Final Case Digest in Succession

I.
SUCCESSION IN GENERAL
A. SUCCESSION
G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians,
AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her
daughters Agnes P. Arellano and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco
Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.
In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of
Letters of Administration," filed by respondents before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, respondents alleged, that a parcel of land located in Teresa
Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent
to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be
considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner.
Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner
which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it "may be
considered as an advance legitime" to petitioner, the trial court, acting as
probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the
donation. The Court of Appeals sustained the probate courts ruling that the
property donated to petitioner is subject to collation bearing in mind that in
intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality of division. Thus, the
property subject of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to
collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the decedent.
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the
probate court, herein petitioner "was able to submit prima facie evidence of
shares of stocks owned by the decedent which have not been included in the
inventory submitted by the administrator."
ISSUES:
Whether or not the property donated to petitioner is subject to
collation.
Whether the property of the estate should have been ordered equally
distributed among the parties.
HELD:
NO.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary,
or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his
collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part
of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has
reserved it for compulsory heirs.
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and
(3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence
over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants
are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who
succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and
ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs
are those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory
heirs; the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring
compulsory heirs.
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left
for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner,
assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger,"
chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory
heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.
YES.
The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally
among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents,
pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate

children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles. (underscoring supplied)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
ordering the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N.
Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set aside.Let
the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of
the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further
proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what finally forms part
of the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among
the parties.
G.R. No. 187056 September 20, 2010

JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner,
vs.
ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR,
ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR., all surnamed G. FERRER, and MIGUELA
FERRER ALTEZA, Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales
executed a document entitled "DonationMortis Causa" in favor of their two
children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter
of their predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses lot and the house in
Pandacan, Manila, in equal shares. Although denominated as a donation mortis
causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation
clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named donees, however,
signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document.
Guadalupe died. A few months later, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed
a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in subject property to their
daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972. In 1998 Jarabini filed a
"petition for the probate of the August 27, 1968 deed of donation mortis
causa" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Asuncion opposed the
petition, invoking his father Leopoldos assignment of his rights and interests in
the property to her.
After trial, the RTC ruled that the donation was in fact one made inter
vivos, the donors intention being to transfer title over the property to the
donees during the donors lifetime, given its irrevocability. Consequently, said
the RTC, Leopoldos subsequent assignment of his rights and interest in the
property was void since he had nothing to assign. The RTC thus directed the
registration of the property in the name of the donees in equal shares. On
Asuncions appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter rendered a decision
reversing that of the RTC. The CA held that Jarabini cannot, through her
petition for the probate of the deed of donation mortis causa, collaterally
attack Leopoldos deed of assignment in Asuncions favor. The CA further
held that, since no proceeding exists for the allowance of what Jarabini
claimed was actually a donation inter vivos, the RTC erred in deciding the case
the way it did. Finally, the CA held that the donation, being one given mortis
causa, did not comply with the requirements of a notarial will, rendering the
same void. Following the CAs denial of Jarabinis
reconsideration, she filed the present petition with this Court.
motion
for
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupes donation to
Asuncion, Emiliano, and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was
denominated, or in fact a donation inter vivos.
HELD:
DONATION INTER VIVOS.
That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation
Mortis Causa" is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its
terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor
styles it mortis causa.
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,11 the Court held that
"irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of
conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the essence of the
act. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of
the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.12 (Underscoring supplied)
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of
the donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a
donation inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this
Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the
surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even
clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of
the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter
vivos.As Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peaflorida,16 in case of doubt,
the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis
causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed.
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was
immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind of donation is
deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donees
acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute
owner of the property donated.17
Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos,
Leopoldos subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to
Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by then, he had no more rights to
assign. He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo dat quod non habet.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the
assailed December 23, 2008 Decision and March 6, 2009 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 80549, and REINSTATES in toto the June 20,
2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, in Sp. Proc. 9890589.
G.R. No. 131953

June 5, 2002
MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S.
CABATINGAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M. BOQUIA,
PERLA M. ABELLA, ESTRELLA M. CAETE, LOURDES M. YUSON, and
JULIA L. MAYOL, HEIRS OF GENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD namely, OSCAR
C. NATIVIDAD, OLGA NATIVIDAD, ODETTE NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA
NATIVIDAD, RICHARD NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND NATIVIDAD, RICHIE
NATIVIDAD, SONIA NATIVIDAD and ENCARNACION CABATINGAN
VDA. DE TRINIDAD, ALFREDO CABATINGAN and JESUSA C.
NAVADA, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her
brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation
Inter Vivos for House and Lot." On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.
Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, an action for Annulment And/Or
Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, seeking the
annulment of said four (4) deeds of donation. Respondents allege that
petitioners through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking
advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of
the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply
with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and
testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa. Petitioners
deny respondents' allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely,
knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments.
The court a quo ruled that the donations are donations mortis causa and
therefore the four (4) deeds in question are null and void for failure to comply
with the requisites of Article 806 of the Civil Code on solemnities of wills and
testaments. Raising questions of law, petitioners elevated the court a quo's
decision to Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donations are mortis causa or inter vivos.

HELD:
DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.
In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to
the donee while the donor is still alive." In determining whether a donation is
one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of
the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
properties conveyed;
and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.13
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is
confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision
that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's
death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR"
admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to
transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime.
Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in
the following Acceptance and Attestation clauses, uniformly found in the
subject deeds of donation, to wit:
"That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis
causa under the terms and conditions set forth therein, and avail herself
of this occasion to express her profound gratitude for the kindness and
generosity of the DONOR."
xxx
"SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE at the foot of this

Deed of Donation mortis causa, which consists of two (2) pages x x x."15
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 106755 February 1, 2002

APOLINARIA AUSTRIA-MAGAT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FLORENTINO LUMUBOS, DOMINGO
COMIA, TEODORA CARAMPOT, ERNESTO APOLO, SEGUNDA
SUMPELO, MAMERTO SUMPELO and RICARDO SUMPELO, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of five (5) children, namely, Rosario
Austria, Consolacion Austria, herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat,
Leonardo, and one of herein respondents, Florentino Lumubos. Leonardo died
in a Japanese concentration camp at Tarlac during World War II. On December
17, 1975, Basilisa executed a document designated as "Kasulatan sa Kaloobpala
(Donation)". On February 6, 1979, Basilisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of
the subject house and lot in favor of herein petitioner Apolinaria AustriaMagat for Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). As the result of the registration of
that sale, Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the donor was cancelled
and in lieu thereof TCT No. T-10434 was issued by the Register of Deeds in
favor of petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat. Herein respondents, representing
their deceased mother Consolacion Austria, all surnamed Sumpelo,
representing their deceased mother Rosario Austria, and Florentino Lumubos
filed before the Regional Trial Court Civil Case against the petitioner for
annulment of TCT No. T-10434 and other relevant documents, and for
reconveyance and damages. The trial court dismissed Civil Case because the
donation is a donation mortis causa pursuant to Article 728 of the New Civil
Code inasmuch as the same expressly provides that it would take effect upon
the death of the donor; that the provision stating that the donor reserved the
right to revoke the donation is a feature of a donation mortis causa which
must comply with the formalities of a will; and that inasmuch as the donation
did not follow the formalities pertaining to wills, the same is void and produced
no effect whatsoever. Hence, the sale by the donor of the said property was
valid since she remained to be the absolute owner thereof during the time of
the said transaction. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed by
the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.

HELD:
The Supreme Court affirm the appellate courts decision.
It has been held that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis
causa depends on whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the
properties upon the execution of the deed. In Bonsato v. Court of
Appeals,11 this Court enumerated the characteristics of a donation mortis
causa, to wit:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of
the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
while alive;
properties conveyed;
transferee.
Significant to the resolution of this issue is the irrevocable character of
the donation in the case at bar. In Cuevas v. Cuevas, we ruled that when the
deed of donation provides that the donor will not dispose or take away the
property donated (thus making the donation irrevocable), he in effect is making
a donation inter vivos. He parts away with his naked title but maintains
beneficial ownership while he lives. It remains to be a donation inter
vivosdespite an express provision that the donor continues to be in possession
and enjoyment of the donated property while he is alive.
Construing together the provisions of the deed of donation,the Court
finds and so hold that in the case at bar the donation is inter vivos. The
express irrevocability of the same ("hindi na mababawi") is the distinctive
standard that identifies that document as a donation inter vivos. The other
provisions therein which seemingly make the donation mortis causa do not go
against the irrevocable character of the subject donation. According to the
petitioner, the provisions which state that the same will only take effect upon
the death of the donor and that there is a prohibition to alienate, encumber,
dispose, or sell the same, are proofs that the donation is mortis causa. We
disagree. The said provisions should be harmonized with its express
irrevocability.
Another indication in the deed of donation that the donation is inter
vivos is the acceptance clause therein of the donees. We have ruled that an
acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a
requirement for donations inter vivos. On the other hand, donations mortis
causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the
donees during the donors lifetime.18
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated June 30, 1989 of the Court
of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-6600 July 30, 1954

HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL., respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan on
June 27, 1945, by respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato
and his wife Andrea Nacario, both deceased. Their complaint charged that
Domingo Bonsato then already a widower, had been induced and deceived into
signing two notarial deeds of donations in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato
and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to them several
parcels of land, both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and
documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis
causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan
Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in
their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services
rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed
freely without the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation;
and prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2,000.
After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered its decision finding that the
deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the latter was of sound
mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter
vivos without any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon
the death of the donor; but as the properties donated were presumptively
conjugal, having been acquired during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and
his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were only valid as to an undivided onehalf share in the three parcels of land described therein. On appeal, Court of
Appeals, rendered judgment holding the aforesaid donations to be null and
void, because they were donations mortis causaand were executed without the
testamentary formalities prescribed by law, and ordered the defendantsappellees Bonsato to surrender the possession of the properties in litigation to
the plaintiffs-appellants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donations are Mortis Causa or Inter Vivos.
HELD:
Despite the widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it is
well-established at present that the Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke
away from the Roman Law tradition, and followed the French doctrine that no
one may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by merging the
erstwhile donations mortis causa with the testamentary dispositions, thus
suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept.
ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of
the donor partake of the nature of disposals of property by will and shall
be governed by the rules established for testamentary successions.
The Court insisted on this phase of the legal theory in order to
emphasize that the term "donations mortis causa" as commonly employed is
merely a convenient name to designate those dispositions of property that are
void when made in the form of donations.
Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or
dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then
the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive
(Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautistavs.
Sabiniano,
G.
R.
L-4326, November 18, 1952);
transferee.
None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation
executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself,
during his lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce ("de los
productos mientras viva el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como
dueo"), a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the
donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of
stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the
deeds expressly declare them to be "irrevocable", a quality absolutely
incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of
the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or
restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil Code, Art.
828).
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase
"that after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation shall become
effective" (que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha
donacion"). However, said expression must be construed together with the rest
of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after
the donor's death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the
absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and
encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself
a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a
charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon the donor's death, when
full title would become vested in the donees.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
that of the Court of First Instance is revived and given effect. Costs against
respondents.
G.R. No. L-45262 July 23, 1990

RUPERTO REYES and REYNALDO C. SAN JUAN, in his capacity as Special
Administrator, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, Judge of CFI, Pampanga (Branch VII), and
URSULA D. PASCUAL,respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The instant petitions have been consolidated as they arose from the same
facts and involve similar issues. Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without
issue on November 18,1972. He was survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual and
the children of his late sisters as follows: (1) Maria Pascual Reyes- Ruperto
Reyes and Jose Reyes; (2) Ines Pascual Reyes-Jose P. Reyes, Benito Reyes, and
Manna Reyes Manalastas; (3) Josefa Pascual Reyes-Augusto Reyes and Benjamin
Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual Dalusong (half- blood Pedro Dalusong. The
heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings in the then Court of First
Instance of Pampanga for the administration of his estate. On February 12,
1976, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties from the
inventory of Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles thereto to her. Ursula
alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2, 1966 executed a
"Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are included in
the estate of Dr. Pascual and therefore should be excluded from the
inventory. On August 1, 1976; the trial court issued an order excluding from the
inventory of the estate the properties donated to Ursula. In the meantime,
Ursula Pascual executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo property in
favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose and Emmanuel, all surnamed Reyes. Benjamin
Reyes, private respondent in filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092, Register of Deeds of Manila and/or
reconveyance of deed of title against Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil, with
the then Court of First Instance of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 115164. The two cases were consolidated. The then Court of First
Instance, Branch 8 rendered a joint decision declaring that TCT in the name of
Ofelia Parungao null and void. Parungao appealed the decision to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court. The decision was, however, affirmed, with costs
against the appellant. The Intermediate Appellate Court issued a minute
resolution denying the above petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation in the present is to be considered Donation
Inter vivos or Donation Mortis causa.
HELD:
It is, now a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not
the determinative factor which makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis
causa" As early as the case of Laureta v. Manta, et al., (44 Phil. 668 [1928]) this
Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donation-whether "inter vivos" or
"mortis causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation
but on the provisions stated in such deed.
In the later case of Bonsato et al. v. Court of appeals, et al. (95 Phil. 481
[1954]) this Court, distinguished the characteristics of a donation inter vivos
and "mortis causa" in this wise:
Did the late Domingo Bonsato, make donations inter vivos or
dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the
latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the following
characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death
of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (fun or naked) and control
of the property while alive (Vidal v. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman
v. Ibea 67 Phil., 633);
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed (Bautista v. Sabiniano, G.R. No. L- 4326,
November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.
Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt

that the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter
vivos. The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula
Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal
services rendered by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over
the properties donated to the donee was immediate and independent of the
death of the donor. The provision as regards the reservation of properties for
the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of
donation confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership of the
properties to the donee immediately after the execution of the deed of
donation.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1) In G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394 the petitions are DENIED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued on January 5, 1977 is hereby LIFTED; and
2) In G.R. Nos. 73241-42, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. This
DENIAL is FINAL.
B.TRANSMISSION/ACQUISITION THROUGH DEATH

G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO,
LAGUNA, BR. 31, respondents.
PUNO, C.J.:
FACTS:
On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to
Margarita Herrera several portions of land which are part of the Tunasan
Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell
No. 3787. By virtue of Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR was
succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757. NHA as the
successor agency of LTA is the petitioner in this case. The records show that
Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of
private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado
predeceased her mother and left heirs. Margarita Herrera passed away on
October 27, 1971. On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of
the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that
she is the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the
deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita
Herrera. The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera. The surviving
heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of
Self-Adjudication before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna. A
Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication)
was rendered and the deed was declared null and void. In a Resolution dated
February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by Francisca Herrera,
holding that: on October 7, 1960, Margarita Herrera executed a "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" whereby she waived or transferred all her rights and interest over the
lots in question in favor of the protestee. Private respondent Almeida appealed
to the Office of the President. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office
of the President and the resolution of the NHA, private respondent Segunda
Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the
heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988, for "Nullification
of Government Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna, Branch 31. The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals in a Decision reversed and
held that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
involving "title and possession to real property within its jurisdiction." The case
was then remanded for further proceedings on the merits. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs
of Francisca Herrera. It upheld the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but one that involved disposition of
property which shall take effect upon death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is correct in arguing that assuming that the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" was a will, it could not bind the NHA. That, "insofar as
[the] NHA is concerned, it is an evidence that the subject lots were indeed
transferred by Margarita Herrera, the original awardee, to Francisca Herrera
was then applying to purchase the same before it."
HELD:
NO.
The Supreme Court is not impressed. When the petitioner received the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the effectivity of the said
document commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in
her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay" Hence, in such
period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in
the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of
Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law.
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that
the original applicant has already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away
on October 27, 1971. The NHA issued its resolution on February 5, 1986. The
NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without
considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property,
rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may
have had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the
original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate.
Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go
to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later
to her heirsin accordance with a will or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over
the property. Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell with NHA as
the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither
nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both parties
Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible. Margarita Herrera's
obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or
by operation of law. The Court did not delve into the validity of the will. The
issue is for the probate court to determine. We affirm the Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an element of
testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved and transferred property; (2) the
effect of which shall transpire upon the death of the instrument maker.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated
August 28, 2003, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No. B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
G.R. Nos. 154391-92 September 30, 2004

Spouses ISMAEL and TERESITA MACASAET, petitioners,
vs.
Spouses VICENTE and ROSARIO MACASAET, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and
Rosario Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents,
and Teresita is his wife. On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the
MTCC of Lipa City an ejectment suit against the children. Respondents
alleged that they were the owners of two (2) parcels of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT); that by way of a verbal lease agreement,
Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in March 1992 and used them as their
residence and the situs of their construction business; and that despite
repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of P500 per
week. Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement.
They claimed that respondents had invited them to construct their residence
and business on the subject lots in order that they could all live near one other,
employ Marivic (the sister of Ismael), and help in resolving the problems of the
family. They added that it was the policy of respondents to allot the land they
owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their children. Thus, they
contended that the lot covered had been allotted to Ismael as advance
inheritance. On the other hand, the lot covered by TCT No. T-78521 was
allegedly given to petitioners as payment for construction materials used in the
renovation of respondents house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lots were allotted to petitioners as part of their
inheritance and given in consideration for past debts.
HELD:
NO.
The right of petitioners to inherit from their parents is merely inchoate
and is vested only upon the latters demise. Indisputably, rights of succession
are transmitted only from the moment of death of the decedent. Assuming
that there was an "allotment" of inheritance, ownership nonetheless remained
with respondents. Moreover, an intention to confer title to certain persons in
the future is not inconsistent with the owners taking back possession in the
meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. Other than their self-serving
testimonies and their affidavits, petitioners offered no credible evidence to
support their outlandish claim of inheritance "allocation." Petitioners failed to
prove the allegation that, through a dation in payment, Lot T-78521 had been
transferred to the latter as payment for respondents debts. The evidence
presented by petitioners related only to the alleged indebtedness of the parents
arising from the latters purported purchases and advances. There was no
sufficient proof that respondents had entered into a contract of dation to
settle the alleged debt. Petitioners even stated that there was a disagreement
in the accounting of the purported debt, a fact that disproves a meeting of
the minds with the parents.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS.
G.R. No. L-24098 November 18, 1967

BUENAVENTURA BELAMALA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO POLINAR, administrator, oppositor-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Buenaventura Belamala is the same offended party in Criminal Case No.
1922 filed before the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL, against the
same Mauricio Polinar above mentioned and against other accused, for
Frustrated Murder. The administrator Marcelino Polinar is one of the
legitimate children of the above mentioned Mauricio Polinar now deceased. On
May 24, 1954, the complaint for Frustrated Murder was filed in the Justice of
the Peace of Clarin, Bohol against said Mauricio Polinar, et al, and when said
case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Bohol. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BOHOL rendered a decision thereof, convicting the said
Mauricio Polinar of the crime of serious physical injuries and sentenced him to
pay to the offended party Buenaventura Belamala, now claimant herein, the
amount of P990.00, plus the amount of P35.80 as indemnity the amount of
P1,000.00 as moral damages. The accused (the late Mauricio Polinar) appealed
to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Bohol. While the appeal of said Mauricio Polinar was pending before the Court
of Appeals, he died; and that there was no Notice or Notification of his death
has ever been filed in the said Court of Appeals. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in said Criminal Case No. 1922, has affirmed the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Bohol, in toto, and said decision of the Court of Appeals
was promulgated on March 27, 1958; but said Mauricio Polinar has already died
on July 27, 1956. The Court a quo, overruling the contention of the
Administrator-appellant that the death of the accused prior to final judgment
extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view
of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, admitted the claim
against the estate in the amount of P2,025.80 with legal interest from the date
claim was filed (30 July 1959) until paid. Not satisfied with the ruling, the
Administrator has appealed, insisting on his theory in the Court below.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability has been extinguished.
HELD:
NO.
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished,
in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act
No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the Revised Penal Code.
As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a
civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for
damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action,
still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the
civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately. Such claim in no way contradicts Article 108, of the Penal Code,
that imposes the obligation to indemnify upon the deceased offender's heirs,
because the latter acquired their decedents obligations only to the extent of
the value of the inheritance (Civil Code, Art. 774). Hence, the obligation of the
offender's heirs under Article 108 ultimately becomes an obligation of the
offender's estate. Furthermore, it does not appear that the award of the trial
Court was based on evidence submitted to it; apparently it relied merely on the
findings in the criminal case, as embodied in decisions that never became final
because the accused died during the pendency of said case.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby reversed and set
aside, but without prejudice to the action of appellee Belamala against the
Administrator of the Estate of Mauricio Polinar.
C.OBJECT OF SUCCESSION
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
HILADO, J.:
FACTS:
The Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel
Ibaez, rendered its decision in case of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a
certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant
in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence therein
showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper
and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another
ice plant of two and one-half (2-) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that
the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his
death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the
proposed service". The commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in
the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be
issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing
said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed
by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice
plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the
Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the
said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal,
and in Quezon City", subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail.
Petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to
allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O.
Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the
commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied
for, which is said to be in contravention of law. If Pedro O. Fragante had not
died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute
his application before the commission to its final conclusion. If Pedro O.
Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and
during the life of the option he died, if the option had been given him in the
ordinary course of business and not out of special consideration for his person,
there would be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would
have survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case there
would also be the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his
estate or legal representative fail to comply with the conditions of the option.
In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and
acquire the desired certificate of public convenience the evidence
established that the public needed the ice plant was under the law
conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability to
maintain and operate the service. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain
such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its
objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here
is no different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in the
illustration just given.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a
"citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public
Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and
categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue certificates of
public convenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity "only to
citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations,
copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and
organized under the laws of the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty
per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong entirely
to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.
HELD:
YES.
The estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or
juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his
estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration
thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which
survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his
pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case,
consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As
stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite

just one example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil
rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the
term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial
or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the
constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due
process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. We
take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or
juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in
others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure
estates of deceased persons.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in
view of the evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission
the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one
change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its
economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the
service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent
himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his
heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is
the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from
inheriting it.
WHEREFORE, decision affirmed, without costs.
G.R. No. L-28067 March 10, 1928

BASILIA ARAYATA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FLORENTINO JOYA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FACTS:
Cecilio Joya, during his lifetime, inherited from his deceased parents the
right of lease to six lots of the friar lands at Santa Crus de Malabon,
municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite. Cecilio Joya married the herein
plaintiff, Basilia Arayata. When the Insular Government acquired the said land,
Cecilio Joya continued his lease in accordance with the provisions of the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902 and Act No. 1120 of the Philippine Commission.
While married to the herein plaintiff-appellant, Cecilio Joya purchase the lots
he had been leasing, on installments, from the Government. In order not to lose
them, Cecilio Joya had Pedro Tiongco buy them, supplying him with the
necessary funds. Subsequently, Pedro Tiongco transferred his right to said lots
to Cecilio Joya by donation. These transfers were approved by the Director of
Lands and noted in the proper registry book. Cecilio Joya conveyed his right to
lot to Florentino Joya consideration of the sum of P2,000 said conveyance
having been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the proper
registry book. On May 11, 1919, Cecilio Joya conveyed his right to lot to
Marcelina Joya and Francisco Joya in consideration of the sum of P450,
conveyance having been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in
the proper registry book. On April 27, 1919, Cecilio Joya executed a will
devising lot to Florentino Joya, Pablo Joya, Delfin and Felicisima Blancaflor,
brothers Agustin and Pedro Joya, Feliciano and Asuncion Bobadilla, and
Marcelina and Francisca Joya. At the time of his death, Cecilio Joya had not
yet completed the payment of the price of the lots mentioned above to the
Insular Government. All the lots in question except one, are in the possession
of the defendants, who enjoy their products. On May 10, 1920 some lots were
transferred to Florentino Joya as administrator of the estate of the deceased
Cecilio Joya.
On May 26, 1919, Cecilio Joya died, his executor, the herein defendant
Florentino Joya, presented said will for probate to the Court of First Instance
of Cavite, which was probated after the proper proceedings. In the course of
the testamentary proceedings, the executor Florentino Joya presented an
alleged agreement of partition by the legatees, which agreement was

disapproved by the court in view of the herein plaintiff's opposition, who
alleged that her signature had been obtained by fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the herein plaintiff-appellant is entitled to the possession
and the products of the friar lands acquired by the Insular Government,
which, by virtue of the law, pass exclusively to the surviving spouse upon
compliance of the legal requirements,
HELD:
YES.
While a deceased heirs or legatees acquire the ownership of the property
given them in the will and may taken possession of their respective portions
upon the death of their predecessor, yet upon the appointment of an
administrator, the latter, by virtue of his appointment, acquires a right to the
possession of the property of estate, subject to the orders of the court, unless
he consents to the heirs continuing in possession thereof. But such consent
does not, however, relieve the administrator of all responsibility for the
management of the same and its fruits; because until the judicial partition is
made, said property continues to belong to the testamentary estate.
(Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil., 436; Fernandez vs. Tria, 22 Phil., 603.)
Being a matter of law, the defendants-appellants cannot plead ignorance
of the fact that until a judicial partition of the property left by Cecilio Joya is
made, said property belongs to the lather's estate and it together with its
products, is subject to the payment of the testator's debts, if any. Only after
judicial partition has been made do they acquire the title to their respective
legacies, if the latter are valid. (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva
Caceres, 45 Phil., 895.) We have seen that the legacies given by Cecilio Joya to
the defendants were void. If the lands, which are the subject matter of said
legacies and which are in the possession of the defendants, still belong to
Cecilio Joya's estate, because no judicial partition has as yet been made of the
property he left, which is subject, together with its fruits, to the payment of
his debts, said defendants cannot invoke the provisions of the Civil Code with
respect to possession in good faith insofar as the fruits are concerned;
because even when the legacies are valid they acquired only when the latter
judicially assigned to them in the final partition, and because, while said lands
are under administration, the administrator is obliged to render an account of
his management of the same and the products thereof.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is
modified, and it is ordered that Feliciano and Pablo Joya, Asuncion Bobadilla,
Delfin and Felicisima Blancaflor return lots Nos. 1031, 1086, 1153, and 2352 to
the plaintiff-appellant, Basilia Arayata, together with their products, or the
latter's equivalent in cash from the year 1920 until their restitution, deducting
the necessary expenses of cultivation, preservation, and production. Without
any special pronouncement as to costs, it is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990

LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO
ALVAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS
YANES, ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and
ILUMINADO YANES, respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora.
Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of
Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and
Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita
(Jovito) Alib. It is not clear why the latter is not included as a party in this
case. Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three
hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two
lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record does
not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the
lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle
in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to
Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the
parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there
to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that
Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession
of Lot 773. Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title
covering Lot 773-A. TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot
773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT
No. 8804. The bigger portion of Lot 773 was also registered in the name of
Fortunato D. Santiago. Said transfer certificate of title also contains a
certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT
No. 8804. Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in
consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. Consequently, on February 20, 1956,
TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name.
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the
administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special
Proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion
requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B. By virtue of a court order
granting said motion, on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said
lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to
Rosendo Alvarez. Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the
children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against
Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession
of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of the
land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the defendants,
that after court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent
due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay
plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees. During the
pendency in court of said case, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot
for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. Meanwhile, Jesus Yanes, in his own
behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed
a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs
"renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise, against
the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the aboveentitled case."
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are correct in their contention that the
liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo
Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo
Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.
HELD:
NO.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in
this jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of
the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which
the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of
the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to

another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or
by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond
the value of the property received from the decedent.
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot
escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to
the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property
involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary
equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate,
and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality
for the payment of the debts of the estate. It must, however, be made clear
that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance.
With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are
other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount
adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb
the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000

RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED
DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING
CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents.
BUENA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim
whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings.
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing
Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action
Company are corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws
and which owned real properties covered under the Torrens system. On 11
June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse
and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, fried on 17 March 1995, a joint
petition for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Private respondent corporations, whose
properties were included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then
filed a motion for the lifting of lis pendens and motion for exclusion of certain
properties from the estate of the decedent. The Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City granted the private respondents' twin motions. Moreover,
petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent
corporations are properly part of the decedent's estate but also the private
respondent corporations themselves. Petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y.
Lim during his lifetime, organized and wholly-owned the five corporations,
which are the private respondents in the instant case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of
and be included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person?
HELD:
NO.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and

distinct from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held
liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the
personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected
with it.
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a
personality distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the same
vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a
protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons
comprising it. Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see
through the protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities
that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from
a seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction. The
corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a
corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation.
Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated; where a
wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of
legal entity should come to naught. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or
by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation
is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate
corporate personalities.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of
Appeals which nullified and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12
September 1995 is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 145736 March 4, 2009

ESTATE OF ORLANDO LLENADO and WENIFREDA T. LLENADO, in her
capacity as (a) Administratrix of the Estate of Orlando A. Llenado and (b)
Judicial Guardian of the Minor children of Orlando A. Llenado, and (c) in her
Own behalf as the Surviving Spouse and Legal Heir of Orlando A.
Llenado, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO LLENADO, JORGE LLENADO, FELIZA GALLARDO VDA.
DE LLENADO and REGISTER OF DEEDS of Valenzuela City, Metro
Manila, Respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land denominated as Lot
249-D-1 (subject lot) consisting of 1,554 square meters located in Barrio Malinta,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and registered in the names of Eduardo Llenado
(Eduardo) and Jorge Llenado (Jorge) under Transfer of Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. V-1689.4 The subject lot once formed part of Lot 249-D owned by
and registered in the name of their father, Cornelio Llenado (Cornelio), under
TCT No. T-16810.
On December 2, 1975, Cornelio leased Lot 249-D-1 to his nephew, Romeo
Llenado (Romeo), for a period of five years, renewable for another five years at
the option of Cornelio. On March 31, 1978, Cornelio, Romeo and the latters
cousin Orlando Llenado (Orlando) executed an Agreement whereby Romeo
assigned all his rights to Orlando over the unexpired portion of the aforesaid
lease contract. The parties further agreed that Orlando shall have the option
to renew the lease contract for another three years commencing from
December 3, 1980, up to December 2, 1983, renewable for another four years or
up to December 2, 1987, and that "during the period that [this agreement] is
enforced, the x x x property cannot be sold, transferred, alienated or conveyed
in whatever manner to any third party." Shortly thereafter or on June 24, 1978,
Cornelio and Orlando entered into a Supplementary Agreement amending the
March 31, 1978 Agreement. Under the Supplementary Agreement, Orlando was
given an additional option to renew the lease contract for an aggregate period
of 10 years at five-year intervals, that is, from December 3, 1987 to December 2,
1992 and from December 3, 1992 to December 2, 1997. The said provision was
inserted in order to comply with the requirements of Mobil Philippines, Inc. for
the operation of a gasoline station which was subsequently built on the subject
lot. Upon the death of Orlando on November 7, 1983, his wife, Wenifreda
Llenado (Wenifreda), took over the operation of the gasoline station.
Meanwhile, on January 29, 1987, Cornelio sold Lot 249-D to his children, namely,
Eduardo, Jorge, Virginia and Cornelio, Jr., through a deed of sale,
denominated as "Kasulatan sa Ganap Na Bilihan,"7 for the sum of P160,000.00.
As stated earlier, the subject lot, which forms part of Lot 249-D, was sold to
Eduardo and Jorge, and titled in their names under TCT No. V-1689. Several
months thereafter or on September 7, 1987, Cornelio passed away. Sometime in
1993, Eduardo informed Wenifreda of his desire to take over the subject lot.
However, the latter refused to vacate the premises despite repeated demands.
Thus, on September 24, 1993, Eduardo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila against
Wenifreda.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale of the subject lot by Cornelio to his sons, respondents
Eduardo and Jorge, is invalid for (1) violating the prohibitory clause in the lease
agreement between Cornelio, as lessor-owner, and Orlando, as lessee; and (2)
contravening the right of first refusal of Orlando over the subject lot.
HELD:
NO.
It is not disputed that the lease agreement contained an option to renew
and a prohibition on the sale of the subject lot in favor of third persons while
the lease is in force. Petitioner claims that when Cornelio sold the subject lot
to respondents Eduardo and Jorge the lease was in full force and effect, thus,
the sale violated the prohibitory clause rendering it invalid. In resolving this
issue, it is necessary to determine whether the lease agreement was in force at
the time of the subject sale and, if it was in force, whether the violation of the
prohibitory clause invalidated the sale.
Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, the heirs are bound by the
contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights
and obligations therein are not transmissible by their nature, by stipulation or
by provision of law. A contract of lease is, therefore, generally transmissible to

the heirs of the lessor or lessee. It involves a property right and, as such, the
death of a party does not excuse non-performance of the contract. The rights
and obligations pass to the heirs of the deceased and the heir of the deceased
lessor is bound to respect the period of the lease. The same principle applies to
the option to renew the lease. As a general rule, covenants to renew a lease are
not personal but will run with the land. Consequently, the successors-ininterest of the lessee are entitled to the benefits, while that of the lessor are
burdened with the duties and obligations, which said covenants conferred and
imposed on the original parties.
The foregoing principles apply with greater force in this case because the
parties expressly stipulated in the March 31, 1978 Agreement that Romeo, as
lessee, shall transfer all his rights and interests under the lease contract with
option to renew "in favor of the party of the Third Part (Orlando), the latters
heirs, successors and assigns" indicating the clear intent to allow the
transmissibility of all the rights and interests of Orlando under the lease
contract unto his heirs, successors or assigns. Accordingly, the rights and
obligations under the lease contract with option to renew were transmitted
from Orlando to his heirs upon his death on November 7, 1983.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 118248 April 5, 2000

DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U. BARTOLOME and REGISTER OF
DEEDS FOR METRO MANILA, DISTRICT III, respondents.
FACTS:
On March 16, 1988, petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease with
Option to Buy with Encarnacion Bartolome, whereby petitioner was given the
option to lease or lease with purchase the subject land, which option must be
exercised within a period of two years counted from the signing of the
Contract. In turn, petitioner undertook to pay P3,000.00 a month as
consideration for the reservation of its option. Within the two-year period,
petitioner shall serve formal written notice upon the lessor Encarnacion
Bartolome of its desire to exercise its option. The contract also provided that
in case petitioner chose to lease the property, it may take actual possession of
the premises. In such an event, the lease shall be for a period of six years,
renewable for another six years, and the monthly rental fee shall be P15,000.00
for the first six years and P18,000.00 for the next six years, in case of renewal.
Petitioner regularly paid the monthly P3,000.00 provided for by the Contract
to Encarnacion until her death in January 1990. Thereafter, petitioner coursed
its payment to private respondent Victor Bartolome, being the sole heir of
Encarnacion. Victor, however, refused to accept these payments. Meanwhile,
on January 10, 1990, Victor executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication over all
the properties of Encarnacion, including the subject lot. Accordingly,
respondent Register of Deeds cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. B37615 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-14249 in the name of Victor
Bartolome. Petitioner served upon Victor, via registered mail, notice that it was
exercising its option to lease the property, tendering the amount of P15,000.00
as rent for the month of March. Again, Victor refused to accept the tendered
rental fee and to surrender possession of the property to petitioner. Petitioner
thus opened Savings Account No. 1-04-02558-I-1 with the China Banking
Corporation, Cubao Branch, in the name of Victor Bartolome and deposited
therein the P15,000.00 rental fee for March as well as P6,000.00 reservation
fees for the months of February and March. Petitioner filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages against Victor and the Register of Deeds.
Petitioner prayed for the surrender and delivery of possession of the subject
land in accordance with the Contract terms; the surrender of title for
registration and annotation thereon of the Contract; and the payment of
P500,000.00 as actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P300,000.00 as attorney's fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into
by the late Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner was terminated upon her
death or whether it binds her sole heir, Victor, even after her demise.
HELD:
NO.
The general rule is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by
their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising
therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision
of law.
In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal
provision making the rights and obligations under the contract intransmissible.
More importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein are, by their
nature, transmissible.
It has also been held that a good measure for determining whether a
contract terminates upon the death of one of the parties is whether it is of
such a character that it may be performed by the promissor's personal
representative. Contracts to perform personal acts which cannot be as well
performed by others are discharged by the death of the promissor. Conversely,
where the service or act is of such a character that it may as well be
performed by another, or where the contract, by its terms, shows that
performance by others was contemplated, death does not terminate the
contract or excuse nonperformance. 11
In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from the late
Encarnacion Bartolome. Rather, the obligation of Encarnacion in the contract
to deliver possession of the subject property to petitioner upon the exercise by
the latter of its option to lease the same may very well be performed by her heir
Victor.
As early as 1903, it was held that "(H)e who contracts does so for himself
and his heirs." In 1952, it was ruled that if the predecessor was duty-bound to
reconvey land to another, and at his death the reconveyance had not been
made, the heirs can be compelled to execute the proper deed for
reconveyance. This was grounded upon the principle that heirs cannot escape
the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-ininterest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability
affecting their common ancestor. It is futile for Victor to insist that he is not a
party to the contract because of the clear provision of Article 1311 of the Civil
Code. Indeed, being an heir of Encarnacion, there is privity of interest between
him and his deceased mother. He only succeeds to what rights his mother had
and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against
him.
In the case at bar, the subject matter of the contract is likewise a lease,
which is a property right. The death of a party does not excuse
nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right, and the rights
and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the
deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party
when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the
contract.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is
GRANTED.
G.R. No. 121940 December 4, 2001

JESUS SAN AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO MENEZ, JR., respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
On February 11, 1974, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
sold to a certain Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, a parcel of residential land with an
area of 168 square meters located in Rosario, Pasig City and denominated as
Lot 13, Block 7, Pcs-5816 of the Government Service and Insurance System Low
Cost Housing Project (GSIS-LCHP). The sale is evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale. 2 On February 19, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in
the name of Macaria Vda. de Caiquep. Sometime in 1979, for being suspected
as a subversive, an Arrest, Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) was issued against
private respondent. Military men ransacked his house in Cainta, Rizal. Upon
learning that he was wanted by the military, he voluntarily surrendered and was
detained for two (2) years. When released, another order for his re-arrest was
issued so he hid in Mindanao for another four (4) years or until March 1984. In
December of 1990, he discovered that the subject TCT was missing. He
consulted a lawyer but the latter did not act immediately on the matter. Upon
consulting a new counsel, an Affidavit of Loss5 was filed with the Register of
Deeds of Pasig and a certified copy6 of TCT No. 436465 was issued. Private
respondent also declared the property for tax purposes and obtained a
certification thereof from the Assessor's Officer. Private respondent sent
notices to the registered owner at her address appearing in the title and in the
Deed of Sale. And, with his counsel, he searched for the ,registered owner in
Metro Manila and Rizal and as far as Samar, Leyte, Calbayog City, Tacloban
City, and in Eastern and Northern Samar. However, their search proved futile.
On July 8, 1992 private respondent filed a petition docketed as LRC Case No.
R-4659 with the RTC, Branch 154, Pasig, Metro Manila for the issuance of
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 436465 to replace the lost one. To show he
was the owner of the contested lot, he showed the Deed of Absolute Sale,
Exhibit "D". The petition was set for hearing and the court's order dated July
10, 1992 was published once in Malaya, a nationally circulated newspaper in the
Philippines. On September 18, 1992, there being no opposition, Menez presented
his evidence ex-parte. The trial court granted his petition. On October 13, 1992,
herein petitioner, Jesus San Agustin, received a copy of the abovecited
decision. He-claimed this was the first time he became aware of the case of her
aunt, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep who, according to him, died sometime in 1974.
Claiming that he was the present occupant of the property and the heir of
Macaria, he filed his "Motion to Reopen Reconstitution Proceedings''11 on
October 27, 1992. On December 3, 1992, RTC issued an order denying said
motion. Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which, as earlier
stated, was denied in its decision of May 19, 1995. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration, but it was denied in a resolution dated September 11, 1995.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent's allegation that failure to send
notice to petitioner who is the actual possessor of the disputed lot is fatal to
the present case.
HELD:
NO.
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the "Property
Registration Decree" is decisive. It provides:
Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case
of loss or theft of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, due notice
under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as
the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a
new certificate to him or for :the registration of any instrument, a sworn
statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the
registered owner or other person it interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest,
the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a
new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact
that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all
respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and
shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
Here, petitioner does not appear to have an interest in the property

based on the memorandum of encumbrances annotated at the back of the
title. His claim, that he is an heir (nephew) of the original owner of the lot
covered by the disputed lot and the present occupant thereof is not annotated
in the said memorandum of encumbrances. Neither was his claim entered on
the Certificate of Titles in the name of their original/former owners on file
with the Register of Deeds at the time of the filing or pendency of LRC Case
No. R-4659. Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to notice.
Noteworthy is the fact that there was compliance by private respondent
of the RTC's order of publication of the petition in a newspaper of general
circulation. This is sufficient notice of the petition to the public at large.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED, and the decision of the
respondent court is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 146006

February 23, 2004
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and
Corporate Secretary, respectively, of Philippines International Life Insurance
Company, and FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP, petitioners
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 presided by
JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y.
ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G. RIVERA and PEDRO L.
BORJA, all of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA.
DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be Special Administratrix, and other persons/
public officers acting for and in their behalf, respondents.
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, representing Philinterlife and
FLAG, assail not only the validity of the writ of execution issued by the
intestate court dated July 7, 2000 but also the validity of the August 11, 1997
order of the intestate court nullifying the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares
of stock made by Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez, in their personal
capacities and without court approval, in favor of petitioner FLAG.
What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of the
decedent without securing court approval have appropriated as their own
personal property the properties of [the] Estate, to the exclusion and the
extreme prejudice of the other claimant/heirs. In other words, these heirs,
without court approval, have distributed the asset of the estate among
themselves and proceeded to dispose the same to third parties even in the
absence of an order of distribution by the Estate Court. As admitted by
petitioners counsel, there was absolutely no legal justification for this action
by the heirs. There being no legal justification, petitioner has no basis for
demanding that public respondent [the intestate court] approve the sale of
the Philinterlife shares of the Estate by Juliana and Jose Ortaez in favor of
the Filipino Loan Assistance Group.
Parties to the Memorandum of Agreement dated March 4, 1982 are not
the only heirs claiming an interest in the estate left by Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez.
The records of this caseshow that as early as March 3, 1981 an Opposition to
the Application for Issuance of Letters of Administration was filed by the
acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P.Ortaez with LigayaNovicio.
This claim by the acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez is

admittedly known to the parties to the Memorandum of Agreement before
they executed the same. This much was admitted by petitioners counsel during
the oral argument.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction in nullifying the
sale of stocks by the petitioner [Jose Ortaez] and his mother
[Juliana Ortaez] of the Philinterlife shares belonging to the Estate
of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez.
2. Whether or not an heir has the right to dispose of the decedents
property pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate
court.
HELD:
1. NO.
Public respondent can never be faulted for not approving the
subsequent sale by the petitioner [Jose Ortaez] and his mother [Juliana
Ortaez] of the Philinterlife shares belonging to the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P.
Ortaez.
It is clear that Juliana Ortaez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and
Antonio, all surnamed Ortaez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of
agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves,
despite their knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate
and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since the
appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortaez and her children
(Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortaez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by
Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise
void.
2. NO.
Whileitistruethatan heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in
the property under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which
provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the
heir without interruption from the moment of death of the

decedent.However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that
may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate
court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or
the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares.This means that an
heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific
property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold
specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife)
in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final
adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue
prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what happened
in the present case.
Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate,
without court approval. It is well-settled that court approval is necessary for
the validity of any disposition of the decedents estate. In the early case
ofGodoy vs. Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of the property of
the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate court is void
and passes no title to the purchaser.
G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004

TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her
husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O.
UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA UNGOS, petitioners
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P.

ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO
JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P.
ORFINADA, respondents.
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles
City leaving several personal and real properties located in Angeles
City,Dagupan City and KalookanCity. He also left a widow, respondent
Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he
had seven children who are the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P.
Orfinada, Alfonso Clyde P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso
James P. Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada
(deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada.
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in
mourning his paramour and their children. They are petitioner TeodoraRiofero,
who became a part of his life when he entered into an extra-marital
relationship with her during the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza
sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena.
Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on
June
29,
1995,
petitioner
TeodoraRioferio
and her children executed anExtrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a
Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the
decedent located in Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds
in Dagupanissued Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of
petitioners TeodoraRioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada
and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents also found out that petitioners
were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan
Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the
extra-judicial settlement.
Respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra
Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real

Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos.
63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related Documents with Damages against
petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of
Dagupan City before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.
Petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the

defense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial
settlement pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of
TeodoraRoofers and that the titles thereof were delivered to her as an
advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his
name. Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not
the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in
view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate
pending the appointment of an administrator.
HELD:
YES.
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt
have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code that (t)he
rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the
property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a
person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by
operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the
heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been
appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to
the heirs in the rules on party representation.
II. WILLS
A. CONCEPT AND NATURE OF WILLS
G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENACOSCOLUELLA Y

BELLEZA VILLACARLOS,respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
FACTS:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix

AlejaBelleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein
petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of parcel of land.
The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he
dies, every year to give Maria MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic) piculs of
Export sugar and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria
MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza dies.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to
enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.
In the said Codicil, testatrix AlejaBelleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be
delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the
said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the
fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the codicils should be given effect.
HELD:
YES.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned
unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an
obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver
one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena
CoscolluelaBelleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did
not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution
as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear,
though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be
turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because
it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the
efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an
obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it
clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator.
In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not
conditional.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of
the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is
to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made. Such construction as will sustain and
uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.
A Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person
disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. Since the Will
expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed,
the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will
cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat
the very purpose of making a Will.
G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997

MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE,
MARITES AGAPE, ESTABANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondents.
FACTS:
TORRES, JR., J.:
Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape,

Marites Agape, EstebanaGalolo and Celsa Agape, the oppositors in Special
Proceedings No. 112 for the probate of the will of Torcuato J. Reyes.
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and
testament declaring
xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion Oning R. Reyes the
following properties to wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of
jewelries, coins, antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the
building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I
own in common with my brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao,
Mahinog, Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camiguin; real estates in Lunao, Ginoong,
Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc, Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines,
Caesta, Talisayan, all in the province of Misamis Oriental..
The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for paragraph II (a) and
(b) of the will which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and
morals. Hence, Julio Vivares filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals with
the allegation that the oppositors failed to present any competent evidence
that Asuncion Reyes was legally married to another person during the period of
her cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes.
The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which affirmed

the trial courts decision admitting the will for probate but the modification
that paragraph II including subparagraphs (a) and (b) were declared valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in declaring that the
contested testamentary disposition in the will is valid.
HELD:
No.
TheCourtofAppealsdidnoterrindeclaringthatthesaidtestamentarydisposit
ionsare valid.As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to
pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus,
the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with
the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the
testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficacy of the wills provisions.The intrinsic validity is not considered since the
consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and
allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic
validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its
face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is
intrinsically invalid.The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because
practical considerations demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or
the testamentary provisions are doubtful legality.Where the parties agree that
the intrinsic validity be first determined, the probate court may also do
so. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will
The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of
the will of the late Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in
the said proceeding were: (1) whether or not the testator had animus testandi;
(2) whether or not vices of consent attended the execution of the will; and (3)
whether or not the formalities of the will had been complied with. Thus, the
lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that

Asuncion Oning Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the
probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of
the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the wills intrinsic validity and
which need not be inquired upon by the probate court.
In this case, there is a presumption of marriage wherein the testator
himself declared in his will that Asuncion is his wife. Moreover, in the elegant
language of Justice Moreland written decades ago, he saidA will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have
substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator
stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as
they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation
of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak
after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument,
permitted them to do so. xxx All doubts must be resolved in favor of the
testators having meant just what he said. (Santosvs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TESTAMENTARY ACT
G.R. No. 1439

March 19, 1904
ANTONIO CASTAEDA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE E. ALEMANY, defendant-appellant.
WILLARD, J.:
FACTS:
Appellant contested the validity of the will of Doa Juana Moreno upon
the ground that although the attestation clause in the will states that the
testator signed the will in the presence of three witnesses who also each signed
in each presence, the will was not actually written by the testator.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary that a will be written by the testator
herself.
HELD:
No.
There is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which supports the claim of the appellants that the will must be
written by the testator himself or by someone else in his presence and under his
express direction. That section requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2)
either that the testator sign it himself or, if he does sign it, that it be signed by
someone in his presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical
work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in
this case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testatrix is
of no consequence.
G.R. No. L-2071

September 19, 1950
Testate estate of Isabel V. Florendo, deceased. TIRSO DACANAY, petitionerappellant,
vs.
PEDRO V. FLORENDO, ET AL., oppositor-appellees.
OZAETA, J.:
FACTS:
This is a special proceeding commenced in the Court of First Instance of

La Union to probate a joint and reciprocal will executed by the spouses Isabel
V. Florendo and Tirso Dacanay on October 20, 1940. Isabel V. Florendo having
died, her surviving spouse Tirso Dacanay is seeking to probate said joint and
reciprocal will, which provides in substance that whoever of the spouses, joint
testators, shall survive the other, shall inherit all the properties of the latter,
with an agreement as to how the surviving spouse shall dispose of the
properties in case of his or her demise.
The relatives of the deceased Isabel V. Florendo opposed the probate of
said will on various statutory grounds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said joint and reciprocal will may be probated in view
of article 669 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
No.
The
execution
wills in a
reciprocal
prohibition of article 669 of the Civil Code is directed against the

of a joint will, or the expression by two or more testators of their
single document and by one act, rather than against mutual or
wills, which may be separately executed.
Article 669 of the Civil Code reads as follows:
ART. 669. Two or more persons cannot make a will conjointly or in the same
instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third
person.
The reason for this provision, especially as regards husband and wife, is
that when a will is made jointly or in the same instrument, the spouse who is
more aggressive, stronger in will or character and dominant is liable to dictate
the terms of the will for his or her own benefit or for that of third persons
whom he or she desires to favor. And, where the will is not only joint but
reciprocal, either one of the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous,
wicked, faithless or desperate, knowing as he or she does the terms of the will
whereby the whole property of the spouses both conjugal and paraphernal goes
to the survivor, may be tempted to kill or dispose of the other.
G.R. No. L-20234

December 23, 1964
PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
On May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and GervasiaRebaca,

executed a joint last will and testament in the local dialect whereby they willed
that "our two parcels of land acquired during our marriage together with all
improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, our niece, whom we
have nurtured since childhood, because God did not give us any child in our
union, Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot", and that "while each
of the testators is yet living, he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the
two lands aforementioned", the said two parcels of land being covered by Tax
No. 4676 and Tax No. 6677, both situated in sitioBucao, barrio Lugo,
municipality of Borbon, province of Cebu. Bernabedela Serna died on August
30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was submitted to probate by said Gervasia and
Manuela before the Court of First Instance of Cebu which, after due
publication as required by law and there being no opposition, heard the
evidence, and, by Order of October 31, 1939; in Special Proceedings No. 499.
Upon the death of GervasiaRebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for
the probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed on
November 6, 1952, being Special Proceedings No. 1016-R of the same Court of
First Instance of Cebu, but for failure of the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot and
her attorney, Manuel Potot to appear, for the hearing of said petition, the
case was dismissed on March 30, 1954.
The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the
testament null and void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint
wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of
the Philippines); but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals
reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a
court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the

testament.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the joint will executed is valid.
HELD:
No.
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate,
entered in 1939 by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator,
Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will and
testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the
invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or
in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). The error thus committed by
the probate court was an error of law, that should have been corrected by
appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the
conclusive effect of its final decision, however erroneous. A final judgment
rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world
(Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estates of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156); and
public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors
judgment of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by
law. Interest rei publicaeut finis set litium (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil, 521,
and other cases cited in 2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1963 Ed.,
p. 322).
The SupremeCourtaddedthat the probate decree in 1939 could only
affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not
include the disposition of the share of the wife, GervasiaRebaca, who was then
still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court
acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in
issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be
probated during the testator's lifetime.
It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the
wife was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de
novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. Thus
regarded, the holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will
is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased
GervasiaRebaca in the properties in question.
Therefore, the undivided interest of GervasiaRebaca should pass upon
her death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir,
unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the
only heir intestate of said Gervasia.
It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in
common usage could not make them valid when our Civil Codes consistently
invalidated them, because laws are only repealed by other subsequent laws, and
no usage to the contrary may prevail against their observance (Art. 5, Civ. Code
of 1889; Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950).
C. RULES IN INTERPRETATION OF WILLS
G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997

MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE,
MARITES AGAPE, ESTABANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondents.
FACTS:
TORRES, JR., J.:
Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape,

Marites Agape, EstebanaGalolo and Celsa Agape, the oppositors in Special
Proceedings No. 112 for the probate of the will of Torcuato J. Reyes.
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and
testament declaring
xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion Oning R. Reyes the
following properties to wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of
jewelries, coins, antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the
building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I
own in common with my brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao,
Mahinog, Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camiguin; real estates in Lunao, Ginoong,
Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc, Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines,
Caesta, Talisayan, all in the province of Misamis Oriental..
The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for paragraph II (a) and
(b) of the will which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and
morals. Hence, Julio Vivares filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals with
the allegation that the oppositors failed to present any competent evidence
that Asuncion Reyes was legally married to another person during the period of
her cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes.
The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which affirmed

the trial courts decision admitting the will for probate but the modification
that paragraph II including subparagraphs (a) and (b) were declared valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in declaring that the
contested testamentary disposition in the will is valid.
HELD:
No.
TheCourtofAppealsdidnoterrindeclaringthatthesaidtestamentarydisposit
ionsare valid.As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to
pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus,
the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with
the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the
testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficacy of the wills provisions.The intrinsic validity is not considered since the
consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and
allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic
validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its
face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is
intrinsically invalid.The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because
practical considerations demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or
the testamentary provisions are doubtful legality.Where the parties agree that
the intrinsic validity be first determined, the probate court may also do
so. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will
The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the
probate of the will of the late Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be
settled in the said proceeding were: (1) whether or not the testator had animus
testandi; (2) whether or not vices of consent attended the execution of the
will; and (3) whether or not the formalities of the will had been complied
with. Thus, the lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the

testator that Asuncion Oning Reyes was his wife did not have to be
scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of
Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the
wills intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the probate
court.
In this case, there is a presumption of marriage wherein the testator
himself declared in his will that Asuncion is his wife. Moreover, in the elegant
language of Justice Moreland written decades ago, he saidA will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have
substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator
stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as
they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation
of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak
after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument,
permitted them to do so. xxx All doubts must be resolved in favor of the
testators having meant just what he said. (Santosvs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
D. GOVERNING LAW
G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011

PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILLOF RUPERTA PALAGANAS
WITHPRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENTOF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,
MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners
vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS,Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who
became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In
the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her
brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had
left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S..
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto),
another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his
appointment as special administrator of her estate.
However, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin
Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on
the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in the Philippines but in
the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming
Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for
having been executed under duress and without the testators full
understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also
not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
The RTC issued an order:(a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of
Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the
Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and

Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),arguing that an unprobated
will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the
first time in the Philippines.
The Court of Appeals held that the RTC properly allowed the probate
of the will, subject to respondent Ernestos submission of the authenticated
copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required
bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does
not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its
execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case, said
the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated
and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or
procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated
in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and
allowed in the country where it was executed.
HELD:
No.
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners
abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the
countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to
the formalities observed in his country.
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the
settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the
executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested
in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the
court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will
must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the
names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the
estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the
will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody
of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his
residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is
sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been
allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979

FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA,
ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY
PROVINCE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO
BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE
S. ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, respondents.
FACTS:
GUERRERO, J.:
Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doa FlorentinaRella, both of Ligao,
Albay, together with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo
Alsua, Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and
AmparoAlsua de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura
de Particion Extrajudicial over the then present and existing properties of the
spouses Don Jesus and Doa Florentina.
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doa Florentina, also known as Doa
Tinay separately executed their respective holographic willsthe provisions of
which were in conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition
of November 25, 1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the
institution of the other to his or her share in the conjugal properties, the other
half of the conjugal assets having been partitioned to constitute their legitime
among their four living children in the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949. The wigs
also declared that in the event of future acquisitions of other properties by
either of them, one-half thereof would belong to the other spouse, and the
other half shall be divided equally among the four children.
As previously stated, Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar
holographic will on the same day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly the same terms and
conditions as the above will of his wife.
On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;aTinay filed before the
Court of First Instance of Albay their respective petitions for the probate of
their respective holographic wills.
On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;aTinay executed
their mutual and reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their
respective holographic wins. Again, the codicils similarly acknowledged and
provided that one-half of all the properties of the spouses, conjugal and
paraphernal, had been disposed of, conveyed to and partitioned among their
legitimate heirs in the "Escritura de Particion" of November 25, 1949, but that
they reserved for themselves (the spouses Don Jesus and Do;aTinay) the
other half or those not disposed of to the said legitimate heirs under the above
agreement of partition, and that they mutually and reciprocally bequeathed
unto each other their participation therein as well as in all properties which
might be acquired subsequently. Each spouse also declared that should she or
he be the surviving spouse, whatever belongs to him or her or would pertain to
him or her, would be divided equally among the four children. It was also
declared in both codicils that upon the death of either of the spouses, the
surviving spouse was designated mutually and reciprocally as the executor or
administrator of all the properties reserved for themselves.
On the same day, August 14, 1956, Don Jesus executed also a separate
but similar codicil in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above codicil
of his wife. Also on the same day of August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus
and Doa Tinay both filed their respective supplemental petitions for the
probate of their respective codicils in the probate proceedings earlier filed. On
February 19, 1957, their respective holographic wills and the codicils thereto
were duly admitted to probate.
Upon the death of Doa Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was named
executor to serve without bond in an order issued by the probate court on
October 13, 1959. Letters testamentary having been issued in favor of Don
Jesus, he took his oath of office and performed his duties as such until July 1,
1960.
Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his
holographic will in the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P.
Ramirez, whom he instructed to make a list of all his remaining properties with
their corresponding descriptions. His lawyer, Atty. Gregorio imperial Sr. was
then instructed to draft a new will which was duly signed by Don Jesus and his
attesting witnesses on November 14, 1959 at Ms home in Ligao, Albay. This

notarial will and testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959 had
three essential features: (a) it expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all the
provisions of Don Jesus' holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of
August 14, 1956; (b) it provided for the collation of all his properties donated to
his four living children by virtue of the "Escritura de Particion Extra. judicial"
of 1949, and that such properties be taken into account in the partition of his
estate among the children; and (c) it instituted his children as legatees/devisees
of certain specific properties, and as to the rest of the properties and
whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death, were
to be given to Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to serve
without a bond.
After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of
Doa Tinay had been paid, all her heirs including Don Jesus, submitted to the
probate court for approval a deed of partition executed on December 19, 1959
and which essentially confirmed the provisions of the partition of 1949, the
holographic will and codicil of Doa Tinay. On July 6, 1960, the court approved
the partition of 1959 and on January 6, 1961 declared the termination of the
proceedings on the estate of Doa Tinay.
On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the
executrix named in the will of November 14, 1959, filed a petition for the
probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua.Oppositions thereto were filed by
Pablo, Amparo and Fernando, thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, on
the following grounds: (a) that Don Jesus was not of sound and disposing mind
at the time of the execution of the alleged will; (b) that the will was executed
under duress or influence of fear or threats; or it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the main beneficiaries and of
person or persons in collusion with them, or the signature of the testator was
secured by or thru fraud; (c) that the will was not executed according to the
formal requirements of the law; and (d) that the alleged will subject of probate
contravened the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949 agreed upon by him, his
deceased spouse, Doa Tinay, and all his children, Francisco, Pablo, Amparo
and Fernando thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and also contravened
Don Jesus' own probated holographic will and codicil of 1955 and 1956,
respectively, essentially confirming and implementing the said partition of 1949
which had already been partially executed by all the signatories thereto in the
partition of the estate of DoaTinay in December, 1959.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not estoppel is applicable in probate proceedings.
2. Whether the respondent court erred in not allowing the probate of
the last will and testament of Don Jesus Alsua..
HELD:
1. No.
The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings.
probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application therein of the
rile of estoppel, when it win block the ascertainment of the truth as to the
circumstances surrounding the execution of a testament, would seem inimical
to public policy. Over and above the interest of private parties is that of the
state to see that testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and only if,
executed conformably to law. The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to
establish the existence of the right of any living person, but to determine
whether or not the decedent has performed the acts specified by the
pertinent statutes, which are the essential prerequisites to personal direction
of the mode of devolution of his property on death. There is no legal but
merely a moral duty resting upon a proponent to attempt to validate the wishes
of the departed, and he may and frequently does receive no personal benefit
from the performance of the act. One of the most fundamental conceptions
of probate law, is that it is the duty of the court to effectuate, in so far as
may be compatible with the public interest, the devolutionary wishes of a
deceased person.
2. YES.
The respondent court erred in denying probate to the will of Don Jesus
dated November 14, 1959; it erred in holding that Don Jesus being a party to
the extrajudicial partition of 1949 was contractually bound by the provisions
thereof and hence could not revoke his participation therein by the simple
expedience of making a new will with contrary provisions or dispositions. It is
an error because the so-called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and
inoperative as a partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because
it involved future inheritance; it may only be given effect as a donation inter
vivos of specific properties to the heirs made by the parents.
Considering that the document, the extrajudicial partition of November
25, 1949, contained specific designation of properties allotted to each child, We
rule that there was substantial compliance with the rules on donations inter
vivos under the old Civil Code (Article 633). On the other hand, there could
have been no valid donation to the children of the other half reserved as the
free portion of Don Jesus and Doa Tinay which, as stated in the deed, was to
be divided equally among the children for the simple reason that the property
or properties were not specifically described in the public instrument, an
essential requirement under Article 633 which provides as follows:
Art. 633. In order that a donation or real property be valid it must be
made by public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically
described and in the amount of the encumbrances to be assumed by the donee
expressed.
The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate public
writing; but it shall produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the
donor.
If the acceptance is made by separate public instrument, authentic
notice thereof shall be given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in
both instruments.
This other half, therefore, remained as the disposable free portion of the
spouses which may be disposed of in such manner that either of the spouses
would like in regards to his or her share in such portion, unencumbered by the
provision enjoining the last surviving spouse to give equally to the children what
belongs or-would pertain to him or her. The end result, therefore, is that Don
Jesus and Doa Tinay, in the Deed of 1949, made to their children valid
donations of only one-half of their combined properties which must be charged
against their legitime and cannot anymore be revoked unless inofficious; the
other half remained entirely at the free disposal of the spouses with regards to
their respective shares.
Upon the death of Doa Tinay on October 2, 1959, her share in the free
portion was distributed in accordance with her holographic will dated January
25, 1955 and her codicil dated August 14, 1956. It must be stressed here that the
distribution of her properties was subject to her holographic win and codicil,
independently of the holographic will and codicil of Don Jesus executed by him
on the same date. This is fundamental because otherwise, to consider both
wills and codicils jointly would be to circumvent the prohibition of the Civil
Code on joint wills (Art. 818) and secondly because upon the death of
Do;aTinay, only her estate was being settled, and not that of Don Jesus.
We have carefully examined the provisions of the holographic will and
codicil of Doa Tinay and We find no indication whatsoever that Doa Tinay
expressly or impliedly instituted both the husband and her children as heirs to
her free portion of her share in the conjugal assets. In her holographic will,
mention of her children as heirs was made.
G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
FACTS:
PARDO, J.:
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish

priest. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the United States
and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the
United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited
his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an
adulterous relationshipwithhis brother. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed
for divorce, which granted. Lorenzo married Alicia Llorente; they lived
together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and
testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed
a petition for letters administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC ruled in
favor of Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as coowner of whatever properties they have acquired. Hence, this petition to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to
remarry.
2. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?
HELD:
1. YES.
In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. In the same case,
the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are
valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held that divorce
obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
2. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will and determine the
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not
covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and
legal capacity since he was a foreigner.
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994

SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18,
RTC, Bulacan, respondent.
FACTS:
QUIASON, J.:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became
American citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New
York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it
is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be
presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a
fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Joses will,
filed
for
separate
probate
proceedings
of
the
wills.
Later, Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in
Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New
York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New
York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and
his brothers and sisters were Joses heirs and as such entitled to notice of the
reprobate
proceedings,
which
Salud
failed
to
give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn,
and that the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she
could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court
already issued an order, disallowing the wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed in the
Philippines.
HELD:
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American
citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the
following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in
which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in
conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed
by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which
have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due
execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has
his domicile in theforeign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has
been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal
is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills. Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner
submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of them.
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very
glaring fact - petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr.
Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent
Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal
or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will
shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented
for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with
regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an
"original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time.
Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he

is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim,
are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under
Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause
copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be
addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge
shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed
for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that
the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies
of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088
July 31, 1954
In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO

SUNTAY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.
FACTS:
PADILLA, J.:
On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the

Philippines, died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China,
leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy,
Fookien province, China, and children by the first marriage had with the late
Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana,
Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr. and a child named Silvino by the second
marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate
proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacanand after
hearing letters of administration were issued to ApolonioSuntay. After the
latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate.
On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to
have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late
Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after
the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the
insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. An appeal
was taken from said order denying the probate of the will and this Court held
the evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will
and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the
further proceedings. In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate
court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh,
an attesting witness to the will, on 7 February 1938 the probate court denied a
motion for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the
surviving widow and dismissed the petition. In the meantime the Pacific War
supervened. After liberation, claiming that he had found among the files,
records and documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese
characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the
same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of
Fookien, China, SilvinoSuntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings
praying for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November
1929 or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4 January 1931.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will of the deceased be allowed in the Philippines.
HELD:
No.
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy,
China, the law on the point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such
country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First
Instance in the Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is
filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other
person interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time
and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines,
the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the
Judge, and attested by the seal of the courts, to which shall be attached a
copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have
the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court
must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of
wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid
will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is

no proof on these points.
Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal
district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two
attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district
court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof
that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the
Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the
proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts
are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it
does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a
proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or
by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested
parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows
that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the
Philippines.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China,does not
purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings.
In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to
have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental
concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills.
Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the
municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as
proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the
will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent
court of this country.
G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.

CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS:
LABRADOR, J.:
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California

where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines
where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his
only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia
(illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of
the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the
matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel
for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply,
illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in
determining the successional rights of his heirs.
HELD:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen
said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal
law which applies to Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule
for Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being domiciled in
the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case was
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings the determination of
the successional rights under Philippine law only.
G.R. No. L-23678
June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositorsappellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
FACTS:
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his
death. Before he died, he had made two wills, one disposing of his Texas
properties, the other, disposing of his Philippine properties. In both wills, his
recognized illegitimate children were not given anything. Texas has no conicts
rule (rule of Private International Law) governing successional rights.
Furthermore, under Texas Law, there are no compulsory heirs and therefore,
no legitimes. The illegitimate children opposed the wills on the ground that they
have been deprived of the legitimes (to which they would be entitled, if
Philippine law were to apply).
ISSUE:
Whether or not they are entitled to their legitimes?
HELD:
Said children are NOT entitled to their legitimes for under Texas law
which we must apply (because it is the national law of the deceased), there are
no legitimes.
The renvoi doctrine, applied in Testate Estate of Edward Christensen,
Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L- 6759, Jan. 31, 1963, cannot be applied. Said
doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country,
and a domiciliary of another. In the present case, the decedent was BOTH a
national and a domiciliary of Texas at the time of his death. So that even
assuming that Texas has a conicts of law rule providing that the law of the
domicile should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi)
to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas Law. Nonetheless, if Texas has
a conicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi
would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In
the absence however of proof as to the conicts of law rule in Texas, it should
not be presumed different from ours. (Lim v. Collector, 36 Phil. 427; In re
Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500).
The contention that the national law of the deceased (Art. 16, par. 2;
Art. 1039) should be disregarded because of Art. 17, par. 3 which in effect
provides that our prohibitive laws should not be rendered nugatory by foreign
laws, is WRONG, rstly, because Art. 16, par. 2 and Art. 1039 are special
provisions while Art. 17, par. 3 is merely a general provision; and secondly,
because Congress deleted the phrase notwithstanding the provisions of this
and the next preceding article when it incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change, the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the
new. It must have been its purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a
specic provision in itself, which must be applied in testate and intestate
successions. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a
new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to
be governed by the national law of the decedent. It is, therefore, evident that
whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. (4) It has been pointed out by the oppositor that the
decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other
his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedents intention
in executing a separate Philippine will, it will NOT ALTER the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 60 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigners
will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void for his national
law, in this regard, cannot be ignored.
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, petitionervs.
HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, respondent
BARREDO, J.:
FACTS:
Charles and Linnie Jane Hodges (Husband and Wife) provided mutually in
their respective will a provision wherein they would give all their estate to the
surviving spouse, and upon the death of the surviving spouse, the remainder of
what has been inherited by the surviving spouse from the earlier deceased
spouse would be bequeathed to the brothers and sisters of the later deceased.
Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. Hodges was appointed special administrator and
later executor of the will. No liquidation was made. Upon death of Mr.
Hodges, Magno was appointed Administratix of Mrs. Hodges estate and was
initially also Mr. Hodges estate but PCIB took over. Probate proceedings for
both estated initiated, the two administrators (PCIB and Magno) differed in
the alleged share of Mrs. Hodges in their conjugal partnership property that
she could have bequeathed to her heirs. PCIB alleged that the estate left by
Mrs. Hodges is less than of her share in the conjugal estate (apply Philippine
law), notwithstanding Art. 16 of our Civil Code which mandates the application
of Texas Law, Mr. Hodges being a citizen of Texas. Magno, on the other hand,
alleged that Texas Law applicable, wherein no system of legitime provided so
estate of Mrs. Hodges could not be less than her share or should be more than
.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine Law, as alleged by PCIB, should be applied and
not Texas Law?
HELD:
NO.Texas Law applies but it is yet to be proven. Elementary is the rule
that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like
any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare
exceptional instances when the said laws are already within the actual
knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally known, or
they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the
parties concerned claim otherwise.
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is
a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in
the probate court. Texas law at the time of her death (and not said law at any
other time).
E.TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
G.R. No. 157451 December 16, 2005
LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, petitioner vs.
JOSEFINA VALMONTE, respondent
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as
follows:
Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time
in the United States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido
finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot
located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in
common with his sister CiriacaValmonte and titled in their names in TCT
123468. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80
he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge
Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years of
wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR
PULMONALE.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English
and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only
on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary
dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end or
bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three
instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the
attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses
at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left hand margin.
Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the
testators will, testified that it was in the first week of June 1983 when the
testator together with the three witnesses of the will went to his house cum
law office and requested him to prepare his last will and testament. After the
testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will,
the notary public told them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to
prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary public kept it safely
hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on
the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were
instructed by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and which they did.
Before the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary
public explained to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect
which the testator spoke and understood. He likewise explained that though
it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his witnesses on June
15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of
town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that
he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not
like the document to appear dirty. The notary public also testified that to his
observation the testator was physically and mentally capable at the time he
affixed his signature on the will.
ISSUE:
Was there a valid will?
HELD:
NO. We are not convinced. Fraud is a trick, secret device, false
statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of
such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or
contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some
extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is
led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made.
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving
the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show
otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible
evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving
allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect
the due execution of a will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not
sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was
more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded
petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken the cudgels of
taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years.
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict
between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document,
because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x xx be executed
and acknowledged on the same occasion. More important, the will must be
subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who
must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before
a notary public. In any event, we agree with the CA that the variance in the
dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily
and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses.
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a grand
conspiracy in the commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the
witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of
the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are
credible evidence of its due execution.Their testimony favoring it and the
finding that it was executed in accordance with the formalities required by law
should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to
identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in
them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it
was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have
stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its
formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its
disposition becomes irrelevant.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. L-6801 March 14, 1912

JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appelle vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, et al., defendants-appellants
TRENT, J.:
FACTS:
The record shows that the testator, PioquintoPaguio, for some fourteen
of fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the
left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became
impaired and that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of
certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He
retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well.
Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and
to other members of his family.
PioquintoPaguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and
items relating to the disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn
delivered to Seor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The
witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which the notes were written
are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to the
testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator
assented each time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the
will as a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a loud
voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that Seor Marco gave
the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in
the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it
in the presence of the testator and each other.
One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the
execution of the will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he
was seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were.
Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether
decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not, because he had been
ill for some years, and that he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The other
subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness for
the opponents. He was unable to state whether or not the will was the wish of
the testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and
advanced age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. The
witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his own
signature as a subscribing witness.
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony
is that the testator had suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some
mental disorder. He does not say that the testator was not in his right mind at
the time of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he
was without the necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not
state in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he
had noticed that the testator did not reply to him on one occasion when he
visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his
answer was in reply to a hypothetical question as to what be the mental
condition of a person who was 79 years old and who had suffered from a
malady such as the testator was supposed to have had according to the
testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He
replied and discussed at some length the symptoms and consequences of the
decease from which the testator had suffered; he read in support of his
statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost. In answer,
however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to certify to
the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease.
ISSUE:
Was the will duly made?
HELD:
YES. We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any
way strengthens the contention of the appellants. Their testimony only
confirms the fact that the testator had been for a number of years prior to his
death afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of which his physician and
mental strength was greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted to state what
was the mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the will in
question. There can be no doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very
serious character, and it is quite evident that his mind was not as active as it
had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we can not include from this
that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of his property by

will.
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well
established, and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged
insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it
is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption
by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There are many cases
and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly
held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not
render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a
person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and
mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard,
few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such exacting
requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are universal in
statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that
there are many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the
lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated as insanity and
idiocy.
The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator
during the last years of his life may have led some of those who knew him in his
earlier days to entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we
think that the statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and
statements of the conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he
unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it on this occasion.
At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct
was irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what
the nature of the business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show
that the writing and execution of the will occupied a period several hours and
that the testator was present during all this time, taking an active part in all
the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and
its dispositions are those of a rational person.
For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and
the same is hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.
G.R. No. L-24665 October 13, 1926

ESTATE OF THE DECEASED ISIDRA ABQUILAN. ATANASIO
ABQUILAN, petitioner-appellant vs.
FELICIANA ABQUILAN, opponent-appelle
FACTS:
STREET, J.:
This court refused to legalize an instrument purporting to be the last will

and testament of IsidraAbquilan, the deceased. It appears that the deceased
left no forced heirs, and her only heirs, in case of intestacy, are her brother,
AtanasioAbquilan, the proponent of the will, and Feliciana Abquilan, a sister,
who is the opponent.
The denial was based on the finding of the trial court that the document
propounded as the will of the deceased is apocryphal, that the purported
signatures of the deceased to the supposed will are forgeries, and that the
instrument in question was not executed by the deceased. He therefore denied
probate, and the proponent appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the purported last will and testament was executed by
the deceased.
HELD:
NO. A clear preponderance of the evidence shows that on November 6,
1924, the date when the will purports to have been executed, the supposed
testatrix was not in a condition such as to enable her to have participated in
the act, she being in fact at that time suffering from paralysis to
celebralhemorrhage in such degree as completely to discapacitate her for
intelligent participation in the act of making a will. A careful comparison of the
name of the testatrix as signed in two places to the Exhibit A, with many of
her authentic signatures leads to the conclusion that the signatures to the
supposed will were made by some other person. Furthermore, the combined
testimony of Juan Serato and Alejandro Genito completely demonstrate in our

opinion that no will at all was made on November 6, the date attributed to the
questioned document, and that, instead an attempt was made on the night of
that day to fabricate another will, which failed of completion because of the
refusal of Alejandro Genito to be party to the making of a will in which the
testatrix took no part. The instrument before us was undoubtedly fabricated
later, probably on November 7, at a time when the condition of the deceased
was such as to make rational participation on her part in the act of making a
will impossible.
G.R. NO. 4445 September 18, 1909

CATALINA BUGNAO, proponent-appelle vs.
FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL., contestants-apellants
CARSON, J.:
FACTS:
The court admitted to probate a document purporting to be the last will
and testament of Domingo Ubag, deceased. The instrument was propounded by
his widow, Catalina Bugnao, the sole beneficiary thereunder, and probate was
contested by the appellants, who are brothers and sisters of the deceased, and
who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate
were denied, as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct
ascending or descending line.
The appellants alleged that the evidence of record is not sufficient to
establish the execution of the alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that at the time when it is
alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind and memory,
and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deceased was of sound mind and memory at the time
of the execution of his last will and testament?
HELD:
YES. That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our
opinion fully established by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who
swore positively that, at the time of its execution, he was of sound mind and
memory. It is true that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at that
time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe
intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his
bed; that he needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and
that during the paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he could not
speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his
mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence
of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in
preparing the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical
description of the various parcels of land set out therein, taken together with
the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will clear and
explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is
strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.
But when it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had
no heir in the ascending or ascending line; that a bitter family quarrel had
separated him from his brothers and sisters, who declined to have any relations
with the testator because he and his wife were adherents of the Aglipayano
church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers or sisters,
although some of them lived in the vicinity, were present at the time of his
death or attended his funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to
leave and did leave all of his property to his widow and made no provision for
his brothers and sisters, who themselves are grown men and women, by no
means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence of undue
influence on the part of his wife, or in anywise corroborates contestants
allegation that the will never was executed.
G.R. No. L-24569 February 26, 1926

MANUEL TORRES, petitioner-appellant and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO,
appellant vs. MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appelle
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
On January 3,1924, the testator Thomas Rodriquez, who was 76 years of
age and was in feeble health for a long time, made his will where he made his
cousin Vicente Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno as the only and
universal heir of his properties. The probate of the will was opposed by
Margarita Lopez, cousin and nearest relative of the deceased. The ground
cited for the opposition was that the testator lacked mental capacity, she
claimed that at time of the execution of the supposed will, the deceased was
suffering from senile dementia and was under guardianship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testator was mentally capacitated during the
execution of the will?
HELD:
YES. The deceased testator had mental capacity to make his will during
its execution. The Supreme Court held that at the time of the making of the
will, the testator may be of old age, may have been physically decrepit, may have
been week of intellect, have suffered a loss of memory, had a guardian over his
person and property and may have been eccentric, but he still possessed that
spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention,
and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention which the law
terms testamentary capacity.
G.R. No. L-39033 November 13, 1933

IN RE WILL OF THE LATE MATEA ABELLA. MONS. SANTIAGO
SANCHO, applicant-appelle vs. MARCIANA ABELLA, opponent-appellant
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FACTS:
Testatrix MateaAbella of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, went to San Fernando, La
Union accompanied by her niece, to consult a physician. While in San Fernando,
she stayed in a convent under the charge of Father Cordero. After two
consultations with the physician, it was found out that Matea was suffering
from dyspepsia and cancer of the stomach.
Thereafter, Matea talked to Atty. Reinoso to whom she expressed her
desire to make a will. She was then interviewed by the lawyer twice on separate
days in the presence of four persons at the convent where she was staying.
During the interview, the testatrix even directed her niece to bring her the
documents in her trunk which she delivered to Atty. Reinoso.
After the will has been drafted in Ilocano, MacarioCalug, one of of the
witnesses, read the same to her and she approved. The will was then copied
clean and was again read to her and she expresses her approval thereof but
inasmuch as it was rather late at night, she did not care to sign the same
suggesting that it be postponed to the following day, April 29, 1932, which was
done in the presence of each and every one of the instrumental witnesses
thereto and of other persons, including Father Cordero. After the signing,
Atty. Reinoso delivered the original copies of the will to the testatrix.
On July 3,1932, Matea died of senile debility at the age of 88 years.
Thereafter, a petition for probate of Mateas will was filed. The petition was
opposed by MarcianaAbella, one of the grounds cited was that the testator
lacked testamentary capacity since the she was 88 years old and was suffering
from senile debility at the time she executed her will.
The probate court admitted the will to probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MateaAbella possessed the mental capacity at the time
she executed her will?
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court believed that based on the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the will of the deceased showed that the
testatrix was not so physically weak, nor so blind, nor so deaf, nor so lacking in
intelligence that she could not, with full understanding thereof, dispose of her
properties and make a will. Neither senile debility, nor blindness, nor deafness,
nor poor memory is by itself sufficient to incapacitate a person from making his
will. The mere fact that in her will MateaAbella disposed of properties, which
she had already donated to other persons at a prior date, is not an indication
of mental insanity. At most, it constitutes forgetfulness or a change of mind,
due to ignorance of the irrevocability of certain donations.
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979

FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, respondents
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS:
On 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Dona FlorentinaRalla, together
with all their children entered into a duly notarized agreement over the then
present and existing properties of the spouses.
On 1955, the spouses separately executed their respective holographic
wills, the provisions of which were in conformity and in implementation of the
extrajudicial partition of November, 1949. Their holographic wills similarly
provided for the institution of the other to his or her share in the conjugal
properties, the other half already to be partitioned as part of the legitime of
the four living children.
On 1959, Dona Florentina died. About 2 weeks after the death of his
wife, Don Jesus executed a new will, thereby revoking and canceling his
previous holographic will which he made on 1955 and also its codicil. On 1962,
Don Jesus died. Petitioner herein Alsua-Betts, as the executrix named in the
will filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua.
Oppositions thereto were filed by his children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned will was executed in accordance with the
requisites prescribed by law pertaining to the soundness of mind of the
testator during execution of his will?
HELD:
YES. Don Jesus was of sound mind at the time of the execution of his
will. Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of
mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless
degrees of mental capacity and incapacity and while on one hand it has been
held that mere weakness of mind, or imbecility from disease of body, or from
age, will not render a person from making a will, provided he has understanding
and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how
and to whom he is disposing his property. To constitute a sound and disposing

mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or
unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary
incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or
of unsound mind.
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA
PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appelle vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and
ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors-appellants
ABAD-SANTOS, J.:
FACTS:
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who
lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain.
Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11,
1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate
by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria
Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she
submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as
follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part
shall go to the widow 'en plenodominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the
other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en
nudapropriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged
with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in
favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a)
that the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with
respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the
first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions
for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not
related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided
in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real
property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates
Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed
partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building
between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express
win to give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the
project of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge
and Roberto have appealed to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an impairment of legitime occurred in the instant case.
HELD:
YES. The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle onehalf of the estate in full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions
impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the
only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of
the hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is
entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no burden,
encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par.
2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants
question and justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the
usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct
in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle
who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en plenodominio" as her legitime and
which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any
additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run
counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even
impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is
hereby ordered distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple
substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
G. R. No. 76648 February 26, 1988

HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-SANSON, petitioners vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, respondents
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
A petition was filed by private respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez
on April 22, 1981 seeking the probate of the holographic will of the late
HerminiaMontinola executed on January 28, 1980. The testatrix, who died
single, parentless and childless on March 29, 1981 at the age of 70 years, devised
in this will several of her real properties to specified persons.
On April 29, 1981, private respondent who was named executor in the will
filed an urgent motion for appointment of special administrator. With the
conformity of all the relatives and heirs of the testatrix except oppositor, the
court appointed private respondent as Special Administrator of the testate
estate of deceased.
On June 29, 1981, MatildeMontinolaSanson (petitioner), the only surviving
sister of the deceased but who was not named in the said will, filed her
Opposition to Probate of Will, 7 alleging inter alia: that the subject will was not
entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the same was
falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full possession of her
mental faculties to make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was
exerted upon the person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named
in the will; and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to the remainder
of the estate.
The court admitted the will to probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testator was of sound mind at the time of the
execution of her last will and testament?
HELD:
YES. The fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only
eleven (11) of her real properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an
indication that the testatrix was of unsound mind. The portion of the estate
undisposed of shall pass on to the heirs of the deceased in intestate successor.
Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other
than compulsory heirs have been omitted, for while blood ties are strong in the
Philippines, it is the testator's right to disregard non-compulsory heirs. The fact
that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither fraud or
undue influence. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a
testament, otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The exercise of
improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial
evidence that it was actually exercised.
Finally, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the observation of the
respondent court- There is likewise no question as to the due execution of the
subject Will. The most authentic proof that deceased had testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of the Will, is the Will itself which
according to a report of one of the two expert witnesses reveals the existence
of significant handwriting characteristics such as spontaneity, freedom and
good line quality could not be achieved by the testatrix if it was true that she
was indeed of unsound mind/or under undue influence or improper pressure
when she executed the Will.
F. FORMS OF WILLS
GR. No. 13431 November 12, 1919
IN RE WILL OF ANA ABANGAN. GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrixappelle vs. ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants
AVANCEA, J.:
FACTS:
The will of Ana Abangan executed on July, 1916 was duly probated. The
opponents appealed. The document consists of two (2) sheets, the first of
which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom
by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and
by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause
duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these
sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor
numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to appellants contention,
are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied. Further,
appellants alleged records do not show that the testatrix knew the dialect
which the will is written.
Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two
sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly
signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the
direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains
only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental
witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix
and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these omissions,
according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the
will should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was duly
admitted to probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with the formal
requisites prescribed by law?
HELD:
YES. In requiring that each and every page of the will should also be
signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of
each other, Act no. 2645 (which is the one applicable in the case) evidently has
for its object (referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution
of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testators disposition. But when
these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by
the testator and three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the
left margin on the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless. In
requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into consideration,
undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and must have
referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have to
sign at the bottom.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear
that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has
been removed. But when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one
sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this
single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
As to the allegation that the testatrix did not know the dialect in which
the will is written, the circumstances appearing in the will itself that the same
was executed in the city of Cebu, and the dialect in the locality where the
testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary,
to presume that she knew this dialect in which the will is written.
Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets
the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at
the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only
the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses,
it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the
testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on
this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is
not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any
other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last

will, must be disregarded.
G.R. No. L-28946 January 16, 1929

IN RE ESTATE OF PIRASO, deceased. SIXTO ACOP, petitioner-appellant vs.
SALMING PIRASO, ET AL., opponents-appellees
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
FACTS:
This appeal was taken from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Benguet, denying the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased
Piraso.The will was written in English which the supposed testator Piraso did
not know thus the proponent-appellant contends that the will is not valid for it
was not written in a dialect understood by the testator. The proponentappellant further contends that the will should have been in the Ilocano
dialect, the dialect that is known to the testator.
The proponent-appellant assigns the following as alleged errors of the
lower court:
1. In holding that in order to be valid the will in question should have
been drawn up in the Ilocano dialect.
2. In not holding that the testator Piraso did not know the Ilocano
dialect well enough to understand a will drawn up in said dialect.
3. In refusing to admit the will in question to probate.
The fundamental errors assigned refer chiefly to the part of the
judgment which reads as follows:
The evidence shows that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect,
although imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that dialect, and
the court is of the opinion that his will should have been written in that
dialect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will herein is valid?
HELD:
NO. The fact that the will was written in English which the supposed
testator Piraso did not know, is sufficient to invalidate said will according to
the clear and positive provisions of the law, and inevitably prevents its probate.
Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that:

"No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills
executed by a Spaniard or a resident of the Philippine Islands, before the
present Code of Civil Procedure went into effect), "shall be valid to pass any
estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in
the language or dialect known by the testator," etc.
Moreover, the presumption in favor of the will established by this court
in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), to the effect that the testator is
presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is
proof to the contrary, can not be applied in this case because, in the instant
case, not only is it not proven that English is the language of the City of Baguio
where the deceased Piraso lived and where the will was drawn, but that the
record contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no other language than
the Igorot dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano.
G.R. No. L-19079 January 15, 1923

PRIMITIVO GONZALES Y LAUREL, applicant-appelle vs.
JOVITO LAUREL Y TAPIA, opponent-appellant
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Batangas allowed the probate of the last
will and testament of the deceased Maria Tapia. Jovita Laurel now appeals to
this court from that ruling of the court below, alleging, among others, that
court erred: 1. In holding that the supposed will of the deceased Maria Tapia
was executed with the solemnities prescribed by the law, notwithstanding that
there was no proof of the dialect known by the said deceased; 2. In not holding
that the signatures of Maria Tapia appearing in the will had been obtained
through deceit, surprise, fraud, and in an illegal and improper manner
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid for being written in a dialect not known
to the testator?
Whether or not the testatrix acted voluntarily and with full knowledge in
executing and signing the will?
RULING:
YES. The deceased Maria Tapia was a resident of the Province of
Batangas, a Tagalog region, where said deceased had real properties for several
years. She requested Modesto Castillo to draw her will in Tagalog. From the
record taken as a whole, a presumption arises that said Maria Tapia knew the
Tagalog dialect, which presumption is now conclusive for not having been
overthrown nor rebutted.
YES. With respect to the second issue, the preponderance of evidence
established that the will was executed and signed by Maria Tapia voluntarily
and with full knowledge, without fraud, deceit, surprise, or undue influence or
machinations of anybody, she being then mentally capacitated and free.
A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19, 1981

NENITA DE VERA SUROZ, complainant vs. JUDGE REYNALDO P.
HONRADO of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25 and
EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk of Court, respondents
AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
Mauro Suroza and his wife Marcelina Salvador reared a boy named
Agapito who used the surname Suroza. Agapito got married to Nenita and
begot a child named Lilia. Agapito became disabled and his wife Nenita was
appointed as his guardian when he was declared an incompetent.
Meanwhile, a couple entrusted their child Marilyn to Arsenia de la Cruz
(apparently a girl friend of Agapito). The child was later delivered to
MarcelinaSuroza who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and
as her granddaughter. She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted
by Agapito. Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will when she was 73
years old. That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was
illiterate. In that will, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed
granddaughter Marilyn.
Upon learning of the existence of a testamentary proceeding for the
settlement of Marcelina's estate, Nenita and the other occupants of the
decedent's house filed a motion to set aside the order ejecting them. They
alleged that the decedent's son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, that
he has a daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was Agapito's guardian and that
Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter nor the decedent's granddaughter. In spite
of the fact that Judge Honrado was already apprised that persons, other than
Marilyn, were claiming Marcelina's estate, he issued an order probating her
supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress.
In a motion for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita V.
Suroza reiterated her contention that the alleged will is void because
Marcelina did not appear before the notary and because it is written in English
which is not known to her.
Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976 "denied" the various incidents
"raised" by Nenita.
ISSUE:
Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having

admitted to probate a will, which on its face is void because it is written in
English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a
forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the
notary as admitted by the notary himself?
HELD:
YES. In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that
it was written in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate
testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void. In the opening
paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood
and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that
the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". That
could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the
illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision
of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language
or dialect known to the testator.
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted
not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was
something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and
giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive. Furthermore,
after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court, respondent
judge could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness.
In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have
personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could
have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.
Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty
to be inexcusable.
G.R. No. 147145
January 31, 2005
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA

CAPONONG-NOBLE, petitioner, vs.
ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, respondents
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Abada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray died in 1943.
Both died without legitimate children. Respondent Abaja filed a petition for
the probate of the last will and testament of Abada. Abada allegedly named as
his testamentary heirs his natural children EulogioAbaja and Rosario Cordova.
Alipio is the son of Eulogio.
NicanorCaponong opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left
no will when he died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada
really executed it, should be disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not
executed and attested as required by law; (2) it was not intended as the last will
of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds invoked by
Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz,
Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada and Levi,
Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela Tronco also opposed the
petition. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada
and Toray. The RTC admitted to probate the will of Toray. Since the
oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration, the order allowing the
probate of Torays will became final and executory. Caponong-Noble further
alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the testator
signed the will and its every page in the presence of three witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the
attestation clause complies with the requirements of the applicable laws
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that f Abadas will has an attestation clause.
While the attestation clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close
inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it. An attestation
clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of

the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the
memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be
proved. The Court applied the liberal construction in the probate of Abadas
will. Abadas will clearly show four signatures: that of Abada and of three
other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are three witnesses to
the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an
examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of
evidence aliunde.
With respect to the allegation that the attestation clause does not
expressly state the circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and signed the
will and all its pages in the presence of the testator and of each other, the
Court has ruled that precision of language in the drafting of an attestation
clause is desirable. However, it is sufficient if from the language employed it
can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law
expects of it.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12
January 2001 in CA- G.R. CV No. 47644.
G. NOTARIAL WILLS
G.R. No. L-5149
March 22, 1910
GREGORIO MACAPINLAC, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
MARIANO ALIMURONG, opponent-appellant.
ARELLANO, C. J.:
Facts:
Simplicia de los Santos having died on June 19, 1907, her surviving
husband, Gregorio Macapinlac, submitted her will to the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga for probate. Macario Alimurong, a nephew of the
deceased, opposed the proceedings and requested that "the will of the
deceased, Doa Simplicia de los Santos, be declared null and void for either of
the two reasons" which he expresses, and which are:
(1) Because the will was not executed and signed by the witnesses in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure now in
force.
(2) Because it was executed under duress and undue and illegal influence
on the part of the persons benefited thereby or of a person acting in
their interests.
the trial court declared the following facts to be proven:
(1) That at 6 o' clock on the evening of June 17, 1907, Simplicia de los
Santos, who was sick but in full possession of all her faculties, executed
her will, which is the document attached to the record, Exhibit No. 1 of
the petitioner.
(2) That after the execution of such will on Monday, the testatrix died
early on the morning of the following Wednesday.
(3) That, as a preliminary act, a rough copy of the said will was made up,
which rough copy was read to the testatrix, and the latter ordered an
additional clause to be added thereto, in connection with a legacy that
she desired to make in favor of some of her old servants who and
rendered good service.
(4) That, after the rough copy was amended by the addition of the abovementioned clause, a clear copy thereof was made up and was again read
to the testatrix, who approved it in all of its parts, and as she was unable
to sign, she requested Amando de Ocampo to sign for her and the latter
wrote the following words with his own hand. "At the request of the
testatrix D.a Simplicia de los Santos, I signed Amando de Ocampo."
Immediately afterwards and also in the presence of the same testatrux
and of each other, the witnesses Jose Juico, Gabino Panopio, Eusebio
dayao, Juan Angeles, Jose Torres, Alejo San Pedro, and Gregorio Sangil
signed at the bottom of the will.
In view of the said factsthe lower court concludesthe will executed
by Simplicia de los Santos must be admitted to probate. The provisions of
section 618 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special
Proceedings are fully complied with. The will bears the name of the
testatrix written by Amando de Ocampo in her presence and by her
express direction, and has been witnessed and signed by more than three
trustworthy witnesses, in the presence of the testatrix and of each
other.
Issue:
whether or not the will was signed in accordance with the law
held:
no. inasmuch as the law requires that when a person signs in place of the
testator he should write the name of the latter in the will as the signature; this
was not done by Amando de Ocampo in the will in question, as he did not sign
it with the name of testatrix.
It is shown by the evidence that the will was wholly written in the handwriting
of the subscribing witness, Gregorio Sangil, and at the foot thereof. it is
claimed that the form of signing for the testatrix "At the request of the
testatrix Da. Simplicio de los Santos, I signed: Amando de Ocampo," is not in
accordance with the requirements of the law.
Wherefore, The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the costs of
this instance against the appellant.
G.R. No. 2586
January 19, 1906
TOMAS GUISON, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
MARIA CONCEPCION, respondent-appellee.
Teodoro
WILLARD, J.:
Facts:
Jacoba Concepcion Salcedo made her will in Manila, on January 3, 1904.
witness Feliciano Maglaqui, instead of writing the name of the testatrix on
will, wrote his own. Probate of the will was refused in the court below on
ground that the name of the testatrix was not signed thereto, and
petitioner has appealed.
the
the
the
the
Issue: can the will be admitted for probate?

Held:
No. It will be seen that the witness Feliciano Maglaqui, instead of writing the
name of the testatrix on the will, wrote his own. As such, it cannot be
admitted for probate on the ground that the name of the testatrix was not
signed thereto.
Wherefore, The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant, and after the expiration of twenty days
judgment should be entered in accordance herewith and the case remanded to
the court below for execution.
G.R. No. L-9150
March 31, 1915
MARIANO LEAO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ARCADIO LEAO, objector-appellee.
CARSON, J.:
Facts:
Cristina Valdes, deceased, placed her costs against her name, attached by some
other person to the instrument offered for probate which purports to be her
last will and testament, in the presence of three witnesses whose names are
attached to the attesting clause, and that they attested and subscribed the
instrument in her presence and in the presence of each other.
Issue: whether or not the placing of a cross opposite her name at the
construction of the instrument was a sufficient compliance with the
requirements of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
Held: yes. the placing of the cross opposite her name at the construction of
the instrument was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which prescribes that except where wills
are signed by some other person than the testator in the manner and from
herein indicated, a valid will must be signed by the testator. The right of a
testator to sign his will by mark, executed animo testandi has been uniformly
sustained by the courts of last resort of the United States in construing
statutory provisions prescribing the mode of execution of wills in language
identical with, or substantially similar to that found in section 618 of our code,
which was taken from section 2349 of the Code of Vermont. that the evidence
of record satisfactorily establishes the execution of that instrument as and for
her last will and testament in the manner and form prescribed by law.
Wherefore, The judgment entered in the court below should therefore be
reversed, without costs in this instance, and the record remanded to the court
below, where judgment will be entered admitting the instrument in question to
probate in accordance with the prayer of the petitioner.
G.R. No. L-4067
November 29, 1951
In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. ROSARIO

GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents.
PARAS, C.J.:
Facts:
1. The CA disallowed the probate of the will of Antero Mercado dated Jan
1943. The said will was written in Ilocano dialect.
2. The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote
the name of the testator followed below by 'A ruego del testador' and the
name of Florentino Javier. In effect, it was signed by another although under
the express direction of the testator. This fact however was not recited in the
attestation clause. Mercado also affixed a cross on the will.
3. The lower court admitted the will to probate but this order was reversed by
the Court of Appeals on the ground that the attestation failed to recite the
facts surrounding the signing of the testator and the witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the attestation clause in the will is valid
HELD:
NO
the attestation is fatally defective for its failure to state that Antero or
the testator caused Atty. Javier to write the former's name under his express
direction as required by Sec. 618 of the Civil Procedure. Finally, on the cross
affixed on the will by the testator, the Court held that it is not prepared to
liken the mere sign of a cross to a thumbmark for obvious reasons- the cross
does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark so it is not considered as a
valid signature.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with against the
petitioner. So ordered.
G.R. No. 6845
September 1, 1914
YAP TUA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA KUAN, objectors-appellants.
JOHNSON, J.:
FACTS:
August, 1909, one Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap
Tua, presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila,
asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be admitted to probate, as
the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, deceased. Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong died in the city of Manila on the 11th day of August, 1909.
Together with the petition was the will, signed by deceased, as well as Anselmo
Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez. During the hearing, Timoteo Paez
and Pablo Agustin declared that they knew the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong;
that she had died on the 11th day of August, 1909; that before her death she
had executed a last will and testament; that he was present at the time of the
execution of the same; that he had signed the will as a witness; that Aselmo
Zacarias and Severo Tabora had also signed said will as witnesses and that they
had signed the will in the presence of the deceased; that the said Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong signed the will voluntarily; and in their judgment, she was in
the possession of her faculties; that there were no threats or intimidation used
to induce her to sign the will; that she signed it voluntarily. It was ordered
that the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be allowed and
admitted to probate. From the record it appears that no further proceedings
were had until the 28th of February, 1910, when Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu
appeared and presented a petition, alleging that they were interested in the
matters of the sail will and desired to intervene asked that a guardian ad litem
be appointed to represented them in the cause. The court appointed guardian
ad litem of said parties, Gabriel La O, appeared in court and presented a
motion
in
which
he
alleged,
in
substance:
XXX
(b) Because at the time of the execution of the will, the said Tomasa Elizaga
Yap Caong was not then mentally capacitated to execute the same, due to
sickness.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in declaring that the testator had clear
knowledge and knew what she was doing at the time of signing the will.
HELD:
NO. Article 800 of the Civil Code states that: The law presumes that every
person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary. The burden
of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the
testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be
insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the
testator made it during a lucid interval.We find the same conflict in the
declarations of the witnesses which we found with reference to the undue
influence. While the testimony of Dr. Papa is very strong relating to the mental
condition of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, yet, nevertheless, his testimony related
to a time perhaps twenty-four hours before the execution of the will in
question (Exhibit A). Several witnesses testified that at the time the will was
presented to her for her signature, she was of sound mind and memory and
asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her possession for ten or fifteen
minutes and finally signed it. The lower court found that there was a
preponderance of evidence sustaining the conclusion that Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong was of sound mind and memory and in the possession of her faculties at
the time she signed this will. In view of the conflict in the testimony of the
witnesses and the finding of the lower court, we do not feel justified in
reversing his conclusions upon that question. Upon a full consideration of the
record, we find that a preponderance of the proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga
Yap Caong did execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of
all of her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909 (Exhibit A).
Therefore the judgment of the lower court admitting said will to probate is
hereby affirmed with costs.
G.R. No. L-30289
March 26, 1929
SERAPIA DE GALA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
APOLINARIO GONZALES and SINFOROSO ONA, opponents-appellants.
OSTRAND, J.:
Facts:
On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which
Serapia de Gala, a niece of Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix
died in November, 1926, leaving no heirs by force of law, and on December 2,
1926, Serapia, through her counsel, presented the will for probate. Apolinario
Gonzales, a nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the
ground that it had not been executed in conformity with the provisions of
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On April 2, 1927, Serapia de Gala
was appointed special administratrix of the estate of the deceased. She
returned an inventory of the estate on March 31, 1927, and made several
demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of the deceased, for the
delivery to her of the property inventoried and of which he was in possession.
On September 20, 1928, the Court of First Instance ordered Sinforoso Ona to
deliver to Serapia de Gala all the property left by the deceased. Instead of
delivering the property as ordered, Sinforoso filed a motion asking the
appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix be cancelled and that
he, Sinforoso, be appointed in her stead. The motion was opposed by both
Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia de Gala, but on March 3, 1928, it was
nevertheless granted, Serapia was removed, and Sinforoso was appointed
special administrator in her place, principally on the ground that he had
possession of the property in question and that his appointment would simplify
the proceedings.
Issue: 1 whether or not the attestation clause does not mention the placing of
the thumb-mark of the testatrix in the will; and
2. whether or not the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the
witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause but only in the last
paragraph of the body of the will.
Held:
1.The first point can best be answered by quoting the language of this court in
the case of the Estate of Maria Salva, G. R. No. 26881.the testatrix placed her
thumb-mark on the will in the proper places. When, therefore, the law says that
the will shall be 'signed' by the testator or testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only
by the customary written signature but by the testator or testatrix' thumbmark. The construction put upon the word 'signed' by most courts is the
original meaning of a signum or sign, rather than the derivative meaning of a
sign manual or handwriting. A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied
if the signature is made by the testator's mark.
2. As will be seen, it is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the
testatrix signed by thumb-mark, but it does there appear that the signature was
affixed in the presence of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is
sufficiently described and explained in the last clause of the body of the will. It
maybe conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that,
standing alone, it does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but
taken in connection with the last clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear
and sufficiently carries out the legislative intent; it leaves no possible doubt as
to the authenticity of the document.
The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales that
the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not
stated in the attestation clause is without merit; the fact is expressly stated in
that clause.
Wherefore, In our opinion, the will is valid, and the orders appealed from are
hereby affirmed without costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 103554 May 28, 1993

TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN
CABALLERO, AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN
CABALLERO, SANTOS CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR
RAGA, MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA RAGA, RUPERTO ABAPO,
represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact, ARMSTICIA * ABAPO VELANO,
and CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his heirs, JESUS CANEDA,
NATIVIDAD CANEDA and ARTURO CANEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Facts:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children,
already in the twilight years of his life executed a last will and testament before
three attesting witnesses and he was duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary
public. It was declared therein that, among other things that the testator was
leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to
specific persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to Mateo. Not long
after, he himself filed a petition before the CFI seeking the probate of his last
will and testament but the scheduled hearings were postponed, until the
testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate
court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will, sought his
appointment as special administrator of the testators estate but due to his
death, he was succeeded by William Cabrera, who was appointed by RTC which
is already the probate court.
PETITIONERS: The petitioners assail to the allowance of the testators will on

the ground that it was not executed in accordance with all the requisites of
law since the testator was already in a poor state of health such that he could
not have possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise contend that the will
is null and void because its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails
to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the
testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and
all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
RESPONDENTS: The respondent, on the other hand, argue that Mateo was
of sound and disposing mind and in good health when he executed his will.
Further, they also contend that the witnesses attested and signed the will in
the presence of the testator and of each other.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is
fatally defective such that whether or not it affects the validity of the will.
2. Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantial
compliance pursuant to Article 809 of the Civil Code.
Held:
1. An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the
attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before
them and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate
memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of
execution and once signed by the witnesses; it gives affirmation to the
fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has
been observed. Under the 3rd paragraph of Article 805, such a clause,
the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will,
should state:
1. The number of pages used upon which the will is written;
2. That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign,
the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
attesting witnesses; and
3. That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the
testator of the will and all its pages, and that the said
witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest
and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Attestation and subscription differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of
sense, while subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation clause herein
assailed is that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all
its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the
number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the
circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the
will in the presence of the testator and of each other. What is then clearly
lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
2. The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or
imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will
that is here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in
pointing out that the defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot
be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language
used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial
compliance rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper pressure
and influence, defects and imperfection in the form of attestation or in the
language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not proved that
the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all
the requirements of Article 805.
The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection
would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really
executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. These considerations do
not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting
witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator
and of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or
language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element
required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a
will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the present case since there
is no plausible way by which it can be read into the questioned attestation
clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did
actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all of its
pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will and every page
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the impugned decision of
respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is
accordingly directed to forthwith DISMISS its Special Proceeding No. 3899-R
(Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero)
and to REVIVE Special Proceeding No. 3965-R (In the matter of the Intestate
Estate of Mateo Caballero) as an active case and thereafter duly proceed with
the settlement of the estate of the said decedent.
G.R. No. L-9089
January 5, 1915
In re the state of the deceased SOTERA BARRIENTOS. SAMUEL PERRY,

petitioner, respondent-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE ELIO, petitioner, respondent-appellee.
ARAULLO, J.:
Facts:
Upon the deceased of Sotera Barrientos, a resident of the municipality
of Mambajao, Province of Misamis, 68 years of age, the wife of Samuel Perry in
her third marriage, in the said municipality on August 31, 1912, two documents
were presented in the Court of First Instance of the said province, each of
which, according to those who respectively presented them, was the last will
and testament of the said deceased.
The first document was filed on September 4, 1912, that is, four days after the
death of the testatrix, by Vicente Elio, son of her first husband, and her
brother-in-law; and the second on December 20 of the same year, 1912, by
Samuel Perry, her surviving husband. Perry opposed probate of the first
document, and Elio, in turn, that of the second. By agreement of both parties
the two petitions were heard jointly, in order that the evidence introduced to
support the one might be used to impeach the other. Likewise the court, on
February 1, 1913, made one single order in both cases, whereby, after giving due
weight to the evidence introduced and setting forth the findings of fact and
of law that he deemed pertinent with respect to each of the said petitions and
to the documents to which they respectively referred, he held that the said
two wills were true and authentic, but that the one executed on September 21,
1910, had been revoked by the one subsequently executed on August 26, 1912.
He therefore denied the probate of the first, that is, of the one executed in
favor of Samuel Perry, and ordered that the second will, in favor of the other
petitioner, Vicente Elio, be probated as the last will and testament of the said
Sotera Barrientos, disallowing with costs the claim of the respondent Perry.
Issue: is the will valid?

Held: in order that a will may be deemed valid, that is executed by one person
and signed by another on account of the testators inability to sign, the law
requires (sec. 618, Code Civ. Proc.) that it shall have been signed under the
express direction or by the express order of the testator. In the present case,
as we have already seen, when Elio and his companions took the said document
to the house of Sotera Barrientos, there to be executed as her will, it already
contained a statement in the paragraph preceding the space reserved for the
signatures of the testatrix and the witnesses, to the effect that, as the
testatrix was unable to sign the will by reason of her advanced age and her
debility, she authorized and begged Santos Matayabas to do so at her request.
There is no proof whatever that Vicente Elio was instructed by Sotera
Barrientos to have that statement inserted in the said document, when, as he
testified, the drafting and preparation of the instrument was commended to
him. It is evident, therefore, that it was all merely the idea and purpose of Elio
himself.
For the foregoing reasons, and taking account of the fact that Samuel Perry,
the widower of the deceased Sotera Barrientos, has also requested the
probate of the document presented by him, under date of September 21, 1910,
as being the last will and testament of the decedent a will the legality and
due execution of which were recognized by the lower court in the order
appealed from, notwithstanding which it was not admitted to probate for the
reason that it was held to have been revoked by the other later document
presented by Vicente Elio as the will of the said decedent we revoke the
order appealed from and deny the petition for the probate of the
aforementioned document dated August 26, 1912, presented by Vicente Elio as
the last will and testament of the said decedent, Sotera Barrientos; without
special finding as to costs. In view of this decision, the lower court will
proceed as the law requires with regard to the petition made by Samuel Perry
for the probate of the document presented by him dated September 21, 1910,
as the last will and testament of the said decedent. So ordered.
G.R. No. 1641 January 19, 1906

GERMAN JABONETA,Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET
AL.,Defendants-Appellees.
CARSON, J.:
Facts:
On the 26th day of December, 1901, Macario Jaboneta executed under
the following circumstances the document in question, which has been
presented for probate as his will.
Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro, in this province, he ordered
that the document in question be written, and calling Julio Javellana, Aniceto
Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed the said document as his
will. They were all together, and were in the room where Jaboneta was, and
were present when he signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as
a witness, at his request, and in his presence and in the presence of the other
two witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the presence of
the testator, and in the presence of the other two persons who signed as
witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat
and left the room. As he was leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen in
his hand and put himself in position to sign the will as a witness, but did not
sign in the presence of Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had left the
room the said Julio Javellana signed as a witness in the presence of the
testator and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena.
Issue: whether or not the will is a dmitted for probate?
Held:
yes. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his
hand and pen in the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken together
with the testimony of the remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did
in fact there and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that the signature
was affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving,
and that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the witness was
being written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and the
testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were
together in the same room for that purpose, and at the moment when the
witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically present
and in such position with relation to Javellana that he could see everything
which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without
any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion
that the document was in fact signed before he finally left the room.
The principles on which these cases rest and the tests of presence as between
the testator and the witnesses are equally applicable in determining whether
the witnesses signed the instrument in the presence of each other, as required
by the statute, and applying them to the facts proven in these proceedings we
are of opinion that the statutory requisites as to the execution of the
instrument were complied with, and that the lower court erred in denying
probate to the will on the ground stated in the ruling appealed from.
Wherefore, The judgment of the trial court is reversed, without especial
condemnation of costs, and after twenty days the record will be returned to
the court from whence it came, where the proper orders will be entered in
conformance herewith.
C.A. No. 4
March 21, 1946
In the matter of the testate estate of the late Encarnacion Neyra. TRINIDAD
NEYRA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. DE
BLANCO, oppositors-appellants.
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA.
BLANCO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
TRINIDAD NEYRA and EUSTAQUIO MENDOZA, oppositors-appellees.
DE JOYA, J.:
Facts:
That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer any
ascendants, executed a will on September 14, 1939, marked Exhibit 16, disposing
of her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen
Maria" and her other relatives named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and
Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, making no provision whatsoever in said will in
favor of her only sister Trinidad Neyra, who had become her bitter enemy; that
when the said will was brought to the attention of the authorities of said
Congregation, after due deliberation and consideration, said religious
organization declined the bounty offered by Encarnacion Neyra, and said
decision of the Congregation was duly communicated to her; that in order to
overcome the difficulties encountered by said religious organization in not
accepting the generosity of Encarnacion Neyra, the latter decided to make a
new will, and for that purpose, about one week before her death, sent for one
Ricardo Sikat, an attorney working in the Law Offices of Messrs. Feria and
LaO, and gave him instructions for the preparation of a new will; that Attorney
Sikat, instead of preparing a new will, in accordance with the express
instructions given by Encarnacion Neyra, merely prepared a draft in the form
of a codicil, marked as Exhibit M, amending said will, dated September 14, 1939,
again naming said religious organization, among others, as beneficiary, and said
draft of a codicil was also forwarded to the authorities of the said religious
organization, for their consideration and acceptance.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from
Addison's disease, and on October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser
and confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make
confession, after which she expressed her desire to have a mass celebrated in
her house at No. 366 Raon Street, City of Manila, so that she might take holy
communion, in view of her condition; that following the request of
Encarnacion Neyra,
Issue: whether or not the testator has testamentary capacity when she made
the will?
Held: yes. it has been conclusively shown in this case that the testatrix
Encarnacion Neyra, at the age of 48, died on November 4, 1942, due to a heart
attack, after an illness of about two (2) years.
In connection with testamentary capacity, in several cases, this court has
considered the testimony of witnesses, who had known and talked to the
testators, more trustworthy than the testimony of alleged medical experts.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the
transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the
property to be disposed of, and the persons who would naturally be supposed
to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the
instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
(Bugnao vs. Ubag. 14 Phil., 163.)
Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors who testified for the
opponents to the probate of a will, who stated that it tended to destroy mental
capacity, was held not to affect the full possession of the mental faculties
deemed necessary and sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20
Phil., 400.) The testatrix was held to have been compos mentis, in spite of the
physician's testimony to the contrary, to the effect that she was very weak,
being in the third or last stage of tuberculosis.
After a careful consideration of the evidence and the law of this case, we find
it legally impossible to sustain any of the errors assigned by the appellants. The
judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed, with costs against the
appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-13431
November 12, 1919
In re will of Ana Abangan.

GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
AVANCEA, J.:
Facts:
1. On September 1917, the CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will
executed on July 1916. It is from this decision which the opponent appealed. It
is alleged that the records do not show the testatrix knew the dialect in which
the will was written.
Issue: Whether or not the will was validly probated
Held:
YES. The circumstance appearing on the will itself, that it was executed in
Cebu City and in the dialect of the place where the testarix is a resident is
enough to presume that she knew this dialect in the absence of any proof to
the contrary. On the authority of this case and that of Gonzales v Laurel, it
seems that for the presumption to apply, the following must appear: 1) that the
will must be in a language or dialect generally spoken in the place of execution,
and, 2) that the testator must be a native or resident of the said locality
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against
the appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. 15566
September 14, 1921
EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the minors
Cesar Garcia and Jose Garcia, objectors-appellants.
STREET, J.:
Facts:
In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for
probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia
and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose
Garcia and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for the hearing, the
proponent of the will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who
testified with details not necessary to be here specified that the will was
executed with all necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at
the time in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the
witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of
the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was
their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will. The will was signed
on the right margin.
Issues: whether or not the will is valid despite the fact that the signatures
where on the right margin instead of the left?
Held:
yes. The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated
In Re will of Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479), where the court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Avancea, in a case where the signatures were placed at the bottom of
the page and not in the margin, said:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to

close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution o will
and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore
the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose
sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and
curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation
already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever,
that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice
to any person, as attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of the
law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate the instrument.
It results that the legal errors assigned are not sustainable, and the judgment
appealed from will be affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs against the
appellants.
G.R. No. L-18979
June 30, 1964
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA

VILLACORTE.
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Facts:
1. Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa
Villacorte and for his appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the
evidence that the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She executed a will in
Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an
original
and
a
carbon
copy.
2. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the
original copy of the will while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in
Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the original
copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he
signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the
testator and other witnesses in his presence.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix
his signature to a page is sufficient to deny probate of the will
RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere
inadvertence. Since the duplicated bore the required signatures, this proves
that the omission was not intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a
duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be
defective, then in law, there is no other will bu the duly signed carbon
duplicate
and
the
same
can
be
probated.
The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the
testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose

conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of the law is to guarantee
the identity of the testament and its component pages, and there is no
intentional
or
deliberate
deviation
existed.
Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that
the will should be signed by the witnesses on every page. The carbon copy
duplicate was regular in all respects.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against appellants.
G.R. No. L-21151
February 25, 1924
In re will of Antonio Vergel de Dios, deceased.

RAMON J. FERNANDEZ, petitioner-appellant,
HERMELO VERGEL DE DIOS and SEVERINA JAVIER, legatees-appellants,
vs.
FERNANDO VERGEL DE DIOS, ET AL., opponents-appellees.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Facts:
as a will was propounded by Ramon J. Fernandez for probate. and
contested by Fernando Vergel de Dios and Francisco, Ricardo and Virgilio
Rustia, the court of First Instance of Manila having denied its probate.
The applicant takes this appeal, assigning error to the action of the lower
court in holding the attestation fatally defective and in not finding Act No.
2645 void.
The defects attributed to the will by the contestants are as follows, to wit:
(a) It was not sufficiently proven that the testator knew the contents of
the will.
(b) The testator did not sign all the pages of the will.
(c) He did not request anybody to attest the document as his last will.
(d) He did not sign it in the presence of any witness.
(e) The witnesses did not sign it in the presence of the testator, or of
each other, nor with knowledge on the part of the testator that they
were signing his will.
(f ) The witnesses did not sign the attestation clause before the death of
the testator.
(g) This clause was written after the execution of the dispositive part of
the will and was attached to the will after the death of the testator.
(h) The signatures of the testator on page 3 of Exhibit A are not authentic.
Issue: is the attestation clause made in accordance with the formalities
required by law?
Held: yes. In the case at bar the attestation clause in question states that the
requirements prescribed for the will were complied with, and this is enough for
it, as such attestation clause, to be held as meeting the requirements
prescribed by the law for it.
The fact that in said clause the signature of the testator does not appear does
not affect its validity, for, as above stated, the law does not require that it be
signed by the testator.
We find no merit in the assignment of error raising the question as to the
validity of Act No. 2645, which is valid. For the purposes of this decision, it is
not necessary to reason out this conclusion, it being sufficient for the
adjudication of this case to hold the first error assigned by the appellants to
have been demonstrated.
G.R. No. L-1787
August 27, 1948
Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.
TUASON, J.:
Facts:
In 1947, Don Sixto Lopez executed a will where Jose Lopez was named an
heir. Agustin Liboro questioned the validity of the said will based on the
following ground, among others:
1. The first sheet, which is also the first page) is not paged either in letters
or in Arabic numerals.
2. That the witnesses to the will provided contradictory statements.
3. That Don Sixto used his thumb mark to sign the will.
4. There was no indication in the will that the language used therein is
known by Don Sixto Lopez.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid.
HELD: Yes, the will is valid.
1. The omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be
necessary, is supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy
than the conventional numeral words or characters. The unnumbered
page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its
contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By
their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second
page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the
testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of
the preceding page. Further, the first pages is captioned Testamento.
2. The contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are
set out in Liboros appelants brief are incidents not all of which every
one of the witnesses can be supposed to have perceived, or to recall in

the same order in which they occurred.
3. Don Sixto affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing
his name. The reason for this was that he was suffering from partial
paralysis. There is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the
testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It
was a matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good.
4. There is no statutory requirement which prescribes that it must be
expressly placed in the will that the testator knows the language being
used therein. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde.
AMADO
Tedoro CANEDA, et al., petitioners vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and William CABRERA, as Special Administrator
of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.
G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993
FACTS:
Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, executed a last will and
testament before three attesting witnesses and he was duly assisted by his
lawyer and a notary public. It was declare therein that, among other things,
that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and
personal properties to specific persons, all of whom do not appear to be related
to Mateo. Not long after, he himself filed a petition before the CFI seeking the
probate of his last will and testament but the scheduled hearings were
postponed, until the testator passed away before his petition could finally be
heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the
will, sought his appointment as special administrator of the testators estate
but due to his death, he was succeeded by William Cabreara, who was
appointed by RTC which is already the probate court. In the course of the
hearing, herein petitioners claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator,
appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of the testators will on
the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already
in the poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the
same; and that the signature of the testator is not genuine. The probate court
rendered a decision that such will is the Last Will and Testament of Mateo
Caballero and that it was executed in accordance with all the requisites of the
law. Upon appeal to CA, the petitioners asserted that the will in question is
null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since
it fails to specifically state the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the
testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and
all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
However, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court ruling and ruling that the
attestation clause in the Last Will substantially complies with Article 805 of the
Civil Code. Due to denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence this
appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is
fatally defective such that whether or not it affects the validity of the will.
Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantial
compliance pursuant to Article 809 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the
attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them
and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate memorandum
or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed
by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the
essential formalities required by law has been observed. Under the 3rd
paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would
result in the invalidity of the will, should state:
The number of pages used upon which the will is written;
That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and
That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will
and all its pages, and that the said witnesses also signed the will and every page
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest
and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Attestation and subscription differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of
sense, while subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation clause herein
assailed is that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all
its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the
number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the
circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the
will in the presence of the testator and of each other. What is then clearly
lacking, is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page
The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection
which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought
to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the
defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely
involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would
warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in
Article 809 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper pressure
and influence, defects and imperfection in the form of attestation or in the
language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not proved that
the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all
the requirements of Article 805.
The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection
would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really
executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. These considerations do
not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting
witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator
and of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or
language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element
required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a
will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the present case since there
is no plausible way by which it can be read into the questioned attestation
clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did
actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all of its
pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will and every page
Rosario Feliciano VDA. DE RAMOS, et al., petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Marcelina (Martina) GUERRA, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-40804, January 31, 1978
FACTS:
Adelaida Nista claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a petition for
the probate of the alleged will and testament as well as codicil of the late
Eugenia Danila. Adelaida prayed that after due notice and hearing, the alleged
will and codicil be probated and that she or any other person be appointed as
administrator of the estate. Buenaventura and Marcelina, both surnamed
Guerra, filed an opposition alleging among others that they are legally adopted
children of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila; that the
purported will and codicil were procured through fraud and undue influence;
that the formalities required by law for the execution of a will and codicil have
not been complied with; that the late Eugenia Danila had already executed her
last will and testament was duly probated and not revoked or annulled during
her lifetime; and that Adelaida is not competent and qualified to act as
administration of the estate. Afterwards, the parties entered into a
compromise agreement which was approved by the lower court. The petitioners
herein filed a motion for leave to intervene as co-petitioners and filed a reply
partly admitting and denying the material allegations in the opposition to the
petition and alleging among other things, that oppositors repudiated their
institution as heirs and executors because they failed to cause the recording in
the Register of Deeds the will and testament in accordance with the Rules and
committed acts of ingratitude when they abandoned the testatrix and denied
her support. Subsequently, the intervenors (petitioners herein) also filed a
motion for new trial and/or re-hearing and/or relief from judgment and to set
aside the judgment based on the compromise agreement and consequently, the
oppositors interposed an opposition to the motion to which the intervenors
filed their reply. The lower court allowed and admitted to intervene the
petitioners herein, the compromise agreement was disapproved except as
regards to their lawful rights, and the original petition and amended opposition
to probate of the alleged will and codicil stand. The lower court also denied
the motion for the appointment of a special administrator filed by the
intervenors. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. The
lower court then allowed the probate of the will although two of the
instrumental witnesses testified that they did not see the testatrix sign the will.
The oppositors herein appealed to the Court of Appeals set aside the order of
allowing the probate. Hence, this present action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last will and testament and its accompanying codicil were
executed in accordance with the formalities of the law considering the
complicated circumstances that two (2) of the attesting witnesses testified
against their due execution while other non-subscribing witnesses testified to
the contrary.
RULING:
There is ample and satisfactory evidence to convince the Supreme Court that
the will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required
by law. It appears positively and convincingly that the documents were
prepared by a lawyer and the execution of the same was evidently supervised by
his associate and before whom the deeds were also acknowledged. The
solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is attended by some intricacies
not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman. The object is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will
and testament, and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. If there should
be any stress on the participation of lawyers in the execution of a will, other
than an interested party, it cannot be less than the exercise of their primary
duty as members of the Bar to uphold the lofty purpose of the law. There is no
showing that the lawyers who participated in the execution of the will had
been remiss in their sworn duty. Consequently, the Court of Appeals failed to
consider the presumption of regularity on the questioned documents. There
were no incidents brought to the attention of the trial court to arouse
suspicion of anomaly. While the opposition alleged fraud and undue influence,
no evidence was presented to prove their occurrence. There is no question
that each and every page of the will and codicil carry the authentic signatures
of Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting witnesses. Similarly, the
attestation claim far from being deficient were properly signed by the attesting
witnesses. Neither it is disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the
will and codicil in the presence of each and the testatrix. Both instruments
were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public who was all the time present
during the execution.
Agapita N. CRUZ, petitioner vs.
Hon. Judge Guillermo P. VILLASOR and Manuel LUGAY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973
FACTS:
Agapita Cruz is the surviving spouse of the deceased Valente Cruz. Agapita
filed before the CFI an opposition for the allowance of the will of his late
husband alleging that the will was executed through fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation and undue influence because the said instrument was
executed without the testator having been fully informed of the content
thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the
supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law.
However, due to unfavorable decision, Agapita appealed by certiorari before

the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the supposed last will and testament was executed in
accordance with law.
RULING:
Of the three instrumental witnesses, one of them is at the same time the
Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged.
The Supreme Court is inclined to sustain the last will and testament in
question was not executed in accordance with law. The notary public before
whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having
signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow. Consequently, if the
third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or
admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done
because he cannot split his personality into two.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and
acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting
witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of
Article 805 requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of
Article 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of
witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The
result would be that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public for
or that purpose. In the circumstance, the law would not be duly observed.
Rev. Father Lucio V. Garcia, petitioner, vs.
Hon. Conrado M. VASQUEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. L-26808, March 28, 1969
FACTS:
Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried and leaving no descendants,
ascendants, brother or sister thereafter, Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. De
Precilla, niece of the deceased petitioned for probate the alleged last will and
testament of Gliceria dated December 1960 and that she be appointed as
special administratrix. Various parties opposed the petition contending that
the 1960 will was not intended by Gliceria to be her true will and that there was
a 1956 will executed by Gliceria were the oppositors were named as legatees.
Consequently, Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis an ophthalmologist testified that Glicerias
left eye suffered form cataract in 1960 which made her vision mainly for
viewing distant object but not for reading prints.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 808 regarding blind testator be followed in the instant
case to make Glicerias will valid?
RULING:
For all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, the deceased Gliceria del
Rosario was like a blind testator and the due execution of her will would have
required observance of the provisions of Article 808 of the Civil Code.
Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by
the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is
blind or incapable of reading the will himself, is to make the provisions of the
will known to the testator, so that he may be able to object if they are not in
accordance with his wishes. That the aim of the law is to insure that the
dispositions of the will are properly communicated to and understood by the
handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of his desire, is
evidenced by the requirement that the will should be read to the latter, not
only once but twice, by two different persons, and that the witnesses have to
act within the range of his (the testators) other senses.
Brigido Alvarado,
Cesar ALVARADO, petitioner vs.
Hon. Ramon GAVIOLA
G.R. No. 74695, September 14, 1993
FACTS:
Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled, Huling Habilin wherein he
disinherited an illegitimate son, Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a
previously executed a holographic will at the time awaiting probate before
RTC. As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and
Cesar, the testator did not read the final draft of the will, instead, Atty. Rino,
as the lawyer who drafted the document read the same aloud in the presence
of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. While
the testators will was admitted to probate, a codicil was subsequently
executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for
the testators eye operation because he was then suffering from glaucoma. But
the disinheritance and the revocatory clauses remained and as in the case of
the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the
codicil. Instead, it was Atty. Rino who read it alound in his presence and in the
presence of the three instrumental witnesses and of the notary public. Upon
the testators death, Atty Rino as executor filed a petition for probate of the
notarial will which was in turn opposed by Cesar alleging that the will sought to
be probated was not executed and attested as required by law. Upon failure of
Cesar to substantiate his Opposition, a Probate Order was issued from which
an appeal was made to IAC stating that the probate of the deceaseds last will
and codicil should have been denied because the testator was blind within the
meaning of the law at the time his Huling Habilin and the codicil thereto was
executed;and that since reading required by Art. 808 was admittedly not
complied with. CA concluded that although Art. 808 was not followed, there
was, however, as substantial compliance.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Brigido Alvarado was blind within the meaning of Article 808 at
the time his Huling Habilin and codicil were executed.
If so, whether or not the requirement of double-reading in said Article was
complied with such that whether or not, they were validly executed.
RULING:
Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one
reason or another, are incapable of reading their wills. Since the deceased was
incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate
occasions of their execution due to his poor, defective, or blurred vision,
there can be no other course but to conclude that he comes within the scope
of the term blind as used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him,
he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will
and codicil did so conformably with his instruction. Hence, to consider his will
as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential to ascertain whether
or not Art. 808 had been complied with.
There is no evidence and Cesar does not allege that the contents of the will
and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the
testator. On the contrary, with respect to the Huling Habilin, the day of the
execution was not the first time that the testator had affirmed the truth and
authenticity of the contents of the draft. Moreover, with four persons
following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely
concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him
were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents. This is
especially true considering the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were
persons known to the testator.
The spirit behind that law was served though the letter was not. Although
there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law
in order to insure authenticity of the will, the formal imperfection should be
brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into
account may only defeat the testators will. Substantial compliance is
acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being
that the solemnities surrounding the execution of will are intended to protect
the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be
so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.
Abangan v Abangan
Avancena;
Nov 12, 1919
FACTS:
Trial Court admitted Ana Abangans probate. The will is described in
thefollowing manner:
First sheet:
Contains all the disposition of the testatrix.
Signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the
direction of Ana Abangan) Signed by three witnesses
Second sheet:
Contains only the attestation clause. Duly signed by the same three witnesses
at the bottom. Was not signed by the testatrix herself Anastacia Abangan
(different person) et al. appealed from this decision. She says that the probate
should have been denied on three grounds: Neither of the sheets were signed
on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses the pages were not
numbered by letters It was written in a dialect that the testatrix did not
understand.
Issue: WON the probate should have been admitted.
Ruling: Yes. The trial court was correct in admitting the probate.1. Re: signing
on the left margin- The object of Act 2645, which requires that every sheet
should be signed on the left margin, is only to avoid the substitution of any
sheet, thereby changing the dispositions of the testatrix.- Act 2645 only took
into consideration cases of wills written on several sheets, which did not have
to be signed at the bottom by the testator and the witnesses.- But when the
dispositions are duly written only on one sheet, and signed at the bottom by the
testator and the witnesses, the signatures on the left would be purposeless.- If
the signatures at the bottom already guarantee its authenticity, another
signature on the left margin would be unnecessary.- This interpretation of Act
2645 also applies to the page containing the attestation clause (the second
sheet). Such a signature on the margin by the witnesses would be a formality
not required by the statute.- It is also not required that the testatrix sign on
the attestation clause because the attestation, as its name implies, appertains
only to the witnesses and not the testator since the testator does attest, but
executes the will.2. Re: Page numbering- Act 2645s object in requiring this was
to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed.- But when all the
dispositive parts of the will are written on one sheet only, the object of the
Act 2645 disappears because the removal of this single sheet although hot
numbered, cannot be hidden.
FELIX AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS and GERALDA AIDA

CASTILLO, substituted
by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO
G.R. 122880, 12 April 2006, Tinga, J. (Third Division)
Facts:
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which
the will is written is fatally
defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental
witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps
most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere
jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of
these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three
defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
Felix Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial
will purportedly
executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and notarized on the same day.
The will consisted of
two (2) pages and was written in Filipino. The attestation clause did not state
the number of pages
and it was not signed by the attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The
said witnesses affixed
their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will though.
Geralda Castillo opposed
the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery. She also argued that the will
was not executed and
attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that the decedents
signature did not appear on
the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged.
The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been executed in
accordance with
law and, thus, admitted it to probate, calling to fore the modern tendency in
respect to the
formalities in the execution of a willwith the end in view of giving the
testator more freedom in
expressing his last wishes. According to the trial court, the declaration at the
end of the will under
the sub-title, Patunay Ng Mga Saksi, comprised the attestation clause and
the acknowledgement,
and was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. It also held
that the signing by the
subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will
containing the attestation
clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially
satisfied the purpose of
identification and attestation of the will. The Court of Appeals, however,
reversed the trial courts
decision and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that
the attestation clause
failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void
and undeserving of
probate.
Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that
the number of
pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause is merely
directory, rather than
mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as the substantial
compliance rule.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject will complied with the requirements of the law
and, hence,
should be admitted to probate
HELD:
The petition is DENIED.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which
the will is
written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the
instrumental witnesses
is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not
contain an acknowledgment,
but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to
deny probate. A notarial
will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection. RECENT
JURISPRUDENCE CIVIL LAW
Prior to the New Civil Code, the statutory provision governing the formal
requirements of
wills was Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Extant therefrom is the
requirement that the
attestation state the number of pages of the will. The enactment of the New
Civil Code put in force a
rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the
attestation clause is
concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed the said Section
618. Article 809 of the
Civil Code, the Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal
construction through the
substantial compliance rule. However, Justice J.B.L. Reyes cautioned that
the rule must be limited to
disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will
itself: whether all the pages are
consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page;
whether the subscribing witnesses are
three or the will was notarized...But the total number of pages, and whether all
persons required to sign did so in the
presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause,
being the only check against perjury in the
probate proceedings. The Court suggested in Caneda v. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993,
222 SCRA 781): the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be
supplied by an
examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence, will not be fatal
and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will
being assailed.
However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde
would result in the
invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which
the will was
written remains a fatal flaw, despite Art. 809. This requirement aims at
safeguarding the will against
possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and thus
preventing any increase or
decrease in the pages. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with
this requirement if the
will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the
situation in Singson and
Taboada. In this case, however, there could have been no substantial
compliance with the
requirements under Art. 805 of the Civil Code since there is no statement in
the attestation clause or
anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.
There was an
incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted
for the insertion of the
number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in.
The subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the
instrumental
witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the
left-hand margin of the
will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause. Art. 805
particularly segregates the
requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from
the requisite that the will
be attested and subscribed by them. The signatures on the left-hand corner of
every page signify,
among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing
forms part of the will. On
the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the
witnesses are referring to the
statements contained in the attestation clause itself. An unsigned attestation

clause results in an
unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin
of the page containing
the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these
witnesses undertakings in
the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed
towards a wholly different
avowal.
The notary public who notarized the subject will wrote, Nilagdaan ko at
ninotario ko ngayong
10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila. By no manner of
contemplation can these words
be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who
has executed a deed
in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act
or deed. It might be
possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not follow to
the usual language
thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that
before him/her, the
document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.
It may not have been said before, but a notarial will that is not acknowledged
before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is
subscribed and sworn to RECENT JURISPRUDENCE CIVIL LAW
before a notary public. The importance of the requirement of acknowledgment
is highlighted by the
fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Art. 805
and entrusted into a
separate provision, Art. 806. The express requirement of Art. 806 is that the
will be acknowledged,
and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The acknowledgment coerces the
testator and the
instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had
executed and subscribed
to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and
under pain of perjury,
thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the
execution of spurious
wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also
provides a further degree of
assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary
dispositions to those
persons he/she had designated in the will.
Guerrero vs Bihis
G.R. No. 174144 April 17, 2007
Facts:
Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero
andrespondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died. Guerrero filed for probate in the
RTCQC. Respondent Bihis
opposed her elder sisters petition on the following
grounds: the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
itsattestation clause and acknowledgment did not comply with the
requirementsof the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud
and petitioner and her children procured the will through undue and improper
pressure andinfluence. The trial court denied the probate of the will ruling
that Article 806 of
the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was acknowledged
bythe testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrixs residence at No. 40 Kanlaon
Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a
commissionednotary public for and in Caloocan City.
ISSUE:
Did the will acknowledged by the testatrix and the instrumental
witnessesbefore a notary public acting outside the place of his commission
satisfy therequirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
No. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution
of a notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by
thetestator and the witnesses. This formal requirement is one of
theindispensable requisites for the validity of a will. In other words, a notarial
willthat is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
theinstrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate.The

Notarial law provides: SECTION 240.Territorial jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with

theprovince. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be
co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any
notarialact beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.Sine Atty. Directo was not a
commissioned notary public for and in QuezonCity, he lacked the authority to
take the acknowledgment of the testratix andthe instrumental witnesses. In
the same vain, the testratix and theinstrumental witnesses could not have
validly acknowledged the will beforehim. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Bu
enaventuras last will and testament was, in
effect, not acknowledged as required by law.
Taboada v. RosalGutierrez,Jr. (Nov. 5, 1982)Pet: Apolonio Tobadoa, for the

probate of the will of Dorotea PerezRes: Hon. Avelino S. Rosal, Judge CFI
Leyte who denied the probate of the will for want of formality
inexecvution.Doctrine: Specific requirements for a Notarial Will may be
liberally construed to prevent the will of thetestator from being defeated by
purely technical considerations. Here, witness signatures at the marginwas
sufficient compliance of the req. for attestation and subscription by 3credible
witnesses.
Facts:1. FILED: Probate of the will of Dorotea Perez, written in the CebuanoVisayan Dialect consisting of twopages. Page1: the entire testamentary
dispositions and signed at the end by the testatrix. Thewitnesses signed at the
left hand margin. Page2:Attestation and acknowledgment, signed by
thetestatrix at the left hand margin, signed by the three witnesses at the end.2.
The petitioner complied with the requirement of publication and no opposition
was filed. Hence thecourt commissioned the clerk of court to receive evidence
which was accordingly presented.3.
CFI: J.Pamatian
DENIED the probate of the will for want of formality in execution. It also
requiredthe petitioners to submit the names of the intestate heirs with their
corresponding addresses sothat they could be properly notified and could

intervene in the summary settlement of the estate.4.
Instead of complying Pet FILED: M for 30day period(extension) to deliberate.
And the 10day periodof submitting the list be held in abeyance.5.
Pet FILED: MR
but was not acted upon by J.Pamatian coz he was transferred. And M
forAppointment of a Special Administrator.6.
New CFI J. Rosal (Resp.)
DENIED the MR as well as the motion because the pet failed to complywith
the order requiring him to submit the list of intestate heirs.Hence pet filed the
present petition.
Issue: w/n for the validity of a notarial will, does Art 805 NCC, require that
BOTH the testatrix and the3witnesses to sign at THE END of the will and in
the presence of the testatrix and one another?
Decision: No. Liberal Construction, would permit the testatrix to sign at the
end and the witnesses at themargins.1.
Art 805 NCC provides:
Every will, other than a hol,ographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator
himself or by the testators name written by sonme other person in his presence,
and by his
express dirextion, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in thepresence of the testator and one another
2.
Lower Courts Stand: Both the testatrix and the witnesses should sign at the
end.
Pet. Stand: Art 805 does not make it a condition precedent or a matter of
absolute necessity forwitnesses to sign specifically at the end of the will after
the signature of the testatrix.3.
Note that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed differently:
Attestation
witnessing the execution of the will
Subscription
is the signing of the witnesses names upon the same paper for the purpose of
identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator
IN RE WILL OF ANTONIO VERGEL DE DIOS, RAMON J. FERNANDEZ vs.

HERMELO VERGEL, et al.
G.r. No. L-2115, February 25, 1924
Facts:
The question in this case is as to the validity of the will of the late Antonio
Vergel de Dios, which was propounded by Ramon Fernandez for probate, and
contested by Fernando Vergel de Dios and Francisco, Ricardo and
VirgilioRustia, alleging that the attestation clause was fatally defective since
the witnesses did not sign the attestation clause in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
Issue:
Whether or not the signatures of the testator and the paging of the will are
also necessary in the attestation clause
Ruling:
The attestation clause shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and
every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed
and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
each other. This refers to the contents of the text of the attestation, not the
requirement or signatures thereof outside of its text. It does not require that
the attestation clause be signed by the testator or that the page or sheet
containing it be numbered. In the case at bar the attestation clause in question
states that the requirements prescribed for the will were complied with, and
this is enough for it, as such attestation clause, to be held as meeting the
requirements prescribed by the law for it. The fact that in said clause the
signature of the testator does not appear does not affect its validity, for, as
above-stated, the law does not require that it be signed by the testator.
Furthermore, although the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation
clause does not appear in the upper part thereof, yet if that numbering is
found in its text, as when it is said therein that
the will consists of three sheets actually uses, correlatively numbered, besides
this one, that is to say, the sheet containing the attestation clause, the
requirement prescribed by the law is substantially complied with, for if the will
consists of three sheets besides the one containing the attestation clause, it is
evident that the latter is the fourth page is to say, that the document consists
of four sheets.
Ortega v. Valmonte
478 SCRA 247
FACTS:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age
of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two
years of wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and
testament written in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June
1983but acknowledged only on 9 August 1983.
The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia, Placidos sister.
According to the notary public who notarized the testators will, after the te
stator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the
notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to
prepare. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but
the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come
back on 9 August 1983. The formal execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He
reasoned he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because
he did not like the document to appear dirty. Petiti
oners argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 years
old and was no longer of sound mind. 2. Josefina conspired with the notary
public and the 3 attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is
allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of
the will.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the
will. 2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or
trickery.
HELD:
1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the
kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their
location. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he
identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the
will did not affect its formal
validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its

disposition becomes irrelevant. 2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false
statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such
character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents
of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in
consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a
certain will which, but for fraud, he would not have made. The party
challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the
time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent
of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Omission of some
relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict
between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document,
because the law does not even require that a notarial will be executed and
acknowledged on the same occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to
its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively
explained by the notary public and instrumental witnesses.
Canopong- Noble v. Alipio Abaja

Facts:
Abada died sometime in May 1940.[4] His widow Paula Toray (Toray) died
sometime in September 1943. Both died without legitimate children.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja (Alipio) filed with the then Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a petition,[5]
docketed as SP No. 070 (313-8668), for the probate of the last will and
testament (will) of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs
his natural children Eulogio Abaja (Eulogio) and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is
the son of Eulogio.
Nicanor Caponong (Caponong) opposed the petition on the ground that
Abada left no will when he died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that the
will, if Abada really executed it, should be disallowed for the following reasons:
(1) it was not executed and attested as required by law; (2) it was not intended
as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same
grounds invoked by Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely,
Joel, Julian, Paz, Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada
(Joel Abada, et al.), and Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and
Carmela Tronco (Levi Tronco, et al.), also opposed the petition. The
oppositors are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
In an Order dated 14 August 1981, the RTC-Kabankalan admitted to probate
the will of Toray.
Since the oppositors did not file any motion for
reconsideration, the order allowing the probate of Torays will became final and
executory.
s prayed for by counsel, Noel Abbellar[11] is appointed administrator of the
estate of Paula Toray who shall discharge his duties as such after letters of
administration shall have been issued in his favor and after taking his oath and
filing a bond in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos.
Mrs. Belinda C. Noble, the present administratrix of the estate of Alipio
Abada shall continue discharging her duties as such until further orders from
this Court.
Issue:
Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the
attestation clause complies with the requirements of the applicable laws
Held:
Yes. Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not
indicate the number of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the
appellate court in applying the rule on substantial compliance in determining
the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the
number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses
signed it.
This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the
effectivity of the New Civil Code. In Dichoso de Ticson v. De Gorostiza,[30]
the Court recognized that there are two divergent tendencies in the law on
wills, one being based on strict construction and the other on liberal
construction. In Dichoso, the Court noted that Abangan v. Abangan,[31] the
basic case on the liberal construction, is cited with approval in later decisions
of the Court.
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abadas will.
Abadas will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three other
persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are three witnesses to the will.
CEFERINO ALDABA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
LUDOVICO ROQUE, opponent-appellant.
Facts:
It appears from the record of the case that on July 9, 1918, Maria Roque y
Paraiso, the widow of Bruno Valenzuela, resident of the barrio of Mambog,
municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan, executed her last will and
testament in the Tagalog dialect with the help of Vicente Platon and in the
presence of three witnesses who signed the attestation clause and each of the
four pages of the testament. Maria Roque died on December 3, 1919, and when
her will was filed in court for probate, it was contested by Ludovico Roque on
the ground that it had not been prepared nor executed in conformity with the
requirements and solemnities prescribed by law.
After due proceedings had been had, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
by its decision rendered on February 27th of the following year, pronounced
the testament in question valid, and ordered its probate, appointing Ceferino
Aldaba as the administrator of the estate.
Issue:
whether or not the ommission of the numbering of pages render the will invalid
Held:
No. In that case the testament was written on one page, and the attestation
clause on another. Neither one of these pages was numbered in any way; and it
was held:
In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the
testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three
witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also
at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be
further signed on their margings by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
This means that, according to the particular case, the omission of paging does
not necessarily render the testament invalid.
The law provides that the numbering of the pages should be in letters placed
on the upper part of the sheet, but if the paging should be place din the lower
part, would the testament be void for his sole reason? We believe not. The law
also provides that the testator and the witnesses must sign the left margin of
each of the sheets of the testament; but if they should sign on the right
margin, would this fact also annul the testament? Evidently not. This court has
already held in Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145):lvvph1n+
It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses
shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is
undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory
requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully complied with. The
same doctrine is also deducible from cases heretofore decided by this court.
Maravilla v. Maravilla
Facts:
ppellant Herminio Maravilla, probate petitioner and husband of the decedent,

died on 16 July 1966, after the case was submitted for decision. Upon motion
for intervention filed by Concepcion Maravilla Kohlhaas and Rose Mary
Kohlhaas, this Supreme Court allowed their intervention on 24 July 1967, upon
showing that their interest as substitute heirs was vested definitely upon the
death of Herminio Maravilla, and that said movants for intervention merely
adopt the pleadings and briefs filed in behalf of the deceased Herminio
Maravilla so that the intervention will not delay the disposition of the case. 2
Appellees Pedro, 3 Asuncion and Regina, all surnamed "Maravilla," who are
allegedly the brother and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla and
oppositors to the probate, had moved to require the P. C. Laboratory to
submit explanations of the photographs of the will and the signatures thereon
previously filed, 4 but this Court, considering that such explanation would
amount to new evidence not heard at the trial, denied the motion on 3 August
1967. 5
Herminio Maravillas petition for probate was opposed by the appellees in an
amended opposition filed in the course of the trial in the court below and
admitted without objection. The opposition alleged the following
grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
That the deceased, Digna Maravilla, the alleged testatrix and the instrumental
witnesses did not sign the alleged will, each and every page thereof, in the
presence of each other.
Issue: wether or not there is proper attestation in the will
Held:
Yes. The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "A," which is typewritten in the
Spanish language, purports to have been executed in Manila on the 7th day of
October, 1944; it consists of five (5) pages, including the page on which the
attestation clause was completed. The purported signatures of the testatrix
appear at the logical end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all
the other pages.
Upon the evidence, the trial judge concluded that Mansueto did not actually
see Digna Maravilla sign the will in question, basing such conclusion upon the
fact that while Mansueto positively identified his own signature ("I identify this
as my signature") but not that of the testatrix, his five answers to the
questions of counsel, in reference thereto, being "this must be the signature of
Mrs. Digna Maravilla."cralaw virtua1aw library
In our opinion, the trial courts conclusion is far fetched, fanciful and
unwarranted. It was but natural that witness Mansueto should be positive
about his own signature, since he was familiar with it. He had to be less positive
about Digna Maravillas signature since he could not be closely acquainted with
the same: for aught the record shows, the signing of the will was the only
occasion he saw her sign; he had no opportunity to study her signature before
or after the execution of Exhibit "A." Furthermore, he witnessed Dignas
signing not less than fourteen years previously. To demand that in identifying
Dignas signature Mansueto should display a positiveness equal to the certainty
shown by him in recognizing his own, exceeds the bounds of the reasonable.
The variation in the expressions used by the witness is the best evidence that
he was being candid and careful, and it is a clear badge of truthfulness rather
than the reverse.
We are satisfied that the preponderance of evidence is to the effect that the
testament, Exhibit "A," was duly executed by a qualified testatrix and
competent witnesses, in conformity with the statutory requirements.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the court below denying
probate of the 1944 will of Digna Maravilla (Exhibit "A") is reversed and the said
testament is hereby ordered probated. Let the records be returned to the
Court of origin for further proceedings conformable to law. Costs against
oppositors-appellees.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72
November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D.

SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D.
SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS,
VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIOLIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of private
respondent Elisa D. Seangio-Santos as special administrator and guardian ad
litem of Dy Yieng Seangio. However, petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia
opposed the petition contending that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy; 2)
Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her
the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in
the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the
administrator of the estate; and 4) Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting
one of the private respondents. Thereafter, a petition for the probate of the
holographic will of Segundo was filed by the petitioner and reiterating that the
probate proceedings should take precedence over the petition filed by the
private respondents because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy
priority over the intestate proceedings. The two petitions were then
consolidated. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of
the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783
of the Civil Code, of which petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to
dismiss. RTC then issued an order dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings. Due to petitioners denial of motion for reconsideration, hence
this present action.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the holographic will is valid.
Such that, whether or not the disinheritance is valid.
RULING:
A holographic will, as provided under Article 819 of the Civil Code, must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and
need to be witnessed.
Secundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Sefundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition
of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition
of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed
in the absence of Alfredo.
The document entitled, Kasulatan ng Pag-Alis ng Mana, unmistakably
showed Segundos intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to
his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was
disinherited by Segundo. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil
Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal
cause therefore shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the
disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court
believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of
maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo and that the matter presents a
sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article
919 of the Civil Code.
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the
holographic will to be probated, it is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent to take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.
No. 72706 October 27, 1987

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division),
VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the
probate of the will of his late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the
latter died leaving a will in which the former and his brothers and sisters were
instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court,
Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the
widow of the deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that: (1) Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter
have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion
for reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate
Court. IAC granted Fernandez and Diongsons petition and ordered the trial
court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will. Due to the denial of
Acains motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.
RULING:
Article 854 of the Civil Code:

The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at
the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar
as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs
or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not
ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir.
However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under
Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of
the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in
the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were deprived of at
least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted
child.
The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to
the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any
other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written.
G.R. No. L-23445
June 23, 1966
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid, testator in the holographic will, died single and without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six brothers and sisters,
namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all
surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, sister of Rosario, filed in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid
on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her death. The will stated as
follows:
1951
Nov.
17,
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and

memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give,
devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to
my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga,
Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of
November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
Remedios prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her. This was opposed by the
parents of Rosario, Felix and Paz.
The parents opposed on the ground of preterition. The CFI of Rizal
decided in favor of the parents and declared that there was indeed preterition
of compulsory heirs.
Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs were simply ineffectively
disinherited and that they are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the
institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so
instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes.
ISSUE:
May a part of the will, when preterition has been declared, be considered to
still be valid with respect to the free portion of the will?
RULING:
No, preterition has an effect of completely nullifying the will. Article 854 of
the Civil Code states that (T)he preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious.
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents. The will
completely omits both of them. They thus received nothing by the testament;
tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly
disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
It cannot be gleaned in the will that any specific legacies or bequests are
therein provided for. It is in this posture that the Supreme Court held that the
nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
Remedios claim that the will should only be nullified as to the part of the
legitime and that she should thus be considered a devisee or legatee is without
merit. The law requires that the institution of devisees and legatees must be
expressly stated in the will. Such was not present.
Also, the omission of the parents in the will cannot be interpreted as a form
of disinheritance as the law also requires that, for disinheritance to be proper,
the disinheritance should be clearly and expressly stated in the will. Absent
that, no inference of disinheritance may be had.
HILARION,
ORENDAIN,
ORENDAIN,
JR.
and
ENRICO
represented by FE D.
Petitioners,[1]
- versus TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF
DOA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ,
Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doa Margarita Rodriguez, died in Manila,
leaving a last will and testament. The will was admitted to probate. At the time
of her death, the decedent left no compulsory or forced heirs and,
consequently, was completely free to dispose of her properties, without regard
to legitimes, as provided in her will. Some of Doa Margarita Rodriguezs
testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the
properties and the income from her properties for distribution to beneficiaries
specified in the will.
Thus, the following pertinent items in the will paint the desire of the
decedent:
1. Clause 2 instructed the creation of trust;
2. Clause 3 instructed that the remaining income from specified properties,
after the necessary deductions for expenses, including the estate tax, be
deposited in a fund with a bank;
3. Clause 10 enumerated the properties to be placed in trust for perpetual
administration (pangasiwaan sa habang panahon);
4. Clauses 11 and 12 directed how the income from the properties ought to be
divided among, and distributed to the different beneficiaries; and
5. Clause 24 instructed the administrators to provide medical support to
certain beneficiaries, to be deducted from the fund deposits in the bank
mentioned in Clauses 2 and 3.
Almost four decades later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico
Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned in Clause 24 of
the decedents will, moved to dissolve the trust on the decedents estate,
which they argued had been in existence for more than twenty years, in
violation of Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code.
The trustees argued that the trust instituted may be perpetual citing the
case of Palad, et al. v. Governor of Quezon Province where the trust holding
the two estate of one Luis Palad was allowed to exist even after the lapse of
twenty years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a trust may be perpetual.

Whether or not the named trustees may be considered as heirs to the
estate.
RULING:
The general rule remains that upon the expiration of the twenty-year
allowable period, the estate may be disposed of under Article 870 of the New
Civil Code, which regards as void any disposition of the testator declaring all or
part of the estate inalienable for more than 20 years.
The Palad Case is not violative of such provision of the law by the trust
constituted by Luis Palad because the will of the testator does not interdict
the alienation of the parcels devised. The will merely directs that the income of
said two parcels be utilized for the establishment, maintenance and operation
of the high school.
Said Article 870 was designed to give more impetus to the socialization of
the ownership of property and to prevent the perpetuation of large holdings
which give rise to agrarian troubles. The trust involved in the Palad case covers
only two lots, which have not been shown to be a large landholding. And the
income derived therefrom is being devoted to a public and social purpose the
education of the youth of the land. The use of said parcels therefore is in a
sense socialized.
In the present case, however, there is a different situation as the testatrix
specifically prohibited the alienation or mortgage of her properties which were
definitely more than the two (2) properties, unlike in the Palad case. The herein
testatrixs large landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely to a trust

because the ownership thereof would then effectively remain with her even in
the afterlife.
Apparent from the decedents last will and testament is the creation of a
trust on a specific set of properties and the income accruing therefrom.
Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that the decedent intended any of
the trusts designated beneficiaries to inherit these properties. Therefore, the
probate court must admit the case to determine the properties to be subject
to intestate succession as well as the nearest relative of the deceased that may
inherit the said properties under the perpetual trust.
G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970

RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA
MOZO,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO
CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and
LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA respondents.
CASTRO,
J.:
Facts:
Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal apetition for
probate,ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed
by the present petitioners, who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. The will was
subsequently allowedwith the bulk of her estate designated for respondents,
all of whomwere Basilias legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming
tobe the nearest of kin of Basilia, assert that the respondents had notin fact
been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law,thereby making them
mere strangers to the decedent and withoutany right to succeed as heirs.
Petitioners argue that thiscircumstance should have left the whole estate of
Basilia open tointestacy with petitioners being the compulsory heirs.It is alleged
by petitioners that the language used imply thatBasilia was deceived into
believing that she was legally bound tobequeath one-half of her entire estate to
the respondents as thelatter's legitime, with the inference that respondents
would nothave instituted the respondents as heirs had the fact of
spuriousadoption been known to her. The petitioners inferred that from
theuse of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and"sapilitang
mana" (legitime), the impelling reason or cause for theinstitution of the
respondents was the testatrix's belief that underthe law she could not do
otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the CivilCode applies whereby, the statement
of a false cause for theinstitution of an heir shall be considered as not written,
unless itappears from the will that the testator would not have made
suchinstitution if he had known the falsity of such cause.
ISSUE:
W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barringthe
petitioners nephews and niece from registering their claim evento properties
adjudicated by the decedent in her will.
HELD:
No. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled underarticle 850 of the
Civil Code, the following requisites must concur: First , the cause for the
institution of heirs must be stated in the will;second , the cause must be shown
to be false; andthird , it mustappear from the face of the will that the testator
would not havemade such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
The decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal mannerthe
cause for such institution of heirs. Absent such we look at
otherconsiderations. The decedents disposition of the free portion of
herestate, which largely favored the respondents, compared with therelatively
small devise of land which the decedent left for her bloodrelatives, shows a
perceptible inclination on her part to give therespondents more than what she
thought the law enjoined her togive to them. Excluding the respondents from
the inheritance,considering that petitioner nephews and nieces would succeed
tothe bulk of the testate by virtue of intestacy, would subvert theclear wishes
of the decedent. Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its
side,especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of thetestator to
dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done inthis case. Intestacy
should be avoided and the wishes of thetestator should be allowed to prevail.
Granted that a probate courthas found, by final judgment, that the decedent
possessedtestamentary capacity and her last will was executed free
fromfalsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, it follows that givingfull
expression to her will must be in order.
G.R. No. L-24365
June 30, 1966
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.

CHRISTENSEN,
deceased.
ADOLFO
C.
AZNAR,
executor
and
appellee,
vs.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, oppositor and appellant.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, oppositor and appellee.
J.:
MAKALINTAL,
Facts:
Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court
declared that Helen Garcia was a natural child of thedeceased. The Court of
First Instance equally divided the propertiesof the estate of Christensen
between Lucy Duncan (whom testatorexpressly recognized in his will as his
daughter) and Helen Garcia.In the order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was
preterited in thewill thus, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled
andthe properties passed to both of them as if the deceased diedintestate.
issue:
Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equallydivided or
whether the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir shouldbe merely reduced to
the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to of
the entire estate.
Held:
he inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to coverthe legitime of Helen
Garcia.Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as hisnatural
daughter and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00.When a testator leaves
to a forced heir a legacy worth less than thelegitime, but without referring to
the legatee as an heir or even asa relative, and willed the rest of the estate to
other persons, theheir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be
annulledentirely, but only that the legitime be completed.
[G.R. No. 141882. March 11, 2005]

J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L. TEVES,
petitioner, vs. ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA CADAYDAY,
respondents.
TINGA, J.:
Facts:
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia
Baena (Antonia), and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros
Donio). Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: JosefaTeves
Escao (Josefa) and Emilio Teves (Emilio). He had also four (4) children with
Milagros Donio, namely: MariaEvelyn Donio Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose Catalino
Donio Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves (MilagrosReyes) and Pedro
Reyes Teves (Pedro).The present controversy involves a parcel of land known as
Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre, which was originallyregistered in the name of
the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and Antonia. When Antonia died, the
land wasamong the properties involved in an action for partition and damages.
Thereafter, the parties to the case enteredinto a Compromise Agreement
which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian. The property
was toremain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. The Compromise
Agreement lays down the effect of theeventual death of Don Julian that in
the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties now selected
andadjudicated to Don Julian shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in
second marriage of Don Julian and his four minor children.On 16 November
1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets
with Assumptionof Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Less than a year
later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed aninstrument entitled
Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Supplemental
Deed. Thisinstrument transferred ownership over Lot No. 63 in favor of J.L.T.
Agro, Inc. Don Julian died intestate.Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her
children had immediately taken possession over the subject lot after
theexecution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly
lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. At the
Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute
sale,respondents discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether Don Julian had validly transferred ownership of the subject lot
during his lifetime?
Held:
yes. Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering
Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner,Don Julian remained the owner of the
property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirsfrom
the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the
subject lot, Don Julian retained theabsolute right to dispose of it during his
lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her childrenon
the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the
compromise agreement.The adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don Julian
from the second marriage became automatically operative uponthe approval of
the Compromise Agreement, thereby vesting on them the right to validly
dispose of Lot No. 63 infavor of respondents. All things which are not outside
the commerce of men, including future things, may be theobject of a contract.
All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts. No
contract may beentered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law. Well-entrenched is the rule thatall things, even future ones,
which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract.
Theexception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future
inheritance, and the exception to theexception is the partition inter vivos
referred to in Article 1080. The first paragraph of Article 1080, which
providesthe exception to the exception and therefore aligns with the general
rule on future things, reads: ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his
estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall berespected, insofar
as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.. . . .The partition
inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to
Article 1347. However,considering that it would become legally operative only
upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from thesecond marriage
to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but
a mereexpectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their
father. Being the prospect of a futureacquisition, the interest by its nature
was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which
itrelated was at the time nonexistent and might never exist
G.R. No. L-47799
June 13, 1941
Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI,

ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN, respondents.
J.:
MORAN,
FACTS:
Testator Neri indicated in his will that he was leaving all of his properties by
universal title to his children by his secondmarriage with preterition of his
children by his first marriage.- Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapita, Getulia, Rosario
and Celerina are all Neris children by his first marriage. The trial court
annulled the institution of the heirs and declared total intestacy.- The children
by the second marriage filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds
that:1) there is no preterition as to the children of the first marriage have
received their shares in the property left by thetestator 2) assuming that there
has been a preterition, the effect would not be the annulment of the
institution of heirs but simplythe reduction of the bequest made to them. The
children by the second marriage anchor their argument on the concept of
heir whose A814 definition is deemed repealed by that of the Code of Civil
Procedure. It is maintained that the word "heredero" under the Civil Code, is
notsynonymous with the term "heir" under the Code of Civil Procedure, and
that the "heir" under the latter Code is nolonger personally liable for the debts
of the deceased as was the "heredero" under the Civil Code
ISSUES
1. WON there is preterition
2. WON there should be annulment of the institution of the heirs and open the
estate to total intestacy
HELD:
YES, there is preteritionAccording to the courts findings, none of the children by the first marriage
received their respective shares from the
testators property
- Even if clause 8 of the will is invoked (said clause states that the children by
his first marriage had already receivedtheir shares in his property excluding
what he had given them as aid during their financial troubles and the money
theyhad borrowed from him) the Court can rely only on the findings of the trial
court that the inventory indicates that theproperty of Neri has remained
intact and that no portion has been given to the children of the first marriage.Neri left his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage
and did not expressly disinherit hischildren by his first marriage but did not
leave anything to them. This fits the case of preterition according to A814,
CCwhich provides that the institution of heirs shall be annulled and intestate
succession should be declared open.2. YES- The word "heir" as used in A814 of
the Civil Code may not have the meaning that it has under the Code of
CivilProcedure, but this does prevent a bequest from being made by universal
title as is in substance the subject-matter of A814 of the Civil Code.- It may
also be true that heirs under the Code of Civil Procedure may receive the
bequest only after payment of debtsleft by the deceased and not before as
under the Civil Code, but this may have a bearing only upon the question as
towhen succession becomes effective and can in no way destroy the fact that
succession may still be by universal or special title.- Since a bequest may still be
made by universal title and with preterition of forced heirs, its nullity as
provided in article814 still applies there being nothing inconsistent with it in the
Code of Civil Procedure. The basis for its nullity is thenature and effect of
the bequest and not its possible name under the Code of Civil Procedure.- In
addition, Secs. 755 and 756 of the Code of Civil Procedure affected A814 and
A851 of the Civil Code. But thesesections have been expressly repealed by Act
No. 2141, thus restoring force to A814 and A851
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982

RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her properties shall
beinherited by Dra. Maninang with whose family Clemencia has lived
continuously for thelast 30 years. The will also provided that she does not
consider Bernardo as his adoptedson. Bernardo, as the adopted son, claims to
be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate
proceedings.
ISSUE:
Was Bernardo preterited?
HELD:
In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under
theterms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or
disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance.Preterition
and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.Preterition consists in the
omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs oranyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.Disinheritance is
atestamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the
legitime fora cause authorized by law.By virtue of the dismissal of the testate
case, the determination of thatcontroversial issue has not been thoroughly
considered. The conclusion of the trial court was that Bernardo has been
preterited. The SC is of opinion, however, that from the faceof the will, that
conclusion is not indubitable. Such preterition is still questionable. TheSpecial
Proceeding is REMANDED to the lower court.
G.R. No. L-8927
March 10, 1914
ASUNCION NABLE JOSE, ET AL., plaintiff-appellants,

vs.
MARIA IGNACIA USON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
MORELAND, J.:
FACTS:
This is an appeal which involves a question which arises from the interpretation
of the first andsecond clauses of a codicil to the will of Filomena Uson.The
court below found that the children of the deceased sisters should take only
that portionwhich their respective mothers would have taken if they been alive
at the time the will wasmade; that the property should be divided into six equal
parts corresponding to the number ofsisters; that each living sister should take
one-sixth, and the children of each deceased sister should also take one-sixth,
each one- sixth to be divided among said children equally.The appellants
asserted that under a proper construction of the paragraphs of the codicil,
theproperty should be divided equally between the living sisters and the
children of the deceasedsisters, share and share alike, a niece taking the same
share that a sister receives. Hence, thisappeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters shall
take percapita and in equal parts the property passing under the codicil in this
case.
Held:
Yes. The appellants' contention is well founded.The court finds expressions
which seem to indicate with fair clearness that it was the intention ofthe
testatrix to divide her property equally between her sisters and nieces.Upon
looking at the codicil, it can be observed that: first, that the testatrix, in the
first paragraphthereof, declares that after her husband's death she desires
that "my sisters and nieces, ashereinafter named, shall succeed him as heirs; in
the second place, that the testatrix, in thesecond paragraph of the codicil,
names and identifies each one of her heirs then living, in eachone of the
persons whom she desires shall succeed her husband in the property. Among
thosementioned specially are the nieces as well as the sisters. The nieces are
referred to in no waydifferent from the sisters. Each one stands out in the
second paragraph of the codicil as clearlyas the other and under exactly the
same conditions; and in the third place, the last clause of thesecond paragraph
of the codicil, taken together with the last clause of the first paragraph,
isdecisive of the intention of the testatrix. In the last clause she says that she
names all of thepersons whom she desires to take under her will be name "so
that they must take and enjoy theproperty in equal parts as good sisters and
relatives."We have then in the first paragraph a declaration as to who the
testatrix desires shall becomethe owners of her property on the death of her
husband, her nieces as well as her sisters. Wehave also the final declaration of
the testatrix that she desires that the sisters and the nieces shalltake and
enjoy the property in equal parts. Thus, of the property passing under the
codicil, theliving sisters and the children of the deceased sisters shall take per
capita and in equal parts.
December 22, 1928

G.R. No. 29789
In re estate of Jose Macrohon Tiahua. FRANCISCO BARRIOS, administratorappellee,
vs.
EDUARDA ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., heirs-appellants.
IGNACIO MACROHON, appellant.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Facts:
surviving spouse of the deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua, and the latter's
legitimate children on the one side, and Ignacio Macrohon, his adulterous son,
on the other, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga,
laying down the following conclusions of law: (1) That an adulterous child may
be instituted heir within the limits provided by law; (2) that in making Ignacio
Macrohon an heir under his will, the testator did not observe the limitations
prescribed by law; (3) that the institution of Ignacio Macrohon as heir under
the will ought not to be declared absolutely void, but he should so share in the
inheritance as not to prejudice the legitimate of the other heirs; (4) that as
Exhibit 1 deals with certain acts contrary to law, such as not presenting the will
to the court, and as some minors took part in it through their guardian without
the latter being authorized by the court to enter into the transaction in their
behalf, said exhibit cannot bind the parties, nor do the admissions made by
them therein constitute estoppel; whereupon it disapproved the scheme of
partition presented by the administrator and ordered him to file another in
consonance with the conclusions therein laid down.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Macrohon Tiahua have a right to dispose of a part of his
estate by will in favor of his adulterous son
Held:
Yes. As to the first question, while it is true that article 845 of the Civil Code
provides that "illegitimate children who have not the status of natural children
shall be entitled to support only," and therefore cannot demand anything more
of those bound by law to support them, it does not prohibit said illegitimate
children from receiving, nor their parents from giving them, something more
than support, so long as the legitimate children are not prejudiced. If the law
permits a testator to dispose of the free third of his hereditary estate in favor
of a stranger (art. 808 of the Civil Code), there is no legal, moral or social
reason to prevent him from making over that third to his illlegitimate son who
has not the status of a natural son. On the contrary, by reason of blood, the
son, although illegitimate, has a preferential right over a stranger unless by his
behaviour he has become unworthy of such consideration. For these reasons,
we are of opinion and so hold, that Jose Macrohon Tiahua could dispose of
the free third of his estate in favor of his adulterous son, Ignacio Macrohon.
G.R. No. L-31703
February 13, 1930
CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara,

plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, defendants-appellants.
J.:
ROMUALDEZ,
Facts:
The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the
association known as La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the
liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said
plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his son,
the defendant Mariano Garchitorena. And as said Mariano Garchitorena held
a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the
plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution
issued in said judgment, levied an attachment on said amount deposited with
La Urbana. The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the
fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a
preliminary injunction restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so
attached. The defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's

universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution of the injunction. The court
below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as
fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a final writ of
injunction.
Issue:
whether or not there is a simple substitution in the Will
Held:
none. Clause X expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it does
not say whether the death of the heiress herein referred to is before or after
that of the testatrix; but from the whole context it appears that in making the
provisions contained in this clause X, the testatrix had in mind a
fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the transmission of her estate to
the children of the heiress by this provision, "in such wise that my estate shall
never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally
possible." Here it clearly appears that the testatrix tried to avoid the possibility
that the substitution might later be legally declared null for transcending the
limits fixed by article 781 of the Civil Code which prescribed that
fideicommissary substitutions shall be valid "provided they do not go beyond
the second degree." Another clear and outstanding indication of
fideicommissary substitution in clause X is the provision that the whole estate
shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is
required to preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it
on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs. This provision complies with
another of the requisites of fideicommissary substitution according to our
quotation from Manresa inserted above. Lastly, clause XI more clearly
indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution, when a provision is therein
made in the event the heiress should die after the testatrix. That is, said clause
anticipates the case where the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix
and after receiving and enjoying the inheritance. The foregoing leads us to the
conclusion that all the requisites of a fideicommissary substitution, according
to the quotation from Manresa above inserted, are present in the case of
substitution now under consideration, to wit:
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the
plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate,
according to clause IX of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a
third person the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed in
clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her
(heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to
dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in case she
dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress
instituted, but also provides for the disposition thereof in case she should die
after the testatrix. 3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress
instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs both in clause X and in
clause XI.
G.R. No. L-41971 November 29, 1983

ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA, and EMETERIA S.
GARCIA, respondents.
MELENCIO HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
Bienvenido and Emeteria filed an action for recognition against Melita Solano
Meliton died during the pendency of the petition and his daughter substituted
him while asking for the probate of the will of the decedent. RTC specified the
legal issues as 1) the recognition of Garcias, 2) correct status of Zonia, 3) the
hereditary share of each of them in view of the probated will. In deciding, RTC
declared Garcias as illegitimate children of late Meliton.; the institution of
Sonia as sole heir declared null and void, the 3 children shall share equally the
estate CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the
institution of sole heir from decedents will.
RULING:
That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Melitons will,
and as a result, Sonias institution as sole heir is null and void pursuant to Art.
854
The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir, but the devises
and legacies shall be valid

The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his
property which the testator had the right to such so that it should be upheld
as to the one-half portion of the property that the testator could freely
dispose of Sonias share is hereby declared to be 4/6 of the estate and Garcias
1/6 each. The usufruct in favor of will should not be invalidated all together.
G.R. No. L-26545 December 16, 1927

Testate Estate of Florencia R. Mateo. PERFECTO GABRIEL, petitionerappellee,
vs.
RITA R. MATEO, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
AVANCEA, C. J.:
Facts:
The judgment appealed from allowed the will of Florencia Mateo dated
February 6, 1923, composed of two used sheets to probate. The will appears to
be signed by the testatrix and three witnesses on the left margin of each of the
sheets, by the testatrix alone at the bottom, and by the three witnesses after
the attestation clause. The testatrix died on August 13, 1925. Opposition to
such probate was filed by Rita Mateo, the testatrix's sister, and by other
relatives. The three attesting witnesses to this will, testifying in this case,
declared that the signature of the testatrix were written in their presence and
that they signed their names in the presence of the testatrix and of each
other. The testatrix from girlhood knew how to sign her name and did so with
her right hand; but as the right side of her body later became paralyzed, she
learned to sign with her left hand and for many years thereafter, up to the time
of her death, she used to sign with that hand. Opponents allege that Florencia
Mateo did not sign this will.
Issue:
whether or not testatrix has the right to choose her heirs in the will
Held:
Yes. there is nothing strange in the testatrix having left nothing to the
opponents, or in her having left all of her estate to the only heir instituted in
her will, Tomas Mateo, who is also one of her nieces. And not only is it not
strange, but it seems reasonable, since, according to the evidence of the

testatrix when the former was but 3 years old, and from then on up to the time
of her death had never been separated from her. The opposition presented
Doctor Banks as expert. He testified that the signatures of the testatrix in the
will are not genuine. The petitioner, on the other hand, presented another
expert, Pedro Serrano Laktao, who affirmed that these signatures are genuine.
But, over the testimony of these experts, we have the categorical and positive
declaration of veracious witnesses who affirm that these signatures were
written by the testatrix herself.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA
DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Facts:
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate
children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon
(herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a
legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child
and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent.
Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrixappellee) are the oppositors-appellants. The deceased testatrix left a last will
executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect. Named
beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with
seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D.
Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and
Laureano Tiambon. In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed
of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of
land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank
deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development
Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in
substance adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1)
with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrixappellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in
the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants,
namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their
respective legitime;
(2)
thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively
given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective
legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are
adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or
properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number
2 above;
(4)
the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain
untouched.
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition
dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate
on the following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of
one-half () of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half () amounting
to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of
their legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in
payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the
properties devised to them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or
cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not
compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties respectively devised to them
subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the
devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.
Issue:
Whether or not there is proper partition
Held:
in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all
her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the
expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her property
in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I
command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions
immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in
her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs
and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a
valid partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first
paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person
make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition
shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only
to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides
the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less
than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of
the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they
may be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition,
wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina,
Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed
and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to
complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the
cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their cooppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and
received in the partition by will more than their respective legitimes.
G.R. No. L-353
August 31, 1946
PACIENCIA DE JESUS, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
IIGO S. DAZA, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, ET AL., respondents.
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.

La O and San Jose for respondents.
.:
HILADO, J
Facts:
Petitioners pray for the writs of certiorari and mandamus whereby they
would have this Court annul the order of the respondent judge dated January
29, 1946, entered in civil case No. 3174 of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas in the matter of the estate of the deceased Gavino de Jesus, which
order petitioners denominate "a writ of possession," and command the
respondent provincial sheriff of Batangas and the respondents Justina S. Vda.
de Manglapus and Gregorio Leynes to return to said petitioners the possession
of the two parcels of land covered by original certificates of title Nos. 1292 and
1344, issued by the Register of Deeds of Batangas and mentioned in their
petition.
Among other things, it is alleged in the petition and admitted in the
respondents' answer that petitioners are some of the testamentary heirs of the
late Gavino de Jesus whose estate is the subject matter of the aforesaid
special proceeding No. 3174
in connection with this action for legal redemption, respondents in paragraph 4
of their answer, after admitting the institution of said action for legal
redemption, allege that on March 11, 1946, the Court of First Instance of
Batangas issued an order dismissing the amended and supplemental complaints
in said civil case No. 3960 (they attach a copy of the order of dismissal as
Appendix 1 of their answer), but petitioners in their reply aver that within the
period prescribed by law they had perfected an appeal from said order of
dismissal.
From what appears in the allegations of the parties, as well as their appendices
and annexes, the said for legal redemption is still pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs can claim Legal Redemption
Held:
Yes. The very fact that petitioners lodged an action for legal redemption with
the Court of First Instance of Batangas, thus commencing, civil case No. 3960
of said court, carries with it an implied but necessary admission on the part of
said petitioners that the sale to respondent Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus of
the shares of Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga in the oft-repeated estate,
particularly, the two parcels of land in question, was valid. The sale was duly
approved by the probate court. By the effects of that sale and its approval by
the probate court the purchaser stepped into the shoes of the sellers for the
purposes of the distribution of the estate, and Rule 91, section 1, confers upon
such purchaser, among other rights, the right to demand and recover the share
purchased by her not only from the executor or administrator, but also
from any other person having the same in his possession. It is evident that the
probate court, having the custody and control of the entire estate, is the most
logical authority to effectuate this provision within the same estate
proceeding, said proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power
and function of the court can be exercised and performed without the
necessity of requiring the parties to undergo the inconvenience, delay and
expense of having to commence and litigate an entirely different action. There
can be no question that if the executor or administrator has the possession of
the share to be delivered the probate court would have jurisdiction within the
same estate proceeding to order him to deliver that possession to the person
entitled thereto, and we see no reason, legal or equitable, for denying the same
power to the probate court to be exercised within the same estate proceeding
if the share to be delivered happens to be in the possession of "any other
person," especially when "such other person" is one of the heirs themselves who
are already under the jurisdiction of the probate court in the same estate
proceeding.
The probate proceeding over the testate estate of the deceased Gavino de
Jesus was a proceeding in rem And by the publication of the notice prescribed
by the Rules and by the fact that petitioners herein were and are among the
testamentary heirs of the decedent, they were and are subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Batangas sitting as a probate
court when the said court's order of January 29, 1946, was entered and
thereafter. If, even the action for compulsory recognition of a natural child
may be instituted and decided within the proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the ancestor (Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343, 348), it would be
absurd were we to declare now that for the mere object of ordering the
delivery of possession of a portion of the inheritance which has already been
assigned to a certain person within the estate proceeding, the probate court
lacks jurisdiction to make the order within the same proceeding, but should
require the institution of an independent ordinary action.
We, therefore, conclude that, without prejudice to the final result of the legal
redemption case, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed, with
costs to petitioners. So ordered.
G.R. No. 109972. April 29, 1996
ZOSIMA VERDAD, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA ROSALES, NAPOLEON
ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA
ROSALES AND VIRGINIA ROSALES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Facts:
The petitioner, Zosima Verdad, is the purchaser of a 248-square meter
residential lot (identified to be Lot No. 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre,
located along Magallanes Street, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan
City). Private respondent, Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise
a right of legal redemption over the subject property and traces her title to the
late Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law, who died intestate on 08 March 1956.
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with
Angel Burdeos and the second, following the latters death, with Canuto
Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son
Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos)
Estela Lozada of the first marriage and her children of the second marriage,
namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales.
Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some time
after Macarias death, died intestate without an issue.
In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely,
his widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold
to petitioner Zosima Verdad (their interest on) the disputed lot supposedly for
the price of P55,460.00. In a duly notarized deed of sale, dated 14 November
1982, it would appear, however, that the lot was sold for only
P23,000.00. Petitioner explained that the second deed was intended merely to
save on the tax on capital gains.
Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 while she was at the City
Treasurers Office. On 31 March 1987, she sought the intervention of the
Lupong Tagapayapa of Barangay 9, Princess Urduja, for the redemption of the
property. She tendered the sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter refused
to accept the amount for being much less than the lots current value of
P80,000.00. No settlement having been reached before the Lupong
Tagapayapa, private respondents, on 16 October 1987, initiated against
petitioner an action for Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction before
the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.
On 29 June 1990, following the reception of evidence, the trial court
handed down its decision holding, in fine, that private respondents right to
redeem the property had already lapsed.
Issue:
Whether or not Socorro Rosales can claim for the right of redemption being
not a co-heir
Held:
Yes. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere
relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law;[3] however,
Socorro s right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship
in Macarias estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales,
part of whose estate is a share in his mothers inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mothers death. When Macaria
died on 08 March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving children, among
them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When
David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included
his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to
his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession.
ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and
illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the
rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under
Article 1001.
xxx
xxx
xxx
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.[4]
Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David
Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally descended
from Macaria.
When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to
petitioner, a right of redemption arose in favor of private respondents; thus:
ART. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same
terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who
acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other transaction

whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title.
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case
the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third
person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner
shall pay only a reasonable one.
We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private
respondents. Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the
Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners[5] required under Article 1623 of the
Civil Code
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor,
or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in
the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that
he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when
private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31
March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City
Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987,
before the trial court.
G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989

FRANCISCO GARCIA, PAZ GARCIA, and MARIA GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE CALALIMAN, PACIENCIA TRABADILLO & HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, Third Division, respondents.
Jose Gaton for petitioners.
Ricardo Q. Castro for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents claim that the 30-day period prescribed in Article
1088 forpetitioners to exercise the right to legal redemption had already
elapsed and thatthe requirement of Article 1088 that notice must be in writing
is deemed satisfiedbecause written notice would be superfluous, the
purpose of the law having beenfully served when petitioner Garcia went to the
Office of the Register of Deeds and was for himself, read and understood the
contents of the Deeds of Sale.
Issue:
Whether or not there is legal redemption and is there proper notice
HELD:
The Court took note of the fact that the registration of the deed of sale
assufficient notice of sale under the provision of Section 51 of Act No. 496
appliesonly to registered lands and has no application whatsoever to a
casewhere the property involved is unregistered land.If the intention of the law
had been to include verbal notice or nay other meansof information as
sufficient to give the effect of this notice, then there would havebeen no
necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 that the saidnotice be made in
writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice or informationwas sufficient. In
the interpretation of a related provision (Article 1623)
Written notice is indispensable actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some
other manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled
to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to
the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is
not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative method
of notifications remains exclusive, thought the Code does not prescribed any
particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written
notification of redemption.
G.R. No. 133345. March 9, 2000

JOSEFA CH. MAESTRADO, as substituted by her daughter LOURDES
MAESTRADO-LAVIA and CARMEN CH. ABAYA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Ninth Division and JESUS C. ROA,
JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS, respondents.
DE LEON,
JR., J.:
Facts:
These consolidated cases involve the status of Lot No. 5872 and the
rights of the contending parties thereto. The said lot which has an area of
57.601 square meters, however, is still registered in the name of the deceased
spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. The spouses Ramon and Rosario died
intestate in 1943 and 1944, respectively. They were survived by the following
heirs, namely: Carmen Chaves-Abaya, Josefa Chaves-Maestrado, Angel Chaves,
Amparo Chaves-Roa, Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores and Salvador Chaves.
To settle the estate of the said deceased spouses, Angel Chaves initiated
intestate proceedings[3] in the Court of First Instance of Manila and was
appointed administrator of said estates in the process. An inventory of the
estates was made and thereafter, the heirs agreed on a project of partition.
Thus, they filed an action for partition[4] before the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental. The court appointed Hernando Roa, husband of Amparo
Chaves-Roa, as receiver. On June 6, 1956, the court rendered a decision
approving the project of partition. However, the records of said case are
missing and although respondents claimed otherwise, they failed to present a
copy of said decision.
This notwithstanding, the estate was actually divided in this wise: (1) Lot No.
3046 situated in Bulalong, Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of 44 hectares of
coconut land was distributed equally among four (4) heirs, namely: (a)
Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores; (b) Angel Chaves; (c) Amparo Chaves-Roa;
and (d) Ramon Chaves, while (2) Lot Nos. 5925, 5934, 1327 and 5872, all located in
Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City and consisting of an aggregate area of 14
hectares was distributed equally between petitioners (a) Josefa ChavesMaestrado; and (b) Carmen Chaves-Abaya. Scmis
At the time of the actual partition, Salvador Chaves had already died. His
share was given to his only son, Ramon, who is the namesake of Salvadors
father. In 1956, the year the partition case was decided and effected, receiver
Hernando Roa delivered the respective shares of said heirs in accordance with
the above scheme. Subsequently, Concepcion sold her share to Angel, while
Ramon sold his share to Amparo. Hence, one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 3046 went to
Angel and the other half to Amparo.
Issue:
Whether or not oral partition can be considered
Held:
Yes. Lot No. 5872 is no longer common property of the heirs of the deceased
spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. Petitioners ownership over said lot was
acquired by reason of the oral partition agreed upon by the deceased spouses
heirs sometime before 1956. That oral agreement was confirmed by the
notarized quitclaims executed by the said heirs on August 16, 1977 and
September 8, 1977, supra.
It appeared that the decision in Civil Case No. 867, which ordered the partition
of the decedents estate, was not presented by either party thereto. The
existence of the oral partition together with the said quitclaims is the bone of
contention in this case. It appeared, however, that the actual partition of the
estate conformed to the alleged oral partition despite a contrary court order.
Despite claims of private respondents that Lot No. 5872 was mistakenly
delivered to the petitioners, nothing was done to rectify it for a period of
twenty-seven (27) years from 1983. Ol-dmiso
We are convinced, however, that there was indeed an oral agreement of
partition entered into by the heirs/parties. This is the only way we can make
sense out of the actual partition of the properties of the estate despite claims
that a court order provided otherwise. Prior to the actual partition,
petitioners were not in possession of Lot No. 5872 but for some reason or
another, it was delivered to them. From 1956, the year of the actual partition of
the estate of the deceased Chaves spouses, until 1983, no one among the heirs
questioned petitioners possession of or ownership over said Lot No. 5872.
Hence, we are convinced that there was indeed an oral agreement of partition
among the said heirs and the distribution of the properties was consistent with
such oral agreement. In any event, the parties had plenty of time to rectify the
situation but no such move was done until 1983.
A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the
adverse claimant establishes a better right. In the instant case it is the
petitioners, being the possessors of Lot No. 5872, who have established a
superior right thereto by virtue of the oral partition which was also confirmed
by the notarized quitclaims of the heirs.
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common
among those to whom it may belong. It may be effected extra-judicially by the
heirs themselves through a public instrument filed before the register of deeds.
In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of the oral
partition is the fact that the terms of the actual partition and distribution of
the estate are identical to the sharing scheme in the oral partition. No one
among the heirs disturbed this status quo for a period of twenty-seven (27)
years.
In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of the oral
partition is the fact that the terms of the actual partition and distribution of
the estate are identical to the sharing scheme in the oral partition. No one
among the heirs disturbed this status quo for a period of twenty-seven (27)
years.
G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000

VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, respondents. ULANDU
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Facts:
ne Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador,
Higino, Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel
of land of residential and coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte,
denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters.
It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the
instant controversy.
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained
permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot
No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house
together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of
Pastor's children, has been living in that house since 1960.
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial
partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document
which they, however, never registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds
of Leyte.
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present
while his other brothers were represented by their children. Their sisters,
Valentina and Ruperta, both died without any issue. Marciano was represented
by his daughter, Maria; Amador was represented by his daughter, Concordia;
and Higino was represented by his son, Silverio who is the private respondent in
this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter,
Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the said partition.
When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner
of said property.
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his
father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership
right of his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first cousin of
Maria, was the buyer.
Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the
northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said
area. They went through a series of meetings with the barangay officials
concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts
toward that end, failed.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a valid extrajudicial Partition
Held:
The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed
voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status. When they
discussed and agreed on the division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is
presumed that they did so in furtherance of their mutual interests. As such,
their division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there were debts
existing against the estate which had not been paid No showing, however, has
been made of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus,
there is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of
Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four
(44) years of never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial
partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano and Ananias,
produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador
Pada was not the subject property which was a parcel of residential land in
Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in
the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel
of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by his heirs to
petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the owners
thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to
repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription
and laches have equally set in.
G.R. No. 114151 September 17, 1998

MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA,
RTC-9, CEBU CITY, and LICERIO P. NIQUE, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Facts: The late spouses Alejandrino left their six children named Marcelino,
Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a lot in Cebu City. Upon
the death of the spouses, the property should have been divided among their
children, however, the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in
accordance with the procedures.
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased portion of the

lots from her brothers, Gregorio's, Ciriaco's and Abundio's share. It turned
out, however, that a third party named Nique, the private respondent in this
case, also purchased portions of the property from Laurencia, Abundio and
Marcelino.
However, Laurencia (the alleged seller to Nique) later questioned the sale in an
action for quieting of title and damages. The trial court (Quieting of title case)
ruled in favor of Nique and declared him the owner of the lots. Laurencia
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals but later withdrew the same.
Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portion of the property that
had been declared by the trial court (Quieting of title case) as his own by virtue
of purchase. The trial court segregated the property on the basis of the ExtraJudicial Settlement between Mauricia and Laurencia.
Issue: Whether or not partition of the lot was validly made
Held: Yes.
1) Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate
as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a
co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right.
Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share. The
legality of Laurencia's alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino
spouses was upheld in the Quieting of title case which had become final and
executory by Laurencia's withdrawal of her appeal in the CA. When Nique
filed a motion for the segregation of the portions of the property that were
adjudged in his favor, he was in effect calling for the partition of the property.
However, under the law, partition of the estate of a decedent may only be
effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an
ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, (3)
by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.
2) Extrajudicial settlement between Mauricia and Laurentia became the basis
for the segregation of the property in favor of Nique However, evidence on
the extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered before the trial court and it
became the basis for the order for segregation of the property sold to Nique.
Mauricia does not deny the fact of the execution of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of the estate. She only questions its validity on account of the
absence of notarization of the document and the non-publication thereof.
3) A partition is valid though not contained in a public instrument.
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate
reflected the intention of both Laurencia and Mauricia to physically divide the
property. Both of them had acquired the shares of their brothers and
therefore it was only the two of them that needed to settle the estate. The
fact that the document was not notarized is no hindrance to its effectivity as
regards the two of them. The partition of inherited property need not be
embodied in a public document to be valid between the parties.
G.R. No. 49286
August 16, 1947
EUSEBIO QUIZON and FLORDELIZA QUIZON, petitioners,

vs.
MODESTO CASTILLO, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, ET
AL., respondents..
PERFECTO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners seek the annulment of two orders of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, issued on July 26 and August 18, 1944.
In the first one, the lower court, acting on a petition for the execution
of the decision in special proceeding No. 3906, intestate of Gregorio Mayo
Villapando, dated October 25,1943, declaring all the parties therein heirs of the
deceased and dividing all the estate into three parts, one to each of the three
sets of heirs, ordered petitioners to deliver one-third of the estate to Josefa
Mayo Villapando, unless they should post a bond in the amount of P2,000
pending the decision of the Supreme Court on the appeal interposed against
the lower court's decision of the petition. The order issued on August 18, 1944,
amended the first one to the effect that petitioners should deliver two-thirds
of the estate to Josefa Mayo Villapando, and Amando, Ciriaco, David and Jose
Morada, unless they should file a bond in the amount of P2,000, pending the
decision of the Supreme Court.
Ten days before the decision became final, on May 9, Josefa Mayo filed a
motion for execution upon the ground that the appeal bond at P2,000 having
been rejected, her share in the fruits of the estate was left without guarantee.
The petition was filed without notice to petitioners. On May 19, petitioners
filed their amended record on appeal as well as the appeal bond of P60. On May
24, Josefa Mayo filed a petition, also without notice to petitioners, praying that
the hearing on the amended record on appeal be suspended until after her
motion for execution be acted upon, and the lower court issued an order on
the same day, setting for hearing the motion for execution sometime after
June 15. On June 6, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the order of
May 24, upon the ground that the motion for execution should not have been
acted upon as it was filed without notice in violation of section 2 of Rule 39,
besides having been filed during the efficacy of the resolution of January 14,
1944, issued by the Supreme Court, suspending all proceedings in the intestate
of Gregorio Mayo Villapando, case No. 3906, and that the amended record on
appeal is the only valid pleading then pending and should be acted upon before
anything else.
On July 3, the respondent judge issued an order setting for July 18 the hearings
on the motion for execution, on the amended record on appeal and on the
motion for reconsideration. On July 14, petitioners filed their opposition to the
motion for execution alleging, among other reasons, that the lower court had
no power or authority to order the execution during the time for perfecting
the appeal and that said decision, being declaratory in nature could not be
executed.
Issue:
Whether or not the judge acted in excess of its jurisdiction
Held:
Yes. The facts in this case show that the respondent judge acted in excess of
its jurisdiction when he issued the orders of July 26 and August 18, 1944. Said
orders, purportedly to execute the decision of October 25, 1943, provided for
the delivery, at first, of one-third of the estate to Josefa Mayo and later of
two-thirds of the estate to Josefa Mayo and to the Morada brothers, unless
petitioners should file bond in the amount of P2,000. No law nor legal authority
has been mentioned in respondent's answer in support of said orders and none
can be cited. The decision of October 25, 1943, provided only for the
declaration of heirs and of the shares each set of heirs was entitled to.
Nothing was provided in said decision as to the delivery of shares from one
person to another. The orders of July 26, and August 18, provided for the
execution of something supposed to be executed by the decision of October
25, 1943, which in fact is not provided therein.
Besides, it was premature to order the delivery of shares to the heirs, when no
project of partition has as yet been filed and approved.
G.R. No. L-273
March 29, 1947
CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ZACARIAS ANDAL, defendant-appellant.
QUIRINO DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ and AQUILINA
HERNANDEZ, intervenors-appellants.
TUASON, J.:
Facts:
Plaintiff Cresencia, intervenors Maria & Aquilina; and Pedro and
Basilia(not parties herein) are brothers and sisters. They acquired in common by
descent from their father a parcel of land. An oral partition of the land was
allegedly made by the siblings. The intervenors sold 1800 square meters of the
parcel to Zacarias Andal in consideration of P860. After the sale, the plaintiff
attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. According to her complaint,
dated February 3, 1944, she offered the purchaser P150 as price of repurchase.
Such amount was the supposed price paid for Aquilina and Marias shares. But
Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with the property in favor of Cresencia.
On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint wherein the she
alleged that when the cause was called for trial, she announced in open court
that she was willing to repurchase the lot from Andal and reimburse Andal for
his expenses. Meanwhile, respondent Andal resold the land fictitiously to the
vendors for the amount of 970 pesos.
In their answer, the intervenors alleged that a partition was made after
which everyone took exclusive, separate and independent possession of his/her
portion in the partition. They charged the plaintiff with bad faith for allegedly
delaying the sale in favor of Andal. The court handed down its decision
declaring that the resale of the land in favor of Maria and Aquilina was illegal
and in bad faith. The court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of
Court as well as Article 1248 of the Civil Code, parole evidence of partition
was inadmissible.
Issue:
Whether or not oral evidence for proving a contract of partition is admissible.
Ruling:
Yes.
ORAL PARTITION ENFORCED IN EQUITY WHEN PERFORMED.
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds,
courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or
partly performed.
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are
required to be reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a
means of providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written form exacted
by the statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes only."
(Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 471.) The Civil Code, too, requires the
accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument, not in order to
validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the
existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be
compelled to execute the document. (Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs. Hernandez,
45 Phil., 746.)
-SECTION
OF
RULE
74,
NOT
CONSTITUTIVE
BUT
MERELY
EVIDENTIAL OF PARTITION.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no express or clear declaration that the
public instrument therein required is to be constitutive of a contract of
partition or an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties.

And this Court had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the
efficacy of a partition as between the parties de-pendent on the execution of a
public instrument and its registration. The requirement that a partition be put
in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of
creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against
tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and
creditors. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this
means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition
not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when
there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of
creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into
an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those
provided by law.
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA
DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Facts:
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate
children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon
(herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a
legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child
and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent.
Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrixappellee) are the oppositors-appellants. The deceased testatrix left a last will
executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect. Named
beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with
seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D.
Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and
Laureano Tiambon. In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed
of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of
land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank
deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development
Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in
substance adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1)
with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrixappellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in
the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants,
namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their
respective legitime;
(2)
thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively
given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective
legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are
adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or
properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number
2 above;
(4)
the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain
untouched.
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition
dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate
on the following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of
one-half () of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half () amounting
to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of
their legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in
payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the
properties devised to them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or
cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not
compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties respectively devised to them
subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the
devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.
Issue:
Whether or not there is proper partition
Held:
in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all
her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the
expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her property
in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I
command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions
immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in
her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs
and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a
valid partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first
paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person
make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition
shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only
to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides
the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less
than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of
the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they
may be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition,
wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina,
Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed
and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to
complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the
cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their cooppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and
received in the partition by will more than their respective legitimes.
EUGENIO FELICIANO, substituted by his wife CEFERINA DE PALMAFELICIANO, ANGELINA DE LEON, representing the heirs of ESTEBAN
FELICIANO, TRINIDAD VALIENTE, AND BASILIA TRINIDAD,
represented by her son DOMINADOR T. FELICIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO CANOZA, DELIA FELICIANO, ROSAURO FELICIANO, ELSA
FELICIANO AND PONCIANO FELICIANO, Respondents.
VILLARAMA,
JR., J.:
Facts:
In May 1930, Antonio Feliciano died leaving behind a parcel of land. In 1972,
an extrajudicial settlement was executed by Leona Feliciano, Maria Feliciano,
Pedro Feliciano, and Salina Feliciano. The four declared that they are the only
heirs of Antonio; they did not include the heirs of their dead siblings Esteban
and Doroteo Feliciano. Thereafter, Pedro sold his share to Jacinto Feliciano;
Salina sold her share to Felisa Feliciano; and Leona and Maria sold their share
to Pedro Canoza.
Subsequently, Jacinto and Canoza applied for their respective titles covering
the lands they purchased. In November 1977, a free patent was issued to
Jacinto. In February 1979, a free patent was likewise issued to Pedro Canoza.
In October 1993, Eugenio Feliciano and Angelina De Leon (surviving heirs of
Esteban) as well as Trinidad Valiente and Basilia Trinidad (Surviving heirs of
Doroteo) filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the deed
of extrajudicial settlement on the ground of fraud by reason of the exclusion
of the other compulsory heirs (Esteban and Doroteo).
The trial court ruled in favor of Eugenio et al but on appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court on the ground that Eugenio et als action has
prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action filed by Eugenio et al is barred by
prescription.
HELD: Yes. It is undeniable that the extrajudicial settlement executed by
Leona Feliciano, Maria Feliciano, Pedro Feliciano, and Salina Feliciano in 1972 to
the exclusion of Esteban and Doroteos heirs is attended by fraud. As such,
the deed of extrajudicial settlement can be attacked in action for annulment
in court. However, such action should be filed within 4 years from the
discovery of the fraud. In this case, the fraud was actually committed in 1972
but it was only deemed discovered in 1977 and 1979. In 1977, because this was
the time when a free patent was issued to Jacinto and in 1979, when a free
patent was issued to Canoza. These years are the reckoning point because the
free patents released to Jacinto and Canoza served as constructive notices to
Eugenio et al and to the whole world. And so, when Eugenio et al filed their
complaint in 1993, the complaint was already filed out of time (16 years late in
case of Jacinto; and 14 years in case of Canoza).
CELESTINO BALUS,
Petitioner,
- versus -
SATURNINO
LEONARDA
CALUNOD,
BALUS
BALUS and
VDA. DE
Respondents.
G.R. No. 168970

Present:
CORONA, J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 15, 2010
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and
Sebastiana Balus. On January 3,1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he
owns, as asecurity for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao
del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was
foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sloe bidder at a public auction held
for that purpose. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by
law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff
executed aDefinite Deed of Sale in favor of the Bank. Thereafter, anew title
was issued in the name of the Bank.On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and
respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to
each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of
10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions
wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father
mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem
the same at the soonest possible time. Three years after the execution of the
Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject property from
the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was
executed by the Bank in favour of respondents. Subsequently, a TCT was
issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession
of the subject lot. On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they
had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of
the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession
of the same to them. The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase
from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the
provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had
executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with
the CA. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem
the subject property within the redemption period and allowed the
consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new titlein the name of the
Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished. Hence, the instant petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership by him andrespondents over the subject property
persisted even afterthe lot was purchased by the Bank and title
theretotransferred to its name, and even after it was eventuallybought back by
the respondents from the Bank.
Held:
The court is not persuaded. At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is
no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively
owned by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was
mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing
conducted bythe trial court on October 28, 1996. Evidence shows that a
Definite Deed of Sale was issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984,
after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new
title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984.
Hence,there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the
contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo. The rights to a person's succession
are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a
person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing
at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the
opening of the succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of
the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his
death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which
his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never
inherited the subject lot from their father. Furthermore, petitioner's
contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed coownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject
Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of
having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the
petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls
for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property
owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each coowner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving
each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from
the other. In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to coownership, an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
G.R. No. 137287. February 15, 2000

REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI
VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO, respondents. LEX
VITUG, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners, in their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seek a reversal of the 29th May 1996 decision of the Court of
Appeals, basically affirming that rendered on 30 April 1991 by the Regional Trial
Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 23, adjudicating the property subject
matter of the litigation to respondents. The case and the factual setting found
by the Court of Appeals do not appear to deviate significantly from that made
by the trial court.
During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned
several pieces of property, among them a house and lot located at 147 Isarog
Street, La Loma, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42682. Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado died three
years later on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their children -- Nilo
Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to
Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22
April 1987. Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents --- his
wife Alicia Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the
Isarog property. Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated
between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia Viado after the
former had asked that the property be equally divided between the two
families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith,
claimed absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that
petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. On 01 February 1988,
petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a case
for partition before the Quezon City RTC (Branch 93). Jj sc
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject
property on two documents --- a deed of donation executed by the late Julian
Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of
Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah
Viado Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and
petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and
interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado. Both
instruments were executed on 26 August 1983 and registered on 07 January
1988 by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682 was cancelled
and new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646 was issued to the heirs of Nilo
Viado.
Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing
instruments, contending that the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue
influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner
Rebecca Viado, in her particular case, averred that her brother Nilo Viado
employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial
settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado,
in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should
warrant its annulment. Finally, petitioners asseverated at the assailed
instruments, although executed on 23 August 1983, were registered only five
years later, on 07 January 1988, when the three parties thereto, namely, Julian
Viado, Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs had already died. Sc jj
Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for respondents and
adjudged Alicia Viado and her children as being the true owners of the
disputed property.
Issue:
Whether or not there can be a partition shall be rescinded
Held:
No. When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal
property, the Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her heirs
--- her husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah
Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of
death of the decedent,[1] remained under a co-ownership regime[2] among the
heirs until partition.[3] Every act intended to put an end to indivision among coheirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport
to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial
settlement.[4]
In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties
hereto, respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial
settlement which consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail
the due execution of the documents on the grounds heretofore expressed. Sj
cj
Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the
appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the trial
court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a
quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting,
consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo
Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the signatures
of the parties to the deeds of donation and of extrajudicial settlement,
petitioners are vague, however, on how and in what manner those supposed
vices occurred. Neither have petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should
be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and
interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of petitioner
Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of extrajudicial settlement on the
mistaken belief that the instrument merely pertained to the administration of
the property is too tenuous to accept. It is also quite difficult to believe that
Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession, could have misunderstood the tenor
of the assailed document.
The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of
their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such
circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents
was a ministerial act[5] and merely created a constructive notice of its contents
against all third persons.[6] Among the parties, the instruments remained
completely valid and binding. Supreme
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the
deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This
kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith,
does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646.
The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests
on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is
not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but
the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.
H. WITNESSES TO WILLS
G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973

AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I,
Court of First Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.
ESGUERRA , J. :
FACTS :
Of the three instrumental witnesses namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr.,
Dr. Francisco Paares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last
named, is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was
supposed to have been acknowledged. As the third witness is the notary public
himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only two witnesses appeared
before the notary public to acknowledge the will. On the other hand, private
respondent-appellee, Manuel B. Lugay, who is the supposed executor of the
will, following the reasoning of the trial court, maintains that there is
substantial compliance with the legal requirement of having at least three
attesting witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of them .
ISSUE :
Whether the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E")
was executed in accordance with law .
HELD
NO .
We are inclined to sustain that of the appellant that the last will and
testament in question was not executed in accordance with law .To allow the
notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and acknowledging
witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the
will which would be in contravention of the provisions of Article 80 be
requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806
which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses must
appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed
and the probate of the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E")
is declared not valid and hereby set aside.
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979

RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO,
respondents.
GUERRERO , J. :
FACTS:
On June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3617, for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed
by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the
principal beneficiary and executrix.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in
Tagalog, appears to have been executed in Manila on the 15th day of April,
1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel.The will itself
provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic Cemetery of
Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, all
expenses to be paid from her estate; that all her obligations, if any, be paid;
that legacies in specified amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda.
de Santiago, her brother Santiago Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces,
Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all
surnamed Gabriel, and Evangeline, Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia,
Verena an surnamed Santiago.
To herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago, who was described in the will
by the testatrix as "akingmahalnapamangkinnaakingpinalaki, inalagaan at
minahalnakatulad ng isangtunaynaanak" and named as universal heir and
executor, were bequeathed all properties and estate, real or personal already
acquired, or to be acquired, in her testatrix name, after satisfying the
expenses, debts and legacies as aforementioned.
ISSUE :
Did the respondent Court abuse its discretion and/or acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of fact and conclusions of
the trial court.
HELD :
NO .
We find that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the decision of
the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the last will and testament
of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three
instrumental witnesses, namely, MatildeOrobia, CelsoGimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the
evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact
this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not
pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it
been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound mind,
deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No.L-8774. November 26, 1956
EMILIANA MOLO-PECKSON and PILAR PEREZ-NABLE, PetitionersAppellees, vs. ENRIQUE TANCHUCO, FAUSTINO GOMEZ, ET AL.,
Oppositors-Appellants.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
FACTS :
Mariano Molo and Juana Juan was a couple possessed of much worldly
wealth, but unfortunately, not blessed with children. To fill the void in their
marital life, they took into their home and custody two baby girls, raising them
from infancy, treating them as their own daughters, sending them to school,
and later to the best and exclusive centers of higher learning, until they both
graduated, one in pharmacy, and the other in law. These two fortunate girls,
now grown up women and married, are Emiliana Perez-Molo-Peckson, a niece of
Juana, and Pilar Perez-Nable a half sister of Emiliana.
Mariano Molo died in January, 1941, and by will bequeathed all his estate to
his wife. Juana, his widow, died on May 28, 1950, leaving no forced heirs but
only collateral, children and grandchildren of her sisters. She left
considerable property worth around a million pesos or more, and to dispose of
the same, she was supposed to have executed on May 11, 1948, about two years
before her death, a document purporting to be her last will and testament,
wherein she bequeathed the bulk of her property to her two foster children,
Emiliana and Pilar. These two foster daughters, as Petitioners, presented the
document for probate in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
ISSUE :
Was the probate court correct in rulint that the instrument in question
was the last will and testament of Juana ?
HELD :
YES .
We have carefully gone over the evidence of the record, and we are
convinced that the great preponderance thereof is in favor of the probate of
the will .
While the written opposition to the probate of said will consists of a litany
of supposed abuses, force and undue influence exercised on the testatrix, yet
the evidence shows that these supposed abuses, force and undue influence
consist only of failure on the part of the deceased to invite the Oppositors in
all the parties held in her house through the alleged influence of Mrs. Nable,
of paying more attention, care, and extending more kindness to the Petitioners
than to the Oppositors .
Neither do we find anything unusual or extraordinary in the testatrix giving
practically all her property to her foster daughters, to the exclusion of her
other relatives.
Oppositors-Appellants in their printed memorandum contend that, two of the
attesting witnesses to the will in question, namely, Miss Navarro and Miss
Canicosa, who were employed as pharmacist and salesgirl, respectively, in the
drugstore of Pilar Perez-Nable, one of beneficiaries in the will, may not be
considered credible witnesses for the reason that as such employees, they
would naturally testify in favor of their employer. The relation of employer and
employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a will, does not disqualify one
to be a witness to a will.
In view of the foregoing, finding no reversible error in the decision
appealed from the same is hereby affirmed. No costs.
I. HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS
III REVOCATION OF WILLS

IV REPUBLICATION AND REVIVAL OF WILLS
V PROBATE OF WILLS
VI INSTITUTION OF HEIR
VII PRETERITION
VIII SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS
IX DISPOSITION WITH CONDITIONS OR TERMS
X LEGITIME
A. CONCEPT
B. INTANGIBLE RIGHT TO LEGITIME
C. COMPULSARY HEIR
D. SHARES/LEGITIMES
G.R. No. L-69679 October 18, 1988

VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM, LIM BIAK CHIAO and CALASIAO BIJON
FACTORY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CONSORCIA FRIANEZA GOLEA,
MARIA FRIANEZA VERGARA, BENEDICTA FRIANEZA MAYUGBA
BONIFACIA FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DOMINGO FRIANEZA namely,
DECIDERIA Q. VDA. DE FRIANEZA FRANCISCO, DONA, VILMA and
DECIDERIA, all surnamed FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DANIEL FRIANEZA
namely, ADELA V. VDA. DE FRIANEZA in her behalf and as Guardian ad
litem of Minors, DARLENE, DANIEL JR., DUSSEL and DAISY GLEN, all
surnamed FRIANEZA respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Violeta Cabatbat Lim, her husband Liam Biak Chiao, and the
Calasiao Bijon Factory assail the decision dated October 25, 1984 of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals (AC-G.R. No. CV 67055),

which affirmed the trial court's decision finding that petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is not the off-spring, hence, not a legal heir of the late Esperanza
Cabatbat.
The private respondents, sisters of the late Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat, filed
a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No. D3841), praying for the partition of the estate of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat,
who died without issue on April 23, 1977. Part of her estate was her interest in
the business partnership known as Calasiao Bijon Factory, now in the possession
of Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be the child of the spouses Esperanza
and Proceso Cabatbat.
Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat was survived by her husband, Proceso Cabatbat,
her sisters, Consorcia Maria, Benedicta, Bonifacia, all surnamed Frianeza and
the children of her deceased brothers Daniel and Domingo. In their complaint,
the private respondents alleged that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not a child of
Esperanza, but was only a ward (ampon) of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso
Cabatbat who sheltered and supported her from childhood, without benefit of
formal adoption proceedings.
Private respondents' evidence on the non-filiation of Violeta to Esperanza
Cabatbat were: 1) the absence of any record that Esperanza Cabatbat was
admitted in the hospital where Violeta was born and that she gave birth to
Violeta on the day the latter was born; 2) the absence of the birth certificate
of Violeta Cabatbat in the files of certificates of live births of the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948, when Violeta was supposedly
born; 3) certification dated March 9, 1977, of the Civil Registry coordinator
Eugenio Venal of the Office of the Civil Registrar General, that his office has
no birth record of Violeta Cabatbat alleged to have been born on May 26, 1948
or 1949 in Calasiao, Pangasinan; 4) certification dated June 16, 1977 of Romeo
Gabriana, Principal II, that when Violeta studied in the Calasiao Pilot Central
School, Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Cabatbat were listed as
her guardians only, not as her parents; 5) testimony of Amparo Reside that she
was in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital on May 21,1948 to watch a cousin
who delivered a child there and that she became acquianted with a patient
named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth on May 26, 1948 to a baby girl who grew
up to be known as Violeta Cabatbat.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision of Article 263 of the New Civil Code
should be considered?
HELD:
No. Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not
well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim
their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not
claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither a legally
adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of
Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The appealed decision is
affirmed, but with modification of paragraphs 2 and 4 of the dispositive
portion thereof, by excluding the widows Adela B. Vda. de Frianeza and
Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza, who are not legal heirs of Esperanza Frianeza
Cabatbat from participating with their children and the surviving sisters of the
deceased in the one-fourth share of the estate pertaining to the latter under
Article 1001 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18753
March 26, 1965
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She
executed a will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged
before Notary Public by her and the witnesses. Among the legacies made in
the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrixs
niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Marias interest in the Calvo
Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in
equal parts to her grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses.
Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all the remainder
of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed a
petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan,
claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria)
and an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that
said will was not executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and
mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution and was
executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUE:
WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to

intervene in a probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in the
estate, will or in the property to be affected by either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a
claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will, defendant has no
right to intervene because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir,
executor or administrator because it did not appear therein any provision
designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate. She could have
acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is not under
the CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law does not give her
any right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and
Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from
succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that
relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and
adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except
only as expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the
adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal

heir in the probate proceeding.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which
declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the
same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is
ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
G.R. No. L-23445
June 23, 1966
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving
her were her legitimate parents Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.
Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed
by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties.
She prayed that said will be admitted to PROBATE and that letter of
administration be issued to her. Felix and Paz opposed to the PROBATE of
the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of
the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending
line were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.
Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs
in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir.
Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective
disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that
Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as
the sole, universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs.
HELD:
Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate,
but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, and her
holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names
altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of
ineffective disinheritance.Preterition consists in the omission in the testators
will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs
nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause
authorized by law.Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the
sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains
no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by
itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.
G.R. No. 173614
September 28, 2007
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLIMEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
It is petition assailing the RTCs reinstatement order on the formerly
dismissed filed action for the declaration of nullity of marriage between the
petitioner and respondents father. Eulogio Medinaceli and Trinidad CatliMedinaceli, were married on June 14, 1962, begotten seven children. Trinidad
died on May 1, 2004; Eulogio married another woman named Lolita Enrico on
August 26, 2004. Six months later, Eulogio passed away. Respondents filed an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage between Petitioner and the

respondents late father on two grounds: 1. that the marriage lacks the
requisite of MARRIAGE LICENSE , and; 2. the lack of marriage ceremony
due to respondents father serious illness that made its performance impossible.
Loleta, defend her stand by citing Article 34 of the family code arguing her
exemption from getting marriagelicense. She sought then the dismissal of the
respondents filed action by citing the AM-02-11-10-SC, Sec. 2, par.(a) Rule of
the family code.
Pursuant to AM-02-11-10-SC embodied the rule on declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages RTC dismissed
the respondents filed action. Respondents filed motion forreconsideration
invoking the ruling in the case of Nial v. Bayadog, holding that the heirs of a
deceased spouse have the standing to assail a voidable marriage even after
death of one of the spouses. RTC granted the motionand issued an order for
reinstatement of the case. Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration but
denied, thereby petitioner assailed a petition directly to Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1.)Whether or not respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage
after the death of Eulogio.
2.) Whether which of the two rule AM 02-11-10-SC or Nial v.
Bayadog shall govern the instant case
HELD:
Petition is GRANTED. Respondent/heirs have NO legal standing to assail
the validity of the second marriage after the death of their father; because
the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC shall govern the said petition, under the Family
Code of the Philippines. Particularly Sec 2, par. (a) Provides that a petition for
Declaration of AbsoluteNullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.Question: Why the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC should govern
this case not the held decision on Nial v. Bayadog casewhereas the two cases
expressed a common cause of issue?Here the court resolved that; in Nial v.
Bayadog case the heirs were allowed to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their fathers second marriage even after their fathers death because
the impugned marriage there was solemnized prior to the affectivity of the
Family Code. Unlike in this case Enrico v Heirs of Medinaceli wheresame
holding cannot be applied because the marriage here was celebrated in 2004
where the Family Code is already effective and under family code is embodied
the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC where this rule shall governpetitions for the
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages.
Nonetheless, as the heirs major concern here, the court supplied; that
the heirs have still remedy to protect their successional rights not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding forthe settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED
DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of
Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167109
February 6, 2007
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE
E. BRAGANZA, Respondents.
DECISION
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4,
1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.4Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of
America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of
marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988.5
Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married
respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.6 Contending that said marriage
was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio
Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with

damages in the RTC of Dagupan City7 against Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of cause of
action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was
denied.9 Trial on the merits ensued.
ISSUE:
whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy.
HELD:
In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity
of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce
decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial
court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law
which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a
valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent
Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents marriage
as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral damages
from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00
to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss
the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner
Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the
trial court for its proper disposition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were
married inthe Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on
July 23, 1954.Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina
Dandan, the respondentherewith. They were blessed with six children.
On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared
as to whowill be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs
Escano case held thatthe divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized
in our country. Private respondentstressed that the citizenship of petitioner
was relevant in the light of the ruling in VanDorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who
obtain divorce abroad are recognized in thePhilippnes provided they are valid
according to their national law. The petitioner herselfanswered that she was an
American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she alsostated that Arturo
was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the shewas no
longer a Filipino citizen.
The Trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The net
hereditary estatewas ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the
brother of Arturo. Blandina and thePadlan children moved for
reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsiderationwas granted
declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to onehalf of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe
Quita.Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo
was declared voidsince it was celebrated during the existence of his previous
marriage to petitioner.Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of
Appeals thatthe case was decidedwithout a hearing in violation of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE:
(1)Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio.
(2)Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as
surviving spouse of Arturo.
HELD:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of
Fe D.Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is
valid here sinceshe was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and
such is valid in theircountrys national law.
Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be
the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent
Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner
Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order

of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2)
of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed
Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED.
The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial
court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving
spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to
dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA.
IMMACULADA T. ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A.
TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA
ARUEGO, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and
enforcement of successional rights was filed before RTC Manila by the minors
Antonia Aruego and alleged the sister Evelyn Aruego represented by their
mother Luz Fabian. The complaint was opposed by the legitimate children of
Jose Aruego Jr.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego. A petition for
certiorari was then filed alleging that the Family Code of the Philippines which
took effect on August 3, 1988 shall have a retroactive effect thereby the trial
court lost jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground of prescription.
ISSUE:
case.
Whether or not the Family Code shall have a retroactive effect in the
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld that the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect in so far as the instant case is concerned as its application
will prejudice the vested rights of respondents to have her case be decided
under Article 285 of the Civil Code. It is a well settled reception that laws shall
have a retroactive effect unless it would impair vested rights. Therefore, the
Family Code in this case cannot be given a retroactive effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 31, 1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors,

represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE
ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON,
CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN
DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD
MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY
CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Facts:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August
1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie
Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March
1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by
Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving
behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various
corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for
"Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan
G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder,
sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while
denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the
status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo
de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of
Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to
lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and subsequent motion for reconsideration
on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents assailed
the denial of said motions before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court
and ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the conflicting assertions should be
threshed out at the trial considering that the birth certificates presented by
respondents appeared to have effectively contradicted petitioners' allegation
of illegitimacy.1wphi1.nt
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and
several other motions, respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the action instituted was, in
fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate
children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely
an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able the establish their
status as such heirs. It was contended, in fine that an action for partition was
not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the question of paternity and
filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an independent suit or
proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately,
dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being
improper.1 It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a
special proceeding in asmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a

status or right.
Issue:
Whether or not they are illegitimate children of Juan for the purpose of
inheriting from him.
Ruling:
No. in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan
G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being
children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be
aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the
father,13 or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs,14 can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only
when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G.
Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent
cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e
whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the
decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first
instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus
and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly
settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked
collaterally,15 one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose.16 Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock
shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition
is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163707
September 15, 2006
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge,
RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and
KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES,
respondents.
DECISION
Facts:
1. The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima
Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged
that they are the acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died
intestate. The minors were represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who
filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of
Makati City.
2. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving
spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no
debts hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters
administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the
certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and
not by counsel.
3. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason
of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and
educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children
discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.
4. The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the
supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted
guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver. It
also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
wards
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the
RULING:
No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and
guardians must necessarily obtain judicial approval. repudiation of inheritance
must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the
ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the release or waiver is
therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their
supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of
the decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right
which, according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.
As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs
The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of

the claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters
administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to
the settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship included. As
held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in one
complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of
petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records
be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006

MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and ELISA
CRISTOBAL SIKAT, Petitioners,
vs.
EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, JOSE CRISTOBAL,
HEIRS OF NORBERTO CRISTOBAL and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the
deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the
legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to
Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents (Norberto,
Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata
Enriquez.
On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an
area of 535 square meters located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan,
Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10878-2 (the
subject property).
Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate.
More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had
executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred its
title to their names.
Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case
between them and private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a
Complaint 2 for Annulment of Title and Damages was filed before the RTC by
petitioners against private respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso
shares in the subject property. In their prayer, they sought the annulment of
the Deed of Partition executed by respondents on 24 February 1948; the
cancellation of TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, No. 165134 and No. 165135 issued in
the individual names of private respondents; re-partitioning of the subject
property in accordance with the law of succession and the payment of
P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages; P300,000.00 as moral
damages; P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the
baptismal certificates of Elisa, 3 Anselmo, 4 and the late Socorro 5 were
presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on 31 January 1909, she
produced a certification 6 issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the
years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to
ordinary wear and tear.
Issue:
(1) whether or not petitioners were able to prove their filiation with the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal;
(2) whether or not the petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition of
the subject property executed by the private respondents;
(3) whether or not petitioners right to question the Deed of Partition
had prescribed; and
Held:
1. the baptismal certificates of Elisa, 15 Anselmo, 16 and the late Socorro
17
were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary
evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909, she
produced a certification 18 issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the
years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to
ordinary wear and tear.
Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that
petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they
reside as being the children of Buevaventura Cristobal with his first wife.
Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by continuous
possession of the status as a legitimate child. 19
In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable to
present any proof to refute the petitioners claim and evidences of filiation to
Buenaventura Cristobal.
The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners
are, indeed, children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first
marriage.
2. the applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which
states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
In the case at bar, since the estate of the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is
composed solely of the subject property, the partition thereof by the private
respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of Buenaventura
Cristobals estate. The partition of the subject property by the private
respondents shall not bind the petitioners since petitioners were excluded
therefrom. Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of Partition executed by
private respondents among themselves in 1948. Petitioner Elisa became aware of
the transfer and registration of the subject property in the names of private
respondents only in 1994 when she was offered by private respondent Eufrocina
to choose between a portion of the subject property or money, as one of the
children of private respondent Jose wanted to construct an apartment on the
subject property. 21 This led petitioner Elisa to inquire as to the status of the
subject property. She learned afterwards that the title to the subject property
had been transferred to the names of private respondents, her half brothers
and sisters, to the exclusion of herself and her siblings from the first marriage
of Buenaventura Cristobal. The Deed of Partition excluded four of the eight
heirs of Buenaventura Cristobal who were also entitled to their respective
shares in the subject property. Since petitioners were not able to participate in
the execution of the Deed of Partition, which constitutes as an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the late Buenaventura Cristobal by private
respondents, such settlement is not binding on them.
Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not
affect the right of petitioners to inherit from their deceased father, this
Court shall then proceed to divide the subject property between petitioners
and private respondents, as the rule on succession prescribes.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:
(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late
Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not
binding upon petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the
execution thereof;
(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and
No. 165135, in the name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters
is ORDERED to be partitioned and distributed in accordance with this
Decision and appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of the
recognized heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and
(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS as damages, to be paid by private respondents.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181132
June 5, 2009
HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG, represented by surviving spouse

VICENTA PANGILINAN MARAMAG, Petitioners,
vs.
EVA VERNA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, ODESSA DE GUZMAN
MARAMAG, KARL BRIAN DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, TRISHA ANGELIE
MARAMAG, THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:
(1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag
(Loreto), while respondents were Loretos illegitimate family; (2) Eva de Guzman
Maramag (Eva) was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the
latter, thus, she is disqualified to receive any proceeds from his insurance
policies from Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular)4 and Great Pacific
Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife);5 (3) the illegitimate children of
LoretoOdessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angeliewere entitled only to one-half

of the legitime of the legitimate children, thus, the proceeds released to
Odessa and those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie were
inofficious and should be reduced; and (4) petitioners could not be deprived of
their legitimes, which should be satisfied first.
In support of the prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners
alleged, among others, that part of the insurance proceeds had already been
released in favor of Odessa, while the rest of the proceeds are to be released
in favor of Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie, both minors, upon the appointment
of their legal guardian. Petitioners also prayed for the total amount of
P320,000.00 as actual litigation expenses and attorneys fees.
In answer,6 Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate
wife and Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and
that they filed their claims for the insurance proceeds of the insurance
policies; that when it ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it
disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the proceeds among Odessa, Karl
Brian, and Trisha Angelie, as the remaining designated beneficiaries; and that it
released Odessas share as she was of age, but withheld the release of the
shares of minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters of
guardianship. Insular alleged that the complaint or petition failed to state a
cause of action insofar as it sought to declare as void the designation of Eva as
beneficiary, because Loreto revoked her designation as such in Policy No.
A001544070 and it disqualified her in Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it
sought to declare as inofficious the shares of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha
Angelie, considering that no settlement of Loretos estate had been filed nor
had the respective shares of the heirs been determined. Insular further
claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies designating the
children of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of the
Insurance Code.
In its own answer7 with compulsory counterclaim, Grepalife alleged that Eva
was not designated as an insurance policy beneficiary; that the claims filed by
Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were denied because Loreto was
ineligible for insurance due to a misrepresentation in his application form that
he was born on December 10, 1936 and, thus, not more than 65 years old when
he signed it in September 2001; that the case was premature, there being no
claim filed by the legitimate family of Loreto; and that the law on succession
does not apply where the designation of insurance beneficiaries is clear.
As the whereabouts of Eva, Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were not
known to petitioners, summons by publication was resorted to. Still, the
illegitimate family of Loreto failed to file their answer. Hence, the trial court,
upon motion of petitioners, declared them in default in its Order dated May 7,
2004.
Issue: WON the TC erred in granting the motion to dismiss?
Held:
The petition should be denied.
The grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial courts finding that
the petition failed to state a cause of action, as provided in Rule 16, Section
1(g), of the Rules of Court, which reads
SECTION 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any
of the following grounds:
xxxx
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although
petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as
beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. The basis
of petitioners claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in
his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the
insurance policies, and that Evas children with Loreto, being illegitimate
children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the policies. They
also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the Insurance Code,19 Evas share in
the proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the former having brought
about the death of Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and
portions of the shares of Loretos illegitimate children should be awarded to
them, being the legitimate heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112483 October 8, 1999

ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY,
CESAR VILLALON, JR., TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON,
AUGUSTO VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO VILLALON and
ESTHER VILLALON, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Facts:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter
parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 200, also known as
Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the said
lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then
acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots.
Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the contract's
designation as one of "Absolute Sale", the transaction was in fact a
donation.1wphi1.nt
On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a
complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, docketed as Civil
Case No. 1177, in the then Court of First Instance of Albay, on the ground that
he was deceived by petitioner herein into signing the said document. The
dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement, approved by
the Court of First Instance of Albay on November 3, 1961 3, under which terms:
(1) Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the
land donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter
portion of the donated land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank,
for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of Leoncio's death, it was
agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to
defray burial costs.
On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio
died, leaving only two heirs the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged
natural son, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was
substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-mentioned case, and it was he who
moved for execution of judgment. On March 15, 1962, the motion for execution
was duly granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and without
issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a
portion of the disputed land. Four years hence, or on September 25, 1981,
Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa
Villalon.
Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint
for annulment of the donation with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 7646. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of
res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, but the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for
further proceedings.
On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same
case, Civil Case No. 7646, for "Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and
Recovery of Possession" with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, seeking
the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting the above property,
on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the amended complaint, it
was alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking
undue advantage of the latter's physical weakness and mental unfitness, and
that the conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired the
legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest.
Issue:
Whether or not that the donation was inofficious and should be reduced.
Held:
Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the
legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must
be taken: (1) the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting
all the payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by
the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value of all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. 24
Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the
property itself, which is brought to collation. Consequently, even when the
donation is found inofficious and reduced to the extent that it impaired
Victor's legitime, private respondents will not receive a corresponding share in
the property donated. Thus, in this case where the collatable property is an
immovable, what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as possible, in
property of the same nature, class and quality; 25 (2) if such is impracticable, the
equivalent value of the impaired legitime in cash or marketable securities; 26 or
(3) in the absence of cash or securities in the estate, so much of such other
property as may be necessary, to be sold in public auction.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No.
31976, affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case
No. 7646, is reversed and set aside. No costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141501
July 21, 2006
ELINO RIVERA, DOMINADOR CLAUREN, SOLEDAD CLAUREN DE

RIVERA, TEOFILA RIVERA and CECILIA RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA* represented by MELCHOR
VILLANUEVA, ANGELINA VILLANUEVA, VICTORIANO DE LUNA,
CABANATUAN CITY RURAL BANK, INC. and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
NUEVA ECIJA, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners- half brothers, half sister and children of the half brother of
the deceased, Pacita Gonzales. Respondents are the Heirs of Villanueva,
represented by Melchor. They were allowed to be substitute for Villanueva
upon his death. The remaining respondents are Angelina and her husband
Victorino, are allegedly the daughter and son-in-law of the late Villanueva. From
1927 until 1980, Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because
the latter was married to Amanda Musngi who died in 1963. In the course of their
cohabitation, they acquired several properties including the properties contested in this case.
Gonzales died without a will. In 1980, Villanueva and Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition with sale, that is, an extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales estate comprising a
number of the aforementioned properties. In this document, Villanueva, for the amount of
P30,000, conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina. Later on, the Petitioners filed
a case for partition of Gonzales estate and annulment of titles and damages with
the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
RTC- 2 Findings:
1. Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and
2. Respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to
the exclusion of petitioners
Petitioners appealed to the CA and the latter affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Angelina was the illegitimate daughter of the
decedent Gonzales
Held:
No.
According to the assailed decision, the birth certificate clearly discloses that Pacita Gonzales
was the mother of Angelina proof that respondent Angelina was Gonzales
Illegitimate child. It is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence
of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of
the statements made there by the interested parties.
Following the logic of Benitez v. CA, respondent Angelina and her codefendants in SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view
of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of
any such evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and Benitez-Badua v. CA that are simply too
compelling to ignore. First, both Benitez-Badua and respondent Angelina
submitted birth certificates as evidence of filiation. Second, both claimed to
be children of parents relatively advanced in age. Third, both claimed to have
been born after their alleged parents had lived together childless for several
years. There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez-Badua and
this case which ineluctably support the conclusion that respondent Angelina
was not Gonzales' daughter, whether illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike
Benitez-Badua's alleged mother Chipongian, was not only 36 years old but 44
years old, and on the verge of menopause21 at the time of the alleged birth.
Unlike Chipongian who had been married to Vicente Benitez for only 10 years,
Gonzales had been living childless with Villanueva for 20 years. Under the
circumstances, we hold that it was not sufficiently established that respondent
Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter, nor even her adopted daughter.
Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have validly
participated in Gonzales' estate, the extrajudicial partition which she executed
with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51449 are reversed and set aside,
and a new one entered ANNULLING the deed of extrajudicial partition with
sale and REMANDING the case to the court of origin for the determination
and identification of Pacita Gonzales' heirs and the corresponding partition of
her estate.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129505
January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,

vs.
PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.
----------------------------G.R. No. 133359
January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official
Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA
PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de
Santos, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati
City, filed a petition for probate of his will1 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos
alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole
legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by
his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00;
and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix,
private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will 2 was annexed
to the petition for probate.
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch
61 issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention
claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and
Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin
of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator.
Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will
and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the
designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters
testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, private respondent moved to
withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was required to file a
memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said court (Branch 61)
still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.3
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court Makati, Branch
61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its
issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.
Held:
The contention has no merit.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the
court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether
the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law.9
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the
testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court
proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator.
The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions,
courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator
under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.10
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for
probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:
CIVIL CODE, ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having
jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the
testator's death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as
may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during
the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to
its due execution.
Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:
Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. Any executor,
devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the
estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the
court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in
his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for
the allowance of his will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F.
LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA
LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ,
CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA
FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Facts:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died
[Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and
their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and
Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were
partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and
the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented
by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943.
Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially
to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter,
Filomena Legarda.
As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her
deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held
proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents
wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter,
in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen
grandchildren in all).
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six
surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share
in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in
representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a
holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races
Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the
testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her
mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased
daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable
properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and
three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all
surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F.
Legarda.
Issue:
whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable
properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her
sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree,
her three daughters and three sons.
Held:
No.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her
sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from
her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of
her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make
a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees
survived the reservor.
Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if
the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from
Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to
Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from
Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but
from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs
mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservoir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of

Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
XIII LEGAL SUCCESSION
G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C.
ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX
ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Facts:
that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City,
died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their
two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child,
Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox
Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of
the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter,
the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said
estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order
dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the
deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter),

1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February
4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the
estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son
of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law
together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Issue:
Held:
is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law?
No. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely,
those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own
right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the
same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from
him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of
other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in
their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by
right of representation, and if any one of them should have died,
leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided
among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate
children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or
widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate

child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving
spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of
any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her
own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which
relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate
with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State
as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes
a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our
observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an
intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to
the trial-court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140975, Promulgated December 8, 2000

OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, Petitioner.
vs.
PASTORA PIEDAD, Respondent.
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to
intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the matter of the
Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before
the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting
entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner
assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate
to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted
with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publications of the notice
of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in
the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the
estate. The trial court denied the motion, prompting petitioners to raise her
case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal
on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involving nothing else
but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with
Circular 2-90 of the Court.
ISSUE:
Is the right of representation apply in the case?
HELD:
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in
degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and
to the extent that the right of representation can apply.
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by

operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that
of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby
steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the
latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have
succeeded.
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending,
never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation
may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the
decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.
The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within
the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong)
who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate
children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants,
thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving
spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth
decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and
nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of
proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute
rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the
decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
"Article 966. xxx
"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then
descent is made ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom
the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his
brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his
first cousin and so forth."
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto
H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from
succeeding an intestato to the estate of the decedent.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48140
May 4, 1942
SINFOROSO PASCUAL, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PONCIANO S. PASCUAL, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
MORAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the
acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the
full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was
survived by Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses, Children of
Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, Children
of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, Acknowledged
natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased,
Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased.
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres
Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br.
XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate
estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental
Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly
stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don
Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit,
to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full
blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement
made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the
deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT,
above-mentioned
heirs entered
into a
ISSUE:
whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance
of the deceased.
HELD:
NO. Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it
is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing
but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law
does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment. respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein
cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to
the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of
their father.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to
whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in
the negative.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and

the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983
CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and
RURAL BANK OF PARAAQUE, INC.,respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by two
(2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the
son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo
died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son
of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties,
sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking
judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca
Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with
defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties
left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint, partitioned between
him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the
income derived from said properties from the time defendants took possession
thereof until said accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his share
therein with legal interest.
Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive
ownership over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an
illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of representation. For his part,
the other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said
properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria
Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly
mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime in
September 1963.
ISSUE:
Is there right of representation in the case at bar?

HELD:
NONE. even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo,
still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by
the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of
Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was
born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet
married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting.
At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the
deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in
this petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA
SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C.
BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her
husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL
SAYSON, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,
Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela
on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23,
1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were
left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson,
who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with
Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of
Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who
alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful
descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this
time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and
Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed
as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The
complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit,
that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to
inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
ISSUE:
Is there right of representation?
HELD:
Yes. as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter

of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in
the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981,
she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he
survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other
children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo,
to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the
adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right
as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The
relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and
the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the
adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson
and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to
share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals
was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of
representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the
other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased
Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.
G.R. No. L-18753
March 26, 1965
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She
executed a will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged
before Notary Public by her and the witnesses. Among the legacies made in
the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrixs
niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Marias interest in the Calvo
Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in
equal parts to her grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses.
Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all the remainder
of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed a
petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan,
claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria)
and an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that
said will was not executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and
mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution and was
executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUE:
WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to

intervene in a probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in the
estate, will or in the property to be affected by either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a
claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will, defendant has no
right to intervene because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir,
executor or administrator because it did not appear therein any provision
designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate. She could have
acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is not under
the CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law does not give her
any right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and
Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from
succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that
relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and
adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except
only as expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the
adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal

heir in the probate proceeding.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which
declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the
same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is
ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
G.R. No. L-30455 September 30, 1982

MARIA LANDAYAN, et al., petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANGEL BACANI, et al., respondents.
VASQUEZ, J.:
FACTS:
In his lifetime, Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land located
in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and a house and lot in Manila. The said properties
were all covered by Torrens Titles in his name. He died intestate in Urdaneta,
on March 20, 1948.
On February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima Andrada, the surviving spouse
of Teodoro Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar, executed a public document,
entitled "Extra-Judicial Agreement of Partition" whereby they adjudicated
between themselves the properties left by Teodoro Abenojar. Severino
Abenojar represented himself in said document as "the only forced heir and
descendant" of the late Teodoro Abenojar.
On March 6, 1968, petitioners herein filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan presided over by the respondent Judge seeking a
judicial declaration that they are legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro
Abenojar, and that private respondents be ordered to surrender the ownership
and possession of some of the properties that they acquired under the deed of
extra-judicial settlement corresponding to the shares of the petitioners and
that the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent deed of
donation executed in favor of private respondents, spouses Liberata Abenojar
and Jose Serrano, in consequence thereof be declared nun and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is right of representation?
HELD:
petitioners contend that Severino Abenojar is not a legal heir of Teodoro
Abenojar, he being only an acknowledged natural child of Guillerma Abenojar,
the mother of petitioners, whom they claim to be the sole legitimate daughter
in first marriage of Teodoro Abenojar. If this claim is correct, Severino
Abenojar has no rights of legal succession from Teodoro Abenojar in view of
the express provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.
The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro

Abenojar depends on the truth of his allegations that he is not an illegitimate
child of Guillerma Abenojar, but an acknowledged natural child of Teodoro
Abenojar. On this assumption, his right to inherit from Teodoro Abenojar is
recognized by law (Art. 998, Civil Code). He even claims that he is the sole legal
heir of Teodoro Abenojar inasmuch as the petitioners Landayans, who are
admittedly the children of the deceased Guillerma Abenojar, have no legal
successional rights from Teodoro Abenojar, their mother being a spurious child
of Teodoro Abenojar.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The respondent Judge is ordered to try the case on the merits and
render the corresponding judgment thereon. The private respondents shall pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44051 June 27, 1985

EUFRACIA VDA. DE CRISOLOGO, EUSTAQUIO, VICENTE, ESTELA,
CAMILA, MAXIMO, LITO, FELIX, OMAN, CRISPINA and REY, all
surnamed RAMIREZ, TRIUNFO, RUPERTA and CARMEN, all surnamed
PASSILAN, and DOMINGO ROQUE, QUIRINO, MANUELA and ANITA, all
surnamed LABOG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANDRES PLAN and BERNARDO
MALLILLIN, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The petitioners filed an action against the private respondent for

ownership, annulment of sale, and delivery of possession of various properties,
with writ of preliminary injunction and damages. Claiming to be legal heirs of
the vendor, they sought the annulment of four deeds of sale covering
seventeen (17) parcels of land and a residential house executed by Lutgarda
Capiao in favor of respondent Mallillin. The latter filed a motion to dismiss
which was however denied for not being indubitable at that stage of the
proceedings. The private respondent, therefore, filed his answer.
After termination of the pre-trial proceedings and during the trial on the
merits, the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church, Rev. Father Roque N.
Fidol, testified on the witness stand. He was duly cross-examined by Atty.
Aguirre, counsel for the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Can the plaintiff inherit from Lutgarda Capiao, the original owner of the
property?
HELD:
NO. The source of these properties in question deceased Lutgarda
Leogarda is undoubtedly an illegitimate child. In fact, her surname is Capiao
and not Taccad, retaining the surname or family name of her mother Julia
Capiao Article 992 of the Civil Code, cited by the movant, the defendant,
provides:
Art. 992. Illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor
shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.'
Clearly, they can not because the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao cannot
inherit from an illegitimate child of the latter, because that is the clear and
unmistakable provision of Article 992 of the New Civil Code. Neither can
Lutgarda Capiao inherit from the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao who are
the plaintiffs in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977

GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO
CARTENA, defendant-appellant.
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 (Exh.
"D") Of this marriage there were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic
(Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit F), and Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit H).
Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit "E"). Of
this second marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) and
Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra
Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff Francisca
Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 (Exhibit B)
survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra
Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her heirs, the
plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and
Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14,
1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other
daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta
Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit was filed or on July 23,
1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the defendant herein
Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza.
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the
Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia
Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo
Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the
properties left by Maura Bagsic.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to
Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same.
Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of
their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza
not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of
Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of
the same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only.
This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly,
had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the
properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and
administration of the same to the defendants.
ISSUE:
Are the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code
applicable in the case?
HELD:
Yes. In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that
Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her
ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral
relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10)
children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the
provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled
to inherit in their own right. InAbellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382,
August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone
do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring
with brothers or sisters of the deceased."
The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by
Felipa Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and
nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for
it is based on an erroneous factual assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died
in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945,
thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and
jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976

BENITA SALAO, assisted by her husband, GREGORIO MARCELO;
ALMARIO ALCURIZA, ARTURO ALCURIZA, OSCAR ALCURIZA and
ANITA ALCURIZA, the latter two being minors are represented by
guardian ad litem, ARTURO ALCURIZA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JUAN S. SALAO, later substituted by PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator of
the Intestate of JUAN S. SALAO; now MERCEDES P. VDA. DE SALAO,
ROBERTO P. SALAO, MARIA SALAO VDA. DE SANTOS, LUCIANA P.
SALAO, ISABEL SALAO DE SANTOS, and PABLO P. SALAO, as
successors-in-interest of the late JUAN S. SALAO, together with PABLO P.
SALAO, Administrator, defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit,
Malabon, Rizal begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and
Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886
survived by his only child. Valentin Salao.
There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties formed part of
Manuel Salao's estate, if any. His widow died on May 28, 1914. After her death,
her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.
It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but
notarized on May 22, 1919 (Exh. 21). The deed was signed by her four legal heirs,
namely, her three children, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson,
Valentin Salao, in representation of his deceased father, Patricio.
ISSUE:
Is representation present in the case?
HELD:
No. The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assail that donation.
Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any
successional rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her
nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao,
if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir,
together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of
Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia
since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art
972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or greatgandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19382
August 31, 1965
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA

FERRARIS.
FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE
VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she
transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there
continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of
the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard
of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having
elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared
presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her
estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share
in the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and
which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same
court.
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant,
or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena
Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto
Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed
Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only
brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent).
These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to
participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
ISSUE:
Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or
she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a
brother who predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the
children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former be
excluded by the latter?
HELD:
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far
distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the
collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by
first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil
Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and
nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless
concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by
Article 975.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of
intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals
(aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily
apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
It will be seen that brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab
intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded
only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines
merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers
and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the
latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a
decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews
and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby
affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. 113539 March 12, 1998

CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID REY
GUZMAN and EMILIANO CATANIAG,respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving
real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant
appellee [herein private respondent] Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son,
defendant appellee [also herein private respondent] David Rey Guzman, both
of whom are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed
of quitclaim (Annex A-Complaint), assigning [,] transferring and conveying to
David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in and over six parcels of land
which the two of them inherited from Simeon.
Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation, . . . situated in
Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695 square meters,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-170514 of the Registry of Deeds
of Bulacan. The quitclaim having been registered, TCT No. T-170514 was
cancelled and TCT No. T-120259 was issued in the name of appellee David Rey
Guzman.
On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendantappellee [also herein private respondent] Emiliano Cataniag, upon which TCT
No. T-120259 was cancelled and TCT No. T-130721(M) was issued in the latter's
name.
ISSUE:
Is the conveyance from Helen Meyers Guzman to her son David Rey
Guzman illegal?
HELD:
No. The Krivenko rule was recently reiterated in Ong Ching Po vs. Court
of Appeals, 19 which involves a sale of land to a Chinese citizen. The Court sad:
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the
capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private
land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities
"qualified to acquire lands of the public domain" (II Bernas, The
Constitution of the Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed.]).
The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the

"disposition, exploitation, development and utilization" of all "lands
of the public domain and other natural resources of the
Philippines" for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty
percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified
from acquiring private lands. 20
In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of
the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. 21
But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to
a qualified Filipino citizen? This is not a novel question. Jurisprudence is
consistent that "if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered
valid."
Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent
Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed.
The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our land in Filipino
hands has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-42539
October 23, 1936
In re Will of the deceased Felisa Javier. SULPICIO
RESURRECCION, administrator-appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN JAVIER, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
AVANCEA, C. J.:
FACTS:
On October 18, 1932, Felisa Francisco Javier made a will instituting her
husband Sulpicio Resurreccion as her universal heir and, among other things,
left a legacy of P2,000 in favor of her brother Gil Francisco Javier. The
testatrix died on January 22, 1933, and her will was probated on March 8th of
said year.
On October 12, 1933, the court, finding that Gil Francisco Javier died in
August, 1930, even before the testatrix made her will, ordered that the legacy
of P2,000 in his favor revert to the fund of the estate.
Gil Francisco Javier's children and heirs, claiming that they are entitled to
receive the legacy of P2,000 in favor of their father, appeal from the court's
resolution ordering the reversion of this amount to the funds of the estate.
The important thing to determine in this appeal is the effect of a legacy made
in favor of a person who was already dead not only before the death of the
testatrix but even before the will was made.
The testatrix, having no forced heirs, may dispose by will of all her property or
any part thereof in favor of any person qualified to acquire it (art. 763, Civil
Code). Upon being instituted as legatee by the testatrix, Gil Francisco Javier
lacked civil personality, which is extinguished by death, and, therefore, lacked
capacity to inherit by will on the ground that he could not be the subject of a
right (art. 32, Civil Code). Consequently, his institution as a legatee had
absolutely no legal effect and his heirs are not now entitled to claim the
amount of legacy. They cannot even claim under the principle of representation
because this takes place only in intestate inheritance. Furthermore, as the
legatee died before the testatrix, he could transmit nothing to his heirs (art.
766, Civil Code).
ISSUE:
Should the will be interpreted in the sense that the intention of the
testatrix was to leave the legacy to the heirs of Gil Francisco Javier
HELD:
This court, however, does not find sufficient evidence to establish this
fact. The only witness who testified to this effect was Agustin Javier, Gil's
brother, who alleged that he was in the house of the testatrix in May, 1931, and
in a conversation with her he informed her that their brother Gil had already
died, leaving a widow and children. But against this testimony was presented
that of Sulpicio Resurreccion, the widower of the testatrix, who testified that
Agustin Javier was in his house only once, in April or May, 1930, prior to the
death of the testatrix. According to this, he could not have given to the
testatrix the information about Gil's death which took place some months
later, or in August, 1930.lwphi1.nt
Furthermore, if the testatrix, in making her will, knew that Gil was already dead
and that he had left children, it cannot be explained why she left the legacy to
Gil and not to his children, if such was her intention, particularly because,
according to the evidence for the appellants, she knew one of said children
named Jose.
Consequently, in either case, whether the testatrix knew that Gil was already
dead or she was ignorant thereof, as she had left the legacy in favor of Gil,
there is no reason to admit that it was, nevertheless, her intention to leave it
to his children.
The appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs to the appellants. So ordered.

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I.

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate

G.R. No. 187056 September 20, 2010

G.R. No. 131953

Whether or not the donations are mortis causa or inter vivos.

"SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE at the foot of this

G.R. No. 106755 February 1, 2002

Whether or not the Donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.

G.R. No. L-6600 July 30, 1954

G.R. No. L-45262 July 23, 1990

Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt

B.TRANSMISSION/ACQUISITION THROUGH DEATH

G.R. Nos. 154391-92 September 30, 2004

G.R. No. L-24098 November 18, 1967

distinct from the criminal action.

Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite

G.R. No. L-28067 March 10, 1928

alleged agreement of partition by the legatees, which agreement was

G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990

the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to

G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000

It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and

G.R. No. 145736 March 4, 2009

by provision of law. A contract of lease is, therefore, generally transmissible to

G.R. No. 118248 April 5, 2000

G.R. No. 121940 December 4, 2001

Here, petitioner does not appear to have an interest in the property

G.R. No. 146006

This claim by the acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez is

heir without interruption from the moment of death of the

G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004

COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P.

Respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra

Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real

Petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the

G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000

COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENACOSCOLUELLA Y

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix

G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997

COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape,

The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which affirmed

provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that

B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TESTAMENTARY ACT

G.R. No. 1439

G.R. No. L-2071

This is a special proceeding commenced in the Court of First Instance of

prohibition of article 669 of the Civil Code is directed against the

Article 669 of the Civil Code reads as follows:

G.R. No. L-20234

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

On May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and GervasiaRebaca,

court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the

C. RULES IN INTERPRETATION OF WILLS

G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997

COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape,

The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which affirmed

efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the

G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011

Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and