Senior Secondary Unit of Work

Justin Olmstead 4492529
SENIOR SECONDARY UNIT OF WORK

Unit 2: Twentieth century history 19452000
AREA OF STUDY 1: Ideas and political power
Outcome 1 - Analyse and discuss how postwar societies used ideologies to
legitimise their worldview and portray competing systems.
This unit will focus on the relationship between the USA and Russia after World War
II, specifically the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.
From the VCE History Study Design: Conflict and competition between the
opposing ideologies of capitalism and communism raised world tension and conflict,
and continued until the fall of communism in 1989. Rivalry between the superpowers
was played out in the arts, propaganda, sport, the space race, nuclear weapons
production and political influence over developed and emerging nations.
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Three components of knowledge to be addressed:
- the principal features of a post-war conflict(s)

- the propagation and maintenance of ideological views both domestically
and beyond their borders; specifically the use of the media, espionage,
and physical force

- the outcome of the competition between ideologies; for example, military
threats, propaganda wars, isolationism

Three components of skills to be addressed:
- use key concepts relevant to the selected historical conflict; such as
ideology, power, racism, communism, and capitalism

- analyse written and visual evidence

- synthesise evidence to draw conclusions

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VCE History Study Design 2013

BACKGROUND INFORMATION
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
On October 16, 1962 President John F. Kennedy (JFK) was informed that the Soviet Union
was building launching sites in Cuba for ballistic missiles with a range of 1000 miles. Cuba is
approximately 90 miles from the United States. The missiles could have carried warheads 60
times more powerful than the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.
Kennedy called together a group of advisors (informally named the EX COMM) who
weighed several strategies for responding to the presence of missiles in Cuba. On October
22, Kennedy announced to the world that the United States was imposing a naval blockade
around the island of Cuba -- to prevent the further shipment of missiles and of parts for the
completion of the launch sites -- and he demanded that the Soviets pull out all of their
offensive weapons from Cuba.
During the next five days, tension ran quite high, particularly when a Soviet boat came to the
point of crossing the blockade line. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev responded to
Kennedy's demands on October 26 with an impassioned letter in which he proposed that the
Soviet Union would withdraw the missiles if the United States promised not to invade Cuba.
The next day he sent a second, less emotional letter to Kennedy in which he added a demand:
that the United States also withdraw its medium range ballistic missiles from Turkey, a
NATO ally which bordered the Soviet Union. October 27 was a day that was particularly
anxiety-filled, because in the morning a U.S. surveillance plane (U-2) was shot down by a
Soviet surface-to-air missile. Similar surveillance flights had flown over Cuba at least twice
daily without interruption since October 14. Sensing trouble, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommended that the President order an invasion of Cuba. That evening, Attorney General
Robert Kennedy gave Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin an ultimatum: get the missiles
out in 48 hours or the U.S. will attack Cuba.
Khrushchev also feared events were spiraling out of control. In addition to ballistic missiles,
the Soviets had placed tactical nuclear missiles in Cuba, which would have been used to
stop an invasion force. The U.S. was poised to invade Cuba with 180,000 troops on October
29. If U.S. forces were hit with tactical nuclear weapons, Kennedy was sure to launch a
retaliatory nuclear strike. The Soviet leader saw that the Soviet Union and the United States
were headed toward nuclear war.
In his meeting with Dobrynin, Robert Kennedy offered the Soviets a secret deal: the United
States would withdraw its missiles from Turkey, but would not acknowledge this publicly.
The public announcement would follow the lines of Khrushchevs first letter. Khrushchev
accepted this offer, and on the morning of October 28 he announced that the Soviet Union
was withdrawing its missiles from Cuba in return for a U.S. promise not to invade the island.
From October 24 to November 20, U.S. defense forces were at their highest stage of alert just
short of actual war: DefCon 2. Even a small incident might have triggered a nuclear war.
Decisions based on inaccurate information (such as the false U.S. assumption that the Soviets
had not yet brought nuclear warheads to Cuba) could have been catastrophic. For this reason,
many observers have said that during the Cuban missile crisis the world came closer to the
brink of nuclear war than at any other time.
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Brenner, P The Cuban Missile Crisis: Three Perspectives

KEY TERMS
Communism - an economic system where the central government controls
economic decisions of businesses and citizens.
Propaganda - chiefly derogatory information, usually of a biased or misleading
nature, used to promote or publicize a particular political cause or point of view.
Capitalism - an economic system where supply and demand dictates economic
decisions.
Ideology - a system of ideas and ideals, esp. one that forms the basis of economic or
political theory and policy.
Quarantine - a condition of enforced isolation.
Revolution a drastic change that happens in a short period of time, effecting
political or social institutions, or the culture or economy of a country or region.
Depose to remove from office or power.
Mixed Economy - usually describes an economy that is capitalist, but with some
government control over limited areas of the economy.
Bay of Pigs - a bay on the southern coast of Cuba; the site of a CIA-backed operation
of anti-Castro Cuban ex-pats who landed in Cuba hoping to incite rebellion; the US
refused to back the men, and the mission was a disaster; the mission began under
President Eisenhower, and military leaders urged JFK to fulfill the mission; this was
JFKs first major foreign policy debacle and would deepen his distrust of the joint
chiefs.
EXCOMM - an abbreviation that stood for the Executive Committee of the National
Security Council; made up to describe the group of advisors -- key department heads
and Soviet experts -- who got together secretly to advise President Kennedy on his
course of action throughout this crisis; Bobby Kennedy was the leader of EXCOMM.
ICBM - An acronym for Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile, a weapon designed for
use against enemy cities and other stationary targets. ICBMs typically had a range of
more than 3,500 miles, so that if launched from the Soviet Union they could reach
targets in the United States, and vice versa. By the 1960s both the United States and
the Soviet Union had large numbers of these weapons armed with nuclear
warheads, thus leading to fears that much of the civilized world would be destroyed
if war between the two powers ever broke out.
MRBMs - medium-range ballistic missiles.
FROGs - short-range tactical nuclear weapons.

KEY PLAYERS
John F. Kennedy - president of the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis
Nikita Khrushchev - premier of the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis
Fidel Castro - Communist revolutionary; president of Cuba during the Cuban
Missile Crisis
Robert "Bobby" Kennedy - JFK's youngest brother and his attorney general;
known for his shrewdness and fierce loyalty to his brother
Kenneth O'Donnell - JFK's chief political advisor and scheduler
Robert "Bob" McNamara - JFK's Secretary of Defense
Anatoly Dobrynin The United States Soviet Ambassador
Colonel Oleg Penkovsky - Soviet informant who revealed to JFK plans and descriptions
of rocket launch sites in Cuba.
Joint Chiefs of Staff - the heads of each branch of the Armed Services; together they
advised JFK on military issues
Dean Rusk - JFK's Secretary of State

ACTIVITIES
ACTIVITY 1. Film analysis
Students watch the film Thirteen days, which is about the 13 days of the Cuban
Missile Crisis of 1962, seen from the perspective of the US political leadership.
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Students will then write a review of the film, in which they analyse the film based
upon its adherence to historical evidence and research. Students should cite specific
facts and sources to support their conclusions.
Students will also research the Internet and answer the following questions about
the film:
What seems accurate in the film? How can you assess this?

Is this film primarily entertainment or is it trying to recreate an historical
period accurately? How do you assess this?

How successful is this film as an entertainment and an historical representation?

How does this film explain the historical events and the experiences of
different groups at the time?

What techniques are used by the filmmaker to create a sense of an historical
time and place? Are they effective?

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IMDB website

ACTIVITY 2. Document analysis
Document 1: Herbert Blocks October 20, 1960 cartoon, What happens when
they run out of foreigners?

Content:
1. Who is the author of this cartoon?
2. When was it created?
3. What is the author describing; in other words, what is the authors subject?
4. How does the title of the cartoon help you to understand its meaning?
Perspective:
1. How does the author portray, or picture, the subject of this cartoon? In other
words, what is the authors perspective?
2. Does the author seem to have positive or negative feelings about the subject
of this cartoon? How can you tell?
3. How might the author have been trying to influence the way that you, the
reader, feel about the subject of this cartoon?
Context:
1. What was happening around the time when this cartoon was crated that
might have affects its content?
Corroboration and Significance:
1. Does this cartoon support or challenge what you already know or have
learned about its subject? If so, how?
2. What can this cartoon teach us about the past?
Conclusions:
1. From whose perspective, or point of view, was this cartoon created?
2. What is the message, or thesis, that the author is attempting to communicate
to the reader?

Document 2: CIA reference photograph of Soviet Medium Range Ballistic
Missile (SS-4) in Red Square, Moscow

1. What is pictured in the photo above? Why might pictures such as these have
deeply disturbed Americans?
2. Why do you think the Soviets would have made photographs like this public?

Document 3: Map showing the range of Russian missiles stationed in Cuba

1. What do you think this map shows?
2. How might a map like this have influenced how President Kennedy
responded to the growing missile crisis?
3. What would you have advised President Kennedy to do? Why?

ACTIVITY 3. Analysis of correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev
Students will read the following correspondence, which took place between
Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev between October 22 and 28, 1962.
Based on their reading, they will be prepared to answer the following in class
discussion:
What did Kennedy agree to do to end the crisis?
What did Khrushchev agree to do to end the crisis?
On balance, do you think either side won in the end? If so, which one, and why?

1. From a Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, October
22, 1962:
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba044.htm
In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the
one thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility that your
Government would not correctly understand the will and determination of the
United States in any given situation, since I have not assumed that you or any other
sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it
is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic
consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor....
It was in order to avoid any incorrect assessment on the part of your Government
with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took
place, the United States would do whatever must be done to protect its own security
and that of its allies.
...Despite this, the rapid development of long-range missile bases and other offensive
weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. I must tell you that the United States is
determined that this threat to the security of this hemisphere be removed. At the
same time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum
necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The
fact of this minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any
misjudgment on your part.
I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or
deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of
peaceful negotiation.

2. From a Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October
24, 1962:
You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather are setting forth an
ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use
force. Consider what you are saying!
And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What would it mean to agree to these
demands? It would mean guiding oneself in one's relations with other countries not
by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness. You are no longer appealing to reason,
but wish to intimidate us....
The Soviet Government considers that the violation of the freedom to use
international waters and international air space is an act of aggression which pushes
mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war. Therefore, the Soviet
Government cannot instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to
observe the orders of American naval forces blockading that Island. Our instructions
to Soviet mariners are to observe strictly the universally accepted norms of
navigation in international waters and not to retreat one step from them. And if the
American side violates these rules, it must realize what responsibility will rest upon
it in that case. Naturally we will not simply be bystanders with regard to piratical
acts by American ships on the high seas. We will then be forced on our part to take
the measures we consider necessary and adequate in order to protect our rights. We
have everything necessary to do so.

3. From a Telegram from the U.S. Department of State to the Embassy in the
Soviet Union, October 25, 1962:
I have received your letter of October 24, and I regret very much that you still do not
appear to understand what it is that has moved us in this matter. The sequence of
events is clear. In August there were reports of important shipments of military
equipment and technicians from the Soviet Union to Cuba. In early September I
indicated very plainly that the United States would regard any shipment of offensive
weapons as presenting the gravest issues. After that time, this Government received
the most explicit assurance from your Government and its representatives, both
publicly and privately, that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba....
In reliance on these solemn assurances I urged restraint upon those in this country
who were urging action in this matter at that time. And then I learned beyond doubt
what you have not denied--namely, that all these public assurances were false and
that your military people had set out recently to establish a set of missile bases in
Cuba. I ask you to recognize clearly, Mr. Chairman, that it was not I who issued the
first challenge in this case, and that in the light of this record these activities in Cuba
required the responses I have announced.
I repeat my regret that these events should cause a deterioration in our relations. I
hope that your Government will take the necessary action to permit a restoration of
the earlier situation.

4. From a Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of
State, October 26, 1962:
You have now proclaimed piratical measures, which were employed in the Middle
Ages, when ships proceeding in international waters were attacked, and you have
called this "a quarantine" around Cuba. Our vessels, apparently, will soon enter the
zone which your Navy is patrolling. I assure you that these vessels, now bound for
Cuba, are carrying the most innocent peaceful cargoes. Do you really think that we
only occupy ourselves with the carriage of so-called offensive weapons, atomic and
hydrogen bombs? Although perhaps your military people imagine that these
[cargoes] are some sort of special type of weapon, I assure you that they are the
most ordinary peaceful products.
Consequently, Mr. President, let us show good sense. I assure you that on those
ships, which are bound for Cuba, there are no weapons at all. The weapons which
were necessary for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not want to say that
there were not any shipments of weapons at all. No, there were such shipments. But
now Cuba has already received the necessary means of defense.
I don't know whether you can understand me and believe me. But I should like to
have you believe in yourself and to agree that one cannot give way to passions; it is
necessary to control them. And in what direction are events now developing? If you
stop the vessels, then, as you yourself know, that would be piracy. If we started to do
that with regard to your ships, then you would also be as indignant as we and the
whole world now are. One cannot give another interpretation to such actions,
because one cannot legalize lawlessness. If this were permitted, then there would be
no peace, there would also be no peaceful coexistence. We should then be forced to
put into effect the necessary measures of a defensive character to protect our
interest in accordance with international law. Why should this be done? To what
would all this lead? [....]
If assurances were given by the President and the Government of the United States
that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain
others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet, this would
immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that
he and the Government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would
appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of
armaments would disappear, since, if there is no threat, then armaments are a
burden for every people. Then, too, the question of the destruction, not only of the
armaments which you call offensive, but of all other armaments as well, would look
different....
Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will
declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, are not carrying any armaments. You would
declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not
support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then
the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.
Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive, piratical actions,
which you have declared the USA intends to carry out in international waters, would
lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man simply cannot agree with this,
cannot recognize your right to such actions.
If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident
that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you
have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then,
Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which
you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that
knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that
even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be
necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to explain to
you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries
dispose.

5. From a Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October
26, 1962: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/msc_cuba091.asp
You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by
sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us; our
sentries patrol back and forth and see each other. Do you consider, then, that you
have the right to demand security for your own country and the removal of the
weapons you call offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? You have placed
destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us.
How then can recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such
unequal relations between our great states? This is irreconcilable....
I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means
which you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make this
pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the
effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of
the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach
agreement as to the period of time needed by you and by us to bring this about. And,
after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on
the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made....
We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of the peoples of
Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidence in their security, will make a
statement within the framework of the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet
Government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and
sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey,
not to make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it
would also restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey,
either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey's other
neighboring states.
The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework
of the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will
respect the inviolability of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to
interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Cuba itself or make its territory
available as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and will also restrain those who
might contemplate committing aggression against Cuba, either from the territory of
the United States or from the territory of Cuba's other neighboring states....

6. From a Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet
Union, October 27, 1962:
I have read your letter of October 26 with great care and welcomed the statement of
your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be
done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all
weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under
effective United Nations arrangements.
Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York
instructions that will permit them to work out this week andin cooperation with
the Acting Secretary General and your representativean arrangement for a
permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of
October 26. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposalswhich seem
generally acceptable as I understand themare as follows:
1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate
United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable
safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.
2. We, on our part, would agreeupon the establishment of adequate arrangements
through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these
commitments(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and
(b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and I am confident that other
nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.
If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we
should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world
within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions
would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other
armaments", as proposed in your second letter which you made public....
But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in
Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective
international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this
discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of
European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban
crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can
quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26.

7. From a Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October
28, 1962:
I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October
27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the
part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western
Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us
to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.
It is for this reason that we instructed our officersthese means as I had already
informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officersto take appropriate
measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle
them, and to return them to the Soviet Union....

ASSESSMENT STRATEGIES
A range of different methods of assessing the students work will be used for this
unit.

Informal assessments will incorporate discussion within the classroom, fostering
students analysis and discussion of their work, gauging what they have learnt.

The formal assessment will involve collecting and grading the range of tasks that
students complete during classes. These will include a film analysis, a
primary/secondary source document analysis, an oral presentation, and a final
research essay.

The oral presentation and research essay will be graded using specifically designed
rubrics, which are listed under the relevant assessment tasks.

Assessment tasks
1. ORAL PRESENTATION
Students work in small groups (4-6) and research on the Internet to answer key
questions about the Cuban Missile Crisis. They collate their findings in a
presentation format. They then present their findings as a group to the class as a 5-8
minute oral presentation.
1. Identify the key people, locations, and events relevant to the Cuban Missile
Crisis.
a. Who were the key players?
b. Why did the Soviets place nuclear missiles in Cuba? Why were Cuba and
the Soviet Union allies?
c. How was the crisis resolved? Why did President Kennedy decide against
using military force?

2. Analyse the origins and significance of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the
broader context of the Cold War.
a. Why was there tension between the United States and Soviet Union?
b. What impact did the Cuban Missile Crisis have on the rest of the Cold
War?

3. Analyse the role that espionage played during the Crisis.

a. How important was the use of espionage for the Americans? For the
Russians?

b. What secrets did JFK gain from Soviet informant, Colonel Oleg
Penkovsky?

c. Would the outcome of the Crisis have been different if JFK didnt have
access to secret intelligence via Penkovsky and other sources?
4. Analyse the role that the media and propaganda played during the
Crisis.

a. What role did the media play in the Cuban Missile Crisis?

b. Why did JFK use television instead of diplomatic channels to give his
ultimatum of maximum force to the Soviets?

c. Why did JFK insist that the Soviets not make public the fact that the U.S.
withdrew their missiles from Turkey?
5. Evaluate the decision-making process and draw lessons from the Crisis.
a. Did the United States make the right decision? How could things have
gone wrong had they acted differently during the Crisis?
b. If faced with a similar situation as President Kennedy and his advisors,
what would you have done?
c. What lessons about decision-making can we draw from the Crisis?

2. Research essay
Students write a research essay from a standpoint covered in the unit, correctly referencing
primary sources, and incorporating key terminology in their arguments.
Students choose from one of these essay topics:
The USA won the propaganda battle. Discuss.
In your essay you must include reference to at least 3 primary sources. Your essay
must also include accurate use of the following terms within the context of the
ideological conflict between the USA and USSR: ideology, power, racism,
communism, and capitalism.
The Soviet Union won the propaganda battle. Discuss.
In your essay you must include reference to at least 3 primary sources. Your essay
must also include accurate use of the following terms within the context of the
ideological conflict between the USA and USSR: ideology, power, racism,
communism, and capitalism.

Who was responsible for the most dangerous period in human history?

In your essay you must include reference to at least 3 primary sources. Explain with
reference to accurate use of the following terms within the context of the ideological
conflict between the USA and USSR: ideology, power, racism, communism, and
capitalism.

Answer these three questions in an essay:

What mistakes did Cuba, Soviet Union and United States make during the build-up to
and during the Cuban Missile Crisis?

At what point were tensions between capitalism and communism the highest?

What kept the United States & the Soviet Union from becoming involved in a nuclear
war?

capitalism.

What do historians mean when they say the Cuban Missile Crisis was the most
dangerous moment in human history? Why was this moment so incredibly dangerous?
After all, werent the United States and the Soviet Union only having an argument
about a weak little country called Cuba?

capitalism.
ASSESSMENT RUBRICS
Task: Each student will perform research on assigned questions and present their answers as
part of a small group (of four) presentation.
KNOWLEDGE Distinguished Proficient Intermediate Novice
Knowledge of the
principal features
of a post-war
conflict
The
presentation
demonstrates a
depth of
knowledge of
the principal
features of the
Cuban Missile
The presentation
demonstrates an
above average
knowledge of the
principal features
of the Cuban
Missile Crisis
The presentation
demonstrates
some knowledge
of the principal
features of the
Cuban Missile
Crisis
The presentation
demonstrates
little knowledge
of the principal
features of the
Cuban Missile
Crisis
Crisis
Knowledge of the
propagation and
maintenance of
ideological views
both domestically
and beyond their
borders;
specifically the use
of media,
espionage, and
physical force
The
presentation
displays a vast
knowledge of
the ways the
competing
ideologies were
propagated
through the
media,
espionage and
physical force
The presentation
displays an above
average
knowledge of the
ways the
competing
ideologies were
propagated
through the media,
espionage and
physical force
The presentation
displays some
knowledge of the
ways the
competing
ideologies were
propagated
through the
media,
espionage and
physical force
The presentation
displays little to
no knowledge of
the ways the
competing
ideologies were
propagated
through the
media,
espionage and
physical force
Knowledge of the
outcome of the
competition
between
ideologies; for
example, military
threats,
propaganda wars,
isolationism
The
presentation
demonstrates a
high level of
understanding
of the Crisis
outcomes
The presentation
demonstrates an
above average
level of
understanding of
the Crisis
outcomes
The presentation
demonstrates
some level of
understanding of
the Crisis
outcomes
The presentation
demonstrates
little to no level
of understanding
of the Crisis
outcomes

Task: Students will write a research essay on one of the assigned topics regarding
the Cuban Missile Crisis.
SKILLS
Use key concepts
relevant to the
selected historical
conflict; such as
ideology, power,
racism,
communism,
capitalism
The essay is
very effective
in its use of
relevant key
historical
concepts while
building its
argument
The essay is
effective in its
use of relevant
key historical
concepts while
building its
argument
The essay is
somewhat
effective in its
use of relevant
key historical
concepts while
building its
argument
The essay is
ineffective in its
use of relevant key
historical concepts
while building its
argument
Analyse written
and visual evidence
The essay
demonstrates
an excellent
ability to
analyse written
and visual
evidence
The essay
demonstrates a
better than
average ability
to analyse
written and
visual evidence
The essay
demonstrates
some ability to
analyse written
and visual
evidence
The essay
demonstrates an
inability to analyse
written and visual
evidence
Synthesise
evidence to draw
conclusions
The essay
involves a high
level of
synthesis of
evidence and
draws
The essay
involves a
medium-high
level of synthesis
of evidence and
mostly draws
The essay
involves some
synthesis of
evidence and
draws some
satisfactory
The essay doesnt
involve synthesis
of evidence and
doesnt draw
convincing
conclusions
convincing
conclusions
convincing
conclusions
conclusions

REFERENCES
http://www.vcaa.vic.edu.au/Documents/vce/history/history-sd.pdf
Flash Points: Searching for Modern Lessons in the Cuban Missile Crisis:
http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/23/flash-points-searching-for-modern-lessons-in-the-
cuban-missile-crisis/
The Missiles of October: The Cuban Missile Crisis
http://edsitement.neh.gov/sites/edsitement.neh.gov/files/worksheets/MissileCrisis.pdf
On the Brink: From the Bay of Pigs to the Cuban Missile Crisis
http://lib.colostate.edu/research/history/11.9HOTOn_The_Brink.pdf
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Three Perspectives A Simulation
http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/lais/resources/Brenner-CMC.doc
How to create rubrics University of Connecticut, USA (Based on Introduction to Rubrics:
An Assessment Tool to Save Grading Time, Convey Effective Feedback, and Promote Student
Learning by Stevens and Levi 2005; Assessing Academic Programs, by Huba and Freed
2000)
http://www.assessment.uconn.edu/docs/How_to_Create_Rubrics.pdf
VCE History Study Design, 2013
http://www.vcaa.vic.edu.au/Documents/vce/history/history-sd.pdf
Medias Role in the Cuban Missile Crisis
http://www.paleycenter.org/p-cuban-missile-crisis

Senior Secondary Unit of Work - Justin Olmstead

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