SHENCK VS US

SYNOPSIS OF RULE OF LAW. THE CHARACTER OF EVERY ACT DEPENDS ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH
IT IS DONE. THE QUESTION IN EVERY CASE IS WHETHER THE WORDS ARE USED IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES
AND ARE OF SUCH A NATURE AS TO CREATE A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER THAT THEY WILL BRING
ABOUT THE SUBSTANTIVE EVILS THAT CONGRESS HAS A RIGHT TO PROTECT.

FACTS: CHARLES SCHENCK AND ELIZABETH BAER WERE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF
THE SOCIALIST PARTY IN PHILADELPHIA, OF WHICH SCHENCK WAS GENERAL SECRETARY. THE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE AUTHORIZED, AND SCHENCK OVERSAW, PRINTING AND MAILING MORE THAN 15,000 LEAFLETS
TO MEN SLATED FOR CONSCRIPTION DURING WORLD WAR I. THE LEAFLETS URGED MEN NOT TO SUBMIT TO
THE DRAFT, SAYING "DO NOT SUBMIT TO INTIMIDATION", "ASSERT YOUR RIGHTS", "IF YOU DO NOT ASSERT
AND SUPPORT YOUR RIGHTS, YOU ARE HELPING TO DENY OR DISPARAGE RIGHTS WHICH IT IS THE SOLEMN
DUTY OF ALL CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO RETAIN," AND URGED MEN NOT TO
COMPLY WITH THE DRAFT ON THE GROUNDS THAT MILITARY CONSCRIPTION CONSTITUTED INVOLUNTARY
SERVITUDE, WHICH IS PROHIBITED BY THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT.[3]

AFTER JURY TRIALS SCHENCK AND BAER WERE CONVICTED OF VIOLATING SECTION 3 OF THE ESPIONAGE
ACT OF 1917.[4] DEFENDANTS APPEALED TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, ARGUING THAT THEIR
CONVICTION, AND THE STATUTE WHICH PURPORTED TO AUTHORIZE IT, WERE CONTRARY TO THE FIRST
AMENDMENT. THEY RELIED HEAVILY OF THE TEXT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THEIR CLAIM THAT
ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1917 HAD WHAT TODAY ONE WOULD CALL A "CHILLING EFFECT" ON FREE DISCUSSION
OF THE WAR EFFORT.
ISSUE. WHETHER THE WORDS USED IN THE LEAFLETS ARE USED IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES AND ARE OF
SUCH A NATURE AS TO CREATE A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER THAT THEY WILL BRING ABOUT THE
SUBSTANTIVE EVILS THAT CONGRESS HAS A RIGHT TO PROTECT?

HELD: THE COURT, IN A UNANIMOUS OPINION WRITTEN BY JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., HELD
THAT SCHENCK'S CRIMINAL CONVICTION WAS CONSTITUTIONAL. THE STATUTE ONLY APPLIED TO
SUCCESSFUL OBSTRUCTIONS OF THE DRAFT, BUT COMMON-LAW PRECEDENTS ALLOWED PROSECUTION
FOR ATTEMPTS THAT WERE DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO SUCCESS. ATTEMPTS MADE BY SPEECH OR WRITING
COULD BE PUNISHED LIKE OTHER ATTEMPTED CRIMES; THE FIRST AMENDMENT DID NOT PROTECT SPEECH
ENCOURAGING MEN TO RESIST INDUCTION, BECAUSE, "WHEN A NATION IS AT WAR, MANY THINGS THAT
MIGHT BE SAID IN TIME OF PEACE ARE SUCH A HINDRANCE TO ITS EFFORT THAT THEIR UTTERANCE WILL
NOT BE ENDURED SO LONG AS MEN FIGHT, AND THAT NO COURT COULD REGARD THEM AS PROTECTED BY
ANY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT."[6] IN OTHER WORDS, THE COURT HELD, THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF WARTIME
ALLOW GREATER RESTRICTIONS ON FREE SPEECH THAN WOULD BE ALLOWED DURING PEACETIME, IF ONLY
BECAUSE NEW AND GREATER DANGERS ARE PRESENT.

THE OPINION'S MOST FAMOUS AND MOST OFTEN QUOTED PASSAGE WAS THIS:

THE MOST STRINGENT PROTECTION OF FREE SPEECH WOULD NOT PROTECT A MAN IN FALSELY SHOUTING
FIRE IN A THEATRE AND CAUSING A PANIC. [...] THE QUESTION IN EVERY CASE IS WHETHER THE WORDS
USED ARE USED IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES AND ARE OF SUCH A NATURE AS TO CREATE A CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER THAT THEY WILL BRING ABOUT THE SUBSTANTIVE EVILS THAT CONGRESS HAS A RIGHT
TO PREVENT.


NELSON NAVARRO VS. MAYOR ANTONIO VILLEGAS.

FACTS:ON FEBRUARY 24, 1970, THE PETITIONER, ACTING IN BEHALF OF THE MOVEMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC
PHILIPPINES, WROTE A LETTER TO THE RESPONDENT, THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, APPLYING TO
HOLD A RALLY AT PLAZA MIRANDA FEBRUARY 26, 1970, FROM 4-11PM.ON THE SAME DAY, THE RESPONDENT
WROTE A REPLY, DENYING HIS REQUEST ON THE GROUNDS THAT, THEY HAVE TEMPORARILY ADOPTED
THE POLICY OF NOT ISSUING ANY PERMIT FOR THE USE OF PLAZA MIRANDA FOR RALLIES OR
DEMONSTRATION DURING WEEKDAYS DUE TO THE EVENTS THAT HAPPENED FROM THE PAST WEEK. ON
THE SAME LETTER, THE RESPONDENT GAVE THE PETITIONER AN OPTION TO USE THE SUNKEN GARDEN
NEAR INTAMUROS FOR ITS RALLY, AND FOR IT TO BE HELD EARLIER FOR IT TO END BEFORE DARK. THE
PETITIONER FILED SUIT CONTESTING THE MAYORS ACTION ON THE GROUND THAT IT VIOLATES
THE PETITIONERS RIGHT TO PEACEABLE ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS
OF GRIEVANCES (ART. 3, SEC 1(8)) AND OF THE PETITIONERS RIGHT TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAW (ART. 3, SEC. 1).

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS ACT ON DENYING THE REQUEST OF THE PETITIONER
VIOLATES THE PETITIONERS RIGHT TO PEACEABLE ASSEMBLY AND RIGHT TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAW.

HELD: THE RIGHT OF PEACEABLE ASSEMBLE IS SUBJECT TO REGULATION UNDER THE POLICE POWER OF
THE STATE. THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY, THOUGH GRANTED BY THE
CONSTITUTION, IS NOT ABSOLUTE FOR IT MAY BE REGULATED IN ORDER THAT IT MAY NOT BE INJURIOUS
TO THE EQUAL ENJOYMENT OF OTHERS HAVING AN EQUAL RIGHT OF COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY,
THIS POWER MAY BE EXERCISED UNDER THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE, WHICH IS THE POWER OF THE
STATE, WHICH IS THE POWER TO PRESCRIBE REGULATIONS TO PROMOTE THE HEALTH, MORALS, PEACE,
EDUCATION, AND GOOD ORDER, SAFETY AND GENERAL WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE. WHILE THE PRIVILEGE
OF THE CITIZEN TO USE STREETS AND PARKS FOR COMMUNICATION MAY BE REGULATED IN THE INTEREST
OF ALL, SAID PRIVILEGE IS NOT ABSOLUTE. IT MUST BE EXERCISED INSUBORDINATION TO THE GENERAL
COMFORT AND CONVENIENCE AND IN CONSONANCE WITH PEACE AND GOOD ORDER, BUT IT MUST NOT
GUISE OF REGULATION BE ABRIDGED OR DENIED.