Complete Cases Rule 4-8

RULE 4: VENUE
1. Young Auto Supply vs CA

FACTS:
Young Auto Supply Co. Inc. (YASCO) represented by Nemesio Garcia, its president, Nelson Garcia and
Vicente Sy, sold all of their shares of stock in Consolidated Marketing & Development Corporation (CMDC) to
Roxas. The purchase price was P8,000,000.00 payable as follows: a downpayment of P4,000,000.00 and the
balance of P4,000,000.00 in four post dated checks of P1,000,000.00 each.
Immediately after the execution of the agreement, Roxas took full control of the four markets of
CMDC. However, the vendors held on to the stock certificates of CMDC as security pending full payment of
the balance of the purchase price. Nelson Garcia and Vicente Sy assigned all their rights and title to the
proceeds of the sale of the CMDC shares to Nemesio Garcia.
RTC:
On August 19, 1988, the trial court declared Roxas in default. The order of default was, however,
lifted upon motion of Roxas. On May 3, 1991, Roxas filed an unverified Motion to Lift the Order of Default
which was not accompanied with the required affidavit or merit. But without waiting for the resolution of the
motion, he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
CA:
In holding that the venue was improperly laid in Cebu City, the Court of Appeals relied on the address
of YASCO, as appearing in the Deed of Sale dated October 28, 1987, which is "No. 1708 Dominga Street,
Pasay City." This was the same address written in YASCO's letters and several commercial documents in the
possession of Roxas.
In the case of Garcia, the Court of Appeals said that he gave Pasay City as his address in three letters
which he sent to Roxas' brothers and sisters. The appellate court held that Roxas was led by petitioners to
believe that their residence is in Pasay City and that he had relied upon those representations
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the venue was improperly laid in Cebu City.
There are two plaintiffs in the case at bench: a natural person and a domestic corporation. Both
plaintiffs aver in their complaint that they are residents of Cebu City, thus:
YASCO is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with principal
place of business at M. J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City. It also has a branch office at 1708 Dominga Street,
Pasay City, Metro Manila.
Nemesio Garcia is of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and with business address at Young Auto
Supply Co., Inc., M. J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the venue was improperly laid?
RULING:
A corporation has no residence in the same sense in which this term is applied to a natural person.
But for practical purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal
office is located as stated in the articles of incorporation (Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd., 34 Phil. 256
[1916] Clavecilla Radio System v. Antillon, 19 SCRA 379 [1967]). The Corporation Code precisely requires
each corporation to specify in its articles of incorporation the "place where the principal office of the
corporation is to be located which must be within the Philippines" (Sec. 14 [3]). The purpose of this
requirement is to fix the residence of a corporation in a definite place, instead of allowing it to be ambulatory.
Civil Procedure December 13, 2014
If it was Roxas who sued YASCO in Pasay City and the latter questioned the venue on the ground that
its principal place of business was in Cebu City, Roxas could argue that YASCO was in estoppel because it
misled Roxas to believe that Pasay City was its principal place of business. But this is not the case before us.
With the finding that the residence of YASCO for purposes of venue is in Cebu City, where its principal
place of business is located, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether Garcia is also a resident of Cebu City
and whether Roxas was in estoppel from questioning the choice of Cebu City as the venue.
2. Saludo vs AMEX
FACTS:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc.
(AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of
Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) is a Filipino citizen, of legal
age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte,
Philippines. On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) is a corporation doing business
in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit facilities and allied services with office
address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. The other defendants (herein
respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served with summons and
other court processes at their office address.
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish,
embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as a result of respondents
acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised
the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred
that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the
parties
was
resident
of Leyte. They
alleged
that
respondents
were
not
residents
of Southern
Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident
thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed
the complaints verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To buttress
their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludos complaint was prepared in Pasay City and
signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.
He asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded
considering that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his
complaint. He urged the court a quo to take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress,
he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his
district. He was also a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has
been such ever since his admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only
because he has an office thereat and the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event,
the community tax certificate is not determinative of ones residence.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to
plaintiffs caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. The rule on venue, like other
procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and
evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding. The option of plaintiff in personal actions
cognizable by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where
plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court a
quo which is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the House
of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency
requirement of the rule.
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents theory, made the finding that petitioner Saludo
was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. It hinged the said finding
mainly on the fact that petitioner Saludos community tax certificate, indicated in his complaints verification
and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued atPasay City. That his law office is in Pasay City was also
taken by the appellate court as negating petitioner Saludos claim of residence in Southern Leyte.
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte,
had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is
also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in
another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is
understood in its popular sense. This is because residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled
with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.
That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte
at the time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it
consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludos residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the
representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quocannot be faulted for doing so because courts
are allowed to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Courts
are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the
Philippines, including its Constitution.
3. San Luis vs San Luis
FACTS:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was
the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce
before
the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.
He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement
of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration
before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.
Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that
respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since
the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition
12
thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to
Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her
by virtue of paragraph 2,
13
Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the venue was improperly laid.
RULING:
Under Section 1,
39
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time
of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,
40
we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining
the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence
or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still
it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez
are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a
distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.
42
However, for
purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence
or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person
may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court
50
which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 3.
51
Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
4. United Overseas Bank v. Rosemoore Mining & Devt Co.
FACTS:
Respondent Rosemoor a Philippine mining corporation with offices at Quezon City, applied for and
was granted by petitioner Westmont Bank (Bank) a credit facility in the total amount of P80 million consisting
of P50,000,000.00 as long term loan and P30,000,000.00 as revolving credit line.
To secure the credit facility, a lone real estate mortgage agreement was executed by Rosemoor and
Dr. Lourdes Pascual (Dr. Pascual), Rosemoors president, as mortgagors in favor of the Bank as mortgagee in
the City of Manila. The agreement, however, covered six parce;s of land located in San Miguel, Bulacan, all
registered under the name of Rosemoor and two parcels of land situated in Gapan, Nueva Ecija (Nueva Ecija
properties), owned and registered under the name of Dr. Pascual.
Rosemoor subsequently opened with the Bank four irrevocable Letters of Credit (LCs) totaling
US$1,943,508.11.
To cover payments by the Bank under the LCs, Rosemoor proceeded to draw against its credit facility
and thereafter executed promissory notes amounting collectively to P49,862,682.50. Two other promissory
notes were also executed by Rosemoor in the amounts of P10,000,000.00 and P3,500,000.00, respectively, to
be drawn from its revolving credit line.
Rosemoor defaulted in the payment of its various drawings under the LCs and promissory notes. In
view of the default, the Bank caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the Nueva Ecija properties and the
Bulacan properties. The Bank was the highest bidder on both occasions.
The Bank then caused the annotation of the Notarial Certificate of Sale covering the Nueva Ecija
properties on the certificates of title concerned. Later, the Notarial Certificate of Sale covering the Bulacan
properties was annotated on the certificates of title of said properties. The foregoing facts led to Rosemoors
filing of separate complaints against the Bank, one before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual filed a Complaint, originally captioned as one for Damages, Accounting
and Release of Balance of Loan and Machinery and for Injunction before the Manila RTC. Impleaded as
defendants were the Bank and Notary Public Jose Sineneng, whose office was used to foreclose the
mortgage. The complaint was twice amended, the caption eventually reflecting an action for Accounting,
Specific Performance and Damages. Through the amendments, Pascual was dropped as a plaintiff while
several officers of the Bank were included as defendants.
The Bank moved for the dismissal of the original and amended complaints on the ground that the
venue had been improperly laid. The motion was denied by the trial court through an Omnibus Resolution.
Plaintiff Rosemoor prayed for the ff: (1) Bank to render an accounting; (2) actual damages for
operational losses; (3) exemplary damages; (4) indemnity and other relief.
The Bank filed another motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the ground of forumshopping since, according to it; Rosemoor had filed another petition earlier before the Malolos RTC. The Bank
contended that as between the action before the Manila RTC and the petition before the Malolos RTC, there is
identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same set of facts.
The Bank further claimed that any judgment that may be rendered in either case will amount to res judicata
in the other case.
Manila RTC denied the motion to dismiss. It also denied the Banks motion for reconsideration of the
order of denial.
The Bank challenged the Manila RTCs denial of the Banks second motion to dismiss before the Court
of Appeals, through a petition for certiorari. The appellate court dismissed the petition. The Bank filed a
motion for reconsideration which, however, was denied through a Resolution.
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Bank argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that no forum-shopping attended the actions brought by Rosemoor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosemoor committed forum-shopping in filing the Malolos case during the pendency
of the Manila case?
RULING:
NO.
The rule on venue of real actions is provided in Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which reads in part:
The venue of the action for the nullification of the foreclosure sale is properly laid with the Malolos
RTC although two of the properties together with the Bulacan properties are situated in Nueva Ecija. The
venue of real actions affecting properties found in different provinces is determined by the SINGULARITY or
PLURALITY of the transactions involving said parcels of land. Where said parcels are the object of one and the
same transaction, the venue is in the court of any of the provinces wherein a parcel of land is situated.
Elements of forum-shopping: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that
any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata
in the other case.
5. Marcos-Araneta v CA
FACTS:
Sometime in 1968 and 1972, Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto, now deceased, and his business
associates (Benedicto Group) organized Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity
Corporation (UEC), respectively.
Irene Marcos-Araneta would later allege, both corporations were organized pursuant to a contract
whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name and in the name of his associates, as trustees, the shares
of stocks of FEMII and UEC with the obligation to hold those shares and their fruits in trust and for the benefit
of Irene to the extent of 65% of such shares. Several years after, Irene demanded the reconveyance of said
65% stockholdings, but the Benedicto Group refused to oblige.
In March 2000, Irene filed before the RTC two similar complaints for conveyance of shares of stock,
accounting and receivership against the Benedicto Group with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO).
In a consolidated opposition, Benedicto, moved to dismiss on 5 grounds, among which were: (2)
venue was improperly laid
During the preliminary proceedings on their motions to dismiss, Benedicto presented the Joint
Affidavit of Gilmia B. Valdez, Catalino A. Bactat, and Conchita R. Rasco who all attested being employed as
household staff at the Marcos Mansion in Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte and that Irene did not maintain
residence in said place as she in fact only visited the mansion twice in 1999; that she did not vote in Batac in
the 1998 national elections; and that she was staying at her husbands house in Makati City.
Irene presented her community tax certificateissued on 11/07/99 in Curimao, Ilocos Norte to
support her claimed residency in Batac, Ilocos Norte.
RTC dismissed both complaints, stating that these partly constituted real action, and that Irene did
not actually reside in Ilocos Norte, and, therefore, venue was improperly laid.
The RTC eventually entertained an amended complaint filed by Irene, dispositively stating: (1) Irene
may opt to file, as a matter of right, an amended complaint. (2) The inclusion of additional plaintiffs, one of
whom was a Batac, an Ilocos Norte resident, in the amended complaint setting out the same cause of action
cured the defect of improper venue. (3) Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4 allow the filing
of the amended complaint in question in the place of residence of any of Irenes co-plaintiffs.
The Benedictos filed on April 10, 2001 their Answer to the amended complaint but also went the
CA via a petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the following RTC orders. The CA rendered a Decision,
setting aside the assailed RTC orders and dismissing the amended complaints in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and
3342-17.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Venue essentially concerns a rule of procedure which, in personal actions, is fixed for the greatest
convenience possible of the plaintiff and his witnesses. The ground of improperly laid venue must be raised
seasonably, else it is deemed waived. Where the defendant failed to either file a motion to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue or include the same as an affirmative defense, he is deemed to have waived his
right to object to improper venue. In the case at bench, Benedicto and Francisca raised at the earliest time
possible, meaning within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint, the matter of improper
venue. They would thereafter reiterate and pursue their objection on venue, first, in their answer to the
amended complaints and then in their petition for certiorari before the CA. Any suggestion, therefore, that
Francisca and Benedicto or his substitutes abandoned along the way improper venue as ground to defeat
Irenes claim before the RTC has to be rejected.
According to the Benedictos, venue was in this case improperly laid since the suit in question
partakes of a real action involving real properties located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC in
Batac.
This contention is not well-taken. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property,
the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages. Real actions, on the other hand, are those
affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. In accordance with the wordings of Sec. 1
of Rule 4, the venue of real actions shall be the proper court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. The venue of personal actions is the
court where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.
Irene seeks to compel recognition of the trust arrangement she has with the Benedicto Group. The amended
complaint is an action in personam, it being a suit against Francisca and the late Benedicto (now
represented by Julita and Francisca), on the basis of their alleged personal liability to Irene upon an alleged
trust constituted in 1968 and/or 1972. They are not actions in rem where the actions are against the real
properties instead of against persons.
SC: Irene, as categorically and peremptorily found by the RTC after a hearing, is not a resident of
Batac, Ilocos Norte, as she claimed. Accordingly, Irene cannot, in a personal action, contextually opt for Batac
as venue of her reconveyance complaint. As to her, Batac, Ilocos Norte is not what Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court adverts to as the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides at the time she
filed her amended complaint. That Irene holds CTC No. 17019451 [41] issued sometime in June 2000 in Batac,
Ilocos Norte and in which she indicated her address as Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos is really of no moment since
it can easily be procured from the BIR with the necessary desired information.
Petitioners, in an attempt to establish that the RTC in Batac, Ilocos Norte is the proper court venue,
asseverate that Batac, Ilocos Norte is where the principal parties reside. Pivotal to the resolution of the
venue issue is a determination of the status of Irenes co-plaintiffs in the context of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in
relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4,
There can be no serious dispute that the real party-in-interest plaintiff is Irene. As self-styled
beneficiary of the disputed trust, she stands to be benefited or entitled to the avails of the present suit. It is
undisputed too that petitioners Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin, all from Ilocos Norte, were
included as co-plaintiffs in the amended complaint as Irenes new designated trustees. As trustees, they can
only serve as mere representatives of Irene.
Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action case,
the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for determining proper venue. Before the
RTC in Batac, in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17, Irene stands undisputedly as the principal plaintiff, the
real party-in-interest. Following Sec. 2 of Rule 4, the subject civil cases ought to be commenced and
prosecuted at the place where Irene resides.
As earlier stated, no less than the RTC in Batac declared Irene as not a resident of Batac, Ilocos
Norte. Withal, that court was an improper venue for her conveyance action. The Court can concede that
Irenes three co-plaintiffs are all residents of Batac, Ilocos Norte. But it ought to be stressed in this regard
that not one of the three can be considered as principal party-plaintiffs . In the final analysis, the residences
of Irenes co-plaintiffs cannot be made the basis in determining the venue of the subject suit. Irene was a
resident during the period material of Forbes Park, Makati City. She was not a resident of Brgy. Lacub, Batac,
Ilocos Norte, although jurisprudence[44] has it that one can have several residences, if such were the
established fact. The Court will not speculate on the reason why petitioner Irene, for all the inconvenience
and expenses she and her adversaries would have to endure by a Batac trial, preferred that her case be
heard and decided by the RTC in Batac. On the heels of the dismissal of the original complaints on the ground
of improper venue, three new personalities were added to the complaint doubtless to insure, but in vain as it
turned out, that the case stays with the RTC in Batac.
6. Ang vs Ang
FACTS:
On September 2, 1992, spouses Alan and EmAng (respondents) obtained a loan in the amount of
Three Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$300,000.00) from Theodore and Nancy Ang (petitioners). On even
date, the respondents executed a promissory note in favor of the petitioners wherein they promised to pay
the latter the said amount, with interest at the
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, upon demand.
However, despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to pay the petitioners.
Thus, on August 28, 2006, the petitioners sent the respondents a demand letter asking them to pay
their outstanding debt which, at that time,
already amounted to Seven Hundred Nineteen Thousand, Six
Hundred Seventy-One U.S. Dollars and Twenty-Three Cents (US$719,671.23), inclusive of the ten percent
(10%) annual interest that had accumulated over the years. Notwithstanding the receipt of the said demand
letter, the respondents still failed to settle their loan obligation.
On August 6, 2006, the petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles, California, United States
of America (USA), executed their respective Special Powers of Attorney6 in favor of Attorney Eldrige Marvin
B. Aceron (Atty. Aceron) for the purpose of filing an action in court against the respondents. On September
15, 2006, Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint7 for collection of sum of money with the
RTC of Quezon City against the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not venue was improperly laid.
RULING:
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the
plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an action
is not left to a plaintiffs caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.19
The petitioners complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents is a personal
action as it primarily seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing
where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2)
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the defendant must
be residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.
In this regard, it bears stressing that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by
the Rules of Court to attain the greatest convenience possible to the litigants and their witnesses by affording
them maximum accessibility to the courts.23 And even as the regulation of venue is primarily for the
convenience of the plaintiff, as attested by the fact that the choice of venue is given to him, it should not be
construed to unduly deprive a resident defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court.
7. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MAUNLAD HOMES, INC.
G.R. No. 190071 August 15, 2012
Facts:
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Union Bank of the
Philippines.
Union Bank owns a commercial complex located in Malolos, Bulacan, known as the Maunlad Shopping
Mall.
In 2002, Union Bank and Maunlad Homes, Inc entered into a contract to sell of the Maunlad Shopping
Mall set at P151M as purchase price and P2.4M as down payment.
Union Bank then authorized Maunlad Homes to take possession of the property and to build or
introduce improvements thereon and should there be violation of the provisions of the contract, all payments
made will be applied as rentals for the use and possession of the property, and all improvements introduced
on the land will accrue in favor of Union Bank. Alos, in the event of rescission, Maunlad Homes will be
required to immediately vacate the property and must voluntarily turn possession over to Union Bank.
Maunlad Homes however failed to pay the monthly amortization so Union Bank sent the former a
Notice of Rescission of Contract. demanding payment of the installments due within 30 days from receipt.
Maunlad Homes failed to comply. A letter demanding payment of the rentals due and requiring that the
subject property be vacated and its possession turned over to the bank.
Maunlad Homes continued to refuse so Union Bank instituted an ejectment suit before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City.
Maunlad Homes Argument: claimed, among others, that it is the owner of the property as Union Bank did not
reserve ownership of the property under the terms of the contract.
By virtue of its ownership, Maunlad Homes claimed that it has the right to possess the property.
It claimed that it never lost ownership over the property despite the execution of the contract, since
only the right to possess was conceded to Maunlad Homes under the contract; Union Bank never transferred
ownership of the property to Maunlad Homes. Because of Maunlad Homes failure to comply with the terms of
the contract, Union Bank believes that it rightfully rescinded the sale, which rescission terminated Maunlad
Homes right to possess the subject property. Since Maunlad Homes failed to turn over the possession of the
subject property, Union Bank believes that it correctly instituted the ejectment suit.
MeTC:
Dismissed Union Banks ejectment complaint.
Union Banks cause of action was based on a breach of contract and that both parties are claiming a
better right to possess the property based on their respective claims of ownership of the property.
Appropriate action to resolve these conflicting claims was an accion reivindicatoria, over which it had
no jurisdiction.
RTC:
On appeal, RTC affirmed the MeTC in its decision
Agreed with the MeTC that the issues raised in the complaint extend beyond those commonly
involved in an unlawful detainer suit. It declared that the case involved a determination of the rights of the
parties under the contract.
Also , property is located in Malolos, Bulacan, but the ejectment suit was filed by Union Bank in
Makati City, therefore, it ruled that the proper venue for the ejectment action is in Malolos, Bulacan, pursuant
to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court
The RTC declared that Union Bank cannot rely on the waiver of venue provision in the contract
because ejectment is not an action arising out of or connected with the contract.
CA:
The CA affirmed the RTC decision
The CA determined that Union Banks cause of action is premised on the interpretation and
enforcement of the contract and the determination of the validity of the rescission, both of which are matters
beyond the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Therefore, it ruled that the dismissal of the ejectment suit was proper.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Union Bank ca rely on the waiver of venue provision in the contract thus filing in
MeTC Makati City is proper and not in Malalos,Bulacan
RULING:
While Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court states that ejectment actions shall be filed in "the
municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved x x x is situated," Section 4
of the same Rule provides that the rule shall not apply "where the parties have validly agreed in writing
before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof." Precisely, in this case, the parties provided for
a different venue. In Villanueva v. Judge Mosqueda, etc., et al the Court upheld the validity of a stipulation in
a contract providing for a venue for ejectment actions other than that stated in the Rules of Court. Since the
unlawful detainer action is connected with the contract, Union Bank rightfully filed the complaint with the
MeTC of Makati City.
RULE 5
Uniform Procedure In Trial Courts
Section 1. Uniform procedure. ? The procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts shall be the same as in the
Regional Trial Courts, except
(a) where a particular provision expressly or impliedly applies only to either of said courts, or
(b) in civil cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
*refer to rules on summary procedure :)
RULE 5: UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS
8. VICTORIA D. BAYUBAY, represented by her attorney-in-fact, MARIBEL MAMARIL vs THE COURT
OF APPEALS, Former Fourth Division and BIG MAK BURGER, INC.
G.R. No. 105866 July 6, 1993
FACTS:
Victoria Bayubay filed an action for ejectment in MTC Los Banos, Laguna on the ground that Contract
of Lease with Big Mak Burger Inc, has already expired.
Big Mak Burger argued in its answer that it had the option to renew the term of the lease contract . To which
the contract states "under such conditions as may be agreed upon by the parties" and set up the defense of
estoppel.
MTC:
MTC issued summons and notified them that it will be heard under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
After Pre-Trial, Judge Romulo G. Carteciano rendered a decision holding that the contract of lease had
expired because no extension had been agreed upon by the parties as required by the agreement.
Big Mak appealed to the RTC Calamba, Laguna, on the ground that "the MTC violated Secs. 6 and 7 of the
Rules on Summary Procedure by rendering judgment without ordering the parties to submit their respective
position papers and affidavits of their respective witnesses, as a consequence of which, defendant's right to
due process was violated.
RTC:
affirmed the appealed decision in toto
CA:
CA reversed and ordered the remand of the case to the Municipal Trial Court for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
WON the failure of the MTC to give the private respondent the opportunity to submit its position
paper and/or affidavit of witnesses constituted a denial of due process;
WON there was a need to remand the case to the MTC so that evidence could be presented to prove the
factual issues through position papers and affidavits.
RULING:
The failure of the MTC to give the petitioner the opportunity to submit its position paper and/or
affidavit of witnesses constituted a denial of due process. True, that MTC rendered its decision was a period of
more than three months. But under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the ten-day period for submitting
affidavits and position papers did not commence to run, until receipt by a party of the order of the court
embodying the results of the pre-trial conference. Here, as already stated, the MTC never issued such an
order and so the ten day period never started to run.
The Court of Appeals did not err therefore in calling for the remand of the case to the Municipal Trial
Court. The respondent court was merely enforcing the mandatory provisions of the Rule on Summary
Procedure. The record shows that the Municipal Trial Court failed to take into account the following pertinent
provisions of the Rule:
Sec. 6. Preliminary Conference. ? Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, the case
shall be calendared for a preliminary conference. Among other matters, should the parties fail to arrive at an
amicable settlement, the court must clarify and define the issues of the case, which must be clearly and
distinctly set forth in the order to be issued immediately after such preliminary conference, together with the
other matters taken up during the same.
Sec. 7. Submission of affidavits. ? Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the
next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of witnesses and other evidences on the factual
issues defined therein, together with a brief statement of their petitions setting forth the law and the facts
relied upon by them.
The above provisions require that immediately after the preliminary conference, the Municipal Trial
Court should issue an order clearly and distinctly setting forth the issues of the case and the other matters
taken up during the preliminary conference.
The order is an important part of the summary procedure because it is its receipt by the parties that
begins the ten-day period to submit the affidavits and other evidence mentioned in Sec. 7.
The minutes of the Municipal Trial Court dated August 22, 1989, contained a notation that the pretrial had been "terminated" and that the parties were to submit position papers. 5 However, there was no
order to this effect nor was there an indication of when the position papers were to be submitted for the
purpose of discussing the factual questioning raised.
RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE SEC. 19
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. ? The following pleadings, motions or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases covered by this Rule: chanrobles virtual law library
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for opening of trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper; chanrobles virtual law library
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default; chanrobles virtual law library
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third party complaints;
(l) Interventions.
9. GLORIA LUCAS vs JUDGE AMELIA A. FABROS, MeTC, Branch 9, Manila
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31, 2000
FACTS:
Gloria Lucas charged Judge Amelia A. Fabros of the MTC Manila with Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Grave Abuse of Discretion in relation to an ejectment case entitled "Editha F. Gacad, represented by Elenita
F. Castelo vs. Gloria Lucas,
Glora alleged that Judge Amelia A. Fabros issued an Order granting the plaintiffs (Gacad/Castelo)
motion for reconsideration of the Order which dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to
appear at the Preliminary Conference..
Gloria claims that t it is elementary, under Section 19 (c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure, that a
motion for reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of the rule, granted the motion for
reconsideration.
That notwithstanding the fact that the she herself had pointed out in open court that the case is
governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure,[ the judge still ordered the revival of the case out of malice,
partiality and with intent to cause an injury to complainant.
Judge Amelia A. Fabros admitted that she granted the motion for reconsideration even if the same is
a prohibited motion in an ejectment case. She explained, however, that it was granted in the interest of
justice. She reasoned:
The Rule on Summary Procedure is not a straight jacket and it is believed it was never meant to be
that. This is the reason why we have in the Rules of Court Section 5 (g) of Rule 135 which is one of the
inherent powers of the Court, that is, to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice......This Presiding Judge in this particular case was fully aware of the Rule on
Summary Procedure. She fully knew that the Motion for Reconsideration was a prohibited pleading but she
still considered it because to deny it would result in a miscarriage of justice. It was not a capricious,
whimsical and despotic act when viewed in the light of this circumstance.
The complaint and the Comment were referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation
OCA:
Finds that respondent Judge Fabros abused her discretion in granting the Motion for Reconsideration.
Failed to realize that the first duty of the court is to apply the law and that when the law is clear and
unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation. Although her intention was good, this could not free her
from liability. Respondent should have denied the motion since the plaintiff had other judicial remedies like
appeal."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Fabros abused her discretion in granting the Motion for Reconsideration even if
its considered a prohibited pleading under Rules on Summary Procedure
RULING:
As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure.
This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on
the merits. As held by the Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure,
later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure effective November 15, 1991:
"The motion prohibited by this Section is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered
by the court after trial on the merits of the case."Here, the order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due
to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment on the merits
after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading
contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to the
motion for reconsideration subject of the present complaint.
ROSP Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. ? The following pleadings, motions or petitions
shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;
10. TERESITA BONGATO vs Spouses SEVERO A. MALVAR and TRINIDAD MALVAR
G.R. No. 141614.August 14, 2002
FACTS:
A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Spouses Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioner Teresita Bongato. That Terisita
unlawfully entered their land and erected thereon a house.
Terisita filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer- MTCC denied, it being proscribed under
the Rule on Summary Procedure.
With a new counsel, Atty. Viador C. Viajar, Terisita filed an answer - MTCC disregarded, the same
having been filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period.
Later, with still another counsel, Atty. Jesus G. Chavez of the PAO, terisitar filed a motion to dismiss
-MTCC denied as being contrary to the Rule on Summary Procedure.
MTC:
Ordered Terisita to vacate the land in question, and to pay rentals, attorneys fees, and the costs of the suit.
RTC:
Affirmed MTC decision
MR Granted but only insofar as to determine the location of the houses involved in this civil case so
that the Court will know whether they are located on one and the same lot or a lot different from that
involved in the criminal case for Anti-Squatting.
Terisita filed a motion for extension of the deadline for the submission of the relocation survey as the
engineer concerned, Engr. Lumarda, could not conduct his survey during the Holy Week, he being a lay
minister and parish council member.
Respondent Judge noted that no survey report was submitted and ordered the record of the case
returned to the court of origin for disposal.
CA:
That the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) had jurisdiction, and that it did not err in rejecting
petitioners Motion to Dismiss. MTCC had passed upon the issue of ownership of the property merely to
determine possession -- an action that did not oust the latter of its jurisdiction
But Teresita claims that the MTCC had no jurisdiction, because the Complaint for forcible entry was
filed only in 1992 or beyond the one-year period provided under the Rules of Civil Procedure
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the Motion to Dismiss
was a prohibited pleading.
RULING:
Yes.
Motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is not a prohibited
pleading, but is allowed under Sec. 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated specifically to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases.[50] The speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter
of public policy,[51] and the Rule should equally apply with full force to forcible entry cases, in which
possession of the premises is already illegal from the start.
Further, a courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by
their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. A party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the
action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. That the MTCC can take cognizance of a motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer has been belatedly filed we likewise held
in Bayog v. Natino:
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, do not provide that an answer
filed after the reglementary period should be expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no
provision for an entry of default if a defendant fails to answer. It must likewise be pointed out that
MAGDATOs defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even been raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception
to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such a motion is allowed
under paragraph (a) thereof, x x x.
In the case at bar, the MTCC should have squarely ruled on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of
erroneously holding that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Because the
Complaint for forcible entry was filed on July 10, 1992, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was
applicable.
11. FRANCISCA P. PASCUAL vs Judge EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Alcala, Pangasinan
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1429. October 4, 2002
FACTS:
Francisca Pascual filed a complaint for forcible entry against a certain Lorenzo L. Manaois, it was
dismissed without prejudice for being insufficient in some material allegations.
She filed a corrected complaint but Lorenzo Manaois Instead of filing an answer, filed a Motion to
Strike Out arguing that the new allegations in the complaint are false.
After the period to answer lapsed and no answer was submitted, Francisca
filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment to which Lorenzo opposed the motion.

The motion of Lorezo to strike out was granted by Judge Jovellanos. Francisca filed an MR accusing
Judge Jovellanos of neglect of Duty:
1. Lorenzo should have filed an answer instead of a Motion to Strike Out
2. Judge granted the motion 120 days after its filing, thus defeating the summary nature of the case;
3. The Order granting the motion to strike out is bereft of any findings of fact because no hearing was
conducted relative thereon;
4. Judge Jovellanos exhibited his bias and partiality in favor of the defendant in his Order granting the motion
to strike out when he pointed out x x x that the complaint in this case is virtually a rehash of the complaint
in Civil Case No. 730 x x x. Complainant asserts that the same is to be expected because the defects or
insufficiency in the first complaint were just being rectified in the later one;
4. Her Motion for Summary Judgment remains, until the present, unacted upon.
Lorenza taking advantage of the lack of activity with proceeding erected a one-storey building on the subject
land. Francisca then filed a Preliminary Injunction to protect her interest. Judge Jovellanos issued a TRO set
the hearing was set on the Injunction.
Francisca was able to present evidence in support of her application while Lorenzochose not to
present controverting evidence and to just submit a memorandum.
On the last day of TRO, Francisca filed an Extremely Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to grant her application
for injunction. However, until the present, respondent Judge has not ruled on her application on preliminary
injunction.
Lorenzo then continued to construct buildings. A contempt charge was filed by Francisca and the court issued
an Order furnishing anew the defendants/respondents with a copy of the contempt charge.
These, Francisca claims, cured the defect cited by defendants/respondents in their motion to dismiss.
However, respondent Judge still has not resolved the aforesaid motion to the prejudice of herein complainant.
Judge Jovellanos denied the allegations in the Complaint. He accused Atty. Alejandro V. Peregrino,
complainants counsel in the forcible entry case, of having a penchant for filing administrative cases against
him instead of appealing decisions before the proper court. Respondent added that none of the charges had
any factual or legal bases. He insisted that his Decision in Civil Case No. 730 had been rendered with utmost
good faith, honesty and sound discretion.
OCA:
Judge Jovellanos failed to apply the Rule on Summary Procedure, which he ought to have been very
conversant with, because it was a common procedure in municipal courts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Jovellanos failed to apply the Rule on Summary Procedure and acted in grave
abuse of in granting the motion to strike out
RULING:
We agree with the findings of the OCA, but increase the penalty, taking note that this is respondents
second infraction.
It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by this Court
to ensure the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the
wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of law. The Rule on Summary Procedure was
promulgated precisely to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. Failure to observe
the period within which to render a judgment subjects the defaulting judge to administrative sanctions. For
this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and expressly prohibits, altogether, the filing of motions for
extension.
In this case, it is very clear that respondent lacks awareness of the relevant provisions on ejectment.
He has evidently been remiss in resolving the forcible entry case, pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. Verily, judgment should have been rendered based on the allegations of the Complaint and the
evidence presented therein, inasmuch as the defendant failed to file his answer after the lapse of ten (10)
days from the service of the summons. Section 6 of the Rule allows the trial court to render judgment,
even motu proprio, upon failure of the defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period. Moreover,
under Section 10 of the Rule, respondent was duty-bound to render his decision within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing them. This
notwithstanding, he has not yet ruled on the Motion for Summary Judgment dated December 15, 1999, filed
in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Furthermore, respondent failed to apply these very basic rules when he granted the defendants
Motion to Strike Out which was in reality a motion to dismiss, a prohibited pleading. In his Order dated May
30, 2000, he ruled that the Complaint in Civil Case No. 740 was a mere rehash of the dismissed Complaint in
Civil Case No. 730. He cited Section 1227 of Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure as basis for this
ruling. In doing so, he committed an obvious mistake showing gross ignorance of the law. This is because the
civil case assigned to him is for forcible entry, which is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.In fact,
all cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are governed by this Rule.
Lack of knowledge of the Rules on Summary Procedure reflects a serious degree of incompetence.
When the law is so elementary, as in this case, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A
member of the bench must be constantly abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments, bearing in mind
that this learning process never ceases. It is indispensable to the correct dispensation of justice.
12. DR. JOSE S. LUNA vs JUDGE EDUARDO H. MIRAFUENTE, Municipal Trial Court, Buenavista,
Marinduque,
A. M. No. MTJ-05-1610 [formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1548-MTJ] September 26, 2005
FACTS:
Dr. Luna filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Florencio & Alex Sadiwa with the MTC
Buenavista, Marinduque.
Florencio & Alex Sadiwa however filed an unverified answer to the complaint, seven (7) days beyond
the reglementary period of ten (10) days from the service of the summons on them.
Dr. Luna's counsel filed a Motion for Judgment as provided by Section 6 (EFFECT OF FAILURE TO
ANSWER) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure , to which motion the defendants did not file
any opposition. Judge Mirafuente however denied the motion.
Dr. Luna hence filed the present administrative complaint asserting that Florencio & Alex Sadiwa's
answer was unverified and belatedly filed, he should have motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiffs
rendered judgment as warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint, following Section 6 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Judge Mirafuente explains that his admission of the Florencio & Alex Sadiwa's unverified, belatedly
filed answer was premised on the spirit of justice and fair play. That It was proper because the
delay was negligible, it involving only four (4) days as June 13 to 15, 2003 were non-working holidays
(per presidential proclamation in connection with the Independence Day celebration);
that the
defendants might have believed that the period to file answer was 15 days, which is the usual or
common period to file an answer; and that the delay was also excusable as defendants acted pro
se, without the benefit of legal assistance, and not dilatory.
OCA:
Finds Judge Mirafuente liable and charged with ignorance of the law
ISSUE:
WON Judge Mirafuente should have motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiffs rendered judgment as
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint, following Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
RULING:
YES. Judge Mirafuente should have motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiffs rendered judgment as
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint.
For forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases involve perturbation of social order, which must be
restored as promptly as possible, such that technicalities or details of procedure which may cause
unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided.[9]
That explains why the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure which governs ejectment, among other cases, lays down procedural safeguards to guarantee
expediency and speedy resolution.
Sections 5 and 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provide:
Sec. 5. Answer. Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to
the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the
period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may
be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein
The word shall in the above-quoted sections of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
underscores their mandatory character.[10] Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the
nature of the Rule and defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of the suits covered thereby. To
admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory maneuvers the very mischief that the Rule seeks to
redress.
In the present case, respondent gave a liberal interpretation of the above-said Rule.
Liberal
interpretation or construction of the law or rules, however, is not a free commodity that may be availed of in
all instances under the cloak of rendering justice. Liberality in the interpretation and application of Rules
applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is
not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
13. AZUCENA GO and REGENA GLORIA SIONG vs COURT OF APPEALS and STAR GROUP
RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT, INC
G.R. No. 128954. October 8, 1998
FACTS:
Star Group filed with the MTCC of Iloilo City an ejectment case against Go and Siong.
Upon motion of Go and Siong, said court issued an Order holding in abeyance the preliminary
conference in said case until after the case for specific performance docketed as Civil Case No. 21142
likewise involving the same parties shall have been finally decided by the RTC of Iloilo City.
Star Group appeal from the aforesaid Order and was assigned to the RTC of Iloilo City.
Go and Siong filed with the respondent RTC a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the
appealed order is interlocutory and therefore not appealable.
RTC:
It was denied. They filed an MR but was like wise denied.
Hence, Go and Siong filed the present petition for certiorari.
Star Group then filed with respondent RTC a Motion to Resume Proceedings' and was granted and
directed the remand of the records of the case to the MTCC (Branch 1) of Iloilo City for further
proceedings. A motion for reconsideration and clarification but the same was denied.
Go and Siong filed with this Court the present petition for review,
Issued a TRO enjoining the Star Group RTC from further proceeding with the case.
Sometime after the restraining order lapsed, respondent court remanded the records to the MTCC.
Go and Siong
CA:
filed with the MTCC a motion to hold in abeyance further proceedings. The MTCC
denied the motion and set the case for preliminary conference.Go and Siong's
motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Go and Siong subsequently, filed their supplemental petition for review impleading the presiding
Judge of the MTCC, raising the issue of whether or not the respondent MTCC erred in resuming the
proceedings in view of the timely filing of the petition for review,
CA:
Granted Go and Siong's motion for a writ of preliminary injunction and ordered herein CA and Star
Group to refrain from continuing with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 332 (93) before the MTCC
until the herein above-entitled petitions are resolved by this Court.
ISSUE:
WON the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in allowing the appeal of an interlocutory order.
RULING:
Indisputably, the appealed order is interlocutory, for it does not dispose of the case but leaves
something else to be done by the trial court on the merits of the case.[5] It is axiomatic that an interlocutory
order cannot be challenged by an appeal.[6] Thus, it has been held that the proper remedy in such cases is
an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for
assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would result in the sorry
spectacle of a case being subject of a counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate court as often
as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its interlocutory rulings. However, where the
assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.
Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory. But neither can it file a
petition for certiorari, because ejectment suits fall under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section
19 (g) of which considers petitions for certiorari prohibited pleading
As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, the purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure
is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical
rules. (Section 36, Chapter III, BP Blg. 129) Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit petitions for
certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the
disposition of cases. In this case, however, private respondent challenged the MTCC order delaying the
ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief envisioned by the Rules.
Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary proceeding is suspended indefinitely, a petition
for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion may be allowed. Because of the extraordinary circumstances
in this case, a petition for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and life to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A
contrary ruling would unduly delay the disposition of the case and negate the rationale of the said Rules.
Private respondent herein filed an appeal to question the interlocutory order. This recourse was
upheld by the RTC and the CA in order to fill a procedural void. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. We hold, however, that the appeal should instead be treated as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. An appeal ordinarily entails a longer process which negates an expeditious
resolution.
WHB vs WOA
The writ of habeas corpus, also referred to as "the great writ," comes from English
common law and dates back to the Magna Carta. Habeas corpus is Latin for "you shall produce
the body.The writ is a judicial order to a prison official, jailer or custodian to bring the person
before the court to determine if the person's imprisonment is lawful or if the person should be
released.
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
14. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and DEPUTY DIRECTOR
REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA vs MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA
G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013
FACTS:
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Magtanggol Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of Manila. It was
raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. on the same day.
The Amparo was directed against Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima et al.
Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. to:
1. Cease and desist from framing him up for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated
Murder against him in relation to the alleged ambush incident.
Instead of deciding whether to issue a Writ of Amparo or not, judge Pampilo issued summons and
ordered De Lima, et al. to file Answers. A hearing was alos set and held allegedly for determining
whether a TRO may be issued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a
Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases.
The hearing proceeded and even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their
respective memoranda within five (5) working days after that hearing. Since the period to file an
Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided that the memorandum of De Lima, et al.
would be filed in lieu of their Answer.
RTC:
Granted the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
Also granted interim reliefs : temporary protection, production and inspection orders.
MR was filed but denied.
De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC "Decision through a Petition for Review on
Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of
Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45, as enunciated in Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo(A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, 25 September 2007), but such decision in court's view is not the
judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may
not yet be the proper remedy at this time.
WHAT IS WRIT OF AMPARO?
The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of
the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court's power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to
address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
The PROCEDURE FOR WRIT OF AMPARO was devised to afford swift but decisive relief.
1. It is initiated through a PETITION filed in RTC, SANDIGANBAYAN, CA or SC.

2. The judge or justice then makes an "IMMEDIATE" evaluation of the facts as alleged in the petition and the
affidavits submitted "with the attendant circumstances detailed"
3. After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of Amparo or immediately dismiss the case.
Dismissal (When Proper)- if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner's right
to life, liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful
4. Respondents are required to file a Return after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of court. The
Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition. Return unlike Answer has other purposes aside from
identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are also required to detail the actions they had taken to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
Respondents are also required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party.
a. verify the identity of the aggrieved party
b.
recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the
petition
c. identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or disappearance
d. determine the cause, manner, location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or
practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance
e. bring the suspected offenders before a competent court
5. There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and
whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte. After the
hearing, the court will render the judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision.
The "Decision" assailed by the De Lima et al could not be the judgment or final order that is
appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, not thejudgment under Section 18. The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as
suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given
together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim
reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is
rendered
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was procedural irregularities in grating the WRIT OF AMPARO.
WON The revised rules on summary proceeding is applicable to a special proceeding that of issuance
of a woa
RULING:
YES.
FIRST, The insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the
responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is
contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and
security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo,
Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.
It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is
mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited
the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special
proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. 34 It is not a
civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously
misplaced.
The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the
writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.
Worse, is the trial courts third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading
(Answer) of De Lima, et al.
The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should
be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the
party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot
substitute for the other since these submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit.
More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.35
The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. In the body of its decision, the RTC
stated:
"Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner."
(Emphasis supplied).
This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the phraseology is similar to
Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
"SEC. 18. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the
privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo.
The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ
ofAmparo. After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in
the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if
not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.1wphi1 It is
tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to
avail of the privilege of the Writ ofAmparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial
responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo."
The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that petitioners used in elevating the
matter to this Court.
It is the responsibility of counsels for the parties to raise issues using the proper procedure at the
right time. Procedural rules are meant to assist the parties and courts efficiently deal with the substantive
issues pertaining to a case. When it is the judge himself who disregards the rules of procedure, delay and
confusion result.
The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order denominated
as "Decision" dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited. 36 Simply
dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the
salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.
In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in order to promote a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. 37 The rules can be suspended on
the following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. 38
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities committed by the trial court
judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after
respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo;
(2) DIRECT Judge
Pampilo
to
determine
within
forty-eight
(48)
hours
from
his
receipt
of
this Resolutionwhether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and
its attached affidavits.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this Resolution on Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr.
of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for his proper guidance together with a WARNING that
further deviation or improvisation from the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC shall be meted with severe
consequences.
SO ORDERED.
15. CONSUELO V. CALO, doing business under the trade name CVC Lumber Industries, assisted by
MARCOS M. CALO, vs
AJAX INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED
G.R. No. L-22485 March 13, 1968
FACTS:
Calo ordered from Ajax International 1,200 ft. of John Shaw wire rope at P2.85 per foot. A Charge
Order No. 37071, was issued for P3,420.00
Calo alleged that when the rope was delivered, it was found shortof 300ft. She then wrote 2 letters to
Ajax asking for completion of delivery or account adjustment.
Adolfo Benavides who claimed to have acquired outstanding credit account of Calo from Ajax Intl
filed in the Municipal Court of Manila a complaint. The Charge Order No. wasamong those included in
the assigned account.
Municipal Court Manila:
A judgement by default was entered and a writ of execution was issued again Calo subsequently.
Calo resorting to Petition for Certiorati, prohibition and mandamusgot a favorable decision and the
the judgment of default and writ of execution issued against her was remanded for further
proceedings.
Calo assisted by husband then filed a complaint against Ajax in theCFI of Agusan
Ajax instead of filing an answer moved for the dismissal of the caseon the ground that the subject
matter on this case and the casebefore Municipal Court Manila are involved and intimately related.
CFI Agusan:
Sustained the motion and dismissed the case.
MR and NT but denied hence the present appeal.
Calo argues that, the dismissal of the latter case by the court a quo because of the pendency of Civil
Case in the municipal court of Manila is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in the latter
case.
ISSUE:
WON the second case filed by Calo in CFI Agusan is a compulsary counter-claim
RULING:
Calo's claim is not a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case filed before Municipal Court Manila for the
simple reason that the amount thereof exceeds the jurisdiction of the municipal court.
The rule that a compulsory counterclaim not set up is barred, when applied to the municipal court,
presupposes that the amount involved is within the said court's jurisdiction. Otherwise, as this Court had
already noted in Yu Lay v. Galmes we would come to the absurd situation where a claim must be filed with
the municipal court which it is prohibited from taking cognizance of, being beyond its jurisdiction.
Besides, the reason underlying the rule, which is to settle all related controversies in one sitting only,
does not obtain. For, even if the counterclaim in excess of the amount cognizable by the inferior court is set
up, the defendant cannot obtain positive relief. The Rules allow this only for the defendant to prevent plaintiff
from recovering from him. This means that should the court find both plaintiff's complaint and defendant's
counterclaim (for an amount exceeding said court's jurisdiction) meritorious, it will simply dismiss the
complaint on the ground that defendant has a bigger credit. Since defendant still has to institute a separate
action for the remaining balance of his counterclaim, the previous litigation did not really settle all related
controversies.
Plaintiff Calo's claim of P12,000.00 not being a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case before Municipal
Court Manila, it need not be filed there. The pendency then of said civil case could not be pleaded in
abatement of Civil Case before CFI Agusan Consequently, the lower court erred in dismissing plaintiff's
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded for
further proceedings. Costs against appellee Ajax International, Inc. So ordered.
16. INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Presiding Judge of Branch IX, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, C.F. SHARP, INC. and FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING & INSURANCE CO., INC.
G.R. No. 90530. October 7, 1992.
FACTS:
Petition for Review
Sharp inc.(Private Respondent) filed a complaint for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
against the Sec. of Transportation and Communications, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), E.
Razon, Inc., and the International Container Terminal Services Inc.,(ICTSI) the herein petitioner before
RTC Manila
RTC Manila issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting by Sharp of a bond issued by the
Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co. in the sum of P10M.
On the same day, ICTSI filed an answer with a compulsory counterclaim against Sharp for its
"unfounded and frivolous action." that as a consequence of the complaint and the writ of preliminary
injunction, it had suffered injuries which "if monetized (would) amount to more than P100M."
The issued writ of preliminary injunction was however nullified by this court (in a separate case)
finding Sharp Inc.is not a proper party to stop the negotiation and awarding of the contract for the
development, management and operation of the Container Terminal at the Port of Manila. Moreover,
the petition was premature because Sharp had not exhausted the administrative remedies open to it
from "the PPA, the Bidding Committee, and the Office of the President."
PPA, taking its cue from this decision, filed a motion to dismiss Sharps complaint and such motion
was adopted by CCTSI in theirmanifestation.
RTC Manila:
Judge Sandoval, dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim.
ICTSI filed an MR insofar as their counterclaim and gave noticeto FIBI (Bonding Co.) that it was
claiming damages against Sharpfor the revoked injunction.
MR Denied.
Upon appeal of dismissal,CA upheld the lower court on the following justifications:
CA
(1) Compulsory counterclaims for actual damages are not the claims recoverable against the bond.
(2) Petitioners manifestation adopting Philippine Ports Authoritys motion to dismiss did not contain any
reservation. Hence, Sec. 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court will not apply. The counterclaim for damages being
compulsory in nature, for which no filing fee has been paid, was correctly dismissed.
(3) Sec. 20 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that "such damages (recoverable against the
bond) may be awarded only upon application and after proper hearing, and shall be included in the final
judgment. The application must be filed before the trial . . ., with due notice to the attaching creditor and his
surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof.
The application contemplated in Sec. 20 is distinct and separate from the compulsory counterclaim asserted
in the answer.
(4) The filing in court of claim against the injunction bond, with copy thereof being furnished the surety, was
not sufficient notice to the latter of an application against it under this bond.
ISSUE:
WON The dismissal of the complaint upon petitioners motion necessarily entailed the dismissal of
the compulsory counterclaim.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners motion necessarily entailed the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim.
We have consistently held that a counterclaim is compulsory where: (1) it arises out of, or is
necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing partys
claim; (2) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction; and (3) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
Tested by these requirements, the petitioners counterclaim was clearly compulsory. The petitioner
itself so denominated it. There is no doubt that the same evidence needed to sustain it would also refute the
cause of action alleged in the private respondents complaint; in other words, the counterclaim would
succeed only if the complaint did not. It is obvious from the very nature of the counterclaim that it could not
remain pending for independent adjudication, that is, without adjudication by the court of the complaint itself
on which the counterclaim was based.
Rule 17, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 2. Dismissal by order of the court. Except as provided in the preceding section, an action
shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and
conditions as the court may deem proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the
service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the
defendants objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.
Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice.
The Court notes that, to begin with, the petitioner itself joined the PPA in moving for the dismissal of
the complaint; or put passively, it did not object to the dismissal of the private respondents complaint.
Secondly, the compulsory counterclaim was so interwined with the complaint that it could not remain
pending for independent adjudication by the court after the dismissal of the complaint which had provoked
the counterclaim in the first place. As a consequence, the dismissal of the complaint (on the petitioners own
motion) operated to also dismiss the counterclaim questioning that complaint.
The petitioner is correct in contending that the claim for damages caused by the wrongful issuance of
a preliminary injunction can be made in the form of a counterclaim. As we held in Raymundo v. Carpio:
It would seem that the proper practice to be followed in cases where it is desired to obtain damages
by reason of the wrongful issuance of an attachment in favor of plaintiff that an issue would be tendered on
the subject by the defendant in his answer in the main case. Such a tender would present the question
squarely in that court, and the parties having offered their evidence on the subject, the trial court could
dispose of it along with the principal action. It is not necessary that the defendant wait until it is determined
by a final decision in the main action that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in order to present the
question of his right to damages. All questions which are material to the main action or which are incidental
thereto but depending thereon should be presented and litigated at the same time with the main action, so
as to avoid the necessity of subsequent litigation and consequent loss of time and money.
However, there is no glossing away the fact that it was the petitioner itself that caused the dismissal
of its counterclaim when it not only did not object to, but actually moved for, the dismissal of the complaint.
The petitioner cannot undo that act. If it wanted the counterclaim to subsist, it should have objected to the
dismissal of the complaint or at least reserved its right to prosecute it, assuming this would still be possible.
It did neither of these. The petitioner now claims that there is no law requiring that reservation, but there is
no law presuming it either. The petitioner cannot simply say now that it intended all the time to preserve its
counterclaim when it knew that under Rule 17, Sec. 2 "if a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant
prior to the service upon him of a motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the
defendants objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the
Court."
The counterclaim was not permissive. A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of nor is it
necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing partys claim. It is not barred even if not set
up in the action. 3 The petitioners counterclaim was within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Most
importantly, it had no independent existence, being merely ancillary to the main action. 4 The petitioner
knew all this and did not object to the dismissal of the complaint. On the contrary, it actually moved to
dismiss that main action, and in so doing also moved, in effect, for the dismissal of its counterclaim.
RULE 6: KINDS OF PLEADINGS
17. Metals Engineering resources Oporation , v., CA and Plaridel Jose
GR No. 95631
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the decision of CA dismissing the special civil action
filed by herein petitioner.
Petitioner filed a case for annulment of an agreement to buy and sell, against private respondent.
Before the case to be heard, private respondent file a motion to expunge the complaint on the
ground that the petitioner did not specify the amount of damages sought, either in the body or in the prayer.
The court order the petitioner to amend their complaint by specifying the amount of damages. The petitioner
comply, however, the private respondent move for reconsideration on the order, stating that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction when the wrong docket fee was paid, hence the amended complaint did not vest
jurisdiction upon the court. Thus the motion to expunge was granted and trial court oder that the complaint
be expunged from the record. Subsequently, the respondent file a motion to set case for presentation of
evidence in support to their counteclaim.
In their opposition, petitioner averred that since respondent counterclaim is compulsory in nature
because it is necessary connected to the subject complaint which was dismissed, hence the compulsory
counteclaim can no longer remain pending for independent adjudication. Despite such argument presented
by petitioner, the court issued an order in favor of private respondent.
Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner elevated the case to CA by filing a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition. Such was denied by Ca on the ground that the said order is merely interlocutory in
nature and certiorari is not the proper remedy. Thus, this instant case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, can the counterclaim of private respondent proceed independently of the main
action?
RULING:
NO. Counterclaim presupposes the existence of claim against the party filing the counteclaim. When
there is no claim against counterclaimant, then counterclaim is improper and should be dismissed.
In this case the complaint filed by petitioner is dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for nonpayment of docket fees. By reason of said dismissal, it can be considered that, as if no claim was filed against
the private respondent, hence no leg to stand on. If the civil case is dismissed, so also the cunterclaim filed
therein.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reveresed and set aside.
18. Lualhati A. Cojuangco, V., Purification Villegas and the Presiding Judge, RTC Branch XVII
GR no. 76838
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Petitioner is the widow of Don Juan Cojuangco, the registered owner of the disputed parcel of land.
The latter file an ejectment case against herein respondent before MTC. However, Don Juan died during the
proceedings, thus, he was substituted by his wife and other relatives. The inferior court dismissed the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, citing that respondent has been an actual possessor of the land for no
longer than 60 years. Then, the private respondent file an adverse claim of ownership, thus transforming the
suit into accion publiciana, which is cognizable by CFI now RTC.
The
CFI/RTC
Malolos
branch
XV,
reversed the decion of inferior court and order the respondent to vacate the premises. The case was elevated
to CA and SC, and in both instances, upheld the right of petitioner. The petitioner went to RTC Branch XV and
filed a motion for execution of judgment which was later on granted. The respondent did not opposed the
order and instead asked for extension in order for her to move her personal property.
Subsequently, respondent filed a separate civil action against petitioner and sherrif, this case was
raffled to RTC branch XVII, which issued TRO enjoining petitioner and sherriff from enforcing the order. Thus,
this instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent can still legally institute separate civil action?
RULINGS:
NO. Under Rule 9 Sec. 4 of Rules of Court, a counterclaim or cross claim not set up shall be barred if it
arises out of or necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's or co-party's claim and it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Respondent claim to recover compensation fo improvements made on the land is essentially in the
nature of a counterclaim since it is woven with the fact of possession. Such claim for compensation should
have been presented as counterclaim in the ejectment suit. It deemed barred if not aised on time and the
party in error is precluded from setting up in a subsequent litigation.
Also, she failed to set up alternative defense and instead rely on the sole defense that she inherited
the land from her parents. The adjudication of the issue joined by the parties in the earlier case constitutes
res judicata, the theory being what is barred by prior judgment are not only the matters actually raised and
litigated upon, but also such other matters as could have been raised but not.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The respondent court is hereby ordered to dismiss the case.
19. Manuel C. Buncayao, V., Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation
GR no. 170483
FACTS:
Petition for Review assailing the decision of CA.
Manuel C. Buncayao, claimed to be one of the entreprenuers who introduced improvements in the
foreshore area of Calayab Beach. The petitioner and other entreprenuers formed themeselves into the
D'sierto Beach Resor Owners Association. The latter Association applied for a foreshore lease with the CENRO
and which subsequently granted. On the otherhand, the respondent also filed a foreshore application that
which cover the portion of lanf applied by the petitioner. The Association now want to apply for another lease
but DENR deny the application, on the ground that the portion of land they want to apply has already been
subject to the application of respondent. The Association appealed to Secretary of DENR but then again it
was denied.
Respondent invited the Association and discuss matters that would be beneficial to them. The said
meeting was mediated by Atty. Liza Marcos. They made a financial settlement to which all the member of
association agreed. Petitioner file an action for nullity of contract on the ground that his son who attended
the meeting has no authority to represent him and the deed was void and not binding upon him. In
respondent counteclaim, they alleged that petitioner's son's, attended the meeting on their own volition and
the weer able to talk through cellular phone. And also they indicate to their counteclaim that the want to
recover the land possess by petitioner.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and find the contract enforceable. Not satisfied with the
decision, he sought relief to Ca. The latter cout affirmed the decision of RTC and the counterclaimant raised
by the respondent were compulsory in nature, as they are connected with the transaction. Thus, this instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent claim is compulsory?
RULING:
YES. A compulsory counteclaim is any claim for money or relief which a defending party may have
against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarry connected with the same
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff complaint.
The criteria to determine whether the counteclaim is compulsory or permissive are as follows: .) are
issue of facts and law raised by the claim and counteclaim is largely the same?, B.) would res udicata bar a
subsequent suit on defendant's claim?, c.) will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's
claim as wel as defendant counterclaim?, d.) is there any logical relations between the claim and the
counteclaim?
In the case of petitioner the only issue in their complaint is whether Manuel Jr is authorized? And the
trial court is correct in ruling that petitioner could not have suffered any damage even if Manuel jr entered
into an agreement with respondent.
As for respondent, in their counteclaim they present 3 arguments; 1.) recovery of the money they've
given to Manuel Jr.; 2.) recovery of possession; 3.) damages. The first counteclaim was rendered moot and
academic with the isseance of order confirming the agreement of the parties to cancel. The third claim was
waived and renounces of the respondent.As for the second agument, recovery of possession, it is clear that it
will not be bared if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Respondent second argument
like what RTC and CA found that it is permissive counterclaim. It is capable to proceed independently of the
main case.
The rule in permissive counterclaim is that counterclaimant is bound to pay the persecribed dcket
fees. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at anytime, even on
appeal before this court. In this case, respondent did nt dispute the non-payment of docket fees and only
insisted that its claims were all compulsory counterclaims.
Wherefore, the assailed decision is hereby modify, this court dismiss the respondent counterclaim
without rejudice to filing a separate action against petitioner.
20. Pesane Animas Mongao and Benhur Mongao, V., Pryce Prooperties corporation
GR no. 156474
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Civil Procedure, assailing the decision of
CA which reversed the trial court's judgement on the pleadings.
The petitioner file before RTC a complaint for recission and damae against respondent. In their
complaint they alleged that petitioner and respondent executed a MOA, wherein the former agreed to sell a
parcel of land registered under her name to the latter. The respondent initially give an earnest money,
thereafter they offer to pay the balance of purchase price by issuing check in favor to petitioner and her
mother. However, the former rejected the same. The petitioner still demand to pay the balance solely t her
but respondent did not comply.
In respondent answer, they assert that they bought the land belonging to Pedro Animas, petitioners
father. They also admit the existence of MOA and their willingness to pay the balance purchase price to the
family not to the petitioner alone through check but it was rejected by the latter. So ,they deposit the said
check to the clerk of court and by way of compulsory counterclaim they prayed that petitioner be adjudge
liable for attorney's fee.
Petitioner moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the answer admitted the material
allegation of the complaint and therefore failed to tender an issue. Also the consignation was not valid for it
was not raffled to a particular branch. The RTC, rendered a decision rescinding the agreement and order the
respondent to execute a conveyance and order the petitioner to return the earnest money they received.
Aggrieved by the decision, respondent elevated the case to CA, and the latter court reversed the decision of
RTC, holding that there were actual issues raised in the answer. Thus this instant petition was filed by
petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, does answer prepared by respondent tender issue?
RULING:
NO. Sec 1 of Rule 19 of Rules of Court provides that when an answer fails to tender issue or otherwise
admits the material allegation of the adverse party;s pleadings, the court may on motion of that party direct
judgment of pleadings. If an answer does in fact specifically deny material averments of the complaint in the
manner indicated by Sec. 10 ( now Sec. 8) of Rule 8 and/or assert affirmative defenses in accordance with
sec. 4 and 5 of Rule 6, a judgment in the pleadings would not be proper, otherwise failure to tender issue,
judgment on the pleadings is proper.
In this case, the express terms of the MOA and the genuiness and due execution aer not denied, and
thus, clearly show that the contract of sale was entered by the petitioner alone and respondent. Respondent
corporation cannot assert affirmative defenses in order to resist petitioner's claim, for it clearly shows in the
complaint and answer that the former has committed breach of contractual obligation to Mongao. There
being no material allegation in the answer to resist petitioner's claim the trial court is correct in redering
judgment based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.
Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby granted. CA decision is hereby set aside.
21. Victorina (Victoria) Alice Lim Lazaro, V., Brewmaster International

GR 182770
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of CA, that grant the relief prayed for by the respondent.
Respondent is a marketing company engaged in selling and distributing beer and other products of
Asia Brewing, Inc., filed a complaint for sum of money against Prescillo lazaro and petitioner with MeTC of
Makati City.
Prescillo and petitioner filed an answer with counterclaim, denying any knowledge of obligation sued
upon and alleged that the purchaser was Total and not them. In the preliminary conference petitioner and
precillo did not appear before the inferior court.After due proceedings, despite the non-appearance of the
petitioner and Prescillo, the inferior court render a decision in favor to the former, holding that the
respondent failed to establish a preponderance of evidence that it was really the petitioner who received the
said goods.
Aggrieved by the said decision, they elevate the case to RTC, who in return affirmed in toto the
decision of inferior court. Not satisfied with the decision they sought relief to the CA, in which the same
reversed and set aside the decision of the METC and RTC, stating that the latter court should not rely only in
the invoices presented by the reposndent, what they did is contravene to the summary procedures.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, CA erred in the interpretation of SEC 6 of the revised rules of summary procedure
when it reversed the decision of RTC?
Whether or not, CA erred in giving relief to the private respondent despite the lack of cause of action
in its complaint against petitioner?
RULINGS:
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether,
admitting the facts alleged, the court may render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer of the petition or complaint.
The basic equirements under the rules of procedure is that a complaint must be in a plain, concise
and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiffs relies for his claim.
In this case, the complaint state a cause of action: the following allegation in the complaint
adequately make up a cause of action for collection of sum of money against petitioner; 1.) that petitioner
and her husband obtained beer and other products on credit from respondent; 2.) that they refused to pay
the said amount despite demand. And as correctly held by CA, the sales invoices are not actionable
documents and thus, this ruling.
Wherefore, the assailed decision of CA is hereby affirmed.
22. GSIS vs. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, GR No. 158090, Oct. 4, 2010
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
FACTS:
Respondent Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) was the registered owner of a residential lot
designated as Lot No. 3355, Ts-268, covered by TCT No. T-16035 of the Register of Deeds of Cotabato,
containing an area of 800 square meters and situated at Rizal Street, Mlang, Cotabato. On the said lot,
respondent built a residential/commercial building consisting of two (2) stories.
On March 7, 1968, Fernando and his wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured a loan from petitioner
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in the amount of P20,000.00, as evidenced by a promissory
note. Fernando and his wife likewise executed a real estate mortgage on the same date, mortgaging the
afore-stated property as security.
Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan with the GSIS. Hence, on January 20, 1973, the
mortgage covering the subject property was foreclosed, and on March 26, 1973, the same was sold at a
public auction where the petitioner was the only bidder in the amount of P36,283.00. For failure of Fernando
to redeem the said property within the designated period, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership on September 5, 1975. Consequently, TCT No. T-16035 was cancelled and TCT No. T-45874 was
issued in the name of petitioner.
On November 26, 1975, petitioner wrote a letter to Fernando, informing him of the consolidation of
title in its favor, and requesting payment of monthly rental in view of Fernandos continued occupancy of the
subject property. In reply, Fernando requested that he be allowed to repurchase the same through partial
payments. Negotiation as to the repurchase by Fernando of the subject property went on for several years,
but no agreement was reached between the parties.
On January 16, 1989, petitioner scheduled the subject property for public bidding. On the scheduled
date of bidding, Fernandos daughter, Jocelyn Caballero, submitted a bid in the amount of P350,000.00, while
Carmelita Mercantile TRADING Corporation (CMTC) submitted a bid in the amount of P450,000.00. Since
CMTC was the highest bidder, it was awarded the subject property. On May 16, 1989, the Board of Trustees of
the GSIS issued Resolution No. 199 confirming the award of the subject property to CMTC for a total
consideration of P450,000.00. Thereafter, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between petitioner and
CMTC on July 27, 1989, transferring the subject property to CMTC. Consequently, TCT No. T-45874 in the
name of GSIS was cancelled, and TCT No. T-76183 was issued in the name of CMTC.
Due to the foregoing, Fernando, represented by his daughter and attorney-in-fact, Jocelyn Caballero,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint3 against CMTC, the GSIS and its
responsible officers, and the Register of Deeds of Kidapawan, Cotabato. Fernando prayed, among others, that
judgment be rendered: declaring GSIS Board of Trustees Resolution No. 199, dated May 16, 1989, null and
void; declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner and CMTC null and void ab initio; declaring TCT
No. 76183 of the Register of Deeds of Kidapawan, Cotabato, likewise, null and void ab initio; declaring the bid
made by
Fernando in the amount of P350,000.00 for the repurchase of his property as the winning bid;
and ordering petitioner to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of
Fernando. He also prayed for payment of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.
In his complaint, Fernando alleged that there were irregularities in the conduct of the bidding. CMTC
misrepresented itself to be wholly owned by Filipino citizens. It misrepresented its working capital. Its
representative Carmelita Ang Hao had no prior authority from its board of directors in an appropriate board
resolution to participate in the bidding. The corporation is not authorized to acquire real estate or invest its
FUNDS for purposes other than its primary purpose. Fernando further alleged that the GSIS allowed CMTC to
bid despite knowledge that said corporation has no authority to do so. The GSIS also disregarded Fernandos
prior right to buy back his family home and lot in violation of the laws. The Register of Deeds of Cotabato
acted with abuse of power and authority when it issued the TCT in favor of CMTC without requiring the CMTC
to submit its supporting papers as required by the law.
Petitioner and its officers filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim.4 The GSIS
alleged that Fernando lost his right of redemption. He was given the chance to repurchase the property;
however, he did not avail of such option compelling the GSIS to dispose of the property by public bidding as
mandated by law. There is also no prior right to buy back that can be exercised by Fernando. Further, it
averred that the articles of incorporation and other papers of CMTC were all in order. In its counterclaim,
petitioner alleged that Fernando owed petitioner the sum of P130,365.81, representing back rentals,
including additional interests from January 1973 to February 1987, and the additional amount of
P249,800.00, excluding applicable interests, representing rentals Fernando unlawfully collected from
Carmelita Ang Hao from January 1973 to February 1988.
After trial, the RTC, in its Decision5 dated September 27, 1994, ruled in favor of petitioner and
dismissed the complaint. In the same decision, the trial court granted petitioners counterclaim and directed
Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of P249,800.00.
Fernando filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated March
27, 1995.
Aggrieved by the Decision, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal.6 The CA, in its Decision dated December 17,
2002, affirmed the decision of the RTC with the modification that the portion of the judgment ordering
Fernando to pay rentals in the amount of P249,800.00, in favor of petitioner, be deleted. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied.
ISSUE:
Going now to the first assigned error, petitioner submits that its counterclaim for the rentals collected by
Fernando from the CMTC is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the original action of Fernando
against petitioner for annulment of bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. 76183. Respondents, on the
other hand, alleged that petitioners counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket
fees results into the dismissal of its claim.
HELD:
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests:
(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res
judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will
substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendants counterclaim?
And (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four
questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the
counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.13 This, petitioner did not do, because it asserted
that its claim for the collection of rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to
pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The judgment
rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals which he collected from
CMTC, is considered null and void.
In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag,17 the Court, in interpreting the third rule laid down in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. V. Judge Asuncion regarding awards of claims not specified in the pleading, held that
the same refers only to damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading as to which the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any
pleading should be specified.
While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or
corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such
damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination,
and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not
specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages
that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the
claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
Due to the non-payment of docket fees on petitioners counterclaim, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over it and, thus, there is no need to discuss the second issue raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and the Resolution, dated December 17, 2002 and April
29, 2003, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 49300, are AFFIRMED.
23. Agana vs. Lagman, GR No. 139018, April 11, 2005
Petition for certiorari (Rule 65) seeks to reverse the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77,
Malolos, Bulacan.
FACTS:
On 18 March 1996, petitioner filed a Complaint for annulment of title with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction against respondent. Petitioner claims that as the sole heir of one Teodorico Cruz, she is
the sole owner of a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3907. Petitioner further claims that the
lot was fraudulently sold to Eugenio Lopez, Jr. who later on transferred the lot to respondent. The case was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Malolos, Bulacan presided by Judge Aurora Santiago-Lagman
and docketed as Civil Case No. 210-M-96.
Respondent seasonably filed its Answer with compulsory counterclaim. Petitioner moved to dismiss
respondents counterclaim for lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping.
In an Order dated 11 March 1999, the trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss respondents
counterclaim. The trial court reasoned that respondents counterclaim is compulsory and therefore excluded
from the coverage of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved that the trial court reconsider
its Order invoking the mandatory nature of a certificate of non-forum shopping under Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94.2 On 25 May 1999, the trial court reversed its 11 March 1999 Order and
dismissed respondents counterclaim for lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping.
Respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that Administrative Circular No. 0494 does not apply to compulsory counterclaims following the ruling in Santo Tomas University Hospital v.
Surla.3 On 4 June 1999, the trial court again reversed itself and recalled its Order dismissing respondents
counterclaim.
Petitioner now comes before this Court through Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS
RESPONDENTS COUNTERCLAIM?
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
Santo Tomas clarified the scope of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 with respect to counterclaims.
The Court pointed out that this circular is intended primarily to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient
application of a party asserting a claim for relief.
The
distinction
between
compulsory
and
permissive counterclaim is vital in the application of the circular.

It should not be too difficult, the foregoing rationale of the circular aptly taken, to sustain the view
that the circular in question has not, in fact, been contemplated to include a kind of claim which, by its very
nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as deriving its substantive and jurisdictional
support therefrom, can only be appropriately pleaded in the answer and not remain outstanding for
independent resolution except by the court where the main case pends. Prescinding from the foregoing, the
proviso in the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, i.e., that the
violation of the anti-forum shopping rule shall not be curable by mere amendment xxx but shall be cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, being predicated on the applicability of the need for a
certification against forum-shopping, obviously does not include a claim which cannot be independently set
up.
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 does not apply to compulsory counterclaims. The circular applies
to initiatory and similar pleadings. A compulsory counterclaim set up in the answer is not an initiatory or
similar pleading. The initiatory pleading is the plaintiffs complaint. A respondent has no choice but to raise
a compulsory counterclaim the moment the plaintiff files the complaint.
Petitioner argues, however, that the Courts rulings in Santo Tomas and Ponciano are contrary to the
mandate of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and other procedural laws.6
Petitioner is mistaken.
The Constitution expressly bestows on this Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.7 Procedural matters are within the sole jurisdiction of this
Court to prescribe.
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is an issuance of this Court. It covers a matter of
procedure. Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is not an enactment of the Legislature.
This Court has the
exclusive jurisdiction to interpret, amend or revise the rules it promulgates, as long as the rules do not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
This is precisely the purpose of Santo Tomas as far as
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is concerned.

It is clear that the counterclaim set up by respondent arises from the filing of plaintiffs complaint.
The counterclaim is so intertwined with the main case that it is incapable of proceeding independently. The
counterclaim will require a re-litigation of the same evidence if the counterclaim is allowed to proceed in a
separate action. Even petitioner recognizes that respondents counterclaim is compulsory.10 A compulsory
counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping because a compulsory counterclaim is not
an initiatory pleading.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 77, Malolos Bulacan, dated 4 June 1999 recalling the Order dated 25 May 1999 which
dismissed the compulsory counterclaim of respondent B. Serrano Enterprises, Inc.
24. PHILTRANCO Service Ent. vs. CA, GR No. 161909, April 25, 2012
An action for breach of contract of carriage commenced by a passenger against his common carrier,
the plaintiff can recover damages from a third-party defendant brought into the suit by the common carrier
upon a claim based on tort or quasi-delict.
FACTS:
Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco) appeals the affirmance with modifications by the
Court of Appeals (CA) of the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) awarding moral, actual and temperate
damages, as well as attorneys fees and costs of suit, to respondent Felix Paras (Paras), and temperate
damages to respondent Inland Trailways, Inc. (Inland), respectively the plaintiff and the defendant/third-party
plaintiff in this action for breach of contract of carriage, upon a finding that the negligence of the petitioner
and its driver had caused the serious physical injuries Paras sustained and the material damage Inlands bus
suffered in a vehicular accident.
Plaintiff-appellant [respondent] Felix Paras (Paras for brevity), who hails from Cainta, Rizal is engaged in the
buy and sell of fish products. Sometime on 08 February 1987, on his way home to Manila from Bicol Region,
he boarded a bus with Body No. 101 and Plate No. EVE 508, owned and operated by Inland Trailways, Inc.
(Inland for brevity) and driven by its driver Calvin Coner (Coner for brevity).
At approximately 3:50 oclock in the morning of 09 February 1987, while the said bus was travelling
along Maharlika Highway, Tiaong, Quezon, it was bumped at the rear by another bus with Plate No. EVB 259,
owned and operated by Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco for brevity). As a result of the strong
and violent impact, the Inland bus was pushed forward and smashed into a cargo truck parked along the
outer right portion of the highway and the shoulder thereof. Consequently, the said accident bought
considerable damage to the vehicles involved and caused physical injuries to the passengers and crew of the
two buses, including the death of Coner who was the driver of the Inland Bus at the time of the incident.
Paras was not spared from the pernicious effects of the accident. After an emergency treatment at
the San Pablo Medical Center, San Pablo City, Laguna, Paras was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital.
At the latter hospital, he was found and diagnosed by Dr. Antonio Tanchuling, Jr. to be affected with the
following injuries: a) contusion/hematoma; b) dislocation of hip upon fracture of the fibula on the right leg; c)
fractured small bone on the right leg; and d) close fracture on the tibial plateau of the left leg. On 04 March
1987 and 15 April 1987, Paras underwent two (2) operations affecting the fractured portions of his body.
Unable to obtain sufficient financial assistance from Inland for the costs of his operations,
hospitalization, doctors fees and other miscellaneous expenses, on 31 July 1989, Paras filed a complaint for
damages based on breach of contract of carriage against Inland.
In its answer, defendant Inland denied responsibility, by alleging, among others, that its driver Coner
had observed an utmost and extraordinary care and diligence to ensure the safety of its passengers. In
support of its disclaimer of responsibility, Inland invoked the Police Investigation Report which established the
fact that the Philtranco bus driver of [sic] Apolinar Miralles was the one which violently bumped the rear
portion of the Inland bus, and therefore, the direct and proximate cause of Paras injuries.
In its answer, defendant Inland denied responsibility, by alleging, among others, that its driver Coner
had observed an utmost and extraordinary care and diligence to ensure the safety of its passengers. In
support of its disclaimer of responsibility, Inland invoked the Police Investigation Report which established the
fact that the Philtranco bus driver of [sic] Apolinar Miralles was the one which violently bumped the rear
portion of the Inland bus, and therefore, the direct and proximate cause of Paras injuries.
On 02 March 1990, upon leave of court, Inland filed a third-party complaint against Philtranco and
Apolinar Miralles (Third Party defendants). In this third-party complaint, Inland, sought for exoneration of its
liabilities to Paras, asserting that the latters cause of action should be directed against Philtranco
considering that the accident was caused by Miralles lack of care, negligence and reckless imprudence.
After trial, the RTC (Branch 71) in Antipolo, Rizal rendered its judgment on July 18, 1997,
WHEREFORE, third-party defendant Philtranco and Apolinar Miralles are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff jointly
and severally;
All the parties appealed to the CA on different grounds.
On September 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision; WHEREFORE, in consideration of the
foregoing premises, the assailed decision dated 18 July 19(9)7 is perforce affirmed. The CA agreed with the
RTCs finding that no trace of negligence at the time of the accident was attributable to Inlands driver,
rendering Inland not guilty of breach of contract of carriage; that faulty brakes had caused Philtrancos bus to
forcefully bump Inlands bus from behind, making it hit the rear portion of a parked cargo truck; that the
impact had resulted in considerable material damage to the three vehicles; and that Paras and others had
sustained various physical injuries.
ISSUE:
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioner submits that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in awarding moral damages to Paras despite the fact that the complaint had
been anchored on breach of contract of carriage; and that the CA committed a reversible error in substituting
its own judgment by motu proprio awarding temperate damages of P250,000.00 to Inland and P50,000.00 to
Paras despite the clear fact that temperate damages were not raised on appeal by Paras and Inland.
HELD:
The appeal lacks merit.
The Court does not disturb the unanimous findings by the CA and the RTC on the negligence of
Philtranco and its driver being the direct cause of the physical injuries of Paras and the material damage of
Inland.
Impleading Philtranco and its driver through the third-party complaint filed on March 2, 1990 was correct. The
device of the third-party action, also known as impleader, was in accord with Section 12, Rule 6 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the rule then applicable, viz:
Section 12. Third-party complaint. A third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may,
with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponents claim.
Section 12 of Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes a defendant to bring into a lawsuit any
person "not a party to the action . . . for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in respect of
his opponent's claim." From its explicit language it does not compel the defendant to bring the third-parties
into the litigation, rather it simply permits the inclusion of anyone who meets the standard set forth in the
rule. The secondary or derivative liability of the third-party is central whether the basis is indemnity,
subrogation, contribution, express or implied warranty or some other theory. The impleader of new parties
under this rule is proper only when a right to relief exists under the applicable substantive law. This rule is
merely a procedural mechanism, and cannot be utilized unless there is some substantive basis under
applicable law.
The provision in the rule that, The third-party defendant may assert any defense which the thirdparty plaintiff may assert to the plaintiffs claim, applies to the other subject, namely, the alleged liability of
third party defendant. The next sentence in the rule, The third-party defendant is bound by the adjudication
of the third party plaintiffs liability to the plaintiff, as well as of his own to the plaintiff or to the third-party
plaintiff applies to both subjects. If third party is brought in as liable only to defendant and judgment is
rendered adjudicating plaintiff's right to recover against defendant and defendants rights to recover against
third party, he is bound by both adjudications.That part of the sentence refers to the second subject. If third
party is brought in as liable to plaintiff, then third party is bound by the adjudication as between him and
plaintiff. That refers to the first subject. If third party is brought in as liable to plaintiff and also over to
defendant, then third party is bound by both adjudications. xxx
Under this Rule, a person not a party to an action may be impleaded by the defendant either (a) on
an allegation of liability to the latter; (b) on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff-; or, (c) both (a) and
(b). The situation in (a) is covered by the phrase "for contribution, indemnity or subrogation;" while (b) and
(c) are subsumed under the catch all "or any other relief, in respect of his opponents claim."
The case at bar is one in which the third party defendants are brought into the action as directly
liable to the plaintiffs upon the allegation that "the primary and immediate cause as shown by the police
investigation of said vehicular collision between (sic) the above-mentioned three vehicles was the
recklessness and negligence and lack of imprudence (sic) of the third-party defendant Virgilio (should be
Leonardo) Esguerra y Ledesma then driver of the passenger bus." The effects are that "plaintiff and third
party are at issue as to their rights respecting the claim" and "the third party is bound by the adjudication as
between him and plaintiff." It is not indispensable in the premises that the defendant be first adjudged liable
to plaintiff before the third-party defendant may be held liable to the plaintiff, as precisely, the theory of
defendant is that it is the third party defendant, and not he, who is directly liable to plaintiff. The situation
contemplated by appellants would properly pertain to situation (a) above wherein the third party defendant
is being sued for contribution, indemnity or subrogation, or simply stated, for a defendant's "remedy over".
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
September 25, 2002, by ordering PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. and APOLINAR MIRALLES to pay,
jointly and severally.
25. Singapore Airlines vs. CA, GR 107356, March 31, 1995
FACTS:
Sancho Rayos was an overseas contract worker who had a renewed contract with the Arabian
American Oil Company (Aramco) for the period covering April 16, 1980, to April 15, 1981. As part of Aramcos
policy, its employees returning to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia from Manila are allowed to claim reimbursement for
amounts paid for excess baggage of up to 50 kilograms, as long as it is properly supported by receipt. On
April 1980, Rayos took a Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight to report for his new assignment, with a 50-kilogram
excess baggage for which he paid P4,147.50. Aramco reimbursed said. Amount upon presentation of the
excess baggage ticket.
In December 1980, Rayos learned that he was one of several employees being investigated by
Aramco for fraudulent claims. He immediately asked his wife Beatriz in Manila to seek a written confirmation
from SIA that he indeed paid for an excess baggage of 50 kilograms. On December 10, 1980, SIAs manager,
Johnny Khoo, notified Beatriz of their inability to issue the certification requested because their records
showed that only three kilograms were entered as excess and accordingly charged. SIA issued the
certification requested by the spouses Rayos only on April 8, 1981, after its investigation of the anomaly and
after Beatriz, assisted by a lawyer, threatened it with a lawsuit. On April 14, 1981, Aramco gave Rayos his
travel documents without a return visa. His employment contract was not renewed.
On August 5, 1981, the spouses Rayos, convinced that SIA was responsible for the non-renewal of
Rayos employment contract with Aramco, sued it for damages. SIA claimed that it was not liable to the
Rayoses because the tampering was committed by its handling agent, Philippine Airlines (PAL). It then filed a
third-party complaint against PAL. PAL, in turn, countered that its personnel did not collect any charges for
excess baggage; that it had no participation in the tampering of any excess baggage ticket; and that if any
tampering was made, it was done by SIAs personnel.
Judge Jesus O. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30, rendered judgment on September 9,
1988, in favor of the plaintiffs; The defendants counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT, the third-party defendant PAL is ordered to pay defendant and
third-party plaintiff SIA whatever the latter has paid the plaintiffs.
In so ruling, the court a quo concluded that the excess baggage ticket of Rayos was tampered with by
the employees of PAL and that the fraud was the direct and proximate cause of the non-renewal of Rayos
contract with Aramco.
All parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. SIAs appeal was dismissed for non-payment of docket fees,
which dismissal was eventually sustained by this Court. The Rayos spouses withdrew their appeal when SIA
satisfied the judgment totaling P802,435.34.
In its appeal, PAL claimed that the spouses Rayos had no valid claim against SIA because it was the
inefficiency of Rayos which led to the non-renewal of his contract with Aramco, and not the alleged
tampering of his excess bagged ticket On the other hand, SIA argued that the only issue in the said appeal is
whether or not it was entitled to reimbursement from PAL, citing the case of Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company of the Philippines v. Tempongko.
The appellate court disagreed with SIAs contention that PAL could no longer raise the issue of SIAs
liability to the Rayoses and opined that SIAs answer to the complaint should inure to the benefit of PAL, and
the latter may challenge the lower courts findings against SIA in favor of plaintiffs-appellees (the Rayos
spouses) for the purpose of defeating SIAs claim against it, and not for the purpose of altering in any way
the executed judgment against SIA. In its answer to the main complaint, SIA set up the defense that the
excess baggage ticket was indeed tampered with but it was committed by PALs personnel. On September
21, 1992, the appellate court granted PALs appeal and absolved it from any liability to SIA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PAL can validly assail for the first time on appeal the trial courts decision sustaining
the validity of plaintiffs complaint against SIA if PAL did not raise this issue in the lower court. It added that
the appellate court should have restricted its ruling on the right of SIA to seek reimbursement from PAL, as
this was the only issue raised by SIA in its third-party complaint against PAL?
HELD:
The instant appeal is impressed with merit.
The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device whereby a third party who is neither a
party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of
court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right
for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiffs claim. The third-party
complaint is actually independent of and separate and distinct from the plaintiffs complaint. . . . When leave
to file the third-party complaint is properly granted, the Court renders in effect two judgments in the same
case, one on the plaintiffs complaint and the other on the third-party complaint. When he finds favorably on
both complaints, as in this case, he renders judgment on the principal complaint in favor of plaintiff against
defendant and renders another judgment on the third-party complaint in favor of defendant as third-party
plaintiff, ordering the third-party defendant to reimburse the defendant whatever amount said defendant is
ordered to pay plaintiff in the case. Failure of any of said parties in such a case to appeal the judgment as
against him makes such judgment final and 38ortuous. By the same token, an appeal by one party from such
judgment does not inure to the benefit of the other party who has not appealed nor can it be deemed to be
an appeal of such other party from the judgment against him.
The appellate court was in error when it opined that SIAs answer inured to the benefit of PAL for the
simple reason that the complaint and the third-party complaint are actually two separate cases involving the
same set of facts which is allowed by the court to be resolved in a single proceeding only to avoid a
multiplicity of actions. Such a proceeding obviates the need of trying two cases, receiving the same or similar
evidence for both, and enforcing separate judgments therefor. This situation is not, as claimed by the
appellate court, analogous to a case where there are several defendants against whom a complaint is filed
stating a common cause of action, where the answer of some of the defendants inures to the benefit of those
who did not file an answer. While such a complaint speaks of a single suit, a third-party complaint involves an
action separate and distinct from, although related to the main complaint.
SIA was informed of the anomaly in December 1980 but only issued the certification four months later or,
more specifically, on April 8, 1981, a few days before the expiration of Rayos contract. Surely, the
investigation conducted by SIA could not have lasted for four months as the information needed by the
Rayoses could easily be verified by comparing the duplicate excess baggage tickets which they and their
handling agent, PAL, kept the record purposes. The fact that the Rayos spouses had to be assisted by counsel
who threatened to file a damage suit against SIA if the certification they urgently needed was not
immediately issued only strengthens the suspicion that SIA was not dealing with them in utmost good faith.
The effect of SIAs mishandling of Beatriz Rayos request became instantly apparent when her husbands
contract was not renewed in spite of his performance which was constantly highly regarded by the
manager of Aramcos equipment services department.
The non-renewal of Rayos employment contract was the natural and probable consequence of the
separate 39ortuous acts of SIA and PAL. Under mandate of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, Rayos is entitled to
be compensated for such damages. Inasmuch as the responsibility of two or more persons, or tort-feasors,
liable for a quasi-delict is joint and several, 3 and the SHARING as between such solidary debtors is pro-rata,
4 it is but logical, fair, and equitable to require PAL to contribute to the amount awarded to the Rayos
spouses and already paid by SIA, instead of totally indemnifying the latter.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 20488 dated September 21,
1992, is hereby REVERSED and a new one is entered ordering private respondent Philippine Airlines to pay,
by way of contribution, petitioner Singapore Airlines one-half (1/2) of the amount it actually paid to Sancho
and Beatriz Rayos in satisfaction of the judgment in Civil Case No. 142252, dated September 9, 1988.
RULE 7 PARTS OF A PLEADING
26. Quimpo vs. Dela Victoria, GR L 31822, July 31, 1972
FACTS:
Petition to review the following orders of the Court Of First Instance of Davao, 16 th Judicial District,
Branch 11, in its Civil Case No. 6473, entitled Catalino dela Victoria, et al. vs. Jose Salcedo Quimpo: order of
29 July 1969 denying defendant-petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint for forcible-entry for lack of
merit, and granting the writ of immediate execution of the City Court decision of 16 January 1969; order of 16
August 1969, denying defendant-petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof; and order of 12 November
1969 dismissing the defendant-petitioners appeal from the aforesaid judgment of the City Court.
On 2 May 1968, plaintiffs-respondents filed a complaint against defendant-petitioner with the Court
of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 6005, for quieting of title and recovery
of possession with damages. 4
On 28 June 1968, plaintiffs-respondents filed another case against defendant-petitioner with the City
Court of Davao City (Civil Case No. 1299-B) for forcible entry over the same parcel of land, subject-matter of
Civil Case No. 6005, supra. Plaintiffs-respondents prayed in the later case for the court to order defendantpetitioner
to vacate the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the former, and ordering defendant
to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P500.00 a month as rental and the same to begin from the later part of
March, 1968 until possession thereof shall be delivered to the plaintiffs, and the amount of P500.00 as
attorneys fees.
In a motion to dismiss dated 13 July 1968, 6 defendant-petitioner sought the dismissal of the
complaint for forcible entry alleging the pendency of Civil Case No. 6005; but the City Court, in its order of 29
November 1968, denied the said motion for the reason that there is no identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for and for the further reason that it does not appear that any judgment which would be rendered on
the other action will amount to res 40djudicate in the herein case. 7 The same court order set the case for
hearing on 12 December 1968.
On 12 December 1968, defendant-petitioner was declared in default for failure to file his answer to
the forcible entry case and the City Court set the reception of plaintiffs-respondents evidence for the
following day.
Defendant-petitioner then moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order of 29 November 1968
denying his motion to dismiss the complaint for forcible entry, and also the decision of 16 January 1969.
However, his motion was denied in the City Court order of 4 March 1969.
Defendant-petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance and it was docketed therein as Civil Case
No. 6470. In a motion dated 5 July 1969, defendant-petitioner reiterated his arguments for the dismissal of
the complaint for forcible entry as stated in his earlier motion in the City Court. On 29 July 1969, the court a
quo denied the motion to dismiss of 5 July 1969 for lack of merit, and at the same time granted the
immediate execution of the City Court judgment. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, and his
appeal dismissed, defendant filed the herein petition;
ISSUE:
1. Did not acquire jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry, the verification of the corresponding
complaint being void;
2. Erred in not dismissing the complaint for forcible entry filed a month after an action for recovery of
possession and quieting of title had been filed by respondents against petitioner over the same cause
of action, the same subject matter and the same parties;
HELD:
Section 6, Rule 7, Revised Rules of Court provides:
Verification. A pleading is verified only by an affidavit stating that the person verifying has read the
pleading and that the allegations thereof are true of his own knowledge.
Verification based on information and belief, or upon knowledge, information and belief shall be
deemed insufficient.
Catalino dela Victoria, one of the plaintiffs (now respondents) clearly referred to the allegations in the
complaint as having been read by him. However, while he stated that they are true and correct, he omitted
to state that said conclusion was reached of his own knowledge. The latter detail, however, is logically
inferable since affiant was a party and it does not appear that he was verifying upon information and belief. If
petitioner entertained doubt about the true character of the verification, he should have asked that it be
made more definite.
Moreover, even if We should find the verification insufficient, that insufficiency would not render the
complaint for forcible entry, or the whole proceedings in the court below, void. This Court already held in
several decisions that the requirement regarding verification is not jurisdictional, but merely formal.
What is important is that the object of the Rule, to insure good faith and veracity in the material
averments of the petition, be complied with, so that the court may properly act on the case. Here, the
petition has complied with the requirement in form and in substance.
Thus, while it is true that Section 1, Rule 70, of the Revised Rules of Court requires the verification of
the complaint for forcible entry, the insufficiency of the same, or its being defective, is not fatal to the
jurisdiction of the City Court or that of the court a quo to which the case was later appealed.
With respect to the second assignment of error, one the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule
16 of the Revised Rules of Court is the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same
cause. 13
In order that this ground may be availed of there must be, between the action under consideration
and the other action, (1) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions;
(2) identity rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the
identity on the two preceeding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the
other action will regardless which party is successful amount to res 41djudicate in the action under
consideration.
We cannot assent to the proposition that the motion to dismiss should have been granted by the
Municipal Court of origin, and sustained on appeal by the Court of First Instance, for the reason that the
question of ownership was necessarily involved in the action for forcible entry (not for unlawful detainer), as
is proved by the admitted pendency of the prior suit for quieting of title in the Court of First Instance. While
the fact that triggered both actions was appellant Quimpos forcible invasion of respondents titled property
in March of 1968, on the pretext that the part of respondents land forcibly entered and occupied by him was
part of the area covered by his pasture permit from the Bureau of Forestry, still the causes of action in the
two cases are distinct from each other.
It is contended in the next assigned error that immediate execution of the City Court decision in the forcible
entry case should not have been granted pending a resolution of the issue of the pendency of another action
between the same parties over the same subject matter.
The contention is without merit. Section 8, Rule 70, of Revised Rules of Court not only authorizes but
also requires the immediate execution of a judgment in plaintiffs favor. The said provision, taken in relation
to that of section 10 of the same Rules, is mandatory, 15 the only exception being when the delay is due to
fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence. 16 The purpose of the law is to prevent further damages to
him caused by the loss of his possession. 17 However, defendant may stay execution (a) by perfecting his
appeal and filing a supersedeas bond; and (b) by depositing from time to time, with the Court First Instance,
during the pendency of the appeal, the amount or rents or the reasonable value of the use and occupation of
the property as fixed by the justice of peace or municipal court in its judgment.
The issues raised against the decision of the City Court of Davao being unmeritorious, as previously
shown, it becomes irrelevant to discuss the final question of whether defendant-petitioner can appeal the
judgment of the inferior court which declared him in default.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the orders appealed from, the same are hereby affirmed, with
costs against defendant-petitioner.
27. Sameer vs Santos
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of
the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
Private respondents Lord Nelson Santos, Danilo Balcita, Nicson Cruz, Pepito Manglicmot, and Allan
Aranes (Santos, et al.) were recruited by petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. (Sameer) as
aluminum products manufacturer operators for Ensure Company Ltd. of Taiwan (Ensure), under a one-year
employment contract with a basic monthly salary of NT$14,800.00.
Santos, et al. were deployed and were able to work for Ensure. However, they were repatriated even
prior to the expiration of their contracts.
Santos, et al. filed complaints against Sameer before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries, and unauthorized salary deductions.
Sameer filed a third party complaint against private respondent ASBT International Management
Service, Inc. (ASBT). It claimed that the latter should be liable for all the contractual obligations of Ensure
since Sameers accreditation was transferred to ASBT on June 9, 1997.
Labor Arbiter Ruled in Favor of the complainant
Sameer appealed to the NLRC alleging, among others, that the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse
of discretion in failing to decide the third-party complaint, to its damage and prejudice, insisting that it should
have been absolved of any and all liabilities pertaining to the claims of Santos, et al.
NLRC
SET ASIDE Labor Arbiterss Decision and a new one entered absolving SAMEER Overseas Placement
Agency, Inc. from its liabilities in view of the transfer of accreditation to ASBT Management Services, Inc. and
ordering the latter to pay
ASBT elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
Court of Appeals
CA denied due course and dismissed ASBTs petition on the ground that the attached Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by Mildred R. Santos as President of ASBT without any proof
of authority to sign for and bind ASBT in the proceedings
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petition and the Motion for Reconsideration should be considered unsigned
pleadings which produce no legal effect, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
RULING:
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides
SEC. 3. Signature and address.Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing
him, stating in either case his address which should not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such
deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for
delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or
alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly report to the court a change of his
address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied.)
Obviously, the rule allows the pleadings to be signed by either the party to the case or the counsel
representing that party.
In this case, ASBT, as petitioner, opted to sign its petition and its motion for
reconsideration in its own behalf, through its corporate president, Mildred R. Santos, who was duly authorized
by ASBTs Board of Directors to represent the company in prosecuting this case.
Therefore, the said
pleadings cannot be considered unsigned and without any legal effect.

28. Anderson vs. Ho
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Resolution of the CA.
FACTS:
On June 5, 2003, Anderson filed a Complaint for Ejectment against respondent Enrique Ho (Ho) before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. She alleged that through her mere tolerance, Ho is in
possession of her parcel of land at Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. As she was already in need of the said
property, Anderson served upon Ho a Demand Letter to Vacate but despite receipt thereof, Ho refused.
Because of this, Anderson prayed that the MeTC order Ho to vacate the Roosevelt property and pay her
damages and attorneys fees.
In his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, Ho denied that his occupation of the Roosevelt property
is through Andersons mere tolerance. He claimed that since Anderson is an American citizen, he managed
her affairs in the Philippines and administered her properties in Quezon City and Cebu.
Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
On June 25, 2004, the MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the case for lack of cause of action. It gave much
weight to the written document executed by Anderson wherein she gave her consent for Ho
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in its Decision10 of January 21, 2005 ruled as follows:
The evidence of the parties thus stands upon an equipoise. With the equiponderance of evidence, the Court
is inclined to consider the dismissal of the complaint as without prejudice depending on the outcome of the
determination in the proper forum whether or not the written document dated January 14, 1999 x x x was
falsified.
The RTC modifies the Decision dated June 25, 2004 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
by
dismissing the complaint without prejudice.

Ruling of the CA
Atty. Oliva able to file the Petition for Review but the certification against forum shopping attached thereto
was signed by him on Andersons behalf without any accompanying authority to do so.
The Court resolves to DISMISS herein Petition for Review as the certification against forum shopping was
executed not by the petitioner herself but by her counsel without attaching therewith any special authority to
sign on her behalf.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was valid certification against forum shopping
RULING:
The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the certificate of nonforum shopping is due to the fact that a "certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the
principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases
involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. Obviously, it is the petitioner, and not
always the counsel whose professional services have been retained for a particular case, who is in the best
position to know whether she actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case.
Per the above guidelines, however, if a petitioner is unable to sign a certification for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, she must execute an SPA designating her counsel of record to sign on her behalf. A certification
which had been signed by counsel without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause
for the dismissal of the petition.
Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the application of
the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.
The
liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally
true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly
and speedy administration of justice. Party litigants and their counsels are well advised to abide by rather
than flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.
Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED
29. Buan vs. Lopez
Facts:
Petitioners instituted in this Court a special civil action for prohibition to the end that respondent
Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., acting as Mayor of the City of Manila, be "perpetually prohibited from arbitrarily,
whimsically and capriciously revoking or cancelling ... their licenses or permits (as hawkers or street vendors)
and threatening the physical demolition of their respective business stalls in the places specified in such
licenses or permits. They allege that their licenses "were revoked or cancelled (by respondent Mayor) for
reasons unknown to them which is tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of laws.
It appears that on July 7, 1986 there was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Civil
Case No. 8636563, a special civil action of "prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Acting Manila City
Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr. It was filed by Samahang Kapatiran Sa Hanapbuhay Ng Bagong Lipunan, Inc."
(hereafter, simply "Samahan") composed, according to the petition, of "some 300 individual owners and
operators of separate business stalls ... mostly at the periphery immediately 0beyond the fence of the
Quiapo Church." The president of the Samahan is Rosalina Buan and its Press Relations Officer, Liza Ocampo.
9 Rosalina Buan and Liza Ocampo are two of the five petitioners in the case at bar,
The petition in Case No. 86-36563 is grounded on the same facts as those in the case at bar:
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners committed forum shopping
Ruling:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 Identity of parties,
or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as Identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the Identity on the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter
action pendant.
As already observed, there is between the action at bar and RTC Case No. 86-36563, an Identity as
regards parties, or interests represented, rights asserted and relief sought, as well as basis thereof, to a
degree sufficient to give rise to the ground for dismissal known as auter action pendant or lis pendens That
same Identity puts into operation the sanction Of twin dismissals just mentioned. The application of this
sanction will prevent any further delay in the settlement of the controversy which might ensue from attempts
to seek reconsideration of or to appeal from the Order of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 86-36563
promulgated on July 15, 1986, which dismissed the petition upon grounds which appear persuasive.
It would seem that after the filing by Rosalina Buan and Liza Ocampo (president and press relations
officer, respectively, of the Quiapo Church vendors' association known as the Samahan) of the petition in this
case, "for themselves and all others similarly situated as themselves" (i.e., the members of the Samahan;
who are vendors in the area of Quiapo Church) they came to the belated that in view of the pendency of the
Identical action filed by them in the Regional Trial Court (Case No. 86-36563), It is so out of the ordinary as to
require clear and convincing evidence of its actuality, which is lacking in this case. It is also belied by the fact
that Rosalina Buan and Liza Ocampo themselves were among those who verified the petition at bar before a
notary public. 18 And the claim is undermined by the misrepresentation in Buan's and Ocampo's "Joint
Affidavit of Withdrawal" that the status quo order in RTC Case No. 8636563 was still subsisting and the case
still pending trial 19 when in truth, the case had already been dismissed and the restraining order lifted by
Order of July 27, 1986
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit, and the Regional Trial Court is commanded to
dismiss Civil Case No. 86-36563 and to conduct no further proceedings in connection therewith save in
accordance with and in implementation of this Decision. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
30. Loquias vs. Office of the Ombudsman
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Resolution dated June 29, 1998 charging
herein petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
FACTS:
The antecedent facts are as follows: In a sworn complaint filed with the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao, private respondents Dr. Jose Pepito H. Dalogdog, Dr. Aurora Beatriz A. Romano, Maria Teresita C.
Abastar, Jessica S. Allan and Maria Teresa Aniversario charged herein petitioners Efren O. Loquias, Antonio V.
Din, Jr., Angelito I. Martinez II, Lovelyn J. Biador and Gregorio Faciol, Jr. with violation of Republic Act No. 3019
for their alleged failure to give the salary increases and benefits provided in Section 20 of the Magna Carta of
Public Health Workers (R.A. 7305) and Local Budget Circulars Nos. 54, 54-A, 56, 60 and 64 for the health
personnel of the local government of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur.
Public respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved on September 4, 1999 the Resolution
dated June 29, 1998 of Graft Investigation Officer II Jovito A. Coresis, Jr. of the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 14, 1999 of the Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao dated June 29, 1998 alleging that there is no probable cause in holding that they
violated Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Alleging that the order disapproving the dismissal of the case constituted denial of the motion for
reconsideration, petitioners filed the present petition assailing the Resolution dated June 29, 1998 and the
Memorandum dated June 11, 1999.
The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Solicitor General, alleges that the petition does not
comply with Section 5, Rule 7 as the Verification and the Certification on Non-Forum Shopping were signed
only by petitioner Antonio Din and not by all the petitioners and there is no showing that petitioner Din was
authorized by his co-petitioners to represent them in this case; that the petition raise factual issues; and that
the municipality had sufficient funds to grant the statutory salary increases and benefits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition complies with section 5 rule 7.
RULING:
At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of
the petitioners in the instant case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective. Section
5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that he has
not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court, etc. Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of
San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification. There is no showing that he was authorized by his
co-petitioners to represent the latter and to sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that
petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions
or claims filed or pending. We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict
observance by the rules.
The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires
personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure
to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the
policy of liberal construction.
The petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
31. Docena vs Lapesura
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the nullification
of the Court of Appeals Resolutions.
FACTS:
On June 1, 1977, private respondent Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of
land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed ownership
of the land based on occupation since time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case.
RTC
In a Decision dated November 24, 1989, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the
intervenor Abuda.
CA
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners
to vacate the land they have leased from the plaintiff-appellant [private respondent Casiano Hombria],
excluding the portion which the petitioners reclaimed from the sea and forms part of the shore, as shown in
the Commissioners Report, and to pay the plaintiff-appellant the agreed rental of P1.00 per year from the
date of the filing of the Complaint until they shall have actually vacated the premises.The Complaint in
Intervention of Abuda was dismissed.
RTC Judge
On May 22, 1995, private respondent Hombria filed a Motion for Execution of the above decision
which has already become final and executory. The motion was granted by the public respondent judge, and
a Writ of Execution was issued therefor.
However, the public respondent sheriff subsequently filed a
Manifestation requesting that he be clarified in the determination of that particular portion which is sought
to be excluded prior to the delivery of the land adjudged in favor of plaintiff Casiano Hombria in view of the
defects in the Commissioners Report and the Sketches attached thereto.
After requiring the parties to file their Comment on the sheriffs Manifestation, the public respondent judge,
in a Resolution dated August 30, 1996, held that xxx no attempt should be made to alter or modify the
decision of the Court of Appeals. 1998, the public respondent judge, in open court, granted the petitioners
until January 13, 1999 to file a Motion for Reconsideration.[12] On January 13, 1999, petitioners moved for an
extension of the period to file a motion for reconsideration until January 28, 1999.[13] The motion was finally
filed by the petitioners on January 27, 1999, but was denied by the trial court in an Order dated March 17,
1999.[14] A copy of the Order was received by the petitioners on May 4, 1999.
CA
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the Court of Appeals, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the Orders dated November 18, 1998
and March 17, 1999, and of the sheriff in issuing the alias Writ of Demolition. In a Resolution dated June 18,
1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the grounds that the petition was filed beyond the 60day period provided under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by
Bar Matter No. 803 effective September 1, 1998, and that the certification of non-forum shopping attached
thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was
denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated September 9, 1999.
ISSUE:
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
It has been our previous ruling that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the
petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient. In the case at bar,
however, we hold that the subject Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping signed by the petitioner Antonio
Docena alone should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the rules. There are only two
petitioners in this case and they are husband and wife. Their residence is the subject property alleged to be
conjugal in the instant verified petition. The Verification/Certification on Non-Forum Shopping attached to the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was signed only by the husband who certified, inter alia, that he and his
wife have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues raised in the petition in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency; that to the best of their knowledge no such action is pending
therein; and that he and his wife undertake to inform the Court within five (5) days from notice of any similar
action or proceeding which may have been filed.
Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the sole
administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may
defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife. Corollarily, the husband
alone may execute the necessary certificate of non-forum shopping to accompany the pleading.
More important, the signing petitioner here made the certification in his behalf and that of his wife.
The husband may reasonably be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife
of any action or claim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices and legal
processes involved in a legal proceeding involving real property. If anybody may repudiate the certification
or undertaking for having been incorrectly made, it is the wife who may conceivably do so.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Court of Appeals
Resolutions dated June 18, 1999 and September 9, 1999 are hereby SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
32. G.R. No. 150865
June 30, 2006
ART FUENTEBELLA, Park-in-Charge, and ROLLING HILLS MEMORIAL PARK, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
DARLICA CASTRO, Respondent.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review
Respondent Darlica Castro filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner Rolling
Hills Memorial park and its Park-in-Charge Art Fuentebella before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City. The complaint is based on the negligence and insults committed by the
petitioners when their funeral service was engaged by respondent for the burial of her husband.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the MTCC has no jurisdiction because the
amount of damages claimed is more than P200,000. Meanwhile, respondent filed a motion to withdraw
the complaint, which was granted by the MTCC.
Later on, respondent filed a similar complaint with the RTC of Negros Occidental with an
attachment of the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping required under Section 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the certification is false because respondent
had previously filed an identical complaint with the MTCC.
The RTC denied the said motion to dismiss for lack of merit and stated that while the requirement as
to the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless, the requirement is not to be interpreted
too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum shopping.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the motion to dismiss was not based on the
ground that respondent had filed two similar actions at the same time but rather on the submission by the
latter of a false certification.
RTC denied said motion and stated that the sanction provided by the said rule on the submission of a
false certification is not dismissal of the case but the same will be considered as an indirect contempt of
Court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal action that may be filed against the
party concerned.
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order.
CA dismissed the said petition and stated that the verification and the certification against forum
shopping was signed by a certain Lourdes Pomperada without any showing or indication that she is duly
authorized by the petitioners to sign for and in their behalf.
Petitioner Rolling Hills Memorial Park, Inc. filed a motion for reconsideration attaching thereto a
Secretarys Certificate signed by Monico A. Puentevella, Jr., Corporate Secretary of petitionercorporation,
affirming therein the authority of Lourdes A. Pomperada to file the aforementioned petition.
CA denied said motion and declared that Petitioners submitted a Secretarys Certificate showing the
authorization of Mrs. Lourdes Pomperada to represent the petitioner corporation. However, there is still no
showing that the said Mrs. Lourdes Pomperada is duly authorized to act for and in behalf of the other
petitioner.
Petitioners filed before the SC a petition for review arguing that (a) a board resolution or a secretarys
certificate is unnecessary to show proof that the one signing the petition or the verification and certification
against forum shopping has been duly authorized by petitioner company; and, (b) where there are two or
more petitioners, the one signing the petition need not append his authority to sign on behalf of the other
petitioners.
Petitioners opine that respondents failure to disclose that a similar case was earlier filed by her
before the MTCC but was later withdrawn for lack of jurisdiction constituted false certification. They contend
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not dismiss the petition for this reason.
ISSUES:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED ERRONEOUSLY IN DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI ON THE BASIS OF A NON-EXISTENT RULE; AND
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF,
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN REFUSING TO ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUND OF A FALSE CERTIFICATION.
HELD:
First Issue: NO! It is obligatory that the one signing the verification and certification
against forum shopping on behalf of the principal party or the other petitioners has the
authority to do the same.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall specify under oath
in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and, (c) if he should thereafter learn that the
same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or noncompliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice
to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly
constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.`
The above provision mandates that the petitioner or the principal party must execute the certification
against forum shopping. The reason for this is that the principal party has actual knowledge whether a
petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same issues. If, for any reason,
the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized.
This requirement is intended to apply to both natural and juridical persons as Supreme Court Circular
No. 28-91 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court do not make a distinction between natural and juridical
persons. Where the petitioner is a corporation, the certification against forum shopping should be signed by
its duly authorized director or representative.
Likewise, where there are several petitioners, it is insufficient that only one of them executes the
certification, absent a showing that he was so authorized by the others. That certification requires personal
knowledge and it cannot be presumed that the signatory knew that his co-petitioners had the same or similar
actions filed or pending.
Hence, a certification which had been signed without the proper authorization is
defective and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.
Second Issue: NO! An omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event
that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia, as in the present case, is not fatal as
to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils
sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not present.
Hence, in any event, the trial court correctly held that the submission of a false certification shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
sanctions. This is in accordance with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
33. SANTO TOMAS UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, petitioner vs. CESAR ANTONIO Y. SURLA and
EVANGELINE SURLA, respondents.
Can a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer be dismissed on the ground of a failure to
accompany it with a certificate of non-forum shopping? This question is the core issue presented for
resolution in the instant petition.
FACTS:
Respondent spouses filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Santo Tomas
University Hospital with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City predicated that their son while confined at
the said hospital for having been born prematurely had accidentally fallen from his incubator on possibly
causing serious harm on the child.
Petitioner hospital filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim asserting that
respondents still owed to it the amount of P82,632.10 representing hospital bills for Emmanuels confinement
at the hospital and making a claim for moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees, by reason of the
supposed unfounded and malicious suit filed against it.
Petitioner received a copy of respondents Reply to Counterclaim that sought the dismissal of petitioners
counterclaim for its non-compliance with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring that a
complaint and other initiatory pleadings, such as a counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourt, etc.) party
complaint, be accompanied with a certificate of non-forum shopping.
In its Rejoinder to respondents Reply to Counterclaim, petitioner contended that the subject circular
should be held to refer only to a permissive counterclaim, an initiatory pleading not arising out of, nor
necessarily connected with, the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim but not to a compulsory counterclaim
spawned by the filing of a complaint and so intertwined therewith and logically related thereto that it verily
could not stand for independent adjudication. Petitioner concluded that, since its counterclaim was
compulsory in nature, the subject circular did not perforce apply to it.
RTC dismissed the said counterclaim holding that Administrative Circulars No.-04-94 the counterclaim
does not distinguish whether the same should be permissive or compulsory, hence the said Circular covers
both kinds.
An Omnibus Motion was filed by the Petitioner on the dismissal of its compulsory counterclaim and
denial of Motion of Reconsideration.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court, was filed by the petitioner
before the CA espousing the view that Administrative Circular No. 04-94 should apply even to compulsory
counterclaims.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari contending that said AC04-09includes both
permissive or compulsory counterclaim. A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause
of action against the plaintiff in a case x x x, only this time it is the original defendant who becomes the
plaintiff. It stands on the same footing and is tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners compulsory counterclaim is properly dismissed.
HELD:
Partly meritorious.
The pertinent provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 provide:

The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the original
civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim third (fourth, etc.) party complaint or complaint-inintervention, petition, or application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief.
It bears stressing, once again, that the real office of Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on
01 April 1994, is to curb the malpractice commonly referred to also as forum-shopping. It is an act of a party
against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or
the other court would make a favorable disposition. The language of the circular distinctly suggests that it is
primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for
relief.
It should not be too difficult, the foregoing rationale of the circular aptly taken, to sustain the view that
the circular in question has not, in fact, been contemplated to include a kind of claim which, by
its very nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as deriving its substantive
and jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be appropriately pleaded in the answer and not
remain outstanding for independent resolution except by the court where the main case
pends. Prescinding from the foregoing, the provisio in the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure, i.e., that the violation of the anti-forum shopping rule shall not be curable by mere
amendment x x x but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, being predicated on the
applicability of the need for a certification against forum shopping, obviously does not include a claim
which cannot be independently set up.
Petitioner, nevertheless, is entitled to a mere partial relief. The so called counterclaim of petitioner
really consists of two segregative parts: (1) for unpaid hospital bills of respondents son, Emmanuel Surla, in
the total amount of P82,632.10; and (2) for damages, moral and exemplary, plus attorneys fees by reason of
the alleged malicious and unfounded suit filed against it. It is the second, not the first, claim that the Court
here refers to as not being initiatory in character and thereby not covered by the provisions of Administrative
Circular No. 04-94.
34. G.R. No. 158917
March 1, 2004
EVELYN T. PARADERO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALBERT B. ABRAGAN, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte,
Branch 4, Iligan City and VICTOR B. JARABA, respondents.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Respondent Victor B. Jaraba filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iligan City, Branch
I, an ejectment suit against petitioner Evelyn T. Paradero. . Petitioner failed to file an answer; hence,
respondent filed a Motion for Judgment pursuant to Rule 70, Section 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 5
MTCC rendered a decision in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner, among other things, to
vacate the subject land and restore physical possession to the respondent.
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City, while respondent moved for the
immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal. Since the records of the case were forwarded to the
RTC, private respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal with the latter court, which was granted.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or Lifting the Order and Fixing of the
Supersedeas Bond. At the hearing of the said motion, petitioner was asked to produce Supreme Court ruling
authorizing the RTC to fix and approve supersedeas bonds. Petitioner submitted a "Manifestation in
Compliance with the Order of the Honorable Court and Urgent Motion to Order the Clerk of Court to
Receive/Accept the Monthly Rental Deposit of P2,000.00."
Meanwhile, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and motion to fix the
supersedeas bond on the ground that petitioner failed to show any good cause sufficient for it to exercise its
discretion in her favor.
After
hearing,
the
RTC
granted
respondents
prayer
for
the
issuance
of
writ
of
demolition. Subsequently, , on March 19, 2003, it denied petitioners appeal and affirming in toto the decision
of the MTCC. Petitioner filed two motions for reconsideration of the Order and the decision of the RTC,
however, both were denied. Petitioners house was demolished on May 22, 2003.
Petitioner filed a petition for review dated June 6, 2003, with the Court of Appeals, challenging the affirmance
by the RTC of the MTCC decision as well as the propriety of the execution pending appeal. Petitioner likewise
prayed for damages for the demolition of her house.
On July 7, 2003, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that the trial court
gravely abused its discretion in granting the execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of demolition.
Respondent, on the other hand, prayed that the instant petition be dismissed because petitioner is guilty of
forum shopping.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner violated the rule against forum shopping.
HELD:
YES. There is forum shopping when, in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties,
rights or causes of action and relief sought. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis pendentia to
exist, the following requisites must be present:
1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both
actions;
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts;
3. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, is such that any judgment
that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount
to res judicata in the other case.
In the case at bar, the parties to the instant petition and in the one filed with the Court of Appeals are
identical. The rights asserted are the same, i.e., to maintain peaceful possession of the disputed lot pending
final adjudication of the case. Likewise, similar reliefs are prayed for to nullify the order of execution
pending appeal and the writ of demolition, such reliefs being founded on the same facts the ejectment
case filed with the trial court. A judgment in the present certiorari case on the validity of the order of
execution pending appeal and the writ of demolition will pre-empt and amount to res judicata on the petition
for review before the Court of Appeals, questioning, inter alia, the legality of the same order and writ with
prayer for an award of damages.
The March 12, 2003 writ of demolition and the March 19, 2003 decision of the RTC were received by
petitioner on March 22, 2003, while the actual demolition occurred on May 22, 2003. Thus, when she filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals on June 6, 2003, she questioned not only the merits of the March
19, 2003 decision but also the orders of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and
the issuance of a writ of demolition. It is clear therefore that a ruling of this Court on the very same issue of
the legality of the execution pending appeal and writ of demolition would undoubtedly constitute res
judicata on the identical issues pending with the Court of Appeals.
35. G.R. No. 182311
August 19, 2009
FIDEL O. CHUA and FILIDEN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, ATTY. ROMUALDO CELESTRA, ATTY. ANTONIO V. VIRAY,
ATTY. RAMON MIRANDA and ATTY. POMPEYO MAYNIGO, Respondents.
FACTS
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Chua is president of co-petitioner Filiden, a domestic corporation, engaged in the realty
business. Respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. is a duly licensed banking institution.
Petitioners obtained from respondent Metrobank several loans secured by a real estate mortgage
(REM) on parcels of land covered by TCTs and registered in petitioner Chuas name (subject properties).
Upon failure of the petitioners to settle their liabilities after lawful demand, respondent Metrobank
filed a verified Petition for Foreclosure. A Notice of Sale was issued by respondent Atty. Romualdo Celestra
(Atty. Celestra).
Petitioner Chua, in his personal capacity and acting on behalf of petitioner Filiden, filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), Preliminary Injunction and
Damages, against
respondents
Atty.
Celestra,
docketed as Civil Case No. CV-01-0207. Upon the motion of petitioners, RTC 257 issued a TRO enjoining
respondents Metrobank and Atty. Celestra from conducting the auction sale of the mortgaged properties.
After the expiration of the TRO, and no injunction having been issued by RTC, respondent Atty. Celestra reset
the auction sale. Tauction sale, however, proceeded, and a Certificate of Sale was accordingly issued to
respondent Metrobank as the highest bidder of the foreclosed properties.
Petitioners filed with RTC-Branch a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207
alleging that the Certificate of Sale was a falsified document since there was no actual sale that took place
on the date of Said Public Auction; the bad faith of respondent Metrobank in offering the subject properties
at a price much lower than its assessed fair market value; and the gross violation by respondents Metrobank
and Atty. Celestra of the injunction.
The auction sale, was considered as proper and valid by the RTC
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Upon failure of RTC to act on it, petitioners filed with
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. The Court of Appeals reversed tOrder of RTC- and remanded the
case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of respondents with finality.
Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque a Verified Complaint for Damages against
respondents Metrobank, Atty. Celestra, and three Metrobank lawyers. The Complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. CV-05-0402. Petitioners sought in their Complaint the award of actual, moral, and exemplary
damages against the respondents for making it appear that an auction sale of the subject properties took
place, as a result of which, the company was prevented from realizing a profit of from the intended sale.
Petitioners filed with RTC a Motion to Consolidate seeking the consolidation of Civil Case No. CV-050402, the action for damages pending before said court, with Civil Case No. CV-01-0207.
Respondents filed with \an Opposition to Motion to Consolidate with Prayer for Sanctions, praying for
the dismissal of the Complaint for Damages in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402, on the ground of forum shopping.
RTC granted the Motion to Consolidate. After the two cases were consolidated, respondents filed two
motions before RTC (1) Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of RTC, which granted the Motion to
Consolidate of petitioners; and (2) Manifestation and Motion raising the ground of forum shopping, among
the affirmative defenses of respondents. RTC granting the first Motion of respondents, thus, dismissing Civil
Case No. CV-05-0402 on the ground of forum shopping, and consequently, rendering the second Motion of
respondents moot. RTC declared that the facts or claims submitted by petitioners, the rights asserted, and
the principal parties in the two cases were the same.
From the foregoing Order of RTC, petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 88087.
In a Decision dated 31 January 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed Order RTC-. The appellate court
observed that although the defendants in the two cases were not identical, they represented a community of
interest. \.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied
Nevertheless, petitioners insist that they are not guilty of forum shopping, since (1) the two cases do
not have the same ultimate objective Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 seeks the annulment of the 8 November
2001 public auction and certificate of sale issued therein, while Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 prays for the
award of actual and compensatory damages for respondents tortuous act of making it appear that an
auction sale actually took place on 8 November 2001; and (2) the judgment in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207, on
the annulment of the foreclosure sale, would not affect the outcome of Civil Case No. CV-05-0402, on the
entitlement of petitioners to damages. The Court, however, finds these arguments refuted by the allegations
made by petitioners themselves in their Complaints in both cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not successively filing Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 and Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 amounts
to forum shopping.
HELD:
YES. Petitioners committed forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action, although with different prayers. There is no question that the claims of petitioners for
damages in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 and Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 are premised on the same cause of
action, i.e., the purportedly wrongful conduct of respondents in connection with the foreclosure sale of the
subject properties.
At first glance, said claims for damages may appear different. In Civil Case No. CV-01-0207, the
damages purportedly arose from the bad faith of respondents in offering the subject properties at the auction
sale at a price much lower than the assessed fair market value of the said properties, said to
be P176,117,000.00. On the other hand, the damages in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402, allegedly resulted from
the backing out of prospective buyers, who had initially offered to buy the subject properties for "not less
than P175,000,000.00," because respondents made it appear that the said properties were already sold at
the auction sale. Yet, it is worthy to note that petitioners quoted closely similar values for the subject
properties in both cases, against which they measured the damages they supposedly suffered. Evidently, this
is due to the fact that petitioners actually based the said values on the single appraisal report of the
Philippine Appraisal Company on the subject properties. Even though petitioners did not specify in their
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 the exact amount of damages they were seeking to
recover, leaving the same to the determination of the trial court, and petitioners expressly prayed that they
be awarded damages of not less than P70,000,000.00 in their Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402,
petitioners cannot deny that all their claims for damages arose from what they averred was a fictitious public
auction sale of the subject properties.
If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent case shall be
dismissed without prejudice, on the ground of either litis pendentia or res judicata. However, if
the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions
shall be dismissed with prejudice. In this case, petitioners did not deliberately file Civil Case No. CV-050402 for the purpose of seeking a favorable decision in another forum. Otherwise, they would not have
moved for the consolidation of both cases. Thus, only Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 is dismissed and the hearing
of Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 before RTC-Branch 258 will be continued.
36. G.R. No. 181277

July 3, 2013
SWEDISH MATCH PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
THE TREASURER OF THE CITYOF MANILA, Respondent.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
Petitioner paid business taxes in the total amount of P470,932.21.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Refund of Taxes with the RTC of Manila.
The RTC dismissed the Petition for the failure of petitioner to plead the latters capacity to sue and to
state the authority of Tiarra T. Batilaran-Beleno (Ms. Beleno), who had executed the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping..
On appeal, the CTA Second Division affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the Petition for Refund of Taxes on the
ground that petitioner had failed to state the authority of Ms. Beleno to institute the suit.
The CTA En Banc likewise denied the Petition for Review and declared that there was no board
resolution or secretrys certificate showing proof of Ms. Belenos authority in acting in behalf of the
corporation at the time the initiatory pleading was filed in the RTC.
Petitioner argues before the SC that there can be no dispute that Ms. Beleno was acting within her
authority when she instituted the Petition for Refund before the RTC, notwithstanding that the Petition was
not accompanied by a Secretarys Certificate. Her authority was ratified by the Board in its Resolution
adopted on 19 May 2004. Thus, even if she was not authorized to execute the Verification and Certification at
the time of the filing of the Petition, the ratification by the board of directors retroactively applied to the date
of her signing.
On the other hand, respondent contends that petitioner failed to establish the authority of Ms. Beleno
to institute the present action on behalf of the corporation. Respondent avers that the required certification
of non-forum shopping should have been valid at the time of the filing of the Petition.
ISSUES:
Whether Ms. Beleno was authorized to file the Petition for Refund of Taxes with the RTC
HELD:
YES.
The power of a corporation to sue and be sued is lodged in the board of directors, which exercises its
corporate powers. It necessarily follows that "an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any
corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors." Thus, physical
acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly
authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.
Consequently, a verification signed without an authority from the board of directors is defective. However,
the requirement of verification is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading and non-compliance
does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.The court may in fact order the correction of the
pleading if verification is lacking or, it may act on the pleading although it may not have been verified, where
it is made evident that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with so that the ends of justice
may be served.
A distinction between noncompliance and substantial compliance with the requirements
of a certificate of non-forum shopping and verification as provided in the Rules of Court must be
made. In this case, it is undisputed that the Petition filed with the RTC was accompanied by a
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping signed by Ms. Beleno, although without
proof of authority from the board. However, this Court finds that the belated submission of the
Secretarys Certificate constitutes substantial compliance with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
RULE 8: MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS

37. Vda de Daffon V. CA
FACTS:
The action is a petition for review.
Private respondents were daughter in-law and grand-children of the herein petitioner. The private
respondents instituted an action for partition of real and personal properties left by the late husband of the
petitioner and father in-law of the herein respondent. Respondents alleged that late Joselito Daffon being the
forced heir of late Amado Daffon was entitled to at least one half of Amados estate. The petitioner claimed
absolute ownership over all the properties and deprived the respondents of the fruits thereof.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state cause of action.
The lower court denied the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but same
was denied by the lower court.
Petitoner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but same was denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the SC contending that CA erred in holding that private
respondents need not be acknowledged as heirs of the deceased Amado Daffon.
ISSUE:
WON allegations on the complaint were sufficient to prove that deceased Joselito Daffon was the
legitimate son of deceased Amado Daffon.
HELD:
It was alleged on the pleadings of the herein petitioner that she was married to deceased Amado
Daffon and they begot one son Joselito Daffon and later married to herein plaintiff Lourdes Osmena and they
begot six children. The SC held that the rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise
statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.
38. Toribio V. Bidin
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an action for recovery of hereditary rights against the private respondents.
The subject property was commonly owned by the petitioners and the rest of their siblings, it was
purchased by the herein private respondents from other siblings. Petitioners alleged that they never sold
their shares to the herein private respondents. The private respondents alleged that petitioners had sold their
shares to their brother Dionisio Toribio as evidenced by deeds of sale executed by the petitioners in favor of
their brother Dionisio, who, in turn, sold the same to the private respondents. During the trial Eusebia
Torrebio was asked if she executed any sale of her share but it was objected by the counsel of the
respondents, the trial court sustained the objection. Petitioners filed a constancia with a motion for
reconsideration stating that the documents submitted by the respondents were merely evidentiary in nature,
not a cause of action or defense, the due execution and genuineness of which they had to prove. The court
denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WON the deeds of sale allegedly executed by the petitioners in favor of their brother Dionisio Toribio
are merely evidentiary in nature.
HELD:
The deed of sale executed by Dionisio Toribio in favor of the respondents would be insufficient to
establish a defense against the petitioners claims. If the petitioners deny that they ever sold their shares in
he inherited lot, a failure to prove the sale would be decisive. If the petitioners deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale, the respondents have to prove the genuineness and due
execution of the said document.
39. Bough and Bough V. Cantiveros
FACTS:
Plaintiffs sought to have themselves put in possession of the property covered by the deed of
sale allegedly executed by defendant in favor of the former. Appellant Basilia Bough was the cousin of
Defendant Cantiveros, the husband of Basilia induced the herein defendant to execute a deed of sale
covering sixty-three parcels of land. The lower court ruled in favor of the defendants declaring the deed of
sale, fictitious, null and without effect.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in permitting the defendant to present evidence tending to impugn the
genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale.
HELD:
Although the defendants did not deny the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale , under
oath, yet the defendants could properly set up the defenses of fraud and want of consideration.
40. Hibberd V. Rohde
FACTS:
Defendant Mc Millan secured a stock of merchandise worth P1,200.00 from plaintiff and sold it.
However defendant Mc Millan alleged that plaintiff delivered the said goods for deposit only. Plaintiff filed an
action for estafa against the defendant Mc Millan. Defendant Rohde, a practicing lawyer wanted to help his
client by signing a promissory note binding himself and defendant Mc Millan to be jointly and severally liable
to the plaintiff of the said amount to be paid in monthly installment.
Defendant Rohde contended that he signed the note if plaintiff would withdraw the estafa complaint.
After the execution of the note the complaint was dismissed.
ISSUE:
WON admission of the genuineness and due execution of document does not bar the defense of want
of consideration.
HELD:
The illegality of the consideration is not barred by the failure of the defendant to enter a verified
denial of the genuineness and due execution of the note set out in complaint. No part of the consideration of
the note declared upon is illegal or against public policy. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment.
41. Jabalde V. PNB
FACTS:
Plaintiff filed an action for the recovery of money against the defendant.
The herein plaintiff deposited with the defendant Bank P5,000.00 in Philippine currency and other
P5,000.00 in mixed Philippine currency and Japanese Military notes. The defendant answered and admitted
the making of the deposits but denied the date of deposits contending that the dates of deposits appearing
on the bank passbook were altered. However, the answer of the defendant was not under oath.
ISSUE:
WON the failure of the bank to deny under oath the entries in the passbook constitutes an admission
of the genuineness and due execution of the document.
HELD:
Ordinarily, such failure is an admission. However, the plaintiff failed to object to the testimonies of
the witnesses of the defendant and the documentary evidences. By these acts, the plaintiff waived the
defendants technical admission through failure to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of
the of the document.
42. Titan Construction vs David
Nature: Petition for Review
FACTS:
1. Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married, the spouses acquired a 602
square meter lot located at White Plains, Quezon City, which was registered in the name of MARTHA S.
DAVID, of legal age, Filipino, married to Manuel A. David.
2. Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation (Titan)
for P1,500,000.00 through a Deed of Sale.
3. Manuel filed a complaint for Annulment of Contract and Recovenyance against Titan before the RTC of
Quezon City. Manuel alleged that the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his kanowledge
and consent, and therefore void. He prayed that the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 130129 be invalidated, that
the property be reconveyed to the spouses, and that a new title be issued in their names.
4. Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) and prayed for the dismal of the complaint.
5. Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (granted)
6.
RTC: invalidated the deed of sale and ordered Titan to reconvey the property.
CA: affirmed the decision of RTC

ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED BY DISCARDING THE NATURE OF A NOTARIZED SPECIAL
POWER OF ATTORNEY CONTRARY TO JURISPRUDENCE AND BY GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT TO THE ALLEGED
EXPERT TESTIMONY VIS--VIS THE CONTESTED SIGNATURES AS THEY APPEAR TO THE NAKED EYE CONTRARY
TO JURISPRUDENCE.
HELD:
Titan claimed that because Manuel failed to specifically deny the genuineness and due execution of
the SPA in his Reply, he is deemed to have admitted the veracity of said document, in accordance with Rule
8, Sections 7 and 8 of the ROC.
It is true that the reply filed by Manuel alleging that the special power of attorney is a forgery was not
made under oath. However, the complaint, which was verified by Manuel under oath, alleged that the sale of
the subject property executed by his wife, Martha, in favor of Titan was without his knowledge, consent, and
approval, express or implied; and that there is nothing on the face of the deed of sale that would show that
he gave his consent thereto. In Toribio v. Bidin, it was held that where the verified complaint alleged that the
plaintiff never sold, transferred or disposed their share in the inheritance left by their mother to others, the
defendants were placed on adequate notice that they would be called upon during trial to prove the
genuineness or due execution of the disputed deed of sale. While Section 8, Rule 8 is mandatory, it is a
discovery procedure and must be reasonably construed to attain its purpose, and in a way as not to effect a
denial of substantial justice.
A notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution and only
clear and convincing evidence will overcome such legal presumption. However, such clear and convincing
evidence is present here. While it is true that the SPA was notarized, it is no less true that there were defects
in the notarization which mitigate against a finding that the SPA was either genuine or duly executed.
Curiously, the details of Manuels Community Tax Certificate are conspicuously absent, yet Marthas are
complete. The absence of Manuels data supports his claim that he did not execute the same and that his
signature thereon is a forgery. Moreover, we have Manuels positive testimony that he never signed the SPA,
in addition to the expert testimony that the signature appearing on the SPA was not Manuels true signature.
Moreover, there were circumstances which mitigate against a finding that Titan was a buyer in good
faith.
First, TCT No. 156043 was registered in the name of MARTHA S. DAVID, married to Manuel A. David
but the Deed of Sale failed to include Marthas civil status, and only described the vendor as MARTHA S.
DAVID, of legal age, Filipino citizen, with postal address at 247 Governor Pascual, Navotas, Rizal. And it is
quite peculiar that an SPA would have even been necessary, considering that the SPA itself indicated that
Martha and Manuel lived on the same street.
Second, Titans witness Valeriano Hernandez, the real estate agent who brokered the sale between
Martha and Titan, testified that Jerry Yao (Yao), Titans Vice President for Operations (and Titans signatory to
the Deed of Sale), specifically inquired why the name of Manuel did not appear on the Deed of Sale. This
indicates that Titan was aware that Manuels consent may be necessary.
Third, Valeriano Hernandez also testified that during the first meeting between Martha and Yao,
Martha informed Yao that the property was mortgaged to a casino for P500,000.00. Without even seeing the
property, the original title, or the SPA, and without securing an acknowledgment receipt from Martha, Titan
(through Yao) gave Martha P500,000.00 so she could redeem the property from the casino
It is equally true that elementary considerations of due process require that a party be duly apprised
of a claim against him before judgment may be rendered. Thus, we cannot, in these proceedings, order the
return of the amounts paid by Titan to Martha.
However, Titan is not precluded by this Decision from
instituting the appropriate action against Martha before the proper court.
43. Consolidated Bank vs Del Monte Motor Works
Nature: Petition for Review on certiorari
FACTS:
1. Solidbank filed a complaint against respondents, impleading the spouse of respondent Narciso O. Morales
(respondent Morales) in order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains.
2. Solidbank alleges therein that on 23 April 1982, it extended in favor of respondents a loan in the amount of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as evidenced by a promissory note executed by respondents on the same
date. Under the promissory note, respondents Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. (respondent corporation) and
Morales bound themselves jointly and severally to pay petitioner the full amount of the loan through twentyfive monthly installments of P40,000.00 a month with interest pegged at 23% per annum.
3. The note was to be paid in full by 23 May 1984. As respondents defaulted on their monthly installments,
the full amount of the loan became due and demandable pursuant to the terms of the promissory note.
Solidbank likewise alleges that it made oral and written demands upon respondents to settle their obligation
but notwithstanding these demands, respondents still failed to pay their indebtedness which, as of 09 March
1984, stood at P1,332,474.55.
4. Solidbank attached to its complaint as Annexes A, B, and C, respectively, a photocopy of the
promissory note supposedly executed by respondents, a copy of the demand letter it sent respondents dated
20 January 1983, and statement of account pertaining to respondents loan.
5. Solidbank filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare the Defendants in Default which was opposed by the
defendants upon the ground that they were never served with copies of the summons and of petitioners
complaint.
6. Solidbank made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the original copy of Exhibit A could no longer
be found, petitioner instead sought the admission of the duplicate original of the promissory note which was
identified and marked as Exhibit E.
7.
trial court initially admitted into evidence Exhibit E and granted respondents motion that they be
allowed to amend their respective answers to conform with this new evidence.
8. respondent corporation filed a manifestation and motion for reconsideration. of the trial courts order
admitting into evidence petitioners Exhibit E. Respondent corporation claims that Exhibit E should not
have been admitted as it was immaterial, irrelevant, was not properly identified and hearsay evidence.
9. Lastly, respondent corporation claims that the exhibit in question had no bearing on the complaint as
Lavarino admitted that Exhibit E was not the original of Exhibit A which was the foundation of the
complaint and upon which respondent corporation based its own answer.
10. respondents separately filed their motions to dismiss on the similar ground that with the exclusion of
Exhibits A and E, petitioner no longer possessed any proof of respondents alleged indebtedness.
11. RTC: granted
CA: affirmed
ISSUE:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
DENIED THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONER SOLIDBANKS COMPLAINT, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF
INDUBITABLE FACTS CLEARLY POINTING TO THE FACT THAT SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ADMITTED THE
GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE SUBJECT PROMISSORY NOTE.
HELD:
SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under
oath, specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath
does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance
with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
In this case, both the court a quo and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were able
to specifically deny the allegations in petitioners complaint in the manner specifically required by the rules.
In effect, respondents had, to all intents and purposes, admitted the genuineness and due execution of the
subject promissory note and recognized their obligation to petitioner.
The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling of the trial court that
the best evidence rule or
primary evidence must be applied as the purpose of the proof is to establish the terms of the writing
meaning the alleged promissory note as it is the basis of the recovery of the money allegedly loaned to the
defendants (respondents herein). respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory
note. This being the case, there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in
question. Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the promissory note
sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present the
original of said note.
Under the promissory note executed by respondents in this case, they are obligated to petitioner in the
amount of One Million Pesos, this being the amount of loan they obtained on 23 April 1982. In addition, they
also bound themselves to pay the 23% interest per annum on the loan; and a penalty charge of 3% per
annum on the amount due until fully paid. Respondents likewise agreed to pay attorneys fees equivalent to
10% of the total amount due, but in no case less than P200.00, plus costs of suit with both these amounts
bearing a 1% interest per month until paid. Costs against respondents. (REVERSED DECISION)
44. Luistro vs CA
FACTS:
1. First Gas Power Corporation (respondent) operates a gas-fired power generating facility by virtue of a
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with the Manila Electric Company (Meralco). First Gas sells the electric
power generated by its facility to Meralco.
2. First Gas entered into a Substation Interconnection Agreement (SIA) with Meralco and the National Power
Corporation (NPC). The SIA required respondent to design, finance, construct, commission, and energize a
230-kilovolt electric power transmission line, in length from its power plant site in Sta. Rita, Batangas City to
Calaca, Batangas. Respondents obligation under the SIA entailed the acquisition of easements of right-ofway over affected lands located along the designated route of the transmission line.
3. First Gas entered into a Contract of Easement of Right-of-Way (Contract) with Antero Luistro (petitioner),
owner of a parcel of land. Under the Contract, Luistro granted respondent perpetual easement. portion of his
property for the erection of the transmission line tower and a 25-year easement over 2,453.60 sq. m. portion
of the property for the right to pass overhead line cables.
4. Luistro counsel wrote a letter to respondents president asking for a temporary stoppage of all kinds of
work within the vicinity of petitioners residential house pending settlement of petitioners grievance that the
house and other improvements lay underneath the transmission wire/line being constructed and would
endanger the life and health of the persons in the vicinity.
5. Luistro filed a complaint for Recission/ Amendment or Modification of the contract. Luistro alleged that
respondent, by means of fraud and machinations of words, was able to convince him to enter into the
Contract. Petitioner alleged that he entered into the Contract under misrepresentation, promises, false and
fraudulent assurances, and tricks of respondent. Petitioner alleged that the powerful 230 kilovolts passing the
transmission wire/line continuously endanger the lives, limbs, and properties of petitioner and his family.
6. respondent filed a motion to dismiss.
7. RTC: denied the motion
CA: reversed the decision of RTC
ISSUE:
W/NOT THE COMPLAINT ALLEGES FRAUD WITH PARTICULARITY AS REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 5,
RULE 8 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
HELD:
Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Section 5.
Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. - In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge or
other condition of the mind of a person may be averred generally.
Not only did petitioner fail to allege with particularity the fraud allegedly committed by respondent.
A review of the Contract shows that its contents were explained to petitioner. The Contract states:
Bago ko/namin nilagdaan ang kasulatang ito ay ipinaliwanag muna sa akin/amin sa wikang Tagalog/ o
sa wikang aking/aming naiintindihan. Ang nilalaman nitoy lubusan ko/naming nauunawaan kayat lumagda
kami rito ng kusang loob, walang sinumang pumilit o tumakot sa akin/amin.
There is clearly no basis for the allegation that petitioner only signed the Contract because of fraud
perpetrated by respondent
(Petition denied)
45. Capitol Motors vs Yabut
FACTS:
1. Capitol Motors Corporations filed a complaint against Nemesio I. Yabut.
2. Yabut executed in favor of the plaintiff a promissory note (copy of which was attached to the complaint) for
the sum of P30,134.25, payable in eighteen (18) equal monthly installments with interest at 12% per annum,
the first installment to become due on June 10, 1965, that it was stipulated in the promissory note that
should the defendant fail to pay two (2) successive installments, the principal sum remaining unpaid would
immediately become due and demandable and the defendant would, by way of attorney's fees and costs of
collection, be obligated to the plaintiff for an additional sum equivalent to 25% of the principal and interest
due;
3. Capitol Motors filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, on the ground that the defendant, not having
set forth in his answer the substance of the matters relied upon by him to support his denial, had failed to
deny specifically the material allegations of the complaint, hence, must be deemed to have admitted them.
4. Yabut contends that the court a quo erred in considering him as having failed to deny specifically the
material allegations of the complaint, and, consequently, in deciding the case on the basis of the pleadings.
5. He argues that since Section 10, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court, recognizes three (3) modes of
specific denial, namely:
(1) by specifying each material allegation of fact in the complaint the truth of which the defendant does not
admit, and, whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to
support his denial or
(2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true and material and denying only the
remainder or
(3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of a material averment in the complaint, which has the effect of a denial, and he has adopted the third
mode of specific denial, his answer tendered an issue, and, consequently the court a quo could not render a
valid judgment on the pleadings.
ISSUE:
WHETHER PARAGRAPH 2 OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S ANSWER CONSTITUTES A SPECIFIC DENIAL
UNDER THE SAID RULE.
HELD:
This Court said that the rule authorizing an answer to the effect that the defendant has no knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a
denial, does not apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted, is so plainly and necessarily
within the defendant's knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue.
It becomes evident from all the above doctrines that a mere allegation of ignorance of the facts
alleged in the complaint, is insufficient to raise an issue; the defendant must aver positively or state how it is
that he is ignorant of the facts so alleged.
Thus, in at least two (2) cases where this Court ruled that judgment on the pleadings was not proper,
it will be seen that the reason was that in each case the defendants did something more than merely alleging
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief.
There are two other reasons why the present appeal must fail.
First. The present action is founded upon a written instrument attached to the complaint, but
defendant-appellant failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the instrument; hence,
the same are deemed admitted. (Section 8, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court; Songo vs. Sellner, 37 Phil.
254; Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank vs. ELRO Development Corporation, et al., G.R. No. L-30830,
August 22, 1969 [29, SCRA 38]; J. P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc., supra.)
Second. Defendant-appellant did not oppose the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by plaintiff
appellee; neither has he filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of September 13, 1966, which
deemed the case submitted for decision on the pleadings, or of the decision rendered on January 9, 1967.
In Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Company, G.R. No. L-15532, October 31, 1963 (9 SCRA 349), this
Court said:
It appears that when the plaintiff moved to have the case decided on the pleadings, the defendant
interposed no objection and has practically assented thereto. The defendant, therefore, is deemed to have
admitted the allegations of the complaint, so that there was no necessity for the plaintiff to submit evidence
of his claim.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with cost against defendant-appellant
46. Antam Consolidated vs CA
Nature: Petition for certiorari
FACTS:
1. respondent Stokely Van Camp. Inc. (Stokely) filed a complaint against Banahaw Milling Corporation
(Banahaw), Antam Consolidated, Inc., Tambunting Trading Corporation (Tambunting), Aurora Consolidated
Securities and Investment Corporation, and United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (Unicom) for collection of sum of
money.
2. In its complaint, Stokely alleged:
(1) that it is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Indiana, U.S.A. and has its
principal office at 941 North Meridian Street, Indianapolis, Indiana, U.S.A., and one of its subdivisions "Capital
City Product Company" (Capital City) has its office in Columbus, Ohio, U.S.A.;
(2) that Stokely and Capital City were not engaged in business in the Philippines prior to the commencement
of the suit so that Stokely is not licensed to do business in this country and is not required to secure such
license;
(3)Comphil failed to deliver the coconut oil so that Capital City covered its coconut oil needs in the open
market at a price substantially in excess of the contract and sustained a loss of US$103,600; that to settle
Capital City's loss under the contract, the parties entered into a second contract wherein Comphil undertook
to buy and Capital City agreed to sell 500 long tons of coconut crude oil under the same terms and conditions
but at an increased c.i.f. price of US$0.3925
(4) ALL of the petitioners evaded their obligation to respondent by the devious scheme of using Tambunting
employees to replace the Tambuntings in the management of Banahaw and disposing of the oil mill of
Banahaw or their entire interests to Unicorn;
(5) Respondent has reasonable cause to believe and does believe that the coconut oil milk which is the only
substantial asset of Banahaw is about to be sold or removed so that unless prevented by the Court there will
probably be no assets of Banahaw to satisfy its claim.
3. RTC: ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment in favor of the respondent upon the latter's deposit of a
bond.
4. the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the respondent, being a foreign
corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, has no personality to maintain the instant suit.
5. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, they filed this instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order.
ISSUES:
1.W/NOT STOKELY VAN CAMP, INC. HAS THE CAPACITY TO SUE, IN LIGHT OF THREE TRANSACTIONS, IT
ENTERED INTO WITH COMPHIL, ANTAM ETC. WITHOUT LICENSE
2. W/NOT CA ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDE OF ATTACHMENT
HELD:
1. The transactions enterd into by Stokely with Comphil, Antam are not a series of commercial
dealings which signify an intent on the part of Stokely to do business in the Philippines but constitute an
isolated one which does not fall under the category of doing business.The only reason why Smokely entered
into teh second transaction was because it wanted to recover loss sustained from the failure of Comphil,
Antam to deliver the crude coconut oil under the first transaction. Instead of making an outright demand on
comphil,Antam, Stokely opted to try to push through with the transaction to recover the amount it lost.
Unfortunately, Comphil, Antam failed to deliver again, prompting Stokely to file the suit. From the facts, it can
be deduced that in reality, there was only one agreement. The three seemingly different transactions were
entered into by the parties only in an effort to fulfill the basic agreement and in no way indicate an intent on
the part of Stokely to engage in a continuity of transactions with Comphil, Antam which will categorize it as a
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Stokely, being a foreign corporation not doing business
in the Philippines, does not need to obtain a license to do business in order to have capacity to sue.
2.the petitioners contend that the trial court should not have issued the order of attachment and the
appellate court should not have affirmed the same because the verification in support of the prayer for
attachment is insufficient. They state that the person who made such verification does not personally know
the facts relied upon for the issuance of the attachment order. Petitioners capitalize on the fact that Renato
Calma, the assistant attorney of Bito, Misa, and Lozada, counsel for respondent, stated in his verification that
"he has read the foregoing complaint and that according to his information and belief the allegations therein
contained are true and correct."
The above contention deserves scant consideration.
We rule that the defect in the original verification was cured when Renato Calma subsequently
executed an affidavit to the effect that the allegations he made in support of the prayer for attachment were
verified by him from the records of Comphil and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Moreover,
petitioner had the opportunity to oppose the issuance of the writ.
As to the merit of the attachment order itself, we find that the allegations in the respondent's
complaint satisfactorily justify the issuance of said order.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
47. Steelcase Inc. vs Design International Selections
Nature: Petition for review
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Steelcase, Inc. (Steelcase) is a foreign corporation existing under the laws of Michigan, United
States of America (U.S.A.), and engaged in the manufacture of office furniture with dealers worldwide.
2. Respondent Design International Selections, Inc. (DISI) is a corporation existing under Philippine Laws and
engaged in the furniture business, including the distribution of furniture.
3. Steelcase and DISI orally entered into a dealership agreement whereby Steelcase granted DISI the right to
market, sell, distribute, install, and service its products to end-user customers within the Philippines. The
business relationship continued smoothly until it was terminated after the agreement was breached with
neither party admitting any fault.
4. Steelcase filed a complaint for sum of money against DISI alleging, among others, that DISI had an unpaid
account of US$600,000.00. Steelcase prayed that DISI be ordered to pay actual or compensatory damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit.
5. Steelcase filed its Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, which was granted by the RTC.
However,
Steelcase sought to further amend its complaint by filing a Motion to Admit Second Amended Complaint.
6. Acting Presiding Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda dismissed the complaint, granted the TRO prayed for by
DISI, set aside the April 26, 1999 Order of the RTC admitting the Amended Complaint, and denied Steelcases
Motion to Admit Second Amended Complaint.
The RTC stated that in requiring DISI to meet the Dealer
Performance Expectation and in terminating the dealership agreement with DISI based on its failure to
improve its performance in the areas of business planning, organizational structure, operational
effectiveness, and efficiency, Steelcase unwittingly revealed that it participated in the operations of DISI.
Steel case moved for reconsideration.
7. RTC: denied
CA: affirmed the decision
ISSUES:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT STEELCASE IS DOING BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES WITHOUT A LICENSE; AND
(2) WHETHER OR NOT DISI IS ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENGING THE STEELCASES LEGAL CAPACITY TO
SUE.
HELD:
1. Steelcase is an unlicensed foreign corporation NOT doing business in the Philippines
The appointment of a distributor in the Philippines is not sufficient to constitute doing business
unless it is under the full control of the foreign corporation.
On the other hand, if the distributor is an
independent entity which buys and distributes products, other than those of the foreign corporation, for its
own name and its own account, the latter cannot be considered to be doing business in the Philippines. It is
undisputed that DISI was founded in 1979 and is independently owned and managed by the spouses Leandro
and Josephine Bantug. In addition to Steelcase products, DISI also distributed products of other companies
including carpet tiles, relocatable walls and theater settings. All things considered, it has been sufficiently
demonstrated that DISI was an independent contractor which sold Steelcase products in its own name and
for its own account. As a result, Steelcase cannot be considered to be doing business in the Philippines by its
act of appointing a distributor as it falls under one of the exceptions under R.A. No. 7042.
2. DISI is estopped from challenging Steelcases legal capacity to sue
This Court has time and again upheld the principle that a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines without a license may still sue before the Philippine courts a Filipino or a Philippine entity that had
derived some benefit from their contractual arrangement because the latter is considered to be estopped
from challenging the personality of a corporation after it had acknowledged the said corporation by entering
into a contract with it.
During this period of financial difficulty, our nation greatly needs to attract more foreign investments and
encourage trade between the Philippines and other countries in order to rebuild and strengthen our economy.
While it is essential to uphold the sound public policy behind the rule that denies unlicensed foreign
corporations doing business in the Philippines access to our courts, it must never be used to frustrate the
ends of justice by becoming an all-encompassing shield to protect unscrupulous domestic enterprises from
foreign entities seeking redress in our country. To do otherwise could seriously jeopardize the desirability of
the Philippines as an investment site and would possibly have the deleterious effect of hindering trade
between Philippine companies and international corporations.
WHEREFORE, the March 31, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its March 23, 2006 Resolution
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The dismissal order of the Regional Trial Court dated November 15,
1999 is hereby set aside. Steelcases Amended Complaint is hereby ordered REINSTATED and the case is
REMANDED to the RTC for appropriate action.

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RULE 4: VENUE

1. Young Auto Supply vs CA

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.

we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,

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Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

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rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, upon demand.

already amounted to Seven Hundred Nineteen Thousand, Six

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

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filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment to which Lorenzo opposed the motion.

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Florencio & Alex Sadiwa with the MTC

That explains why the Revised Rule on Summary

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It was denied. They filed an MR but was like wise denied.

Hence, Go and Siong filed the present petition for certiorari.

reconsideration was likewise denied.

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. to:

Granted the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.

MR was filed but denied.

WHAT IS WRIT OF AMPARO?

1. It is initiated through a PETITION filed in RTC, SANDIGANBAYAN, CA or SC.

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Municipal Court Manila:

Sustained the motion and dismissed the case.

MR and NT but denied hence the present appeal.

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Judge Sandoval, dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim.

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

21. Victorina (Victoria) Alice Lim Lazaro, V., Brewmaster International

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or

Civil Procedure December 13, 2014

permissive counterclaim is vital in the application of the circular.

Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is an issuance of this Court. It covers a matter of

procedure. Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is not an enactment of the Legislature.

This Court has the