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NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE-54

COL JOHN A WARDEN , USAF

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
AIR STRATEGY CONCEPT
ENEMY AS A SYSTEM / FIVE RINGS MODEL
STRATEGIC PARALYSIS THROUGH PARALLEL ATTACK
FUTURE AIR CAMPAIGN
IMPACT ON CONDUCT OF WAR
LIMITATIONS / VALIDITY IN MODERN TIMES
PLACE IN HISTORY
CONCLUSION

1965

BACHELORS

USAF ACADEMY

1975

MASTERS

TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY

1965-85

FLYING

USAF - OVER 3000 HRS

1985-86

STUDENT

NWC, WASHINGTON DC

1986-88

VICE / COMM

36 TAC FTR WG, GERMANY

1988-91

DD S-D-W

USAF HQ, PENTAGON

1991-92

SPL ASST

VICE PRESIDENT OF US

1992-95

COMNDT

ACSC, MONTGOMERY, AB

1995-

CEO

VENTURIST INC.

NUMEROUS ARTICLES ON
FUTURE, STRATEGY, AEROSPACE
POWER AND CAMPAIGN
PLANNING

NUMEROUS ARTICLES ON
FUTURE, STRATEGY, AEROSPACE
POWER AND CAMPAIGN PLANNING

THE AIR CAMPAIGN

NUMEROUS ARTICLES ON
FUTURE, STRATEGY, AEROSPACE
POWER AND CAMPAIGN PLANNING

THE AIR CAMPAIGN


WINNING IN FAST TIME

THE AIR CAMPAIGN

AIR SUPERIORITY

CHECKMATE

STRATEGIC USE OF
AIR POWER
FIVE RINGS MODEL

DIFFERENT ESSAYS

ENTITIES AS SYSTEM
FUTURE AIR CAMPAIGN

AIR SUPERIORITY
STRATEGIC USE OF
AIR POWER
FIVE RINGS MODEL
ENTITIES AS SYSTEM
FUTURE AIR CAMPAIGN

THAT AIR SUPERIORITY IS CRUCIAL


THAT A CAMPAIGN WOULD BE LOST IF ENEMY HAS
IT
THAT IN MANY CIRCUMSTANCES IT ALONE CAN
WIN A WAR
THAT ITS POSSESSION IS NEEDED BEFORE OTHER
ACTIONS ON THE GROUND OR IN THE AIR CAN BE
UNDERTAKEN

THE FIVE CASES OF WAR


OWN
REAR AREAS

BATTLE
LINES

ENEMY
REAR AREAS

VULNERABLE

REACHABLE

VULNERABLE

SAFE

REACHABLE

VULNERABLE

CASE-III VULNERABLE

REACHABLE

SAFE

CASE-IV

SAFE

REACHABLE

SAFE

CASE-V

SAFE

UNREACHABLE

SAFE

CASE-I
CASE-II

THE FIVE CASES OF WAR


OWN
REAR AREAS

BATTLE
LINES

ENEMY
REAR AREAS

VULNERABLE

REACHABLE

VULNERABLE

SAFE

REACHABLE

VULNERABLE

CASE-III VULNERABLE

REACHABLE

SAFE

CASE-IV

SAFE

REACHABLE

SAFE

CASE-V

SAFE

UNREACHABLE

SAFE

CASE-I
CASE-II

THE FIVE CASES OF WAR


OWN
REAR AREAS

BATTLE
LINES

ENEMY
REAR AREAS

VULNERABLE

REACHABLE

VULNERABLE

SAFE

REACHABLE

VULNERABLE

CASE-III VULNERABLE

REACHABLE

SAFE

CASE-IV

SAFE

REACHABLE

SAFE

CASE-V

SAFE

UNREACHABLE

SAFE

CASE-I
CASE-II

THE FIVE CASES OF WAR


OWN
REAR AREAS

BATTLE
LINES

ENEMY
REAR AREAS

VULNERABLE
b
SAFE

REACHABLE

VULNERABLE

REACHABLE

VULNERABLE

CASE-III VULNERABLE

REACHABLE

SAFE

CASE-IV

SAFE

REACHABLE

SAFE

CASE-V

SAFE

UNREACHABLE

SAFE

CASE-I
CASE-II

MISSION PRIORITY

AIR SUPERIORITY
OVER

INTERDICTION
OVER

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

THAT POINT WHERE THE ENEMY IS


MOST VULNERABLE AND THAT POINT
WHERE AN ATTACK WILL HAVE THE
BEST CHANCE OF BEING DECISIVE
COL JOHN WARDEN

BODY

ELECTRIC
COMPANY

STATE

LEADER

BRAIN

CONTROL
CENTER

GOVERNMENT

ORGANIC
ESSENTIALS

FOOD
OXYGEN

INPUT(HEAT)
OUTPUT(ELECT)

ENERGY
MONEY

INFRASTRUCTURE

VESSELS
BONES

TX LINES

ROAD
FACTORIES

POPULATION

CELLS

WORKERS

PEOPLE

FIGHTING
MECHANISM

LEUKOCYTES

REPAIRMEN

MILITARY
POLICE

LEADER
ORGANIC
ESSENTIALS
INFRASTRUCTURE
POPULATION
FIGHTING
MECHANISM

LEADER
ORGANIC
ESSENTIALS
INFRASTRUCTURE
POPULATION
FIGHTING
MECHANISM

INCAPACITATION THROUGH
DECAPITATION

MUST BE
CONSONANT WITH PREVAILING POLITICAL
AND PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
ACCOMPLISHING DESIRED POLITICAL GOALS
AT AN ACCEPTABLE PRICE
CONDUCTED FOR SOME REASON

WAR IS ALL ABOUT MAKING


YOUR ENEMY DO SOMETHING YOU
WANT HIM TO DO WHEN HE
DOES NOT WANT TO DO IT
Col WARDEN

HOW TO MAKE ENEMY DO


IMPOSED COST (COERCION) STRATEGY
PARALYSIS STRATEGY
DESTRUCTIVE STRATEGY

UNDERSTAND ENVIRONMENT
IDENTIFY POLITICAL OBJECTIVES
DECIDE HOW TO INDUCE WILL:
IMPOSED COST / PARALYSIS / DESTRUCTION
FIVE RINGS MODEL - COGs

ATTACK RIGHT TARGETS IN PARALLEL

THE GULF WAR

COALITION STRUCK THREE


TIMES AS MANY TARGETS
IN IRAQ IN THE FIRST 24
HRS AS HIT IN GERMANY
IN ALL OF 1943!

WW-II

4500 BOMBERS - 9000+ TONS TO DESTROY


A SMALL TARGET

WW-II

4500 BOMBERS - 9000+ TONS TO DESTROY


A SMALL TARGET

VIETNAM WAR

95 AIRCRAFT - 190 TONS TO DESTROY


THE SAME TARGET

WW-II

4500 BOMBERS - 9000+ TONS TO DESTROY


A SMALL TARGET

VIETNAM WAR

95 AIRCRAFT - 190 TONS TO DESTROY


THE SAME TARGET

THE GULF WAR

ONE AIRCRAFT - ONE BOMB !

LIMITED COMBAT FORCES


ABSENT CENTERS OF GRAVITY
LIMITED WAR

IT ADVOCATES INSIDE-OUT
STRIKES & PARALLEL ATTACKS
AGAINST ENEMYS FIVE
STRATEGIC RINGS
IT IS A CONCEPT

DEPENDS UPON
AVAILABILITY OF EFFORT
CAPABILITY OF SUSTENANCE
SUPERIORITY OF TECHNOLOGY

THE PAST

ECONOMIC WARFARE AND INDUSTRIAL


TARGETING

THE PRESENT

CONTROL WARFARE AND COMMAND OR


LEADERSHIP TARGETING

THE FUTURE

CONTROL WARFARE AND INFORMATIONAL


TARGETING

A STRATEGIST SHOULD
THINK IN TERMS OF
PARALYZING, NOT OF
KILLING

LIDDELL HART

LIDDELL HART

- STRATEGIC PARALYSIS

G DOUHET

- AIR SUPERIORITY

CLAUSEWITZ

- CENTER OF GRAVITY

W B MITCHELL

- INTERDICTION

STRATEGIC PARALYSIS
AIR SUPERIORITY
CENTER OF GRAVITY
INTERDICTION

WE MUST NOT START OUR THINKING ON WAR WITH


THE TOOLS OF WAR - WITH THE AIRPLANES, TANKS,
SHIPS, AND THOSE WHO CREW THEM. THESE TOOLS
ARE IMPORTANT AND HAVE THEIR PLACE, BUT THEY
CANNOT BE OUR STARTING POINT, NOR CAN WE ALLOW
OURSELVES TO SEE THEM AS THE ESSENCE OF WAR,
NOR EVEN A DESIRABLE PART OF IT. THE REAL ESSENCE
IS DOING WHAT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THE ENEMY
ACCEPT OUR OBJECTIVES AS HIS OBJECTIVES.
Col JOHN A WARDEN III