MD. Akhter Hossain- 14025 MD. Kowser Bhuiyan- 14083 Farhana Yasmin- 14024 MD. Al-Amin- 14032 MD. Moniruzzaman- 14035 Group Members Earnings Management from the Bottom Up: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives Below the CEO
Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Harvard University & NBER Julie Wulf, Harvard University & NBER
Date of publication: August, 2012. The primary data set used in this study includes a panel of more than 300 publicly traded U.S. firms over the years 1986-1999, spanning a number of industries. The survey sample is most representative of Fortune 500 firms. Performance-based pay contracts are a critical instrument to align the interests of principals and agents.
Different studies linked between the structure of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and various measures of earnings manipulation.
Examples of managers at lower levels in the corporate hierarchy cooking the books,
This literature is extended in the three broad ways: First, performance pay for CEOs, division managers, and CFOs. Second, developed models measure earnings manipulation from changes in compensation. Third, they tested for earnings manipulation using a variety of proxies, including a new measure of firm-specific excess 4th-quarter sales and incidence of future lawsuits.
Four broad results were found:
First, they found a systematic association between pay below the level of CEO with earnings manipulation.
Second, earnings manipulation occurs through both changes in discretionary current accruals and through the manipulation of 4th-quarter sales.
Third, stock options, the focus of many recent studies, seem to encourage earnings manipulation in the sample as well. For instance, firms whose CFOs receive a large number of options report higher discretionary current accruals, larger excess 4th quarter sales and greater likelihood of future lawsuits.
Fourth, traditional forms of compensation such as bonus schemes also invite gaming. Comments & Questions . Comments & Questions . Comments & Questions . Comments & Questions . Comments & Questions .