Legislatures are creatures of conflict, and Congress is no exception.

Uniquely exposed and intensely political, it is the object of the combined awe
and denigration with which Americans view their elected officials. In the past
few decades Congress has endured periodic criticism from bot h scholars and
other citizens for its inefficient procedures, its undemocratic structure, and its
political shortcomings, whether real or imagined. These criticisms, together with
greater executive participation in legislative functions (discussed in Chapter 7),
have called into question the very survival of our national legislature as a viable
policy-making instrument.
Nor has Congress remained unmoved in the face of external challenges. In
recent decades many institutional alterations-formal and informal, planned and
unplanned-have occurred on Capitol Hill. The modern history of Congress probably begins with the landmark Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, spurred
by the extensive investigations of a joint committee chaired by Senator Robert
M. LaFollette, Jr. (Prog.-Wis.), and Representative A. S. Mike Monroney
(D.-Okla.). The act produced far-reaching innovations in congressional practices,
especially in increasing staf f resources and reducing the number of standing
COmmittees; some other reforms, particularly in fiscal procedures, fell by the
wayside. Many minor innovations have occurred s~ce World War II in response
to the increasing work loads of individual members. Others have arisen from the
ebb and flow of party fortunes: The advent of a Democratic administrati.on in
1961 led late Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D.-Tex.) to take control of
the obstreperous House Rules Committee; an outsized Democratic majority in
the 89th Congress enabled liberals to enact a series of rules changes; disastrous

253
leaders he
changes would arouse stiff oppositio n, especially from the senior
'
.
reasoned that the omnibus approach would permit a few "ice cream" provisions
to make the "spinach " provisions more palatable. He was fond of pointing out,
for example, that the 1946 act had been approved partly because it had been
accompanied by a pay raise and a retiremen t plan desired by most members.
According to Monrone y's resolution (S. Con. Res. 2), the new joint committee, like its 1945 predecessor, would be prohibite d from recommending
changes in House or Senate rules. Obviously many of the innovations that Monroney had in mind, like reformula ting committe e jurisdictions, involved amending the rules, but these proposals could emerge from the joint committe e's work
and then (as had actually occurred in 1945-194 6) be processed by the two
houses separately. Monrone y argued on the Senate floor that contentio us rules
fights, like that over the Senate's cloture rule, should be avoided. "The intent of
this resolution," he told the Senate, "is to seek solutions to the problems of
2
Congress on which there is a consensus that something should be done."
Several reform senators, led by Joseph S. Clark (D.-Pa.), charged that
reform would be meaningful only if the committe e were free to probe what
Clark called "our present iniquitou s rules." "I find myself unable to agree,"
Clark declared, "that the resolutio n as [Monroney] has caused it to be drawn
would accomplish what the body of the resolution purports to do." Those who
drafted the resolution, he declared, "do not wish to put their support behind
any investigation ... which might conceivably overthrow the balance of power
in the Senate." He went on to estimate that the limitation would cut out as
much as three-fourths of the work that the committe e ought to accomplish.
During the previous Congress Clark himself had proposed no fewer than twentyseven rules changes, and "not one of these ... changes in the rules ... could be
the subject of recomme ndation by the joint committe e llllder the resolution of
the Senator from Oklahom a." Although Clark's position was supported by a few
liberal colleagues from both parties, his amendme nt to the Momone y resolution
was defeated 29 to 58 on a roll-call vote; on March 9, 1965, the Monroney
proposal was adopted 88 to 0.
On the other side of Capitol Hill creation of a joint committe e was one of
a series of demands presented to Speaker John McCormack (D.-Mass.) by liberal
Democrats, their ranks swollen by the 1964 elections and their organization
spearheaded by the Democratic Study Group (DSG). McCormack saw to it that
the resolution (H. Con. Res. 4) reached the floor under a no amendme nt rule.
Two days after the Senate adopted the joint committee plan, the House
approved it quickly by a voice vote.
The committee's twelve members (six from each chamber divided equally
by party) underscored the complex politic~ constraints under which it was to
work. They were designated by the House and Senate Majority and Minority
Leaders. Monroney, who headed the six-man Senate contingent, was a genial
moderate acceptable to both conservatives and liberals. Representative Ray J.

254

Inertia and Change

Madden (D.-Ind.), who led the House delegation and was named cochairman,
was chosen by Speaker McCormack because he was a "safe" liberal who was also
a member of the House Ru1es Committee. The other members were chosen to
represent faithfully the various ideological points of view in the two houses.
The joint committee's first action was to adopt unanimously a brief statement interpreting its scope of operations. 3 The statement was drafted specifically to answer the charge that the prohibition on considering rules changes
would render the hearings meaningless before they even began. It noted that the
joint committee had a mandate to study and take testimony on all aspects of
Congress and was limited only in what it could recommend. As time went on,
however, persistent quarrels among the staff members (who were divided according to political party and chamber) precluded the kind of cohesive research
effort that had been completed single-handedly by scholar George Galloway for
the LaFollette-Monroney committee.
Laboring under these handicaps, the joint committee inaugurated hearings
on May 10, 1965. It relied mainly on hearings to gather information, hearing
199 witnesses-mostly congressmen, but also scholars, interest-group spokesmen,
and a few executive officials. The printed testimony ran to 15 volumes and
2,322 pages. "I think just about every reasonable and constructive idea for the
reorganization of Congress-plus a few silly ones-is in our files," Monroney
reported. No fewer than 275 separate proposals were presented. They ranged
from Senator Clark's demand that Congress reassess its role in society {buttressed by 70 pages of testimony on dozens of subjects) to one member's suggestion that the congressional restaurants improve their service. Most proposals in
fact came from incumbent legislators, and typically they reflected their authors'
particular institutional statuses.
After the hearings had been concluded Monroney's committee took ten
months to negotiate its report. During this period scattered meetings were held,
and members discussed the proposals freely and bargained for agreement on a
fmal report. Essentially the deliberations represented a two-step process. First,
those proposals were eliminated that were deemed actually undesirable. Next the
committee had to agree on that combination of desirable proposals that would
have the best chance of passage in both houses. Some of the ideas that fell by
the wayside at this stage were included in supplemental views filed with the
committee's final report. 4
On July 21, 1966, the Monroney committee revealed the results of its
deliberations. Sixty-six proposals received the unanimous backing of the committee, which immediately incorporated the provisions into the omnibus Legislativ~ Re~~gani~ation Act of 1966. The heart of the report was a "committee bill
of n~ts, dest~ned :o regularize committee procedures, prevent the arbitrary
e~erc1s~ of cha1rm~n s powers, and protect minority-party rights. The bill of
r1ght~ Included such proposals as recognition of the majority's right to call
meettngs and report bills in the event that the chairman refused to do so more
frequent open hearings, broadcasting and telecasting of hearings at the' com-

2
ptt'paraHou of
n porf s. :111d cliluin :tfion of (>10 y Votiu' in COllllllitll'<.'S . 'flu '' staff positions Oil
, ar h r o 111111 i t( t~ wo u 1d h ' aII o t ft~ d t o U1 ' tll i n o ri t y p n r t y , u p o n i t s 1 , q u c s t. A11
ndditionnl staff nH' tuher, desi ' ttafed as a ". review specialist,,., would bt assjg11 d
to each standing conttniffo' to handl e ovr-rsipht fun tion s. ()n the basis of an
, t 'nsivc study of rongt 'ssioual work loads and s h ' dules, the joint conu11ittc
~dso propos 'd to lit nit individual otnrnit tee assigtHnents and Ghainnan ships in
tniff 'e,s disl.'H' tion, parth;ipation of all cotutnittl't' nH'tllhers in

the~ \'nnt b.

and ongressioual review or th' budg 't were also th, focus
of ll\lllH rous proposal s. Autotnatic data prorl'ssing was favotcd to expnnd the
(ltll<Hllli of budgl't infolluatinn availahl' to tn ' lllht'IS, nnd sp ific alt 'rations in
tlt, ptt'St'llfation of the hudgt't were sugp sted . Exec utive officers would ap 1 ear
before thl' appropdatiotts couunittt'l'S wifhi11 thirty day s nf'ter the subtnission f
tht~ budget to discuss overall budg '( guidelines . 'T h' appropriations ronunitt rs
paud their study of lllUftingency progratl\S and to hold tHOr
Wl'll~ 'lljOill 'd to
h~ati ngs . N{'W OJ 'rating units within th' (~eneral A counting ()fflcr w r urg d
to assist cotutuittees in prognttn t'valuation . Such prop >sals aud others rcrl ct d
onct'rn ovt't inadequntl' attention to th' ov'rsight function (ser 'hapter S).
( ue of the n1ore far-rea 'hing suggesti lllS was creation of a pl'tlll4Hl nt
Joint Conunittoe on (\)llgressional ()p 'rations to unctcrt4tke continuing inquiry
into th' organizatiOtl of (\ulgft'SS and (o proto t legislative pre1 gntivcs. 'rhcrl'
were also proposals for an enJtrgrd legislative research st'rvic' (to be r'at 'd
frorn th' 'xisting l ,cgislative l{ef renee Scrvicr), a fiv' .. day wort week f lr I gislativc busitH.'ss, a r<.'(l'Ss during August, nnd chutg 'sin th' ront 'llt and f )t'lnat of
th ' "o11Krcssi )I/a/ /' ecorli.
'l'h' teport included several ""ice r~ant"' 1 rovisions: the August vacation,
additional individual and conHuit h.'t' staffing._ increased travel allowances and
tel 'phone fa ilitics for llll'lllbcrs, and organizational streatuliuing or the (,apitol
poli '', pag 'S, aud guides.
'J'hc Monroney COll\IHittoe,s report was H laundry list or tclatively d 'tailed
itcrns. Missing wcr' discussions or issues that IUany dedicattHi r 'f'Ort\ll't'S thought
c 'ntral: Sl'lliority, party ll'Sponsibility und Senate filibustets. lu view or th \
coJnrnit tel' ,s lin tit 'd ruanda t, and broad ideological tni . ture~ not to tnen tion its
lintit 'd tint' and r'sources ~ th e oJnissions Wl~ t't' pr '{ii tabl~. lndcl'd~ th' tt ne of
Ut I"'IH>rt reflect 'd p 'rf' tly th, approach of its o haiunan" S 'nator Mon ..
roncy . .... J\ lot or lit tic refo11ns add up to a hig rl'fonn,", hl' reruarkl'd during >Ill'
of th' h 'a rings.~.~., f we ar, 'Oing to get an up- to-date, tnodern ('ongrl'Ss, it will b'
a lllOsaic you build front lots of lit tl' itnprOVl'lll 'tl ts."'

Fiscal

controls

'I

S. 55 (;o 'S in th It 'frig 'r~ttor

13' 'a us' th' joint conunit t ', had not ht'l'll au thoriZl'd h> report I 'gislation
it was anti ipatcd that loth houses would t\'ate spl'Cial tonunitt 'CS to transfonn th ~ ontnt ~ndations into I 'gislation or rules t'lHtllgl'S and r'port thl:lll t)

th

'lS ,\

S.

\ ll~ fl ll hilt,~

\Kl~

lH.lW th~ St'ttat' as t\ltl . )f tht' 10 pH>post'd :tl\H:'ttdttll'tlts th ~1t Wt'll dl'ftatl'd
(no ar thlll was takt'H nn anotln't l t), th) ft'W a than Jlt\ ltl\' ft ltll Sl'll:tilt ;lad~
and d~aft with S\1 h l\l:titt'tS as lotur " ((H. Sl'lP ' ti O ll of l t.llllllll( t' l htit t\ll'll, ~ttll!
thl~ St'll!lt s 1\llt:-tnaking ptl\V t' . All Wt'tt' t'asU .. dt'l 'tt d. (ln fill' ')thl' t h ~tnd,
Mont on' had ht' 'n autlHlti 7.t'd h his couuuU (t'' 't)llt'au es t ) ac 'l'pt .nut udnu.'n ts that wnuld tnakl' th' hill ttHHt' ac 'pta hi ~ to tht' St u,lft' ,ts a \VIhlh:' . ( t tla
~'> aan~tHhHl'llts that Wl'l'l' tdoptt'd ~ \ dl'alt with l'OllliHittt'l pt llt'\htn's and
t'Utl\l' frotu l)t..'tnot:ratic l'tlllltuit ftt' leadt'as IHltH tht' South and ~outll\ l'SL 'rh'
iotut t' ntntnittt' t' a quil'Sl't'd to all hut t ol tin Sl' atnt'lldttl 'tlts . 'rht' 1 ttt.Hilttl' )
atnt'tHhneut" Wt'll' tnainl " ~it..t' r n':un " ptovashHlS ltkl' .L1c )h Ia Us" (I' . N., .)
voir 'ntnplin 'atiou s Sll'lll hH tln' Nt'Unft' t lO(ll and I htgh SCllf
(I' .-Pa .) ,lll ,,) ..
tnntic data .. pt'Ol'lSSiug ra~ llittl'S lor tiH' I ihull' nt ( \ Hl 'h' SS . 'rht' patll' ltl l t
:tl' 'OtllllHldat ion l(')lll'Sl'llll'd h thl' l\) :tt\ll'IHhlll'tl ts \Vas Siftd I tl'all t \ r I l sttnil.ll
ptor ess was hl tak' pi art.' in th' llousP- thouglt th, sl ~ ,H 1 d till\\' , 11 (l\llld , ,,.Jld
h , in plivutl' .
'l'he sttat PJ' ot :tl'l' OtHHHHlnfton Sl l' t\H d to havt' plid ,)t t , lt,'tt, ,) 11 ~t 11 c h 7.
thl' S 'll ' tlt: adopted S. \ . h ,, voh' )r 7, to t> . Both Slu:tf\:' .111 d ll,l\1Sl
1\lllllhl'lS of fht ioiu t ' OtHillif t l' agll d that flll'lt t COt\\t\\t'tHl t( i\lll S ft:td SUI tV 'd
vit tuall iut:a t. S. 3
tltt'll tuovtd to tit' 11,)\lSl' \ll p ' Ph'Sl utati es,

rs

257
Two days after tl1e Senate had approved S. 355 , Speaker McCormack
referred the bill to the House Rules Committee . He was acting on the advice of
veteran House Parliamentarian Lewis Deschler, 7 who argued that, after all, the
bill did propose changes in House rules. The real reasons behind McCormack's
and Deschler' s decision were somewhat different, however. The committee bill
of rigl1ts, which Senate committee leaders had succeeded in modifying somewllat, was still too potent for McCormack and the circle of senior committee
chairmen around him. He would not, if he could prevent it, allow the bill to go
to tl1e House floor until these provisions were drastically diluted. The Rules
Committee, composed mainly of senior and "safe" congressmen of both parties,
provided a reliable tool for transforming the bill. Or perhaps the bill could be
sidetracked altogether, for Rules Chairman William Colmer (D.-Miss.) was known
to oppose the whole idea. As one member of the committee confided,
McCormack had "put the bill in the refrigerator"-where, as it turned out, it
would remain for more than three years.
Various attempts were made to revive the bill. Chairman Colmer began
hearings on April 10, but they were suspended before the first day was over.
There followed a fitful and more or less clandestine series of negotiations
designed to reach an acceptable compromise. In all , seven "committee prints"
(versions) of the bill were produced, mainly at the instigation of Representative
Jack Brooks (D.-Tex.). All were designed, in the words of a staff member who
helped to prepare them, to "write a bill the Speaker [or, more properly , his
Parliamentarian] would allow to be reported out." Some reformers charged that
the committee bill of rights was being so emasculated that "it would be worse
than no bill at all." Republicans charged that Brooks and others were gutting the
minority-staffmg provision through requirements that the committees' majorities
retain fmal control over staff decisions. Such conflicts occasionally surfaced in
the press, as one side or the other attempted to gain support for its position.
In this atmosphere it is not surprising that the congressional reform issue
took on a partisan flavor as 1967 wore on. It was obvious to everyone that the
elderly cadre of Democratic committee leaders had decided to hold the reform
measure in the Rules Committee, hoping that they could remove its committeerelated proVIsions or even kill it altogether. For their part, many Republicans
had long been resentful of unfair treatment at the hands of Democratic committee chairmen. Some chairmen allotted no staff assistance for minority-party
members, and many tried to withhold information from the minority. When
younger, activist Republicans first raised the issue in the late 1950s, they
received little encouragement from their own party elders, who, as often as not,
had reached comfortable accommodations with their Democratic counterparts
and were perfectly content with the situation. When Ford had been installed as
GOP Conference (caucus) chairman in 1963; it had been generally understood
that he would bear down on the minority-staffing issue. 8 He had immediately
appointed a Conference Task Force on Congressional Reform and Minority

258

Inertia and Change

Staffing, headed first by Fred Schwengel (R.-Iowa) and then b~ James C. Cleveland (R.-N.H.). 9 As more and more senior Republica ns were retued, especially in
the Johnson landslide of 1964, younger activists came to dominate the GOP
apparatus in the House. They presented a striking contrast to the Democratic
1 0
leadership, epitomize d by the likable but aging Speaker McCorma~kOn May 10, exactly one month after the Rules Committ ee s one-day hearing, the House Republican Policy Committe e issued a call for immediat e ~ction
on the reorganization bill. On August 22 Cleveland reactivate d the twenty-twoman task force "to put pressure on House Democra ts to report out" the Senatepassed bilL "I want to make it clear," he emphasiz ed, "that I am talking about
the bill passed by the Senate, not some watered-d own 'comprom ise version.' We
have worked too hard on this legislation, and the need for moderniz ing Congress
is too urgent for us to accept anything less than the modest reform package
embodied in S. 355." Thereafte r task force members arose almost daily on the
floor to comment on the delay and to insert in the Record comparis ons among
the various committe e prints. On October 11 the entire Republic an Conference
voted unanimously to ask the leadership to schedule floor debate on S. 355
under an open rule, but the session ended without any stirrings from the Rules
Committee.
Republican sniping at the Democra tic leaders resumed early in 1968 and
continued througho ut the year. In fact, Minority Leader Ford delegated a portion of the GOP response to the President 's State of the Union message to young
William A. Steiger (R.-Wis.), who spoke of the need for congressi onal reorganization. When pressed, McCormack and Majority Leader Carl Albert (D.-Okla.) said
that, yes, they favored a reorganiz ation bill and certainly hoped that the Rules
Committee would come up with a report.
Meanwhile, the ultimate fate of the reform package was in jeopardy on
another front. Monroney 's strategy had dictated a number of "ice cream" provisions to accompany the necessary "spinach " in the bill. But, while S. 355
remained bottled up in the Rules Committ ee, both House and Senate found time
to enact some of the more attractive provision s piecemea l. Representative
Madden called this process "ho-dagg ing"- a Hoosier term that apparentl y means
stripping the measure of its more attractive features. Some of tl1e major "hodags" occurred when the Senate voted to increase each senator's clerk-hire allowance (Monroney opposed it on the floor as removing one incentive for enacting
S. 355), to add to the Capitcl police force, to consolida te telephone and telegram allowances for individual members, and to establish an ethics committee.
Several House committe es adopted rules to curb the chaitmen 's power and to
protect minority- party rights. However laudable these moves may have been,
they were correctly viewed as deterrents to the basic reform bill.
Late in the session a group of thirteen Republic ans, led by Donald
Rumsfeld (R.-111.), began to use delaying tactics on the House floor to publicize
the congressional-reform issue and to protest the leadershi p's unwillingness to

As th'
l ill

th' p 'ndin'

260

Inertia and Change

Related events were taking place, however, that were finally to unlock the
refonn bill from the Rules Committ ee's deep freeze. The ferment centered on
the House Democrats, who had returned as the majority party even though the
voters had elected a Republican to the White House. The party clearly needed
compelling spokesmen to challenge the administr ation in the coming years, but
it was badly divided after the disastrous Chicago conventio n and the ensuing
campaign. As Democratic legislators returned to Washington, they faced a disheartening prospect. The disconten t and disillusionment that had been smoldering among young and middle-seniority members for at least a decade burst into
the open. "The House is like the Black Hole of Calcutta, " said one of the harsher
critics. Freshman Congressman Allard K. Lowenste in (D.-N.Y.) agreed: "Nothing
prepares you for its horrors." 1 2
In a real sense, House Democrats were victims of their own past successes.
Since 1932 they had controlled the House for all but four years, usually by
substantial margins. Democratic incumben ts, moreover , had until recently
tended to come from less competitive districts than had their Republican
counterparts. As a result, House Democrats were older on the average than
Republicans: Their median seniority was 6.5 terms (thirteen years), compared
with 4.6 terms (nine years) among GOP ranks. Their leaders, too, were older:
House committee chairmen Averaged almost sixty-seven years of age, whereas
ranking Republican members of those same committe s averaged sixty-one years.
And, whereas House Republicans had streamlined their party apparatu s in the
1960s (see Chapter 4), middle-seniority Democra ts-men in their forties and
fifties, for the most part-wer e disenchanted and bitter at their minimal role in
party affairs.
The disenchantment was manifested in many ways, but it naturally
focused on seventy-seven-year-old Speaker McCormack. The day after Christmas
1968 Morris Udall (D.-Ariz.) announce d that he would challenge McCorm ack for
the speakership in the initial Democratic Caucus of the 91st Congress . That his
challenge was doomed from the beginning was obvious to everyone (the story is
related in greater detail in Chapter 4). What was telling, however, was the
amount of discontent that Udall's candidacy uncovered. Under the circumstances, a vote of "no confidenc e" from virtually one-third of the party members was an unmistakable warning, and Speaker McCorm ack could not fail to
heed it.
Although they lost their battle to oust McCormack, the challengers nonetheless won several concessions that promised younger members a larger voice in
party and legislative affairs in the House. One was an agreemen t to hold regular
monthly party caucuses. Another was to establish a holiday and vacation
schedule to enable members, especially younger ones with school-aged children,
to spend time with their families and plan trips to their districts. McCormack
also agreed to support a study of electronic voting systems for installati on in the
House committee chairmen averaged almost sixty-seven years of age, whereas
soon after, Colmer indicated that he would not try to pigeonhole S. 355 any

261

longer ... ongrcssional reforn1 l1as bccontc a syntbolic thing to n1any 1ne 1nbers,
and it's awfully difficult to resist it under those circumstances," one of
McCorn1ack's as ociatcs confess d. 1 think tl1e Speaker l1as become reconciled
3
to l1aving a bill.'' 1
Eve11 witl1 tl1is i11forn1al tu1derstandit1g, progress was not imntediate. It was
not until April 22 tl1at Coln1er designated a special Rules subcommittee, to be
cl1air d by Represe11tative B. F. Sisl (D.-Calif.) , to study the matter and to write
an acceptable bill. 1\ltllOtlgl1 not identified witl1 tl1e refonn cause, Sisk was
known as a fair and l1ard-workh1g legislator, a tnoderate Den1ocrat of southern
e traction wl1o enjoyed tl1e cot1fidence of tl1e House leadership. Once l1aving
been give11 tl1e assigntnent, Sisk persisted doggedly in tl1e face of lukewarm
leadersl1ip support and often conflicting dire~tions. Soon he won the respect of
even tl1e most disgru11tled refortners, wl1o testified to l1is fairness in l1earing them
out. His counterpart, senior Republican H. Alle11 Smitl1 (D.-Calif.), tl1ougl1 never
identified witl1 congressional reform, also demonstrated determination to
develop a meaningful bill. Of tl1e remaining subcommittee members, only
Ricl1ard Bolling (D.-Mo.) was known for l1is refo1mist sentiments. 14
Sisk's group spent tl1e summer and early fall poring over previous proposals and preparing a new draft bill. Additional staff l1elp was recruited from
the Legislative Reference Service, tl1e Office of the Legislative Counsel, and the
personal staffs of Colmer, Sisk, and Bolling. By late October a draft was ready
to be presented in a series of seminars and then circulated to all members of the
House. Meanwhile, the subcommittee opened eigl1t days of hearings: First a
Budget Bureau official discussed fiscal policy making; tl1en media representatives
expounded on the roles of radio, television, and newspapers; and finally thirtyfive representatives spoke. 1 5 lt was seven more tnontl1s before tl1e Rules Committee was ready to report its own revised bill.
H.R. 17654 as it was reported was somewl1at bolder than tl1e con1mittee
prints that had been circulating dtlring tl1e previous Congress. Title I, devoted to
the committee system in t11e House, embraced a long list of specific provisions to
regularize procedures for (among other tl1ings) calling meetings, broadcasting or
telecasting hearings, respecting minority-party rigl1ts. The major goal, as tl1e
subcommittee put it, was "to strike a tnore jttdicious balance between tl1e prerogatives of the majority and the minority parties wl1ile at tl1e sm11e tin1e preserving tl1e legitimate rights of individual comn1ittee 1nen1bers." 16 Beyond prescribing new rules, the bill was designed to prot110te eqtiitable con1n1ittee operations
by more indirect means- by encottraging con1n1ittees to adopt n1ore detailed
written rules for themselves a11d by giving tl1e public n1ore opportunities to
scrutinize committee work. Otl1er titles in the bill de a] t with new congressional
fiscal controls, increased sources of infor1nation (including additional conlnlittee
staffs and an enlarged Congressiotlal Researcl1 Service), and housekeeping
matters like data processing, the Capitol Guide Service, Senate rutd House pages .
and modernization of the House gallery facilities.
Although not intended to en1body sweeping changes, H.R. 17654 was a
4

..

262

1ncrtia

and Chang

. . 1 wid -rangtng

piece of legist tion. It was prin1arily

w 11-drafted and tnptts1ng Y
.

.
f s k s1111th and esp cially Bolhng, wl1ose commt tn1en t and
t11 hru1d1w rk
1 '
'
,

.
lSt.bl
for
n
any
of
the
bill
s
artful
c
tnpron11se
s. Sisk's
1 gisla tiv sktl1 were resp 1

.
.
d tile bill u11anin1ot1sly, as dtd the parent Rules Comsubcon1n11tt e approv
"
1 ,
f
h
.
Th
tt
e
grant
d
tl
e
measure
an
pen
rue
,
except
or c anges
1
n11tt .
COlllfill
.
.
.

.n con11111ttee d. tions tt1at is witll tl1e exception ptovtded, tl1e bill would
JUns 1c
'
'
1
be op n f or amen dnlent On ce it t1ad rea l1ed the Hot1se. floor. Although the
k
tllat tlle men1bers would insist on propos1ng amendments, they
autl1ors new
.

d dd.
feared tllat tlle bill would becon1e so loaded down wtt11 revtstons an a 1t1ons
17
t
ould
sink
of
its
own
weigl1t.
ulf t11ey get into a whole lot of foolish
th t 1
a
w
bill " S. IS
k ~d
stuff,"
Smitl1 warned, "tl1en I'n1 going to walk away f ro~ thIS
Bolling e pressed similar views. Their warnings were n~t tdle, for a btparttsan

refonnist coalition was gathering momentum for the coming debate.

DSG and the Raiders

Tl1e core of the refonn coalition consisted of relatively junior activists

within the 125-member Democratic Study Group (DSG) and remnants of the
Republican Rumsfeld's Raiders. In late May, as soon as the basic contents of
H.R. 17654 were known, they were discussed at tl1e regular Wednesday breakfast meeting of DSG's executive committe e-compos ed of Chairman Donald M.
Fraser (D.-Minn.), Vice-Chairman John Brademas (D.-Ind.), and Chief Whip
James C. Corman (D.-Calif.). During the conversation the staff director, Richard
P. Conlon, suggested that the group try to organize support for a provision to
permit recorded votes in the Committee of the Whole, as well as several otl1er
"antisecrecy" amendments to the forthcoming bill. Tl1ese issues had shown
promise of stirring support among diverse elements in the Hottse; and, as a
former newspaperman, Conlon sensed an opportunity to interest journalists in
the problem. The three leaders bougl1t the idea, and the ne t Wednesday Representative Sam Gibbons (D.-Fla.), cl1airman of a DSG Task Force on Cotlgressional Reform, was invited to join the group. Meanwl1ile, staff negotiations l1ad
begun with Republicans and to the following week's meeting were invited
Representatives Jol1n Dellenback (R.-Ore.) and Steiger. 18 A bipartisan coalition
was beginning to form.
Both parties in the House have several infon11al organizatiox1s within their
9
ranks. The DSG is the largest, best-organized, probably best-know n and mo t
powerful of these groups. It started in December 1956, wl1en a young Minn sota
representative named Eugene J. McCarthy circulated among a group f hi
friends a statement of aims that becan1e known as tl1e Lib ral Mani[i t . By
January 8, 1957, the document l1ad twenty-eigl1t signers; wl1 11 R pr ntativ
Frank Thompson, Jr. (D.-N.J.), inserted tl1e progrm11 in th Congres i nal
Record three weeks later tl1e list of signers had grown to ighty .2 0 Tl1 " lib ral
Democrats, many from urban areas, l1ad found a chance to pr ss th ir own

263

ideas on the sort of measures they thoug ht Congress should be considering. A

rudimentary and informal whip system was soon established to imple ment these
goals, and later the group McCarthy's Mavericks, as it was called - acquired a
staff assistant. Bolstered by an influx of young liberals known as the Class of
'58, the group was formally launched in 1959 with Lee Metcalf (Mont.) as
chairman (McCarthy had moved on to the Senate).
The formal House Democratic leaders at first feared that the new group
might turn into an unfriendly rival. Neverthe]es "', as one studen t has remarked,
"the attitudes of the House leadership toward the group which became the DSG
might best be described . .. as benevolent neutra lity that grew into tacit
approval." 21 By the late 1960s the organization boasted several staff aides, a
fulJ .. fledged whip system, and a fund -raising and publicity program to help liberal
candidates campaign more effectively (a move designed to compensate for the
ineffectual and crony.. dominated. Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee).
DSG's influence in the House naturally fluctuates with the electoral fortunes of liberal Democrats. In the 1964 Democratic landslide its membership
swe11ed to about 175 and its influence reached a high-water mark. To explo it its
strength, the group sponsored a Jist of reform proposals- a]] but one of which
were ultimately adopted in the 89th Congress. One of them was the proposal for
a joint reorganization committee, which dovetailed with Monroney's efforts in
the Senate. Although the group urged its members to testify before the Monroney committee and later before the Sisk subcommittee, it played a relatively
minor role in promoting the reform bilL Its members were badly divided over
whether the Monroney and Sisk committees would produce meaningful proposals and even whether a reorganization bill would yield enough improvements
to be worthwhile. Some younger members, however, suspected DSG's leaderswho by the inexorable process of seniority were approaching leadership status in
the Iiouse of becoming "soft' ' on reform .
In fact , the DSG as an organization was slow to mobilize on this issue. The
reasons are not difficult to find. Once a fairly con1pact band of younger liberals,
the group had grown by 1he late 1960s into a large body with its own internal
factions. Some of its early leaders had been transforrned by seniority into confirmed establishmentarians. An even more divisive factor in the liberals' ranks
was the rise of new issues- particularly ecology and the Vietnam war- which
threatened to redefine 1ibera1ism and often pit ted traditional advocates of economic intervention against those who crnphasizcd antiwar and conservation
issues. By 1969 DSG's whip system was breaking d JWn, and rnany of its rnen1 ..
bers remained on the roJJs prirnarily to receive the staffs infonnative fact sheets
on measures under consideration on the floor a service that supplcn1entcd the
scanty information released by the Majority Whip's office . Staff ])irector Conlon
estimated that, of DSC's members, about half were "core " supporters and the
remainder "on the fringe ."
Nonetheless, the DS was a potentially powerful source of suppo rt for

264

1nertia and Change

reform in the House. At first, agitation on the reform bill was concentrated
among a few of the most liberal member~, like those in the Tuesday Group.
Once the Rules Committee seemed determtned to produce a measure, however,
the group's leaders were galvanized into action by the desire to build a broader
coalition for reforms than the Tuesday Group and their GOP allies could hope to
achieve. DSG's staff proved indispensable to the entire operation.
Although the DSG provided the broadest base for reform among Democrats, there was no lack of reform sentiment on the Republican side of the aisle .
The minority-staffing issue aroused special energies, although that single issue by
no means preoccupied Republicans. When the 91st Congress opened, the GOP
lacked vigorous leadership on such issues, but Dellenback, Steiger, and Barber
Conable (N.Y.) soon moved in to fill the vacuum. Even before lines of communication to DSG opened, they agreed among themselves to divide chores: Dellenback would keep track of proposed amendments, Steiger would handle press
relations, and Con able would coordinate overall strategy.
Talks between Democratic and Republican reform leaders proved fruitful,
for both sides had decided to avoid partisanship. "We decided we couldn't make
this a political issue because we'd lose the reforms we sought, and they were
more important than scoring some political points," Conable explained. In such
a partisan institution as Congress, though, bipartisanship was not without its
hazards. The collaboration was viewed with suspicion by some. "One has to be
careful about how many things he gets into at one time around here," one
Republican reformer commented. "Some of my colleagues are beginning to refer
to me as 'the honorary Member of the DSG.' "
Throughout the 91st Congress, the GOP leadership felt intermittent pressure to take a more partisan stand on congressional reform-especially because
the Democratic leadership was vulnerable on this score. Minority Leader Ford
resisted these appeals, maintaining that Smith and the Rules Committee should
be given a chance. Ford appeared to believe that a good bill would be worth
more than an issue to the Republicans and to Congress. Turning reform into a
partisan issue also had tactical drawbacks: Good working relations with Democratic leaders were necessary if President Nixon's legislative program was to have
any chance of passage, and some senior Republicans, with whom Ford had to
work closely, were themselves only reluctant supporters of reform.
At the initial mid-June breakfast session the two factions decided to draw
up a bipartisan list of amendments to present during floor debate on H.R.
17654. Memorandums and telephone calls crisscrossed congressional offices for
the next few weeks; lists of possible amendments were exchanged and their
merits weighed. Many of the proposals emanated from such reformers as those in
Thomas M. Rees' (D.-Calif.) breakfast group (the Tuesday Group), and Rees
himself hired an extra staff assistant and drafted almost 100 amendments on a
variety of subjects. Once the proposals had reached the DSG-Raider group for
serious consideration, much of the background work was done by Linda Kamm,
a DSG staff member.

265

The coalition was searching for ideas that would be potent yet also reasonably likely to pass. The bill's sponsors were apprehensive about what might
happen on the floor; the reformers were equally worried. As they saw it, two
eventualities were to be avoided. If too many "extreme" amendments were put
forward, a wave of negative reaction might set in, and all the amendments would
be defeated. On the other hand, if too many controversial amendments were
successfully tacked onto the bill, the leadership might turn against it and try to
defeat it on final passage. Rules Committee members Sisk, Bolling, and Smith
repeatedly warned others that, if the bill were loaded down with amendments,
Colmer would not hesitate to have the Committee of the Whole rise without
reporting the bill ("Colmer will just fold his tents, and the Committee of the
Whole will never report") or, failing that, would try to kill the bill in conference.
The coalition convened in a Capitol room supplied by Majority Leader Carl
Albert (D.-Okla.) and after a few sessions was able to agree on a basic reform
package of ten proposals. Agreement on this bipartisan package served to focus
the reformers' efforts, ensure more orderly floor debate, and dissuade many
individuals from offering their own proposals. Because of this package, most of
the 200 or so amendments being prepared were never offered on the floor. The
DSG-Raider group also made certain that its package of amendments was widely
circulated and understood in advance of floor debate; as the debate progressed a
daily agenda put out by Gibbons' office became an essential guide for participants on all sides.
In formally announcing the bipartisan package on July 8, Gibbons and
Conable noted in a joint statement that "secrecy undermines the democratic
process and saps public confidence in the House as a responsive and effective
legislative body."
Unquestionably the most important of the coalition proposals was one
introduced by Charles Gubser (R.-Calif.) and Thomas P. O'Neill (D.-Mass.) to
permit recording of teller votes on major amendments during House consideration of legislation. In a teller vote representatives file quickly past two tellers and
vote "aye" or "nay," without any record of who voted which way. The device
originated in t11e British House of Commons and has been used on this side of
the Atlantic from the early days of the Republic. It is used only on amendments
22
But the
and only when the House is sitting as a Committee of the Wl1ole.
House almost always sits as a Committee of tl1e Wl1ole for serious consideration
of legislation, and so the most significant votes have often been cast in unrecorded teller votes. The technique has been attractive because it is quick and
simple and allows members to vote without worrying about public repercussions.
In the 91 st Congress alone unrecorded teller votes were used on such key issues
as the Senate-passed Coopcr-Cl1urch runendment to limit tl1e use of land troops
in Southeast Asia; attempts to cut appropriations for military projects, including
the antiballistic missile system; efforts to cut development funds for tl1e supersonic transport; and controversial aspects of the D.C. crime bill.
Unrecorded voting in Committee of the Whole l1as represented n1uch n1ore

266

Iner tia and Change

than an exercise in secrecy. It also has butt ress ed the pow er of com mitt ees by
making it more diffi cult for coal ition s to oppo se bills on the floo r. Partly
because votes were unre cord ed, deba tes were ofte n poor ly atte nded and committee managers usually prevailed. Ther e were few mem bers who coul d not cite
instances in which their own ame ndm ents had faile d beca use too few of their
allies had shown up on the floo r. Inde ed, ame ndm ents pres ente d in Com mitt ee
of the Whole usually failed; duri ng the year imm edia tely prec edin g deba te on the
reform bill, 53 of the 73 telle r vote s take n on the floo r had repr esen ted defeat.
During the same perio d 85 of 113 division (stan ding ) vote s had been defeats.
These expe ditio us semipublic prac tices were part of the set of proc edur es that
supp orted the com mitt ee syste m and frag men ted pow er in the Hou se of Representatives.
Almost everyone who wrot e abou t the Hou se-s chol ars, repo rters , and
even representatives themselves-had paid scan t atten tion to the imp orta nce of
Committee of the W11ole practices. "It !eall y show s how this plac e can get out of
touc h with itsel f," Gibb ons rema rked. For several year s, how ever , inte rest in the
matt er had been building, and in May 1970 it sudd enly burs t into the open .
Journalists and lobb yists in the galleries were begi nnin g to try to reco rd the
votes of individual legislators. AI thou gh key cong ressm en were easy to iden tify,
it was virtually impossible to keep track of large num bers of legis lator s. Peop le
not in the repo rters ' gallery were even mor e hand icap ped beca use of an inex plicable rule that gallery visitors may neith er read nor take note s.
The issue came to a head as a by-p rodu ct of Hou se lead ers' hand ling of
mou nting antiw ar sent imen t on the Hill. Criti cism of tlte Viet nam war, not to
men tion foreign polic y and mili tary spen ding gene rally , had by that time
become politically respectable. In 1966 a grou p calle d Mem bers of Con gres s for
n
Peace thro ugh Law had been crea ted to coor dina te effo rts; by 197 0 it had grow
23
t.
eigh
of
staff
a
with
bers
into a full-fledged organization of nine ty-ei ght mem
The group was bipartisan (one -thir d of its mem bers were Rep ubli cans ) and
bicameral (including eighteen Sena tors and seve nty repr esen tativ es). Esse ntial ly
the group perf ortn ed back-up and coor dina tion func tion s for indiv idua l legislators and their aides. It was also able to mob ilize an outs ide lobb y calle d the
Coalition on National Priorities, a loose alliance of mor e than twen ty chur ch and
peace organizations.
In spring 1970 this latte r grou p stati oned abou t forty "spo tters "-m ostl y
liberal House staffers- in the visitors' galleries to try to reco rd indiv idua l votes
on defense-related issues. Each spot ter was char ged with mem oriz ing the facial
and physical characteristics of four repr esen tativ es so that he coul d tell from tl1e
gallery which were walking past whic h teller. Duri ng Hou se deba te over a $20. 2
billion military appr opri ation s bill, a series of key ame ndm ents that wou ld have
reduced military speuding was defe ated on teller votes. The anger of antiw ar
legislators reached its zeni th on May 6, whe n Pres iden t Rich ard M. Nixo n's
Cambodian offensive caused heat ed deba te on Sou thea st Asian polic y. Anti war

267

forces lost all the votes, but the coalition quic~y prepared lists of these votes
and sent them to all representatives, asking for any corrections before they were
released to hometown newspapers. Howls of rage could be heard all over Capitol
Hill. Members whose votes were recorded incorrectly or who had hoped their
votes would not be publicized found it difficult to counter the adverse publicity.
(The spotters, as it l1appened, were not overly scrupulous in recording members
when they were unsure of the vote-the idea being to evoke just such an angry
response.)
It soon became clear that many members had been stung by such incidents.24 One of them was Gubser, who had earlier been attacked by an opponent in his district on the basis of misleading spotter information. The GubserO'Neil! amendment had thus evolved just as the DSG-GOP coalition was forming, and it was a natural focus of reform sentiment. O'Neill, a member of the
Rules Committee, first presented his proposal at a final committee session on the
reform bill; it lost by a 6 to 6 tie vote, thus making it necessary to take the issue
to the floor. Meanwhile, DSG's mid-June survey of its own members showed
that this was by far the most popular of all the reform proposals; eventually 182
representatives of both parties cosponsored it.
Republicans found the teller-vote amendment attractive for reasons having
to do with the prerogatives of the minority party. House rules provide that those
opposed to a bill have the right just before final passage to offer a motion to
recommit the bill to committee with or without instructions for revision. A
successful motion to recommit ensures opponents of a chance either to defeat or
to alter the pending measure, and the vote on this motion is often the most
critical vote on a bill during House deliberations. Control of the motion to
recommit rests with the minority party.
In efforts to have votes on matters acted upon in the Committee of the
Whole recorded, liberal Democrats had started to use a maneuver that threatened
to wrest control of the recommit motion from the minority party . On several
occasions liberal strategists had sought to defeat (by roll call) the calling of the
previous question on GOP motions to recommit, announcing that such votes
would permit new recommit motions embodying amendments previously
defeated in Committee of the Whole. Liberals advertised such votes as the
equivalent of substantive votes on the rejected amendments. Sensing that this
tactic threatened their traditional control over the motion to recommit and
faced with substantive it1terpretations of procedural votes, many Republicans
seized upon tl1e notion of recorded teller votes in tl1e Committee of the Wl1ole.
The very fact of Gubser's sponsorship of the teller-vote amendment also
encouraged GOP support. As one Republican leader commented, "When you get
a respected conservative like Cl1arlie Gubser working for a reform like this, then
the boys know that it isn'tjust some scheme by tl1e far-out crowd."
The teller-vote amendment promised to revolutionize legislative proceedings by stripping the semisecrecy from the most crucial voting on the House

268

Inertia and Change

floor. But other amend ments were impor tant too. One propo sal struck at closed

committee meetings: 43 percent of all hearings and meetings held by House

committees were closed to the public in 1969. The Appro priati ons Committee,
for example, held every one of its 330 meetings that year behin d closed doors. 2 5
Impor tant sessions of such House comm ittees as Ways and Means , Armed Services, Judiciary, and Foreig n Affairs were also closed . 26
The ten proposals were chose n from the scores being circul ated because
they were considered to have the broad est appea l and the best chanc e of passage.
Many in the bipartisan group would have gone much farthe r. An attack on the
seniority system was plann ed by Rees, Charles Yanik (D.-O hio), and Henry S.
Reuss (D.-Wis.), who drafte d an amend ment propo sing that a comm ittee chairman not be required to be the senior memb er of the comm ittee. Other s also had
seniority amend ments to offer. The DSG-GOP coalit ion avoid ed the seniority
issue because it had no chance of being resolved on the floor and might weaken
efforts to modif y senior ity throug h the party caucuses.
On the Repub lican side of the aisle relate d reform activit ies were taking
place concu rrently with the DSG-Raider negot iation s. A 19-me mber House Republican task force (with Conab le as chairm an and includ ing Steige r) had been set
up by the GOP leadership to frame recom mend ations on the senior ity system.
From its incept ion in March until the Labor Day recess the task force met
weekly in a confer ence room just off the House floor (next door to the room
used by the DSG-Raider group ). From the beginn ing, progre ss on the reform bill
was of conce rn to the task force: Floor action on H.R. 17654 could create a
hostile atmosphere for furthe r reform effort s within the partie s, and seniority
amendments of the Rees-Reuss-V anik type could drasti cally restric t the task
force' s scope. (A more compl ete accou nt of the task force' s activities is presented in Chapt er 4.)
As plans for the floor challenges evolved, leader s of the coalit ion group
checked with their respective party leaders. Retiri ng Speak er McCo rmack took a
detached but bemus ed stance. " McCo rmack 's real attitu de is that this is none of
his business," one leading Demo crat confid ed. "This is Carl's busine ss." As
Majority Leader and the Speak er's heir appar ent, Alber t tried to placat e both the
reformers and the comm ittee leaders. One DSG leader descri bed Alber t's role:
We met with Carl early in the game as part of our stagin g opera tions.
He was sympa thetic but didn' t comm it himse lf. He's alway s weighing his positio n against that of the comm ittee chairm en. He know s
that if he wants to be a successful Speak er he has to play ball with
them.

His Republican count erpart , thoug h somew hat more comm itted to reform ,
struck essentially the same pose. One GOP reform er descri bed Ford this way:

269

Jerry is genuinely interested in reform . But he can't afford to

antagonize the barons. He's got to work with them on White House
legislation all the time. Dellenback and Steiger went to see him and
he agreed with their proposals right down the line. Yet, as the leader,
he can't say so. 2 7
The remaining top party leaders on both sides remained aloof, and some were
hostile to the reform proposals.
Even though they lacked the Whip and organized communications resources of the DSG, the GOP Raiders worked to sell the proposals on their side
of the aisle. Memorandums from Conable, Steiger, and Dellenback describing the
amendments were sent to all House Republicans. Cosponsors were sought from
within the party's ranks. Raider leaders formally presented their arguments at a
meeting of the House Republican Policy Committee and at a well-attended
Republican Conference (caucus) that stimulated unusual interest. The GOP
reformers were eager that all members be informed about the proposed amendments to prevent opponents from claiming that the amendments had been unveiled without adequate notice.
The antisecrecy amendments made an attractive package that immediately
put opponents at a disadvantage. But the DSG-GOP leaders recognized that they
would stand little chance unless a bandwagon for support started rolling. In the
weeks before floor debate on H.R. 17654 the DSG prepared an intensive campaign to publicize the amendments. The lobbying effort, Staff Director Conlon
explained, followed "the classic two-pronged effort" of talking to represen tatives and persuading outside organizations to generate pressure.
A series of three meetings was called to acquaint lobbyists with the reform
bill and the proposed floor amendments. The theory was that many lobby
groups would profit from open sessions and votes. Not all the groups were
interested, but a few were. "We got a big lobby effort going," Conlon said. "But
it is what you would call a 'public interest lobby.' They understand that this bill,
with our revisions, is really going to revolutionize this place." Actually, most of
the help came from such liberal and labor organizations as the AFL-CIO, the
National Education Association (NEA), Americans for Democratic Action, the
National Committee for an Effective Congress, the National Farmers Union, and
the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. On July 10 AFL-CIO Legislative
Director (and former representative) Andrew J. Biemiller wrote a letter to legislators saying that "the AFL-CIO urges you to be present on the floor when H.R.
17654 is before the House ... ." Letters on behalf of the antisecrecy provisions
also went out from the National Farmers Union and the NEA.
Even more successful was the coalition's appeal to journalists around the
nation. The antisecrecy theme was selected partly with this appeal in mind. As
one leader of the drive said privately:

270

Inertia and Change

We were extrem ely eager that th e st akes b e seen as b eing larger th an

merely a housek eeping m atter of sma11 con cern to ,,th e pubH
. c. The
this was done was to packag e our moves as an antJsecrecy
wa Y
h.
drive." Since the press hates secrecy in all fo rms, t 1s proved to b e a
highly produc tive techniq ue .

A concerted campaign, designed by Conlon , was launch ed to catch the

attentio n of journalists, and the results were gratifying. DSG Chairman Fraser
wrote to the editors of 600 newspapers , as well as to nationa l political columnists. A two-page letter, signed by 11 Republicans and 11 Democ rats who
described themselves as "both liberal and conservative,'~ was mailed to 2,000
editorial-page editors and news editors . Samuel J. Archib ald, directo r of the
Washington office of the University of Missouri's Freedo m of Inform ation Center, alerted 770 daily newspapers and 600 radio and television station s in urban
areas; Sigma Delta Chi, the professional journal ism society , issued a similar statement; and the chairman of the freedom-of-information commi ttee of the American Society of Newspaper Editors issued a statem ent that "the more the public
knows about Congress, the better the Congress." The three ..month- old Public
Information Center inaugu rated its editoria l service with a release entitled
"Making Congressmen Accoun table," which in turn served as the basis for many
newspaper editorials.
No one knows just how many newspa per articles were genera ted by the
campaign, but dozens of editorials were introdu ced into the Congressional
Record by supporters of the amendm ents. Probab ly not since the revolt against
Speaker Joseph Cannon in 1910 had the nation' s press taken such an interes t in
congressional procedures. Whether or not the general public evinced any deep
interes t in the question is doubtf ul; Rumsfe ld's remark about the lack of a
reform constituency must be recalled. But this time at least a few influential
'
'
outside voices were heard.
Leisurely Floor Debate
The reform bill reached the House floor on Monda y, July 13, under a rule
that permit ted four hours of general debate , followed by consideration of
amendments under the "five-minute rule"- which permits each membe r to speak
no more than once or for no longer than five minute s on any single propos ed
amendment. The House was to sit as the Comm ittee of the Whole. In presenting
the rule for approval, Chairman Colmer issued a warning to the reformers:
There will be some membe rs who will be running off on differe nt
tangent s wanting to change what your commi ttee, in its wisdom and
after long and deliber ate conside ration, has provide d . . .. [ 'f] hose
who have been crying loudest for reorgan ization and reform, if they

271
want it, 1 would suggest to them [that] they stay pretty well within
the lines of reason and not try to just revamp the whole Congress
28
and the character of the legislative procedures now in existence.

Other committee leaders echoed this warning. After a day of general debate, the
amending process began, also in the Committee of the Whole.
The proceedings did not start auspiciously for the bipartisan coalition. Its
first major proposal, presented by Representative William D. Hathaway
(D.-Maine) and forty-two cosponsors, was designed to open more committee
sessions to the public. It would have required that a quorum of committee
members conduct an open roll call each day on whether or not that day's
meeting or hearing would be open or closed to the public. The proposal actually
involved two amendments, one covering hearings and another covering committee mark-up sessions (which are usually closed to the public). Hathaway
asked for and received unanimous consent to have the two amendments considered together, a move that turned out to be a tactical error. The notion of
open hearings might well have passed, but the thought of open mark-up sessions
horrified many members. 29
The error was not long in revealing itself. Representative Emanuel Celler
(D.-N.Y.), veteran chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, followed debate
on the reform bill from his usual seat in the front row. Then he asked, "Does the
amendment provide for 'hearings' or for 'meetings'?" "Under the unanimous
consent request, I will say to the gentleman, it applies to both," Hathaway
replied. Later Hathaway argued that only lobbyists have access to committee
members when secret meetings are employed. "Now just one minute," interjected peppery Wayne Hays (D.-Ohio). "If you want to write up a bill with a
lobbyist sitting at every Member's elbow, some of you who like to proclaim
yourself as ultra-liberals ... are going to have a rude awakening." 3 0 Represen tative George Mahon (D.-Tex.), chairman of the prestigious Appropriations Committee, declared that, if open mark-up sessions were instituted, "the silent
majority will not be there, but the special interests will be well represented."
Representative L. Mendel Rivers (D.-S.C.), chairman of Armed Services,
remarked that many hearings on national-security matters would have to be
closed. He said that the proposed change "is not needed. We get along well
now." A majority of his colleagues seemed to agree, for the Hathaway amendment was defeated by a 102 to 132 teller vote.
The Gubser-O'Neil! proposal to permit recorded teller votes came up ten
days later, and the result was more favorable. Introducing the amendment for
the 182 cosponsors, O'Neill explained that although he did not think of himself
as a reformer, he did think that "every member should report to his or her
constituency as to how he or she votes , and the complete record should be
available for public scrutiny." 31 He recited the familiar arguments against the
unrecorded teller vote: the ubiquity of debate in Committee of the Whole, the
I

272

Ine rtia and Change

ity of legisbil
nsi
spo
irre
the
and
re,
the
d
ere
sid
con
nts
me
end
am
of
e
importanc
e of the
itte
mm
Co
the
of
y
rec
sec
e
Th
"
ns.
stio
que
h
suc
on
y
retl
sec
lators' voting
id the perils of
Whole has allowed too many Members to duck issues, to avo
nation, nor
this
of
rit
spi
the
t
no
is
t
tha
t
"bu
,
ded
clu
con
he
"
es,
vot
l
sia
ver
contro
e re ..
som
y
wh
ting
ges
sug
nt
me
com
a
ed
add
eill
O'N
en
Th
."
ess
of this Congr
rin g to the many
fer
Re
nt.
me
end
am
his
in
d
ste
ere
int
so
e
om
bec
had
rs
me
for
ts had known in
uen
stit
con
if
t
tha
ed
lar
dec
he
es,
issu
l
cia
cru
on
es
vot
d
rde
eco
unr
bably
pro
we
e
iev
bel
"I
ed,
vot
ly
ual
act
had
es
ativ
ent
res
rep
ir
the past how the
have passed more
would have had some different results. Probably we would
pieces of legislation."
pubThe
m.
icis
crit
le
litt
y
ver
w
dre
nt
me
end
am
the
ind
beh
ple
The princi
record in favor of
on
go
to
ling
wil
re
we
ers
mb
me
few
and
,
job
its
e
don
had
ty
lici
nts to the
me
end
am
l
era
sev
at
ed
ect
dir
s
wa
n
sio
cus
dis
the
of
st
Mo
secrecy.
House passed the
amendment (two were accepted and two rejected). Th en the
" on duty in
ers
ott
"sp
th
wi
e,
vot
ce
voi
by
ion
vis
pro
e
vot
ertell
il!
'Ne
r-O
Gubse
the galleries.
coalition all
n
isa
art
bip
the
by
ted
sen
pre
nts
me
end
am
ht
eig
ing
ain
rem
The
for
ion
vis
pro
the
s
wa
l
sia
ver
tro
con
st
mo
the
s
hap
Per
es.
vot
ce
voi
passed, most by
tha t time the idea
by
gh
hou
Alt
ty.
par
ity
nor
mi
the
for
ffs
sta
tee
mit
com
er
larg
ose d by many
opp
ly
rce
fie
s
wa
it
ns,
lica
pub
Re
for
cry
g
yin
rall
a
e
om
had bec
lared, "I have long
Democrats, including mo st com mi tte e cha irm en. As Celler dec
t only along ideono
,
ers
mb
me
the
ve
ser
uld
wo
ff
sta
ttee
mi
com
the
t
tha
ed
hop
3 2 He
"
en.
ftsm
cra
and
s
nal
sio
fes
pro
lled
ski
of
s
logical lines, but along the line
one-third for the
objected also to the rigid app ort ion me nt of staffs (th at is,
t the amendment
Ye
.
ces
voi
ir
the
ed
add
ts
cra
mo
De
ior
sen
er
Oth
.
ty)
par
ty
ori
min
lition.
coa
orm
ref
n
isa
art
bip
the
of
ne
sto
key
a
and
ns
lica
pub
Re
to
t
was importan
was heard to comAs if to underscore the trade involved, a Democratic liberal
through the
er
eth
tog
ved
mo
y
the
as
n
lica
pub
Re
ive
vat
ser
con
a
to
ly
ment wry
1OS
was
e
vot
er
tell
e
Th
?''
me
for
do
to
ng
goi
u
yo
are
at
wh
now
teller line, "A nd
en did not let
inn
cha
e
tte
mi
com
the
h
ug
tho
ntme
end
am
the
of
or
fav
in
to 63
the matter rest there.
sensus were
The ten amendments on which the reformers had achieved con
sixty-five
of
al
tot
A
or.
flo
the
on
bill
the
y
dif
mo
to
pts
em
att
the
only a few of
ed and twenty-nine
ept
acc
re
we
-six
rty
thi
;
ted
sen
pre
ly
ual
act
re
we
nts
me
end
am
from being
re
mo
ted
ven
pre
bill
ire
ent
the
for
eat
def
of
eat
thr
the
ly
rejected. On
in traduced.
a few
t
ten
con
in
cal
hni
tec
re
we
als
pos
pro
ed
eat
def
the
of
st
mo
Although
'Dante
and
l
nge
we
Sch
ves
tati
sen
pre
struck at basic issues. One, pre sen ted by Re
mittee
com
in
es
vot
xy
pro
of
use
the
ted
ina
elim
e
hav
uld
wo
a.),
Fascell (D.-Fl
s defeated on
wa
t
bu
ole
Wh
the
of
e
itte
mm
Co
the
sed
pas
al
pos
pro
The
gs.
meetin
uld
wo
nts
me
end
am
l
era
Sev
54.
176
.
H.R
of
e
sag
pas
l
fina
ore
bef
reconsideration
t election of a
mi
per
to
al
pos
pro
l
cel
Fas
a
:
tem
sys
ity
ior
sen
the
ied
dif
mo
have
for m his duties, a
chairman if the incumbent chairman was unable to per

273
Schwengel proposal to allow a majority of committee members to elect their
chainnan ~rom among the three_ s~nior majority members, a proposal by Jonathan B. Bmgham (D.-N.Y.) to l1m1t the tenure of committee chainnen to four
terms (unless the House, by a two-thirds vote, made an exception to the rule in
each individual instance), and the Rees-Reuss-Vanik proposal that seniority not
be required as the only consideration in selecting committee chairmen.
This last suggestion was by far the mildest on the subject, and in fact
represented no modification of existing rules, for seniority is nowhere mentioned in the rules. But Sisk, the bill's floor manager, warned that the seniority
amendments, "if adopted, probably are going to be enough weight to sink this
bill." 33 Bolling, a long time foe of seniority, also opposed the amendments:
"The problem of seniority when the Democrats are in the majority is the problem of the will of a majority of the Democrats," he said. "If they choose to
modify seniority, they have the power to do so." Republicans like Conable, and
indeed most members, seemed to agree that the matter was properly the responsibility of the two party caucuses, both of which had subcommittees studying
the matter (see Chapter 4). Some members, especially on the Republican side,
also considered the Rees-Reuss-Vanik amendment a device to provide the Democrats with a means of attacking seniority without changing the way in which the
House would be required to operate under the rules. The measure was defeated
on a 73 to 160 teller vote.
During the debate, which was generally well attended, House leaders
hovered in the background. Speaker McCormack took no part in the deliberations, but he was often seen roaming around the chamber and talking to his
friends. When asked how he stood on the recorded teller-vote issue, he told a
reporter: "It's all right with me. It would have been all right 20 years ago."
Then, spreading his arms wide, he added with disbelief, "Why, it's the great
utopia ..." 34 Generally McCormack supported the Rules Committee, voting
against attempts either to strengthen or to weaken the bill.
The Democratic leadership had obviously decided to let the debate proceed at a leisurely pace. "They're loving this bill to death," one reformer said
caustically. Frequently the bill would be scheduled for consideration but then
passed over in favor of substantive legislation. The long Labor Day vacation
(between August 15 and September 9) intervened, as did many minor matt~~s
like the annual House gymnasium party, a testimonial dinner for a rettnng
member, a campaign seminar for Democratic representatives, White House
picture-taking sessions for Republican representatives, and a dental appointment
for Colmer. As a result, almost ten weeks passed between the opening of debate
and the ftnal House vote (although it was true that the House devoted only
eleven full days to the measure, whereas the Senate had required seventeen days
in 1967).
.
Just before the August recess Representative Rees issued a caustic news
35
release detailing delays in what he called the "ghost bill" of the year. GOP

27 4

1nertia and Change

Conference Chairman John B. ~?erson (Ill.) s~parately char~~d the Democratic

leadership with "benign neglect of congre.sstonal reform. .Other members
expressed fears that the bill might be lost m the rush for adJournment after
Labor Day.
The charges leveled by Rees, Anderson, and others were primarily preventive measures, for the leadership was still maintaining its stance of indifference.
But the criticisms were not without effect, and Rees' news release generated a
fair amount of newspaper publicity. Perhaps more influential than the reformers'
criticisms was Sisk's issuance of what amounted to an ultimatum to the Democratic leadership. If the leadership could not promise to set aside time to finish
the bill without interruption, Sisk said that he would abandon the effort altogether. He asked that consideration of H.R. 17654 be resumed on September 15
and continue for the next two days if necessary to complete action. The request
was granted.
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 was finally passed by a rollcall vote of 326 to 19. The six Republican dissenters were all conservatives; of
the thirteen Democrats recorded against the bill, twelve were southerners, and
six were senior committee leaders. Most representatives probably concurred with
Anderson when he said:
At a time when our institutions are under increasing attack from all
directions for not being responsive, we have passed a bill that will
make this Congress more responsive to its own membership
and ... to the people it serves ... . I am proud to have been part of
this most historic moment. 3 7
The rest of the bill's history was anticlimactic. The Senate promptly scheduled the bill for consideration. During debate on October S-6, the floor manager
was Metcalf, who had been a member of the Monroney committee. 3 8 In presenting the bill to his colleagues Metcalf recalled that it had been former Senator
Monroney who had started the history of the law six years earlier. Of the 16
amendments accepted by the Senate, thirteen were presented by Metcalf; all
pertained to the Senate, and most were uncontroversial. One of the five defeated
amendments was Senator Robert Packwood's (R.-Ore.) bid to eliminate the
seniority system, which failed on a 22 to 46 roll-call vote. The final vote on the
bill was 59 to 5 (the opponents were all conservative southern Democrats).
Two days after the Senate had acted, the House accepted the amended bill
and sent it to the President. The leading Washington newspaper marked the
event with only a two-inch story.

The Politics of Reform

Passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act (P.L. 91-510) proved that
explicit reform is not impossible, given the right combination of discontent,

275
persistence, shrewdness in mobilizing outside support, and at least six years of
tortuous negotiations. "The doomsayers were wrong, and we were right,"
e ulted one reform-minded representative. What direct impact the bill's provisions will have, only time will tell. Even the most thoughtful alterations in
institutions often turn out quite differently from what instigators have
39
planned- as the 1946 reorganization law had shown. Sometimes reforms do
110t alleviate the ills for which they have been devised; sometimes they have
effects undreamed of by the authors. At the same time, subtle and gradual
alterations- often produced by long-range social and political forces-may come
"like a thief in the night" and have far greater impact than any piece of legislation.
It did not take long for a few of the reform provisions to fall by the
wayside. Tl1e Senate quickly ignored the provision of the act which limited to
one the number of joint committee memberships a senator was entitled to hold.
On at least one occasion, the House by unanimous consent waived the requirement that House-Senate conference reports be printed in the Congressional
Record at least three days before the House considered the report. The streamlined quorum-call procedure was ignored by the House, with the Parliamentarian
maintaining it was unworkable. And committees varied in complying with the
mandate to publish the results of all record votes on reporting bills.
The most dramatic reversal of the act occurred when the House voted, the
day after it convened in January 1971, to delete the provision that one-third of
committee investigative funds be used to hire minority staff members. Instigator
of the move was the new chairman of the Government Operations Committee,
Chet Holifield (D.-Calif.). With the support of other seniority leaders, Holifield ,
persuaded the Democratic Caucus to approve the rescission and, over the protests of some of the previous year's reformers, saw to it that the caucus vote was
"binding"-th at is, Democrats voting against the caucus position on the House
floor would 1isk expulsion from the caucus. Two days later-after the Republicans had stalled for a day-the House by a straight party-line vote approved H.
Res. 5, wltich included deletion of the minority-staffing reform.
Republicans were apoplectic at the Democrats' action. Steiger, after making a hasty survey of GOP committee staff resources, accused the Democrats of
"tearing down the work of the bipartisan group.'' Cleveland branded it a "shocking breach of faith'' and Minority Leader Ford said it was a ' setback" for the
cause of reform. On the Democratic side of the aisle, views were scattered.
Obviously, a majority felt that the one-third apportionmen t had been too generous. (Some reformers, like Rees, argued that the DSG bargainers had offered the
Republicans far more staff tl1an his own Tuesday Group l1ad earlier agreed upon
with the Raiders.) Thompson, who had sponsored, witl1 Schwengel, t11e bipartisan proposal, was placed in an embarrassing position and, along witl1 a few
otl1ers, voted "present" on H. Res. 5. But a separate vote was never taken on the
minority-staffing issue. 4 0
Tl1e 1970 law nevertheless promised to work significant cl1anges-

276

Inertia and Change

especially in the larger House of Representatives, with its often hierarchical

committee fiefdoms. Greater publicity on floor votes and committee sessions
may alter the structure of power in the House. With the possibility of recorded
votes on a large proportion of the amendments presented in the Committee of
the Whole , attendance during floor debates will be higher than in the past, when
most members spent most of their time in their offices , in meeting rooms, or in
the House gymnasium. Furthennore, the presence of additional members on the
floor to cast recorded votes will mean more challenges to the committee
managers of bills, a development that may reduce committee influence over
legislation. It may also mean some loss of "efficiency" in floor debate, as consideration of legislation becomes more protracted.
The recorded teller vote soon bore spectacular fruit. Committee decisions
\vhich had seldom been overturned on the floor , were soon being challenged in
the glare of national publicity. On March 30, for example, during discussion of
Sidney Yates (D.-Ill. proposed amendment to delete funds for the supersonic
transport from the Department of Transportation appropriation, Yates called
out, ~ r. Chairman, I demand tellers with clerk." Tellers were ordered, and for
the next twelve minutes members streamed onto the floor, picked up and signed
green or red cards (signifying 'aye" or "nay" on the amendment), and walked
past the tellers to deposit the cards in ballot boxes on either side of the chamber.
\Vhen the cards \vere counted, the House had voted 217 to 204 to reverse seven
years support of federal fmancing of the SST.
Political commentators were quick to credit the recorded teller vote. As
veteran reporter . . orman C. Miller put it, the recorded vote substantially
weakens perhaps the most effective carrot-and-stick power the committees
hold.' The rules change will, he said,
)

force more meaningful votes in the House on issues that the _!embers, as a whole, have heretofore tended to let the committees
decide. And the committees, for the most part, tend to be advocates
for the interests whose bills they handle; any diminution of their
influence thus should tend to reduce the influence of special
interests. 4 1

Of course the precise impact of the innovation may change as time goes on, and
other devices like more frequent imposition of closed rules, may soften the
effect of recorded teller votes~ But it seems fair to conclude that ''the refonn
makes the House a far more open political arena than it had been ... 4 2 And
that fact alone , as students of politics know, can serve to alter the power structure of an institution.
The recorded teller vote illustrates a central truth about the politics of
reform. The proposal was widely accepted as a limited remedy for a problem
that many members had faced in bringing amendments to the floor. Its capacity
for altering fundamental power relationships was largely overlooked by the

277
by it. O'Neill's r mark during fl oor
nu,Jnbc ts, rv n tuany who st od t) 1
d bah' on th 111 asur -that with thi devic "pr bably we would have passed
nts t hav b en ign r d by many of his colntotc pi cc of l gi lati n ''
I ag\H: s. }-lad its full itnport been kn wn- r for that matter, knowable- his
atn~ndtnc n t n1ight v ry w 11 hav b n d ~ a ted.
Mo 1 of the truggl ov r th 1 gislative r organization bill took place in
p1ivat , with littl public involv 111 nt. E cept for the flurry of journalistic
, <.:clainl fo1 tl1c anti cr y an1 ndtn nts, press c verag was almost none istent.
Nor did th publi, d rnonstrat any abiding int r st in the subject. "Congressional rt;fonn i .. an issu with ut a constitu ncy ." H w ver painful it may seem,
only the lcgi lat r tl1 n1 elv can ngage in s If-evaluation and "preventive
nutint nancc .~" Th l 967 and 1970 d bates showed !early that legislators had
ay about th "tructurc and procedur s of C ngress. A might be
plenty t
isting practi es were most fearful
e..'pcctt: d, tl1os who had gain d rn st und r
l hangc, and th :\y h3d di prop rti nat p w r t resist th e changes. The
rt ulting 111 a ur was th pr duct of n1any hands, some of whom were hostile to
th notion f r rganization. But th Reorganization Act f 1970 remained a
ingular achicvt;nl nt: it~ itnpact will b f lt f r y ar t come.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 8
The

' H'

ork 1Ynzes. Novctnb r 26. 1964, p. 42.

The t:nate dt:batc on . Con. R ' '. _can be found in U. S., Congres Senate, Congressionol
ng.. 1st scss . -9 Mar h 1965. pp. 4 __ 3-4429 .
Record. daily ed . 9th
n11nittcc
ngn:s . J int
ng. 2d scss . 1966. pp. 5

n the Organization of the C ngre''... In terinz Report.

ngn: ,'s, Joint C n1n1ittcc on the Organizati n of the C ngre~ ' . Organizatio1l of
. 89th ong .... d scs~ . . 1966. . Rl~pt. 1414. lthough the c n1n1ittcc 's rcl tnnlencre unanin1 us. th' House Rl:public.ln ddcgah:s tiled supplcn1cntal vie\ ~ urging.
thcr things. n1in rit -part c ntr 1 f ne in estigati c c mnrittec \Vhen a :ingl
ngrc ..s and tht: pre 'tdCtll:y . curtailn1cnt f 1 bbying by
ntrolh:d b th h us~s f
__,.__,utiv branch. discl sure f a,sets and inc n1c by nlctnbers. and pr vision: relating t
n ing of political can1paigns .
. . C ngrlss. Joint
., I st sc ss . l, 1 7 ..

{ ttltnith:c on thl'

rg..1nizati n

f thl:

l'natl'. ongrcssio11a/ Rcc r i. 90th

nah: d ha tt: s t\stt: d fr )tl\ Janunr ' _5 t) lurch 7. 196 7 .

ngn:ss.

ngress.

Hearin~

JanuiUy l

th

7, p.

"chl r ha,
n .. his appointnll'nt b _ pl'akt:r Nil"h las c ng\V\)rth {R.- hil) in l
rk d lo all ' for l"~\l'h sUl' 't: t:ding p~aklr as ~Ul adviser c.: n. nnd intcrpr~tt:r f.. tl1c H u~c
I~ ntilc 8{ UShl'f. "Thl" Speakl'r's ~lan : l'\Vis n~schler. ll \1St: P.~rli..Hn~nt ..lri~ln."
rul .
Jtla hington I< 11th/y. ( pril l 70). pp. ----7.

27

Inerti a and Change

8 House Republican leadership changes are recounted in Chapter 4.

.

. . .

ere somewhat sporadic, the task force h ad played a valuable

9 Although tts acttvltte~ wh .. t committee's work and even wrote its own book o
behind-the-scenes role m t e J~tn ss (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).
n
reform, We Propose: A Modern ongre
p

f .t

Donald Ru msfeld (R.-111.), delighted in pointing to his party's

10 One of the GO ac tVlls s,
ional baseb all game as evidence of Republican youthfuldominance of the annua congress
ness.
roup were Represent atives Thomas M. Rees (Calif.), William
11 Leaders o f t 11e T ues day G

d
ms
(Wash)
William
Hath
awa
y
(Matne),
an
Andrew Jacobs
Hungate (Mo. ), Brock Ada
'
(Ind.).
"Updating Congress" Wall Street Journal, March 27, 1969, p. 1.
12 Norman C. Miller,

'
13 Quoted in Miller.
14 Other members were John Young (D ...Tex.) and Delbert Latta (R.-Ohio).
15 u.s., Congress, House, Co mm ittee on Rules, Special Subcommittee on Legislative Reorganization, Hearings on Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 91st Cong., 2d sess.,
1970.
16 U. S. , Congress, House, Committee on Rules, R eport on Legislative R eorganization Act
of 1970, 91 st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, H. Rept. 91-1215 , p . 4 .
17 By the time that general debate (the stage of consideration of legislation before action on
amendments in the Committee of the Whole) had ended, more than 200 amendments had
been drafted. By their sheer number they threatened to prolong consideration to the point
at which the bill could not be acted upon.
18 A description of these events was written by Andrew J . Glass, National Journal (July 25,
1970), pp. 1607-1614.
19 These informal groups are explained in greater detail in Charles L. Oapp, The Congressman: His Job as He Sees It (Washington, D.C. : Brookings, 1963), pp. 36-45 ; and Miller,
" Chowder and Marching Society Does More than Eat and Strut," Wall Street Journal, March
4 , 1971 , p. 1.
20 U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Record 85th Cong., 1st sess., 30 January 1957,
103, 1324-1326.
'
21 Kenneth Kofmehl' "Th e I nst 1.t u t tona
.
li zatton

of a Votmg
Bloc " Western Polztzcal
Quarterly, ~ 1 (June 1964), 272, provides a useful account of the Democratic Study Group's
early history.
22 The Committee o f the Whole is described on p. 218.
2
3 The work of MCPL is described in Congressional Quarterly, July 31, 1970, PP
1952-1956 .

279
24 Representative Steiger (see Chapter 2) found himself incorrectly recorded on five of six
vote upplicd by spotters for the Milwaukee papers.
25 The Senate Appropriations Committee opened 7 5 percent of its meetings, probably
reflecting its somewhat different role. The House committee has normally considered its
function as to cut the budget, whereas its Senate counterpart has normally acted as a "court
of appeals" for executive agencies whose budgets have been cut in the House.
26 Congressional Quarterly A lmanac (Washington, D.C.: 1969), pp. 1031-1032.
27 Quoted in Glass, National Journal, pp. 1610-1611.
28 U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Record, daily ed., 91 st Cong., 2d sess., 23 July
1970, p. H6598.
29 At the time of the debate only one congressional committee-the House Committee on
Education and Labor- opened its mark-up sessions (and verbatim transcripts of them) to the
public. The committee had long been a liberal-conservative battleground, with jurisdiction
over many of the more controversial domestic issues. Attending the sessions or even reading
the transcripts is an eye-opening experience.
30 Debate on this amendment is found in U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Record,
daily ed., 91st Cong., 2d sess., 14 July 1970, pp. H6671-6681.
31 UoS., Congress, House, Congressional Record, daily ed., 91st Cong., 2d sess., 27 July
1970, p. H7155.
32 Debate on this amendment, which was introduced by Frank J. Thompson (D.-N.J.), can
be found in U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Record, daily ed., 91st Cong., 2d sess.,
15-16 July 1970, pp. H6750-6756, H6845-6854.
33 Debate on the Rees--Reuss-Vanik proposal can be found in U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Record, daily ed., 91st Cong., 2d sess., 27-28 July 1970, pp. H7189-7193,
H7251-7252.
34 Glass, National Journal, p. 1610.
35 Thomas M. Rees, news release, August 10, 1970.
36 Quoted in Washington Evening Star, August 11, 1970.
37 U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Record, daily ed., 91st Cong., 2d sess., 17 September 1970, p. H8893.
38 For Senate debate see U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, daily ed., 91st
Cong., 2d sess., 5-6 October 1970, pp. S17122-17138, S17141-17182.
39 For a discussion of the politics of reform, see Roger H. Davidson, David M. Kovenock,
and Michael K. O'Leary, Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform (Belmont,
Calif.: Wadsworth, 1966), esp. chap. 3.

280

Iner tia and Change

in U s Co
40 The lively e change of views on this poin t can be foun d
ngress a
.,
1, PP H ' ouse,
Congressional Record, daily ed., 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 22 Janu ary 197
8
-70. See
~
~n
ingt
Wash
ils,"
Spo
r
Ove
le
abb
also Richard L. Lyons, "Ho use Opens with Squ
ost, Janu..
ary 22, 1971, p. A-7.

nal, April 2, 1971

41 Miller, "Ho use Refo rm Begins to Tak e Hol d," Wall Stre et Jour
'p. 8.
Mar ch 23 19?
42 David S. Broder, "SS T: Hill Refo rm Vic tim, " Washington Post,
1,p.A-19
'

D.- .
lle o- .,.
r p~ cee i o and called a 'p e o '
table cCo rma c 's o on o
co n rd by mo "ng
~man ing a r JJ call. Da . ' mot ion a defe a ed afte r a

r II calL imHar r 11 caU to appro e ,fcCorm ack 's t 0 o io s

ti n, then the main m tion took ano ther half ho r . B./ this time he Ho
c n umed ne h ur and thirty--eight min utes hn saris".. ing e e _on e th
qu' r m wa pre ent .
Rayburn then moved to dispense with reading of the joum al-n orm all_ a
-ed
r utine mean of facilitating business. On that afte rnoo n: ho Iever: Da s insis
for
c n a fulJ reading. embers were heard to groan audibly as the)' disappe ared
lunch. Jour minutes later Davis, noting that the chamber was empt)'ing made a
a
point f no quorum. Twenty-two minutes were required to reassemble
qu rum, after which the round robin of roll calls began again. Three roll calls
en
were completed. (Jp to that poin t the House had spen t three hours and flite
minutes on quorum caiJs.
The clerk resumed the reading of the jour nal while members drifted awa)
s
once more. Twenty minutes later Williams look ed arou nd at the empty chm
and raised a point of no quorum. And so it wen t for mos t of the afternoon.
In the end Davis and Williams rele nted and allowed the House to consider
the
the bilL After the journal had been approved Ray bur n ordered the call of
committees under the Calendar Wednesday procedure. When the clerk reached
for
Banking and Currency, Chairman Brent Spence (D.-Ky.) called up S. 722
dec< nsidcration. Minority Leader Halleck called for a test vote on the bill,
The
Jnanding a roll call on whether or not the House wan ted to consider it.
motion carried comfortably, 221 to 171 . With this vote the House was auto
tnatically transformed into a Committee of the Whole. This relatively informal
procedure has the effect of easing the fight against dila tory tactics, for only 100
me1nbcrs arc required for a quo rum , and time-consuming roll calls are prose
hibited. When substantive debate finally com men ced at 5:08 P.M ., the Hou
had consun1cd ahnost four and a half hou rs in calling the roll twelve times.
Only two hours were devoted to general deb ate , but even then dilatory
tactics were etnployed by the bill's opp one nts. When Chairman Spence offered
the
an an1endtncnt to substitute a committee-approved $25 1 million measure for
nate's $389.5 nlillion bill (S. 722 ), Congressman James Haley (0.-Fla.) forc ed
ive
a thirty-nlinutc reading of tl1e thirty-two page sub stitu te. When Representat
Willian1 Widnall (R.-N.J .) offered tl1e adm inis trati on's $53 million version, it too
had t~ be r ad verbatin1. Tl1e com mitt ee sub stitu te was accepted , but the Widnan v r i n was rejected by a standing vote of 77 to 152.
ly
A tl1 delib rations proceeded, Halleck and his southern allies close
7