1

PAINS OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON THE BANGSAMORO
by: Zainal Dimaukom Kulidtod, PhD
1


Caveat

Voltaire once said, I may not agree with what you say, but I will defend to death your
right to say it. This hallmark foundation of the freedom of expression is what I expect the
readers to bear in mind when reading this manuscript. Since this writing tackles the different
factors that could possibly explain the foreseen failure of the Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro (CAB), it contains a lot of thought-provoking issues and probably even offensive
propositions. In this paper, I intentionally adopted the rigid Islamic perspective in organizing
my thoughts, not because I want to follow the track of extremism, but to analyze the present
peace engagement between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) in the most objective way possible using the Islamists perspective since
they are the most radical members of the Bangsamoro society.

I expect varied reactions to my presentation. Some may find both positive as well as
negative points in this work. But those who could not or would refuse to see the truth and
wisdom of this writing may find only the negative aspects. Expectedly, they might even consider
me as a peace-spoiler, if not an outright enemy of the peace process.

Nevertheless, let it be known that with all sincerity and honesty in my heart, it is never
my intention to hurt anyone or any group. My sole aim is to present the perspective of the
most radical segment of the Moro separatist fighters for our reconsideration and evaluation so
that real peace may finally reign in this troubled land. It is my conviction that unless the
grievance of the most militant Moro is addressed, real and everlasting peace in Mindanao will
remain an elusive dream. It should be remembered that this band of freedom fighters has the
strongest capability, the burning determination and the iron will to sow disturbances in our
midst in the name of long-aspired justice and freedom.

Moreover, knowing and understanding the real causes and genuine motives of this
conflict would bring us closer to our quest for justice for the thousands of lost lives from both
sides, and ultimately for the direct victims of this war. Then, we can say we are already one step
closer to its ultimate resolution.

Looking at the provisions of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro and its
Annexes, one will notice that it contains both substantive as well as procedural shortcomings.
Presented hereunder are some of the more serious ones. The first seven are considered as
substantive while the rest are procedural.

Substantial Limitations

1
Dr. Zainal D. Kulidtod, a native of DatuPiang, Maguindanao, is the former Assistant Dean of the College of Social
Sciences and Humanities, Mindanao State University, Main Campus at Marawi City. He holds the following
degrees: AB Political Science (CUM LAUDE), Master in Public Administration, Doctor of Philippine Studies and
Bachelor of Laws, all taken in the same university.


2


[1] The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro recognizes the spirit and embodies
some principles of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The foremost evidence of this is the
provision of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB)
2
in Paragraph 7 of the section
on Transition and Implementation that The Bangsamoro Basic Law submitted by the
Transition Commission shall be certified as an urgent bill
3
by the President. Clearly, this
provision of the Agreement is a constitutional framework emphasizing a constitutional process
that all statutory laws emanate from the Philippine Congress whose passage may be expedited
when the President certifies the urgency of the bill. This, indeed, championed the legal
sovereignty of the Congress of the Philippines being the ultimate repository of the state
legislative power. Consequently, the above provision affirms the spirit of the Philippine
Constitution being embodied in the Framework Agreement.

Therefore, since the Comprehensive Agreement recognizes the fundamental law, it may
be safely concluded that the MILF finally conceded to the granting of only an autonomous
government, being the only possible highest degree of self-determination that can be validly
established under the existing Constitution.
4
It is worth remembering that any form of local
governmental set-up different and higher in degree of autonomy than the present ARMM
would require a change of the Constitution.
5
And because the Framework Agreement does not
require the change in the fundamental law, it follows that only an autonomous
region/government (like the ARMM) is affirmed as the constitutionally-prescribed form or
degree of internal self-determination for the Bangsamoro people. Consequently, the only way
for it to go higher in degree of self-determination is through a constitutional change.
6
In short,
it may be safely deduced that because the questioned peace formula does not require
amendment to the Constitution, we can hardly expect any form of government substantially
higher in degree of autonomy than the ARMM set-up.

Time and again, peace advocates have been consistent in their proposition that the
present set-up of autonomy prevailing in Mindanao is never the solution to the Moro problem.
In fact, no less than President Benigno S. Aquino III
7
categorically said that the ARMM is a
failed experiment. Otherwise, if this ARMM is the ultimate solution, it could have put a rest to
the worsening peace and order situation in Mindanao which started in August 1989 and
continues for more than 25 years (as of press time).

It is a fatal mistake to believe that there could be another form of autonomy higher than
the so-called Expanded-ARMM which could possibly and validly be established under the

2
Signed on October 15, 2012, this is a roadmap agreement whose details are provided in the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB).
3
In the landmark case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the Supreme Court clarified the two objectives of the
Presidents certification, viz: The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but
also that of reading the bill on separate days. [G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630].
4
Section 15, Article X, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
5
Soliman M. Santos, Jr., Legal Notes on the Right of Self-Determination and on Secession: The Real and Realistic
Score, REFERENDUM ON POLITICAL OPTIONS FOR THE BANGSAMORO: Study Papers on the Legal and
Historical Basis. Cotabato City: Mindanao Peoples Peace Movement, 2010, p. 39.
6
Ibid.
7
He is popularly known among Filipinos as PNoy (President Noynoy).


3

existing 1987 constitution. This frame of mind is a sheer ignorance of the Philippine
constitutional law as well as the Philippine jurisprudence.

Putting the blame on the Philippine legal system as the ultimate obstacle to our public
quest for lasting peace in Mindanao, one writer opined: The Philippine legal systems seem to
be unfriendly to a Peace Agreement like the FPA. Many of the agreements provisions strike
discordant chords with the body of Philippine jurisprudence and the Constitution itself, which is
adverse to separatist tendencies.
8


Since the present ARMM set-up, which is the highest degree of self-rule that could be
legally granted to the Moros, is an autonomy formula established under the present
constitution but never solved the Mindanao crisis, the envisioned Bangsamoro Government to
be organized in 2016 may also likely fail as it is to be created also under the same constitution.

[2] Contrary to the claim of some sectors of our society that the Bangsamoro Government
prescribed in the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) is a variant of sub-state,
which is a real form of political autonomy, the fact remains that this political arrangement also
envisions a version of just an administrative autonomy experimented by previous Philippine
Administrations.

In clarifying the difference between an administrative autonomy (decentralization of
administration) and a political autonomy (decentralization of power), the Supreme Court
pronounced in the landmark case of Limbona vs. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989;
170 SCRA 786, the following:
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the
central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in
order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments more responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. At the same
time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs
and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law. He has no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In
that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape
its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a

8
AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW: The 1996 Final Peace Agreement Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front: An In-depth Analysis, Highlights of the 1996
Final Peace Agreement and Conflicting Claims of Interpretation. Cotabato City: Institute of Autonomy and
Governance, January-March, 2009, p. 12.


4

constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation,
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to
the central authorities but to its constituency. [Italics supplied]
In short, political autonomy happens when the people are given the right to freely
determine their political status, and to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development without any imposition, dictation or intervention from outside forces. Along this
line, one could infer that all forms of autonomy given to the Moro (from the Marcos Regional
Autonomous Governments [RAGs], to Corys Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
[ARMM], to Arroyos Expanded Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao [E-ARMM] and finally
to Aquino IIIs Bangsamoro) are just shades of administrative decentralization pursuant to
decentralization principles embodied in the Constitution as well as in the existing laws
governing local governments. In all these variants of autonomy, the Bangsamoro people have
never been given the freedom to chart their political destiny. This is done by the Philippine
Congress, being the legal sovereign in the country.
9


In other words, the system of life for the Muslims in Mindanao is prescribed not by the
Bangsamoro themselves but by someone else. Can the Christian-majority Philippine Congress
10

prescribe what system of life is best suited for the Muslims? Plain reason dictates that it cannot.
In the same manner, the Moro cannot prescribe what system of life is appropriate for the
Christians.

Following this logic, observers of the Mindanao conflict commonly share the view that
all variants of autonomy offered by the Philippine government aimed at resolving the conflict
finally ended as failed experiments because they were all authored by people foreign to the
Moros. Obviously, since these law-makers do not know the peculiarities and intricacies of the
Moros system of life, they prescribed the wrong solutions.

Because the ARMM is just a version of an administrative autonomy, it is not surprising
that the Supreme Court, in Kida vs. Senate,
11
considered it as a local government unit justifying
that autonomous regions fall under Article X of the Constitution which is entitled Local
Government. Consequently, the fate of this local autonomy
12
in the country, where the ARMM
belongs, was clarified by the same Court in the most celebrated case of Pimentel vs. Aguirre,
G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000, where the highest court lauded:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national
government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local
governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over

9
In the R.A. 9054, its preamble provides: The people of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao . . . do
ordain and promulgate this Organic Act through the Congress of the Philippines. [underline supplied]
10
As of the Sixteenth Congress, the total membership of the Philippine National Legislature is 314, consisting of 290
Representatives and 24 Senators. Of this number, only 9 or 2.87% are Muslims, all belong to the Lower House.
[http://www.congress.gov.ph/members/] and [http://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/sen16th.asp], both accessed on
6/27/2014.
11
G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011.
12
Since the proposed Bangsamoro Government is also categorized as a version of local autonomy prescribed by the
Congress, it is also bound by this ruling of the Court.


5

local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation
is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels.
In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units
are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to
enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected
locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal.
Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.
[Italics supplied]
[3] The New Political Entity to be organized by 2016 shall have no control over the LGUs in its
territorial jurisdiction since their IRAs shall automatically be given to them without passing
through the future Bangsamoro Government.

The Philippine Constitution provides that Local government units shall have a just
share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them.
13
This non-self-executing provision is given life by the Local Government Code of 1991 in
further stating that The share of each local government unit shall be released, without need of
any further action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case
may be, on a quarterly basis within (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not
be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for
whatever purpose.
14


Due to the statutory injunction for the National Government to automatically and
regularly release the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of any Local Government Unit (LGU),
either within or outside the proposed Bangsamoro Political Entity, these LGUs shall still be
fiscally dependent on Manila. In short, LGUs in the future Bangsamoro Government shall only
be administratively under the Regional Government but they shall still be politically and fiscally
dependent on the Central Government. Thus, these LGUs shall be accountable and, therefore,
loyal not to the Bangsamoro Government but to the National Government.

In the Pimentel case, the Supreme Court of the Philippines laid down the following legal
doctrines relative to the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs regarding their shares in the national
internal revenue taxes. With only three Justices dissenting in an en banc decision, the Court
nullified Administrative Order No. 372 decreed by former President Ramos, entitled Adoption
of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998, which ordained in its Section 4 thereof that:
Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee
of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue
allotment to local government units shall be withheld. Says the Court:
A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than
the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release
shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every

13
Section 6, Article X, Philippine Constitution.
14
Section 286, Paragraph (a), Chapter 1, Title III, Republic Act No. 7160 (otherwise known as the Local
Government of 1991.


6

quarter of the year and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be
imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. [italics supplied]
The above pronouncement of the Court is now a legal principle mandating that even the
Chief Executive of the Philippines cannot hold back or make any deduction in the IRAs of the
LGUs irrespective of his intention and purpose.

This judicial ruling also holds true even if the one making any lien or holdback in the IRA
is the Philippine Congress as settled in the Alternative Center for Organizational Reforms and
Development, Inc. (ACORD), et.al. vs. Ronaldo Zamora, et.al., G.R. No. 144256, June 8, 2005. In
that case, the national legislature enacted the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year
2000 which provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion) appropriated for
UNPROGRAMMED FUND, shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted
by the President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted
by certain committees enumerated by this law.

In invalidating such act of Congress, the highest court amplifies:

As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically
release the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the
legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing
this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional
provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is
virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute - a proposition which is
patently absurd. [Italics supplied]

In conclusion, for as long as the 1987 Philippine Constitution remains un-amended, both
the President as well as Congress cannot impose any lien, holdback or encumbrance of
whatever kind to the IRAs of the LGUs which would prevent them from their automatic release,
much more for rechanneling the release of these revenue allotments to other entity, such as to
the future Bangsamoro Government.

Since the LGUs in the future Bangsamoro Government shall remain politically and
fiscally under the Central Government, can the New Political Entity to be established in 2016
control and institute effective reforms in these government units?

[4] On several occasions, the Peace Panel of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have
made several appeals to their counterparts in the government side not to offer them the same
propositions already enjoyed by the present ARMM. Apparently, the MILF want to be given a
substantially higher degree of self-rule, politically and fiscally, than that granted to the MNLF-
inspired ARMM.

However, a cursory reading of the CAB suggests that the MILF has only minor
achievements as compared to the MNLF. The most notable ones are the following.



7

(4.I) The shifting from a presidential-like ARMM to a parliamentary-like Bangsamoro
Government.
15
To some peace observers, this is the essence of asymmetry contemplated by the
MILF in the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) as stipulated in Section I,
Paragraph 2 of said Agreement which mandated that the government of the Bangsamoro shall
have a ministerial form. As can be recalled, both peace panels conceded that the status quo
16

is unacceptable, hence, the proposal for the parliamentary system.

Some of the manifestations of the claim that ARMM exhibited a presidential form are as
follows: First, the law creating it stipulates that the legislative power of the autonomous
government shall be vested in the Regional Assembly whose members are elected by popular
vote.
17
And second, its executive power shall be vested in a Regional Governor who shall be
elected by the qualified voters of the autonomous region. Since he is the chief executive of the
Region, the Regional Governor appoints all the members of the cabinet.
18


Accordingly, the above provisions indicate that the law-making body of the autonomous
region is distinctly separate from its law-implementing body both in terms of their
memberships and functions. Moreover, as opposed to a parliamentary system whose head of
government is voted indirectly by the electorates, the chief executive of the ARMM is directly
elected by popular votes. Hence, it exhibits a presidential system.

On the other hand, the Annex on Power Sharing
19
indicated the following salient
features of the proposed Bangsamoro Government which exemplify a parliamentary system.


15
Presidential government is one wherein the state makes the executive constitutionally independent of the
legislature as regards his tenure and, to a large extent, as regards his policies and acts, and furnishes him with
sufficient powers to prevent the legislature from trenching upon the sphere marked out by the constitution as the
executives independence and prerogatives. This suggests that presidential government possesses three basic
characteristics: (1) there is a separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial departments, (2)
the chief executive (i.e., President) is directly chosen by the people and not by the legislature, and (3) heads of
executive agencies and administrative departments are normally members of the presidents party. The first feature
suggests three attributes, such as: (a) each department is equal to the other, (b) everyone must coordinate with the
activities of the other, and (c) each is independent within its own sphere.
By comparison, parliamentary system (sometimes known as Cabinet government) is one in which the state
confers upon the legislature the power to terminate the term of office of the real executive. Under this system, the
Cabinet or ministry is immediately and legally responsible to the legislature and politically responsible to the
electorate, while the titular, nominal, ceremonial or symbolic executive chief of state (monarch or president)
occupies the position of irresponsibility. Among the most outstanding features of parliamentary system are: (1)
there is a union or fusion between the legislative and executive departments, (2) the chief executive is the Prime
Minister who selects the ministers of government to constitute the Cabinet, (3) the Prime Minister is not only head
of government but also the leader of his party and, consequently, the leader of the parliamentary majority, (4) the
citizens do not vote for the chief executive but vote only for the legislative representatives, and (5) the cabinet
system separates the ceremonial executive from the real working executive.
16
This concept was once a source of misunderstanding between the GPH and MILF Peace Panels. On one hand, in
using this term status quo, the MILF was obviously referring to the system of the National Government in the
Philippines which has been prejudicial to the Bangsamoros quest for self-rule. Therefore, it needs to be changed to
accommodate the sentiments of the Moro. On the other hand, the Central Government was consistently interpreting
this term to mean the present ARMM. Thus, instead of changing the whole Philippine governmental structure, what
needs to be changed is only its subpart, the ARMM.
17
See Sections 1 and 2, Article VI, R.A. No. 9054.
18
See Sections 1 and 2, Article VII, R.A. No. 9054.
19
Signed on 8 December 2013, it is the 3
rd
Annex of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.


8

It shall have a ministerial form of government that is democratically constituted and
representative of the people in the region, and reflective of the diversity of the Bangsamoro.
The central seat of governmental power is the Bangsamoro Assembly whose members are to
be chosen through democratic means. Being vested with power to legislate,
20
this Assembly will
select from among themselves a primus inter pares (literally means first among equals), known
as Chief Minister, who will appoint his cabinet members, known as Ministers, majority of whom
shall also come from the members of said Assembly.

Composed of the Chief Minister, the Deputy Minister and other ministers, the Cabinet
performs the executive functions of government. By a vote of at least two-thirds (2/3) of its
members, it may be dissolved by the Assembly through a vote of no-confidence proceeding.
Furthermore, serving as the advisory body to the Assembly is a separate Council of Leaders to
be composed of LGU chief executives of provinces and chartered cities and such other
representatives coming from non-Moro indigenous communities, women, settler communities
and other sectors.

With the proposal to replace the ARMM by a parliamentary-like Bangsamoro, will all the
present problems of the former be addressed by the latter? Could the so-called Moro problem,
being articulated at present by the Islamic elements of the Bangsamoro society, be effectively
solved by a ministerial system of government? Is the conflict in Mindanao a question of what
government type is given to the Moro, or is it a question of how much do they control their
system of life?

(4.II) If we compare the Wealth Sharing Annex of the MILFs CAB and the present law
governing the ARMM,
21
there are two most striking areas worth mentioning. First is the
internal revenue taxes collected in the region. Article I (Taxation), Section A (Taking Powers),
Paragraph 4, Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the Wealth Sharing Annex proffers that: Central
Government taxes, fees and charges collected in the Bangsamoro . . . shall be shared as follows:
(a) Twenty five (25%) percent to the Central Government, and (b) Seventy (75%) percent to the
Bangsamoro . . . On the other hand, Article IX, Section 9 of RA 9054 provides that seventy
(70%) percent of The collections of a province or city from national internal revenue taxes,
fees and charges, and taxes imposed on natural resources shall be given to the regional
government including the local government units therein, while the remaining thirty (30%)
percent goes to the national government. In other words, the share of the proposed
Bangsamoro Government from incomes collected in its territory is increased to only five (5%)
percent as compared to the share of the present ARMM from taxes collected in the region.
Second is the sharing arrangement on matters of potential sources of energy in the region. The
Annex on Wealth Sharing in Paragraph 3, Section VII (Natural Resources) thereof states that:
With respect to fossil fuels (petroleum, natural gas, and coal) and uranium, the same shall be
shared equally between the Central and Bangsamoro governments . . . This means that the
sharing of income derived from exploration, development and utilization of all natural

20
Implied from Item 9, Part Two of the Annex on Power Sharing, p. 4.
21
Republic Act No. 9054, or otherwise known as An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled An Act
Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, As Amended. Promulgated on March 31, 2001.


9

resources within the Bangsamoro between the Central and Bangsamoro governments is in
fifty-fifty (50:50) ratio.
On the other hand, Paragraph (b), Section 5, Article XII (Economy and Patrimony) of RA 9054
also recognized and mandated that: Fifty percent (50%) of the revenues, taxes, or fees derived
from the use and development of the strategic minerals
22
shall accrue and be remitted to the
Regional Government . . . The other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the central government
or national government. This entails that on matters of regional economy and patrimony,
there is no difference between the present ARMM law and the newly-signed Wealth Sharing
agreement.

Based on these facts, radical sectors of the Bangsamoro society posit the conclusion that
the MILF have not achieved anything on matters of control of the regions strategic minerals as
compared to the present ARMM set-up.

(4.III) Under the CAB, the term Bangsamoro is given three meanings: (1) as a form of
political entity, (2) as a national identity, and (3) as a territory.

The first is found in Paragraph 1 of Section I which provides that The Bangsamoro is the
new autonomous political entity (NPE)
23
which shall be established to replace the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). It will exhibit a ministerial form and
Cabinet system of government which must reflect the Bangsamoro system of life and meet
internationally-accepted standards of governance. It must have an electoral system suitable
to a ministerial form of government which shall allow democratic participation, ensure
accountability of public officers primary to their constituents and encourage formation of
genuinely principled political parties.

The second meaning of the abovementioned term is stated in Paragraph 5 of the same
Section which discloses that the Bangsamoro refers to those who at the time of conquest and
colonization were considered natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu
archipelago and its adjacent islands including Palawan, and their descendants whether of mixed
or of full blood Their spouses shall also carry the same identity. Obviously, this definition
extends the meaning of Bangsamoro as a national identity beyond residency.

Under R.A 6734, Bangsa Moro people are citizens of the Philippines residing in the
Autonomous Region who are also considered as indigenous cultural community on account of
their descent from the populations that inhabited the country or a distinct geographical area at
the time of conquest or colonization and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or
all of their own socioeconomic, cultural and political institutions. On the other hand, the new
ARMM law (R.A 9054) defines Bangsa Moro people as those citizens of the Philippines residing
in the Autonomous Region belonging to the indigenous cultural community who are believers
in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political

22
Paragraph (a) of same Section defined the term strategic minerals to include uranium, petroleum, and other fossil
fuels, mineral oils, all sources of potential energy.
23
The FAB envisions The government of the Bangsamoro shall have a ministerial form with an electoral system
suitable to a ministerial form of government. And, The relationship between the Central Government with the
Bangsamoro Government shall be asymmetric.


10

institutions. Essentially, while the former law clarified the term Banga Moro/Bangsamoro
using a cultural perspective, the latter statute defines it in religious viewpoint. Does it make any
sense? One thing is certain that in both definitions the term Bangsa Moro is only confined to
ones residency as qualified by the phrase residing in the Autonomous Region.

The final meaning is stipulated in Sections 1 and 3, Article V of the FAB enumerating the
core territory
24
to constitute the Bangsamoro. As agreed upon by the Panels and subject to the
results of a plebiscite, the New Political Entity shall consist of the following:
25


First is the present geographical area of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). This covers the five (5) provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Basilan, Sulu and
Tawi-Tawi, and the cities of Marawi and Lamitan. It is interesting to note that the cities of
Cotabato in Maguindanao and Isabela of Basilan do not form part of the ARMM, although they
are located right in the very heart of the Muslim Autonomy.

Second are those local government units adjacent to the ARMM that voted for inclusion
in ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite, like the municipalities of Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar,
Tagoloan, and Tangkal in the Province of Lanao del Norte and some barangays in the
municipalities of Kabacan, Carmen, Aleosan, Pigkawayan, Pikit, and Midsayap.
26


Some legal luminaries in the country have reservations on the validity of this political
consensus arguing that in the 2001 plebiscite, the residents of these 37 barangays in North
Cotabato were asked whether they were or were not interested to be included in the territory
of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and not to the territory of the future
Bangsamoro Government. In other words, considering that the ARMM and the Bangsamoro
Government are two different and distinct political entities, is it legally permissible to say that
the peoples initial preference to be included in the former is the same preference to be
included in the latter? This invites a doctrinal pronouncement by the Supreme Court. However,
this doubt could be clarified in the result of the plebiscite for the ratification of the Bangsamoro
Basic Law. After all, the Constitution affirms that sovereignty resides in the people.

The third core area is the cities of Cotabato in the Maguindanao Province and Isabela in
the Basilan Province. Between these two cities, it is the case of Cotabato City which is more
intriguing. It should be recalled that since the first establishment of the ARMM in 1989 under
the old law (R.A 6734), this City has been the seat of the Regional Government, although it is
not a part of its territory. Thus, a government employee in Cotabato City was quoted saying:
Actually, a single step immediately outside the Main Gate of the ORG (Office of the Regional

24
Following the provision of Article V, Section 2 of the FAB, these areas are not be automatically form part of the
Bangsamoro Government. Instead, they are still to be subjected to a plebiscite in pursuance to the mandate of the
Constitution that The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.. [See Article X,
Section 18]
25
Article V, Sections 1 and 3, Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB).
26
Based on the 2001 Plebiscite Results from the COMELEC (Commission on Elections), the number of barangays
in each of these 6 Municipalities in North Cotabato is distributed as follows: Aleosan has 3 out of its 19 barangays;
Carmen, 2 out of 28; Kabacan, 3 out of 24; Midsayap, 12 out of 57; Pigkawayan, 6 out of 40; and, Pikit has 11 out
of its 40 barangays.In short, the barangays in question are 37 all in all.


11

Governor) Compound is already outside the ARMM. How is this awkward situation legally
permissible? Can one LGU in the Philippines legally hold its office in another LGU?
27


The fourth category includes those other contiguous areas
28
where at least 10% of the
qualified voters pass a resolution or a petition in their LGU asking for their inclusion, at least
two months prior to the conduct of the ratification of the Bangsamoro Basic Law and the
process

The phrase other contiguous areas includes those communities of Muslims contiguous
to, but outside, the first three categories of the core territory previously mentioned. As
intended by the Parties, these areas shall also be subjected to a plebiscite where at least 10% of
the qualified voters therein would indicate their initial preference to be covered by the
Bangsamoro Government through their LGU resolution or a petition. Such intention for
inclusion must be filed at least two months prior to the conduct of the ratification of the law
abolishing the ARMM.

But why is it that only at least 10 percent is required, why not at least a majority? It
requires a long stretch of imagination to believe that in the intention for inclusion (say) only 10
percent of the residents consented, but two months thereafter and during the formal
ratification majority of them agree. This statistical improvement from 10 percent approval to a
majority (say, 50 percent plus 1) approval is highly improbable, if not impossible, considering
the very short period of two months which is to be used both for providing basic services in
these communities and thereafter campaigning for their acceptability of the new law.

The fifth and final category of the Bangsamoro territory is those areas which are
contiguous and outside the core territory where there are substantial populations of the
Bangsamoro that would opt anytime to be part of the territory upon petition of at least ten
percent (10%) of the residents and approved by a majority of qualified voters in a plebiscite.
29


This last category refers to those Muslim communities contiguous to, but outside, the
first four categories of the core territory that may opt anytime to be part of the territory of
the Bangsamoro. In other words, as compared to the fourth category, the filing of their
intention for inclusion shall be done after the popular ratification of the new law. However, for
them to be validly under the Bangsamoro, the final approval of the majority of the qualified
voters therein is also required.

Why does the FAB contemplate expanding the Bangsamoro territory after its first
plebiscite? This is mandated in Article VI, Section 4 that protects the rights of the Bangsamoro
people residing outside the territory of the Bangsamoro and undertakes programs for the
rehabilitation and development of their communities. It further states that The Bangsamoro

27
In the case of Kida vs. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011, the Supreme Court considered the ARMM as a
local government unit because autonomous regions fall under Article X of the Constitution which is entitled Local
Government.
28
Relate this to Article I, Section 2, Paragraph (b), GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement which says: . . . clusters of
contiguous Muslim-dominated municipalities voting in favor of autonomy be merged and constituted into a new
province(s) which shall become part of the new Autonomous Region.
29
Paragraph 3, Article V, Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.


12

Government may provide assistance to their communities to enhance their economic, social
and cultural development. Thus, it is believed that once their communities are rehabilitated
and developed by the new government they would eventually opt to join. On the contrary,
should the new political entity fail to meet their expectations, these communities may refuse to
be a part of this new autonomous government.

Among the three interpretations of the term Bangsamoro, what can be considered as a
new achievement in the FAB, as compared to the GRP-MNLF Final Agreement, is the
recognition of the Bangsamoro as a national identity. According to MILF sympathizers, this is
what makes the new Agreement one step ahead of the old one. However, it must be
emphasized that said recognition is just a national identity liberation, not the liberation of the
Bangsamoro homeland from the bondage of tyranny, oppression and injustice.

(4.IV) Even before the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro in
October 2012, there were already several foreign development agencies actively involved in the
peace process in Mindanao. Among the most visible ones were the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), The Asia Foundation (TAF), and the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). Their involvement was formalized and expanded in
pursuance to the third identified mandate of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) to
implement socio-economic assistance in the conflict-affected communities.
30


However, after the signing of the FAB, a great number of development agencies joined
such as: the World Bank, International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP), United
Nations Children Education Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organizations (UNESCO), Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Australian Agency for
International Development, among others. Moreover, experts on peace building are telling us
that still other foreign development partners are ready and very eager to extend their
assistance once the Bangsmoro Government is in place. As one peace builder noted, Within
the first three years of the regional government, many donors are expected to offer their
contribution for the success of the Bangsamoro experiment.

This expected influx of development agencies shall always carry with them their
corresponding flooding of funds which may be interpreted by some as bribe to the rebels in
the guise of development. This impending sponsoring of massive development efforts in the
Moro communities is based on the mistaken belief that this war in Mindanao is a rebellion
motivated dominantly by poverty and social injustice. Perhaps, this is true in the early days of
the Moro struggle under the banner of the MNLF
31
as its Manifesto lauded: We, the five
million oppressed Bangsamoro people,wishing to free ourselves from the terror, oppression and
tyranny of Filipino colonialism which has caused us untold sufferings and miseries by criminality
usurping our land, . . . and murdering our innocent brothers, sisters and old folks in a genocidal

30
See the Terms of Reference of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) signed by the GRP-MILF Peace Panels
on 27 August 2007 at Cyberjaya, Malaysia.
31
Notwithstanding its Manifesto, the MNLF Draft Demand submitted by Nur Misuari to Undersecretary Barbero in
February 1977, Tripoli, Libya sought to establish an Autonomous Bangsamoro Islamic Government (ABIG).
[Italics in the text quoted supplied]


13

campaign of terrifying magnitude . . . With such declaration, the common direction of all
peace efforts in Mindanao is veering towards massive development initiatives. Thus, the
creation of the Zone of Peace and Development, the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and
Development, and the Southern Philippine Development Authority.

However, if we review the evolution of the Moro cause, we would realize that it is
getting deeper and more radical. A good case in point is the pronouncement made by the
founding MILF Chairman, Salamat Hashim, when he confided, The ultimate objective of a
Muslim community or Ummah is to make supreme the Word of Allah by (1) The
establishment of a true Muslim community; (2) The establishment of a genuine Islamic
system of government; and, (3) The application of a real Islamic way of life in all aspects of
our life.
32
Obviously, the same ideological line is followed by the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom
Fighters (BIFF). Having been inspired by Salamats teachings, this Islamist Moro group preferred
to be under a government run like hell by the Bangsamoro, as long as the Shariah law is
observed to the fullest extent possible, rather than a government run like heaven by non-Moro
whose laws promote all forms of immoralities and injustices.

Therefore, this may take to mean that even if all the Moro shall become millionaires
overnight, this conflict shall not necessarily end. As noted earlier, the ultimate aim of every
Mujahid
33
is to make supreme the words of Allah. And contrary to the poisonous propaganda
of the West, this long-aspired system of life by the Moro will not result to fundamentalism as it
is already practiced in such liberal Muslim countries as Indonesia (Banda Aceh), Malaysia, and
Turkey.

(4.V) Another notable achievement of the MILF in the CAB is the direct channeling of
the development programs of the government in the Moro areas (i.e., the Sajahatra Programs)
to the MILF. Predictably, this avoids the phenomenon of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), as a
strategy of central governments to defeat liberation movements, by winning the hearts of their
civilian supporters while fighting the rebels. In highlighting the strategy of the LIC program, one
author made this pronouncement:

Instead of using economic aid as leverage for substantial reforms, LIC
advocates increased use of humanitarian assistance . . . as a way to soften, not
solve socioeconomic problems. Also humanitarian assistance is being used for
military support and as part of psychological operations . . . The goal is to erode
or eliminate base of popular support
34



32
Salamat Hashim.THE BANGSAMORO MUJAHID: His Objectives and Responsibilities: Mindanao: Bangsamoro
Publications, 1985, p.8.
33
Interpreted by some as Islamic freedom fighters, this term Mujahid (singular for Mujahideen) differs from the
word rebel. While a rebel aims for social justice and human dignity, a Mujahid ultimately aims for the establishment
of an Islamic system of life. Applying this to the ongoing GPH-MILF Peace Process, all those rebel-inclined MILF
elements shall interpret the CAB as the endpoint of their struggle, while those Mujahid-inclined ones shall continue
it until such time that Islam finally reigns in the Bangsamoro Homeland.
34
Tom Barry. Low Intensity Conflict: The New Battlefield in Central America. The Resources Center, Vol. 34, No.
4, 1986, pp.10-12.


14

As correctly observed by one rebel leader, the relationship between the rebels and their
mass-supporters is analogous to that of a fish and its water habitat. If you remove the fish from
the water it will eventually die. Applying this to a conflict setting, if one party wins the
sympathy of the support base by providing them economic benefits, they will be isolated and
eventually, neutralized.

Avoiding this political trick, the GPH, as a sign of sincerity, has directly given these
government programs intended for rehabilitation of the war-torn areas to the MILF.

(4.VI) From the MNLF point of view, their peace agreements
35
with the GRP did not
succeed because they were all implemented unilaterally by the government. Their participation
in the peace process was only up to the signing of the agreements. After which, the GPH took
over the implementation of the entire agreement.

Take the case of the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. In following its Third stipulation,
Paragraph 16,
36
President Marcos unilaterally implemented the said peace deal. On March 25,
1977, he issued Proclamation No. 1628 declaring autonomy in Southern Philippines. It was
followed by the enactment of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 which provided for the organization
of the Sangguniang Pampook (Regional Assembly) in Regions IX (Central Mindanao) and XII
(Western Mindanao).
37
After the election of the representatives to the two Sangguiang
Pampook was held on May 7, 1979, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1618
implementing the organization of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap
ng Pook (Regional Executive Council) in the said two Regions.

The same process happened during the administration of President Corazon Aquino.
Immediately after her short meeting with Misuari on September 5, 1986 in Jolo, Sulu, she
facilitated the realization of the Muslim Autonomy by constitutionalizing the autonomy
formula.
38
Subsequently, following the Section 18, Article X of the Constitution,
39
President
Aquino appointed all the members of the Regional Consultative Commission (RCC) that drafted
the bill which finally metamorphosed into Republic Act No. 6734. The appointed commissioners
were representatives of multi-sectoral bodies, not necessarily MNLF members or sympathizers.

Even when the 1996 Peace Agreement was implemented by incorporating its provisions
in the Expanded-ARMM Law, there was still no involvement of the MNLF. They were not even
required to submit their proposal on how to accommodate the provisions of said agreement to
the proposed bill. As a result, both the formulation and implementation of this law were solely
done by the Philippine Congress.

35
There are two major peace agreements signed by the Government and the MNLF: the Tripoli Agreement (signed
on December 23, 1976) and the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (signed on September 2, 1996).
36
The Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the
entire Agreement.
37
It may be noticed that, although the 1976 Tripoli Agreement contemplated only one autonomous region but,
Marcos finally implemented two autonomous regions (i.e., Regions IV and XII) for reasons only known to him.
38
See Article X, Section 15, 1987 Constitution.
39
The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees
from multi-sectoral bodies . . .


15


In other words, all necessary steps, legal or otherwise, were done unilaterally by the
GPH. For these reasons, till now, the MNLF have never recognized their participation in the
implementation of either of the two major agreements which they have signed with the
Philippine government.

Thus, to avoid this same pitfall, the FAB proffers that This Agreement shall not be
implemented unilaterally. Apparently, this provision signals the bilateral participation of both
parties in its implementation.

(4.VII) As an off-shoot of this on-going peace settlement, the MILF shall be given the
chance to hold political power. Also, its high ranking members are expected to occupy key
positions in the National Government. More properly termed as a pacification campaign, this
approach is known to some as the policy of accommodation, if not attraction. However, it is
feared that if there are no adequate safeguarding measures instituted, the MILF may just fall
into the same pitfalls of the MNLF.

As a sign of their gradual integration into the government body politic, some of the top
MNLF leaders, supporters or their relatives were either appointed or elected to government
posts. Among the elected ones were MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari (former ARMM Governor),
MNLF Foreign Affairs Officer Parouk Hussin (former ARMM Governor), MNLF Commander
Abdulgani Salapuddin (former Deputy Speaker for Mindanao, Philippine Congress), MNLF
Council of 15 Secretary-General Muslimin Sema (former Mayor of Cotabato City), MNLF Council
of 15 Interim Chairman Hatimil Hassan (former Assemblyman, ARMM Regional Assembly),
MNLF Commander Alhabsi Hassan (former Assemblyman, ARMM Regional Assembly), MNLF
Commander Omar Solitario Ali (former Mayor of Marawi City), MNLF Field Commander Cassan
Capal Kumander Posao (former Mayor of Saguiaran), and MNLF Field Commander Datu Ben
Mokalid (former Mayor of Datu Piang), to name only a few.

These appointed MNLF members or supporters included Yusop Jikiri (SPDA Chair),
Bainon Karon (SPDA board member), Alvarez Isnaji (DOST-ARMM Secretary), Duma Sani (DILG-
ARMM Secretary), Abraham Iribani (DILG Undersecretary), Bai Sandra Sema (DECS
Undersecretary), among others. Today, some of the MNLF members returned to civilian life,
while others simply followed the path of banditry. There were also those who became the
poorest of the poor.

Commenting on the final fate of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, Salah Jubair
elucidates that instead of giving genuine self-rule or autonomy to the Bangsamoro people, as a
distinct historical, religious, cultural group, the FPA integrated the MNLF, including its leaders
and combatants, into the government body politic . . .
40


More telling on the plight of the MNLF in this pacification campaign was the findings of
the IAG in its January-March 2009 publication illuminating:


40
Salah Jubair, THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process. Cotabato City: Institute of
Bangsamoro Studies, 2007, p. 13.


16

During the Marcos regime, government jobs were offered to MNLF
commanders in exchange for allegiance to government. Such vestiges of
parceling government positions for pacification of Moro leaders live on today.
Instead of facilitating Moro representation in national affairs, government jobs
have become instruments for co-opting Moro leaders.
By being governor of the ARMM, Misuari presided over an institution
that his revolutionary group rejected many times over. More significantly, he
was perceived to have allowed himself to be co-opted at a time when he was
expected to provide the visionary leadership for the Bangsamoro. The regular
mentoring provided by high government officials to Misuari at the beginning of
his term as ARMM governor evoked the pathetic image of a revolutionary eaten
up by the system he wanted to change.
41


Would the MILF not suffer the same blunder as that of the MNLF?

(4.VIII) Aspiring to free the Bangsamoro people from the human rights abuses and
sufferings committed and perpetrated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the FAB
mandated that In a phased and gradual manner, all law enforcement functions shall be
transferred from the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the police force of the Bangsamoro.
42

Pursuant to this objective, The government shall redeploy AFP units and troops from or within
the Bangsamoro, consistent with a normal and peaceful life . . . The AFP shall only retain
installations necessary for national defense and security.
43
Obviously, this is the government
response to the consensus that the MILF shall decommission its forces and put their weapons
beyond use. Under this decommissioning component of the peace deal, those MILF fighters
who can qualify as members of the Regional Police Force of the Bangsamoro may have the
opportunity to work in the government and shall become the security forces of their homeland.
In the course of time, it is finally envisioned that all law enforcement activities and programs
related to the maintenance of peace and order in the region shall be solely delegated to this
police force.

Provisions of the Agreement implicitly state that the MILF could establish a special
regional police force which would take charge of all law enforcement activities in the region,
except those relating to national security and external defense. To perform this mandate, it is
necessary that such police force must be separate and distinct from the regular members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP); otherwise, it cannot perform its especially delegated law
enforcement function. Could this be possible?

Anent thereto, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution enjoins that The State shall
establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission.
44
Since the FAB
embodies the spirit of the Constitution, this above-quoted provision shall always prevail over
any of the expressed or implied stipulations of the Parties. Thus, following the imports of said

41
AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW:, 2097, Supra, pp. 96-97.
42
Article VIII, Section 6, FAB.
43
Paragraphs 1 and 2, Section D, Annex on Normalization.
44
[italics supplied]


17

provision, the Philippine Constitution recognizes no other unit of the PNP doing law
enforcement activities in the land except the nationally-constituted police unit administered
and controlled by the Central Government. Consequently, an establishment of any special
police force, with different uniform, insignias, badges, or coat of arms from the regular PNP
personnel, shall definitely be an affront to the fundamental law and, therefore, illegal.

This stand of the MILF in establishing a special regional force for the Bangsamoro is not
a new development in the Mindanao peace process. As a matter of fact, the MNLF have always
insisted on its inclusion in many instances. First was in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement which
stipulated that Special Regional Security Forces are to be set up in the area of the Autonomy
for the Muslims in the South of the Philippines. The relationship between these forces and the
Central security forces shall be fixed later.
45
In clarifying the functions of these forces, the 1977
MNLF Draft Demand posited that:

A Regional Security Force shall be set up and maintained within the
Autonomous Bangsamoro Islamic Region for the following purposes: 1. To
Maintain law and order within the Region; 2. To protect the lives and properties
and honor of the nationals of the Autonomous Bangsamoro Islamic Government;
3. To perform such other functions as the Majlis As-Shura may, by law,
provide.
46


The final attempt of the MNLF in this aspiration was embodied in the 1996 FPA which
provides: . . . there shall be created or constituted a PNP Regional Command for the new
Autonomous Region, which shall be the Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF) as referred to in
Paragraph 8, Article III of the Tripoli Agreement. With this stipulation of the FPA, the proposed
separate and distinct character
47
of the SRSF from the regular police personnel of the country,
being contemplated in the Tripoli Agreement as well as in the MNLF Draft Demand, had already
gotten blurred. Thus, to erase further any cloud of separateness or distinctiveness from the
regular PNP, the Agreement in question already allowed the SRSF to be composed of the
existing PNP units in the area of autonomy, the MNLF elements and other residents of the area
who may later on be recruited into the force. This political fine-tuning effort was intended to
be consistent with the constitutional provision that there shall be one police force in the
country which is national in scope and civilian in character.

Putting the blame on the government side for the failure of this integration formula, the
MNLF explained, the GRP did not organize the MNLF integrees into separate units under the
command of a Deputy Commander. Furthermore, they claimed that the GRP deploys the
MNLF integrees in combat duties to fight their Muslim brothers from the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF).


45
Paragraph 8, Article III, Tripoli Agreement.
46
Article 21, MNLF Draft Demand, Supra.
47
In explaining the proper interpretation of the MNLF on the nature of the SRSF, the Institute of Autonomy and
Governance (IAG), after series of their FGDs, disclosed the MNLF understands the SRSF as distinct from a regular
PNP regional command, since it brings together PNP and MNLF members into a single security unit.
[AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW, Supra.,p.38.]


18

In reference to the GPH-MILF CAB, both parties have to meet immediately to thresh out
problems and arrive at a common interpretation of all its provisions to avoid future conflicting
interpretations. Take a closer scrutiny of that part of the Agreement which says The
government shall redeploy AFP units and . . . shall only retain installations necessary for
national defense and security. Parenthetically, in the minds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, all military units, troops, installations, establishments and camps in the country are
intended and necessary for national security. In short, the term redeploy is emasculated by its
qualifying phrase necessary for defense and national security.

Furthermore, another very alarming issue of decommissioning is raised by a radical
Moro professional who preferred anonymity. In comparing the MILF CAB to the MNLF FPA, he
pointed out that What is even more shocking provision of the CAB is the obligation on the part
of the MILF to decommission its forces by putting their weapons beyond use regardless of
whether they will join the proposed regional police force or not. On this note, the FPA was far
better than the CAB. As can be recalled, the former agreement obliged only those MNLF
combatants who intended to join in the AFP to surrender their firearms, while those who joined
the PNP were exempted from this requirement. In the case of the CAB, all MILF forces are
mandated to disarm themselves whether they will join the regional police force or return to a
civilian life. Did the MILF achieve more in the CAB than what the MNLF achieved in the FPA?

In conclusion, this envisioned integration of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
(BIAF) to become regular members of the PNP is still considered by some as a pain of the CAB.
Have they sacrificed for more than four decades only to become policemen? If this were so, to
my mind, they could have spent the good forty years or so of their struggle in known
universities where they could have become generals by now!

Perhaps the MILF leadership and the Bangsamoro people could learn a rewarding lesson
from the experience of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia relative to the
decommissioning of their forces. In highlighting the points of growing dissatisfaction among the
Acehnese in the course of the implementation of their peace agreement, one author says:
48


. . . there were voices of dissent in regards to the compensation as the
combatants are claiming that the amount is not enough, while non-combatants
are asking why they are left out in the compensation process as they too have
been victims of the conflict . . .
There have been claims that the compensation given was not what was
originally promised . . . there have also been rumors of dissatisfaction among the
GAM rank and file with the way the GAM leadership is benefitting . . . many of
them have now become rich overnight by being contractors, government
officials . . . and other types of employment, while the majority of the rank and
file continues to live in poverty and hardship.


48
Kamarulzaman Askandar, The Struggle for Self-Determination in Aceh, AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW:
International Experiences of Self-determination. Cotabato City: Institute of Autonomy and Governance, April-June
2007, pp. 55-56.


19

If the above-cited development in the Banda Aceh would happen in the implementation
of the recently-signed CAB, it would confirm the prediction that this peace agreement will solve
only the problem of the post-Salamat MILF leadership, but not the problem of the Bangsamoro
people.

[5] Since the signing of the FAB in October 2012, the GPH-MILF peace panels have already
conducted countless peace advocacies or consultations in different parts of Mindanao. But
some participants are wondering why they can hardly ask diagnostic questions pointing to
sensitive issues on the CAB (which may be the reasons for its failure) because they were
automatically branded as peace spoilers or, worse, BIFF sympathizers. Are the GPH-MILF peace
panels espousing a dictated peace? Why is it that only questions supportive of the peace
process are well entertained during those consultations?

In order to know the possible implications of this policy of the peace panels in our quest
for sustainable peace in southern Philippines, we have to understand what dictated peace is all
about.

Using the manner of its attainment as the criterion, peace can be classified as either
negotiated or dictated. The former is believed to last long since the interests of both parties are
addressed, while the latter is temporary as the interest of only one party is served.

There are two ways of committing this dictated peace. First is when one party in a
negotiation imposes its will, interests or condition to the other party. This is sometimes known
as horizontal-dictation because the parties involved are presumed to be in equal footing. And,
second is when the negotiators are imposing to their supporters/followers the will of the other
party in exchange for any political consensus which may or may not redound to the benefit of
the stakeholders. This manner of imposition is labelled by peace experts as vertical-dictation
since the flow of decision or control is from the top to the bottom.

Commenting on the final destiny of this phenomenon of a dictated peace, a writer in
the IAG made the following pronouncement:

. . . peacebuilding is not about the imposition of solutions . . .
Community harmony and peace can be achieved if people are allowed to
participate in activities that redound to their welfare. Enduring or sustainable
peace can be achieved when people . . . can share their views before any
decision is made.
49


[6] Under the CAB, funds from the National Government shall come to the Bangsamoro in five
forms, viz:
(a) The 75% share of the Bangsamoro in the national taxes, fees and charges levied
within the Region (Article I, Section A, Paragraph 4, Annex on Revenue Generation
and Wealth Sharing Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro);

49
AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW, 2009, Supra., pp. 55 and 58.


20

(b) Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) of the Local Government Units within the Region
(Section 286, Paragraph (a), Chapter 1, Title III, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as The Local Government Code of 1991);
(c) The Block Grant (Article V, Paragraph A, Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth
Sharing Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro);
(d) The Special Development Funds (Article V, Paragraph B, Annex on Revenue
Generation and Wealth Sharing Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro); and,
(e) Funds for the socio-economic components of the normalization (Item G, Paragraphs
1-6, Annex on Normalization Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro).

This enumeration is not exclusive as the CAB also contemplates to attract multi-donor
country support, assistance and pledges to the normalization process. As mentioned earlier
on, many are anticipating that Within the first three years of the regional government, it is
expected that many donors will be on parade wanting to contribute to the success of the
Bangsamoro experiment.

Those who are closely monitoring this recently-signed Agreement have noted that
among these five identified funds from the National Government, what appears to be new are
the last three as the first two are already enjoyed by the ARMM.

The Bangsmoro block grant (BBG) is an amount that Central Government will provide
annually for the operation of the Bangsamoro Government. This fiscal management system is
aimed to free the future Bangsamoro Government from the difficulties of the usual annual
budgetary process in which the budget allocations for the Region is negotiated with the
Congress. Hence, the ARMM never enjoyed fiscal autonomy since both the approval as well as
the amount of its budgetary appropriation are under the dictate and mercy of the Congress.
Such difficulty is even aggravated by the national governments policy of prescribing ceiling
amount for the Regions fiscal allotment.

On the other hand, under this block grant system, the Bangsamoro shall be
automatically provided with block subsidies to be allotted to it yearly without undergoing the
difficult process of budget hearing before the Committee on Appropriations in the Lower
House. As mandated by the agreement, its total amount shall not be less than the last budget
received by the ARMM immediately before the establishment of the Bangsamoro.

With this new fiscal arrangement between the New Political Entity and the Central
Government, many are made to believe that this block grant is a unique achievement of the
MILF. However, if we try to scan the provisions of the 1996 FPA one would realize that it also
provided almost the same stipulation when it proffers in its Paragraph 44 that:
50
The Regional
Autonomous Government in the area of autonomy shall enjoy fiscal autonomy in budgeting its
own revenue resources and block subsidies granted to it by the National Government . . .
51


50
The Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoii Agreement Betweenthe Government of the
Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the Participation of the
Organization of Islamic Conference Ministerial Committee of Six and the Secretary General of the Organization of
Islamic Conference, signed on September 2, 1996.
51
[italics and bold face supplied]


21


Moreover, another analogous stipulations found in the MILF-CAB and the MNLF-FPA
relate to development funds. The former provides: The Central Government shall also provide
for a Special Development Funds to the Bangsamoro for rehabilitation and development . . .
while the latter stipulated: The National Government shall appropriate for the area of
autonomy a sufficient amount . . . for infrastructure projects which shall be based on a
development plan duly approved by the Regional Autonomous Government . . .
52


Funds for the normalization process are mandated by the provision of the Agreement
which obliged both Parties to intensify development efforts for rehabilitation, reconstruction
and development of the Bangsamoro, and institute programs to address the needs of BIAF
members and that of their communities. For this purpose, negotiators of both Parties
envisioned to establish a Trust Fund to ensure the efficient, transparent and accountable
release of the funds to be provided by multi-donor country support, assistance and pledges.

Given this wide range of fiscal provisions of the CAB, peace building experts are
predicting that if there are no rigid mechanisms for transparency, accountability and
monitoring of public spending, excessive funding of the future Bangsamoro Government may
result to rampant graft and corruption among new public servants (and their families) who are
fresh from their difficult life in the forest. This common anticipation has been based on post-
conflict peace building experiences in other countries.

[7] As already mentioned , there has been a developing perception that the CAB will solve only
the problem of the post-Salamat MILF leadership, but not the problem of the Bangsamoro
people, especially those sectors of the Bangsamoro society aiming for a real Islamic system of
life aspired by the late MILF founder.
53
For them, this peace formula cannot solve the Islamic
elements of the Bangsamoro struggle because only the basic dimensions of it are intended to
be addressed by the said Agreement, such as its economic, social and historical components.
Since the CAB recognizes the Bangsamoro as a national identity, the perceived victory of the
MILF in the Agreement is considered by some as just a national identity liberation (at most) but
never a political liberation. Regrettably, this is against (or even an insult to) the name of the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front, as conceived by the late Sheik Salamat Hashim (Allaho Yarhamu).
As can be recalled, the MILF broke away from its mother organization as an off-shoot of the
secular ideological line followed by the MNLF. Thus, this Islamic Front was aimed at Islamic
Liberation being the essential requisite of establishing a genuine Islamic government
proposed by its late founder.


52
[italics supplied]
53
In his book, the founding Chairman mentioned the following: The ultimate objective of a Muslim community or
Ummah is to make supreme the Word of Allah . . . The meaning of making supreme the Word of Allah is capsulized
in the following: 1. The establishment of a true Muslim community; 2. The establishment of a genuine Islamic
system of government; and, 3. The application of a real Islamic way of life in all aspects of our life. [Salamat
Hashim, THE BANGSAMORO MUJAHID: His Objectives and Responsibilities. Mindanao: Bangsamoro
Publications, 1985, pp. 8-9.]


22

However, after the death of Sheik Salamat Hashim in 2003, some of the MILFs former
members have been accusing its new leadership of leaning towards the secular path.
54
Some of
their justifications are the following:

First, in their negotiation with the government, the MILF Peace Panel does not have any
ulama member while the GPH Panel has one (i.e., Dr. Hamid Barra). With this arrangement, we
cannot expect the MILF negotiators to be properly guided by Islamic principles of diplomacy
since all of them have limited background in Islam. What is even worse is they can be easily
manipulated by their counterparts in the government who are more equipped with secular
knowledge.

Second, among the four justifications
55
of the MILF in negotiating with the Philippine
government, there was no mention of any Islamic concern. Although, the MILF is an Islamic
front but the foundation of its negotiation is very much secular.

Third, it is personally witnessed by some observers of the MILF-Central Committee that
decision-making in the group is dominated by non-ulamas. Those members who are learned in
Islam cannot (or refused to) have meaningful participation even in highly critical issues as their
opinions are suppressed by the secular-minded members. This emerging development in the
present MILF leadership seems an affront to the Islamic social contract developed by Caliph
Abubakar As-Siddique when, upon his formal enthronement as the khaleefah (literally means
successor) of Prophet Mohammad (s.a.w.) to lead the Muslim Ummah, he mentioned before
the Muslim crowd the following: I have been chosen to govern you, though I am not the best
among you. Help me if am right; correct me if I am wrong. The weak among you will be strong
until I have attained for him his due, and the strong among you will be weak until I have made
him give what he owes. Obey me as long as I obey ALLAH (s.w.t.) and his Prophet (s.a.w.); if I do
not obey them, you owe me no obedience.
56
This pronouncement of Caliph Abubakar became
the foundation of the universally-accepted principle of Islamic governance practiced in the
Muslim world Wa Amruhum Shra Baynahum (Consultative Mandate). Moreover, the afore
cited passages lay down the duty of individual Muslims to their rulers, that is, to object those
decisions done contrary to Islamic teachings and manners. Allegedly, however, this duty is no
longer faithfully observed in the Central Committee of the MILF after Salamats demise. One
interview said that if the ones making decisions in the group are those more senior or lawyer
members, whether or not they have enough knowledge on Islam, their views are usually
controlling and conclusive even without further consultation from the ulamas.

Is this alleged practice in the MILF-CC also present in the MILF Peace Panel?

It must be recalled that during the leadership of Sheik Salamat Hashim in the MILF, this
revolutionary organization have been faithfully adopting the Islamic principle of consultative

54
This is based on the interviews conducted by the author with a BIFF high ranking officer sometimes in February of
2014. According to the interviewee, these are some of their grounds in breaking away from the MILF.
55
The four justifications are enumerated in the book of Salah Jubair (pseudonym of Mohagher Iqbal), The Long
Road to Peace: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process.Cotabato City: Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, 2007, pp. 13-
14.
56
http://um-bs.com/2011/02/06/what-does-islam-say-about-leadership/. Accessed on August 8, 2014. [underscoring
and italics in the quoted text supplied]


23

decision-making. In fact, in his little book, the late founder had vividly prescribed the general
guidelines used by the MILF in formulating its decisions and policies, viz:

One of the hallmarks of the MILF is its policy of CONSULTATIVE and
COLLECTIVE Leadership. Essentially, this policy means that no major decisions
could be formulated and implemented without first resorting to Shra
(consultations) in general meetings attended by Central Committee members in
the Homeland and representatives from different regions.
57


For many sympathizers of the MILF, this long-cherished policy of the Front has been
relaxed in many instances since the loss of its founder. In particular, among the Sangir
58

Bangsamoro, they have the emerging perception that the current MILF Leadership serves only
the interests of the major Moro tribes, like the Maguindanaon, the Iranun and the Meranaw.
For example, during the signing of CAB on March 27, 2014, when one of the Sangir Bangsamoro
Mujahideen, who was fatally wounded during the All-Out-War Policy of President Estrada in
2000, was asked on his reaction, he flippantly replied:Ang pakiramdam namin ngayon ay
parang hindi na kami importante sa Jihad natin, lalo na ang katulad namin na walang pinag-
aralan. Hindi kasi kami nakapag-aral dahil sa Jihad natin. Masakit talaga sa amin na mga
Sangir na kahit isa ay wala man lang pinasama ng MILF sa Manila. Anu pa kaya kapag mag-
gubirno na sila. [We feel that we are no longer important in our struggle, especially those
uneducated Moro like us. We failed to study because of our Jihad. It is painful to us Sangir
Bangsamoro that no one of us was invited to join the MILF delegation in Manila. What more if
they are the ones running the government.]
59


Seemingly, the MILF Peace Panel members, in particular, are perceived by some peace
advocates in Mindanao as having adopted a centralist-democracy policy. It has been generally
observed that all critical commentators to the present peace process are collectively labelled as
peace spoilers regardless of their honest intentions or the merit of their contentions. This
observation became more apparent in August 2013 when a group of Bangsamoro youth drafted
their press release containing their strongly felt frustrations on the recently-signed Annex on
Wealth Sharing. Motivated by their honest intention to remind the MILF Peace Panel on the
sensitivity of their peace journey with the Philippine government, the press release made a
bold declaration which reads in part:
60

The future leaders of the Bangsamoro people would like to make it known to
the Peace Panels of both the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that we are closely monitoring the on-going
peace negotiation between you. We know that whatever peace agreement you
may have agreed will certainly shape our future in Mindanao.

57
Salamat Hashim, Supra, p. 57.
58
The term Sangil, coined by misinformed history writers and professors, to refer to those Islamized natives in the
Sarangani and the Balut Islands, is inaccurate. In the same manner that the Islamized natives of the Maguindanao
and the Cotabato provinces must be correctly referred to as Maguindanaon, NOT Maguindanao.
59
The respondent, who requested not to be named, is one of the members of the MILF-National Guard who were the
close-in bodyguards of Chairman Salamat Hashim.
60
Entitled PRESS RELEASE FROM THE BANGSAMORO YOUTH OF THE MOROLAND, it was released on
July 31, 2013, Bangsamoro Homeland.


24

For the MILF, we want to remind you again to please solve the Bangsamoro
problem in such a manner that it would benefit the past, present and future
generations of the Bangsamoro people. How we wish that the present MILF
leadership after Chairman Salamat Hashim would not be like that of the MNLF
which served only the interests of its present-day members. Being motivated by
personal interests, the MNLF was demobilized and lost its credibility even among
the poorest sectors of the Bangsamoro society because each of its members
saved only his own worldly and material benefits by either joining the AFP/PNP
or becoming local politicians, without solving the Bangsamoro problem. Out of
frustration, others simply turned into a civilian life and became the poorest of
the poor.
If the MILF is really committed to represent the common interests of the
oppressed Bangsamoro people, it is even needless to remind you not to repeat
the same mistakes done by the MNLF in its two (2) peace agreements with the
Government (i.e., 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 Final Peace Agreement).
Furthermore, may we remind you again of our cries during the Second
Bangsamoro Consultative Assembly of June 1-3, 2001, where we delegates were
calling that the only just, meaningful, and permanent solution to the Mindanao
problem is the complete independence of the Bangsamoro people and the
territories they now actually occupy? And, if you can still remember, the
delegates even warned you in that assembly:
That in view of the forthcoming peace negotiations
between the MILF and GRP, we are giving our full support and
mandate to the MILF to represent us in said negotiations
provided, however, that the MILF does not deviate from our
demand for complete independence and accept a compromise
formula short of this aforesaid demand. Should the MILF choose
to deviate, these supports or mandates are automatically
rescinded and withdrawn. [Italics supplied]
We are hereby expressing our overwhelming frustration to the recently-signed
Annex on Wealth Sharing, because we have noticed that the MILF Peace Panel
violated its pronouncements not to accept any agreement with the GPH having
the same tenor with that of the present ARMM Law . . .
. . . on matters of regional economy and patrimony, there is no difference
between the present ARMM law and the newly-signed Wealth Sharing
agreement. Or, to be brutally frank, the MILF has not achieved anything on
matters of control of the regions strategic/metallic minerals as compared to the
present ARMM set-up . . .


25

However, instead of entertaining the merit of the above call, the official website of the
MILFs Committee on Information (www.luwaran.com) stated in part in its August 8, 2013
Editorial, entitled The ideal is only in the mind, the following:
61

There is always no perfect agreement in negotiation. If one tries to find
fault, say the annex on wealth-sharing, he or she can always see one or two . . .
The idealists, mainly coming from the inexperienced, always look for the
perfect thing but they wouldnt find any, because it does not exist . . .
It is very easy to criticize, because it is only the tongue that waggles. The
critics assume this role . . .
Often those who did not taste being bitten by mosquitoes for years or
even decades or have almost starved to death for days, or have suffered or
involved in bloody battles are the bitterest of critics of those who have dedicated
their whole life in the struggle.
Sometimes, those who are receiving regular salaries from government
are among those harsh critics . . . Experience tells us that those self-anointed
leaders of the MNLF in the 70s, usually the lovers of limelight, pretenders, and
the credit-seekers, were the first to abandon the struggle. Some of them are in
government now . . . criticism hurled outside of what Islam allows is tantamount
to assuming the task of the enemy or at least that of a spoiler.

A close scrutiny of this reaction shows that the MILF Peace Panel is no longer open for
any criticism or suggestion, no matter how constructive it may be. Whatever is its idea, correct
or wrong, is controlling and final. Again, isnt the MILF Panel espousing a dictated peace for the
Bangsamoro?

This perceived close door policy was confirmed further during the BDP community
visioning conducted in different parts of Mindanao last February 2014.
62
In those occasions, I
have consistently emphasized to the participants that the safest stance to be taken by the Moro
people in view of these sprouting hopes from all corners of the Mindanao society relative to the
ongoing peace process is, while expecting some good things from this peace negotiation, we
too must be ready and prepared for the worst. However, immediately, a week after the
conclusion of said community activities, the official website of the MILFs Committee on
Information released its Editorial on March 8, 2014, with the title Spoilers in the guise of
helpers, emphasizing the following:

All sorts of people from genuine friends of the peace process to outright
spoilers are what peace builders have to grapple with as they struggle to
conclude the negotiations.

Sometimes spoilers are dressed in sheepskin and pretend to be allies
only to expose their real color later after they have already sown virus in the

61
http://www.luwaran.com/index.php/editorial/item/489-the-ideal-is-only-in-the-mind.Accessed on July 25, 2014.
62
This author had attended almost all of the community visioning organized by the Bangsamoro Development
Agency (BDA) in crafting the Bangsamoro Development Plan (BDP).


26

peace efforts. Even the best of allies can also create problem in how they frame
their ideas, especially if they insist on them.

More seriously, there are those who pretend to help but their real
agenda is how to promote their rigid ideological line that tend to create trouble
rather than harmony . . .

This pronouncement from the MILFs Committee on Information confirmed the
observation that opinions critical to the MILF position in the peace process are bound to be
suppressed. What shall be the effect of this suppressive character of the negotiators to the
peace process?

Along this line, it is important to mention the most leading case of West Virginia Board
of Education vs. Bernadette, where the United States Supreme Court castigated this suppressive
tendency of those in authority. In this case, the said tribunal passionately stated:

Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiments in support of some end
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many good as
well as by evil men. . . As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater,
so strife becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be . . . Those who begin
coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters.
Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the
graveyard.
63
[Italics supplied]

Procedural Limitations

[8] Expert peace builders proffer their comment that the Mindanao-wide consultation process
done by the Peace Panel is against the procedure recognized by medical practice, which is
diagnose first before prescribe. As observed, the two Panels are doing the massive
consultations with the people in the proposed Bangsamoro Government only after they already
have an agreement. So, how could they accommodate the suggestions of the people during
these consultations if the limitations and restrictions were already fixed in the Agreement
itself?
64
Hence, critics of the peace agreement are accusing that this consultation is just an
education drive, not a consultation in the real sense of the word.

This perceived lack of proper consultation in the on-going Mindanao peace process is
especially felt in the choice of the word Bangsamoro. As observed, people of Mindanao do not
exactly know who can rightfully claim this national identity. Even the Bangsamoro themselves
are confused of this term. Of course, the general understanding among the Muslims is this term
refers only to them, and not to the Lumads nor to the migrants. However, the GPH-MILF Peace

63
West Virginia Board of Education vs. Bernadette, 219 U.S. 624.
64
In emphasizing the controlling effect of the signed agreements relative to the so-called public consultations
conducted by the BTC, the Editorial of the official website of the MILFs Committee on Information mentioned last
8, 2014 that: The BTC welcomes all ideas especially those relevant and useful ones, but with the full understanding
that only those that are within the purview of the above-stated documents will find space in the BBL . . . [italics
supplied]


27

Agreement included the Lumads in the term Bangsamoro when their peace pact mentioned
both Islamized and non-Islamized Bangsamoro.

In particular, among the Meranaw, many are afraid that with the adoption of such term
Bangsamoro, Muslims in Mindanao might not be supported anymore by their brothers-in-faith
abroad since the Moro are now becoming nationalistic, which practice is strongly discouraged
by Islam.

Furthermore, among the Lumads, they are not comfortable to be called Bangsamoro
because they are afraid that their ancestral domain will be taken by the Muslims. In addition,
they claimed that even before their brother Moro became Muslims they were all originally
Lumads. This growing opposition among the indigenous people in Mindanao on the present
peace process is reinforced further by the programs of some Christian missionaries to empower
them, per se. On this note, a prominent Moro scholar has this to say:
65


. . . some Bangsamoro intellectuals have perceived a serious security threat to
the future Bangsamoro Government being perpetrated by some conservative
and dogmatic Christians politicians, churchmen and grassroots activists
whose interest is to sow confusions and misunderstandings in the Moro
communities. As early as now, even before the operation of the Bangsamoro
Government, this group of Christians has been designing various strategies to
materialize their poisonous plans. Their strategies concentrate in three entry
points: (1) persistently creating an impression that there can be no real peace in
Mindanao unless the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement of 1996 is fully
respected and incorporated into the GPH-MILF CAB; (2) persistently encouraging
the revival of the sultanate/royalty claims of the Moro royal families; and, (3)
persistently initiating, propagating, inciting and even sponsoring the urge of the
Indigenous Peoples (IPs) to have a BangsaMamalu autonomy within the
Bangsamoro Government. This third one is the most serious of the three since
our brother IPs are very much vulnerable for this divide-and-rule tactics of the
migrants . . .

While in plain view, they want to empower the Lumads, but in substance and
essence they are (will be) using the IPs to create troubles within the future
Bangsamoro Government. Obviously, these settlers are interpreting and re-
interpreting the aspiration of the IPs for self-governance to mean a fully self-
governing territory within the core areas of the new political setup. The written
pronouncement of the Mindanao Peoples Peace Summit last December 2013 is
an outward testimony for this sinister design. In highlighting their conceived
marginalization of the IPs in the GPH-MILF Peace talks, the staff writer in that
Summit says: In the wake of these high profile negotiations between the peace
panels, a segment of the population in Mindanao has remained in the margins
and still is. The Indigenous Peoples of Mindanao or the Lumads have remained in
the side lines.He further stated:They (the Lumads) posed that as distinct people,

65
Unpublished concept paper for the creation of MILF-Special Agency for Indigenous Peoples Affairs, Bangsamoro
Homeland, Mindanao, February 2014.


28

with their own set of belief and justice system, they are entitled to self-
governance within the future Bangsamoro Government.

More telling is the alarming declaration of the MPPM (Mindanao Peoples
Peace Movement) saying: A Mindanao-wide IP assembly declared that they
dont want to be part of the proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and that there
was no consultation on making their territories part of the proposed BJE . . .
Despite the consistent demand of the IP, the current FAB came up with a
definition of the Bangsamoro which includes the Indigenous Peoples. The
question of recognition of their territory remained silent in the provisions of the
FAB. [Italics supplied]

[9] Due to the lack of proper and meaningful consultation among the Bangsamoro
stakeholders, the likelihood of the future Bangsamoro territory to be smaller than the present
ARMM is not a remote possibility. So, after the plebiscite, what will happen if the core territory
will be smaller than the present ARMM?

A 20-year old Maguindanaon student of MSU Marawi Campus, who refused to be
named, made the following reactions when he was asked on the state of the BTC consultation
in Buluan, Maguindanao: Actually, only the political leaders are very much active of these
consultations. Local people, especially those who came from the remote places do not have any
say during these consultations. This is because they are afraid that what they say is useless, or
they do not know what really is thisministerial form of government. In the last consultation
here in Buluan, I tried myself to express my views but I was not properly entertained because
they accused me of having a radical mind.
This trend in the peace process of engaging only with the politicians is very much
dangerous because these traditional political leaders are the very potential political opponents
of the MILF come 2016. Expectedly, they will exert all means to grab political power from the
MILF.

In like manner, this observation was also felt in the Lanao provinces. During the GPH-
MILF Peace Panels public consultation in Marawi City last March 11, 2014 participants were
wondering why only local politicians and some Meranaw MNLF Top 90 cadres were properly
consulted and entertained. There were not even enough microphones to be used by the
thousand participants who came with their queries. Furthermore, majority of the participants
were students from different elementary and secondary schools in Marawi City. However, more
important sectors of the society, like the business, church and media were not properly
represented. Not even the officials, faculty and students of the Mindanao State University -
Main Campus, which is the only supra-premier University in the Bangsamoro core territory,
were invited to attend.
66


[10] Another procedural lapse of the CAB is the duration of the Transition Authority. In this
respect, a question is propounded: Can the MILF-led BTA deliver the Bangsamoro expectations
within the short transitional period of 1 year or even less?

66
Based on the narration of an Executive Director of an NGO based in Marawi City, who preferred anonymity.


29


It is very disturbing to note that only 1 year duration is given as a transition period for
the MILF Tansitory Authority to solve the various sufferings of the Bangsamoros which have
evolved for decades, even for centuries. We know that the success of the MILF in the 2016
political exercise depends on the political miracles it can introduce to the Moro communities
during the intelligently-crafted short transitional period. Can the MILF remedy all these
problems in such a short time? Is the real intention to show the MILF in good light? Or is it
another ploy to demean the MILF to the Moro population it seeks to represent so that it cannot
gain support when that most awaited time in 2016 comes? Is it offered by the Philippine
government to the MILF so that it will become another failed experiment?

Worth noting is the joint pronouncement of the Office of the President and the
Philippine Senate that the deadline set for the final promulgation of the Basic Law, which is to
metamorphose into a Republic Act to be processed by the Philippine Congress, shall be on
December 31, 2014. Thereafter, there shall follow a special registration which may last to at
least a week or two to give an ample time for the Moro voters, many of whom reside in the far-
flung areas without sufficient means of transportation, to register. About three to four months
after that general registration, there shall be a region-wide campaign of the MILF and the GPH
Peace Panels to ensure the wide acceptance of the Basic Law. Therefore, by the time that the
plebiscite shall be conducted in April or May of 2015, only 1 year (or even less) is left for the
Bangsamoro Transition Authority to govern the new political entity.

It must be recalled that the Bangsamoro Basic Law was submitted by the BTC last April
22, 2014 to the Office of the President. However, as of press time it was not yet forwarded to
Congress as it is still being subjected to the rigid scrutiny of the Malacaang Legal Team for
possible constitutional infirmities. Just last week of June 2014, there has been a rumor that the
GPH legal team totally revised the BTC-draft of the BBL so that it could pass any constitutional
test. To save the peace process from impending impasse, the principals of both Peace Panels
met in Hiroshima, Japan last June 24, 2014 to discuss this hurdle. Is the act of President Aquino
III in ordering the revision of the BTC draft of the BBL in accordance with the signed
agreements? Be it noted that if the version of the BBL is dominantly out of the constitutional
parameters, we cannot expect the President, or any Philippine President for that matter, to
submit it to Congress as a certified bill as it can be a ground for his impeachment.
67


[11] With the overwhelming declaration of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court last November 19, 2013, political analysts have
anticipated the lessening of President Aquino IIIs influence in the Philippine Congress. Thus, a
question is raised: How could the President ensure the full cooperation of the Congress in the
enactment of a Republic Act, which is the statutory version of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)
since his influence on the lawmakers seems to have weakened after the removal of the PDAF?


67
Under Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution provides: The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office
on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office
as provided by law, but not by impeachment. [italics supplied]


30

Popularly known as pork barrel, the PDAF is the budgetary allocation given to the
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. It is a public spending which is
intended to benefit constituents of a politician in return for their political support, either in the
form of campaign contributions or votes.
68


Beginning 2006, the amount was P70 Million for each of the Congressmen and P200
Million for each of the Senators. This fund allocation was stopped during the Marcos Regime
but was revived during the Administration of President Corazon Aquino. Since then the pork
barrel is given different names, such as Countryside Development Fund (CDF), Congressional
Initiative Fund (CIF) and Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). As practiced in some
countries, pork barrel also assumed different appellations, such as election sweetener in
United Kingdom, culvert politics in Finland, election gifts in Germany, and electoral alms in
Romania.
69


Since the granting of the pork barrel largely depends on the programs of any
administration, by all indications, it is a form of political favors granted to the legislators in
order to gain their political support. Predictably, with the removal of the PDAF, it would be
difficult for President Aquino III to gain the full cooperation of the Congress in the passage of a
Republic Act that would faithfully incorporate the provisions of the BTC-draft Basic Law. And,
once the law-makers will not fully cooperate with the administration, it would be disastrous to
the peace process as they might re-write the BTC version of the BBL which act may not be a
welcome development to the MILF Peace Panel.

Corollary to the nature of the PDAF is the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) of
the President which is considered by some as his pork barrel. Specifically, it is a stimulus
package under the Aquino administration designed to fast-track public spending and push
economic growth. This covers high-impact budgetary programs and projects which will be
augmented out of the savings generated during the year and additional revenue sources. The
DAP was approved by the President on October 12, 2011, upon the recommendation of the
Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) and the Cabinet Clusters.
70
Few months
after the decision of the supreme court in the PDAF was reached, last July 1, 2014, the DAP was
also stricken out by the same Court for being an affront to the mandate of the Constitution.

In invoking Section 25(5) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of
separation of powers, the following are the specific items declared as repugnant to the
supreme law, viz: a) the withdrawal of un-obligated funds and their declaration as savings, b)
the funding of projects, activities and programs not covered by the General Appropriations Act,
and c) the cross-border transfer of savings by the executive branch.
71



68
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pork_barrel. Accessed on July 16, 2014.
69
Ibid.
70
http://philippinesgoforgold.blogspot.com/2013/10/what-is-dap-disbursement-acceleration.html. Accessed on July
16, 2014.
71
http://www.interaksyon.com/article/90256/supreme-court-votes-unanimously-dap-unconstitutional. Accessed on
July 11, 2014.


31

This latest development in the Executive Department rendered even more difficult the
fiscal delinquency of the President to provide the sufficient funds necessary for the favorable
and immediate legislation of the draft Basic Law in question.
[12] Although the CAB is believed (as it is intended) to be the final embodiment of all the
agreements of the Parties, the subsequent engagements of both Panels confirm the suspicion
by some that it is not yet a terminal agreement as many of its parts are still subject to further
negotiations.
As can be recalled, the FAB postulated in its Section VII, Paragraph 7 that The draft
Bangsamoro Basic Law submitted by the Transition Commission shall be certified as an urgent
bill by the President. This means that once the BTC-draft BBL, being based on the CAB, is
submitted to the Office of the President what remains to be done by the President is only his
ministerial act of certifying the same to the Congress as an urgent bill. The Agreement did not
contemplate to allow the Chief Executive to exercise his discretionary powers to review, revise
or set-aside the BTC version in order to make it conform to the provisions of the supreme law
as this duty is supposed to be left to the sole discretion of the Congress. Hence, after its
submission to Malacaang last April 22, 2014, the MILF Central Committee was expecting
President Aquino III to immediately certify said proposed measure to the Congress and
adopting in toto the BTC draft.
However, being mindful of his sworn duty to preserve and defend the Constitution of
the Philippines, after his receipt of the draft Basic Law, President Aquino III immediately formed
the Malacaang Legal Team, instead of immediately forwarding it to the Congress, to study the
same for any constitutional infirmity. Based on the Teams review for sixty-one (61) days, its
members had decided to totally revise it because majority of its provisions are found repugnant
to the supreme law. But to save the strained relations between the Two Peace Panels from
further deterioration, GPH Peace Panel Chair, Miriam Coronel-Ferrer mentioned in one of her
interviews the following diplomatic reaction - That certain provisions in the draft measure may
be unconstitutional and that is why members of the government and MILF peace panels are
trying to fix these loopholes.
72
As a result of this act of fixing loopholes the draft measure was
overhauled. Said revision was so serious that only about 27 percent of the BTC version was left.
This means the other 73 percent were all insertions or alterations from the Malacaan-created
Legal Team.
73

What is more alarming is the latest pronouncement of the GPH Peace Panel Chair when
she claimed that their involvement in the peace process is only up to the signing of the CAB last
March 27, 2014. After that, the BTC had the sole authority to draft the BBL, although the
Government Peace Panel could still lend assistance when the need arises.
74
Understandably,
this new direction of the government negotiators are clear violation of their obligation under

72
http://www.luwaran.com/index.php/welcome/item/1110-impasse-on-diluted-basic-law-may-ignite-war-political-
analyst-says.Accessed on July 29, 2014.
73
Based on the interview conducted by this author to one of the BTC Commissioners last July 13, 2014, Marawi
City.
74
Based on the narration of a senior officer of an NGO based in Cotabato City who attended the Mindanao
Peacewavers Meeting in Matina, Davao City last August 1-2, 2014 participated by the two Peace Panels. The MILF
side was represented by Mohagher Iqbal (MILF Peace Panel Chair), Abdulla Camlian and Melanio Ulama; while the
Governments representatives were Miriam Coronel-Ferrer (GPH Peace Panel Chair) and Benedicto Bacani.


32

the Framework Agreement. They must not forget that they made a commitment in Section VII,
Paragraph 12 of the FAB saying, An Exit Document officially terminating the peace
negotiation may be crafted and signed by both Parties if and only when all agreements have
been fully implemented. Apparently, this provision of the truce contemplated the continuous
functions of both Peace Panels until all the agreements are fully implemented. Ergo, if they are
really committed to the attainment of a just and lasting peace in the South, the members of the
Government Peace Team must not evade their responsibility under all the Agreements.
Last June 24, 2014 President Aquino III, together with the members of the GPH Peace
Panel and other personnel from the Office of the Presidential Assistant on the Peace Process
(OPAPP), went to Japan to present to the MILF Peace Panel the Malacaan-revised version of
the BBL in the presence of the MILF Chair Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim. But since the government has
overhauled the BTC draft, the two Peace Panels cannot immediately agree on a joint version.
Instead, they met in Kuala Lumpur last July 7-11, 2014 to settle the controversy with the
participation of the Malaysian Facilitator. However, the disagreement was not finally settled.
Hence, the BTC Commissioners were scheduled to go to Manila last July 17-20 to have a
finishing touch in order to finally arrive at an agreed version of the proposed legislation. After
which, the final decision on this emerging diplomatic conundrum should be settled, with the
participation again of the Malaysian facilitator, by the respective principals of the two Panels,
who were scheduled to meet in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia last July 26, 2014. Predictably, any
positive development in that meeting should have been incorporated in the incoming State of
the Nation Address (SONA) of President Aquino III set on July 28, 2014. Although said meeting is
scheduled two days before the Presidential speech in the opening of the Congress regular
session, till now, we have yet to see a draft of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) that should
have been sent to congress for deliberation on its opening session on July 28 at the Batasang
Pambansa. Furthermore, no meeting happened between President Aquino III and Chairman Al-
Haj Murad as this proposal would have corrupted the peace process since this violates the
protocols on peace negotiations.
Evidently, this diplomatic strategy of President Aquino III in dealing with the MILF
through its Chairman, instead of dealing with its duly constituted Peace Panel, is analogous to
the practice of employers during collective bargaining with their employees known as
Boulwarism, which is completely outlawed in our jurisdiction. Construed by foreign courts as a
bad-faith practice, this approach presupposes that the company dealt with the union through
the employees rather than with the employees through the union.
75
In effect, the employees
union is rendered ineffective or useless.
Should such proposal of Malacaan have been granted by the MILF Central Committee,
its Peace Panel shall be rendered nugatory which tendency may possibly result to the moral
corruption of its high ranking officers and the eventual paralysis of the Front as a revolutionary
organization.
In expressing their developing frustration to the recent development in the on-going
peace process, the MILF stated in a public affairs radio program of the DXMY Radio Station in
Cotabato City last July 28, 2014 at 6:30am that Wala kaming inaasahan sa SONA ni Pnoy

75
Cesario A. Azucena, Jr. Everyones LABOR CODE. Quezon City: Rex Printing Company, Inc., 2006, p. 267.


33

ngayon, at hindi kami masaya sapagkat hindi pinaniwalaan ng Malacaan ang Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro. [We do not expect anything from PNoys SONA today, and we
are not happy because Malacaan does not abide with the Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro.]
76
In response to this threatening remarks from the MILF echelon, the Office of
the President made a public pronouncement last July 31, 2014 before the Malacaan Press
Corps that President Aquino III would certainly certify the Bangsamoro Basic Law to the
Congress as an urgent legislative measure. However, this writer humbly believes that this
pronouncement of Malacaan is misleading the public because the proper issue now is not
whether or not PNoy will certify the BBL to the Congress since that is already settled in the FAB
that he must do that. The contending issue is what version of the BBL will be certified by the
President the BTC draft, the Malacaan draft or the joint/agreed draft?
In the light of this political impasse, the MILF Peace Panel registered the Fronts official
position which they presented during their special meeting in Kuala Lumpur before the
Malaysian Facilitator last July 7-11, 2014, to wit: 1.All those issues that are settled in the FAB
and its Annexes will not be subject for renegotiation; and 2. Settled language in the FAB and its
Annexes will not be subject for renegotiation. Moreover, in order to put a final closure to any
attempt on the part of the Philippine Government to renegotiate the CAB, the MILF Peace
Panel called their subsequent engagement with the GPH as only a discussion instead of
negotiation,
77
although experts on peace negotiation are viewing these subsequent special
meetings or discussions between the Peace Panels as extensions of their negotiation and,
therefore, still a part of it. Thus, as long as the Exit Document
78
is not yet jointly signed by the
Peace Panels, this on-going negotiation, renegotiation, special meetings, or discussions will
continue over and over again.

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, the CAB exhibits both procedural and substantive limitations which may
possibly cause its failure to establish the MILF vision to end tyranny, restore dignity and secure
a bright and prosperous future for all in the Bangsamoro Homeland. With these identified
varying loopholes of the concluded Agreement, the Bangsamoro from different walks of life
have varied views on the real fate of this peace journey.

From the most conservative point of view among Moro Mujahideen, the signed
Comprehensive Agreement between the Government and the MILF is a gracious act from the
Highest Heaven for two reasons. First, it will serve as a filtering device among the Bangsamoro
to realize who are faithful in fighting for the genuine cause of the Muslim south and who are
hypocrites.
79
For those who follow the path pursued by Sheik Salamat Hashim,
80
they are

76
Live radio interview with the MILF First Vice Chairman, Gazhali Jaafar.
77
http://www.luwaran.com/index.php/editorial/item/1100-milf-position-on-bbl%E2%80%99s-delay Accessed on
July 29, 2014.
78
Section VII, Paragraph 12 of the FAB says: An Exit Document officially terminating the peace negotiation may
be crafted and signed by both Parties if and only when all agreements have been fully implemented.
79
This was based on an interview conducted by this writer, sometimes in July 2014, to a 46-year old MILF cadre in
Basilan.
80
The following are some of the teachings of the late MILF founding chairman, Sheik Salamat Hashim, viz:
(a) The ultimate objective of a Muslim community or Ummah is to make supreme the Word of Allah by
(1) The establishment of a true Muslim community; (2) The establishment of a genuine Islamic system of


34

convinced that the CAB is never a solution to the Moro Question for reasons already
enumerated in the previous pages. In fact, they viewed it as a design to address only the
grievance of those secular-minded Moros who pretend to be the real representatives of the
oppressed Bangsamoro people. On the other hand, those who view the Mindanao conflict as a
revolution (not a Jihad Fii Sabiilillah), this recently-concluded Agreement is the most fitting
solution to the decades security crisis in the South, even though the same does not
categorically recognize any Quranic injunction to be compulsorily practiced by every Muslim.
For them, any objective that is more ambitious than the present Agreement is a utopia which
does not exist except only in the mind. Moreover, those who do not support the CAB are
outrightly and collectively categorized by these self-anointed peace builders as peace spoilers
irrespective of the merit of their supposition. Worst, those critics of the CAB are accused of
sowing a fitna (confusion or misconception) to the Moro people.

Secondly, since the Bangsamoro Government to be established under the CAB shall be
based on the provisions of the Constitution relative to regional autonomy, this peace paradigm
shall prove the long-held public perception that the constitutionally-prescribed autonomy
formula in this country will never solve the Bangsamoro quest for self-rule.

More importantly, other Moro groups are associating their perceived uncertainty of the
CAB to the post-President Aquino IIIs scenario.
81
As experienced, any peace initiative in
Mindanao sustains itself only during the reign in power of whoever is the sponsoring President.
For example, the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) between the GRP the MNLF was only
temporarily successful during the administration of President Ramos. After making the high
ranking MNLF officers (like Nur Misuari and Parouk Husin) as Regional Governors, the Muslim
autonomy was already transferred to the hands of the local feudal-war lords who exploited and
corrupted the ARMM in the pursuit of their political and economic aggrandizement.

With respect to the CAB, after PNoys exit from power by 2016, how could the Parties
ensure the sustainability of peace dividends this Agreement may foster? Would the next

government; and, (3) The application of a real Islamic way of life in all aspects of our life. [Salamat Hashim.
THE BANGSAMORO MUJAHID: His Objectives and Responsibilities: Mindanao: Bangsamoro Publications,
1985, p.8.];
(b) . . . our demand is independence. It means having a separate territory, a separate government, and a
separate armed forces . . . [Interview by the ASIAWEEK Magazine, March 31, 2000];
(c) Do not be subjected by the Philippine Constitution, and do not drop independence [Based on the
narration of a faculty of MSU Marawi City who once served as a member of the MILF Peace Panel, this was the
general guidelines sent by Chairman Salamat to the MILF Peace Panel during the June 2001 GHP-MILF Peacetalks
in Tripoli, Libya.]; and
(d) It is a generational obligation of every Bangsamoro to teach, educate and enlighten his children,
relatives or friends on the historical injustices and sufferings committed by the Filipino colonizers and the
Philippine government against the Bangsamoro people, so that if we cannot achieve independence during our time,
at least we will be assured that our struggle shall be continued by our succeeding generations. [This was his
constant advice to the Bangsamoro youth visiting him at Camp Abubakar-Siddique. Matanog, Maguindanao. This
writer had the privilege to attend some of his lectures about the Mindanao problem.]
81
This is based on the assumption that PNoy could fully serve his six-year term in office which is to end on June 30,
2016. It must be noted that after the Supreme Court declaration of the DAP as unconstitutional, PNoy has been
experiencing all forms of political demolition threatening his political survival. In fact, aside from the widespread
rumor on the destabilization plan, there are already 3 impeachment complaints filed against him before the House of
Representatives. Given this scenario, can he still give ample time, efforts and resources for the realization of the
Bangsamoro Government?


35

Philippine President to be elected in 2016 be supportive of the Bangsamoro Government, what
if he would come from the opposition party? Would the original vision of the Bangsamoro
Government be preserved once it is placed in the hands of the tribal feudal lords whose
personal interests always dictate and dominate the common interest of the toiling and
suffering Moro masses? Is it not wiser to consider the view that we can think and even expect
for the best in the present peace process, but we must also be ready and prepared for the
worst? What if we only expected for the best and did not prepare for the worst, and the
Bangsamoro Government became another failed experiment? These are the never-ending
doubts haunting the minds of genuine peace advocates but which the spiritual-materialist
Moros consistently refuse to entertain.

Right now, the Bangsamoro Basic Law is undergoing a process of legal decomposition as
the variances between the BTC and the OPAPP versions are like the distance between the
heavens and the earth due to constitutional issues. In this regard, what are the appropriate and
civilized courses of action left to the MILF to undertake? Obviously, there are two peaceful
alternatives which can be employed by the said Moro Front to vindicate itself from the
developing diplomatic gaps it is experiencing - domestic and international measures.

In the local level, the MILF, through the BTC, can work on proposals to amend the
Philippine Constitution for the purpose of accommodating and entrenching in the constitution
the agreements of the Parties . . . without derogating from any prior agreements. Since this
course of action requires the surgical amendment to the supreme law, it also presupposes the
uniform vision, cooperation and commitment, not only of the MILF and the Philippine
Government but also of the sovereign Filipino people. But given these tremendous governance
issues (PDAF, DAP, etc.) currently faced by the Aquino III Administration, could it possibly get
the needed public support from the Filipino voters during a plebiscite to be called for the
purpose? Does it still have enough time to amend the Constitution?

Additionally, the MILF can also engage the full support of the Mindanao civil societies to
exert both political and moral pressures to the government to be consistent with its promises
and commitments to the MILF.

In the international level, on the other hand, the MILF can appeal to world opinion.
Through the sponsorship of the member-countries of the International Contact Group and the
International Monitoring Team, with the Government of Malaysia, having been the facilitator to
the peace talks, playing the lead role, the international community could persuade the
Philippine Government to hold on to its obligations and commitment to the Moro Front under
the CAB; otherwise, the Philippines may have a negative image in the eyes of the peoples of the
world. If this happens, the economic as well as the political conditions of the Philippines shall be
adversely affected as many countries might exert diplomatic pressures to the Philippine
government to faithfully comply with the Agreement in question.

It must be recalled that in the international milieu, there are some forms of economic
and political diplomatic measures used by foreign governments in persuading a certain


36

government to comply with its international obligations.
82
The following are some of the most
recognized ones, to wit: boycotting of commercial products and human resources, suspension
of commercial intercourse, currency restriction, imposition of higher tariffs, denial of loans and
aids as well as withdrawal of privileges, stoppage of travel to the subject state, adverse
propaganda, and denunciation of treaties. The most extreme form of diplomatic pressure
method is the severance of diplomatic and consular relations.
























REFERENCES

Books/Journals

ASIAWEEK Magazine, March 31, 2000.

Askandar, Kamarulzaman. The Struggle for Self-Determination in Aceh, AUTONOMY AND
PEACE REVIEW: International Experiences of Self-determination. Cotabato City: Institute
of Autonomy and Governance, April-June 2007.

AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW: The 1996 Final Peace Agreement Between the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front: An In-depth
Analysis, Highlights of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement and Conflicting Claims of

82
This author respectfully submits that the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro is an international legal
document.


37

Interpretation. Cotabato City: Institute of Autonomy and Governance, January-March,
2009.

Azucena, Cesario A. Jr. Everyones LABOR CODE. Quezon City: Rex Printing Company, Inc.,
2006.

Barry, Tom. Low Intensity Conflict: The New Battlefield in Central America. The Resources
Center, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1986.

Hashim, Salamat. THE BANGSAMORO MUJAHID: His Objectives and Responsibilities: Mindanao:
Bangsamoro Publications, 1985.

Jubair, Salah.THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process. Cotabato City:
Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, 2007.

Soliman M. Santos, Jr., Legal Notes on the Right of Self-Determination and on Secession: The
Real and Realistic Score, REFERENDUM ON POLITICAL OPTIONS FOR THE
BANGSAMORO: Study Papers on the Legal and Historical Basis. Cotabato City: Mindanao
Peoples Peace Movement, 2010.

Documents

Annex on Normalization, signed on 25 January 2014, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Annex on Power Sharing, signed on 8 December 2013, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing, signed on 13 July 2013, Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.

FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON THE BANGSAMORO, signed on October 15, 2012, Malacaan
Palace, Manila, Philippines.

PRESS RELEASE FROM THE BANGSAMORO YOUTH OF THE MOROLAND, Released on July 31,
2013, Bangsamoro Homeland, Mindanao.

Terms of Reference of the International Monitoring Team (IMT), signed by the GRP-MILF Peace
Panels on 27 August 2007 at Cyberjaya, Malaysia.

THE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON THE BANGSAMORO, signed on March 27, 2014,
Malacaan Palace, Manila, Philippines.

The Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement Between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) with the Participation of the Organization of Islamic Conference
Ministerial Committee of Six and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic
Conference, signed on September 2, 1996, Malacaan Palace, Manila, Philippines.


38


The MNLF Draft Demand, submitted by Nur Misuari to Undersecretary Barbero in February
1977, Tripoli, Libya.

Tripoli Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), signed on December 23, 1976, Tripoli, Libya.

Unpublished Concept Paper for the Creation of MILF-Special Agency for Indigenous Peoples
Affairs, February 2014, Bangsamoro Homeland, Mindanao.

Laws Cited

Batas Pambansa Blg. 20, or otherwise known as An Act Providing for the Organization of the
Sangguniang Pampookin Each of Regions Nine and Twelve, Providing Funds Therefor,
and for Other Purposes. Enacted on March 23, 1979.

Presidential Decree Number 1618, Implementing the Organization of the Sangguniang
Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap Ng Pook in Region IX and Region XII and for
Other Purposes. Issued on July 25, 1979.

Presidential Decree Number 1628, Declaring Autonomy in Southern Philippines and for Other
Purposes. Issued on March 25, 1977.

Republic Act Number 6734, or otherwise known as An Act Providing for an Act for the
Autonomous Region in Mindanao. Enacted on August 1, 1989.

Republic Act Number 7160, or otherwise known as An Act Providing for a Local Government
Code of 1991. Enacted on October 10, 1991.

Republic Act Number 9054, or otherwise known as An Act to Strengthen and Expand the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose
Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, As Amended. Promulgated on March 31, 2001.

The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Ratified on February 2, 1987.



Cases Cited

Alternative Center for Organizational Reforms and Development, Inc. (ACORD), et.al. vs.
Ronaldo Zamora, et.al., G.R. No. 144256, June 8, 2005.

Kida vs. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011.

Limbona vs. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989; 170 SCRA 786.


39


Pimentel vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630.

West Virginia Board of Education vs. Bernadette, 219 U.S. 624.


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