RECIPROCITIES IN HOMER Introduction This study is a description of a single aspect of the economy of Homer- ic society. By ‘Homeric society’’ is meant the network of social institu- tions, relations, and norms of the human groups depicted in the Homeric epics, as these poems have come down to us. If the examination of recip- rocal exchanges (which concerns mainly the transactions within the econ- omy, and only indirectly touches on the bases of production, technology, and the relations of production) reveals consistent and coherent patterns, the question of the validity of Homer as an ‘‘historical’’ source will be partially answered.’ There are three connected aims in this account: first, to describe eco- nomic exchanges in Homer; second, by analysis of the nature and func- tion of these exchanges, and by demonstrating that they exhibit inter- locking, reinforcing and non-contradictory patterns of behavior, to show that the epics have an internal unity; third, to ‘fix’? Homeric society along the continuum of ideal types of social organization as precisely as the data allow. In respect to this last point, I hope, by treating the epics as an ethnographic case, to show that Homer’s world corresponds to "This problem, a perennial one in Homeric studies, may never be completely resolved. A. comman point of view is that the Homeric epics are an artificial amalgam of widely scat- tered and disparate elements, and therefore uscless as an historical source. Even many who believe in an essentially unified Homer argue which era (Late Bronze, eighth century, or some period in-between) forms the background of the poems. I agree with the position of ‘Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977:38 (references are to the bibliography on pp. 174-75, be- low], that the society described by Homer was “neither the Mycenean world, nor his own time, but a world chronologically in between the two, namely the Greek world of the Dark ‘Age in the tenth and ninth centuries. . ." This was the conclusion of Finley (1957, 1965, 1974), one that has gained wide acceptance among social historians. A strong, recent ex pression to the contrary is Snodgrass (1974), who insists that the background and institu- tions (i.e. the social system) represent **a mixture of practices, derived from a diversity of historical sources” (p, 118), This crucial question is complex, and cannot be argued here, except to say that if the Homeric sosial systern can be shown Lo be coherent within the texts, then, logically, it may be supposed that such consistency reflects a “real system, ev dependently of pocts” imagination. (Snodgrass even entertains the contrary possibi Homeric society may be “too cohesive and unmixed” to be historically real [1974-11 5). Finley’s methodological point is that the institutions (as opposed to narrative or to material objects) are consistent and coherent (1957: 146-47). Snodgrass attempts to disprove this by showing that marriage-patierns in Homer display discrepancies, and thus rejsresenst widely different levels of society. On this see note 18, below As an illustration of the premises underlying this study, I can do no better than to quote Finley: ‘The test | am putting forward is the presence in a given body of heroic poetry of a behavior pattern which can be shown, by comparative study, to have existed in one or an- other society outside the one under examination. Such a behavior pattern, if itis integral to the account and reasonably consistent in the portrayal, must—I choose my words care- fully —must be accepted by us as part of a social reality. It cannot be the product of poetic imagination ot invention’ (1974216). 137138 WALTER DONLAN theoretical or logical models of simple societies in evolution? My tenta- tive conclusion is that Homeric society approximates the stage of the chiefdom, but in an ‘‘imperfect’’ or “‘inchoate”’ form (i.e., insufficiently integrated), exhibiting a number of features which are survivals from the previous stage of the tribe.) The ultimate aim of this kind of approach is a scientifically exact de- scription of Homeric society in its entirety. This study, which treats only the two-way transactions within the single sphere of the economic sys- tem, falls far short of a complete analysis. There is little consideration of the material economy, kinship and status relations, political organiza- tion, or value-system—the subjects of further specialized studies. By fo- cusing narrowly on the system of reciprocities, which touches intimately on all the other aspects, | hope to provide a basis for a synthetic analysis of the evolution of social organization in Dark Age Greece. 2Sce Finley (1975: 102-19) and Humphreys (1974) on the breakdown of the early “dialogue” between anthropology and classics and the relevance of anthropological models for ancient studies. Both emphasize the value of the anthropological methodology itself. On the socio-psychological constraints that inhibit classically trained historians from utilizing methods and concepts from other disciplines, see Finley (1975: 70-73). 3 In this I follow E. R. Service (1965), who has proposed that all societies can be classi fied into four merging evolutionary types, from simple to more complex, depending on the degree of socio-cultural integration: bands, tribes, chiefdoms, states. Service's typology, the correciness of which is hotly debated among anthropologists, is adopted here because it ‘meshes with Sahlins’ scheme of reciprocities. For a brief, elementary exposition of Service's four types sce Ember and Ember (1973: 232-44). Even more briefly here, bands are small, local groups, usually hunter/gatherers, with an egalitarian political structure, based on kin ship, and characterized by informal, ad hoc leadership. Tribal societies are more sedentary and more densely populated settlements of agriculturalist/herders. The larger number of local groups is integrated by “‘pan-tribal sodalities” (clans, age-sets, military societies, €xc,), but political integration is usually for specific purposes only. Hence, as in bands, trib- al leadership is largely informal and impermanent, the several groups retaining their autonomy. The “advance” from the band to the tribal design is essentially in the potential for integration of local groups into larger wholes. Chiefdoms have a formal authority structure, in which a duly constituted, permanent leader holds an “‘office."* Numbers of local groups are integrated into a single community, under the chief and a proto-nobility.. ‘The population is denser and economic production usually greater and more varied. Unlike bands and tribes, which are egalitarian, chiefdoms are ranked societies—the chief, his fam- ily, and his associates having structured greater access to prestige. In its more advanced form the political structure of chiefdoms approaches a simple class society, which means that the chief and “nobility” have differentiated access t0 economic resources as well States have complex and centralized political and economic structures, characterized by the institutionalization of authority: formal legislative and judicial bodies, bureaucracies, tax collectors, etc. The government holds a legal monopoly on the use of physical force: stand- ing armies, police. Class stratification (hence restricted access to prestige and economic re- sources) replaces rank. The form of economic distribution corresponds to the type of social organization. Bands and tribes practice egalitarian distribution, chiefdoms centralized re- distribution, while states engage in market exchange. Another evolutionary scheme, which many prefer to Service's, is that of Morton Fried (1967), whose societal stages are egalitarian, rank, stratified, state. According to this con- figuration, Homeric society would have essentially the features of a ranked society, with a number of elements of an egalitarian society * Renfrew (1972), using Service's model, has done precisely this for the period 3000 to 1400 8.C. He concludes that the Mycenaean palace-complexes (which he calls “princi palities"") were the products of evolution into ‘'Something more than chiefdoms, something less than states,"" that is, “minor states, effectively organized economically, but in otherre~RECIPROCITIES IN HOMER 139 Economic relations are a basi¢ factor in the structure of all societies; in simple (i.c. pre-state) societies they have a correspondingly greater deter- mining role in the formation, function, and interactions of other institu- tions. Accordingly, we cannot speak of the ‘‘economy’’ as something separate from the social, political, religious, moral and attitudinal ele- ments of early societies, since economic relations are indivisibly part of the total cultural pattern. In such societies there is an economic aspect to every social relationship and a social aspect to all economic relationships. As Marshall Sahlins says (1972: 185), ‘A material transaction is usually a momentary episode in a continuous social relation,”” From this it fol- lows that the modern concept of “‘Economic Man’’ (as a purely rational being motivated solely by his economic self-interest), however appropri- ate to industrial, capitalistic society, is a false and misleading notion when applied to pre-market societies.’ In order to analyze the sociology of economic exchanges *‘embedded”” in the social systems of primitive groups, cultural and economic anthro- pologists have devised classificatory schemes which connect these trans- actions to the society at large. The strategy employed here is to relate the formal typology of exchanges or “‘reciprocities” promulgated by Sahlins to the economic transactions observed in Homer. In Sahlins’ scheme all economic interactions are viewed as a series of “‘reciprocities,”” ranging from “‘pure gift” to exploitation and plunder, depending on the kinds of social relationships involved. Because the modes of reciprocity are seen to be linked to the social structures themselves, there is, ideally, a corre- lation between social systems and the prevalent type of economic ex- change. In other words, norms of reciprocity, and deviations from those norms, may be used as an index of the evolutionary stage of social organ- ization of the culture in question. spects not differing so strikingly from chiefdoms" (p. 369). Interestingly, Renfrew also sees these “states” as linked by “tribal ties,"” which “may indeed be the perpetuation of tribal Tinks seen during the neolithic period,” so that ‘the Mincan-Mycenaean social organiza- tion in the late bronze age was one of minor states or principalities, linked by ties resem- bling those operating within tribes” (p. 370). The implications of Renfrew’s findings that ‘the late Bronze Age had a kind of composite structure, with features of the state, the chief- dom, and the tribe, interesting enough in the context of the period, are equally intriguing for post-Mycenaean Greece. Exploration of the continuities and discontinuities between the social structure of the Late Bronze and Dark Ages from an anthropological viewpoint will, 1am sure, provide some interesting answers to the problems of culture-change in early Greece. 3 Humphreys (1969) gives an excellent summary and analysis, with extensive bibliogra- phy, of the proposition that the economy is ‘*embedded” in the social system, This impor- tant idea, which has found general (though not uncritical) acceptance among anthropo- logists, was first brought to the attention of Hellenists by M. 1. Finley, who has incorpor- ated into his work the theories of K. Polanyi and M. Mauss (Humphreys (1969: 179-80]). In his last work, published posthumously, Polanyi surveys the scholarship on this question; '$ a general conclusion, it can be stated that the production and distribution of material goods was embedded in social relations of a noneconomic kind. No institutionally separate economic system —no network of economic institutions—could be said to exist” (1977: St 52), For a brief summary of “the controversy over the ancient Greek economy." and of Polanyi's contributions, see Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977: 3-11). M. D. Sahlins (1968, 1982), whose models of reciprocity and redistribution are employed in this study, has modi- fied Polanyi’s scheme, and has developed a typology of economic exchanges that is linked closely to Service's social-evolutionary system,140 WALTER DONLAN Sahlins’ categories are: generalized reciprocity, balanced reciprocity, and negative reciprocity. In generalized reciprocity the giving is (ideally) altruistic. There is no overt pressure for a return. Those who can, give; those who need, take. The emphasis is on social solidarity, and the “‘material’’ aspect is minimal. An extreme example is a mother suckling her child—or the practice of foodsharing among hunter-gatherers, There is, to be sure, an implicit moral obligation to reciprocate, but there is no reckoning, no stipulation of time or of equivalent value. Other concrete examples of generalized reciprocity, taken from the ethnographic litera- ture, are “‘pure gift,” “sharing,” “help,” ‘“‘generosity,"’ “hospitality,” “mutual aid.’” Sahlins also places in this category gifts to kinsmen and chiefs as well as nablesse oblige. The importance of this last distinction to our discussion of Homeric society will be seen. Balanced reciprocity is direct exchange—a quid pro quo—usually made immediately or within a stipulated time, and in equivalent value. In this kind of exchange the “‘personal’’ motive is less, the ‘teconomic’’ more apparent. The material value is as important as the social; there is more or less precise reckoning; failure to “‘balance’’ the giving tends to disrupt the relationship. Ethnographic examples are certain marital transactions between kinsmen of the bride and groom, blood brother- hood pacts, peace agreements, Also included by Sahlins are many so- called ‘‘pift-exchanges”’ or *‘tr: alfed fi Kit le avInE an mae king i in negative reciprocity, which is the attempt to get something for nothing. This exchange is the most im- personal kind; it is ‘‘doing business.’’ Each participant is impelled to gain the maximum individual benefit. Thus, what cthnographers relate as “haggling,” ‘“‘barter,” “‘chicanery,"” are examples of negative reci- procity. At the extreme of this category are cheating, theft, violent acqui- sition—even to the point of stealing and plunder. The particular mode of reciprocity is determined by what Sablins calls the ‘‘span of social distance’’ between exchanging individuals or groups. The closer the relationship (expressed in terms of kinship or spatial prox- imity) the more personal (generalized) the exchange; the more distant the relationship, the more the exchange tends toward balance or negativity. Thus, schematically, within the household, lineage and village there tends to be generalized reciprocity; balanced reciprocity may be found at the wider sector of the tribe or beyond; while negative reciprocity is seen only at the inter-tribal level (*‘strangers”). In addition to horizontal sectoral distance, other factors, notably rank and wealth, affect the nature of the exchanges. The vertical axis of rank relationship supposes an economic relation and an appropriate mode of reciprocity. A key element in the social relations between high and low is economic generosity, which is the cement that binds leaders and subordi- nates. Generosity may be enlisted as a ‘‘starting mechanism’’ in the formation itself of rank by a would-be “‘big man’’—a process whereby giving generates esteem and is requited by loyalty and followership. Or, where rank is already institutionally established (as in the office of chief), continued generosity is the leader’s obliggation, in return for whichRECIPROCITIES IN HOMER 141 goods and services, as well as loyalty, are the chief’s claim on the people. “In tribal society social inequality is. . .the organization of economic equality, and high position often only secured or maintained by o’ercrowning generosity” (Sahlins [1968: 87]). By its nature (the leader is the generous ‘‘father"’ to his people) the economic relationship is fairly classified as generalized; and when, as in the chiefdom, the organization of the flow of goods upward and downward is formally centralized, this complex system of generalized reciprocities is termed ‘‘chiefly redistribu- tion.” Whatever the level of social organization, generosity is a crucial ele- ment in rank relationships, and the leader (“‘big man’’ or chief) who fails in generosity risks losing his constituency. The political organization of reciprocities, therefore, is an index of the social organization itself, and the position of the Homeric leader within the process of reciprocal ex- changes is a vital clue to the evolution of political forms in Homer. Negative Reciprocity Of negative reciprocity in Homer little need be said. Because almost all such exchanges occur at the inter-tribal level, their connection with the internal structure of Homeric society is peripheral. On the other hand, any cases of negative reciprocity observed within the tribal sector will be significant, Negative reciprocity in Homer ranges from trade to thievery to robbery to raid.* The familiar anthropological dictum that often in primitive societies trade equals raid is attested to in Homer; thus the question asked of strangers, whether they sail kata préxin or as (éistéres (Od. 3.71 = 9.252), and Eumaeus’ tale (Od. 15.403-484) in which Phoe- nicians barter ‘*trinkets”’ (for food?), receive stolen goods, abduct Eu- maeus and sell him.’ 6 Occurrences of thievery and robbery (as opposed to raid) are rare in the epics. Klepiés and Kleptosurré are found only once (Il. 3.11; Od. 19.396). Except for the generalized case in Hl, 3.10 and the Phoenician woman in Od. 15.469 there are no mentions of thievery or robbery within tribal groups. 7 Although trade has important social functions in many primitive societies, and is there- fore correctly classed as balanced reciprocity, there is no evidence for intra-tribal trade (or of local markets) in Homer, while trade with strangers is generally regarded as an ‘unsoci- able" activity. The only traces of a trade ‘‘relation”” are the (apparently regular) wine ships from Lemnos to the Greeks at Troy (in exchange for bronze, iron, hides, cattle, slaves) and from Thrace, both with a special arrangement for the Atreidae (Il. 7.467; 9.71). Otherwise, trade in goods is an impersonal exchange between strangers: f1. 6.288: 23.741; Od. 1.180; 15.415. The same trade-network dealt in humans (kidnapped or captured) for goods: #. 21.40; 24.751 (Achilles sells Trojan captives in Lemnos, Samos and Imbros); Od. 1.430; 14.115, 287, 339, 449; 15.425; 17.249; 20.381; cf. 14.202, In Od. 13.271 “Odysseus” pays ‘passage on a Phoenician ship with booty. The insult by a young Phacacian, who tells Odys- seus that he looks like a trader (prék¢ér), not an athlete (Od. 8.159), reflects the general sus- picion and disdain of a tribal warrior society towards activities that are not embedded in a social relationship, and confer no prestige, but are regarded as negative and unsociable ‘Commercial trade, in short, had a very small role in Homeric economics. Greek trade Homer was generally “passive” (Knorringa [1926:3]), consisting mostly of exchange natural products (including humans) for luxury goods, with non-Greeks, mainly Phoeni- cians. The evidence of archaeology is in accord with the testimony of Homer, showing that trade beyond Greece was almost non-existent during most of the Dark Ages and began to142 WALTER DONLAN Raiding (or warfare) has as its main purpose plunder (cattle, horses, sheep, goats, swine, women, children, men, luxury objects, armor, metals) for use, treasure, barter-sale or ransom. The raid is the principal means of acquiring moveable wealth in Homeric society, organized ei- ther as an ad hoc raiding party or as a more formal expedition. The ‘‘eco- nomics” of Homeric raiding are simple. Territorial acquisition is never a motive, and, although revenge is sometimes adduced, the primary pur- pose is to acquire booty, always at the expense of strangers. The success- ful leader both enriches his followers and is awarded a disproportionate share of the spoils, thereby gaining in wealth, prestige, loyalty and fol- lowership. The raid, which has a prominent place in the activities of the Homeric Greeks, thus serves important social as well as economic func- tions. Besides being a means of enrichment for the group it is a unifying mechanism, for it structures the political hierarchy, creates or affirms leaders, and validates the dominant ideology of strength, courage, war- craft and personal glory. Any instance of negative reciprocity within tribal groups will signify rupture of the normally expected pattern of social relations.’ The injury to the aikos of Odysseus in the Odyssey and the seizure by Agamemnon of Achilles’ prize in the //iad are plot-themes of their poems. The descrip- tions of these negative transactions are similar to descriptions of forcible acquisition, robbery and depredation.® There are other situations of negative reciprocity within groups in the Odyssey, all of which are related to crises of group-leadership. The ac- tual plot of the suitors to ambush Telemachus and to divide his bioros and kt@mata (Od, 16.383) is an extreme example. The suitors sought to end the unresolved problem of the Ithacan chieftainship, and, in the spe- cific action of the ambush, to forestall a possibly effective appeal by Telemachus to the /aoi for the expulsion of the suitors (Od. 16.371-382). pick up around 900 B.C., although "Throughout the ninth century B.C. and for the earlier part of the eighth, the development of material links with overseas cultures is gradual, | calized and unspectacular"’ Snodgrass {1971:332]). Of course there was some trade, both internal and long-distance, but trading as an occupation was neither well-regarded nor much represented in Homer. Trade, 1 acy, or expeditions for “gifts” was similar and often simultaneous activities, and the distinction between the trader proper and the adven- turous warrior rested on “Little but an ideological hairline” (Humphreys [1978: 167; cf. 70- 71, 144)), Mentes/Athena, the leader of the Taphians, one of the free Greek-speaking groups identified as being traders (and pirates as well), a xeinos of Odysseus, passed through Ithaca on his way 10 trade iron for copper “with alien men” (with no intention of staying to trade. Od. 1.180). © The concept of “tribe” asa level of socio-cultur not least because there is no agrecd-upon definition. Homeri whereas tribes are usually regarded as aggregates of clans and lineages, in which s tions are regulated by the wider kinship groups and by ‘‘sodalities” (non-kinship voluntary associations), both of which are conspicuously absent in Homer. The problem is an im- portant one, but for my purpose here the presence or absence of a tribal stage between the acephalous egalitarian society and the chiefdom is not critical. By “tribal group" in Homer I mean those people who share the same name and a common territory, and are conscious that they form a single community—a concept that is encompassed by the term démos. See Donlan (1970; 382-85), 9 Eg. Od. 1.250, 377; 2.48, 335; 3.314; 4.318; 14.92; 15.12; 16.107; 20.1705 Ml. 1.161, 230, 356; 9.111, 368; 16.53; 19.89.RECIPROCITIES IN HOMER 143 Antinous’ father had been threatened by death and by consumption of his 26¢ at the hands of the démos because he had joined Taphian pirates against the Thesprotians (Od. 16.424). Having strained the people-lead- er bond by an unpopular act, Antinous’ father was forced to flee to the established paramount chief (primus), Odysseus, for protection. The “Cretan’’ Odysseus relates how he slew Orsilochus, son of Idomeneus, to forestall Orsilochus’ attempt to deprive (stere6) Odysseus of the booty he had won at Troy, as a penalty for not serving Idomeneus (Od. 13.256). Odysseus had acted on his own, leading ‘‘other companions” (266) and amassing his own booty, in opposition to the constituted chief. Melampus’ chrémata were held by force by Neleus, chief of the Pylians, and by his kinsmen, while Melampus was in captivity in Phylace, where he had gone to steal Phylacus’ cattle as his brother's ‘‘bride-price’’ for Neleus’ daughter (Od. 15.225; cf. 11.281). Melampus “‘avenged”’ (tind) Neleus’ deed, secured the girl for his brother, and left Pylos for Argos, where he “ruled over many Argives.’” Although the background of this tale is obscure, the situation is one of negative reciprocity, involving a chief and an unruly subordinate. In Od. 22.213 the suitors threaten Men- tor with death and confiscation of his goods and property if he helps Odysseus, saying that they will ‘‘mingle” (meramisg6) his property with the rest of the spoils. Although the situations are circumstantially different, they all involve negative reciprocity between leaders and lesser leaders or between leaders and people. The existence at this sector of “‘unsociable’’ economic tt actions, as if between strangers, suggests a deep undercurrent of poli instability in Homeric society. Ambiguity about the extent of a leader’s control over his people (cf. Thersites in //. 2.21 1ff.) and rivalry between leaders confirm that a stable polity in the form of a fully integrated and firmly established chieftainship had not been achieved. Political power was personal power, and did not reside in an ‘‘office’ (Qviller (n.d: 8- oye Balanced Reciprocity Balanced reciprocities in Homer may be grouped under two general headings, ‘‘compensatory’’ and ‘‘compactual.’’ Compensatory balanced exchanges are: debts, dues, fines, wages and rewards, blood-price, recompense for injury or insult. On the spectrum of reciprocities these The story of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra is another example (among several) of the political ‘‘immaturity’” of the Homeric chiefdom, used as an admonitory parallel to the Ithacan situation (Od. 1.29, 298; 3.193, 248: 4.512; 11.385). Aegisthus, the author of the coup, enlists Clytemnestra by seduction, gathers a small force, treacherously slays Agamemnon and his men, and rules Mycenae for seven years, until he is killed by Orestes. In the interview with his mother’s shade in Hades Odysseus assumes the possibility of the loss of his geras to another (Od. 11.174), as does Achilles also (Od. 11.494; see M1. 24.486). Similar is the lament of Andromache that “‘others'* will ake away Astyanax’ ploughlands now that Hector is dead (1. 22.489). In M7. 20.178 Achilles asks Aencas if he has ambitions ‘on Priam’s timé and geras. For a single example of economic exploitation within the com- munity, see below p. 170.144 WALTER DONLAN tend towards the negative pole, being more material and less sociable than compactual exchanges. For example, in Odyssey 21.15ff. we learn that Odysseus had met Iphi- tus while they were both visiting the Messenians to collect a ‘‘debt”” (chreios) owed them. Three hundred sheep and their shepherds had been taken from Ithaca, and twelve mares and mules had been stolen from Iphitus, Presumably these goods had been taken in raids; the response, however, was not a counter-raid, but a debt-collecting embassy (exesié), which served to even-out the material loss and to preserve peaceful rela- tions between groups. The difference between the exesié and the counter- raid as a way of collecting a chreios is vividly illustrated by Nestor’s lengthy account of his youthful raiding exploits in Jliad 11.670-761. Raid is a negative reciprocity with no sociable aspect; the debt-collecting em- bassy had as its instrumental purpose the maintenance of inter-tribal har- mony.!! The quid pro quo nature of compensatory balanced reciprocity is seen in rewards for service. Hector promises to aportion (apodateomai) half the spoils to the man who captured Patroclus’ corpse (//. 17.229). In Iliad 20.184 Achilles taunts Aeneas, asking him if the Trojans had “‘cut out’’a temenos for him if he kills Achilles.'? The acceptance of goods as compensation (poiné) for someone killed has as its primary purpose the maintenance of peaceful relations. In Ifiad 9.632 Ajax says that a man accepts poiné for the slaying of a brother or son, and the killer is allowed to remain in the démos. In this category the material value of the blood-price is secondary to the social purpose of peace between families of the same community.” Other instances of compensatory balanced reciprocity have a similar social function. Zeus gave horses to Tros as poiné for Ganymede (//. 5.265); Agamemnon of- fered apereisi’ apoina to Achilles as recompense for insult (//.9.120); Meleager was offered a déron (= temenos) by the Aetolians to return to the fighting and as recompense for his mother’s curse (//. 9.576); Eurya- lus gave a déron and apology to Odysseus in exchange for insult (Od.8.396). ‘That such reciprocities were not simply agreements between the parties concerned but formal, structured conventions is demonstrated by the 1 For a similar negative usage of chreias see M1, 13.746. Other debts: Od. 3.366; 8.355; cf, Od. 8.462; , 8.185; 18.406, Trading “dues”: I, 7.470; 23.745; ef. 9.71 (Knorringa [1926:5)), Fine (in liew of service): Hl, 13.66% 23.296. 2 Other rewards for a service: 1, 4.97; 10.213, 304 (cf. 321); 11,124 Od, 4,525; 9.196; 14.152, 395; 15.506 (cf. Od. 15.536 = 17.163; 19.309). Wages and payment: I. 12.433; 2b.444; 24.429; Od, 10.84; 11.489; 13,2725 15.316, 449; 17.223; 18.357; 19.27 (ef. 14.102), Failure to pay for services contracted is considered a negative reciprocity, answerable in kind, as in 1, 21.441, where Poseidon and Apollo, defrauded of their pay by Laomedon, send’a sea-monster; and //. 5.640, where Heracles, also cheated by Laomedon, sacks Troy (f.11. 20.145). 19 See 11. 18.497, When stranger kills stranger (as in war) the only possible poiné is the other's death ({!. 13.659; 14.483; 21.28). The alternative to acceptance of poiné in com- pensation is exile of the killer or blood-feud (Od. 24.430-437). The slaughter of the cattle of the Sun is a negative reciprocity for which Helios demands of Zeus that Odysseus’ men pay (tind) a fitting exchange (epieikés amoibé), which can only be death (no other form of com- pensatory balance being possible (12.382).RECIPROCITIES IN HOMER 145 moichagria which Ares ‘owed’ to Hephaestus as the penalty for adul- tery (Od. 8.332). We note that Poseidon offered to go surety for the penalty, for which he himself was liable and could be put in chains if the chreios was defaulted (8.347-356)."* A second group of balanced exchanges, which I have termed ‘‘com- pactual,”” in which social relations hinge on the material flow, indicates more positively than the compensatory exchanges the social aspect of economic relations. These are peace-making and friendship agreements, marital alliances, hospitality, gift-giving and gift-exchange. Peace-making agreements are, of course, inter-tribal. The social pur- pose of peace agreements is to initiate or to maintain harmonious rela- tionships; the material aspect must approximate the social advantage, and payment must be immediate or within a stated time. In Iliad 3.71 Paris proposed a duel between himself and Menelaus, the winner to keep Helen and the Ktémata. Oaths of friendship (philotés) were to be sworn and the Greeks were to return home (//. 3.92, 255). The actual compact, proclaimed at a solemn sacrifice by Agamemnon and Priam, contained the proviso that if Menelaus won the Trojans would pay additional re- compense (timén. . .apotinemen), and if this were not forthcoming the Greeks would continue to fight for poiné (3,281-291; cf. 456-461).!° The peace proposal illustrates well the nature of balanced reciprocity. There is a certain amount of “bargaining;”’ the terms are stated formally, and, bound by oaths, have a moral aspect; the social and material advantages to either side are equivalent; there is a mutual foregoing of self-interest; the instrumental purpose—peace and amity—dominates (Sahlins 11979-710.91 Peace compacts between individuals are similar. The famous agree- ment between Glaucus and Diomedes in /fiad 6.215 is a social compact between strangers and enemies, which transforms the enmity into a new relationship, that of xeinoi, via the exchange of gifts and oaths.* A temporary pact of philotés, with equal exchange, was struck between Ajax and Hector (i. 7.299). With marital alliances we move in the direction of a more generalized form of reciprocity. As Sahlins notes, marriage prestations are “the clas- '4 Cf. the formal proceedings (the precise details of which are a matter of controversy) fon the poiné for a murdered man in Hl, 18,497/f, Note, 400, that payment was a public, communal act (Od. 8.348; /1. 19.172, 258-275), and that the group as a whole had a vital Stake in the resolution of the conflict. |S The peace agreement is again broached in an agora by Antenor, who proposes simply that the Trojans surrender Helen and the kiémava. Paris insists he will keep Helen, but back the goods and more from his own store (oikothen), an offer that is spurned by Diomedes and the Greeks. However , a truce for burning the dead is agreed upon (i, 7.348- 411), Hector, in soliloquy, fantasizes a final, desperate version, as he faces Achilles: return of Helen, plus one half of what Troy contains (/!. 22.111-12); cf. 18.510-512). '6 “Actually, its a renewal of an old xeinos-relationship between their two houses, which had been forgotten. The effect is the same in either case, since compacts between individ- uals are not separable from their oikoi, The lack of material equivalence is anomalous and is presented by the poet as a mental lapse on the part of Glaucus. The puzzling disparity of exchange may be an example of competitive gift-giving, in which one party outdoes the other in order to enhance his prestige.146 WALTER DONLAN sic form of exchange as social compact.”” Sahlins also warns against viewing marital exchanges as symmetrically balanced. Not only is there often not an equivalent exchange, but perfect balance is neither to be ex- pected nor is it always socially desirable. Aside from the obvious incom- mensurabilities (e.g. when a woman is moved against goods), the intangi- bles of benefits to both groups are great and difficult to measure exactly. Additionally, and most important, the overriding purpose of marriage is alliance, of the closest sort, by which non-kin become kin. Thus the par- ties move closer to the fluid pattern of obligations associated with gener- alized reciprocity. Sahlins points out that a perfectly equal exchange can- cels obligation, and ‘‘opens the possibility of contracting out,”’ making the social bond established between the two groups comparatively fragile. If either side is still “‘owing,”’ as a result of unequal prestation or as a consequence of alliance between unequally ranked families, this “shadow of indebtedness” will insure a continuing pattern of giving and obligation (Sahlins [1972: 222-23]). The common type of contract in Homer is marked by gifts (hedna) to the woman's family, as Penelope reminds the suitors in Odyssey 18.276 (cf. 290FF.).17 Other circumstances, however, will alter the nature or direction of the material exchange.Thus Nausicaa, who was wooed with gifts by the local suitors (Od. 6.159; cf. 284), is promised without gifts to ‘Odysseus, who will himself be given a house and ktémata (Od. 7.311). Agamemnon offers Achilles his choice of daughters anaednos, plus polla ¢meilia as recompense and for promise of service (//. 9.144). Orthryoneus was promised Priam’s daughter, Cassandra, anaednos, in return for war- service (If. 13.365; cf. 376-382). lobates gave his daughter to Bellero- phon, plus half the basiléis timé and a femenos, because of Bellerophon's prowess (//. 6.191). Melampus won the daughter of Neleus for his broth- er Bias as a reward for stealing the cattle of Phylacus (Od. 11.288; 15.235). The “Cretan’” Odysseus gained the daughter of a rich man be- cause of his areré (Od. 14.211). Altes gave his daughter with a ‘tdowry’* to Priam (J/. 22.51; see 21.85)."" Despite a variety of marriage patterns and material exchanges, all "7 So di. 11.241; 16.173, 189; 22.471; Od. 6.158; 8.317; 11.281; 15.16, 366; 16.391; 19.529; 21.159. #1. 18.593 is instructive, since it describes brides not of high status. ‘8 In an influential article, Snodgrass (1974) attempts to show that Homeric soci was: not ‘historical’ by contrasting marital situations in which “bride-prices"* (hedna) are of- fered to the bride's kin, and those in which a ‘“dowry"” is given to the bride and groom by the bride’s kin. He concludes that the two systems are incompatible and confused, and therefore that Homer ‘is describing a mixture of practices, derived from a diversity of his- torical sources" (p. 118). In his analysis of marital transactions Snodgrass is guilty of se- rious misuse of anthropological technique, especially in his effort to correlate Homeric so- ciety with Goody's categories of “diverging devolution" and ‘homogeneous devolution"’ societies. Despite forthright acknowledgment of the shakiness of his theoretical founda- ions (pp. 118, 120-21), Snodgrass’ case for denying a coherent sociological background to the epics rests squarely on what he sees as inconsistencies in marriage-settlements and prop- ‘erty-iransmission. (Inevitably, however, he falls back on the discrepancies in the material background to clinch his case (pp. 122-24].) The question of marriage considerations in primitive societies is itself complex (see Murdock [1949:19-23}}, and the variety of mar- riage-patterns in Homer reflects that complexity.RECIPROCITIES IN HOMER 147 marital contracts in Homer exhibit key features in common. Marriages were arranged by the male heads of oikoi, or between the father of the bride and the groom directly. The main purpose of the alliance was the strengthening of one or both houses, and the material value and direction of the prestations varied according to the situation. Whether the mar- riage was made within the tribal group or between groups, the purpose was the same, and the diversity of the “‘giving”’ reflects directly the im- mediate circumstance of rank, need, and advantage (Lacey [1968: 39- 41}). The discrepancies in marital prestations (“‘bride-price”’ and ‘dow- ty”), far from indicating a conflation of practices from different peri- ods, rather underlies the flexibility of the Homeric kinship system and the fluidity of hierarchical relationships. The relative status, strength, and need for assistance of the contracting families are important deter- mining factors. A high-status bride is wooed (and won) by gifts, but a de- sirable groom may receive a dowered wife without giving hedna, and sometimes gifts besides. The suitors agree with Penelope that ‘‘those who wish to woo an agathé woman and the daughter of a rich man, and who compete (eriz6) with one another, bring cattle and goodly flocks, a feast for the philoi of the bri and give splendid déra"’ (Od. 18.276-279). This is competitive gift-giving: the one who gives the most wins not only the bride (and, in the case of Penelope, the chiefdom), but also the most prestige. Thus, additionally, marital gifts are seen as the expression of the need to prove high status by not being outdone in gift-giving.'® It 1s clear that among those of high status in the Homeric world the marriage alliance, its prestations carefully calculated, was aimed at the increase of the primary social unit, the oikos. The overwhelming impres- sion is that of small, autonomous societal segments jockeying for posi- tion, seeking an edge of superiority within and without the larger group. This ‘‘oikos-mobility”’ (vividly reflected also in the heroic value-system of competition for individual prestige) appears to describe a society that had passed from the corporate egality of the segmentary tribal design— in which the “primary political segments’* (¢.g. oikos, lineage) are equal, unranked, autonomous—to the ranked society of the chiefdom, in which descent and community groups are hierarchically arranged. Homeric so- cial organization does not, however, appear as a series of neatly ranked pyramids, showing an orderly subordination of individuals and groups, as is found in well-developed and stable chiefdoms. In uals and 49 Finley (1955) attempts to unravel the complications by comparing marriage-gifts to guest-gifis: the common practice was “‘an exchange of gifts, in addition to the hand of the girl” (p. 186). Lacey (1966) accepts Finley's major point, that the bride was part of an exchange of gifts and services, and that the gifts were called hedna, arguing further that ‘edna “expressed the giver’s quality, and this in turn carried the assumption that to be out- done in hedna, as in gifts, would incur a slur on a man’s rank and quality as an agathos” (p. 55). Thus, hedna-gifts are intended to provoke counter-gifts (hedna), and “personal honour demands that the hedna given are worthy of the hedna received" (p. $6). According to Qviller (7, note 15), ". . .the co-existence of bride-price and dowry may be explained as an aspect of competitive gift-giving in Homeric society. The one side tried to outdo the other in generosity.””148 WALTER DONLAN groups are ranked, but the process of socio-political integration is not complete, with the result that the degree of local autonomy is great.” For that reason the reciprocal exchanges observed thus far take place, for the most part, between individuals or between familial units, not at the level of the community at large, nor at the superordinate level of leadership. So, in the section that follows, gift-exchange and guest- friendship will appear as embedded transactions directed toward the crease of prestige and power of high-ranking men and of the autono- mous groups that they head. Of central importance to Homeric social relations is the nexus of bal- anced reciprocities which involve hospitality, gift-giving and gift-ex- change, and the institution of guest-friends Two categories of hospitality are to be distinguished. One type, ‘‘obli- gatory”’ hospitality, is that offered to “‘a total stranger who unexpectedly may have applied for food and shelter.”” *! Obligatory or altruistic hospi tality is divinely sanctioned, and in form and effect is akin to generalized reciprocity. The other category, ‘‘formal” hospitality (called ‘‘contrac- tual’’ by Bolchazy), reflects a wide-spread practice among primitive peo- ples. There is little we need add to well-known expositions of the basic purpose of this type of exchange (Finley [1955]: 177-79; [1965]: 61-64, 104-05, 107-08). Similar in function to peace compacts (¢f. Glaucus and Diomedes, I. 6.215), these reciprocities make friends of strangers or celebrate existing alliances between individuals and oikoi from different groups. The pattern of connections among the various hospitafity-customs is illustrated by the dealings between Telemachus and Mentes/Athena in Odyssey 1, Mentes appears suddenly as a total stranger and is offered food and shelter by Telemachus (obligatory hospitality). In the inevitable questioning about origins Mentes reveals himself as xeinos patréios—a formal bond between oikoi, inherited over generations (Od. 1.123-195). The obvious purpose of the ‘“‘contract’” is mutual aid between inter-tribal oikoi, a balanced reciprocity of food, shelter, protection, and favors (cf. Od. 1.257-265; 15.54). A fixed custom was the bestowal of a parting gift (xeinéion) by the host, which was intended to be reciprocated in equal value at some future counter-visit (1.309-318). ‘The frequent recurrence of the same sequence of events and the “‘for- mulaic” language in which they are expressed, show that xenié and gift- giving/exchange were deeply embedded in the social fabric of Homeric society. Indeed, participation in the custom was an index of humanness, as we learn from the episode of the Cyclops (see Od. 9.175). Odysseus “expects” xeinia (9.228), and, in fact, demands hospitality (xeinéion) 2 Service (1965): 122, 124, 141, 157, 173; Sablins (1968): 17, 21, 24, 39. 21 Bolchazy (1978):57. Bolchazy terms this kind of hospitality “‘altruistie"” (pp. 62-63). 22 Guest-friendship as hereditary and as an alliance of oikoi: Il. 6.215; Od. 1.187, 417; 4.171-180; 15.195; 17.522; 19,191; 24.114. Promise or expectation of a return gift: I 6.218.231 (mutual exchange on the spot because of circumstances); Od. 1.316; 22.290 (cf 20.296); 24.283, 313. In some instances of guest-giving no return is suggested: e.g. Od. 4,589-619 (Gf, 15.113-128); 8.389, 430; 10.19; 11.339; 13.13. See also M. 10.269; 11.20; 15.932; Od. 4125-132; 14.285: 19.241RECIPROCITIES IN HOMER 149 and giving (d6riné) as a divinely ordained thernis (9.267), the perversion of which marks the Cyclops as an inhuman monster (9.355-370). As in all types of balanced reciprocity the material and social value are inter- twined. The basic material value, as has been noted, is the practical need of food, shelter, and protection, which are the essential ingredients of xeinéia.? Although there is no way to be certain, it is reasonable to suppose that obligatory hospitality evolved prior to the formal or contractual type. During periods of migration and movement (characteristic of the Greek world from about 1100 to 900) the social necessity of extending to strang- ers the kind of mutual aid found in kin-groups is readily apparent. The facts that xeinos is the “‘stranger,’’ and that obligatory hospitality was one of the few areas of divine concern in human-to-human affairs sup- port this contention. The prescription that “‘all strangers and beggars are from Zeus, and giving, though small, is welcome’ occurs twice in situa- tions of obligatory hospitality (Od. 6.207; 14.57). The contrast between men who are violent, wild, and unjust, and those who are philoxeinoi and god-fearing is expressed formulaically by the stranger in a strange land (Od. 6.120; 9.175; 13.201; cf. 8.575; 5.447). The sanction gets its strongest articulation in Odyssey 9.270, where Zeus xeinios is epitimétor of suppliants and strangers (cf. //. 13.624; Od. 7.164; 13.213; 14.283, 389; 16.422; 17.475, 485). In addition to the explicit naming of the gods, obligatory hospitality is hedged about with powerful moral terms like kalon, eoike, epeaike, the- mis, dikaion (I. 11.779; Od. 6.193; 7.159; 9.268; 14.56; 17.483; 20.294). The connection between hospitality to strangers and the generalized reci- procity of kinship is expressed by Alcinous (the idealized host), who likens the xeinos and hikerés to a kasignétos (Od. 8.546), The giving of an isé moira to the stranger/beggar Odysseus (with no prospect of a re- turn, obviously) is another indication of the generalized nature of obliga- tory hospitality (Od. 20.281, 293). Just as obligatory or altruistic hospitality brings the stranger tempo- rarily into the orbit of kinship relations, so algo formal or contractual guest-friendship is the institutionalized recognition of those extended boundaries. Xeinoi are ‘‘political’’ allies, and the benefits of the relation- ship contracted by ofkoi-heads are shared by the whole oikos, This is “foreign policy’’ in its tribal form, contracts being made not by states (which do not exist), nor by the solidary community, but by autonomous units, the membra of a society which had not evolved to the stage of the fully unified chiefdom and which still modeled external relations on the 2 For xeingia (seinia) meaning simply hospitality (he verb is xeinizd) see i. 11.779: 18.387, 408; Od. 3.490 = 15.188; 4.33; 5.91; 7.190; 14.404; 15.514, 546, See esp. Od. 3.346-355; in Md, 3.207 the Trojan Antenor xeinizé Menelaus and Odysseus, who had come to Troy on a peace-making mission. 4 Itis important to note that the verb philed is often used in extending hospitality to the stranger: Id. 6.18; Od. 1.123; 4.29; 8,42, $45; 10.14 (cf, 43); 13.206; 14.128, 388; 15.281, 543: cf. amphagapaz6, Od. 14.381. Other examples of obligatory of altruistic hospitality: Od, 3.34; 6.192, 246; 14.45, 3)150 WALTER DONLAN pattern of kinship. The conversation in Hades between Agamemnon and Amphimedon in Odyssey 24.102-119 is a good example. Agamemnon had gone to his xeinos in Ithaca, Melaneus, when he sought to persuade Odysseus to provide a contingent for the Trojan war. In the type of in- cipient state characterized by the mature or advanced chiefdom, negotia- tions would have been conducted directly between the paramount chiefs, but Agamemnon had to employ the available mechanism of his personal xeinos-relationship with a lesser chief as the base for his approach to the man with real authority in Ithaca (see Finley (1965: 107-09}). Like the marriage alliance, the guest-friend compact constitutes a kind of affinal bond. The guest-gift is the affirmation or reaffirmation of the contract, both symbolic and material, which keeps the relationship alive. Thus in Odyssey 21.31-41 the youthful Odysseus had met Iphitus at the house of Ortilochus, to which they had both come to collect debts owed them by the Messenians. Odysseus and Iphitus exchanged gifts as the “beginning of an affinal guest-friendship"’ (arché xeinosunés proské- deos), but because of Iphitus’ early death they never “*knew one another at table.” The exchange of modest gifts had initiated the friendship; the adjective proskédés (a Homeric hapax) illustrates the “kinship” quality of the relationship; future meetings would have been characterized by an almost generalized reciprocity, in which the host gives hospitality and a gift, which are to be “balanced” at some unspecified future time by the counter-visit. The origin of the divine sanction which made Zeus the overseer of hospitality (obligatory and formal) is, then, to be sought in the extension of his province from the family and lineage to strangers, who are admitted, via the bond of hospitality, into the sphere of an asso- ciation that resembles kinship. The quasi-kinship quality of guest-friendship, which brings distant xeinoi into the narrower circle of proximity, imposes obligations of “generalized” reciprocity, of the kind due from kin and friends, which go beyond the “formal” duties of hospitality and gift-giving. This is the lesson that Peisistratus imparts to Telemachus as they prepare to leave Sparta: “But wait until. . .Menelaus, bringing déra, puts them on the chariot. . .for a guest (xeinos) remembers all his days a guest-receiving man (anér xeinodokos) who provides him philotés"* (Od. 15.51-55).* Ac- cordingly, we are not surprised to find that xeinoi correspond to a cate- 25 In connection with this see Od. 17.110, where Telemachus tells how Nestor philed him “‘as a father his son, newly come from afar, after a long time.'* See also //. 9.480 (Phoenix). 26 Telemachus borrows a ship from Noemon, a philos (we suppose) of his oikos (Od. 2.386; see 4.630-656). This kind of reciprocity, which is based on bonds of loyalty and fol- lowership within the group, is paralleled by Od. 3.475: Nestor provides a chariot and his son Peisistratus for Telemachus' journey; Od. 4.171: Menelaus would have resettled Odys- ‘seus in Argos; Od. 14.321; Pheidon stored Odysseus’ " treasure; Od, 15.80; Menelaus of- fers to go on a gift-collecting journey with Telemachus. On the closeness of the bond, see /. 17,149: Sarpedon was hama xeinon kai hetairon to Hector, a great ophelos both to Hec- tor’s polis and self. Asius was hapant6n xeindn philtatos to Hector (Il. 17.583). Lycaon was ransomed by his xeinos Eetion for a great price (I. 21.42). Cf. Od. 8.209: a man who chal- lenges his xeinodokes is aphrén and outidanos; Il. 3.350: Menelaus' prayer to Zeus to punish, as an example, the man “who does evil to his xeinodokos, who provides him philotés.""RECIPROCITIES IN HOMER 151 gory of alliance within the group. Mentor and Halitherses are ex archés patr6ioi hetairoi to Telemachus (Od. 2.254; cf. 2.286; 17.69). They are dedicated to the oikos of Odysseus, and their own fortunes are bound to his (Od. 2.186, 225,244; 22.213). Finally, in emphasizing the social side of the xeinos-relationship, we must not lose sight of the economic aspect. However closely xenié ap- proaches the sphere of generalized reciprocity, it is still a balanced ex- change, with the firm expectation of return. Along with war-spoil and marriage prestations the guest-gift is a major means of material enrich- ment and prestige. To sum up: Compensatory balanced reciprocity stresses the material. In its usual form in Homer it balances goods against deeds (positive or negative), thereby canceling the obligation. A social purpose is embed- ded in the material transaction; as a ‘‘fair”’ exchange it preserves peace- ful and orderly relations within and between groups. Compactual bal- anced reciprocity stresses the social. The equivalent flow of goods and services operates to bring individuals and groups into a closer relation- ship which often resembles bonds of kinship or affinity. All instances of balanced reciprocity in Homer reveal that the underlying instrumental purpose is stabilization of the social order. Strife is prevented or medi- ated, peaceful relations are established or maintained, by means of for- mal (or semi-formal) mechanisms that evolved to cover typical ‘real life” situations which have an inherent potential for social discord. Balanced reciprocity thus differs sharply from negative reciprocity, which has no sociable purpose, whose object is to secure a material ad- vantage at the expense of others. Those “‘transactions,"’ as we have seen, occur beyond tribal boundaries, between ‘‘strangers’’ and “‘enemies.”” When balanced reciprocity takes place at the inter-tribal level its social purpose is peaceful coexistence between tribal groups. Thus at the inter- tribal level contact can take the form of negative reciprocity (trade, raid, war) or balanced reciprocity (gift-exchange, alliances, debt-collecting embassies). Within the tribal group the dominant mode of exchange is, properly, balanced reciprocity, because tribes (as opposed to bands) are composed of a number of small corporations, autonomous and self- gov- erning, among which the stabilizing institution of balanced exchange in- sures the desired harmony. In a sense, therefore, the operation of bal- anced reciprocity between the corporate entities of the segmented tribe is not unlike the balanced reciprocity that occurs between tribes. We have already noted, in fact, the simil: between the xeinos-relationship and the bonds of the herairos-relationship in Homer. And, in the (difficult to account for) scarcity of wider ties of kinship and other cross-cutting in- stitutions—the normal ‘‘cement’* that binds the local communities of tribal societies—balanced reciprocity within Homeric groups assumes even greater importance. The chiefdom form, on the other hand, effec- tively removes the necessity for such ‘‘between’’ transactions, by trans- forming external into internal relations, integrating local units into a sin- gle political union (with a corresponding increase of generalized over bal- anced exchanges).152, WALTER DONLAN The anomalous occurrence of negative reciprocity in the intra-tribal sector is, therefore, a significant indicator of social “‘dysfunction.”” At the least it is a sign that the integrative process has been interrupted or impeded. Accordingly, the economic relations “embedded” in the socie- ty will reflect directly the problems of political integration—specifically, the relations between the chief and others of high rank who challenge his authority as the single leader of a unified community. Few scenes in Homer better illustrate the interrelation of material and social concerns than the Ithacan assembly in Odyssey 2. Although the situation concerns the political leadership of the community, it is put before the assembled démos in terms of the economic distress of Odys- seus’ oikos. Having called the assembly, Telemachus admits that it was not a communal matter (démion, 44) that occasioned the agora, but the chreios (48, preserving the basic sense of ‘need"’) of his oikos. It is ap- parent that the devouring of Odysseus’ estate was nof perceived as a problem of the whole community, although Mentor implies that it should be (239-241). Telemachus says that it would be better (kerdion) for him if it were the Ithacans who were eating up his patrimony, because then he could range through the astu, importuning them until “all was given back” (2.74; cf. tisis, 76).”” Although he was recognized as the “‘legitimate”’ heir to the office of paramount chief (Od. 1.386), Telema- chus had insufficient political authority and personal power to halt the continuing despoiling of his patrimony by the suitors (Od. 2.58). As it is, Telemachus’ only recourse is moral persuasion. He appeals to the suit- ors to feel shame (a powerful tribal constraint) in front of their neighbors (Od. 2.64; cf. nemessaomai, 64 and aideomai, 65) and to fear the wrath and punishment of the gods (66), and to the people to allow him to be left alone (70). The only cause that Telemachus can adduce for the people’s unwillingness to rally to his side is that Odysseus had done them some evil. in reauital for which (qpotin6. 73) they were urging on the suitors. Thus it is that the economic situation of Odysseus’ house reveals the state of Ithacan politics. Odysseus (and Laertes before him) had exer- cised a loose, but effective, political control in Ithaca and the neighbor- ing islands, and portions of the mainland. Although the other basileis were essentially independent, the Cephallenians were one group under 2 Iris difficult to determine precisely what this means; most likely, that Telemachus still had sufficient political authority within the narrow sphere of the astw of Ithaca and its en- virons to treat any loss asi it were a chreios, hence collectable. In that case, humeis (75, 76) refers to the local residents. Alternatively, humeis may mean all the people of the chiefdom except the lesser tribal leaders (who, in any case, were mostly from outside Ithaca; see Stan- ford (1974: ad loc. }). In any case, the assembly is evidence of the “immaturity” of the Homeric chiefdom. From the perspective of the démos the conflict between the ranking household and those of the suitors was not a general concern, like the return of the army (2.30 = 42, possibly an invading army), but a private matter (see Od. 3.82 and 4.314 on the distinction between idion and démion), The fact that no assembly had been held for twenty years indicates that normal, peaceful life did not require centralized decision-mak- ing. Finally, the admission that the struggle for political power was being played-out at the top, with the people in a passive role, tells us that political authority was fragmented among the Smaller social units of the Ithacan chiefdom. See p. 162 below.RECIPROCITIES IN HOMER 153 the leadership of a single man, Odysseus (//. 2.631; Od. 20.210; 24.355, 378, 429). The political arrangement, in short, was that of a chiefdom, not fully centralized and largely dependent on the personal competence of the chief to command still autonomous local units. With the long ab- sence of Odysseus the central authority of the always fragile chieftain- ship had dissolved into its constituent segmental groupings. The sys- tematic eroding of the economic base of the paramount’s oikes—in ef- fect a negative reciprocity—was thus a calculated political act of the suit- ors, since the chief's ability to command the loyalty of other tribal units depends ultimately on his wealth—his continuing source-fund of prestige and power.” Political authority, prestige, and wealth form an inextrica- ble web in tribal ‘‘power structures,”’ as we learn from Telemachus’ suc- cinct (and youthfully naive) statement in Odyssey 1.392: ‘For it is no bad thing to be chief (basifeuemen); quickly his house (d6) becomes rich (aphneios), and he himself more honored”’ (timéesteros). But, as Telem- achus knew full well, without wealth and prestige one did not become basileus in the first place. In the Ithacan situation wealth flows only one way—out of the oikos (Od. 14.13-20, 85-95). Inability to control one’s wealth means inability to act as redistributor, which is the economic or- ganization of political power in chiefdoms. His oikos thus weakened, the support of the démos (and even of some members of his oikos) now dis- sipated, with no kin, and only a tiny core of followership, having no re- putation as a warrior-leader, Telemachus lacks any leverage for effective political action.” The operation of political control through economic means and Te- lemachus’ inability to exercise that control are both revealed in the course of the agora. The suitor Eurymachus assumed that Halitherses’ motive in defending Telemachus was the expectation of a d6ron for oikos (2,184), By threatening Halitherses with a heavy fine (thdé, 192) if 24 As Luce says (1975:74); “The occupation of the palace by the suitors is striking al the root of Telemachos' social position and economic security.” That the political situation is presented in economic terms is of the greatest importance. The consumption of the goods of Odysseus without recompense is a negative reciprocity, therefore an act of hostility. This is the force of Telemachus’ statement in 1.376-380 (= 2.141-148; cf. 1.160; 16.431) that if the suitors destroyed his livelihood népotnon, Zeus will give patinti¢a erga, and they would perish népoinoi. Compensatory balanced reciprocity (2.76-78, 203-205) would be the peace- ful way to achieve balance. In Od. 22.54-59 Eurymachus belatedly offers rimé to Odysseus, but the political/moral dimension of the suitors’ huperbasié had become too great (Od. 22.61; 23.63; ef, 13.193). Eurymachus' speech is also an explicit admission that the suitors perceived their actions as negative reciprocity, 2 In 14,13-20 Homer prescrves for us an example of careful stock-breeding. The num- ber of breeding sows is kept high (600); only the hogs, their number reduced to 360, are slaughtered. Thus there is no danger that the ‘‘capital’* wealth of the aikos will be con- sumed, leading to the destruction of the aikos-cconomy, only the “‘surplus,."" But it is pre- cisely the surplus that the ofkos-head can “‘spend"* in exchange for prestige and power. By “devouring” the surplus, the suitors devour the basis of Telemachus" political power. The strategy of the suitors is thus very effective, The oikos-head still controls labor and home production, but has lost control of the spendable surplus. With no war-capacity the oikos gains no wealth from booty; without prestige and political authority there is no income from gifts, either at home or from foreign gift-exchange. Once the power imbalance has been repaired wealth comes pouring in (Od, 22.54-59; 23,355-358)..154 WALTER DONLAN he continued to speak up for Telemachus, and by insisting that the suitors would continue to devour Odysseus’ chrémara without compen- sation (isa, 203) until Penelope re-wed, Eurymachus makes it clear that the suitors controlled the economic (hence, political) destiny of the house of Odysseus. The extent of their dominance is underscored by the final sequence of events in the agora. Telemachus requests of the people a ship to seek news of his father: if Odysseus is alive, he can hold out (s/a6) for a year; if Odysseus is dead, Telemachus promises to give Penelope toa suitor. Mentor scolds the démos for their passive acceptance of the situa- tion, despite their numerical superiority; the loss of the loyalty of the démos to the ranking chief's house is emphasized by Leocritus’ pre tion that even if Odysseus were to return the suitors would outnumber his followers (2.209-259).” Generalized Reciprocity Telemachus’ inability to control the outward flow of his wealth or to replenish loss by exacting compensation focuses attention on the central- ity of the redistributional role in chiefdoms: ‘‘Redistribution is chieftain- ship said in economics” (Sahlins {1968:95]). Aware of Sahlins” hypothe- sis that chiefly redistribution is a system of generalized reciprocities, and that the organization of these exchanges has important implications for the genesis and retention of ranking itself, we may hope, by an analysis of generalized reciprocity, to understand better the relationship between leaders and followers within the larger tribal group. The presence of con- flicting modes of distribution in Homer favors the thesis that Homeric social organization consisted in ‘“‘imperfect” chiefdoms, displaying ele- ments associated with the egalitarian tribal model. Generalized reciprocity in the epics may be grouped into the following categories: kinship reciprocity and pure giving; sharing; chiefly due; chiefly redistribution; chiefly generosity. As with the categories estab- lished in negative and balanced reciprocity, these will often overlap or merge, along the continuum of generalized exchanges. Instances of kinship reciprocity are not numerous in the flied and Odyssey. This is somewhat puzzling at first glance, since tribal societies are networks of kinship relations. The fact is that the nuclear family, al- though obviously of the greatest importance as the primary social ele- ment, gets little economic attention in Homer, while wider kinship- 30 Epic economy neatly encapsulates the situation in Od. 2.257: Leocritus breaks up the agora, the people scatter to theit homes, the suitors repair to the home of Odysseus. Bul, because Telemachus had taken some action that demonstrated his competence (calling an agora, denouncing the suitors, raising a following), the balance of public sentiment shifted, so that in 16.371 the suitors must rethink their strategy, Antinous says that Telemachus is epistémén in boulé and noos, the laoi no longer show them favor, Telemachus will surely call another agora, and the result will be their expulsion from the land. From an economic point of view Telemachus’ actions are significant. By gathering herairoi and voyaging abroad he assumes the economic role of basileus, if only tentatively. ‘In this instance, Tele- machus’ companions gain nothing from the voyage except fre wine and food eat roure and meat provided by Nestor. . .Had they travelled further afield, into territory where theit leader had no guest-friends, there would have been booty as well" (Humphreys [1978: 165)).RECIPROCITIES IN HOMER 155 groups (genos, phratry, phwlé) figure hardly at all in Homer as corporate entities in any sphere of activity—economic, political or religious." Bonds of kinship operated at the level of the family and its extension, the oikos; beyond that they were attenuated. The absence of these larger kin groups underscores the importance of the basic Homeric social unit, the oikos, “household,” which was a residential group (usually, but not al- ways, patrilocal), whose human membership also embraced non-kin (de- pendents, slaves). As an economic entity it was self-contained and nearly self-sufficient, including land, property and livestock, alll under the abso- lute control of the oikos-head. The oikos was the center of economic and political power, from which radiated the wider non-kin associations of hetairoi and xeinoi. For that reason, as we have seen, all effort was pur- posefully expended toward the increase in wealth and influence of the oikos, including marriage alliances, guest-friendship, and followership. “In no way worse than a brother (kasignétos) is an hetairos, who has an understanding heart’” (Od. 8.585). All economic transactions within the aikos are of the generalized type, identical to the kinship reciprocity of the nuclear family or the primitive band. Eumaeus’ careful and equal sharing-out of meat among the other swineherds and Odysseus (Od. 14.414-448) is an example of this simplest type of generalized reciprocity, and is the pattern for all tribal distribu- tional schemes, including chiefly redistribution. Eumaeus’ role is that of the family-head, who is instrumental in procuring the food, supervise: preparation, performs the religious ritual, and distributes equitably. He acts, therefore, in the capacity of ‘‘leader,’” responsible for the welfare of his ‘‘people,”” with the leader’s prerogative of rewarding (gerairé, 437, 441), and enjoying the status that accrues from generous acts (hence, perhaps, the epithets dios and orchamos andrén, that some critics have found inappropriately applied to a “‘lowly”’ swineherd), As noted, all other forms of generalized reciprocity flow from this nuclear idea of food-sharing among kith and kin. Giving to beggars (e.g. 3! Finley (1965): 111; Lacey (1968):34, 37; Humphreys (1969):209; Starr (1977): 138. The following exhaust the instances of kinship reciprocity. Jl. 4.477 = 17.301: Trojan warriors slain before they can apadidémé 10 their parents the cost of their nurture (‘hrepia); HH. 5.272: Anchises gives Aeneas two horses; #1. 12.433: 2 woman spins for a meager wage (misthos) for her children; Od. 19.411 (cf. 24.333): Odysseus’ maternal grandfather, Autolycus, promises him gifts from his ktémara, Horses were expected to reciprocate for their tendance (komidé): It. 8.186; 23.411. Asthe son of a “bought"™ woman, the “Cretan” Odysseus received only a small share of the division of Castor's 2dé, an illustration that kin- ship reciprocity is reckoned in terms of consanguinal closeness (Od. 14.207). No doubt the misery forecast for her fatherless child by Andromache is exaggerated, but the passage shows the dangers of being without kin and kinship reciprocity (If. 22.487; cf. d/. 24.538: $42; Od. 16.114-121). The most obvious example of kinship réciprocity is the aid rendered Menelaus by his brother. S.C, Humphreys emphasizes (corr.) that affinal ties, especially among the Trojans (on home ground) are important to Homer, and that while kin groups are entirely absent, kin networks are present (e.g. Support of brothers and cousins in fighting). B. Qviller (corr) sees cognatic kinship reckoning as significant; the absence of larger kin groups (which fig- ure prominently in the later polis) and evidence of uxorilocal residence imply high mobility and the optional nature of kinship beyond the family,136 WALTER DONLAN Od. 14,45; 17.345, 367, 420) is a generalized reciprocity; other forms of obligatory or altruistic hospitality, which we have classed under balanced reciprocity, are closely related to this kind of **generalized reci- procity broadened beyond ordinary sectoral limits," common to many primitive peoples (Sahlins [1972:216-17]}. To a significant degree, how- ever, giving to beggars has a balanced aspect. Ideally, such giving is in- spired by human pity and fear of Zeus xenios (Od. 14.388; cf. 17.367, 475-487), In practice, beggars ussually receive food and clothing in re- turn for some sort of service: for example, reward for news (Od. 14.126, 152, 395; 17.163, 549, $56; 19.309), for servant's work (Od. 15.317; 18.7; 19.27), for farm work (Od. 17.20, 223; 18.357), for a deed of prowess (Od. 18.46; 21.338). In economies with little surplus a non-productive consumer is burdensome (kafatruché, Od. 15.309; 16.84; cf. 19.27), and is plainly regarded as such (Od. 17.226, 375-387, 446; 18.362; 20.376; cf. 15.335; 17.407; 18.114; 20.178). Conversely, unstinting generosity in these circumstances is both visible proof of rank and wealth and a source of prestige. In a tribal society the man who can afford to be and who is generous demonstrates his right to be leader. That this generosity takes place at the peripheral sector (stranger, beggar) simply confirms the right more strongly; and the giver gains in ‘‘moral’’ stature by adherence to the divine prescription that all strangers and beggars are from Zeus. Telemachus treats the beggar Odys- seus in this way (Od. 16.78; 20.281; cf. 17.345), as does the swineherd (Od. 15.335); Odysseus pointedly brags to Antinous and Melantho of his past generosity (Od. 17.419 = 19.75). On the other hand, Telemachus sarcastically upbraids Antinous for his lack of generosity to the beggar (Od. 17.397), a theme which Odysseus himself expands on, accusing Antinous of not giving a grain of salt from his oikos even to his own ‘‘retainer’’ (epistatés, 17.455). This statement comes after Odysseus’ ironical beggar’s approach to Antinous, in which he calls the suitor aristos and ‘‘like a basifeus,’’ and says that Antinous should therefore give him a better portion than the other suitors, for which ‘I would make you famed over the boundless earth”’ (17.415). The wealthy suitor Ctesippus displays a similar failing in generosity, ob- jecting to the isé moira given to Odysseus by Telemachus, in a violent 32 Note xenié trapeza, Od. 14.158 (= 17.155; 20.230), bracketed by Zeus and Odysseus” hearth; cf. Od, 19.303. Also, Telemachus’ treatment of the suppliant-stranger Theo- clymenus, Od, 15,280; 17.52. Finally, Telemachus’ insistence on his right to bestow freely, Od. 21.248. The collective pressure on the leading men to maintain beggars and wanderers, strongly reinforced by the ideological system, may also have functioned as a communal-protection device, since such “strays”” (Quiller) would pase not only an economic burden on the popu lace but also a physical danger, as potential brigands. Additionally, the suppliant (or the beggar) may be incorporated (permanently or temporarily) into the oikos, increasing its productivity and the oikas-head’s circle of followers (e.g. Irus, the messenger-beggar, Od. 18.6).RECIPROCITIES IN HOMER 187 breach of the laws of giving (Od. 20.281-300; cf. athemistia eidGs, 287). The suitors distort the rules of giving even further, threatening to turn situations of generalized reciprocity into negatives ones, when they ad- vise selling the beggar Odysseus and the suppliant Theoclymenus into slavery. The treatment of beggars and suppliants by Odysseus and his family- members further illustrates the rule that generosity begets prestige, which is an indispensable element in the achievement and maintenance of high position. The suitors, who do not observe these conventions, but engage in negative reciprocity, risk a negative reputation in the communit hence their fear of public opinion (Od. 16.375). Penelope tells Euryma- chus that men who dishonor and consume the oikos of an aristeus cannot be ewklees among the démos (Od. 21.331). This is in strong contrast to the honored memory of Odysseus’ kindly rule and to Penelope’s kleos which ‘“‘reaches broad heaven,” like that of the ideal basifeus (Od. 19.107). The importance of the observance of altruistic hospitality to one’s reputation is underscored by Penelope's complaint to Telemachus that he has allowed the beggar to be mistreated: Telemachus looks like a rich man’s son, but his intentions are no longer righteous; should the beggar suffer some harm, then “‘aischos and /6bé among men" would fall on Telemachus (Od. 18.215-225). Generous giving creates not only goodly fame but also loyalty. Gener- osity begins at home, of course; hence the generosity to the ofkos-mem- bers, the core of loyal followership. Eumaeus, lamenting Odysseus’ ab- sence, enumerates the rewards that ‘‘a benevolent anax gives to his oikeus who toils much for him'’—a house, a k/éres, and a much-wooed wife.’ The suitors also reward their followers; their hupodréstéres are well-clothed and well-fed (Od, 15.330). Melanthius, Odysseus” goatherd, went over to the suitor Eurymachus and was treated gener- ously by him (Od. 17.256); his sister, Melantho, once a favorite of Pene- lope, was Eurymachus’ mistress (Od. 18.325); twelve of the fifty women- servants in Odysseus’ oikos had also joined the suitors. The practical result of the draining of Odysseus’ food-stocks is that the suitors’ supplies lie untouched, to feed their own oikées, while Telema- chus has no surplus with which to reward his people (Od. 17.532-538). The economic decline of the paramount’s household is therefore the cause of political weakness. Odysseus" house is now in a precarious posi- 33 Note in Od. 21.312 the effectiveness of Penelope's repetition (in a reversed sense) of ‘Ctesippus* words in 20.294. Penelope's generosity is like that of Odysseus and Telemachus. 3 Od, 20.381; ef. 17.249; 18.83, 115; 21.306. In Od. 17.462; 18.394; 20.299, Odysseus suffers the further indignity of having things thrown at him. Note also the complaint by one of Odysseus’ grinding-women about the suitors’ harsh treatment, Od. 20.105 29 Od. 14.62; ef. 14.138; 15.365, 488; 18.322. Philoetius, the cowherd, contemplates Jeaving with his cattle to join the oikas of another chief; only the thought of the possible re- turn of Odysseus keeps him (Od. 20.217). In return for their help Odysseus later promises the swineherd and cowherd wives, krémaia, houses near his own, and that they will be as Aetairoi and kasignétoi to Telemachus—i.c. that they will advance in nearness to the chief (Od. 21.213).158 WALTER DONLAN tion relative to the other households of the Ithacan chiefdom and to the démos, while even within the oikos itself the bonds of loyalty have be- come fluid. As a category of generalized reciprocity, sharing differs from kinship and oikos-reciprocity in that it takes place at a broader sector of society, among groups that are not self-contained entities with fixed hierarchies of status. Thus the larger, temporary coalition of tribal units that make up the /aoi of the Greek army at Troy, or these units themselves, like the hetairoi of Odysseus on his return (whose membership is drawn from various oikoi), are sharing groups. The characteristic feature of econo- mic relations within the oikos is that the head, like the father in the nu- clear family, is the redistributor of the oikos’ production, and obliga- tions of giving and reciprocity are precisely reckoned in terms of nearness to the aikos-head.** The organization of sharing in Homer reveals an am- biguity at exactly the point of relationship between tribal group and leader, Sharing in the epics mostly involves the distribution of the spoils of war and raid. The most common pattern of sharing of spoils is collection and equal distribution, sometimes by lot, by the group, to all group- members. An extra, of choice, portion (geras) is usually given, by the group, to the leader or to an outstanding warrior, as his due. In these in- stances the agent of distribution is the group itself.” In a few instances, however, the agent of the sharing-out is the leader, not the group.*> The difference, however apparently slight, between these two ways of sharing is significant. The distinction lies in the competence to initiate and to control the process of distribution, and reflects, therefore, the presence of differing (or “‘shifting’’) systems of social organization. In the one (the vast majority of cases) we observe “‘true’’ sharing, that is, egalitarian, noncentralized, distribution, which is associated with the so- cial organization of tribes; the other is actually a form of ranked distri- bution, characteristic of the centralized economies of chiefdoms. The economic and political consequences of this shift are great. When the agent of sharing-out is not the group but the leader, control of goods has passed into the hands of one man; asa result, what was ‘‘due’’ to the leader becomes “‘privilege,’’ and “‘sharing’” becomes “‘redistribution.”” 36 A simple itlustration is the division of the 208 of Castor, the father of the fictitious “Cretan Odysseus. Castor's “legitimate” sons divided thetr patrimony among them (by lot); and to the ““Cretan,”” who was born of a slave woman, they gave “‘a few things,” plus a house (Od. 14.199). 37 1. 1.122-126, 161-162, 366-369; 9.138, 365-367; 16.56; 18.327; Od. 9.41-42, 159-160, $48-551; 11.533-534; 13.137-138; 14,232-233. In MI. 11.625-627 Achilles sacked Tenedos and the Achacans ‘‘chose out" a woman for Nestor ‘‘because he was best of all in council."” See also #1. 1.135, 276, 299, 392; 2.228, 255; 18.444; Od. 7.10, 150; 16.384. For an extended analysis of expressions denoting “sharing,” “dividing,” “‘alloting,”" eic., see Boreck¥ (1965). 38 1, 9,330-334 (Agamemnon); 11.687-688, 704-705 (the hégésores of the Pylians, Neleus). In 1. 9.367 Achilles says it was Agamemnon who gave him Briseis, a contradiction cof earlier statements,RECIPROCITLES IN HOMER 159 Although chiefly due and chiefly redistribution are mutual aspects of chiefly office, they may be analyzed separately. Chiefly due can be de- fined as the formal statement of the chief’s rights of call on the produc- tion and services of the group. The extent and limit of this right are pro- portional to the power of the office. At the extreme of chiefly Power, when chief has become, in fact, “king,” and the chiefdom a “‘state,” with formally constituted organs of control and coercion (army, bu- reaucracy, tax collectors, etc.), there is no limit: the king controls all. in Homeric chiefdoms the limits of what is due to the chief are a reciprocal of the limits of his imperfectly integrated political control. In Homeric society, as we have seen, chiefly due is that something extra which accrues to the leader, qua leader, usually perceived as a re- ward due for his services to the group, Thus, in the sharing of booty, an extra share (geras) is either awarded to the leader by the group, which “gives” or ‘‘chooses”’ the geras, or the leader himself ‘‘chooses out" a geras for himself,’* This difference in the way a leader acquires a geras (like the difference in the sharing-out of spoils) is the difference between centralized and noncentralized schemes of distribution, and expresses the variance in the degree of contral over the goods of the group that is vest- ed in the group or in the leader. There are other forms of chiefly due. Subordinate leaders, with their groups, were expected to lend their aid in war and to provide other serv- ices to the ranking chief. Another important form of chiefly due is the remenos, whose ety- mology, from temndé, ‘‘cut,’’ suggests its meaning. The Lycians ‘‘cut out” an “‘outstanding”’ femenos, of orchard and ploughland for Bel- lerophon, ‘so that he might distribute it for himself’? (gemomai, I. 6.195). The gerontes of the Actolians promised Meleager a mega déron: to “‘choose out” an ‘‘outstanding"’ remenos of fifty measures, half of vineland and half of cleared plowland, ‘‘cut’’ from the plain (//. 9.574). Glaucus and Sarpedon nemomai a mega temenos of orchard and wheat- land in Lycia (//, 12.313). Achilles sarcastically asks Aeneas if the Trojans had ‘‘cut out" an ‘‘outstanding” remenos of orchard and ploughland ‘‘so that you may nemonrai it’’ (H. 20.184). In every instance it is stated or implied that the femeros, a substantial piece of choice agri- cultural land, is given, by the larger group, to a chief or other important 3% The group ‘'gives™” (diddmi): , 1.123, 135, 162, 276, 299, 392; 2.228, 255; Od. 7.150; 9.551; of, 11,934, 23.358. The group ‘“chooses-out"’ (exaired): H. 1.369; 11.627; 16.86; 18.444; Od, 7.10; 9.160, The leader ‘‘chooses-out for himself" (exaireamaf): i. 9.130 (Agamemnon); 11.697, 704 (Neleus); Od. 14.232 (Odysseus the Cretan”); cf. J, 9.139 (Achilles). The leader “holds” (echd); Hi. 9.333 (Agamemnon); 17.232 (Hector). For the distinction between *‘share'* (moira) and geras, see Od. 11.534. E.g. H, 1,198; 5.211, $50, 613; 13.669; 23.297, 24.400; Od. 14.70; 24.116. Also, H. 24.449; Od. 2.212, 286, 306, 319, 386; 3.363 (cf, 4.642-654); 4.669, 778.160 WALTER DONLAN figure, for his use, as a reward for some outstanding service to the group. It is to be noted that the femenos is freely given, the giver is the group it- self, and that the giving is contingent on service.” Finally, chiefly due, as an embedded aspect of social relationships, is seen in sumptuary custom, by which leaders are honored with special Privileges at feasts, because of their higher rank. The general impression we have of chiefly due in Homer is one of a free granting of material goods, land, service, and privilege by the group to the leaders, as something ‘‘due’’ them, by virtue of their rank, in re- turn for leadership. Such transactions are properly classed as general- ized, since, taken together, they form a systern of reciprocities (that is, a continuing series of mutual benefits, not single transactions). At the same time, there is an element of balance, as in the awarding of gera and temené, which is usually linked to specific situations. This ambiguous- ness—generalized-unspecific giving, dependent on rank, versus bal- 41 Other references to temenos: il. 18.550, a temenos basiléion, in which workers reaped while the basilews watched; Hi. 20.391, temenos pairdion of a slain warrior; Od. 6.293, the temenos of Alcinous; Od. 11.184, Odysseus* mother tells him that Telemachus still pos- sesses his kelon geras and temenea nemesai; Od. 17.299, the remenos of Odysseus. See also It, 2.696; 8.48; 23.148; Od. 8.363, semené of gods. Finley (1965:99) calls the femenos a “separate estate. . which the community placed at his disposal."* In (1957:149) Finley suggests femenos means "‘no more than ‘royal land,” that is a ‘privately owned" estate which differed from all other estates solely by the fact that it belonged to a king." He argues that the femenos was nol a grant that went with ‘‘the throne,” given by the démas or gerontes; that Greek kings “are never given a ¢emenos” conditional "‘in the tenure sense;"” and that the land was nat the property of the community. Finley is here attempting to show that there was no collective holding of land in Homeric society, and he is probably correct The question of property relations (especially of real property) in Homer is a very obscure one. Nevertheless, the texts themselves make it quite plain that the femenos was given by the wider community to the leader, as a reward for, or contingent on, some communal serv- ice. (We note that Meleager did not get the temenos promised, II. 9.598-899.) Whatever the source of the land in question, its granting was in the control of the community. Finley is correct in saying that the remenas-holding did not go with the ““throne:” i.e., once given it was kepl as “personal” property. This does not necessarily mean “ownership” in the legal sense, but usufruct is certainly meant, For a general discussion of this difficult subject see Thucnwald (1932: 186-204); and for a survey of the question of Greek land-tenure see Starr (1977: 150-52), with bibliography. As to the availability of land, we may conjecture, with some chance of being correct, that in the tenth to eighth centuries B.C, the amount of "surplus™ tillable land was sufficient to allow for the granting of faitly large pieces as semené, Snodgrass lists the number of occu- pied sites in the whole of the Greek world (excluding Crete) as ¢.320 in the thirteenth cen tury, 130 in the twelfth, and 40 in the eleventh, concluding that “the population of Greek lands in the eleventh century B.C. was lower than it had been for a thousand years"’ (1971:364-67). Coldstream (1977:369, note 2) estimates the number of occupied sites (also excluding Creté) as 100 in the tenth century, 112in the ninth and 200 in the eighth. If these figures are approximately correct, the amount of arable land available during the tenth and ninth centuries would have exceeded even that available in Early and Middle Helladic, for wl the number of sites on the mainland and islands is computed at 200 and 250 respec- tively (Snodgrass (1971:367)). 42, 4.287, 343: 8.161; 12.310; 17.248; Od. 11.188. Note also the expressions ‘honor him like a god with gifts"’ Ui. 9.155 = 297) and “honored like a god by the démos™ Ut. $5.78; 10.33; 11.58; 13.218; 16.608; Od, 14.205; cf, 7.11), which convey in general terms the ‘granting of higher awards to persons of ascribed higher rank.RECIPROCITIES IN HOMER 161 anced-specific giving, dependent on a particular service—is the economic statement of the ambiguity of political control in Homeric chiefdoms. If, in other words, we ask whether the giving to the chief is “voluntary,” or whether the chief may ‘‘command” the giving, we must answer ‘*yes”” twice. That is the nature of chiefly due. But, as the texts make plain, peo- ple in Homer perceive chiefly due as uncoerced giving. It is the group that normally ‘‘gives’’ and “‘chooses”’ the geras, **gives’’ and ‘‘cuts out”” a temenos for the leader. Historically, such a perception will have had its origin in a less com- plex stage of social organization, when a special material honor was given, ad hoc, to the successful leader in some communal exploit. At the stage of social development depicted in the epics, chiefly due had become a formal socio-economic institution, by which rank was recognized and sustained; the chief received his ‘‘due’’ because he was the chief. In sum: ‘it is abundantly clear that the division of spoils and the rewarding of leaders in Homer conforms to the pattern of egalitarian, tribal economic systems. On the other hand there is the sense of transition to a more stratified system, in which chiefly prerogative is an ascribed right. This may be seen in the generalized usage of geras (e.g. I. 20.182; Od. 11.175, 184; 15.522; cf. 7.150) and timé (e.g. I. 6.193; 9.616; Od. 11.498; cf. 1. 1.278; Od. 1.117) as equivalent to the office itself of chief. See especially H. 20.181-182. Given the duality of conceptions, social friction is’ inevitable; and, given the importance of control of the distributional process to political authority, it is inevitable that friction will center about the limits of the chief's authority in this sphere (sharing, chiefly due, chiefly redistribu- tion). The crisis of leadership, which is the basic plot of //iad, opens on the unsettled questions of the paramount’s due and his competence to con- trol the distributional process. Forced to give back the daughter of Chryses (by divine action, his duty to the group, public pressure), Agamemnon views this as a threat to his prestige (and, therefore, to his political authority). Caught between the necessity of his obligation to the community and the diminution of his ¢imé, Agememnon feels compelled ta balance his loss, ‘‘so that I may not be the only one of the Argives agerastos, since that is not fitting” (//. 1.118; see 135). Achilles’ reaction exemplifies the ambiguities inherent in the chief's role as the distributor. On the one hand, Agamemnon would contradict the principle of egali- tarian sharing: ‘‘For how will the great-hearted Achaeans give you a geras? We know of no great store of xunéfa, but what we plundered from the cities has been dateomai, and it is not fitting for the /aoi to gather these things back again” (1.122-126)."" On the other hand, the chief's su- perior right to compensation is recognized in Achilles’ offer to “‘apotinein three and four-fold” in the future (1.128). * Or, perhaps, ‘to gather again from the faoi.” The social dilemma is captured in the highly charged formula, “‘it is fitting.”” Lt is oude eotke for Agamemnon to be without a geras, and it is ouk epeoike to reverse the process of distribution,162 WALTER DONLAN We have seen that Achilles states twice that the agent of the sharing- out of spoils was Agamemnon, while elsewhere this is the prerogative of the whole group. It is also made clear that Agamemnon has the power to take back the geras which had been given out. This is negative reciproci- ty, in effect, and is expressed in the language of forcible seizure.“ Nestor judges this an improper social act (//. 1.275; 9.108), and Achilles com- pares his treatment to that of a ‘‘rightless migrant’’ (atimétos meranasiés, 9.648; 16.59). Although there is a measure of ambiguity re- garding the paramount chiefs role in the distribution of spoils, there is no doubt about his ultimate authority to enforce his will in these matters, even though it is universally recognized as an abuse of that authority, re- sulting in a socially dangerous distancing of the chief from his subordi- nates, stretching the limits of chiefly right. Agamemnon can coerce, of course, because he is politically more powerful than Achilles—he rules over more men and he is far wealthier Ui. 1.281; 9.69—i.e., he has more followers and more goods to distrib- ute). Although for one mad moment (//. 1.188) Achilles contemplates physical attack, his only realistic response must be restricted to words and to withdrawal of himself and his followers. For its part, the assembled /aos, like the assembly in Odyssey 2, remains essentially Passive: first, because their individual shares of the spoils are unaffected; and, more pertinently, because their economic and political concerns are bound-up in their own tribal groups. The Quarrel is between paramount and subordinate chief, further evidence that social friction in Homer's world concerns primarily the relationship between heads of autonomous social units and the ranking chief, whose ability to extend his control over a wider polity is in question, Agamemnon can force Achilles to sur- render his prize; he cannot make the Myrmidons fight. In chiefdoms the chief's authority, while considerable, falls far short of autocracy because he has no governmental apparatus to enforce his will. This is the root of the chiefdom’s notorious instability, and explains why control of the flow of goods and the rights of call on goods is crucial to political power. Because it is the validation of his rank and of his authority as leader, the chief must insist on public affirmation of his superior due. So, Agamemnon threatens to come himself to take away Achilles’ geras, “that you may know well how much I am pherteros than you, and that another man may loathe to call himself isos to me and liken himself to me (komoioomai) to my face" (//. 1.185). Nestor makes a general rule of this when he warns Achilles not to ‘strive might with might against a basileus, since a sképtouchos basileus, to whome Zeus has given kudos, 4 fi, 1.137, 161, 184, 230, 275, 323, 356 (= 1.507; 2.240), 391; 9.107, 335, 344, 368; 16,33, $8; 19.89. The verbs are haired, aphaired , epouras, ephubrizd, amerdd, In 1.299 and 430 it is stated that it was the group that took away Achilles’ prize, a “slip'® that serves to emphasize the ambiguity. The plural in 1.430 may refer to the heralds who actually led the girl away, but Achilles" words in 1.299 preserve the confusion about the ultimate source of authority in the distributional process.RECIPROCITIES IN HOMER 163 never has a common (Aomoios) share of timé.’" Agamemnon is ‘‘mighter (pherteros) because he rules over (ammass6) more men’’ (JI. 1.277ff.}. This states the position of chieftainship in its more mature form—a con- ception, however, that is not unanimously accepted. Achilles’ complaint, that grief comes ‘“‘whenever a man wishes to despoil (amerdé) an equal (homoios), and to take back his geras because he is superior in Kratos” (Hl. 16.52), is the contradicting statement, the source of which is the still vital principle of tribal egalitarianism. By the same token, generosity is no less crucial, for the chief who is perceived as greedy risks losing his followership. As a subordinate chief Achilles easily separates himself and his group from Agamemnon’s au- thority, on these grounds. He calls Agamemnon “‘most gain-loving of all,”’ ‘‘clothed in shamelessness, profit-minded,”’ ‘‘chief who eats the people”’ (7. 1.122, 149, 231), and says that he will not remain, afimos, to increase Agamemnon's aphenos and ploufos (1.171). Indeed, perception of Agamemnon as greedy and ungenerous is the stated grounds of Thersites’ call for a general revolt (//. 2.225; cf. 254-256). In sum: the dispute over the limits of distributional authority is the economic statement of the limits of the chief’s political authority. In the Hiad the actual political resolution of this conflict between two ways of distributing (and the corresponding conceptions of leadership) is com- promise. Ultimately, Agamemnon’s claim to superiority is upheld, but only after he has indemnified his challenger, Achilles, many-fold. That Agamemnon is forced to offer Achilles a most generous compensatory balanced reciprocity (in exchange for the injury of the negative recipro- city and as inducement to return), and that Achilles can refuse the offer, are proof of the political frailty of Homeric chiefdoms. It must be noted’ parenttietitally tere that Agamemnon’s ‘chief dom” at Troy was an anachronistic epic retrojection, since the chiefdom form, as we see it in Homer, was not capable of effecting anything like a pan-Hellenic consolidation. Nevertheless, the sociological stresses that it experienced correspond perfectly (scaled down) to our model of the chiefdom with surviving elements of the tribal form, and it is reasonable to conclude that the epic’s conception of the Greek confederacy at Troy was an inflated version of the local system. Chiefly redistribution as an established mechanism of social and politi- cal integration is evident in the epics. The extent to which the production ‘of the group is collected at the center and dispersed outward and down- ward is a measurement of the control exercised by the central authority— the chief. The most common Homeric example of chiefly redistribution is, not surprisingly, the communal feast—dafs—whose prototype was food-sharing in the family, presided over by the male head.” In all these 43 H.9.115-161; cf. aperesi® apoina, 120; also 1,213, $10. “ II. 1.315: hecatomb to Apollo, provided by Agamemnon, conveyed by Odysseus, pre- sided over by Chryses, and shared by the embassy (1.468); //. 2.402; 7.314: bull to Zeus, presided over by Agamemnon, shared by the geranres; Il. 9.89: dais, provided by Agamem-164 WALTER DONLAN examples but one (Od. 3.5), the chief, as provider of the dais, functions as the distributor of food to the group. Dais has the same root as verbs meaning “‘to distribute;’” often the adjective eisé (equal) is joined to it. The feast is commonly also a religious sacrifice, with the chief acting as priest, on behalf of the group (Od. 14.250-251) The ability to distribute food is attended by political privilege. The dais is an occasion for rewards to subordinates, which displays the chief’s generosity, increases his prestige, and is a means of further inte- grating the group under the chief’s control. Thus Agamemnon gives Ajax the chine as a geras for an exploit.” Agamemnon tells Idomeneus (i, 4,257) that he honors (14) him above the rest in the dais, by giving Idomemeus more than the alloted portion (daitron) of the ‘wine of the elders’’ (gerousios oinos; cf. Od. 13.8). When Agamemnon chides Menestheus and Odysseus for holding back, he complains that they are the ‘‘first to hear my call to the feast whenever we Achacans prepare a dais for the gerontes”’ (il. 4.343). There are few sure statements in the text about the ‘“source”’ of the food that the chief distributes. The public feast of 81 bulls in Odyssey 3.5 is clearly provided by the nine segments (hedrai) of the Pylian commun- ity—a truly communal feast. Menelaus rallies the Aégérores and medonies ‘‘who, at the side of the Atreidae, Agamemnon and Menelaus, drink démia’’ (11. 17.248). The adverb démia signifies ‘‘at the démos’ ex- pense'"—a positive example of chiefly redistribution, in which the wine (gerousios oinos) is collected by the paramount and redistributed by him to the lesser chiefs, as their geras. Odysseus the ‘‘Cretan’’ gave hospital- ity to Odysseus ‘‘out of the many things that were in the oikos,” and non, shared by the gerontes; II. 18.558: dais, of an ox, provided by a basileus, shared by the workers in his femenos; Il. 23.29: funeral feast, of many bulls, sheep, goats, swine, for Patroclus, presided over by Achilles, shared by the Myrmidons; If, 24,802: dais, provided by Priam, in honor of Hector, shared by the kasignétoi and herairoi of Hector; Od. 3.$: 81 bulls to Poseidon, provided by the Pylians (nine hedrai gave nine bulls each), presided over by Nestor, shared by the Pylians; Od. 3.309: funeral feast, provided by Orestes, in honor of the slaying of his mother and Aegisthus, shared by the Argives; Od. 4.3: marriage feast, provided by Menclaus, shared by the geitones and evai of Menelaus: Od. 7.98: feast, pro- vided by Alcinous, shared by the Aégérores; Od. 8.38: dais, of 12 sheep, 8 boars, 2 oxen, Provided by Alcinous, shared by the ship's crew and the Phaeacian Aégérores; Od. 13.2: dais, of a bull to Zeus, provided by Alcinous, shared by the hégérores; Od. 14.249: “many victims," provided by Odysseus the “‘Cretan,"’ for feasting and sacrifice, shared by his “‘trusty companions."’ These feasts are shared by groups that cross-cut kinship and other associational lines. Exactly the same is the family dais, of a heifer to Athena, provided by Nestor and presided over by him, shared by the family and by Telemachus and his heairai (Od, 3.421). Cf. I. 9.205 (the embassy to Achilles); H!, 24.123 (Achilles’ hetairoi). In Od. 1.226 (see Gd, 11.415; Il. 18.491), eranos, a meal to which the guests themselves con- tributed, is contrasted to gamos (marriage-feast) and eilapiné (drinking-revel?);

Вам также может понравиться

• Shoe Dog: A Memoir by the Creator of Nike

  

  От Everand

  Shoe Dog: A Memoir by the Creator of Nike

  Phil Knight

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (537)
• Why Philogenetic Methods Do Not Work

  

  Документ34 страницы

  Why Philogenetic Methods Do Not Work

  Agustín Avila

  Оценок пока нет
• The Subtle Art of Not Giving a F*ck: A Counterintuitive Approach to Living a Good Life

  

  От Everand

  The Subtle Art of Not Giving a F*ck: A Counterintuitive Approach to Living a Good Life

  Mark Manson

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (5794)
• • Журналы
  • Подкасты
  • Нотное издание
• Norman HOUSLEY, Documents On Later Crusades 1274-1580 (F - 109)

  

  Документ68 страниц

  Norman HOUSLEY, Documents On Later Crusades 1274-1580 (F - 109)

  Agustín Avila

  100% (3)
• Hidden Figures: The American Dream and the Untold Story of the Black Women Mathematicians Who Helped Win the Space Race

  

  От Everand

  Hidden Figures: The American Dream and the Untold Story of the Black Women Mathematicians Who Helped Win the Space Race

  Margot Lee Shetterly

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (895)
• Petronian Society Newsletter

  

  Документ29 страниц

  Petronian Society Newsletter

  Agustín Avila

  Оценок пока нет
• The Yellow House: A Memoir (2019 National Book Award Winner)

  

  От Everand

  The Yellow House: A Memoir (2019 National Book Award Winner)

  Sarah M. Broom

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (98)
• Ralph Hanna - Editing Medieval Texts - An Introduction, Using Exemplary Materials Derived From Richard Rolle, - Super Canticum - 4-Liverpool University Press (2015)

  

  Документ196 страниц

  Ralph Hanna - Editing Medieval Texts - An Introduction, Using Exemplary Materials Derived From Richard Rolle, - Super Canticum - 4-Liverpool University Press (2015)

  Agustín Avila

  Оценок пока нет
• Grit: The Power of Passion and Perseverance

  

  От Everand

  Grit: The Power of Passion and Perseverance

  Angela Duckworth

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (588)
• Housley, The Later Crusades

  

  Документ276 страниц

  Housley, The Later Crusades

  Agustín Avila

  Оценок пока нет
• The Little Book of Hygge: Danish Secrets to Happy Living

  

  От Everand

  The Little Book of Hygge: Danish Secrets to Happy Living

  Meik Wiking

  Рейтинг: 3.5 из 5 звезд

  3.5/5 (400)
• Review of KALDELLIS A. The Byzantine Rep

  

  Документ2 страницы

  Review of KALDELLIS A. The Byzantine Rep

  Agustín Avila

  Оценок пока нет
• The Emperor of All Maladies: A Biography of Cancer

  

  От Everand

  The Emperor of All Maladies: A Biography of Cancer

  Siddhartha Mukherjee

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (271)
• On The Imitation of Antiquity

  

  Документ25 страниц

  On The Imitation of Antiquity

  Agustín Avila

  Оценок пока нет
• Never Split the Difference: Negotiating As If Your Life Depended On It

  

  От Everand

  Never Split the Difference: Negotiating As If Your Life Depended On It

  Chris Voss

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (838)
• Apollonius' Jason: Human Being in An Epic Scenario Author(s)

  

  Документ9 страниц

  Apollonius' Jason: Human Being in An Epic Scenario Author(s)

  Agustín Avila

  Оценок пока нет
• The World Is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century

  

  От Everand

  The World Is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century

  Thomas L. Friedman

  Рейтинг: 3.5 из 5 звезд

  3.5/5 (2259)
• 12 Maximos Planudes

  

  Документ42 страницы

  12 Maximos Planudes

  Agustín Avila

  Оценок пока нет
• On Fire: The (Burning) Case for a Green New Deal

  

  От Everand

  On Fire: The (Burning) Case for a Green New Deal

  Naomi Klein

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (74)
• C. Asinius Pollio and The Early History of Public Recitation at Rome

  

  Документ10 страниц

  C. Asinius Pollio and The Early History of Public Recitation at Rome

  Agustín Avila

  Оценок пока нет
• Elon Musk: Tesla, SpaceX, and the Quest for a Fantastic Future

  

  От Everand

  Elon Musk: Tesla, SpaceX, and the Quest for a Fantastic Future

  Ashlee Vance

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (474)
• Cabaniss - The Satyricon and The Christian Oral Tradition

  

  Документ4 страницы

  Cabaniss - The Satyricon and The Christian Oral Tradition

  Agustín Avila

  Оценок пока нет
• A Heartbreaking Work Of Staggering Genius: A Memoir Based on a True Story

  

  От Everand

  A Heartbreaking Work Of Staggering Genius: A Memoir Based on a True Story

  Dave Eggers

  Рейтинг: 3.5 из 5 звезд

  3.5/5 (231)
• Textual Criticism - Zetzel: Sander M. Goldberg

  

  Документ6 страниц

  Textual Criticism - Zetzel: Sander M. Goldberg

  Agustín Avila

  Оценок пока нет
• Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln

  

  От Everand

  Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln

  Doris Kearns Goodwin

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (234)
• Eros Ludens: Apollonius' Argonautica 3, 132-41

  

  Документ9 страниц

  Eros Ludens: Apollonius' Argonautica 3, 132-41

  Agustín Avila

  Оценок пока нет
• Devil in the Grove: Thurgood Marshall, the Groveland Boys, and the Dawn of a New America

  

  От Everand

  Devil in the Grove: Thurgood Marshall, the Groveland Boys, and the Dawn of a New America

  Gilbert King

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (266)
• Polanyi - Aristotle Discovers The Economy

  

  Документ16 страниц

  Polanyi - Aristotle Discovers The Economy

  Agustín Avila

  100% (4)
• The Hard Thing About Hard Things: Building a Business When There Are No Easy Answers

  

  От Everand

  The Hard Thing About Hard Things: Building a Business When There Are No Easy Answers

  Ben Horowitz

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (345)
• Johnson - Toward A Sociology of Reading in Classical Antiquity

  

  Документ36 страниц

  Johnson - Toward A Sociology of Reading in Classical Antiquity

  Agustín Avila

  Оценок пока нет
• Yes Please

  

  От Everand

  Yes Please

  Amy Poehler

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (1891)
• Women in Livy

  

  Документ9 страниц

  Women in Livy

  Agustín Avila

  Оценок пока нет
• The Unwinding: An Inner History of the New America

  

  От Everand

  The Unwinding: An Inner History of the New America

  George Packer

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (45)
• Buck, Greek Dialects

  

  Документ354 страницы

  Buck, Greek Dialects

  Kostas Vlassopoulos

  100% (3)
• Rise of ISIS: A Threat We Can't Ignore

  

  От Everand

  Rise of ISIS: A Threat We Can't Ignore

  Jay Sekulow

  Рейтинг: 3.5 из 5 звезд

  3.5/5 (137)
• Hefferman, Ekphrasis and Representation

  

  Документ21 страница

  Hefferman, Ekphrasis and Representation

  Agustín Avila

  Оценок пока нет
• Principles: Life and Work

  

  От Everand

  Principles: Life and Work

  Ray Dalio

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (599)
• Fear: Trump in the White House

  

  От Everand

  Fear: Trump in the White House

  Bob Woodward

  Рейтинг: 3.5 из 5 звезд

  3.5/5 (738)
• Angela's Ashes: A Memoir

  

  От Everand

  Angela's Ashes: A Memoir

  Frank McCourt

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (440)
• Bad Feminist: Essays

  

  От Everand

  Bad Feminist: Essays

  Roxane Gay

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (1016)
• Steve Jobs

  

  От Everand

  Steve Jobs

  Walter Isaacson

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (806)
• The Glass Castle: A Memoir

  

  От Everand

  The Glass Castle: A Memoir

  Jeannette Walls

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (1713)
• The Gifts of Imperfection: Let Go of Who You Think You're Supposed to Be and Embrace Who You Are

  

  От Everand

  The Gifts of Imperfection: Let Go of Who You Think You're Supposed to Be and Embrace Who You Are

  Brené Brown

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (1090)
• John Adams

  

  От Everand

  John Adams

  David McCullough

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (2409)
• The Outsider: A Novel

  

  От Everand

  The Outsider: A Novel

  Stephen King

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (1839)
• The Light Between Oceans: A Novel

  

  От Everand

  The Light Between Oceans: A Novel

  M.L. Stedman

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (789)
• Manhattan Beach: A Novel

  

  От Everand

  Manhattan Beach: A Novel

  Jennifer Egan

  Рейтинг: 3.5 из 5 звезд

  3.5/5 (792)
• The Sympathizer: A Novel (Pulitzer Prize for Fiction)

  

  От Everand

  The Sympathizer: A Novel (Pulitzer Prize for Fiction)

  Viet Thanh Nguyen

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (121)
• The Woman in Cabin 10

  

  От Everand

  The Woman in Cabin 10

  Ruth Ware

  Рейтинг: 3.5 из 5 звезд

  3.5/5 (2322)
• Brooklyn: A Novel

  

  От Everand

  Brooklyn: A Novel

  Colm Tóibín

  Рейтинг: 3.5 из 5 звезд

  3.5/5 (1937)
• A Man Called Ove: A Novel

  

  От Everand

  A Man Called Ove: A Novel

  Fredrik Backman

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (4610)
• The Perks of Being a Wallflower

  

  От Everand

  The Perks of Being a Wallflower

  Stephen Chbosky

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (2104)
• Wolf Hall: A Novel

  

  От Everand

  Wolf Hall: A Novel

  Hilary Mantel

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (3811)
• Little Women

  

  От Everand

  Little Women

  Louisa May Alcott

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (104)
• Her Body and Other Parties: Stories

  

  От Everand

  Her Body and Other Parties: Stories

  Carmen Maria Machado

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (821)
• The Art of Racing in the Rain: A Novel

  

  От Everand

  The Art of Racing in the Rain: A Novel

  Garth Stein

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (4200)
• Sing, Unburied, Sing: A Novel

  

  От Everand

  Sing, Unburied, Sing: A Novel

  Jesmyn Ward

  Рейтинг: 4 из 5 звезд

  4/5 (1103)
• The Constant Gardener: A Novel

  

  От Everand

  The Constant Gardener: A Novel

  John le Carré

  Рейтинг: 3.5 из 5 звезд

  3.5/5 (104)
• A Tree Grows in Brooklyn

  

  От Everand

  A Tree Grows in Brooklyn

  Betty Smith

  Рейтинг: 4.5 из 5 звезд

  4.5/5 (1929)