Revista "Njohja" Nr.3 Viti 2014

Pristina, Gusht 2014 KDU 316.
74: 001(05)
NJOHJA
Txetxu AGUADO
Aliriza ARNLIU
Bekim BALIQI
Adem BEHA
Anton K BERISHAJ
Dashamir BRXULLI
Zlata BOZAC
Linda GUSIA
Kaltrina KELMENDI
Alma Vardari-KESLER
Muhamedin KULLASHI
Blerim LATIFI
Hana LIMANI
Astrit SALIHU
Niklas TOIVAKAINEN
Lino VELJAK
David WEBERMAN
Instituti pr Studime
Sociale dhe Humanistike
Universiteti i Prishtins, Fakulteti Filozofik
INSTITUTIT PR SUDIME SOCIALE DHE HUMANISTIKE
Bordi Redaktues
Hasnije Ilazi Kryeredaktore
Astrit Salihu
Nita Luci
Stephanie Schwandner Sievers
Besnik Pula
Bekim Baliqi
Valdrin Prenkaj
Dizajni dhe Faqosja
Albert Zuka Printing Press
Ky numr i revists shkencore NJOHJA sht financuar nga Universiteti I Prishtins Hasan Prishtina.
Mendimet dhe konkludimet apo rekomandimet e shprehura n revist jan t autorve dhe jo
domosdoshmrisht pasqyrojn qendrimet e donatorit.
Pr njohjen ....................................................................................... 7
Muhamedin Kullashi - Njohja dhe regjimet e t vrtets
te Michel Foucault ............................................................................................................................9
Niklas Toivakainen - Man and his invention ........................................................................ 25
T drejtat e njeriut prtej ideologjis ..................................... 41
Txetxu Aguado - Ethnicity, violence, and vulnerability:
The case for Individual versus collective Identity rights in Spain ................................ 43
Bekim Baliqi - Zhvillimi dhe t drejtat e njeriut .................................................................. 61
Adem Beha - Minority rights: An opportunity for adjustment
of ethnic relations in Kosovo? .................................................................................................. 69
Anton K. Berishaj - Fmijt n pun dhe n rrug ............................................................. 101
Kaltrina Kelmendi & Aliriza Arnliu & Dashamir Brxulli
Qndrimet ndaj t drejtave t njeriut dhe vlerat njerzore ............................................ 127
Linda Gusia - Silence versus recognition of survivors
of sexual violence in Kosovo .................................................................................................... 139
Alma Vardari-Kesler - Between the oda and state-building:
Womens collective action in post-war Kosovo ..................................................................149
Blerim Lati - Filozoa e Nies:
Nga fundi i ides s zotit tek llimet e ides s europs .................................................. 171
Prmbajtja
Hana Limani - Accommodation of dierence:
Shared civic identity and minority rights ............................................................................ 191
Lino Veljak - The purpose of philosophy and the
question of human rights ........................................................................................................205
David Weberman & Zlata Bozac
Tempered prospects for a globalized conception of human rights .............................. 213
Arkitekstura ..................................................................................................................... 223
Astrit Salihu - Drejt nj arkitekture demokratike!
(Bruno Zevi ose modernizmi vetreeksiv n arkitektur) ........................................ 225
Pr njohjen
9
Njohja dhe regjimet e t vrtets te Michel Foucault Muhamedin Kullashi
Muhamedin Kullashi
Universiteti Paris 8
Njohja dhe regjimet e t vrtets
te Michel Foucault
1
Abstrakt
Foucaultja ka ndrtuar nj metod t veant t problematizimit t mnyrave
tona t t menduarit dhe njohjes lidhur me disa objekte-tema univerzale si:
menduria, delikuenca, seksualiteti, qeverisja. Ai shtron s pari pohimin pr
mosekzistimin e tyre (nuk ka menduri, nuk ka seksualitet etj.) me qllim t
zhbrjes s bindjeve tona t sigurta lidhur me to. Pastaj, ngre pyetjen se n
mnyr ajo q nuk ekzistonte ka mundur t ndodh, n mnyr nj seri
1 (ky artikull sht sajuar n mbshtetje t librit t autorit Pushteti dhe dija te Michel
Foucault, ku tematizohet shtja e njohjes dhe t vrtets)
Veantia e krkimeve mendore t Foucaults
gjen shprehje pikrisht n prpjekjet e tij q,
n njern an, t veoj nj fush t njjt
objektesh, apo nj shtres objektesh gjegjsisht
nj shtres relacionesh dhe n ann tjetr, t
formsoj mjetet e veta t hulumtimit. Shtresat
kryesore t objekteve me t cilat sht marr
Foucaultja jan relacionet dija-pushteti, e
vrteta-pushteti, e vrteta-subjekti.
N dallim nga filozoft q ishin t prirur ta
shikojn procesin e prodhimit t t vrtets
si t shkputur nga kushtet dhe rrethanant
brenda t cilave ajo ngjizet, Foucault zhvillon
nga fundi i viteve 70 tezn se do shoqri e
ka regjimin e vet t vrtets. Kjo do t thot
se n periudha t ndryshme historike, brenda
shoqrive t ndryshme sajohen mekanizma
e instanca t cilat prkufizojn kriteret me
t cilat dallohen shprehjet (les noncs) e
vrteta nga ato t pavrteta.
Disa lexues e interpretues e kan shpjeguar
kt koncepsion t Foucalts si koncepsion i
cili relativizon shum t vrtetn, duke e br
t varur nga do regjim i t vrtets, sipas
epoks dhe shoqris ku paraqitet. Mirpo,
Foucault, n fakt synon t nxjerr n shesh, n
mnyr gjithnj e m t saktsuar, mnyrn
se si, n nj shoqri, sajohen kritere me t
cilat disa njohuri konsiderohen t vrteta e t
tjerat t pavrteta. Relacionin midis dijes dhe
pushtetit Foucault nuk e kupton nprmjet t
nj nocioni t shkaksis s njnashme, pra
si dije e cila do ishte e prcaktuar tro nga
nj qeveri a pushtet. Ai e shikon dinamikn
e ktyre relacioneve t sajohen brenda
praktikave t ndryshme (ligjrimore, politike,
ekonomike, sociale).
Thn prgjithsisht, Foucaultja lidhur
me shtjen e t vrtets synon t vej n
pah aspekte t cilat ishin t shprfillur nga
filozoft. N vend se t ndalet te hulumtimi
i kushteve mendore q e bjn t mundur
njohjen e t vrtets, n vend se t ndalet
te rishqyrtimi i teorive tradicionale mbi t
vrtetn (teoria e korespondencs, teoria
pragmatiste, teoria ekzistencialiste etj.) ai
vijzon nj varg faktorsh q ndrmjetsojn
prodhimin e t vrtetave.
10 NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014 KDU 1(091)
praktikash ka mundur t sajohet pr t prodhuar, lidhur me donjerin prej ktyre
objekteve, nj regjim t s vrtets, i sajuar nga pushteti dhe dija t prziera, i
cili bn t mundur t thuhet sht e vrtet e sht e pavrtet lidhur me kto
objekte (menduria, qeverisja etj.).
Mvetsia e koncepsionit t Foucaults mbi t vrtetn shquhet me ndriimin
e raporteve t saj me relacionet e pushteteve. Foucault i shqyrton kto raporte
n nj numr t madh t teksteve t veta: jo vetm n libra si T mbikqyrsh
dhe t ndshkosh, Vullneti pr dije
2
por edhe n prmbledhjet e ligjratave t
tij t mbajtura n Collge de France si Pushteti psikiatrik
3
, Duhet ta mbrojm
shoqrin
4
, Siguria.Territori. Popullsia, Lindja e biopolitiks si edhe edhe n disa
artikuj e intervista.
N disa shkrime Foucault kishte pohuar se ai nuk ka nj koncepsion global e
t prgjithshm mbi pushtetin. Ky pohim shkaktonte ndonjher hutim e
paqartsi. Efekt t njjt prodhonte edhe pohimi tjetr i tij se ai nuk ka nj
metod t prgjithshme t ciln do ta zbatonte n mnyr t njjt n fusha t
ndryshme
5
. N fakt, Foucault me kto pohime dshiron pikrisht t saktsoj
karakterin dhe natyrn specifike t hulumtiveve t veta mendore, q nuk i
prkasin vetm filozofis por edhe fushave tjera t dijes (historis, letrsis,
drejtsis, psikiatris etj.).
Veantia e krkimeve mendore t Foucaults gjen shprehje pikrisht n
prpjekjet e tij q, n njern an, t veoj nj fush t njjt objektesh, apo
nj shtres objektesh gjegjsisht nj shtres relacionesh dhe n ann tjetr, t
formsoj mjetet e veta t hulumtimit. Shtresat kryesore t objekteve me t cilat
sht marr Foucaultja jan relacionet dija-pushteti, e vrteta-pushteti, e vrteta-
subjekti. Duke mohuar t ket nj teori t prgjithshme pr ti shkoqitur kto
relacione, Foucault e di se i ekspozohet rrezikut ta cilsojn si nj empirist t
cilit i mungojn parimet. Ndonjher ai sikur zbavitet ta quaj veten nj empirist
i verbr dhe ta paraqes pozicionin e krkimit t vet si pozicion i cili nuk mund
t mbrohet: sht vrtet pretencioze t flassh pr nj objekt t panjohur me
nj metod t paprkufizuar
6
. Mirpo, Foucault ia del, gjat hulumtimeve t
veta mbi historin e shoqrin, t farkoj vegla t metods t cilat i bjn t
mundur t shkoqis shtresa objektesh (si dija-pushteti). Ndrkaq, relacioni t
cilin Foucalut e kultivon midis veglave t metods dhe shtresave t objekteve t
zbrthyera sht nj relacion dinamik q implikon nj korigjim reciprok. Zbatimi
i metods nuk prodhon vetiu t vrteta pr objektet e hulumtuara:Un provoj
ti korrigjoj veglat e mia prmes objekteve q besoj se i kam zbuluar; vegla e
2 Surveiller et punir, Paris, Gallimard, 1975.
Histoire de la sxualite. Tome I : La volont de savoir, Paris, Gallimard, 1976.
3 M.Foucault, Le Pouvoir psychiatrique (1973-1974), Paris, Gallimard, 2003.
4 M.Foucaulut, Il faut dfendre la socit (1975-1976), Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, 2000 ?.
5 M. Foucalut, Dits et crits (Thnie dhe shkrime), II, Paris, Gallimard, 2001, f.404.
6 Po aty, f.404.
11
korrigjuar nxjerr n shesh se objekti t cilin e kisha prkufizuar nuk ishte krejt
ashtu si dukej
7
. sht fjala pr nj proces brenda t cilit ndodh nj formsim i
ndrsjell i objekteve t dijes dhe subjekteve t njohjes. Ky pikvrojtim prbn
piknisjen e asaj teorie, q Foucaultja m von do ta emrtoj si ontologji kritike
e vetes son.
Origjinaliteti i mendimit t Foucaults mbi historin shprfaqet edhe n saje t
krahasimit me koncepsionet mbizotruese asokohe n Evropn perndimore:
me strukturalizmin, fenomenologjin dhe marksizmin. Thn krejt shkurtazi,
ndryshe nga struktrualizmi q i shprfill apo i tret ngjarjet historike brenda
strukturave jashtkohore, Foucault shtjellon shtreszimet e tipeve t ngjarjeve
t ndryshme, t cilat nuk kan t njjtn pesh, as gjersin antropologjike, e as
t njjtn aftsi pr t prodhuar efekte. Ai krkon t bhet dallimi i ngjarjeve, t
diferencohen nivelet dhe t rindrtohen fijet q i lidhin dhe q bjn q ato t
prodhohen njera nga tjetra.
N vend t analizave q i referohen fushs simbolike apo fushs s strukturave
domethnse, Foucault zhvillon analiza q problematizojn gjenealogjine
raporteve t forcave n periudha t caktuara t historis. Njherit, ai
konteston qasjen fenomenologjike e cila sht e prirur ta shpjegoj historin
n mbshtetje t ides s njeriut si subjekt themelues, edhe nse ai shikohet
prmes transformimeve q pson brenda kohsis. Duke kritikuar iden e
subjektit themelues, ai zhvillon nj analiz e cila mund t shpjegoj konstituimin
e subjektit brenda indit historik, n saje t gjenealogjis, si trajt e historis
e cila shpjegon ndrtimin e dijeve, t ligjrimeve dhe t fushave t objekteve,
pa iu referuar nj subjekti
8
. Foucalut ndrton koncepcionin e vet edhe n saje
t kontestimit t qasjes marksiste, e cila, n instanc t fundit, mbshtetet n
ndrveprimet e ideologjive me lojn e superstrukturave dhe t infrastrukturave.
Aspekti tjetr i qasjes metodologjike t Foucaults gjen shprehje n kategorin
e gjenealogjis, e sajuar n mbshtetje t mendimit t Nietzsches (Nie).
Gjenealogjia pr Foucaultn sht nj hulumtim i historis q dallon dhe i
kundrvihet atyre koncepsioneve q shpjegojn historin me kategorin e
teleologjive t pakufishme, atyre q mbshteten n krkimin e origjins, n
gjenezn e nj objekti dhe unitetin e rrefenjs historike. Historia gjenealogjike
eviton ti fus ngjarjet e historis brenda kallpeve t paraprgaditura, brenda
nj vazhdimsie t dhunshme, dhe orvatet t kap historin prmes veantis
s ngjarjeve, llojshmris dhe shkaprderdhjes s tyre. Historia gjenealogjike
e Foucaults, n dallim nga historiografit jokritike, problematizon edhe vet
racionalitetin e vetes, do t t thot t regjimit t t vrtets mbi t cilin
mbshtetet.
7 Po aty, f. 404.
8 Po aty, f.147.
Duke u frymzuar nga shkrimet e Nietzsches mbi historin efektive (wirkliche
Historie), Foucault ndrton qasjen e vet gjenealogjike me t ciln u kundrvihet
sa qasjeve historiografike aq edhe atyre tradicionale t filozofis s historis.
Historia efektive dallon nga ajo e historianve ngase nuk mbshtetet n asnj
konstant: asgj tek njeriu madje as trupi i tij nuk sht aq e qndrueshme
sa t na lejoj t kuptojm njerzit tjer dhe t mund ta rizbulojm veten te
ata. Gjith ajo mbi ka mbshtet kthimi te historia dhe kapja e trsis s saj,
gjith ajo q bn t mundur q historia t paraqitet si nj lvizje e qet dhe e
vazhdueshm, e gjith ajo duhet t thyhet
9
.
Pr ta dalluar qasjen gjenealogjike nga ajo metafizike Foucault thekson:
Gjenealogjisti ka nevoj pr historin pr tiu shmangur kimers s prejardhjes,
ngapak sikurse filozofi i mir ka nevoj pr mjeksin pr tiu shmangur hijes
s shpirtit. Duhet ditur t hetosh ngjarjet e historis, tronditjet e saj, befasit e
saj, fitoret e pasigurta, dshtimet e paprtypura mir, t cilat nxjerrin n shesh
fillimet, atavizmat dhe trashgimit; sikurse q duhet t dish t diagnostikosh
smundjet e trupit, gjendjen e ligshtis dhe at t energjis, plasaritjet e tij
dhe rezistencat e tij, pr t gjykuar se sht nj diskurs filozofik. Intenzitetet
e historis, dshtimet e saj, trbimet e saj t fshehta, trandjet e saj t ethshme
sikurse edhe sinkopat e saj, t gjitha kto jan vet trupi i historis. Do t duhej
t ishe metafizikan pr tia krkuar asaj nj shpirt n idealitetin e largt t
prejardhjes
10
. Ky fragment q vijzon kahjen e krkimeve t Foucaults mund
t shrbej si ndihmes pr t kuptuar veorin e trajtimit t tij t ngjarjeve t
caktuara t histories, q do ti zm n goj n kaptinat vijuese.
shtja e s vrtets
Brenda hulumtimeve kushtuar pushtetit, Foucault shqyrton n veanti raportin
midis t vrtets dhe pushtetit. E vrteta, pr t, nnkupton trsin e procedurave
q i bjn t mundur donjerit, brenda nj epoke, t shqiptoj shprehjet q do t
shikohen si t vrteta. Foucault shkputet kshtu nga ajo tradit filozofike (q
nga Platoni) e cila ishte e prirur ta shikoj t vrtetn si prodhim t mendimit t
pavarur nga kushtet dhe kushtzimet (historike, kulturore, sociale), si instanc
q rri disi pezull kundrejt institucioneve, pushtetit, shoqris. Kt pikshikim
Foucault e trajton si nj iluzion t kndshm t filozofve. Kjo sdo t thot se
pushteti e prodhon t vrtetn apo e prcakton at mekanikisht. Sepse pr
Foucaultn nuk ka fare instanc supreme, e cila do t ofronte nj garanc t
paluhatshme pr t vrtetn. Ligjrimi i cili prodhon njohuri (pr historin, jetn,
dijet shkencore), q mtojn t jen t vrteta, i nnshtrohet, n do epok disa
rregullave dhe procedurave. N disa periudha e n disa kultura kto procedura
9 Dits et crits, I, f.1015.
10 Po aty, 1008.
13
jan t kodifikuara n mnyr tejet t ngurt. N t tjerat, ato jan t hapura ndaj
dyshimit dhe problematizimit.
Ligjrimet q prodhojn t vrteta, pr Foucaultn, nuk mund t ndahen nga
mekanizmat e pushtetit ngase kto njherit bjn t mundur, induktojn
prodhime t t vrtetave dhe ngase kto prodhime t t vrtetave vet jan efekte
t pushtetit q na lidhin, na bashkojn.
N dallim nga filozoft q ishin t prirur ta shikojn procesin e prodhimit t t
vrtets si t shkputur nga kushtet dhe rrethanant brenda t cilave ajo ngjizet,
Foucault zhvillon nga fundi i viteve 70 tezn se do shoqri e ka regjimin e
vet t vrtets. Kjo do t thot se n periudha t ndryshme historike, brenda
shoqrive t ndryshme sajohen mekanizma e instanca t cilat prkufizojn
kriteret me t cilat dallohen shprehjet (les noncs) e vrteta nga ato t pavrteta.
Kur Foucaultja pohon se e vrteta nuk sht jasht pushtetit dhe pa pushtet
11
ai
nuk dshiron t prkrah ndonj nnshtrim t krkimit shkencor ndaj pushtetit
politik. S pari, nuk duhet harruar se pushteti pr Foucaultn nuk reduktohet
n pushtet politik, por nnkupton nj shumsi raportesh t forcave, n nivele
t ndryshme t nj shoqrie. N ann tjetr, pohimi i msiprm thot edhe se e
vrteta mund t bhet pushtet, do t thot forc q ushtron ndikim.
Disa lexues e interpretues e kan shpjeguar kt koncepsion t Foucalts si
koncepsion i cili relativizon shum t vrtetn, duke e br t varur nga do
regjim i t vrtets, sipas epoks dhe shoqris ku paraqitet. Mirpo, Foucault,
n fakt synon t nxjerr n shesh, n mnyr gjithnj e m t saktsuar, mnyrn
se si, n nj shoqri, sajohen kritere me t cilat disa njohuri konsiderohen t
vrteta e t tjerat t pavrteta. Relacionin midis dijes dhe pushtetit Foucault nuk
e kupton nprmjet t nj nocioni t shkaksis s njnashme, pra si dije e cila do
ishte e prcaktuar tro nga nj qeveri a pushtet. Ai e shikon dinamikn e ktyre
relacioneve t sajohen brenda praktikave t ndryshme (ligjrimore, politike,
ekonomike, sociale).
Disa t tjer e kan thjeshtzuar pikpamjen e tij, duke e prkufizuar at me ca
formulime t shkurtra por q kan zgjuar habi te publiku filozofik. Kta t fundit
rndom i zgjedhin disa fjali ku Foucaultja, nn ndikim t Nietzsches, shpreh
dyshime ndaj vullnetit pr t vrtetn ose vullnetit pr t ditur. Sikurse, fjala
vjen, pohimi i Nietzsches, t cilin e prsrit Foucaultja, se pasioni pr t njohur
ndoshta do t shkaktoj shkatrrimin e njerzimit
12
. Ose fragmente ku Foucault
shpreh mosbesimin kundrejt atyre q shpallin vullnetin pr ta krkuar dhe
shpallur t vrtetn. Csht e vrteta Foucault e v n pah shpesh prdorimin e
t vrts si mask pr veprime hipokrite e mashtruese. N shkrime t ndryshme
t Foucaults, mund t gjenden fjali e formulime q shprehin pokshtu mosbesim
ndaj mendjes (raison) dhe fuqive e synimeve t saj. Megjithkt, ai nuk gjen
11 Dits et crits, II, f.158.
12 Dits et crits, I, f.1023.
mbshtetje, si e kan akuzuar ndonjher, n forca iracionale. Kritika e tij e
mendjes ka t bj shpesh me kritikn e disa trajtave t caktuara t racionalitetit
q kan prodhuar, n shoqrin moderne e bashkkohore, pasoja katastrofike
pr njerzimin. Prvoja e prdorimit t njohurive t larta shkencore, jo vetm
pr sundimin e njerzve por edhe pr zhdukjen e tyre e shtyri Foucaltn t
shpreh qndrimin e vet edhe kshtu: Racionaliteti i t mynxyrshmes sht nj
fakt historik bashkkohor. Mirpo, kjo nuk i jap t drejta t pakontestueshme
iracionales. Kjo shprehje e thukt prmbledh mir qndrimin kompleks t
Foucaults ndaj mendjes (arsyes) dhe jomendjes (joarsyes) brenda prvojave
historike t bashkkohsis.
Kto observime e shembuj mund t sygjerojn se t lexuarit e teksteve t
Foucaults krkon nj kujdes pr t evituar konstatime t ngutshme lidhur me
konceptet e pikpamjet e tij. Pikvrojtimin e tij mbi raportin midis t vrtets
dhe t pavrtets ndoshta mund ta bjm pak m t qart n saje t konceptit
t tij mbi problematizimin, t zhvilluar nga mbarimi i viteteve 70 t shekullit
t kaluar. Kur Foucaultja n qasjen e vet gjenealogjike, n veprn Historia e
menduris pohonte se menduria nuk ekziston, ai kishte pr qllim ta shtroj
kt problem nga nj piknisje e cila do ti bnte t mundur ta problematizoj
at duke krijuar nj distanc ndaj prfytyrimeve mbizotruese e t sigurta
mbi mendurin. Foucaultja, n fakt, shtronte pyetjen n mnyr dhe prse
menduria n nj moment t caktuar, u problematizua prmes nj praktike t
caktuar institucionale dhe nj aparati t caktuar t njohjes
13
. Kjo vlen edhe
pr problematizimin e raporteve midis delikuencs dhe ndshkimit prmes
praktikave penale dhe institucioneve t burgut, kah mbarimi i shekullit XVIII
dhe fillimi i shekullit XIX. Problematizimin e ksaj shtje Foucault e zhvilloi n
veprn T mbikqyrsh dhe t ndshkosh. Me problematizim Foucaultja kupton
nj trsi t praktikave ligjrimore dhe joligjrimore e cila bn q dika t hyj
n lojn e t vrtets dhe t pavrtets dhe e sajon at si objekt i t menduarit
(qoft n trajt t refleksionit moral, qoft t njohjes shkencore, qoft t analizs
politike, etj.)
14
. Pra, ktu sht fjala pr ndrimin e mekanizmave t praktikave
t cilat bjn q brenda nj shoqrie t formsohen kritere pr t prkufizuar
si t vrteta a si t pavrteta pikvrojtime t caktuara si, bie fjala, ai mbi
mendurin. Sikurse edhe pr ndriimin e mnyrs si lidhen, rreth ligjrimeve,
t shikuara si t vrteta, efekte t pushteteve specifike.Mirpo, kjo nuk vlen
vetm pr t vrtetat, ashtu si prodhohen nga ligjrimet shkencore.Sistemet e
informimit sot arrijn t prodhojn pikpamje e prfytyrime, te miliona njerz,
lidhur me perceptimin e nj problemi t brendshm a t jashtm (ekonomik,
politik, etik).Kto prfytyrime t prodhuara pastaj, prmes ndikimit mbi sjelljet
e njerzve, bhen si nj pushtet, n saje t ndikimit q ushtrojn.Sjelljet dhe
bindjet e njerzve formsohen dhe kushtzohen nga t vrteta t prodhuara
nga ato sisteme.
13 Dits et crits, II, f. 1488.
14 Po aty, f. 1489.
15
Thn prgjithsisht, Foucaultja lidhur me shtjen e t vrtets synon t vej
n pah aspekte t cilat ishin t shprfillur nga filozoft. N vend se t ndalet te
hulumtimi i kushteve mendore q e bjn t mundur njohjen e t vrtets, n
vend se t ndalet te rishqyrtimi i teorive tradicionale mbi t vrtetn (teoria e
korespondencs, teoria pragmatiste, teoria ekzistencialiste etj.) ai vijzon nj
varg faktorsh q ndrmjetsojn prodhimin e t vrtetave
15
.
Kshtu, bie fjala, duke tematizuar raportin dija-pushteti n rastin e shtjes
s seksualitetit n historin e Evrops perndimore, Foucault do t orvatet t
ndrioj se n far, trajtash, prmes cilave kanale, duke rrshqitur prgjat
cilave diskurse pushteti arrin deri te sjelljet m t holla dhe m individuale,
cilat rrug ia bjn t mundur t arrij te format e rralla apo mezi t hetueshme
t dshirs, n mnyr ai deprton dhe kontrollon knaqsin e prditshme
16
.
Se koncepcioni i Foucaults dallon nga qasjet politologjike mund t hetohet edhe
nga fragmenti q vijon, ku ai shpjegon se ka e ka shtyr q t zgjedh pikrisht
ato probleme me t cilat sht marr : Aktualisht ekziston dhe mu ktu ndrhyn
politika n shoqrit tona, nj numr i caktuar i pyetjeve, problemeve, plagve,
shqetsimeve, anktheve t cilat prbjn motorin e vrtet t zgjedhjes q kam
br dhe t caqeve q synoj ti analizoj, t objekteve q prpiqem ti analizoj
dhe mnyrn me t ciln i analizoj. sht ajo q ne jemi konfliktet, tensionet,
ankthet q na deprtojn ajo q sht fundja trolli, nuk guxoj t them solid,
ngase ky sht prkah natyra e vet i minuar, sht i rezikshm, trolli mbi t cilin
un lviz
17
.
Regjimet e s vrtets dhe politika
M von, n ciklin e ligjratave q u botuan me titullin Lindja e biopolitiks (1978-
1979) Foucaulut brenda shqyrtimit t tipareve karakteristike t neoliberalizmit
bashkkohor, do ti kthehet tems s regjimit t s vrtets.
Duke krahasuar periudhn e liberalizmit klasik me liberalizmin q u zhvillua pas
Lufts s dyt botrore, ai konstaton se n fillim dukej se ekonomia politike, me
krkesn pr nj pushtet despotik, vetm e vazhdon tendencn e arsyes s shtetit
q i jipte monarkut pushtet t plot. Mirpo, prthellimi i analizs s Foucaults
nxjerr n shesh transformimin q e sjell ekonomia politike. Ky transfromim
hetohet edhe me zvendsimin e nocionit t drejtpeshimit t drejt nga i cili
duhet t synoj nj sundimtar me parimin maksimumi-minimumi me t cilin
vlersohet masa e duhur e qeversijes s qeveritarit : qeveritari duhet t dij, n
do situat se deri ku duhet t shkoj ndrhyrja e tij, me cilat mjete e n far
15 Po aty, f. 407-408.
16 La volont de savoir, f.20
17 Dits et crits, II , 405.
mnyre. Dhe pikrisht rreth ktyre analizave mbi vlersimet dhe llogaritjet e
aksioneve t qeverisjes politike Foucault e shkoqit temn e regjimit t t
vrtets q paraqitet n kt koh t politiks dhe dispozitivi baz i t cilit
vazhdon t jet i pranishm edhe sot e tutje. Kategoria e regjimit t t vrtets
paraqitet edhe n tekste t tjera t Foucaults dhe lidhur me probleme t tjera.
N kt rast, me regjim t t vrtets Foucault nuk kupton ndonj sundim t
t vrtets n politik, as nj prag epistemologjik, me kalimin e t cilit arti i
qeverisjes do t bhej shkencor, por nj ast t shnuar me artikulimin e nj tipi
t caktuar t ligjrimit mbi nj seri t praktikave, ligjrim ky q gjykon pr kto
praktika me terma t vrtetsis apo t pavrtetsis s tyre
18
.
T kuptuarit e vet t ktij regjimi t t vrtets, Foucault e bn m t qart n saje t
krahasimit t praktikave qeverisse n kohn klasike me ato t bashkkohsis.
Te pushteti i sovranitetit, vjelja e tatimeve, taksat doganore, rregulloret pr
fabrikimin e gjrave, kodifikimi i praktikave t tregut, kundroheshin si ushtrim
i t drejtave sovrane, i t drejtave feudale, si mbajtje e zakoneve
19
. Ndrkaq po
kto praktika, duke filluar nga shekulli i XVIII, do t vlersohen si t mira apo
t kqia, jo sipas kutit t ligjeve hyjnore a morale, por sipas kritereve q bjn
dallimin midis t vrtets dhe t pavrtets. Ky regjim i ri i t vrtets si parim
i vetkufizimit t qeverisjes i bn shtje aksionet e qeverisjes me pyetjen : a
jam duke qeverisur mir brenda kufijve t asaj shum dhe shum pak, midis
maksimumit dhe minimumit q m prcakton natyra e gjrave[]?. Derisa m
par, n mesjet, ngritej pyetja nse aksionet e nj qeverie jan n pajtim me
ligjet morale, natyrore apo hyjnore, n kohn klasike pyetja shtrohej athua nj
qeverisje, n saje t arsyes s shtetit, arrin t sendrtoj maksimumin e forcs
s nj shteti
20
.
Kjo qasje e Foucaults ndaj problemit t qeversijes sht e ngjashme me qasjet
q kishte zhvilluar ai lidhur me problemet e menduris, smundjes, delikuencs
e seksualitetit, n tekste t tjera. N t gjitha kto hulumtime Foucault synon t
nxjerr n shesh se n mnyr iftet e sajuara nga seria e praktikave dhe regjimi
i t vrtets prbjn nj dispozit t dijes-pushtetit dhe shnojn efektivisht
brenda realitetit at q nuk ekziston duke ia nnshtruar, n mnyr legjitime,
ndarjes midis t vrtets dhe t pavrtets
21
.
Me at q nuk ekziston Foucault nuk nnkupton gjra joekzistuese apo
fantazma por gjra t cilat, deri n nj ast t caktuar historik, nuk i takojn ende
nj regjimi legjitim t t vrtets dhe t pavrtets, e ky ast shnon lindjen e
ktij bipolariteti josimetrik t politiks dhe ekonomis
22
. Foucault arrin ktu
te prfundimi se q t mund t kuptohet biopolitika, e cila ka pr brtham
18 Naissance de la biopolitique, f. 20.
19 Po aty, f. 20.
20 Po aty, f. 21.
21 Po aty, f. 22.
22 Po aty, f. 22.
17
qendrore popullsin, doemos duhet analizuar s pari tipi i ri i racionalitetit
t artit t qeverisjes, tipi i ri i llogaritjes dhe matjes s hapave q duhet ti bj
dhe atyre q duhet ti shmanget nj qeveri, n saje t nj vetkufizimi t arsyes
qeverisse: e pikrisht kjo sht pr t liberalizmi
23
.
Te kjo shtje e liberalizmit Foucault del edhe duke krahasuar jehonat q disa ide
ekonomike t liberalve t viteve 70 n Gjermani gjejn brenda rrymave politike
disidente n Europn Lindore, e cila ishte nn zgjedhn e Bashkimit sovjetik.
Veorit specifike t artit liberal t qeverisjes
N vijim t analizave t veta Foucault synon t prthelloj dhe ti bj m t holla
shqyrtimet e tij mbi artin e ri t qeverisjes, i cili paraqitet nga mesi i shekullit t
XVIII dhe dallon nga arti i arsyes s shtetit sa prkah mekanizmat e veta aq edhe
prkah efektet dhe parimi i vet. Mirpo, risia dhe dalimet e artit t ri t qeverisjes
nuk nnkuptojn pr Foucaultn shkputjen apo heqjen e artit t mparm t
qeverisjes, t cilsuar me arsyen e shtetit. Ndonse arti i ri i qeversijes, ndryshe
nga arsyeja e shtetit e cila mton t shtoj vazhdimisht fuqit dhe pasurit
e shtetit, ka si preokupim si ta kufizoj nga brenda ushtrimin e pushtetit t
qeverisjes, megjithkt ky art pr Foucaultn del si strhollim i brendshm i
arsyes s shtetit, sht ky parim i mbajtjes s tij, pr zhvillimin e tij m t plot,
pr prsomrin tij
24
. Tani, duke e prkufizuar n kt mnyr raportin midis
ktyre dy tipeve t artit t qeverisjes moderne, kemi prshtypjen se Foucault
m pak dshiron t theksoj dallimet e tyre. Mirpo, shqyrtimet vijuese tregojn
se preokupimi i Foucaults sht si t shkoqis transformimet q ka psuar
arti i qeverisjes n mbshtetje t arsyes s shtetit dhe n drejtim kan shkuar
ato transformime dhe far efekte kan prodhur ato n jetn politike. Synimi i
Foucaults pr t mos e kuptuar kt transformim si shkputje midis dy tipeve
t artit t qeverisjes hetohet edhe n mnyrn se si ktu ai formulon nj dallim
midis tyre: n raport ndaj artit t qeverisjes q ka pr parim arsyen e shtetit,
tipi i dyt i qeverisjes del i shquar me nj arsye m t pakt t qeverisjes si
parim i organizimit t vet arsyes s shtetit
25
. Pr ta shprehur kt tipar dallues
t tipit t dyt, Foucault huazon shprehjen e Benjamin Franklin mbi qeverisjen
e pakt (le gouvernement frugal). Ai mendon se kjo shprehje mund t shpreh
mir nj tendenc t tipit t ri t artit t qeverisjes, nga mbarimi i shekullit t
XVIII, ndonse, mu n kt koh zhvillohet nj praktik sa ekstenzive aq edhe
intenzive e qeverisjes q shkakton rezistenca e revolta. Duke e vr n pah kt
aspekt paradoksal t artit t ri t qeverisjes, Foucault sikur don t mbrohet q
m par nga kritikat eventuale pr prvetsimin e shprehjes qeverisje e pakt.
Mirpo, n fakt, ai sht m shum i interesuar t nxjerr n shesh ant komplekse
23 Po aty, f. 23.
24 Po aty, f. 30.
25 Po aty, f. 30.
t ktyre fenomeneve, duke iu shmangur thjeshtzimeve. Megjith ekstenzitetin
dhe intenzitetin me t cilin cilsohej qeverisja n kt koh, brenda saj do t rritet
preokupimi si t kufizohet, si t bhet qeversije m e pakt. Ky preokupim madje
do t jet aq i theksuar sa ai do ta shtyj n plan t dyt shtjen e cila ishte
dominante q nga shekulli i XVI, shtjen e konstitucionit t shteteve gjegjsisht
karakterin e regjimeve politike (monarki, aristokraci, demokraci). Kjo shtje e
qeversijes s pak prputhet, pr Foucaultn, me shtjen e liberalizmit, ngase
nga fusha e ekonomis politike u sajua nj lloj regjimi i s vrtets i cili do t
ofroj cytjet pr kufizimin e brendshm t qeverisjes
26
.
Mirpo, duke trajtuar raportet q sajohen midis ekonomis politike dhe
arsyes s shtetit, n gjysmn e dyt t shekullit t XVIII, Foucault mnjanon
disa interpretime t tyre. Kto raporte nuk nnkuptojn, pr Foucaultn, se
ekonomia politike ka ofruar nj model t qeverisjes politike, ose se politikant
kan prdorur n aksionet e tyre msimet e ekonomis politike ose se modeli
ekonomik sht br parim organizues i praktiks qeverisse. Ndryshe nga
kto interpretime, Foucault orvatet t kap lidhjen q vehet midis praktiks s
qeverisjes dhe regjimit t t vrtets, duke filluar nga gjysma e dyt e shekullit t
XVIII. sht kjo koh kur tregu, i cili edhe n shekujt e mparm ishte njri nga
vendet e privilegjuara t ndrhyrjes s qeveris, do t bhet nj vend dhe nj
mekanizm i formimit t t vrtets. S kndejmi, nuk sht ekonomia politike
si dije q bhet kriter i s vrtets pr praktikn qeverisse, por sht tregu i cili
do t veproj me mekanizmat e veta dhe do t ofroj mundsin pr formsimin
e rregulave dhe normave pr praktikn qeverisse. Foucault e emrton tregun,
kshtu, si vend i t vrtets pr praktikn qeverisse; tregu do t krkoj q
ndrhyrjet e qeveris t jen sa m t pakta dhe sa m t kujdesshme e t
menduara mir
27
.
Tregu si vend i juridiksionit dhe si vend i
veridiksionit (vrtetsis)
Sqarimin e ktij prkufizimi t tregut si vend i s vrtets mund ta bjm
duke marr parasysh krahasimin q e bn Foucault midis rolit dhe funksionit
q kishte tregu, n njren an, n mesjet dhe n shekujt XVI e XVII dhe, n
ann tjetr, n gjysmn e dyt t shekullit XVIII. Rolin e tregut n periudhn e
par Foucault e prkufizon kryesisht si vend i drejtsis. Ky prkufzimi ka disa
domethnie: s pari tregu del si vend q i nnshtrohej rregullave juridike lidhur
me objektet q mund t nxjerreshin n t pr tu shitur, pastaj si kriter pr tipet
e fabrikimit t ktyre objekteve, pr origjinn e ktyre objekteve, po kshtu edhe
26 Po aty, f. 30-31.
27 Po aty, f. 31.
19
pr procedurn e shitjes dhe mimeve t caktuara
28
. Drejtsia, kshtu, shfaqej
prmes rregulloreve juridike me t cilat rregullohej funksionimi i tregut.
Domethnia tjetr e prkufizimit t tregut si vend i drejtsis shfaqet n teorit
e shumta, q nga mesjeta, q e shikonin mimin e shitjes t prcaktuar n treg
si mim i drejt, ngase ky sajohej duke marr parasysh punn e br, nevojat
e tregtarve si dhe nevojat e mundsit e konsumatorve. Foucault mbshtetet
n kt analiza edhe n krkimet e ekonomistve t specializuar pr ekonomin
e mesjets. Kshtu J.W. Baldwin, n librin Teorit mesjetare mbi mimin e drejt
(Filadelfi, 1959) sqaron se nocioni i mimit t drejt (justum pretium) si model
ideal i transakcioneve u zhvillua n skolastikn mesjetare nn ndikimin e
doktins aristoteliane mbi drejtsin komutative.Nj mim konsiderohet i drejt
kur tregtart e caktojn nj prfitim t matur dhe kur masa e popullit e cila jeton
n nj gjendje t mjerimit kronik nuk vuan pr s teprmi, do t thot jo m
shum se rndom. N kohn normale, mimi i drejt sht thjesht mim aktual
(si e rekomandojn teologt) i caktuar n saje t nj vlersimi t prbashkt e
jo i imponuar me manovrimet e tregtarve apo urdhrat e qeveris
29
.
Tregu funksiononte si vend i drejtsis distributive edhe ngase rregullat e
tij bnin t mundur q, s paku pr prodhimet ushqimore, mimet t jen t
prshtatshme edhe pr disa shtresa t varfra t popullsis. Nj tipar tjetr,
i cili bnte q tregu t shikohej si vend i drejtsis, shfaqej n rregulloret q
ndalonin dhe ndshkonin fardo lloj mashtrimi, sidomos at lloj q i prkiste
vlers dhe cilsis s prodhimit. N kt mnyr Foucault arrin t vej n pah
se si sistemi i sajuar nga rregullat, mimi i drejt dhe ndshkimi i mashtrimeve
bnin q tregu t jet thelbsisht, t funksionoj realisht si nj vend i drejtsis,
nj vend ku duhej t paraqitej nprmjet kmbimit dhe t formulohet prmes
mimit dika q ishte drejtsia
30
.
Pasi ti ket shoshitur tiparet shquese t tregut si vend i juridiksionit apo i
drejtsis, Foucault orvatet t hetoj pikat kye t transformimit t rolit t tregut,
nga gjysma e dyt e shekullit t XVIII. Tani e tutje tregu nuk del aq si vend i
juridiksionit apo vend ku thuhet e drejta, por m tepr si vend i veridiksionit
apo vend ku thuhet e vrteta
31
. Kjo vrtetsi e tregut shfaqet te mekanizmat e
saj q shikohen si t natyrshme, ngase spontane, mekanizma q nuk duhet
natyruar apo prishur. Vrtetsia e tregut shfaqet edhe nprmjet lojs s lir t
mekanizmave t natyrshme t tregut q bjn t mundur sajimin e mimeve t
vlers s prodhimeve, t cilat disa do ti quajn mime t natyrshme, disa t
tjer mime t mira e t tjert mime normale
32
.
28 Po aty, f. 32.
29 Po aty, f. 49.
30 Po aty, f. 32.
31 Po aty, f. 33.
32 Po aty, f. 33.
Rndsin e teorive ekonomike t ksaj kohe mbi raportin mimi-vlera Foucault
e shikon te aftsia e tyre pr t nxjerr n shesh faktin se tregu duhet t jet
zbulues i t vrtets. Kt funksion tregu e realizon pikrisht pse mimet, duke
qen n prputhje me mekanizmat e natyrshme t tregut, do t formojn nj
etalon t s vrtets i cili do t ndihmoj q t dallohen brenda praktikave
qeverisse ato q jan korrekte nga ato q jan t pavrteta
33
.
Vlersimi i praktikave qeveritare, i masave dhe rregulloreve t tij, tani do t
bhet n saje t mekanizmit t natyrshm t tregut dhe formimit t nj mimi t
natyrshm. Tregu, n at mas sa nprmjet kmbimit bn t mundur t lidhen
prodhimi, nevoja, oferta, krkesa, vlera, mimi, etj., prbn n kt kuptim
nj vend t veridiksionit, dua t them t verifikimit-falsifikimit pr praktikn
qeveritare
34
.
Tani nj qeveri do t vlersohet si e mir, jo vetm nse respekton rregullat e
drejtsis por sidomos nse vepron n at mnyr q t mos e prish karakterin
e natyrshm t funksionimit t tregut. N kt mnyr, tregu bhet vendi ku
qeveria mund t krkoj, n saje t dijes s ekonomis politike, parimin me t
cilin do t vlersoj praktikn e vet. Ky rol i veridiksionit t tregut bhet njherit,
pr Foucaultn, kriter me t cilin do t prcaktohet nevoja, dobishmria apo
padobishmria e mekanizmave t juridiksionit, gjegjsisht e ligjeve q duhet
miratuar pr funksionimin e tregut
35
.
Foucault e konsideron fenomenin e paraqitjes s tregut si parim i veridksionit si
absolutisht fundamental n historin e qeverishmris perndimore. Mirpo,
t kuptuarit e ktij fenomeni pr t nuk mund t arrihet n saje t krkimit t nj
shkaku, por prmes prvijimit t relacioneve (poligonale apo poliedrike) midis
gjendjes monetare n shekullin e XVIII, fluksit t ri t arit, qndrueshmris
relative t monedhave, rrits ekonomike e demografike t vashdueshme,
midis intensifikimit t prodhimit bujqsor, deprtimit n radht e qeveris t
ekspertve ekonomik, dhe n fund fal elaborimit teorik t disa problemeve
teorike. Shpjegimi i ktij fenomeni fundamental, pr Foucaultn, krkon q krahas
ndriimit t relacioneve t prmendura, njherit t realizohet kuptueshmria e
ktij procesi. Kjo do t thot pr Foucaultn se t brit e kuptueshm t realitetit
arrihet duke treguar thjesht se ai ka qen i mundshm
36
.
Mirpo Foucault e kupton kt histori t kalimit prej tregut si vend ku thuhet
e drejta nga tregu si vend ku thuhet e vrteta, si njrin nga shembujt e shumt
t kryqzimit midis juridiksionit dhe veridiksionit, shembuj kto q prbjn
njrin nga fenomenet fundamentale t Perndimit modern
37
.
33 Po aty, f. 33.
34 Po aty, f.33-34.
35 Po aty, f. 34.
36 Po aty, f. 35.
37 Po aty, f. 35.
21
Ksisoj, Foucaultja e sheh t arsyeshme q t saktsoj srish qasjen e vet ndaj
problemeve me t cilat sht marr. Ai v n pah se qasja e tij ndaj relacioneve
midis tregut dhe praktikave qeverisse, sht e ngjashme me qasjet ndaj
problemit t menduris, pastaj ndaj problemit t institucioneve penale, ndaj
shtjes s seksualitetit, te veprat e mparshme.
Kto sqarime t metods i dukeshin Foucaults aq m t nevojshme ngase
bheshin m t shpeshta edhe interpretimeit joadekuate t disa koncepcioneve
t tij. S kndejmi, ai e sheh t udhs t saktsoj se Historia e menduris n
kohn klasike nuk synonte t tregoj formimin e psikiatris si ligjrim me
pretendime shkencore brenda spitaleve psikiatrike, por as t vej n dukje
se si institucionet e mbylljes, q ekzistonin qmoti, duke filluar nga nj ast
kishin nisur t sekretojn teorin e tyre apo ligjrimin psikiatrik. Foucaultja
kishte pr qllim, n t vrtet, t studioj gjenezn e psikiatris, nprmjet
institucioneve t mbylljes t cilat ishin burimisht t lidhura pr mekanizma t
juridiksionit t tipit policor. Ai njherit shoshit rrethanat dhe kohn e caktuar
kur ato mekanizma gjetn mbshtetje, u transformuan dhe u zhvendosn me
proceset e veridiksionit
38
.
Qasje t ngjashme Foucaultja zhvilloi edhe n shqyrtimin e institucioneve
penale, jo vetm si vende e forma ku sundonte kryesisht praktika juridiksionale
por edhe si hapsira ku krahas praktiks juridiksionale do t zhvillohet edhe
nj praktik e veridiksionit, e mbshtetur te kriminologjia dhe psikologjia, ve
diturive tjera. Cshtja e veridiksionit, sipas Foucaults, shprfaqet n gjirin e
penalitetit modern prej atij asti kur praktika penale e zvendson pytejen q ia
bnte kriminelit (ke br ti?) me nj pyetje t re : cili je ti?. Kshtu, Foucault
dshiron t nxjerr n shesh procesin historik n t cilin hetohet transformimi
i funksionit t jurdiksionit brenda penalitetit prmes sajimit t relacioneve
komplekse me shtjen e veridiksionit
39
.
N mnyr t ngjashme, Foucaultja kishte hulumtuar edhe gjenealogjin e
seksualitetit brenda praktikave t pranimit-rrfimit, drejtimit t ndrgjegjes,
nprmjet ndriimit t astit kur bhej kryqzimi midis nj juridiksioni t
relacioneve seksuale q prkufizojn at q sht e lejuar dhe at q sht e
ndaluar, dhe veridiksionin e dshirs ku shfaqet armatura themelore e objektit
seksualiteti
40
.
38 Po aty, f. 35-36.
39 Po aty, f. 36.
40 Po aty, f. 36.
KDU 1(091) NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014 22
Regjimi i veridiksionit
Ndaj t gjitha ktyre objekteve t hulumtimit (tregu, pranimi-rrfimi,
institucioni psikiatrik, burgu, seksualiteti) Foucault zbaton nj qasje, ndonse
me kndvshtrime t ndryshme, n shkoqitjen e nj historie t s vrtets t
bashklidhur me nj histori t s drejts. Me kt qasje, koncepcioni i Foucaults
dallon nga ato koncepcione q historin e s vrtets e kuptojn si rindrtim
i gjenezs s t vrtets prmes korigjimit apo eliminimit t gabimeve, jo si
varg i racionaliteteve t njpasnjshme gjat historis q do ti korigjonin apo
hiqnin ideologjit. Foucaultja mton t prvijoj gjenealogjin e regjimeve
t veridiksionit si nj trsi t rregullave q bjn t mundur, lidhur me nj
ligjrim, t prcaktohen shprehjet t cilat mund t karakterizohen aty si t
vrteta apo t pavrteta
41
.
Foucault e shikon t nevojshme ta theksoj dallimin e ksaj historie t regjimeve
t verdiksionit edhe ndaj teoris kritike t filozofve t shkolls s Frankfurtit
mbi racionalitetin europian dhe lidhjen e tij me shtypjen q ushtron pushteti.
Kt interpretim Foucaulut e gjen t pranisme te nj tradit e tr, duke filluar
nga romantizmi. Kritika politike e dijes q zhvillon Foucault n tekstet e veta
nuk merret me denuncimin e karakterit shtyps t arsyes, ngase mendon se
edhe joarsyeja (draison) sht po aq shtypse, as me zbulimin e prirjeve pr
pushtet t do t vrtete t pohuar, ngase edhe rrena dhe gabimi jan gjithashtu
keqprdorime t pushtetit. Foucault zhvillon nj kritik politike t dijes e cila
synon t prcaktoj se brenda far kushtesh dhe me far efekte ushtrohet
nj veridiksion apo nj tip i formulimit q i takon rregullave t verifikimit dhe
t falsifikimit
42
. S kndejmi pr Foucaultn problemi nuk shtrohej q t vej
n pah karakterin shtyps t psikiatris n saje t pavrtetsis s saj, por
ti nxjerr n shesh kushtet q sht dashur t prmbushen n mnyr q t
mund t zhvillohej nj ligjrim mbi mendurin (ose pr delikuenncn, ose pr
seksin), ligjrime q mund t ishin t vrteta apo t pavrteta, sipas rregullave
t mjeksis, t pikologjis apo t psikanalizs
43
.
Historia e veridiksionit mund t ket pesh politike pr t sotmen, nse ajo
nuk merret thjesht me zbulimin e gabimeve n historin e t vrtetave, por nse
arrin t shpjegoj se cili ishte regjimi i veridiksionit q u vendos n rrethana dhe
n nj koh t caktuar e q u bnte t mundur njerzve t formojn gjykime t
vrteta apo t pavrteta
44
. Kjo teori mbi veridiksionin dhe regjimin e t vrtets
sikur ia zu vndin teoris mbi relacionet pushteti-dija, s paku forms s saj m
t theksuar apo m rigjide.
41 Po aty, f. 37.
42 Po aty, f. 37.
43 Po aty, f. 38.
44 Po aty, f. 38.
23
Bibliografia
1. Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Paris, Gallimard,
1975.
2. Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualit, vol. 1 :La volont de savoir, Paris,
Gallimard, 19763.
3. Michel Foucault, Le Pouvoir psychiatrique, Paris, Gallimard, 2003.
4. Michel Foucault Il faut dfendre la socit , Paris, Gallimard, (Cours
1975-1976) 1997
5. Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique, Paris, Gallimard, Cours 1978-1979 :
2004.
6. Michel Foucault, Dits et crits, I-II, 2001.

Niklas Toivakainen
Man and his invention
Abstract
1. Introduction
Charles Taylor has characterized modernity as a time of both grandeur et
misere (Taylor 1989: x, preface). This is evidently true: The same culture that
has enhanced democracy, individual freedom, equality (gender, class etc.), rights
(human and animal) etc. has also produced a global political and economic
structure that exploits humans, animals and nature to an unprecedented
extent. Technological and scientific ingenuity displays the same dichotomy. The
same techno-scientific knowhow that has produced modern industry, modern
medicine, modern means of communication and transport, modern technical
devices and comforts, has also produced weapons of mass destruction, a culture
of surveillance, a freedom based on consumerism, an ecological crisis etc. To
openly and honestly acknowledge that the modern computer grows, so to speak,
on the same tree as the hydrogen bomb, or that the humanitarian and ecological
crises are not accidental features of the liberal global markets, is more or less
unbearable. Instead, utilitarian ethics is called upon to ease our conscience
This paper can be seen as divided into two
parts. The first part discusses Artificial
Intelligence research as part of modern
science and technology, or techno-science,
and tries to indicate that the paradigm of
modern techno-science builds on a conception
of knowledge as power. This topic is then
discussed by help of examples and drawing
the conclusion that Artificial Intelligence,
as a form of technology, poses a morally
charged challenge to our self-understanding.
It is also suggested that the contemporary
techno-scientific self-understanding is
characterised by repression. The second
part focuses on discussing and clarifying the
conceptual relationship between humans
and Artificial Intelligence systems. While this
topic invites a continued discussion on the
topic of power, it also challenges us to engage
in a conceptual investigation into concepts
such as autonomy and formalisation.
By way of such a conceptual clarification,
a claim is made that while Artificial
Intelligence systems operate exclusively
on formal aspects of the world and human
intelligence, humans are characterised by,
and formalisation presupposes, what will
be called a-formal features of life. This
a-formal aspect will be characterised as
essentially grounded in morals, leading to
the claim that understanding the relationship
between man and machine and why this
relationship is so often distorted requires
acknowledging the topic as simultaneously
both a conceptual as well as a moral issue.
25
Man and his invention Niklas Toivakainen
KDU 001.894
by measuring the positive effects against the negative ones, assuring us of the
consequential victory of good over evil. Such is the condition of modernitys
progress.
Out of the many different forces and ideas that shape and drive the notion of
progress, this paper shall focus on the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI)
research, which, according to many, belongs to the most fascinating, inspiring,
hopeful, but also to the most worrisome and dangerous advancements of
modern civilisation. Now the very simple question I want to begin with is: why
are we at all interested in the concept of artificiality in relation to intelligence,
the mind, humans, life etc.? Two different projects seem to be involved
here. On the one hand we have the search for practical applications in the form
of new technologies, whereas on the other hand, building on the former and
seen against the background of a scientific worldview, many think that AI is an
important element of a new philosophy of mind, contributing to a revolution in
our understanding of humans and life in general. This latter standpoint, which is
usually referred to as strong AI (Searle 1980, see also Dennett 1991), builds
on the idea that life (biological as well as cognitive/psychological life) is made
up of (cellular) robots and builds on the same fundamental principle as the
modern computer, namely on computing or information processing. As
John Haugeland pointed out, the imagination at play here is that people are
computers (Haugeland 1986: 5-6). Hence, the argument goes, since AI systems
build on the same fundamental principles as life and cognition, these systems
might become autonomous, conscious agents, with a genuine mind of their
own (ibid, Dennett 1991 & 2006). The quite obvious implication of strong AI
is of course that human rights, among other things, would then in the future
potentially be applicable to AI systems. These issues are already discussed
both in popular culture and mass media, as well as in academic discourses (e.g.
Kurzweil 2005).
My aim in this paper will be to point out problematic features in both of these two
different but inter-related projects. In this respect the paper can be divided into
two parts; the first focusing on a discussion of AI as part of the techno-scientific
complex, and the other part engaging more directly with trying to clarify what
the idea and relationship between man and his machines is. Importantly, both
parts will try to show how the question of AI is morally charged at its very
conceptual foundation.

NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014 26
27
2. AI as technology
I will begin this first part by giving a short depiction of how AI places itself
in relation to technology followed by a few examples to illustrate this. These
examples will then be used later on to deepen the discussion.
Now AI as instances or features of of technology falls into at least three different
categories: (i) compensatory, (ii) enhancing and (iii) therapeutic. For instance
the robot seal doll called Paro is used as a therapeutic tool in elderly care across
the world (Wada & Shibata 2008). Paro is both therapeutic and compensatory
since its therapeutic power lies in that it compensates for poor contact with
relatives and friends and is able to face cost and management resource restraints
which e.g. real animal therapy fails to do. The case of Paro exemplifies how one
of the major questions for AI as technology is how compensatory AI systems can
become within the limits of practical, economic, political etc. constraints. Another
example is the waste-recycling robots produced by Zen Robotics. These devices
compensate for human labour and also enhance performance in the sense
that these machines can do the work at an accuracy, pace and endurance well
beyond any human. Both of these examples illustrate how AI plays the role of a
social prostheses (Collins 1990: 14). Another example would be Deep Brain
Stimulation (DBS) a form of technology which relates to AI somewhat more
indirectly which is used to treat symptoms related to Parkinsons disease
and people suffering from essential tremor, and which falls under the category
of Brain Machine Interfaces (van Erp et.al. 2009). Here, as opposed to the
two former examples, technological intervention compensates for a biological
absence or dysfunction, which means that that which is absent is really absent
and not just restricted by social organisation or human relations. DBS is also
part of enhancement in the sense that the area of technologies that it belongs to
is also looking into how to enhance human performance and cognitive abilities
of normal and healthy people. This has been of special interest, not only of
the commercial markets, but also to the military industrial complex, as a recent
NATO document clearly shows (ibid).
2.1. Techno-science and power
Now these were just a few crude examples (which we shall come back to) to
indicate how AI places itself within the field of technology. What I now want to
pursue is a philosophical clarification of what I will call techno-science. My
general thesis here will be that modern science is a techno-science. I will give
some reasons for my claim below.
I start with the question: what does artificiality so to speak give us that the
natural doesnt? It is not of course surprising to claim that if something is
28 NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014 KDU 001.894
artificial/constructed it is directly related to human control and power. In fact,
power and control are concepts that can be found at the very beginning of the
programmatic era of modern techno-science: in the self-understanding of the
fathers of modern science and the way that their new methods and ideologies
where conceptualised into a programmatic project. Early in the 17
th
century
Francis Bacon brought about a reform in scientific thinking (opposing the
medieval contemplative sciences) by claiming that the duty of human power/
force is to manipulate/change and refine corporeal bodies, whereas knowledge
is to understand how this is done (Lng 1986: 96). Hence Bacons famous term
ipsa scientia potestas est or knowledge itself is power (Bacon 1952). In turn,
The Royal Society, founded in 1660, described the relation of rationality/science
to nature along the following lines: nature is a woman, which the scientist
(being, as he then was, male) must subdue, exposing all her secrets, forcing
himself into her womb, thus bringing her under full submission and control
G.H. von Wright rightfully called the founders of modern experimental science
the master philosophers of technology hence also my term techno-science
(von Wright 1986: 55). It is also worth pointing out that the increase of power
that the new techno-science generated was primarily used to serve the interests
of the newly formed Nation States in Europe. So at its very core, techno-science
has always been interlinked with political and economic interests and influence
(ibid. See also Mumford 1934 and Taylor 2007).
Both Bacons and the Royal Societys way of conceptualising knowledge of
the world builds on an idea that whatever is to be included in the sphere of
knowledge is to be placed as an object of our demand to master and control it,
which means that the techno-scientific attitude towards the world becomes one
of problem, as the following quote explains.
When technology has acquired an essential role in society it means that the
concept of problem is understood in a certain way. Problem indicates that
there is some phenomenon we do not yet master scientifically and technically.
To solve the problem is to learn to master the phenomenon; and to master it
means that the phenomenon can be made an instrument of our will. That
is; to solve a problem is to increase our power to will. Problem means that
there is something that we cannot yet make obey our will. This kind of willing,
which I have called demand, presupposes an externally related method as
its instrument, or; the essence of technology (in the broad sense) is demand.
(Nyknen 1995:130)
The project of techno-science is a project of increasing human power. This
perspective also dominates or forms AI research and development. It can be
seen present in the three examples I gave earlier, for essentially in all three
cases AI is directed at solving some social, bodily or ecological problems. So for
instance in the case of Paro and Zen Robotics, AI as technology deals with how
to uphold a certain (technologically driven) society, without having anything
29
to say about the problematic aspects of the society as such: is it a good thing
that elderly people are forced to spend their last years at institutions or how is
it with a culture that produces so much waste that it is more or less resulting
in an ecological catastrophe? These are not questions for techno-science, for
techno-scientific thinking only solves problems (and creates them): it does not
engage itself in thinking about the fundamental presuppositions that drives its
progress.
In order to bring out a more comprehensive picture of the complexity of the
network of the techno-scientific complex, let me say some things about DBS.
While it is true that DBS certainly does compensate for something which is
not due to cultural conditions and can in this sense be said to be an example
of a genuinely good use of technology, it nevertheless finds itself as part of
a larger techno-scientific ambition to expand manipulative control and power
over the human mind, thus becoming suitable for the military industrial
complex, as does more or less all branches of techno-science. An official NATO
report document from 2009 makes the following observation: From a military
perspective, knowledge [neuroscientific knowledge] development should focus
on three transitions: 1) from clinical and patient applications to applications
for healthy users, 2) from lab (or controlled) environments to the field, and 3)
from fundamental knowledge to operational applications (van Erp et.al. 2009:
11-12, emphasis added). I added the emphasis to this quote just to make the
point that here we have the Beconian dictum of knowledge as power at work.
One of the main focuses of the report was military utilisation of Brain Machine
Interfaces (henceforth BMI), to which DBS belongs. Obviously, we might think
that even though DBS belongs to the category of BMI, this does not necessarily
mean that DBS as such furthers military technology. While one might wish to
think so, it unfortunately is not a reality.
In 1975, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institutes annual books
record that around 400 000 scientists, engineers and technicians (roughly
half of the entire worlds science power!) were committed to and engaged
with weapons research (Uberoi 2002: 90). At least since the Second World
War up until, say, late 1980s, military technology research and development
(henceforth R&D) relied mostly on direct funding by the state, while state policy
(at least in the US) was dominated by what is usually called spin-off. The term
spin-off refers to the idea and belief that through heavy funding of military
R&D also the commercial sector (and other social sectors) would benefit. So,
as it was perceived, as military research and development yielded new high-
tech devices and knowledge, some of this knowledge and innovation would then
flow downstream and finds its place in the civilian and commercial markets (in
appropriate form). This was, arguably, one of the main legitimatising reasons for
the heavy numbers of scientists working directly for military R&D.
But this relationship has changed now (if it ever really was an accurate
description). For instance, in 1960 the US Department of Defence funded a third
of all Scientific R&D in the Western world, whereas in 1992 it funded only a
seventh of it (Alic et.al. 1992: 5). Today this figure is even lower due to a change
in the way military R&D relates to civil commercial markets. Whereas up until the
1980 military R&D was dominated by spin-off thinking, today it is possible to
distinguish at least up to eight different ways in which military R&D is connected
and interdependent with civil commercial markets (Alic et.al. 1992: 64-75).
(i) Traditional spin-off: e.g. the microwave oven
(ii) Defence procurement pull and commercial learning: e.g. supercomputers
(iii) Concurrent development of civil and military applications of a common
technology: e.g. commercial and military aircrafts
(iv) Shared infrastructure for defence programs and emerging commercial
industry: e.g. the Internet
(v) Development of engineering techniques and tools to meet Government
needs: e.g. NASTRON, which was developed for NASA.
(vi) Dual-use technology development from defence agency support of
basic research. The military funds basic research in universities and
government labs in a wide range of subjects of potential military
interest: e.g. a substantial amount of Artificial Intelligence R&D in the
Academia has been funded by the Department of Defence (US) for more
than five decades.
(vii) Reverse spin-off or spin-in. Technology developed in the civil and
commercial sector flows upstream, so to speak, into military uses: e.g.
COMOS (Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductors).
(viii) Forced diffusion through demonstration programs. Military funded
technologies are demonstrated in order to create incentives to the
markets to develop military compatible technology.
With this list in mind, let us take another look at the NATO report:
Until today, the majority of applied neuroscience research is aimed at assisting
people who suffer from a physical, perceptual or cognitive challenge and
not at performance enhancement for healthy users. This situation opens up
opportunities for spin-off and spin-in between advanced (military) Human
System Interaction knowledge and the accomplishments in neurotechnology for
patients. (van Erp et.al. 2009: 11)
31
As the report clearly indicates the field of applied neuroscience (with which
AI research is tightly connected) falls most likely everywhere, and in varying
degrees, in between (i) and (viii), and DBS with it and this is arguably the
case with more or less all technologies that are directly or indirectly connected
with AI. So what do I want to say with all of this? Well to begin with, I believe that
thinking about DBS as part of a military-commercial complex gives us reason
to think more closely about what it would mean to say that DBS is an all good
example of scientific application. It is all good to the extent we are ready to
believe that whatever the possible other applications and consequences of
a certain technological development are, we need not connect it to its source,
nor do we need to take responsibility for it. And secondly, it is, I think, quite
essential to reflect on why techno-scientific research has such a huge potential
for military industry: techno-science increases human power and the military
is one of the rawest forms of power Both good and bad uses of techno-
science are conditions of technology.
What deepens this morally problematic aspect of technology is that the techno-
scientific self-understanding displays repressive features. By this I mean that
while the will to power is internal to the method of techno-science, there is a
self-understanding at play here which shows clear signs of repression. For, it is
not uncommon that this non-rational and morally questionable element of a will
to power is externalised or outsourced to another domain of social reality; to the
private, non-professional, or public, non-scientific and ethical discourse. Let
me exemplify this. Going back to the NATO document, which we discussed earlier,
back to the section where the three crucial transitional phases from medical
neuroscience to military applications were listed, we can read the following
observation by the authors: These transitions will also involve ethical issues
(op. cit.: 11-12). Involve ethical issues means that moral considerations are
separate from (not internal to) the technological considerations, and something,
say, an ethics committee should take care of. Will also involve ethical issues
avoids considering that the issues at hand are ethical through and through,
which of course doesnt mean that there are no technical questions here. My
point is rather that the techno-scientific questions are always bound to (and
logically secondary to) the morally charged question of what need we want to
fulfil, and how that will connects to a larger network of civilizational aspirations.
And here I think that we cannot separate techno-science from politics. Take
again the case of DBS. As such, we might all agree that DBS really is a good use of
technology and that it genuinely benefits humans: compensates for something
nothing else could really compensate for or so it seems. But the problem is
that such genuinely good uses of technology become political instruments for
legitimising the whole project of techno-science and an increasing dependence
on it. If there is any serious doubt about an increasingly techno-scientifically
driven society, cases like DBS are always there to save techno-science, receiving
heartfelt applause from the crowd who marvel at the almost messianic miracle of
techno-scientific knowhow. And if techno-scientific development and its spread
throughout all corners of society are accepted as necessary (due to the good it
produces), then utilitarian ethics comes to us naturally: Yes technology does
create some problems, but just look at how much good it does (e.g. DBS)! But
today you save the lives of 1000 people and tomorrow you drop a bomb on 1000
or 10 000 people, or perhaps, in twenty years the earths ecological systems will
radically alter (due to human interaction) and not millions but billions will die.
I wonder if anyone has ever made an attempt at producing a real utilitarian
calculus and how would we even go about doing it!
Here I end the first part of the paper, hoping that I have been able to bring out
some fundamental problems about technology and AI as part of it, and how the
issue is simultaneously both a conceptual and a moral matter.
3. Strong AI and autonomy: power and control
I now set aside the discussion of AI as technology and direct my attention to a
discussion on the notion of strong AI. As has been recognised by many thinkers
within the field of AI research, the dream of strong AI depends on the ability
to create systems that are self-generating and autonomous (Dennett 1991,
Haugeland 1986). In a recent article this problem is discussed in terms of open
and closed systems.
As far as the authors know, all systems in AI are closed systems. These closed
systems do not allow new properties to emerge. If there is flexibility at all, it only
leads to a solution that the creator wanted the machine to find. This implies that
for every problem a human has to create a new solution. This way of working
will probably not lead to intelligent machines on a human-level time scale since
for every little problem someone has to create a solution for the software. Only
open-ended systems display interesting properties such as self-organising and
emergence, which are required for the scaffolding of the mind (van der Zant et.al.
2013: 112-113).
As the authors explain, these open systems will be formed only by minimal human
steering in the form of pre-programmed predispositions and by (steered)
interaction with the environment. The aim is that all aspects of human heuristic
exploration will be replaced by autonomous mechanisms (op. cit.: 115). There
are two aspects here, which relate to each other, that I want to focus on: firstly, how
the idea of autonomous systems/mechanism relates to the discussion of techno-
science as power and secondly, how a conceptual understanding of autonomy,
in human cases, is best understood in moral terms, not in terms of mechanisms.
33
The idea that open systems would be autonomous, because the only human
intervention would consist of pre-programmed predispositions and (steered)
interaction with the surrounding is somewhat misleading. Rather, I think one should
say that open systems would follow new and technologically innovative methods of
engineering, but which would all the same build on the same principles as any closed
system: What the pre-programmed predispositions are and what kind of steered
interaction with the environment will be adopted, is directly related to a demand
placed on the project, a demand placed there with some purpose, a demand which the
engineers determine. In other words, it is not just any new capacities or behaviour
that is of interest, but rather the aim is to force the systems to behave accordingly
to some perceived standards of intelligence. One might say that the idea here is to
exercise power and control in a more subtle form, and as much as possible, without
having to intervene in the process. This said, what are our reasons for calling such
systems autonomous? Or put slightly differently: how we understand the concept
of autonomy in relation to open systems depends on what our demand is and how
we understand our own autonomy. Is what makes an open system autonomous the
same as that which makes a human being autonomous?
But before I continue with this question I want to make a short observation about
the popular topic of the fear and concern that development within AI and technology
raises, a fear that is reflected in both popular culture and in academic and public/
political discussions. This fear has two forms. Either it is a question of how increasing
dependency on technology makes our society vulnerable, or then there is the fear
that technology or AI will become uncontrollable (autonomous?) and will eventually
enslave or destroy humanity. Whereas the first type of fear is perhaps the more realistic
and urgent one, the second type reflects, to my mind, an important truth about our
understanding of techno-science. This second form of fear builds essentially, I think,
on the somewhat unconscious or repressed realisation that the struggle to make
technology and AI autonomous would be to make power itself autonomous and
here the question is of course autonomous from what, from human concerns? A good
example of the fear I am alluding to here would be Nick Bostroms remark that If a
device can learn and has far greater memory capacity and recall than we do, it could
process huge stores of data to better predict our behavior. It could then tailor its own
behavior to achieve a desired result (quoted from Malone 2012). What we should
note here is that Bostrom is imagining AI as something that is essentially driven by
power interest. Even though the idea of a genuinely autonomous AI system is to
my mind confused (as I will try and show), the fear is warranted exactly because AI
systems are built on the idea of knowledge as power, and so any such autonomous
system would obviously seek to increase its power. On the other hand, it is unclear
what such a fear is, so to speak, about: are we really afraid that it is the machines that
will become such that they will want to have power and dominate, or are we in fact
afraid of ourselves, of the possibility that we will eventually create power instruments
which we cannot any more master: that power will run freely, independently of any
other principles than the principle of techno-science itself?
4. AI and conceptual self-understanding
Could an open system be autonomous and have a mind of its own? To answer
this question we must first ask what it means for human beings to be autonomous
and have a mind of ones own. I shall now attempt to give a short characterisation
of one instance of how the concept of autonomy enters into our lives, hoping that
it will give me a substantial ground for continuing my discussion.
Let us imagine a teenager for whom, at least in many cases, the concept of
autonomy is a central part of what it is to be a teenager on his or her way to
adulthood. A not so unusual example, especially in the culture I come from, would
be a teenager who quite blindly focuses on becoming independent from especially
the parents, and so gives no thought to the concerns of the parents and thinks little
of obligations and responsibility: the teenager might for instance think that the
parents should have no say about coming home times, that to be independent is
to be free from parental tyranny one might say that the teenager is exclusively
focusing on his or her (imagined) rights. Because I do not have the space here to
make the case, I will simply assume that most will agree that such a conception
of autonomy is confused. But understanding why the teenager is confused in
her conceptual-existential self-understanding is central to our understanding
of what it is to be human and what autonomy implies in a human life. Here is
one possibility, out of many. Let us say that the teenager is under huge collective
pressure to be a cool person who does not pay attention to parental wishes
and concerns, and is thus tempted to think about autonomy as being equal to
freeing oneself from parental tyranny. If she yields to the collective pressure
she will have to supress or repress (part of) her bonds to her parents, whereas
if she doesnt yield to it she runs the risk of being cast out of the social group she
wants or feels pressured to be part of. Now the way she will understand herself
in relation to concepts such as autonomy or freedom will directly be related to
how she is able to deal with the moral conflict which arises out of this situation.
If the moral difficulty is not resolved the teenagers reasoning and thinking about
the concepts and their meaning will be directed by an urge to avoid those features
of the concept which she is not able to handle. Hence the teenager will in her
own self-understanding perceive freedom and autonomy as dislocated from
obligations, responsibility (simply focusing on rights) and above all, from
the moral ties to her parents and other people that her confusion will affect. One
might add that this example illustrates how being autonomous is essentially
to be able to live independently in a relationship with other people, i.e. without
yielding to any pressure from society, parents etc. but also without having to deny
any relational bonds. So, just as it is quite confused to think about (human) rights
without simultaneously thinking about obligations and responsibilities, so is any
conception of a genuine (human) autonomy that does not take the moral bonds
that tie us humans to each other as central.
35
Now what makes imagining strong AI so difficult is that it requires us to imagine
machines displaying the same kind of moral dynamics as we do for to be
autonomous and to have a mind of ones own, in a human sense, is essentially
a moral concern and not a technical question of complexity. But such a morally
charged picture of the mind/intelligence seems to be the anti-thesis to the whole
project of AI research, as it is and has always been directed at picturing humans
as, if not fully, then at least on the progress towards a nature determined more
and more by rational reason and computation, not by moral dynamics.
There are obviously logical and historical reasons why drawing analogies
between humans and machines is, not only easy (in certain respects), but also
tells us something true. Namely, machines have more or less exclusively been
created to enhance and then replace human labour and capability. And since
this is so, it is only logical that machines had to build on some analogies of
human physiology and cognitive capability. But this is only half of the story,
for this relation in itself could not explain why such an analogical relationship
becomes a question of self-understanding; that humans understand themselves
to be machines. The other side of the story resides in something Lewis Mumford
pointed out: if it seemed natural for Descartes to think that a clarification of
the physiology of human beings could best be sought through a comparison
or analogy with different automata and machines fabricated by human
industry, the opposite was even more true, namely that the mechanization
of human habits prepared the way for mechanical imitations (Mumford 1934:
41). This captures Mumfords general thesis that mechanisation developed
from, or as an outcome of, a striving to regulate, discipline, regiment, control
and master human beings; their behaviour, actions and reactions, desires and
emotions, their thinking and that modern technology is the outcome of the
unprecedented success of such regulation and regimentation. In other words, if
Mumford is right, the development of technology is to some extent founded on
features which I will call formalisation of human behaviour, and this exercise
of power and control has then developed into a matter of projecting human
power on the whole universe, on every culture, on nature in its totality [and
then back on to the human], thanks first to the machine and then, gloriously, to
the whole array of techniques (Ellul 1990: 162). One might characterise the
official story of the techno-scientific paradigm thus: Humans have found out
that we are able to formalise elements of our lives, and the techno-scientific
paradigm has developed this into a claim that the world and everything in it is
in fact formal in its essence. But this is of course tautological since the techno-
scientific way of relating to the world is formal so what else could techno-
science have found out!
Formalisation gives us power to control and manipulate that which we
formalise, but we must also notice that to formalise human behaviour, society
and institutions is itself to force, so to speak, human nature into a formality. The
same thing goes for formalisation of the physical universe: the objective and
neutral stance of knowledge as power forces itself as the founders of The
Royal Society so aptly put it on nature. The problem with the techno-scientific
perspective is that it aims at hegemonic power, trivialising and de-essentialising
any other perspectives. My point is: when this has happened, thinking of
ourselves as machines, as essentially formal entities, seems quite plausible, if
not logically necessary.
4.1. Beyond formal and informal
Let us now take a social situation which we would call formal; a cocktail party
at the presidents residence. Now the reason why we call it formal is that the
expectations on each persons behaviour are quite strict. One is for instance
expected not to drink too many cocktails, not to express ones emotions or desires
on the dance floor too much, not to be impolite or too frank in ones conversations
and so on. The appropriate and expected behaviour follows formal rules. But
note, exactly because this is the case, so is its opposite. That is to say, because
appropriate behaviour is formal, so would also inappropriate behaviour be:
to each appropriate response and act there are various ways of breaking them,
ways which are derived from the appropriate ones. In other words, to the
extent that it would be technically possible to program a robot to follow all (or
a sufficient amount of) the formal/informal rules of a cocktail party, we could
make the AI system behave in expected or unexpected ways: but we must first
know what is expected in order to have the system behave inappropriately
or unexpectedly, so that it does not just behave completely unintelligibly. Now
if a cocktail party would be, in its essence, that is to say, thorough-and-through
formal, then an AI system could become a human-like cocktail party attender.
Why? Because the computer (the brain of the robot) exclusively acts on what is
formal. The difference with humans is that their nature as passionate, aspiring,
emotional, autonomous, moral etc. persons interfere with or poses a challenge
to the formal part of a cocktail party. And as we all know, it takes a great deal of
social conditioning in order to subjugate oneself to the domination of formalities,
social standards, collective norms etc.
So a distinction needs to be drawn: even though we would call a presidential
cocktail party a formal occasion, this does not mean that it is formal in its
essence. Rather, the formal feature is only a certain, and one might argue quite
small part/aspect of what is really going on. In fact, I would claim, the formal
part is, as I have already indicated, the part which disciplines, regiments and
controls what I would call the a-formal ground. By a-formal I mean something
that, so to speak, stands outside of the language game of formal/informal and
appropriate/inappropriate. To exemplify this, think of a dinner invitation: If the
invitation comes with the words informal dress that indicates that the receiver
had reason to expect that the dress code might have been formal. Or it might just
as well be that there is nothing explicit on the invitation card about formalities
37
and dress codes, which might mean either of three things. It might be that the
receiver will automatically understand that this will be a formal dinner with
some specific dress code, or it might mean that the she will understand due
to the context of the invitation that it will be an informal dinner, but might
have had reason still to expect that such invitations usually implied some form
of formality. Needless to say though, both of these play on the idea of a code
that is either expected or not expected. The third possibility is simply that the
whole idea/concept of formalities/informalities does not present itself. If my
friend, with whom I have an open and loving relationship, invites me over for
dinner, it would be very odd and morally suspect for me to ask him if I should
dress formally or informally: our relationship is in this sense and to this extent
a-formal and will stay so as long as no conflict or difficulty arises between us,
potentially leading us to adopt a code of formality in order to manage and control
the difficulty.
The logic that this example sketches can be adopted for human society at large:
the fact that social standards and norms are formal does not make human
relations essentially formal. Now it is in relation to such an understanding of
formal/informal and a-formal that I think that the question of AI needs to be
put. Even if the cocktail party is formal, it does not mean that the a-formal nature
of human relations is completely absent. Rather, the formal aspect of the event
is there as a means of controlling the a-formal and struggling to avoid those
potential relational conflicts that might emerge, to make things more efficient
etc. And the fact that after such formal events people often remark how boring,
frustrating, embarrassing etc. the event had been or how irritating, annoying,
manipulative etc. some person had been, shows just how the formal interplays
with the a-formal.
I am making a strong claim here, namely, that relating to the world and others
in terms of a language game of formal/informal is relating to the world, oneself
and others in terms of control and manipulative power (there are obviously
other aspects to this as well). And further, that the programming of AI systems
is logically restricted to this plane. Simultaneously, the whole language-game of
formal/informal presupposes or interplays with what I have called the a-formal
nature of life (there has to be something to formalise), and AI systems are not
a-formal. While features of human will to power need not always be in the form
of explicit formal/informal rules it nevertheless seeks to develop techniques for
realising this will. As a counterexample, in a relationship of openness and love
there is no logical/grammatical space open for power here we do not find
the attitude to make something yield to our will (Nyknen 1995: 130) and
thus, no need for formalisation, for all that is required is an understanding of
each other. Obviously, our lives are mostly an interplay between these two.
But, the techno-scientist and advocate of strong AI might respond, everything
in the universe, every movement of every particle, might someday be describable
by science. Does this not show that the whole universe is really formal? I do
not want to speculate about the future of scientific findings. My point has only
been that claiming that humans and nature as such are fundamentally formal
mechanisms (which fundamentally build on information processing) is to repress
or avoid acknowledging that one has projected ones desire for power, the desire
to formalise, on the essence of being one has created an essence for being.
Alternatively, this can be characterised thus: science creates representations of
the world and everything in it, but the world, life, language, the human mind,
morality are not representations.
5. Concluding remarks
John Haugeland was right in claiming that the only reason to take contemporary
Artificial Intelligence more seriously than clockwork fiction is the powerful
suggestion that our own minds work on computational principles. In other
words, were really interested in AI as part of the theory that people are
computers (Haugeland 1986: 5-6). But whereas Haugeland clearly thought that
people are computers in an essential way, I would claim that what is of interest
here is to understand what it entails for our moral self-understanding that such
a perspective has become so dominant and pervasive to us and to our times.
This goes together with the points that have been made by both Lewis Mumford
and Hubert Dreyfus, namely, that the equation between man and machine
builds essentially on the idea that human beings may become progressively like
machines and thus machines can become like humans, which is not the same
as to say that humans are machines or vice versa (Dreyfus: 1979: 230, see also
Mumford 1934).
Bacon defined knowledge as that understanding which enabled one to execute
what he thought to be the duty of power, namely to manipulate and refine
corporeal bodies. What does refinement mean here? Be that as it may, what
this indicates, and what I think is not hard to see when looking at the field
of AI, is that techno-science, with its power-driven concept of knowledge,
has always been a morally loaded concept, and not a neutral one. Rather, it
serves an imagined civilizational purpose, which struggles to overcome what
it perceives to be superstitious ghosts of human irrationality and subjugate
them to the power of the rational (Ellul 1990: 162, See also Dennett 1991). My
argument has not been to say that this cannot be done, but only to indicate that
this would essentially mean not overcoming irrationality but rather repressing
the fundamental a-formal nature of human life which is grounded in a moral
dynamics, and repressing the fact that one has projected a perspective of power
onto the whole universe.
39
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T drejtat e njeriut prtej
ideologjis
43
Ethnicity, violence, and vulnerability: The case for Individual versus collective Identity rights in Spain Txetxu Aguado
Txetxu Aguado
Ethnicity, violence, and vulnerability:
The case for Individual versus collective
Identity rights in Spain
Abstract
We define ourselves in our everyday lives with those who appear to sustain a
degree of difference with us. When these differences can be easily understood,
we are among equals, i.e., among people who share enough of our cultural or
economic background as to be perceived as belonging to the same group in
which we place ourselves. When these differences, however, are perceived
as irreducible, i.e., as questioning instead of affirming our cultural or ethnic
traits, we sometimes feel at risk. In our global systems of communication our
immediate environment is no longer based on location or proximity for any
local crisis quickly becomes global and hence our own. This shift in scale has
direct repercussions on the ways we theorize our collective social identities
given how global crises prove just how insufficient the nation-state has become
in controlling the proliferation of perils that directly menace us, as is the case
of international terrorism. One psychological response to this situation of the
perceived proximity of all things global and the weakness of the nation-state to
We define ourselves in our everyday contact
with those who appear to sustain a degree
of difference with us. When these differences
can be easily understood, we are among
equals. When these differences, however, are
perceived as irreducible, i.e., as questioning
instead of affirming our cultural or ethnic
traits, a crisis appears within the identitarian
community.
In this essay, I will analyze three of these
crises, as they pertain to Spain but easily
imagined in other European contexts, and the
violent responses to them: ETA terrorism, the
xenophobic and racist violence that exploded
in Spain (one of its extreme examples being the
event of El Ejido in Almera in 2000), and the
Madrid Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks of March
2004. If at the heart of the first type of violence
lies the exclusiveness of the nation-state (a
Spanish nation supposedly undermining the
political identity of another nationthe
Basquesthrough its denial of cultural and
political heterogeneity), at the core of the
second example, we find a racially tainted
concept of Spanishness in contradiction with
democratic values. Finally, the third example
is grounded on an ideological framework that
confronts civilizations (West against East) and
religions (Christianity versus Islam) and hides
its links to the evolution of late capitalism and
its aftermath.
The alternative framework to these threats I
intend to develop will plead for a democratic
society grounded on notions of dependency
and vulnerability (Judith Butler, Victoria
Camps), where the demos will elaborate
political answers (Sheila Benhabib, Fernando
Savater) to overpass the etnos in a community
sensitive to differences without getting
blinded by them.
KDU 1:341.231.141(460)
fully protect its citizens is fear, a feeling that expresses the anxiety of impending
doom, a state of mind that results when we take for granted that sooner than
later our cultural and economic landscapes will collapse and our lives will be
thrown into turmoil with an unclear outcome.
In this essay, I will analyze three of these crises, as they pertain to Spain but
easily imagined in other European contexts, and the violent responses to them:
ETA terrorism, the xenophobic and racist violence that exploded in Spain (one
of its extreme examples being the event of El Ejido in Almera in 2000), and the
Madrid Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks of March 2004. If at the heart of the first type
of violence lies the exclusiveness of the nation-state (a Spanish nation supposedly
undermining the political identity of another nationthe Basquesthrough its
denial of cultural and political heterogeneity), at the core of the second example,
we find a racially tainted concept of Spanishness in contradiction with democratic
values. Finally, the third example is grounded on an ideological framework that
confronts civilizations (West against East) and religions (Christianity versus
Islam) and hides its links to the evolution of late capitalism and its aftermath.
Spanish philosopher Victoria Camps has studied in great detail just how difficult it
is to accept what is different (117), even though the manifestation of heterogeneity
and diversity is, actually, our most common trait, what really makes us equals
(117). However, coming to terms with difference implies putting aside knee-jerk
responses of fear and its corollaries of exclusion, discrimination, or containment,
that it to say, various forms of exercising violence.
45
These kinds of acts are
emotional responses to an excess impossible to accept, much less to assimilate
or make our own. Eradicating whatever we regard as threatening helps us stage
the fantasy of an original unity lost along the way when we come in contact with
those who do not look, behave, think, or believe in the same gods we do. The
safety net built around uniformity and homogeneity becomes more fashionable;
no longer undetermined by foreign images when we look at ourselves in the
identitarian mirror. Has the time come to find comfort in similarity and to only
recognize ourselves in an unnatural sameness in everything that surrounds us?
Unfortunately, the more heightened the belief in the existence of an unpolluted
group the more unfeasible its realization becomes. These irrational desires and
perceptions cannot be counterbalanced by rational means; this is only possible by
elaborating viable dreams of tolerance and inclusion to be discussed later.
When violence is the means employed to protect our vulnerability, it originates in
a twistedso to speakvision of our weaknesses, both physical and emotional.
For Judith Butler being too dependent on others, attached and exposed to them
(20), results in a strong sense of feeling vulnerable to aggression. Instead of
resolving our dependency in terms of a political configuration that could
45 Or in Tony Judts words, fear corrodes the trust and interdependence on which civil society rests (9).
44 NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014
45
guarantee our peaceful coexistence, the cry for violence attempts to erase the
threat, or if this proves to be unworkable, to make it invisible. In the search
for a reasonably secure environment, violence gives a false sense of security
with which to mask our physical and cultural vulnerability, an aggression
that paradoxically fences in our fears and creates the illusion of protection if
only momentarily. Violence, of course, is never powerful enough to make this
experience of vulnerability disappear given how, most likely, this is an essential
part of the human condition. If this is the case, why not make the vulnerability of
bodies and identities the political grounding of society (Butler 20)? A society that
takes as its point of departure the recognition and protection of the weaknesses
and differences of all its citizens would also recognize the fears, weaknesses, and
differences of others. In this manner, it would become more difficult to make the
outside responsible for our internal fears, stigmatizing it as the source of conflict.
At this point in time, vulnerability has not followed this path. One only needs
to think about the rise of xenophobic or openly racist political parties in todays
Europe and the frightening projections in the next elections to the European
Parliament in May 2014. Instead, vulnerability has become the excuse to close
borders, to purify cities, to confine difference outside of the proper political body.
From here, it is easy to understand that the dehumanization of everything and
everyone outside of the hegemonic identitarian group will naturally follow. In
this model, identity is entrenched in the dreams of a society that has expelled
ambiguity and uncertainty from its framework. Within ones group, we are all
alike, clones of each another, relentlessly needing to see ourselves reflected
in the mirror of sameness, in fear that the unknown will return to haunt us
and take away our peace of mind. Foreigners are no longer comprehensible,
their languages and their cultural values are locked in distrust, as noise and
interruptions in the everyday reenactment of a totally homogenous identity.
What does not fit in the identitarian framework is assimilated as a monstrosity,
only tolerated if it does not threaten us. The monster-foreigner is nothing more
than a deviation, a perversion of our bodies and thoughts, an excess in need of
severe control.
In the pages that follow, I would like to analyze the three above-mentioned
positions of crises in relation to vulnerability. All three involve varying degrees
of violence and they are reactions to unwelcomed fears perceived as threats.
I will start by analyzing ethnic nationalism in the Basque Country and how it
provided the ground for ETA terrorism.
Ethnic violence
46 NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014 KDU 1:341.231.141(460)
We are attached and exposed to others, as Butler reminds us. The nationalist
response to vulnerability recognizes our attachments, but instead of extending
them to everyone, it keeps them within the identitarian community; it decides
to limit the links only to the members of the same national group. Ethnicity and
its definition become instrumental in deciding the nature of the attachment to
be preserved against the contamination of the social body from the outside. In
other words, ethnicity strictly classifies those who belong from those who do
not according to the criteria put into place to be a rightful member.
But of course, not all identitarian bonds are conductive to exclusion. A very
substantial part of being a unique person originates in the combination of what
is given to us from the community we live in and what we choose to add from
the outside. The degree to which we mix one factor with the other depends
on the strength of the collective ties and on our will to be creative with them,
or, if necessary, to resist them. Sometimes, we need to find refuge in collective
belonging while at other times we need to emphasize our independence to
ascribe to whatever values we see fit. Xavier Rubert de Vents focuses on one
side of the equation by pointing out how our singularityour identityderives
from collective belonging or attachments (Identidad 39). Having said this,
Rubert de Vents does not hesitate to uphold individual interests so that our
persona is not reduced to a mere set of collectively shared values (Identidad
45). If this were the case, we would be diminishing our singularity turning into
perfectly interchangeable beings.
This last type of ethnocentrism far exceeds the understandable feelings of
connection to ones place of birth or mother tongue. Extreme nationalists
make those feelings the center of their ideology of belongingthat is to say,
of the criteria to exclude and include those who will be alike or irreducibly
alienby excluding any other type of interdependence among people. Once
the community has been founded, differences from the outside world can
never be incorporated. They would be perceived as a threat, as an undesirable
corruption. These shared ethnic traits are the most effective way of becoming
visible in the public arena and of keeping members together around the same
national or ethnic configuration. The stricter the criteria to belong becomes, the
more intense the agglutination of the members and the better the protection
from undesirable influences. When the ethnic criteria is based on biological or
cultural featuresimpossible to make their own by those who arrive late or
who cannot not speak a language with the appropriate accent, as is the case with
immigrants of any sortthe nationalist community is almost safe, or at least it
believes to be safe within its impermeable borders.
Nationalism as an ideology of ethnic belonging has little to do with the notion of
singularity espoused by Rubert de Ventsas a combination of collective and
individual idiosyncrasiesand much to do with Fernando Savaters critique
of unredeemable nationalism (61). For Savater, nationalism bases individual
47
democratic participation on ethnic belonging instead of on the political link
among citizens (61). Only those belonging to the hegemonic group made up by
the nationalist credo have the right to participate in political life. But citizens
are those who engage in community matters not because they are members of a
particular ethnic group but because they share a willingness to be involved in what
affects all. For the author, citizenship will always be in opposition to a democratic
engagement based on national affiliation. This is why Savater distrusts a type of
nationalism that sacrifices the singularity of individuals for the sake of collective
values. For this reason, instead of safeguarding a national identity, nationalism
actually attacks it by reducing it to a few of its features (61-2).
Furthermore, for the nationalist community, there is always a degree of
uncertainty impossible to eliminate. Perhaps our singularity is our resilience
to fully adapt to group demands; perhaps the criteria to determine who belongs
will never be established with mathematical proof. Radical foreignness is easily
identifiable and therefore easily excluded. Nonetheless, a more muted form of
foreignness, as Zygmunt Bauman has put it, is not hated so much on the basis of
its dissimilarities, but rather because it is not sufficiently different (Identity 58).
There is distrust among the members of the group given how one of them could
be camouflaged. This results in a serious unreliability about the nature of the
group and its criteria of admittance. There is a variable degree of uncertainty:
no one will ever be totally sure about the true nature of those who belong. In this
case, fear is not directed towards the outside of the groupthe anxiety of being
contaminatedinstead it is internalized as the anxiety of being infiltrated. The
group has the enemy within its borders, one difficult if not impossible to unmask.
The enemy is at home: he or she looks like us, behaves like us, speaks like us;
how can we access their true inner being? This is the case within nationalist
terrorism where usually its first victims belong to the national community.
Violence comes in handy in reducing this version of vulnerability too, in keeping
at bay the uncontrolled explosion of uncertainty, unreliability, insecurity, and
paranoid fears of infiltration and betrayal. Once the group enters a state of
constant fear, accumulated paranoid energies are released only by the exercise
of violence. It has the advantages of not having to argue rationally with those
who are its targets. It is attuned to the deep irrational structure of the group;
it purifies with fire and blood the social body; and it engages in a ritualistic
elimination of the infiltrated and of the traitor by way of a procedure close to
sacrificial rituals. Those who engage in violence will be elevated to the category
of warriors sacrificing themselves for the common good. Their criminal practices
will never be seen as such but as the necessary meanslegal means within the
groupto protect it from undefined perils. Once again, the more ambiguous the
dangers, the better they suit the purpose of violence. The violent act is directed
at getting everyone involved: those who actually practice the bloodshed and
those who participate passively through its ritualistic nature. We are reunited
both by the criteria of belonging put into play and by the violent act committed
by all through the leadership of the one chosen to carry out the deed of violence.
At the end of the 1950s, the terrorist organization ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna,
Basque Country and Freedom) might have been in its origins a resistance
movement against criminal Francoist policies directed at the prohibition of
identitarian practices for Basques. But almost 1000 deaths latersome of them
at the hands of parallel state terrorist organizationsits original goals have been
diluted. Many of the terrorist attacks took place during the unstable transition
to democracy period, attacks that destabilized the incipient democratic climate;
other attacks took place when the Spanish democracy was more or less fully
established. Many intellectuals and politicians working for a peaceful solution
to a problem that is not so much political as criminal have remarked that this
is a feud, a violent one, among Basques within the same family. The feud takes
place among people living in close proximity, some identified with exclusionary
nationalist positions, others kept out as Spanish nationalist oppressors. A family
conflict has been extended to the victims; Basque society has been brutally
divided between friends and enemies. Once again, the group intensifies the
links among its members by religious rituals of purification and elimination of
the pollutants within the Basque social body. No one is safe. Dissidence and
disagreement are punished with death for the few and with social ostracism for
the many.
The way out of this violence must begin by returning the victim to the condition
of humankind; it must re-humanize difference, threats, and hatred. Violence
aims at destroying abstract values that are embodied in real people without
wanting to see the human flesh and bones, the emotions and relationality,
proper to us all. It is a human body that violence destroys not a symbolic idea.
To re-humanize the victim means to open our ears and listen to their voices as
in Iaki Artetas documentary Trece entre mil (2005). Here we have access, for
example, to the thoughts of a policeman who lost one of his twins when a bomb
exploded under his car. In Julio Medems La pelota vasca, la piel contra la piedra
(2003), among other testimonies, we understand what it means to be subjected
to psychological and physical torture by police forces when a woman accused of
being a member of ETA narrates her story. In Fernando Aramburus Los peces de
la amargura (2006) we become spectators of the suffering of the victim in the
form of a lack of social solidarity: nobody dares to approach a widow for fear of
being stigmatized; no one shows any compassion; the victim is the oppressor and
those who victimize are innocently oppressed. In Gonzlez Sainzs Ojos que no
ven (2010) the main character is socially isolated even by his own family because
he disagrees with the violent rendering of nationalist beliefs. By the same token,
violence rewrites history forcing the victim to accept his or her victimization.
Luisa Etxenikes El ngulo ciego (2008) presents a character whose father has
been killed by ETA. The first section of the book narrates a literary rewriting
49
of his fathers death and the sons ideal response to his killing. In the second
section, the character finally decides to take control of his past, and his present,
by addressing his fear and cowardliness at his father assassination at the hands
of ETA members. History should not always be written by those with power to
impose their views. To resist terrorism means to resist its false narratives of
justification.
Listening, reading, or watching films rescue the victims from the silence imposed
by their executioners. When we listen we engaged in a dialogue with those next
to us, excluded for one reason or another. We become members of the same
community, one not defined by ethnic or racial linkages but by the willingness
to talk and to listen, to share experiences, to receive second-hand knowledge as
if it were our own. Without this conversation between the victim and society at
large, there will be no reconstruction of this social fabric seriously wounded by
the artificial separation between us and them proper to any act of violence. Now,
empathy is directed towards anyone who could have been one of us given the
right circumstances. The feeling of compassion emerges when we acknowledge
that the victim has been unfairly injured. Moving the position of the victim
from its social relegation to oblivion to the center of political debate is a way of
weaving relationships to restore a vigorous civil society. It is time for citizenry
to take control of its future rather than relegating it to groups full of unitary
fantasies.
At the time of the writing of this essay, new hopes have materialized for a
bloodless end to ETA. Perhaps the organization will decide to dismember in
the near future as a way of admitting the uselessness of its existence.
46
The use
of violence to achieve political means has been discredited within the ranks
of those previously supporting the organization. However, the rejection of
violence by ETA supporters does not imply the recognition of the victim or civil
reconciliation. As Reyes Mate has pointed out, it is the ideology of exclusionary
nationalism, the victimization of its supporters, and the violent stigmatization
of its opponents, what must be ruled out in a democratic society. There is no
room for them.
We are still not there but the time has changed for identitarian violence. ETA
and similar organizations have been in decline for many years throughout
Europe, which does not mean, obviously, that they could not strike and kill at
their will. A new phenomenon has come to the fore: groups like ETA cannot
compete for media attention or for the propagandistic effect of their actions with
the spectacular nature of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. The indiscriminate
nature of the murders of the latter has won the media battle for producing horror
and rejection on a citizenry more confident about the possibilities of ending
46 Fortunately, after the January 8, 2011 cease-fire, ETA has announced the end of its terrorist activity
even though the organization still has not dismantled.
with ETA through police efforts and international pressure. In the international
sphere, ETA has almost lost its niche to shock audiences. Today, it is more difficult
to justify how the goals of independence for the Basque Country need to recur to
violence in an open, democratic, and relatively wealthy European society.
The time has come to politically counteract if not nationalism itselfgiven its
prevalence in Basque and Spanish societies it would not be a realistic goalat
least to delegitimize nationalisms tendency to discriminate and exclude. Before
approaching this last issue, I will address two other responses to vulnerability
in the form of violence in the xenophobic and racist treatment of immigration
in Spain and the relatively new terrorism of a religious fundamentalist nature.
Spain and its Ejidos
47
February 2000, El Ejido, Almera (Spain). A Moroccan immigrant kills a woman
to steal her purse. He has been under psychiatric treatment. Apparently, this
was the spark responsible for the persecution of the local immigrant population
that included the burning of homes, businesses, cars, and the beating of everyone
that looked like a Moroccan. During the first days of the riots, the police forces did
not intervene to protect those under attack. In the previous years, El Ejido had
experienced very fast economic growth thanks to the use of cheap labor coming
from abroad. The town took advantage of the massive use of green houses built
with plastic, a year round semi-desert climate, and improvements in irrigation
technology to grow vegetables mainly for a lucrative European market. Despite
this growth, the affluent local population had not change much from the times
when El Ejido was one of those very poor and depressed villages Juan Goytisolo
described in Campos de Njar (1954). In 2000, most of the locals from El Ejido
seemed to have been unaware of the difficulties of integration, the hardships of
immigration, or even the subhuman conditions immigrants were living under. It
was easier to look the other way.
El Ejido was not an isolated case of racism and xenophobia. In an article written
by Fernando Delgado a few days after the clashes, he stated, A few days ago, it
happened in southern Almera, but tomorrow it could be in Baix Llobregat, the
Selva, Osona, the Segri..., or in Barcelonas Raval district. And it wouldnt be the
first time: a few days ago it transpired in Premi, a few months ago in Ca nAnglada,
in 1990 in Alpicat, in 1993 in Massalcoreig, and we could also add Ceuta in
1995, among numerous other examples. The incidents in El Ejido attracted
widespread media attention because of the Ku-Klux-Klan reminiscences
(Martnez Muoz) and the 1930s German-style assaults perpetrated against
the Moroccan population (Goytisolo and Nar). The rule of law was suspended
47 This is the title of the book written by Juan Goytisolo where he analyzes and critiques Spains long
history of exclusion.
51
at the hands of the local haiders (Goytisolo and Nar), in reference to the late
Austrian extreme right and racist leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (FP)
Jrg Haider. In El Ejido, as in many other places before and after, the possibility
of a peaceful coexistence among differences was seriously undermined.
It is intellectually sound to relate the violent events against the immigrant
populations in towns like El Ejido with Spains long history of discriminations,
expulsions, and killings of all those perceived as different. El Ejido is the rightful
heir of the expatriation of Jews and Muslims taking place centuries ago, because
as Jos Mara Ridao states they were not foreigners but Spaniards practicing a
religion other than Christianity (58). If democracy, as Flores DArcais claims, is
a value; it is not found in nature. It is a should be (106), then Spanish democracy
should make as one of it most peremptory tasks the habilitation of a sociability
for all living under the same sun, legal or illegal, an indecent term in a democracy
when referring to a foreigner (Goytisolo, Espaa 54). In a democracy worthy of
that name there should only be citizens.
From a country of emigrants to a country of immigrants, some Spaniards seem
to have a short memory. Hardly anyone remembers how in the 1950s and 60s,
even early 1970s, many Spaniards crossed the border in search of a better means
of living; how they were placed in infamous trains and sent outside their cultural
and linguistic milieu. Upon arriving to their final destination in France, England,
Switzerland, and Germany, many of them would find democratic confinement in
barracks and barbed wired settlements very close to the factories to which they
also democratically sold their labor force. Many nationals of these host countries
thought of Spaniards as an infectious body in need of cultural, religious, and
sanitary containment and cleaning. How could Central and Northern Europeans
not feel that their identity and health conditions were at risk when these noisy
and vociferous immigrants from Spain even dared to use smelly olive oil and
believe in the Pope? How were they, civilized and democratic people, not to
show resentment and distrust towards a group of foreigners coming from a non-
elegant dictatorship and a country so close to Northern Africa? How could they
treat as equals this horde of undernourished and underdeveloped immigrants so
visible everywhere one dared to look?
Beginning with the late 1980s and with the entrance of Spain and Portugal in
the international circulation of capitalwith the admittance of both into the
highly selective club of wealthy countries called the European Union todaythe
movement of people changed. Many Spanish emigrants had already begun to
return to their country much earlier, a return favored by the adverse economic
conditions that broke out with the first oil crisis in 1973. Those who decided
to remain in their host countries were more or less integrated, their differences
made almost invisible by the arrival of new immigrants from Northern and sub-
Saharan Africa, Asia, and Eastern European countries. Spaniards were no longer
as much of a threat as these recent arrivals were becoming. They had finally
KDU 1:341.231.141(460)
reached the category of Europeans.
The entrance into the European club made the access to international financial
markets for Spanish companies much easier, an access further facilitated with
the beginning of the euro as a European currency in January 1, 2002. Affordable
financing and a cheap labor force facilitated a new economic boom. There was
no need to go outside Spain to Africa or Latin America to extract a surplus
value. With the invaluable help of local mafiasalways very well connected to
the police and the political powers for protectionthe transportation of illegal
immigrants to Spain was easily arranged. The many that lost their lives trying to
cross the Strait of Gibraltar, or those who were forced to work as prostitutesto
cite just two examplesdid not matter. The economy needed a non-unionized
and foreign labor force. The real estate bubble on Spanish beaches, labor intense
agricultural work, and the menial jobs not wanted by Spaniards anymore rapidly
made the immigrant population increase from an anecdotal presence in the
1970s to a significant percentage of the Spanish populationbut still well
under the average in other European countries. Before the world financial crisis
hit Spain in 2008 with soaring unemployment rates close or above 20%, the rate
of immigration continued to rise to an approximate 10%.
It goes without saying that a country, which did not have the time to culturally and
politically digest its own emigration to Europe, would have serious problems in
dealing with its new immigrant population.
48
Many Spaniards relate to difference
with suspicion, distrust, with an unavoidable sense of superiority. It appears as
if the humiliations and at times physical violence suffered by Spaniards at the
hands of Europeans living north of the Spanish border were not resolved and
were transferred to the new immigrant population in Spain. Spaniards never
understood the ethnic discrimination they were subjected to as an effective tool
to mask class discrimination, as a means to control and subjugate their foreign
labor force in a capitalist mode of production. For the most part, many Spanish
emigrants to Europe understood their exclusion from their host societies as
solely based on their peculiar cultural traits emanating from an anachronistic
dictatorship so uncomfortable to European democracies. For the most part,
this labor force found it difficult to comprehend what was at stake: work has
no names or national origins when it is incorporated into merchandise, diluted
into its exchange value. The ethnic labeling of a labor force does not matter in a
capitalist culture as much as its cost, i.e., the amount of labor incorporated into
goods at the lowest possible price. Ethnic discrimination is nothing more than a
way of making rough working conditions more palatable to a foreign labor force.
In this social environment, any manifestation of difference on the part of
immigrants was seen as a direct attack to what the Right termed the sacred values
48 For example, it is surprising to find the reduced number of fictional works that deal with this topic,
something more prevalent in countries like Italy, as the book by Graziella Parati Migration Italy:
The Art of Talking Back in a Destination Culture (2005) shows.
53
of Spanish identity: language and religion. The immigrant population was not
only exploited economically by giving them salaries well under the minimum
wage established by Spanish law, condemning them to marginality. They were
also culturally exploited by making their language and cultural practices a threat
to be subdued. These two forms of violence exercised upon an undocumented
populationwith no means to defend itself in the open by unionizing, for
exampleare still active in defining a Spanish identity that, as Alain Badiou has
put it, wants to purify itself of exogenous elements (27, 28). Of course, this is
the shortest route to perceiving difference as a clashperhaps of civilizations as
Samuel Huntington would like to have itin need of a violent resolution.
Perhaps some Spaniards see in immigrants a commonality they strongly refuse
to admit. Perhaps some Spaniards, like some French, are afraid of not living up to
the demands of the highly favorable identitarian image they have of themselves
(Ben Jelloun 58), a fear that turns into unrecognized anxiety every time the said
commonality haunts them. The easiest way out would be a violent rejection
of the shared humanness, to disguise our shared vulnerability. However, as
Paolo DArcais has emphasized, prior to political equality lies the physiological
equality of life []. The utmost certainty of our mutual equality when facing
illness and death (24-25). Our biology is enough to make us similarworth
deserving the same rightsno matter how striking appearances might be. We
only need to remember how vitally congruent our culturally driven responses
are when confronted with illness and death. We are not so different after all.
As Victoria Camps has stated, immigrants want to be recognized, which is the
necessary condition for constructing ones identity, in order to exist (118). To
be admitted to the normality of everyday life means to be taken not as someone
overwhelmingly determined by ethnicity, but rather as someone that partakes
in the same imaginings of life. This, of course, implies having access to political
participation, education, work, health, housing, i.e., being imbued with the same
degree of humanity as the locals or nationals. As Tahar Ben Jelloun affirms, our
biology makes us cosmetically different, but it is society that attaches value to
differences so that they become inequalities (61). These inequalities fueled the
clashes at El Ejido. And, when made irreducible, these differences are at the core
of the indiscriminate murder of people by religiously inspired terrorism.
Religious violence
Madrid, March 11, 2004. A cell of Al Qaeda terrorists placed bombs on several
commuter trains in Madrid. The bombs exploded by remote control when the
trains arrived or were approaching the Atocha station to maximize the carnage.
Nearly two hundred people were killed; several hundred wounded, many of them
immigrants. The images of the catastrophe found immediate attention in the
world press. We saw mutilated bodies, chaos, people in panic, in tears, in shock,
some seriously injured, and cell phones ringing and ringing endlessly hoping to
be answered. Weeks later, special police forces surrounded a group of terrorists
related to the bombings in an apartment in the outskirts of Madrid. Having no
possibility of escape, they decided to self-immolate. It took weeks for forensic
doctors to be sure of the exact number of people present in the apartment at
the time of the explosion; that was the degree of destruction perpetrated. Some
years later, a terrorist cell was dismantled in Barcelona. They wanted to place
bombs in the Barcelona metro system, once again to maximize the damage.
Despite cruel and senseless terrorist acts committed by ETA over the years, the
Spanish population is now confronted with a degree of random violence never
experienced before. For the terrorists, the enemy is the Spanish population at
large. It does not matter if they are Christians or Muslims, if they supported or
were against the illegal war in Iraq (March 2003). For the Barcelona terrorist
attempt, it was irrelevant if the Spanish socialist government had decided to
withdraw its troops from Iraq a few months after it won the general elections in
2004, shortly after the Madrid bombings. Against substantial pressure from the
United States and other European countries, and even though Spains military
presence in Afghanistan was increased, the new Socialist government had made
good one of its electoral promises.
Because of its proximity to North Africa and its relatively recent immigrant
population, Spain has become a center for the organization and planning of
religious fundamentalist terrorism. Sound policy is no longer sufficient to resolve
possible conflicts; irrationality and the impossibility of dialogue permeate the
terrorist discourse. For example, the political positions of the government, the
efforts at integration of the immigrant population, or how the Spanish population
does not senselessly blame Islam for the pointless violence in its name are
inconsequential. One day it is the colonial intervention in Afghanistan; another
day it is the reconquest of Al-Andalus, now a somewhat mythical territory
distanced from its historical reality; another the Spanish enclaves in Ceuta and
Melilla in North Africa; or the presence of Christians in Islamic territories, that
justify terrorism. No one is safe. If Hannah Arendt once stated that violence
can be justifiable, but it never will be legitimate (52), religious fundamentalist
terrorism neither tries to justify nor legitimize its actions unlike ETA terrorism
or the criminal persecution of immigrants in El Ejido. Its aims were never to
convince but to sacrifice people to their version of a non-compassionate and
bloody god.
No direct connections should be drawn between the violence affecting immigrants
and religious fundamentalist terrorism. It is appalling to approach the latter in
defense of anything other than a radical sacred vision of reality. In this sense,
this type of terrorism is as reluctant to accept difference much like those who
violently target foreigners. However, the distinction between religious terrorism
and violence is one of degree and goals: the latter terrorizes with the purpose
55
of controlling and confining the foreigner to a marginalized space within civil
society; the former uses violence as a means to install a religious state. Violence
is related to an economy of exchange, where the immigrants valuemoral or
culturalis determined by its price on the market. On the other hand, religious
terrorism wants nothing from profane valuescivil society or human rights by
the same tokenbecause it follows a life exclusively governed by the sacred, by
the Book.
The perfect and instant interchange of labor and individuals at any point in
the globe is the true identity of economic migrants, as those referenced in El
Ejido. It does not matter if the immigrant labor force moves from one place
to another within national borders; they are always within markets. The
specificity of immigrants in this context is precisely their interchangeability,
i.e., their reduction to nothing more than mere labor stripped of any distinctive
identitarian marks. As Paul Virilio has explicitly put it, immigrants flow [. . .]
on a never-ending journey [. . .] nowhere at home, except in transit camps, here
and there (7-8). Fluidity becomes the main trait of an immigrant population
only welcomed as a labor force that will keep economic growth rates rising or
maintain the generous European welfare state system, given the decrease in
national birth rates. At the same time, immigrants are always confined to the
outskirts of society in transient camps waiting to be hired as cheap labor, to be
expelled out of the country, or to move across another national border. Given
these conditions, why is it so challenging to understand the failures of immigrant
integration?
Religious fundamentalist terrorism refuses the idea of economic exchange
and instead appeals to an identity that is nothing but sainthood. In relation
to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Jean Baudrillard has pointed out that terrorism
is the act that restores an irreducible singularity to the heart of a system of
generalized exchange (9). There is no production, no banal proliferation of
meaning, only the repetitive acting out of the scriptures, of the revealed word
from the deity. There is no room for appearances or for the mystifications
proper to merchandise. On the contrary, here words only have one meaning,
and truth has nothing to do with the accumulation of goods. Truth is always
absolute, pointing to an unquestionable distinction between good and evil, far
removed from postmodern doubts. In the logic of religious fundamentalism, the
reenactment of the sacred is the only source of meaning. The rest is useless. Its
logic points to the restoration of absolute events, being death the most obvious
one, and making them pervasive in our lives (Baudrillard 17). In a world where
death has disappeared once and for all, drowned its sorrows in a compulsive
consumerism, in an economy of perfect exchange, for the religious terrorist only
the sacred keeps its value.
No more democratic contractual relations where individual positions are constantly
renegotiated. What matters is the reinforcement of the sacred against the profane,
death versus life, the religious pact against civil agreement. A pact does not link
individuals to each other but rather a collectivity with a god, a bond that is irreversible.
Whatever is written in the pact is always a group of words with absolute meaning
(Baudrillard 22), words that refer to the representation of the scriptures and not
to factual meanings engaged in the real and physical world. Society and its citizens
have been substituted by the sect. The passing of time has been eliminated in a
dream of perfect continuity between past and present, between the time of the gods
and our time. The erasing of the discontinuity between past and present, or present
and future, install us in a perfect circle of time. Moving in the circle does not take
us anywhere; we are constantly within the borders dictated by sacred time. We can
either be in or out, but never moving along. No more linear time; every act is nothing
more than a repetition, another performance of an original and unquestionable
deed. In this sense, identity is not related to individuality, to the manifestation of the
personal; it is subsumed to a collective rendition of the pact with the god.
Moving forward
There are no easy solutions to the problems of violence described here. Violent
behavior is entrenched in an identitarian defense that rejects consensual practices
with differences. The process to overcome violence, or at least to minimize its
instances and effects on people, has to do with a pedagogy aimed at imagining us
and those around us with trust and confidence instead of with hatred and exclusion.
I am not being nave here. On the contrary, given the scope and nature of the violence
we face, one still believes in the capacity of political concepts to generate a society
more tolerant with its fears and anxieties.
At the beginning of this essay, I discussed Butlers notion of vulnerability as an
expression of attachment and exposure to others. Vulnerability has also been used to
legitimate a cry for violence, as a means to sever any links we might have developed
with those unlike us. Since we are exposed to others, the argument follows, it is
better to confine them to an space where they cannot harm us. However, we could
conceive vulnerability as the tool to construct a community fully aware of the
interdependence among its members (Butler 20, 22). We could join forces over the
shared burdens of our human condition expressed by Edgar Morin: we are together
on the same planet Earth, as much a physical as an emotional place, as much a
place to favor life as a place where we develop attachments and affections towards
others (199, 213). Lets confront the cruelty of naturedespite its innocenceby
showing concern towards those under dire circumstances. If we are all vulnerable,
inhabitants of a cruel planet, at risk of being exposed to violence, we can still turn
our weaknesses into a primary source of compassion.
One is not only proposing that we be better human beings, and return morality
and ethics to the social, cultural, and political life. We need to translate
57
vulnerability, emotionality, and compassion into a political structure similar
to what Zygmunt Bauman has termed an autonomous society, one defined
by constant self-examination, critique, and reform (In Search 81).
49
This
autonomous society is an effective defense against violence rooted in myths
(Bauman, In Search 81): the myth of ETAs notion of Basque identity, the myth of
Spanish purity in El Ejido, and the myth of sacred destiny in religious terrorism.
These examples emphasize the redemptive nature of a future to come through
messianic time. These three violent responses to vulnerability are little more
than the acknowledgement of a failure: (a) the impossibility of coming to terms
with the brutal industrialization of the Basque country at the end of the 19
th

century, a transformation that changed the landscape and local homogeneity
forever; (b) the failure of an archaic notion of Spanish identity based on religion,
language and Imperial glories to confront the new challenges of migration and
integration; (c) and the collapse of a religious vision of the world defeated by
abusive modernization. None of these failures have been resolved politically.
They refuse to engage with their time; instead they place themselves outside of
the present by elaborating the myth of a Basque Acadia, the myth of a Christian
Spanish identity, or the myth of a Islamic society without fissures.
50

We could rephrase vulnerabilityor the mortality of our bodiesfrom a curse
into a blessing (Bauman, In Search 81), from a curse associated with fear to
the blessing of participating in the design of a future not determined by an
already written fate. The future is still open; it is not dependent on destiny or
chance, but on gathering the knowledge to facilitate the society we want. It is an
undertaking whose content is to be established in dialogue. But dialogue calls
for privileging the demos, the citizen, over the ethnos, the nationalist tribe or
the religious fundamentalist group (Benhabid 66); it advocates for participation
and involvement over disengagement and exclusion for a future less cursed by
violence. Both demand the refusal to be indifferent to our surroundings because,
as Fernando Vallespn puts it, if we do not want to accept what already is the
only possible outcome the violent response against differencewe should
translate desires and thought into action.
Works cited
49 This is precisely what Stphane Hessel claimsa critical and creative spirit (11)as
the condition to engage in the reform of society through becoming indignant. However, Bauman
does not think that indignation is the sole condition for change. In relation to the Spanish move-
ment of protest not led by any political party, 15-Msimilar to other movements like Occupy Wall
Street in the USAhe has remarked that it is easier to gather people against actual social condi-
tions than to made them agree on feasible goals (El 15-M 37).
50 The similarities among the three myths has been brought forward by Josep Ramoneda, among
other authors, when he states that if religion looks for its justification in the sacred, nationalism,
both Basque and Spanish finds it in nature, or to be more precise, in destiny (108), in a natural
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61
Zhvillimi dhe t drejtat e njeriut Bekim Baliqi, PhD
Bekim Baliqi
Zhvillimi dhe t drejtat e njeriut
Abstrakt

Hyrje
Zhvillimi i t drejtave t njeriut sht i pandashm nga historia e mendimit
politik dhe teologjik n njrn an dhe n ann tjetr nga historiku i formimit t
shteteve moderne dhe t vet demokratizimit t tyre. Kshtu, dokumenti i par
q obligonte institucionet qeveritare n respektimin dhe mbrojtjen e t drejtave
t njeriut ishte Kushtetuta e Sh.B.A-ve, e miratuar n vitin 1787 dhe q merret si
kushtetuta e par demokratike n bot. Vetm pak vite m vone, nn ndikimin
e Revolucionit Francez u shpall edhe Deklarata pr t Drejtat e Njeriut, e cila
shrbeu si frymzuese edhe pr shum debate, traktate dhe dokumente tjera
n kt sfer. U deshn edhe shum kohe q t krijohej nj katalog i mirfillt
ku prshiheshin t gjitha aspektet t drejtave pr t cilat nevojitej mbrojtja. Kjo
u b me krijimin e Deklarats Ndrkombtare pr t Drejtat e Njeriut m 1948,
Ideja e t drejtave universale dhe t
patjetrsueshme t njeriut, filloi t jetsohet
n mas t shtuar pas gjysms s dyt t
shekullit njzet, duke u br motivim e
burim i legjitimitetit pr lvizjet sociale dhe
kombtare n kauzn e tyre pr barazi dhe
liri. Ishte Deklarata Universale e t Drejtave
t njeriut e vitit 1948 q vuri themelet pr
mbrojtjen e tyre n nivel botror. Megjithat,
t drejtat individuale t njeriut, akoma
vazhdonin t luanin vetm nj rol margjinal n
politiken e shumics s vendeve dhe qeverive
botrore. Me demokratizimin e shteteve,
veanrisht pas rnies se Komunizmit, t
drejtat e njeriut u bn pjes prbrse e
kushtetutave liberale por edhe t diskurseve
politike ndrkombtare. Por, dekadn e fundit
n procesin e shtetndrtimit dhe t misioneve
ndrkombtare, kmbngulja pr mbrojtjen
e drejtave t njeriut nuk shkonte paralelisht
me zhvillimin dhe nevojn e krkesat pr
t. Madje, edhe sot kto dyja vazhdojn
t konceptohen si shtja t ndara dhe t
pavarura. Neglizhenca e aspektit zhvillimor
si element fondamental i drejtave t njeriut
ka br q viteve t fundit diskutohet gjithnj
e m shum n qarqet akademike edhe kjo
shtje.
N kt trajtes, do t prqendrohem kryesisht
te ndrlidhja e drejtave t njeriut dhe
zhvillimit, vshtruar nga ana e diskursit dhe
veprimtaris t organizatave ndrkombtare,
duke e marr rast studimor Kosovn. Me
konceptin e zhvillimit nuk nnkuptohet
vetm prmirsimi i gjendjes ekonomike por
n kuptimin e gjer t gjendjes shoqrore,
politike dhe kulturore. Gjithashtu, aspektet
e shumta q ndrthuren me drejtat e njeriut
dhe zhvillimin, do t diskutohen. M pas
do t shtjellohen roli i shoqris civile dhe
bartsve institucional rreth ktyre shtjeve.
Dhe s fundi, prmes nj vshtrimi kritik do
t prmblidhen t gjeturat dhe konkluzionet
e studimit.
62 NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014 KDU 342.721.73
nga ku mori shembull edhe Konventa Evropiane pr t Drejtat e Njeriut. Deri
n ket koh vetm shtetet me sovranitetin e tyre ishin bartse e t drejts n
arenn dhe t drejtn ndrkombtare. Njra ndr arsyet kryesore t krijimit t
tyre, ishin prvoja e hidhur nga dy luftrat botrore, por edhe frika nga prhapja
e mundshme e diktaturave t reja (Ignatieff, 2003: 288- 292).
Pas prfundimit t lufts s dyt botrore, tmerret e vrteta dhe shkatrrimet e
shumta q la pas u bn shtytse pr krijimin e mekanizmave ndrkombtar q
do t parandalonte dika t tille. Prandaj me formimin e Organizats s Kombeve
t Bashkuara, shtetet antare t saj u angazhuan qe t ndrmerrnin masa q kjo
t mos prsritej asnj her m. Dhe nj ndr shtyllat kryesore t veprimtaris
s OKB-s ishte e lidhur me mbrojtjen dhe respektimin e t drejtave t njeriut.
Prve organizatave ndrkombtare ndrqeveritare u formuan edhe nj varg
organizatash ndrkombtare jo-qeveritare, si bie fjala Human Rights Watch,
Amnesty International dhe t tjera, me qllim t mbrojtjes dhe respektimit t
drejtave t njeriut n nivel global.
Mirpo, sa jan t drejtat e njeriut t dobishme ose sa jan etike n nj bot, ku
rreth 2.8 Miliard njerz apo rreth 46% e popullats s prgjithshme jetojn nn
2 dollar n dit, ndrsa m pak se 900 Milion ose 15 % e popullats botrore
zotrojn m shum se 80 % e t hyrave t prgjithshme globale? (Pogge, 2002).
Diskrepance e till nuk shfaqet vetm n nivel global por vlen edhe n nivel
kombtare ku n shumicn e shteteve- sidomos n ato t hemisfers jugore dhe
lindore, dallimet ekonomiko-sociale jan t frikshme.
Dhe kjo pabarazi, e disa mund t e klasifikojn edhe si padrejtsi, ngre n vete
jo vetm dilema morale, n kuptimin Kantian t kategoris imperative rreth asaj
se a kan njerzit obligim ti ndihmojn t tjert n nevoj. Por edhe probleme
politike, ekonomike, kulturore dhe shoqrore, n at se sa jan legjitime
shtetrore, sa jan t qndrueshme sistemet ekonomik, far raportesh
kulturore krijohen dhe se sa jan shoqrit t sigurta dhe t lira, nse t drejtat
e njeriut nuk prshijn edhe barazin apo drejtsin sociale. Prandaj, shtrohet
pyetja si mund t respektohen e mbrohen t drejtat e njeriut kur ka aq padrejtsi
n mirqenie dhe pabarazi n shprndarjen e t mirave materiale? Por, para se
t prballemi me prgjigjet e mundshme do t shtjellojm teorikisht konceptet
e t drejtave t njeriut dhe at t zhvillimit si dhe raportin ndrmjet tyre. Dhe
m pas n rastin e Kosovs do t diskutojm ndrlidhjen apo thn m mir
mosprputhshmrin e tyre n praktik.
63
Koncepti i t drejtave t njeriut dhe zhvillimit

Ekzistojn prkufizime t panumrta rreth asaj se ka jan t drejtat e njeriut
dhe varsisht se a definohen nga perspektiva legale, politike apo filozofike ato
marrin konotacione dhe kuptime t ndryshme. Diskutimet rreth t drejtave
t njeriut kan qen t gjata dhe t gjra. Prandaj disa autor si Charles Beitz
pohojn se n thelb ekzistojn dy qasja ndaj t drejtave t njeriut, njra
filozofike dhe tjetra praktike apo politike (Beitz, 2004). Kjo do t thot, q
krahasuar me konceptet tjera, t drejtat e njeriut nuk jan vetm ide, vlera e
koncepte abstrakte si liria, barazia apo drejtsia por jan t drejta t rregulluara
e precizuara sipas ligjeve, konventave dhe kshtu t sanksionuara nse nuk zbatohen.
T ksaj vije argumentuese sht edhe teoricieni politik John Rawls i cili pohon se
t drejtat e njeriut jan m shum nj koncept politik i drejtsis sesa doktrin
religjioze, flozofke apo morale. Pasi q ky koncept i adresohet n rend t par nj
kornize kushtetuese dhe ligjore, pavarsisht nga parimet e caktuara morale e fetare
t shoqris (Rawls 2007). Gj q nuk do t thot q kto nuk kan ndikim fare, por
vetm se kjo e drejt sht universale, e patjetrsueshme dhe mbrohet me ligjet n
fuqi.
N veprn e mirnjohur Zhvillimi si Liri, ekonomisti dhe nobelisti Indian
Amartya Sen argumenton se t drejtat e njeriut jan t pandashme nga zhvillimi
ekonomik, pasi q pa kushte themelore t jetess t drejtat e njeriut (politike,
qytetare, ekonomike etj.) nuk mund edhe t jetsohen. Kshtu si shembull t
thjesht ai e merr t drejtn pr votim dhe pamundsin reale (pr munges
transporti, pr shkaqe analfabetizmi, etj.) pr t votuar. Ndrsa premisat
pr arritjet e liris jan: liria politike, kushtet ekonomike, mundsit sociale,
garantimi i transparencs dhe siguria mbrojtse. Liria, sipas tij, nuk sht vetm
qllim themelor i zhvillimit por kshtu edhe mjeti kryesor i tij (Sen, 2009).
Ngjashm sikurse koncepti i t drejtave t njeriut edhe koncepti i zhvillimit sht
shumdimensional dhe ka qasje t ndryshme. Por n prgjithsi me zhvillim
nnkuptojm kalimin nga nj gjendje e padshiruar -te mjere sociale, ekonomike
por edhe politike, ne at te dshiruar mirqenie dhe me kushte te bollshme ose
ku se paku plotsohen nevojat kryesore t qytetareve. Koncepti bashkkohor i
zhvillimit nnvizon jo vetm zhvillimin e prgjithshm ekonomik ose ngritjen
e Bruto Prodhimit Vendor, por zhvillim t qndrueshm ku hyjn edhe drejtat
e njeriut, liria qytetare, barazia dhe sundimi i ligjit. Parametrat jan t bazuara
te individi n rend t par e m pas tek ato indikator kolektiv e shtetror, si
p.sh treguesi i zhvillimit t njerzimit ose Human Development Index (i OKB-
s) bazohet tek niveli arsimor, kushtet shndetsore dhe t ardhurat mesatare
t qytetareve por jan edhe disa indikator tjer si mediat e lira e pavarura,
ambienti, infrastruktura por edhe shkalla e korrupsionit, liria e fjals dhe shtypit
q merren parasysh n kto matje (Rapley, 2007).
Nj nder veprimet m konkrete dhe strategjit m t diskutuara pr zhvillim
jan padyshim Qllimet e Mijvjearit pr Zhvillim nga Kombet e Bashkuara. Nj
plan mjaft ambicioz i OKB-s i koncentruar n prioritete konkretet dhe objektiva
kohore t caktuara. I miratuar n prag t mijvjearit t ri ne vitin 2000 dhe u
aprovua nga 192 shtete antar te OKB dhe ku parashihej qe te kto objektiva
te prmbushen deri n vitin 2015. Kuvendi i Kosovs ka miratuar me 2008
Rezolutn prmes s cils a merr prsipr zbatimin e Objektivave t Mijvjearit.
Objektivat kye te QMZh jan; 1) zbutja e varfris s skajshme dhe uris; 2)
realizimi i arsimimit fillor n nivel global; 3) prkrahja e barazis gjinore dhe
fuqizimi i rolit t gruas; 4) zvoglimi i vdekshmris s foshnjave; 5) prmirsimi
i shndetit t nnave; 6) luftimi i HIV/AIDS, malaries dhe smundjeve tjera;
7) sigurimi i mjedisit t qndrueshm; 8) ndrtimi i partneritetit global pr
zhvillim. Secili prej ktyre objektivave prmbajn po ashtu edhe nn objektivat
e caktuara.
Edhe pse shum pak e njohur, ekziston edhe Deklarata e OKB-s pr t Drejtat
pr Zhvillim, e miratuar nga Asambleja e Prgjithshme m 1986. Por meq sht
n form t nj rezolute dhe jo traktati ose konvente ajo nuk ka fuqi obliguese
n t drejtn ndrkombtare. Prkundr prpjekjeve q m von n kongresin
botror pr t Drejtat e Njeriut, mbajtur m 1994 n Vjen, kjo e drejt u
riafirmua prmes Deklarats s Vjens dhe Programit Veprues, fuqia reale
politike dhe realizimi i saj praktik nuk duket se u prmbushen edhe aq shum
(Uvin, 2004: 41-43).
Se ndrmjet institucioneve q merren me t drejtat e njeriut dhe agjencive pr
zhvillim- si n ato shtetrore ashtu edhe ato ndrkombtare, ka fare pak ose aspak
bashkpunim, e dshmojn edhe shtimi i artikujve dhe librave kritik rreth ksaj
shtje. Kshtu, n librin me titull Human Rights and Development studiuesi
Peter Uvin nga prvoja dhe observimet personale, argumenton se n misionet
e shumta ndrkombtare bashkpunimi mes aktorve dhe ndrveprimi n kto
dy fushveprime mungon n mas t madhe (Uvin, 2004). Rasti i UNMIK-ut, por
edhe OSBE-s dhe organizatave tjera ndrkombtare q vepruan dhe veprojn
ende n Kosov mund t shrbej shklqyeshm pr t pasqyruar kt fakt.
T drejtat e njeriut dhe zhvillimi n Kosov
Deklarata Universale e t Drejtave t Njeriut n nenin 25 parasheh t drejtn
pr nj standard t jetess ku shndeti dhe mirqenia duhet t gzohen. Mirpo,
n nj vend si Kosova ku nuk ekziston sigurimi shndetsor dhe ku trajtimi
mjeksor sht m shum shtje fati, si dhe ku mbi 17% e popullats jetojn
n varfri t skajshme, kjo tingllon m shum si cinizm sesa si e drejt
elementare e njeriut. Gjithashtu, edhe e drejta e lvizjes s lir e cila garantohet
si me konventa ndrkombtare ashtu edhe me kushtetutn e vendit, duket t
65
jet vetm formalitet legal e konstitucional, pasi q n shumicn e vendeve t
bots qytetart e Kosovs jan t privuar t udhtojn lirshm. Apo t drejtat
e puntorve, kshtu vetm gjat vitit 2012 dhe n gjysmn e par t, 2013
n orar dhe vende pune kan vdekur 24 persona, prap masat mbrojtse nuk
ndrmerren si dhe ato ndshkuese ndaj prgjegjseve mungojn (Koha Ditore
12.09.2013). Lista e neneve dhe rastet ku t drejtat e njeriut, pr shkaqe t
ndryshme, nuk respektohen dhe shkelen mund t jet shum e gjat. Por t
mbesim te shtja se sa dhe si ndikon zhvillimi n t drejtat e njeriut. Zhvillimi
vjen si rezultat i nj qeverisjeje t mir, kompetente dhe demokratike e cila jo
vetm q arrin t fuqizoj ngritjen ekonomike por edhe siguroj mirqenie sociale,
prosperitet kulturor dhe si rrjedhoj edhe mbroj faktikisht t drejtat e njeriut.
Qasja e bashksis ndrkombtare n Kosov q nga administrimi ndrkombtar
i UNMIK-ut lidhur t drejtat e njeriut ka qen m shum mbi baza etnike, gjinore
apo kryesisht politike e jo humane e universale. Bashksia ndrkombtare nuk
i ka prkrahur sa duhet dhe si duhet organizatat e shoqatat vendore q do t
promovonin dhe mbronin t drejtat e njeriut.
Gjithashtu, bashksia ndrkombtare ka br pak ose aspak q t i ndrlidh t
drejtat e njeriut me zhvillim, duke ln pas nj koncept e cila kuptohet vetm si
akt ligjor e prmbushje e standardeve ndrkombtare e jo nevoj e krkes e
qytetarve. Pikrisht ky koncept legal-juridik i t drejtave t njeriu ka br q
t caktohen shum zyrtar ligjor pr barazi gjinore apo avokati i popullit por q
n fakt vetm interpretojn ligje dhe prpilojn ankesa. Apo edhe organizata
jo qeveritare si KMDLNj q m shum merrem me analiza politike e projekte
prfituese sesa me avokim dhe veprime aktive pr mbrojte t drejtave t njeriut.
N debatet e shumta rreth t drejtave t njeriut, kritikohet qasja eurocentrike
apo perndimore ndaj t drejtave t njeriut gj q shpesh e bn t vshtir
pranimin dhe zbatimin e tyre n vendet jo-perndimore. Nj kritik t ashpr e
drejton kshtu intelektuali kanadez Michael Ignaitieff kur pohon: As the West
intervenes ever more frequently but ever more inconsistently in the affairs of
non-western societies, the legitimacy of its rights standard is put into question.
Human rights is increasingly the language of moral imperialism just as ruthless
and just as self-deceived as the imperialism of yesteryear (Ignatieff, 1999: 13).
Nj shqetsim t ciln lirisht mund te ilustrojm edhe n rastin e Kosovs
ku koncepti i t drejtave t njeriut dhe standardeve q i prfshin kjo, sikurse
edhe rregullimi ligjor sht trsisht i importuar pa ia prshtatur mekanizmat,
koston dhe kapacitetet e zbatimit t tyre n realitet. Shembulli m domethns
sht me kt rast, mbrojtja e t drejtave t puntorve, ku prkundr ekzistimit
formal t ligjit t puns dhe kontrats kolektive respektimi i tyre nuk mbikqyret
e as nuk mbrohet fare nga askush. Sindikatat jan t pafuqishme dhe t paafta
t kryejn kt funksion, e q tradicionalisht iu takon, ndrsa adresimi zyrtar
i prgjegjsis pr jetsimin e ligjit dhe respektimin e ksaj t drejte mbetet
shum i mjegullt. Si edhe n shum ligje tjera (pr shembull harmonizimi me
standardet e BE-s), zbatimi i tyre n praktik sht shumfish m i rndsishm
sesa aprovimi apo prshkrimi formale-juridik.
Prandaj koncepti si dhe diskursi mbi t drejtat e njeriut duhet t jete i pandashm
nga koncepti i zhvillimit, respektivisht q t drejtat e njeriut t mos kufizohen
vetm ne drejtn legale e konstitucionale por edhe t promovoj zhvillimin
e gjithanshm njerzor. Kshtu, bie fjala Kosova prve q e ka miratuar dhe
ratifikuar Qllimet e Mijvjearit pr Zhvillim nuk ka ndrmarr asnj hap
konkret q kto objektiva t i prmbush vrtet deri m 2015 kur edhe sht vu
afati i parapar pr arritjen e tyre.
Prmbledhje
Para m shum se nj dekade, n kohn kur n Kosov n mnyr masive e
brutale shkeleshin t drejtat themelore njerzor, bota u vu para nj dileme
(far n kto momente t shkrimit vlen pr Sirin!) se a duhet apo jo t thyhen
parimet e sovranitetit pr mosndrhyrje n punt e brendshme t nj shteti,
me qllim t intervenimit humanitar pr t shptuar popullatn e rrezikuar. Pr
fat t mir, dilema u zgjidh n favor t mbrojtjes s t drejtave t njeriut, mbi
parimin e asaj q njihet si prgjegjsia pr t mbrojtur (responsibility to protect)
nga bashksia ndrkombtare ather kur shteti i shkel brutalisht kto t drejta.
Mirpo, sot Kosova dhe qytetart e saj nuk rrezikohen nga nj regjim fashist si
ai i Milloshevicit q do t i shkelte t drejtat themelore njerzor pr shkak t
prkatsis etnike apo se t drejtat e komuniteteve jo-shumic nuk ekzistojn
formalisht por q kush dhe si do t promovoj dhe mbroj kto t drejta n t
vrtet. Me nj sundim t dobt t ligjit, me nj ekonomi t brisht dhe me
nj kultur politike klienteliste respektimi dhe zbatimi i t drejtave t njeriut
sht m shum nj formalitet e demagogji sesa nj e drejt q jetsohet edhe
n praktik. Arsye pr kt sht edhe q koncepti i saj normativ nuk sht
i bazuar n kushtet reale t jetess, respektivisht aspekti zhvillimor sht
neglizhuar krejtsisht. Kjo mosprputhje ndrmjet t drejts ligjore dhe gzimit
t njmend t saj sigurisht q nuk reduktohet vetm n t drejta t njeriut apo
t kufizohet vetm n nj faktor t vetm, si sht zhvillimi. Arsyet tjera kan t
bjn me shkalln e legjitimitetit institucional, forcn vepruese t autoriteteve,
kulturn politike dhe vetdijen qytetare. Sidoqoft, fusha e t drejtave t njeriut
sht sfer e rndsishme dhe domethnse pr t reflektuar sinqerisht rreth
formalitetit dhe realitetit, rreth t drejts dhe padrejtsive. Kshtu bie fjala,
shum pak ka rndsi nse formalisht ekzistojn t drejtat e pacientve nse ata
detyrohen t blejn vet do gj pr shrim, apo t drejtat e konsumatorve nse
inspektorati fito-sanitar nuk vepron gati kurr apo edhe shum t drejta tjera
q nuk mbrohen pasi q vullneti i duhur mungon, prgjegjsia e autoriteteve
67
prkatse mbetet e panjohur apo thjesht nuk ka kushte pr zbatim t tyre.
Shembulli i Qllimeve t Mijvjearit pr Zhvillim nga OKB-ja dshmon shum
qart se t drejtat e njeriut nuk duhet t jen vetm formulime ligjore e krkesa
demagogjike por edhe strategji vepruese q pr baz marrin edhe konceptin e
zhvillimit. Prandaj koncepti i t drejtave t njeriut duhet t konsistoj edhe n t
drejtn pr zhvillim.
Bibliografia
Amartya Sen: Zhvillimi si Liri, Dudaj. Tiran, 2009
Charles Beitz: Human Rights and the Law of Peoples. n; D. Chatterjee
(ed.): The Ethics of Assistance. Cambridge University Press, 2004
John Rapley: Understanding Development. Theory and Practice in the
Third World. 3er ed. Lynne Riener, Boulder, 2007
John Rawls: Drejtsia si Paanshmri, Tiran, 2007
Michael Ignatieff: Whose Universal Values? The Crisis in Human
Rights. Praemium Erasmianum Essay, Amsterdam, 1999
Michael Ignatieff et.al.,:Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry,
Princeton University Press, 2003
Thomas Pogge: World Poverty and Human Rights, Polity Press, 2002

69
Minority rights: An opportunity for adjustment of ethnic relations in Kosovo? Adem Beha
Adem Beha

Minority rights: An opportunity for adjustment
of ethnic relations in Kosovo?51
Abstract

1. Introduction

If ethnic hatred triumphs, then everything that people of goodwill [in Kosovo] and
their friends in the international community struggled for during the last 10 years
would have been in vain. Bernard Kouchner, SRSG, 1999.
After l5 months of the unsuccessful United Nation sponsored negotiations
between Serbia and Kosovo to reach a political settlement for the status of
Kosovo, UN Secretary General Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for
Kosovo, Marti Ahtisaari, on 26 March 2007, prepared a Comprehensive Proposal
for the Kosovo Status Settlement and recommended a supervised independence for
51 I would like to thank Seraina Ruegger, Rand Engel and Cecilia Uddenfeldt Wort for their valuable
help and comments in finalizing this article.
There is a prevailing perception in Kosovo
that minority rights are nothing but ad
hoc compromises. Faced with a multilevel
governance of international administration,
Kosovos political leadership and its
institutions embraced the discourse of
minority rights as a price to be paid for
Kosovo statehood; however, they neither
deemed it as necessity to Kosovos democratic
development, nor as an opportunity or
challenge to repair ethnic relations in Kosovo.
The prevailing discourse was that they, the
majority in Kosovo, Kosovo Albanians, have
suffered immensely during the last decade,
and for this Kosovo Serbs are to be blamed.
Further, Kosovo Serbs were perceived as the
fifth column of Kosovo society, likely to be
working for the enemy of Kosovo, Serbia. This
paper argues that without de-securitization of
ethnic relations in Kosovo and establishment
of fair representation of minority communities
in public life, democracy will be not
sustainable in Kosovo. This will be examined
with reference to the work of Will Kymlicka
regarding group differentiated rights. As
key stakeholders of a newly independent and
sovereign state, Kosovo Albanian leadership
and its institutions should with generous
intent implement democratic standards,
which are enshrined in Kosovos Constitution,
and Kosovo legislation. Kosovo legislation
guarantees the highest democratic standards
in protecting, preserving and developing the
identity of its minority communities. This
paper concludes that the main impediment
to minority communities enjoying the
highest democratic standards is not the
spirit and germ of Kosovos legislation,
but its implementation, which shows the
unwillingness of Kosovos political leadership
and institutions to meaningfully embrace the
discourse of minority rights as an existential
necessity for Kosovo society.
70 NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014 KDU 341.234 (496.51) | 342.724 (496.51)
Kosovo (hereafter Ahtisaari plan).
52
Kosovo is a country with one of the most modern
constitutions in Europe.
53
Kosovos constitution embeds almost all key international
legal documents related to minority rights, and has established high standards in
protecting minority communities in Kosovo.
54
However, much of these laws remain
unimplemented and this is the main hindrance to minority rights in Kosovo.
For the first time since 1981, in April 2011 Kosovo finalized its first post-
independence population and housing census. The results of the 2011 census
were seen as controversial given the fact that the census was not conducted in the
four Serb northern municipalities Leposavic, Zubin Potok, Zvecan and Northern
Mitrovica. Serbia was not interested to call Serbs from north of Kosovo to be part of
the 2011 census in Kosovo, as they pledged to local Serbs in northern Kosovo that
Serbia will conduct its own census and determine the number of Serbs in Kosovo
55
.
On the other hand, the Kosovo Academy of Arts and Science criticized the census
results and called for a new census, as the initial expectations for the figures for
Albanians were estimated higher.
56
In other words, the census did not meet the
expectations of ethno-national elites/institutions in both Serbia and Kosovo, as
both of them saw the census as a means to legitimizing the nationalist discourse
of predominance. The 2011 census numbered 1,739,825 residents in Kosovo. The
figures for Albanians in the 2011 census were estimated to 92, 2%, Serbs 1,5%,
Bosniaks 1,6%, Gorani 0,6%, Roma 0,5 %, Egyptians 0,6 %, Ashkalia 0,9 %, Turks
1,1 %, and others or not specified 0,6%.
57
52 For an account of the negotiations, see James Ker-Lindsay, Kosovo: The Path to Contested State
hood in the Balkans (I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London-New York, 2009); Marc Weller, The Rambouil
let Conference On Kosovo, International Affairs, Vol. 75, Issue 2, 1999, pp. 211251; Mark Weller,
Contested Statehood: Kosovos Struggle for Independence (Oxford University Press, New York
2009); For an account of the conflict in Kosovo, see Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (Yale
University Press, New Haven, 2002); Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (Basingstoke, Mac
millan, 1998).
53 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo was adopted on 9 April 2008 and promulgated on 15 June 2008.
54 ibid, Article 22 [Direct Applicability of International Agreements and Instruments] Human rights
and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the following international agreements and instru
ments are guaranteed by this Constitution, are directly applicable in the Republic of Kosovo and,
in the case of conflict, have priority over provisions of laws and other acts of public institutions:
(1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (2) European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols; (3) International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights and its Protocols; (4) Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities; (5) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; (6)
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; (7) Convention on
the Rights of the Child; (8) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
55 Linda Karadaku, Kosovo completes 2011 census without data from north, 16/10/2012. Available at
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/10/16/
feature-04 (Accessed 11 October 2013)
56 Karadaku, First Kosovo state census proves controversial, 18/07/2011. Available at http://www.
setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2011/07/18/feature-03
(Accessed on 10 October 2013)
57 About 2011 census, see Kosovo Agency of Statistics, Estimation of Kosovo Population 2012. Avail-
able at http://esk.rks-gov.net/rekos2011/?cid=2,40 (Accessed 10 October 2011).
71
The Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, five months after
Kosovo declared itself an independent state, issued a report called Kosovo Serbs
after the Declaration of Independence and underlines that:
Kosovos government has pledged to respect and implement the highest standards
for minority communities protection enshrined in the new Constitution. The
nature of the state, as pledged in the Constitution, is inclusive for all communities
and has a symbolic neutral to any community living in Kosovo, which is contrary
to the prevailing regional nation-state philosophy. The Albanian majority has at
large embraced such neutrality and civic foundations of the new state. Such a
milieu has opened opportunities for a major change in Albanian-Serb relations.
On the other hand, without the cooperation of Kosovo Serbs, the provisions of
the Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovos Status Settlement might not be fully
implemented. This in turn would negatively impact the life of Kosovo Serbs and
interethnic relations.
58
This report emphasizes the neutral nature of the newly independent and
sovereign state institutions with regard to communities in Kosovo, and highlights
that such symbolic neutrality is embraced both by Serbs and the Albanian
majority in Kosovo. However, the state of Kosovo is a result of the motivation of
the Albanian majority in Kosovo to be independent from Serbia. Since the 1990s,
the Kosovo Albanians organized a virtual state in response to perpetuated
discrimination, intimidation, segregation, culminating in 1999 with the
expulsion of more than half of the population from Kosovo by Serb authorities,
which resulted in the NATO intervention. Consequently, such neutrality does not
exist, as Serbs, especially those in northern Kosovo continue to oppose Kosovo
statehood. This leads to the following rhetorical question: If Kosovo is a neutral
state with regard to ethnic communities, why does it need this legislation which
guarantees community and minority rights? I argue that the Kosovo state is not
neutral, because the majority of the population in Kosovo is ethnic Albanian. This
fact is recognized by Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo in Article 3 which
establishes that The Republic of Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society consisting of
Albanian and other Communities, governed democratically with full respect
for the rule of law through its legislative, executive and judicial institutions.
59

However, the Kosovo Constitutions, which resulted from the Ahtisaari plan, is a
document, which recognizes the group-differentiated rights of Kosovo Serbs,
as the biggest minority in Kosovo. Chapter III Rights of Communities and their
Members of Kosovo Constitution, Article 57.1 states: Inhabitants belonging to
the same national or ethnic, linguistic, or religious group traditionally present on
the territory of the Republic of Kosovo (Communities) shall have specific rights
as set forth in this Constitution in addition to the human rights and fundamental
58 KIPRED, Kosovo Serbs after the Declaration of Independence: The Right Momentum for Confi-
dence Building Measures, Policy Brief No 8, Prishtine, July 2008, p. 5.
59 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 3.
freedoms provided in chapter II of this Constitution
60
, which guarantees
fundamental human rights and freedoms.
Kosovo Constitution is heavily based upon the principles of the Ahtisaari plan
on Kosovo Status Settlement. Even though Kosovo is neither a member of the
UN nor of the Council of Europe and consequently is not obliged to ratify and
report with regard to international human rights instruments, in the general
principles of the Ahtisaari plan it was foreseen that the framework of Kosovo
Constitution (Article 22 entrenches that Kosovo will be governed by highest
democratic standards.
61
This includes that Kosovo institutions are obliged
to preserve, protect and develop identities of the communities in Kosovo.
62

Parallel to this, Marti Ahtisaari anticipated the scope of the values and principles
according to which Kosovos Constitution should be established, by stating that
Kosovo Constitution needs to be consistent with all the provisions provided
by the Ahtisaari plan, and in the case of the conflict between the Kosovo
Constitution and the Ahtisaari plan, the latter shall prevail.
63
With regards
to ensuring these high standards on protection of communities, the Kosovo
Constitution is subordinated both to the Ahtisaari plan (internationally non-
binding document) and binding international law. Consequently, since Kosovo
declared its independence and adopted a new Constitution, about forty laws
have been promulgated in the Kosovo Assembly, guaranteeing high standards in
protecting the minority communities in Kosovo.
64
With the Ahtisaari plan, as a blueprint to Kosovo state-building, the International
Civilian Office (ICO)
65
of the Special Representative of the European Union and
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) were established in
Kosovo, in order to guarantee that the minority right provisions of the plan will
be fully implemented. Although the Ahtisaari plan is implemented to a large
extent in the south of Kosovo, the four northern Serb dominated municipalities
60 See, Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, especially Chapter III and Chapter II.
61 Marti Ahtisaari, Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, UN doc
S/2007/168 (26 March 2007), General Principles, Article 1.3.
62 ibid, Annex 2, Article 2.
63 ibid, Annex 1, Constitutional Provisions, Article 1.
64 In the text, we will use the term minority community to designate the ethnic minorities in Koso-
vo. However, it should be noted that the term community has a twofold meaning in the Kosovo
legal framework. The first meaning is prescribed in the Law Nr.03/L-040 On Local Self Government,
Article 3, defining the community as a group of communities belonging to the same ethnic, reli-
gious or linguistic group; while, the second meaning is used in the sense of minorities, including
Serbs, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, Gorani, Turks. The second meaning is prescribed in Article 1, of
the Law 03/L-047 On the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Communities and Their Mem-
bers in Kosovo.
65 See Peter Feith, State Building and Exit: The International Civilian Office and Kosovos Supervised
Independence 2008-2012 (ICO, Pristina, Kosovo, December 2012), p.v. As Feith emphasizes here:
The ICO was privileged to have been mandated to help implement such a clear and well balanced
blueprint for state-building as the Ahtisaari plan. Ours was not an open ended mission to super-
vise the Kosovar authorities, but above all a forward looking program to support reform, integra-
tion of the communities and reconciliation in the region, to be completed in only a few years time.
73
of Kosovo remained in limbo and no effect of the Ahtisaari plan was tangible in
this area. Any close look into the Ahtisaari plan will reveal that this plan indeed
foresees extensive rights for minority communities in Kosovo, especially Serbs.
The catalog of rights which are listed in the Ahtisaari plan goes beyond the rights,
which are listed by the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities in Europe. For instance, additional rights on citizenship goes beyond
the Framework Convention and are regulated by the Ahtisaari plan and the
Law on Citizenship of Kosovo, which guarantees multiple citizenship. A citizen
of the Republic of Kosovo may also be a citizen of one or more other states, while
Article 32 of the same law foresees that all persons who on 1 January 1998 were
citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and on that day were habitually
residing in the Republic of Kosovo shall be citizens of the Republic of Kosovo and
shall be registered as such in the register of citizens irrespective of their current
residence or citizenship.
66
In addition, the right of speaking their language is
guaranteed to the Serb community in Kosovo in the entire territory of Kosovo,
also in the areas where this community is not concentrated.
Parallel to this, in terms of representation, the Ahtisaari plan guarantees more
rights for minority communities than the Framework Convention, as in every
municipality where a minority community constitutes ten percent or more of
the overall population, the post of vice-president of the municipality will be
guaranteed for this minority. Despite these provisions, five years since Kosovos
independence, Serbs, paricularly in the northern part of Kosovo, have refused
any formal cooperation with Kosovo institutions. Therefore, in March 2011, the
EU in line with UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298 has begun to facilitate
a process of dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia on the normalization of the
relations between the two countries. The dialogue has advanced from a technical
to a political one and currently resulted in technical agreements (in the form of
conclusions), which are reached between the parties. However, much remains to
be done and addressed in terms of implementations of these agreements, which
goes beyond the scope of this paper.
This paper applies Kymlickas (1995) theoretical approach on group-
differentiated rights to examine minority rights in Kosovo. This paper is divided
in four sections and each of them will analytically assess minority rights. Section
one explains the terminology on minority rights. Section two reviews minority
rights from a legal perspective. Section three will assess the challenges to
minority protection in Kosovo, from a ground perspective. Section four analyzes
the mainstream minority policies deployed by UNMIK. We conclude that
without genuine pro-active involvement and commitment of Kosovo authorities
and its political leadership towards minority communities, neither sustainable
democracy nor effective institution building can be achieved in Kosovo.
66 Law No 04/L-215 Citizenship of Kosovo. Law approved by Assembly, date 31.07.2013.
2. Will Kymlickas theory of minority rights
With the emergence of the post-Cold War order a new paradigmatic shift from
human rights to minority rights was raised. While following World War II human
rights discourse was prevalent, in the post-Cold War era a discourse on minority
rights gained legitimacy in international debates; this discourse was analytically
observed in the work of Will Kymlicka. He argues that international debate on
minority rights increased after the Cold War, as issues related to minority rights
were considered not exclusively an internal affair of a state, but rather a matter
of international concern. As a result of the dissolution of Russian, Hapsburg and
Ottoman empires and emerging of new independent states, many minorities
ended up in the wrong side.
67
This created the dynamic that arguably lead to
two world wars, the Cold War, and the Balkan wars of the 1990s.
Consequently, new independent national states, such as Germany, Turkey,
Poland, Austria etc., established bilateral treaties to ensure reciprocal protection
of their co-nationals in neighboring states as a kin-state, but not minorities who
had no kin-state. Given the fact that most of these bilateral treaties were used
as a means of intervention and invasion by the kin-states to other states to
protect their co-nationals on the grounds that these states were violating the
treaty rights for their co-nationals, the idea of minority rights was discredited
after World War II. The post World War II order had reference to minority rights
neither in the Charter of the United Nations, nor in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. In the 1980s, this attitude began to change and a new approach on
minorities emerged after World War II and this approach substituted universal
human rights for minority-specific rights. This approach required not only to
guarantee basic human rights in a negative sense, but moreover adopted
positive measures to ensure that the needs of minorities are accommodated.
For the first time in 1992, the UN adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.
68
In Europe, the Council of Europe, the European Community, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in reaction to the devastation, ethnic
cleansing, and genocide of certain groups in Europe, during the 1990s begun
to work on the prevention of conflict, peace and security in Europe and focused
their attention on minority rights. During this time, the OSCE prepared the
Copenhagen Document (1990), the office of the High Commissioner on National
Minorities (1993) was established, and a series of recommendations were issued
regarding different spheres of minorities, including education (1996), language
(1998), effective participation (1999), and broadcasting (2003). In 1995,
67 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford
University Press, 2007), p.28.
68 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Ox-
ford University Press, 2007), p.35.
75
the Council of Europe adopted the Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities.
69
Now, minority rights were seen as undivided from human rights
and a precondition for democratization and thus, could no longer be considered
as a matter of state affairs.
Embedded in the theory of liberalism, the Kymlickian theory of minority
rights
70
posits a premise of personal autonomy, which implies supporting and
recognizing individuals who belong to different social, cultural and ethnic
backgrounds.
71
However, in Kymlickas perspective, personal autonomy can only
be developed and nourished within a social and cultural context or context of
choice, because personal autonomy does not exist in a cultural void and there
is always a link between personal autonomy and the culture. This leads to the
debates over minority rights between liberals and communitarians, respectively
those who see minority rights from an individual perspective and others from a
group perspective. In the Politics of Vernacular, Kymlicka summarizes this debate
comprehensively into three stages, which I review in the following subsection.
Kymlicka highlights three stages in the development of minority rights. The
first stage was the pre-1989 debate between liberals/individualists and
communitarians/collectives. While the former argue that the individual
is morally prior to the community, the latter argue that rather than viewing
group practices as the product of individuals choices, view individuals as the
product of social practices.
72
During this stage, there was an overwhelming
optimism among political philosophers that communism will collapse and a
democratization process would emerge smoothly in Eastern Europe. However,
with the collapse of communism issues of ethnicity, nationalism and minority
rights derails this optimism, because new conflicts spread all across Eastern
Europe, particularly Yugoslavia. Consequently, in the second stage, the debate
over minority rights was not amongst liberals and communitarians, but amongst
liberals themselves. The issue at stake was how minority rights match with liberal
democracy and the question posed was: If groups are indeed liberal, why do their
members want minority rights?.
73
This debate did not solve the problem. Kylmicka
69 ibid, p.37.
70 Kymlicka draws an analytic distinction between national minorities and ethnic groups. The point
of this distinction is to justify his hierarchy of cultural rights: while national minorities merit
rights to special representation and devolved self-government, ethnic groups deserve only rights
to help them integrate on terms that are fair. p.4-5. See more, Stephen May, Tariq Modood, and
Judith Squires, Ethnicity, nationalism, and minority rights: charting the disciplinary debates, in
Stephen May, Tariq Modood, and Judith Squires (ed.), Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Minority Rights
(Cambridge University Press, 2004).
71 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). See also Leigh-
ton McDonald, Regrouping in Defence of Minority Rights: Kymlickas Multicultural Citizenship,
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2. 1997, p.294.
72 Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford
University Press, 2001), p. 18-19
73 Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford
University Press, 2001), p.21
refers to David Miller, Yael Tamir and Jeff Spinner, who more or less share his view
that there is no contradiction between group and individual rights and emphasizes
the importance of cultural membership or national identity to modern freedom-
seeking citizens.
74
In the third stage, Kymlicka proposes that minority rights are not
as a deviation from ethnocultural neutrality, but as a response to majority nation-
building.
75
Institutionalization and regulation of ethnocultural diversity in public life is essential
for a stable and fair democracy. The determination and ability of countries in Eastern
Europe, including Kosovo, to solve ethnic conflict profoundly affects the process of
democratization. According to Kymlicka:
The ability or inability of countries in Eastern Europe to resolve their ethnic conflicts
has profoundly affected the process of democratization. While most countries
without significant ethnic tensions have democratized successfullyfor example
Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Sloveniathose countries with major ethnic and
linguistic cleavages are having a more difficult time consolidating democracy and
civil societyfor example Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Macedonia.
76
In other words, minority rights should be seen in the perspective of a just and stable
democracy and the justification of minority rights should not be a prescription for
this or that minority or as an ad hoc compromise. In contrary, according to Kymlicka,
minority rights should be seen as the appropriate application of defensible moral
principles. The protection of minority rights became an internal imperative
for stabilizing ethnic relations and establishing a fair democracy in newly post-
communist countries, and a precondition for allowing these countries to join the
NATO, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the European Union as well. The EU
membership Copenhagen Criteria asserts that the candidate country has achieved
stability of institutions guaranteeing... respect for and protection of minorities.
77

Minority rights are not considered a matter of domestic politics but of international
politics and international law. Indeed, the movement of internationalizing minority
rights has gained a widespread international legitimacy and there are even
tendencies to develop a universal declaration of minority rights, to supplement the
1948 universal declaration of human rights.
78
Liberal critics of international minority right movements argue that state
institutions are color-blind, that the state is neutral to different ethno-cultural
74 ibid, p.21
75 ibid, p.41.
76 Will Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, Introduction, in Will Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, ed., Can Liberal Plu-
ralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe (Oxford
77 Bern Rechel, Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe (USA and Canada: Routledge), p.4.
78 Will Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, Introduction, in Will Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, Can Liberal Plural-
ism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe (ed.) (Oxford
77
groups, and that minority rights constitute an unfair privilege for these
groups. However, defenders, including Kymlicka state that liberal theory has
ignored certain minority rights, including cultural membership, language,
and identity of ethno-cultural groups, and that minority rights compensate
these unfair disadvantages of these groups. In principle minority rights are
not in contradiction with liberal theory.
79
Kymlicka disagrees with the myth of
ethnocultural neutrality emphasized by the liberal state, which presupposes
that the state is neutral amongst different ethnocultural groups. Instead, he
argues that state and ethnicity can not be completely separated, because the
state systematically privilege the majority nation in certain fundamental ways
for example, the drawing of internal boundaries; the language of schools, courts,
and government services; the choice of public holidays; and the division of
legislative power between central and local governments. All of these decisions
can dramatically reduce the political power and cultural viability of a national
minority, while enhancing that of the majority culture.
80
Kymlicka argues that
there are three cases where individual human rights are insufficient to protect
minority rights from injustice and these are settlement policies, boundary
policies and language policies.
81
As a solution, he proposes group-differentiated rights, such as territorial
autonomy, veto-powers, guaranteed representation in central institutions, land
claims, and language rights, which indeed can help to rectify this disadvantage,
by alleviating the vulnerability of minority cultures to majority decisions.
These external protections ensure that members of the minority have the same
opportunity to live and work in their own culture as members of the majority.
82

In the Kymlickian perspective, minority rights as a heterogeneous category share
two features: First, they go beyond the familiar set of common civil and political
rights of individual citizenship which are protected in all liberal democracies.
Second, they are adopted with the intention of recognizing and accommodating
the distinctive identities and needs of ethnocultural groups.
83
79 Will Kymlicka, Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Con-
cepts in Will Kymlicka, Wayne Norman (ed.), Citizenship in Diverse Society (Oxford University
Press, 2003), p.5.
80 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford University
Press, 1995), p.51-52.
81 Will Kymlicka, Human Rights and Ethnocultural Justice, Review of Constitutional Studies, Vol. IV,
No. 2, 1998, p.213.
Press, 1995), p.109.
83 Will Kymlicka, Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Con-
cepts, in Will Kymlicka, Wayne Norman (ed.), Citizenship in Diverse Society (Oxford University
Press, 2003).
3. Minority community rights as precondition to Kosovo
statehood
First standards on minority community rights in Kosovo have been enshrined
in the 2001/9 UNMIK regulation Constitutional Framework for Provisional
Self-Government. Chapter VI of the Constitutional Framework recognized
the specific rights of minority communities, going beyond of specifying rights
contained in the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.
84
In 2003, the
UNMIK administration in Kosovo set forth the policy standards for Kosovo -
eight standards which Kosovo provisional institutions must reach in order to
accelerate the opening of negotiations for Kosovos final status. However, in
the introduction of the standards for Kosovo, nowhere in the text is Kosovo
final status explicitly stated, but instead the text paraphrases as follow: These
standards reinforce Kosovos parallel progress towards European standards in
the framework of the EUs Stabilization and Association Process, based inter alia
on the Copenhagen criteria.
85
One of the most explicit standards required of Kosovo provisional institutions
was Sustainable Returns and the Rights of Communities and their members. As
outlined by this standard, Kosovo was asked to provide laws that protect human
and minority rights, set an effective structure to respond to human and minority
rights violation, empower with staff and resources Municipal Community
Offices, implement fully the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities, distribute fairly municipal and ministerial resources to all
communities, and provide education curricula that encourage tolerance and
respect for all minority communities in Kosovo.
86
The implementation plan for
meeting these standards was set to take place in 2005, before the international
community would address the question of Kosovos final status. In November
2005, Marti Ahtisaari, was appointed by the UN Secretary General as a Special
Envoy to mediate Kosovo status talks and in 2006 he was placed in Vienna, a
neutral country for both Kosovo and Serbia, where the negotiations between
parties on Kosovos final status was to be conducted. After almost two years
of the unsuccessful United Nations-sponsored negotiations to reach a political
settlement for the status of Kosovo between Serbia and Kosovo, UN Secretary
Generals Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, Marti Ahtisaari,
on 26 March 2007 prepared a Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status
84 Wolfgan Benedek, Final Status of Kosovo: The Role of Human Rights and Minority Rights, Chicago-
Kent Law Review, Vol.80, p.221.
85 Standards for Kosovo, 10 December 2003, Pristina. Available at http://www.securitycouncilre-
port.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20Standards.pdf
(18 October 2013)
86 Standards for Kosovo, 10 December 2003, Pristina. Available at http://www.securitycouncilre-
port.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20Standards.pdf
(18 October 2013)
79
Settlement and recommended a supervised independence for Kosovo (hereafter
Ahtisaari plan).
87
The Ahtisaari plan foresaw comprehensive specific rights for minority
communities living in Kosovo, which later on would be enshrined into the Kosovo
Constitution. On June 2008, the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo entered
into force and with this document the rights of minority communities have been
recognized and all provisions of the Ahtisaari plan on minority community rights
were integrated into the Kosovo Constitution. The Kosovo Constitution depicts
Kosovo neither as a multiethnic state nor as a multinational/multicultural
state in Kymlickas terminology, but as a multiethnic society, consisting of
Albanians and other communities. Based on the Ahtisaari plan, approximately
forty laws have been promulgated in the Kosovo Assembly, guaranteeing high
standards in protecting minority communities in Kosovo. In this paper we will
examine the spirit and the germ of both Kosovo Constitution and respective
laws promulgated by the Kosovo Assembly, which entrench high standards in
protecting minority communities in Kosovo. However, in five years since Kosovo
statehood was declared, there has been no genuine effort to implement fully
and unconditionally minority community rights in Kosovo. I argue here that
minority rights were seen as a compromise in Kosovo. Faced with the multilevel
governance of international administration, Kosovo political leadership and
its institutions embraced the discourse of minority rights for compensation of
statehood, however, they neither deemed it as necessity to Kosovos democratic
infrastructure nor as an opportunity to improve ethnic relations in Kosovo.
In the sections below, I will review equality and cultural rights, representation
and self-government rights of minority communities living in Kosovo from
Kosovos legislation perspective. Then, I will examine shortcomings with regard
to implementation of such rights in the light of credible sources and last but
not least I will articulate a critique of the UN administration in Kosovo as its
minority rights policies seems to have meant simply addressing the demand
of Serb leaders for effective segregation. All other minority groups have been
effectively treated as second-class citizens.
88
87 For an account of the negotiations, see James Ker-Lindsay, Kosovo: The Path to Contested State-
hood in the Balkans (I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London-New York, 2009); Marc Weller, The Rambouillet
Conference On Kosovo, International Affairs, Vol. 75, Issue 2, 1999, pp. 211251; Mark Weller, Con-
tested Statehood: Kosovos Struggle for Independence (Oxford University Press, New York 2009);
For an account of the conflict in Kosovo, see Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (Yale University
Press, New Haven, 2002); Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998).
88 MRG, Minority Rights in Kosovo Under International Rule, by Clive Baldwin 2006, p.27.
3.1. Equality and Cultural Rights
Will Kymlicka points out that there is a close relationship between equality and
minority rights. Kymlickas starting point is that the state is not neutral between
various national groups/ The state is not arbitrary defender of the individual
human rights to its citizens regardless of their ethnicity, language, religion
and so on. Indeed, Kymlicka convincingly argues that states are not culturally-
blind, ethnically blind or religiously-blind, for states systematically privilege
the majority nation in certain fundamental waysfor example, the drawing of
internal boundaries; the language of schools, courts, and government services;
the choice of public holidays; and the division of legislative power between
central and local governments. All of these decisions can dramatically reduce the
political power and cultural viability of a national minority, while enhancing that
of the majority culture.
89
Therefore, Kymlicka proposes group-specific rights
regarding education, local autonomy, and language, in order to ensure that
national minorities are not disadvantaged in these decisions, thereby enabling
the minority, like the majority, to sustain a life of its own.
90
The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (Article 58) enables minority
communities to sustain their life and obliges institutions to adopt adequate
measures as may be necessary to promote, in all areas of economic, social, political
and cultural life, full and effective equality among members of communities. The
Constitution provides for positive rights and active measures, which will sustain
the distinctiveness of minorities per se. The chapter related to Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms, is a starting point for analyzing group-differentiated rights
for minority communities in Kosovo. This chapter guarantees the physical and
psychological integrity,
91
and furthermore, prohibits torture, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment
92
of every person in Kosovo.
Parallel to this, there is another specific chapter related to the Rights of
Communities and Their Members, which safeguards that persons belonging
to minority communities have the right to develop, foster and maintain the
attributes of their community, but also individually or as a group to receive
public education, to use their alphabet freely in relation to local and central
authorities, to have their personal names registered in their original form, to
have and manage their own media, to enjoy unhindered contact with persons in
any state, particularly with persons with whom they share a common cultural
heritage.
93
In respect to this, Kosovo authorities have extended the catalog
of these rights into various specific laws, such as: The Anti-discrimination
Press, 1995), p.51-52.
90 Ibid, p.52.
91 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Chapter II, Article 26.
92 ibid, Chapter II, Article 27.
93 ibid, Chapter II, Article 59.
81
Law;
94
Law on the Civil Service of the Republic of Kosovo;
95
The Law on the Use
Languages;
96
Law on Access to Official Documents;
97
The Law on Protection and
Promotion of the Rights of Communities and Their Members in Kosovo
98
; Law on
Official Holidays in the Republic of Kosovo
99
; Law on Local Self-Government
100
; and
the Cultural Heritage Law
101
.
Cultural rights of minority communities are also regulated with Kosovos
legislation. When Will Kymlicka addresses culture, he refers to a very specific sort
of culture, the societal cultural.
102
This is a culture which provides its members
with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including
social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing
both public and private spheres.
103
Similarly, Ulrich Schneckener (2004) argues
that cultural rights are those which allow group members to express freely,
preserve, and develop their cultural and linguistic heritage. This set of rights
includes: i) the right to maintain and develop ones own cultural identity; ii)
the right to information; iii) the right to public and private use of a minority
language; and, iv) the right to education in ones mother language.
104
Cultural rights, which are modeled by Kymlicka and Scheckener, are provided
explicitly by the Law on Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Communities
and Their Members in Kosovo. This is a very all-inclusive law which guarantees
a very wide scope of rights, such as right to culture (Article 5), the right to
language (Article 4), the right to identity (Article 2), the right to full and effective
equality, the right to media (6), and the right to education (Article 8).
105
Cultural
94 Law No.2004/ 3 The Anti-discrimination Law. Law approved by Kosovo Assembly on 19 February
2004.
95 Law No 03/L-149 On the Civil Service of the Republic of Kosovo. Law approved by Kosovo Assem-
bly on 15 May 2010.
96 Law No 02/L-37 On the Use Languages. Law approved by Kosovo Assembly on 27 July 2006.
97 Law No 2003/12 Law on Access to Official Documents. Law approved by Kosovo Assembly on 16
October 2003.
98 Law No. 03/L-047 On The Protection And Promotion Of The Rights Of Communities And Their
Members in Kosovo. Law approved by Kosovo Assembly on 13 March 2008.
99 Law No. O3/L-064 On Official Holidays in Republic of Kosovo. Law approved by Assembly, date 21
May 2008 and promulgated by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kosovo No. DL-025-
2008, date 15 June 2008.
100 Law No. O3/L-040 On Local Self Government. Law is approved by Assembly, date 20 February
2008.
101 Law No. 02/L 88 Cultural Heritage Law. Law approved by Assembly, date 09 October 2006.
102 In Liberalism, Community and Culture, the importance of cultural membership was ascribed to
a cultural community or cultural structure. In Multicultural Citizenship, the focus changes to
societal cultures. See more, Leighton McDonald, Regrouping in Defense of Minority Rights: Kym-
lickas Multicultural Citizenship, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2. 1997, p. 297.
Press, 1995), p.76.
104 Ulrich Schneckener, Models of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Politics of Recognition, in Ulrich Sch-
neckener & Stefan Wolfe eds. Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflict: Perspectives on Success and
Failures in Europe, Africa and Asia (C. Hurst & Co: London, 2004) p.24.
105 Law No. 03/L-047 On The Protection And Promotion Of The Rights Of Communities And Their
Members in Kosovo. Law approved by Kosovo Assembly on 13 March 2008.
rights in Kosovo have been provided at the same time by the Law on Official
Holidays in the Republic of Kosovo, wherein Kosovo has recognized the minority
communities holidays as official: a) Easter Monday (Serbian holiday); b) 23
April Day of Turks; c) 8 April Day of Roma; d) 15 February Day of Ashkalia; e) 28
September Day of Bosnians; f) 6 May Day of Gorans.
106
In addition, the Law on
the Use Languages guarantees cultural rights, which goes beyond rights which
are provided with the 1995 Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
in Europe (1995) and the 1998 Oslo Recommendations for Linguistic Rights of
National Minorities,
107
by establishing the Albanian and Serbian languages as
official languages and leaving room to other smaller minority communities to
establish their own language as official. Article 2.3 of the law states that: In
municipalities inhabited by a community whose mother tongue is not an official
language, and which constitutes at least five (5) percent of the total population
of the municipality, the language of the community shall have the status of an
official language in the municipality and shall be in equal use with the official
languages. Notwithstanding the foregoing, exceptionally, in Prizren Municipality
the Turkish language shall have the status of an official language.
108
By recalling on the values of tolerance, common life and the multi religious
character of Kosovo society, the Law on Freedom of Religion guarantees equal
rights and obligations to religious communities, without any discrimination
109
,
while there shall be no official religion. Regarding financial matters, the
law highlights that the religious communities in Kosovo are exempted from
obligation to pay taxes.
The Cultural Heritage Law legally regulates cultural heritage in Kosovo.
Within the scope of this law, cultural heritage includes Architectural heritage,
Archaeological heritage, Movable heritage and Spiritual heritage.
110
According to
this law, the archeological movable and immovable objects might be determined
under the so-called protective zones and areas, and archeological objects found
in Kosovo should be considered as the property of Kosovo. Furthermore, the
106 Law No.03/L-64 On Official Holidays in Republic of Kosovo, Article 2.1, k) Easter Monday (Serbian
holiday); Article 5, d) 23 April Day of Turks; e) 8 April Day of Roma; f) 15 February Day of Ashkalia;
g) 28 September Day of Bosnians; h) 6 May Day of Gorans.
107 For instance, the 1998 OSCE Oslo Recommendations, as for using of names, Article 3, states: In
areas inhabited by significant numbers of persons belonging to a national minority and when there
is sufficient demand, public authorities shall make provision for the display, also in the minority
language, of local names, street names and other topographical indications intended for the public.
Article 14 states: In areas inhabited by significant numbers of persons belonging to a national mi-
nority and when there is sufficient demand, public authorities shall make provision for the display,
also in the minority language, of local names, street names and other topographical indications
intended for the public. OSCE (1998), The Oslo Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights
of National Minorities & Explanatory Note. February 1998.
108 Law No 02/L-37 On the Use Languages. Law approved by Kosovo Assembly on 27 July 2006.
109 Law No. 02/L-31 On Freedom of Religion in Kosovo. Law approved by Assembly of Kosovo, 13 July
2006
110 Law No. 02/L-88 Cultural Heritage Law. Law approved by Assembly of Kosovo, 9 October 2006,
Article 7.1.5.
83
religious and cultural heritage has been guaranteed by the Ahtisaari plan. Annex
V of this plan unequivocally states that the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo
shall be afforded the protection and enjoyment of its rights, and those Serbian
cultural sites which are considered to have a significant meaning should be
provided with security by the Kosovo Police Force. Parallel to this, the Ahtisaari
plan selected a number of Serbian Orthodox Churches monasteries to be
protected under the so-called Protective Zones. There are forty-four Serbian
cultural, religious and historical sites which, according to the Ahtisaari plan, are
considered to have a special significance for Serbs in Kosovo, and which have
been protected under the so called Protected Zones.
111
3.2. Representation and self-government rights
The OSCE 1999 Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of
National Minorities points out that: Effective participation of national minorities
in public life is an essential component of a peaceful and democratic society.
Experience in Europe and elsewhere has shown that, in order to promote such
participation, governments often need to establish specific arrangements for
national minorities.
112
On the other hand, political science scholars argue that the
representation of minorities in a democratic process is decisive to maintaining
its functionality.
113
Western democratic countries have guaranteed seats for
minority community in order to safeguard their political representation. Ulrich
Schneckener has analyzed this very dimension of minority rights by highlighting
two pivotal elements: self-rule and representation of minorities. The scope of
rights included in this dimension of minority rights differs in different countries,
and this may include: i) political representation at local and national level; ii)
symmetrical representation in the civil services; iii) self-government bodies and
so forth. The above catalog of rights, in Schneckeners model, can be classified
as positive and negative rights; while positive rights are active measures which
will sustain the distinctiveness of minorities per se, negative rights protect the
existence of minorities from any central or local governmental policies, which
are established to endanger the minority existence per se.
Will Kymlicka argues, on the contrary, that while the traditional concern of
national minorities and ethnic groups has been with either self-government or
poly-ethnic rights, there has been increasing interest by these groups, as well as
111 Marti Ahtisaari, Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, UN doc S/2007/168
(26 March 2007), General Principles, Annex V, Religious and Cultural Heritage; 4.1.4. Protective
Zones for the following sites shall be defined by the following maps: Visoki Decani Monastery,
Decan/Decani; Pec Patriarchate, Peje/Pec; Gracanica Monastery, Prishtine/Pristine; Church of the
Presentation of Virgin, Lipjan/Lipjan; Devic Monastery, Skenderaj/Srbica; Gorioc Monastery, Is-
tog/Istok; Budisavi Monastery, Kline/Klina;Sokolica Monastery, Zvecan/Zvecan; Draganac Monas-
tery, Gjilan/Gnilan [.].
112 OSCE/HCMN, The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minori-
ties in Public Life & Explanatory Note. September 2009, p.7. Avaibale at http://www.osce.org/
hcnm/32240?download=true (Accessed 16 October 2013)
113 David Held, Models of Democracy (Polity Press, 2006).
84 NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014 A
other non-ethnic social groups, in the idea of special representation rights.
114

These special representation rights or, in Kymlickas terms, group-differentiated
rights, are guaranteed by Kosovos legal system. The Kosovo Constitution and
the Law On The Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Communities are the
two most important legal documents, which provide the realm for community
representation. Twenty of the one hundred twenty seats of the Kosovo Assembly
are guaranteed for representation of non-majority communities.
115
A permanent
Committee on Rights and Interests of Communities
116
is established within
Kosovos Assembly in order to guarantee the vital interests of communities,
as highlighted in Article 81 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, in the
process of lawmaking. There are eight laws through which the vital interests of
minority communities in Kosovo are guaranteed and none of these laws can be
submitted to a referendum.
The following laws require for their adoption, amendment or repeal both the
majority of the Assembly deputies present and voting and the majority of the
Assembly deputies present and voting holding seats reserved or guaranteed for
representatives of Communities that are not in the majority:
(1) Laws changing municipal boundaries, establishing or abolishing
municipalities, defining the scope of powers of municipalities and their
participation in inter municipal and cross-border relations;
(2) Laws implementing the rights of Communities and their members, other
than those set forth in the Constitution;
(3) Laws on the use of language;
(4) Laws on local elections;
(5) Laws on protection of cultural heritage;
(6) Laws on religious freedom or on agreements with religious communities;
(7) Laws on education;
(8) Laws on the use of symbols, such as community symbols, and on public
holidays.
117
Press, 1995), p.31-45.
116 ibid, Article 78. This committee is composed of one third (1/3) of members who represent the
group of deputies of the Assembly holding seats reserved or guaranteed for the Serbian Communi-
ty, one third (1/3) of members who represent the group of deputies of the Assembly holding seats
reserved or guaranteed for other communities that are not in the majority and one third (1/3) of
members from the majority community represented in the Assembly.
85
The Kosovo Government also guarantees the representation of communities at
its ministerial level. It is regulated that the Serb community will be represented
by one minister and one from the none-majority community, while the third
minister from the non-majority community might be appointed in the case that
Kosovos Government has more than twelve Ministries.
118
Under the auspices
of the President of Kosovo, according to the new Kosovo Constitution, the
Consultative Council for Communities (CCC) has been developed. The mandate
of this Council lies in the following areas:
i) Articulating of minority communities views with regards to public
policies of Kosovo institutions;
ii) Affording Kosovo institutions legislation at an early stage and having the
opportunity to give their inputs in respect to specific laws per se;
iii) Serving as a channel of inter-ethnic coordination and consultation;
iv) Enabling the representatives of minority communities in Kosovo in the
process of assessing the needs of minority communities in Kosovo.
119
At the judicial level, fifteen percent of the judges in the Supreme Court of Kosovo
belong to minority communities.
120
The Constitutional Court of Kosovo, as a final
authority in interpreting the Kosovo Constitution, is composed of seven Albanian
and two non-majority community members.
121
The Kosovo Judicial Council, as an
institution, which guarantees the impartiality of the judicial system in Kosovo, is
composed of four community experts out of thirteen members.
122
In addition, the
Kosovo Constitution guarantees the employment for minority communities in public
institutions, particularly in public owned enterprises and police services in the areas
inhabited by a respective community.
123
The Law on Civil Service of the Republic of
Kosovo issued in 2010 regulates that within the civil service in institutions of the
central level at least 10% of the positions are reserved for persons belonging to
communities that are not majority in Kosovo and who fulfill the specific employment
criteria.
124
Parallel to this, the right of representation for communities in Kosovo is ensured
at the local level.
125
Kosovos Law on Local Self-Government, which was adopted
three days after Kosovo declared its independence, highlights that in the case that
118 ibid, Article 96.
119 Law No. 03/L-047 On The Protection And Promotion Of The Rights Of Communities And Their Mem-
bers in Kosovo, Article 12.
121 ibid, Chapter VIII.
124 Law No 03/L-149 On the Civil Service of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 11. Law approved by Kosovo
Assembly on 15 May 2010.
125 Basic unit of self-government in the Kosovo territory is Municipality. See more: Law Nr. 03/L-040
Law On Local Self-Government, adopted on 20 February 2008, Chapter II, Article 4.1.
a minority community consists of at least ten percent of the overall municipal
population, they would have been ensured with the right of having their Deputy
Major for Communities.
126
To fully protect minority rights and interests, the above law has established the
Communities Committee. This Committee serves as a reviewer of the overall local
municipality policies and their compliance with the applicable law in Kosovo.
127
Based
on this law, some of the Kosovo municipalities have benefited in terms of enhancing
their competences in four areas: i) secondary health care; ii) higher education;
iii) culture and, iv) selection of higher police station commanders.
128
Most of these
enhanced competencies have been given to newly established Serb municipalities.
Hence, the law enhanced the competences in the municipalities of Mitrovic/
Mitrovica North, Graanic/Gracanica, Shtrpc/trpce, which are predominantly
inhabited by the Serb minority community in Kosovo.
Will Kymlicka claims that a self-government right implies some form of political
autonomy to ensure the full and free development of their culture and the best
interests of their people.
129
Ahtisaari proposed a sustainable system of local self-
government in Kosovo, which attempted to address the concerns of Kosovo Serbs.
This plan was incorporated in the Kosovos Law on Local Self-Government. With the
Ahtisaari Proposal, the 5+1 newly Serb majority municipalities (Graanic/Gracanica,
Ranillug/Ranilug, Partesh/Partes, Mitrovic/Mitrovica North, Klokot/Vrbovac and
Novbrd/Novo Brdo with its border extended) would have enhanced asymmetrical
competences for provisions of secondary health care, enhanced competences on
cultural affairs, including Serbian religious heritage within their municipalities, and
competence to appoint the Police Station Commanders. Mitrovica North in addition
would have had competences on higher education. The establishment of new Serb
municipalities through the decentralization process is considered one of the most
successful stories in Kosovo. The only Serb municipality, which is not established to
date, as foreseen by the Ahtisaari plan, is Mitrovica North. Mitrovica North remains
the most fragile territory in Kosovo due to lawlessness, organized crime, and the
persistent rejection of Kosovos authority by local Serbs. In March 2011, the UN
Assembly adopted the Resolution 64/298 through which the EU was obliged to
facilitate a technical and political dialog between Kosovo and Serbia, aiming through
this dialogue the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. One of the
topics addressed in this dialogue was the normalization through rule of law and free
and fair elections in Mitrovica North and other northern Serb municipalities.
However, with regards to the aforementioned Kosovo legal framework, I
Press, 1995), p.27.
87
emphasize two aspects. The first aspect is related to the lack of the implementation
of these laws. International and local NGOs, such as Minority Rights Group
International, Kosovo Ombudsperson, EU Commission progress reports on
Kosovo, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Kosovo, Humanitarian
Law Center have concluded in their reports that most of these laws remain
only a good paper, and most of them have not been implemented. For instance,
the Law on Ant-Discrimination and Law on Use of Languages are the two most
advanced laws in Southeast European region, but still no implementation
mechanism has been created in order to make them applicable for the Kosovo
minority communities. The second aspect of the legal framework is a political
one. UNMIK policy of minority rights have been equated with the policy of dealing
with Serbs, respectively reducing the minority rights perspective towards other
minority community in Kosovo. This paper will argue that the UNMIK approach
to minority communities in Kosovo was flawed.
4. Shortcomings of the enforcement of minority
rights in Kosovo
The 2010 EU Commission Progress report, which measures the state of overall
progress in Kosovo, does not speak in terms of minorities, but in terms of human
rights. Limited progress with regard to enforcement of human rights is noted in
their report; although the report underlines that Kosovo has adopted the strategy
and action plan for human rights (2009 - 2011). The main critique addressed
in this report is that human rights mechanisms in Kosovo are ineffective both
at central and local levels, the lack of funding for human rights units and poor
coordination between local and national authorities to enhance awareness on
human rights. The report concludes that both the institutional framework and
the financial commitment of Kosovo are inappropriate for the implementation
of the human rights legislation. Ensuring full respect for human rights is a key
European Partnership priority,
130
is mentioned in this report.
Similarly, the annul reports of the Ombudsperson, which measure the state of
human rights protection in the Republic of Kosovo, have depicted that the state
of human rights has progressed in Kosovo. However, the Ombudsperson reports
from 2009 until 2012 have not devoted even a particular section on minority
rights. For the first time, in 2012, the annual report of the Ombudsperson
included a section for the right of communities and their members as guaranteed
by Article 59 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. This report highlights
progress with regards to returning refugees in Kosovo, houses reconstruction
of Serbian communities in Kosovo, plan and programs of education in Serbian
language provided by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Serbia etc.
130 Kosovo 2010 Progress Report, SEC (2010) 1329, Brussels, 9 November 2010, p.13.
While addressing other minorities, such as Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptian (RAE)
communities, this report underlines that these communities face a certain scale
of discrimination and poverty, although in 2009, the Government of Kosovo
has adopted the Strategy for integration of RAE communities. Parallel to this,
forceful deportation of RAE communities from Western countries is considered
a problem. The same report draws attention on the loss of confidence and lack
of awareness of Kosovos institutions to implement the law. During its reporting
period in 2011, the Ombudsperson had registered 1453 potential cases of
human rights violation, however, most of the recommendations provided have
not been considered.
Given that the implementation of the law is the main premise of functioning of
the legal State, in the Republic of Kosovo, despite the positive efforts, the non-
implementation of the law is a main indicator of loss of confidence of the citizens
in the State authorities whose legal and constitutional obligation is to implement
the law.
131
Knut Vollebaek, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, tackling the
problems of minority rights in Kosovo, highlight[ed] the urgency and importance
of ensuring that minority rights are protected and implemented in Kosovos
evolving democratic society. Combining a legal and economic perspective,
Vollebaek recognizes the fact that without addressing the inter-ethnic tensions,
Kosovo cannot secure long term economic development through investments
when it has shown that inter-ethnic conflict is well and truly a thing of the past.
132
The 2011 EU Commission Progress report in Kosovo marks some progress in
respect to the minority protection, such as decentralization. However, it marks
limited progress to education of minority communities. The main critique in
respect to education is the lack of school textbooks and curricula in the mother
tongue of the Turkish, Bosniak and Roma communities. Similarly, this report
highlights the problem of a lack of civil registration for Roma, Ashkalia and
Egyptian communities in Kosovo and the presence of Roma camps in northern
part of Kosovo, especially Osterode camp.
133
In general, the enforcement of
minority rights remains one the largest challenges in Kosovo.
Another matter of concern for minority communities remains the enforcement
of legislation on proportional representation and employment of communities
at public enterprises and institutions, at central and local institutions. The 2013
OSCE report on representation of communities in the civil service in Kosovo
accentuates the fact that the Law On the Civil Service of the Republic of Kosovo is
131 Ombudsperson Kosovo, Eleven Annual Report 2011, addressing the Assembly of Kosovo,
Prishtina, 13 July 2012, p. 8. Available at http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/repository/
docs/48705_Raporti%202011%20ANGLISHT.pdf (10 October 2013).
132 OSCE, Address on Minority Rights in Kosovo, by Knut Vollebaek, Humanitarian Law Centre Confer-
ence on Minority Rights in Practice. Pristina, Kosovo, 11 September 2008, p.3.
133 Kosovo 2011 Progress Report, SEC (2011) 1207, Brussels, 12 October 2011, p.14-16.
89
not implemented and minority communities continue to be underrepresented
in the civil service in Kosovo. The minimum of 10 percent of the workforce for
member of communities at the central level is not implemented. The data of this
report covers 29 municipalities and 15 central-level institutions. This report finds
that communities at the central level occupy approximately eight per cent of civil
services position, while Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptian continue to be the most under-
represented communities at the central level. The latter communities, including
Gorani and Turks continue to be under-represented at the municipal level, while
Kosovo Albanians, Serbs and Bosniaks were represented proportionally or over-
represented in those municipalities where they constituted a numerical minority.
134
Data provided by the Ministry of Public Administration on the overall representation
of minority communities at the central level institutions in Kosovo indicates that
only 0.12 per cent were Kosovo Ashkali, 1.6 per cent were Kosovo Bosniak, 0.11
per cent were Kosovo Egyptian, 0.17 per cent were Kosovo Gorani, 0.22 per cent
were Kosovo Roma, 4.34 per cent were Kosovo Serb and 1.29 per cent were Kosovo
Turk..
135
These data do not match with the 2011 census organized in Kosovo. These
descriptive statistics prove that the Law On the Civil Service of the Republic of Kosovo
is not implemented and minority communities continue to be underrepresented in
the civil service in Kosovo.
5. Segregation as a means to minority protection in Kosovo
The largest minority community in Kosovo, the Serbs, has a kin-state, which most
of Kosovo Albanians consider a threat of Kosovo, due to war crimes and atrocities
committed by Serbian governmental forces to Kosovo Albanians. A decade since
1999, the Serbian community in Kosovo particularly in the northern part of Kosovo
bordering Serbia, with the Serbian governments support, have created a parallel
system of administration, health and education, whose ultimate aim was to impede
the international endeavor of building a multiethnic society in Kosovo by separating
Serbs, especially those in northern Kosovo, from the rest of Kosovos society.
The Serbian governments policy towards Kosovo Serbs can be traced back and
distinguished in two important periods. Thus, Serbias government has pursed two
policies with regard to Kosovo Serbs. The first one covers the period from 1999-
2008, and focused on creating alternative authorities on administration, health, and
education (so-called enclaves) and, by doing this, impeding the political order of
Kosovos authorities and the UNMIK administration in Kosovo.
The first policy had twofold aims: showing the inability of Kosovos authorities
to govern with Kosovo territory and the inability of UNMIK administration to
134 OSCE, Representation of Communities in the Civil Service in Kosovo, Pristine, February 2013, p. 4.
135 ibid, p. 7.
integrate Serbs in Kosovo.
136
The second policy of the Serbian government towards
Kosovo Serbs, from 2008 onwards, is related to the era of post-independence
Kosovo, and it is mainly focused on undermining the Kosovo independence by
isolating the Kosovo Serbs from Kosovos institutions. While much of the Serbian
government success has been achieved in respect to this policy in the northern
part of Kosovo where Serbs remain largely untouchable by Kosovos authority,
the Serbs in the southern part of Kosovo have shown incentives of integration
into the Kosovo political system.
137
Despite this, the Serbian government plan
of isolating Kosovo Serbs of the four northern municipalities (Leposavic, Zubin
Potok, Zvecan and Northern Mitrovica), from Kosovo authorities has prevailed.
And this prevalent isolationist policy overlapped with the UNMIK policy of ethnic
segregation as a tool of ethnic conflict regulation in Kosovo. The deployment
of EULEX as the biggest EU mission to settle rule of law in Kosovo have not
succeeded to date to integrate and accommodate northerner Serbs into Kosovo
institutions.
Clive Baldwin has criticized the segregation as way to peace of international
community in Kosovo. While speaking about the language of segregation as an
inevitable language of international community in Kosovo, Baldwin stressed
the stronger degree of segregation in Kosovo compared to other European
countries.
138
Despite the fact that minority rights promote integrated societies, and despite
the fact that conflict prevention requires integrated societies, the international
community in Kosovo has, time and again, reinforced the segregation that it
allowed to develop in 1999. In fact, dealing with minority issues seems to have
meant simply addressing the demand of Serb leaders for effective segregation.
All other minority groups have been effectively treated as second class.
139
Paradoxically, the application of minority rights appeared as a compromise
between the demands of Kosovo Albanians to establish their statehood and
demands of Kosovo Serbs to be fully protected within Kosovos society. The
shortcoming of this approach is that minority rights were seen as solution
to ethnic conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, but not as the
appropriate application of defensible moral principle. Kymlicka and Opalski
136 UNMIK Reg. 1999/1, Chapter 12, The exercise of the responsibilities of the Provisional Institu-
tions of Self-Government under this Constitutional Framework shall not affect or diminish the au-
thority of the SRSG to ensure full implementation of UNSCR 1244(1999), including overseeing the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, its officials and its agencies, and taking appropriate
measures whenever their actions are inconsistent with UNSCR 1244(1999) or this Constitutional
Framework. Available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg09-01.htm (13 Oc-
tober 2013).
137 For instance, the biggest Serbian enclave, in the center of Kosovo, Gracanica, is less isolated com-
pared with other Serbian dominated areas. See, ICG, Serbs Integration in Kosovo, Report No. 200,
May 2009, p. 2-7.
138 MRG, Five Essential Elements for a Long-term Solution in Kosovo, December 2007, p.2.
139 MRG, Minority Rights in Kosovo Under International Rule, by Clive Baldin 2006, p.27.
91
(2001) argue that proposals for resolving ethnic conflicts almost always
appear as special pleading on behalf of this or that minority, rather than as the
appropriate application of defensible moral principles.
140
The application of
defensible moral principles as general principles to minority rights were not
applicable to other small, vulnerable minorities in Kosovo, who in addition had
no kin-state, such as Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptian.
Minority communities, such as Roma, Ashkalia and Egytipian, who face large-
scale discrimination and poverty, have been treated as second-class citizens.
Although the Government of Kosovo has adopted a Strategy for Integration
of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities in Kosovo 2009 2015,
141
the
progress towards implementing this strategy is low and financial commitment
is almost inexistent. The main actors at play are Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo
Serbs who continue to shape the current domestic politics in Kosovo.
The leadership of ethnic Albanians and the Kosovo Serbs has encouraged
ethnicization of politics as a rational self-interest approach in order to present
themselves as the real defenders of their ethnic identity, and thereby legitimizing
the preservation of their political power.
142
Moreover, UNMIKs failure to address
the real needs of the Kosovo citizens was justified by the lack of consensus and
cooperation among ethnic minority communities in Kosovo. UNMIK was seeking
a cultural and ethnic compromise, while promoting civic identity in Kosovo.
This line of arguments, in all three cases, examines the inability of the involved
stakeholders within the Kosovo territory to address and politically solve the
structural problems related to the political and economic rights of citizens living
in Kosovo. Instead of solving the longstanding problems, the political agenda in
Kosovo focuses on ethnicity and communities.
One of the largest flaws of the UN administration in Kosovo was conceptualizing
Albanians and Serbs through an essentialist perspective of ethnicity. Rather than
seeing ethnicity as a constructed identity and situational, which presupposes
the fluidity of ethnicity, and the possibility of these groups to interact with each
other, the UN administration employed the premordialist and essentialist
perspective and saw Albanians and Serbs as two antagonist groups with some
bundle of unchanging cultural traits, to put into Barths words
143
, whom you can
140 Will Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, Introduction, in Will Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, Can Liberal Plural-
ism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2001), p.1.
141 See, Strategy for the Integration of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities in the Republic of
Kosovo 2009 2015, Office of Prime Minister, December 2008.
142 For the ethno-accentuation in post conflict societies see, in particular, Steven Gunnar Simonsen
Ethnic Divisions in Post-conflict Institution-building, (Security Dialog 2005) p. 299. [L]ead-
ers may themselves be among those who actively encouraged an ethnicization of conflict, and it
remains in their rational self-interest to present themselves as representatives and defenders of
their particular ethnic groups.
143 Quoted in Stephen May, Tariq Modood, and Judith Squires, Ethnicity, nationalism, and minority
rights: charting the disciplinary debates, in Stephen May, Tariq Modood, and Judith Squires (ed.),
Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Minority Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.9.
manage through one and only strategy by keeping them physically separated
from each other. UNMIK failed to see ethnic groups as processual, dynamic and
contextually fluctuating, contrary to what Roger Brubaker (2004) stated:
Ethnicity, race, and nation should be conceptualized not as substances or things
or entities or organisms or collective individuals as the imagery of discrete,
concrete, tangible, bounded, and enduring groups encourages us to do but
rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated terms.
This means thinking of ethnicity, race, and nation not in terms of substantial
groups or entities but in terms of practical categories, cultural idiom, cognitive
schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines institutional forms, political
projects, and contingent events. It means thinking of ethnicization, racialization,
and nationalization as political, social, cultural, and psychological processes.
And it means taking as a basic analytical category not the group as an entity
but groupness as a contextually fluctuating conceptual variable.
144
Fourteen years since international deployment in Kosovo, antagonist positions
between substantial groups Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs are still
predominant. The inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo continue to be seen through
a security perspective and Kosovo Serbs, especially those in the northern part
of Kosovo, continue to be perceived as a threat to the security of the new state.
Will Kymlica has depicted circumstances where a specific group is received as
disloyal and as a threat to the security of the state.
In particular, states will not accommodate groups which are seen as likely to
collaborate with foreign enemies[...]minority groups are often seen as a kind of
fifth column, likely to be working for the enemy. This is particularly a concern
where the minority is related to a neighbouring state by ethnicity or religion,
so the neighbouring state claims the right to intervene to protect its minority.
Minority groups are seen rightly or wrongly as allies or collaborators with
external powers that have historically oppressed the majority group.
145
Furthermore, Kymlicka argues that claims for minority rights should not be
seen as evidence that minorities have become aggressive, but as defensive
response to the assertion of majority nation-building, which minorities might
considered as actual or perceived injustice. In the words of Kymlicka: virtually
the only reference to justice comes in the form of insisting that minorities pay
for the historic injustices that the majority has suffered, and which the minority
is perceived to be responsible for. Justice means that the majority should be
compensated for the historic wrongs it has suffered; it does not mean that the
state should seek to ensure a fairer distribution of power, rights, and resources
144 Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without groups, in Stephen May, Tariq Modood, and Judith Squires
(ed.), Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Minority Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.53-54.
145 Will Kymlikca, Multiculturalism and Minority Rights: West and East, Journal on Ethnopolitics and
Minority Issues in Europe, Issue 4/2002, p.19. See, also, Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Oddysess:
Navigating New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 118.
93
between majority and minority.
146
However, in the process of nation and state-
building, loyalty is not secured by suppressing minority rights, but by enabling
minorities to enjoy self-government rights. Kymlicka agrees with Donald
Horowitz (2000) that early and generous devolution of power prevents ethnic
separatism.
147
6. The way ahead
On 10 September 2012, the formal supervision of Kosovos independence by the
International Civilian Office, which was created by the Ahtisaari plan to oversee
the post-independence commitments of Kosovos institutions towards minority
communities, ended with the justification that much of the Ahtisaari plan was
implemented in Kosovo.
148
Despite significant progress reached in Kosovo in
terms of accommodation of minority community rights in the southern and
eastern part of Kosovo, especially with a successful decentralization process
and the establishment of newly Serb majority municipalities in the southern and
eastern part of Kosovo with enhanced competencies, such as Gracanica, Ranilug,
Partes, Klokot Novo Brdo, the execution of Ahtisaari plan in the northern part of
Kosovo, and the establishment of Mitrovica North as new municipality failed. To
date, northern Kosovo Serbs do not feel bound to the Ahtisaari plan.
Recent negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia, which begun in 2011,
address the needs of Serbs living in the northern part of Kosovo, who have
not supported the nation and state-building processes in Kosovo, with further
devolution of power and group-differentiated rights from Prishtina towards
Serbs in northern Kosovo. In order for Kosovo to accommodate Kosovo Serbs
living in the northern part of Kosovo, and to see this community not as a fifth
column or enemy of the state and to further normalize the relations between
the authorities in Prishtina and Serbs in the north, a new process of technical
and political dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia for the normalization of their
mutual relations in undergoing. Serbia does not recognize the independence of
Kosovo and both countries relations remain in stalemate. In March 2011, the
UN Assembly adopted the Resolution 64/298 through which the EU was obliged
to facilitate a technical and political dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, aiming
through this dialogue the normalization of the relations between Kosovo and
Serbia. From 2011 to date, several technical agreements and conclusions were
reached between the two countries, including agreements on integrated border
146 Will Kymlicka, Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, in Will Kymlicka,
Magda Opalski, Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic (ed.) (Ox-
ford University Press, 2001), p.67.
147 ibid, p.64.
148 ICG, Setting Kosovo Free: Remaining Challenges, Europe Report N218 10 September 2012, p.1.
See also Peter Feith, State Building and Exit: The International Civilian Office and Kosovos Super-
vised Independence 2008-2012 (ICO, Pristina, Kosovo, December 2012), Chapter X, p.129.
management, university diploma, custom stamps, free trade, registry books,
cadastral registry etc.
On 19 April 2013, Kosovo and Serbia reached a 15-point ground-breaking
agreement
149
, and this agreement grants special autonomy to the Association
of Serb Municipalities in exchange of dismantling the Serb parallel structures in
the north. Similarly, with new reached agreements, northern Kosovo Serbs from
the municipalities of Mitrovica North, Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposovic would
have a District Court and a regional police commander. This commander, as is
underlined in the agreement, has to belong to the Serb community. This agreement
is meant to unlock the EU integration of both Kosovo and Serbia.
150
The main
critique of this agreement is that it could endanger the multiethnic character of
Kosovos society and some of the points in the agreement contradict the spirit
and the germ of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. The Vetevendosja
movement articulated this position through his leader Albin Kurti as follows:
the agreement with Serbia had totally suspended the state-building of Kosovo.
Instead of state-building, we have an Association of Serbian municipalities.
151

However, beyond this debate, the agreement aims to accommodate and integrate
northern Serbs into Kosovos institutions through free and fair elections, which
will be held in November 2013. The implementation of this agreement could
contribute to the normalization of the relations between Kosovo and Serbia,
on one hand, and Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, on the other hand. The
normalization of the relations between Kosovo and Serbia would immensely
affect the process of integration of the Serb community into Kosovos society.
CONCLUSION
Although the political leadership has adopted the discourse of minority rights,
particularly as a result of the protracted international presence in Kosovo, the
willingness to fully and unconditionally implement minority rights in Kosovo is
unsatisfactory. Te claims for minority rights were perceived as aggressive tendencies
towards institutions and later on, towards the newly independent state of Kosovo.
Antagonist relations between Kosovo and Serbia shaped the treatment of minorities
in Kosovo, especially Serbs. Te need for de-securitization of ethnic relations remains
immanent in Kosovo. Tis paradigm that the Kosovo Serbs should pay for the historic
149 Bojana Barlovac, Kosovo and Serbia Reach Historic Deal in Brussels, BIRN, Belgrade, 19 April
2013. Available at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-and-serbia-may-seal-eu-
deal (Accessed 16 October 2013).
150 Serbia and Kosovo: A breakthrough at last, The Economist, 20 April 2013. Available at http://
www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/04/serbia-and-kosovo-0 (Accessed 16 Oc-
tober 2013).
151 Edona Peci, Kosovo Nationalists to Rally Against Serbia Deal, Balkan Insight, 26 June 2013. Avail-
able at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/opposition-questiones-pristina-s-impact-on-
local-election-date (Accessed 16 October 2013).
95
injustice that the Kosovo Albanians had sufered, in particular during the last decade,
neglects that the core of the confict in Kosovo was not between Kosovo Serbs and
Kosovo Albanians, but between Kosovo Albanians and Serbian authorities, which had
employed all available coercive strategies to violate basic human rights of Albanians
in Kosovo. Kosovo authorities should be cautious not to treat their Serbian minority
the same way the Serbian authorities treated the Albanian minority before. As a policy
implication, I suggest that the authorities in Kosovo support a fair distribution of
rights and resources among all minority communities in Kosovo, including the Serbs.
Tis signifcantly increases the legitimation of Kosovos still contended sovereignty.
Furthermore, in all parts of Kosovo, much remains to be done in terms of
implementing the Ahtisaari provisions. Serb parallel structures in the northern
part of Kosovo should be abandoned and free and legitimate institutions through
free and fair elections should be established. Provisions and rights, which
are guaranteed by Kosovos legislation on bi-lingual language, proportional
representation of minority communities at public enterprises and public
institution, dignified return for displaced persons and anti-discrimination, have
to be enforced in Kosovo.
However, several obstacles have contributed to not fully enforce minority rights
in Kosovo, which need to be addressed in the near future: a) the contestation of
Kosovo statehood by local Serbs, especially those living in northern Kosovo; b)
the lack of political will of the political leadership in Kosovo to enforce minority
rights and overcome the ethnocentric discourse; c) the war crimes and genuine
reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs; d) the lack of normalization of the
relations between Kosovo and Serbia; e) the lack of sufficient funding to enforce
positive measures to implement minority rights in Kosovo. Without addressing
these challenges, no genuine implementation of minority rights in Kosovo is
possible.
In order to fully embrace minority rights in Kosovo, pro-active involvement
and commitment of Kosovos political leadership to minority communities is
substantial, because neither a sustainable democracy nor effective institution
building is possible without minority protection in Kosovo. Minority rights
should not be regarded as an imposed policy to meet international standards but
as a window of opportunity allowing to consolidate a fair and just democratic
society in Kosovo.
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101
Fmijt n pun dhe n rrug Anton K. Berishaj
Anton K. Berishaj
Interpretim sociologjik i hulumtimit empirik
152
:
Fmijt n pun
153
dhe n rrug
Abstrakt
152 Pr hir t korrektsis ndaj lexuesit t nderuar, theksoj se ky hulumtim i prkrahur nga Qendra
pr Mbrojtjen e Grave dhe Fmijve (QMGF), n Prishtin dhe pr shkak t rrethanave n kt
OJQ ka pritur nj koh m t gjat q t publikohet.T dhnat q i ofron hulumtimi nga prizmi i
shifrave mbase mund t ken ndryshuar. Poashtu, edhe institucionet prkatse kan br m
shum n parandalimin e ksaj dukurie, mirpo ajo q sht me interes pr analizn sociologjike
t tij, fenomeni si i till, ka vazhduar t mbijetoj masat dhe zrin e ndrgjegjes ton (A.B.)
153 Kosova e ka pranuar prkufizimin fmij ashtu si sht n Konventn Universale pr t Drejtat
e Fmijve: do qenie njerzore nn moshn tetmbdhjet vje. Pun e fmijve mund t prku-
fizohet si pun q dmton mirqenien e fmijs dhe pengon edukimin, zhvillimin dhe jetn e tij/
saj t ardhshme. Puna e fmijve sht pun e cila me natyrn ose mnyrn sesi zhvillohet, dm-
ton, abuzon dhe shfrytzon fmijn dhe i mohon fmijs t drejtn pr arsim. Aspektet kryesore
q mund t dmtojn fmijn prfshijn: a) ort e gjata n pun, b) ngacmimet fizike, morale dhe
psikologjike q i shkaktohen fmijs, c) pamundsia pr t ndjekur shkolln dhe pr t gzuar t
drejtn pr rekreacion. N t kundrt,puna e lejuar pr fmijt prdoret pr t prshkruar pjes-
marrjen e fmijs n aktivitete ekonomike jo t dmshme pr shndetin dhe zhvillimin e fmijs,
dhe veanrisht q nuk e pengojn fmijn q t ndjek shkolln dhe t luaj. N prputhje me
Konventn Nr 138 t ILO-s pr Moshn Minimale t Punsimit, Ligji Themelor i Puns n Kosov
ndalon punn e fmijve nn moshn 15 vje, me qllim q ata t ken mundsi t ndjekin arsimin
e detyruar. Mosha 18 vje sht prcaktuar pr futjen n punsim t rrezikshm.
N t gjitha shoqrit, qofshin ato t
zhvilluara apo paraindustriale, (diku m
shum e diku m pak), fmijt paraqiten si
akter aktiv t krijimit t t ardhurave pr
familje. Vendet e bots perndimore, fuqin
puntore t fmijve, kryesisht e shfrytzojn
n ekonomin sherbyese (ndihmskamerier,
enlars, pastrues t veturave, etj), ose n
pun t ndryshme n rrug ( shits t ndonj
malli t vlers s vogl, si jan cigaret,
shkrepset, amakzt, etj).
Pr fmijt n rrug dhe pun, n bot sht
folur dhe shkruar shum. Mirpo, te ne, m
shum sht folur sesa shkruar. Megjithat,
inkurajon fakti se viteve t fundit jo vetm
Ministria e Puns dhe Mirqenies Sociale, por
edhe sektori i shoqris civile ka shprehur
interesim t shtuar pr kt dukuri. (Koh
m par, MPMS, qiti n drit disa publikime
vrtet modeste pr nga mostra, por mjaft
t ngjeshura n interpretimin e procesit t
prfshirjes s fmijve n pun, n Kosov),
mirpo, gjer tani, interesimi nuk kalon prtej
konstatimit dhe regjistrimit t ksaj dukurie,
ose s paku nuk vrehet efekti i tyre. Mungojn
masat konkrete dhe efikase pr ngushtimin e
hapsirs s shfrytzimit t fmijve qoft
nga familjart, qoft nga rrjete t organizuara
kriminale. Kjo prshtypje krijohet edhe nga t
vrejturit e rendomt, n rrugt dhe kafenet
e qendrave tona. Fmijt vazhdojn t bredhin
gjer n ort e vona si lyps apo shits.
Historiku i shfrytzimit t fmijve si fuqi
puntore sht i gjat. Crom Alternative
News, n (Investigative journalism and
useful articles on various topics, 03.08.2013),
na prkujton se puna e fmijve ishte
komponent kye q e mundsoi suksesin e
102 NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014 KDU 316.053.51.6 (496.51) | 364.053.41.6 (496.51) | 343.627 (496.51)
Nj retrospektiv historike jo shum e lasht - dshmon se dukuria e
prfshirjes s fmijve me procesin e puns n shum vende t bots, ka qen
e zakonshme. Kjo dukuri, n kohn e sotme mund t jet modifikuar, sidomos
n aspektin e humanizimit t ambientit fizik t puns pr fmij, por fmijt,
gjithandej bots vazhdojn t jen objekt shfrytzimi jo vetm n pun fizike.
N t gjitha shoqrit, qofshin ato t zhvilluara apo paraindustriale, (diku
m shum e diku m pak), fmijt paraqiten si akter aktiv t krijimit t t
ardhurave pr familje. Vendet e bots perndimore, fuqin puntore t fmijve,
kryesisht e shfrytzojn n ekonomin sherbyese (ndihmskamerier, enlars,
pastrues t veturave, etj), ose n pun t ndryshme n rrug ( shits t ndonj
revolucionit industrial anglez, konstatim ky
q doli nga hulumtimi i profesores s Oxfordit,
Jane Humphries.Vlersimet e saj tregojn se n
fillim t shek.XIX, n Britanin e Madhe kishte
mbi 1 milion fmij puntor, duke prfshi
ktu edhe 350 000 t mitur t moshs prej
7-10 vjet, q krejt s bashku prbnin rreth
15% t fuqis s gjithmbarshme puntore
n vend. Mirpo, duke marrur parasysh
faktin se puna e fmijve ishte nj dukuri e
zakonshme n t kaluarn, fakti i zbuluar
nga J. Humphries nuk paraqet ndonj befasi.
Befasi sht se fuqia robruese e fmijve ishte
factor ky i suskesit t revolucionit.
Prve puns s fmijve, lypsia sht ndr
fenomenet q n esenc vetm me disa veori
dallon nga puna. Lypsia, n versionin m
t reduktuar definohet si: form e krijimit
t dobis materiale duke e shfrytzuar
gadishmrin e njerzve pr mshirim ndaj
atyre q e ushtrojn kt aktivitet. Nga kjo
shpesh rezulton keqtrajtimi q shprehet
prmes krimit t organizuar dhe eksploatimi
i atyre q mirren me kt, e sidomos fmijve.
N ambientet urbane t Kosovs, masovizimi
i dukuris s fmijve n pun dhe n rrug,
prkon me krizn politike t viteve 90-ta
dhe me luftn. Prndryshe, si u tha m lart,
pr mjediset rurale kosovare, kjo dukuri ka
qen dhe mbetet nj praktik e rndomt.
Fmijt, tradicionalisht kan paraqitur fuqin
puntore ndihmse prkrah prindrve apo
antarve tjer t familjes. Mirpo, zakonisht,
punt q kryenin ata ishin pun m t lehta
dhe t prballueshme pr moshn dhe fuqin
e tyre fizike. Ktu kemi parasysh punt n
blegtori, n mbledhjen e t lashtave, pemve,
perimeve e npr qendrat urbane edhe
si shegrt (nxns) n zejtari etj. Mirpo,
natyra, forma, qllimi dhe prmbajtja e
angazhimit t tyre, n rrethana dhe kushte te
reja kosovare, ndryshon dukshm .
Nga lista e gjer e shkaqeve t ofruara n
hulumtim si nxits t angazhimit t fmijve
n kryerjen e punve fmijt dhe prindrit
e tyre i veojn shkaqet ekonomike dhe
sociale. Vetm nj prqindje e vogl e fmijve
deklaron se kt e bjn pr t siguruar
para xhepi pr vete. Mirpo, pavarsisht
nga arsyet, dukuria si e atill krkon nj
trajtim serioz dhe t vendosur nga fakrort
relevant shoqror. Ekzistenca e familjeve dhe
individve n shoqri, nuk guxon t trajtohet
si shtje e tyre dhe aq m pak e fmijve.
Dukuria e fmijve n pun dhe n rrug
nuk duron qasje dhe trajtim t nj kategorie
t inkriminuar, ose si pjestar t shoqris
q manifestojn prirje pr sjellje devijante.
Prkundrazi. Atyre u duhet prkrahja dhe
ndihma e tr shoqris, pasi q vet fakti se
nj dhjetvjear shtyn karrocn plot mall
nga tregu i gjelbr, e nuk merret me hajni
ose lypsi, vetvetiu flet pr nj brum t
shndosh edukativ, i cili i ekspozohet forms
s socializimitq n rrethana t rrezikimit
permanent mund t marr konotacion
destruktiv.
103
malli t vlers s vogl, si jan cigaret, shkrepset, amakzt, etj). Mirpo,
sht me rndsi t nnvizohet lidhur me kt dukuri planetare, se pr shkak t
ndalesave t rrepta ligjore, fmijt prfshihen me pun ekskluzivisht n sektorin
privat, ekonomizimin e imt, n biznes t vogl madje q kryesisht i prket
ekonomis terciare.
Pr fmijt n rrug dhe pun, n bot sht folur dhe shkruar shum. Mirpo,
te ne, m shum sht folur sesa shkruar. Megjithat, inkurajon fakti se viteve
t fundit jo vetm Ministria e Puns dhe Mirqenies Sociale, por edhe sektori
i shoqris civile ka shprehur interesim t shtuar pr kt dukuri. (Koh m
par, MPMS, qiti n drit disa publikime vrtet modeste pr nga mostra, por
mjaft t ngjeshura n interpretimin e procesit t prfshirjes s fmijve n pun,
n Kosov), mirpo, gjer tani, interesimi nuk kalon prtej konstatimit dhe
regjistrimit t ksaj dukurie, ose s paku nuk vrehet efekti i tyre. Mungojn
masat konkrete dhe efikase pr ngushtimin e hapsirs s shfrytzimit t
fmijve qoft nga familjart, qoft nga rrjete t organizuara kriminale. Kjo
prshtypje krijohet edhe nga t vrejturit e rendomt, n rrugt dhe kafenet
e qendrave tona. Fmijt vazhdojn t bredhin gjer n ort e vona si lyps apo
shits.
N 11-vjetorin e Konvents s Organizats Ndrkombtare t puns (ILO) nr.182,
t ciln gjer tani e kan nnshkruar 182 vende, e sipas shnimeve zyrtare jan
regjistruar miliona fmij t cilt kan pasur dobi nga kjo konvent meq jan
shptuar nga robria, fitohet prshtypja se u ngjall aktiviteti parandalues i
dukuris s puns dhe lypsis s fmijve gjithandej bots. Nj komenti n Radio
Evropae lir, CET, e shtun 13 korrik 2013), se gjrat n kt drejtim kan
lvizur nga vendi, jo vetm pr shkak t aktualizimeve t zakonshme n vigjile t
prvjetoreve e prforcon kt bindje.
Megjithat, Juan Somavia, drejtor general i ILO-s, ngadalsoi optimizmin duke
manifestuar nj dshprim pr ritmin e ngadalsuar t ballafaqimit me kt
problem, pasiq si pohon ai 215 milion fmij kryejn pun t rnda pr t
mbijetuar. Ndr problemet q u theksuan si t rndsishme q kan pasur efekt
pozitiv n zbutjen e ktij problem sht sigurimi i shkollimit fillor falas, ndalimi i
formave m t kqia t puns s nj numri t fmijve dhe sigurimin e integrimit
t tyre n shoqri.
Historiku i shfrytzimit t fmijve si fuqi puntore sht i gjat. Crom
Alternative News, n (Investigative journalism and useful articles on various
topics, 03.08.2013), na prkujton se puna e fmijve ishte komponent kye q
e mundsoi suksesin e revolucionit industrial anglez, konstatim ky q doli nga
hulumtimi i profesores s Oxfordit, Jane Humphries.Vlersimet e saj tregojn se
n fillim t shek.XIX, n Britanin e Madhe kishte mbi 1 milion fmij puntor,
duke prfshi ktu edhe 350 000 t mitur t moshs prej 7-10 vjet, q krejt
s bashku prbnin rreth 15% t fuqis s gjithmbarshme puntore n vend.
Mirpo, duke marrur parasysh faktin se puna e fmijve ishte nj dukuri e
zakonshme n t kaluarn, fakti i zbuluar nga J. Humphries nuk paraqet ndonj
befasi. Befasi sht se fuqia robruese e fmijve ishte factor ky i suskesit t
revolucionit.
N ballinn e s prditshmes Vijesti (03.08.2006), dominon lajmi se India e ka
ndaluar punn e fmijve. Qeveria e Indis i ka zgjeruar ndalesat t cilat kan
t bjn me punn e fmijvenn moshn 14 vjeare Sipas t dhnave t
Qeveris s Indis, n kt shtet punojn rreth 13 milion fmij, e shumica prej
tyre u jan ekspozuar dhuns fizike dhe abuzimeve seksuale. Mirpo, t dhnat
e Organizats Ndrkombtare t puns tregojn se pikrisht n Indi jan rreth
44 milion fmij si fuqi puntore aktive. Ndalesat n letr, jan vetm hapi i par
n rrugtimin e gjat t lufts ndaj ksaj dukurie.
ALJAZZERA (6 qershor 2012) publikon t dhna ku 74 milion djem dhe 41 milion vajza punojn
pun nga m t kqiat. hyrja e hershme n tregun e puns i nxjerr fmijt nga sistemi arsimor
dhe prgatitja e cila u nevojitet pr pun t dinjitetshme kur t rriten. (Burimi: Agjencioni).
Ministria pr Pun dhe Mirqenie Sociale e Kosovs prpiloi Objektivin
Strategjik: Eliminimi i t gjitha formave m t kqija t puns s fmijve n
Kosov deri n vitin 2016. Plani i Veprimit pr parandalimin dhe eliminimin e
puns s fmijve 2011-2013, me Objektivat Specifike: I. Krijimi i nj mjedisi
t favorshm pr parandalimin dhe eliminimin e puns s fmijve; II. Zbatimi
i ndrhyrjeve t menjhershme pr parandalimin e prfshirjes s fmijve t
rrezikuar dhe trheqjen e fmijve t prfshir n format m t kqija t puns
s fmijve
105
N po kt dokument, (shih: fq.nr.5) jepet definicioni i puns s fmijve,
definicion i pranuar n nivele t ILO.
Prve puns s fmijve, lypsia sht ndr fenomenet q n esenc vetm me
disa veori dallon nga puna. Lypsia, n versionin m t reduktuar definohet si:
form e krijimit t dobis materiale duke e shfrytzuar gadishmrin e njerzve
pr mshirim ndaj atyre q e ushtrojn kt aktivitet. Nga kjo shpesh rezulton
keqtrajtimi q shprehet prmes krimit t organizuar dhe eksploatimi i atyre q
mirren me kt, e sidomos fmijve
154
.
Megjithat, kur kalojm para lypsarve sigurisht shumicn prej nesh na mundon
dilema se a sht lypsia nevoj reale e tyre, apo bisnes i dobishm kriminal.
155
Angazhimi i fmijve n pun dhe n rrug, pra sht evident. Fakti i shtrirjes
s ksaj dukurie n gjith Kosovn po ashtu. Fmijt n pun dhe n rrug
hasen gjithandej, mirpo, sht evident fakti se numri i tyre sht dukshm
m i madh n qendrat urbane. N kategorin e fmijve t prfshir n pun
hyjn edhe ata, t cilt n forma t ndryshme angazhohen n kryerjen e punve
shtpiake, si fuqi ndihmse puntore e prindrve dhe familjarve t tyre.
154 Shin n: urnal za kriminalistiku i pravo, preuzeto iz teksta autora Bose &Hwang,2002,
Kriminalistikopolicijska akademija, Beograd 2009.godine si dhe - Ivan Vidanovi, Renik socijal-
nog rada, 2006; urnal za kriminalistiku i pravo, preuzeto iz teksta autora M.Milosavljevia,2003,
Kriminalistikopolicijska akademija, Beograd 2009.g.)
155 Zadarski list, 16.03.2013, fq.5
Nj form e re e angazhimit t fmijve n pun dhe n rrug
Dukuria e shfrytzimit t fuqis puntore t fmijve, q si pam, u ka
mbijetuar epokave t industrializimit, automatizimit dhe modernizimit t
teknlogjis moderne edhe n botn perndimore, e t mos flasim pr vendet e
Bots s Tret e gjetiu, kryesisht ka mbetur breng e UNICEF-it
156
. Kjo organizat
i ka kushtuar rndsi t veant, ka br hulumtime dhe studime t shumta, ka
shkruar rekomandime dhe kritika, t cilat i ka publikuar dhe adresuar qarqeve
zyrtare t vendeve ku dukuria e shfrytzimit t fmijve si fuqi puntore, i
tejkalon kufinjt e nj angazhimi adekuat moshs dhe fuqis fizike t tyre.
N ambientet urbane t Kosovs, masovizimi i dukuris s fmijve n pun dhe
n rrug, prkon me krizn politike t viteve 90-ta dhe me luftn. Prndryshe,
si u tha m lart, pr mjediset rurale kosovare, kjo dukuri ka qen dhe mbetet
nj praktik e rndomt. Fmijt, tradicionalisht kan paraqitur fuqin puntore
ndihmse prkrah prindrve apo antarve tjer t familjes. Mirpo, zakonisht,
punt q kryenin ata ishin pun m t lehta dhe t prballueshme pr moshn
dhe fuqin e tyre fizike. Ktu kemi parasysh punt n blegtori, n mbledhjen e t
lashtave, pemve, perimeve e npr qendrat urbane edhe si shegrt (nxns)
n zejtari etj. Mirpo, natyra, forma, qllimi dhe prmbajtja e angazhimit t tyre,
n rrethana dhe kushte te reja kosovare, ndryshon dukshm .
Hulumtimet tregojn se n qendrat urbane t Kosovs, kjo dukuri ka evuluar
gjer n prmasat abuzive - si n aspektin e organizimit t puns s fmijve,
ashtu dhe n aspektin e natyrs s vet punve q ata i kryejn. Edhe vet dalja
n rrug sht dukuri relativisht e re pr ambientin kosovar. Deri n vitet 80,
kur kriza ekonomike e ka mbrthyer popullatn kosovare, dukuria e angazhimit
t fmijve n pun jasht ekonomis shtpiake trajtohej si bidat i romve.
Familjet rome, me ndonj prjashtim, kryesisht prbnin kategorin e fmijve,
q pr shkak t gjendjes s dobt ekonomike, por edhe pr shkak t stilit specik
t jets s tyre, jo vetm nuk e luftonin, por madje e stimulonin punn e fmijve
t tyre, duke i rekrutuar ata si lyps, bredhs, pastrues kpucsh, xham-lars t
veturave, puntor fizik, etj.
Rezultatet e ktij hulumtimi, mtojn t nxisin krshrin e qarqeve shkencore
q me m prkushtim ti qasen ktij problemi mjaft t rnd shoqror. Poashtu,
qllimi sht q t zbutet mungesa e projekteve t ktij lloji dhe t ndikoj
n sensibilizimin e institucioneve kompetente, q prve konstatimit dhe
evidentimit t problemit, t marrin masa konkrete pr eliminimin e tij.
156 Konventa e ILO-s pr Format m t Kqija t Puns s Fmijve (Konventa 182) u miratua una-
nimisht nga t gjith delegatt e ILO-s n vitin 1999 dhe mbulon t gjith fmijt derisa mbushin
moshn 18 vje. Si sugjeron edhe titulli, kjo Konvent merret me t gjitha format e kqija t puns
s fmijve q duhet t eliminohen urgjentisht pr t gjith fmijt nn moshn 18 vje, pa marr
parasysh nivelin e varfris apo t zhvillimit t vendit q ka ratifikuar Konventn.
107
N moshn kur fmijt duhet t vijojn msimin, t edukohen dhe t prgatiten
pr jet si antar t dobishm t ksaj shoqrie, ata shtyjn karroca nga tregu
i gjelbrt ose bredhin rrugve dhe vizitojn lokalet gjer n ort e mngjezit si
lyps apo shits.

Metodologjia dhe mostra e hulumtimit
N kt hulumtimin, prfshihet nj mostr ambicioze, me gjithprfshirje
kosovare, mirpo meq mungojn t dhnat e zyrtare mbi numrin e sakt t
fmijve t prfshir me lypsi dhe pun, sht vshtir t caktohen parametra
valid t nj hulumtimi t ksaj natyre.
Fjala pra, sht pr projekt q ofron t dhna t mbledhura nga terreni Kosov,
me pyetsor q prmban 44 pyetje, n nj mostr prej 878 fmijve. Me kt
projekt jan prfshir fmij nga 19 komuna t Kosovs, t moshs deri n 18
vjet, t dy gjinive dhe t prkatsive t ndryshme etnike.
N baz t intervistave t realizuara me fmij n 19 komuna t ndryshme t
Kosovs, sipas kriterit t vendbanimit jan prfshir 68.56% nga zonat urbane
dhe 31.44% nga zonat rurale. sht me interes t theksohet fakti se nga numri
i prgjithshm i fmijve, 10.71% vijn nga fshati n qytet n periudhn e
paslufts dhe aty jetojn prej 1-5 vjet; 4.33% jetojn n qytet n periudhn prej
1-10 vjet; 5.47% n periudhn prej 11-21 vjet, ndrsa 10.93% jetojn n qytet
mbi 21 vjet. Kto t dhna jan t rndsishme pr shkak t analizs s dukuris
s migrimeve t mdha t popullsis nga fshati n qytet, n periudhn prej
fundit t viteve 70, kur nj numr i madh i familjeve rurale synojn integrim n
ambientin urban prmes punsimit n industri, por ende sot mbeten n zonat e
varfra periferike, n margjina dhe t paintegruar plotsisht. Sa i prket dukuris
s fmijve n pun dhe n rrug npr komunat e Kosovs, pr nga kriteri i
vendbanimit del se Gjakova ka m s shumti fmij nga fshati q dalin n pun
dhe n rrug: 52.95%.
157
Prve pyetsorit, anketuesve n terren iu sht sugjeruar q sipas vlersimit
t tyre, t aplikojn edhe instrumentet tjera hulumtuese (intervista grupore
dhe intervista individuale me prindrit, pundhnsit, individ t implikuar
n fardo forme qoft ajo direkte apo indirekte me angazhimin e fmijve
n pun, t vrejturit, etj.). Kjo qasje e kombinuar metodologjike ka ofruar t
dhna q na e mundsojn interpretimin sociologjik kualitativ dhe kuantitativ
t pozits s kategoris s fmijve t angazhuar n forma t ndryshme n pun.
Projekti prfshin kto segmente t jets dhe puns s ksaj kategorie t fmijve:
157 Prqindj kaq e madhe e fmijve n pun dhe n rrug, nga komuna e Gjakovs, sipas sygjerimit
t kolegut tim, Sh. Krasniqi, mund t lidhet me traditn zejtare gjakovare, por edhe me shkalln e
lart t papunsis dhe ritjen e varfris n kt komun, pas mbylljes s fabrikave.
I T dhna t prgjithshme, ku prfshihen t dhnat demografike t
respodentve, (gjinia, mosha, prkatsia etnike, vendbanimi, etj.
II Gjendja e familjes, q prfshin kontekstin familjar t respodentit,
numrin e antarve t familjes s tij, gjinin e kryefamiljarit, nivelin
arsimor t tij, gjendjen ekonomike, ndihmat, prkrahjet eventuale
t familjes nga jasht, numrin e antarve t amvisris s tij, etj.
III Puna sht objekt interesimi i radhs n pyetsor. Ktu prfshihen
pyetjet lidhur me llojin e puns, vendin e puns, gjatsin e orarit
t puns, ort javore n pun, fitimin, menaxhimi i fitimit,
antart tjer t punsuar t familjes, mosha e t punsuarve nga ajo
familje dhe arsyeja e prfshirjes s ktyre fmijve me punn konkrete.
IV Koha e lir sht bllok tjetr tematik i ktij pyetsori. Ktu prfshihen
pyetjet e kohs s lir t respodentve pr t luajtur me shok/shoqe.
V Shndeti i respodentve sht blloku i fundit i pyetsorit, q prfshin
gjendjen shndetsore, pasojat fizike dhe shpirtrore t angazhimit t
tyre n kryerjen e ktyre punve, etj.
Dukuria e prfshirjes s fmijve n pun, bredhja e tyre npr rrug pa
kontrollin, ose edhe nn kontrollin e t rriturve, pundhnsve, prindrve
apo kujtdoqoft tjetr, prve dimensionit social q dominon n kt hulumtim,
ngrthen n vete edhe dimensione tjera shum t rndsishme pr formimin dhe
zhvillimin e tyre psikosocial. Nevoja e regjistrimit t t dhnave q ndriojn kto
segmente sht po aq e rndsishme sa edhe t dhnat q kemi n dispozicion,
pasi q vetm n kt mnyr do ta kompletojm pasqyrn reale t rrethanave
q nj fmij e shtyjn t shitet si krah pune, apo t dal n rrug. Kombinimi i
metodave dhe instrumenteve hulumtuese, padyshim na kan ofruar t dhna, t
cilat na kan ndihmuar n qartsimin e motiveve t vrteta t daljes s fmijve
n rrug dhe n pun. Mirpo, mbledhja e opinioneve t prindrve, pronarve
t bisneseve t imta, pundhnsve, shfrytzuesve t shrbimeve t fmijve
(edhepse ne shumicn e rasteve refuzojn t prgjigjen ose e shtrembrojn t
vrtetn), institucioneve t ndryshme, ekspertve, arsimtarve, etj., padyshim ka
ndihmuar rrumbullakimin e prshtypjeve t mia mbi rrethanat q e stimulojn
dukurin e punsimit dhe bredhjes s fmijve n rrug.
109
Format specifike kosovare t rekrutimit t Fmijv n pun
dhe n rrug
158
N qendrat urbane kemi dukurin e punsimit t fmijve npr puntorit e imta
zejtare, q n Kosov poashtu sht pjes e tradits. Puna e shegertit trajtohet
si pag pr t msuar zanatin. Kjo sht form e legalizuar e punsimit dhe
aftsimit t fmijve dhe t rinjve, me pajtim dhe marrveshje t prindrve apo
kujdestarve t tyre. Mirpo, edhe n kt form, ka shfrytzim dhe shkelje t
drejtave t fmijve pasi q dihet se ata pr ustan shpesh kryejn edhe pun
q i tejkalonin obligimet e parapara pr trajnimin dhe msimin e zanatit.
Kosovn e fundit t viteve 80-ta, e sidomos t viteve 90-ta, e goditi edhe nj
kriz e re e papunsis, e shkaktuar nga ngjarjet politike, q si pasoj pati
varfrimin e nj numri t madh t familjeve. Derisa jeta rurale, edhe prbri
problemeve t mdha, megjithat garantonte njfar minimumi pr ekzistenc
nga bujqsia dhe blegtoria, jeta e familjeve q ekzistencn e kishin mbshtetur
n pag muajore nga puna n industri u godit rnd.
Sidomos q nga fillimi i viteve t 90-ta, procesi i deinstitucionalizimit t
popullats shqiptare n Kosov, pati si pasoj rrezikimin ekonomik dhe fizik t
nj numri t madh t familjeve. Kjo gjendje, solli edhe rekrutimin e nj armate t
tr t fmijve dhe t rinjve n ekonomin e ashtuquajtur t zez, pa marr
parasysh nivelin arsimor dhe kualifikimin e ushqyesve t tyre.
Dhuna e ushtruar nga ushtria dhe policia serbe, q u intensifikua kah fundi i
viteve 90-ta, fillimisht ishte e koncentruar n zonat e Drenics dhe Dukagjinit.
Kto regjione, kryesisht rurale, karakterizohen me ekonomizim ekstensiv,
kshtu q dyndjet e tyre t dhunshme, bartn me vete vetm skamjen. Vendosja
dhe strehimi i tyre n viset urbane, n rrethana t nj okupimi t egr, nuk
shkoi n mnyr t organizuar, por m shum me sistemin e prej t njohurit
te i njohuri. Kosova, prndryshe njihet si shoqri e cila mbshtetet n kt
struktur t fort farefisnore. Kjo situat krijoi probleme t mdha t sigurimit
t minimumit t ekzistencs. Shum fmij nga kto familje, pr t mos mbetur
barr e askujt, u rekrutuan si fuqi puntore e ekonomis s zez, q sidomos
n at koh lulzonte n Kosov. Rekrutimi i tyre n kt lloj biznesi ishte burim
dhe mundsi e vetme e ekzistencs edhe pr shum familje, pasi q ushqyesit e
familjes zakonisht ishin n shnjestr t pushtetit represiv serb.
158 Puna n rrug: - 1. Ndalohen t gjitha punt n rrug pr fmijt nn moshn 15 vjeare;- 2. Ndalo-
het puna n rrug e fmijs prej moshs 15 deri 18 vjet, si: shitja e gjrave n rrug; transportimi i
mallrave; pastrimi i arafangove t automjeteve; bartja e mallrave me karroc; krkimi i lmoshs;
3) Mbledhja e mbeturinave pr riciklim - hulumtimi, grumbullimi dhe bartja e mbeturinave n
deponit e mbeturinave apo n kontejner; (STRATEGJIA DHE PLANI I VEPRIMIT PR PARANDA-
LIMIN DHE ELIMINIMIN E PUNS S FMIJVE N KOSOV 2011 2016)
T shkputur nga jeta e ambienti rural, t liruar nga mekanizmat e kontrollit
joformal farefisnor, tradicional dhe mjaft rigjid, t shtrnguar nga situata e rnd
politike dhe ekonomike, ata, dukshm m leht e pranojn daljen e fmijve t
tyre n rrug si shits, puntor krahu apo lyps, por me qllim t ndihms s
buxhetit t kufizuar familjar.
Hulumtimi, poashtu ofron t dhna se numri m i madh i atyre familjeve, kurr
nuk jan kthye n vendlindje, pavarsisht nga fakti se vazhdojn t jetojn
npr objekte t paprshtatshme banimi, si qiramarrs apo n lagje periferike.
Moskthyerja n ambientin rural prej nga kan ardhur, arsyetohet me shtpit
e djegura gjat lufts, me jet m t leht n qytet, por edhe me rezitencn e
hapur t grave dhe fmijve t tyre. Grat dhe fmijt, del se jan m t joshur
nga rehatia qytetare, nga jeta jasht familjes s madhe, nga cilsia m e mir e
shkollave, nga grupet e moshatarve si dhe mundsi m e leht pr idare.
Sidoqoft, kjo kategori sociale cilsohet si burim (edhepse jo i vetmi), nga radht
e popullats shqiptare, nga t cilat n vazhdimsi rekrutohen fmijt puntor
dhe bredhsit e lypsart.
Nga lista e gjer e shkaqeve t ofruara n hulumtim si nxits t angazhimit t
fmijve n kryerjen e punve fmijt dhe prindrit e tyre i veojn shkaqet
ekonomike dhe sociale. Vetm nj prqindje e vogl e fmijve deklaron se
kt e bjn pr t siguruar para xhepi pr vete. Mirpo, pavarsisht nga
arsyet, dukuria si e atill krkon nj trajtim serioz dhe t vendosur nga fakrort
relevant shoqror. Ekzistenca e familjeve dhe individve n shoqri, nuk guxon
t trajtohet si shtje e tyre dhe aq m pak e fmijve.
MPMS-ja, si dhe UNICEF-i, koh m par bn hapat e par, pasi q qasja
shkencore e ktij problemi sht vetm nisma e nj procesi t gjat drejt
ndryshimeve pr tejkalimin e gjendjes ku fmija n vend t shkolls ka zgjedhur
punn dhe rrugn.
Fmijt n pun dhe n rrug n dritn e shifrave
1. Gjendja familjare e fmijve n pun dhe n rrug
Nga numri i prgjithshm i fmijve t kategoris s atyre q jan n pun dhe n
rrug, t prfshir m kt hulumtim (gjithsej 878), 766 apo 88%, deklarojn se
jetojn me dy prindrit. sht befasuese kjo prqindje e lart, pasi q konteksti
patriarkal i familjeve kosovare, prve strukturimit rigjid n frymn e sistemit t
vlerave patriarkale, nnkupton edhe angazhimin dhe obligimin e prindrve q t
marrin prsipr barrn kryesore t prkujdesjes familjare (edukimin, sigurimin
e ushqimit, strehimin, veshmbathjen, etj.). Nga ky hulumtim nuk del si form
dominuese e organizimit, mirpo prshtypja ime sht se logjika e funksionimit
t biznesit t imt nnkupton angazhimin e disa antarve t familjes, ndrsa
111
njri prej tyre sht barts nominal. Ky fakt duket se ka karakter zinxhiror t
nxitjes dhe angazhimit t vllezrve dhe motrave m t vogla, q nuk do mend
se e rrit numrin e fmijve n pun dhe n rrug. Si dshmi, mund t merren
t dhnat se 263 ose 29.95% e t anketuarve deklarojn se n biznesin e tyre
jan t angazhuar edhe antart tjer t familjes.
Prndryshe, si mund t shpjegohet prqindja minimale e fmijve pa prindr q
angazhohet n pun? Vetm 9, ose 1.3%, t t intervistuarve deklarojn se nuk
jetojn me prindr. Lidhur me kt dukuri, duhet pasur parasysh edhe faktin
se fmijve pa prindr u mungon prkrahje pr t hyr n biznesin e tregtis.
Inkurajimi familjar, pra, vjen si nj impuls i hyrjes n pun. Shih tabeln nr. 1.
Tabela nr.1
Nga kjo tabel, aq sa del befasues numri tepr i madh i fmijve n pun dhe
n rrug q jetojn m t dy prindrit (88.15%), po aq befason edhe numri
relativisht i vogl madje edhe i atyre q jetojn me njrin prind nnn, (90
apo 10.36%), dhe numri minimal i fmijve q jetojn vetm me baban (13,
apo 1.50%). N situata t ktilla, sidomos nnat ushqyese t familjes ose nuk
marrin guximin t lshojn vendbanimin rural dhe t msyjn qendrn urbane,
ose nga prgjegjsia e shtuar nuk pajtohen me rekrutimin e fmijve t tyre n
bizneset e vogla. Angazhimi i tyre n punt e shtpis, do shohim m von, sht
shum m i madh. sht pr tu theksuar edhe numri jashtzakonisht i vogl i
fmijve q punojn dhe nuk jetojn me prindr, gjithsej 9 apo vetm 1.03%.
Ky fakt edhe m tepr e bn t qndrueshm mendimin se punsimi bhet n
marrveshje me prindrit dhe fmijt gzojn prkrahjen e tyre n ushtrimin e
ktij profesioni. Un pa pun, gruaja fmij dhe pun shum n shtpi, rrug
tjetr nuk kemi. Sa pr idare, po bajn are kta fmij. E di se e lan msimin
pasdore, por a vdiset? (Rrfim i nj prindi nga koumna e Prishtins).
Sa i prket madhsis s familjes (numrit t antarve t amvisrive), t fmijve
puntor, (Tabela nr. 2), dominon familja me 4-6 antar. Nga familjet me kt
numr t antarve, burojn 344 ose 39.18 %, ndrsa nga komunat kryesojn
Lipjani (37 ose 10.76%), mandej Fush Kosova (36 ose 10.47%), Prishtina (30
ose 8.72%), etj. Kuriozitet paraqet numri minimal i Gjakovs (5 ose 1.45%). Po
ashtu, n kt tabel, trheq vmendjen numri i antarve t amvisris me nga
11-13 antar, nga t cilat burojn fmijt n pun dhe n rrug n komunn e
Prishtins dhe Prizrenit (13 apo 14.13 %, dhe 12 apo 13.04%).
Tabela nr.2
Dukuria e ruajtjes s familjes s madhe duket se sht pasoj e pamundsis
s nj numri t familjeve t mbijetojn n ambientin e ri pas migrimit t tyre
para ose pas lufts. sht e njohur se Prishtina ka prjetuar dyndje t popullats,
mirpo situat t ngjashme me prmasa t ndryshme kemi edhe n qendrat
tjera urbane kosovare. N familjet e fmijve n pun dhe n rrug t prfshir
me kt hulumtim, n rolin e kryefamiljarit dominon babai me 761 raste, ose
86.67%, ndrsa nna vetm me 94 raste, ose 10.71%. Kjo dshmon se shkaku
kryesor i daljes s fmijve n pun dhe rrug nuk sht kompensimi i krahut
t humbur t puns - babait, por motivi i kontributit n krijimin e minimumit
ekonomik t familjes. (Shih: Tabela nr. 3).
113
Tabela nr.3
2.Nniveli i arsimimit t kryefamiljarit t familjes s
fmijs puntor dhe n rrug.
Rezultatet jan befasuese me prqindjen e madhe t numrit t amvisrive,
kryefamiljari i t cilave sht me shkoll t lart dhe me fakultet. Derisa prqindja
e madhe e kryefamiljarve t fmijve n pun me shkoll fillore dhe t mesme,
deridiku sht pritur (239 ose 27.22% dhe 314 ose 35.77%,), ato me fakultet
97 ose 11.05%, e nse ktij numri t fakultetlinjve ia shtojm edhe numrin e
atyre me shkoll t lart (9.45%), po del nj total vrtet befasues prej 20.50%.
Kjo befasi shpjegohet me rrnimin e sistemit t vlerave n kontekstin e caktuar
kohor, ku puna intelektuale sht devalvuar dukshm, por, mendoj un, edhe
me nj gjendje inercioni q kto familje i prcjell q nga vitet 90-ta, kur sistemi
rasimor u godit fuqishm nga kriza e papunsis dhe rnies s standardit jetsor.
(Shih Tabeln nr. 4).
Tabela nr.4
Befasi tjetr n kt hulumtim, q trheq vmendjen ton, sht prqindja
e madhe e fmijve q burojn nga familjet ku punon prindi. Krahasuar me
prqindjen e atyre q nuk u punon prindi, t part dominojn me 638 apo
72.67% (sektori shtetror 211 ose 33.07 dhe sektori privat 296 ose 46.39%),
karshi atyre q nuk punojn dhe q marrin pjes me 240 ose 27.33%. (Shih
Tabeln numr 5).
Tabela,nr.5
115
Tabela nr. 6 ofron t dhna interesante q lidhen me motivet ekonomike
t angazhimit t fmijve n pun dhe n rrug. Familjet t cilat sipas t
intervistuarve nuk deklarojn t ardhura mujore, fmijt e tyre i rekrutojn
pr pun dhe rrug me vetm 134 ose 15.26%, q sht befasisht prqindje e
vogl krahasuar me numrin e atyre q deklarojn t ardhura deri n 200 Euro
(193 ose 21.98%), dhe t atyre q deklarojn t ardhura deri n 500 euro
(161 ose 18.34%). T dhna edhe m befasuese ofron edhe prqindja e lart e
fmijve q deklarojn t ardhura mujore deri n 500 euro, deri n 1000 euro
dhe mbi 1000 euro. Kto kategori, t gjitha s bashku prbjn numrin prej 193
ose 29.99%.
Si t shpjegohet ky fakt? Nse mungojn t dhnat se n far pune jan t
angazhuar fmijt e ktyre familjeve, ather sypozimi mund t prqendrohet
n faktin se ata jan t angazhuar n pun t bizneseve private familjare, ose
fjala sht pr kategorin e fmijve t cilt manifestojn padgjueshmrin
familjare dhe manifestojn nevojn e krijimit t t ardhurave vetjake si nevoj
e pavarsimit t tyre nga familja (?) Mirpo, nj gj sht e sigurt se motivi
social i angazhimit t tyre n pun dhe n rrug - prjashtohet. Pr nga kriteri
i prejardhjes s familjes n vendbanimin e tanishm, fmijt e deklaruar si
vendas (602 ose 68.56%), dominojn n krahasim me ata q deklarohen si t
ardhur (276 ose 31.44%), q flet pr kategorin e lartprmendur t familjeve
q nj koh t gjat jetojn n margjinat e qendrave urbane, pa ndonj mundsi
t arrijn ritmin e zhvillimit t ktyre qendrave.
3.Lloji i puns s fmijve n rrug
Lidhur me llojin e puns q kryejn fmijt n pun dhe n rrug, hulumtimi
ofron t dhna interesante, por jo edhe befasuese. Prej numrit t prgjithshm
t prfshir me hulumtim, numri m i madh i tyre kryen pun jasht familjes, q
mbshtet brengn e prgjithshme pr fatin dhe perspektivn e ktyre fmijve.
Pun n amvisri
159
, pun n mjedisin shtpiak dhe pun n blegtori, nga numri
i prgjithshm i t anketuarve, kryejn (303 ose 33.51%), q krahasuar m
prqindjen e punve q kryhen n rrug (575 ose 66.49%), del mjaft e vogl.
N kt prqindje dominon numri i fmijve q hyjn n kategorin shits (150
ose 17.08%), mirpo, nse n kt kategori nuk fshihet kategoria e shitsve t
cigareve dhe kartelave, e cila figuron vetm me 43 ose 4.90%, ather prqindja
e tyre npr lokale private dhe n ekonomin shrbyese sht mjaft e madhe.
4.Orari i puns s fmijve n rrug, sipas rezultateve t hulumtimit del mjaft
i gjat, q krijon huti kur krahasohet me prqindjen e fmijve q deklarojn se
prbri angazhimit n pun, vijojn msimin me rregull. Tabela nr. 6 na ofron t
159 Pr shkak t numrit t madh t tabelave dhe hapsirs s kufizuar, nga nj numr t tabelave do t
prmendim vetm numrin dhe prqindjet e deklaruara sipas varjanteve t ofruara me pyetsor
dhna t cilat flasin pr angazhimin e plot t fmijve n pun. Gati gjysma e
t intervistuarve pohon se gjat dits n pun jan t angazhuar mbi 5 or (prej
5-6 or, 120 ose 13.67%; prej 7-8 or 85 ose 9.68%; prej 9-10 or 47 ose
5.36%, ndrsa mbi 10 or deklarohen 70 ose 7.9%). Prqindja e fmijve q
angazhohen mbi 10 or n dit sht tepr e madhe dhe ktu sdo mend se kemi
t bjm me kategorin e fmijve t cilt i jan prkushtuar trsisht puns dhe
rrugs.
TABELA nr. 6
Pra, kemi parasysh kategorin e cila nuk vijon msimin dhe paralajmron nj
shtres t popullsis me nj t ardhme shqetsuese e cila ka gjas t mbetet
gjysmanalfabete. Nga tabela n vijim figurojn deklaratat e fmijve lidhur
me pyetjen e shtruar n pyetsor: Sa or n dit punon kur shkon n shkoll?.
Befason prqindja e prgjigjeve joobjektive e ktyre fmijve, pasi q 150 ose
42.78% deklarojn se pas shkolls punojn prej 4 e mbi 10 or n dit. (Shih
tabeln nr. 7).
117
Tabela nr.7
N tabeln vijuese nr. 8, figurojn deklaratat e t intervistuarve lidhur me
numrin q angazhohen n pun gjat javs. Kategoria e fmijve q deklaron se
n pun dhe n rrug sht e angazhuar 7 dit n jav, tr vitin, sht shum
e madhe dhe arrin shifrn 354 ose 40.32%. Ky fakt flet pr angazhimin e tyre
n pun q nuk lidhen me sektorin e regjistruar privat, ose me ndonj pun
shtpiake sezonale, por me ndonj biznes t imt strshits t rrugs ose lypsi.
(Shih tabelat nr. 8 dhe 9)
Tabela nr.8
Tabela nr.9
Fmijt n pun dhe n rrug dalin pr t fituar para. Mirpo, nga vet fakti
se punt e tyre jan pun t ashtuquajtura t dors s fundit, si rezultat i t
cilave nxirren t ardhura minimale, pothuajse n sasi t lmoshs q mund
t paraqesin vler reale vetm pr familjet n varfri t skajshme, ose fmij -
individ q punojn pr para xhepi. Limiti i lart i shums q kjo kategori fiton
nga dalja n pun dhe n rrug, sipas deklarimit t tyre, nga numri i prgjithshm,
sillet prej 1-10 Euro (pr 257 ose 34.16% t tyre), por nse hiqet kategoria e
t angazhuarve n punt shtpiake ku punohet pa pag, fitimi mbi 10 Euro n
dit sht privilegj i vetm 63 ose 5.95% fmijve n pun dhe n rrug. (Shih
tabeln nr. 10).
Me interes sht edhe e dhna q del nga tabela n vijim, ku deklarohet se
prqindja e fmijve n pun dhe n rrug t gjitha t hollat e fituara i dorzojn
n familje. Vetm 95 ose 10.72% e t anketuarve deklaron se menaxhon vet m
t hollat e fituara. Ndrsa, mosha e t posarekrutuarve n pun dhe n rrug,
sipas t dhnave q na ofron Tabela nr. 11, del se sht tmerrsisht e ult! Ajo
fillon q nga 5 vjeart dhe kur arrihet mosha 13 vjeare kjo kategori bhet
dominuese, me 532 ose 54.5%.

119
Tabela nr.10
N tabeln nr. 11, ofrohen opcionet e prgjigjeve t t anketuarve lidhur me motivet
e angazhimit n pun dhe rrug. Dominon absolutisht opcioni: Pr ti ndihmuar
familjes! me 596 ose 61.05%. Mirpo, mbetja nga shifra e prgjithshme e t
intervistuarve sht megjithat e madhe. Pjesa tjetr nga numri i prgjithshm
sht tregues i angazhimit t fmijve n pun dhe n rrug m vetiniciativ,
pa plqimin e prindrve ose pa dijen e tyre. sht edhe m brengoss fakti kur
kategoris s deklaruar q ka plqimin dhe miratimin e prindrve i shtohet edhe
ky numr. Prindrit duket se shpesh nuk kan kontroll t mjaftueshm mbi fmijt
e vet. T dhnat n kt tabel lidhen me t dhnat n tabeln vijuese (nr. 23), ku
sipas deklaratave t fmijve n pun dhe n rrug, del se vetm 289 ose 32.92%
- kan pajtimin dhe prkrahjen e prindrve, ndrsa prqindja tjetr shprndahet
npr opcionet, si jan: moshatart, pundhnsit, t tjert, etj.
Tabela nr.11
Tabela nr.12

5.Shkollimi i fmijve n pun dhe n rrug.
Pr pasojat e angazhimit t fmijve n pun dhe n rrug u fol m lart, si
pr njrn ndr pasojat serioze t ksaj dukurie. Mirpo, tabelat n vijim na
pasqyrojn moduset e adaptimit t ksaj kategorie t fmijve n rrethanat e
rrugs prbri obligimeve shkollore. sht kundrthnse e dhna q dshmon
pr vijueshmrin e msimit karshi t dhnave paraprake pr angazhimin e
tyre n pun dhe rrug, ku prqindja m e madhe deklaron se puna dhe rruga u
merr prej 5-10 or n dit. Sidoqoft, pr kt rast po i veojm dy kuriozitete:
1. Prqindjen e prfshirjes s ksaj kategorie m shkollim t rregullt (789 ose
89.86%), q krahasuar me variantet tjera sht absolutisht dominuese; dhe 2.
Variantin ku nga numri i atyre q nuk vijojn msimin, 26 ose 29.21% deklaron
se Nuk i ka mbushur vitet pr shkoll! Kjo prqindje nuk do koment, pasi q
sht e qart se kemi t bjm me kategorin e fmijve n pun dhe rrug nn
moshn 7 vjeare. sht vshtir t besohet se kjo kategori e fmijve kan
prkrahjen e prindrve pr t punuar dhe dal n rrug, ose kemi t bjm me
kategorin e lypsve dhe fmijve jetim.
121
Tabela,nr.13
Tabela nr. 13 dshmon pr kualitetin e shkollave tona, pr prkushtimin e
trupit arsimor dhe politikn e gjithmbarshme arsimore n shoqrin ton. N
pyetjen: A e ke prsritur klasn?, nga numri i gjithmbarshm i fmijve n
pun dhe n rrug, me jo deklarohen 740 ose 93.79%, q karshi numrit q e
pohon karakterin e pyetjes sht minimal dhe i befasishm. Ndrsa, nga numri
i atyre q pohojn se e kan prsritur klasn, 89 apo 6.21%, deklarojn se e
kan lshuar shkolln prgjithmon. Sa sht n nivel objektiviteti i prgjigjeve
t fmijve, ose sa sht n nivel objektiviteti i vlersimit t dijes n shkollat
tona, mbetet shtje me te ciln duhet t mirren institucionet kompetente n
shoqrin ton. Mirpo, niveli i stimulimit t trupit arsimor, sht n proporcion
me prkushtimin e tyre. Fjaln e kan institucionet prkatse.
Tabela nr.14
6.Koha e lir e fmijve n pun dhe n rrug.
Angazhimi i fmijve n pun dhe rrug nnkupton flijimin e shum knaqsive
t cilat prkojn me moshn e tyre. Fmijt e ksaj moshe u ekspozohen shum
rreziqeve q dmtojn shndetin, procesin e edukimit familjar, socializimin,
arsimimin, formimin e tyre t shndosh n ambientin familjar e shoqror, etj.
Fmijt n pun dhe rrug flijojn edhe kohn e lir t tyre, lojn me moshatar,
pushimin, zbavitjet e ndryshme, emisionet e dashura pr moshn e tyre n TV,
surfimin n internet, etj. Mirpo, nga faktort e numruar, vend me rndsi n kt
hulumtim z edhe koha e lir.
Prve arsimit, koha e lir paraqet faktorin m t rndsishm t socializimit t
fmijve prgjithsisht. Edhe pse nga tabela n vijim q na ofron t dhna lidhur
me kt faktor del se fmijt n pun dhe n rrug deklarojn se kan koh t lir
(madje 728 ose 82.915 prej tyre), mirpo t dhnat paraprake i demantojn kto
deklarime. Fmija i cili prve udhtimit deri n vendin e puns udhton m tepr
se nj or, punon 7 dit n jav prej 5-10 or e m tepr, vshtir se mund t gjej
koh pr loj dhe argtim. Pauzat jan t zakonshme kur fmija lodhet duke bredhur
dhe pushon dhunshm, mirpo pushim dhe argtim pr at nuk mund t ket.
Prandaj, nuk sht e rastsishme q shumica e t intervistuarve pushim dhe koh
pr argtim e prjeton pasditen (250 ose 34.34%) dhe mbrmjen (124 ose 17.03%).
Pasditja nnkupton kohn e dreks dhe pushimit t qytetarve q e zvoglon
frekuencn e tyre n rrug dhe lokale, ndrsa mbrmja prjetohet si argtim n
rrethin familjar. Kshtu, p.sh., n mesdit, sipas deklarimit t tyre, pushojn m s
shumti fmijt n rrug dhe n pun nga Obiliqi (28 ose 23.33%), ndrsa vushtrriasit
pasdite (39 ose 15.60%).
123
N pyetjen Me ka luani?, pjesa drmuese deklarohet se luan me top (565 ose
64,35%), ndrsa n vendin e dyt vijn lojrat elektronike (114 ose 12.98%).
Mirpo, nuk guxon t nnmohet prqindja e atyre q n kt mosh nuk luajn
fare, pasi q merr pjes me prqindje (152 ose 17.31 %). Shiko tabeln nr.15
Tabela nr.15
7.Shndeti i fmijve n pun dhe n rrug.
Ndr komponentt e rndsishme q atakohen nga ritmi, natyra, dhe paknaqsit
q sjell puna, padyshim sht shndeti i fmijs. Meqense fjala sht pr fmijn
puntor dhe n rrug, mundsia e dmtimit t shndetit t tij fizik dhe moral sht
e madhe. Fmijt i ekspozohen t ftohtit ose temperaturave tepr t larta, ngritjes s
peshave t rnda, izolimit nga moshatart dhe farefisi, dshtimeve n afarizmin e tyre
t imt, krcnimet nga pundhnsit, konsumatort e mallit q ata shesin, ndjekjet
krcnuese nga personeli i lokaleve t ndryshme, etj. T gjitha kto s bashku krijojn
nj grup rrethanash t cilat seriozisht e dmtojn shndetin e fmijs.
Edhe pse shumica absolute deklarojn se kan shndet t mir (705 ose 80.29%),
numri q deklarohet se sht i ftohur (85 ose 9.68%); dhmbje n shpin, eshtra t
thyer dhe lndime tjera, arrin shifrn 70 ose 9.96%, q nuk sht e numr i cili duhet
injoruar. N kt mosh, t vuash nga kto dmtime fizike sht nj breng pr t
ardhmen e tyre. Shoqria dhe familjet e tyre patjetr do t ballafaqohen me pasojat
e dmtimeve t ksaj kategorie t fmijve t angazhuar n pun dhe n rrug.
Nse ktij numri i shtohet edhe numri i atyre q deklarojn se vuajn nga Stresi dhe
trauma (18 ose 2.05%), q n shikim t par duket minimal, por n t vrtet edhe i
tejkalon njohurit e tyre pr kto probleme, ather ne q nga momenti i pikrishm
po ballafaqohemi me pasojat e drejtprdrejta t shndetit t fmijve n pun dhe n
rrug.
8. Siguria e fmijve n pun dhe n rrug.
sht i njohur fakti se kategoria e fmijve n pun dhe n rrug, jasht
mbikqyrjes s prindrve apo prgjegjsve t tyre (arsimtarve, pedagogve,
pundhnsve t regjistruar etj.), pr shkak t moshs, por edhe natyrs s
punve q kryejn, i ekspozohen rrezikut n nj shkall shum m t lart se
moshatart e tyre. Mediat e paralufts, por edhe ato t paslufts, kan informuar
pr raste t abuzimit apo t rrezikimit t drejtprdrejt t shndetit dhe jets s
fmijve t pambrojtur n pun dhe n rrug. Para dhe pas lufte, jan prmendur
dhe gjetur disa viktima nga radht e kategoris s fmijve n pun dhe n
rrug, si pasoj e ekspozimit t tyre ndaj vendeve, kohrave dhe situatave q
stimulojn krimin dhe rrezikojn ata.
Edhe pse nga t dhnat q ofron hulumtimi del se shumica absolute e fmijve n
pun dhe n rrug e ndjejn veten t sigurt (561 ose 63.89%), numri tjetr prej
121 ose 13.78%, q deklarohet si t rrezikuar, sht tregues i mjaftueshm se
punn e ktyre fmijve e prcjellin krcnimet, frika, maltretimet e qytetarve,
pundhnsve, psikopatve, pedofilve, kalimtarve, organeve t ndjekjes, etj.
Nse ktij numri i shtojm edhe nj prqindje t respodentve, t cilt hezitojn
t deklarohen pr sigurin e tyre n vendin e puns, situata sht alarmante.
N vazhdim t hulumtimit, shihet qart se 60 apo 6.83%, e fmijve nga numri
i prgjithshm i t intervistuarve ka deklaruar se ka qen i sulmuar, plakitur
ose i krcnuar gjat orarit t puns. T ndjehesh i rrezikuar gjat puns, jo
vetm pr fmijn, do t thot t bartsh me vete ankthin, frustrimet, traumat,
pasigurin dhe frikn q ndikon negativisht n funkcionimin, formimin dhe
socializimin e tij.
Tabela nr.16
125
Si prfundim, dukuria e fmijve n pun dhe n rrug nuk duron qasje dhe trajtim
t nj kategorie t inkriminuar, ose si pjestar t shoqris q manifestojn
prirje pr sjellje devijante, por si raste potenciale q mund t abuzohen dhe
inkriminohen. Atyre u duhet prkrahja dhe ndihma e tr shoqris, pasi q vet
fakti se nj dhjetvjear shtyn karrocn plot mall nga tregu i gjelbr, e nuk mirret
me hajni, vetvetiu flet pr nj brum t shndosh edukativ, i cili i ekspozohet
forms s socializimit, q n rrethana t rrezikimit permanent, mund t gatuhet
keq. Vlersimet e ngjashme m rrall artikulohen publikisht, por imponohen si
t tilla nga vet qndrimi i shfrytzuesve t shrbimeve t tyre. Nj gabim i ktill
do t krijonte konfuzione, t cilat padyshim do i jepnin konotacion tjetr aksionit
t organizuar t shoqris pr zbutjen e ktij problemi akut shoqror.
Ky hulumtim, synon t jap nj kontribut, sado modest, n procesin e ndriimit
t problemit t fmijve n pun dhe rrug, dhe n sensibilizimin e opinionit
kosovar, jo vetm pr t reaguar sa pr t reaguar dhe pastruar ndrgjegjen,
por pr t ndriuar dukurin q ka tendenca masovizimi e jo zvoglimi. Meq
sht evidente se ky hulumtim as nuk sht i pari as nuk sht i vetmi i ktij lloji,
prpjekjet e mia le t kuptohen jo si refleksion i aktualizimit t fanomenit n
vigjile t prvjetorit, por si nvoj q gjrat t mos lihen q t presin prvjetoret,
pasiq gjendja sht alarmante dhe krkon angazhim t intensifikuar dhe
permanent.

127
Qndrimet ndaj t drejtave t njeriut dhe vlerat njerzore Kaltrina Kelmendi & Aliriza Arnliu & Dashamir Brxulli
Kaltrina Kelmendi
Aliriza Arnliu
Dashamir Brxulli
Qndrimet ndaj t drejtave t njeriut
dhe vlerat njerzore
Abstrakt
shtja e drejtave t njeriut paraqet nj ndr shtjet m sfiduese n vendet e zhvilluara
dhe ato n zhvillim. Q nga viti 1983, kur Organizata e Kombeve t Bashkuara miratoi
Deklaratn Universale mbi t drejtat e njeriut, shtetet dhe organizatat e ndryshme
ndrkombtare filluan t veprojn n drejtim t identifikimit dhe parandalimit
t shkeljeve t drejtave t njeriut (United Nations 1983a, 1983b). Qllimi kryesor i
politikave dhe iniciativave pr t drejtat e njeriut ishte vetdijsimi i shoqris, se t
gjith njerzit jan t barabart pa dallim etnie, kombi, gjuhe, religjioni apo ndonj
karakteristike tjetr. Mirpo sot prkundr t gjitha prpjekteve t bra nga shtetet
dhe organizatat e ndryshme ndrkombtare, ka dshmi pr shkelje t rnda t
drejtave t njeriut n bot. N kt pik, Kosova nuk bn prjashtim.
Ky artikull paraqet rezultatet e hulumtimit t
qndrimeve t studentve t Universitetit t
Prishtins Hasan Prishtina ndaj t drejtave
t njeriut dhe ndrlidhjen e tyre me vlerat
njerzore. Shfletimi i literaturs nxorri n
pah nj sr faktorsh, q ndikojn n kto
qndrime si faktor individual, sociokulturor
dhe ideologjik. Mostra e hulumtuar prfshiu
234 student, duke u przgjedhur me an
t mostrimit t konveniencs. Analizat
statistikore t aplikuara te t dhnat ishin
nxjerrja e mesatareve dhe korrelacioni i
Pearsonit. studentt shprehin qndrime
pozitive ndaj barazis gjinore, liris s
shprehjes, t drejts pr emigrim, t drejts
pr ushqim dhe strehim, t drejts pr
prkujdesje shndetsore, legalizimit t
prostitucionit, numrit t fmijve, orientimit
seksual, t drejtave gjinore t barabarta. M
tej, studentt shprehin relativisht qndrime
tolerante apo neutrale ndaj pyetjeve n lidhje
me shprndarjen e ideve t huaja n klas,
refuzimit t puns, posedimit t veprave
artistike, pensionimit t obliguar, posedimit
t drogave, arrestimit t radikalve dhe artit
vulgar. Gjithashtu, grupimi dhe analizimi
i qndrimeve n baz t katr faktorve:
siguris sociale, barazis, kufizimeve civile
dhe privatsis t qndrimeve tregon, se
ekziston nj ndrlidhje pozitive midis siguris
sociale, kufizimeve civile dhe privatsis. Pr
m tepr, analizat e korrelacionit t Pearsonit
n mes t pikve t distancs sociale dhe
vlerave t Schwartz-it treguan korrelacion
negativ me pikt e vlerave pr tradit [ r=
-.168, p<0.010], me vlerat pr konformitet [ r=
-.155, p<0.017], me vlerat pr siguri [ r= -.162,
p<0.013] dhe vlerat pr arritje [ r= -.144,
p<0.028]. N fund, rezultate interesante kan
dal edhe pr ndrlidhjen midis distancs
sociale, vet-prsosmris, tolerancs dhe
konservatorizmit.
128 NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014 KDU 008.342.72.173
Pas shpalljes s pavarsis s Kosovs n shkurt t vitit 2008, institucionet e
Kosovs, duke aspiruar integrimin n Bashksin Europiane dhe mekanizmat
e tjer ndrkombtar, punuan n mnyr t vazhdueshme n prmirsimin e
infrastrukturs ligjore dhe mekanizmave t tjer, q sigurojn t drejtat dhe
lirit e njeriut.
N vitet e fundit organizatat e ndryshme ndrkombtare kan realizuar
disa studime dhe anketa pr perceptimet e qytetarve t Kosovs lidhur me
diskrimiminin me fokus n grupet e margjinalizuara. T dhnat nga Raporti
i Zhvillimit Njerzor (2010) identifikojn grupe t caktuara sociale, t cilat
prjetojn prjashtim social m shum se t tjert si: t papunt, fmijt, femrat
dhe minoritetet (n veanti komuniteti RAE) dhe personat me nevoja t veanta.
Sipas UNDP (2010) kto rezultate lidhen edhe me situatn dhe kontekstin
ekzistues n Kosovn e paslufts, q karakterizohet me nj varfri t skajshme,
papunsi t lart, diskriminim dhe kualitet t dobt t jetess. N anketimin
e fundit t br n Gusht t 2013, pr Public Pulse nga UNDP-ja, lidhur me
perceptimet e qytetarve pr grupet m t diskriminuara, 31% t kosovarve
kan identifkuar t moshuarit si grup m t diskriminuar, rinin 18% dhe 13%
femrat (UNDP, 2013: 5). Rezultatet nga e njjta anket tregojn, q kosovart
ndjehen t diskriminuar pr kto arsye: vendbanimi/statusi i personit t
zhvendosur apo emigrantit statusi social apo shndetsor (31%), mosha (17%),
gjinia (15%), mendimi politik apo mendimet e tjera (9%), feja (8%), prkatsia
etnike (6%), gjuha (4%) dhe aftsit e kufizuara (3%) (UNDP, 2013: 23).
Sipas ODonnell, Cullell & Iazzeta (2004) t kuptuarit e asaj, se ka qytetart
mendojn pr t drejtat dhe se si kjo i informon politikbrsit dhe politikat,
sht mse qensore pr demokracin e nj vendi (Hertel, Scruggs & Heidkamp,
2009: 445). N kt aspekt mund t konsiderohet se hulumtimi i qndrimeve
t qytetarve dhe grupeve t caktuara sociale nga pikvshtrimi e psikologjis
sociale sht nj burim i mir i informatave pr t hartuar politika dhe ligje,
q zbatohen m me lehtsi. N Kosov hulumtime t tilla mungojn. Kurse
evidencat shkencore dhe studimet e opinionit publik n vendet e tjera shpesh
japin rezultatet t prziera lidhur me qndrimet ndaj t drejtave t njeriut dhe
strukturn e ktyre qndrimeve.
Studimi i br Mclosky (1964) tregon, se t kuptuarit e parimeve abstrakte t t
drejtave t njeriut nga ana e popullats s gjer sht qensor pr aplikimin e
tyre dhe si rezultat i ksaj paaftsie pr ti kuptuar, kto principe respektohen
apo kuptohen vetm prej grupeve t caktuara t ashtuquajtura elite (Crowson,
2004: 236) N ann tjetr, studimet e bra nga Getz (1985) dhe Barrow (1981)
theksojn, se preokupimi pr t drejtat e njeriut dhe shtjet globale rritet me
ngritjen e nivelit t arsimimit t individve (McFarland & Mathews, 2005: 368).
Pr m tepr studimet e tjera theksojn, se qndrimet ndaj t drejtave t njeriut
paraqesin nj sistem bindjesh komplekse, q ndrlidhen me dimensione t
129
shumta dhe varen nga faktor individual dhe sociokulturor. N studimin e
br nga Moghaddam dhe Vuksanovic (1990), t cilt kan analizuar qndrimet
e studentve kanadez ndaj t drejtave t njeriut (lirin e shprehjes, lirin e
besimit, t drejtn pr prkujdesje shndetsore) npr kontekste t ndryshme
politike (si vendet e bots s tret, Bashkimi Sovjetik dhe Kanada) gjetn, se
studentt kanadez tregonin prkrahje m t madhe pr t drejtat e njeriut n
vendet e bots s tret dhe Bashkimin Sovjetik sesa pr Kanadan. Gjithashtu,
ata gjetn se prkrahsit e ideologjive autoritariste t krahut t djath dhe
religjiozitetit ishin negativisht t ndrlidhura me prkrahjen pr t drejtat e
njeriut (f. 463).
Dias-Veizades, Widaman, Little & Gibbs (1995) me qllim t analizimit t
strukturs s qndrimeve ndaj t drejtave t njeriut hartuan pyetsorin mbi t
drejtat e njeriut, q analizonte katr faktor, duke prfshir sigurin sociale,
barazin, privatsin dhe kufizimet civile. Analiza faktoriale n nj mostr prej
365 studentsh hern e par, 212 studentsh hern e dyt dhe 42 t rritur gjeti,
se qndrimet ndaj t drejtave t njeriut jan t strukturuara rreth dy aspekteve
kryesore: a) t drejtave civile dhe politike dhe b) t drejtave sociale, kulturore
dhe ekonomike (Dias-Veizades, Widaman, Little & Gibbs, 1995: 324). Sipas tyre,
t drejtat civile dhe politike nnkuptonin t drejtat, q mbronin lirin, sigurin
dhe integritetin shpirtror dhe fizik t personit, kurse t drejtat ekonomike,
sociale dhe kulturore kishin t bnin me t drejtn pr punsim, n nj standard
adekuat jetese dhe zhvillim ekonomik t t gjith individve (Dias-Veizades,
Widaman, Little & Gibbs, 1995: 325). Rezultatet nga studimi i Dias-Veizades,
Widaman, Little & Gibbs (1995) pr her t par theksuan faktin, se qndrimet
ndaj t drejtave t njeriut lidhen me shum dimensione t bindjeve t individve.
Po ashtu, ky ishte edhe tentimi m serioz n prpjekjen pr matjen e qndrimeve
ndaj t drejtave t njeriut.
S fundi, Crowson (2004), duke qen prkrahs i ides, se qndrimet ndaj t
drejtave t njeriut jan shum dimensionale dhe duke theksuar faktin, se
studimet e mhershme i konsideronin ato si nj sistem nj-dimensional t
bindjeve, analizoi disa konstrukte psikologjike dhe ideologjike, q lidhen m
t drejtat e njeriut. Crowson (2004), duke u fokusuar n ekzaminimin e t
drejtave t njeriut dhe zhvillimit t gjykimit moral, prfundoi, se qndrimet ndaj
t drejtave t njeriut paraqesin nj sistem shumdimensional t bindjeve, q
prfshin lirin personale, kufizimet civile dhe sigurin sociale .
Kurse McFarland & Mathews (2005) gjetn tre faktor t rndsishme, kur flitet
pr t drejtat e njeriut, duke prfshir shnimin apo prparimin, prkushtimin
dhe kufizimet. Sipas tyre, kjo sht e arsyeja, se amerikant m tepr prkrahin
principet pr t drejtat e njeriut, sesa q jan t gatshm t shprehin vullnet pr
t investuar n resurse pr mbrojtjen e drejtave t njeriu. Ata gjithashtu gjetn,
se empatia, edukimi dhe njohurit e prgjithshme ndikojn n prkrahjen e t
drejtave t njeriut, por jo n prkushtimin ndaj tyre apo kufizimin e tyre, kurse
etnocentrizmi, dominanca sociale e dobsonin prkrahjen pr to. Pr m tepr,
Crowson & DeBacker (2008) analizuan aspektin ideologjik, bindjet dhe faktort
kognitivo-motivacional n parashikimin e qndrimeve pr t drejtat e njeriut
dhe ato civile. Ata gjetn, se personat, t cilt ishin prkrahs t krahut t djath
dhe kishin bindjen se struktura e njohjes ishte e thjesht, shnuan pik m t
larta n kufizimin e drejtave t njeriut dhe ato civile gjat lufts dhe terrorit,
kurse personat t cilt shnuan pik t larta n nevojn pr struktur kognitive
dhe kishin bindjen se njohja sht e konstruktuar nuk i kontribuan modelit n
mnyr t rndsishme (Crowson & DeBacker, 2008: 305).
Prfundimisht, studimet e bra nga Feldman (2003) dhe Rokeach (1973)
shpjegojn, se vlerat personale jan parashikues t mir t qndrimeve dhe
sjelljeve politike dhe sociale, prandaj mund t thuhet, se ato jan edhe t
ndrlidhura edhe me qndrimet ndaj t drejtave t njeriut. N kt drejtim
teoria e Schwartz (1992) mbi vlerat njerzore gjeti nj zbatueshmri t madhe n
studimin e qndrimeve dhe sjelljes njerzore n nj numr t konsiderueshm
t shoqrive npr bot. Schwartz (2006) dalloi 10 lloje t vlerave njerzore, q
i ndau n universalizm (t kuptuarit, vlersimin, tolerancn dhe prkujdesjen
pr mirqenien e t tjerve edhe natyrs); dashamirsia (prkujdesja dhe
ruajtja e personave me t cilt jemi n nj lidhje personale), konformizmi
(kufizimi i veprimeve, ndjenjave dhe impulseve, q kan t ngjar t shqetsojn
apo dmtojn t tjert dhe t cilat shkelin normat sociale); tradita (respekti,
prkushtimi dhe pranimi i zakoneve dhe ideve, t cilat promovohen nga kultura
tradicionale dhe religjioni); siguria (harmonia, siguria dhe stabiliteti n shoqri,
lidhje dhe n vete); fuqia (statusi social dhe prestigji, kontrolli dhe dominanca
mbi njerzit dhe resurset); arritja (suksesi personal i demonstruar prmes
kompetencave t prcaktuara nga standardet sociale); hedonizmi (knaqsia
me veten); stimulimi (eksitimi, risia dhe sfida n jet) dhe vetvendosja (t
menduarit dhe t vepruarit n mnyr t pavarur) (f. 3-6). Studimet tregojn, se
prderisa vetvendosja n vete prfshin motivin pr t qen i lir dhe i pavarur,
universalizmi dhe siguria jan vlera, q nxisin motivin pr egalitarizm dhe
kontroll social (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005: 1431). Kurse ndenja
e prgjegjsis personale ishte m tepr e lidhur me vlerat e dashamirsis,
universalizmit dhe vetvendosjes dhe m pak e lidhur me vlerat e fuqis dhe
siguris, ndrsa prkushtimi ndaj implementimit t drejtave t njeriut ishte e
lidhur m dashamirsin dhe universalizmin n rend t par dhe hedonizmin n
rend t dyt (Spini & Doise, 1998). S fundi, studimi i br nga Cohrs, Moschner,
Maes, & Kielmann (2007) analizoi, nse orientimi mbi t drejtat e njeriut mund t
shpjegohet si funksion i autoritarizmit t krahut t djatht, dominancs sociale,
vlerave humane njerzore dhe ideologjive politike. Rezultatet nga ky studim
gjetn se autoritarizmi i krahut t djatht, universalizmi dhe fuqia parashikuan
dimensione t qndrimeve ndaj t drejtave t njeriut, si dhe njohurit mbi t
drejtat e njeriut mund t parashikojn sjelljen (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, &
Kielmann, 2007:459).
131
Duke marr parasysh faktin, se n Kosov nuk kemi t dhna t tilla lidhur
me qndrimet dhe strukturn e qndrimeve ndaj t drejtave t njeriut, ky
studim kishte pr qllim t analizoj qndrimet ndaj t drejtave t njeriut dhe
ndrlidhjet e tyre me vlerat njerzore, duke u bazuar n teorin e Schwartz- it.
Metodologjia
N studim morn pjes 234 student t Fakultetit Filozofik (Departamenti i
Psikologjis dhe Departamenti i Sociologjis), Universiteti i Prishtins). Mostra u
przgjodh prmes mostrimit t konveniencs. Nga pikpamja gjinore 11.3% (N=27)
ishin meshkuj, ndrsa 87% (N=207) ishin femra dhe 1.7% (N=4) nuk iu prgjigjn
pyetjes pr gjinin. Mosha mesatare e studentve, q morn pjes n studim ishte
21 vje. Pyetsori i prdorur ka prfshir disa lloje pyetjesh si pyetjet demografike,
qndrimet ndaj drejtave t njeriut, vlerat njerzore dhe distanca sociale.
Qndrimet ndaj t drejtave t njeriut u matn prmes shkalls s hartuar nga
Moghaddam dhe Vuksanovic (1990), q prbhet prej 23 deklaratash, q kishin
t bnin me qndrimet ndaj liris s t shprehurit, t drejts pr emigrim, mos
ndalimit t librave/ filmave, kundr shprndarjes s ideve t huaja n klas, refuzimit
t puns, veprave artistike, censurimit, pasuris s patundshme, pensionimit t
obligueshm, sjelljeve t papranueshme, prdorimit t drogave, lagjet e izoluara,
grupet e rrezikshme, qasje n shrbime shndetsore falas, arti vulgar, t drejts pr
strehim dhe ushqim elementar, t drejts pr prostitucion, t drejts pr arrestimin
e radikalve, kundr pjesmarrjes s mazhorancs n politikat e qeveris, numrit t
fmijve, orientimit seksual dhe t drejtave gjinore. Studentt duhet t deklaronin,
se sa pajtoheshin me kto deklarata prej shkalls 1 definitivisht nuk pajtohem
deri n shkalln 9 definitivisht pajtohem.
Vlerat humane njerzore jan matur prmes shkalls s Shwartz (1992), q prbehet
nga 21 deklaratash, q kan t bjn me universalizm (t kuptuarit, vlersimin,
tolerancn dhe prkujdesjen pr mirqenien e t tjerve dhe natyrs); dashamirsia
(prkujdesja dhe ruajtja e personave m t cilt jemi n nj lidhje personale),
konformizmi (kufizimi i veprimeve, ndjenjave dhe impulseve, q kan t ngjar
t shqetsojn apo dmtojn t tjert dhe t cilat shkelin normat sociale); tradita
(respekti, prkushtimi dhe pranimi i zakoneve dhe ideve, t cilat promovohen nga
kultura tradicionale dhe religjioni); siguria (harmoni, siguri dhe stabilitet n shoqri,
lidhje dhe n vete); fuqia (statusi social dhe prestigji, kontrolli dhe dominanca mbi
njerzit dhe resurset); arritja (suksesi personal i demonstruar prmes kompetencave
t prcaktuara nga standardet sociale); hedonizmi (knaqsia me veten); stimulimi
(eksitimi, risia dhe sfida n jet) dhe vetvendosja (t menduarit dhe t vepruarit n
mnyr t pavarur). Pjesmarrsit do t duhej t rrumbullakosnin kto deklarata n
6 shkall, prej 1 njjt si un deri n 6 aspak nuk sht aspak si un.
Distanca sociale sht matur pr nj deklarate si: A mund t prmendni
ndonjrin, q nuk dshironi ta keni si fqinj? dhe pjesmarrsit do t duhej
t rrumbullaksonin grupet, t cilat nuk do t donin ti kishin fqinj si personat
e varur nga droga, njerz t nj racs ndryshe nga respondenti, persona t
infektuar me HIV, imigrant/puntor t huaj, homoseksual, njerz t besimit
tjetr fetar, persona me probleme me alkool, ifte t pamartuara, q jetojn
bashk, njerz, q flasin gjuh tjetr, serb, RAE, turq dhe boshnjak. Pr qllim t
analizs u krijua nj indeks, ku do respondent mund t shnonte 0, duke mos
patur kundr t ket asnj nga grupet e prmendura si fqinj, dhe me 10 pik, ku
nuk dshiron asnj nga grupet e prmendura t ket si fqinj.
Rezultatet
Qndrimet e studentve ndaj t drejtave t njeriut jan prezantuar detajisht pr
do pyetje prmes pikve t mesatares n figurn 1, ku pik t larta shprehin
qndrim pozitiv apo tolerant ndaj shtjes s pyetur. Ashtu si mund t shihet
nga kto rezultate, studentt shprehin qndrime pozitive ndaj barazis gjinore,
liris s shprehjes, t drejts pr emigrim, t drejts pr ushqim dhe strehim,
t drejts pr prkujdesje shndetsore, legalizimit t prostitucionit, numrit
t fmijve, orientimit seksual, t drejtave gjinore t barabarta. Rezultate
interesante jan treguar nga ana e studentve n lidhje me shprndarjen e ideve
t huaja n klas, refuzimit t puns, posedimit t veprave artistike, pensionimit
t obliguar, posedimit t drogave, arrestimit t radikalve dhe artit vulgar.
Mesataret e prgjigjeve n kto pyetje variojn prej 7.8 2.6, duke treguar, se
studentt shprehin relativisht qndrime tolerante apo neutrale ndaj pyetjeve t
lartprmendura.
Pr m tepr rezultate nga studimi tregojn, se 93.7 % (N=223) kan raportuar,
se nuk do t donin t kishin fqinj grupe si personat e varur nga droga, njerz t
racs s ndryshme, persona t infektuar me HIV, imigrant/puntor t huaj,
homoseksual, njerz t besimit tjetr fetar, persona me probleme me alkool,
ifte t pamartuara, q jetojn bashk, njerz, q flasin gjuh tjetr, serb, RAE;
turq dhe boshnjak. Figura 2 tregon prqindjen e studentve, q nuk preferojn
ti ken si fqinj grupe t caktuara t qytetarve.
Pr analiz t mtutjeshme t variablave t interesimit t ktij studimi, u prdor
korrelacioni i Pearsonit, q rezultoi me nj korrelacion negativ midis qndrimeve
ndaj t drejtave t njeriut dhe matjes s distancs sociale [ r= -.171, p<0.013].
Hulumtimet e tjera tregojn, se qndrimet ndaj t drejtave t njeriut kan t bjn
me bindje t ndryshme. N kt kuptim, u b grupimi dhe analizimi i qndrimeve
n baz t katr faktorve: siguris sociale, barazis, kufizimeve civile dhe
privatsis. N kuadr t siguris sociale jan grupuar qndrimet, q kishin t
133
bnin me nj standard t caktuar jetese (ushqim, strehim, pun dhe shrbime
shndetsore falas). N kuadr t kufizimeve civile jan grupuar qndrimet, q
kan t bjn kufizimet individuale dhe politike, q shpesh konsiderohen si e
kundrta e t drejtave t njeriut (censurimi, shprndarja e ideve t huaja). N
kuadr t barazis u grupuan qndrimet, q kishin t bnin me t drejtn pr me
qen t barabart pa dallim feje, race, gjinie apo bindjeje (orientimi seksual dhe
t drejtat gjinore). N kuadr t privatsis u kategorizuan qndrimet, q kishin
t bnin me t drejtat individuale t secilit prej nesh.
Analiza korrelative midis ktyre kategorive t qndrimeve tregon, se ekziston
nj ndrlidhje pozitive midis siguris sociale, kufizimeve civile dhe privatsis.
Respektivisht shihet nj korrelacion relativisht i dobt, por sinjifikant n mes
ktyre faktorve, q sillet prej r=0.134 deri r=0.312. Nj analiz e mtutjeshme
ka pasur pr qllim analizimin e ndrlidhjes s ktyre faktorve me distancn
sociale. Rezultatet nga analiza korrelative tregojn, se kishte vetm nj
korrelacion negativ t dobt, por sinjifikant midis barazis dhe distancs sociale
[r=-0.150 p<0.05], duke theksuar faktin, se me rritjen e prkrahjes ndaj barazis,
ulet distanca sociale me grupet e caktuara si personat e varur nga droga, njerz
t racs s ndryshme, persona t infektuar me HIV, imigrant/puntor t huaj,
homoseksual, njerz t besimit tjetr fetar, persona me probleme me alkool,
ifte t pamartuara, q jetojn bashk, njerz, q flasin gjuh tjetr, serb, RAE,
turq dhe boshnjak.
Figura 1 - Mesatarja e pyetjeve, q kan matur qndrimet ndaj t drejtave t njeriut
Figura 2 - Prqindja e mostrs, q ka deklaruar, se nuk dshiron t ket si fqinj
grupe t caktuara t qytetarve
Nga shqyrtimi i literaturs prkatse, del n pah, se theksi vihet n mnyr t
veant n analizimin e vlerave humane njerzore si nj ndr aspektet mjaft t
rndsishme n krijimin e qndrimeve ndaj sjelljeve t njeriut si dhe parashikimit
t sjelljes. Analiza e mesatareve t vlerave humane sht paraqitur n tabeln
2. Ashtu si mund t shihet, mesatarja m e lart sht vrejtur pr vlerat, q
kan t bjn me universalizm, dashamirsi, siguria dhe vetvendosje, kurse
mesatare m t ult kan treguar vlerat, q kan t bjn me fuqin, hedonizmin
dhe stimulimin.
Tabela 1. Mesatarja e pikve mesatare t vlerave t matura me pyetsorin e
Schwartz-it
Mesatarja Devijimi standard
Vetvendosja 10.19 1.42
Fuqia 6.12 2.08
Universalizmi 15.71 1.92
Arritja 9.64 1.75
Siguria 10.12 1.66
Konformizmi 7.97 2.28
Tradita 9.37 1.90
Hedonizmi 7.28 2.47
Stimulimi 8.39 2.15
Dashamirsia 10.78 1.28
135
Analizat e korrelacionit t Pearsonit n mes t pikve t distancs sociale dhe
vlerave t Schwartz-it treguan korrelacion negativ me pikt e vlerave pr tradit
[ r= -.168, p<0.010], me vlerat pr konformitet [ r= -.155, p<0.017], me vlerat pr
siguri [ r= -.162, p<0.013] dhe vlerat pr arritje [ r= -.144, p<0.028].
Pr nj analiz t mtutjeshme t vlerave njerzore dhe drejtave t njeriut sht
br grupimi i vlerave n kategori. Vet - prsosmria [self-transendence], ku
jan kategorizuar vlerat, q kan t bjne me universalizm dhe dashamirsi;
konservatorizmi, ku jan kategorizuar vlerat, q kan t bjn me traditn,
konformizm dhe siguri; vet-prmirsimi [self- enhancement], ku jan grupuar
vlerat, q kan t bjn me arritje dhe fuqi; si dhe ndryshimi/toleranca, ku jan
grupuar vlera, q kishin t bjn me stimulimin dhe vetvendosjen.
Analiza korrelacionale e ktyre kategorive t vlerave tregon nj ndrlidhje
midis vet- prsosmris dhe konservatorizmit [r=0.346, p<0.01], si dhe vet-
prsosmris dhe ndryshimit/tolerancs [r=0.358, p<0.01]. Korrelacion pozitiv
sht vrejtur edhe midis vlerave, q kan t bjne m vet-prmirsimin dhe
ndryshimin/tolerancn [r=0.278, p<0.001]. Kurse analizimi i distancs sociale
n raport me kategorit e vlerave njerzore prmes analizs korrelacionale
nxjerr n pah ekzistencn e nj korrelacioni pozitiv relativisht t dobt, por
sinjifikant midis konservatorizmi dhe distancs sociale [ r=0.204, p<0.002].
Prfundimisht, distanca sociale duket t ket nj ndrlidhje negative m
qndrimet ndaj drejtave t njeriut [r=-0.146, p<0.035], duke theksuar faktin, se
me ngritjen e prkrahjes ndaj t drejtave t njeriut zvoglohet distanca sociale.
Kurse distanca sociale duket t ket nj korrelacion sinjifikant dhe mjaft t
fuqishm n rastin, kur kemi t bjm me etnitetet e tjera [r=0.804, p<0.01] dhe
kur kemi t bjm me etnit, q flasin gjuh tjetr [r=0.755, p<0.01].
Diskutimi
Ky studim kishte pr qllim t analizonte qndrimet ndaj t drejtave t njeriut
n lidhje me koncepte relativisht abstrakte, si jan vlerat dhe distanca sociale
prmes prdorimit t instrumenteve prkatse, t cilat jan prdorur pr her
t par n nj mostr shqipfolse.
Rezultatet e ktij studimi tregojn, se ajo, q mostra e studentve t przgjedhur
moi m s shumti ishin t drejtat elementare njerzore pr lirin e shprehjes,
t drejtn n strehim edhe ushqim, t drejtn n prkujdesje shndetsore, t
drejtn n emigrim, t drejtn n numrin e fmijve dhe t drejtat gjinore. Gjetje
interesante jan niveli i lart i mesatareve pr pyetjet, q kan matur qndrimet
pr shtjet n lidhje me orientimin seksual dhe prostitucion, duke marr
parasysh kontekstin patriarkal dhe tradicional n Kosov. Pik m t larta n
kto dy shtje mund t ken rezultuar, pasi studimi sht br me student
t psikologjis dhe sociologjis, t cilt mund t ken qndrim m tolerant si
rezultat i edukimit t tyre.
Rezultatet pr vlerat njerzore tregojn, se universalizmi, dashamirsia,
hedonizmi, siguria dhe vetvendosja jan vlerat prioritare, q udhheqin
studentt e psikologjis dhe t sociologjis. Nj moment i rndsishm, q do
t duhej t ket ndikuar n kto rezultate dhe i cili duhet t theksohet, ka t
bj me faktin, se mostra e ktij studimi me m se 80% sht femra. Shqyrtimi
i literaturs lidhur me rezultatet tregojn ngjashmri me studimin e br nga
Shwartz & Rubel (2005) n m se 68 vende t bots, ku ata theksojn femrat
kan tendenc t theksojn dhe t jen t udhhequra nga vlerat si universalizmi
dhe dashamirsia. N ann tjetr, mesataret shum t ulta pr vlerat si fuqia,
hedonizmi, arritja dhe stimulimi mund t shpjegohen me faktin se kto vlera
jan vlera tipike pr meshkuj (Shwartz, 2006: 10).
Gjithashtu, mund t vrehet mesatare m e lart n krahasim me vlerat e tjera
ka shnuar universalizmi. Shwartz (2006), duke analizuar edukimin dhe vlerat
njerzore, thekson, se universalizmi si vler fillon t rritet prej edukimit t
mesm dhe sht zakonisht i lart tek ata, q ndjekin studimet universitare, q
sht karakteristik edhe e mostrs s ktij studimi.
N analizimin e rezultateve, q kan t bjn me vlerat dhe distancn sociale,
shohim, se konservatorizmi dhe distanca sociale kan nj korrelacion pozitiv.
Kto rezultate theksojn, se prkrahja pr traditn, konformizmin dhe sigurin
rrit distancn sociale me grupet t caktuara si personat e varur nga droga,
njerzit e racs s ndryshme, persona t infektuar me HIV, imigrant/puntor
t huaj, homoseksual, njerz t besimit tjetr fetar, persona me probleme me
alkool, ifte t pamartuara, q jetojn bashk, njerz,q flasin gjuh tjetr, serb,
RAE, turq dhe boshnjak.
Prfundimisht, ky studim, q sht br pr her t par n Kosov, ofron t
dhna prshkruese lidhur me qndrimet ndaj t drejtave t njeriut dhe vlerave
njerzore. Por si i till ka limitimet e veta. S pari, mostra e prdorur n studim
sht mostr e vogl e konveniencs, q nuk ofron t dhna mjaftueshm
reprezentative pr studentt apo edhe pr popullatn n prgjithsi.
Hulumtimi dshmon, se qndrimet ndaj drejtave t njeriut mund t maten dhe
mund t japin indikacione, kur politikbrsit apo hulumtuesit, q dshirojn
t kuptojn m hollsisht qndrimet e qytetarve posarisht pr shtje
m specifike, pr shembull liria e t shprehurit. Pasi shtjet m specifike do
t mundsonin t krijojn instrumente, q matin nj shtje specifike dhe
mundsis, q shtja e njjt t matet n disa dimensione, pr shembull n
media, n institucione edukative, etj.
137
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Crowson, H. M. (2004), Human Rights Attitudes: Dimensionality and
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Crowson, H. M. & DeBacker, T. K. (2008), Belief, Motivational, and Ideological
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Cohrs, J. C., Moschner, B., Maes, J., & Kielmann, S. (2007),Determinants of
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Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 165). San Diego:
Academic Press.
Schwartz, S. H. (2006), Basic Human Values: Theory, measurement and
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September 3, 2013 from http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.

139
Silence versus recognition of survivors of sexual violence in Kosovo Linda Gusia
Linda Gusia

Silence versus recognition of survivors
of sexual violence in Kosovo
Abstract
This paper looks at two issues: firstly, the legal framework of reparation for
survivors of sexual violence and, secondly, the public portrayal and visibility of
the former. Both of these issues are subject to contestations by politicians, the
media involved, NGOs and the so-called local and the international community.
As Cynthia Enloe notes, making rape visible as a matter of political and legal
concern can be dangerously easy (2000: 1089).
1
Her insights strongly resonate
with public discussions in Kosova over the question why war time rape is not
included in the current legal framework. I would like to argue that this discussion
and the question of visibility and the existing legal framework for wartime
survivors of sexual violence becomes especially complex and difficult, because it
is entangled in competing public discourses of nationalism and remembrances
2
For more than 13 years, since the end of the war, womens experiences of war -
particularly that of rape - has been silenced and absent from public discussions
in Kosova. The master-narrative of the national identity project is based on the
memory of war (Di Lellio and Schwandner-Sievers 2006). However, this narrative
has persistently marginalized not only women (Krasniqi 2007), but also ordinary
This paper aims at looking at two issues:
firstly, the legal framework of reparation for
survivors of sexual violence and, secondly,
the public portrayal and visibility of the
former. Both of these issues are subject
to contestations by politicians, the media
involved, NGOs and the so-called local and
the international community. The master-
narrative of war created and shaped a
particular narration of war based on heroic
masculinity which in turn renders visibility to
particular articulations of national memory,
where some stories are mythologized and
glorified while others are silence and made
invisible. In Kosova there was a conspicuous
lack of mechanisms for dealing with the past
and providing a better sense of social justice,
which disposed the visibility of war time sexual
violence. The historic momentum gained
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in making war
time sexual violence visible and punishable,
as well as crating an understanding and the
recognition of sexual violence during the war
as crime against humanity and genocide
seems to be short lived when it comes to
Kosova. The effort for legal recognition and
reparation for survivors has however helped
revitalize the questions at stake and opened
public discussion among women and human
right activists on the issue.
This paper also reflects on challenges of
recognition and visibility of war time sexual
violence in Kosova as well as general discourse
and public rhetoric of victim /hero dichotomy
that has been prevailing in the articulation of
war time sexualised violence.
civilians account of the past. In effect, this mnemonic hegemony has fostered
political and social changes that elevate different kinds of patriarchalities. In
contrast to the visible landscape of war memories that portray almost exclusively
male freedom fighters as fallen heroes, it can be assumed that in social reality it
was a disproportionately high number of civilians who lost their live in the last
Kosova war. Figures state that since the Second World War civilians constitute
more than 90% of casualties.
3
In the specific context of post-war Kosova one also needs to consider the long-
term impact of the military and humanitarian international intervention and
state-building project, which did not allow for a critical and differentiated
revisiting of the past and thereby promoting a sense of social justice and
closure. The general framework influenced by the international community
and accepted by local politicians in Kosova has been one of moving forward and
looking towards the future, rather than critically dealing with the past. Security
and peace were regarded as paramount to justice, an approach that did create a
sense of historical limbo in that the social and individual experience of war felt
erased for many. There was a conspicuous lack of mechanisms for dealing with
the past and providing a better sense of social justice. These mechanisms could
have created or shaped alternative narrations beyond the dominant narrative
of heroic masculinity. Performing messaging work
4
institutions such as war
crimes tribunals, truth and reconciliation commissions, and other mechanisms of
transitional justice have complex objectives as transitional justice mechanisms
can be seen as performing or enacting certain kinds of understandings not just
of the issues at hand, but also the larger processes of transition; the rebirth of
the nation after a period of political violence/conflict
5
Although the ICTY and
EULEX prosecuted top commanders of the KLA, this selection arguably only
reinforced a sense of parallelism, rather than providing a space for actually
dealing with the past.
Meanwhile, in Kosova on the ground the experience of war was privatized in
the sense of whoever could afford it or had political power would contribute to
the building of memory in terms of heroic masculine self-assertion and thereby
boosting their political legitimacy or social status. (see Politics and Practices of
Collective Memory, Alter Habitus)
The so called pantheon of male heroes to borrow the term from Mayer
(2000;12) structures and shapes national memory and identity marginalizing
and narrowing women experiences and roles allowing the image of dedicated,
suffering mother as a foremost to the national imagining. Ground breaking
text Women Nation- State, Fyola Anthias and Nira Yuval Davis elaborated five
ways in which women figured in the national project as; biological reproducers
of the ethnic collectivity; reproducers of the boundaries between ethnic/
national groups; agents in the ideological reproduction of the groups ethnical
and cultural identity; symbolic signifiers of group difference; and active
141
participant in national identity struggle (1987;7)
6
It is this juxtaposition of
women as cultural carriers, markers of boundaries as well as male honor and
symbols of nation that enables war time sexual violence. As women embody
these borderers (Yuval-Davis, Anthias, 1989, Menon,Bhastin, 1998) they have
symbolically become places of traffic for the exchange of messages by men and
enemy nations, as their bodies become ceremonial battlefields
7

Furthermore as markers and as property mothers, daughters and wives require
in turn the defense and protection of patriotic sonsjust as territory of the nation
must be protected by male soldiers and national leaders, womens bodies must
be protected by fathers, husbands and the (national) state
8
As the concepts
of boundaries, belonging and honor may become the base for revenge and
embellished nationalism it can also become a crucial site of forgetting (Renan
1882, 5)
9
and marginalization.
Endangered ideal of heroic masculinity is however not the only explanation for
lack of political commitment and neither is masculine tarnished honor, nor the
so-called patriarchal culture, the only omission for legal and public recognition
of war time rape. Establishing legal framework for reparation of war time sexual
survivors and institutional recognition of this issue would also entail public
acknowledgement that the Albanian women were not the only ones raped
during the war. In addition the presence and involvement of the international
community that has occupied a central role not only in dealing with past but
in daily local politics in the past decade in Kosovo, complements the existing
patriarchy and with the persisting logic of moving forward which adds to the
myriad of reasons for sweeping the war time rapes from national/international
agenda and memory.
Ultimately, as Mayer (2000,18) points out the interplay between nation, gender
and sexuality and in the mutual roles that they play in constructing each other,
power becomes the most important narrative because power, more than any
other discourse, determines the hierarchical relations within each of these
discourses and among them.
10

In Kosovo, the Law 04/L-054 on the Status and the Rights of the Martyrs,
Invalids, Veterans, Members of Kosova Liberation Army, Civilian Victims of War
and their Families that has officially entered in effect on January 15 2012 is the
primary piece of legislation that regulates reparations for civilian victims of war
and their families. It defines three categories of civilian victims of war: civilian
invalids of war, civilian hostages of war, and civilian victims of war. This law
does not specify or address in any way survivors of sexual violence or whether
they should be considered as civilian invalids, civilian hostages of war, or civilian
victims of war.
11
As a consequence, in Kosova survivors of sexual violence are not
recognized as category and are not entitled to any compensation, reparation or
the rehabilitation services for the violations of their rights.
KDU 176.316.485.26
Even where the law would, in theory, apply, women are not treated as a subject
but as somebodys property and a patriarchal mind-set reproduced. This
became most evident to me when, only one day after a heated parliamentary
debate about amending the law on war time sexualized violence, I talked to one
woman survivor of sexual violence about what the reparation law states: If I had
lost my husband during the war then that would have been acknowledged and
accounted for, I would now have the benefit pay as a widow. But my suffering as
a woman is not recognized by the state, although the torture that I have endured
during my captivity by Serbian police resulted in dialyses because of damaged
kidneys and other injures
12
In fact, women in Kosova today can only benefit
under the rubric of government welfare (social protection) schemes to address
the needs of poor or vulnerable persons.
Additionally, the law on Status and the Rights of the Martyrs, Invalids, Veterans,
Members of Kosova Liberation Army, Civilian Victims of War and their Families,
enable different distribution for KLA martyrs and different for civilian victims of
war. According to the law, families of victims receive 135Euro/month, in contrast
with the families of KLA martyrs who receive 385 Euro/month
13
Different
status and distribution that this law foresees for martyrs, invalids and veterans
and different one for civilian victims is another example that emphasizes the
differences between heroic/ militarized masculinity and victimhood as feminine
characteristic that suggests how this national memory is so closely linked to
the concept of heroism making the more complex underling dynamics between
gender and nation visible.
The exclusion and the lack of recognition of sexualized violence persist even
with the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the recent adoption of UN
Security Council Resolution 1820. According to United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1820, sexual violence is conflict-related, when [it is] used
or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians, or as
part of widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations.
In 2005 the United Nations General Assembly also adopted the Basic Principles
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law. The Basic Principles represent the most
comprehensive international guidelines and principles on remedy and
reparation.
14

Although the principles and norms of such international laws are broadly
accepted as the basis of legal action and state responsibility in Kosova, they are
not always translated into legally binding obligations in national law. Local and
international politicians in Kosova frequently make rhetorical commitments to
womens right and equality. However, there is a huge gap of implementation in
practice of such principles and guidelines.
143
In my opinion, placing Martyrs, Invalids, Veterans, Members of the Kosova
Liberation Army, Civilian Victims of War in one legal category is highly problematic,
although it maintains so in Kosova unquestioned today. Similarly, a sole focus
on womens war experience of sexual violence flattens any differentiated and
deeper understanding, as well as the recognition of, women experience, given
that a majority of women who experienced sexualized violence usually also
experienced other forms of torture and violence. The question arising would be,
whether it would have been more effective to have created/enacted a law solely
for civilian survivors (and subsume those of sexual violence underneath this
category) rather than amending the existing Law on the Status and the Rights
of the Martyrs, Invalids, Veterans, Members of the Kosova Liberation Army,
Civilian Victims of War to include war victims of sexual violence. In fact, focus
group research prepared for Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
suggests that some survivors prefer the term invalid, thus indicating their
preference for being incorporated into an existing category in the Law on the
Status and the Rights of the Martyrs, Invalids, Veterans, Members of the Kosova
Liberation Army, Civilian Victims of War, which would thus provide them with a
greater level of anonymity.
15
NGOs involved in lobbying for womens recognition in this Law, (KWN, Medica
Kosova, KRTC) have adopted the approach of do no harm that they consciously
want to avoid in further harming the survivors. In the context of compensation
for crimes of war-related sexual violence in Kosovo an issue remains; how to
administer benefits in a way that would minimize the possibility that survivors
are identified by the community-at-large and avoid further stigmatization . This
has been the main argument in including war time sexualized violence under
this law and not enacting a separate one. I concur with their general stand of the
need to break the silence which consolidates womens inequality in both wider
society and at this political level.
The history of war time sexualized violence has been traditionally that of
overlooking and invisibility even when it was massive and systematic like in
World War II only in Berlin where less conservative estimates cite the number as
900 000 raped and abused women
16
enslavement of 200 000-400 000 comfort
woman by the Japanese army, Nanking( estimates that 20 000 women were
raped only during the first month) or the rape of 200 000 Bengali women during
the war of independence from Pakistan
17
. War time sexualized violence had
been perceived as side effect of the war and collateral damage. This perception
reflected also international legal frameworks where rape is a criminal act in most
of these countries, but it seems that it fails to be recognized and punished during
the conflict. Before 1995 The Hague Convention of 1907 does not mention
rape but Art. 46 provide that family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and
private property must be protected, as well as that religious convictions and
practice must be respected. The 4
th
Geneva Convention of 1948 mentions rape
and enforced prostitution explicitly in Art. 27, but again characterizes them as
honor crimes: Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their
honor, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent
assault.
Chastity and honor are sought to be protected in the Geneva Conventions by
viewing rape as the lesser crime under humanitarian law. Furthermore, under
these Conventions rape is not specified in the list of crimes considered grave
breaches, which includes willful killings, torture or inhumane treatment and
willful causing of great suffering or serious injury to the body or health
18
.
As Copelon reminds us, the concept of rape as a crime against dignity and honor
as opposed to a crime of violence is a core problem adding further that loss of
honor implies loss of station and respect, reinforcing the social view often
internalized by women that rape women is dishonorable. While the concept of
dignity potentially embraces more profound concerns, the emphasis on honor
obfuscates the fact that rape is fundamentally violence against women violence
against womens body, autonomy, integrity, selfhood, security, and self esteem as
well as her standing in community
19
.
The statute of International Tribunal lists rape as a crime against humanity
that was first recognized in the charter and judgment of the Nuremberg Trial
although nobody was put in trial for rape during these proceedings. International
Tribunal states that rape is a crime against humanity if: 1. The conduct was part
of a widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian population;
and 2. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of, or intended the
conduct to be part of, a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population. It stipulates that rape is a war crime under the following
conditions: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with
an international armed conflict; and the perpetrator was aware of factual
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict
20
. The statute
of the International Tribunal created by the United Nation to prosecute war
crimes in former Yugoslavia included the systematic and widespread character
of sexualized assaults in Bosnia and Herzegovina
21
. United Nation Commission of
Experts
22
that have suggested to neglect what they termed opportunistic rape
and to focus the investigation and prosecution on the use of rape and sexual
assault as a method of ethnic cleansing.
23
The United Nations Security Council
further notes that such violence can constitute a war crime, crime against
humanity or constitute an act of genocide.
24
Until 1995 war rapes, although recognized, were not persecuted. General
perception about rape was that of an unfortunate side effect of the war. ICTY
created a precedent with a case of Bosnia, naming rape and sexual assault as a
method of ethnic cleansing.
145
War time sexual violence
25
as a gross human right violation was put into
international legal agenda by feminists, journalists and human rights activists
as the mass rape was reported in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the visibility
and attention became a site of activism and international reform of legal system
and a hub for important feminist debate and theory. More importantly it helped
a reconceptualization of war time rape (Copelon, Buss, MacKinnon, Zarkov).
Making the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina one of the two entities that
compose the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is the only post-conflict zone in
the world where rape survivors are explicitly recognized as war victims and can
thus claim a war pension.
26

The historic momentum gained in Bosnia and Herzegovina in making war time
sexual violence visible and punishable, as well as crating an understanding and
the recognition of sexual violence during the war as crime against humanity and
genocide seems to be short lived when it comes to war time sexual violence in the
seceding countries of former Yugoslavia, like Kosova. Even though Human Right
Watch reported that rape and other forms of sexual violence used in Kosovo in
1999 as a weapon of war and instrument of systematic ethnic cleansing, rape
is used deliberately as an instrument to terrorize the civilian population, extort
money from the families and push people to flee their homes
27
. International
and local journalist during 1998- 1999 reported on continuous rape by Serbian
paramilitary that has previously served in Bosnia
28
. Local women and human
rights organization like the Center for Protection of Women and Children were
documenting and working with survivors of sexual violence even during the
conflict
29
. Nevertheless, war time sexualized violence slipped from international
and local agenda. In turn, virtually no public institution dealt with war time
sexualized violence in Kosova. Locating all the needs of women who have
experienced direct violence in two main NGOs Medica Mondiale (that is focused
only on women) and Kosova Rehabilitation Center for Tortured Victims (KRCT),
they became the only place of treating psychological and physical traumas of
women during the war. By relocating and isolating womens experiences in NGO
sector and removing it from public view and institutions, the position of the
survivor was marginalized and de-politicized. Looming, the so-called womens
issues in private domain as less serious and significant not only silences the
issue by making it invisible but also reinforces patriarchal structure and public/
private divide. As Seifert notes by being marginalized, suppressed, or even
naturalized rape as an extreme and structural act of violence disappears from
cultural memory, the experiences, the reality and thereby the subjectivity of
women is denied.
30
Why did war time sexualized violence lost the momentum
gained in 1995, does denying and silencing the war time sexualized violence
makes Kosova more patriarchal then Bosnia, is the question asked by many
looking at these issues. Is cult of heroism and logic of moving forward creating
particular contexts that in turn create a different narration of war and conflict
neutralizing and silencing particular voices? Or has it become very difficult to
claim genocidal ethnic rape and recognition of rape as violence and war crime
becomes link to particular understanding and division of conflict versus war.
And gender aspect of wartime rape a complex and difficult to conceptualize.
The effort for legal recognition and reparation for survivors has helped revitalize
the questions at stake and opened public discussion among women and human
right activists. For example, in 2013 the KRTC has started a campaign Hear my
voice with the purpose of awareness-raising and de-stigmatization of sexual
violence by breaking the public silence on the issue. However, the ways in which
efforts are made in breaking the silence and the ways in which we articulate and
conceptualize wartime sexualized violence affects the ways of thinking about
the issue as well as changes general understanding .Unfortunately, the image
of heroism and sacrifice for the nation has prevailed in these recent awareness
rising campaigns. The rhetoric used has named the survivors of sexual violence
as the nations heroines. From one perspective, this could be viewed as just
another attempt to dismiss the image of victimhood and support a notion of
agency for the survivors through using existing notions of patriotic sacrifice and
a contribution to the national liberation war; the cult of heroism that has been
built for past fourteen years in Kosovo. Arguably, such rhetorical reproduction
of the prevailing master narrative could be excused in a societal context in which
the general assumption was that of being subjected to sexual violence in war is
a fate worse than death. However, I regard this rhetoric as a highly problematic
one in so many levels as it reproduces a narrow understanding of the sexual
violence as a crime against Our Women as well as ultimately reinforcing an
essentialized image of gender roles where women contribute with their body
and man with action. It is the same rhetoric that Indira Gandhi used when she
called the survivors of wartime sexual violence in Bangladesh national heroines.
That same rhetoric didnt prove effective in creating an agency or de-stigmatizing
the women as victims. Moreover, such well-intended discourse reveals the
structural rigidities which affect the survivors position (as described above) in
that it seeks to reproduce an essentialised role of women in society and wartime
while it leaves the existing gender roles in society unquestioned.
How do we then narrate and articulate wartime sexualized violence in Kosova?
When attempting to challenge the existing discourses, it has first to be taken
into consideration that the public rhetoric has focused disproportionately on
the ethnic rationale of mass rapes. Without venturing into elaboration of two
major theoretic frameworks in which wartime rape has been articulated within
feminist discourse that in which it emphasizes gendered approach and is
contrasted by genocidal rape
31
(see also Zarkov, Buss) . The existing theoretical
framework creates a big challenge for all of us involved by creating either /or
approach, and adds an emphasis on genocidal ethnic aspect, it minimizes
and diminishes gender nature of the harm women face in a war. The difficult
task, Enloe suggests, is to make visible the mass rapes of women by men as
147
a systematic weapon of war in a way that does not turn those raped women
into new commodities: commodities for our angst; commodities for human
rights activism; commodities, especially, for galvanizing the next generations of
nationalists to seek revenge (2004: 1778). Enloe, C.
32
It can be considered a progress that human right activist and feminist that
contribute to challenging such narrow perspective are not speaking in one voice.
Much conceptual and policy work remains to be done for women in Kosovo and
developments are far from perfect, but they offer a departure from the political
and public silence on the issue.
References
1 Cynthia Enloe Maneuvres: the international politics of militarizing womens lives,
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.(2000)
2 (when I talk about remembrance I mean include both dealing with a past, legal
framework practice of commemorations
3 UNICEF 1989 Civilian fatalities in wartime have climbed from 5 per cent at the turn
of the century ... to more than 90 per cent in the wars of the 1990
4 Doris Buss term
5 Doris Buss Performing Legal Order: Some Feminist Thoughts on International
Criminal Law International Criminal Law Review 11 (2011) 409
6 Women Nation State ed Nira Yuval Davis and Floya Anthias Macimillian press LTD
(1989)p 7
7 Biljana Kasic The dynamic of Identifcation within Nationalist Discourse, From Gender
to Nation ed Rada Ivekovic and Julie Mostov. 2002 A Longo Editore
8 Julie Mostov, Politics of national identity in the former Yugoslavia ed Tamar Mayer
Gender Ironies of Nationalism Sexising the Nation Routledge 2000 p. 90
9 Ernest Renan What is Nation? 1882 p 5
10 Tamar Mayer Gender Ironies of Nationalism Sexising the Nation Routledge 2000 p
19
11 Offce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Healing the Spirit; Reparation for
Survivors of Sexualized Violence Related to the Confict in Kosovo
12 Interview with survivor of sexualized violence in Gjakova 2012
13 CRDP Time to stop and Listen Needs assessment of Kosovo Victims p 50
14 The United Nations Offce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
subsequently developed a guide on Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Confict States: Repara-
tions Program, which provide practical guidance on how to render operative the Basic
Principles.
15 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Healing the Spirit; Reparation
for Survivors of Sexualized Violence Related to the Conflict in Kosovo
16 War and Rape Preminary Analyses Ruth Seifert in Mass Rape The War against
Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina Ed Alexandra Stiglmayer University of Nebraska
Press, Lincoln and London p.54
17 Rhoanda Copelon Gendered War Crimes;Reconceptualising Rape in Time of War p
197
18 Geneva Convencion IV, art 147
19 Rhoanda Copelon Gendered War Crimes;Reconceptualising Rape in Time of War
p201
20 UN Assembly of States. Elements of Crime. Official Records of the Assembly of
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
21 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the ICTY web-
site: www.icty.org/sections/LegalLibrary/Statuteof tribunal
22 On 6 October 1992, the United Nations (UN) Security Council requested the Secretary-
General to establish a Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information on
crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in the territory of the former Yugo-
slavia.
23 Final Report of the Commissions of experts -ICTY (1992), Annex IX, p. 9, 10
24 United Nations Security Council. Security Council Resolutions 1325. 2000; Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1820. 2008; and Security Council Resolution 1960.
25 The statutes and case law of the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia, and the ICC Rome Statute, when taken collectively, defne sexual
violence to encompass: rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, en-
forced sterilization and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, which
may include indecent assault, traffcking, inappropriate medical examinations and strip
searches.
26 Medica Mondiale ...and it dose not happend to annyone anywhere in the world The
Trouble with Rape Trials Views of Witnesses,Prosecutors and Judges on Prosecuting
Sexualised Violence during the War in the former Yogoslavia December 2009
27 Human Rights Watch Under Orders p130
28 During the conflict (1997-1999) I was translating for Washington Post correspon-
dents in Kosovo and we had interviewed several women who were sexually vio-
lated from Serbian Paramiletary
29 Interview with Sevdije Ahmeti April 2013
30 Ruth Seifert War and Rape Preminary Analyses in Mass Rape The War against
Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina Ed Alexandra Stiglmayer University of Nebraska
Press, Lincoln and London p67
31 Vesna Kesic Muslim women, Croatian women Serbian women, Albanian women, Eu-
rozine
32 Cynthia Enloe (2000) Maneuvres: the international politics of militarizing womens
lives, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press
149
Between the oda and state-building: Womens collective action in post-war Kosovo Alma Vardari-Kesler
Alma Vardari-Kesler
Between the oda and state-building:
Womens collective action in post-war Kosovo
Abstract

Introduction
This paper attempts to examine the processes underway in post-war Kosovo
(2000-2006), in the absence of a definition of state and territorial borders,
before the declaration of the independence (February 12, 2008). In the absence
of a states definition and territorial borders I explore the framing processes
through the study of the Albanian women narratives, shaped in the course of
their collective action in Kosovo.
According to the definition of Weber, a state is an entity with monopoly over
the legitimate use of force. However, the international administration authority
in Kosovo (UNMIK & KFOR), which had the monopoly over the legitimate use
of force, in reality were perceived by virtue of its definition as temporary and
foreign. Despite the establishment of a local government, it too constituted a
temporary institution but even more important, lacked real authority, as it
was dependent on UNMIK for every decision. Therefore, the main tenet of this
paper is that in light of the reality of the democratization processes, women
activists called on the rhetoric of democratization and change in the struggle
for equal rights. They framed the promotion of womens rights as an essential
precondition to the democratization processes, thus proving to the international
community to be worthy of the independent state. Moreover, due to the cultural
constraints and the understanding of the political context, they concentrated
their activity on the private space, i.e. the family, as the most important structure
in the Albanian society.
This paper examines the processes underway
in post-war Kosovo (2000-2006), before the
declaration of the independence (February
12, 2008). In the absence of a defined state
status, I explore the framing processes
through the study of womens collective
action in Kosovo. Based on an ethnographic
and text analysis research, the author argues
that in the context of the international
authority and state-building, women activists
have framed their rights as the essential
precondition to an advanced family and a
progressed society, constructing womens
role as the key figure of the democratization
processes in pre-independence Kosovo. In
the process, due to the cultural constraints
and womens understanding of the political
reality, they have targeted the private space,
i.e. the family, as the essential structure of the
society in Kosovo, as opposed to state agencies
as maintained in the academic literature.
150 NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014 KDU 305.055.2 (496.51) | 396.1 (496.51)
Feminist criticism of nationalism has revealed its gendered discourses and
practices. Some feminists scholars emphasize women within the national project
as either absent or stereotyped (Moghadam, 1994; Jawayardena, 1986),
while according to other approaches women are carriers and transmitters
(cultural and biological) of the national collectivity (Yuval-Davis, 1997; West
1997; Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1998). Others like Virginia Woolf, Cynthia
Enloe and Anne McClintock, have pointed to the bases of gender difference, and
to the masculine appropriation of national agency as opposed to femininity.
Throughout the feminist literature, nationalism has been portrayed as a male
construction that constantly oppresses women, representing the nationalist
identity as a masculine prerogative.
This picture omits the womens possibility of acting upon nationalist identity, as
it contradicts the authentic feminist identity, which is based on gender per se
(Hasso, 1998). In the light of these controversies, this paper takes upon gender
as an essential dimension of the examination of nations symbolic boundaries,
while trying to present them as symbols, agents and narrators of their own
nationalism. As such, I explore the framing processes through the study of the
women activists, shaped in the course of their collective action in post-war
Kosovo. This paper is based on the analysis of in-depth interviews conducted
in July-August 2004 and May 2005, with nearly 30 women activists, participant
observations, movements documents, and secondary sources.
1. Dual Authority, the rhetoric of democratization and
state-building in Kosovo
It was the international intervention in the name of protecting human rights
that put an end to the policy of ethnic cleansing, implemented by the former
president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic. The war in Kosovo ended in the
summer of 1999, following heavy bombardment of Serbia by NATO forces. In
June 10, 1999, the UN Security Council immediately declared resolution 1244
which authorized the conversion of the Kosovo region into a region temporarily
under international auspices, and empowered the interim administrative
management of Kosovo (UNMIK) as the international governing authority. As
termed by the resolution, its aim was to establish a democratic and multi-ethnic
regime under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy,
based on the principle of self-definition.
Since NATOs intervention, it took nearly eight years for Kosovo to finally declare
its independence on February 12, 2008. Until that moment, a precondition for any
progress on the subject was the articulation of the process known as Standards
before Status, meaning that Kosovars will be able to conduct negotiations
about the status of the region only if they uphold several democratic principles.
151
Therefore, since then UNMIK has been playing the role of the educator of the
Kosovars, while teaching them the norms of democracy and human rights. In
the interim, Kosovo lacked any definition of an independent state and territorial
borders recognized in the international arena. The day-to-day practicalities,
among them the identities of the people, were subject to this complex socio-
political context, and likewise women, as part of the society.
In order to fully understand womans place in Kosovo, it is necessary to first
examine the main institutions that shaped the patriarchal order in the post-wart
reality, i.e. the International Administrative Authority and the Interim Albanian
Government (see Appendix 4). With the end of the war, UNMIK began acting
according to Resolution 1244 which shaped the framework of the administration
of Kosovo in tandem with a process of building democratic institutions, and
rehabilitating economic and social infrastructures. In order to fulfill its role,
UNMIK had to legislate many regulations as part of its legislative authority in
the region. These regulations bestow on the representative of the UN Secretary
General (SRSG):
far-reaching powers to pass legislation and appoint judicial as well as
administrative personnel These powers which would be incompatible with
any regular democratic constitution, give the SRSG the unique opportunity to
shape the Kosova legal space, free of constraints other than compliance with
UNSC Resolution 1244, which in its ambiguity hardly represents an obstacle to
progressive legislation.
This unlimited powers of SRSG and its administration were expressed in the
legislation of the regulations pertaining to every field, by foreign officials who
were not very familiar with the cultural context of Kosovo, and as a result, who
patronized and judged the tradition and its customs. In effect, from the viewpoint
that examines gender relations, these regulations perpetuated the patriarchal
order which generally relied on the knowledge of administrative officials
regarding the tradition of the canon alone, while ignoring the present dynamics
of gender relations and the activity of women. This rendered the international
authority unable to establish a democratic system which was gender sensitive
as declared in UNMIK policy.
The enraged declaration of Igo Rugova, Bernard Koucher treats us as Barbie
dolls attested to the tendency of UNMIK to ignore the experience of local
women, and in so doing preserved the patronizing and inefficient conduct of
the administration. Moreover, a small number of women were appointed to key
positions within UNMIK institutions, pointing to the failure of the system in the
test which should have served as an example of the democratic structure.
As to the interim Albanian institutions, their influence on gender relations in
Kosovo was well reflected in the poor representation of women within the
structure. As detailed in the reports of the UN Secretary General to the Security
Council and UNIFEM, women were insufficiently represented on all levels in
political institutions. According to this report of February, 2005 women were
underrepresented at all levels: one minister (of 12), one permanent secretary
(of 9), one municipality chief executive officer (of 30) and 31% of Assembly
deputies (37 of 120) are women. In the following Report of May 23, 2005 it was
stated that women make up 14% of the Kosovo Police Services (KPS), only 26%
of judges and 16% of prosecutors. In addition the Office of Gender Affairs (OGF)
has yet to be established and operationalised. This means that the practice
of patriarchal institutions still existed, at the expense of gender equality, and
negated the rights of women to equal access to the public and political sphere in
Kosovo of pre-independence.
However, the picture is even more complicated, as women acted within the
tense political space, which was created by the hostile relations between the two
authorities; UNMIK and PISG. Gheciu (2005) relates to this dual authority and
to its institutions, by claiming that the two institutions adopted the framework
of liberal-democratic norms (rule of law, democracy, human rights) in order to
blame the other for the defective administration of the region.
On the one hand, the Kosovars claimed their right to increase the extent of
intervention in the process of decision-making concerning their interests, while
the UNMIK officials on the other hand, rejected these demands, insisting that the
interim Albanian institutions were not sufficiently mature to govern in Kosovo.
In an attempt to position women within this hostility, one might argue that they
become interpretative authorities which struggle for the right to be trusted to
know/speak the truth about Kosovo, and during the course they positioned
themselves as activists for the national interest of Kosovo. Therefore, action
based on this identity marks the women as active players in the ethno-national
discourse and in the state-building processes.
Though women are still strangers to the public-political space, this is not the case
when discussing civil society. The academic literature attributes to civil society
a decisive role and sees it as the agent of change in the democratization process.
(Peck, 1998). The symbolic and practical role of civil society is expressed in two
central elements on which it is based: one the relations between the state and
civil society, which according to international perception constitutes a space that
allows expression and criticism from the citizen (Gelner, 1994). The second is
the perception of civil society as an arena that embodies moderation, tolerance,
and as such encourages participation and cooperation between citizens
(Barber, 1998; Brynt, 1995). In the absence of desired results from the political
and the economic process in the context of solving the dispute, primarily in
Balkan countries, the international community hangs its hopes on building the
infrastructure for civil society as a tool which will lead to a democratic process
and resolution of the conflict.
153
The central mechanism for developing and building civil society in Kosovo (and
in the other Balkan states) is the establishment of non-government organizations
(NGO). Following the rhetoric of democratization and huge funding invested
by international agencies, these organizations experienced significant growth,
particularly womens organizations during the period following the war. The
two main paths according to which the NGOs operate are 1) advocacy and
participation and 2) empowerment of civil society (Belloni, 2001). Below I will
attempt to show how the local womens organization adopted international
rhetoric for their current needs. To this end, I have chosen to begin with a brief
description of one of the field workshops which the movement activists held
during my visit to Kosovo, in one of the villages near the city of Gjakova.
2. The family, the oda and the gender order

On August 4, 2005, I was invited by the centers activists in the Gjakova branch
to join them on an educational workshop on contraceptives and family planning.
I agreed happily and we set out, the two activists - the coordinator, the doctor -
and I, and traveled with the Centers Jeep. Upon arriving in the village a group of
15 women waited for us in one of the houses at the entrance to the village. Many
of them wore festive garb, and had taken pains with their make-up, wore high
heels and had groomed their hair. One gray-haired woman dressed completely
in black greeted us and led us into the house. She was, it turned out, the owner
of the house. Her husband had been killed in the last war and since then she
was the CPWCs contact person in the village. There were many children milling
around and they accompanied us up to the top floor, to the Oda, which means
the room of men.
At the rooms entrance I saw many shoes and understood that it would be
appropriate to enter barefoot. The room was fully carpeted, while around its
perimeter and against the walls there were pillows, inviting everyone who
entered the room to be seated. Pictures of the family forefathers and other
members (only men) peered down at us from the walls, some from the last war
and others from the distant historic past. A masculine ambiance was present
in the room despite the fact that all the occupants were women (except for
the young children who came and went). The two CPWC activists and I sat on
pillows on the left side of the room with our backs to the wall, while in the center
of the carpet opposite us sat the owner of the house, and behind her a row of
the youngest women, with the remaining women sitting in semi-circles behind
them. She opened the discussion by thanking us for honoring her, the women
and the village with our visit.
Following this the coordinator introduced me, the reason for my visit and only
then continued with an explanation about the course of the workshop. The doctor
then began the workshop and towards the end the participants were invited
to ask questions and discuss the topic. At first it was the younger women who
dared to ask, but then the older women began to join the conversation. It was
interesting that the discussion flowed beyond the subjects of family planning
and contraception, as the women shared their dilemmas with one another. e.g.
decisions concerning the education of their children, leaving the village for
better income, organizing a support system for bereaved and divorced women,
etc. In the end, a date was set for the following meeting with the activists and
the owner of the house, and according to the CPWCs workshop plan. On the way
out, before collecting my things, I once again looked at the pictures on the walls,
and this time I felt that their authoritative look was beginning to diminish.
I chose to present this story because it constitutes a central site in which one
could examine the processes underway in post-conflict Kosovo and the place of
women. In a reality where on the one hand the international authority (UNMIK)
was far from proving itself as a model for government that promotes the rights
of women, and on the other hand, the interim Albanian government lacked the
authority and tools which would lead it to implement policy that promotes the
status of the women, the family became the central arena in and through which
the political players of civil society strived to effect change. A clear example of
this was the Oda and the role of women within.
3. The symbolic and practical significance of the oda of men
In order to understand the symbolic and practical value of the womens
penetrating the Oda, it is necessary to first examine the significance of this
space in Albanian culture. This room fills several functions in the daily life of
the Albanian family in Kosovo, particularly in rural regions, such as: hosting
guests, conducting important discussions on various issues in the day-to-day
life, making decisions during the time of war and peace, and it also serves as
the arena of mourning (death) and happiness (wedding). According to the
traditional practices, this room has always served as the ultimate space of male
power and control.
In earlier times the Albanian society in rural areas lived according to the
Code of Leke Dukagjini. In every village there was a single dominant family,
and accordingly for the whole region of northern Albania, as well as Kosovos
sovereign regions, it was the Gjomarkaj family which ruled and as such it was
identified as the ultimate authority of the law.
Due to the geographic obstacles to access these areas, they enjoyed considerable
autonomy during most of the occupations over time (Slavic, Ottoman, Italian, etc.).
The local government usually was in the hands of the two strongest families, and
155
the space where they implemented the political, economic and cultural practices
was the Oda. This is where social life in Kosovo was conducted, in the past and
partly also today, as it symbolizes the space of honor, thinking, law, justice and
power. Hence also the other names for the Oda, such as the Oda of the elders
(attesting to wisdom and experience) and the Oda of men (symbolizing power
and control). This term assumes particular importance as it is the meeting point
between the private and public, or put more correctly, public life is conducted
within the private space. This interweaving only demonstrates the artificial
differentiation between the private and public realms.
According to the traditional Albanian code, as in any other institution, there
are very clear rules of speaking and seating that apply to all who arrive at and
visit the Oda. In the Code of Leke Dukagjini it is written Burrat flasin me
mend e me rend which means that men speak with intelligence and in turn.
The structure of the Oda is such that the seating is in a circle, around the
room and next to the walls, on pillows and mattresses. The older people sit in
a central place where they can be seen from everywhere in the room, with the
other men seated around in descending order of age. The same order applies to
the rules of speaking, where the adults speak and the younger ones listen. The
center of the room which is covered in carpets is generally meant for round low
tables, on which the coffee, tobacco and meals are placed. The main purpose for
which women are allowed into the Oda is to serve the guest with coffee and
refreshments, or by bringing him clean clothes and bed linen and even washing
his feet. The participation of women in the mens discussions in the Oda, and in
any such meeting, is prohibited. The power and politics were and continue to be
operated within the family.
Today, there is a marked separation between the city and village, in all pertaining
to social behavior according to the rules of the traditional code. The urban
regions, being exposed to modern developments, no longer behave according to
this code, even though conceptual gender remnants are still strong in day-to-day
social practices. This is not the situation in rural regions, which constitute more
than 60% of Kosovo. The geographic distance from the cities, the violent Serbian
rule, the patriarchal gender order coupled with the financial factor, all joined
forces, till today, to perpetuate the conditions that repress the woman in Kosovo.
The root of repression lies in the family norms which originated in the ancient
traditional code. The rules of conduct in the Oda are only one of the practices of
the patriarchal order, but the symbolic importance of the Oda as a public space
of male power within the private sphere extends to the social arena beyond the
family as well. The symbolic and practical entry of women into the public space
within the family indirectly heralds their appearance in the outside public arena.
This appearance means visibility, voice and action. In order to examine this
phenomenon thoroughly, it is important to understand the political and social
context and the conditions that may delay or encourage womens action.
4. Can the oda also be of women?
I documented my participation in the workshop on family planning held in the vil-
lage of Gjakova thus:
We went up to the Oda, the room of the men it should be noted, the room
of men of the past? Now the owner of the house is a woman. She is koka
e shtepise in the local language, meaning the head of the family/house. The
situation was somewhat ironical in the room where the men of the village for
decades used to gather and discuss day-to-day matters, today women of the
village sit and discuss matters still considered taboo in the Albanian society in
Kosovo: sex education, contraception and family planning. In other words, in
the Oda women discuss their needs and give expression to their desires, in
the holiest place of male control, in the space identified as the symbol of the
patriarchal order.
I read these notes which at the time documented my observation during the
course of the movements activity, and still ask myself: What is the place of
women in the Oda today? What does their penetration into the space of control
in the Albanian family mean? How do women operate in a context in which the
private is interwoven with the public?
Many women became the heads of the family mainly due to the death of their
husbands and sons during the war. Since then they are the main breadwinners of
the family, the single caregivers of the elderly and the children. The experience
that women accumulated during and after the war, while striving for daily
survival, has served to revolutionize the traditional roles within the family. The
woman who in the past was powerless in the private sphere is now responsible
for every decision concerning the complete functioning of the family members.
One of the activists described being a woman in Kosovo as follows:
This is an extremely critical issue as the woman is the central pillar of the family,
of the nation. and it is important to understand her importance in society,
because Kosova has to progress, Kosova needs to develop, it needs a spine and if
the woman is the spine of the nation then society in Kosova will indeed progress
and develop.
The parallel between the family and the nation is not coincidental, as even in
the ancient code we find the source of the connection between the two. In the
chapter that discusses the definition and structure of the family it is written:
The family consists of the people of the house; as they increase, they are divided
into brotherhoods, brotherhoods into kinship groups, kinship groups into clans,
clans into banners, and all together constitute a nation which has one homeland,
common blood, a common language, and common customs.
157
In other words, according to the traditional view, the nation is perceived as
a natural extension of the family cell, and hence the identification between
the two. Moreover, the traditional code which is meant to provide the legal
foundation for social behavior and for the independent government of the
Albanians, served as a substitute for the governing system in the absence of the
state and its legislature. Therefore in those periods the family cell constituted
the spine of the society, and as such functioned simultaneously as private and
public space together. Seeing that the woman is the central pillar of the family,
her identification with the national collective is an unshakable continuation in
society:
The woman is the educator of the children, the woman is the biological creator,
she creates life, and there is nothing more important than this She not only
creates life but also preserves it, because children are the axis around which
human society revolves. If they receive sound and correct education, they in fact
receive it from the mother, and so on for the rest of the life. In other words, if
the woman is good, if the woman is well bred and educated, naturally society will
advance and improve, naturally it will be good. Therefore, the young girls too must
ask themselves Why was I born a woman, why wasnt I born a man? Today they
must say to themselves I am a woman, I have power, I will progress, I will learn
and I will work. Everything depends on me. Everything depends on the woman.
In effect, the activist interprets the progress and empowerment of the woman not
only as a practice that is good solely for the individual, but as a tool for society
itself to move forward: if the women is well-bred and educated, naturally society
will progress and improve. This approach liberates the woman from the shackles
of the traditional perception, as she imbues the female subject with rights,
knowledge and power which she previously lacked.
During the transition from a totalitarian regime to a democratic one, and in the
absence of a state, it appears that the family once again assumed the central role
in the life of society in Kosovo. The woman by definition as the central pillar
becomes the leading agent in the change processes within the family, and indirectly
also beyond. The activists use the cultural motif and claim that today the woman
is the central pillar of the home as distinct from the past when the man was the
dominant figure.
This insight is the basis for the collective activity of womens organizations that
strive so women may develop self-awareness in all matters pertaining to gender
relations, and from there to object to preconceived ideas that silenced the
women. Womens collective activities thus sought to challenge the traditional
image of women, to achieve their rights, to obtain higher education and to be
equal to men. This means rejecting outright the logic of the patriarchal order.
Moreover, through the process of resisting the signs of the old gender relations,
women drafted a new gendered we, that demands voice, power and visibility.
I act therefore I exist is the definition of visibility for one of the CPWC activists.
Making women visible challenges the traditional identity and role and in so
doing shapes a new identity of a woman who is aware, active and powerful.
Womens organizations have accumulated extensive experience in the public
space due to the collective activity conducted before and during the war, and
also contributed considerable political and social knowledge. The experience
and the contribution are what gave legitimacy to womens claim for gender
equality in society.
. We must promote the status of the woman and free her from preconceived
ideas from the pre-war period we lived in a very totalitarian society, add to this
also our tradition and conservative customs, all these silenced the woman, she
had no voice, and now our aim is to give her the voice, to make her voice heard,
for her status to change, for her to exercise her rights, for her to be a political
woman, we need a society in which the woman will obtain higher education,
where she will be equal to the man, ... where she will be equal ... if she has the
abilities and the potential, why shouldnt a woman be the prime minister of
Kosova?
For this activist, the struggle to promote the status of women does not distinguish
between the private and public, because just as the woman has become the head
of the family and is present in the Oda, so thanks to her potential she may
even be the head of the national collective: Why shouldnt a woman be prime
minister of Kosova? Furthermore, one should examine the context in which
such an aspiration comes to life. In the context of transition to democratization
and nation-building, the international requirement as presented mainly by
UNMIK, to internalize and behave according to the norms of democracy and of
human rights, facilitates the practices of womens activity. The activists of CPWC
understood the need to promote the status of women as serving the national/
collective interest which demands the change (the internalization of democratic
values) of every individual in society, including women:
Our main goal is the woman, promoting her status, developing awareness
regarding her role, and her status in the family first and also in society. And if
she is aware of her role as a woman, as a mother and as a partner, and as part of
society, then obviously the society will have no problems..
The activist defines women as political subjects and their roles as central to the
essence of democratic society in its formation. The speaker also introduces the
motif of social responsibility as falling on the shoulders of the woman, because
she must be aware of her role as a woman, as a mother and as a partner and
in the end, as part of the society. This practice, which summons the cultural
perception of the woman as responsible for the domestic sphere, positions her
as the leading agent in the center of public space, necessitating a more in-depth
159
distinction of the manner in which she is created and preserved. Following is the
response of one of the activist to my question: What does it mean for you to be a
woman in Kosovo today?
I am speaking about myself as a woman in Kosova, I feel good, I have faith
in myself, I dont really consider the preconceived ideas of others, I can go where
I want, whether to family or with friends, also with a male friend, from abroad
or local, it doesnt matter. In all honesty I can say that I am not concerned, I
have no time to think about what others say or what they think about me. I have
no time for these preconceived ideas I think that a person in every situation
and at all times must be decisive about what he does, however, he must be
aware of the laws and rules of the place where he lives. For the time being the
traditional codes here are very strict because in my opinion it is connected to
the independence and freedom people received after the war, they are likely to
exploit it .. they can cross the boundaries of normative behavior .. we must see
the whole picture, true we speak about women and the traditional ideas make it
difficult for them, but on the other hand see how the women dress today, she is
far more modern, and when I hear a woman say I cant do this or that .. then I ask
so why arent you fighting to achieve the things that are really important to you,
and instead you fight for things that are minimal?
Two elements stand out in her answer: one is the distinction between the private
and public, in other words, knowing how to ignore the preconceived ideas and
strict traditional codes, which restrict the freedom of the woman, and at the
same time she has to be sufficiently decisive in order to promote herself. This
determination leads to the second element, the balance between the traditional
(local) and modern (global), and this is expressed in the rhetoric of democracy
between rights and responsibility, as according to her, women must respect the
boundaries of normative behavior. According to her, after the war, the national
liberation and the sense of freedom and independence from the totalitarian
government were translated among things as release from traditional codes,
and this is expressed in the more modern dress and behavior. As she claims,
the meaning of the word rights is not only the possibility to adopt the modern
world (especially superficial norms of external appearance) without any control,
but also means taking responsibility for actions. She discusses the question of
struggles and at the same time recognizes the hierarchy between them. There are
struggles for things that are really important, as she details later, for education,
freedom of movement, etc. and there are the less important such as struggles for
the minimal things i.e., clothes, accessories, make-up, etc.
She is aware of the obstructing role of traditional codes on the life of women,
but at the same time is not blinded by the glamour of rights that bring
independence and freedom after the war, as is the tendency of most of the
population. The sentence We must see the whole picture reflects an elite
perspective of a group that can see beyond the existing reality, and this ability
gives it the legitimacy to guide and direct the masses that are captivated by the
charm of modernization. In the course of the process, this group also becomes
the interpretative and shaping authority both of the boundaries of normative
behavior and of the correct gender struggles for women. Several paragraphs
later she claims that in the chaotic situation currently prevailing in Kosova, the
woman wastes her time and money on pointless concerns and not because
she lacks potential and ability but because she has no intellectual orientation.
In addition, she adds to the list also the economic factor which forces the woman
to deal constantly with existential questions (mainly supporting and taking
care of the children) which does not allow her to deal with questions of status,
politics and others.
This gives rise to the question, how does the collective activity of CPWC become
meaningful for the women in post-war Kosovo? What strategy do they adopt in
order to promote their activity? In my opinion, the key to these questions lies in
structuring the activity of the movement as a practice which is vital to the whole
society. Following is an example, which despite its specific reference to activity
aimed at denouncing violence following the war in particular, still shows the
logic of the organizations activity in every field and area:
Starting from 1999 and until today, from all the activities we organized the
most unforgettable for us were the workshops to develop awareness with the
participation of women and men together, awareness of violence following
the war. I remember we had many disputes on the matter, the men did not
understand what there was to discuss. Four or five time we had to come to the
villages in order to sit and explain to the men the interest of the center, to explain
that this was a shared interest of us all to increase awareness, not only of women
but of everyone, of the whole nation.
To begin with, the movement activists needed the approval of the men in the
villages to hold the workshops and meetings with the women, because the entry
of a womans organization to conduct any activity with the local women was
considered an invasion of the privacy of the community. In those regions there
is still the elite of men who control the social boundaries and supervise every
foreign entity that tries to infiltrate into their space. Presenting the meetings
before the local mens authority as a tool that serves not only the women of the
region but also the interest of the entire collective, is what led to the success
of the CPWC activity in penetrating the private local arena and influencing it.
It is important to note that the activist speaks in terms of national collective
the nation, and this in my mind reflects the influence of the context of nation-
building, in which the collective activity of women occurs. The overlap between
the nation-state interest and the feminist interest, even if not structured and
presented as such, facilitates the existence of practices that challenge the
traditional gender order. But what is the rhetoric that characterizes the collective
activity of QMGF?
161
The woman is the central pillar of the home the woman is the key to the
home, she can enflame arguments but in the same way with a few words she
can settle things ... her goal is for the population to develop awareness, because
the woman has suffered a lot and silenced the violence, whether the violence
was inflicted on her or on someone else it is in this direction that we want to
develop awareness because we still have no laws to protect us you cannot
say someone hit me, because he will simply go to jail for 30 days, this is terribly
disappointing then he will get out and he will kill me there is no protection
for the victim. Therefore they remain silent and close all matters. Here we hope
to change so that through increasing awareness, people will at least be able to
speak and tell, if not take legal measures, to vent the frustration, and so when
ten people speak, things begin to change I think herein lays the great change
following our work in society. Therefore it is very important to work with
society.
The activist uses the traditional perception of the woman, because she assigns
her place only in the private space, she is the central pillar and the key to the
home. At the same time, she also criticizes the fact that the woman suffered a
lot and silenced the violence inflicted on her. In order to fight against it she
believes that the development of social awareness against violence is what will
lead to a change in the cultural reality in the context of the absence of the rule of
law, we still have no laws that will protect us.
As I mentioned earlier, advocacy is one of the main strategies according to which
civil society operates. The CPWCs activity adopts the practice of advocacy
in order to change the traditional perception and in order to develop social
awareness in relation to violence against women. The traditional perception and
social opinion are the focus of the movements activity in promoting womens
rights in the absence of a state system and sound legal authority. In contrast
to the international viewpoint which regards civil society as balancing and
criticizing the state institutions, the activist speaks about another connection
between the two. In her opinion it is the NGOs that are fulfilling the role of the
absent state in many fields.
The CPWCs activity aspires to develop womens awareness, enabling them to
talk about the reality of violence and the repression they experience in their
daily lives. Their story is what may reshape the awareness of society, as it has the
power to operate norms that normalize the male behavior which is harmful to
women. While not explicitly, the activist points to the two-way relations between
the activity of the movement and public opinion. On the one hand, the activity of
CPWC is directed to and focused on changing social norms, while on the other,
the power of the social consensus is what gives validation and recognition to the
activity of the movement.
The movements choice to focus its activities first and foremost on the private
sphere, the family, and to concentrate its activity on working with women, in
contrast to the ability to adopt a more overt and aggressive activity strategy
directed at the international and local government together, stems from the
organizations understanding of the gap between the desire of society in Kosovo
to adopt the international rhetoric of democracy and its laws, and its ability to
implement it in reality:
Regarding the international ideas or opinions, it is necessary to distinguish
between the desire to adopt their laws and the application here in effect. There
is a law that obliges the father to pay alimony for divorce but in effect does he
really do that? In other words, one must understand that despite the adoption of
western laws, they dont always work in the local circumstances which generally
dictate the laws. No matter how strong the desire for progress, and in this case
how important it is that the child will not lack anything and will be able to grow
up in an atmosphere that allows him to achieve his potential, this does not
always determine, as it is the economic, political and cultural conditions that
ultimately influence and shape how the law is conducted.
The activists comments point to the importance of the context in which the
activity takes place, and the influence of economic, political and cultural
conditions on the implementation of western law. This has a direct implication
on the activity of CPWC, no matter how strong the desire for progress and on
the way in which it chooses to promote the status of the woman and to protect
her rights. Therefore, the logical continuation of advocacy is the empowerment
of the woman in Kosovo, expressed in the aspiration and attempts of the
movement to give her a voice to exercise her rights, to be a political woman,
to obtain higher education and to be equal to the man... .
5. Womens collective action between global frames
and local struggles

In this paper I seek to explore how the socio-political context in post-war
Kosovo construes the interpretation of womens collective action by using the
theoretical lens of the Collective Action Frames (CAF) approach.
Sociological inquiry into social movements began with the traditional approaches
of Collective Behavior, moved on to Resource Mobilization theories, and later
on to those of New Social Movements. The latter approach has focused on the
analysis of the cultural processes, arguing that due to the structural changes
societies have gone through, new experiences of deprivation have emerged,
besides those based on class struggle. The power of the new movements is based
thus on new modern identities such as race, gender, age etc.
163
Another dimension of the analysis of social movement has emphasized the context
within which their action takes shape. Every event or process that contests the
existing political structure creates an opportunity for political change (McAdam,
1983; Eisinger, 1973). Political Opportunities Structure (POS) are thus sets of
constraints and opportunities present in the socio-political environment that can
encourage or suppress social action, thus shaping both strategy and structure
(Tarrow, 1998; Crossely 2002).
Despite the usefulness of the POS model, it still contains a number of shortcomings.
One is that this model applies mainly to the western societies, and as such it
raises questions regarding its validity in other social and political contexts that
are not built around western realities (elections, political parties, professional
associations, media, etc). An additional flaw in this model relates to the subjective
dimension of the structure of political opportunities, or as McAdams puts it: to
the process of cognitive liberation enabled by the subjective interpretation that
the challengers produce in light of the changes of the political reality (McAdam,
1982). It is the subjective dimension that brings to life human agency while raising
the question of how social actors decide when the opportunity to act is ripe. These
conceptual factors, which do not receive enough attention in the theory of political
opportunities, are worked out in the model of Collective Action Frames (CAF).
The sociologist David Snow et al., adopted the notion of framing in the context of
collective action, while claiming that collective action frames comprise a type of
cognitive understanding which explains the mode in which the social movements
structure the meaning of their action. Thus, collective action frames indicate
schemes of interpretations through which the members of the movements define
and articulate their social situation, as well as how they grasp and signify their
grievances (Snow et al., 1986, Snow and Benford 1992).
Collective action frames comprise the source of legitimacy for the members
protest, justifying their very collective action as a way of improving their conditions.
The members of social movements label the injustice on one hand while on the
other hand they articulate the broader frames of meaning which are consistent
with the cultural spirit of the society. The collective actors steer the frames of the
movement towards the protest, making it fit with the specific context, and basing
it on the merger between the culture of the target group and their values and goals
(Benford and Snow, 2000).
According to Benford and Snow this overlap is a function of how notable is
the frame salience adopted by the movement. Frames are notable if they are
consistent with the national myths, the cultural narrative, and the political
perceptions of society (ibid). The frame salience of democratization used by
the women activists is notable according to this definition, as it overlaps with
the national myth of historical and political injustice on the part of the western
powers (Malcolm, 1998; Mertus, 1999; Judah, 2000). Simultaneously, the frame
KDU 305.055.2 (496.51) | 396.1 (496.51)
of democratization is consistent both with the cultural narrative of family honor
by virtue of its being the central foundation of Albanian society, and the political
perception that espouses the definition of an independent state for the Albanians
in Kosovo.
The attempt of the feminist struggle in various countries, such as Chile (Noonon,
1995), South Africa (Hill, 2004) and Mexico (Trevizo, 2006), shows that in order
for the struggle for womens equality to succeed, it must be an integral part of the
restructuring of the state. In my reading thus, by presenting womens rights as
essential to the democratization, the activists construe its rhetoric and collective
action as central to the national discourse of state-building.
However in the political context of the interim period in which local and
international (UNMIK and PISG) shared the control, and in the absence of an
independent state, due to the dual governing authorities the movements were
unable to set for themselves the state institutions as a target for their complaints
and demands, as is customary both in democratic and totalitarian societies
(Tarrow, 1988; Brockett, 1991, Kriesi et al., 1995; Tilly, 1999). Consequently, in
terms of the relations between civil society and the state, the dual government
structures constitute an array of constraints which repress collective activity.
This occurs because the duplication encumbers the implementation of the
principle of accountability by increasing the chances that the two authorities
will shirk their responsibility while casting blame on the opponent (Belloni,
2001; Gheciu, 2005).
However with a change in the focal point for examining the relations between
the social movements and society, in the sense that the latter has become the
activity target of the former, the structure of political opportunities encourages
social activity. Therefore, as seen in the above text analysis, I maintain that in pre-
independence Kosovos political context, women movements and NGOs, mark
society and its fundamental institutions as the target of their collective activity.
This study shows that the women collective actions mark the private sphere, i.e.
the family and the women within it as the target of their activity, because the
woman is the central pillar of the family cell, which is the foundation of the
Albanian society in Kosovo.
Furthermore, due to the very close interaction between the private and public,
as mentioned earlier, one might assert that the perceptual changes within
the private space of the family cell may have practical implications for society
(promoting womens status in the education system, health system, etc.) and for
the political arena (more representation in government institutions, legislation
that promotes womens rights, etc.).
165
6. Conclusion: Dual authority, democratization
and womens rights

As stated above, according to UNMIK policy, the society in Kosovo in the
framework of democratization processes had to undergo political and social
transformation in order to determine the future status of the region. In other
words, society had to internalize and put into practice the values and democratic
norms, in order to prove to the international community that it was worthy of an
independent status. In parallel, for the Albanians in Kosovo, the democratization
process was seen as the best opportunity to achieve national independence.
In light of the traditional perception, which considers women as the central
pillar of the family, society and the nation, the international rhetoric of change
and democratization constituted an opportunity for womens organizations
to structure their liberation and promote their status as a vital factor in the
advancement of the entire society.
Therefore, I argue that in light of the international demand for social and political
transformation, women activists framed their struggle to promote womens
rights as a collective and national interest. In other words, the frame of change
of the organization overlaps at the same time both international rhetoric of
democratization and equal rights, and the national discourse of state-building.
The instability that characterizes the transition periods facilitate the redrafting
of politics and the democratic order. This context invites women to define
themselves as political subjects whose issues are central to the content of
democratic society. In spite of all, womens act of challenge and their visibility
are limited, because they act within the civil societys territory. Albanian women
in Kosovo are still outsiders regarding the post-war political space. Their
collective action is based on the agency-based approach, meaning that women
believe in their abilities as individual to effect changes at the structural levels.
In their perspective, the change could not fully take place within the state
apparatus/es (be that local-PISG or international-UNMIK), for they impeded
womens progress due to their patriarchal nature. In that case, women created
new spaces for collective action and practices of contestation, (re)formulating
on the process new gendered identities and national narratives. Thus, solely the
recognition of women as national conscious actors may extricate them from the
captive dichotomy of authentic feminism versus paternal nationalism.
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171
Filozofa e Nies: Nga fundi i ides s zotit tek fllimet e ides s europs Blerim Latif
Blerim Lati
Filozoa e Nies:
Nga fundi i ides s zotit tek llimet e ides s
europs
Abstrakt
Vdekja e Zotit dhe rnia e rendit moral t bots
Filozofia e Nies shnon nj moment kthese n historin e metafiziks s
emancipimit. Ajo manifestohet si nj kritik radikale e themeleve teorike mbi
t cilat sht e ngritur kjo histori. Tek Vullneti pr Fuqi Nie flet pr fundin e
interpretimit moral t bots dhe filozofia e tij mund t profilizohet krejtsisht si
nj refleksion mbi kt fund. Interpretimi moral bots sht metafizika judeo-
kristiano-iluministe e emancipimit. N filozofin e Nies e gjith kjo metafizik
mbshtetet dhe frymon prmes nj ideje t vetme, ides judeo-kristiane t Zotit,
nga e cila ka dal ideja e rendit moral t bots dhe nga kjo ideja e historis si nj
proces objektiv dhe universal i shptimit e lirimit t njeriut. Ky rend idesh ka
determinuar gjith mendimin dhe prjetimin kulturor n historin perndimore
deri n modernitet, prfshir edhe vet modernitetin. Nie ndrkaq vren nj
arje dramatike n kt rend idesh, duke filluar nga vet ideja themeltare, pra
ideja e Zotit. Momenti i par ksaj ka t bj me krizn dhe rnien e ksaj ideje,
q n gjuhn e Nies shfaqet n formn metaforike si vdekja e perndis.
Koncepti q gjallron brenda ksaj metafore sht koncepti i shprbrjes s nj
episteme t madhe, nse flasim me terma t Foucault, e cila ka mundsuar gjith
diskursin humanisto-emancipues n kulturn perndimore. Zoti sht subjekti
transcendental, rreth t cilit ky diskurs sht ngritur, kuptimsuar dhe ka
prodhuar praktika t caktuara historike, sociale e politike. Po cilat jan atributet
e ktij subjekti transcendental dhe ka sht momenti i rnies s ktij subjekti?
Filozofia e Nies shnon nj moment kthese
n historin e metafiziks s emancipimit.
Ajo manifestohet si nj kritik radikale e
themeleve teorike mbi t cilat sht e ngritur
kjo histori. Tek Vullneti pr Fuqi Nie flet
pr fundin e interpretimit moral t bots dhe
filozofia e tij mund t profilizohet krejtsisht
si nj refleksion mbi kt fund. Interpretimi
moral bots sht metafizika judeo-kristiano-
iluministe e emancipimit. N filozofin e
Nies e gjith kjo metafizik mbshtetet dhe
frymon prmes nj ideje t vetme, ides judeo-
kristiane t Zotit, nga e cila ka dal ideja
e rendit moral t bots dhe nga kjo ideja e
historis si nj proces objektiv dhe universal i
shptimit e lirimit t njeriut. Ky rend idesh ka
determinuar gjith mendimin dhe prjetimin
kulturor n historin perndimore deri n
modernitet, prfshir edhe vet modernitetin.
Nie ndrkaq vren nj arje dramatike n
kt rend idesh, duke filluar nga vet ideja
themeltare, pra ideja e Zotit
172 NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014 KDU 1 (430) (092)
Teologjia e prpunuar mbi materialin narrativ t monoteizmit abrahamik
na jep konceptin e nj Zoti q ngrthen n qenien e tij gjithfuqishmrin dhe
gjithmirsin e mundshme e t mendueshme. Atributet e tij jan omnipotenca
(gjithfuqishmria), omniprezenca (gjithprania), omniscienca (gjithdituria),
omnibenevolenca (gjithmirsia), simpliciteti (thjeshtsia), imutabiliteti
(pandryshueshmria) dhe eternaliteti (prjetsia)
160
. N trsin e tyre kto
atribute na japin pamjen e nj Zoti totalitar por n t njejtn koh edhe filantrop.
Nj despot i iluminuar, sipas terminologjis volteriane.
Pikrisht figura e nj Zoti t till pr Nien sht br e pamundur n epokn
moderne. Kt pamundsi Nie e paraqet prmes ides s tij pr ngjarjen e
madhe t quajtur Vdekja e Zotit.
Qysh n fillim duhet shmangur banaliteti i intepretimit biologjik t ksaj ngjarje,
ngase Nie nuk sht duke folur pr nj qenie t gjall q dikur ka ekzistuar
dhe tash n nj moment ka dhn shpirt. N fakt Nie sht duke menduar
nj ngjarje epsitemologjike dhe kulturore brenda kontekstit t kulturs
perndimore moderne. Ky sht konteksti i iluminizmit, me qndrimin e tij
radikal kritik ndaj t gjitha prmbajtjeve ideore fetare. Ngjarja e Vdekjes s
Zotit ishte prgaditur gradualisht prgjat rrjedhs s formimit t modernitetit.
Dekarti kishte tentuar t pajtoj skepticizmin radikal me argumentin ontologjik
pr ekizstencn e Zotit, por pasuesi i metafiziks s tij Spinoza kishte arritur n
konsekuenca t tjera, n mesin e t cilave m e rndsishmja ishte panteizmi
( identifikimi i Zotit me Natyrn), i cili nga pikpamja e kritereve teologjike t
kishterimit sht asgj tjetr prvese ateizm. M von Laibnici kishte tentuar
t shptoj iden karteziane prmes Monodalogjis dhe Teodices s tij, por pas
tij Kanti do t provoj se Zoti sht vetm nj ide transcendentale e mendjes s kulluar
dhe duke e qen e till, n munges t prmbajtjes empirike, ajo sht vetm nj ide
e zbrazt. Pr t shmangur pozicionin ateist, Kanti nxorri prfundime agnosticiste.
Mirpo agnosticizmi, n instanc t fundit, mund t shpjer n ateizm praktik, sepse
nse nuk mund ta njohim Zotin, kjo do t thot se nuk mund t mendojm pr t,
e nse fllojm t mos mendojm pr t, nj dit edhe do ta harrojm krejtsisht.
Agnosticizmi sht braktisje pa zhurm e Zotit.
N ann tjetr n iluminizmin francez dhe at anglez ishte zhvilluar nj form
tjetr e ksaj braktisje, nn etiketn e deizmit. N deizm Zoti sht nj qenie q
e ka krijuar botn, por pas ktij akti bota sillet sipas ligjeve t saj, ligje n t cilat
Zoti nuk przihet. Kjo sht si puna e or punuesit, pasi e ka vn n funksion ora
lviz pa ndihmn e prodhuesit t saj. Deizmi sht n thelb natyralizm ngase
prjashton faktort mbinatyror n shpjegimin e gjrave dhe mrekullit, t cilat
sipas prkufizimit t David Hume, nnkuptojn ngjarje q thyejn ligjet e natyrs.
Pr deistt kto ligje nuk mund t thyhen, prandaj mrekullit jan tregime t
160 . Edward R.Wierenga, The Nature of God, An Inquiry into Divine Attributes, Cornell University
Press, Ithaca and London, 1989, fq. 1-11.
173
rreme. Konsekuenca n kt rast prseri sht radikale pr fen, ngase si mundet
t qndrojn n kmb nj besim fetar pa iden e mistereve dhe mrekullive?. N
kt mnyr mund t shihet se si kto rryma t fuqishme n mendimin e fillimeve
t modernitetit, panteizmin spinozian, agnosticizmi kantian dhe deizmi iluminist,
po e shpinin frymn e kulturs europiane drejt ngjarjes s braktisjes s Zotit.
Ndjesia e ksaj braktisje do t dominoj tr at q Hobsbaum e quan shekulli
i gjat i XIX, q fillon me Revolucionin e vitit 1789 dhe prfundon n vitin 1914,
kur Europa u prfshi nga Lufta e Par Botrore. Figura nieane e vdekjes s Zotit
sht figura q kondenson gjith prmbajtjen e ksaj ndjesie. Por Nie nuk sht i
pari q artikulon kt ndjesi t modernitetit. Shum m hert, para tij, artikulimin
e saj e gjejm n shkrimet e hershme t Hegelit. N konkluzionin e tekstit Besimi
dhe Dija, Hegeli flet pr ndjenjn se Zoti vet sht i vdekur, si nj ndjenj mbi
t ciln mbshtetet religjioni i kohve m t vonshme
161
. N kt rast Hegeli i
referohet pikpamjes s Laibnicit se natyra sht e till q gjithkund nnkupton
nj Zot t humbur si brenda ashtu jasht njeriut. Si duket Laibnici me kt i
referohet natyralizmit, si filozofi dhe metodologji dominuese e dijes shkencore n
modernitet. sht e njohur se n themele t ktij natyralizmi qndron ideja mbi
hipotezn e Zotit si nj hipotez t panevojshme
162
.
N nj kontekst m t gjr Nie nuk sht as i pari q tematizon iden e Vdekjes
s Zotit. Kjo ide ka nj histori t gjat brenda mendimit filozofik e fetar t kulturs
perndimore. E gjejm p.sh. n mitologjin greke n mitin e perndis Pan. Pani
ishte perndi e pyjeve, e barinjve dhe gjahtarve. Plutarku, historiani i famshm
grek, autor i veprs Jett paralele, rrfen nj histori t uditshme pr vdekjen
e ksaj perndie. Kjo histori sht pak a shum e till : n vitet e sundimit t
perandorit romak Tiberit, nj anije kishte ngecur n ujrat e detit Egje. N ato
momente nga brigjet ishte dgjuar nj z i cili i thrriste timonierit q kur t
zbriste n brigje t lajmronte se Pani i madh vdiq. Timonieri e dgjoi thirrjen,
e lajmroi vdekjen e perndis dhe pas ksaj rnkimet dhe dhimbja u prhapen
gjithandej
163
. Ktu e ka edhe origjinn termi panik, i cili i referohet nj dshprimi
dhe frike q kaplon t gjith
164
. Emri Pan, q fillimisht kishte kuptimin e kullotave,
mori kuptimin e nj trsie, t gjithprfshirjes. Mbi bazn e ksaj vdekja e Panit
u interpretuaa si vdekje e gjith perndive pagane. Ky interpretim gjeti m se
shumti mbshtetje nga teologt e hershm t krishterimit, zyrtarizimi i t cilit si fe
shtetrore perndoris romake, pas tre shekujsh prndjekje nga kjo perandori, u
kuptua edhe si triumf mbi politeizmin dhe paganizmin greko-romak.
Edhe Marksi i referohet ides s vdekjes s zotit n kulturn greke n kontekstin
161 . Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, State University of New York Press, Albany,
1977, fq.189.
162 . Artikulimin m t vonshm t ksaj pikpamje e gjejm edhe n veprn Dizajni i Madh t njrit
prej fizikantve m t njohur bashkkohor, Steven Howking.
163 . Fjalor i Mitologjis, Hartuar nga Doc.Todi Dhama, Rilindja, Prishtin, 1988, fq.188-189.
164 . Ekziston edhe shpjegimi tjetr sipas t cilit kur Pani u lind ishte aq i shmtuar saq t gjitha
perndit ikn t tmerruara nga pamja e tij.
e analizs filozofike t tij pr ndryshimin e epokave historike, t cilat ai i
identifikon si formacione ekonomiko-shqorore : Historia di bn dhe kalon
nepr shum faza, para se ta oj n varr nj form t vjetruar jete. Faza e fundit
e nj forme historike botrore sht komedia e saj. Perndive t Greqis, q
u plagosn njher pr vdekje n form tragjike n Prometeun e Lidhur
t Eskilit, iu desh t vdisnin edhe njher n form komike n Bisedat e
Lukianit
165
.
N ann tjetr ideja e vdekjes s Zotit haset edhe n themele t doktrins s
krishter, ku Krishti, biri i perndis q sht Zot, vdes n kryq pr t shptuar
njerzit e vdekshm nga mkatet. Mbi bazn e ksaj, kjo doktrin i sheh hebrenjt
si popull deicidal ( zotvrass). Dihet se nj qndrim i till ka influencuar n
botn perndimore nj nga format e antisemtizmit, e pikrisht antisemitizmin
fetar.
N modernitet, para Nies, gjejm dy interpretime tjera t ides s vdekjes
s Zotit. Njri interpetim ka t bj me Hegelin dhe tjetri me Fojerbahun.
Intepretimi i Hegelit sht quajtur intepretim optimist, ngase Hegeli vdekjen e
Zotit e kontekstualizon brenda dialektiks botrore t aufhebung-ut ku gjejm
raportin n mes jets dhe vdekjes. Nga kjo pikpamje, sikurse mendon William
Franke, te Hegeli vdekja e Zotit sht n t vrtet mnyra prmes t cils Zoti
realizon veten e tij duke mohuar veten. Vdekja hyjnore sht par nga Hegeli si
nj mnyr e pashmangshme, e paprecedent dhe madhshtore e vetrealizimit
t Zotit n bot. Mesazhi kryesor i zbuless s krishter sht mishrimi i plot
i Zotit si njeri, n nj njeri t veant, Jezusin e Nazaretit dhe jeta e tij e plot
n gjendjen njerzore kulminon n vdekjen n kryq
166
. Prmes mishrimit
Zoti vetmohon pafundsin e tij abstrakte, e cila nuk sht pafundsi reale,
ngase Zoti bhet Zot vetm prmes bots konkrete, prmes pranis n t, pastaj
prmes vdekjes n kryq ai realizon hyrjen e plot n jetn njerzore dhe tr
kjo kulminon me ringjalljen, e cila pr Hegelin do t thot shpirti q jeton n
bashksin e besimtarve. Ksisoj vdekja e Zotit te Hegeli nuk sht ngjarje
prfundimtare, por vetm nj moment i domosdoshm dialektik n procesin
e realizimit t tij n dhe prmes bots. Ajo sht sakrifica q mundson jetn
e shpirtit. Ajo q mund t hetohet ktu sht se tek Hegeli kemi nj rishfaqje,
natyrisht me zhargon filozofik, t mitit t lasht pr sakrificn n sherbim t
jets: dika duhet t vdes q t jetoj dika tjetr. Kjo mund t shpjegohet me
faktin e influencs s madhe q ka teologjia e krishter n mendimin e Hegelit,
teologji e cila sakrificn, si marrdhnie nnshtruese t njeriut ndaj hyjnores, e
shndrron n t kundrten e saj.
Ndrkaq te Fojerbahu vdekja e Zotit ka nj domethnie krejtsisht tjetr. Derisa
te Hegeli vdekja e Zotit sht moment i dialektiks s pajtimit n mes hyjnores
165 . Karl Marks, Rreth kritiks s filozofis hegeliane t s drejts, Tiran 1979, fq.13.
166 . William Franke, Deaths of God in Hegel and Nietzsche and the Crisis of Values in Secular Modernity
and Post-secular Postmodernity, www.ingentaconnect.com .
175
dhe njerzores, te Fojebahu kjo vdekje sht moment i ndarjes s plot n mes
tyre. Pr Fojerbahun vdekja e Zotit nnkupton vetdijen e njeriut pr Zotin si
iluzion i mendjes s tij, vetdijen e njeriut pr tjetrsimin dhe projektimin e
esencs s tij njerzor n nj qenie imagjinare t quajtur zot q rri diku matan
bots. Nuk e ka krijuar Zoti njeriun, por njeriu e ka krijuar Zotin, thot Fojerbahu.
Kjo krijes nuk sht qenie reale, por vetm nj iluzion q jeton pr aq koh sa
njeriu nuk arrin t njoh veten e tij. Kur kjo t arrihet ather edhe ky iluzion
zhduket. Fojerbahu konsideronte se koha e tij ishte momenti final i ksaj zhdukje.
Ai besonte se prparimi i shkencs do ta bj t pamundur besimin tek Zoti,
dhe rrjedhimisht teologjia do tia lshonte vendin antropologjis, e me kt edhe
teolatria vendin humanizmit. Kjo pikpamje, thellsisht iluministe, do t ndikoj
shum n qndrimin q do t mbaj marksizmi ndaj fes dhe problemit t Zotit.
Pas ktyre dy interpretimeve, kemi at t Nies. Vdekja e Zotit prbn nj tem
bazike n filozofin e tij. Ajo sht porta hyrse n universin e ideve t tjera
t rndsishme nieane, sikurse jan ajo e Vullnetit pr fuqi dhe Rikthimi i
Prhershm i s Njejts.
Tema e vdekjes s Zotit pr her t par tek Nie shfaqet n veprn e tij Dija
Gazmore, e cila u paraprin dy veprave tjera t rndsishme t Nies, veprs
Kshtu fliste Zarathustra dhe veprs Pr tej s mirs e s keqs.
Tek Dija gazmore vdekja e Zotit paraqitet n tre seksione, n seksionin 108,
125 dhe 343
167
. N seksionin e par flitet se si pas vdekjes s Buds, kishte
mbetur pas hija e tij dhe njerzit pr shekuj me rradh e tregonin hijen e tij n
nj shpell. Kjo ishte nj hije pamas e frikshme. Sikurse Buda, shkruan Nie,
Zoti sht i vdekur, por raca njerzore sht e ndrtuar si nj shpell ku pr
shekuj, njerzit do t tregojn hijen e ktij Zoti. Kjo hije, ende thot Nie, nuk
sht kaprcyer. Duket se figura e hijes tek Nie ka domethnien e rrjedhimeve
q l dikush pas vetes. Ajo sht thelbsore pr t kuptuar kritikn e Nies ndaj
idealeve t modernitetit dhe iluminizmit. Iluministt jan njerzit q n besimet
e tyre nuk bjn gj tjetr vese tregojn hijen e mbetur pas t Zotit t vdekur. Pr
ta kjo vdekje sht pun e kryer, por prkundr ksaj ata vazhdojn t besojn
n rendin e prbotshm moral. Ky rend sht hija e zotit.
N seksionin 125 Nie paraqet alegorin e t marrit. N kt alegori Nie shkruan :
A nuk keni dgjuar pr at t marrin q n dritn e mngjesit ndizte nj fener,
vraponte n treg dhe thrriste pandrprer: Po krkoj Zotin! Po krkoj Zotin!.
Duke qen se rreth tij kishte plot njerz q nuk besonin n Zot, ai shkaktonte
shum t qeshura. Pse, a ka humbur Zoti?, e pyeti njri. A mos vall edhe ai e
humb rrugn si nj fmij?, tha nj tjetr Apo po fshihet? Mos ka frik nga ne ?
Mos ka shkuar diku larg n udhtim? Apo ka emigruar? Kshtu talleshin ata dhe
qeshnin. I marri hyri n mes tyre dhe i shigjetoi me vshtrim. Ju a them un se
167 . Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
ku sht Zoti, thirri ai. Ju a them un. Ne e kemi vrar at ; ju dhe un bashk.
Ne t gjith jemi vrassit e tij. Si e kemi br ne kt? Si mundm ne ta pinimin
krejt detin? Cili na dha neve sfungjerin pr t fshir me t krejt horizontin?
kemi br kur e liruam kt tok prej diellit t saj? Ku po shkon ajo tani? Pr
ku jemi nisur ne t shkojm? Larg prej diejve? A nuk po fundosemi gjithnj e m
shum, paprer ? A nuk jemi ne duke humbur si n nj hi pa fund? A nuk jemi
duke ndjer drithrimn e hapsirs boshe? A nuk sht bra ajo m e ftoht?
A nuk jemi duke par q po vijn rresht nett, nat pas nate, pa dit n mes? A
nuk duhet ndezur pra fenert n mngjes? A nuk e dgjojm ne akoma grvimn
e lopatave t varrmihsve, t cilt po varrosin Zotin? A nuk e nuhatim ne ern
e dekompozimit t Zotit? Sepse edhe zotat dekompozohem Zoti ka vdekur. Zoti
vazhdon t jet i vdekur. Dhe jemi ne q e kemi vrar at
168
.
N kt tekst t ngjeshur alegorik, prmes pyetjeve retorike, Nie derivon t
gjitha prgjegjet mbi pasojat e vdekjes s Zotit, prej t cilave m e rndsishmja
sht nihilizmi, ndjesia e fuqishme e hiit dhe boshllkut, e ftohtsis radikale t
qenies dhe dezorientimit total t njeriut n bot dhe histori, njeriut i cili tanim
n gjendjen e nihilizmit, sikurse shkruan Nie tek Vullneti pr fuqi lviz prej
qendres drejt x, do t thot drejt t panjohurs s madhe. Kjo do t thot se me
vdekjen e Zotit merr fund edhe pamja jon mbi horizontin e t ardhmes. Nuk ka
m dit n horizontin e saj, por vet net q kalojn njra pas tjetrs.
N konstekstin e alegoris nieane t t marrit mund t shtrohet nj pyetje e
rndsishme : prse lajmin pr ngjarjen e vdekjes s Zotit duhet tia tregoj
bots pikrish ai, i marri. Duket se ka dy prgjegje t mundshme n kt pyetje.
E para prej tyre vjen nga kontekstualizmi i figurs s t marrit brenda rrjetit
konceptual t filozofis s Nies. N kt rrjet ne gjejm kritikn radikale q
Nie zhvillon ndaj racionalizmit sokratiko-platonik. Arsyeja, kjo fuqi supreme
sokratiko-platoniko-iluministe, pr Nien nuk sh e till ; ajo nuk sht n
gjendje t tregoj t vrtetat dhe ngjarjet mdha. N kursin historik t kulturs
perndimore kjo arsye ka ndrtuar vetm iluzione t mdha, t cilat sipas frazs
s famshme t Nies kur jan harruar se jan iluzione jan quajtur t vrteta.
Prandaj duhet dalur nga mbretria sokratike e arsyes q t bhet e mundur pr
ne t kapim ngjarje t mdha sikurse sht vdekja e Zotit. Figura e t marrit
shnjon pikrisht kt dalje.
Prgjegjia e dyt duket se lidhet me natyrn e transmetimit t lajmit t madh.
Lajmrimi i t marrit sht lajmrim profetik, nj lajmrim i nj ngjarje t
madhe botrore, pas t cils bota prfundimisht nuk do t jet m sikurse ka
qen. Ai sht i marr pikrisht sepse e jep nj lajmrim t till. I till ka qen
fati i t gjith profetve n fillimet e profecive t tyre, q nga Sokrati i Shpells s
Platonit, i cili tallet nga t burgosurit kur kthehet n shpelln nntoksore pr
ti liruar ata nga bota e errsirs dhe hijeve, pastaj Jezu Krishtit t Nazaretit, t
168 . Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Cambridge University Press, 2001, fq.119-120.
177
cilit i vendosin kurorn me ferra n kok, kur jep lajmin e ardhjes s Mbretris
s Hyut, e deri tek talljet e banorve te Mekes pagane me Muhametin e mendur
q lajmronte se Zoti ishte krejtsisht tjetr nga statujat prej balte q ndrtonin
dhe adhuronin ata. I ngjashm sht edhe ballafaqimi me turmn i profetit
niean. Marrzia e tij sht parakohshmria e tij. Duke qen i parakohshm ai
duket jonormal, i mendur, i marr, jasht rendit t arsyes. Fjalt e tij shkaktojn
t qeshura, por edhe habi. M n fund ai hodhi fenerin prtok dhe ky u thye,
e u b cop e ik. Un kam ardhur shum hert, tha i marri pastaj ; koha ime
nuk ka ardhur akoma. Kjo ngjarje e tmerrshme sht akoma duke u zhvilluar,
sht akoma n rrug e sipr dhe nuk ka mbrritur akoma n vesht e njerzve.
Pas rrufes, do koh t dgjohet bubullima, drita e yjeve vonon t vij n tok,
prpara se ato t shikohen. Kjo bm sht akoma m larg tyre nga sa jan edhe
yjet m t largt, por prapseprap, kta vet e kan kryer at
169
. Paraqitjen e
vdekjes s Zotit si nj ngjarje n zhvillim e sipr e gjejm edhe n seksionin 343
t veprs Dija gazmore : Ngjarja m madhshtore e sotme- q Zoti sht i
vdekur ; q besimi n zotin e krishter sht br i pabesueshm- tashm ka
filluar t hedh hijen e saj mbi Europ
170
. N kt seksion mund t shihet nj
paraqitje m konkrete dhe m pak alegorike e ides s vdekjes s Zotit. Tash me
kt ide Nie i referohet nj gjeografie konkrete- asaj t Europs dhe nj situate
konkrete- asaj t kohs s tij, shekullit t XIX. Nie e prcakton kt situat si
ardhje e nihilizmit n kulturn europiane. Heidegger mendon se vdekja e zotit
tek Nie sht nj emr tjetr pr t prshkruar nihilizmin europian, raporti
thelbsor i t cilit sht raporti me metafizikn perndimore. Sipas Heidegger-it
kur Nie flet pr nihilizmin, ai nuk ka parasysh vetm nj mnyr t menduari,
apo nj pikpamje ndryshe, n shumsin e pikpamjeve mbi botn. Nihilizmi
sht dika m shum. Ai shnon nj lvizje historike europiane, thelbi i t cils
prmblidhet n sentencn Zoti sht i vdekur. Prmes ksaj sentence, pr
Heidegger-in, Nie do t thot se Zoti i krishter ka humbur fuqin e tij mbi
qeniet dhe determinimin e njeriut
171
. Ky Zot prmban nj semantik t ngjeshur.
Ai nnkupton transcendencn, si thot Heidegger, n t gjitha kuptimet e saj
t ndryshme. Kjo transcendenc sht menduar si burim i vetm i idealeve,
normave, parimeve, rregullave, qllimeve dhe vlerave, t cilat n trsin e tyre
kan formuar kuptimin e qenies e t bots. Vet emancipimi i njeriut sht par
si funksion i ksaj trsie. Nuk ka shptim jasht fes, thon etrit e kishs, e cila
mendohet t jet n tok zdhnsi i transcendencs. Nihilizmi niean nnkupton
pikrisht rrnimin e ksaj transcendence polisemike. Lidhur me kt Heidegger
shkruan : Nihilizimi sht procesi historik nprmjet t cilit dominimi i
transcendentes bhet i pavlefshm dhe bosh, kshtu q e tr qenia humb
vlern dhe kuptimin e saj. Nihilizmi sht historia e vet qenies, nprmjet t
169 . Nietzsche, The Gay Science, po aty, fq.120.
170 . Nietzsche, po aty, fq.199.
171 . Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume IV : Nihilism, Harper & Ro, Publishers, San Francisco, 1979,
fq.4.
cils, Vdekja e Zotit t krishter vjen ngadal, por pashmanshmrisht n drit
172
.
Drita e nihilizmit sht drita e nj bote q ka humbur kuptimin gjithprfshirs
t saj. Fusha ku prgjat rrjedhes s shekujve sht gjurmuar ky kuptim ka qen
metafizika, prandaj nihilizmi niean nnkupton fundin e metafiziks, q pr
Heidegger-in sht i barabart me kolapsin e mbretris s transcendencs dhe
idealit t dal prej saj
173
.
Por ky kolaps nuk sht fundi i historis. N fakt ai sht hapja e horizontit pr
nj fillim t ri. Nihilizmi i Nies nuk sht vetvrass, sikurse e gjejm te Albert
Kamy, por nihilizm i lirimit nga barra e transcendencs platoniko-krishtere
n funksion t riafirmimit t bots toksore, nj lirim i trupit nga t qenit
skllav i shpirtit t pavdekshm, i pasionit nga t qenit i dirigjuar nga arsyeja e
ftoht sokratike. Me fjal t tjera prmbysje e plot e platonizmit, dhe variantit
t tij fetar-krishterimit. Kt nihilizm Nie e zhvillon edhe n veprn e tij t
madhe Kshtu fliste Zarathustra. Qysh n fillimin e pjess s par t veprs e
gjejm dramn mbi tri metamorfozat e shpirtit. N metamorfozn e par shpirti
shndrrohet n deve, n t dytn n luan dhe n t tretn n fmij. Filozofi
kroat Danko Grliq jep nj interpretim mjaft konciz t ides themelore, e cila
fshihet prapa paraqitjes alegorike nieane : Shpirti m par bhet deve, shpirt
i cili pasi sht zhdukur perndia ka vullnet q t bart, q t marr prsipr
gjithka q sht m e vshtir. Njeriu, pra, sht i detyruar dhe mund ti marr
t gjitha mbi shpatullat e veta dhe si deveja q bart barrn, ta bart t tr
trasncendencn
174
.
Po kush sht ky njeri q pas vdekjes s Zotit merr prsipr barrn e
trasncendencs, e t cilin Nie e quan shpirti punonjs. Duket se ktu Nie ka
parasysh njeriun modern, njeriun iluminist, i cili ka braktisur Zotin transcendent,
por jo edhe qllimet e mdha t tij, t cilat tash ai i merr prsipr q ti jetsoj.
Kt ai synon ta bj prmes puns, principit t deves. Kjo na jep t kuptojm
pse puna n modernitet, q nga Luteri, e Loku, nprmjet Adam Smithit, Hegelit,
deri te Marksi, sht ngritur n nivelin e t qenit kuptimi i qenies dhe historis
njerzore. Puna n modernitet sht br shenj e shptimit ( Luter), burim i
prons (Loku), i pasuris ( Smith), i lirimit t skllavit nga zotria ( Hegel), i
lirimit universal t njerzimit (Marksi). Por, n ngutin e shpirtit punonjs, n
ngutin e deves q vrapon n shkrettir ndodh metamorfoza e dyt. Deveja
bhet luan, lirimtar, bish grabitqare q si nihilizmi europian i rrnon t
gjitha vlerat e vjetra e nuk mund t krijoj vlera t reja, por q, si inkarnim i
vullnetit pr fuqi mund ti krijoj vetes lirin pr krijimtari t re. I leqitur nga
zotria i tij i fundit, perndia, vetm kshtu njeriu lirin e individit mund ta vr
prmbi traditn. N vend t ti duhet ( Du sollst ) vjen Un dua( Ich will).
Pr luant t gjitha kriteret e moralit heteronom jan t padurueshme, prandaj
172 . Heidegger, vep e cit, po aty, fq.4
173 . Heidegger, vep e cit, po aty, fq.5
174 . Danko Gerli, Fridrih Nie- mendimtar e artist, Parathnie, n veprn Kshtu fliste Zarathustra
t Nies, botuar nga Rilindja, Prishtin, 1981, fq.11-12.
179
liria duhet t fitohet si shpartallim i t gjitha vlerave t deritashme
175
. Mirpo
n aktualizimin e vullnetit pr fuqi, t energjis s pafrenueshme grabitqare,
ndodh metamorfoza e tret e shpirtit, luani transformohet n fmij. Fmija,
thot Nie, sht pafajsi dhe harres, nj fillim i ndrrave, nj loj, nj rrot
q rrotullohet nga vetvetja. Ai sht lir nga fajet e t kaluars dhe projeksionet
e t ardhmes. Ai jeton n t tashmn dhe botn e kupton si nj loj, prapa t
cils nuk fshihet asnj plan apo qllim madhshtor. Fmija sht jasht do lloj
teleologjie t linearitetit temporalo-historik. Loja prbn thelbin e rikthimit t
prhershm t s njejts, njra nga temat themelore t filozofis s Nies. N fakt
ideja e rikthimit t prhershm t se njejts sht rezultat logjik i shkatrrimit
t transcendencs dhe surogatve iluminist t saj, sikurse jan progresi dhe
historia, rrfimi pr t cilat prbn at q Nie e quan Interpretimi moral i
bots. Pr Nien ky interpretim sht br i pamundur n kushtet e diktuara
nga ngjarja madhshtore e vdekjes s Zotit t krishter. Nuk mund t ket rend
t prbotshm moral, qoft si rend zanafillor q duhet rivendosur, qoft si ideal
q duhet arritur n horizontin e s ardhmes, nse nuk ekziston instanca supreme
q e ka projektuar dhe e garanton nj gj t till, e meq nuk ekziston nj rend i
till, ather edhe historia e kuptuar si nj proces linear dhe universal drejt nj
qllimi t madh, nuk sht asgj tjetr prvese nj iluzion. sht pikrisht ky
momenti, n t cilin fshihet fara e dshtimit t projeksioneve eskatologjike t
iluminizmit, sepse ky prpiqet ta ruaj historin universale pa ndihmn e Zotit,
pra t mbaj n kmb ndrtesn edhe n munges t themeleve. Iluminizmi
nuk arrin t kuptoj se vdekja e Zotit sht njkohsisht edhe vdekje e kuptimit
universal t historis dhe rendit t prbotshm moral. Kjo vrejtje prbn at
q sht quajtur kritik postmoderne e iluminizmit, rrnjet e t cils i gjejm
pikrisht tek Nie.
N lidhje me kt Vattimo shkruan : Humbja e kuptimit t njsuar t historis,
e menduar si racionalitet objektiv, sht nj rrjedhim, nj aspekt, madje kuptimi
i vrtet dhe i prpikt i vdekjes s Zotit. Kjo sht vrtet ajo ka Nie e quante
nihilizm, vetdija se ndryshimi nuk ka nj kuptim, nj piksynim, apo nj
formulim logjik fardo. Vdekja e Zotit nuk sht nj teori filozofike, as zbulimi
i nj strukture objektive t bots- sikur t kishim msuar se Zoti nuk ekziston.
Ajo sht nj ngjarje e prbotshme historike, pr t ciln sipas Nies, ne jemi
njhersh dshmitar dhe protagonist ; ne sot, shum m tepr se sa ai q
mbahet vetm si profet i nj ngjarje t till
176
. Pikrisht shkputja apo thn
ndryshe lirimi i ndryshimit nga teleologjia shnon hyrjen n horizontin e
rikthimit t prhershm t se njejts.
Ndonse e paralajmruar n veprat m t hershme t Nies, iden e ktij rikthimi
e gjejm n nj form m t zgjeruar tek vepra Vullneti pr Fuqi. Aty Nie e
quan kt ide nj konceptim t ri t bots. Brenda ktij konceptimi bota sht
175 . Gerli, po aty, fq.11-12
176 . Gianni Vattimo, Nihilizmi dhe Emancipimi, IPLS&Dita 2000, Tiran, 2006, fq.60-61.
nj trsi dinamike q bhet, shprbhet dhe ribhet prseri n nj pafundsi
formash, prgjat nj procesi q nuk ka as fillim e as fund. Kjo bot, thot Nie,
sht e pavarur n t brit e saj ; ajo jeton prej vetvetes; mbeturinat e veta i
shrbejn si ushqim asaj. Kjo bot sht nj prbindsh energjie, pa fillim,
pafund, nj madhsi e hekurt dhe e palvizshme force, q nuk bhet as m e
madhe, as m e vogl, q nuk harxhohet, por vetm shndrrohet, si nj e tr dhe
pashmagshmrisht e madhe, sht nj gj pa harxhime as humbje, por edhe pa
rritje, e prfshir n rrotullim nga asgjja si nga kufiri i saj, nuk sht nj gj q
shuhet e shkatrrohet, nuk sht pafundsisht e shtrir, por e futur si nj forc
e prcaktuar n nj hapsir t prcaktuar, jo n nj hapsir q n ndonj pik
sht boshe, por mbi t gjitha e futur, si nj forc, si loj forcash dhe val forcash
q sht njkohsisht nj e vetme dhe e shumfisht, q ktu grumbullohet dhe
njkohsisht zvoglohet, nj det forcash rrjedhse dhe lvizs brenda vetes
prjetsisht n shndrrim, rrjedhse n prjetsi n drejtimin prapa, nj bot q
ka vite t panumrt kthimi, nj vrshim i pavdekshm i formave t saj
177
. Ktu
ne rigjejm prfytyrimin heraklitian t ndryshimit t prhershm t gjendjeve
t kozmosit, mirpo Nie nuk sht trsisht heraklitian gjat zhvillimit t ides
s rikthimit t prhershm t se njejts, sepse derisa tek Herakliti ndryshimi i
prhershm i nnshtrohet logosit, q do t thot nj ligjshmrie objektive, tek
Nie ndryshimi i prhershm merr formn e nj ndryshimi kaotik. N afirmimin
e rikthimit t prhershm t se njejts si t ndodhur i prhershm kaotik Nie i
qndron konsekuent refleksionit t tij themelor mbi vdekjen e Zotit. Nj pranim
jokritik i Heraklitit do t na shpinte srisht tek ideja e Zotit, dhe prseri do t
niseshim rrugs s gjat t interpretimit moral t bots q kalon nga Platoni,
prmes krishterimit, deri tek Hegeli dhe panlogjizmi i tij.
Nj gj t till e thekson edhe Heideggeri n studimin e tij t madh pr filozofin
e Nies. Sipas Heideggeri-it paraqitja e totalitetit t bots si nj kaos nga
Nie sht br pr t ndrtuar nj mbrojtje kundr humanizimit t qenies
n trsi
178
. Ky humanizim nnkupton shpjegimin moral t bots, por edhe
shpjegimin teknik t saj, sepse prapa ktyre dy shpjegimeve qndron ideja
e demiurgut, zejtarit t madh t bots, i cili ka projektuar nj mori qllimesh
morale dhe teknike n krijesn e tij. Humanizimi i bots pr t cilin flet
Heideggeri, sht i ashtuquajturi bashkimi i vlers dhe faktit, bashkautor t
t cilit jan dy armiqt kryesor t Nies : Platoni dhe Krishterimi. sht Platoni
i cili n filozofin greke e ontologjizon t mirn si vler themelore etike duke e
br at princip themelor t qenies, dhe krishterimi, duke vazhduar n linjn
e judaizmit, q eticizon qenien e Zotit. E gjith filozofia e Nies sht ekii q
rrnon ngrehinn e ktij bashkimi. Mesazhi kryesor q del prej saj sht lakonik
: qiejt jan bosh ; askush nuk do t vij prej andej q t na nxjerr nga balta e
vendimeve tona njerzore n emr t bots s vrtet. N gjendjen e nihilizmit
177 . Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Vintage Books, New York, 1967, fq.550.
178 . Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, HarperSanFrancisco,
1984, fq.92.
181
kjo bot, bota e transcendencs, sht shndrruar n prrall dhe gjith historia
e saj nuk sht tjetr gj vese historia e nj gabimi
179
. N fillim t ksaj historie
gabimi, shkruan Nie, bota e vrtet, sht e kapshme nga i urti, nga fetari, nga i
virtytshmi. Ky sht momenti i platonizmit me figurn e Sokratit. M pas bota e
vrtet bhet e pakapshme, por e lejuar pr t urtin, fetarin, t virtytshmin dhe
mkatarin q pendohet. Tani jemi n krishterim. Vetm kta , predikon Krishti,
do t hyjn n mbretrin e hyut. Pas krishterimit vjen moderniteti. Momenti i
tij sht momenti kantian. N kt moment bota e vrtet e pakapshme, nuk
mund t tregohet, as t premtohet, por mund t ruhet vetm si nj ngushllim,
detyrim apo imperativ moral. Por si mund t mbahet n kmb nj ngushllim
apo detyrim duke u thirrur mbi t pakapshmen? Bota e vrtet e pakapshme?
N do rast ende e paarritur. Dhe meq nuk sht e arritur, sht e panjohur.
Si rrjedhim, ajo nuk ngushllon, nuk shpton, nuk detyron m : si mund t na
detyroj nj gj e panjohur?...
180
. Kantianizmi ngrihet mbi nj boshllk ontologjik
dhe bashk me t edhe t gjith ato projeksione q ndonse pranojn zhdukjen
e bots s vrtet, prpiqen t ruajn botn e dukjes. Kto jan projeksionet
e iluminizmit. Por jo, mendon Nie, bashk me botn e vrtet zhduket edhe
bota e dukjes. Ky sht fundi i esencializmit perndimor. sht pikrisht qasja
antiesencialiste, e cila do ta shptoj Nien nga rnia n mkatet e ideologjive
esencialiste t modernitetit.
Nie, nacionalsocializmi gjerman dhe ideja e europs
Ashtu si pothuajse t gjith mendimtart e mdhenj t modernitetit, edhe Nie
dhe filozofia e tij nuk i ka shptuar intepretimeve ideologjike, qoft nga e majta,
qoft nga e djathta. Biles mund t thuhet se Nie e ka pasur fatin m t keq n kt
aspekt, ngase t dy kampet ideologjike duket se kan pasur njlloj konsensusi mbi
prkatsin ideologjike t tij. E djathta ekstreme sht mburrur me Nien duke
pretenduar se sht mendimtar i saj, ndrsa e majta ekstreme sht distancuar
prej Nies duke par n filozofin e tij vetm nj ideologji reaksionare t ekstremit
t djatht. Shembull i mburrjes djathtiste me Nien jan ideologt nazist, ndrsa
si shembull i akuzave t ekstremit t majt mund t merret vepra Shkatrrimi
i Arsyes, e filozofit t njohur marksist, George Lukacs, vepr ku Nie paraqitet
si themelues i irracionalizmit gjerman, q pr Lukacs-in nuk sht asgj tjetr
vese ideologji e imperalizmit gjerman, i cili fajsohet pr dy luftrat botrore q
rrnuan Europn n pjesn e par t shekullit XX
181
. Qasja e Lukacs sht n fakt
qasja e vet marksizmit ortodoks, i cili sht i prirur t vlersoj brenda filozofis
gjermane vetm filozofin e Marksit dhe gjithka tjetr brenda saj ta flak ose si
t pavler, ose si t rrezikshme. Kjo qasje dhe vet vepra n fjal e Lukacs sht
179 . Friedrich Nietzsche, Perndimi i Idhujve, ose si filozofohet me ekiq, Bargjini, Tiran, 2002, fq. 25
180 . Nietzsche, po aty, fq.26
181 . http://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/destruction-reason/ch03.htm
kritikuar shum nga marksist t tjer, sidomos nga ata t qarqeve akademike t
atij q njihet si marksizmi perndimor, si sht Adorno i cili konsideron se vepra
Shkatrrimi i Arsyes nuk sht paraqet shkatrrimin gjerman t arsyes, por n
fakt shkatrrimin e vet arsyes s Lukacs-it, apo Kolakowski, i cili konsideron se
kjo vepr e Lukacs-it sht fryt i periudhs staliniste t krijimtaris s tij
182
. Derisa
Stalini, n rrafshin politik, pr gjithka fajsonte gjermant, prjashto komunistt
gjerman, Lukacs n rrafshin filozofik fajsonte gjermant pr t gjitha fajet
teorike, prjashto Marksin, faje t cilat sipas tij i dhan rrug nacionalsocializmit.
Por sa sht i bazuar ky konsensus i t majts ekstreme dhe t djathts ekstreme
mbi prkatsin politiko-ideologjike t Nies?
A sht Nie dhe antihumanizmi i tij kozmik dhe historik nj burimi frymzimi i
nacionalsocializmit, ksaj ideologjie e cila n thelbin e saj prbn nj sulm radikal
ndaj ides perndimore t emancipimit?
Prgjegjiet n kto pyetje nuk jan aspak t lehta. Debati i gjat rreth tyre nuk
ka prodhuar rezultate prfundimtare konsensuale. Duket se dy faktor kan
determinuar n mas t madhe nj gj t till. Njri ka t bj me abuzimin e
madh propagandistik q vet nacionalsocializmi ka br me veprn e Nies.
Pjesmarrs i drejtprdrejt n kt abuzim ka qen edhe vet lideri nazist, Adolf
Hitleri i cili n vitin 1934 bri nj vizit shum t mediatizuar n Arkivin e Nies n
Waimar, ku para bustit t filozofit u fotografua me motrn e tij, Elisabeth Forster
Nietzsche, drejtoresh e arkivit. Gazetat gjermane e publikuan fotografin me
nj mbishkrim t till : Fyhreri para bustit t filozofit gjerman, idet e t cilit
kan u kan dhn jet dy lvizjeve t mdha popullore : Nacionalsocializmit
t Gjermanis dhe lvizjes fashiste t Italis
183
. Edhe pse t vepra e tij Main
Kampf, Hiteri nuk u referohet ideve t Nies, nj mediatizim i till do t mjaftoj
q interpretimi nazifikues i veprs s Nies t lulzoj nn Gjermanin Naziste.
Faktori i dyt lidhet me vet natyrn e filozofis s Nies, t ciln e karakterizon
mungesa e nj metode t elaborimit sistematik dhe koherent t ideve e
pikpamjeve, gj e cila l shteg pr kundrthnshmri brenda ideve t tij. Kjo
sidomos vlen pr temat jo themelore t cilat Nie i trajton n veprat e tij, ndrsa
kur sht fjala tek temat e mdha, sikurse jan Vdekja e Zotit, Vullneti pr fuqi,
Rikthimi i prhershm si nj njejts, megjithat Nie ruan nj linj t qart
koherence logjike.
Por jan pikrisht temat jobazike dhe trajtimi shpeshher kundrthns i tyre
nga ana e Nies ato q prbjn lndn kryesore t abuzuesve ideologjik t
filozofis s tij.
182 . Leszek Kolakowski, The Main Currents of Marxism / Its origin, growth and dissolution, Volume III
: Breakdown, Clarendon Press- Oxford, 1978, fq.285
183 . Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?, On uses and abuses of a philosophy, Jacob Colomb and Robert
S.Wistrich (ed), Princeton University Press, 2002, fq.1.
183
Q t mund t dekonstruohet ky abuzim spari duhet par se cilat jan shtyllat
e ideologjis dhe regjimit nazist. Ndonse, sikurse shkruan Franz Neumann,
n veprn e tij Behemoth - Strukura dhe Praktika e Nacionalsocializmit,
nacionalsocializmi nuk ka nj teori politike koherente t vetn, as nj filozofi
politike
184
, megjithat ai identifikohet me disa tema t cilat i konsumon n
mnyr konstante, si instrumente legjitimimi t praktikave t tij politike. N
mesin e ktyre temave jan nacionalizmi ekspansionist, racizmi, antisemitizmi,
antikomunizmi, antiliberalizmi dhe antiparlamentarizmi t mishruar n
partin dhe shtetin totalitar. Nacionalizmi ekspansionist ka t bj me njren nga
komponentet themelore t nacionalsocializmit gjerman, me t ashtuquajturn
Lebensraum ( hapsir jetsore). Lebensraum sht politika e zgjerimit
territorial t Gjermanis n emr t dominimit t racs superiore ariane t
mishruar n kombin gjerman. Kjo politik sht shkaku kryesor n shprthimin
e Lufts s Dyt Botrore. N analizn komparative duket qart se Nie nuk
sht mendimtar q do t nnshkruante nj politik t till. N pikpamjet e tij
ai shfaqet hapur si nj mendimtar antinacionalist. Ka disa shembuj t fuqishm
q e mbshtesin kt. Tek vepra Ecce Homo, Si bhet njeriu ai q sht, Nie e
paraqet nacionalizmin si nj absurditet dhe neuroz nacionale, nga e cila sht
duke vuajtur Europa. Pr me tepr Nie fajson gjermant pr prhapjen e ksaj
neuroze. S fundi, kur n urn mes dy shekujsh dekadence u b e dukshme nj
forc e madhe gjeniu dhe vullneti, mjaft e fort pr ta br Europn nj njsi,
nj njsi politike dhe ekonomike t aft pr t qeverisur Tokn, gjermant
me luftrat pr liri i prishn Europs sensin, at mrekulli sensi q sht n
ekzistencn e Napoleonit dhe me kt iu rndon n ndrgjegje gjithka q
ndodh, q sht sot, kt smundje dhe absurditet me t kundrt nga t gjitha
me kulturn, pra nacionalizmin, neurozn nacionale nga e cila Europa sht
smurur, prjetsimin e ndarjes s Europs n shtete t vegjl, n politika t vogla.
I kan prishur Europs sensin e saj, arsyen e saj e kan shtyr n qorrsokak.
A njeh dikush, prve meje, nj rrug pr t dal nga ky qorrsok ak?
185
. Ktu
duket qart se Nie sht duke parandjer rrezikun e Europs nga nacionalizmi
dhe prirja e tij dezintegruese. Nie pyet se si mund t dilet nga ky rrezik?
Prgjegjia e tij nuk prmban asgj nga ideja naziste e unifikimit t Europs nn
hegjemonin raciale gjermane, por prkundrazi prmban nj shumsi idesh t
cilat Nien e bjn nj lajmtar t Bashkimit Europian. Kjo prgjegjie gjendet
tek vepra tjetr e njohur e Nies, Njerzor, tepr njerzor, dhe konkretisht n
seksionin 475, t titulluar Njeriu Europian dhe shkatrrimi i kombeve. Aty mes
tjerash Nie shkruan : Tregtia dhe industria, shkmbimi i librave dhe letrave,
karakteri i prbashkt i gjith kulturs s lart, ndrrimi i shpesht i shtpis
dhe vendit, jeta e tanishme nomade e gjith atyre q nuk zotrojn tok kto
rrethana do t sjellin domosdoshmrisht me vete nj dobsimn dhe, n fund,
nj shkatrrim t kombeve, t paktn t atyre europiane: n mnyr q, nga t
184 . Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944, Oxford
University Press, 2009, fq. 38-39, 463 464.
185 . Friedrich Nietzsche, ECCE HOMO, Si bhet njeriu ai q sht, Konica, Tiran, 2001, fq.121.
gjitha kto kombe, si rrjedhoj e kryqzimeve t vazhdueshme, do t lind nj
rac e przier, ajo e njerzve europian
186
. Koncepti i przierjes s racave sht
n kundrshtim t plot me iden naziste t racs s pastr. Nie ktu nuk sht
duke krkuar figurn e njeriut arian, por at t njeriut europian, t cilin e sheh t
dal, n njern ann, nga kultura e lart, q pr Nien n thelbin e saj, nuk sht
nacionale, por gjith europiane, dhe n ann tjetr nga nj shtres njerzisht t
popujve europian q nuk jan t lidhur me tokn dhe bjn jet nomade. N
shikim t par duket sikur Nie i jep nj rndsi m shum se sa q duhet ktij
faktori, por n fakt Nie ka t drejt n pikpamjen e tij ngase lirimi nga lidhja
me tokn, sht lirimi nga njri prej obsesioneve themelore t nacionalizmit,
lirimi nga ajo q Gellner e quan babzia pr tokn, origjina e t cils shtrihet
n shoqrit agrare mesjetare, ku njerzit vriten e priten me njri tjetrin pr
nj pllmb tok. sht pikrisht nacionalizmi q pr Nien synon t pengoj
zhvillimin e ktij procesi t unifikimit t Europs n nj njsi politike, ekonomike
dhe kulturore prmes przierjes kreative t popujve t saj. Por gjithsesi kjo
przierje po e vijon ngadal rrugn e saj, pavarsisht t gjitha rrymave t
prkohshme e t kundrta: pr me tepr, ky nacionalizm artificial sht po aq
i rrezikshm sa ishte i rrezikshm edhe katolicizmi artificial, sepse, n thelbin e
tij, sht nj gjendje e ashpr rrethimi dhe lufte, e shpallur nga pakica n dm
t shumics dhe ka nevoj pr dredhi, gnjeshtra dhe terror q t ruaj veten.
Jo interesi i shumics ( pra i popujve), si thuhet zakonisht, por para se gjithash
i disa dinastive princrore, pastaj i klasave dhe t prcaktuara t tregtis dhe
t shoqris, shtyn drejt ktij nacionalizmi ; pasi t kemi kuptuar kt, duhet
t paraqitemi, pa skrupuj, si europian t mir dhe t punojm palodhur pr
shkrirjen e kombeve me njri tjetrin
187
. Edhe pse n sociologjin e nacionalizmit
Nie nuk figuron si ndonj teoricient i rndsishm i saj, n kt tekst mund
t gjenden themelet e njres prej teorive m t rndsishme pr origjinn dhe
natyrn e nacionalizmit. Kjo sht teoria mbi nacionalizmin si krijim manipulativ
i elitave n funksion t pushtetit t tyre
188
. Nj element tjetr n kt tekst t
Nies, e i cili bie n kundrshtim t drejtprdrejt me frymn e ideologjis
naziste sht vizioni mbi rrjedhn e historis europiane. Derisa nazizmi mban
vizionin pr kt histori q lviz drejt sundimit mijravjear t Rajhut t Tret,
vizioni i Nies sht ai nj historie q n mnyr t domodoshme lviz drejt
nj Europe t Bashkur nn sistemin e vlerave t prbashkta q kan popujt e
saj. Natyrisht Nie kt nuk e mendon n formn e ndonj domosdoshmrie t
hekurt historike, apo teleologjie transcendentale ose imanente historike, por si
rezultat t proceseve t vetvetishme q zhvillohen n jetn e popujve europian.
Nga kt pikpamje Nie sht m shum sociolog i ndryshimit social, e m pak,
nse jo krejtsisht, filozof i ndryshimit historik.
Komponenta tjetr e ideologjis naziste sht racializmi, pikpamja se ndarja
186 . Friedrich Nietzsche, Njerzor, tepr njerzor, UEGEN, Tiran, 2005, fq.285.
187 . Nietzsche, po aty, fq.286
188 . Joseph M.Whitmeyer, Elites and popular nationalism, botuar n: British Journal of Sociology, Vol.
No.53 Issue No. 3 ( September 2002), pp.321 -341.14
185
kryesore e njerzimit sht ndarja hierarkike racore n raca superiore dhe
inferiore, pikpamja n t ciln dallimet fizike mes njerzve interpretohen si
pabarazi shpirtrore e mendore mes tyre. N racializmin nazist raca superiore
jan gjermant, prandaj pushteti mbi botn u prket atyre. Ky i fundit sht
konkluzioni final i vpers Main Kampf, t Hitlerit. Por far mendojn nazistt
kur operojn me termin rac dhe far mendon Nie? A mund t trhiqen
analogji n mes kuptimeve t tyre?
Gjja e par q mund t shihet n raportin n mes kuptimit nazist dhe atij niean
t termit rac sht se derisa tek kuptimi nazist dominon elementi biologjiko-
aksiologjik, tek Nie kemi dominimin e elementit socialo-deskriptiv. Gerd
Scank n tekstin e tij Raca dhe mbarshtimi n filozofin e Nies konsideron
se koncepti i Nies pr racn vjen nga studimet antropologjike t mjekut dhe
antropologut Rudolf Virchow, bashkkohs i Nies. N kto studime Virchow
arriti n prfundimin shkencor se n Europ nuk mund t bhen dallime
raciale, biologjikisht t bazuara, ngase Europa sht nj vend n t cilin qysh
prej lashtsis kan ndodhur przierje t vazhdueshme popullatash, e ku
rrjedhimisht popujt mund t dallohen vetm nga ana kulturore. Prfundime
t tilla hidhnin krejtsisht posht hipotezat mbi racn superiore ariane, t
cilat qndrojn n themele t ideologjis naziste. Kto pikpamje t Virchow,
sipas Schank afirmohen n tekstet e Nies
189
. Teksti i lart prmendur nga vepra
Njerzor, tepr njerzor, sht nj argument q duket se mbshtet tezn e
Schank. Sipas tij, n tekstet e Nies, termi rac prmendet n dyqind raste
dhe at n tre kuptime t ndryshme. N shumicn e ktyre rasteve termi rac
(rasse) pr Nien ka kuptimin e fjals popull (Volk), n rastet e tjera ai u
referohet me kt term klasave sociale (Stande), por edhe n nj kuptim t
tret me kt term Nie ndonjher i referohet edhe njerzimit n prgjithsi.
Schank mendon se pr Nien sht i njohur edhe koncepti modern biologjik i
racs, mirpo me kt koncept Nie operon vetm n ato tekste ku ai polemizon
me antisemitt e njohur t kohs s tij
190
. Jan pikrisht kto polemika, t cilat
prbjn nj moment qndror n shqyrtimin e raportit t Nies me ideologjin
naziste. Antisemitizmi ka qen ana m e errt e ksaj ideologjie, mbi t gjitha
pr shkak t pasojave katastrofale t tij para dhe gjat Lufts s Dyt Botrore,
t cilat kulminuan me krimin e madh t Holokaustit ku besohet se humbn jeten
rreth gjasht milion hebrenj.
A sht e mundur t identifikohen brenda teksteve filozofike t Nies momente
t cilat do ta bnin at nj mendimtar q sht n funksion t bashksis s
ndjenjave, paragjykimeve dhe pikpamjeve antisemitiste?
Pr shkak t trajtimit josistematik dhe fragmentar t shtjes hebreje nga ana
e Nies kjo pyetje mbetet sfiduese. N shikim t par duket se kritika radikale
189 . Gerd Scank, Race and Breeding in Nietzsches Philosophy, n : Nietzsche and German Tradition,
Nicholas Martin (ed), Peter Lang AG, European Academic Publishers, Bern 2003, fq.237.
190 . Gerd Scank , po aty, fq.238
e Nies pr metafizikn dhe moralin judeo-kristian shpie n konsekuenca
antisemite. Vdekja e Zotit dhe shembja e rendit moral t bots sht pikrisht
vdekja e ides judeo-kristiane pr Zotin dhe Botn. Tu heqsh figurn e Zotit t
tyre a nuk do t thot tu rrnosh gjith themelin mbi t cilin qndron kultura dhe
ekzistenca e hebrenjve? Ata q konsideroj se n tekstet e Nies ekziston nj
brum antisemitist zakonisht i referohen seksionit nr.7 n veprn Gjenealogjia
e Moralit ku Nie i portretizon hebrenjt si nj popull predikuesish q me
predikimet e tyre morale kan shkaktuar prmbysjen e vlerave aristokratike n
funksion t moralit t skllevrve, n antipodin e t cilit sht morali i zotrive.
Pikrisht pr shkak t hebrenjve- shkruan Nie- filloi kryengritja e skllevrve
moral, q ka nj histori dymij vjeqare
191
. Brenda ksaj historie Nie vendos
edhe njren prej ngjarjeve m t rndsishme t modernitetit, Revolucionin
Francez t vitit 1789. Ideja perndimore e emancipimit sht inherente n
kt histori dhe, n kt pikpamje, Nie duket si nj mendimtar q sht
kundrshtar i ksaj ideje. N ann tjetr, n seksionin nr.205, t titulluar Pr
Popullin e Izraelit, t veprs Aurora Nie jep nj parashikim t uditshm mbi
fatin e hebrenjve n shekullin e XX dhe pikrisht pr at q njihet si zgjidhja
prfundimtare e problemit t hebrenjve. N tekstin e ktij seksioni thuhet :
Mes shfaqjeve q na fton t shohim shekulli i ardhshm, duhet llogaritur edhe
rregullimi prfundimtar i fatit t ifutve evropian. sht fare e qart se ata i
kan hedhur zaret e tyre, se e kan kaluar Rubikonin e tyre : nuk u mbetet tjetr
vese t bhen zotr t Europs ose ta humbin Europn, si n kohrat e shkuara
teksa humbn Egjyptin kur u vendosn para nj alternative t ngjashme
192
.
Tre momente mund t dekonstruohen n kt tekst. N momentin e par duket
qartsisht se Nie sht duke br nj parashikim dhe jo duke shprehur nj
preferenc t tij mbi at se si duhet t zhvillohet fati i hebrenjve n Europ. N
momentin e dyt, q ka edhe karakter analize, Nie heton nj situat radikale
n t ciln ndodhen kta hebrenj, e kjo sht situata q i vendos ata para nj
alternative : ose t bhen zotr t Europs ose t ikin prej saj. Kt t fundit Nie
e krahason me ikjen e lasht nga Egjipti, t njohur n histori si eksodi biblik,
me ka shihet se Nie sht duke parandjer nj persekutim tjetr t madh t
hebrenjve dhe pikrisht holokaustin. N momentin e tret shihet se n konceptin
e situats bipolare t hebrenjve pr t ciln po flet Nie, mund t identifikohet
nj doz ndikimi e teorive t konspiracionit, shum prhapura n kohn e Nies,
mbi t ashtuquajturin komploti ifut pr sundimin e bots, por n nj tekst
tjetr, n seksionin 251 t veprs Pr tej s Mirs dhe s Keqs, Nie shprehet
qart se sht vrtetuar se hebrenjt nuk punojn e as nuk bjn plane pr
ndonj sundim t Europs nga ana e tyre
193
. Dihet se teorit e komplotit botror
t hebrenjve u prvetsuan nga nazistt n funksion t praktikave t tyre t
191 . Friedrich Nietzsche, Mbi Gjenealogjin e Moralit, Fan Noli, Tiran, 2011, fq. 24
192 . Friedrich Nietzsche, Agu i Mngjesit, UEGEN, Tiran, 2004, fq.172-173
193 . Friedrich Nietzsche, Prtej se Mirs dhe s Keqes, Preludi i nj filozofie t s ardhmes, Plejad,
Tiran, 2003, fq.149
187
persekutimit sistematik t tyre. Ky lloj parashikimi i Nies dhe momentet e
nnkuptuara t tij duhen par n kontekstin e nj klime antisemitike, n ngritje
e sipr n gjysmn e dyt t shekullit XIX
194
.
N tekste t tjera Nie shfaqet n polemik t ashpr me trendin e ksaj
klime. Filozofi hebraik Yirmiyahu Yovel ka studiuar gjersisht kt aspekt
t filozofis s Nies. Prfundimet e studimeve t tij e nxjerrin Nien si nj
mendimtar krejtsisht kundr rryms s antisemitizmit, apo si e quan vet
Yovel nj mendimatar anti-antisemit. Sipas tij jan gjasht dimensione q e
formsojn qndrimin anti-antisemit t Nies
195
. N dimensionin e par, Nie
e sheh antisemitizmin si lvizje masive q n thelb prbn nj shfaqje vulgare,
ideologjike t turms, nj form t re t moralit t skllavit t kopes. Nuk ka
asgj aristokratike brenda tij, asgj nga shpirti i lir krijues. N dimensionin e
dyt, pr Nien, antisemitizmi prbn nj neuroz popullore e shkaktuar nga
njerzit e dobt t cilve u mungon fuqia ekzistenciale dhe vetbesimi. Jan
pikrisht kt njerz t dobt ( n kuptimin e dobsis shpirtrore) t cilt jan
n thumb t cinizmit t pamshirshm filozofik t Nies. N dimensionin e tret
Nie e sheh antisemitizmin si nj instrument ideologjik n funksion t forcimit t
Rajhut t Tret Gjerman dhe ngritjes s kultit t shtetit, pr t cilin Nie shprehet
me aq prmim, si nj idol i ri q sht n antagonizm me shpirtin e kulturs.
sht i njohur teksti i Nies n veprn Perndimi i Idhujve ku ai shfaqet si nj
mendimtar antipolitik : Kultura dhe shteti t mos mashtrohemi n kt pik,
jan antagoniste: shteti i kulturs sht vetm nj ide moderne. Njri jeton
n kurriz t tjetrit, njri prparon n dm t tjetrit. T gjitha epokat e mdha t
kulturs jan epoka t dekadencs politike: ajo q ka qen e madhe n kultur ka
qen gjithnj jopolitike, madje antipolitike
196
. Ktu Nie ka parasysh konceptin
estetik t kulturs dhe n insistimin e tij t ndarjes s kulturs nga shteti ai
shfaqet n kundrshti t plot si me fashizmin, i cili e estetizon politikn, ashtu
edhe me komunizmin i cili e politizon estetikn
197
, dhe n nj far mnyre bie n
pozitat e liberalizmit.
N dimensionin e katrt, sipas Yovel, Nie e sheh antisemtizimin si nj
lubrifikant t nacionalizmit gjerman, ndaj t cilit Nie, sidomos n veprat e tij
t pjekuris, zhvillon nj opozit t hapur. Duke qen t dy neurotik n thelbin
e tyre, antisemitizmi dhe nacionalizmi n bashkdyzimin e tyre prbjn vetm
nj neuroz t dyfisht kolektive. Antisemtizmi sht shprehje e racizmit, ndaj
194 . Kjo klim nuk ishte vetm fenomen gjerman, por europian n prgjithsi. Si rast ilustrativ pr
kt mund t merret Afera Dreifusn Franc, e cila provokoi nj reagim t fuqishm intelektual,
n krye me shkrimtarin Emil Zola, kundr antisemitizmin n institucionet e shtetit francez. Pr
kt shih : David Drake : French Intellectuals and Politics from the Dreyfus Affair to the Occupation,
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, fq. 8-34.
195 . Yirmiyahu Yovel, Nietzsche contra Wagner on the Jews, n : Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?, On
uses and abuses of a philosophy, Jacob Colomb and Robert S.Wistrich (ed), Princeton University
Press, 2002, fq.134
196 . Friedrich Nietzsche, Perndimi i Idhujve, ose si filozofohet me ekiq, Bargjini, Tiran, 2002, fq.52.
197 . Walter Benjamin, Iluminacione, Korbi, Tiran, 1998, fq.158-160
t cilit Nie gjithashtu ka qndrim t rrept kritik. Pr Yovel, Nie e prdor
termin rac vetm n kuptimin deskriptiv, dhe pr dallim nga racistt q
aspirojn ndarje totale mes racave, Nie mbshtet przierjen e tyre brenda nj
Europe t re. Kjo prbn edhe dimension e pest t qndrimit niean kundr
antisemitizmit, ndrkaq n t gjashtin Nie del kundr antisemitizmit ngase n
rrnj t tij qndron struktura e prbashkt gjenealogjike e friks, pasiguris,
dobsis ekzistenciale, dhe mbi t gjitha e ressentimentit- i mllefit t t smurit
kundr atij q sht mentalisht i fuqishm dhe vetafirmues
198
. T gjasht kto
dimensione n sintezn e tyre prbjn analizn e thell kritike psikoanalitike,
psikologjike dhe sociologjike t Nies pr antisemitizmin. Nj analiz e till e
distancon krejtsisht filozofin e tij nga ideologjia naziste.
Por n ann tjetr mbetet edhe nj shtje tjetr e cila n shikim t par duket
se shkon kundr rryms s ktij distancimi, dhe pikrisht shtja e kritiks
radikale q Nie zhvillon pr judaizmin. Yovel konsideron se Nie nuk e
kritikon n bllok judaizmin. Pr t judaizmi nuk ka nj struktur monolite, t
pandryshueshme prgjat tr ekzistencs historike t tij. Ai dallon tre faza t
mdha n rrjedhn kohore t ksaj ekzistence. Faza e par sht ajo judaizmit t
Testamentit t Vjetr. N kohrat biblike ( t Testamentit t Vjetr) Nie sheh
nj madhshti natyrore dhe dionisiake, e cila i ngjall atij nderim. Ai nuk e pranon
prmbajtjen e besimeve fetare t tyre, por admiron qndrimin ndaj jets dhe
fen e personaliteteve biblike, sepse ai sht vital, natyral, toksor, dhe sepse
ndrtohet m shum mbi vetafirmimin se sa vetakuzimin
199
.
Ndrkaq Nie ka probleme me judaizmin e fazs s dyt, q njihet si judaizmi
i Tempullit t Dyt. Ky sht judaizmi i prifterinjve t ktij tempulli me t cilt,
sipas Nies lidhet origjina e moralit t skllevrve, origjina e revolucionit dhe
e prmbysjes e denatyralizmit t vlerave, prej nga edhe del krishterimi
200
. Ka
edhe nj faz t tret n historin e judaizmit, dhe ajo sht jeta n diaspor
e hebrenjve, e cila tek Nie ngjall prseri admirim, sepse n t sheh fuqin e
afirmimit t jets prkundr vuajtjeve q prjetojn ata n vazhdimsi. Diaspors
hebreje Nie i njeh edhe meritn e te qenit bartse e qndrimit konstant kritik
ndaj krishterimit
201
. N lidhje me kt vet Nie shkruan : N kohrat m t
errta t Mesjets, kur shtresa e reve aziatike u vendos rnd mbi Europ, ishin
mendimtart e lir ifut, dijetart dhe mjekt ifut, ata q mbajtn fort flamurin
e ndriimeve dhe t pavarsis shpirtrore, nn shtrngesat m t ashpra
vetjake, pr t mbrojtur Europn nga Azia ; prpjekjeve t tyre u detyrohemi t
paktn pr kt, q nj shpjegim m natyror, m racional dhe n do rast jomitik
i bots, m n fund arriti t fitonte, dhe se unaza e qytetrimit, e cila tani na
lidh me ndriimet e lashtsis greko-romake, mbeti e pathyer. Nse krishterimi
ka br gjithka pr ta orientalizuar perndimin, hebraizmi ka kontribuar
198 . Yirmiyahu Yovel, vep e cit, fq. 134.
199 . Yovel, tekst i cit, fq.136
200 . Yovel , po aty, fq,.136
201 . Yovel , po aty. 136
189
thelbsisht pr ta perndimizuar at prseri: dhe n nj kuptim kjo do t thot
se ka kontribuar q misioni dhe historia e Europs t jet vazhdimsi e asaj
greke
202
. Ky vlersim vitalist dhe historik i kontributit t hebrenjve t diaspors
e vendos Nien n pozita krejtsisht antagoniste me ideologjin naziste, e cila
donte ti qronte hesapet pikrisht me kta hebrenj.
Par n trsin e saj pikpamja vlersuese e Nies mbi judazimin megjithat
prmban njlloj kontradikte brenda saj. Derisa Nie vlerson vitalitetin e
hebrenjve, n fazn e par dhe t tret t judaizmit, fuqin e rezistencs dhe
afirmimit t jets prball sfidave krcenuese ndaj saj, dhe shvlerson iden
judaiste t nj Zoti benevolent e nj rendi t prbotshm moral t derivuar prej
saj, duket se nuk vren se sht pikrisht nj ide e till q i jep jet kulturs s
rezistencs dhe optimizmit jetsor edhe n kushtet m ekstreme t dshprimit
dhe rnies. Rezistenca dhe emancipimi gjithmon e presupozojn iden se parimi
i drejtsis, n instanc t fundit, triumfon mbi do parim tjetr. Mirpo kjo ide
sht vetm nj pandehm ; ajo nuk ka kuptim jasht nj vizioni esencialist pr
botn dhe Nie duke dekonstruktuar pikrisht nj vizion t till i krijon mendimit
t tij imunitet nga format e vrazhda t esencializmit, sikurse jan racizmi dhe
antisemitizmi. N kt kontekst rryma postmoderniste e konstruktivizmit social
i ka shum borxhe atij. Kjo rrym prbn nj form t re t asaj q njihej qysh
nga shekulli i XIX si kritik e ideologjis. Duke i prcaktuar identitetet grupore
njerzore si trajta socialisht t konstruktuara, dhe si shprehje t hegjemonive t
pushteteve, konstruktivizmi social shrbn si nj kritik efektive ndaj pushteteve
t ndryshme q synojn t natyralizohen dhe esencializohen, n mnyr q
t prjetsohen.
Literatura
1. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
2. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Vintage Books, New York, 1967.
3. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume IV : Nihilism, Harper & Row,
Publishers, San Francisco, 1979.
4. Friedrich Nietzsche, Perndimi i Idhujve, ose si filozofohet me eki,
Bargjini, Tiran, 2002.
5. Friedrich Nietzsche, ECCE HOMO, Si bhet njeriu ai q sht, Konica,
Tiran, 2001.
6. Friedrich Nietzsche, Njerzor, tepr njerzor, UEGEN, Tiran, 2005.
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191
Accommodation of difference: Shared civic identity and minority rights Hana Limani
Hana Limani

Accommodation of dierence:
Shared civic identity and minority rights
The state does not oppose the freedom of people to express their particular
cultural attachments, but nor does it nurture such expressionrather [...] it
responds with benign neglect [...] The members of ethnic and national groups
are protected against discrimination and prejudice, and they are free to maintain
whatever part of their ethnic heritage or identity they wish, consistent with the
rights of others.
- Will KYMLICKA
Abstract
The domain of rights is undoubtedly a
political imperative in the world today, given
its rise in the political and social agenda
especially during the twentieth century.
Various debates within this topic have been
developed particularly throughout the recent
decades, therefore, many sub-topics are part
of this wide spectrum of discourses. The focus
of this paper is, by and large, on the rights
of the minority communities and the related
issues that rise within this realm. More
specifically, emphasis is put on the question
whether minority communities within a state
society should be granted specific rights as
to match their discrepancy with the majority
community, or should the liberal doctrine
prevail and thus they be treated the same,
that is, in harmony with the liberal principles
of equal treatment. Discrimination, unequal
opportunities, marginalization, and so forth,
are abundant throughout the world, hence
the need to look at the problem more closely
and seek alternatives and solutions. This topic
shall be treated by providing an overview
of various concepts in the field of rights,
with focus on that of citizenship, equality,
justice, representation, and relation of the
individual to the community, whereby they
will be broken down, analyzed, compared,
and evaluated. Likewise, some of the most
prominent theorists of this broader domain
will be discussed, by looking at theories of
representation, liberalism, cosmopolitanism,
communitarianism, and similar. Noteworthy,
these debates are developed in the context
of democratic societies of the present times.
With this said, in order to settle the issue
of minorities and to regulate the conflict
between minority and majority cultures, a
theory that addresses how minority rights
can coexist with human rights and how the
former are limited by principles of individual
liberties, social justice, and democracy
is identified and evaluated. The ongoing
tensions in this domain are still very intense,
which shows that they will remain at the core
of discourse in the domain of political theory,
and consequently, the practice of the political
systems also in the future.
Amid the most important discourses in the field of political theory today is
undoubtedly that which falls under the domain of rights. Although this has been
an ongoing debate during various stages of history, it is in the twentieth century
and onwards that this topic became the core of political discourse and moreover,
it shaped the way the world functions today. With the historical occurrences of
the twentieth century and the changes they brought forth to the political systems,
relations between states, and ways societies function, it is therefore safe to say
that never before in history has the discourse about rights been stronger. To
illustrate this, one can look at the many subtopics that this subject contains; the
concept of rights is indeed very general, and as such, there has been a need to
break it down to more specific segments that fall under this domain. With this
said, and given the broad spectrum of this topic, the emphasis henceforth shall
be put on the issues that rise in context of the rights of the minorities, that is,
their relation to concepts that are part of the rights field, and most importantly,
the tension between accommodation of minorities in relation to majorities,
human rights versus minority rights, and similar debates.
Given the importance and the relevance of the topic of minority rights (and
rights in general) to the world today, there are many philosophers and thinkers
deal with this topic. In the following is an endeavor to compare and contract
theories of some of them, in order to show several of the multiple theories that
exist in this domain. A selection of these philosophers has been done with the
attempt to choose the most relevant ones to be compared and contrasted based
on their distinct stands. Therefore, in one hand there is Seyla Benhabib with her
theory of cosmopolitanism, that pushes for a world order that in its core is very
broad-based rights-wise, to continue with Iris Young that pushes strongly for
recognition of difference, and against universalism. A counterargument to this
comes from Martha Nussbaum, as a strong proponent of universalism. While
these three argue in this domain, John Rawls cannot go unmentioned in his liberal
theory, where attempts to construct justice as fairness (used here to show efforts
for building a fair system for the minorities also) are strong, however, criticized
highly by Charles Mills, a philosopher of oppositional political theory with a
mission to correct the injustices done to the race-discriminated populations.
Needless to say, communitarianism as the contrary theory to liberalism is
discussed as brought forth by Michael Sandel, for purposes of comparison.
Lastly, and most importantly, the theory of Will Kymlicka is discussed, and at the
same time, supported, to show the regulation of the tension that this paper tries
to resolve that is, the regulation of the conflict between special and human
rights, by finding a combination of the two. This is supplemented by the theory
of David Miller, whereby is shown the possibility of existence of the welfare and
multi-cultural policies.
193
1. Group rights approaches

2.1 Cosmopolitanism and civic Identity
In light of collective identity and therefore internationalization of rights and
citizenship as a concept, or in other words, shaping a cosmopolitan society,
Seyla Benhabib is one of the most prominent theorists. In her book Another
Cosmopolitanism, the very general question that she seeks to answer is how can
political and legal institutions be fashioned so that we, the people can govern
ourselves collectively. Benhabib acknowledges that the fundamental challenge
of the present times is the construction of a jurisprudential theory able to
reconcile the universality of human rights with the partiality of positive law
[that is, the law regarded from its legitimacy stance] (Benhabib, 2006, p. 3).,
and thus seeks to address it from human rights or excluded groups point of view,
the latter being the people that are inhabitants of a state but are excluded from
its polity, including both legal and illegal aliens (Benhabib, 2006). In this context
come into play the cosmopolitan norms which the author analyses throughout
this book, and are briefly explained in the following, and the way how they
would contribute to equality amid the people (the most touched groups being
members of non-majority communities, refugees, etc.).
In relation to what was said above, the act of entry into force of UN Declaration
of Human Rights in 1948 is considered to be the act that has marked a step on
the evolution of the world society, its main principle being the transition from
international to cosmopolitan norms of justice (Benhabib, 2006, pp. 15-16).
Following this, what Benhabib calls cosmopolitan norms of justice are those
norms that, regardless of their legal orientation, apply to all individuals as
moral and legal persons in a worldwide civil society (Benhabib, 2006, p. 16).
The argument is that in spite of the fact that those norms come from written
documents (e.g. UN Charter for the signatory states), the essence lies in the fact
that these norms endow individuals, rather than states, with particular rights
and claims. Therefore, it is in this factor that the international norms of justice
have become indeed cosmopolitan. Lastly, as it comes forth in the book discussed
herein, Benhabib is determined to press the principles of cosmopolitanism to
their fullest possible embodiment, and that she is willing to limit these principles
only as necessary to preserve democratic authority(Benhabib, 2006, p. 9).
Given that cosmopolitanism is the core concept that the author uses to develop
her theory, and that this is a notion that has been defined and redefined
differently throughout time by various actors, it is important that her view of
this concept is defined for the reader in specific terms, in order not to use of the
general meaning of this term without the details; in other words, when speaking
of Benhabibs cosmopolitan norms of justice, it is appropriate to use the specific
definition that she holds for cosmopolitanism. Therefore, according to her, what
this term means in critical theory is a normative philosophy for carrying the
universalistic norms of discourse ethics beyond the confines of the nation-
state(Benhabib, 2006, p. 18). This is a definition by Jurgen Habermas, David
Held, and James Bohman that Benhabib has chosen to adopt for her theory of
cosmopolitan norms in this book.
With this said, it appears that Benhabib holds it important that the norms and
ethics of discourse are moved beyond the limits that may be set by the current
construct of the world, that is nation-states. Needless to say, this theory assumes
no need for employment of special rights, and neither adoption of rights according
to the specifics of a particular group, but rather pushes for internationalization,
globalization of a system which would contribute to a collective identity. The
latter would in turn serve the adoption of a cosmopolitan order, and governance
by cosmopolitan norms of justice. However, there are many challenges to this.
Other theories argue that this kind of system leaves out many groups that in
the past, or still today, are discriminated against, more vulnerable, or are simply
do not belong to the mainstream society. To show these challenges, in the
following are theories that directly or indirectly challenge Benhabibs principles
of cosmopolitan rights and world order.

2.2 Group difference
In light of comparing and contrasting theories in this domain, this part shall be
focused on a theory that is the opposite of the afore-described one, brought forth
by Iris Young, also a renowned theorist in this field. The latter argues strongly
against the concept of universal citizenship which seems to have been more
embraced than not in todays political theory. In her article Polity and Group
Difference: a Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, Young develops the
argument that universality of citizenship, meaning the inclusion and participation
of everyone, is in conflict with universality in its other two meanings, that are:
universality as a generality, and universality as equal treatment (Young, 1989).
Before analyzing that however, it is worth mentioning that Young refers to the
universality of citizenship as it is defined in contemporary political thought:
a universality of citizenship in the sense that citizenship status transcends
particularity of difference. Following this, with equality understood as sameness,
the concept of universal citizenship, besides extending citizenship to all, it also
means: first, universality as general rather than specific (i.e. what citizens have
in common and not their differences), and second, universality as laws and rules
that are the same for everyone and likewise, apply to all (i.e. laws and rules that
do not recognize the individual or group difference) (Young, 1989).
Young argues against the assumed link between citizenship for all and the two
above-mentioned senses of citizenship. To address this, she believes mechanisms
for group representation should be used in order to secure the inclusion and
participation of everyone in public discussion and decision making. Equal
195
treatment, in societies where non-majority and privileged groups exist, can
bring forth oppression or disadvantage to the former. Therefore, in order to
avoid that, articulation of special rights that recognize group difference must
be employed as a means to avoid discrimination and inequality (Young, 1989).
A summary of Youngs argument is that democratic procedures favor some
individuals over others by universalizing citizenship and putting everyone
together under one identity (that of a citizen). The inclusion of all citizens and
their participation in political life does not suffice for equal representation of all
groups, and does not necessarily bring forth wise and fair decisions. The unity
and universality of citizenship that the structures of participatory democracy
define indeed create more group oppression. Unlike Benhabib, Young argues that
the paradox of democracy makes some citizens more equal than others and the
universal citizenship that it promotes gives power to certain groups of individuals.
The argument follows that trying to make citizens leave aside their differences
and experiences brings forth the domination of the privileged as it is only their
experiences that will dominate over the unified public (which includes the other
groups that do not have the same views, social standings, etc.) (Young, 1989).

The argument presented above follows from the idea that a perspective
completely independent of personal experiences and histories is impossible; the
author argues that it is not possible for all people to understand all experiences
and points of view, therefore unity under one unbiased group is unfeasible.
When public is described in terms of universality, homogeneity becomes a
requirement. Since some are more privileged than the others in the real world,
that requirement leaves some groups underrepresented (Young, 1989).
The suggestion that Young gives related to the issue of dealing with democracy
and the fact that its procedures favor some individuals over others, is the
employment of mechanisms for group representation and special rights for
the underrepresented people. These two ways, according to her, would bring
just outcomes in a society. She argues that to achieve just outcomes, democracy
should be built based on real circumstances, and not based on a humanity
that is assumed to be undifferentiated (which is obviously not the case in
the real world) (Young, 1989). While Benhabib argues that universality and
cosmopolitan norms serve the world by shaping norms of discourse ethics and
norms by which people are governed to be beyond nation-states, Young argues
that this is harmful to equality and thus group difference should be at the center
of attention when attempting to accommodate justice in the domain of rights.
2.3 Universalism versus group differentiated rights
The third argument in this line of discussion is that which brings forth a strong
argument pro universalism. While Young with the above theory argues strongly
for group differentiated rights, and attacks universalism as equality amid the
equal while leaving many underrepresented or inequality treated, Martha
Nussbaum, a contemporary theorist on matters of universal values, shows how
Youngs theory is not a valid attack on universalism, and even less so a solution to
equal treatment. Nussbaum starts by defending her position against the attack
on universalism through promoting the case that universalist ideas of humans
arise within the human history and experience. She argues that, when one
belongs to more than one culture, and therefore more than one set of traditions,
it is the human commonality that brings all of them together, and the world is
seen as a set of connections of similarities. She defends universalism against the
attack that it neglects historical and cultural differences by arguing that such
argument does not show how choosing one picture of the human over another is
full of political and philosophical difficulty (she gives the historical example that
humans have been defined by characteristics of males, thus females have been
left out) (Nussbaum, 1993).
Given what was said above, it can be concluded that the defense of universalism
against the attack on the neglect of autonomy lies simply in the approach that
politics must refuse to determinate theory of human being, as that would be
imperialistic. The argument that follows is that every citizen should be
given choices and politics should not be the determinant of any of them. The
prejudicial application attacks universalism by saying that is very easy for the
powerless to be excluded. Nussbaum argues that this is a vague argument, and
it fails to show how we would be better without the application of universalism,
since certain groups of people (i.e. women) could just be excluded anyways. In
general, Nussbaum shows that such attacks to universalism fail to show how
universalism would fail in any of the abovementioned cases (Nussbaum, 1993).

3. Equality and social justice
3.1 Liberalism
When speaking of rights, equality, and social justice in general, the philosopher
that certainly cannot go unmentioned is John Rawls. A significant thinker in the
liberal political philosophy, Rawls remains amid the most important figures in
political theory, and certainly his theories are relevant to the topic of this paper.
To relate to the previous and subsequent discussions on the areas mentioned, it
is essential to briefly examine the Rawlsian theory of justice, as in the following.
The concept of justice as fairness in Rawlsianism is intended as a political
conception of justice that applies only to the political, social, and economical
institutions of a modern constitutional democracy. It is a specific moral concept,
rather than a general one, designed particularly for the set of institutions that
it applies to. The reasons for the existence of such concept are the social and
197
historical conditions of the democracies whose histories consist of conditions
that are not relevant to the general moral concepts. Therefore, justice as fairness
is adopted in a way that makes it pertinent with those conditions. This adoption
requires the transformation of the notion of the good and consequently, the
general moral concept transforms into a specific political concept of justice
(Rawls, 1985).
It is important to comprehend Rawlss idea how public bases for political
agreement be found through justice as fairness. He argues that provisional fixed
points, which are a societys most firmly held convictions (such as religious
toleration and rejection of slavery), should be the basis for a coherent concept
of justice in order to narrow the range of public disagreement, which is the
key to finding a shared basis on the most appropriate institutional forms for
liberty and equality. In this regard, philosophical controversies should be left
out as they consist of deep and unresolved matters and thus bring discrepancies
amongst people and thus serve the opposite purpose of finding the shared
beliefs. Therefore, the method of avoidance of such factors is applied to make
justice as fairness a political not a metaphysical matter (Rawls, 1985).
In his theory of justice as fairness, Rawls also gives an account about the ideas
that belong to a political conception of justice that make up justice as fairness.
In this respect, the argument that follows is that the notion of a society as a fair
system of cooperation between free and equal persons is an idea that belongs to
political justice as well as to justice as fairness. This system of cooperation works
based on three elements, that are: cooperation by rules recognized publicly and
not those set by a central authority, fair terms of cooperation which are accepted
by all, and a cooperation from which all the participants can acquire the good
that is considered to be good from their own point of view. A person who accepts
such conditions to be elements of a fair system of cooperation is: one who is a
fully cooperating member of society, which is a person who has the moral power
for a sense of justice and the conception of good (Rawls, 1985).
Lastly, it is undoubtedly useful to discuss one of the key concepts that Rawls uses
in his theory of justice, that is, the notion of the so-called original position. This
concept is the idea that determines what conception of justice specifies the most
appropriate principles for liberty and equality in a society that is seen as the
system of cooperation between free and equal persons. Those fair terms for a
social cooperation are derived from those engaged on it themselves, the people. A
crucial element of this idea is the veil of ignorance, that is a figurative feature of
the original position which serves the purpose of creating circumstances under
which the concept of justice is not distorted based on particular features and
circumstances of the people; in other words, it is an objective justice. This veil
deprives them from knowing their personal features and circumstances beyond
it, and since it is these features and circumstances that determine how they will
be treated beyond the veil, the uncertainty about them brings to specification of
the most appropriate and fair principles for realizing the institutions of liberty
and equality. Therefore, the conception of justice that would be adopted in such
case is perceived as the one supported by the best and most fair reasons (Rawls,
1985).
3.2 Liberalism critique
This idea of original position to serve the theory of justice as fairness is however
highly criticized by Charles Mills, a philosopher of oppositional political theory.
In his book Contract and Domination, among the other topics touched is that
which focused particularly on the concept of original position, whereby Mills
argues that it is a flawed idea given its tendency to disregard the real historic
and present situation of a particular group in a society. Thus, Mills attempts to
repair the breach of this Rawlsian concept as follows:
The revision of Rawls is based on the construction of a device of representation
which is appropriate to deal with a non-ideal theory. Rawlss theory is ideal, Mills
argues, therefore there is no discrimination to be directed; it is a theory which
starts from ground zero. To address the problem of discrimination, the theory
should start from an already existing social order, where the discrimination
problem is present and thus can be directed. The author uses the matter of racial
economic inequalities to revise Rawls (Mills, 2007). Although he in his revision
of Rawls employs the example of race particularly, given the social and political
circumstances in the American history, for purpose of this paper, race shall be also
read as: ethnic minority and/or any other potentially underrepresented group.

The argument presented as a critique to the previous theory is that instead
of imagining ourselves behind a veil of ignorance in an original position of
establishing an ideal society, we must imagine ourselves behind the veil in
a society where we could end up being a member of the discriminated races
in a society shaped by the racial contract (which is the type of society that
exists today). To eliminate the illicit racial differences (read: ethnic), as Mills
calls them, one must create proportionality between the white supremacy
group and the subordinated (non-whites) (read here: ethnic majority and
ethnic minority). This proportionality would eliminate the racial (ethnic)
differences, and there would be no need for reorganization of a society based
on egalitarian, liberal, or justice as fairness theories. The argument continues
that a thinner veil than that of Rawls is needed; one that contains more details
than just the general social facts. Behind this thinner veil one would make
e decision based on the possibility that he could end up being a member of a
subordinated group which has the white superiority above them. This way,
a balance point can be found in between those two groups (Mills, 2007).
199
3.3 Communitarianism
Michael Sandel, an American Political theorist, is widely known for his criticism to
the Rawlsian theory of justice. Although he can be identified as a communitarian
of certain type, his main counterargument to the Rawlsian theory rests in the
concept of original position, that he claims, is a concept which makes the citizens
unencumbered. In his article The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered
Self, Sandel argues that the principle of the right as prior to the good (the liberal
principle mostly embraced and endorsed by Rawls) is a failed one. This concept,
as defined in contemporary political theory, is that the individual rights cannot
be sacrificed for the greater good and these rights cannot be justified by any
principle of justice that is based on any specific idea of a good life. The author
makes three arguments about this contemporary liberalism: first, that it has a
profound and influential philosophical appeal; second, regardless of the first
argument, the claim fails ultimately (i.e. for the priority of right over good);
and third, regardless of the second argument, this liberal vision is the one by
which we live (Sandel, 1984). For the purpose of relevancy to this paper, Sandels
second argument will be in the focus in the following.
Another matter worth mentioning prior to the examination of that argument
however is that of Sandels view on a certain conception of a person as a moral
agent (an issue this that relates the three arguments to one another). It is the
view that liberal theory is not merely a set of regulative principles, but also
looks at the way the world is and our functioning within it. Now, at the heart of
this stands the person that both inspires and undoes it (Sandel, 1984, p.83).
While this ethic is persuasive, argues Sandel, it is also vulnerable because of the
promise and the failure of the unencumbered self. This relates to the Rawlsian
idea of original position behind the veil of ignorance, which frees a person from
his encumbrances, and this does not serve the purpose that Rawls claims.
Sandel, following the Kantian theory of transcendental subject, takes up the
Rawlsian concept of original position as the provider of what the first theory
lacks, namely the foundation for the right prior to good but that is placed in the
world. The argument is that this concept of Rawls puts into light the notion of
the unencumbered self. For the unencumbered self, the most important matter
is our capacity to choose our ends (rather than the ends that we choose) (Sandel,
1984). This being a deep liberal thought, the argument that follows is that such
self cannot make sense of the moral and political life by the light of the self-image
it requires (Sandel, 1984, p.87). The author therefore develops this argument
first within the liberal framework and then beyond its limits, as explained in the
following.
In order to argue in light of that was said above, Sandel uses the principle
of difference, which he perceives as the result of the failure of the liberals to
recognize the arbitrariness of fortune. This statement is based on the Rawlsian
concept of justice as fairness, whereby it is said that all men agree to share
each-others fate (talents are common assets), and all are beneficiaries of the
benefits they bring. It follows that the benefits of ones attributes shall not be
shared because they are in cases accidental (e.g. physical appearance) and not
an essential fact about the person. Subsequent to this, the difference principle
holds that the assets one has are his only by coincidence, and given that these
assets are shared, everyone has primary claim on the benefits that come from
them. Therefore, the principle of difference is a sharing principle that assumes
some prior moral tie among those the assets of whom it would set up and whose
efforts would be enlisted in a common endeavor. From this it follows that the
authors main argument in opposition of the unencumbered self is that that we
as people cannot perceive justice as being primary while also perceiving the
difference principle as a principle of justice. Lastly, the notion of unencumbered
self remains out of the self-understandings that are ingredients for a common
life, and as such, it remains unsteady between detachment and entanglement
(Sandel, 1984).
The Procedural Republic, in the argument developed here, is a result of the
twentieth century trend of liberalism making its peace with central power. As
democratic communities would not survive alone as entities in themselves,
the historical circumstances brought forth the model of national republic. So,
according to Sandel, together with this came a controversy: on one hand, a
republic with a strong sense of nationality and with principles of common good
still, and on the other, attempts to live up to the theory of the right over the
good. Hence, the situation in the following: As right holders (rights having the
trump power), the citizens perceive themselves as free to choose in the capacity
of individuals that have no obligations that the rights or agreements we make
forebear. On the other hand though, as citizens of the procedural republic that
grants these rights, the people are suddenly part of a variety of frightening
dependencies and expectations that they did not chose, and as a matter of
fact, that they reject. This is the paradox that people in America (read here: in
states that built their systems in harmony with this model of liberalism) find
themselves in, thus live in a mess created in the political aspect as a consequence
of the tensions in philosophy (Sandel, 1984).

4. Universal and special rights
4.1 Minority rights in liberalism
The theory that is supported in this paper and that is deemed the most
suitable one to be pursued by a country in order to accommodate difference
and function as a joint civic entity is the one developed by Will Kymlicka. This
theory is one which rehabilitates the tensions that rise between majority and
minority cultures, by accommodating the latter into the former, and at the same
201
time, by giving them the option to integrate to the level they themselves deem
appropriate (in light of preserving their cultural difference and likewise, of
being part of the shared civic identity of the country the country they live in)
(Kymlicka, 1995). In principle, the theory offered by Kymlicka is a theory which
focuses on supplementation of human rights by minority rights there where the
former are limited by the principles of democracy, individual liberties, and social
justice. Therefore, it is the tradition of the human rights theory supplemented by
a minority rights theory; in other words, it is a combination of the theories that
were previously discussed in this paper, although more liberal than anything
else.
They key to doing this however is to make several distinctions beforehand: what
states exist in relation to their minorities, what rights exist for those minorities,
and to what minorities are granted what kind of rights. This is important given
that the whole theory that is supported here, (as brought forth by Kymlicka), is
based upon the premise that the rights granted to one type of minority should
be matching to the nature of that particular group. Otherwise, a country runs
the risk of widening the gap between its communities, which in turn serves
the opposite goal of this entire topic. With this said, the types of states that
are identified in this theory are the multinational states and polyethnic states.
The former are the states that, as the word itself says it, contain more than one
nation, while the latter, the states that consist of people of other cultures that
came in as immigrants. Correspondingly, there are national minorities and
ethnic minorities. The former are less prone to integration given that usually
they are concentrated into one part of the country, while the latter generally
speaking can be considered as more likely to integrate, though wish to retain
part of their ethnic differences still (Kymlicka, 1995).
Following this line of thought, there are three different types of rights that may
be granted to ethnic and national minorities: self-government rights (mostly
applicable to national minorities), polyethnic rights (mostly applicable to ethnic
minorities), and special representation (that can apply to both depending on the
case, and whose main purpose is to have the minority voice heard in processes
of political representation). While the latter two are mostly rights that spur
integration and solidarity, the former present the risk of the opposite happening.
However, according Kymlickas theory, it is those self-government rights which
in a way are, so to say, a necessary evil. They do widen the gap between the
minority and majority community, and not only that, but they grant the minority
community the opportunity to even seek to secede from the country into which
they are established (given that they have separate political power) (Kymlicka,
1995). Nevertheless, the reason why these rights are deemed mandatory can
be found within the question: what will happen if these rights are not granted?
Therefore, while self-government rights can be potentially dangerous, the act of
not recognizing them as rights at can very well be a stronger motivation to move
towards secession (the feeling of being discriminated against and/or denial of
the identity and rights they wish to retain as a result of who they are). Thus,
while both options are dangerous (self-government rights and lack thereof), the
first option is considered less dangerous (Kymlicka, 1995).
When it comes to representation, the support for group representation comes
as a consequence of the argument that it does not suffice to grant group-
differentiated rights, but the decision making procedures must also define
and interpret these rights. In light of this, it follows that the two cases when
it is legitimate for minorities to demand group representation rights is: the
case when a minority group has been disadvantages by the fact that they do
not belong to the majority community, and when a minority group needs to
prove that the desire for self-government reflects the will of the members of
their community (Kymlicka, 1995). Kymlickas theory is at an advantage to the
other theories because, as previously mentioned, realizes the real situation
in relation to the minority cultures, while is accommodates them by doing
the best to have them part of the shared civic identity, by not interfering with
their minority culture; it is by respect, not by forced integration that a minority
culture will wish to integrate and feel part of a shared civic identity. The
advantage that this theory has against that of cosmopolitanism for example is,
that the need to treat group-difference should not be reduced to the idea that
everyone is treated under the concept of cosmopolitan or universal citizenship.
4.2 Multiculturalism and civic Identity
On another note, David Miller theory takes up the issue whether welfare state
can accommodate multicultural policies. The main argument that exists in
the theories so far is that multicultural policies exclude the possibility of the
implementation of welfare state policies, and vice-versa. Miller however argues
that is it possible that a welfare state applies multicultural policies as well. This
theory can also be seen as complementary to, or similar, to Kymlickas theory.
The main argument that supports the thesis that a welfare state can adopt
multicultural policies lies upon the idea that the multicultural policies do no
widen the gap between communities, but in contrary, make them feel part of a
shared identity (Banting & Kymlicka, 2006).
From what is said above, the argument that follows is that this is possible because
if it is the opposite case (where those multicultural policies serve to widen the
gap), then the majority community is less prone to support welfare policies, given
that a group that refuses to be part of the larger society will also benefit (here
comes into play the idea of benefits that come as a result of welfare policies and
of the redistributive mechanism in the vertical sense (Banting & Kymlicka, 2006).
Having said this, one can see that both Miller and Kymlicka support the group
differentiated rights, however, from a different perspective. While Miller focuses
203
on the importance of integration of the minority groups into the society in order
to have the consent of the majority groups for welfare policies (redistributive
mechanisms), Kymlicka focuses on the minority treatment position. Therefore,
they both advocate in favor of group-differentiated rights and both argue that
they do not widen the gap between communities - quite the opposite - they
narrow down the differences by making each group feel enough comfortable to
count themselves part of the larger unified community.

5. Conclusions

Throughout this paper are discussed various theories regarding minority
treatment and concepts related to it, such as citizenship, representation, liberty,
culture, justice, equality, community, and welfare. While the main goal was to come
to a conclusion after having analyzed, compared and contrasted the presented
theories on how should various non-majority groups within a state be treated
(considering the nation-state system that the world functions upon currently),
many other issues raise along the way. Following this, this theory section did not
cover only the main theories on the domain of minority rights and of the concepts
related to them (as mentioned above), but also the tensions that raise within those
theories, matters that remain unsolved, and arguments and counterarguments
from and between various theorists. Thus, the core purpose of this paper was to
identify the best system to put in place in a country with regard to its minority
treatment, given its society specifics and its historical background. Consequently,
drawing from what was said above, it appears that the theory that deals most
appropriately with the minority communities residing within a country (that
is, consolidation of one civic identity while granting equal rights and promoting
justice for all), is a system where minorities are recognized as different.
In this paper, the theory supported and thus emphasized majorly is that of human
rights complemented and completed by minority rights; it is namely a liberal theory
supplemented by a special part that puts attention in minority communities. This
is the theory by and large developed by Will Kymlicka. As mentioned previously, it
is the one that addresses the question of coexistence between human and minority
rights, and analyses the consequences that come from individual liberties, social
justice, and democracy principles. The option that Kymlicka offers with his theory
is allowing the communities that reside within a country to integrate to the level
that they feel comfortable (meaning that they have the option of full integration),
and at the same time, of preserving their differences so that their identity is not
threatened by assimilation.. Precisely because of this need to recognize difference
and not impose one communal identity upon all (which is likely to have a
counter-effect), it is essential to use this as a means to gradually but surely ensure
unification under one civic identity, regardless of ethnicity.
Following what was said above, it is unavoidable that the those differences
should be accommodated within the system of a country, by at the same time
allowing the system to perform its duty of unifying citizens within one shared
civic identity, and prosper together as one society built upon different grounds.
The political situations in many countries composed of different communities,
and the social attitude therein, is not likely to sustain other treatments of
minority rights, as it could strike back with other hostilities and antagonisms.
It is not before several generation pass that it can be thought for universal
treatment. However, the question at stake is not whether the minorities should
be granted special rights, but rather, what way can minority rights be applied in
order for this not to create larger gaps between communities and thus raise a
society that is divided and unequal, and does not share the same civic identity.
To answer this question, Kymlicas theory offers the path to the best solution.
Bibliography
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University Press.
Benhabib, S. (2006). Another Cosmopolitanism (R. Post, Ed.). New York: Oxford
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Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights.
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Mills, C. W., & Pateman, C. (2007). Contract of Breach: Repairing the Racial
Contract. The Contract and Domination ( (pp. 80-106). Cambridge: Polity Press.
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205
The purpose of philosophy and the question of human rights Lino Veljak
Lino Veljak
The purpose of philosophy and the
question of human rights
Abstract
Speaking from the philosophical point of view about the idea and practice of human
rights it is necessary to explain the purpose of philosophy. What is happening to
philosophy in our so-called post-modern times? Has philosophy today still any
sense? Or should we declare the death of this obsolete type of intellectual activity?
A central question of this paper is the purpose
of philosophy. What is happening to philosophy
in our so-called post-modern times? Has
philosophy today still any sense? Or should
we declare the death of this obsolete type of
intellectual activity? What has philosophy been
reduced to? To a non-scientific interpretation
and explanation of the world, unappealing
for anyone else but the odd lot of enthusiasts
or funny persons who consider themselves to
be philosophers, even wizards, driven by self-
gratification with the very products of their
minds that are definitely beyond all conceivable
reasoning and sense? To something which must
be placed side by side with art and religion?
There is some space for philosophical
contribution to reflection and thinking (and
especially to the improvement) of the concept
and practice concerning the idea of human
rights. A great number of contemporary
philosophers take different positions with
the respect to the content, justification and
nature or function of human rights. But they
do so in large part because they approach the
issues raised by human rights from different
substantive moral orientations, respond to
different sort of problems, and work within
different methodological traditions.
Nevertheless, through interdisciplinary and
multidisciplinary approach those philosophy
which is grounded on the thinking resisting
to disciplinary fragmentation and which in
the same time requires the highest standards
of professional competence in specific areas,
which are important for the relevant issues
could demonstrates its significance and weight
in the context of the human rights. Through
such approach it became possible to prevent
any reduction of the issues concerning the
field of human rights to a mere legal (or even
legislative) question, or - on the other hand - to
the special question of this or that fragmentary
discipline. The logical and linguistic analysis of
the speech which will be used in the theory (and
especially in the application) of human rights
can provides indispensable tools for revealing
of delusions and manipulative lies based on the
reductionism, prejudices and ideology which
very often contaminate the speaking about
human rights and the practice related with the
human rights.
Only through re-introduction of the
philosophically based criticism, maintained by
logical and linguistic clarification of relevant
notions and conclusions, into the sphere of
human rights will the philosophy really realize
own integrative function concerning the sense
and condition of human rights.
206 NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014 KDU 1.342.72/.73
Among the learned and less educated ones, the more and less informed alike,
there is a dominant belief that philosophy has definitely become a dispensable
subject. It is an unnecessary, useless and superfluous luxury, a remnant of
some long-gone times, when it might have been fulfilling a useful task; yet
nowadays, its former rational essence has been diluted in positive, exact,
empirical/experimental sciences. One possible question is the following: what
has philosophy been reduced to? Somebody says: a non-scientific or, better, pre-
scientific interpretation and explanation of the world, unappealing for anyone
else but the odd lot of enthusiasts or funny persons who consider themselves
to be philosophers, even wizards, driven by self-gratification with the very
products of their minds that are definitely beyond all conceivable reasoning and
sense.
Thus, philosophy is placed side by side with art and religion. However, unlike art
in which non-artists can find some aesthetic pleasure and which will provide a
valuable possession, and therefore social prestige to a person devoid of any sense
of beauty and artistic appreciation; unlike religion, that has capacity to inspire
its followers with the sense and orientation in life, to lend them some spiritual
support and give them hope, or at least a promise, philosophy has nothing to
offer to non-philosophers. The consequence is unequivocal: if philosophy does
not provide anything to the overwhelming majority of humanity, it could mean
that philosophers, in turn, have nothing to give either to society or to scientific
community; in a word to anyone. Having nothing to offer, they are useless,
parasitic remnant of the past on the proliferating tree of our modern (or post-
modern) scientifically founded world.
However, the above-mentioned view concerning the obsolescence and uselessness
of philosophy has been possibly founded on some prejudices which are based on
certain existing features of philosophy. It is not the philosophy as such that is at
stake here; this argument is not about the essence of philosophy, but rather about
some characteristics pertaining to some dominant directions of contemporary
philosophy. One of those directions could be defined as reduction of philosophy
to philology: contemporary philosophers interpret, often using very sophisticated
philological tools, the thoughts of ancient philosophers; philosophy acquires the
form of an autoreferential activity, it deals with itself, instead of dealing with its very
subject-matter, with the world. A direct impact of such approach is the reduction
of universal entity of being to an overstrained concretion of interpretations and
reinterpretations. The consequence is for example that the concept of justice (and
this fundamental issue of classical and modern ethics and practical philosophy in
general performs together with the idea of dignity of human being the foundation
of modern civic conception of human rights) becomes overshadowed in such
approaches by issues of appropriate interpretations of Platos (or Aristotles
or stoics) concept of justice in this or that philosophical school of thought. The
issue of justice here merely serves as a basis for interpretational disputes, and
207
those disputes and their arguments are in itself the real aim and true sense of
such philosophical practices. There is some space for philosophical contribution
to reflection and thinking (and especially to the improvement) of the concept and
practice concerning the idea of human rights. A great number of contemporary
philosophers (for example Rawls, Talbott and Griffin) take different positions with
the respect to the content, justification and nature or function of human rights.
But they do so in large part because they approach the issues raised by human
rights from different substantive moral orientations, respond to different sort of
problems, and work within different methodological traditions. But all of them
indicate some of the crucial areas from which new philosophical challenges will
arise.
But, instead of interpreting the world with the aim of its understanding, a great
number of contemporary philosophers provide only the modalities of interpretation.
And, when within the framework of such an approach a pretentious philosopher
ventures to turn to the real thing, such attempts usually result in lifeless
constructs, unconnected and detached from their subject and from the cognitive,
social, spiritual, existential and other needs of the non-philosophical public, of the
society and of the humanity as a whole. It must be clear that the sprouting of such a
philosophical swamp nourishes prejudices not only of the scientific community, but
also of the social community in general regarding philosophy: philosophy is seen as
something unnecessary and useless: practicing philosophy refers to indulging in
useless and groundless speculation. Those of us who deal with vital activities like
protection and improvement of human rights do not have understanding for this
fundamentally redundant - kind of wasting of intellectual energy, time and means.
The idea of the redundancy and superfluity of philosophy can be dismissed by
dominant trend of contemporary philosophy: a predilection of philosophy to play
on the basis of logical-linguistic analysis - the role of an epistemic framework (and
in more ambitious versions maybe also the synthesis) of positive sciences. The
modern science as it is well known - did spring up from philosophy. In modern
times the science was expanding tremendously, regarding both the subjects and
the methods. New areas of research were defined and differentiation increased,
with respect to contents and disciplines as well as to the methods. The spreading
of interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary research, indispensable in the period
of this increasing differentiation for adequate confrontation with an ever more
complex world (which is increasingly shaped on the grounds of an enormous
development of sciences and their application, turning the human environment
into a scientific, artificial technical and technological milieu) merely emphasizes
the role of philosophy as the servant (but also, in a way, the coordinator, if not a
unifying factor) of science. The modalities of concrete, empirical and experimental
researchers activities in all conceivable areas of science crucially depend on
the solution of logical, methodological and epistemological problems (also an
imminently philosophical task).
The above-mentioned interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approach to
social sciences shows its significance and weight, especially in the context of
the human rights. Through such approach it became possible to prevent any
reduction of the issues concerning the field of human rights to a mere legal (or
even legislative) question, or - on the other hand - to the special question of
this or that fragmentary discipline (for example, political science, etc.). Briefly,
there is a strong potency of resistance against tendencies characterized by loss
of wholeness and context just like by false neutrality of scientific approach to
human rights and by production of false alternatives (for example, an alternative
between absolutization of individualism and hypostasis of collective identities)
and the affirmation of those tendencies clearly conducts to the transformation
of the idea of human rights in the (for the instrumental purposes of manipulation
rather adequate) ideology of human rights. Only philosophy (precisely, that
kind of philosophical practice which resists to disciplinary fragmentation and
in the same time requires the highest standards of professional competence
in specific areas, which are important for the relevant issues) can provide
indispensable logical, methodological and epistemological tools for an adequate
interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, integrative and pluriperspectivistic
approach to the issues concerning the complexity of human rights.
Further, the logical and linguistic analysis of the speech which will be used in
the theory (and especially in the application) of human rights can provides
indispensable tools for revealing of delusions and manipulative lies based on
the reductionism, prejudices and ideology which very often contaminate the
speaking about human rights and the practice related with the human rights.
Therefore, that is the irremediable basis and the first indispensable step in the
construction of critical function of philosophy in its relation with the human
social world. Ever since her very beginning, philosophy intended critically to
assess the world. It is to be presumed that, in the mental process of differentiating
good from evil, the justifiable from the unjustifiable, the truth (or trustworthy
belief) from fallacy (or illusion), the inevitable from accidental (or possible),
the acceptable from the unacceptable, the sphere of reality liable to human
influence (or at least the one considered to be such) from inevitable necessity,
was exposed to a much greater degree, and that is the domain of human
world. It appears that society (this domain of human) is much more prone to
change than nature. The natural course of events is obviously unbending (with
exceptions of scientifically based technical innovations which could submit
some natural processes under human control or modify certain necessary
courses and developments). Therefore, a philosopher or any other human being
speculating about the criticism of an earthquake or a flood, a draught or frost,
a grasshopper invasion or a plague epidemic would, inevitably, be seen as a
grotesque figure. Such natural phenomena and their causes and antecedents
can be cursed. However, cursing does not belong to the category of rational
209
activities, and philosophy, according to its original understanding, pretends
to be rational. On the rational plan, it makes sense to prevent all that could be
prevented: to build houses that are not going to collapse, and dams that will
obviate floods, irrigation systems that will alleviate the impact of draughts on
our agriculture, to manufacture clothes that will protect people from excessive
cold, to take care to sow the fields before low temperatures set in, etc. and it
is inasmuch plausible to judge the justification, the efficiency and timelines of al
these rational measures undertaken as a protection from the effects of natural
necessities. However, every instance of such judgment represents an instance
of social critique, at least to the extent in which all the estimated measures are
socially mediated (and it must be said that there is social mediation even on
the level of manufacturing of sheepskin coat for protection against the cold in
an isolated shepherds family, let alone the construction of dams and irrigation
systems).
A genuine field of philosophically based criticism deals with social constructions
and relations which constitute a human world. The superiority of philosophical
criticism concerning social constructs and social contexts (and, in turn, social
structures, institutions, characteristic forms and modes of social practice of
individuals, groups and communities) over so-called common criticism or
daily critique derives from the very nature of philosophy. It could be said that
philosophy is criticism in its essence. In the first place, it means discrimination
between justifiable and unjustifiable thoughts and ideas, separating the truth
from illusion, which constitutes the crucial difference on the grounds of which
philosophy does not belong to the group of spiritual activities, such as mythology
or ideology. Nevertheless, some will remark that the above-mentioned
differentiation is not a specific feature of philosophy, but an ever-present process
in any common-sensed mind; however, it could be noted that that plausible
reasoning is not immune to inherited or deep-rooted prejudices and deceptions:
the people which disposed of common sense believed in witches until not
so long ago, and many of those who still believe in racial superiority of their
own ethnic group boast with their own intellect. The application of discipline
of thought and logical consistence and consequentiality on social criticism (of
isolated phenomena or of the whole) adds a new quality to this discriminating
activity, a dimension of well-founded thought and verifiable results.
However, not even philosophically elaborated social criticism is immune from
radical digressions. It can be empirically proved, at least for the past two
centuries, that there has been no social catastrophe (in the broadest sense:
ranging from irrational dictatorships to quasi-rationally established despotic
realms down to wars and genocide) that has not been given legitimacy by some
very respectable (or seemingly respectable) type of philosophically based social
criticism, had it not resulted in the first place from considerable instrumentation
of social critique, supported by the apologetics of degenerated varieties of that
form. There has been no social mythology or irrational prejudice that did not
seek legitimacy in philosophy. And, although it is not particularly difficult to
prove that, for example, the Nazis perverted and abused the original significance
and intentions of Nietzsches criticism of modern society, driven by motives that
were directly opposed to the character of that very criticism, the social role and
course of philosophy remain overcast by a somber shadow. Even if a figure like
Popper exaggerates by labeling Plato and Hegel as the precursors of modern
totalitarianism, it cannot be denied that the modern authoritarian and totalitarian
theoreticians and politicians were partially inspired by certain motives of the
classical philosophy (including of the philosophical social criticism) how much
torn out of context they might have been or, at least, they did take advantage
of such motives to justify the projected or implemented forms of authoritarian
and totalitarian state and social order (the common denominator of all those
conceptions and practices is the idea that to the community belong all rights and
that the value of individual depends from his adjustment to the community). It
is also true that critical tones against such instrumentations have all too often
been suppressed by the dominance of divergent false alternatives in the field
of social criticism itself (alternative between freedom and justice, between the
individual and the community, etc.).
It is the issue which belongs to critical history of philosophy: to rehabilitate
all those suppressed and strangled voices of authentic social criticism,
and to separate the manipulated philosophers social criticism from their
instrumentations, from all misinterpretations and distortions they have been
exposed to.
But that, as it may, will nourish suspicions regarding philosophy as social
criticism. One among those suspicions could be understood, but not justified:
the induced suspicion, where, on the grounds of an insight into the fatal
consequences of social criticism, the very idea of subjecting society to criticism
is being rejected. According to the proponents of this presumption, philosophy
should not interfere with social life, because it is bound to lead to an evil outcome.
Functionally oriented social sciences entirely cater for the need to rationally
regulate the conditions of social processes. This is the reasoning of an exact
social sciences exponent and, in turn, of the entire academic community (but
also of those philosophers who are concerned with own social and academic
status). What remains to be offered to the academic community or to society
in general after such imposed and self-imposed restrictions, is defined by the
usefulness of the social science which is free of any suspicion that it might result
in any form of social evil. Philosophy will be in this way reduced to applied ethics
and applied logic.
Because of that reduction, the possibility of philosophical approach to the
question of human rights becomes very limited. Normative ethical questioning
jurisprudence which regulate the field of human right sees almost entirely the
211
question of human rights as, on the one hand to the doctrine of international and
maybe also civic law; and on the other hand to the empirical investigations about
the level of the application of legal norms. The effect of laws on the reality of
justice and on human dignity remains in this way practically without possibility
of any founded research. Only through re-introduction of the philosophically
based criticism, maintained by logical and linguistic clarification of relevant
notions and conclusions, into the sphere of human rights will the philosophy
which wants to remain loyal to its duty and to come true to its purpose really
realize own integrative function concerning the sense and condition of human
rights.

213
Tempered prospects for a globalized conception of human rights David Weberman & Zlata Bozac
David Weberman
Zlata Bozac

Tempered prospects for a globalized
conception of human rights

Abstract
This paper examines whether and under which
conditionsis there a common, underlying
philosophical basis of human rights which
could receive wide acceptance. One of
the most serious objections to the idea of
universal human rights is the one addressing
its alleged universality. Human rights, while
purportedly universally valid, are actually
a product of the historical development of
a particular (Western) civilization, and are
therefore grounded in fundamental values
which are unacceptable from the point of
view of many other cultures. They are based
on a particular conception of the person
and the good life not at all shared by all
human beings. Moreover, as its opponents
point out, the idea of human rights is deeply
rooted in one particular doctrine: liberalism.
Although liberalism aspires to show that it
is neutral between different conceptions of
the good and objectively acceptable to all
human beings, it falls short of this goal and
favors and enables certain ways of life while
making others nearly unrealizable. Although
all cultures have some conceptions of human
dignity, the very concept of universal rights is
a particular product of the modern Western
civilization, created in a specific historical and
institutional context of the development of the
modern state and the market, and is based on
the specific assumption that all human beings
have the right to equal concern and respect.
The idea contains the crucial assumption of
individualism which makes it incompatible
with most of the traditional conceptions of
human dignity. This opens a question whether
disagreement on philosophical foundations
of human rights necessarily leads to their
rejection. Some philosophers claim that it is
possible for certain societies to reinterpret
their tradition with regards to human
rights, without automatically accepting
their underlying philosophical assumptions.
Through examination of the work of two
such authors, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim
and Richard Rorty, the paper explores the
possibility of implementation of human rights
outside of their usual justificatory framework.
In the end, it is concluded that human rights,
as an ideal and a standard for evaluation,
may help in creating the preconditions for
peaceful coexistence among different cultural
groups. The current inability of many non-
Western cultures to adopt human rights
standards stems primarily from the enormous
inequalities on the global level, and less from
deep cultural differences. There is a possibility
for the advancement of global institutions
based on human rights instrumental to the
development of a global sense of solidarity.
In this project, the idea of human rights can
(and does) play a crucial role asa source of
inspiration and empowerment for oppressed
social groups all over the world,by being a
universal way to articulate demands for equal
concern and respect.
214 NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014 KDU 1:342.721.73
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. That document is still in effect. It is guided by the principles
of equal and inalienable rights for all members of the human family. The
rights specified include life, liberty, security, as well as the right not be enslaved,
tortured, arbitrarily arrested, and prevented from exercising free speech, free
assembly and religious choice, among numerous other rights. In 1948 only
about 58 countries belonged to the UN (as opposed to 193 today). 48 voted in
favor with eight abstentions and two absences.
In 1968, the first International Conference on Human Rights was held in
Teheran to review the progress made in the preceding 20 years. It proclaimed
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states a common understanding
[emphasis added by DW, ZB] of the peoples of the world concerning the
inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human family and
constitutes an obligation for the members of the international community.
In 1993, the UN held the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, attended
by 171 nations. It issued the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
later endorsed by the UN general assembly, which states that the UN Universal
Declaration of Human Rights constitutes a common standard of achievement
for all peoples and all nations.
It is important to note that these declarations are understood as not only
applicable in all countries and binding on all individuals, but as rooted in a
common understanding or standard of human rights shared by by all peoples
of the world. Our question in this paper concerns under what conditions
such a common understanding can be said to exist that would underlie the UN
appeal to human rights or, for that matter, any theoretical or practical appeal to
human rights. More briefly, what circumstances must obtain in order for such a
common understanding to exist. The question is not whether there is absolute
unanimity. There are surely individuals among the 7 billion human beings on the
planet who would reject any appeal at all to human rights. The question rather
is whether a broad consensus exists about the idea of human rights and what it
entails so that, for example, there is reason to think that many if not all national
governments share something like a common understanding or standard.
Before we begin to deal with this question, we want to set aside one complication,
namely, the issue of enforcement. Human rights are not binding and have no
definite power over the nation-states which are still the main actors on the
international scene. The United States government acknowledges the existence
of human rights as stated by the UN and frequently employs human rights talk
in its foreign policy, but refuses to recognize that any court outside the US has
jurisdictional authority over the US government and its citizens with regard to
human rights violations. Whatever one might think of this position, it certainly
undercuts enforcement. Still, it is an issue separable from the question whether
215
there are human rights and whether they are universally accepted or acceptable
throughout the world. The same goes for the question of military intervention
on humanitarian grounds (based on massive violation of human rights).
This question, much discussed since Kosovo and Rwanda and central for the
protection and enforcement of human rights, is detachable from the question of
whether there exists a shared understanding of the idea.
Our paper is directed at the position that questions the validity and justification
of human rights by casting doubt on their universality. Cultural relativists point
out that the concept of human rights, although pretending to be universally valid,
is actually a product of the historical development of a particular (Western)
civilization, and that human rights are therefore grounded in fundamental values
which are unacceptable from the point of view of many other cultures. Human
rights are not culturally and ideologically neutral but they give us the expression
of one particular culture. They are based on a particular conception of the person
and the good life not at all shared by all human beings. Further, since there is no
way to establish transcultural and neutral standards of evaluation applicable to
the practices of all cultural communities, human rights cannot be considered
universal.
Moreover, human rights are not only a product of a particular, Western culture,
they are also deeply rooted in one particular doctrine: liberalism. The idea of
human rights traces its origins to the theory of natural rights and the philosophy
of Enlightenment. It is based on the concept of man as an autonomous and
rational individual and largely disregards the importance of community in
shaping the individual and providing him/her with the framework for leading
a meaningful life. Although liberalism aspires to show that it is neutral between
different conceptions of the good and objectively acceptable to all human beings,
it falls short of this goal. Liberalism favors and enables certain ways of life
while making others nearly unrealizable. By promoting the ideal of autonomy,
liberalism promotes a certain conception of the good life (the life chosen by the
individual as such), thereby betraying its adherence to neutrality.
Defenders of human rights often point out that all cultures contain certain human
rights in their moral commitments. However, these non-western conceptions
of human rights are not really human rights at all, but consist of different
conceptions of human dignity and values. The idea of the equal, inalienable
universal human rights is the particular product of modern Western civilization
created in a specific historical and institutional context of the development of
the modern state and the market. (Donnelly, 1989)
While it might, at first, seem plausible that human beings the world over are
similar enough in their basic needs for water, food, freedom from pain and
arbitrary domination that human rights can be deemed as common, shared and
universal, further reflection raises immediate doubts. Cultures, due to religious
and non-religious beliefs and practices, have very different ideas about the good
and proper life, legitimate methods of punishment, and political institutions
and ideals. Once one hears more about the specific content of human rights, a
common stock of assumptions and values is hard to find, even more so when
it comes to their implementation. We should not think that whenever a state
rejects an accusation of violating human rights on cultural grounds that its
argument is genuine. Sometimes it is a ruse to shield a state from human rights
that are otherwise endorsed by its culture. But legitimate cultural differences do
abound.
Although the source of human rights lies in the moral nature of a human being,
this nature is only loosely connected to the human nature defined in scientific
terms. However, Brian Barry argues that providing the conditions for a decent
life is a common interest of all people in all cultures:
It is better to be alive than dead. It is better to be free than to be a slave. It is better
to be healthy than sick. It is better to be adequately nourished than malnourished.
It is better to drink pure water than contaminated water It is better to be well
educated than to be illiterate and ignorant It is better to be able to practice the
form of worship prescribed by your religion than being prevented from doing so.
(Barry, 2001:285)
Barry contends that human beings do not consist of different animal species
with radically different needs, but that we have largely the same needs that must
be met in order to enable us to live according to any conception of the good
life. However, it is much harder to define our needs in a moral sense, since they
depend on our understanding of human nature. It is easy to say that it is better to
be alive than dead, but it is much more difficult to show that freedom of speech
is a universal human need.
Many cultures contain conceptions of human dignity but they vary from one
culture to another and they are not conceptions of human rights nor do they
assume a conception of human rights. Human rights represent a particular set
of social ideals and practices connected to a particular understanding of human
dignity formulated in modern Western societies in response to a change in social
and political conditions emerging in modern states and market economies.
(Donnelly, 1989:50) Although many authors claim that Islam, for example,
contains the principles of human rights in its teachings, this might not be the
case, as we explain later. In many cultures, conceptions of human dignity do not
rest on the idea of rights, but on duties of the individual towards society. Human
rights thus are based on but not reducible or equivalent to human dignity (or
related notions like human needs, well-being, or flourishing). (Donnelly,
2009:11)
217
The idea of human dignity implicit in the concept of human rights rests on the
assumption that all human beings have the right to equal concern and respect,
as stressed by Ronald Dworkin:
Government must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with equal
concern and respect. It must not distribute goods or opportunities unequally on the
ground that some citizens are entitled to more because they are worthy of more
concern. It must not constrain liberty on the ground that some citizens conception
of the good life is nobler or superior to anothers. (Dworkin. 1978: 272-273)
Equal concern implies that every human being is capable of experiencing
suffering and frustration, while equal respect is rooted in the idea that every
human being is able to formulate and act upon his or her own conception of the
good life.
Dworkin maintains that there are two types of rights that equal concern can
entail: the right to equal treatment and the right to being treated as equal. The
former assumes that every individual has a right to a distribution of goods and
opportunities equal to everyone elses, as in the case of voting. The latter - being
treated as equal - however, assumes that individuals should be treated as equals,
thus requiring that every individual deserves equal concern and respect in
political decisions about the distribution of goods and opportunities. Sometimes
we have to treat people differently in order to treat them as equals. For example,
a person with a disability may require more resources than a healthy person in
order to be treated as an equal. Social inequalities are permissible only insofar as
they are compatible with equal concern and respect. Therefore we cannot simply
select certain core rights (usually civil and political rights) as important, while
disregarding the importance of human rights concerned with economic equality.
The aim of human rights is to secure the right to live a dignified and meaningful
life, and not merely to survive.
The main difference between modern, Western, and traditional, non-Western
approaches to human dignity is the crucial assumption of individualism in the
former, which regards human beings deserving of equal concern and respect
as autonomous individuals. Many traditional conceptions of human dignity
are incompatible with the background assumptions of the values of equality
and autonomy. Many traditional societies are communitarian in that they
give priority to the community over the individual at both the ideological and
practical levels. (Donnelly, 1989: 75) Individuals deserve concern and respect
only as members of the society to which they belong. They earn that respect
by adhering to ascribed roles. In such societies all aspects of behavior and even
beliefs are subject to social regulation and control. It can be argued that, in such
societies, the concept of human rights is unacceptable since it is grounded on
the value of a certain kind of autonomy alien to them. The liberal conception
of human rights is vulnerable to the charge that it assumes a flat, atomistic
account of human nature that disregards the importance of community in
shaping individual personhood. Critics have denounced the liberal conception
of human rights as founded on a flawed vision of society as the aggregation of
atomized individuals with property rights and negative civil liberties. The so-
called rights of man ... are only the rights of the member of civil society, that is,
of egoistic man, man separated from other men and from the community. (Marx
in Donnelly, 1989: 91).
Furthermore, critics point out that this conception of human rights requires
a specific type of liberal democratic regime in order to be implemented. This
regime might have different institutional features, but only permitting relatively
minor variations. Since the idea of human rights is grounded in and adjusted to
a specific idea of the good life and the just society, how can we appeal to it for
universal validity and practical application? Do human rights as a cause deserve
our support?
Some critics of the concept, such as Charles Taylor, and Iris Marion Young, believe
that the very concept of rights has to be radically re-thought and revised through
democratic mechanisms. They regard the common concept of human rights as
difference-blind and insensitive to other cultures and their claims. Human
rights are the expression of one hegemonic, liberal culture, a particularism
masquerading as the universal. (Taylor, 1994: 44) The very language of rights
is highly specific to Western culture since it only possible to find an overlapping
consensus about norms of conduct referring to the most basic rights violations,
such as slavery, murder or genocide. However, Taylor notes that it might be
possible for certain societies to reinterpret their tradition with regards to human
rights.
This last remark raises the question whether it is possible to separate the
underlying justification of human rights from their application. Might it be
possible to bring (certain) societies to revise their laws to conform to the
demands of human rights? In this way, it might be possible to realize the
proliferation of the idea of human rights without automatically depending on
philosophical assumptions about human nature and society.
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim, a Sudanese legal scholar who has written extensively
on the issue of human rights in the Muslim world, supports the pledge for a re-
interpretation of the tradition and considers the extent to which human rights
can be reconciled with religious and cultural commitments that appear to conflict
with such rights conceived universally. He rejects the claims of some authors
that Sharia law is fully consistent with human rights demands. He points out
that the idea of universal rights is not represented in Sharia law and Islamic
jurisprudence in general. Rights in Sharia are assigned according to the status
of the person in society or features such as gender and religion. In particular,
Sharia discriminates against women and members of other religions. Whether
219
legally enforced in particular Muslim societies or not, Sharia plays a central role
in the socialization of Muslims with a significant impact on their way of thinking
and conduct. Therefore, implementation of human rights in the Muslim world
must be conducted within the framework of Islam in order to be effective. This
can be done through the re-interpretation of Sharia using primary sources for
Sharia, Quran and Sunna. Such reforms must be sufficient to resolve human
rights problems with Sharia while maintaining legitimacy from the Islamic point
of view. (An-NaIm, 1990:42) Islamic law has to be re-interpreted to accord
with modern social, political and economic circumstances. However, we can
expect that the kind of reform he and many other Muslim scholars propose will
probably face strong resistance, because it challenges the vested interests of
powerful forces in the Muslim world and may upset male-dominated traditional
political and social institutions. (An-NaIm, 1990:50)
Critics of the universality of human rights tend to regard other cultures as
monolithic in contrast to Western culture. While the domination of white,
middle-aged, able-bodied, heterosexual men has been perceived as the source
of many biased policies in contemporary Western society (Young, 2005), it is
sometimes forgotten that such dominant groups exist in other cultures as
well. Presenting their own particular group interests as the representative and
essential interests of the whole community, these groups push their own agenda
to prevent the loss of their privileged positions. In illiberal societies, both cultural
and political agendas are shaped by dominant groups able to impose their own
interpretation of traditions. An-NaIm argues that the leading legal interpreters
of Sharia law have offered very conservative interpretations of Quran and
Sunna that perpetuate status quo social attitudes and institutions. They have
also deliberately favored and chosen texts in accordance with those attitudes,
while neglecting more liberal ones. The legitimacy of certain appeals for self-
determination in certain communities thus becomes very dubious, since large
parts of these communities are deprived any say in such matters. The demand for
abandoning discriminatory practices in certain cultures need not be tantamount
to an attack on those cultures themselves. Cultures are not unchangeable, but
undergo a constant process of adaption to changing circumstances and internal
demands. It is not clear that the change of certain social practices need bring a
whole culture into question and threaten its survival.
Another proponent of the human rights approach, who opts for focusing on
the practical side of implementation as opposed to a grander philosophical
justification, is Richard Rorty. Rorty argues against an abstract, foundationalist
conception of human rights and in favor of one based on sentiment and
compassion. He contends that all attempts to find an objective and universal
foundation of human rights are doomed to failure, since they are based on
irresolvable issues such as a conception of human nature. Rorty believes that the
quest for a deep, ahistorical human nature that proves the fact that we are equal
has failed. However, Rorty claims that this fact need not be fatal for the universal
defense of human rights. Today, while few seriously challenge the fact that all
human beings are equal, this hardly stops human rights violations. Lohmann
suggests that that the reason human rights defenders still endeavor to provide
an absolute justification for the universality of human rights lies in the mistaken
assumption that universalism can only be legitimated by absolute justification and
not by relative legitimation and justification. (Lohmann, 2008 in Kirchschlaeger,
2011)
Rorty finds the attempt at universal justification to be both futile and politically
imprudent. The reason for the cultivation of the culture of human rights in the
West is the relative security and affluence of the past two centuries which allowed
generations of people capable of compassion with other peoples suffering. Most
human rights violations around the globe are committed by people deprived of
security and sympathy. The tougher things are, the more you have to be afraid of,
the more dangerous your situation, the less you can afford the time or effort to think
about what things might be like for people with whom you do not immediately
identify. Sentimental education only works on people who can relax long enough
to listen. (Rorty, 1993: 128) Sentiment is stronger than reason, and therefore a
more efficient strategy for the expansion of the culture of human rights. The goal is
to foster peoples ability for compassion and sentiment by working on the creation
of favorable conditions of security and peace where they are missing.
While An-NaIm argues for rational discussion and argumentation with key actors
in Islamic jurisprudence and political authorities, Rorty warns about the futility
of such attempts, maintaining that a better strategy would be to teach people
compassion through what he calls sentimental education. Even though their
strategies are different, both authors regard radical economic inequality and
deprivation as often the crucial source of other inequalities. Rorty points out that
people who live a life of insecurity and poverty do not have the resources needed
to contemplate the position of others living beyond their immediate surroundings.
They lack the time to stop and try to put themselves in other peoples shoes.
Indeed, taking the time could bring with it great dangers for them.
An-NaIm shows us that the process of Islamization, currently ongoing in most
Muslim societies, occurs because current political, economic and social problems
are attributed to a departure from Islam and the failure to implement Sharia.
(An-NaIm, 1990:32). As a result, the solution is often deemed to be a return to
the original interpretation of Islamic laws. As he points out, radical social groups
have an advantage since they send simple and easily acceptable messages by
manipulating powerful and effective traditional symbols, offering a single cause
for all problems and a simple, straightforward solution. Growing insecurity
and economic differentiation push people towards simple explanations and
scapegoating of vulnerable groups.
221
Human rights, as an ideal and a standard for evaluation, may help in creating
the preconditions for peaceful coexistence. The patterns of interaction and
coexistence among and within cultural groups largely depend on the existence
of institutions that enable communication between members of a society. Such
institutions are less direly needed where solidarity already exists. Their task
is to create conditions in which solidarity can flourish and in which people
will be moved to participate in a community of fate. We believe that there is
a possibility for the advancement of global institutions based on human rights
instrumental to the development of a global sense of solidarity. The current
inability of many non-Western cultures to adopt human rights standards stems
primarily from the enormous inequalities on the global level, and less from
deep cultural differences. As long as a large part of the worlds population
lives in abject poverty with huge inequalities between and within societies,
the culture of compassion and solidarity cannot spread effectively. We believe
that the human rights culture could appeal to members of all cultures since
it provides protection for minorities and the weakest members of the society.
In order to be universally accepted and implemented, human rights need not
require underlying philosophical assumptions. Each society can adopt a strategy
best suitable for that particular society. The idea of human rights can (and does)
serve as a source of inspiration and empowerment for oppressed social groups
all over the world as a universal way to articulate demands for equal concern and
respect. Lists of human rights are based only loosely on abstract philosophical
reasoning and a priori moral principles. They emerge instead from the concrete
experiences, especially the sufferings, of real human beings and their political
struggles to defend or realize their dignity. Internationally recognized human
rights reflect a politically driven process of social learning. (Donnelly, 2003:58
References:
An-Naim, Abdullahi Ahmed. 1990. Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-
political conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, Harvard Human Rights Law
Journal, Vol. 3 (1990): 13-52.
Barry, Brian. Barry, Brian. (2001). Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique
of Multiculturalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Donnelly, Jack. 1989. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca.
Donnelly, Jack. 2003. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2
nd
edition.
Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Donnelly, Jack. 2009. Human Dignity and Human Rights (commissioned by
and prepared for the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights in the framework of the Swiss Initiative to Commemorate the
60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, June 2009).
Dworkin, Ronald. 1978. Taking Rights Seriously. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge.
Kirchschlger, P., 2011. Universality of Human Rights. The EWC Statement, Issue
1, pp. 22-25.
Kymlicka, Will. 2009. The Good, the Bad and the Intolerable: Minority Group
Rights in Goodale, Mark (ed.), Human Rights: An Anthropological Reader,
Blackwell Publishing Ltd., Chichester: 58-67.
Rorty, Richard. 1993. Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality u Hurley,
Susan and Shute, Stephen (ed.), On Human Rights: The 1993 Oxford Amnesty
Lectures, Basic Books, New York: 112134.
Taylor, Charles. 1994. The Politics of Recognition ed. Gutman, Amy.
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Taylor, Charles. 1996. A World Consensus on Human Rights? Dissent (Summer,
1996):15-21.
Young, Iris Marion. 2005. Pravednost i politika razlike [Justice and the Politics of
Difference]. Naklada Jesenski i Turk, Zagreb.
Arkitekstura
225
Drejt nj arkitekture demokratike! (Bruno Zevi ose modernizmi vetrefeksiv n arkitektur) Astrit Salihu
Astrit Salihu
Drejt nj arkitekture demokratike!
(Bruno Zevi ose modernizmi vetreeksiv
n arkitektur)
Zgjidhjet arkitekturore n modernizm dalin nga tendosjet e frkimeve diskursive
me ka ai merr nj trajt komplekse stilistike arkitekturore. Premisat thuaja
jan t njjta pr t gjitha stilet, por konsekuencat e t menduarit t zgjidhjeve
arkitektonike nuk jan; me ka modernizmi merr trajt veuese n njfar
diversiteti stilistik natyrisht nn nj presupozim unik programatik. Programi
i arkitekturs moderne sht nj platform e ndrtuar mbi pandashmrin e
arkitekturs me shoqrin, mbi njfar misioni t lartuar t arkitekturs pr
riformsim social t kushtzuar me riformsimin hapsinor. Nse bjm nj
ekskurs npr manifestet e rrymave t ndryshme arkitektonike, do t shohim
se ato jan t ndrtuara mbi kt premis t pandashmris s shoqris dhe
arkitekturs.
Nj gjetje e till sht edhe arkitektura organike e cila identifikohet me
emrin e Frank Lloyd Wrightit, e q trajtn diskursive t nj koherence thuaja
programatike, si dhe rrjedhojave t mundshme me afirmimin e nj modeli t ri
dhe t ndryshm n arkitekturn moderne e mer me Bruno Zevin. Bruno Zevi
n vitin 1945 e shkruan veprn e tij Drejt nj arkitekture organike, me t ciln ai,
ndoshta pr her t par pas veprs s Le Corbusier, i v n pah, thuaja, t gjitha
mangsit e qasjes univalente t zgjidhjeve abstrakte t arkitekturs moderne
s paku n rrafshin diskursiv, prderisa gjetjet e Wrightit kan qen tashm t
implementuara n praktikn arkitektonike. Bruno Zevi n arkitekturn moderne
i identifikon gjetjet e Wrightit si nj rrug e mundshme pr t eksploruar nj
shteg afirmativ pr forma t pareduktuara dhe jo imponuese n kontekstin e
projektimit arkitektonik. Kjo pr arsye se vet prcaktimi pr arkitekturn si
organike jep mundsi t ndryshme t formulimit t problemit, krahasuar me
at t racionalizmit ose edhe universalizmit rigjid t trashguar n premisat
gjeometrike dhe abstrakte.
Pavarsisht nga Wrighti, ne ktu do t ndalemi tek trajtimi i Zevit pr
arkitekturn organike, ngase tek ai sht menduar pr konsekuencat m t
gjera t arkitektures organike, pr t gjitha impulset relevante q ajo ka pr t
riformuluar kahjen e arkitekturs moderne, me ka diskursi pr arkitekturn
organike te Zevi shnjon njfar vetrefleksiviteti t moderns pr t gjitha
konsekuencat e saj, pa mar parasysh prcaktimin e reduktuar n organiken.
226 NJOHJA NR. 3 Gusht 2014 KDU 13
Por ka nnkupton Zevi me arkitekturn organike? Cilat jan veorit e ksaj
arkitekture t ciln duhet afirmuar pr t evituar simplifikimet dhe reduktimet
moderniste? A sht dhe sa sht moderne arkitektura organike? Cilat jan
konsekuencat sociale e t menduarit organik t arkitekturs? Kto dhe shum
pyetje tjera vetm sa e sforcojn mendimin se arkitektura moderne n t
menduarit e vetes gjithher sht n vij t vetkorrektimit, vetkorrigjimit,
qoft edhe me synimin pr vetafirmimin si nj projekti t pakryer, nse ktu
do t shrbeheshim me nj formulim habermasian pr modernen n prgjithsi.
Arkitektura dhe organikja
Bruno Zevi n prkufizimin e arkitekturs organike, nuk sht se ofron ndonj
definicion t ri, prve se zbrthen definicionet e dhna m heret pr arkitekturn
organike, me ka pastaj synon q t arrij deri tek njfar rikonstruktimi i
qasjes organike me t gjitha konsekuencat e saja n zhvillimin e mundshm t
arkitekturs.
Arkitetura organike sht krejtsisht e asociuar me emrin e Frank Lloyd
Wrightit, si shprehja m e arritur arkitektonike q identifikohet me nocionin e
organikes. Ky arkitekt e ka formsuar dhe lartuar kt drejtim t arkitekturs e
cila kishte shkndijuar dhe ishte artikuluar fillimisht me Louis Sullivan. Wrighti
e kishte afirmuar me nj entuziazm kt drejtim t arkitekturs duke pohuar
se po ua sjell nj Deklarat t re t Pavarsis, njfar lirimi t domosdoshm
nga t gjitha kufizimet dhe imponimet me t cilat sht prkufizuar arkitektura
moderne. Arkitektura organike tek Wrighti sht e barazuar edhe me shoqrin
organike, si nj model i funksionimit t balansuar dhe natyrshmris. Ka
edhe prej autorve q arkitekturn organike nuk e shohin si gjetje gjeniale e
arkitektve t cilt e kan projektuar n shekujt e modernitetit, por si nj qasje
tashm e njohur, si nj reminishenc historike n prvojn e lasht t projektimit
arkitektonik.
Claude Bragdon n nj ligjerat t tij pr arkitekturn organike qysh n vitin
1915 kishte pohuar se arkitektura gjat shekujve dhe n t gjitha vendet ishte
paevitueshm e ndar n nj dualitet; ajo ka qen gjithher ose organike
(dhe si e till ka prcjell ligjet e orgnizmave natyror) ose ka qen e aranzhuar
(respektivisht n pajtim me idealet Euklidiane t shpikura nga njeriu).
203
Mirpo,
Bragdon megjithat s fundmi i mendon kto dy aspekte t rndsishme n nj
kreativitet unifikues, ngase mendon q nuk ka arkitektur q nuk sht organike
si dhe nuk ka arkitektur e cila n t njjtn koh nuk sht e aranzhuar. T
ngjajshm e gjejm edhe reagimin e Giedionit i cili shkruan se gjat historis
vazhdojn dy trende veuese - njri kah racionalja dhe gjeometrikja dhe tjetri kah
203 Bruno Zevi, Toward an Organic Architecture, Faber & Faber Limited/London 1949, fq. 67.
227
irracionalja dhe organikja: dy rrug t ndryshme me ose n zotrimin e rrethit
204
Bruno Zevi madje kt qndrim e sheh si agnostik pr shkak t konkludimit
t Giedionit se kto dy qasje nuk jan superiore n raport m njra tjetrn dhe
se jan vetm pjes e nj prcaktimi arbitrar t artistit apo arkitektit. Bruno
Zevi sheh shum m shum n konceptin e organikes, ai mendon se arkitektura
organike e ka vendin e vet jo n estetikn e arkitekturs, por n psikologji,
n interesin social dhe n premisat intelektuale t atyre q e praktikojn
arkitekturn.
205
Bruno Zevi e nxjerr nj list t termeve kualifikuese n veprn
e Behrendtit t ciln e prezenton n form koncize t diferencimeve bazike mes
asaj q njihet si arkitektur organike dhe inorganike.
Arkitektura organike Arkitektura inorganike
1. Art formativ 1. Art i bukur
2.Prodhim i sensacionit intuitiv 2. Produkt i mendjes
3.Pun e imagjinats intuitive 3. Pun e imagjinats konstruktive
4. N kontakt t afrt me natyrn 4. Shprfillje ndaj natyrs
5. Gjurmimi i partikulares 5. Gjurmimi i universals
6. Ngazllim me multiformitetin 6. Synimi kah rregulli, sistemi, ligji
7. Realizmi 7. Idealizmi
8. Natyralizmi 8. Stilizmi
9. Forma irregullare (Medievale) 9. Forma rregullare (Klasike)
10. Struktura sikurse e organizmit
e cila rritet n pajtim me ekzis-
tencn individuale, me rendin
e vet specifik n harmoni me
funksionet e veta dhe t rrethit,
sikurse bima ose ndonj orga-
nizm tjetr i gjall
10. Struktura sikurse e mekanizmit n t
cilin t gjitha elementet jan t vendo-
sura n pajtim me nj rend absolut, n
pajtim me ligjin e pandryshueshm t
nj sistemi apriori.
11. Forma dinamike 11. Forma statike
12. Forma t themeluara n lirin
nga gjeometria
12. Forma t themeluara n gjeometri dhe
stereometri
13. Produkt i mendjes s shndosh
(arkitektur vendore), e buku-
ris s arsyeshme
13. Gjurmimi pr proporcionin e prsosur,
pr prerjen e art dhe bukurin abso-
lute
14. Anti-kompozicioni 14. Kompozicioni
15. Produkt i kontaktit me realitetin 15. Produkt i edukimit
204 Sigfried Giedion, Space, Time & Architecture, The growth of a new tradition, Harward University
Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, 2008, fq. 414.
205 Bruno Zevi, po aty, fq. 71.
Ndarja e prezentuar sht mjaft sinjifikative kur t merret parasysh se ktu,
n fakt kemi nj larges evidente nga t gjitha parimet q ne njohim si ato t
arkitekturs moderne, si parime t mvetsishme t saja, t proklamuara me
nj entuziazm pr gjetjen e s res. Ky diferencim, sa do q edhe pr Zevin nuk
sht absolut, por vetm n shkall apo veim, ngase ai n kt vren njfar
gjetje funksionale t funksionalistve t hershm. Zevi mendon se edhe te Le
Corbusier edhe te Gropius gjejm formn e nxjerr nga funksioni. Por, ai mendon
se duhet veuar funksionin dhe karakterin e tij, momentet prmes s cilave ne
e prkufizojm funksionin. Zevi e shtron nj pyetje interesante dhe bindse
n kt rast kur shkruan: a e kemi kt funksion n relat me disa plane t
predeterminuara, teorike dhe klasike apo me rritjen natyrore t gjrave nga
nukleusi i tyre qensor. Ne duhet t vendosim se a ka dallim jo, po e prsris,
n vlern artistike, por n mentalitet dhe vshtrim psikologjik t arkitektit n
veprn e tij n mes Grekes dhe Gotikes, n mes Le Corbusier dhe Aaltos dhe n
mes t gjenerats s par dhe t dyt t arkitektve modern.
206

Ky sht vetm njri aspekt, edhe pse i rndsishm n t cilin Zevi i sheh
dallimet n konceptimin dhe prkufizimin e arkitekturs. Mirpo, ajo q sht
njfar inputi i tij, n kt rast lidhet drejtprdrejt me t gjitha implikimet q ka
prkufizimi i arkitekturs moderne, n raport me kontekstin dhe gjetjet e kohs
t cilat e formsojn vizionin e modernizmit n arkitektur. Kto jan vendosur
me Giedionin dhe pr kt arsye Zevi mendon se frkimi me skemn ose dhe
rivlersimi i interpretimit t Giedionit sht pjes prbrse e ndrmarrjes s
madhe n arkitekturn moderne pr t riafirmuar veten, pr t rigjetur veten
n mision e saj madhor n riformsimin apo edhe n avansimin social e politik.
Ndoshta, mu n kt qndron insistimi i Zevit, q veten dhe arkitekturn organike
ta sheh n vijn e modernizmit t vrtet, ngase arkitektura organike nuk sht
vetm prcaktim estetik, nj rivlersim i trajtave ortogonale, simetrike dhe
stereometrike n rrafshin estetik, por si nj qasje e lidhur me mentalitetet q
formsohen, apo edhe jan formsuar, me ideologji q shndrrohen ne penges
serioze n afirmimin e shoqrive demokratike. Jo pa arsye Andrea Oppenheimer
Dean konfrontimin e Zevit me Giedionin e sheh n varsi t plot edhe me luftn
e tij t prhershme kundr fashizmit (n librin mbi Bruno Zevin e gjejm edhe
nj kapitull me titull sinjifikativ: Beteja kundr fashizmit dhe Lufta kundr
Giedionit).
Prkufizimi i organikes, nuk do t duhej t jet i reduktuar n aspekte t
gjithpranueshme t prfytyrimit bazuar mbi natyralen dhe biologjiken, ashtu
si ndodh n konceptimin e prhapur dhe t pamenduar. Mnyra e simplifikuar
dhe e gjithpranueshme e konceptimit t organikes i nnshtrohet falsiteteve
konceptuale q e zhbjn esencn e vrtet t organikes n arkitektur. Kto
jan, sipas Zevit, dy falsitete t rndsishme prej t cilave duhet t ruhemi
n prkufizimin e organikes; njri sht falsiteti natyralist dhe i dyti sht
206 Po aty, fq. 71.
229
ai biologjik ose antropomorfik. Ai mendon se sa i prket organikes nuk ka
emr - e me siguri as mbiemr me t ciln kuptimi nuk sht n nj mas i
prafrt. Por megjithat mbetet q kto dy falsitete t identifikohen si aspekte
t cilat reduktojn dukshm arkitekturn organike. Me falsitetin natyralist
duke i mbajtur syt kah natyra sht rreziku i besimit t gabuar se ne duhet t
imitojm natyrn. N kt Zevi sheh vetm njfar kthimi mekanik i cili vlern
artistike e redukton krejtsisht n njfar atribuimi t subjektit - materies
natyraliste.
207
Qasja n t ciln prvidhen kto falsitete sht krejtsisht e
hudhur n pikpamjen e tij. Identifikimi i tyre sht i nj rndsie t veant.
Rrjedhojat e ndikimit t tyre nuk jan t njta, sepse falsiteti biologjik sht
shum m serioz dhe se prbn nj shtje m vete t ndieshme, pr arsye se
sht shum leht e pranueshme dhe n shum raste thuaja se vetevidente
ose edhe imponuese me vetkuptueshmri. Prej Vasarit, Michelangelos e deri
tek kritikt gjerman dhe anglez sht konstruktuar nj sistem estetik nga
metaforat biologjike. T gjitha kto mbshtetur n njohurin e thell t trupit
t njeriut ose anatomis njerzore. Aspekti i thejshtzuar estetik i paradigms
antropocentrike ose biologjike i redukton zgjidhjet arkitektonike n knaqsi
estetike, me besimin se ajo mund t kthehet n knaqsi biologjike ose
seksuale. Por, mendon Zevi, interesi q arkitektura organike manifeston () n
njeriun dhe jetn e tij, shkon larg prtej reprodukimit t sensacioneve fizike
208
.
Arkitektura organike tejkalon qasjet reduktiviste pr t arrit tek komponenta
prfshirse dinamike e jets. Madje arkitektura organike, ndjenjn e lvizjes
dhe kualitetin dinamik nuk i nxjerr nga modelet lineare neurotike sikurse
Art Nouveau por, as, sikurse Bauhaus, prmes kompozicioneve duke qen t
tilla q krkojn lvizjen okulare para se ajo t jet e kuptueshme.() Kjo pr
arsye se aranzhimi hapsinor korrespondon n baz me lvizjen aktuale t
njeriut q e banon at; arkitektura organike nuk sht utilitare abstrakte, por
n kuptimin gjithprfshirs t fjals sht funksionale.
209
Aspekti i reduktimit
t arkitekturs n sensacione ka br, sipas Zevit, q t gjith kritikt ta shohin
veprn arkitektonike nga prizmi i ndonj pikture, duke analizuar mir planet
dhe prerjet, por, duke ln anash krejtsisht konceptimin e vrtet t strukturs
totale dhe konceptimin hapsinor t objektit.
Arktektura sht organike kur aranzhimi hapsinor i dhoms, shtpis dhe
qytetit sht i planifikuar pr lumturin materiale, psikologjike dhe shpirtrore
t njeriut. Organikja pra sht e bazuar n iden sociale dhe jo n iden figurative.
Ne mundemi ta quajm arkitektur organike vetm ather kur ajo ka si qllim
t jet njerzore para se t jet humaniste.
210

Ne shohim se si, qasja e Zevit, pavarsisht se sht kundr reduktimit
antropocentrik t arkitekturs, ajo, megjithat, ruan nj premis t caktuar
207 Po aty, fq.73.
208 Po aty, fq. 75.
209 Po aty, fq. 75-76.
210 Po aty, fq. 76.
antropologjike nj lidhje t natyrshme, por, t pareduktueshme t arkitekturs
me njeriun. Afirmimi i modeleve t gatshme t konstruksioneve abstrakte, n
konstruksionin arkitektonik ka pr pasoj zhbrjen e trsis komplekse n
t ciln manifestohet jeta n hapsirat e projektuara. Ndrlidhja e jets me
hapsirn pashmangshm on edhe kah nj rikonceptim i hapsirs, sidomos
asaj abstrakte t pajet t modernizmit.
Konceptimi i arkitekturs te Zevi, sht krejtsisht jasht tradits unifikuese t
raporteve koh-hapsir t modernitetit, n t cilin e gjejm afirmimin e kohs
dhe hapsirs s zbrazt, q sht njfar sigme e modernitetit n prgjithsi.
Arkitektura aktualisht n t shumtn ushtrohet n konsekuenc me formacionin
modernist q afirmon konceptin e hapsirs s zbrazt, ajo vazhdon t jet
shprfillse ndaj prmbajtjeve q pulsojn n hapsirat e jetuara dhe ato pr t
jetuar. Nuk sht e rastit q edhe pika m e dobt e identifikuar n arkitekturn
moderne sht ajo q ka prvetsuar kt koncept t hapsirs s zbrazt dhe se
ka afirmuar modelimin e saj arbitrar. Kritikat q i drejton qasja fenomenologjike
e nisur me Heideggerin, e q m pastaj zhvillohet teorikisht te Norberg-Schulz,
konsiston mu n shtjen e trajtimit t hapsirs n arkitekturn moderne.
Hapsira abstrakte, por edhe abstraktimi, jan nj nga pasojat e modernitetit,
q do t riformsojn ose edhe ndryshojn trsisht shoqrit tradicionale dhe
para-moderne, si do ta trajtonte Giddens. Edhe pse kto shtje jan trajtuar nga
nj kndvshtrim m i gjer sociologjik tek Giddens, ato fare thjesht mund t
kontekstualizohen n shtjen relevante t trajtimit t hapsirs n arkitekturn
moderne. Dhe aty gjejm q rrjedhojat e modernitetit n prgjithsi jan
reflektuar drejtprdrejt edhe n formsimin e diskursit arkitektonik. Pr kt
Giddens shkruan: Zhvillimi i hapsirs s zbrazt mund t kuptohet n termat
e ndarjes s hapsirs nga vendi. () N kushtet e modernitetit, prkufizimi
i vendit u kthye n nj nocion fantazmagorik, q do t thot se vendndodhjet
penetrohen dhe formsohen n termat e ndikimit shoqror, krejtsisht n
distanc prej tyre. Ajo far e strukturon vendndodhjen nuk sht thjesht
ajo q sht e pranishme n sken; forma e dukshme e vendndodhjes fsheh
marrdhnie t distancuara, t cilat prcaktojn natyrn e saj.
211
N procesin e
abstraktimit t hapsirs nga vendi sht projektuar njfar universalizmi abstrakt i
marrdhnieve t distancuara kontekstualisht, por t prmbledhura konceptualisht,
n nj model q duhet afrmuar gjithandej Stili Internacional nuk sht asgj tjetr
vese konsekuenc e drejtprdrejt e ktij modeli t afrmuar me modernitetin. N
kt proces penetrues t modernitetit sht br nj hap drejt universalizimit dhe
identifkimit t hapsirs me nj entitet abstrakt, absolutisht plastik, me mundsi
modelimi t pakufzuara, t gjitha bazuar n projeksione t mendjes. Prmirsimi
i skicimit t globit oi n krijimin e hartave universale, tek t cilat kndvshtrimet e
ndryshme luajtn rol t vogl n paraqitjen e forms dhe pozicionit gjeografk dhe
krijuan hapsirn e pavarur nga fardolloj vendi ose zone t veant fzike.
212

211 Anthony Gidedens, Pasojat e modernitetit, UETPRESS/Tiran, 2013, fq.19
212 Po aty, fq. 20.
231
Ky pavarsim i hapsirs, zbrazje e saj nga fardo prmbajtje jetsore ose
kontekstuale, sht ajo q pr Zevin mbetet pika m sensitive n arkitektur,
ajo q n fakt e ka sterilizuar arkitekturn moderne. Insistimi i tij s kndejmi
do t jet gjithher i drejtuar kah formulimi i nj koncepti t qart arkitektonik
bazuar n hapsirn, ose m mir t themi nj koncepti t ndryshm pr
hapsirn, nga ai i prkufizimit t prhapur n arkitekturn moderniste. Edhe
pse shtja e hapsirs n kt rast sht ende larg asaj q sot e njohim si
kthes hapsinore (spatial turn), n t ciln prodhimi i hapsirs (Lefebvre),
sot sht pjes e veprimeve t akterve t shumfishuar t cilt e prodhojn dhe
projektojn hapsirn, mbetet ende interesante t shihet prpjekja e Zevit q
t ofroj nj riformulim t konceptit t hapsirs n arkitektur, me efekte t
posame diskursive pr ecjen prpara n modelet shquese arkitektonike, jasht
skemave rigjide t proviniencs moderniste.
Arkitektura dhe hapsira
Bruno Zevi n fund t viteve 40-ta kishte shkruar njrn nga veprat e tija t
njohura Architecture as a space- How to look at architecture, n t ciln ai kishte
vazhduar kritikn e arkitekturs moderne t nisur n veprn Towards an organic
architecture. N kt vepr Zevi shtjellon prcaktimin esencial t arkitekturs
si hapsir duke u thelluar n dimensionin veues t arkitekturs. Zevi sht i
prkushtuar n qndrimin se arkitektura sht hapsir dhe mendon se vetm
karakteri i saj hapsinor sht determinues pr t, sepse fenomeni i hapsirs
sht realitet konkret vetm n arkitektur dhe pr kt e konstituon karakterin
e saj.
213
Zevi arkitekturn nuk e sheh t izoluar nga artet tjera, ai mendon se artet
tjera vizuale kan njfar lidhje me arkitekturn, por nuk e sheh arkitekturn si
t prcaktuar nga gjetjet e atyre arteve. N historit e arkitekturs moderne, n
shumicn e interpretimeve gjejm njjtsimin ose edhe barazimin e prdorimit
t hapsirs n artet figurative me ato t arkitekturs. Nj lidhje e till nuk
sht se nuk ekziston, por ajo nuk sht e vetmja q e prcakton karakterin e
arkitekturs. Pr kt Zevi edhe shkruan se arritjet ose gjetjet analitike t kubizmit
pr hapsirn kan revolucionuar konceptimin ton pr hapsirn. Gjetjet e
kubizimit shkojn kah ajo q hapsira t jet e prezentuar nga pikvshtrime t
ndryshme simultanisht, q realiteti i nj objekti t kapet n totalitetin e tij. Kjo
zhvendosje sukcesive n koh e kndeve t vshtrimit i shton nj dimension t
ri tredimensionalitetit t tradits. (...) Pushtimi kubist i dimensionit t katrt ka
qen i nj rndsie t veant pavarsisht nga vlersimet estetike q mund ti
bhen pr dhe kundr Kubizmit.
214
Por, pavarsisht nga identifikimi i dimensionit
t katrt, mbetet gjithmon dika e mvetsishme pr arkitekturn, ajo q
hapsira e arkitekturs nuk mundet t mendohet n prgjithsi vetm me katr
213 Bruno Zevi, Architecture as a space, How to look at architecture, Horizon Press/New York, 1957, fq. 28.
214 Po aty, fq. 26.
dimensionet. Kuptimi i kohs si dimension i katrt n piktur ta zm, por, edhe
n skulptur sht i ndryshm nga ai i arkitekturs. Dimensioni i kohs n kto
dy arte sht kualitet inherent qoft n reprezentimin e nj objekti n piktur,
apo edhe n veprn skulpturale. Koha n arkitektur nuk sht shtojc nga jasht
e lvizjes s njeriut, por shkrirje organike dhe integrale; n arkitektur ne kemi
t bjm me nj fenomen konkret q sht esencialisht i ndryshm: ktu njeriu
lviz brenda ndrtess, e studion at nga pikat sukcesive t vshtrimit, ai krijon
vet, t themi kshtu, dimensionin e katrt, duke i dhn hapsirs nj realitet
integrues.
215
N reprezentimin e hapsirs q gjejm n krijimin arkitektonik sht
krijuar nj konfuzion i cili e ka reduktuar hapsirn n prfaqsimin dydimensional
t planit duke abstrakuar shpeshher trsin e objektit arkitektonik si vepr n t
gjitha dimesnionet e manifestimit t saj.
Q t jemi m preciz, dimensioni i katrt sht i teprt q t definoj volumin
arkitektural, ai sht, nj kuti e formuar nga muret q e mbyllin hapsirn.
Por hapsira si e till esenca e arkitekturs i transcendon limitet e katr
dimensioneve.
216

Megjithat pikpamja e tij mbi hapsirn duket q kulmon n nj ligjerat t
mbajtur n Tel-Aviv n vitin 1979 me titullin Architecture and Ensteins space-
time. N kt ligjerat, Zevi duket se prmbyll nj nism t madhe pr ndryshimin
rrnjsor n konceptimin e hapsirs q e pret n t ardhmen arkitekturn.
Shtjellimi i koncepcionit einsteinian ktu kontekstualizohet me rrjedhojat m t
gjera t konceptimit t hapsirs pr civilizimin perndimor. Ktu kemi njfar
ndrlidhjeje t drejtprdrejt t pasojave t mdha t konceptimit modern t
hapsirs t cilat bhen pjes e nj formacioni represiv t organizimit t jets n
perndim, pjes e s cils sht edhe organizimi hapsinor. Zevi nis ligjriminn
e tij me nj konstatim t Steiner-it i cili kishte shkruar, n kontekst t bmave
m t kqija t shek XX-t, t fabrikimit t vdekjeve n kampet e prqndrimit,
se barbarizmi ka dominuar mbi bazn e humanizmit kristian, kulturs s
renesanss dhe racionalizmit klasik. T gjitha kto premisa t formsimit t
civilizimit perndimor n vlerat e saja m sublime t reflektuara drejtprdrejt
edhe n arkitektur. Pamundsin e ndryshimit rrnjsor, jo vetm t shoqris,
por edhe arkitekturs, Zevi e sheh n trashgimin e prvetsimit jorefleksiv t
skemave t prmendura apriori.
Ndryshimet q kan ndodh, e q pritet t ken ndikim t rndsishm, jan ato t
prmbysjes s disa paradigmave t prfytyrimeve t rrnjosura n mentalitetin
modern. Ai i prmend tri si m t rndsishmet q mund t ken njfar
ndikimi n rikonceptimin e arkitetkturs moderne; relativiteti Einsteinian, e
pavetdijshmja Freudiane dhe teoria e disonancs e Schoenbergut. N t trija
disciplinat si n fizik, psikologji dhe muzik kto tanim kan predominuar, por
215 Po aty, fq. 27.
216 Po aty, fq. 28.
233
ato jan ende jasht ndikimit t nevojshm t t menduarit dhe jetess ton.
Zevi pohon se mendimi jon ende vazhdon t jet i bazuar n koncepcionet
mileanistike, n konceptet abstrakte dhe idealet kompenzuese t harmonis,
konsonacs, proporcionit dhe n absolutet dogmatike t origjins iluministe.
217

N analizn e aspektit t konceptimit modern t hapsirs, ne e shohim se synimi
pr t mbshtet konceptimet moderne pr hapsirn mbi baza shkencore t teoris
s relativitetit einsteinan dalin t jen krejtsisht siprfaqsore dhe t vrazhdta. Nj
ndrlidhje e ktill e konceptimit modern t hapsirs sht br prmes gjetjeve
t thelluara t Kubizmit, tek i cili sht br njfar arje e hapsirs dhe njfar
ribashikimi i njkohshm n t cilin thehet perspektiva dhe mundsohet manifestimi
simultan i pikvshtrimeve t ndryshme. Por, megjithat, analiza m e thell e Zevit,
tregon se ky sht nj trajtim siprfaqsor i cili nuk prek rrnjsisht prfytyrimin ton
pr hapsirn. Ai, mendon se gjetjet n piktur t transferuara n arkitektur vetm
sa i kan dhn dukje shkencore ktij trajtimi, por q n esenc nuk jan t tilla.
Sipas Zevit me kt gjetje analitike t kubizmit, struktura kulturore e renesanss
ka kolabuar dhe se njeriu i ngrir n hapsir tanim i liruar mund t vshtroj
srish nga knde t ndryshme. Ky lirim i njeriut nuk sht i lidhur siprfaqsisht
me sensacionet e tij, por ai n fakt sht liruar nga kierarkia autoritare e ballores
monumentale refeksion tipik i privilegjit social.
218
Thyerja e perspektivs
njjtson t gjitha pikat, andaj edhe volumet si kuti thehen n copa hapsirat
hapen dhe kirjohet njfar kmbimi i pandrprer mes hapsirs s brendshme
dhe t jashtme. N kt tradit i gjejm t gjitha arritjet e Le Corbusier, Gropiusit
dhe Mies van der Rohes. Edhe pse kto gjetje arkitektonike t modernizmit
nuk jan pa efekte t caktuara, ato ende nuk ojn kah qllimi i nevojshm i
formulimit t procesit arkitektonik n pajtim me t arriturat e konceptimit t ri
t koh-hapsirs.
Zevi mendon se aplikimi i operacionit kubist sht version reduktiv i mendimit
t Eisnteinit, sepse kutia edhe n rastin kur sht e gurit, por edhe n rastin
kur sht e elqit ajo mbetet kuti. Ndrmarrja e De Stijl-it sht dika m afr,
por, as ajo, nuk shtjerr gjitha konsekuncat e mendimit t Einsteinit. Ai madje
citon Einsteinin i cili kishte shkruar: Deri m tash, koncepti yn pr hapsirn
ka qen i asociuar me kutin. Kjo na shpie kah ajo q mundsit e grumbullimit
q e prbjn hapsirn-kuti jan t pavarura nga trashsia e mureve t kutis.
A nuk mundet q kjo trashsi t jet e reduktuar n zero, dhe q hapsira t mos
jet e humbur si pasoj? Natyrshmria e nj procesi t till t limituar sht
aq evidente, dhe tani na mbetet pr mendimin ton hapsira pa kuti, nj gj
vetevidente, edhe pse ende na duket t jet aq joreale nse e harrojm origjinn e
ktij koncepti.
219
Pavarsisht q nj qndrim i till duket t jet i pa aplikueshm
n arkitektur, ku hapsira e saj nuk mund t jet e imagjinueshme pa mure,
217 N Andrea Oppenheimer Dean, Bruno Zevi on Modern Architecture, Rizzoli/ New York, 1983, Ap-
pendix II Speeches, Architecture and Einsteins space-time, fq. 184
218 Po aty, fq. 185.
219 Albert Einstein, cit. sip. Bruno Zevi, Einsteins space-time, po aty fq. 186.
megjithat, n kt qndrim kemi njfar impulsi prmes s cilit gjenden
zgjidhje dhe orientime t rndsishme pr arkitekturn. Ky qndrim nuk sht
gjithaq i huaj pr arkitekturn moderne, sepse, fundja, ideal i saj revolucionar ka
qen t arrij te arkitektura pa ndrtes (dika e till n kt kontekst mund t
jet Farnsworth House e Mies van der Rohes).
Arsyeja pr se duhet t nisemi prej ktij prcaktimi pr hapsirn, n t ciln
humbim primatin e ndrtimit pr hir t hapsirs dhe organizimit t saj sht
n at q at duhet tia rikthejm njeriut, jets e cila sht gjithher e lidhur
pr hapsirn. Zevi pohon se n t vrtet, qllimi sht t desakrohet ndrtesa
si entitet simbolik i fuqis, si nj vler absolute, dhe q ta trheqin vmendjen
kah jeta q z vend aty dhe q, shum shpesh, i sht zn fryma dhe ngulfatur,
shtypur dhe mbytur nga kutia e ndrtess. Arkitektura sht sistem pr njerzit
e jo pr gjrat.
220

Konceptimi i hapsirs jasht entiteteve t absolutizuara t ndrtesave n
kthimin kah jeta, n formulimin e hapsirs pa kuti, jep nj dimension t ri i cili
postulon qllimin lirues dhe sfidn pr lirin njerzore. T gjitha mangsit
e konceptimit kubist t hapsirs bhen evidente edhe nga nj qndrim
tjetr i Eisnteinit ku ai shkruan: Koha-hapsira nuk sht dika q dikush
domosdoshmrisht mund ti prshkruaj nj ekzistenc t ndar, t pavarur nga
objektet aktuale t realitetit fizik. Objektet fizike nuk jan n hapsir, por kto
objekte jan me shtrirshmri hapsinore (spatially extended). N kt mnyr
koncepti i hapsirs s zbrazt humb kuptimin e vet
221
. Zevi n mendimin
e Eisnteinit gjen nj formulim t nevojshm pr prkufizimin e qllimit t
arkitekturs moderne, n nj konsistenc pr at s ka arkitektura sht.
Kritika t ciln Zevi i bn arkitekturs moderne mbshtetur n formulimin e ri
pr hapsirn dhe kuptimin e saj n arkitektur sht m e thell se sa q mund
t mendohet n shikim t par. E gjith paradigma hapsinore e arkitekturs
moderne, bazuar n kt teori t relativitetit einstienian i nnshtrohet nj
korrigjimi rrnjsor i cili ka mbetur ende i paprvetsuar n praktikn e saj, me
ka ajo mbetet ende n orrsokakun e krkimit t modeleve t pambshtetura
siprfaqsore stilistike. Pr procesin arkitektonik, prvetsimi i formuls
einsteiniane si hapsir pa kuti ose pa ndrtes, nuk nnkupton hapsirn e
zbrazt ngase objektet nuk jan n hapsir, por kan shtrirshmri hapsinore.
Ato nuk jan, shkruan Zevi, ndrtesa kuti t fiksuara tridimensionalisht n
hapsir, me faktorin koh q vetm i sht shtuar si dimension i krijuar nga
itinerari i prdoruesit; prkundrazi koha-hapsira varet nga objektet aktuale
t realitetit fizik dhe realizohet n ta.
222
Arkitektura moderne sht shqitur n
nj mnyr t konceptimit joadekuat t hapsirs duke e modeluar si nj entitet
abstrakt dhe t zbrazt, pr t cilin mbahen projeksionet, q ndoshta nuk jan
220 Po aty fq. 186.
221 Po aty, fq. 186.
222 Po aty, fq. 186.
235
as moderne, por m shum pseudo-moderne, t zhveshura nga kuptimi dhe t
zbrazura nga jeta. Kt m s miri e mbshtet qndrimi i Einsteinit se vetit
gjeometrike t hapsirs nuk jan t pavarura, por t prcaktuara nga materia
M duket q formimi i konceptit t objektit material duhet ti paraprij konceptit
ton t kohs dhe hapsirs.
223
Konsekuenc e ksaj sht edhe ajo q madje as
materia m nuk ka kuptimin e substancs s ngurt. Sepse nocioni i materies ka
ndryshuar, po ashtu rrnjsisht, dhe se ajo ka fituar nj karkter t ri q ende nuk
sht prvtsuar n procesin arkitektonik, q do t rezultonte me prmbysje
evidente t konceptimeve reduktuese t hapsirs sidomos t asaj t hapsirs
s zbrazt. Pr kt e kemi edhe qndrimin e Einsteinit i cili shkruante se
fitorja mbi konceptin e hapsirs absolute sht br e mundshme vetm
ngase koncepti i objektit material sht zvendsuar gradualisht si koncept
fundamental i fiziks me at t fushs.
Zevi e shtron n mnyr eksplicite pyetjen pr prfshirjen eventuale t ktyre
t arriturave n fizikn moderne n projektimin arkitektonik. Ai shkruan: Sa
arkitekt i kan asimiluar konceptet e t kufishmit dhe po ashtu t pakufishmit
univerz, t siprfaqeve sferike, ose hapsirs sferike dhe eliptike? Sa prej tyre
e kan prvetsuar trsisht kt qndrim:Koncepti i hapsirs si dika q
ekziston objektivisht dhe pavarsisht nga sendet i takon mendimit parashkencor,
por jo edhe ideja e ekzistencs s numrit t pakufishm t hapsirave n lvizje
relative nga njra tjetra. Kjo ide e mvonshme sht n t vrtet logjikisht e
paevitueshme, por sht ende larg nga t paturit rol t konsiderueshm n
mendimin shkencor?. Vrtet kjo ide sht thuaja e injoruar n mendimin
arkitektonik.
224
Injorimi ndaj ktij lirimi t hapsirave, q n arkitekturn
moderne sht evident, e ka futur at n nj vorbull konfuzionesh n t cilin
emancipimi i forms dhe emancipimi njerzor kan mar kahje t kundrta. Kjo
pr arsye se gjithka i sht sakrifikuar njfar konstruksioni logjik, sistemi
apriori n t cilin jeta dhe dinamika jetsore sht zvetnuar trsisht. lirimi i
njeriut te Zevi shihet n relat t pandashme me at t lirimit eisnteinan nga
hapsira absolute n njrn an si dhe me at t zvendsimit t konceptit t
materies me at t fushs. Pr t nxjerr arkitekturn moderne nga rrjedha n
t ciln sht shqitur ai mendon se duhet t vendoset njfar, si e quan ai,
dialogu mes arkitekturs dhe filozofis einsteiniane. Zevi ktu sht kategorik
se nj gj e till sht arrit n arkitekturn e Frank Lloyd Wright-it. Edhe pse
shumka n projektet e realizuara t Wright-it, mbetet pjes e nj trashgimie
unike n krijimin arkitektonik pr arsye t realizimeve t liruara nga kufizimet
nga formulat apriori t modernizmit, duket q Zevi, mbetet n pozicione t
ngurta kur konsideron se vetm arkitektura organike ka br t mundshm
afirmimin e modelit t qndrueshm modernist. sht e vrtet q arkitektura
organike sht nj resurs i pasur dhe ndoshta ende i paeksploruar deri n fund
n arkitektur, sepse ajo shfaqet si nj rrug tjetr kah revidimi i domosdoshm
223 Po aty, fq. 187.
224 Po aty, fq. 189.
i modernizmit abstrakt dhe shterp, por ajo nuk mbetet e vetmja zgjidhje dhe
zgjedhje pr praktikn arkitekntoike.
N cilat pika sht vendos ky dialog mes filozofis s Einsteinit dhe Wrightit?
Cila sht veoria e krijimit arkitektonik t Wrightit q ka implementuar kt
mnyr t konceptimit t koh-hapsirs? Zevi tek arkitektura organike e
Wrighitit konstaton momentin dinamik dhe prfshirs, n t cilin arkitektura
sht shkrir me rrethin fizik, sht br nj me t dhe q njkohsisht e ka
pasuruar at me eksperiencn njerzore. Sipas Zevit arkitektura e Wrightit e
nxjerr nga loja e ndrsjell dinamike n mes fushs s rrethit dhe t-jetuarit-
n-hapsir, sht morfogjenetike dhe e ndrlidhur pandrprer me ligjin e
ndryshimit.
225
Arktektura organike sht e vetmja e cila reflekton impulset
komplekse t jets e cila zhvillohet n t. Vrulli dhe energjia jetsore nuk mund
t prfshihet n idolet false t dogmave akademike, jeta nuk mund t futet
n kallupet e simetris, proporcionit, prspektives, harmonis abstrakte dhe
konsonancs. N thyerjen e paradigms antropocentnrike gjendet nj nism
emancipuese njerzore. Njeriu nuk sht m qendr e universit, ligjet e tija
nuk jan absolute dhe aksiomatike; por mu ather kur kto ligje bhen relative,
nnshtrimit t njeriut ndaj tyre i vie fundi. Individi e rigjen pavarsin e tij,
q ka qen e shtypur pr shekuj nga koncepcionet mileanistike, rregullat dhe
rregulloret brutalizuese, vizionet metafizike dhe mitet iluministe.
226

Arkitektura dhe gjuha
Mbi kto premisa sht e mbshtetur edhe ndrmarrja e tij e madhe e prpjekjes
s kodifikimit t gjuhs moderne t arkitekturs. Zevi ktu merr nj nism
interesante, n t ciln ai nuk e shtron problemin pr gjuhn e arkitekturs
moderne, por pr gjuhn moderne n veantin e saj, n shprehjen t ciln ai e
sheh si t domosdoshme pr kodifikim.
Nisma e tij sht e motivuar kryesisht nga, si pohon edhe vet, vepra e
suksesshme e John Summersonit pr gjuhn klasike t arkitekturs, e pr t
ciln kishte pritur q t ket nj prgjegje pr gjuhn antiklasike t arkitekturs,
apo gjuhn moderne t arkitekturs. Mungesa e kodifikimit t gjuhs moderne
ka devastuar format arkitektonike, ka br q projektimi n arkitektur t
jet i paartikuluar dhe pa ndonj prmbajtje t qndrueshme q ndrton nj
karakter t mvetsishm t arkitekturs moderne. Zevi pohon se mund
t mos jet shum e largt para se ne t kemi harruar krejtsisht si ta flasim
arkitekturen. N t vrtet shum njerz q sot dizajnojn dhe ndrtojn, mezi
mund t belbzojn. Ata fusin zra t paartikuluar t pakuptimt q nuk bartin
mesazh. Ata nuk din si t flasin. Ata nuk thon asgj dhe nuk kan asgj pr t
225 Po aty, fq. 191.
226 Po aty, fq. 191.
237
thn.
227
Nj kodifikim i gjuhs moderne, n kontekstin e krijuar pas vdekjes
s etrve t arkitekturs moderne, sht i domosdoshm pr t arrit tek nj
artikulim i strukturuar qart mbi ato, q Zevi i quan, invariable (konstanta t
pandryshueshme), pa t cilat nuk mund t ket shprehje t mirfillt moderne
n arkitektur. sht interesant fakti q invariablet e Zevit m shum e lirojn
arkitekturn moderne dhe gjuhn e saj, nga premisat e asaj q ne e njohim
si modernizm, se sa q mund t flasim pr ndonj afirmim apo riafirmim t
modernizmit. N zbrthimin e atyre invariableve, prve asaj t pares q mbetet
trashgimi e drejtprdrejt moderniste e fillimit nga zero (si do te shohim
m von), t gjitha invariablet tjera prekin drejtprdrejt boshtin diskursiv
dhe logjik t ngrehins moderniste. Prderisa n shtjen e formulimit t
arkitekturs organike ai gjen forcat arketipale dhe impulset e pavetdijshme
t jets dhe shprehjes s saj n arkitektur (dimensioni Freudian), n shtjen
e hapsirs Zevi aplikon paradigmn einsteiniane, ndrkaq, n kodifikimin e
gjuhs aplikon paradigmn e Schoenbergut pr muzikn atonale. Kshtu kto
tri referenca mbesin njfar udhrrfyesi pr t kuptuarit e tij t arkitekturs
n prgjithsi. Zevi identifikon shtat invariabla, edhe pse ai mendon se kto
mund t plotsohen edhe me shum invariabla tjera, prderisa ato nuk do t
prjashtojn kto shtat t parat. Mirpo, ajo q mbetet njfar paradoksi n
kt nism t kodifikimit t gjuhs, sht ai q luftimi i rregullave t etabluara n
projektimin arkiektonik (si trashgimi e klasicizmit), bhet prmes kodifikimit i
cili paraqet po ashtu njfar rregulli t antirregullit t cilit i duhet prmbajtur
pr t arrit tek shprehja unike e gjuhs moderne. Kt kontradikt Zevi orvatet
ta zbut duke pohuar se invariablet nuk jan aksioma jasht kohs, t vrteta
absolute, por shkall t shenjuara nga prvoja specifike.
Formulimi i invariablave q kodifikojn gjuhn moderne jan n funksion t
plot t lirimit nga shtrngesat e klasicizmit, pr t ardh deri tek shprehja
antiklasike si mnyr q t arrihet, jo vetm lirimi psikologjik i individit, por
edhe njfar avansimi demokratik i arkitekturs e me kt edhe i shoqris.
1.Listimi si metodologji e dizajnimit
Listimi ose radhitja e funksioneve, sipas Zevit, sht invariabla bazike n kodin
bashkkohor arkitekturor. Sipas tij gjuha moderne e arkitekturs duhet t jet e
ndrtuar mbi njfar nisme n t ciln prmbledhen funksionet. Prmbledhja
e tyre sht n nism nj shprbrje dhe hudhje kritike e rregullave klasike,
rendit, presupozimeve apriori, grumbullit t frazave dhe t secilit tip apo lloji
konvencash
228
. Kjo invariabl sht ekuivalente me at q Roland Barthes e ka
quajtur shkalla zero e shkrimit, aty ku hudhen t gjitha normat dhe kanonet
227 Bruno Zevi, Modern Language of Architecture, Da Capo Press/ New York, 1994, fq. 3.
kulturore t rrnjosura tradicionalisht. Ky sipas Zevit sht nj akt i anihilimit
kultural. Rrnimi i t gjitha modeleve t rrnjosura dhe t institucionalizuara
sht nisma e re, q duhet t rezultoj me shprehjen e re t liruar nga t
gjitha ndalesat dhe dogmat klasike. Edhe pse ky moratorium i plot me t
kaluarn, kjo prerje me t gjith traditn, sht ajo q e njohim si tradit e s
res t modernizmit, Zevi mendon se kjo nuk sht asgj e re, ngase gjithmon
shpirtrat kreativ kan filluar nga zero.
Kthimi kah shkalla zero njherit na bn t rimendojm semantikn
arkitektonike, si dhe t gjitha elementet e gjuhs moderne t arkitekturs
t jen t menduara n thellsi. Zevi ktu niset prej nj elementi konkret, si
sht, dritarja. Ai mendon se n raportet e formalizuara dhe t trashguara t
klasicizmit gjithmon duhet t prcillet njfar simetrie dhe proporcionaliteti
i dritareve. Ai mendon se pr fat arkitektt modern jan t liruar nga kto
brenga formalistike Secila dritare sht fjal q qndron m vete, pr at
ka do t thot dhe ka sht. Ajo nuk sht dika q duhet t jet e radhitur
ose proporcionale. Ajo mund t jet e fardo forme rektangulare, katrore, e
rrumbullakt, eliptike, triangulare, kompozite apo e profilit t lir.
229
Vetm nj
element i thjesht arkitekturor, n kt rast, na dshmon pr at nnshtrimin
e plot q kemi ndaj rregullave t rendit klasik q jan ngulitur n projektimin
arkitekonik, barrn e t cilave duhet ta heqim si heqje e tiranis s klasicizmit.
Zevi, njherit bn njfar radhitje t vrejtjeve q mund ti bhen ksaj qasjeje.
Ai mendon se ato jan dy dhe se ka prgjegjen pr t dyjat. Vrejtja e par sht
ajo q n kt procedur sht e prfshir nj sasi friksuese e puns pasiq
secila dritare duhet menduar ve e ve. Dhe vrejtja e dyt sht ajo q qasja e
ktill shpien kah triumfi i arbitrares. Sa i prket vrejtjes s par Zevi mendon
se dritarja duhet menduar p.sh. n raport me hapsirn q e ndriqon, ngase vlera
perceptuale dhe e sjelljes e secils hapsir varet nga ajo se si sht e ndriquar.
sht fakt q hapsira dhe volumi i tr ndrtess, duhet t planifikohet para se
t vendoset se far forme e dritareve t zgjedhet. A sht arkitektura moderne e
vshtir? Ndoshta, por sht e mrekullueshme sespse secili element, secila fjal
sht e ndrlidhur me prmbajtjen sociale.
230
Sa i prket vrejtjes s dyt se
arkitektura moderne, q hudh t gjitha rregullat, i nnshtrohet nj arbitrariteti,
Zevi mendon se sht e kundrta; se sht arkitektura klasike ajo q sht
arbitrare, pr aq sa i jep vler mitike rendit abstrakt q shtyp lirin dhe sjelljen
sociale.
Pr m shum, sipas Zevit, vrejtjet q i bhen arkitekturs moderne dhe hapjes
s saj ndaj zgjedhjeve nxjerrin n pah disa probleme t natyrs psikologjike
sepse gjuha moderne e rrit mundsin e zgjedhjes, prderisa arkitekura klasike
e redukton at. Zgjedhja krijon ankthin, ankiozitetin neurotik pr sigurin. ()
239
Frika nga liria dhe tmerri nga impulset iracionale jan n bazn e ktij ankthi.
231

Nse i kthehemi dritareve e shohim se si krkesa pr rregull dhe rend, proporcion
dhe harmoni t tyre, sht e pamundshme t oj kah arritja funksionale pr
seciln njlloj. Zevi mendon biles q sht absurde t mendohet madje edhe
arbitrare q secila dritare t jet njlloj funksionale. S kndejmi edhe konstatimi
se ajo q duket racionale dhe logjike, sepse sht e rregulluar dhe e renditur,
sht n aspektin njerzor dhe social e marr; ajo ka kuptim vetm n termet
e fuqis despotike, Ajo ka presupozohet irracionale, n ann tjetr, sht n
prgjithsi rezultat i t menduarit t sendeve nga to dhe dhurimi kurajoz i t
drejts s imagjinats.
232
Zevi edhe pse t reduktuar argumentin e tij vetm n
nj element, at t dritares, megjithat, mendon se e njta vij e zgjidhjes mund
t aplikohet prej projektimit t thjesht t shtpis deri tek projektimet e qytetit,
zgjidhjet e komplekseve urbanistike dhe planifikimet regjionale. Zgjidhjet
e gjetura t aplikueshme pr t gjitha kto aspekte arkitektonike, zhbjn
modelin e imponuar klasik, sepse ato mendohen nn prizmin e jogjeomtris dhe
antiklasicizmit. Klasicizmi, tashm sht e ditur, ka shenjtruar gjeometrin,
vijn e drejt dhe kndin e drejt t gjitha kto faktor t shtypjes s jets dhe
liris. Vrulli i jets s lir, veprimi impulsiv i saj, gjithher zhvillohet pandalshm
vetm n theyrjen e pandrprer t skemave t ngurta dhe rendit t cilin e
imponon prerja e drejt gjeometrike. Liria e zgjedhjes n t ciln projektohemi
dhe me t ciln formsohemi jep gjallri, nj veanti ose edhe prvesim jets
e cila nuk ndalet.
Klasicizmi sht i mir pr varreza, jo pr jet, pohon Zevi.

1.1Asimetria dhe disonanca
Arkitektura demokratike n t ciln afirmohet jeta dhe liria, sht krejtsisht
e lidhur me thyerjen e kanonit dhe dogms t themi jashtkohore t simetris.
Ky kanon edhe sot e ksaj dite vazhdon t mbetet dhe implementohet me nj
vetkuptueshmri n projektimin arkitektonik. Nuk sht e rastit pr shembull
q e gjith arkitektura diktatoriale dhe despotike sht gjithmon simetrike dhe
n kundrshtim me asimetrin si moment i rndsishm i shoqris demokratike.
Zevi pohon se ndrtesat publike t Fashizmit, Nacizmit, Rusis staliniste jan
t gjitha simetrike. Ato t diktaturave t Ameriks Latine jan simetrike. Ato t
institucioneve teokratike jan simetrike: ato shpesh kan simetri t dyfisht.
233

Pr kt arsye lirimi nga kanoni i simetris dhe ndjekja e invariablit t asimetris
paraqet, sipas Zevit, nj hap gjigant kah arkitekrura demokratike.
Simetria tek Zevi, trajtohet n termet e nj neuroze, dhe leximin e historis s
arkitekturs, sidomos asaj perndimore, mund t bjm prmes ksaj neuroze e
cila suspendon jetn n prgjithsi. Zevi ka nj formulim t ashpr pr simetrin.
Ai shkruan: Simetria = nevoj spazmatike pr siguri, frik nga fleksibiliteti,
paprcaktueshmria, relativiteti dhe rritja shkurt frik nga jeta. Skizofreniku
nuk mund t duroj aspektin temporal t t jetuarit. Pr t mbajtur ankthin nn
kontroll, ai krkon imobilitetin. Klasicizmi sht arkitektur e skizofrenis
konformiste.
234

Projektimi arkitekonik sht trsisht i prshkurar nga nevoja neurotike pr
arritjen e simetris si pjes e procesit t shenjtrimit t gjeometris e cila sht
shqitur krejtsisht n gjetjen e simetris dhe harmonis. Pr kt arsye pohon
Zevi se simetria sht nj simptom i veant i tumorit, madje makroskopik,
qelizat e t cilit kan metastazuar gjithandej n gjeometri. Historia e qyteteve
mund t interpretohet si nj ndeshje ndrmjet gjeometris (nj invariabl
i fuqis burokratike ose diktatoriale) dhe formave t lira (q ngjasojn me
jetn njerzore).
235
Trajtimi i kanonit klasik t simetris kap aspekte tjera t
rndsishme t organizimit social t jets, jo vetm t perceptimit estetik t
prmbajtjes arkitektonike. Nxjerrja e formave simetrike, sht e prcjell me
mekanizma represiv ndaj liris dhe jets. Pr kt arsye edhe projektet politike
diktatoriale dhe totalitare jan gjithher t mbshtetura mbi kt siguri mbi
sigurin e simetris. Fundja diferencimi baz i sistemeve represive me ato
demokratike sht ndrtuar mbi bazn psikologjike t krkimit qoft t siguris
qoft t liris. Ndjenja pr siguri shpeshher sht aq e fort sa q individt
jan n gjendje ta kmbejn at pr lirin, dhe ky sht nj faktor q mund t
shpjegoj edhe prqafimin e ideve totalitare nga ana e qytetarve. Nuk sht
e rastit q regjimet absolutiste imponojn gjithher simetrin. Pr kt Zevi
pohon se absolutizmi politik imponon gjeometrin, qeverit absolutiste e
rregullojn strukturn urbane duke etabluar akse dhe m shum akse, qoft
paralele mes vete, qoft duke i prer n knde t drejta. Barrakat, burgjet,
instalimet militare jan gjeometrikisht rigjide. Qytetarve nuk u lejohet q t
bjn kthesa t thyera nga e djathta apo nga e majta.
236
Modeli klasik i gjetjes
s simetris afirmon modelin militar dhe represiv t sistemeve t padshiruara
dhe jodemokratike. Arkitektura n kt rast, prmes invariabls s asimetris
dhe disonancs, i liron impulset jetsore duke ua krijuar nj hapsir fleksibile
pr manifestimin e tyre n pajtim me nevojat saj. S kndejmi antigjeometria me
format e saja t lira, asimetria dhe disonanca, jan ato q duhet t karakterizojn
gjuhn moderne t arkitekturs si arkitektur e alternativs demokratike
ndaj t gjitha etablimeve opresive arkitektonike si shprehje e drejtprdrejt e
ideologjive robruese. Njri prej modeleve tashm t aplikuar t lirimit nga
harmonia dhe konsonanca, sipas Zevit, gjendet tek Schoenbergu dhe koncepti
i tij i muziks atonale. Zevi bazuar n Schoenbergun pohon se Disonanca sht
241
komponent logjike e nj organizmi t ri q ka vitalitetin e njjt me prototipet
nga e kaluara. Schoenbergu ka zbuluar se muzika e liruar nga qendra tonike ose
harmonike, sht e kuptueshme dhe e aft pr t evokuar emocione. Tonaliteti
qndron pr simetrin, proporcionin, konsonancn dhe gjeometrin.
237

1.2 Tredimensionaliteti antiperspektiv
Afirmimi i shoqris demokratike prmes arkitekturs demokratike sht
pandashmrisht i lidhur me trajtimin e njrs nga trashgimit kryesore t
Renesanss dhe Klasicizmit at t perspektivs dhe tredimensionalitetit.
Perspektiva sht nj variant n t cilin asimetria dhe disonanca nuk mund t
realizohen. S kndejmi edhe antiperspektiva mbetet prgjegje e logjikshme
dhe rrjedhoj e dy invariableve t para. Perspektiva, n ann tjetr, sipas Zevit,
presupozon kndvshtrimin e privlegjuar dhe antidemokratik dhe hapsirn e
rrafshuar. Racionalizmi i aplikuar n arkitektur, ka shfrytzuar t arriturat e
Kubizmit dhe gjetjet e tija analitike n thyerjen e perspektivs, si pik e dominimit
n perceptimin e hapsirs pr t hapur rrugn pr eljet e perspektivave
t ndryshme n prceptimin e hapsirs. Ky sht nj hap i rndsishm i
demokratizimit t perceptimit fillimisht, q m pastaj t rezultoj edhe me
zgjidhje t avansuara arkitektonike. Hapsira me thyerjen e perspektivs fiton
nj status tjetr n t cilin afirmohet ekuivalenca e kndvshtrimeve sikurse q
n shoqrin demokratike afirmohet barazia e prgjithshme.
Pr perspektivn dhe ngulitjen e saj n praktikn arkitektonike, t ciln ai ndryshe
e quan kasaphane (hekatomb) arkitektonike, Zevi shkruan: perspektiva sht
nj teknik vizatimi pr t paraqitur objektet tredimensionale n siprfaqen
dydimensionale. Pr ta br punn m t leht, ndrtesat jan thyer n pjes
katrore dhe jan reduktuar n prizme rregullare. Nj trashgimi e madhe e
lakimeve, formave asimetrike, vijave shmangse, modulacioneve, dhe kndeve
tjera nga ato prej 90 shkall jan fshier dhe rn posht. Bota sht kthyer n kuti,
dhe rendi arkitektonik sht shfrytzuar pr t dalluar pjest e mbivendosura
dhe prbrivendosura t kutis.
238

Zhvillimi i natyrshm do t jet m pastaj n invariablen e katrt t dekompozimit.
Megjithat, n arkitekturn moderne, sipas Zevit, mbeten veprat e Gaudit dhe
Mendelsohnit ato q kan rrnuar boshtin racionalist n arkitektur bazuar n
ekspresionizmin. N vend q t dekompozojn kutin n pjest e saja prbrse,
n mnyrn Racionaliste, Ekspresionizmi i jep masave tredimensionale t tyre
nj tension eksplodues, kinetik, q fluturon prball qasjes s Renesanss.
239

Mirpo, kjo nism ekspresioniste n arkitekturn moderne mbetet pjes e
238 Bruno Zevi, po aty fq. 23.
239 Cituar sip. Andrea Oppnheimer Dean, Bruno Zevi on Modern Architecture, fq. 64.
krkimeve dhe realizimeve t veuara dhe individuale t disa arkitektve. Ajo
nuk ka arrit t instalohet si form e as si metod e zgjidhjeve n projektimin
arkitektonik. Pr kt kemi ende pranin e pamendueshme t simetris dhe
perspektivs n krijimin modern t arkitekturs.
Pr kt shpeshher n arkitekturn moderne kemi njfar kthimi n
ngrohtsin familiare t klasicizmit, sikurse q n veprat e Le Corbusier, Mies
van der Rohes edhe Gropiusit kemi aplikimin e simetris dhe perspektivs. Por,
megjithat, Zevi mendon se aplikimi i perspektivs sht vetm nj zgjidhje, t
ciln ai nuk e prjashton, por, as nuk e pranon apriori. Ngase perspektiva mund
t jet e pranuar vetm n rastin e nj mij zgjidhjeve, kur ajo mund t del si
njra prej m t mirave nga 999, sepse, ather ajo sht prvetsuar brenda nj
procesi mendor t zgjidhjeve dhe jo na saje t imponimit apriori t saj.
1.3 Sintaksa e dekompozimit katrdimensional
Procesi i dekompozimit katrdimensional sht invariabla gjithashtu e
rndsishme dhe prbn, t themi, njfar boshti i cili mundson invariablen
prmbyllse t reintegrimit. Kjo invariabl sht pjes e prpjekjeve t De Stijlit,
e cila ofron mundsi aplikimi t prgjithshm si nj kod i rndsishm n gjuhn
moderne t arkitekturs. Procedura e dekompozimit katrdimensional sht
pjes prbrse e emancipimit t arkitekturs moderne. Zevi pohon se nse
problemi sht q t heqet qafe blloku i perspektives, puna e par q duhet br
sht t eliminohet dimensioni i tret duke dekompozuar kutin, duke e thyer
at n panele.
240
Ky sht nj hap i domosdoshm pr t afirmuar hapsirn
dinamike, kompatibile me jetn. Ky sht procesi i thyerjes s kutis e cila
mbyll hapsirn dhe suprimon nj prmbajtje fleksibile t saj, t mundsimit
t rrjedhs s pandrprer t jets. Zevi pohon se kur njher t coptohet
kutia, planet m nuk formojn volume t mbyllura, kontejner t hapsirs s
kufishme. Pr m tepr dhomat bhen fluide dhe bashkohen e rrjedhin n nj
kontinuum t lvizshm. Kualiteti statik i klasicizmit zvendsohet me vizionin
dinamik, me elementin e kohs q shtohet, ose, nse dshironi, dimensionin e
katrt.
241
Arritja e kualitetit t ri t hapsirs prbn nj aspekt substancial n idiomen
moderne. Kjo sht aplikuar n kodin noeplastik te De Stijl, por asnjher nuk
ka arrit q t prvetsohet pr t nxjerr mundsit e shumta q ofron ky kod.
Kjo invariabl na mundson q t eliminojm t gjith procesin e vshtir t
harmonizimit dhe arritjes s proporcionit nga pjest e ndryshme. T njjtin
diagnostikim Zevi e prdor edhe pr proporcionin ngjashm me at t simetris.
Ai pohon se mania e proporcionit sht nj tumor q duhet t pritet. ka sht
240 Bruno Zevi, The Modern Language of Architecture, fq. 31.
243
proporcioni? Ai sht mjet q t vendoset nj marrdhnie e detyrueshme e
pjesve heterogjene t nj ndrtese. sht nj dshir neurotike pr sintez, t
preferuar apriori.
242

1.4 Strukturat guac dhe membran
Invariabli i pest sht n fakt boshti i konstruktimit logjik t t gjitha invariableve
t cilat duhet t implementohen n strukturat fleksibile dhe kreative. N kt
invariabl kemi integrimin e domosdoshm t inxhinieris dhe tekniks e cila n
prdorimin kreativ na mundson zgjidhjet m t avansuara q evitojn kufizimet
n hapsirat rigjide t kutis. Ky nyjtim mes tekniks dhe ekspresionit sht
m se i domosdoshm dhe se kjo do t ishte nj pjes e arritjes antiklasike dhe
e shkputjes s zingjirve t klasicizmit n projektimin arkitektonik. Pr kt
Zevi shkruan se: Kodifikimi i gjuhs moderne t arkitekturs prfshin at q
inxhiniert dhe po ashtu arkitektt duhet q t shkputin zingjirin e klasicizmit
dhe q ti japin fund konfliktit t gjat mes tekniks dhe expresionit, q duhet t
prdoren s bashku n nj mnyr kreative.
243
Ndraja e tekniks nga ekspresioni i ka rrnjt logjike n prpjekjen e gjetjes s nj
shprehjeje t qndrueshme dhe t pandryshueshme n projektimin modern n
gjetjen e formulave stabile strukturore. Nuk sht e rastit q p.sh. Mies van der
Rohe gjithher e ka konsideruar ekspresionin si dytsor n krkimin e strukturs.
N nj intervist Mies van der Rohe deklaron se pr mua struktura sht dika
sikurse logjika. sht mnyra m e mir pr t br dhe pr t shprehur gjrat.
Un jam shum skeptik pr ekspresionet emocionale. Un nuk i besoj atyre,
dhe nuk mendoj se do t zgjasin shum.
244
Eliminimi i impulseve subjektive n
projektimin arkitekonik sht n prputhje me synimin e arritjes s objektivitetit
n shprehjen arkitektonike si instalim i strukturs s pandryshueshme logjike.
N bashkdyzimin kreativ, mes tekniks dhe ekspresionit, t cilin e presupozon
Zevi, prkundr Mies van der Rohes, mundsohet nxjerrja e formave t lira,
t thyera, fluide t formsuara krejtsisht nga struktura fleksibile. Lidhja e
pandashme mes inxhinieris dhe arkitekturs sht gjetje e rrall e arkitektve
kreativ, n t cilt Zevi natyrisht e konsideron Wrightin si shembull emblematik
n Falling Water House. Kreativiteti i Wrightit shprehet m s miri n realizimin e
tij inxhinierik n t cilin ai i sfidon t gjitha normat dhe konvencat dominuese pr
at t ndrtimit t ballkoneve. Puntort kan refuzuar q t heqin skelet nga frika
e kolabimit t trsishm t strukturs. Wrighti e ka br vet kt dhe ka arrit
q n inxhinieringun struktural t flet gjuhn moderne. Invariabla strukturale
sht ajo q mundson lirin e krijimit, shprehjet e pakufizuara arkitekturore si
dhe heqjen e ngarkesave t forcave statike t klasicizmit. Invariabla strukturale
242 Bruno Zevi, po aty. Fq. 33.
244 Mioses Puente edit, Conversations with Mies van der Rohe, Princeton Architectural press/New
York, 2008, fq. 31.
e idiomit modern sht m pak e brengosur me konzolat, membranat dhe guacat
se sa me at t involvimit t t gjitha elementeve arkitekturale n simfonin e
forcave statike. sht mir e ditur se efiqienca e strukturs varet nga forma e saj
dhe tensioni i lakimeve.
245
Arritjet teknologjike nuk mund t jen jasht implementimit arkitekturor, ato
nuk mund t jen t ndara nga prvetsimi arkitektonik q synon t arrij
shprehjen moderne. sht pjes e tradits moderniste q t arriturat teknike
dhe inxhinierike ti prvetsoj dhe q t ec krahprkrah me zhvillimet e saj.
Mirpo ato arritje nuk jan vetm n gjetjet e betonit, elqit dhe elikut, por
edhe n aspektet tjera m sensitive t gjetjeve strukturale. Zevi e nxjerr nj
fraz tashm t zvetnuar n diskursin modernist n arkitektur se revolucioni
teknologjik koincidon me revolucionin n gjuhn e arkitekturs. Por Zevi ktu e ka
fjaln pr kontinuitetin e pandalshm t prvetsimeve t arritjeve teknologjike
n arkitektur, si sht ta zm kompjutori. Prmes simulimeve kompjutorike
ne mund t arrijm tek format q pr arkitekturn tradicionale kan qen t
paimagjinueshme. Pr m shum kalkulimet strukturale t kompjutorit mund ta
bjn inxhinierin strukturale q t zhduket. Kjo pr arsye se format q mund
t arrihen me kt teknologji nuk mund t nxjerren me mjetet tradicionale t
projektimit n arkitektur. Pr kt pohon Zevi, kompjutori mund t sugjeroj
aso forma q e pasurojn leksikun, gramatikn dhe sintaksen e arkitekturs.
246

1.5 Hapsira n koh
Prkufizimi i ktij invariabli sht rrjedhoj logjike e konceptimit t Zevit
pr hapsirn dhe arkitekturn si hapsir ai ktu madje e prkufizon kt
si arkitektur-pr-t-lvizur-npr-t (architecture-to-move-through). Ky
invariabl rezulton nga dy qasje; n njrn an sht relflektim i arjes s kutis q
e gjejm n nismn e paprmbyllur t De Stijlit dhe, n ann tjetr, sht i lidhur me
konceptimin e pandashmris mes hapsirs dhe kohs (konceptimi einsteinian),
q sht nj kundrvnie pr konceptin e hapsirs s zbrazt t modernizmit.
Zhvillimi i ktij koncepti pr hapsirn n koh sht pjes e nj krkimi t gjat t
njeriut. Zevi shkruan se hapsira n koh sht shuma e problemeve n lvozhgn
e arrs. Njeriut i jan dashur mijra vjet q ta zotrojn hapsirn arkitektonike.
Elementi i kohs n arkitektur sht prjetuar vetm n nj prjashtim dhe pr
nj koh t shkurt, at t katakombeve. Do ti duhen njeriut shekuj, ndoshta
mijra vjet, q t zotroj parimin dinamik t hapsirs n koh.
247
Invariabli i hapsirs n koh si parim dinamik i kundrvihet n trsi parimit
245 Bruno Zevi, The Language of Modern Architecture, fq. 43.
245
statik t klasicizmit. Prvoja historike e t jetuarit npr katakomba vetm sa e
sforcon iden e arkitekurs dinamike q duhet t jetohet, jo n formn e saj t
zhveshur nga hapsira dhe qllimi, si e hasim n katakomba. Ka ekzistuar nj
koh kur bota fizike sht konsideruar si vend i mallkimit, dhe jeta pas vdekjes
sht hipostazuar. Njeriu ka jetuar pr at t matanshmen dhe i ka hudhur
vlerat toksore. Hapsira ka qen e shtypur. Tunelet e pafundme nntoksore
pr t vdekurit jan rrmihur nn arkitekturn statike, teatralisht monumentale
t Roms antike. Kshtu elementi i kohs vjen tek vetja me lindjen e ksaj
arkitekture-pr-t-lvizur-n-t.
248
Dimensionin e kohs n histori e shohim
fillimisht si t ndar nga hapsira. Madje edhe n projektimin modernist (s
paku n t shumtn e asaj q njihet si modernizm) kohn e gjejm vetm si
nj dimension t shtuar nga jasht, artificialisht t mveshur pr hapsirn e jo
n lidhjen e tyre t pandashme si hapsir-koh n t ciln manifestohet dhe
jetohet jeta. Njra prej vrejtjeve q i bn Zevi Eisenmanit sht ajo se arja
e kutis n qasjen e tij dekonstruktiviste nuk ka arrit q t implementoj at
q ai e quan vetdijen hapsir-koh n veprn e tij. Vetdija pr kohn sht
nj moment i rndsishm n konceptimin e arkitekturs ngase ajo sht n
prputhshmri t plot me synimin pr t demokratizuar jetn dhe shoqrin.
Zevi e jep kt argument kur shkruan se: sht dashur shekuj e shekuj q njeriu
t njeh kuptimin e hapsirs pozitive, kreative, pasiq prej parahistoris deri tek
Pantheoni, boshllku sht shikuar me mosbesim dhe frik. Pastaj jan dashur
shekuj tjer q t lirohet hapsira prej koncepcioneve statike, dhe n fakt i gjith
itinerari arkitekturor mund t interpretohet si ndeshje n mes koncepcionit
dinamik (E vonshmja-Romake, Mesjeta, Brunelleschi, Michelangelo, Borromini
etj.) dhe ringjalljes s koncepcionit statik (Renesansa, neoklasicizmi, Beaux-Art
etj.). Hapsira statike sht tipike pr regjimet autoritare: fashizmi dhe stalinizmi.
Hapsira dinamike sht emblematike pr komunitetin dhe demokracin.
249

Vetm n shprehjen e hapsirs dinamike arrihet synimi i qart i demokratizimit
t jets. Lvizja, rrjedha, fleksibiliteti t gjitha kto duhet shprehur prmes
koncepcionit dinamik. Madje Zevi edhe konceptin e planit t lir (free plan) t
zhvilluar nga Le Corbusier e sheh vetm nn prizmin e shprehjes s hapsirs
n koh dhe kohs n hapsir. Kjo pr arsye se dinamika e t jetuarit duhet t
shprehet e jo t reduktohet n zero.
1.6 Reintegrimi i ndrtess, qytetit dhe peizazhit
Invariabli i reintegrimit paraqet nj qasje holistike n t ciln kemi nj prfshirje
koherente t arkitekturs n nj rrafsh m t gjer, n t cilin ajo merr karakterin e
urbatektures. Ky invariabl duhet t kontestoj gjith qasjet klasike n t cilat kemi
trajtimin e izoluar t objekteve n hapsir, por edhe nj trajtim statik t hapsirs.
249 Bruno Zevi, cit.sip., Andrea Oppenheimer Dean, Bruno Zevi on Modern Architecture, fq.72.
Ky unifikim t cilin e proklamon Zevi nuk sht, si pohon ai, nj sintez klasike
apriori. Prkundrazi ajo sht vetm shtje e nj uniteti dinamik q krijon lvizjen
dhe formson hapsirn pr kohn.
250
N ndrtimet klasike kemi, po ashtu, mundsin e
lvizjes, por ajo sht gjithher e ngurtsuar n njfar shtangie, ngase sht projektuar, jo
pr njeriun, por pr statujat e palvizshme.
Qllimi yn, pohon Zevi, sht reintegrimi horizontal dhe vertikal, me pasazhe n t
gjitha drejtimet, jo t ndara n katror t kndeve t drejta por t lakuara, t trthorta
dhe t pjerrta. Ky parim shkon shum prtej nj objekti t veant dhe n mnyr
integrale lidh ndrtesn me qytetin. Kur volumi thehet n plane dhe rimbledhet n
mnyr katrdimensionale, fasada tradicionale zhduket s bashku me dallimin mes
hapsirs s brendshme dhe t jashtme, si dhe n mes arkitekturs dhe planifikimit t
qytetit. Shkrirja e qytetit dhe ndrtess on kah urbatektura.
251
Invariabli i reintegrimit
sht prpjekje q t vendoset n plan m t gjer njfar dialogu mes arkitekturs
dhe rrethit natyror.
Reintegrimi sht i domosdoshm ngase sht pjes e arritjeve t rilidhjes s
aspekteve t dekompozimit t domosdoshm t funksioneve. Ai shum nga objektet
t cilat sot ekzistojn t fragmentuara n funksionet e tyre, si jan shkolla, fabrika,
studiot profesionale, mendon se mund t rikonceptohen dhe t dalin nga struktura
vetprmbajtsore. N kt invariabl Zevi mendon se mund t vendoset nj ndrlidhje
e funksioneve; sikurse q komplekset universitare t fragmentuara n fakultete, sot
sfidohen nga interdisciplinariteti.
Implementimi i ktij invariabli nuk sht kurrfar utopie sipas Zevit. Ai mendon se
kjo duhet t shndrrohet n nj gjuh t folur t projektimit e cila prfshin t gjitha
nivelet nga ai i mobilimit t shtpis dhe dhoms, projektimit t ndrtess, qytetit dhe
regjionit.
M invariablat e tij, e sidomos me kt t reintegrimit t ndrtess, qytetit dhe peizazhit,
Zevi bhet njfar anticipuesi i kahjeve t reja n arkitektur dhe urbanizm; kahje
kto q prfundimisht i rimendojn konsekuencat e paradigms moderne q kan
devastuar peizazhet e qyteteve aktualisht. Prpjekjet e Zevit q t rimendoj srish
projektin e modernes mbeten pjes e nj trashgimie relevante pr hapjen e shtigjeve
t krkimit jashta rregullave dhe rendit apriori t synuar t modernizmit. Edhe
pse insistues n konceptin e modernes, Zevi sht i prkushtuar n emancipimin e
arkitekturs moderne, q vetvetiu shqitet n trajta m t avansuara dhe t emancipuara
nga paradigma e prhapur e parimeve abstrakte q kan suprimuar jetn dhe lirin.
2. Arkitektura dhe emancipimi
Emancipimi i arkitekturs moderne nga t gjitha rregullat dhe parimet apriori
abstrakte t prvetsuara, sht nism jo e leht e rimendimit t atij projekti
250 Bruno Zevi, Modern Language of Archtecture, fq.55.
247
tashm t prhapur gjithandej n arkitektur. Bruno Zevi pavarsisht synimit
t tij q t mbetet n suazat e arkitekturs moderne nismn e ka gjithsesi
t pranueshme, por, konkludimet paradoksale. Kjo ngase sht vshtir
t riafirmohet modernizmi prmes dekonstruktimit t plot t strukturs
paradigmatike q i ka dhn identitetin.
S pari sht ajo q Zevi e konteston iluminizmin pr t riafirmuar modernen,
gj q vetvetiu sht nj kontradikt logjike. Moderna nuk sht asgj tjetr
vese shprehje e drejtprdrejt e iluminizmit dhe vlerave t saja supreme, si
sht mendja dhe parimeve abstrakte dhe universale t mendjes. Kontestimi
i iluminzimit vetvetiu nnkupton kontestimin e modernes; identifikimi n
ann tjetr i iluminizmit dhe dogmave e asolutizmit iluminist me totalitarizmin
njherit nnkupton at q tashm e kan identifikuar n diskursin postmodernist
si rrjedhoj e pashmangshme e iluminizmit. Diskursi postiluminist aspiron
mendimin e gjetur jasht skemave iluministe dhe moderniste, gj q vetvetiu
edhe projektimi arkiektonik postiluminist sht i lidhur me gjetjet arkitekturore
jashte skemave karteziane, universale dhe abstrakte. Kontestimi i klasicizmit
dhe neoklasicizmit tek Zevi lidhet kryesisht me kontestimin e iluminizmit. Ai
madje pohon se neoklasicizmi ka qen shprehje e Iluminizmit, pr t pohuar n
vazhdim: si mund lvizja moderne q e konteston neoklasicizmin t hudhet si
produkt i Iluminizmit?
252
Por, kundrshtimi i neoklasicizmit n modernizm nuk
sht i asociuar me aspektet q Zevi i promovon n msimet e tija. Prmbajtja
diskursive dhe logjike e modernizmit sht thuaja diferencuese skajshmrisht
me shum nga ato q Zevi, por edhe arkitektura organike i afirmon n pikpamjet
e saja. Kjo m s miri ilustrohet nga qndrimi i Arganit q arkitekturn moderne
e shihte n vijn e iluminimit t madh, n afirmimin e t vetdijshmes dhe
vetdijes si konstituive pr at projekt. Argan pohonte, natyrisht n konsekuenc
t plot me modernen, se ndrtimi sht shprehje tipike e konstruktivitetit
ose kreativitetit t vetdijes, sikurse q destruksioni sht shprehje e kaosit t
pavetdijshmes.
253
Pr Zevin tashm e kemi t qart se ai mendimin e tij e sheh
t aplikuar n vijn e logjiks freudiane, n afrmimin e t pavetdijshmes, n
kontestimin e plot t asaj q sht projeksion i vetdijes dhe mendjes iluministe.
Nse destruksionin n mendimin e Arganit, e zvendsojme me dekonstruksionin, e
shohim se si del n shesh nj mendim i ndryshm, nj model i ndryshm arkitekturor
t cilin Zevi e promovon me prkushtim (koncepti i dekompozimit katrdimensional,
tredimensionaliteti antiperspektiv, asimetria, disonanca etj.). Rrugtimi i iluminizmit,
i cili n Dialektikn e Iluminzimit t Adorno dhe Horkheimer, sht prvijuar qart
n shqitjet destruktive dhe totalitare, ose n Panoptikonin e Benthamit si model q
e konstaton Foucault, vshtir mund t jet referenc e demokratizimit t shoqris
dhe afrmimit t diversitetit apo poliperspektivizmit. Ai madje edhe vet n intervistn
me Oppenheimer Dean e pranon se ka lexuar tek Adorno dhe Horkheimeri se prej
Voltairit mund t krcehet tek Hitleri dhe se kjo e ka br q t kundrshtoj t gjitha
252 Bruno Zevi, cit.sip. Andrea Oppenheimer Dean, Bruno Zevi on Modern Architecture, fq. 82.
253 G.C.Argan, Studije o modernoj umetnosti, Nolit/Beograd, 1982, fq.163.
absolutizmat, dogmat dhe parimet e Iluminzimit. sht e vshtir t rimkmbet
ajo q quhet modernizm n arkitektur nse heqet dor prej premisave q e kan
konstituuar at.
Synimi emancipues n arkitektur s kndejmi mbetet nj impuls i rndsishm
pr krkimet e reja, pa barrn e trashgimis moderniste. Konsekuencat e ktij
krkimi t lir jan krejtsisht n pajtim me afirmimin e diversitetit, rrmujs dhe
rregullit t cilat prvijojn nj model t ri t projektimit, por gjithashtu edhe nj
paradigm tjetr t mendimit. Pr kt Zevi shkruan se liria implikon nj sasi t
caktuar t rregullit. Qasja n arkitektur t cils i prkas, sht sikurse demokracia
vet. Ajo prfshin rrmuj, rregull, toleranc t t pakryeres, t konfliktit. Ajo
sht nj proces konstant i ndryshimit, q implikon inkonsistencn, prshtatjen,
vshtirsin. Kshtu un preferoj rrmujn e demokracis n raport me rendin
dhe efiqiencn e totalitarizmit. Un nuk jam tolerues pr rrmujn q sht
implicite n slloganin gjithka ecn ja pr ka jam kundr postmodernizmit.
254

Ktu mund t shtrohen pyetjet; pr ka Zevi sht kundr postmodernizmit? Cilat jan
shtjet kontestuese t postmodernizmit q pr Zevin jan t papranueshme? Pse Zevi
nuk mendon se n afrmimin e paradigms tjetr, asaj postmoderniste, kemi njfar
emancipimi t domosdoshm dhe afrmimi t nj sensibilteti t ri pr t gjitha ato q
krkon Zevi pr t demokratizuar shoqrin dhe arkitekturn? Si duket arsyeja sht
n at q Zevi ka nj munges evidente n kompleksitetin e shtjes s defnimit t
postmodernizmit n arkitektur duke e reduktuar at kryesisht n nj defnim t Jencksit.
Jencks n veprn e tij e prkufzon postmodernizmin n arkitektur si nj kod t
dyfsht, n t ciln kemi rikthimin e elementeve estetikisht jorelevante asociative t
historicizmit - si jan citati, pastishi etj. Me kt abstrakohet nj aspekt tjetr shum
m i gjer i prvetsimeve t premisave moderniste n postmodernizm. Njra prej
karakteristikave t postmodernizmit sht edhe ajo q ai nuk sht n vijn e mendimit
zero, n nismn vetthemeluese far e gjejme n logjikn moderniste. Kjo edhe sht
arsyeja q Zevi pohon p.sh. se postmodernizmi i hudh t gjitha arritjet e modernizmit,
sidomos, ato t funksionalizmit dhe hapsirs s pandrprer. Pr m shum Zevi ia
mvesh postmodernistve nj qasje t ciln e afrimon edhe vet gjat gjith veprs s tij
at t hudhjes s gjitha rregullave. Ai shkruan se postmodernizmi na liron nga kompleksi
opresiv i babait dhe nga frustrimi pr qllimin e pa arritur. sht sfd pr lvizjen
moderne, rndsia e t cils qndron kryesisht n involvimin social dhe konceptin e
ri t hapsirs s pandrprer, q ka lindur nga domosdoshmria funksionale, brengat
psikologjike dhe brenga pr efqienc n teknikat e prodhimit. Duke refuzuar q t
pranojn kto sfda, postmodernistt, n termet psikanalitike, vrasin babain dhe mbesin
t pafajshm, dhe kshtu, t lumtur, t lir nga rregullat, parimet dhe rendet e secilit lloj.
Ky sht nj refuzim total. Ky sht nj akt infantil i mohimit dhe prdhosjes.
255
Rikthimi i arkitketurs kah historikja, vernakularja, duke evituar pastrtin
gjeometrike t modernizmit, nuk nnkupton hudhjen e premisave moderniste, por
254 Bruno Zevi, po aty, fq.85.
255 Bruno Zevi, cit.sip. Andrea Oppenheimer Dean, Bruno Zevi on Modern Architecture, fq. 81.
249
pasurimin e projektimit arkitektonik. Madje edhe nismn e Venturit i cili afirmon
papastrtin prkundr pastrtis, Zevi e konsideron t panevojshme q ta
krkoj jasht modernizmit dhe projektit modern. Vernakularen si nj element i
rndsishm i rikthimit t kontekstit ose kontekstualizmit n postmodernizm,
e sheh si nj alibi pr dembelin dhe jokreativitetin pasi q vernakularja
e vrtet, n formn e saj, asimetrin, disonancn, volumin antiperspektiv,
dekompozimin, lojn strukturale dhe kshtu me radhe, nxjerret nga listimi i
nevojave elementare humane, pa asnj sintez apriori apo aposteriori. Dhe pr
kt ai pohon q e urrej arkitekturen pseudo-vernakulare thjesht pr shkak se
fillon me forma apriori romantike e jo me prmbajtje dhe funksion. Dhe pr kt
ajo shum shpesh sht simetrike, konsonante, ka perspektivn tredimensionale
dhe nuk prshtatet me rrethin.
256
Koncepti i vernakulares n postmodernizm
nuk duhet reduktuar vetm n nj nism romantike t rikthimit t tradits, por
t prvetsimit t tradits n trajtat m t shquara t pajtueshme me prvojat e
jetuara, n nj kontinuitet m t avansuar t lidhjes s kaluares me t tashmen.
Kt shum mir e konstaton edhe Calinescu kur pohon se postmodernistt t
kaluars filluan ti rikthehen me kmbngulje, jo vetm si magazin formash
t vdekura dhe t panevojshme q mund t riprdoreshin n ndonj kontekst
racionalist, por edhe si hapsir dialogimi mirkuptues dhe e njohjes s vetvetes,
nj hapsir n t ciln problemet q shtron koha e sotme zgjidhen me zgjuarsi,
ku pyetjet e prhershme marrin prgjigje t ndryshme krijuese, dhe ku sfidat
e kundrtit dhe kompleksitetet (nse prdorim termat e paraplqyer t
Venturit) kan uar n zbulime t shklqyera teknike dhe estetike.
257
Rikthimi i
tradits, prvetsimi i prmbajtjeve t saja nuk ka t bj me nxitjen e ndjesis
nostalgjike pr tashm t humburn, por me prgjigjen krijuese ndaj sfids s
rivendosjes s kontinuitetit me t shkuaren. Calinescu ktu projekton njfar
skeme mendimi q lidhet me tundimin teleologjik historik ngase mendon se e
sotmja sht e derivuar nga e shkuara dhe se sht n vijn paraprcaktuese q
on kah nj drejtim po ashtu t paraprcaktuar t historis. Ky sht poentim
interesant, por m duket se sht njherit i impjantuar arbitrarisht n skemn
intepretuese t gjetjeve postmoderne. Fakti q arkitektura postmoderne i
rikthehet lojs, kontekstit, kompleksitetit, papastrtis vetm sa e sforcon
argumentimin pr zhveshjen nga ndonj qllim i pastr i historis n rjedhn e
saj. Referencat e shumta historike t Zevit tek krijuesit e mdhenj si Mikelangelo
apo Borromini vetm sa flasin q n prvojn historike mund t gjejm nxitje t
shumta pr avansimin e kodeve t shprehjes moderne.
Afirmimi i eklekticizmit n postmodernizm me siguri se pr Zevin ka nj
konotim antiorganik, pr arsye t definimit primar t tij si bashkim mekanik
dhe joorganik i elementeve apo stileve t ndryshme n arkitektur. Megjithat,
eklekticizmin duhet menduar nn prizmin e prvojes demokratike pr zgjedhjen
257 Matei Calinescu, Pes fytyrat e modernitetit Modernizmi, Pararoja, Dekadenca, Kithschi, Postmod-
ernizmi, Dituria/Tiran 2012, fq.298-299.
e lir dhe prcaktimin e lir q sht orientim i domosdoshm n lirimin e
arkitekturs nga kanonet dhe dogmat q i lufton vet Zevi.
Pavarsisht nga deklarimi i kudogjendur i Zevit pr arkitekurn moderne dhe
kontestimin e asaj postmoderne, orvatjet e tija pr t afirmuar modernizmin
n arkitektur kan uar n nj rrafsh vetrefleksiv pr konsekuencat e
padshiruara t formulimit rigjid universal modernist. Formulimi organik n
arkitektur qysh n fillet e saj prbn nj bosht t mvetsishm modernist
pr dallim nga ai racionalist, me ka prher ka sfiduar logjikn e fort dhe t
betonuar t modernizmit universalist dhe racional. Si duket qasja organike n
arkitekturn moderne sht shprehja e drejtprdrejt e kontramodernitetit
t cilin e konstaton Foucault. Foucault mendon se qndrimi i modernitetit
qysh nga formimi sht gjet n luftn me qndrimin e kontramodernitetit.
Kontramoderniteti sht nj kundrqndrim q aktivohet n aktualitet dhe
bashkkohsi q e definon modernitetin.
258
Jasht prkufizimeve t t kaluars
apo t ardhmes s mundshme n vizionin progresiv, ktu kemi konceptin e
konfrontimit t prhershm n t sotmen, q sht prpjekje e pandalshme e
daljes nga zbutja thjeshtzuese e formulimit t pastr n arkitekturn moderniste
racionale. Tendosjet, vshtirsit, kompleksitet, kontradiktat, rrmuja, rregulli,
t gjitha kto preferenca t Zevit n projektimin arkitekonik demokratik nuk
jan asgj tjetr vetm se konfrontimi i prhershm prmes s cilit moderniteti
e mendon veten, n konsekuencn e fundme n riformulimin e pandalshm t
vetes. Nse kt tendenc nuk e prkufizojm si postmoderne ather s paku
mund ta gjejm si pulsim konfrontues q on kah pasurimi i ekulibruar q ndal
vrullin e skemave dogmatike t t menduarit dhe t realizimit arkitekturor.

258 Shih pr kt, Astrit Salihu, Aporit e modernes, kritika e rrfimeve t mdha, Rizoma/QSH Gani
Bobi, Prishtin, 2008.
251
Bibliografia
Bruno Zevi, Toward an Organic Architecture, Faber & Faber Limited/London
1949
Bruno Zevi, Modern Language of Architecture, Da Capo Press/ Ne York, 1994
Bruno Zevi, Architecture as a space, How to look at architecture, Horizon Press/
New York, 1957
Sigfried Giedion, Space, Time & Architecture, The growth of a new tradition,
Harward University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, 2008
Anthony Giddens, Pasojat e modernitetit, UETPRESS/Tiran, 2013
Andrea Oppenheimer Dean, Bruno Zevi on Modern Architecture, Rizzoli/ New
York, 1983, Appendix II Speeches, Architecture and Einsteins space-time
Mioses Puente edit, Conversations with Mies van der Rohe, Princeton Architectural
Press/New York, 2008, fq. 31.
G.C.Argan, Studije o modernoj umetnosti, Nolit/Beograd, 1982
Matei Calinescu, Pes fytyrat e modernitetit Modernizmi, Pararoja, Dekadenca,
Kithschi, Postmodernizmi, Dituria/Tiran 2012

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