Reconciliation As A Transformation Mechanism For Peace, Development and Stability in Africa: With Comparative Evidence From Five Countries

Reconciliation as a transformation mechanism for peace, development and stability in Africa:
with comparative evidence from five countries

Brian Ikejiaku
Abstract
The recent revolutions in North African countries, commonly referred to as the North African
Arab Spring, has shown that Peace and Development are most desired in Africa, but remain
elusive, with serious implication for the stability of the region. There are a number of underlying
factors or forces, including the following; governments and the governed have been estranged by
protracted crises because the basic needs of the people are unmet; there are divisions between
different ethnic groups due to the struggle for survival; and political opponents have suffered
human rights violations from leaders who cling to power. This paper argues that almost all
African countries have continued to search for peace and development over decades because the
reconciliation mechanism has been downplayed as a peace-process. This paper uses brief
empirical comparative illustrative evidence on South Africas Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) and Nigerias Oputa Panel, as well as examples from Uganda, Mozambique
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to drive home its message. The comparative
analysis focuses on how reconciliation can be used as a mechanism for the actualisation of peace
and development in Africa; it also emphasises and compares the roles of the political leadership
in achieving this. The paper concludes that the role of political leadership is crucial to the
success or failure of reconciliation in any given State.
Keywords: Approach to Peace, Civil Society, Conflict, Development, Military Intervention, Law
& Order, Reconciliation Mechanism, and Stability
Introduction
The African region remains one of the most un-peaceful and under-developed regions globally,
even though sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed continued growth in the recent years 1. Evidence
suggests that within the past ten years, sub-Saharan Africa is still the poorest region globally.
The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

Fall 2014, Volume 2 Number 1
For example, not a single country in this natural-resource-gifted sub-region of Africa is on track
to achieve the international target for halving extreme poverty by 20152. Studies also show that
territorial disputes, armed conflicts, civil wars, violence, and the collapse of governments have
become more common and pronounced in Africa than in any other region, taking on a scale and
intensity that defy most conflict resolution approaches3. The association between conflict and
underdevelopment has become more evident since the end of the Cold War. Out of 63 lowincome (poor and underdeveloped) countries, 38 are located in sub-Saharan Africa, and
strikingly, these are the countries associated with conflict, lack of peace, instability, and
underdevelopment 4 .
It is against this unique backdrop, conceptual matrix, and intellectual
platform that this paper attempts to fill an academic research vacuum in the field of peace,
conflict, security, and development studies. This paper links theory and practice and, based on
existing trends in the 21st century, attempts to investigate the question of why peace and
development are most desired in the African region, but remain elusive while impacting the
stability in the region. Most peace and conflict scholars concur that reconciliation is a powerful
conflict resolution mechanism; for example, Assefa5 highlights the importance of reconciliation
over other conflict resolution mechanisms. This paper attempts to analyze the importance of
reconciliation in the context of the current plethora of conflicts, insecurity, and conflict
resolution trends in Africa.
This paper argues that almost all African countries have continued to search for peace and
development over the past three decades. This is because the reconciliation mechanism has been
seriously neglected, downplayed, or poorly used as a peace process, which has once again been
demonstrated by the recent North African Arab Spring. This paper, therefore, is a timely call on
Africa at a critical period in the 21st century to rise up and embrace the practical reconciliation

mechanism as a positive transformative peace process and then open her two hands to
accepting the development benefits that go with it, in order to ensure stability on the continent.
Section two of this paper briefly captures the theoretical context of reconciliation as a conflict
resolution mechanism.
Section three considers some of the forces that inhibit peace and
development in the continent, such as estrangement between the governments and the governed
because of basic needs of people remaining unmet; divisions between different ethnic groups or
communities due to the struggle for survival; and human rights abuses against political
opponents by leaders clinging to power, etc. Section four looks at the efforts made by Africa and
the international community to bring peace and stability in Africa, particularly through military
intervention, with specific reference to the on-going conflict in Libya. It then examines
reconciliation as what Africa needs most in section five, followed by brief comparative
illustrative evidence from South Africa and Nigeria in section six. Section seven assesses the
impact of reconciliation in achieving peace, development, and stability in African countries,
using Uganda, Mozambique, and the DRC as evidence. Section eight presents reconciliation as
the panacea or best available solution for Africas rampant, incessant, and protracted conflicts.
Finally, the paper concludes in section nine that the nature of conflicts and violations in Africa
requires optimum use of the practical reconciliation mechanism, facilitated by a positive political
climate, in order to bring about a more peaceful society, accelerated development, and stability in
African States.
Reconciliation: a brief theoretical context

While conflict and peace scholars, professionals and practitioners view reconciliation from
different perspectives, most authors agree that reconciliation describes a process rather than an

end-state of affairs or an outcome of a situation, aimed at building relationships between

individuals, groups, and societies. Reconciliation has been defined as a process through which
a society moves from a divided past to a shared future; looking at the past in a way that allows
people to see it in terms of shared suffering and collective responsibility, which may help to
restore confidence6. Scholars challenge some of the assumptions that have been made regarding
reconciliation being generic, meaning the same thing for different levels of society, particularly
at national and community levels. For example, reconciliation according to Merwe is multilevel, in that it is used in relation to international conflicts, national conflicts, community
conflicts, and interpersonal conflicts. He argues that this usage of the term at different levels
brings with it the danger that the definition and practice of reconciliation at one level may be
assumed to have the same meaning it does at other levels7.
It has also been argued that reconciliation processes will not necessarily lead to
forgiveness, as this is a power held only by those victimized that cannot be claimed by others8.
However, Rigby highlights that for any kind of reconciliation processes to become of national
relevance, ultimately all strata of society needs to be involved. He speaks of a culture of
reconciliation and forgiveness, of justice and truth that needs to emerge out of cultures of
violence and impunity9. A new culture of this kind would mean that the various levels of the
national society in question must have internalized reconciliation, so that the basic conditions for
the restoration of the fabric of community are met 10. Rigbys conception of reconciliation is very
relevant to this paper, as it views reconciliation at the national level, which helps in
understanding the role reconciliation can play in the conflict-ridden nations of Africa. It also
points to the importance of involving all segments of society.

The need for reconciliation is emphasised in particular for societies that have gone
through a processes of ethno-political conflict, as these are marked by a loss of trust, intergenerational transmission of trauma and grievance, negative interdependence (since the assertion
of each groups identity may require the negation of other groups identity), and polarization.
Given that antagonists may be living in close proximity, not addressing these legacies means
risking that they become the cause of new spirals of violence. Reconciliation therefore is
regarded as being necessary in preventing the desire for revenge11. Bloomfield et al, argue that
reconciliation is an over-arching process, which includes a search for truth, justice, forgiveness,
healing, etc. At its simplest, this means finding a way to live alongside former enemies and to
coexist with them to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them,
so that we can all have better lives together than we have had separately, not necessarily loving
them, forgiving them, or forgetting the past in any way. In trying to distinguish politics from
reconciliation, they posit that whereas politics is a process for dealing with the issues that have
divided us in the past, reconciliation is a parallel process that redesigns the relationship
between us12.
In looking specifically at the concept of reconciliation in post-conflict situations, one
scholar explains that the term generally refers to the processes by which parties that have
experienced an oppressive relationship or a destructive conflict with each other move to attain or
to restore a relationship that they believe to be minimally acceptable13. In addition to this basic
level of understanding, reconciliation in post-conflict situations is also often understood to be
the process of healing the traumas of both victims and perpetrators after violence, a process
that provides a base upon which justice and peace can be constructed14.

Some factors inhibiting peace, development and stability in African states

Against this contextual backdrop, this paper argues that almost all African countries have
continued to search in vain for peace and development over the past three decades, while
seriously neglecting, down playing, or poorly using the reconciliation mechanism as a peace
process.
It proposes that peace and development are most desired in the African region;
however, they remain the most elusive due to several underlying factors.
The first underlying factor has been suppression and intimidation of the masses through
human rights abuses by leaders who over-stay their term in office, such as the extensive list of
the cases of Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast (2000-2011), Muammar Gaddafi of Libya (19692011), Yoweri Museveni of Uganda (1986-1997), Hosni Mubarak in Egypt (1981-2011), Ibrahim
Babangida of Nigeria (1985-1993), Samuel Kanyon Doe of Liberia (1980-1989), Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia (1987-2011), Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe15 (1980 to date), Emperor
Jean Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic (1976-1979), Idi Amin of Uganda (19711979), P. Botha of South Africa (1978-1989), and Mobutu Sese Seku of Zaire (1965-1997)16.
These leaders exhibit similar characteristics and personality traits, such as most came to power
through revolution or coup dtat, they are usually power hungry, and use their power to control
and even oppress their citizens. They are known to imprison thousands, confiscate private
property, confine citizens to islands as captive workers, and to re-educate or re-orient people to
chant the ideologies they favor, or even their own ideologies. Their governments are identified
with endemic poverty, lack of political freedom, weak opposition movements, and large-scale
youth unemployment; and their tenures cannot exactly be said to have set Africa on the road to
peace, development, and stability17.

The second notable underlying factor is the struggle between different communities or
ethnic groups in African states, with the most obvious case being the ethnic crisis between the
Tutsi and Hutus in Rwanda that culminated in mass killing, genocide, and war 18 . In South
Africa, ethnicity made it extremely difficult for the indigenous Africans to enjoy the fruits of
modernization because the white rulers who saw them as a threat continually discriminated and
marginalized them (for example Zulu, Xhosa, and other black ethnic groups) in education, social
facilities, and jobs, which deepened their poverty and intensified conflicts 19 . In Sudan, the
Darfur crisis is yet another instance of the extremes of ethnicity. Before it recently gained
independence, the people and ethnic groups of South Sudan had over the years suffered at the
hands of the more powerful Northerners20. The 2001 Nigeria ethnic crises between the Tiv and
the Junkun tribes claimed hundreds of lives21. Ethnic tensions have also been intense between
the Ijaws and the Itsekiris in the Niger Delta, resulting in the curtailment of oil production by
multinational corporations.
Other recent communal clashes include those between Ife and
Modakeke, the Aguleri communal crisis in Anambra State, and the violent ethnic clashes in
Plateau State, where about 48 people lost their lives in February 200422. African leaders are
therefore faced with the huge task of trying to balance ethnic consciousness and national
patriotism as a way of ensuring peace, development, and stability.
African leaders have played various roles in fomenting these community or ethnic
conflicts. For example, there have been few free and fair elections, and most times the true
leaders of peoples choice are not elected to power. Leaders put all their resources into making
sure that they keep themselves in power, including engineering political or election crises. They
suppress opposition, maintain secret and personal security apparatus, and make things difficult
for the masses rather than respond to the needs of the community or the masses. When leaders

fail to provide the basic human needs of the people or when the people are relatively deprived of
what they are supposed to get or expect to receive, as a last resort they respond by engaging in
conflict. The human needs theory offers a framework of analysis that centers on unmet human
needs. The theory that unmet human needs are a remote source of conflict and violence is a
well-established idea in the fields of politics, international relations, and development studies 23.
Similarly, the relative deprivation theory associated with Gurr24, informs us that people are
bound to rebel when they realize that there is a great discrepancy between what by right they are
supposed to get and their actual reward25. Notable examples include Liberia during the regime
of Samuel Doe, the 2007 Kenya and 2008 Zimbabwe crises, and Nigeria during the regimes of
Babangida and Abacha, as well as in other countries as argued above.
A third factor is the incessant internal conflict found in most countries on the continent.
It seems odd to talk optimistically of peace, development, and stability in African countries
where conflicts have become common, such as Nigeria (since 1985 riots and communal
clashes), apartheid South Africa (1948-1994 riots and violent demonstrations), Mozambique
(1976-1992- civil war and communal clashes) and DRC (1996-2001 civil war). Others include
Sudan (1983-2003 civil war), Somalia (1981-2002 civil war), Kenya (1991-1992, 1997 and
2003-2008 riots and violent demonstrations), Sierra Leone (1991-2000 civil and regional
wars), Liberia (1989-2003 civil and regional wars), Zimbabwe (2004-ongoing riots, violent
demonstrations and communal clashes), Rwanda (1990-ongoing civil and regional wars),
Burundi (1991-onging civil and regional wars), and Angola (1975-2002 civil and regional
wars) 26 . Likewise, in Somalia, Liberia, and the Sudan the rise of political factions led by
warlords during the interminable civil wars rendered the initiatives to restore elusive peace,
distorted development, and undermined stability27.

There are a number of underlying problem factors regarding the cause or increase of
internal conflicts in Africa. In particular, research has shown that ethnicity, elections, colonial
manipulation of Africas boundaries, and long-standing conflicts over lands are the primary
underlying factors for internal conflicts in Africa. Theorists believe that ethnicity underlies
virtually all conflicts in Africa, as ethnic groups engage in violence in their bid to compete for
scarce resources such as property rights, jobs, education, and social amenities. There are studies
employing empirical evidence that associate conflict with ethnic problems28; for example, one
such study identifies the root causes of internal conflicts in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Rwanda as
ethnicity29.
Elections in Africa have also impacted Africas level of conflict. Vote-rigging and
political manipulations of election results have led to internal conflicts in various African
countries. For example, the election of June 12, 1993 in Nigeria, is widely acknowledged to
have been manipulated in order to side-track or prevent Abiola from becoming president; and the
rigging and manipulation of the election results in both Zimbabwe and Kenya in 2007-2008 led
to conflicts. Colonial manipulation of Africas boundaries and territoriality is another factor that
helps in the understanding of Africas littered conflicts. Scholars argue that one of the possible
explanations for its complex and difficult political history is the lopsided nature of the postcolonial African State itself. Being modelled on Westminster, the African State is thus based on
an imported model30.
The fourth underlying factor is the inability of governments to meet the basic needs of the
people, such as in Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Ethiopia, and most other African countries.
Whenever such non-negotiable needs are not met, crises and other instabilities, such as the
breaking of laws and organized strikes, are almost inevitable. The most important need now in

Africa is basic material need, such as food, water, health, and shelter, and most governments in
Africa have failed their people in providing their basic needs. When leaders and states fail to
address important issues concerning basic needs, there are bound to be counter-reactions from
citizens. Such reactions distort peace, hinder development, and heighten instability31.
It is understandable that distortion of peace in any form, whether through direct conflict,
human rights abuses, or opposition to government because of poor responsiveness to the needs of
the people, has a direct and devastating impact on development. It diverts government attention,
affects public infrastructure and assets, disrupts livelihoods and reduces savings, undermines law
and order and political processes, and causes social and cultural erosion and dislocation32.
Efforts made to broker peace in Africa

In the face of these numerous peace and development challenges facing the African continent,
there have been continued efforts aimed at achieving peace, security, and stability in African
countries by the use of various conflict resolution instruments. Conflict resolution here refers to
all those activities that are concerned with transforming destructive or armed conflict along
constructive, non-violent channels33. Various conflict resolution mechanisms, such as mediation,
arbitration, negotiation, peace-keeping, and military intervention have been employed by
different bodies or agencies, including local communities, NGOs, governments of conflicting
states, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development
Community (SADC), the African Union (AU), as well as the international community in the
form of the United Nations, with the aim to bring peace and stability between different
conflicting parties within the African States. The Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), championed by Nigeria, moved to suppress the rebellion that

10
threatened to destabilize Sierra Leone in 1991. The Rwandan genocide in 1994 saw a series of
interventions from different bodies, including a UN Peacekeeping Force before it ended; and the
SADC made a timely move in 1998 to prop up the regime of Laurent Kabila in the DRC 34. In
short, the list of conflict resolution or peace processes in Africa is endless. On the one hand, they
reflect the commitment of Africans to solve their own disputes peacefully, and on the other hand,
the participation of external bodies, like the UN, helps reduce African conflicts and assists in
avoiding unnecessary loss of limb and human life.
In spite of these and other numerous conflict resolution activities in Africa, peace
continues to elude Africa with negative impacts on development and stability.
This is
particularly pronounced given the record of conflicts impacting negatively on development and
stability in Africa in recent times; for example, since 1999 more than 10,000 Nigerians have
been killed in sectarian and communal attacks and reprisals between Muslims and Christians35.
In South Africa, there were some 8,000 deaths and 14,000 injuries between 1990 and 1992 as a
result of the internal uprising 36 , and in Northern Uganda many lives were lost in the tribal
conflict between 2005 and 2008 37 .
As mentioned above, the 2007 Kenyan and 2008
Zimbabwean conflicts were mostly associated with election crises38, and since 2009 conflicts
have ensued in other parts of Africa including Egypt, Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, and
elsewhere, as Africa witnesses revolutions from the citizens bringing about the downfall of
leaders who have held on to power for many years39.
In terms of the role of conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa, the on-going conflictive
transformation of the North Africa Arab Spring and particularly the Libyan conflict provides a
good illustration. Many, if not all Africans, accept that Muammer Gaddafi played a major part in
bringing peace and development to Libya in the past; for example, his leadership role in the B.P.

11
Exploration Company (Libya) Limited v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic40. In the late
1990s, there was an influx of people from other African countries into Libya seeking a
livelihood, and this period witnessed a trend towards a free market economy. This was matched
by foreign investment and a subsequent impulse geared toward further economic reforms
intended to improve the economic framework and render it more efficient. The revised UNDP
2008 Human Development Index (HDI) ranked Libya 52nd out of 177 countries, above
competitors, particularly in comparison with other countries in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region, excluding the rich Gulf States. The policies created by the then-revolutionary
leadership regarding the advancement of women reduced gender discrimination, while social
exclusion due to poverty and lack of access to education was nearly non-existent, with health,
education, and social equality as high priorities41. However, Gaddafis engagement in conflicts
with foreign powers, entrenchment in office, and authoritarian political system amidst increasing
tensions ultimately were contributing factors in his downfall.
It can be argued that had Gaddafi been wise enough to have used his political wisdom
and capabilities and accepted entering into a reconciliation mechanism with the rebels (with the
latter renouncing the name of rebel42 as such) at the out-set, the degree of carnage, loss of
economic wealth, and destruction of socio-economic development in the country could have
been avoided. Another point to note is the role the US/NATO-led coalition played which backed
the rebels militarily, and received mixed reactions in different quarters43. Although it seemed a
success, as a conflict resolution action mechanism this was not a positive development in
establishing an effective peace process or conflict resolution in Africa. Notwithstanding the
criticisms, the Libya example should send a cautionary message to other dictators in Africa, and
the people they rule, that intervention might be repeated. Dictators should not rely entirely on

12
the often-emphasized hidden agenda point that if there is no wealth in the form of natural
resources in their States, they may hardly attract the interest of Westerners44.
Most African conflict scholars concur that other forms of conflict resolution, particularly
military intervention, have not produced the required result, however, they gave varying reasons.
For example, Chuma argues that these conflict resolutions to some extent failed to generate
consensus in their respective regions, and have often come too late45. Be that as it may, the
position of this paper is that African countries have neglected or downplayed the optimum use of
reconciliation as a transformative mechanism, this being the most pivotal actualization of peace
and development on the continent, as the paper will seek to demonstrate.
Reconciliation is what Africa needs most

Unlike other peace processes or conflict resolution tools, there is indication that reconciliation is
the hardest to grasp. Its meaning, processes, and application have not been clearly articulated or
developed. However, its aim to appease, heal, and peacefully co-exist is apparent, and though
it might seem odd to point it out, this is what makes it the best option among other peace
mechanisms in Africa. This implies that reconciliation can take the form of different processes
or applications, as long as its aims are met or achieved.
For the purpose of this paper,
reconciliation means the deliberate or intentional acceptance of guilt and the existing task by the
conflicting parties to initiate interaction, doing so conscientiously in order to communicate a
partys grievances against the deeds of the other party, as well as involving self-reflection on the
part played in the dynamic of the conflict, all with the aim to appease, heal and peacefully coexist.

13
The significant issues that the conflicting parties cannot avoid and have to deal with in
the context of States, is usually how to induce different groups or parties within a State to
peacefully coexist after years of conflict, human rights abuses, suppressions, oppressions, and
sufferings in order to go forward as a peaceful and united entity. This seems to suggest that a
level, potentially strong level, of personal sacrifice is needed in the reconciliation process. It is
from this perspective that a respected peace and conflict expert, Lederach46, sees reconciliation
as a dynamic, adaptive process of rebuilding interpersonal and community relationships. He
identifies at least four salient ingredients or components necessary in reconciliation; namely
truth, justice, mercy, and peace. More comprehensively, Assefa adduces the definition of
reconciliation47 as follows:
Reconciliation is the voluntary initiative of the conflict parties to acknowledge
their responsibility and guilt. The interactions that transpire between the
parties are not only meant to communicate ones grievances against the actions
of the adversary, but also to engage in self-reflection about ones own role and
behaviour in the dynamic of the conflict. In other words, in this kind of
dialogue, as much as one attributes guilt and responsibility to the adversary for
the damage generated by the conflict, one has to also be self-critical and
acknowledge responsibility for his or her own role in the creation or
perpetuation of the conflict and hurtful interaction. The aim of such interaction
is that, in the final analysis, each of the parties acknowledges and accepts his
or her responsibility and out of such recognition seeks ways to redress the
injury that has been inflicted on the adversary, to reframe from further damage,
and to construct new positive relationships48.
African countries have downplayed the use of reconciliation mechanisms, at least in the
sense that either it is not used at all or not properly utilized, in part because of the pomposity or
pretensions of African leaders and other protagonists in conflicts in the various conflict-ridden
African States. Leaders do not cooperate fully during reconciliation, which was the case in
Rwanda (1992-93), Burundi (1995-96), Sierra Leone (2002), and particularly Nigeria (19992001). Compare those countries with South Africa (1995-2000) 49 , where by contrast moral

14
leadership
was
a primary factor
behind
South
Africas
remarkable
reconciliation
transformation50. A brief comparative analysis between South Africas Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and Nigerias Oputa Panel will be helpful in understanding the importance of
reconciliation in Africa, and in demonstrating the position of this paper that reconciliation should
be seen as a key transformation mechanism for peace and development on African continent.
South Africas TRC and Nigerias Oputa Panel: a brief comparative illustration
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission proceedings in the late 1990s led to detailed findings
on various problems that were root causes of the conflict in South Africa51, including corruption
and the misuse of funds52. Nigeria, known for its gross human rights violations, transitioned to
democracy in 1999 after over sixteen years of authoritarian military rule, and established the
Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission (HRVIC, popularly called the Oputa
Panel)53. The TRC has some similarities with the Oputa Panel, in the sense that both aimed in
principle to bring peace in order to pave the way for accelerated development, but practically
they were very different as seen in their structure, processes, and outcome.
The structure and processes of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
centers on its legalized structure and procedural form54, established under an Act of Parliament
in 1994 and by the promulgation of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Bill in
1995, which formalized a seventeen-member commission to facilitate a truth and recovery
process aimed at reconciliation 55 .
The TRC as a statutory agent of national unity and
reconciliation was set up to investigate gross human rights violations, such as abductions,
killings, torture, and severe ill treatment, committed by the State and by liberation movements

15
between March 21st, 1960 and May 10th, 1994. The Commission in performing its role was
empowered to grant individual amnesty, search premises and seize evidence, subpoena
witnesses, and run a sophisticated witness protection program.
During the period of its
operation, December 1995 to June 2002, TRC had three committees: the Human Rights
Violations Committee, the Amnesty Committee, and the Reparations and Rehabilitation
Committee56.
In Nigeria, the former president, Olusegun Obasanjo, had proposed to establish a
Reconciliation Commission similar to the South Africas TRC to investigate the causes, nature,
and extent of the gross violations of human rights that took place from June 2000 to May 2004,
but this proposed Reconciliation Commission never came to being.
Thus, in 1999, after
Obasanjo took the mantle of leadership as president of Nigeria, the Human Rights Violations
Investigation Commission, popularly known as the Oputa Panel, was established by the
executive arm pursuant to extant commission of inquiry legislation to investigate all human
rights violations that had occurred in the country between 1966 and 1999. However, unlike
South Africas TRC, the Oputa panel was not established by the Nigerian Parliament, and thus
lacked similar legal force or backing to carry out its task of investigating human rights violations
in Nigeria.
In the process of its work, the TRC defined its focus of gross human rights violations to
include specifically only victims of killing, torture, abduction, and severe ill treatment57. In
Nigeria, by contrast, there was no such particular focus, with activities covering anything
concerning the suffering of human rights victims. The Oputa Panel also lacked committees of
the kind established by South African legislature to assist the TRC in the process of
implementing its objectives. This includes the Committee on Human Rights Violations to

16
conduct public hearing throughout the country; the Committee on Amnesty to consider
applications for amnesty from those who had committed political crimes; and the Committee on
Reparation and Rehabilitation of Victims to formulate recommendations on how to implement
a reparation policy58. Another point of comparison is that, in its three years of operation in
Nigeria, the Oputa Panel held numerous public hearings in Abuja, Lagos, Kano, and Port
Harcourt and captivated radio and television across the nation, but relied mostly on international
financial support to survive. The TRC held public hearings covering almost the entire country
and had a strong budget, with the government of South Africa providing enough money for its
operations. Moreover, unlike the TRC in South Africa, the representative value of the hearings
of the Oputa panel in Nigeria was more limited because they tended to operate in an adversarial
manner, rather than taking the victim-centered approach of the TRC. Lastly it may be noted that
the HRVICs final report in Nigeria, submitted in 2002, remained confidential until 2004 when
social pressure forced its publications59.
As to their outcomes, critics of the TRC have argued that it did not stretch its horizons or
reach out its tentacles sufficiently to hold senior members of the former government, security
establishment, and business community accountable. The same can be said of the Oputa Panel in
Nigeria, and in this respect both were unlike the Nuremburg trials that took place in Germany
after the defeat of the Nazi regime. A good example is that some personalities at the top end of
the apartheid elite were left to enjoy their holiday homes along the countrys coastline (P.W.
Botha, for instance, quietly retreated to his villa in the aptly-named resort town of Wilderness).
In Nigeria, similarly the likes of IBB (Babangida) are gallivanting while taking their retirements
in the serene countryside of the Niger State. Many of these individuals, including members of
the business elite, have neither accounted for their crimes nor applied for amnesty for offences

17
they might have committed, even refusing in certain cases to cooperate with or answer their
invitations to attend the TRC or Oputa Panel respectively.
This should, however, not detract the fact that the TRC achieved the major purpose of
reconciliation, which Oputa Panel did not. The TRC did help thousands of victims of political
violence find answers to what had happened to love ones, and contributed to national
reconciliation and transformation to peace in South Africa, since no one could claim complete
ignorance of what happened under apartheid60. It is apparent that the TRC, unlike the Oputa
Panel, achieved the primary aim of reconciliation, as this paper proposes, to appease, heal and
peacefully co-exist, just as Oputa61 informed us in a personal interview to the Vanguard:
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa was something
wider in scope, larger in content and funded by the government, the legislature.
A law was passedand they knew what they were after. 62 Money was
provided for research and provided for the sittings of the panel. And the
Commission produced what was destined to bring together the warring groups
in South Africa. And bring them into a nation. Our panel, on the other hand,
was an imitation good imitation of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. As its funding 63 was half-hearted, the legislature was not
involved; facilities were not available to the commission
The above discussions show that the role of good political climate and leadership cannot
be overemphasised in the success of South Africas reconciliation. This was manifested by the
part played by provision of good political climate and leadership qualities of South African
leaders, particularly Nelson Mandela, De Klerk, and Desmond Tutu. These leaders were able to
sacrifice by forgetting the past and moving ahead towards the path of peace, development, and
stability. Just as Amstutz64 argues while discussing the factors behind South Africas notable
transformation with particular reference to the role of moral leadership:
I happen to think that the reason why South Africas model succeeded so well
the person of Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela, is that they did not follow

18
retributive model that was followed by. In a normal civil society context,
however, (the strength of SA model is that it takes an alternative paradigm of
restorative justice which is not fully justice, but its a different kind of justice
in the sense that it calls attention to the healing of the social fabric and political
fabric and hopefully the moral/cultural fabric of society; the extraordinary
leadership, not just on the ANC side, in the case of Nelson Mandela who is a
man of enormous moral courage, but also on the opposite side of President De
Klerk, who was a great statesman.
Reconciliation mechanism made civil society in South Africa seen as being far more
supportive of democracy and helped to minimize the problems that confronted Mbekis
government. Thus, the level of conflict and other instabilities were reduced and more buoyant
economic development achieved within this period than during the apartheid period, a period
characterized by political repressive regimes.
Besides that the Oputa Panel could not bring solace to the opposing factions (unlike in
South Africa), Nigeria has also been less fortunate in its leadership. Ethno-religious conflicts in
Nigeria have continued because the nation seems to have not healed the wounds sustained by the
majority of Nigerians during the Military regimes. Therefore, problems in Nigeria continued,
and political elites succumbed to corruption, human rights violations, split along lines of religion
and ethnicity. The human rights groups that fought against General Babangidas and Abachas
military junta regimes were not prepared for electoral politics, rather with the failure of the
Oputa reconciliation panel to heal the wounds and appease the minds of those affected by years
of oppressions. Hence, the nation marched towards democratization with a feeble civil society
fearing future military takeovers.
Indeed, unlike in the post TRC South Africa with
reconciliation written in the peoples countenances, during the transition to democratic period in
Nigeria were militant ethnic associations that lacked appeasement, which is one of the major
benefits of reconciliation rather than true civil society.

This included the Oudua Peoples
19
Movement for the Yorubas, the Arewa Group for the Hausa-Fulanis, and the Movement for the
Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MOSOB) for the Ibos. Therefore, quite unlike
authentic civil society that acts with rationality for the attainment of peace, development, and
stability, these militant associations operated like political thugs and ethnic gangsters, rarely
promoting the principles, tenets, and aspirations of peace, development, and stability. This
compounded the problems that confronted President Obasanjo during his tenure.
The path to and result of reconciliation in Nigeria and South Africa, had impact on the
level of poverty, conflict, and development in these countries.
As argued, reconciliation
mechanism made civil society in South Africa appear far more supportive of democracy and
helped to minimize the problems that confronted Mbekis government. This is not the case with
Obasanjos administration. It would appear that today South Africa has a higher standard of
living compared to Nigeria.
For instance, the percentage of people with access to social
amenities such as health, and water is higher in South Africa. That nation also has higher life
expectancy and lower infant mortality65. Evidence suggests that although the poverty level was
higher in South Africa (50%) than Nigeria (46%) in early 1980s, this was reversed by 200066.
While poverty did increase in the immediate post-apartheid period in South Africa things had
improved in South Africa compared to Nigeria by the end of the twentieth century (19962000)67. The foregoing overall assessment indicates that the poverty rate was better after the
period of reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa than both during apartheid and after
reconciliation in Nigeria. As argued, this was possible because of the good political leadership
during reconciliation in South Africa.
Impact of Reconciliation in Achieving Peace and Development in Africa (Mozambique,

Uganda and DRC) and the Role of Political Leadership

20
Evidence shows that a major factor that has created and perpetuated poverty and
underdevelopment in Africa is internal conflicts68. It is clear that conflict distorts peace and
promotes economic decline, but the reverse is true as well. Overcoming conflict, particularly
through reconciliation, helps to promote peaceful coexistence, which in turn brings swift
improvements in economic growth, as well as reduction of poverty. A pertinent example is the
experience of the reconciliation processes in Mozambique (1992) and Uganda (1986-1995)69,
which helped in the search for peace, and in turn led to accelerated development in these two
countries. This was not the case with the DRC where reconciliation was totally neglected, which
led to lack of peace and development plummeted. After relative peace came to Uganda in 1995
and Mozambique in 1992 following the reconciliations that took place within these periods, their
governments substantially improved governance and policy with strong backing from donors.
Growth came quickly and was sustained, leading to a rapid reduction in poverty. The number of
Ugandans living below the poverty line of one dollar per day was reduced sharply from 56
percent in 1992 to 35 percent in 2000. In Mozambique, the poverty share fell from 69 percent in
1997 to 54 percent in 200370. Also as argued, the case of South Africa in recent years is another
good point regarding the relative respite that came in South Africa after the end of Apartheid in
1994, consolidated by the achievement of peace through the reconciliation in 2000. This was
followed by high growth rate and positive changes in poverty and well-being since about onethird of those households, who were poor in 1993, were non-poor between 2002 and 200571.
Just as in South Africa and Nigeria, the nature of political climate and political leadership
in Mozambique, Uganda, and DRC also played important roles on their level of growth and
development in relation to peace and reconciliation when comparatively assessed.
In

21
Mozambique there was protracted conflict, or civil war, beginning in 1977, in which about one
million people died in fighting and starvation, and over five million civilians were displaced72.
However, after fighting ended in early 1992, the period of reconciliation began between the
ruling and opposition leaders. This led to Rome General Peace Accords (RGPA), which was
negotiated by the Community of SantEgidio with the support of the United Nations. President
Chissano and the RENAMO opposition leader, Afonso Dhlakama, signed the RGPA in October
1992, and the countrys first multi-party democratic elections took place in 199473. It was within
the period after reconciliation (1992 - 1997) that Mozambique experienced a high level of
growth and development. The provision of a good political climate and the leadership qualities
of Mozambique leaders, particularly Chissano and Dhlakama who were able to make sacrifice by
forgetting the past years of incessant conflict in Mozambique and moved towards the path of
peace and reconciliation, led to the experience of growth and development within this period.
In Uganda, the peace and reconciliation process that followed years of crises, paved way
to growth and development. However, this was fundamentally more from the efforts of the Civil
Society (CSOs) rather than political leadership. Since independence in 1962, Uganda has been
plagued by ethnically driven and politically manipulated violence referred to by some scholars
and professionals as a history of cycles of revenge and mistrust 74 . In effect, deep-rooted
division and polarization remain between different ethnic groups, and these have been greatly
exacerbated by the way in which the countrys leadership has developed since the period of
independence, starting from the leadership of Dr. Milton Obete who received instruments of
power from the British at Independence to Field Marshal Idi Amin, Tito Okello Lurwa, and
Yoweri Museveni.

22
From 1992, the Civil Society, not the political leadership, played a significant role in
peace making that led to the formation of Ugandas 1995 Constitution. Although the National
Resistance Movement (NRM) Government initiated the Constitutional reform process, many
sectors of the society influenced the process, either through debate, advocacy, or underground
influences and intervention75. The growth that was experienced in Uganda between 1992 and
2000 was because the bulk of CSOs in Uganda engaged in the provision of services and filled the
gaps in many areas that influence development including health, education, agriculture and food,
income generating activities, capacity building, water, and sanitation. The predominance of
CSOs in this area is explained by two main factors: the inability by the state to provide social and
economic services to its entire population, and the poverty crisis that afflicts a large percentage
of the countrys population.
Increasingly, many CSOs were involved in the anti-corruption campaign, such as the
Uganda Debt Network (UDN), Transparency International (TI), and the Anti Corruption
Coalition of Uganda (ACCU).
These were the bodies that dwelt on policy intervention,
especially the campaigning for debt relief, debt management, and accountability for Government
funds. These interface with the office of Inspector General of Government (IGG) and the
Department of Ethics and Integrity in fighting corruption and advocating for the enactment and
enforcement of the Leadership Code76. It can be argued that it was because of the state of peace
within this period and the cooperation of the Museveni government, at least not opposing the
activities of the CSOs, which helped Uganda experience high growth between 1995 and 2000.
Since the DRCs independence on June 30, 1960, the countrys leadership has lacked
three important attributes necessary for reconciliation as a peace mechanism, which is of utmost
importance to the countrys welfare. These include: (i) a real vision for the DRCs future, as

23
opposed to agendas and projects; (ii) the competence and ability to execute the vision; and (iii)
the character needed to ensure the realization of the vision with sound judgement, integrity, and
equity77. Ideas for agenda of reconciliation or national unity were replaced with other agendas
by the DRCs presidents, which were both vague and unrealistic. For example, Mobutus de la
NSele in 1967 and Objectif 80, both of which promised to make Zaire, (now DRC), the best
country among Africa countries, lacked strict implementation and gradually came to be regarded
as wish lists rather than political programs. Often the leadership used symbolic gestures and
slogans, in place of substantive action to pacify the Congolese people with the illusion of
progress and historically conceived amidst violence, corruption, and limited accountability78.
The later period of Congolese leadership, dominated first by Laurent-Desire Kabila and
then by Joseph Kabila, was unable to fundamentally change the dynamic that Mobutu created.
The second Kabilas Les Cinq Chantiers program aimed to address five sectors: infrastructure
(e.g., roads, rails, bridges); job creation through investment; health care and education; water;
electricity and housing. However, this program failed woefully because it was conceived on a
weak foundation due to a poor political climate where the leadership did not provide the platform
for any kind of reconciliation. The minds of the Congolese people, affected by years of violence,
remained unappeased and unhealed. Hence, the DRC progressed towards democratization and
embarked on development programs with a feeble civil society. NGambwa argues in this
perspective that:
To break from DRCs past pattern of poor governance, a clear and practical
vision for the countrys future must be articulated. Appropriate metrics must
be identified, and reformative leadership must become part of the discourse. A
starting point for the DRC could involve all stakeholders working toward a
peaceful, politically stable, and economically prosperous DRC, requiring a
structured and vibrant economic system. When combined, the principle of
stability and prosperity can mutually reinforce one another and ensure
continued development but this depends on a leadership that espouses

24
integrity, equity, benevolence, judgement, morality, ethics, and meritocracy,

while being demonstrably committed to advancing the rule of law, public trust,
international cooperation and legitimacy79.
However, the DRCs political leadership was not a reformative leadership, and did not provide a
good political climate conducive for reconciliation of any sort, which impacted negatively on
peace and development of the country.
Comparative analysis of the success or failure of the reconciliation process

The discussion above suggests that with comparative analysis, the major reasons for the success
or failure of the reconciliation process in the five countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Mozambique,
Uganda, and DRC), is determined by the nature of political leadership in each country. There is
evidence to show that the level of success or failure of reconciliation in each of the countries
depends on the type, roles, and activities of political leadership in creating conducive political
climate, and initiating policies necessary for the reconciliation process to thrive. There is the
suggestion that leaders are more likely to create a good political climate and conditions necessary
for achieving a successful reconciliation when they possess moral qualities, clear and practical
vision for the nations future, swallow some of their pride, and sacrifice to the nation by
forgetting the past. These factors and conditions determine the level of success or failure of
reconciliation in each of these five countries so they can move forward and progress to peace,
development, and stability.
On comparative terms, it is clear that in South Africas leadership, the likes of Mandela,
Tutu, and De Klerk demonstrated all or most of these features and were able to create a positive
political climate leading towards reconciliation in their country, while the political system
created a condition that was conducive for the various civil society groups to participate. South

25
African political leaders displayed good statesmanship, showed high standard of morality, and
were able to forget the past crises and animosity created during the apartheid era, which paved
the way for reconciliation. The reconciliation in South Africa was a success because it achieved
the primary aim of reconciliation to appease, heal and peacefully co-exist, as argued in this
paper. This was not the situation in Nigeria, in which the political leaders under President
Obasanjos administration failed to create a good political climate and necessary conditions for
the peace process to thrive. For example, in Nigeria, political corruption80 and religious and
tribal conflicts rooted on political grounds were common 81. This caused a lot of crisis in Nigeria
with various militant groups operating like political thugs and ethnic warriors, rather than
developing authentic civil society groups that contribute positively in paving the way for peace
process. This could not allow for successful reconciliation in Nigeria, due to the primary aim for
reconciliation to appease, heal and peacefully co-exist, which was not achieved.
While Uganda and Mozambique reconciliation processes are quite different and could be
placed in the middle of South Africa and Nigeria, the DRCs case is at the extreme and quite
different from all other cases because the peace process failed completely. In Uganda, there was
deep-rooted rancor, division, and polarization complicated by Ugandas leadership from Obete to
Museveni, though the latter did not prevent the CSOs from championing the process towards
peace. The political leaders in Uganda did not show the moral qualities and practical vision for
the nations future; the enabling political climate was absent in Uganda, while the CSOs were
committed and determined to forge ahead on the route to peace and reconciliation. This is the
major difference between Ugandas reconciliation and that of Nigeria, where in the latter the
CSOs failed to unite in the difficult political climate to ensure the success of reconciliation. In
Mozambique, the political leaderships of Chissano and Dhlakama displayed some good moral

26
qualities and provided a positive political climate for the reconciliation process. This attracted
the support of the United Nations and was to a large extent successful. The DRCs political
leadership was not a reformative leadership, and therefore, provided neither good moral qualities
nor a positive political climate conducive for reconciliation.
The brief comparative analysis suggests that South Africa had the most successful
reconciliation, followed by Mozambique, due to creating more positive moral and political
climates leading towards successful reconciliations. Ugandas reconciliation was the next in the
list of success, primarily due to the efforts of CSOs rather than political leadership, followed by
Nigeria.
Reconciliation is the panacea

Since Africa is one of, if not the most conflicting regions globally, it can be argued that Africa
mostly desires peace and development more than any other region, and there is a need to take
advantage of reconciliation mechanism. Reconciliation costs less financially than most other
conflict resolution mechanisms, and requires collective and self-sacrifice, particularly from the
conflicting parties. The fact that reconciliation can equally take different processes and its goals
are achieved, also makes it an asset for Africa. The modern process of reconciliation can be
perfectly blended with Africas traditional method of reconciliation in order to attain peace.
Africas historical values and cultural antecedent demonstrate that Africa possesses
effective traditional methods of reconciliation, but the embrace to Western culture in the past
thirty years has not only polluted this traditional method, but has almost replaced it. Resolutions
of Africas conflicts make recourse to conventional mechanisms that have excluded the

27
traditional approach; for example, in his paper presentation in 2001, Brock-Utne82 presented a
traditional scenario with Ethiopia:
Ethiopia brings to light the experiences of grassroot peace-making efforts
among the communities of the Kidepo Valley of Eastern Equatoria. Kidepo is
a big forest that starts from Karenga Hills in the north-east of the border with
Uganda and extends deep into South Sudan. The people living along both
divides of the valley regard Kidepo as a major asset in terms of both water and
grazing resources, particularly during the dry season. It is worth pointing out
that communities of the region under study have lived in hostility and coexistence for years and their conflicts have just recently picked up intolerable
proportions due to the proliferation of modern weapons.
Similarly, Malan83 rightly argues: the current methods of conflict resolution from the Americas,
Europe, Asia, and Australia impress us on account of their professional quality and their
scientific underpinning by several human sciences. But we should not allow the appeal of such
contemporary material to make us forget the time-proven methods which originated on African
soil84.
This paper argues for the use of traditional African methods of reconciliation as a means
of conflict resolution. The paper recognizes that there are salient problems and needs that may
be more important or more urgent than resolution of conflicts by the use of western modern
scientific means, or by seeking justice and peace through western trials. Scholars argue that
prosecutions are ambivalent in certain transitional contexts and they can have highly
destabilizing implications on a peace settlement or a fragile shift to democracy. This is because
formal trial prosecutions have some inherent limitations, such as they are more perpetratorfocused and do not give victims the full attention they deserve in order to be healed of the
injustices they suffered. Trials also identify individual guilt, not patterns of atrocities, and they
may contradict the legal culture of a post-conflict society85.

28
Desmond Tutu, chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, argues
that Western-style justice does not fit with traditional African jurisprudence.
It is too
impersonal, in the sense that it does not take into proper consideration the particular cultural
system of the African country in conflict. The African view of justice is aimed at the healing of
breaches, the redressing of imbalances, and the restoration of broken relationships. This kind of
justice seeks to rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the
opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he or she has injured by his or her offence 86.
More so, there may be a whole range of practical shortcomings and risks, such as: material
evidence may have been destroyed; in many cases the criminal law system will be in shock,
seriously crippled, or perceived as an integral part of the old order; and lack of proof can lead to
the acquittal of well-known perpetrators, which is not the same under traditional style. Such
justice may be viewed as arbitrary and will seriously damage victims trust in the whole
system87.
There are good reasons to correct the picture of two pure strategies that differ on all
points and are mutually exclusive. First, in real-world situations, traditional transitional justice
policies will combine, albeit to different degrees, ingredients of both extremes, western trial and
local method. The Rwanda Gacaca, for example, has been highly formalized and can impose
prison sentences, yet operates with lay judges. Second, the original approach of reasoning in
absolute terms, to prosecute or to forgive and forget, has gradually been abandoned.
An
explanation for this development should run along a variety of lines. It was many years earlier
when Rwandans, were battling the heavy legacy of the genocide, they began scouting the
possibility of mobilizing an informal dispute resolution tool, called Gacaca, for their transitional
justice policy.
Since then, thousands of such lay tribunals have been set up. They have

29
identified and tried numerous men and women who were suspected of participating in the events
of AprilJune 1994. The Gacaca justice and reconciliation activities have attracted worldwide
attention because of its successful88 approach to merge the two distinct methods as practical and
possible, in order to appease, heal and peacefully co-exist, as this paper argues.
In addition, the relative success of the South African TRC, is a creative mix of formal and
informal procedures, international norms, and domestically designed techniques. There is also
the growing awareness that broadening the scope of local variation is totally justified. Just as
Orentlicher recently argued: Given the extraordinary range of national experiences and cultures,
how could anyone imagine there to be a universally relevant formula for transitional justice? 89.
The case of northern Uganda is a convincing demonstration of the difficult dilemmas local
people and international facilitators have to tackle. Therefore, this paper supports traditional
justice mechanisms shall be promoted, such as Culo Kwor, Mato Oput, Nzuko Igbo na Eze, Kayo
Cuk, Ailuc, Tonu ci Koka, and others as practiced in the communities affected by the conflict in
African countries, with necessary modifications as a central part of the framework for
accountability and reconciliation90.
Since the aim of reconciliation as presented in this paper is to appease, heal and
peacefully co-exist, the role of forgiveness is pivotal in achieving it. The possibility and
relevance of forgiveness within the framework of social reconciliation in Africas conflict
situation is crucial, as it serves a collective attempt to rebuild a mutually beneficial and
cooperative civil society. Africa, therefore, needs reconciliation because it suits best to address
Africas conflict situations most, and can provide a deterrent for the future and end collective
denial. Since it provides a platform or forum that allows the direct participation of significant
political actors and protagonists in conflicts, it also has the potential to signal a commitment to

30
peace through proceedings that discredit those associated with past crimes on all sides of the
conflict. Reconciliation proponents submit that holding perpetrators accountable through any
kind of platform reveals the vulnerability of those once in power or those who champion the
perpetration of crimes. Knowing these acts have been firmly denounced is empowering to the
general public, and may reinforce the spirit of unity in order for the nation to forge ahead91.
Conclusion
Conflict is known to be prevalent, often inevitable, but usually resolvable if approached
rationally; this requires for open-minded investigation, and challenges everyone involved in
honest, creative, and effective problem solving.
Every conflict is caused by a particular
difficulty, and acknowledges that conflict may arise as a valid way of highlighting a basic
problem. The prospect of solving the problem, thereby resolving the conflicts, demands that an
effective conflict resolution mechanism or peace process should be used92.
This paper examined why peace and development have remain elusive in Africa the past
three decades in spite of the number of peace processes and development programs which have
taken place in Africa. The paper argues that almost the entire African countries continued the
search for peace and development the past three decades because reconciliation mechanism has
been seriously neglected, downplayed, or poorly used as a peace process. It finds that several
factors such as estrangement between governments and the governed; divisions between
different ethnic groups or communities; and human rights violations against political opponents
by African leaders who cling-on to power, constitute problems to peace, development, and
stability in Africa.

31
The paper also finds that other conflict resolution mechanisms, particularly military
interventions, is not favorable to Africa, and cautions against the repeat of the USA-led NATO
Libya military intervention saga.
It also finds that Africas historical value and cultural
antecedents show that reconciliation mechanism has been most effective before the embrace of
Western or modern conflict resolutions.
The paper concludes that the nature of conflicts and violations in Africa call for optimum
use of practical reconciliation mechanism, which can only be facilitated by good political
climate, particularly good leadership quality of the leaders in terms of creating necessary
conditions for embracing reconciliation in order to bring about a more peaceful society,
accelerated development, and stability in each African state. The paper recommends the merging
of traditional and modern approaches of reconciliation as the best for conflict resolution in Africa
in the 21st century and beyond. However, it points out and cautions below on the implication of
reconciliation, as it applies in theory and practice.
Academic discussions on transitional justice in general and reconciliation in particular are
prominent in scholarly debates on democratization, nation-building, peace-building and state
reconstruction. This issue has also gained support from NGOs, international organizations, and
international community. There seems to be an agreement among practitioners and scholars that
societies who have experienced violent conflict must seek ways to sort out the legacies of the
past to prevent degeneration into more violence. Similarly, it appears that reconciliation, even
though seen by many as a mechanism that seeks to promote peace, do not automatically lead to a
peaceful and stable society.
Post-conflict societies need a combination of other factors, including truth recovery, legal
justice or rule of law, accountability, and transparency. Activities need to be undertaken from

32
various levels, bottom-up and top-down, and need to address structural, behavioural, and
attitudinal aspects as well as the context, memory, and relationships. Asymmetries in power
structures, gender relations, and gender-specific experiences of violence also need to be
considered93.
Even if all the above factors are present in a society, the impact of reconciliation as a
peace mechanism is hard to predict given its abstract and complex nature, as well as the lack of
empirical data. Many gaps and questions remain in theory and practice, including: (i) the extent
and practicability of law (in many African societies there are existing legal prescriptions, but the
laws are not active, the issue is putting them into practice); (ii) how truth recovery relates to legal
mechanisms, prosecution, compensation, institutional reforms, initiatives for reconciliation, and
how to get from retributive to restorative approaches; and (iii) the extent to which reconciliation
processes affect people, studies are preoccupied with institutional design and system-level
effects.
Given these continued research gaps and questions and practice issues, transitional justice
analysis needs a sustained focus on the underlying causes of conflict, so trials and truth
commissions become an invitation for continuing a focus on addressing societal divisions.
Research needs to be practice-oriented, generate and elicit policy recommendations, and use case
studies base on qualitative, empirical, and multidisciplinary approaches that can provide useful
insights to peace-builders and nation-builders, to prevent them from having unrealistic
expectations.

33
Notes:
1
World Bank, (2013). Food Price, Watch Issue 13. World Bank: Washington DC. See also
Ikejiaku, B. (2012). Poverty-Conflict Nexus: the contentious issue revisited European Journal of
Sustainable Development. 1, 2, 127-150. European Centre for Sustainable Development
(ECSDEV).

34
Makwana, R. (2007). International Aid and Economy still failing Sub-Saharan Africa, Global
Policy Forum, p.2.
3
Solomon, A. and Wart G. (2005). Defending African Unity: can the Peace of Security Council
of the African Union Succeed?Features 4 December.
See Luckham, R. et al (2001). Conflict and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: an assessment of

the issues and evidence, Institute of Development Studies, Working Paper 128.
5
Assefa, H. (1999). The Meaning of Reconciliation Part 2. European Platform for Conflict
Prevention and Transformation at http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp/part1/2_recon.htm
(06/10/11).
6
Bloomfield, D., Barnes, T. and Huyse, l. (2003) eds. Reconciliation After Violent Conflict:
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, IDEA: Stockholm, 12-21.
7
Van der Merwe, H. (1999),The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Community
Reconciliation: An Analysis of Competing Strategies and Conceptualizations; available at
http://www.csvr.org.za/index.php (27/02/2013).
8
Minow, M. (1998),Between Vengeance and Forgiveness. Facing History after Genocide and
Mass Violence, Boston: Beacon Press, 17.
Ibid
10
Lederach, P. (2000), Five Qualities of Practice in Support of Reconciliation Processes, in

Forgiveness and Reconciliation, ed. Helmick, G., Raymond, S. & Petersen, R. Templeton
Foundation Press, Philadelphia & London, 183194.
11
Lederach, P. (1995), Preparing for Peace. Conflict Transformation Across Cultures. Syracuse,
NY: Syracuse University Press, 20.
12
Bloomfield, D. Barnes, T. and Huyse, l. (2003). eds, Reconciliation After Violent
Conflict:Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, IDEA: Stockholm.
13
Kriesberg, L. (2001), Changing Forms of Coexistence, in Mohammed Abu-Nimer, ed.,
Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 48.
14
Galtung, J. (2001). After Violence, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, and Resolution: Coping
with Visible and Invisible Effects of War and Violence, in Mohammed Abu-Nimer, ed.,
15
It is doubful whether Mugabe has exhibited exactly the same characteristics as these other
leaders, even though he has been in power for a long time. It is debatable whether or not he has
created a political climate in which reconciliation has become necessary.

35
16
See Ikejiaku, B. (2004). A Break Through in the Subject Government: Nigeria, Africa and the
World in Perspective: MCal International Communications, Enugu; also see Arriola, A. (2009).
Patronage and Political Stability in Africa: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 42 No. 10.
17
See for example, Johnson, S. (2011). Turmoil in North Africa Contagion in the Americas? :
Centre for Strategic & International Studies (ISIS); and Ikejiaku, B. (2004). A Break Through in
the Subject Government: Nigeria, Africa and the World in Perspective: MCal International
Communications, Enugu.
18
See Walter, B. and Snyder, J. (1999). Civil War, Insecurity and Intervention: Columbia
University Press.
19
Emeh, O. (2004). Africa and the Crisis of Instability. Global Policy Forum: New York.
20
See
Oxfam
(2009).
Crisis
in
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/oxfam_in_action/emergencies/darfur_chad.html
Dafur,
at
21
See Human Rights Watch, The Warri Crisis: fuelling violence. Human Rights Watch, Vol 15.
No. 18 (a)
22
Onyeiwu, Steve (2004). On the Economic Determinants of Violent Conflict in

Africa,Preliminary Evidence From Nigeria. Paper Prepared for Presentation at WIDERs
Conference on Making Peace, 4-5 June 2004, Helsinki: Finland.
23
See for example, Ikejiaku, B. (2011), African Union, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution in
Africa: A Comparative Analysis of the Recent Kenya and Zimbabwe Conflicts, International
Journal of Development and Conflict Vol. 1, No. 1 (2011) 6183; Marker, S. (2003). Unmet
Human Needs.Beyond Intractability, eds, Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Boulder:
Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado; Burton, J. (1990), Conflict: Basic
Human Needs. New York: St. Martins Press; Coate, R. and J. Rosati,eds. 1988. The Power
of Human Needs in World Society. Boulder: Co Lynne Rienner Publishers.
24
Gurr, T. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton. However, The term relative deprivation was
first used in a series of social-psychological studies of the American armed forces to explain why
morale was lower in units that had higher rates of promotion, published in 1949 under the title
The American Soldier; see Stouffer et al. 1949.
25
Gurr, T. (1970), Ibid.
26
See Uppsala 2003, in UNDOC, (2005). Crime and Development in Africa: United Nations
Office of Drug and Crime.
27
See for example, Chuma, W. (2001). The AU and Conflict Resolution. South African Political
and Economic Monthly (SAPEM) Vol. 14, No. 6; Rupesinghe, K. (1989). The Ties that will not

36
Bind: Conflict and Racial Cleavage in Sudan, In Anyang Nyongo ed. Arms and Daggers in the
Heart of Africa, Academy Science Publishers.
28
Nnoli, O. (1980), Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Fourth Dimension Publishers: Enugu.
29
Ikejiaku, B. and Dauda, J. (2011). African Union (AU) Conflict, and Conflict Resolution in
Africa: Comparative Analysis of the Recent Kenya and Zimbabwe Conflicts: International
Journal of Development and Conflict (IJDC), Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 61-83.
30
Chuma, W. 2001, The AU and Conflict Resolution, South African Political and Economic
Monthly (SAPEM), 14(6): 78.
31
See Ikejiaku, B. (2009). The relationship between poverty, conflict and
development,CanadianJournal of Sustainable Development, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 2009 pp. 1528; Irobi, E. (2005). Ethnic Conflict Management in Africa, A Comparative Case Study of
Nigeria and South Africa, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado: Colorado; and
Onyeiwu, S. (2004). On the Economic Determinants of Violent Conflict in Africa,Preliminary
Evidence From Nigeria. Paper Prepared for Presentation at WIDERs Conference on Making
Peace, 4-5 June 2004, Helsinki: Finland.
32
Handley, G., and Sharma, B., with Bird, K., and Cammack, D., (2009). Poverty and Poverty
Reduction in Sub-Sahara Africa: An Overview of Key Issues. Overseas Development Institute:
London.
Haus, C. (2001). International Conflict Resolution. 1st edition, Continuum: New York. Note,
that the terms or phrases conflict resolution and peace process are used interchangeably in this
paper.
34
See for example Chuma, W. (2001), op cit.
33
35
See The Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom,
May 2006; Washington, DC, p. 98.
36
See Baker, P. (1993). South Africa and the World Economy in the 1990s. Rustica Press: Cape
Town.
37
See Nannyonjo, J. (2005), Conflict, Poverty and Human Development in northern Uganda:
The Round Table, Vol. 94, No. 381, p. 473-488
38
Ikejiaku, B. and Dauda, J. (2011), op cit.
39
For example, Tunisian President Ben Ali was ousted and his government overthrown; similarly
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was ousted and his government overthrown, and there has
been continued popular protest against the military provisional government instituted to maintain
peace; the Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to step down after months of popular
protests; Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast was forced out of office in disgrace; the government of
Muammer Gaddafi was overthrown with rebels capturing and taking control of thecapital, Tripoli
Libya is currently divided by a kind of civil war, following earlier foreign intervention by a

37
US/NATO-led coalition in the form of a no-fly zone and air strikes. See Thomas, L. (2011).
Middle East in Revolt. http://www.tropicpost.com/middle-east-in-revolt/ (21/10/11). There is an
indication that the deposed Libyan Leader Muammer Gaddafi was humiliated and brutally killed
by NATO supported rebels, see Muammar Gaddafi is dead NTC says live coverage at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/middle-east-live/2011/oct/20/syria-libya-middle-east-unrestlive (21/10/11).
40
At 53 I.L.R. 297; 1973. This is in relation to exploration of oil in Africa and exploitation of the
African populations by colonial masters.
41
See Libya Country Report Bertlesmann Transformation Index

http://www.bertelsmann--transfromation-index.de/134.0.html (08/09/2011).
(BTI)
2010
at
42
It is important to note that rebel (which means to refuse allegiance to and oppose by force an
established
government
or
ruling
authority
at
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/_/dict.aspx?word=rebel (02/10/11). It is alsoantithetic to the
ruling government and its structures and authority; and is seen as unsupportive to democracy and
illegitimate in most cases, and it might be difficult justifying providing support to rebels.
43
For example Tarpley said, I would certainly agree that NATO bombings are causing a
tremendous humanitarian emergency and they have caused the death of many civiliansThe
only policy that NATO has is murder, political assassination, it is a level of barbarism which
dont know whether we have seen in the past several hundreds of years, you have to go back
pretty far and dig pretty deep to get something as barbaric and primitive as the NATO; see
NATO Policy in Libya based on Political Assassination, with Mounting Death Toll among
Civilians Interview with Dr. Webster Griffin Tarpley, Author and Historian, Washington, at
http://libyaa360.wordpress.com/2011/07/08/nato-policy-in-libya-based-on-political-assasinationwith-mountingdeath-toll-among-civilians-2/ (11/09/11).
44
Here resources refers mostly to oil and other mineral wealth - see for example Analysis of US
Military Intervention, posted on Monday, Sept. 26, 2011 at http://africaczech (02/09/11).
45
Chuma gives as an example that of Rwanda; the whole continent looked on as hundreds of
thousands were slaughtered in the civil war of 1994. See Chuma, W. (2001), op cit.
46
Laderach, P. (2001). Civil Society and Reconciliation. In Turbulent Peace: The Challenge of
Managing International Conflict. Eds, Crocker, A., Hampson, F., and Aall, P. United States of
Institute of Peace Press: Washington, D.C.
47
Prevention and Transformation at http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp/part1/2_recon.htm
(06/10/11).

38
48
In reconciling the plethora of definitions and/or meanings of reconciliation, it is important to

note that the phrase appease, heal, and peacefully co-exist implies that reconciliation aims to
appease (i.e. give something of reward or benefit to an aggressive party usually for losses
sustained with the aggressors consent); heal (i.e. alleviate an opponents distress or anguish or
injury); and peacefully co-exist (i.e. produce a situation of agreeing to live together in the same
polity or society). The author has experience of life in Africa; has carried out research on peace
and conflict in Africa, and has sought to address practical trends, events and realities on the
continent. He has independently put forward his own definition in order to achieve the purpose
of this paper; to provide a more particular, practical, and nuance understanding of the concept; as
well as to contribute to the debate. The above definition appears relevant to the general debate
because it is thought to capture the primary ingredients or elements and outcomes of successful
reconciliation (to appease, heal, and peacefully co-exist), which as far as the author is aware
have not been brought together in any other definition or meaning of reconciliation given by
other scholars or professionals.
49
See, Hauss, C. (2003). Reconciliation. Beyond Intratactability. Eds. Burgess, G and Burgess
H.
Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado: Boulder at
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/reconciliation (03/09/11); also see Hayner, P. (2001).
Unspeakable Truths. New York: Routlege.
50
See Amstutz, M. Conflict Transformation 2007 Marton, J. Conflict Information Consortium,

University of Colorado at http://www.msct.beyondintractability.org/audio/10025/ (22/10/11).
51
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was set up by the
Government of National Unity to help deal with what happened under apartheid. The conflict
during this period resulted in violence and human rights abuses on all sides; no section of society
escaped these abuses. The TRC was based on the Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, see www.justice.gov.za/trc/
52
One example is the involvement of officials in the Department of Defence in mandrax and
ivory smuggling from Angola; see Vuuren, H. (2006). Apartheid Grand Corruption, Assessing
the Scale of Crimes of Profit in South Africa from 1970 to 1994, Security Studies: Cape Town
p.14. It is important to note, as Vuuren informs us, that corruption was never the focus of the
TRC, though it emerged from the thousands of applications for amnesty that where submitted
and from the public hearings addressing the violation of human rights which were the original
and true focus of the TRC.
53
The popular name is based on the name of Justice Chuwudifu Oputa, who headed the HRVIC.
See Yusuf, H. (2007). Travails of Truth: Achieving Justice for Victims of Impunity in Nigeria:
International Journal of Transitional Justice (IJTJ), 1 (2): 268-286. Oxford University Press.
54
See Stevens, G. (2006). Truth, Confessions and Reparations: Lessons from the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Institute for Social and Health Sciences, University of
South Africa.

39
55
Suffla, S. (2004). Peacemaking and Peacebuilding. In L. Swartz, C. de la Rey & N. Duncan

(Eds), Psychology; 313-322 Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
56
See Fombad, C. (2008). Transitional Justice in Africa: The Experience with the Truth
Commission. Hauser Global Law School Program, New York University School of Law: New
York.
57
Van der Vijver, L. (2000). The Amnesty Process. In W. James & Van der Vijver (Eds), After
the TRC: Reflections on truth and reconciliation in South Africa: Cape Town, David Philip.
58
Stevens, G. (2006), op cit.
59
Freeman, M. (2006). Truth Commission in Africa: A Story to be continued. International

Centre for Transitional Justice, Brussels.
60
For comprehensive account of the TRC, see access in the web: www.justice.gov.za/trc/
61
See Justice, bedrock of peace and development
at http://www.vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/politics/mar.../p106032006.htm (08/03/06).
62
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was granted the most power
in being authorized to grant amnesty in exchange for testimony. It had a committee to
corroborate testimony, judge the political motivation of the crime, and make decisions as to
whether the complete truth had been revealed, see
63
The South African TRC, for example, was given a staff of three hundred and a budget of $18
million per year for its two-and-a-half year existence. By contrast, Nigerias Oputa Panel lacked
the financial commitments and relevant facilities to execute it; see Hayner, P. (2001).
Unspeakable Truths. New York: Routlege.
64
See Amstutz, M. Conflict Transformation 2007 Marton, J, op cit.
65
Bhorat, H. and Kanbur, R. (2006). Poverty and Policy in Post Apartheid South Africa HSRC
Press: Pretoria.
66
May, J. (1998). Poverty and Inequality in South Africa, report prepared for the office of the
Executive Deputy President and Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality Pretoria:
South Africa.
67
Bhorat, H. and Kanbur, R. (2006). Op cit, p.65.
68
See Commission for Africa (2005). Our Common Interest, the Report of the Commission for
Africa: CFA p.107

40
69
See Hyner, P. (2001), Unspeakable Truths. New York: Routlege.
70
Commission for Africa (2005). Op cit, p.108
71
See Bhorat, H. and Kanbur, R. (2006). Poverty and Policy in Post Apartheid S/A HSRC
Press: Pretoria, p. 57
72
Cabrita, J. (2000), Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy: Palgrave.
73
Igreja, V. (2007), The Monkeys Sworn Oath. Cultures of Engagement for Reconciliation and
Healing in the Aftermath of the Civil War in Mozambique, available at
https://apenaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/12089 (17/4/2014).
74
See IDEA (2008). Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from
African Experiences: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Chapter 4.
75
Tripp, A. (2008). The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda: The Endowment of the
United States Institute of Peace.
76
Thue, N. Makubuya, A. and Nakirunda M. (2002). The Report of a study on the Civil Society
in Uganda for the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Uganda: NORAD.
77
See NGambwa, K. (2001). Eds., Leadership, Peace, Stability, and Prosperity in DRC: United
States Institute of Peace, Special Report 289.
78
Several leaders, such as Joseph Kasa-Vubu and Patrice Lumumba, attempted to carry the
nation forward after independence; but Kasa-Vubu, as mentioned above, was ousted, and
Lumumba, tragically, was assassinated. See Nielsen, T. and Riddle, L. (2009). Investing in
Peace: The Motivational Dynamics of Diaspora Investment in Post-Conflict Economies, Journal
of Business Ethics 89, no. 4, 435448.
79
See NGambwa, K. (2001). Eds., Leadership, Peace, Stability, and Prosperity in DRC: United
States Institute of Peace, Special Report 289, p. 3.
80
See Ikejiaku, B. (2013). Political Corruption, Critical Governance Problem Facing the Nigeria
State: Comparative Assessment of Various Regimes: Journal of African Policy Studies, Vol. 16
No 2, 9-30; see also Mohammed, U. (2013). Corruption in Nigeria: a Challenge to Sustainable
Development in the Fourth Republic: European Scientific Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4.
81
See Afegbua, A. (2010). Conflicts and Political Instability in Nigeria: Causes, Consequences
and Prospects: Journal of Social Science and Public Policy, Vol. 2, 10-18.

41
82
See Brock-Utne, B. (2001). Indigenous Conflict Resolution in Africa. A draft presented to the
week-end seminar on indigenous solutions to conflicts held at the University of Oslo: Institute
for Educational Research 23-24 February, p. 1.
83
Malan, J. (1997). Conflict Resolution Wisdom from Africa.

Constructive Resolution Disputes (ACCORD): Durban-Westville.
African Centre for the
84
Hartwell, B. (2000). The Role of Forgiveness in Reconstructing Society After Conflict.

Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, at http://www.jha.ac/articles/a048.htm (18/07/2011).
85
Le Mon, C. (2007).
Rwandas Troubled Gacaca
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/14/2lemon.pdf (29/08/2014).
86
Courts,
available
at
Tutu, D. (1999). No Future Without Forgiveness, London: Riderp, p. 51
87
Huyse, L. and Salter, M. (2008). Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict:
Learning from African Experiences: International IDEA.
88
Huyse, L. (2008). Introduction: tradition-based approaches in peacemaking, transitional justice

and reconciliation policies. In Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict:
Learning from African Experiences: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance.
89
Orentlicher, D. (2007). 'Settling Accounts' Revisited; Reconciling Global Norms with Local
Agency, 1 Intl. J. Transnatl. Just. 10. Diane Orentlicher is a professor of international law and
the United Nations independent expert on combating impunity.
90
This forms part of an extract from article 3.1 of a preliminary pact on accountability and
reconciliation, signed in late June 2007 by the government of Uganda and the rebel Lords
Resistance Army (LRA); see Huyse, L. (2008). Introduction: tradition-based approaches in
peacemaking, transitional justice and reconciliation policies. In Traditional Justice and
Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences: International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
91
For example, see the instructive work of Brody, R. (2001). Justice: The First Casualty of
Truth? The Nation, April 30.
92
See Malan, J. (1997), Op cit.
93
Fischer, M. (2011), 'Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice', in

'Advancing Conflict Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II' eds. B. Austin, M. Fischer, H.
J. Giessmann, Barbara Budrich Publishers, Opladen/Framington Hills, pp. 406-430.

42
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46

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Reconciliation As A Transformation Mechanism For Peace, Development and Stability in Africa: With Comparative Evidence From Five Countries

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Reconciliation as a transformation mechanism for peace, development and stability in Africa:

with comparative evidence from five countries

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

It is against this unique backdrop, conceptual matrix, and intellectual

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

Reconciliation: a brief theoretical context

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

end-state of affairs or an outcome of a situation, aimed at building relationships between

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

Some factors inhibiting peace, development and stability in African states

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

Other recent communal clashes include those between Ife and

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

Efforts made to broker peace in Africa

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

As mentioned above, the 2007 Kenyan and 2008

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

Reconciliation is what Africa needs most

For the purpose of this paper,

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The TRC as a statutory agent of national unity and

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

During the period of its

Thus, in 1999, after

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

Indeed, unlike in the post TRC South Africa with

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

This included the Oudua Peoples

For instance, the percentage of people with access to social

Impact of Reconciliation in Achieving Peace and Development in Africa (Mozambique,

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

These were the bodies that dwelt on policy intervention,

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

integrity, equity, benevolence, judgement, morality, ethics, and meritocracy,

Comparative analysis of the success or failure of the reconciliation process

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

Reconciliation is the panacea

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

Every conflict is caused by a particular

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

It also finds that Africas historical value and cultural

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

See Luckham, R. et al (2001). Conflict and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: an assessment of

Lederach, P. (2000), Five Qualities of Practice in Support of Reconciliation Processes, in

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

Onyeiwu, Steve (2004). On the Economic Determinants of Violent Conflict in

Gurr, T. (1970), Ibid.