Psychological Ingury 1994, Vol 5, No.3, 260-271 Copyright 1994 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc AUTHOR’S RESPONSE Interpretationism, Pragmatism, Realism, and Other Ideologies Willis F. Overton Temple University Shusterman fairly captures the intent of my target article when he describes it as a “picture of a deep and wide-ranging paradigm change that the natural and ‘human sciences seem, gradually and with some reluc- tance, to be undergoing.” As Shusterman writes tis change is, in tur, “away from a foundatonalst, me~ chanical, atomistic, nondirectional objectivism [and] .- involves a more organic, relational, and devetop- rental (or directional) perspective.” With these central features of the target article, Shusterman has litle dif ficulty. However, he goes on to argue that pragmatism, in contrast to the interpretationism suggested in the article, provides a most adequate philosophical context for bringing rational order to this paradigm change. ‘The debate that Shusterman opens in his advocacy of pragmatism and in his critique of interpretationism is, in effect, the same debate that many psychologists are aware of asthe debate between those who advocate a contextualist worldview and those who advocate an organismic worldview (Overton, 1984, 19916, 1991c) a the rational frame within which inquiry ean most audequately proceed. Incontemporary American philos- ophy, the same form of the debate is evident in the pragmatist argument of Richard Rorty (1993), who eschews universals and understands traditional episte ological and metaphysical concerns as beyond r20¥- ‘ery, and of Hilary Putnam (1990), who argues the value of idealized conceptual schemes as a necessary feature of understanding. The debate is also central (0 the stance that post-modernism has taken in opposition to modernism and the stance that skeptical, post-modern thought has taken in opposition to affirmative post- modern thought, as described in my article. Iti, of ‘course, impossible in any sense to fully ener into this debate in these few pages. However, a few points should be made. Asprologue,ithas to beclearly understood that there are vocabulary issues that often play a central, if con- fusing, role in the debate. Several terms that seem on fist blush to define a point of view tar out on further ‘examination to enter into both sides of the debate. Pragmatism, lke realism, and other such central con- cepts draw their meaning from the interpretative whole or system of which they become a part. Thus, both Rorty and Putnam call themselves pragmatist, but Rorty’s pragmatism is committed to an underlying nominalism and physicalism, whereas Putnam’s evokes an idealized normative structure. Given this, vocabulary problem, in a sense a part of my answer to Shusterman’s critique is that I can indeed reasonably accept a pragmatist approach, and, infact, Ihave done so in the past (e.g., Overton, 1991d; Overton & Reese, 1981). However, on analysis, it appears that ‘Shusterman’s Dewey-oriented pragmatism is closer to Rorty’s and that the pragmatism T would advocate is closer to Putnam's. ‘The variety of pragmatism that T would advocate ‘ight be called an interpretative pragmatism on the analogue to Putnam's internal pragmatism. Itis a prag- ‘matism in which reason cannot be naturalized, as both Shusterman and Rorty would naturalize reason. In @ ‘elated fashion, I suggested inthe past (Overton, 1984) thatthe position I describe could be termed contextual- ism as long as itis recognized as being framed by the categories of organismic contextualism rather than the categories of mechanistic contextualism. This latter point also speaks to Beilin’s mistaken impression that I do not consider contextualism. Indeed, I have on several occasions discussed contextualism, and much of it I find appealing. However, for reasons that I have already discussed (see, especially, Overton 1984, 1991¢)—in particular, contextualism’s dispersive rather than integrative dialectical position—I believe that contextualism functions best as a conceptual scheme when it is aligned with organismic categories. (On the other hand, I should also note that my organi- cism, although being a sort of Hegelian approach, is the specific sort that eschews the “absolute” of Hegel's system, Central to the debate as framed by Shusterman and to all other forms of the debate is the question of “organization,” whether concepts such as “system, ceptual scheme,” the “normative,” the “idealized,” “synthesis,” and “reason” are (o enter the arena of inquiry as equal partners with concepts such as “frag-AUTHOR'S RESPONSE, ments;"“elemens,"“causes,"“conten,"the “individ- ual." the “particular,” “analysis.” and “observation " Chandler and Carpendale’s discussion invokes the specter of a highly pessimistic form of post-modern thought that argues thatthe former class of concepts are not categorical and enter the debate only to obscure. Their discussion hints ata kind of consensual progres- sivism in which “the tru isthe mostrecentconsensual agreement reached on the nature of the true. This posi tionisitselfclose wo Pierce's pragmatism. However, the popularity of the skeptical form of the post-modem argument is not at issue, nor is the question of the number of people who have heard of skeptical and affirmative post-modem positions at issue. What is at issue is the question of whether all variants of post- modernism (and of pragmatism as well) are not them- selves general systems of thought or conceptual schemes, To put the matter directly, are not the prag- tmatists and the post-moderists offering an epstemol- ‘gy while denying that epistemology plays any role in knowledge? Ifthe reader decides that these are indeed systems of thought and systems of thought tha expic- ity suppress reason as an equal partner in the inguiry process, then itis a rather direet movement to the recognition that each ofthese positions operates within an ideology that spits reason off from observation. Further, itis only ahalf-step beyond this recognition to acknowledging thatthe ideology itself directs the in- ‘qirer to find understanding notin the reflective crti- cism of commonsense experience, as other perspectives onthe nature of science would claim, but incommonsenseexperienceisel. Butths ideological- rethodological advice is virtually identical with the advice offered by positivism, and, if this is so, itis difficul to discern any profit that has occurred in the ‘movement away from the foundationalism of objectiv- ism, Positivism prescribed that inquiry proceed by the analysis of commonsense experience until we arive at the bedrock foundation of fixed, stable, observable facts. The version of pragmatism offered by Shustr- rman and the post-modemists prescribes that inquiry proceed by the analysis of commonsense experience ‘wherever it should go, as long sit goes tothe physical and the particular. Both are ideologies, and both ideol- ogies prescribe analysis over synthesis, observation over reason. Tt should be acknowledged thatthe pragmatist often audresses this criticism of ahidden ideology and denies that any such second-order scheme is being invoked Instead, the pragmatist, or at least this varity of prag- ‘matist, claims that following everyday, commonsense experience as beea shown to work, and pragmatism is founded on the assertion that truth is whatever works. The critical reply here centers on an examination of how the decision of what “works” is arrived at. Rerty (1993), for example, following the early pragmatists with their evolutionary naturalistic focus, claimed that the Darwinian evolutionary vocabulary has been effec- tive, and, therefore, we may use random variation and natural selection, a these are encoded in “adaptation” as a metric of evaluation concerning decisions about ‘what is “better.” But this is problematic, at best, be- cause the Darwinian evolutionary vocabulary has itself not gone unchallenged, and reflective criticism sug- ‘gests that this vocabulary emerges as much from a second-order conceptual scheme (Lewontin, 1994) as from the commonsense world it claims to explain. Shusterman worries about the “universal” of herme- neutic universatism. Chandler and Carpendale, and Schotnick, worry about “imperial” organicism. Each is, ‘4 manifestation of the same worry—the worry over introducing universals as categorical. The fear here is of both the movement to a level of reflected criticism and that a kind of neo-Platonic universalist idealism and essentialism would consequently be reintroduced. But this fear is only appropriate to the extent thatthe critic is operating in asplitether-or ontological frame- work, In such a frame, either the particular or the universal constitutes the real in ontological terms. In such a frame either ideas/reason (forms) ae privileged as foundational, or matter/observation is privileged as foundational. My argument i that itis unproductive to continue such a splitting. Both ideas and matter, both reason and observation, both universal and particular, bboth form and content constitute the real within the relational system that I suggest. Here the ontology is inherently relational. In the fea ofthe universal, expressed by pragmatist, by post-modernist, and by realist as well there is the thread ofthe ancient ontological issue of idealism ver- sus materialism, Classically, tis issue became critical ‘with Descartes’s introduction ofthe split between the subjective and the objective. From this split, the ques- tion arises as to which real (subjective ideas orobjective matter) and which method for arriving at this real (uibjectve reason or objective observations) are to be asserted as foundational and which as derived. The ‘materialists' claim, as filtered through anempiricistand positivistepistemology (ic, observation asthe one and. only method of knowledge building), was that observa- tion of particulars would allow reduction tothe material and that this constitutes the real (.e, the foundation, the nondivisible—not Beilin’s real as the actual, manifest, fr commonsense world). Here, ideas, forms, reason, and other universals are generalizations inductively ‘generated from this base. The idealist claim (e.g., asin Plato) was the opposing perspective, the “or” of “ei- ther-or." Ideas or forms constitute the real, and reason is the method for arriving at these forms. Here, obser- ‘ations constitute merely individual appearances ofthe universal forms. Today, there are few who seriously advance the essentialism of Platonism (see, however, 261‘OVERTON Katz, 1990), Further, although there continues to be a ‘materialist program defended by metaphysical and sci- entific realists such as Beilin, there have increasingly been attempts to heal the Cartesian split and to move the debate beyond these dichotomous cither-or ap- proaches. ‘The pragmatist ideology is, in fact, just such an attempt to heal the Cartesian spit. The problem, how- ever, with many varieties of pragmatism (not including ‘Putniam’s)is thatthe splitis healed by denial. Both ideas, and matter are initially dismissed as fundamentally irrelevant to knowledge building generally and to sci- entific knowledge building specifically. How, then, will science pursue its traditional aim of arriving at systematized knowledge? Perhaps this aim will itself have tobe abandoned. Thisis often the apparent project ‘of post-modem pragmatist. But, before this occurs, the strategy is to follow (and “follow” invariably means “analyze”) everyday, commonsense observation or ev- ceryday, commonsense experience wherever this takes us, Ifsystem or order emerges, s0 be it; if system does not emerge, so be it also. From this strategic perspec- tive, the pragmatist becomes simply an observer who watches the game being played out. ‘There are several consequences of the pragmatist ‘maneuver of denial. First, note again thatthe strategy is, in fact, a strategy. There is nothing in commonsense ‘observation or everyday experience that says we should ‘or must follow commonsense observation inthe pursuit of knowledge. Following commonsense or everyday experience wherever it takes us isan ideal, a universal, and it may or may not have some value associated with it. The ideal is not self-evident and can certainly be ‘questioned with respect to issues of legitimacy. These. issues, as well as the ideal, appear to entail the use of some conceptual Scheme, some system of rules, some idea, some second-order system. But, itis here thatthe initial healing of the Cartesian spit by denial begins to ‘break down. It becomes apparent that the suppression ‘of form or idea or reason is simply that—a suppression, that comes back to haunt the suppresser. It is also exactly at this point that Shusterman's argument against my introducing a “monolithic” position of uni- vversal interpretationism begins to fail. For what is prag- ‘matism itself but a monolithic position, a universalist position? Shusterman prefers—and he will give rea- sons for this preference—his monolithic system over mine, as Scholnick, Chandler and Carpendale, and Beilin prefer theirs over mine. Fach of us has a system of reasons, a set of ideals, that we will put forward 10 support the legitimacy of our own universal system, but each of them is a universal system. Some of these systems of reasons will involve the paradoxical asser- tion that there are no reasons, no rationality, no ideas, But this is dealing with the Cartesian split by denial Leaving aside rhetorical scare words like monolithic, 262 imperial, and, Beilin’s favorit, radical, the question is not whether universal systems are introduced —there is certainly a coherent argument available to suggest that we all function within some second-order universal system (even if tis a system that denies system)—the ‘question is about the kind of universal system. ‘The second part of Shusterman's argument against imterpretationism i tha, if everything i interpretation, imterpretation becomes vacuous (i. “tne meaning of ‘a term isa function of what it opposes or excludes") This part of the argument would have some validity if were making the claim, for example, that everything the child does should be termed interpretation. This, of course, is not the claim being made. The perspective being advanced operates fundamentally atthe epste- ‘ological level, and, at this level, its virtually identical s more familiarly known as a claim of sm (my constructivism, not Beilin’s con- structvist realism, which, as I discuss later, is prob- ably no constructivism at all, but a variant of ‘metaphysical and scientific realism dressed in con- structivist vocabulary). In the arenas ofthe philoso- phy and history of science, the claim is no more than Hanson's (1958) claim that all data are theory laden ‘or Kuhn's claim that all science is paradigm driven, AAt the epistemological level, the term does, in fact, exclude @ whole class of positions—namely, those positions, such as Beilin’s, that claim that interpreta- tion can be spit off from observation and perhaps Shusterman's own argument that interpretation can be split off from “understanding.” ‘The further claim that Ihave made is that epistemo- logical schemes of this sort—second-order issues con- ‘cerning the value ofan interpretationist ora pragmatist ‘or a realist stance—have a contextual or framing rela- tion to concepts used to explore any specific domain (ist-order issues). Thus, beginning (for purposes of exploration and not as an ontological stance) from an interpretationist epistemological point of view, when T explore the nature of the child's development, produce aan understanding of the child not as a processor of symbols (information-processing model) and not as a random generator of responses (behavioral model), but rather as an active, organized system thatin some sense constructs its known world of percepts, cogni- tions, feelings, beliefs, and desires. None of this precludes me from inquiry into differentiated do- mains of perception, classification, memory, affect, and so forth. Nor does this stance preclude me from considering inguiry to be “revisable, perspectival, partial, selective, and active” (Shusterman). Thus, neither Shusterman's general argument about the potential vacuousness of the concept nor his specific argument about this as applied to inquiry into human cognition and personality development seems to me to be very defensible,[AUTHOR'S RESPONSE Shusterman’s argument about the potential vacuows- ness of the concept of interpretationism is, T would ‘again sugges, framed by his pragmatism and the ma- newver of denial aimed at healing the Cartesian split ‘The strategy of healing by denying both ideas and matter compresses the playing field of inquiry into a single dimension—that of everyday experience. To put this another way, it tiesto naturalize reason. Further, this everyday experience comes very close to being {identified as something like immediate experience or direct experience or even observational experience (and here again the pragmatist’s denial is not quite complet, ast frequently allows observation and phy’- icalism at least a quasi-privileged status). Thus, ‘Shusterman can assert only an ordinary-expetience ar- ‘gument against interpretationism—that “we can often understand language without any special act of inter- pretation” and therefore that interpretation “not only distorts the ordinary meaning of interpretation for no productive purpose—it also is false to our actual expe- Fience.” In this narrow arena, Shusterman’s argument holds some apparent validity. Once again, however, it should be noted that limiting inquiry to ordinary expe- rience flies in the face of other understandings that claim inquiry entails the reflective criticism of every- day experience or even inthe face of claims that reflec- tive reason is as much a part of everyday experience as is analytic observation. After the field is expanded to include both everyday, observational experience and reflective experience, the situation changes. After ob- servation and reason are placed into a relational con- text, neither is foundational, and each defines and is defined by the other. Focusing on one or the other at any given point in inquiry then defines an epistemolog- ical point of view, not an ontological, fixed real. In this relational conten, interpretation and understanding are contrastive, bipolar concepts, much like Hegel's con- ceptof ‘master and slave,” in which freedom is defined by constraint, constraint is defined by freedom, and ceach maintains its own identity. In this way, inquiry roves fromahealing by denial to abealing by adopting what could be termed a systematic contextualism or an interpretative pragmatism. Tn my final comment on Shusterman’s appeal to pragmatism, T must note that a variant of his own argument concerning vacuousness might be advanced against itself, When psychological positions that vary 48 widely in other ways a do those ofthe Skinnerians, information-provessing theorists, social learning theo- Fists, post modemists, and Beiln's reading of Piaget not to mention philosophers of different views, such as Shusterman himself, Rorty, Putnam, Margolis, and even that leading contemporary realist philosopher, Donald Davidson—all find pragmatism (nee con- textualism) appealing, “this notion becomes synony- ‘mous with all human experience and thus loses any real specific meaning of its own” (Shusterman). Kessen (1984) commented about American psychology in a fashion that capture the spirit and impact of this non- systematic, noninterpretative version of pragmatism: Psychologists often make obeisance towards the no- tion of a summary integration, a grand synthesis that will gather all the particles intoa single patter. Butthe historical fact is that analysis begets further analysis. ‘The zest for analysis and for particulars may lie close to the center of American psychology’s unspoken creed. (p. 11) ‘This creed often goes under the name pragmatism. Scholnick’s comments seem to me to be a kind of concrete instantiation of Shusterman’s pragmatism along with the addition of some post-modern thought. In my target article, I argue for the positive value of a telational model that refuses to suppress contrastive terms; fora monism that includes each term of a bipolar relational matrix as equal partners; for including as legitimate categories of knowing synthesis as well as analysis, universals as well as particulars. In all ofthis, appeal for unity in diversity, Scholnick reads only an articulation of dualism and particularistic detached ploys. Tn the end, Scholnick argues that we need “focusing con the primacy of relations.” But isn’t that exactly what Thad proposed throughout my article (see also Overton, 1991c, 191d, 1993, 1994)? Not according to Scholnick’s reading. I think the reason for this is that her reading is framed by categories of the Rorty-type pragmatism and that the effect of this conceptual scheme isto see” only particulars. Or, as I suggested. cearlier, readings such as this are framed by categories that reject reason as categorical and attempt to natural- ie it. For Scholnick, relational means the particular, actual, everyday experiences of two physical objects, ‘brought together to form a relation. This reading nec- essarly leads to the insistence that reason is obscure and that what we need is the careful observation of actual individuals in relations and the “exchange, ne- ‘otiation, collaboration, or interweaving” that takes pplace in these actual relations. ‘But why must this definition in terms of actual rela- tions be the preferred meaning of relation? Why not understand relational as involving virtual as well as. actual relations? The answer again is that Scholnick's understanding of relationalis defined within the frame- ‘work of pragmatist categories that themselves assert that knowledge proceeds only from particular to partic- ular and only at the level of the actual, Within this frame, systems or universals can only be, at best, em- pitical generalizations that emerge as inductions from. the aggregation of particulars. As a consequence, within this frame the observation of particulars is de- 263oveRTON finitive. I would again claim, however, that this com- pression of all legitimate knowing onto the plane of observation is exactly the kind of splitting of reason and. observation that has led to the sort of dead end for inquiry that Chandler and Carpendale worry about in their comments. ‘The concept ofthe relational matrix is central to the perspective I tried to articulate inthe target article. To ‘the extent that relational matrix becomes reworked into ‘apragmatist moldas something thatsentirely captured by observation or everyday, “objective” experience ‘without benefit of reason, the whole perspective be- comes transformed into something never intended. Let ime, therefore, try to clarify this concept on a somewhat. more concrete level. As Winnicott once noted, from ‘one point of view or perspective we may put forth the claim that there is no infant and no mother—there is Just the infant-mother matrix. From this perspective, there is a virtual relationship (ic, the infant-mother matrix), and this has the potential to become an actual relationship. However, that it isnot yet an actual rela- tionship does not stop us from understanding the initial tunity as relational. Now, the perspective I am referring to here isthe infants perspective (or our organization of the infant's perspective). The infant’s perspective does not deny that there is another perspective— namely, the objective observer's perspective. Nor does itdeny that, from the objective observer's perspective, there is both a clearly identifiable infant and a clearly identifiable mother. Some investigators will be intr- ested in building knowledge about development from the subject’ perspective. I would argue, for example, as suggested in the target article itself, that this is what Piaget does. On the other hand, others may aim to build knowledge about development from the observer's pe spective, as, for example, Vygotsky tends to do. The former emphasizes the child constructing its actual relations out of virtual relations. The latter emphasizes. that there are actual relations waiting there to be con- structed. It is only when “relational” is held to be the {inherent property of one or another of these perspec- tives that splitting and suppression occur. To put this relational issue another way, itis only ‘when a “nothing but" frame is imposed on the alterna- ive perspectives—which themselves define a rela tional matrix ata broader level of system—that splitting and suppression occur. I can understand that, from Scholnick's objectivist point of view, the ideas of knower and known, mind and body, and so forth relational seem to assume the “reality of dualism. From my interpretationist perspective, however, these terms are related as two aspects of the same unity, not as two dichotomous entities. As long as each of us ‘maintains that these are two reciprocal perspectives, no significant issue arises. However, the Rorty-type prag- ‘matism that frames Scholnick’s discussion isa “noth- 264 ing but” frame that celebrates the particular by denying the universal, ‘Scholnick’s analysis of what I offer as several inter- related aspects of an integrated system—what she in- terprets as an detached, unrelated series of strategies—is illustrative of the problem. My funda- ‘mental reply to her critique is that, in a world designed to house nothing but particulars, there is nothing but particulars. I presented the reversible figure to illustrate the unity of the system that can be examined from alternative perspectives. Scholnick’s particularistic ‘frame understands this as a dichotomy that suppresses ‘one term. In describing cycle and arrow as a relational unity composed of two aspects, I was again emphasiz- ing the systematic qualities evident in the reversible figure. Scholnick’s particularistic frame sees this as a discrete ploy that identifies my “imperialist” strategy. ‘Then, as [attempt to elaborate the same theme in terms ‘of the double aspect of mind and body, Scholnick ‘observes me “toying” with a possible third, again di crete, approach. Finally, when I elaborate all of the foregoing in terms of the categories of systematic di leetics, Scholnick sees yet another unrelated strategy. ‘This casting of what I offer as interrelated aspects of a system into a particularistic frame that finds only discrete elements is not limited to Scholnick’s sum- ‘mary statement, For example, although I specifically do not claim biological essentialism and would be ‘opposed to any form of it because it represents exactly the split I find to be counterproductive, Scholnick claims this essentialism for the Arrow of Time meta- ‘hor. Further, she seems to identify the Arrow of Time, metaphor with a specific, discrete mental image of an arrow. I believed that I had gone to extensive lengths in the target article to acknowledge that an arrow is too simple an image; that the Arrow metaphor, in fact, is best thought of as a relation among nonclosed cycles (Gpirals); that this metaphor itself is framed by the broader organic metaphor, thatthe organic metaphor as ‘a whole captures both the directional, ireversible fea- tures of the Arrow metaphor as well as the “transfor- ‘mational nature of change, toward increasing complexity,” which Scholnick desires; and that, when cycle is split off and treated as a closed circle, the ‘mechanical categories come to the fore. Interestingly, ‘Scholnick sees none of this, although Santostefano does. ner final closing statement, Scholnick begins from a perspectivist position in suggesting that different tion and integration are not the only ways to account for interconnection. I would certainly agree with that. However, she then finishes by reverting tothe “nothing ‘but” pragmatist frame. Itis in this frame thatthe asser- tion is made that observational particulars may “better describe” both roots and routes. Why “better” and why “describe” and why not “provide the alternative per-AUTHOR'S RESPONSE, spective?” I believe the answer ies as much in the categories of pragmatism as in the world of actual relations. Chandler and Carpendale's comments are marked primarily by their pessimism and even depression that issue from an enmeshment in the skepticism, relativ- ism, and nihilism that are the fruits of the skeptical versions of post-modern thought. As this form of post- modernism progressively seeks out and attempts 10 estroy any vestige of constraint that might possibly be seen asa limit on absolute individual freedom, it nec- cessarly denies order, community, unity, connected- ness. The consequence of this search-and-destroy operation is that post-modernism progressively marches forward toward the anarchy and chaos of the detached, the isolated, the fragmented, the disinte- grated individual and group. The outcome of a com- mitment to this ine of thought can hardly be anything other than depression. Inthe context of this pessimism and depression, itis important to recognize that skeptical post-modernism {saline of thought, not an empirical necessity. Itis only if reason is completely collapsed into observation that depression becomes unavoidable. Santostefano, in his commentary, notes that the organic conceptual scheme operates as a lens for pecring through and understand- ing cognition, personality development, and change. Post-modemism, or any other conceptual scheme or worldview, is also ike a lens. Although we may be fated as humans to always wear one or another type of lens, we choose the type we wear. A potentially liber- ating option, after ths is recognized, is to acknowledge skeptical post-modernism's unhealthy, unhappy, and unproductive consequences and discard it oF to intro- duce modifications that predict a more hopeful and optimistic direction. Unfortunately, this option is un- available tothose who believe that skeptical, post-mod- em concepts represent a direct description of nature, ‘because reason, hope, optimism, anddirectionalleside beyond direct observation. Skeptical, post-modern thought—much like pragmatism—deploysits rhetoric to persuade us that it offers a lensfre vision and that reason is to be disdained because reason clouds this freedom and imposes distorting constraints. ‘Chandler and Carpendale nicely capture the voice of this persuasive rhetoric when they warn against opt- ‘ism and claim tat, on the observational grounds of a sampling of the psychological literature, they exper- ence nothing but pessimism concerning changes in fundamental conceptual schemes. Not surprisingly, they do not sample the same literature that Santostefano describes in much more optimistic terms in his com- ‘mentary. In Chandler and Carpendale’s post-modern voice, a wide arena of scientfic-knowledge activi- ties—from geology to heat dynamics, from cognitive linguistics to neurobiology and evolutionary biology, Which have been arguably moving toward an organic narrative—become simply split off and distanced as irrelevant to our own discipline. Similarly, several phil- ‘osophical arguments generally thought of by the phil ‘osophical community as being quite central to science become in the skeptical, post-modern voice adistanced “philosophical fringe.” Then, having dismissed any possible “reasons” for optimism, the complaint is heard that there is an absence of sufficient reasons for opti- mism, Upon this stage so constructed, there is then assembled observations of the lack of “real evidence” for change. Chandler and Carpendale also capture skeptical post-modernism’s rhetorical voice as it would dismiss the Arrow of Time or any other universals as a “bad ‘cover story for yet another plan to rob” the individual of freedom or would split off the biological from the social by insisting that any mention of biology is “lite more than a regressive step toward ... re-ghettoiza- tion.” And, the same rhetorical style of persuasion by dismissal shows through in Chandler and Carpendale’ ‘own voice, as they do not argue the reasoned merits of skeptical versus an affirmative post-modern perspec- tive but rather the current popularity ofthis distinction. ‘The rhetorical voice of post-modernism that Chan- ler and Carpendale assume as their own becomes particularly evident and important as they address the issue ofthe relation between the Arrow of Time and the Cycle of Time. Here, they rhetorically dismiss, based ‘on neither rational nor observational evidence, the core ‘of my argument concerning the relational matrix. Re~ lational matrices are simply discarded as “heady talk” that may become “a cover story for yet another attempt to discredit opposing views.” From this platform, which appears designed to elicit an emotional rather than a rational response—again in keeping with the post-modern voice—it is a small step to a complete rejection of the relational position with the dismissive phrase, “all talk of a ‘relational matrix’ aside.” And then, upon this stage so constructed, there arises the charge that “Overton stil has not demonstrated that he has found a way to avoid suppressing, rather than actually integrating ...” It is again interesting to com- pare this post-modern posture with the use that Santostefano puts to the same material. If the reader has been persuaded by the post-modern thetoric to the effect that the relational position is only ‘cover story, then issues ofthe author's motives have successfully been introduced—a post-modem rhetori- cal device itself—and the reader is moved to a suspi- ciousness. But where is the evidence, either reasoned or observational, forsuch acharge? Certainly notin the brief example of systems theory that Chandler and Carpendale describe. What has to be remembered here is thatthe goal of the target article was to explore the idea of directionality. Given that the focus ofthe article 265ovERTON is on the place of directionality in developmental change, it is of course the case that directionality subsumes other features. It would be a bizarre pre- sentation—although perhaps quite poststructuraist in form—were the narrative constructed in any other way. But this point of view in which Arrow of Time necessarily subsumes Cycle of Time—because itis from the point of view of Arrow of Time—in no way suppresses the relationally mirrored point of view that Cycles generate Arrows. That's exactly what the relational position is all about and what Santo- stefano, but not Chandler and Carpendale, reads in the target article. T would like to conclude my comments on Chandler and Carpendale’ note with a point of agreement about. the issue of directionality inherent in developing sys- tems. I have never, myself, argued for a narrowly canalized vision of development. The Arrow of Time described in the target article presents a vision of uni- versal trajectories bounded by cycles of individual vari ation. Ths, nsome sense, is why Irejected the concrete arrow image and suggested thatthe chambered nautilus might provide a better visual illustration. Nonclosed cycles (spirals)of individual differences are fundamen- tal tothe generation of directionality. Developmental ‘outcomes do, indeed, describe an “arc” or a relatively broad band within the constraint of the universal, ac- ‘cording to this vision. Along the way, moving toward these outcomes, the cycles are sufficiently broad as to bbe described as alternative paths. Contingent effects within this description of univer- sal trajectories bounded by spiral cycles of individual differences are largely a matter of perspective. When the perspective is the developing psychological system, factors including cultural contexts, neurobiological contexts, educational systems, schedules of reinforce- ‘ment, and so forth constitute nutrients that the psycho- logical system metabolizes and grows from, or climinates, or isolates, ois poisoned and destroyed by. ‘When the perspective is environmental—whether itbe the external environment of the socal or the internal environment of the biological—these factors are de- scribed as contingent effects. The idea of a needed “match” between the current spiral cycle and the con- tingent environment is @ useful way of understanding the ole of change agents in development (see Overton, 1993). Here, change agents are not foreign, causal elements that produce change, but agents that offer nutrients of regulation. ‘The notion of “fit” is also valuable as long as the cautionary note expressed by Chandler and Carpendale is clearly heard: “What saves ... talk (of ‘fit} from collapsing back into some vulgar, survival-of-the- “fitest” form of functionalism is that ... some broad- band version of human nature is seen to set limits on the variety of developmental outcomes.” “Fit” and 26 “adaptation,” when they emerge from a pragmatist, Darwinian interpretative scheme, are highly controver- sial conceptions. This is because, at least for this form of Darwinism—especially as itis advocated by Rorty and perhaps by Shusterman—the picture of the organ- ism and environment that is generated by the scheme is that “there isa radical separation between the internal processes of organisms and the autonomous processes ‘outside the organism that create the environment for adaptation” (Lewontin, 1994, p. 31). This rupture or splitof organism and environment leads directly to the view thatthe organism isa kind of package of solutions to problems posed by the environment. Some ofthese solutions, which are randomly generated, survive (work), and some don’t. Any developmental outcome is explained by appeal tothe fact it works, and that it ‘works is explained by it being a developmental out- come. Further, change within this system is completely ‘variational (closed Cycle of Time) and not transforma. tional (relational Arrow of Time and Cycle of Time)— see Lewontin (1994)—because the developmental solutions are specific pieces of an aggregate package ‘that appear and disappear. ‘As Chandler and Carpendale suggest, we are re- ‘moved from this variety of functionalism (pragmatism) by rejecting the radical split between organism and environment and by positing broad, universal con- straints (hesitate touse the term human nature because it evokes an essentilism that is not intended). These universals constitute broadband, ideal ends of develop- ‘ment. Transformational and cyclical change may then 'be examined and understood as moving toward this variant of “fit” in which “fi” avoids the narrow and viscous circularity of “vulgar functionalism.” Thus, for example, we may, in a widely conceived and abstract fashion, post that the organism is moving toward the ideal end ofa differentiation and integration of affec- tive and cognitive subsystems. Or, in a more narrow frame, we may posit adult (ie., mature) forms of rea- soning as an end, or wisdom, or adult forms of memory, or types of psychosocial maturity. In each of these cases—and in others that would equally well serve as frames for developmental inquiry —the ends of devel- ‘opment are both found and created. They are the prod- ucts of a relational matrix in which concrete observation and idealized reason are two poles of the same matrix. Beilin's comments present the classical narrative of what is called metaphysical and scientific realism. I have argued the problems that this narrative increas- ingly faces to often to repeat them here (see Overton, 1984, 1991a, 1991b, 1991e, 19914). The litany of oth- rs who have detailed and continue to detail the prob- lems of this position runs from Hanson to Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan, Fine, Putnam, and even Rorty and ‘Shusterman, not to mention the figures of the herme-AUTHOR'S RESPONSE, neutic movement. Here, however, only address some specific points that need to be clarified. Fundamental to any other comments, the nature of realism needs tobe clearly understood. Beilin confuses commonsense realism with Realism with a capital R. Commonsense realism accepts the material existence of a real, actual, or manifest world. Commonsense realism accepts tables and chairs and going to work as real. However, this form of realism is distinct from ‘metaphysical and scientific Realism, which and many ‘others have critiqued and which Beilin defends. Meta- physical and scientific Realism—also called objectiv- ism—is an arguable philosophical doctrine about an ultimate or foundational ground of explanation. The ‘metaphysical and scientific Realist argues that there is ‘amind-independent ground of explanation and that the employment of scientific methods (Le., observational methods and only observational methods) will ulti- ‘mately reach this ground. Truth within this narrative is the correspondence between propositions that describe that ground and the ground itself. Asa physicals, the objectivistor scientific Realist maintains that that ulti- ‘mate ground will be describable in the categories of physics. This is the view that Beilin seeks to defend, and, although I certainly accept a commonsense real- sm, as do Putnam and others, I along with these others ‘eject metaphysical and scientific Realism. Hilary Putnam was indeed once a strong advocate of ‘metaphysical Realism but, over many years now, has repeatedly rejected this perspective, which he has called the “God's Eye” view Putnam, 1981, 1983, 1987, 1988, 1990). Putnam (1981) wrote: “On this perspective, the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects, There is exactly one true and complete description of ‘the way the world is” (p. 49). With respect to this view, however, Putnam as- serted “T concluded that metaphysical realism ... is incoherent” (1983, p. 85) and “There is no God's Eye point of view that we can know or usefully imagine” (1981, p.50). But it is not justin philosophy that metaphysical Realism is being increasingly rejected. Opposing Beilin’s comment that “most scientists ... identify themselves as realists,” arguments against scientific Realism are made by Davies (1980), Fddington (1958), and Heisenberg (1958) in physics; Pigogine (Prigog- ine & Stengers, 1984) in thermodynamics; Stolzenberg (1984) in mathematics; Gould (1989) in paleontology and geology (1987); Bertalanffy (1968) and Maturana and Varela (1980, 1987) in biology; Lewontin (1994) in genetics; and von Foerster (1984) in neurophysiot- ‘ogy. In social psychology, Gergen (1994) critiqued Realist assumptions, and Lakoff (1987, 1994), in his analysis ofthe nature of categorical thought and rea- soning, has rejected the approach as unproductive. Katz (1990) did the same with respect to language. And, what Beilin describes as Edelman's (1992) “realist assumptions, albeit qualified” turns out on an actual reading of Edelman (1992)to be “apostion of qualified realism. Our description ofthe world qualified by the ‘way in which our concepts arise” (p. 161). Te specific anti-metaphysical Realism of this quote is clearly re- vealed later, when Edelman (1992) remarked ‘Thus, there is no absolute truth or God's-eye view. Our view of what exists (metaphysics) isnot independent ‘of how we know it (epistemology). As Lakoff puts it “Truths bootstrapping operation, rounded in direct links to preconceptually and distinctly structured ex perience and the concepts that accord wit that expe- rience.” This its with my proposals related to qualified realism. (p. 250) Its difficult to understand how Beilin can find solace ineither Putnam's or Edelman’s position. Finally, Fine (1984) captured the turn of the scientific tide against the doctrine of scientific Realism when he noted: Realism is dead. ... Its death was hastened by the bates over the interpretation of quantum theory, ‘where Bohr's nonrealist philosophy was seen to win ‘ut over Einstein's passionate realism. Its death was cenified, finaly, as the lsttwo generations of physical ‘ciomtists turned theirbacks on realism and have man aged, nevertheless to do science successfully without it (p.83) reasonably colors his reading of Piaget's constructivism. His Realist conceptual scheme could hardly lead elsewhere, as ‘my interpretationist scheme suggests that there are both Beilin’s kind of reading and coherent alterna- tive readings, How, then, is an issue of this sort to be decided? Certainly not by simply pointing to others who have the same category system as our own, And not by the label radical, which is primarily a term designed to scare the reader into agreement. My argument is that the question is best decided by a coordination of cognitive evidence (reason, argu- ment) and empirical evidence (observation). From the perspective of reason, I would claim that the position suggesting that Piaget's constructivism is ‘embedded in a Realism is ultimately incoherent. The incoherence involves the horizon of knowledge with “reality receding further from us,” which Beilin de- scribes as fundamental to his argument. This horizon notion is either (a) a hermeneutic position following, Gadamer’s (1982) notion of “horizons of understand- ing” (in which case, itis not a Realism) or (b) an argument about a transcendent Reality of which we can have no knowledge (and, hence, itis not a con- 267ovERTON structivism). From the perspective of observational ev- idence, my evidence would involve, among other things, « demonstration that Beilin’s interpretation makes sense only if we ignore (i.c., suppress) two concepts that Piaget repeatedly puts forth as funda- mental (for elaboration, see Overton, 1989, 1990, 1991a)—namely, organization and assimilation. If organization and assimilation are fundamental to Piaget's theory ofthe organism's knowing process— 1s Piaget has stated repeatedly in multiple publica- tions (my observational evidence)—then Piaget's position is that all knowledge is constructed, and there is not today or tomorrow or ever a way to know cuside of those constructions. From his metaphysical and scientific Realist posi- tion, Beilin also goes on to argue the issue of scientific explanation. Beilin’s position again follows directly from his Realist narrative, and I emphasize that itis a narrative—a conceptual scheme that is not itself open to the very scientific methods that it claims are the only methods that yield truth. In Beilin’s story of scientific explanation, science becomes identified with causal statements. Causal statements and only causal state- ‘ments constitute scientific explanation for Beilin. This story is straight Newtonian mechanical explanation (Gee Overton 19916): 1, Reduce commonsense phenomena to the mind- independent, stable, observational, Real matter (e.g. responses, in psychology). 2. Discover the observational Real matter that ‘bumps into and hence changes location of initially identified Real (ie., observe the causes that force cchange in the stable Real, which, in psychology, are necessarily some form of stimuli, biological and/or environmental). 3, Induce causal laws (cause-effect relations) con- cerning the material Reals thus discovered. ‘There are many problems associated with this picture of scientific explanation that Beilin offers. Let me begin, however, by noting that, contrary to Beilin's ‘comments, Thave infact explored the issue of scien explanation and the place of causal explanation in scientific explanation at length in several writings (Overton, 1984, 19912, 19916, 19914). Two of these. writings (Overton, 1984, 19916) appear in texts that also have chapters contributed by Beilin himself. As ‘with Realism, Idonottry to retrace all those discussions, ‘but instead limit myself to a couple of the more salient points, Most important, itshould be recognized that the failure of Realism itself implies the failure ofthe idea that it is possible to arive at the kind of pristine (i. untouched by human interpretation) cause-effect prop- ‘sitions that Beilin's story and the story of other posi tivists demand. Over the past 35+ years it has become 268 increasingly clear that the statement “All data are the- ‘ory laden” is not an empty slogan to be quickly dis- ‘missed with scientific advances, but the diagnosis of the conditions of knowing that frames the nature of science itself. Causal explanation is possible in science, but it is always causal explanation in the context of some interpretation. As Hanson (1958) pointed out, That we refer to as ‘causes’ are theory-loaded from beginning to end. They are not simple, tangible links in the chain of sense experience, but rather details in an intricate pattern of concepts” (p. 54). Thus, inter- pretationism is not a necessary enemy of causal expla- nation; it is that causal explanation cannot operate ‘without interpretationism. Interpretations area precon- dition for causal explanation. Quoting Hanson (1958) again, “Causes certainly are connected with effects; but this is because our theories connect them, not because the world is held together by cosmic glue” (p. 64). Brown presents a somewhat similar analysis in his commentary. ‘A recognition of this central place of interpretation inscience leads toa further implication about the nature of scientific explanation. Scientific explanation entails both discovery of pattern that establishes intelli and discovery of cause-effect relations as details within these patterns, Pattern is not directly observable; itis discernible, and it entails inference and interpret but it is as essential to the whole of scientific explana- tion as is causal explanation, Pattern is structural expla- nation; causality is functional explanation. Realist like Beilin would split the twoand declare functionalism the Real e.g.,"the general shift from structuralst to func- tionalist types of explanation”), Interpetationists assert the unity of structure and function. The interpretationist claims that formal explanation and final explanation constitute the broad categories of scientific pattem explanation, whereas efficient explanation and material explanation constitute the broad categories of causal explanation, hope itis clear from the foregoing that it is emphat- ically not the case that I claim that causal explanation is confined to mechanistic accounts or that organismic accounts reject causal explanation. The problem is that Beilin’s form of Realism demands a “nothing but” ccausal account of change. Thus, for example, Piaget's equilibration process could never attain the status of scientific explanation for Beilin because this process is not itself reducible to pristine cause-effect relations ‘and nothing but pristine cause-effect relations. Beilin ‘might accept the equilibration process as a rough and ready initial description, but always under the under- standing that the Real causal explanation would even- tually replace it. Beilin also asserts that the interpetationist position, and by i jon the organismic position, “cannot provide an account of developmental mechanisms”AUTHOR'S RESPONSE. primarily because of the “identification of mechanism with mechanistic metaphor.” Keeping in mind that 1 have already extensively referenced the issue of mech- anisms of development in the target article itself, par- ticularly concerning Siegler’s review of mechanisms of development, Beilin's commentary again describes an, interesting illustration of how one’s understanding is framed by overarching conceptual schemes. Mecha- ‘nism has two alternative meanings, one framed by the mechanistic conceptual scheme and one framed by the ‘organismic conceptual scheme. Within the mechanistic frame, mechanism refers to a device, a thing, acontriv- ance that operates as a cause. This is most certainly Beilin’s interpretation of mechanism. However, from the organismic frame, mechanism refers to amethod, a means, agency. Again, Piaget's equilibration process is instructive. The equilibration process (and reflective abstraction) constitutes the mechanism of development from an organismic perspective, The equilibration pro- cess is the means, or method, according to which ‘change occurs. For Beilin’s mechanistic scheme, how- ever, the equilibration process cannot be the mecha- nism of development because such a mechanism must bbe a causal device. The general point here is that the ‘organismic position both can and does indeed provide ‘an account of developmental mechanisms. This ac- ‘count is not, however, in the shape of the categories of the mechanistic worldview. Beilin's final arguments that embodiment theory as describe itis not a psychological theory at all because itdoes not include specific translations into psycholog- ical statements that can be tested through observation, Perhaps I would agree with Beilin here and point out, (as I did in the target article itself) that the theory as presented in the target article functions primarily at the level of a conceptual platform—or, as Santostefano says, a conceptual lens—for the further construction of specific psychological understandings of cognitive and. personality development, More specific psychological features of the theory are described in several other publications (Overton, 1993, 1994; Overton & Horo- itz, 1991) and appear in Santostefano’s commentary as well asin the work of Lakoff, Piaget, Vygotsky, and so forth, But Beilin is not satisfied with the mere idea that ‘embodiment theory is an unfinished theory; rather, he ‘would like to claim that embodiment theory must nec cssarily remain unfinished because testing of psycho- logical statements by “observation and experiment” are moves that are closed to me, because of my inter- pretationist stance. Again, there is here a misunder- standing of the nature of the interpretationist perspective as it operates in the arena of empirical science. Simply put, to claim that observations operate «within some rational frame is not to deny observations. ‘The reader need only “observe” the empirical literature described in Santostefano’s commentary or inthe other empirical work already referenced here to “see” that this is the case. Metatheory frames theory; theory frames empirical hypotheses; and empirical hypotheses are testable through observation and experiment in the actual or manifest or real world of everyday experience. AAs one is committed to exploring that form of know!- edge termed empirical scientific knowledge, empirical testing constitutes empirical support for theory, and it isone among several criteria of theory selection. Other criteria include scope of explanation, depth of explans tion, fruitfulness in generating novel predictions, co- herence, logical consistency, intelligibility, and the ability to reduce the proportion of unsolved to solved. conceptual and/or empirical problems in a domain of inquiry (see Overton, 19914, for an claboration). The point is that empirical science, outside the confines of Beilin's form of Realist empirical science, proceeds according to criteria that embrace both reason and “observation as reciprocal and equal aspects of unified knowledge-construction process. ‘There is @ good deal in Brown's commentary that 1 support, especially his notions of mechanism and his recognition that Piaget's theory came to understand transformation and comparison as two aspects of the same whole. However, Brown’s remarks tend to be framed by a sort of literalism or misplaced concrete- ness, and ths leads to objectionable conclusions from the perspective I have tried to elaborate. Brown seems to believe first, that I somewhere make the claim that the mechanistic stance argues that “man is a machine.” have never said this, and I do not in any way believe that this is an adequate characterization of the mecha- nistic stance. What I have said is that “the machine metaphor generates metatheoretical narratives thatrep- resent the domain under examination as fundamentally uniform, fixed or reactive, isolated, linear." This in no ‘way suggests that "man isa machine.” Following up on his imaginative construction, Brown argues that “man isa machine” is a metaphor but that “man isan organ- ism” is not a metaphor. Here again, Thave never made the claim that the organismic stance argues that “man isan organism,” and such a construction is not consis- {ent with my argument. What I have sad is that elabo- ration of the organic metaphor yields an integrated set of fundamental categories that then serve as the ground for metatheory and theory development. These fundamental categories consists ofhotism, dynamics, and dialectics... [It] isimportant to.again emphasize that itis this st of categories, and ‘not some specific biological reference that constitutes the organic metaphor, Telieve that the problem Brown creates emerges from his locating his argument in the real, actual, or ‘concrete world of everyday experience and not recog 269‘oveRTON nizing thatthe argument in the target article operates at the level of conceptual schemes deployed in an attempt to bring order and organization into that flux of every- day, actual, real events. In a sense, Brown is another example of a Rorty-type pragmatist. Certainly at the everyday level, “man is a machine” is a metaphor and. “man is an organism” is not a metaphor. However, this is virtually irelevant to the argument presented in the target article. Evidence of Brown's being captured by this every- ay level—including the everyday level of concepts— issceninhis focusing most specifically and exclusively, ‘on Lakoff's notion of conventional metaphors (i “ordinary, everyday expressions"). Lakoff, however, does not limit himself to conventional metaphors, and, ‘more important, the understanding I developed in the target paper concerns a metaphorical stance that is ‘much deeper and broader than conventional metaphors. do not, as Brown’s discussion suggests, elevate con- ventional “metaphor to a central position in inter- pretationist epistemology.” That is the pragmatist, inductivist type of story. T claim that, fundamentally from an epistemological position, knowing is most profitably characterized as metaphorical: “Metaphor as process then operates projectively—beginning from the known, giving meaning to the unknown, and recur- sively resulting in a restructuring of the known. Inter- pretative activity moves from imagination to inference to imagination.” It is important to note that Brown ignores my insis- tence on the transformational nature of metaphor as process—as demonstrated in the quotation just cited— ‘and goes on to argue that conventional metaphor is limited to comparisons. This serves as the premise for his conclusion that metaphor is incapable of explana- tion of transformation and, hence, that metaphor must be only an instance of a deeper and more complex process of knowledge construction. This conclusion loses any possible validity when it is recognized that, ‘metaphor entails both transformation and comparison inthe same kind of relational matrix that frames the rest, of my argument. ‘Although Brown recognizes logical levels of analy- sis within a particular domain of explanation, as sug- gested by his discussion that “there is nothing wrong with mechanisms per se,” he fails to recognize broader and deeper levels that themselves frame these specific explanations. Brown seems to believe, with the Rorty ‘prigmatists, that fundamental problems of epistemol- ‘ogy do not exist or that any such problems are capable Of solution totally on the naturalistic grounds. It is exactly this belief system—which I again note is a monolithic, universal conceptual scheme or world- view—that apparently frames Brown's concluding statement: 270 1Ldo not believe that accepting an organismic metaphor ‘or worldview, asortof Kuhnian religion, isas powerful inexplaining imman understanding asisthe realization that all explanation arises from attribution of aspects of one's experience of oneself a eausalageat. ‘Thus, as with other Rorty-type pragmatists, inquiry that rises above the level of immediate experience is dismissed as irrelevant, whether by the rhetorical de- vice of proclaiming it “religion” or the device of pro- Claiming it less powerful, whatever that might mean. have left Santostefano’s comments to the last, be- ‘cause I am in complete agreement with them and con- sequently can think of little to add, Beilin suggests that, at best, intespretationism and embodiment theory pro- vide the skeleton of a psychological theory. Santoste- fano’s work elaborates one of several valuable paths along which this skeleton can scientifically and produe- tively be fleshed out and brought to lif. Chandler and Carpendale express post-modern pessimism about the future, and Santostefano describes an optimistic litera- ture that looks at the world through the lens of organic categories. Scholnick cals fora greater focus on actual relations, and Santostefano provides it in the context of ‘organic relational categories. Brown wants concrete- ‘ess, and Santostefano provides both concrete, clinical observations and concrete, empirical studies, but each. informed by an abstract, reflective metaphor. Santostefano has long and eminent history as both an empirical research scientist in the field of, developmental psychopathology and a clinician. In his commentary, he demonstrates how these skills combine, in the context of an overarching world- view, to guide a research program that facilitates and is facilitated by a practical concer for the develop- ‘ment of the individual. I believe that his discussion of clinical observation and empirical study in the ‘context of a concern both for reason and for the pragmatics of everyday life provides a model illustration of the fundamental nature of the organic relational approach described in the target article. Note Willis F. Overton, Department of Psychology, 567 Weiss Hall, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122, References ‘ertlafty, L von. (1968). General satem theory. New York Brazil Davies, P. (1980). Other world. New York: Simon & Schuster Bédington, A. (1958). The pilosphy of physical science. Ann ‘Arbor: Univerityof Michigan Press,AUTHOR'S RESPONSE, Elman, GM, (1992). 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