Scribd Logo
Загрузить

Добро пожаловать в Scribd!

  • Mahan and Premonitios of World Power

    Загружено:

    Sarahi GM
    2 просмотров12 страниц
    Politica exterior de E.U

    Авторское право

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Доступные форматы

    PDF или читайте онлайн в Scribd

    Этот документ был вам полезен?

    Это неприемлемый материал?

    Пожаловаться на этот документ
    Politica exterior de E.U

    Авторское право:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Скачайте в формате PDF или читайте онлайн в Scribd
    Отметить как неприемлемый контент
    2 просмотров12 страниц

    Mahan and Premonitios of World Power

    Загружено:

    Sarahi GM
    Politica exterior de E.U

    Авторское право:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Скачайте в формате PDF или читайте онлайн в Scribd
    Отметить как неприемлемый контент
    из 12
    sesulation from the toils of world si Thayer Mahan and Theodore it of power policics; and this igs Forciga relations. Buc its + motivated by an aggressive sational power rather than by Pile his group capcured popular imperialism, but it never sue- Sssating 2 concern in the general it hindered the achievement 3 Kind of egoism not in accord Iscreby attaching to some valid ialist lan, & born, in part, by the frustea- ee utopians largely replaced eission. Their vigorous repudia- BB 2etbimperialise movement and PE 2ppeal of utopian assumptions lism less attractive than ever eae Peramental antipathies further selCinccrest, upon which both roctvely eer CHAPTER 1 MAHAN AND PREMONITIONS OF WORLD POWER 1 Tue Ina. Inacr or Wont Powtn (OK many Americans who wimessed the dramatic evens of the Spanish. American Wer; the cod of the nloewcath cent seemed ta ork che PRONE GE Sew eral And they. were ght lor bythe tad EMC Unt Sets bd beens is worl power, Of course so adh hee Teper: bo the spaniol a few youn; lax the ingots: Ginsetece forcbodings of some great upheaval in international sclayey The most aoe nlutra nations were snepep in a wid enperkicn for iran wagth foci markets, and colonies in Asi, Afi, aed the Poi Great ‘hits were taking place inthe relative strength and prestige of nations. Coal abMae ee ne Noslainliyi wet growing incase Eeetohce a acy Fane Powe ere bulging ominously behind the curtay of a ipl. Boas Ee tT he iterated eee hee ch re oafim the view thatthe quest for national self nteree and power is the Preserved its unity, of destiny, Even before the turn of the century World affai—navalists, statesmen, and acaderyic FOREIGN RELATIONS jal understanding in the At- Sancxation of Hawaii), and Wvocated a canal under ex- jt the American public at tion in a worldwide strug samoan affair of 1888 Amer man Empire. They remem: Ss power. American liberals espected the great German, Bictory in the Franco-Prussian, sions but was widely hailed paother nal in the coffin of uning. point in German- He cxtremely devious impact mncrican mind. The United he Civil War in the minds ulvess as a coaling station weer, i was net considera tion to that remote archi islind before 188, when J in Washington and con: rights at Pago Pago. But 3 seething center of na- many also acquired rights, he rival ambitions and sus ommercial agents, and land. BR ee hs oren BB natives. Then the jingoes PBR ious otk of war. Although an and American vessels ies, and. although a con. ican rights in a condo- [Beer toward Germany. The BBE their cordial relationship, [Ee Britain and France as the Se ‘upon this transformation VTTVIIVY MAHAN AND PREMONTTIONS OF WORLD POWER " as a manifestation of great, imponderable shifts of national power. They beheld a global struggle for national strength and wealth and urged Ameri cans to pay heed to their strategic interests. But it is safe to say that the average American's concern with the Samoan intident was inspired by a chauvinistic desire to keep “Old Glory” unaullied rather than by a concern for the commercial and military advantages of a remote spot in the Pacific Ocean The excitement which the Samoan controversy aroused is best understood as a manifestation of the quickening national consciousness of the cightics, which had already found its prophets of national destiny in men like Josiah Strong, Joha W. Burgess, and John Fiske. It was a rehearsal for the full blows imperialism af the nineties 2: Tue Sense oF Secutrry ano Isouarion # Belore the turn of the century Americans were feeling the urge to abert their national power, but they were no, in general, concerned with the impact. «of world politics ypon their national selfinterest. Why should they buther about world politics when they were convinced that Americas progss was the rel of keeping aloot from is tis? Some expansionist replied that it was time thatthe United Stats take 3 reise view ofits power position in the world because the ruthless struggle mong nations impinged upon the most basic of all nation: interests sel preservation. This opinion was feequently espoused by the advocates of mili tary preparedness. The promoters of America’s expanding navy constantly stresed the defenseless condition of the American constline so constantly that there was considerable pane along the eastern seaboard when the Spa ish-Americn War began.” However, ia the 1890's national security was a thin reed for supportn Preparedness movement of the dimensions envisioned by Anmeriess mos voxal naionaliss. And, a5 2 matter of fact, the most persuasive arguments for military and naval expansion were directed towaed such emotionally charged gosls as the propagation of American ideals, the salvation of Anglo Saton civilization, and the fulfilment of Manifest Destiny, Indeed, in the decade preceding the war with Spain it was obvious to most of the populace, wheter expert or untuiored, thatthe United States was in an enviable Je. feasve miliary position. Het rapidly growing navy seemed to assure dom ianes in the Westera Hemisphere. She was faved with abundant reources, 2 highly developed technology, diversified industry, and great accumulated wealth. With no strong military powers to threaten the nation’s frontiers or ‘ovens, with miles of ocean separating her from Europe and cia, and with European discord increasingly preoceupying potential aggrenors, i would ja IDEALS AND SELF.NTEREST IN AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS have been extremely dificult to convince Americans that their confidence in the absolute security of the United States was misplaced. ‘The opponents of naval and military expansion, such as Senator Arthur P. Gorman, Representative William S. Holman, and Carl Schurz, never failed to poke the preparedness advocates in their most vulnerable spot by challeng, ing them to point out exactly from what quarter they expected danger to come! It was a challenge that was reiterated time and again after the war with Spain and, especially, during World War I. However, this group's strongest argument was simply the American tradition of isolation, which had developed into a cardinal tenet of the national creed in the course of three quarters of a century of relative freedom from the threat of forcign intervention, The typical American outlook upon world politics combined a fierce national pride, a sense of moral superiority, and an aversion to foreign instications with a conviction that the United States could not be seriously affected by events outside her hemisphere, Why, then, erect 2 costly military establishment, contrary to democratic principles and destructive of republican institutions, unless to suck the American people into the vortex of power politics and foreign entanglements? And since when did the nation that had subjugated a continent and defied interference from the great powers of the world need to resore to the toils and trappings of Old World diplomacy in order to protect itself? It would take powerful arguments to counteract this sort of reasoning, 3. Twe Rerurarion oF « Reauier A realistic view of international polities was not likely to floucish in a nation so complacent abow the security offs own power. And yet it was in the 1890's that political Realism found one of its most influential advocates in all American history. From his vantage point as president of the naval war college at Annapolis, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan became America’s most illustrious philosopher of world politics and one of the world’s most influential exponents of sea power. Everyone who examines America's adjustment to the satus of a world power must reckon with Mahan, for his was a seminal mind in the theory of international relations, and against his teachings one can measure the evolution of America’s attitude toward the outside world Less than a decade before the United States acquired an empire, Mahan launched his life's campaign to educate the American people in the lessons of national greatness. Although he first gained public recognition asa naval Ihstorian on the basis of his classic studies, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 660-1783 (1890) and The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812 (i892), these histories were no mere . , |, ficans that their confidence in place. jon, such as Senator Arthur P. Ex Carl Schurz, never failed « vulnerable spot by challeng. es crete: BB time and again after the war ar 1. However, this group's tradition of isolation, which sional creed in the course of from the threat of foreign Tpon world politics combined a BBrity, and an aversion to foreign Fs States could not be seriously then, erecta costly military ee destructive of republics le into the vortex of power & when did the nation that had from the grest powers of the = of Old World diplomacy in I arguments to counteract this poe Resse ieee not likely to fowrish in a ‘own power. And yet it was in its most influential advocates 2 president of the naval war Jppision became Americas mos Pac ofthe world’s most inftuental mines America’s adjustment 0 FBth Mahan, for his was 2 seminal BB and against his teachings one Ftode toward the outside world. tes acquired an empire, Mahan American people in the lessons public recognition as a naval he Influence of Sea Power upon of Sea Power upon the French be these histories were no. mere MAHAN AND PREMONITIONS OF WORLD POWER 3 chronicles of naval events, for Mahan was pre-eminently a student and 2 teacher of world polities; and the message he conveyed was that 2 nation needed a large merchant marine protected by 2 navy with battle-leet suprem: acy in order to compete successfully in the world-wide struggle for overseas markets and colonies? In elaborating this theme, Mahan analyzed the grand seategy of world power with an unrivaled clarity, calmness, and breadth of vision, But he was by no means impartial toward the facts he observed. Some time between 1885 and 18)o he became a convert from anti-expansionism to the cause of expansion; from that time on, his larger motive in all his books and articles was to educate his countrymen to appreciate the need for power in international relations; that is, the need for colonies, a merchant marine, scrategic bases, and a massed fleet of lineof-battle ships. Mahan’s conversion proved timely, for soon after the publication of his first book he became the high priest of expansionism among naval men, diplomats, and scholars; and through the devoted labors of two apostles in particular, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, then As sistant Secretary of the Navy, he exerted an influence upon the course of history that was the envy of many statesmen. Nevertheles, in the long run, itis doubtful whether Mahan's gospel took root in the minds of his countrymen at large. It is significant that, akhough he preached from an American pulpit, his largest and most responsive con. {gregation was across the oceans! The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 ws foe thece years rejeced by publishers in the United States, while its author was being acclaimed an authority and a genius in England Mahan’s study became a campaign handbook for British navalists. In 1895 he was dined by the Queen, the Prime Minister, and the First Lord of th Admicalty; and Osford and Cambridge conferred degrees upan hit. Some of Mahan's popularity in Great Britain ean be atributed to the fact that his work admirably substantiated the contentions of British navalists and Imperialist British naval officers were understandably enthusiastic about an interpretation of history which so neatly generalized the phenomenon of the simultancous rise of the British Navy and the British Empire. But, perhaps, the greater receptiveness of the British as compared to the Americans should also be ascribed to their greater familiarity with the elements of power in ‘world politics. It has been said that Mahan really organized into a philosophy the strategic prineiples which the British Admiralty had been following more or less blindly for over two hundred years! Thus the British were in the Position of Molitre's Bourgeois Gentilhomme, who suddenly discovered he had been speaking prose all his if. A stiking n of husiotie eeeption in Geimany, which was fast becoming Enelnds chief ee aL The Kaiser, with the encouragement of is impel minded mana Thiet, Alleed Von Tipe, was 20 taken with Tie Influence 6} Sea Poser upom History that he made it an oficial rexcbook ofthe German Navy poe upder to make the German people aavakminded, he had the complete see power setes supplied to publi insiations Nbrarcy and schools at gov" ernment expense. varovding to Mahsiy more of is writings were tandated to FRO Ice say other language Jpancse naval and mitary colleges adopted Soa any of sea power aa textbook and the government paced ani aera rest nonce and of cther works by Mahan inal the soos fo Japan, as in England and Germany, Maban's repuracion soared because his veri poke the universal language of power pois and provided 2 Pe Sussive rationale for resurgent imperialism. Fics in spite of bis ambition to educate his countrymen in the Fessens of Realms, Captain Mahan found bis mest enthusiastic audience fo PRY Fed aA esc shee aed ser eee hornet Be 5.28 ctrrely a prophet without honor among the general Armee public, for cares Tac expansionist mood caught fire, he gathered 2 substantia fone rough bit articles in the Avlontic Monthly, the North Ameen Review, Pee McClare’s, and Harper's New Monthly Mopesine. His agony rere trajacily voiced nthe ot of Congres. As he rode the fot tide “Fimperalit sentiment during the approach of the war with Sp2in he cached what was probably the peak of his popularity screech, an author's popularity is not necessarily based upon the messoBe pocket i pear 22 order vise the sgyfcnnes of Mahon s PETS eh resent America's tlle upon world poles one shuld first te tan ncaage and then oberve the way it was rcrived by the CR zenty at large- Toca ax Sezsneest ms Manan’ Masse agai ase ie wep of reais becaue he sualyeed the 9 ee ons of avional conduct with 2 more piecing and caniid vii aac cloak of entiment and custom permit to ordinary ces. He B44 thane ceputton of an exeme. national ¢gis cone e piretched epencparine of impriatim with a fee and candor unequaled by ‘et Me ins who shared his views. But he would be fa les deserving of BE rrcrnton as a perceptive ticker He had not undersond she powst of eee ar slfameret. And his appeal to bis contemporaries would veseinly have been insignificant had he filed to combine idem with 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS bs: becoming England's chief cent of his imperial-minded In with The Influence of Sea -tbook of the German Navy minded, he had the complete libraries, and schools at 60% were translated into Japanese and military colleges adopted the government placed transl Mahan in all the schools. I. Ys reputation soared beeause his + politics and provided a per Fen, at home. Yet he was "6t ‘general American public, for Re gathered a substantial following, the North American Review, Monthly Magazine. His arguments ress. As he rode the flood tide each of the war with Spain, he arity. scessarily based upon the message BM significance of Mahan’s reputo world politics, one should first way it was received by the sit Marian’s Messace realist because he analyzed the sell ‘more piercing and candid vision permit to ordinary eyes. He has Jonal eguist because he preached <2 and candor unequaled by most BD ouid be far less deserving of his rot understood the power of cal 10 his contemporaries would failed to combine idealism with MAHAN AND PREMONITIONS OF WORLD POWER ys for that was a popular blend which proved iesiibly intonica Oe geist, cao ciencebound Americans daring ther imperialist ovens, Ma vere message cannot be understood in crm of any dimple antithesis be- sia national slfinteret and supranational Weal ‘The esses of his veetrine is the particlae way in which ic combined both cements of thought ie Mahan’ exsays bespeak an avrarenes ofthe profound inven of ideas upon national behavior. Although he held chat dhe cts solid igoip of enduring national intrens was the only stable foundation for 3 Frowidentforcign policy he acer ignored the par ‘of moral sentiment in Feading men to act upon their perception of interest ational action. Even when sre sentiment ofa pepe is dhe most energetic clement in ianent to wich they BSE eats ace the orginal exciting cause, it the set itr sch eoton ck, that comes he gree Fores, STS Se he ata edn ames of men re aro eine agnor PY di yh see ot rong Joe, or Fght ob vin? ‘Asif in direc responce to this perception, Mahan’s writings resounded veah the tones of 2 crusade. His language was Biblical: the righicons ‘quality Weis expreasion arse fom intense spriual belies and 2 profound know! scige ofthe Scrpcure, Nation, he was accustomed fo Y/n6s Tike religions aarp if they ncglec their missionary enerprixt. To him, Apricot TANT Seay ie vnoee than national expedicney, was a moral duty: end Be someon tot the extension of American infoence i the wore woul ‘l confer upon them the bkssings of Christianity Fighten backward races ane and Anglo-Saxon political genis Malian's idealism was endowed wit it was fused with motives of extreme national egoism, which cleat it to a secondary cole. This egoism was rationalized hy 2 cons predation of the ability of ial principles ta alert thrust of faerest. ‘Thus Mahan combined Realism and egoism in d nto expect governments £0 act continvovsly on any ofber 8 have no right to do s0, being ager the force of sincere consicti rational interest. They n's doctrine was distinguished by the way i9 w ‘power constantly oberuded wpon mates of the repudiated ideal ends, but his belie im the imperfection off te place a low extimate on the efcacy of moral principles unsurporis Noe ‘Therefore, t made no diference from what ideal point he ststed gument; it always ended in a lesson on the need for military [ or example, ashe took a long view into the twentieth cen to him a8 though he were witnessing the opening of a period in which spirit. F Spirit. H 4 IDEALS AND SELF-INTEREST IN AMERICAS FOREIGN RELATIONS would be decided whether the spiral des af he Bator those of he Ve oS cabaecaredie her iveeka. Thera, wo pear mlsiod Be civilized Caisanity was “to rective into its own bosom and raise 19 it a ideals aenatericns and diferent civilizations by wich itis surounded 299 2% aoe ered" Yet Mahan sensed the turbulence and latent power of Ne East prophesied that the asimiation of Wesera aspirations an Western Cchnalogical progress would cause the people of the East to rus feo their Ting sleep, and then the two grest cvlizations of the Fast and the West. ene close togeber in a struggle for survival, “Our material advantages,” eee Nitec oh congue cay 30d teprep ated wih 20, whe the spiritual ideas which dominate our dhoughes « will Be rejeced for long.” Therefore, im the interval caused by the imperfectich of man’s to alse “Tce snus be ready wo eden any threatened disverbanes ofan yea lance between those who stand on divergent planes of thought, without common standards. vSarly, for Mahan the distinctive feature of international polities 62s Nt idealogiel cont bu the struggle for power. Evecrwhere be looked he 52 wae ee ery nation arayed against nation. And this wat no uansiot fihenomenon. Confict was the condition of all ifs, in Mahas's view. He Pied upon the striggle for cloaca and commerce among nations & sean eran ofthe inexorable Darwisian law of sarc, which deresd 2 sraggle for survival and sucvival of che test. Under theie reunite Te a that ie would be folly fora nation vo drop behind in the race Of © ear onal security to the benevolence oft vals ‘Te efforts of che 1 sresiney aricuace peace advocates to Bit the fstroments of rational Sower and compose national confit with arbitration teste’ and other Or eshte 2s’ cote oo amie nm, TE es Test date ices ore fos onl amgerO let RN ‘fould come to weigh heavier with maakind than materia). desires and San ers enaringene zur, ben ce ale dace ald be superfluous anystay Herre der Mahan sometimes urged the subordination of ational ff se hapa atl pcg bo To thee ashe ears oe “ht the dictates of morality coincided with national sef-astertion 28 opposed to a pasive form of national selfinteret, Thus he was secustomed to eX hrrtng bis countrymen to subordinate the ignable desire for ee and rote and survival tothe heroic moral duty of upholding Christianity and the American mission throughout the world. Ssleving oh db in man's innate sshness and in te inci preda- vory nature of nations, Maha wat understandably Fickle in Bt advocacy of FOREIGN RELATIONS {East o those of the West ik mision before civilized and raise to its own ideals ‘it is surrounded and out fod latent power of the East fp aspirations and Western the East ro rouse from their | of the East and the West “Our material advantages,” appropriated with avidity: foughts .. will be rejected fp the imperfection of man's threatened disturbance of an Fivergent planes of thoughts Jntcrnational polities was not [Everywhere he looked he $3 Je. And this was no transient [i life, in Mahan’s view. He fbemerce among nations as low of nature, which decreed 2 fee. Under these circumstances J drop behind im the race or 19 {os civals. The efforts of the in- the instruments of ational Scbiteation treaties and other Pin Mahan, for it was his cor [dangerous unless moral forces Hed than material desires; and hese idealistic devices would be | oe of national sel Rtsese instances he always found — self-asertion 2s opposed us he was accustomed to x [Benoble desire for mere ese and es of upholding Christianity and ss and in the incurably preda- Benciably fickle in his advocacy of vrs MAHAN AND PREMONITIONS OF WORLD POWER ” ideal gos Thus after arguing that an understanding between ti we great RGghoSauon nations would greatly increase dhe wordt sm of happiness, raven aude moral precasons: “Bot if pla of the world's wollare #0) me pious ike a cloak for national sltntre, et che net be accepted fay asthe adequate motive which # asuedly is" Sellinterest 9 vay an adequate mative in Maha’s scheme of values. Lealism wet ade. ree only when cdi not interfere with the vigorous aerion of national seleinterest 5, Senr-rassexvariOn ox Seur-assexrton? In his concern for the self-interest ‘of the United States, Mahan had a great deal to say about national ‘defense, but if one is to understand the nature of ‘he Realism of the imperialists, it is important ro recognize that the national jererest he invoked in the name of defense was nearct ‘aggrandizemedt than sel preservation In the 1890's Mahan did not seriously contend chat the United States was. ‘unable to protect its existing territory, wealth, or rights from foreign attack or the threat of attack. In 1896 he wrote, “Of invasion, in any real sense of the ‘word, we run no risk." But was there danger of invasion in another sense, Jeiring a different kind of defense? Mahan expressed the hope that “the ited States would never seek war except for the defense of her sights, her ct ann or her necessary interes,” and he proteted that he wanted 2 avy only for defense, not aggression. However, he aso insisted that defense ‘be construed to include all national iriterests.* Therefore, his statement of +e piles wa scarcely 2 imitation upon cational action, for, aftr all Mahan aay hac one of the nation’s most vital interests was the relentless fee world markets. His naval policy was designed to defend the mer- “pane shipping and srategic ourpoas which this search require. Since com fering ato could be expected toresst American commercial and territorial pumion, Ameris’s contol of the seas could readily be interpreted 36 2 defense of vital national interests Certainly, this sort of reasoning strained the word “defense” to its bursting point, for in Mahan's terms the requirements of defense could increase in definitely ina soe of chain reaction. ‘Thus, while he argued that an Isthmian Canal was exental for the defense of America’s coastal and Pacific trade routes, he also contended that the United States needed Caribbean bases, because the construction ofthe canal would induce a great increase of foreign commercial and naval activity throughout the Caribbean Sea and thereby imperil the peace of this strategic region.” At the sume time, the enhanced commercial and military value ofthe Pacific trade routes, which would result 38 IDEALS AND SELF IpVTEREST IN AMERICAS FOREIGN RELATIONS from the construction of a canal, ted ‘Mahan to urge the annexation of Hawaii tre indispensable Key t0 their Wefenge™ And wake the CC compete, we Mr ged thatthe aoqusiion of HWY "eed render the construction of 3° Me penan cana eaperative 82 20S = fctating the naval defense of 4 tutpone, Ani of coun 4 BN panded bate Beets with suai naval uot tenia 1 defend the nal Me Cathean bases, the Sebi vernnercat lanes, and Hawai Fee aN eouec are emt Oa evident from the content ey coment these pera SE from their phrasing and (86, and “Gpove al from thelr consequences vr he mnpeitist)pleas of se arte mare sustained ry atves Oke tea to ambition, pride or eve tress than t0 fear oF apprehension. Mahan’s own writings clearly demonstrate wae this observation applies hin ve wan 3 publi, bor if. that STE the sought to make his it igs plate whi Amerizan sui Frere concealed his dees Dees ine Taohcn he poze tat rule SS nd naval expansion Were eae anrance of national secu? ain gs of harmony and peace i ree are was rates ob FEO the thrusts of the peace 34 ae ar Warwhanhe Barby Ee riperednen as an clement OS spent hing im salt he spe es ana pasion THe etna i aeauelocdralrneely reidental 2 coaeal easton. Uineeds i VN se pin bid chat nations most cet do eeagres, Mahan could me Tegal reduce sprezereion © HS aceon of the Stu 400 Fs ew of re 80 mes 8 team which 80 _ Tas Gone Nee of oa fonace Growth 3 ce chao ot te MS ty increase in size of eat tine ihe Ya hater be doe convey combat mre ean taken by 20, be gee os teow Eel SPS No yearning for a peaceful and iokatd sation 0 troubled Mahan’ rane He considered peace the fae dal of 2 eiiizarion grown ft and breathe merit pursuit of mater mires ad the Sennen ay se peah, "Ease unbroken trade se eromtcts Mao sge tons all caper remmne tan ee eden, Bolen A, crea! Teac salvation lies in coRivaue he masculine, combative instines ‘When, these esinets We dorraants ebiny atropbies.and, civilization ée generates ‘ te the evalries of mations, #9 the ecanninno icc we cant anti ea ie pemcrvaton of te mar 2 ne cable of

    Вам также может понравиться