Musharraf admits that Pakis fought in Afghanistan — so wh: tell us about where Pakistan is t BY THOMAS E. RICKS FEBRUARY 16, 2015 | y George Minde Best Defense guest columnist Former Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf made some news Friday with his Pakistan has supported insurgent “proxies” in Afghanistan, He also claimed: proxies t does that jublic admission that that India had been supporting proxies as well and called for both sides to stop. “In President Karzai’s times, yes, indeed, he was damaging Pakistan and therefore we were working against his interest. )bviously we had to protect our own interest. ... Pakistan had its own proxies, India had its proxies, whi¢h is unhealthy. [do admit thi is most unhealthy. It is not in favour of Afghanistan, or Pakistan or Inllia. It must stop,” he said. Musharraf didn’t refer to the Haqqani Network, the Taliban, or any other grgups by name, Thear you muttering, ‘ok, tell us something that we didn’t know.’ Considering Musharraf's continuing strong ties to the Pakistani army, however, itis interesting that he is choosing to admit this publicly now. ‘Atthe risk of sounding like someone promulgating those wild conspiracy tt sories so common to South ‘sia, one possible interpretation is that his statements could indicate that the Pakistani military is actually starting to move away from support for Haqgani and other groups operating Seven years out of power, Musharraf's comments don’t put the reputation. in Afghanistan. ‘the military's current leadership at risk. And as Musharraf is talking specifically about his time in| power, while he implies that support continued after 2008, his comments are vague enough that they +L “we did that under Musharraf, but we moved away from that between 2008) 1d support a later narrative of ind now.’ With histruces between Islamabad and the TTP and to steer the TTP’ efforts towards, willingness — to do so has been waning. China’s concern over Uighur stomping grounds of Waziristan and receiving support was also a significant to launch Operation Zarb-e-Azb last summer. The Pakistani army may have truly defeating the TTP, rather than just periodically ‘mowing the grass,’ will previously supported in Afghanistan. Or at the very least weakening those org ‘Rawalpindi to put them on a very, very tight leash. Pakistan's warning about Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan before it criticized for giving Haqqani leaders and fighters an opportunity to escape. It itants Afghanistan, their ability - or sheltering in the Haqgani factor in Pakistan's decision ached the conclusion that fequire neutralizing groups it janizations enough to enable lbegan last June has been is worth noting, however, that the Pakistani army has given similar warnings prior to operations in Swat, Kurram, and other TTP- held areas without Haqgani influence, so it would be a mistake to read too mm operations, however, Pakistan has begun announcing airstrikes against Haq .ch into this. Unlike previous Jani fighters — the first in November a week after Ghani visited Islamabad, and more recently during the last week of January. These could be isolated attacks made for international consumption, or perhaps ev} they could actually represent a change in policy relative to Haqgani and othe the Haqqani Network and others to the list of banned organizations last mort en completely fabricated — or 1 groups. Pakistan also added ith. While this could easily be mere window-dressing like earlier bans of Lashkar-e-Taiba and other groups, the apparent active targeting of Haqqani in Waziristan calls for a bit more serious consideration before dis gesture. ‘This isn’t to say that Pakistan is turning away from its proxies in Afghanistat smissing it as an empty ‘There's not enough evidence of action to back that up, and in my mind the jury is stil out. But the reasons for Pakistan’s security establishment to consider such a shift are the strongest they have b ‘Taliban in the 1990s. Giyen the plausible deniability it provides the current would be a good stalking horse for floating such a change in policy while adi ‘Time will tell. Ihope. ep Er(gn Shs gry ee en since the rise of the army leadership, Musharraf mitting past misdeeds. 1d loyments tc iste George Minde se eae reinsimultaneous references to past and current Indian proxies in Afghanistan, Musharraf also asserts moral equivalency between Pakistan's and India’s actions, absolving the army of potential blame for the policy while reinforcing the army’s core raison d’étre. And if this does indicate a shift in policy, ‘Musharraf's ‘visionary’ call for ending support to proxies, could assist in his political rehabilitation — also inthe Army's interests. ‘The United States, more enamored of India than of Pakistan by far, is eager to|put its sojourn in the Hindu Kush behind it. This and Karzai’s departure eases Pakistan's fears of possible encirclement and makes dealing with Kabul more attractive than before. Pakistan seems to see in President Ghani someone it can work with. Cooperation between Islamabad and Kabul is the best it has been since 2001, and Kabul has been slowly distancing itself from India, for example recently reaffirming a dpcision from October to suspend a request for military equipment from India. China, with its copper, oil, and other concessions, has a vested interest in Afghanistan's stability, and has doubled down by supporting development projects, such as the Kunar dam project, in some fairly dodgy ‘areas, Pakistan is pushing to implement the long-delayed TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan- India) gas pipeline project and has also pledged to construct a ral line from Ghaman to Kandahar and roads in the east (some of which will also receive support from China). None of these projects are likely to come to fruition with the current levels of instability in Afghanistan. China hosted a Taliban delegation for talks last November, and China has recently offered to mediate peace talks, @ move which Pakistan supports. They are certainly talking the talk regarding stability in Afghanistan and are pledging to put money‘on the table, which will require that stability to have a payoff. Finally, as TTP and other militancy ‘in Pakistan continues, the Army and ISI may be assessing the opportunity cost of supporting the Taliban and others and deciding that benefits are no longer worth the costs. While Pakistan has traditionally had only relatively nominal control gver the tribal areas, the violence of the last decade —the TTP takeover ‘of the Swat valley, attacks on targets in Karachi, Lahore, and other areas well outside of Khyber-Pakhtunkwa and FATA, targeting of elders and other civilians — is far outside of the traditional norm. These groups have received inspiration and support from the Taliban and the Hacaani Network. Although in the past the Haacani leadershio hag used thelr influence to broker