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GROUP A

ALHAMBRA A
Laurel vs. Misa 77 Phil 856 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Lovedioro GR No. 112235, 11/29/95 (DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
US vs. Mateo 25 Phil 324 (DEC. 14 AND JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. De Jesus 145 SCRA 521 (JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

Laurel vs misa

Facts:

The Supreme Court, in a resolution, acted on the petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed by
petitioner anastacio laurel based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the
latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason
definedand penalized by article 114 of the revised penal code for the reason that
1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens therto was then suspended; and
2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
republic.

Issues:
Whether or not the allegiance of the accused as a Filipino citizen was suspended and that there was
a change of sovereignty over the Phil Islands.

Held:

No, a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent
allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government of sovereign. The
absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate
governmentor sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of
the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby the occupier. Just as treason may be
committed against the Federal as well as against the State Govt, in the same way treason may have been
committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the US as well as against the
sovereignty of the Phil Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of govt from commonwealth to
republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the
commonwealth, bec it is an offense against the same govt and the same sovereign people.

People of the Philippines vs. Elias Lovedioro y Castro

FACTS:

Elias Lovedioro with 3 other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo while Lucilo was walking
along Burgos St. away from Daraga, Albay Public Market. The victim died on the same day from massive
blood loss. On November 6, 1992, Elias Lovedioro was then charged of the crime of murder, and
subsequently found guilty. Lovedioro then appealed the decision, contesting the verdict of murder instead
of rebellion. It was confirmed by the prosecutions principal witness that Lovedioro was a member of the
New Peoples Army.

ISSUES:

Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder, instead of rebellion?

HELD:

- Yes. Because, overt acts and purpose are essential components of the crime of rebellion, with either of
these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does not exist.
- Political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime- alleging rebellion in
order to lessen the possible imposable penalty- could benefit from the laws relatively benign attitude
towards political crimes. If no political motive is established or proved, the accused should be convicted of
the common crime and not of rebellion.
- In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the
furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself suffice.
- The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered no contribution to the achievement
of the NPAs subversive aims, in fact, there were no known acts of the victims that can be considered as
offending to the NPA.
- Evidence shows that Lovedioros allegation of membership to the N.P.A was conveniently infused to
mitigate the penalty imposable upon him.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993,
sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.
Us vs alejandro mateo
Facts: falsification of cedula; erroneous conviction; defendant acquitted.
Mateo being required in October, 1911, for the purposes of an affidavit, to present his cedula for the
year 1911 to a justice of the peace, produced also his cedula for the year 1910; on reading the cedula for
the year 1910, something which he had not done before, mateo discovered that his age was stated
incorrectly therein and he, fearing the result of presenting to a public official a cedula which contained an
incorrect statement regarding his own age, changed his age, making it 25 instead of 23; the change having
been discovered by the justice of the peace on the presentation of the cedula, mateo, without hesitation,
detailed the part he had taken in the change and the reason therefor; it is admitted that the age in the
cedula was incorrect and that the change made the cedula give his true age; mateo was tried for
falsification of a cedula and was convicted.
Held:
In the case in hand, the change did not affect in the remotest degree the privileges or immunities which the
accused could enjoy under the cedula.
The judgment is reversed and the accused acquitted.


People vs De Jesus
violation of the dangerous drugs act; possession of prohibited drugs inherent in the crime of selling
them; which is punishable by life imprisonment to death.
The appellants first assigned error, sustained by the Solicitor General, that the trial court erred in
penalizing De Jesus separately under the two information: as the solicitor general stated: the trial courts
severe stand against traffic in drugs is understandable. But the assumption is that the legislature will not
indulge in absurdities. Since possession of prohibited drugs is inherent in the crime of selling them, it is to
be assumed that, in punishing selling, the legislature took into account the need to possess them first. The
penalty for selling-life imprisonment to death- is already quite harsh. The legislature should not have
intended to attach a further penalty of 12 years to 20 years for possession. It would be superfluous
especially if the accused have been imposed a death sentence for selling.
The judgment for the sale of prohibited drugs is affirmed. The judgment for possession, custody, and
control of prohibited drugs is reversed.
ALHAMBRA R
People vs. Prieto 80 Phil 138 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Hernandez 99 Phil 515 (DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Batulanon vs. People GR 139857 9/15/2006 (DEC. 14 AND JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)


People v. Prieto
G.R. No. L-399 | January 29, 1948
FACTS
:-Prieto was prosecuted in the Peoples Court for 7 counts of treason. Initially, he pleaded not
guilty to every charge. Later on, he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained his
original plea to counts 4, 5 and 6.
-
The prosecutor only presented evidence to count 4 as he admitted insufficiency of evidence as to counts 5
and 6. The court found him guilty to all counts except 5 and 6 of treason complexed by murder and
physical injuries.

ISSUE
: What is the criminal liability of Prieto?

DECISION
(Not guilty of count 4, guilty of treason in counts 1, 2, 3 and 7):-Prieto is acquitted in count 4 as the of
two-witness principle requirement was not satisfied. They failed to corroborate each other:

Juanito Albano testified that the accused and other Filipino undercovers and Japanese officers caught an
American aviator and had him carried to town on a sled pulled by acarabao. That on the way, Prieto walked
behind the sled and the American was takento the Kempetai headquarters.

Valentin Cuison testified that he saw the accused following the American whose hands were tied while
walking and that he struck the flier with a rope. There was no mention of a sled and nor did he see Juanito
Albano.-There is no crime of treason complexed with other felonies because these were not
separate offenses from treason.

When a deed is charged as an element of treason, it becomes identified with it and cannot be subject of a
separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty.

Murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason and cannot be regarded separately under
their general denomination.

But the brutality which accompanied the killing and the physical injuries are taken as aggravating
circumstances since it augmented the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the attainment of
the criminal objectives.

But there is a mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, hence, the punishment shouldbe reclusion perpetua.

People of the Philippines v. Hernandez , 99 Phil. Rep 515 (1956),
Was a case decided by the Philippine Supreme Court which held that the crime of rebellion under the
Revised Penal Code of the Philippines is charged as a single offense, and that it cannot be made into a
complex crime. While it was decided on an almost divided opinion, it nevertheless became a stable doctrine
in Philippine jurisprudence.
It was the height of the Government action against communists and the Hukbalahap guerillas. President
Elpidio Quirino, through his Defense Secretary (and later, President) Ramon Magsaysay intensified the
campaign against them, and the crackdown was on against communist organizations. Due to such
government action, several communist leaders like Luis Taruc and the Lava brothers were soon in
government custody.
On January 20, 1951, the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) headquarters was raided. Writer (and
future National Artist for Literature) Amado V. Hernandez, himself a labor leader, was arrested on January
26 for various rebellious activities with the CLO. Upon his arrest, he was charged in the criminal information
of Rebellion with Murder, Arson and Robbery. Five years after his arrest, Hernandez asked for bail with
the court where his case was pending, but was denied on the basis of the nature of the offense (if the crime
was complexed, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed). Thus, he filed a petition to the
Supreme Court.
Arguments
The government, headed by Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, argued that the gravity of the crime
committed required the denial of the bail. Moreover, the complex crime charged by the government against
Hernandez has been successfully imposed with other arrested communist leaders and was sentenced to
life imprisonment.
HELD:
The Supreme Court, through then Associate Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that rebellion cannot be
complexed with other crimes, such as murder and arson. Rebellion in itself would include and absorb the
said crimes, thus granting the accused his right to bail. Murder and arson are crimes inherent and
concomitant when rebellion is taking place. Rebellion in the Revised Penal Code constitutes one single
crime and that there is no reason to complex it with other crimes. As basis, the Court cited several cases
convicting the defendants of simple rebellion although they killed several persons.
Thus, the petition for bail was granted. On May 30, 1964, the Supreme Court acquitted Hernandez
Leonila Batulanon, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 139857 September 15, 2006
Criminal case: Falsification of private documents and Estafa
FACTS:
Petitioner Leonila Batulanon was employed as cashier/manager of Polomok (Polomok) Credit Cooperative
Inc. from May 1980 up to December 1982 (so thats two years). She was in charge with the receiving of
deposits and releasing loans to members of the said cooperative (Polomok).
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities were found out. Thereafter, four
informations of estafa through falsification of commercial documents were filed against herein petitioner.
1. Criminal case 3625 petitioner Batulanon falsified CASH/CHECK VOUCHER of PCCI in the name of
ERLINDA OMADLAO, making it appear that latter was granted loan where in truth and in fact said person
never received, never granted a loan and never signed such document.
2. Criminal case 3626 same situation as above stated but this time in the name of GONAFREDA
ORACION.
3. Criminal case 3453 Batulanon falsified commercial documents namely Individual deposits and ledger
of FERLYN ARROYO making it appear that the said person made a fixed deposit and was granted a loan
where in truth and in fact ARROYO never made such deposit and never received such loan.
4. Criminal case 3627 same situation as the next preceding case but this time in the name of his son
Dennis Batulanon.
In all cases, accused did then and there release to herself the same and received the loans and thereafter
misappropriated and converted them into her own use and benefit. Also in all cases, she refused to bring
back the same despite demands.
These informations were filed in the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. Petitioner pleaded not
guilty.
Prosecution presented its witnesses:
Modallo (posting clerk) testified that Batulanon released 4 cash vouchers. He also said that
Omadlao, Oracion and Batulanon were not eligible and not members of Polomok Cooperative.
Moreover, according to him, although Arroyo was a member but there was no proof that she applied
for a loan. He also said he witnessed Petitioner Batulanon signed Oracion and Arroyo in cash
vouchers.
Jayoma (Vice chairman of the PCCI Board of directors) testified that laons to Omadlao and
Oracion never passed through the PCCI board of directors.
Petitioner Batulanon denied charges against her. She contended that she did not sigh vouchers of
Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo who according to her are nonetheless members of the cooperative. Lastly,
she said that its been an accepted practice that she can release loan in the absence of Gopio Jr who is in
charge with such responsibility.
RTC convicted her guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner brought it to Court of Appeals (CA)but the
latter affirmed with modifications the ruling of RTC. CA modification is that petitioner is guilty of falsification
of PRIVATE documents.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but CA denied it.

Issue:
Petitioner brought it up to the Supreme Court (SC) and contended that:
1. Best witness is person whose signature is forged
2. Requires prejudice to 3rd person
3. PCCI not prejudiced by loan transactions because loans are accounts receivable by cooperative

HELD:
SC: Petition lacks merit.
Although the offense charged is estafa through falsification of commercial documents, appellant could be
convicted of falsification of private documents.
Elements of falsification of private document are present in this case:
1. She made it appear that Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo were granted loans
2. She made it in private document
****(cash/check vouchers are not public documents because they are not notarized and not
documents used by merchants to promote trade nor regulated by Code of commerce)
3. It caused damage to the cooperative.
Regarding best witness SC cites sec. 22 of Rule 132
according to this rule handwriting may be proved by any person who believes it to be belonging to such
person; or who acquired knowledge of such handwriting
Regarding prejudice to Polomok such loans could have granted to other members but werent because of
illegal acts done by Batulanon such constituted damage or prejudice to Polomok
On complex crime of estafa through falsification:
Falsification committed as means to commit estafa
Estafa may be carried out even without falsification
SC ruled that 1st, 2nd, and 3rd criminal cases herein fall within the purview of falsification of private
documents but the 4th criminal case (with Dennis Batulanon) falls within the ambit of the crime of estafa.
The latter having no untruthful statements but there was conversion and misappropriation; hence elements
of estafa are present in the last criminal case.


ALONSABE
People vs. Perez 83 Phil 314-315 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Enrile vs. Salazar 186 SCRA 217 (DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
E. Spinner, Co. Vs. New Hesslein Corp. 54 Phil 224 (JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

BACHO
People vs. Agpangan (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Manansala 105 Phil 1253 (DEC. 14 AND JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Madarang 147 SCRA 123 (JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

People vs Felix Manansala
Facts:
Manansala was accused of altering the duplicate copy of the Traffic Violation Report (TVR) previously
issued to him as a temporary drivers permit. He erased the originally written figure III and the word
three after the words pending cases, and superimposed thereon number I and the word one. The
alterations made changed the meaning of the document. It was made to appear that he has only one
pending case of traffic violation. The practice was proved to be to arrest a driver who commits a fourth
traffic violation instead of merely issuing to him a TVR, which is usually done for the first, second and third
violations. The accused had in his possession the falsified TVR and had been using it as a temporary
drivers permit from its issuance to the time he was caught committing the fourth traffic violation.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsifying an official document.
Ruling:
It is an established rule that when a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of
the same, the presumption is justified that such person is the forger. The circumstances that the accused
made use of and benefited from the falsified TVR is a strong evidence that he either himself falsified it or
caused the same to be falsified.
People vs Michael Madarang
Facts:
Madarang, together with Cirilo Juan, was charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675). The two were
arrested in an entrapment operation, conducted by a combined team of Integrated National
Police(INP)/Naval Intelligence Bureau(NIB) composed of Alejandro Basallo, Roberto Viloria, Eduardo
Pascua and Douglas Abalos of Poro Point, La Union, for selling Eight Hundred (800) grams of dried
Marijuana with flowering tops to the poseur buyer for 600.00 inside a jeepney. They were apprehended
and brought to the police station in San Fernando, La Union, where they were investigated, detained and
subsequently released. The Provincial Fiscal ordered that they be re-arrested wherein Madarang
voluntarily surrendered and upon arraignment pleaded not guilty.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in discrediting the eyewitness testimony of Felix Biwang.
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt.
Ruling:
The lower court correctly rejected the testimony of Biwang. By his own admission, he was too far to hear
what was being said by the persons inside the jeepney. His version therefore cannot prevail over that of
the police officers who were actually present in the vehicle when Madarang, in conspiracy with Juan,
negotiated the sale of the marijuana leaves for 600.00 a kilo.
Madarangs defense that he only accompanied Juan and that he was completely unaware that the plastic
bag actually contained illegal drugs cannot overcome the positive and unequivocal statements of the two
peace officers that it was none other than Madarang who personally fixed the price of the marijuana leaves
of 600.00 a kilo and who stood firm against Vilorias (who posed as buyer) attempts at haggling.
Ownership and possession are not indispensable elements of the crime under consideration. The mere act
of selling or even acting as broker in a sale of marijuana and other prohibited drugs consummates the crime
under Section 4. When Madarang negotiated the sale without authority of Juans marijuana leaves to
Viloria, he took a direct and active part in the crime. His guilt has been established beyond reasonable
doubt.
People vs Nemesio L. Agpangan
Facts:
Agpangan stands accused of Treason, committed between December 1944 and January 1945, in the
province of Laguna. It was alleged that the accused was a member of the Ganap, a subversive pro-
Japanese organization, joined the Pampars, a military organization supporting the Imperial Japanese Army,
and was equipped with a 1903 Springfield rifle, caliber .30 and was made to undergo training. That from or
about January 12, 1945 to March 15, the accused was assigned to guard duty once a week, armed with a
rifle with orders to shoot any Filipino prisoners who might attempt to escape and also any guerrilla or
American soldier who might approach the Japanese garrison.
Three witnesses testified for the prosecution namely, Tomas C Serrano, a farmer who saw the accused
doing guard duty at the entrance of the garrison with a rifle and bayonet at his side. Serrano saw the
accused confiscating foodstuffs for the support of Japanese soldiers and accompanying the latter in
arresting suspected guerrillas. Mauricio Adaro, another farmer was the second witness who testified that he
saw the accused mounting guard, getting food supplies from the civilians and giving them to the Japanese.
The last witness was Delfin Redor, mayor of Siniloan who testified that the accused belongs to Pampar
Makapili, detailed as guard in front of the garrison with arms and ammunitions.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of treason.
Ruling:
None of the several overt acts alleged in the information has been proved in accordance with the two-
witness rule provided in Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. To meet the test under two-witness rule, it
is necessary that, at least, two witnesses should testify as to the perpetration of the same treasonous overt
act, and the sameness must include not only identity of kind and nature of the act, but as to the precise one
which has actually been perpetrated.
The decision to acquit him is not only based on the reasonable doubt as to his guilt, because the
prosecution has not satisfied the requirements of the two-witness rule, but was rather inclined to believe in
his testimony to the effect that he might have the same fate that befell Vicente Auxilio, a guerrilla member.
The Court believed that the accused could have adhered to the Japanese, the same who tortured and killed
his own son, Bienvenido Agpangan. The decision is reversed and the appellant is acquitted.


GROUP B
BELMONTE
People vs. Perez 83 Phil 314-315 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Enrile vs. Amin 189 SCRA 573 (DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Koh Tieck Heng vs. People 192 Phil 533 (DEC. 14 AND JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Nicolas GR 170234 (2/8/07) (JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

PEOPLE VS PEREZ - (TREASON)

Accused Perez was charged with treason and rape. The accused kidnapped several women in order to present them to a
Japanese Commander to satisfy the latters carnal pleasure against the will of the women. In some instances, the accused
himself raped several women.

The accused was acquitted in relation to the crime of treason; but he was found guilty of rape. The acts of the accused in
relation with the Japanese didnt directly and materially tend to improve the war efforts or to weaken the power of the U.S.
Moreover, intent of disloyalty which is essential in the crime of treason is lacking.
Nevertheless, the accused can be held liable for the several counts of rape he committed.

ENRILE VS AMIN (REBELLION COMPLEXED WITH MURDER)
An information was charged against Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile for having committed rebellion complexed with
murder with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Another information was subsequently filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, charging the former with a violation of PD 1829 for willfully and knowingly
obstructing or delaying the apprehension of Ex, Lt. Col. Gregorio Gringo Honasan.
Allegedly, Sen. Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Gringo Honasan by giving him food and comfort
on Dec. 1, 1989 in his house and not doing anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. It was the
prosecutions contention that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while
rebellion is based on RPC; thus, the two crimes can be separately punished.
Can a separate crime of a violation of PD 1829 be charged against the petitioner?
No. SC used the doctrine that if a person cannot be charged with the complex crime of rebellion, he can
neither be charged separately for two different offenses, where one is a constitutive or component element
or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
It was also noted that petitioner was already facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with Honasan. Being
in conspiracy thereof, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of rebellion. It cannot be made the basis of a separate
charge. Also, the SC reiterated that in cases of rebellion, all crimes committed in furtherance thereof shall
be absolved. Hence, the other charge of rebellion complexed with murder cannot prosper. All crimes,
whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance of rebellion, become absorbed and it cannot be charged as separate crimes.
KOH TIECK HENG VS PEOPLE
Koh Tieck Heng, alias Teddy Koh, alias Tomas P. Flores was charged of estafa thru falsification of a
commercial document in the following manner: after opening a savings account with SBTC under the name
Tomas P. Flores and somehow illegally obtained a PBC check issued by one F. Dycaico, accused making
or causing alterations and changes in a genuine document w/c changed its meaning and thereby affixing
his signature at the back of the check, which check was cleared by the PBC. On the second instance,
accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document by reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, by timely discovery made by officials/employees of said bank of the forgery and
falsification made on the aforesaid check before payment could be made which led then and there to the
apprehension of said accused.
Under the two Informations, the mode of falsification attributed to the accused is that of having erased and
altered the dates and amounts of the checks in question, and superimposing over the original dates and
amounts, thereby making alterations and changes in genuine documents which changed their meaning.
Accused misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit checks in various
amounts.
Did accused committed the crime of attempted estafa in the absence of deceit and damage?
Yes. The fact that appellant was the possessor and utterer of the checks in question and having benefited
from the subsequent withdrawals, as well as having attempted to gain by trying to withdraw an amount
thereon. The use of the spurious checks is by itself fraud or deceit. The appellant made use of and
benefited from the falsified document is a strong evidence that he either himself falsified it or caused the
same to be falsified, he being criminally responsible in either case. Since Heng is the only person who
stood to be benefited by the falsification of the document that was found in his possession, it is presumed
that he is the material author of such falsification.
PEOPLE VS NICOLAS - (DRUGS)

[GR No. 170234 (BUY BUST OPS; Prior Surveillance)]

Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveil lance or test -buy does not af f ect
t he l egal i t y of t he buy- bust oper at i on. Ther e i s no
t ext book met hod of conduct i ng buy- bust oper at i ons. The Cour t has
l ef t t o t he di scr et i on of pol i ce aut hor i t i es t he sel ect i on of ef f ect i vemeans to
apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveil l ance, much less a l engthy one, is not necessary
especiall y where the police operati ves are accompanied by their informant during the
entrapment. Flexibility is a t r a i t o f
g o o d p o l i c e w o r k . I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h e b u y - b u s t operation was conducted
without need of any prior surveillance for the reason that the informant accompanied the policemen
to the person who is peddling the dangerous drugs.




BERNABE
People vs. Agpangan (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Umil vs. Ramos GR 81567 10/3/91 (DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
US vs. Infante 36 Phil 146 (DEC. 14 AND JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

CAJUDAY
People vs. Escleio 84 Phil 121 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Santiago vs. Garchtorena GR 109266 12/2/98 (DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Quelnan vs. People GR 166061 (7/6/07) (JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

SANTIAGO VS. GARCHITORENA (Case Digest)
G.R. No. 109266
December 2, 1998
FACTS:
On May 1, 1991, petitioner Santiago was charged by the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3
(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended , otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly
committed by her favoring unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program.
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Sandiganbayan
from proceeding with criminal case on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she
was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the
Constitution which provides that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination. The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which
motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992, ten days after, the Sandiganbayan, of which the
Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992.
On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending
motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars. However, on
November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to defer the arraignment.

More so, the petitioner cannot accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis
Garchitorena who would her from going to abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft charges
against her. It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the
Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which. The letter of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all
persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, have to secure permission to leave the
country.

The court issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena to
CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by
this Court and from enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds
for the 32 Amended Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on April 12, 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is charged with continued crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code?
HELD:
The 32 Amended Informations charged to the petitioner is known as delito continuado or continued
crime and sometimes referred to as continuous crime. In fairness to the Ombudsmans Office of the
Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the concept of delito continuado has been a vexing
problem in Criminal Law difficult as it is to define and more difficult to apply.
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act
that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such
privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal act: (i) committed by petitioner was in
violation of a law Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one
offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.
The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed
and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is modified in the sense that the
Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32
Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one
offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by the
Court on March 25, 21993 is lifted insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Judge Francis
Garchitorena is concerned.
QUELNAN VS. PEOPLE (case digest)
G.R. No. 166061
July 06, 2007
FACTS:
Sometime in 1996, the Police Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) was tasked to
implement a search warrant to a certain Berard Lim for probably possessing MA HCI (Shabu). The team
was escorted to the unit by the security officer (Punsaran), upon arrival at the place to be searched, a male
person naked from the waist up opened the door, which was later identified as Quelnan. The team
presented the search warrant and proceeded with the search. In the presence of Quelnan and Punsaran,
they found on top of a bedroom table 3 pieces of transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance which was later examined as Shabu. The next day, Quelnan was arrested for violation of Sec.
16 Art. III of RA 6425.
Quelnan in his defense averred that he is not residing in the said unit, but he is the registered owner
of the said unit, which he lwased to Sung Kok Lee beginning May 1996. That he was there during the
search for he was collecting the rent. That he was forced to sign some documents at gunpoint, handcuffed
and brought to PARAC Office. Two days later, he was brought to Makati Prosecutors Office for inquest
and a case was filed against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant was properly enforced provided that he was not the subject of the
search warrant.
Whether or not Quelnan was validly arrested.
RULING:
Yes. There is no provision of law that requires the search warrant must name the person who
occupies the described premises, that where the search warrant is issued for the search of a specifically
described premises only and not for the search of a person, and failure to name to owner or occupant of
such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the warrant.
Yes. Quelnan was arrested inflagrante delicto. In the prosecution of illegal possession of shabu the
following requisites must be present:
1. the accused is found in possession of regulated drug.
2. the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and
3. the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.

That there must be intent to possess the drug, which includes actual possession or constructive
possession. Actual possession exist when the drug is immediate physical possession or control of the
accused, while constructive possession exist when the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion over the place where it is found.
Quelnan was found and caught in flagrante when the shabu was found in his constructive
possession.

CALIZO
US vs. Bautista 6 Phil 681 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Sarep vs. Sandiganbayan GR 68203 9/13/1989 (DEC. 14 AND JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Orteza GR 173051 (7/31/07) (JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)


GROUP C
CAPUZ
People vs. Escleio 84 Phil 121 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Cabrera GR 17855 3/4/1922 (DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Dizon 47 Phil 350 (DEC. 14 AND JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

CASTANEDA
US vs. Bautista 6 Phil 681 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
US vs. Tolentino GR 1451 3/6/1906 (DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
US vs. Ponte 20 Phil 379 (DEC. 14 AND JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

CRUZ
Govt. of Hongkong vs. Hon. Otalia GR 153675, 4/19/07 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Martinez vs. Morfe GR L-34022 3/24/1972 (DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

Government of Hong Kong vs. Olalia
GR 153675 April 19, 2007

Defendant Munoz was charged in Hong Kong and was being extradited to HK. However, he was granted
bail by Olalia during the pendency of the extradition case.

Issue: Whether or not bail is applicable in extradition cases?

Held:
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to
transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step
in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will
abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

Martinez vs. Morfe
GR L-34022 March 24, 1972

Martinez and Bautista was part of the Constitutional Convention and was arrested for criminal offenses with
penalty of prision mayor or higher.

Issue: Martinez and Bautista was claiming immunity due for being part of Constitutional Convention along
with Art. 145 of RPC.

Held:
When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class,
without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same.
There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions
efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate
event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public
interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.


DUMLAO
People vs. Lol-lo 43 Phil 19 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Adelfo vs. Judge Intia 70 SCRA 460 (DEC. 14 AND JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board GR 157870 (JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

People vs Lol-lo
Facts: It was on June 30, 1920 when two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession for Peta another Dutch
possession. One of the boat carried a Dutch subject while the other carried men, women, children, who are
all subjects of Holland. After number of days of navigation, the second boat arrived between the Islands of
Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty
four Moros all armed. The Moros asked for the cargo, attacked some men and brutally violated two
women by methods too horrible to describe. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the
two women, were again placed in the boat with holes made on it, on the idea that it wouold submerge,
although as a matter of fact, these people were succored after eleven days. Two of the Moro marauders
were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-taw, Sulu, Philippine Islands. They
were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer
was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not
within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor any court of the Philippine Islands, that the facts did
not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands.
Issue: Whether or not the crime of piracy committed by Lol-lo and Sarraw lack should be dismissed on the
ground that the Court of First Instance lack jurisdiction to try the case
Ruling: No. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done
animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Piracy is not a crime against any
particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the component tribunal of any country where
the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes
has no territorial limits.
Alfelor vs Intia
Facts: The principal petitioner, Felix Alfelor, and respondent Felix Funtebella were congressional
candidates in the second district of Camarines Sur in the 1965 election with the latter being proclaimed as
the winner resulting in the filing of an electoral protest by the former. Felix Funtebella charged his opponent
and the other petitioners in the municipal trial court of Tigaon, Camarines Sur presided by the respondent
Judge Intia, with falsification of public or official document contained in the ballot box of a precint in
Parubcan, Camarines Sur, the alleged criminal act having taken place in still another municipality, Iriga,
Camareines Sur. There was on the part of petitioners a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, the situs of the alleged falsification being in another municipality. Respondent Judge in the
challenged order issued on April 1967, denied the motion on the ground that falsification is a continuing
offense. Another motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied. Hence, this is a petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether or not falsification of document is a continuing offense?
Ruling: No. Falsification is not a continuing offense. Where public documents inside a ballot box were
falsified in one municipality, the fact that said ballot box was carried to another municipality does not confer
the municipal court of the latter any jurisdiction to try case of falsification of said documents placed in the
said ballot box. It is a settled rule in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was
committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted and the order of the respondent Judge is reversed.

GROUP D
FERNANDEZ D
Govt of Hongkong vs. Hon. Otalia GR 153675, 4/19/07) (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Ferrer 48 SCRA 382 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Marasigan GR 6040 10/18/1940 (DEC. 14 AND JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

People vs. Ferrer
Facts:
On March 10, 1970, a prima facie case was filed against Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance in
Tarlac concerning the Anti-Subversion Act. He was accused of being an officer or a ranked leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the
government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion or any other illegal means.
Co claimed that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. On May 25, 1970, Nilo Tayag and five others
were also charged in the same court with subversion. Tayag copied Cos attack on the law. The court ruled
the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague overbroad. Government
appealed to the SC as a special civil action for certiorari.

Issues:
WoN the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder
WoN it is vague and overbroad
WoN it denies the defendants the due process of the law

Held And Ratio:
No. Only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group
in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. (US
v. Lovett 328 US 303 1946)
No. The contention about the word overthrow regarding the government (peaceful overthrowing) is
clarified by the provision of the clause: by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion or any other illegal
means.
No. The freedom of expression and freedom of association is superseded by the right of the state to self-
preservation.

Govt of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, Jr.

Fact:
Private respondent was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
accepting an advantage as agent in violation of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance of Hong Kong. He
also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong
Kong.

On Sept 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional
arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the NBI which, in turn, filed with the
RTC of Manila. Then RTC issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI
agents arrested and detained him. However, the CA rendered its decision declaring the Order of Arrest
void.

Meanwhile, petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition and petition for bail of private
respondent. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that
there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high flight risk.

Issue:
Whether or not a prospective extraditee may be granted bail?

Held:
Yes, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.

The exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal
proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have
likewise been detained.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of
the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights.


FERNANDEZ R
People vs. Lol-lo 43 Phil 19 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Asuncion 208 SCRA 231 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Samson vs. CA 103 Phil 277 (DEC. 14 AND JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

People vs. Asuncion, 208 SCRA 231 G.R. Nos. 83837-42. April 22, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge of
Branch 104, RTC, Quezon City, PATERNA RUIZ, NOLI G. NARCA, FR. NICK RUIZ, LYDIA R. NARCA,
RODOLFO CORTEZ and TOMAS DOMINADO, respondents.
FACTS:
in February 1988, elements of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines apprehended
the Paterna Ruiz, Noli Narca, Fr. Nick Ruiz, Lydia Narca, Rodolfo Corteza, and Tomas Dominado in
separate operations.
Ammunitions, firearms, and explosives were found in their possession, while subsequent searches in their
respective hide outs resulted in the confiscation of several subversive materials, including documents
showing that they are ranking members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army.
The respondent were then charged with illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives and
violation of R.A. 1700 or the Subversive Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused have committed the complex crime of the absorption of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives to the crime of subversion.
RULING:
Petition was found meritorious with the following rationale:
The dictum in the Hernandez case is not applicable in that case, considering that the legislature deemed
it fit to provide for two distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D.
1866) and (2) subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the Government (R.A. 1700).

People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 Phil. 19 No. 17958. Feb 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants
and appellants.
FACTS:
On or about June 30,1920, A boat of Dutch possession was surrounded by vintas manned by armed
Moros. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo,
attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to be described.
All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it
and holes were made in it, with the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people,
after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored. Taking the two women with them, and
repeatedly violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro
marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw, At Maruro the two women were able
to escape. Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
Islands. There, they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy.
ISSUE:
Whether the CFI of Sulu has jurisdiction for the crime of piracy committed in other territories apart from the
Philippines.
RULING:
Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished
by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state.
Samson vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 103 Phil. 277 Nos. L-10364 and L-10376. March 31, 1958
RUFINO T. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS:
A couple alleging to be Espiridion Lascao and Rosalinda Paras were processing their claim papers as
benefieries of Felipe Lascao, who is the son of Espiridion and who died during World War II. In October 2,
1948, Amado L. Cruz with the couple, asked the help of his former classmate Rufino T. Samson to get the
checks of the claimants in Camp Murphy. Samson relied on the assurance of Cruz and the presented
residence certificates presented by the couple and assisted the couple in obtaining their checks through the
following means: (a) He asked Lt. Manuel Valencia to be the guarantor to secure the claimants checks, for
which Valencia asceded because he knew Samson; (b) facilitated the encashment of the checks since the
teller of the bank also relying on the representation of Samson; (c) at the front of the checks Samson
signed as witness and at the back as endorser.
It was later found that the couple identities were not true. Samson was jointly charged with Cruz and
Bonifacio Vergara and two others involve with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of the two
checks. The CFI of Manila found them guilty. They appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the same.
Samson was only found guilty of committing the crime through gross imprudence. Samson petitions the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Samson is guilty of the complex crime of falsification through gross imprudence.
RULING:
The court affirms the decision appealed on the following rationale:
1. Acts of appellant constitute in each case the crime of estafa through falsification of a mercantile
document by reckless imprudence, because of his acts of endorsing the respective checks by way of
identification of the signatures of the payees entitled to said checks and their proceeds, constituted a
written representation that the true payees participated in the indorsement and cashing of the checks
aforesaid, when in truth and in fact the true payees had no direct intervention in the proceedings Even if
such indorsement and identification were extraneous to the official duties of appellant, he would be
nevertheless liable as a private person under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. Supreme Court of Spain assert the juridical standing of the crime of falsification by imprudence since in
falsifying public or mercantile documents the element of intent to cause damage is not required because
what the law seeks to repress is the prejudice to the public confidence in these documents.
GALLARDO
Astorga vs. People 154131, 10/1/03 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Justo vs. CA 99 Phil 453 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Laserna Jr., vs. Dangerous Drugs Board GR 158633 (JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

LAO
Milo vs. Salonga 152 SCRA 113 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Villalon 192 SCRA 521 (DEC. 14 AND JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Pimentel Jr. vs. COMELEC GR 161658 (JAN 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

GROUP E
LUQUIAS
Astorga vs. People 154131, 10/1/03 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Acierto 57 Phil 614 (DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Reyes 56 Phil 286 (DEC. 14, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
US vs. Jurado 31 Phil 491 (JAN. 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MELECIO A. REYES
G.R. NO. 34516, November 10, 1931


Main Principle: The defendants falsification of the time book with the intent to gain at the expense of the
injured party, constitutes the crime of falsification of a private document with prejudice to a third person,
defined and penalized in article 304 of the Penal Code, and the accused and must suffer the corresponding
penalty.

FACTS: Melecio A. Reyes was charged with the crime of estafa through falsification of a private document.
The accused in this case was in charge of entering the laborers workdays in the time book of the Calamba
Sugar Estate. He is accused of having falsified the time book by making it appear that the laborer Ciriaco
Sario worked twenty-one days, when in reality he had only worked eleven; and having charged the wages
of said laborer for twenty-one days, at the rate of P1 a day, he prejudiced the Calamba Sugar Estate in the
amount of P10. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of estafa through falsification of a
private document. The accused appealed from the judgment.

ISSUE: Whether defendant is guilty of the crime estafa through falsification of a private document.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that where the defendant is accused of estafa with falsification of a
private document, or falsification of a private document with prejudice to a third person, the weight of
authority favors the doctrine that there are not two distinct crimes committed, estafa and falsification, and
that article 89 of the Penal Code is not applicable.

The Supreme Court held that they are of the opinion and so hold that the defendants falsification of the
time book, with the intent of gain at the expense of the Calamba Sugar Estate constitutes the crime of
falsification of a private document with prejudice to a third person, defined and penalized in article 304 of
the Penal Code.

MEDINA
Milo vs. Salonga 152 SCRA 113 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Arnault vs. Balagtas 97 Phil 358 (DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
US vs. Castillo 6 Phil 453 (DEC. 14, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

TOPIC: ASSAULT UPON AN AGENT OF PERSON IN AUTHORITY
G.R. No. L-36595 November 28, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEON ACIERTO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
At about 10 o'clock on the morning of March 2, 1931, while the offended party, Hipolito Velasco, duly
appointed postmaster for the municipality of Bacarra, Province of Ilocos Norte, was in his office situated in
the municipal building, counting two rolls of twenty-peso bills amounting in all to P4,000, the accused, Leon
Acierto, entered the office without the postmaster's noticing it, and stood behind him. Without saying a
word, the accused took one of the rolls, but the postmaster caught hold of his hand and took away the
money, saying: "Get out of here, Lawyer, because we have plenty of work"
the accused came back to his side, and as he did not want to be disturbed, he put the money in the safe,
took the key to the office, and as he was going towards the door, said to the accused: "Be so good as to
leave now, Lawyer".
the offended party approached the defendant quietly, and took hold of his left hand to conduct him outside.
Whereupon the lawyer hit him in the right eye with his fist, leaving him stunned, and making him lose his
balance. When he recovered, the accused again hit him, first in the right frontal region, and then below the
left eye.
As a result of the blows he had sustained, the offended party suffered an ecchymosis in the orbit of the left
eye, and another in the frontal region, which took seven days to heal completely.
ISSUE:
Whether one offended party, Hipolito Velasco, as postmaster of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, who was discharging
his duties at the time of the assault, is merely a public officer, or is an agent of authority besides.
RULING:
The postmaster of a municipality is an agent of the Director of Posts, and as such is in charge of the
custody of the Government funds that come into his hands by virtue of the transactions with the public in
postal matters, telegrams, savings bank, and so forth, and like a municipal treasurer is an agent of a person
in authority in addition to being a public officer, inasmuch as the Director of Posts is a person in authority
who by law exercises jurisdiction of his own in postal and telegraphic matters.
Since the offended party, Hipolito Velasco was an agent of a person in authority when he was attacked, the
defendant herein having laid hands upon him, the crime of which the latter is guilty is assault upon an agent
of a person in authority
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That a postmaster is an agent of
a person in authority; and (2) that the slight physical injuries sustained by such an agent as a result of the
defendant's laying hands upon him, are inherent in the offense of assault upon an agent of a person in
authority

G.R. No. L-6749 July 30, 1955 CONTEMPT
JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, as Director of Prisons, respondent-appellant.
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in-fact or Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The purchase was effected on
October 21, 1949 and the price paid for both estates was P5,000,000. On February 27, 1950, the Senate of
the Philippines adopted Resolution No. 8, whereby it created a Special Committee to determine "whether
the said purchase was honest, valid and proper, and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and
just, the parties responsible therefor, any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises." In
the investigation conducted by the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution, petitioner-appellee was
asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner-appellee refused to
answer this question.
hereupon the Committee resolved on May 15, 1950, to order his commitment to the custody of the
Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison in Rizal until such time
when he shall reveal to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who received the
P440,000 and to answer questions pertinent thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether of Not the Senate has the authority to commit a witness who refuses to answer a question
pertinent to a legislative inquiry
RULING:
The Senate found as a fact that petitioner "has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to
reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of P440,000" and that the situation of petitioner "has not
materially charged since he was committed to prison."
The Senate has the authority to commit a witness if he refuses to answer a question pertinent to a
legislative inquiry, to compel him to give the information, i.e., by reason of its coercive power, not its
punitive power.

PAGSANJAN
US vs. Samonte 16 Phil 516 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Negros Oriental II Electric Coop vs. Sang. Panglungsod of Dumaguete 156 SCRA 421 (DEC. 7 AND
DEC. 14 ASSIGNED CASE)
Hock Lian vs. Republic 17 SCRA 188(JAN. 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
G.R. No. 5649
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISAAC SAMONTE, defendant-appellant.
Godofredo Reyes, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
TRENT, J .:
The defendant, Isaac Samonte, was tried in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas on a
charge of criminal attempt against an agent of the authorities. Counsel for appellant insists, first, that the
prosecution has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the policeman, Gregorio Glindo,
attempted to arrest the accused in Verdales Street, the place where the trouble occurred; and, second that
if said policeman did attempt to arrest the defendant at this place he, not having a judicial warrant, was not,
under the circumstances, authorized to make the arrest which he attempted to make.
About 8 o'clock on the night of September 6, 1908, the appellant, Isaac Samonte, and Basilio Rabe were
together in the house of one Demetrio Pandeio in the barrio of Macalalong, jurisdiction of Pitogo, Province
of Tayabas. They both left the house and met shortly afterwards in the street (Verdades) in said barrio. On
meeting there they became engaged in a quarrel. On account of this resistance the policeman could not
arrest the appellant at that time, so he went immediately to the house of the councilman of that barrio,
Demetrio Pandenio, and reported the matter. Pandenio ordered him to arrest the appellant. He returned to
obey this order, being followed by Pandenio. They found the appellant in a place called Mutingbayan. The
policeman attempted to take hold of the appellant, but he resisted, striking at the policeman again with his
knife. The councilman then ordered the appellant to submit himself, and on receiving this order the
appellant said: "I do not recognize anyone," and struck at the councilman with the knife.
The appellant was not arrested on that night on account of this resistance. He did not lay hands on to touch
with his knife either the policeman or the councilman, but he did refuse to submit himself to the authorities,
and resisted arrest.
Issue: WON the defendants are liable of contempt?
Ruling:Any officer in charged with the preservation of the public peace may arrest, without a warrant, any
person who is committing, or has committed, a breach of the peace in his presence. An offense is
committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an
arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof; of the offense is continuing, or
has not been consummated, at the time the arrest is made. In the case at bar Gregorio Glindo, being a
peace officer, not only had authority to arrest the defendant at that time, but it was his duty to do so, he
having heard the priest call for help and having arrived on the scene before the disturbance had finally
ended.
Article 249 of the Penal Code provides that the following commit criminal attempt:
- Those who attack the authorities or their agents or employ force against them, or gravely intimidate them,
or offer an equally grave resistance while they are discharging the functions of their office or on the
occasion thereof.
Article 250 of the same code fixes the penalty to be imposed for those guilty of an attempt against the
authorities or their agents, as provided in the above article.
The accused in this case, after an attempt had been made to arrest him by duly authorized police officer in
the discharge of his duty a such, offered grave resistance by refusing to submit himself to arrest and by
striking at the policeman with a knife, thereby attempting to a personal injury. Although the policeman was
not wounded or touched by the accused, these facts do not receive him from criminal responsibility.
The penalty imposed by the court below being in accordance with the law and the proofs presented, the
same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Negros Oriental II Electric Coop vs. Sang. Panglungsod of Dumaguete 156 SCRA 421
Facts: This case is all about the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete in punishing non-members for
legislative contempt. On October 25, 1985, respondents sent a subpoena to Patero Torres and Arturo
Umbac requiring their attendance and testimony at the Committees investigation directing the said
petitioners to show cause why they should not be punished for legislative contempt due to their failure to
appear on the said investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public
utilities in the City of Dumaguete where petioner NORECO II, an electric coop had its principal place of
business. Petitioners moved to quash the subpoena on the the ff. grounds:
1. the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to
conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration, and
2. Neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the Local Government Code grants any specific
power to investigate alleged inefficient power lines of NORECO II.
However, the motion to quash was denied. The petioners contend that the Sang. Panglungsod of
Dumaguete is bereft of the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to
order the arrest of witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena. The respondents claim that inherent in the
legislative functions performed by the respondent Sangguniang Panglungsod is the power to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation and if not expressly granted, is necessarily implied from powers granted
to Sangguniang Panglungsod
Issue: WON the sangguniang panglungsod has contempt power and subpoena power
Ruling: The court ruled that the power attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to
the character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government.
The same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law. Furthermore, there
was no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local Government code granting local
legislative bodies the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt.
Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for
the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non members for contumacious behavior would be
for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt
power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of
legislative power.

United States vs. Jurado 31 PHIL 491
Perjury- if the false testimony of the witness is not important, essential or material to the principal matter
under investigation, it can not properly be held that the crime of perjury has been committed.
Facts: This a case against Francisco Jurado with the crime of perjury. Dionisio Jacosalem, provincial fiscal
of Cebu investigated the matter of robbery of some tins of opium committed in the house of Jurado by
Alejandro Albao, a policeman. The opium involved belonged to Vicente Lizarraga who had taken it to the
said house to sell it to the residents of the town. Lizarraga stated that Jurado was present at the time of the
robbery but when Jurado was called to testify as an eyewitness to the crime he denied under oath that he
was at home the night of the robbery as he was in the cinematography together with his family. He also
said that he did not know either Lizarraga or Albao. But in the proceedings brought against Ciriaco Singson
for robbery, commenced on September 24, 1913, Jurado testifying as a witness for the defense, stated
under oathe that he had known Vicente Lizarraga since the month of June and thate he was already
acquainted with Albao.
Issue: Whether or not Francisco Jurado commits perjury
Ruling: The court said that in order that a witness, in testifying under oath before a public official authorized
to administer same commit the crime of perjury and incur the penalty prescribed by section 3 of Act No.
1697, it is necessary and indispensable that he testify to and declare under oath with regard to some
material matter which he does not believe to be true, or that such false testimony tend to establish
something which conflicts with the truth of an essential or important fact which has been proven by the
evidence; because, if the false testimony of the witness is no important, essential or material to the principal
matter under investigation, it can not properly be held that the crime of perjury has been committed.
In the case at bar the principal object of the investigation held by Jacosalem was to find out whether
Alejandro Albao had actually been in Jurados house where Lizarraga was that night with several tims of
opium for sale, and whether on that occasion Albao succeeded in compelling Lizarraga to deliver to him the
tins of opium which Lizarraga was carrying and which Albao seized, took away with him and appropriated to
himself and which have not yet been recovered. The defendant testified that he learned from Isabelo Alburo
that Lizarraga had in fact been it the house with tis of opium for sale, but that witness did not see them
because he was that ight in the cinematograph with his family. The testimony did not contradict any
evidence in the record. Thus, for lack of sufficient proof of the falsity of that statement by the owner of the
house, the defendant Jurado, for it was not proven that it was false and, as he certainly was in his own
house on the said night of the robbery, it cannot be held that, in testifying he did, he perjured himself.
PASION
Sanchez vs. Hon. Dimetriou GR 111771-77, 11/9/93 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
US vs. Ramayrat 22 Phil 183 (DEC. 7 AND DEC. 14 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Hernandez GR 15619-R (11/20/60) (JAN. 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

SANCHEZ V. DEMETRIOU (ILLEGAL ARREST; ARBITRARY DETENTION)
FACTS:

The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges against several
persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of
Allan Gomez.

Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a
preliminaryinvestigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez wasnot present but was represented by his
counsel, Atty.Marciano Brion, Jr.

On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an"invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to
appearfor investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang,Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the
morning of August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to thesaid camp.

At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positivelyidentified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III
VivencioMalabanan, who both executed confessions implicatinghim as a principal in the rape-slay of
Sarmenta and thekilling of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on"arrest status" and taken to the
Department of Justice inManila.

The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted aninquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo
ashis counsel.

After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served onSanchez. This warrant was issued in connection with
Criminal Cases for violation of Section 8, in relation toSection 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith
taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined.

The respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional TrialCourt of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations
charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon,Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George
Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.

Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued awarrant for the arrest of all the accused, including
the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.

The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said
cases might result in a miscarriage of justice. SCthereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the
sevencases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled torespondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.

On September 10, 1993, information were amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating
circumstance.
On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the information substantially on the grounds now
raised in this petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral arguments, the respondent judge denied the
motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
temporary restraining order/writ of injunction.

ISSUES/HELD: WON the arrest of Sanchez was legal- YES (by virtue of the jurisdiction subsequently
acquired


The Arrest

"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rulesof Court as the taking of a person into custody in
orderthat he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule,
an arrest iseffected by an actual restraint of the person to bearrested or by his voluntary submission to the
custodyof the person making the arrest.


Application of actual force, manual touching of the body,physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is
not,required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an
intent onthe part of the other to submit, under the belief andimpression that submission is necessary.

The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter-invitation issued by
PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the said camp for investigation.

In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the investigation of Sanchez
was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a request, it was obviously a command or an
order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the
"invitation," he went without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers who had
come to fetch him.
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438,the requisites of a "custodial investigation" are
applicable even to a person not formally arrested but merely "invited" for questioning.
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was placed on "arrest status" after he
was pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
Respondent Zuo himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993hearing that, on the basis of the sworn
statements of the two state witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested."

His arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,

It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly participated in the
killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal
knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefore because the basis of the arrest was the
sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took
place on June 28-June29, 1993, or forty-six days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the
offense had "in fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested.

The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial
Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it
issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It
was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.

Applicable by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102Section 4 of the Rules of Court that:
Section 4: When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized

If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process sued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason
of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall, anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment

UNITED STATES VS RAMAYRAT (CONTEMPT/ DISOBEDIENCE OF AN ORDER NOT ADDRESSED
TO THE DEFENDANT)
FACTS:
On the 8th of February, 1911, the provincial fiscal of Misamis, Agusan, and Surigao presented against the
defendant a complaint of the following purport:
The undersigned charged of Cayetano Ramayrat with the crime of gross disobedience to the authorities,
committed as follows:
That, on February 1, 1910, who Sabino Vayson filed suit against Cayetano Ramayrat, in the justice of the
peace court of Misamis (Exhibit A), for the recovery of possession of a parcel of land belonging to the said
Sabino Vayson; that, on March 9, 1910, the said justice of the peace court rendered judgment by
sentencing the said Cayetano Ramayrat to deliver the possession of the said land to the plaintiff, Sabino
Vayson (Exhibit B); that, when Cosme Nonoy, the deputy sheriff of the municipality of Misamis, demanded
of the defendant, Cayetano Ramayrat, on April 29, 1910, in this municipality of Misamis, Province of
Misamis, within the jurisdiction of this court, that he deliver the said land to the plaintiff, Sabino Vayson, the
said defendant, Cayetano Ramayrat, voluntarily, unlawfully and criminally refused, and still refuses, to
deliver the said land to the aforementioned Sabino Vayson. The exhibits A, B, and C form an integral part of
this complaint. Said crime was committed in violation of the law and, particularly, of article 252 of the Penal
Code.
The defendant demurred to the complaint, upon the following grounds:
1. That the facts charges do not constitute a crime.
2. That, in the complaint, allegations are made which, if true, would be a justification and legal exemption
for the defendant.
ISSUES: WON RAMAYRAT COMMITTED GROSS DISOBEDIENCE TO THE AUTHORITIES
HELD:
Section 232 of Act No. 190, cited in the order appealed from, provides, in part, as follows:
SEC. 232. What other acts are contempts of court. A person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished as for contempt:
(a) Disobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court,
or injunction granted by a court or judge;
Article 252 of the Penal Code, cited in the complaint and which the trial court held to be repealed by the
said sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, is as follows:
ART. 252. The persons who, without being included in article 249, should resist the authorities, or
their agents, or should grossly disobey them in the performance of the duties of their office, shall be
punished with the penalties of arresto mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas.
The Attorney-General alleges as a ground for his appeal that the trial court erred in holding that
disobedience of judicial orders is not comprised within article 252 of the Penal Code and that this article
was repealed by sections 232 and 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as it was incompatible
therewith.
In view of the opinion we have formed of the facts alleged in the complaint, it becomes unnecessary for us
to decide the aforementioned questions set up in the Attorney-General's brief. We do not think that the
defendant disobeyed any judicial order whatever. The order issued by the justice of the peace (Exhibit C)
and alleged to have to have been disobeyed, is a writ of execution and addressed, as was natural and
proper, to the competent sheriff, and not to the defendant.
The Attorney-General brings up still another aspect of the case. He states in his brief that the defendant
grossly disobeyed an agent of the authorities, such as is the sheriff, by not delivering the land to Vayson, as
he was ordered to do by the said sheriff. In accordance with article 252 of the Penal Code, disobedience to
the agents of the authorities is punishable only when they are in the exercise of the duties that particularly
pertain to their office. As aforesaid, the duty of the sheriff in the present case was to place Vayson in
possession of the land. Instead of so doing, he limited his action to telling or ordering the defendant to
deliver the land to the said Vayson. In acting in this wise, not only did he fail duly to discharge his official
duty, but he openly neglected to perform the same. He had no right whatever to require that the defendant
should perform a duty which he himself ought to have performed: to do so, would be tantamount to
imposing one's own duties upon another, which, evidently, would be illegal and unjust. Under such
circumstances, the defendant's disobedience, if any there were, does not constitute the crime
aforementioned.
GROUP F
SERRANO
US vs. Samonte 16 Phil 516 (NOV 23 AND DEC 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
US vs. Abad Santos GR L-976 10/22/1902 (DEC. 14, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
Diaz vs. People 191 SCRA 86 (JAN. 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

SIA
Sanchez vs. Hon. Dimetriou GR 111771-77, 11/9/93 (NOV 23 AND DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED
CASE)
Giron vs. Sandiganbayan GR 145357-59 8/23/2006 (DEC. 14, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Padol 68 SCRA 365 (JAN. 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

SANCHEZ vs DEMETRIOU
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 09, 1993

FACTS: Information was filed against several people including the petitioner in relation with the rape-slay of
Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Sanchez has brought the petition to challenge the
order of the respondent judge denying his motion to quash the information for rape with homicide filed
against him and six other persons on the ground he is being charged with sevenhomicides arising from the
death of only two persons. The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven
separatehomicides are absurd because the two victims in these cases could not have died seven times.

Issue: Whether or not the court acted properly on denying thepetition of Sanchez to quash on the grounds
that he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons.

Held: The court ruled that where there are two or more offenders who commit rape,
the homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the
special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape
with homicide as there are rapes committed. In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape,
thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of
rape, loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a
qualifying circumstance. However, by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute an constituent element
of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree. The
petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with
the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of
simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that
the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the
assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence
Sarmenta. Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and
later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The
separate information filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is
complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her
seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in
the slaying of Sarmenta.

PEDRO S. GIRON, ET AL. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 145357-59 August 23, 2006

FACTS: The present petition involves alleged irregularities in the construction of a two-kilometer road
connecting Barangays Kinayan and Kauswagan in Tandag, Surigao del Sur ("Kinayan-Kauswagan Road
Project"). Contrary to what was stated in the Monthly Status Report dated 25 January 1989 and the
Physical Status Report dated 31 January 1989 (collectively, "Reports"), the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road
Project was not 100% complete as of 25 January 1989.

In a communication dated January 25, 1989, District Engr. Giron submitted to the Regional Director of
DPWH Regional Office No. XI (Davao City) the Monthly Status Report of CY 1988 Infrastructure Program
where it appeared that Kauswagan-Kinayan Road was 100% complete as of January 25, 1989.

Thereafter, in a letter dated January 31, 1989, Engr. Lala, for and in the absence of the District Engineer,
submitted the Physical Status Reports of Project Costing P2.0 M and below under C.Y. 1988 Infra Program
to the same Regional Office of the DPWH wherein it appeared that the Kauswagan-Kinayan Road, Barobo
Surigao del Sur is 100% complete.

Contrary to the Reports, the road was not finished by 25 January 1989. On 30 June 1989, the Barangay
Council of Kinayan, Barobo, Surigao del Sur resolved to request the Ombudsman to make an immediate
investigation on the irregularities of the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project.

The Ombudsman, through the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, ordered the Provincial Auditor to conduct
an investigation. On 19 June 1990, in a report addressed to the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, State
Auditor III Eusebia Gamulo of the Office of the Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Sur wrote that: Actual
implementation of the project was very much delayed. In an interview made it was disclosed that while the
road opening started in November 1988, spreading of the delivered soil lime base course was done in
October 1989 only, which was contrary to the DPWH report that said project was 100% completed as of
January 25, 1989.

ISSUE: Whether Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza are indeed guilty of falsification of documents under Article
171(4) of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD: No. There are three elements in the crime of falsification of documents under Article 171(4). First,
the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public. Second, the offender takes advantage of his
official position. Third, the offender falsifies a document by making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts. There is no doubt that all three are public officials, as they were employees of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) at the time of the questioned act.

There is serious doubt, however, as to whether anyone among Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza actually took
advantage of his official position. The offender takes advantage of his official position when he has the duty
to make or to prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of the document, or he has the official
custody of the document which he falsifies. According to the Sandiganbayan, Giron testified that: In
preparing these reports, the project engineer reports to the Construction Section the degree of work they
had accomplished with respect to the project assigned to them. The reports of the project engineers were to
be consolidated into one hence arriving at a Monthly Status Report. These reports were being submitted
every 25th of the month and it takes the Office of the District Engineer three (3) to five (5) days to prepare
the said report. The Monthly Status Report was typed by Crizaldo, checked by Cedro, and submitted by
Salang in lieu of Giron. Engr. Cedro, who supervised the preparation of the Monthly Status Report and
checked the same, was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan because "he never signed the subject reports."
Salang was also acquitted by the Sandiganbayan because "his participation was seemingly limited to the
acts before the actual construction of the project."

Crizaldo's item was that of a General Construction Foreman but she was not assigned to the project site.
Crizaldo was assigned in the office and was tasked to type the Monthly Status Report. The prosecution
never proved that Crizaldo had knowledge of the actual status of the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project at
the time she prepared the Monthly Status Report. Crizaldo could have merely relied on field reports
submitted to her, precluding her from making, on her own, untruthful statements at the time she prepared
the Monthly Status Report. Crizaldo could not have conspired with any other party because the
Sandiganbayan found that "there is reasonable doubt as to the existence of conspiracy on the part of the
accused herein to falsify the subject reports." The Sandiganbayan ruled that "any criminal liability should be
based on their individual participation in the questioned act."

Giron's testimony as to the usual procedure cannot be used against him because he did not sign the
Monthly Status Report. Giron's facsimile signature was merely stamped on the Monthly Status Report. The
stamped facsimile signatures of Giron do not establish his personal participation in the preparation of the
Monthly Status Report. To use this portion of Giron's testimony to establish his personal participation is to
extrapolate and speculate. This will not suffice in a criminal action, which requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt for conviction.

Arreza was the Project Engineer of the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project. However, like Giron and
Crizaldo, the prosecution was unable to prove his actual participation in the questioned reports. The
Sandiganbayan found that Arreza "had no participation in the preparation and execution of the said
document[s]." The Sandiganbayan also found that Arreza "did not take advantage of his public position,"
and thus Arreza is liable under Artcle 172 of the Revised Penal code for falsification of a private document.

In sum, Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza are acquitted for failure of the prosecution to satisfy the requisites for
the conviction of the crime of falsification of public documents. All are public officers, However, the
prosecution has failed to prove their criminal culpability beyond reasonable doubt. There is no moral
certainty that Giron, Crizaldo, and Arreza took advantage of their positions to make a false statement in a
narration of facts in a public document.


PEOPLE vs PUDOL
68 SCRA 365, October 18, 1938

FACTS: An information had been filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur charging Esminia Pudol
and Alberto Reyes with having committed the crime of perjury, the former by subscribing a false affidavit by
induction and with the further cooperation of the latter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of subordination of perjury.

HELD: Yes, the fact that subordination of perjury is not expressly penalized in the Revised Penal Code
does not mean that the direct induction of a person by another to commit perjury has ceased to be crime,
because said crime is fully within the scope of that defined in Article 17, subsection 2, of the Revised Penal
Code. Furthermore, Alberto Reyes, as already stated, is charged in the present case not only as subowner
of the perjury committed by his coaccussed but also as principal by cooperation and participation in the
preparation of the false affidavit subscribed by Esminia Pudol.

The order appealed is reversed.

PEOPLE vs CAPISTRANO
40 Phil 902, March 15, 1920

FACTS: Accused-appellant Barbara Capistrano stated under oath two contradictory statement: one before
the Assistant prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation before filing the information against
her father Alejo Capistrano for Rape, statement whereby she was accusing the latter of the said crime; and
another before the Court of first instance at the hearing of the same cause for rape, saying that the one call
Juan Sol, and that for her fear to the latter who had threatened her, she made the former statement before
the fiscal imputing the commission of the crime to his father. In view thereof, the fiscal filed a case against
her for the crime of perjury.

ISSUE: Whether or not the two contradictory sworn statements sufficient to convict the accused of perjury.

HELD: The Court ruled that in order to hold the accused guilty of the crime of perjury, it was necessary to
prove that she did not believe said testimony as true or, what amounts to the same thing, that which she
testified to before the CFI was not true.

A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn statement of the accused,
but the prosecution must prove which of the two statements is false and must show that statement to be
false by other evidence that the contradictory statement. One who is thus accused for having given under
oath a statement contradictory to the one given in a former examination, has the right to prove that the
statement formerly given by him was induced by threats and duress.

TARCA
People vs. Herson Tan GR 117321, 2/11/98 (NOV 23 AND DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
US vs. Nicasio Capule 24 Phil 13 (DEC. 14, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

TUALLA
Marcos vs. Manglapus GR 88211, 9/15/89 (DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Capistrano 40 Phil 491 (JAN. 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

Marcos vs Manglapus
Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the
President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino)
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines
to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any
country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country
cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to
return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that
the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the
return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare.
President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe
away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines,
the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
GROUP G
TUPAZ
People vs. Herson Tan GR 117321, 2/11/98 (NOV 23, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Quasha 93 Phil 333 (DEC. 14 AND JAN. 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
La Chemise Lacoste vs. Hon. Fernandez GR 6379-97 (5/21/84) JAN. 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HERSON TAN y VERZO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
Tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, a to inform her that he will drive Lito Amido
and appellant Herson Tan to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time that Freddie was seen alive. His body
was later found sprawled on a diversion road with fourteen stab wounds.

Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection
with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their
conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in the case at bar. He
narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent
death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio
Summit, Muntinlupa. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a team
to retrieve the same.

Tan and Amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder

Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters, he had no
warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the
instant case, but also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they
were merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed
confession to writing.

In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police investigator upon invitation
and without the benefit of counsel, is admissible in evidence against him.

HELD: No.

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever
information is derived there from shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. R.A.
No. 7438 reinforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial
investigation, a pertinent provision of which reads:

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person
who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to
the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.


People V. Quasha (1953)
G.R. No. L-6055 June 12, 1953
FACTS:
William H. Quasha
a member of the Philippine bar, committed a crime of falsification of a public and commercial document for
causing it to appear that Arsenio Baylon, a Filipino citizen, had subscribed to and was the owner of 60.005
% of the subscribed capital stock of Pacific Airways Corp. (Pacific) when in reality the money paid belongs
to an American citizen whose name did not appear in the article of incorporation,
to circumvent the constitutional mandate that no corp. shall be authorize to operate as a public utility in the
Philippines unless 60% of its capital stock is owned by Filipinos.
Found guilty after trial and sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a fine
Quasha appealed to this Court
Primary purpose: to carry on the business of a common carrier by air, land or water
Baylon did not have the controlling vote because of the difference in voting power between the preferred
shares and the common shares
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty
of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee,
or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts:
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum period and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding
article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial
document.

ISSUE: W/N Quasha should be criminally liable

HELD: NO. Acquitted.
falsification consists in not disclosing in the articles of incorporation that Baylon was a mere trustee ( or
dummy as the prosecution chooses to call him) of his American co-incorporators, thus giving the
impression that Baylon was the owner of the shares subscribed to by him
For the mere formation of the corporation such revelation was not essential, and the Corporation Law does
not require it
The moment for determining whether a corporation is entitled to operate as a public utility is when it applies
for a franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for that purpose.
that can be done after the corporation has already come into being and not while it is still being formed
so far as American citizens are concerned, the said act has ceased to be an offense within the meaning of
the law, so that defendant can no longer be held criminally liable therefor.

VILLAREAL
Marcos vs. Manglapus GR 88211, 9/15/89 (NOV 23 AND DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Po Giok To 96 Phil 917 (DEC. 14 AND JAN. 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
US vs. Manuel 7 Phil 221 (JAN. 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
U.S. vs. Manuel, 7 Phil. 221
Facts:

The soda water, lemonade, and other aerated waters manufactured by A. S. Watson & Co., were sold in
bottles specially made for the purpose, with their trademark blown on the side in large raised letters and
figures. On those bottles labels were pasted also bearing the said trademark. The accused manufactured
and sold a number of bottles of aerated waters in bottles identical in form and appearance with those used
by A. S. Watsons & Co., with the trademark of that firm blown on the side of the bottles. On the bottles sold
by the accused there were pasted labels with his name, the printed matter contained in these labels bearing
different from that contained in the labels of A.S. Watsons & Co.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused Manuel is guilty of Unfair Competition under Article 189 of the RPC

Held:
The accused was found guilty for violating Unfair competition under article 189 as selling of his soft drinks
in the bottles of A.S. Watson & Company gave his goods the general appearance of the soft drinks
manufactured by that firm, in a way which would likely to influence purchasers to believe that goods offered
were those of A. S. Watsons & Co.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs
PO GIOK TO, defendant-appellee.
Facts:
On 7
th
of January 1952 the clerk of the treasurers office in Cebu issued a residence certificate to Po Giok
To, stipulating false information on the document as to his full name, place of birth, citizenship, civil status,
length of residence in the city, occupation which are required to appear in the residence certificate of
which. The defendant- appellee was charged with violation of article 171 of the Revised Penal Code in
falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesial minister, under its paragraph 4, to wit,
Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. The defendant appellee argues that (1) it is essential
that there is intent to injure a third person in committing the violation, (2) and that a resident certificate is a
document which does not require legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts, and therefore with the
absence of these requisites, he did not violate the law.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant-appellee is guilty of falsification of a public officer, employee or ecclesial
Minister under Article 171 of the RPC.
Held:
The defendant-appellee is guilty. CA No. 465 is a law that mandates the establishing of facts of information
on the residence certificate which serves as the legal obligation for the accused to stipulate in his residence
certificate. Likewise, the court also ruled that the wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third
person is not essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. The residence certificate is a
public document, wherefore to injure a third person is not necessary in the case. Wherefore, the accused
met all the requirements in violation of Article 171 of the RPC.
Marcos vs. Manglapus GA No. 88211
Facts:

After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his
deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and
enjoin the implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners
contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of
abode because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor, according to the
petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

Issue:

Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?

Ruling:

The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance national interest.

This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace. The president is not only
clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon.

The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country bolsters
the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed
against the state and instigate more chaos.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats
to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of
the people is the essence of the duty of the government.

The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is
DISMISSED.

Related to Article 127: Expulsion

ZACARIAS
People vs. Elamparo GR 121572, 3/31/2000 (NOV 23 AND DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
People vs. Montana and Cabagsang 57 Phil 599 (DEC. 14 AND JAN. 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

ZAFE
People vs. Baes 68 Phil 203 (NOV 23 AND DEC. 7, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)
US vs. Kyburz 28 Phil 475 (JAN. 11, 2013 ASSIGNED CASE)

OFFENDING RELIGIOUS FEELINGS

People vs. Baes
The case where the funeral passed thru theCatholic churchyard.
The court held that WON the act complainedof is offensive to the religious feelings of theCatholics, is a
question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of theCatholics and not those of other
faithful ones,for it is possible that certain acts may offendthe feelings of those who profess a
certainreligion, while not otherwise offensive to thefeelings of those professing another faith.
Laurel Dissenting: Offense to rel igiousfeelings should not be made to depend uponthe more or less
broad or narrow conceptionof any given particular religion but should begauged having in view the nature of
the actscommitted and after scrutiny of all the factsand circumstances
which should be viewedthrough the mirror of an unbiased judicial criterion. Otherwise, the gravity of
leniency of the offense would hinge in the subjecti vecharacterization of the act from the point of view
of a given religious denomination or sectand in such a case, the application of the
lawwoul d be par t i al and ar bi t r ar y, wi t hal , dangerous, especiall y in a country said toonce
the scene of reli gious intolerance andprosecution.

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