through purchase in a vending machine without the inclusion of a provision which would
permit parents to opt out of the program and without a system of parental notification of condom requests.
Plaintiffs argue that the program infringes on the rights of the plaintiffs to:
1. familial privacy and parental liberty to direct and control the education and the upbringing of their children; zones of
privacy which surround the family a) it allows their minor children unrestricted acces to contraceptives without parental input
and within the compulsory setting of public schools, b) it is a coercive measure because all students are exposed to
condoms at scholl, where attendance is mandatory they should have the right to opt-out of the program and the right to be
notified
2. free exercise of religion the program creates a conflict between the religious teaching of parents as to the issue of
premarital sex and the allegedly endorsed view of the school committee that sex before marriage is not only permissible but
can be made safe
ISSUE: Affirmed (5)
WON the program infringes upon plaintiffs rights to familial privacy and parental liberty (1,2)
WON the program infringes upon plaintiffs right to free exercise of religion (3,4)
1. The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how their interests are burdened by the condom-availability program to an extent
which would constitute and unconstitutional interference by the state. Without this, there is no need to inquire into the States
interest in implementing the program. In order for there to be a constitutional violation, the state action must be coercive or
compulsory in nature that there is no other choice for the parents, such as where refusal to participate results in a sanction
or in expulsion.
2. Here, the students are free to decline to participate in the program without sanction. Parents are free to instruct their children
to not participate. The mere fact that parents are required to send their children to school does not vest the program with the
aura of compulsion necessary to make out a viable claim of deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right.
3. The free exercise clause cannot be understood to require the government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that
comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. Courts have found violations of the free exercise clause where the state
conditions receipt of an important benefit on conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because
of conduct mandated by a religious belief.
4. Here, they are are unable to demonstrate sufficient facts to support their argument that the program burdens their rights to
freely exercise their religion to any degree approaching constitutional dimensions. There is no requirement that any student
participate in the program. The program does not penalize students or parents for their religious beliefs or condition the receipt
of benefits ona certain belief. Although the religious sensibilities of the plaintiffs may be offended, mere exposure to the
program does not amount to a violation of free exercise.
5. Parents have no right to tailor public school programs to meet their individual religious or moral preferences.

Rights of the children:
- To obtain and be educated of the use of contraceptives, to avoid unwanted pregnancies, STD, and other ills caused by
unprotected sex.
KEBABdigest

Roe v. Doe, 29 NY 2d 188
[Scileppi | 1971 | Appeal]

Petitioner 20 y/o student of Univ. of Louisville, represented by a court-appointed guardian
Respondent petitioners dad, a NY atty

Summary:
Facts Daughters support was cutoff when she moved out from the college dorm & lived off-campus w/o her dads knowledge &
consent. She was also asked to go back to NY to her dad but she stayed w/ a classmate after returning from NY. Grades werent that
good & she had experimented w/ drugs.
Held Court still said that the father has the duty to support the minor child & this puts a corresponding duty to the child to observe
propriety, obedience, and conformity to domestic discipline. Father has the right to require the daughter to obey his reasonable
commands, absent caprice, misconduct, or neglect. If daughter leaves home she forfeits her right to support.


Facts:
+ Petitioner-daughter:
o She was 20 y/o, a student of University of Louisville, staying in a college-dorm.
o She was supported & comfortably maintained by her father, a NY atty.
o When she left the dorm, without her fathers knowledge & consent, to live w/ a female classmate in apartment off the
campus, her dad cut off her support & asked her to go back home to NY
o She disobeyed her dad, sold her car, & lived off the proceeds of this sale. She took up summer courses. Her grades werent
that good but she was improving gradually. She also resided w/ the parents of a female classmate in Long Island, after
returning from NY.
o She was 3 y/o when her mom died & her dad remarried for several times.
o She experimented w/ drugs (LSD & marijuana)
o Her tuition fees were overdue.
o She filed a petition for support saying that her dad refused & neglected to provide fair & reasonable support
+ Family court issued 2 orders of support to the father:
a) to pay the tuition fees overdue
b) as actual support to daughter until her 21
st
bday
+ Dad willfully failed to pay support from the order & was jailed for 30 days for it. He posted a cash bond.
+ On appeal, the court reversed the order of support to the daughter until the 21
st
bday and affirmed the order of support for the
overdue tuition.

Issue: WON the State should compel the father to support a daughter who has blatantly disobeyed the demands of her father. No.

Ratio:
+ The lower court should not have ordered the dad to support her daughter. The intrusion was unwarranted because it substituted
the fathers judgment.
+ A father has the duty to support & discipline his child. This duty cannot be evaded just because his relationship w/ his child is at
odds because of disobedience.
+ But this duty to support is reciprocal. The parent can establish and impose regulations for his child.
+ Similar cases were decided this way: if a child abandons the home to seek fortune in the world or to avoid parental restraint,
the child forfeits the claim to support. If such a case is decided otherwise, children could be allowed to disobey their parents
while requiring their parents to give them support.
+ In this case, the dad did not neglect her daughter. His requests (that the daughter either stay in the college dorm or stay at home
in NY) werent arbitrary, as well.
+ The daughter cant ask the aid of the court to frustrate her dads authority.
+ In the absence of caprice, neglect, or misconduct, the father has the right to require her daughter to conform to his
reasonable demands. She abandoned her home, thus she forfeits her right to support.

Appealed judgment (see Facts, last bullet) affirmed.

Concurring opinion, J asen:
+ Courts cant regulate the internal affairs of the home.
+ Before a support order could be granted, there must be a showing that there was a moral, mental, and physical condition that is so
bad as seriously to affect the health or morals of the child.
+ The father would have continued to give the daughter support had she complied w/ his requests. Therefore there was no showing
of a grave harm to her health and welfare so as to entitle her to support.

Phil. Laws in point:
FC, Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court
of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of
counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant,
the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper. (318a)

FC, Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or
legal obstacle thereto.

FC, Art 220. The parents shall have with respect to their emancipated children or wards the ff rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in
keeping w/ their means. xxx
(7) To demand from them respect and obedience
(8) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstance

FC, Art 211. xxx Children shall always observe respect and reverence toward their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are
under parental authority.
KEBABdigest

In Re Edward C. (Sta. Clara County Dept. of Soc. Services v. Edmond C.), 178 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1981)
November 30, 1981 | Barry-Deal, Associate J ustice | Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California
Appeal from judgment of the Superior Court of Santa Clara County, California

Facts:
This is a dispute between the parents (appellants) and the State over the custody of 2 minor children, Edward and Eric. The
father frequently whips the children and says that God wants him to punish them.
Appellants have 3 children: Eric, Marlee, and Edward.
In 1973, when Marlee was 11 months old, custody was granted to the maternal grandmother. Marlee was found to be
malnourished and had a concussion of questionable origin.
In 1975, Eric and Edward were placed in protective custody, then in a foster home; because there was no food in the house,
the house was in a disheveled condition, and Eric at 4 y/o had numerous marks and welts as a result of excessive discipline
by the father throughout the night.
The foster family moved away after 1.5 years and the 2 boys were returned to appellants on a 60-day trial basis. But
dependency proceedings for the boys were terminated in 1978, on the recommendation of the probation officer (who
nonetheless had misgivings).
In 1979, when the grandmother believed that the father was finally permanently out of the home, she allowed Marlee to
reacquaint with her brothers over Christmas. But she failed to go back until March. The father had gone back home by J anuary
or February.
When the grandmother came back for two weeks, she saw the father hit the children with a leather strap, looped over. The
boys were hit with clothing on, but Marlee was whipped on her bare flesh. When Marlee wet the bed, she was whipped three
times, and her screams were also heard by their neighbor who actually called the police (investigation was ineffectual). Marlee
was also made to sleep in her underwear on a plastic sheet placed on the floor in 60 degree weather.
The children were also lectured about God at mealtime. At one instance, the father lectured for 3 hours, the food went cold
and the children fell asleep w/o dinner. After school, they were not allowed to go outside, visit friends, or have friends visit
them.
A neighbor testified that they were frequently awakened at night with sounds of whippings and children crying out in pain.
Marlee was found to have numerous abrasions, bruises, and lacerations on her buttocks, legs and arms after a beating when
she could not recall a lesson at Sunday school. The grandmother called the police and Marlee was placed in the Childrens
Shelter. After which, custody was returned to her grandmother who had adopted her in Idaho (1977).
In the lobby of the probation department, the father struck Eric on the lower back. The probation officer saw it and testified in
court. The father explained that he was reprimanding Eric for flying a paper plane, Eric confirmed but the probation officer saw
none of the sort. Eric was supposed to testify that the injuries on Marlee was due to a falling down game at school.
When Eric and Edward were interviewed in the Childrens Shelter they said that they didnt want to go back home because
their father whipped them too much and too hard. But after a visit from their father, they said that they want to go back home
because their father told them that its not Gods will for the family to be apart.
All the children also had numerous insect bite lesions.
The father proclaimed that he loved and treated his children equally and that God directed his discipline of them. Counseling
would be useless since he had given his heart to the Lord. The mother did not testify but said that she supported her husband.
The court had the following findings at the conclusion of the dependency hearing in April 1980:
1. Marlees injuries reflected infliction upon a child of unjustifiable physical pain and suffering
2. Injuries proved cruel and inhuman corporal punishment or injury resulting to traumatic condition
3. Competent and professional evidence was presented affirming that the childrens injuries were a result of unreasonable or
neglectful acts or omissions of the parents
4. There is clear and convincing evidence to find the minors under 300 (a) of the Welfare and Institutions Code
249
and were
adjudged dependents of the court.
The trial court found that the return of the minors to the custody of the parents would be detrimental to their welfare.
The parents were ordered to be invol ved in a program of counseling for as long as deemed necessary by the
supervising probation officer.
PARENTS CONTENTION: Assert that their fundamental right of parenting is constitutionally protected, and that the state is
precluded in intruding the familys privacy in the absence of substantial evidence of imminent or actual harm to E and E.
Furthermore, appellant likewise content that the 14
th
amendment protects the right to religion and that the state has no
business to command parents how they are to bring up their children (religious aspects---since in the case at bar, E&E were
repeatedly told by their father that he is punishing them because it is Gods will and command)

249
300, Welfare and Institutions Code. Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the
juvenilecourtwhichmayadjudgesuchpersontobeadependentchildofthecourt:
a. Whoisinneedofproperandeffectiveparentalcareorcontrolandhasnoparentorguardian,orhasnoparentorguardianwillingtoexerciseorcapable
ofexercisingsuchcareorcontrol,orhasnoparentorguardianactuallyexercisingsuchcareorcontrol
X X X
d. Whosehomeisanunfitplaceforhimbyreasonofneglect,cruelty,depravity,orphysicalabuseofeitherofhisparents,orofhisguardianorotherperson
inwhosecustodyorcareheis.

Issues:
1) W/N there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that the minors come within the provisions of 300 or the finding that
the minors should be removed from appellants custody
2) W/N even though the jurisdiction orders are sustained, the disposition orders must be set aside because they do not contain a
reunification plan
3) W/N refusal to grant a continuance after the filing of amended petitions was prejudicial error.
4) W/N, the childrens custody should be returned to their parents, on the grounds that the state cannot intrude in the
appellants right to parenting.

Held/Ratio:
1) Evidence of actual and imminent physical and psychological harm supported findings that children were dependent children
without parents willing to exercise or capable of exercising proper and effective parental control, and that their return to the
physical custody of the parents would be detrimental to their welfare.
2) A detailed plan for reunification of the family would have been a futile gesture to mechanically satisfy provisions of rule, rather,
the recommendation for counseling and the court order for counseling were sufficient to apprise parents of the steps needed
for reunification of the family.
3) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant parents a continuance the day before the hearing. Because the
appellants counsel was informed of the contents of the petitions two weeks prior to the hearing.
4) It should always be remembered that in cases which deals with minor, it should always be decided in consideration of their
welfare. When the right s of the parents conflict with those of the child, the legal system should protect the childs
interest.
Mistreatment of a child, is not privileged because it is imposed in the guise of freedom of religious expression. Where
discipline is excessive, it must be measured in light of an objective standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.
Evidence show that the appellants home is not fit for Marlee because of the fathers excessive discipline. From the fathers
actions and testimonies the court can rightly deduce that he might effectuate the same to the two boys. Thus, the children
should remain as dependents

Dispositive: J udgment Affirmed. KEBABdigest

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US 158 (1944)
Appeal from Superior Court of Massachusetts | Rutledge, J. | J anuary 31, 1944

Petitioner: Sarah Prince
Respondent: Superior Court of Massachusetts

FACTS:
The case involves three separate complaints against Sarah Prince:
o Refusal to disclose Bettys identity and age to a public officer whose duty was to enforce the statutes
o Furnishing Betty with magazines, knowing she was to sell them unlawfully on the streets
o As Bettys custodian, permitting her to work contrary to law
Mrs. Prince has two young sons; she also has legal custody of Betty Simmons, her niece
All of them are members of the J ehovahs Witnesses sect; and Mrs. Prince and Betty were ordained ministers
Petitioner was accustomed to go each week on the streets of Brockton to distribute their magazines, Watchtower and
Consolation.
She had permitted her children to engage in this activity previously and has been warned against doing so by the school
attendance officer, Mr. Perkins
She generally did not take the children with her at night until December 18, 1941 when as she was preparing to leave, the
children asked to go. At first she refused. Childlike, they resorted to tears; and motherlike, she yielded.
Arriving downtown, she permitted her children to engage in the preaching work with her upon the sidewalks, with respect to
Betty, she took about twenty feet apart near a street intersection. As usual, on her shoulder hung the canvass magazine bag
on which was printed, Watchtower and Consolation 5c per copy, while she holds in her hand copies of said magazines for
passers-by to see
Mr. Perkins approached Mrs. Prince and a discussion ensued. He inquired about Betty but she refused to give her name
though she stated that she was enrolled at Shaw School. Mr. Perkins referred to his previous warnings and said that he would
allow them 5 minutes to get off the street. However, Mrs. Prince said, Neither you nor anybody else can stop me... This child
is exercising her God-given right and her constitutional right to preach the gospel, and no creature has a right to interfere with
Gods commands.
The Supreme J udicial Court reversed the conviction under the first complaint on state grounds but sustained the judgments
founded on the other two for violating Sec. 69,
250
Sec. 80
251
and Sec.
252
81 of the states comprehensive child labor law.
250
Noboyundertwelveandnogirlundereighteenshallsell,exposeorofferforsaleanynewspapers,magazines,periodicalsoranyotherarticlesofmerchandiseof
anydescription,orexercisethetradeofbootblackorscavenger,oranyothertrade,inanystreetorpublicplace.
251
Whoeverfurnishesorsellstoanyminoranyarticleofdescriptionwiththeknowledgethattheminorintendstosellsucharticlexxxshallbepunishedbyafinexx
x.

ISSUE: W/N the Massachusetts law contravene the 14
th
Amendment by denying or abridging appellants freedom of religion and by
denying to her equal protection of the law?

The freedom of the press and of religion is subject to incidental regulation to the slight degree involved in the prohibition of the
selling of religious literature ins streets and public places by boys under twelve and girls under eighteen
o Prince does not stand on freedom of the press for she regarded it as secular and subject to restrictions. She rests her
case squarely on her freedom of religion under the 1
st
Amendment.
o She buttressed this foundation with a claim of parental right as secured by the due process clause. Hence,
according to her, the liberties of parents to bring up their children in the way they should go (teach tenets and
practices of her faith), and the child to observe these (by preaching the gospel through public distribution of religious
magazines)
o These sacred private interests, basic in democracy, stand the interests of the society to protect the welfare of the
children, and the states assertion of authority to that end (conceded valid if only secular things were involved)
Although it is cardinal that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder,
253
the family itself is not beyond
regulation in the public interest as against a claim of religious liberty.
254
And neither rights of religion nor rights of
parenthood are beyond limitation.
o The mere fact a state could not wholly prohibit this form of adult activity, whether characterized locally as sale or
otherwise, does not mean it cannot do so for children. For the states authority over childrens activities is
broader than over like actions of adults.
Because a democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young
people to into full maturity as citizens.
Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child employment, more
especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all diverse
influences of the street.
o It is true that children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even such use
streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults.
What may be wholly permissible for adults may not be so for children, either with or without their parents
presence. Street preaching is not primary use of highways even for adults.
The presence of the childs guardian puts a limit to the evils that some evils the legislation seeks to
avert but it cannot forestall all of them.
The prohibition, though limited to streets and public places, is necessary to accomplish the legitimate
objectives. Its power to attain them is broad enough to reach these peripheral instances in which the
parents supervision may reduce but cannot eliminate entirely the ill effects of the prohibited conduct.
o Parents may be free to become martyr themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to
make martyr of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make a
choice for themselves.
This also disposes the appellants argument founded upon denial of equal protection. The contention that the streets, for
J ehovahs Witnesses, is their church, and to deny then access for it for religious purposes has the same effect as excluding
altar boy, youthful choristers and other children from edifices in which they practice their belief.
o However they may conceive them, the public highways have not become a religious property of that religion
merely by assertion.
o There is no denial of equal protection in excluding their children from doing so what no other children may
do.
KEBABdigest

252
Anyparent,guardianorcustodianhavingaminorunderhiscontrolwhocompelsorpermitssuchminortoworkxxxshallforafirstoffensebepunishedbyafinex
xx.
253
Peircev.SocietyofSistersCourthassustainedtheparentsauthoritytoprovidereligiouswithsecularschooling,andthechildsrighttoreceiveit,asagainstthe
statesrequirementofattendanceatpublicschools
254
Reynoldv.US

F. Summary Procedure

Reyes-Tabujara v. CA, 495 SCRA 844 (2006)
GR #172813 | J uly 20, 2006 | Chico-Nazario, J . | Certiorari

Petitioner: Ivy J oan Reyes-Tabujara mother of Carlos Inigo; she filed the habeas corpus petition to ultimately gain custody of their
son.
Respondent: Court of Appeals and Ernesto Tabujara husband of Ivy J oan and father of Carlos Inigo

Lesson:
RA 8369 did not divest the SC or CA of its concurrent jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases. Certiorari is only available where there is
grave abuse of discretion.

Facts:
- Ernesto Tabujara and Ivy J oan Reyes are husband and wife. Carlos Inigo is their only child, who at the time of the petition was
4 years old.
- Their marriage soon fell apart and the couple started to live separately. One day, they had a fight where Ernesto told Ivy that
she may not see their son anymore. Ernesto allegedly hit Ivy several times during the fight; he then left w/ their son.
- Ivy filed a petition for habeas corpus to get her son back, as well as filing a complaint for violation of the anti-VAWC
255
law.
These petitions were filed in the RTC where they consolidated into one case.
- RTC J udge Bay issued a provisional order declaring, inter alia
256
, that Carlos Inigo should remain in Ernestos custody until
final determination of the case, and that Ernesto should present Carlos to the court
257
during the scheduled hearing.
- Ivy made a motion to reconsider, alleging that she should be given custody according to article 213 of the Family Code which
states that no child under 7 years of age should be separated from the mother xxx. She also asked the court to make Ernesto
produce Carlos Inigo immediately before the court.
- J udge Asdala handled the motion because J udge Bay was scheduled for leave at the time. J udge Asdala issued an order
directing Ernesto to immediately produce Carlos Inigo before the court under pain of contempt.
- Ernesto failed to comply w/ the order and so J udge issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Ernesto filed a petition for certiorari
w/ the CA, challenging the order. The CA granted his petition and nullified J udge Asdalas order for his arrest.
- Ivy then files a petition for certiorari w/ the SC, challenging the CAs nullification of the RTC order.

Relevant Issue
258
:
1. Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in restraining and nullifying the RTC order of arrest against
Ernesto
2. Whether or not the SC may order Ernesto to produce their son before the court

Ruling:
1. NO. There is grave abuse of discretion when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. This was not proven in this case. There was no whimsical or capricious
exercise as the CA had not even resolved the validity of the arrest order. Certiorari may only be granted in cases of grave
abuse of discretion. There being none here, the petition for certiorari must be denied.
2. The court cannot grant Ivys request to have the CA order Ernesto to produce Carlos Inigo before the court. While the SC, CA,
and RTC (including Family Courts) retain
259
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, once a petition for habeas corpus has
been filed w/ one these courts, jurisdiction over that particular case of habeas corpus is vested in that court alone and no other
(even a superior court) until termination of the case, so much so that no other court may take cognizance of such a petition.
Since the petition for habeas corpus is still w/ the RTC, the SC has let the RTC handle the matter and not interfere.

Obiter:
RA 8369
260
created the Family Courts. One of its provisions says that the Family Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over petitions
for habeas corpus. The SC says that this provision did not divest the SC and CA of their concurrent jurisdiction over habeas corpus
cases. Family Courts are of the same level as RTCs, they only exercise jurisdiction over their judicial regions. Their orders are not
enforceable outside such regions. Thus, in situations where the subject of the habeas petition is in an unknown location or is constantly
moving from one region to another, Family Courts jurisdictions are inadequate to provide a remedy for the situation; SC and CA
jurisdictions are necessary in these cases because SC and CA orders are enforceable anywhere in the RP.
KEBABdigest
255
RA9262AntiViolenceAgainstWomenandTheirChildrenActof2004
256
Amongotherthings
257
Ernestofailedtopresenttheboytothecourtduringthefirstmeeting
258
There were several other procedural issues i.e. mootness of the CA restraining order, violation of the rule against interference w/ a coequal court, forum
shopping,exceptionstoneedformotionforreconsiderationbeforecertiorari,etc.
259
Seeobiter
260
FamilyCourtsActof1997

Madrian v. Madrian, 527 SCRA 487 (2007)

J ul. 12, 2007 / G.R. No. 159374 / Petition for certiorari of a decision of CA. Corona, J:

Petitioner: Felipe N. Madrian (husband)
Respondent: Francisca R. Madrian (wife)
SUMMARY:
Spouses had a quarrel which resulted in the husband taking away three of the four children. Wife petitioned for writ of habeas corpus in
CA, which granted custody to her of the two minor children. Husband assails the jurisdiction of CA claiming that family courts should
have exclusive jurisdiction over the petition. SC ruled that Family courts, CA, and SC itself, have concurrent jurisdiction over petitions
for writ of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
FACTS:
The spouses, married on J uly 7, 1993, resided in Paraaque, and had 4 children (3 sons and 1 daughter).
After a bitter quarrel on 2002, petitioner allegedly took his three sons with him to Albay and then to Laguna. When with the help of
her parents, her parents-in-law, and then with the Lupong Tagapamayapa, she could not patch things up with the petitioner,
respondent filed for a petition for habeas corpus of her three sons in the CA alleging that the petitioners act of leaving the
conjugal dwelling disrupted the childrens education and deprived them of their mothers care.
On a hearing, both agreed to return the custody of the children to respondent but the petitioner had a change of heart
261
, thus, he
filed a memorandum alleging that the respondent was unfit to take custody of the children
262
and that it was the she who left first
and took their daughter with her. Moreover, petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the CA claiming that under Sec 5(b) of
RA 8369
263
family courts have exclusive jurisdictions to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus by respondent.
Respondent alleged however that it was the husband who is an unfit parent
264
and that her in-laws living adjacent to their home
meddled with their personal problems.
CA, ruling under Art 213
265
of the FC, granted custody of the two minors
266
, to the respondent subject to visitation rights, while
the other boys custody was left by the CA to be determined by the proper family court. Petitioners MR was denied, hence the
certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the CA has jurisdiction over petition for the habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors.
HELD: YES. CA, and SC, has jurisdiction
The petitioners reliance on RA 8369 is wrong. In Thornton v Thornton, it has already been resolved that CA, same with the SC, still
has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus since nothing in RA 8369 revoked its jurisdiction (no manifest intent to revoke, no
incompatibility). Further, other laws like RA 7092
267
and BP 129
268
are likewise not incompatible with RA 8369. Thus, applying rule
in stat con of harmonizing laws, RA must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 29--- that family courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the CA and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.
Thus, the jurisdiction of CA over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004)
269
in
Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.
In Thornton, the interpretation of RA 8369 on jurisdiction addressed the problem when individuals do not know the whereabouts of
minors they are looking for since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. In the case, the petitioner moved out of Paraaque residence and twice transferred to provinces with different
judicial regions, thus the petition in CA was appropriate.
Moreover, family courts are only vested with original exclusive jurisdiction over custody cases and not habeas corpus cases. In
custody cases, the writ of habeas corpus is only ancillary remedies that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody
of minors.
270
It is issued to avoid splitting jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court and judicial instability.
This is consistent with the rule that: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court of judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes,
and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
JUDGMENT: Petition for certiorari is DENIED. CA decision granting custody to respondent affirmed.
KEBABdigest
261
Bothpartiesaccusedeachothersparentsofconstantmeddlingintheirfamilylife.
262
Shewashabituallydrunk,frequentlywenthomelateatnightorintheweehoursofthemorning,spentmuchofhertimeatabeerhouseandneglectedherduties
asamother.
263
Sec5(b)oftheFamilyCourtsActof1997provides:
JurisdictionofFamilyCourts.TheFamilyCourtsshallhaveexclusiveoriginaljurisdictiontohearanddecidethefollowingcases:
xxx xxx xxx
b)Petitionsforguardianship,custodyofchildren,habeascorpusinrelationtothelatter;
264
Thathewasanalcoholic,gambler,anddrugaddictwithimpairedmentalfacultieswhichcausedhimtocommitactsofviolenceagainstherandherchildren.
265
In case of separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations,especiallythechoiceofthechildoversevenyearsofage,unlesstheparentisunfit.
266
PhillipandFrancisAngelo
267
AnActExpandingtheJurisdictionoftheCourtofAppeals
268
TheJudiciaryReorganizationActof1980
269
Sec20.Petitionforwritofhabeascorpus.AverifiedpetitionforawritofhabeascorpusinvolvingcustodyofminorsshallbefiledwiththeFamilyCourt.Thewrit
shallbeenforceablewithinitsjudicialregiontowhichtheFamilyCourtbelongs.
The petition may likewise be filed with the SC, CA, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines.ThewritmaybereturnabletoaFamilyCourtortoanyregularcourtwithintheregionwherethepetitionerresidesorwheretheminormaybefoundfor
hearinganddecisiononthemerits.
270
UnderRule99oftheRulesofCourt.

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A2013

X. Property Relations Between Spouses

1. Requisites for donations

2. Donations taking effect upon the death of the donor

A2013 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof. Aguiling-Pangalangan

B. System of Absolute Community

2) NO. They are valid contracts.

Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154 (1983)

Luzon Surety v. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 (1969)

A2013 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof. Aguiling-Pangalangan

Relucio v. Lopez 373 SCRA 578 (2001)

g. Dissolution of the CPG

Partosa-Jo v. CA & Ho Hang, 216 SCRA 692 (1992)

Lacson v. San Jose, 24 SCRA 837 (1968)

Maquilan v. Maquilan 524 SCRA 166 (2007)

Saguid v. CA, 403 SCRA 678 (2003)

A2013 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof. Aguiling-Pangalangan

B. The Family Home

Modequillo v. Breva, 185 SCRA 766 (1990)

Arriola v. Arriola, 542 SCRA 666 (2008)

Albino Josef v. Santos, GR No. 165060 (2009)

b. Biological-Assisted reproductive technology

Under Article 255

De Aparicio v. Paraguya, 150 SCRA 279 (1987)

o There are 2 kinds of acknowledgment

deliberate, cant be supplied by the court.

Uyguangco v. CA, 178 SCRA 684 (1989)

Acebedo v. Arquero, 399 SCRA 10 (2003)

2. Action to Claim Legitimacy

A2013 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof. Aguiling-Pangalangan

A2013 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof. Aguiling-Pangalangan

Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

2. Rights of Illegitimate Children

Gonzales v. CA, 298 SCRA 322 (1998)

Gan v. Reyes, 382 SCRA 357 (2002)

A2013 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof. Aguiling-Pangalangan

A2013 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof. Aguiling-Pangalangan

Zepeda (son) v. Zepeda

Republic v. Capote, 514 SCRA 76 (2007)

A2013 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof. Aguiling-Pangalangan

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, GR Nos. 168992-83 (2009)

C. Nature of Adoption Proceedings

Santos v. Aranzanso, 16 SCRA 344 (1966)

D. Consent Necessary for Adoption

Johnston v. Republic, 7 SCRA 1040 (1963)

A2013 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof. Aguiling-Pangalangan

A2013 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof. Aguiling-Pangalangan

ii. Parental Unfitness

b. Role of the Childs Preference

DECISION: (petition denied, IAC decision affirmed)

Lindain v. CA, 212 SCRA 725 (1992)

Madrian v. Madrian, 527 SCRA 487 (2007)

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