Presently, there has been no serious academic work that addresses American espionage

during the Revolutionary War. The Culper Spy Ring founded in 1778 by Benjamin Tallmadge
was as instrumental as any other aspect of the war in winning independence. Nonetheless there
does exist a series of well-written exposes, some of which were written by professional
historians, of the Culper Spy Ring by the popular press. Since, no real academic work has
addressed this in any real comprehensive way, this paper will examine, the research by the
popular presses, some journal articles, a number of biographies of the Culper spies and the
records of letters of the Culper Spy Ring from the George Washington Papers, as they exist in
their entirety at the Library of Congress1. This paper will also examine a number of pieces
addressing British Intelligence and will primarily focus on the activities of espionage in the
northern colonies primarily because there is little to no activities as to what was going on in the
south. In attempt to patch together the scholarly landscape of this fascinating yet only marginally
told tale.
Historian Alexander Rose presents us with a compelling well-researched picture of the
lives and experiences of Washingtons spies; there is no overt analysis or critical understanding
of this important dimension of the American Revolution. Instead Rose, like most who examined
this gives the reader an overly raving herofication of a rag tag collection of social outcasts, black
marketers, tavern keeps, and smugglers. Though his story clearly shows the class nature of the
Spy ring, Rose fails to dig deeper into the class-riven society of colonial America. Rose fits into
a long list of historians unwilling to grapple with the more unseemly side of class politics that

Though there are many digitized collections on the internet, the most comprehensive is of course the letters that
exist at The Library of Congress. http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gwhtml/gwhome.html composed by Project
Coordinator, Laura Graham as well as the collaborative efforts of a number of individuals and divisions in the
Library of Congress and other institutions. Sadly very fewer of these letters are transcribed but some will be found
on my website
______

lead American history into the body complex such as Shays Rebellion, the whiskey rebellion,
and fries rebellion.2
However, on occasion Rose gives us glimpses into the class antagonisms that existed in
Washingtons Army. For instances, in the past historians have been loathed to point out just how
much Washingtons men hated both the Army and the General himself. Rose counters this in his
description of the Great Fire of New York in 1776. Rose informs us that instead the fire resulting
from a preconcerted [sic] deliberate scheme, as reported in the New York Mercury, instead it
was a product of either stay-behinds, escaped prisoners, or deserters whod had second
thoughts[and were] guilty of taking advantage of the chaos to helpand frustrate efforts to
save the city.3 In the end, if we were to dispose of serious academic analysis, Roses accounting
of this little known spy ring is exciting, soundly researched, and compelling. We can also give
credit to Rose for bringing into light the role that African Americans played as secret agents for

Some examples of Shays Rebellion include:

Cain, Michael JG, and Keith L. Dougherty. Suppressing Shays Rebellion Collective Action and Constitutional
Design under the Articles of Confederation. Journal of Theoretical Politics 11, no. 2 (1999): 23360.; Feer, Robert
A. Shayss Rebellion and the Constitution: A Study in Causation. New England Quarterly, 1969, 388410.;
Marks, Frederick W. Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution. Rowman &
Littlefield, 1986.
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=tH1C9QXO5uEC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=%22Shays+Rebellion%22
&ots=Sfp3bySQlc&sig=HjHtgXRdFdn4I7n2ZmdymAtajrI. ;Pressman, Richard S. Class Positioning and Shays
Rebellion: Resolving the Contradictions of The Contrast. Early American Literature, 1986, 87102.; Priest,
Claire. Colonial Courts and Secured Credit: Early American Commercial Litigation and Shays Rebellion. Yale
Law Journal, 1999, 241350.; Smith, Jonathan. The Depression of 1785 and Daniel Shays Rebellion. The
William and Mary College Quarterly: A Magazine of Early American History, 1948, 7794.; Szatmary, David P.
Shays Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection. Univ of Massachusetts Press, 1980.
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=uOY8x2YfJEoC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=%22Shays+Rebellion%22
&ots=Wf1f6nfMMs&sig=8O9rpKGYLs2UqH8J2uZuDdem1-k.; Warren, Joseph Parker. The Confederation and
the Shays Rebellion. The American Historical Review 11, no. 1 (1905): 4267.; Gould, Roger V. Patron-Client
Ties, State Centralization, and the Whiskey Rebellion. American Journal of Sociology, 1996, 400429.;Slaughter,
Thomas P. The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution. Oxford University Press, 1986.
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=G1SpGtzCOcC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=%22Whiskey+Rebellion%22&ots=pE4Km8CwS&sig=gc9bBMmK1ruc14J4LZ9Xy77Sysc.;Tachau, Mary K. Bonsteel. The Whiskey Rebellion in
Kentucky: A Forgotten Episode of Civil Disobedience. Journal of the Early Republic, 1982, 23959.
3
Alexander Rose. Washingtons Spies: The Story of Americas First Spy Ring. Random House LLC, 2007.
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=K4lUeuoUI8C&oi=fnd&pg=PT8&dq=Washington+Spies+Rose&ots=itGNSEL8pw&sig=KeAK5DFnynQ3CCemH1mQKPNVYg.Pp. 37-38

both the British and Americans. 4 In terms of revealing the extent that women played in the
world of espionage during the American Revolution, Rose gives us very little to nothing. We
know from a tacit search in the Washington Papers, we find that there were many women who
took part of this underground world. These women were Esther Reed, Ana Smith, Miss Jenny,
Ann Bates, etc. Roses attention almost exclusively focused on men who were loyalists and
revolutionary alike.
Some Historians indeed have attempted to uncover the role of women in espionage
including Carol Berkin. Berkin tells us that women use their femininity to gather information and
convey sensitive intelligence. Berkin also touches upon Ann Bates spending three years in
Revolutionary Army camps and supplying the British with a number of counting men, supplies,
and artillery. However her analysis, only scratches the surface of the potentially fascinating
accounting of a loyalist spy. 5 Berkin also addresses a series of other loyalists such as newspaper
editors Margaret Draper and Ann Catherine Greene and other ladies of consequence such as
Mary Morris, Susannah Robinson, and Margaret Ingles. The only point that Berkin makes about
these loyalist women was merely a result of their marital ties. This seems rather outdated or
perhaps demeaning of their independence, intelligence, and autonomy. Berkin also refers to
Anna Strong, who acted as a signal woman in 1778 for the Americans during the fiercest fighting
in New York. Again, we are only left with a taste of what her contribution could have been to the
American Revolution in the Northern Theater. Berkin asserts that women did a majority of the
work while the men controlled everything. 6

Ibid, pp. 91, 104-104, 130, 273,267-268; sadly however Rose only gives us a taste of black espionage on the high
seas which included the lives of countless African Americans working as privateers for both and against the
Revolution.
5
Carol Berkin. First Generations: Women in Colonial America. Macmillan, 1996. Pp.191
6
Ibid, 191

In a digital history that was created by John A. Burke and Andrea Meyer, they discuss
another woman spy of the name Lydia Darragh. Lydia Darragh, in one single and simple act of
domestic espionage had listened quietly as John Andre oversaw a meeting of royalist spies while
staying as a guest at manor of her loyalist husband. After hearing of a plot to ambush colonial
forces. Darragh immediately conveyed the information to Washington, reported the secret plans
of Andre and her husband to the rebels. This episode illustrates a more independent minded
housewife that traditional histories would have us believe. Instead of immediately arresting
Benedict Arnold and John Andre, the Culper ring fed the royalist spy and the turncoat false
information, which underscored the groups talent for counterintelligence. 7 The authors rightly
suggest the difficulties in uncovering the secret history of spies because the nature of their work
is designed to leave as little information about their work as they can but that through laborious
archival research historians can generate enough pieces of evidence to build convincing and
informed narratives. The authors observe, "Conditions in New York prisons were so horrific that
life expectancy was a few months; recent scholarship suggests that more Americans died in such
confinement than were killed in all the battles of the American Revolution combined."8
Frank Reuter argues that after the Revolution the British still relied on spies to keep track
on the empire's former colonies in North America. Reuter explains that though the British
refused to communicate through formal diplomacy with the United States it they reluctantly
relied upon a "checkered assortment of semi-official or semi-secret contacts to observe, influence

[John A. Burke and a Andrea Meyer copious archival research includes findings in the East Hampton Librarys
Long Island Collection, the New York Public Librarys Emmet Collection, The New York State Archives, the
Library of Congress George Washington Papers, the Benjamin Tallmadges memoirs at the Fraunces Tavern
Collection in New York, the Townsend Family Papers at the New-York Historical Society, the Oyster Bay
Historical Society, and Raynham Hall in Oyster Bay, Long Island, the Laval University in Qubec City and finally
the Clinton Papers at the University of Michigans Clement Library. The consequences being caught spying were
dire and severe. If not the gibbet then the thought of spending time in a colonial prison was enough to deter the
bravest from meddling in the treacherous world of espionage.]
8

and manipulate" the United States both domestically and internationally. Reuter focuses on the
Royal Army's intelligence officer George Beckwith to attend to the distasteful but necessary job
of imperial espionage in post-Revolutionary United States. Just as spies like Benedict Arnold and
John Andre he points to Becker's continued support for ex-informants no longer able to support
themselves providing them with "funds for food, blankets, and provisions to families" after the
war ended, giving the "now destitute men whose intelligence services he no longer needed. The
unusual and treacherous world of espionage created powerful bonds between the men and
women who operated in a world of danger and drama that most contemporaries could not
possibly imagine. There was even comradely, respect and even friendship shared between enemy
spies. Even as Tallmadge was exploiting his relationship with Andre for information he still felt
sympathy for the man, who he considered his friend, after he was caught and gibbeted. As
Tallmadge points out in his memoirs, his sympathy for Andre was considerable. " Confidential
communications which took place, of a more private nature, serve rather to mark the ingenuous
character of the man, than to require being noticed at this time. I will, however, remark, that for
the few days of intimate intercourse I had with him, which was from the time of his being
brought back to our head-quarters to the day of his execution, I became so deeply attached to
Major Andre, that I can remember no instance where my affections were so fully absorbed in any
man."9
Beckwith lived and thrived in this secret and dangerous world of war and espionage.
Reuter observes that the petty spy had served as booth a commander of troops in New England
and New Jersey during the campaigns in the North and was also extremely successful at
establishing contacts with the loyalist ranks, so much so that he was promoted to Major

Reuter, Frank T. Petty Spy or Effective Diplomat: The Role of George Beckwith. Journal of the Early
Republic, 1990, 47192.

Beckwith's interpersonal skills, his ability to establish close and trustworthy contacts in North
America did not go unnoticed by British who were so disdainful of Americans. After the war he
was promoted to the position of "Britain's unofficial minister to the United States" wherein he
still maintained his chief role as a spy according to Reuter. The unofficial diplomat and petty spy
was more interested in establishing a friendly relationship with the newly established republic
but as Reuter observes he was still anxious about the expansionist nature of Americans who
coveted both British Canadian and Native American territory which as any student of the early
republic would agree with. He was aware that Americans would almost certainly take advantage
of international intrigues between Britain and their hated papist enemies, namely Spain and
France who were still very active in the Western Hemisphere.10The diplomat spy was also aware
of the animosity that the United States held toward Spain and attempted to fan the flames of war
between the two countries. He was also aware of the divided loyalties in the United States
between England and France, which is why he nurtured a relationship with Alexander Hamilton
who friendly towards Britain and stayed away from Thomas Jefferson who strongly favored the
French or what Beckwith described as the "leader of the French faction" in the United States. In
the end Reuter maintains that Beckwith had learned to understand and even like the Americans
and wanted to establish an amicable Anglo-American relationship but that his recommendations
went unheard as the British Empire was unwilling, at least for a time, to except the permanency
of the United States, most overtly demonstrated by the war of 1812 and the mounting hostilities
between the two nations directly after the Revolution.

10

Ibid. [The United States started the War of 1812 to consolidate Canada into their new homeland and also the
policies of Indian Removal by presidents like Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson.]

Roger Kaplan argues that the unusual circumstances of the American Revolution
compelled them to re-examine their rudimentary understanding and employment of wartime
intelligence gathering operations. Kaplan primarily relies on experiences of General Sir Henry
Clinton to document the changes in the ways in which the British gathered information about the
advances of their enemies in North America. Kaplan argues that the failure of the British was not
their intelligence but their failure to use their intelligence correctly. The failure of the British to
adapt to their intelligence, however, is not the point of the article. Rather, Kaplan is more
interested in observing the way in which the British "rationalized" or conceptualized information
gathering, which became more aligned with the observational practices of enlightenment
thinking. Kaplan argues that "There was no doctrine on which to base an intelligence service,
and the British were intellectually unprepared to fight a war that was revolutionary and extended
over so vast an area." Kaplan observes that the British had to abandon traditional European ways
of espionage, which relied mainly on the intellectual reasoning of a commander who was in
Kaplan's words "his own intelligence officer." The British, or rather Clinton created an "ad hoc
intelligence department." He also argues that the British had to fight against a revolutionary
people, not just soldiers. Moreover, Kaplan observes that the British had to a conflict that
expanded over an expansive wilderness and a vast coastline. He argues that intelligence went
further then traditional 18th century norms in that Clinton did not only gather tactical and
strategic information about the enemy but collected political and social developments as well.
From the totality of his intelligence, Clinton developed a system of short and long-term enemy
plans. He also developed a grouping of field agents which not only gathered information but
engaged in covert operations like sabotage and destruction of enemy resources, counterintelligence diversions and organizing enemy soldiers and citizens into a growing operational or

organizational web of secrecy and espionage. The conclusions that Kaplan comes to about how
Clinton adapted to the new obstacles that the American Revolution presented are also inherent in
how the Culper Spy Ring was organized--a highly rationalized grouping of personal, both
military and civilian, an organization that is not reliant upon just one person which can prove
disastrous if they are suddenly removed from their position. The Culper Spy Ring was strong in
this way as was Clinton's organization, which Kaplan evidences by the fact that the absence of
Benedict Arnold and John Andres did not overwhelmingly impede Britain's espionage activities
in North. America In fact Kaplan instructs us that wartime spying improved when Beckwith
replaced them for he was more amenable to Clinton's new and improved organizational structure.
Frank Reuter also observed this as well, finding new intelligence gathering tendencies and
organizational thinking in the career of George Beckwith. Kaplan, in the end, concedes that even
the innovative thinking of Clinton could not over come the myriad difficulties that the American
Revolution presented and the un-unified or fractious nature of British wartime foreign policy in
North America.11
If John A. Burke and Andrea Meyer have not produced a technically academic article
then they are as guilty of most who have produced stories of the Culper Spy Ring in popular
presses. Together, they produced a Digital History that succinctly captures the essence of most of
the important historical characters including important agents of the British Empire such as
Major General Benedict Arnold and the Charismatic John Andre. The authors of this fascinating
digital history bring to light the reasons for Benedict Arnold treachery, which in some respects
were rooted in reasons. Arnold's fortune by 1776 was in ruins because he had spent it on the
construction of fleets and was never paid back by Congress, even though he supplied the

11

Roger Kaplan. The Hidden War: British Intelligence Operations during the American Revolution. The William
and Mary Quarterly: A Magazine of Early American History and Culture, 1990, 11538.

revolutionary government with full documentation of his expenditures. His reaction, as the
authors instruct us, was "worse than previously recognized, "in that he planed to deliver or rather
to sell the rebels' most important fort over to the British along with General Washington his
French allies which would have ended the war in one fateful blow and saved Arnold's fortune in
the process. Burke and Meyer's findings about Arnold's treachery refute standard accounts of
how his plot was uncovered by accident after colonial highwaymen robbed him. The authors
point to information recently uncovered that implied that it was really the work of colonial spies
whose identity Washington wanted to protect by inventing the story of the robbery.12

12

[The specific archives were not indicated but that they do list the numerous archives that they used to research
their digital project. Though the influential and wealthy Robert Townsend could not break intelligence reports about
the British Army, a woman in Manhattan, secretly connected to Tallmadge, was able to accomplish what Townsend
could not and proved crucial in relaying crucial reports about the nature of British forces moving in and out of
NYC.]