Swastika Over Acropolis

contents
Swastika over the Acropolis
ii
contents
History of Warfare
Editors
Kelly DeVries
Loyola University Maryland
John France
University of Wales, Swansea
Michael S. Neiberg
United States Army War College, Pennsylvania
Frederick Schneid
High Point University, North Carolina
VOLUME 92
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/hw
contents
Swastika over the Acropolis

Re-interpreting the Nazi Invasion of Greece in
World War II
By
Craig Stockings and Eleanor Hancock
LEIDEN BOSTON
2013
iii
iv
contents
Cover illustration: Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, centre, visits the Acropolis in Athens during
the German occupation of Greece in 1941.
Source: ullstein bild/The Granger Collection, New York: 0084444
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Stockings, Craig A. J., author.
Swastika over the Acropolis : re-interpreting the Nazi invasion of Greece in World War Two / by
Craig Stockings and Eleanor Hancock.
pages cm. -- (History of warfare ; volume 92)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-25457-2 (hardback : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-25459-6 (e-book) 1. World War,
1939-1945--Campaigns--Greece. 2. Greece--History--Occupation, 1941-1944. I. Hancock, Eleanor,
author. II. Title.
D766.3.S76 2013
940.542195--dc23
2013019451
This publication has been typeset in the multilingual Brill typeface. With over 5,100 characters
covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities.
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ISSN 1385-7827
ISBN 978-90-04-25457-2 (hardback)
ISBN 978-90-04-25459-6 (e-book)
Copyright 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
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contents
For Emma, Georgia, Charlotte and Thomas Stockings

and
in loving memory of
Eva Maria Jutta Hancock (1921-2008)
and
William Frederick Hancock (1922-2008)
vi
contents
Twas just a month agonot more

We sailed to Greece to win the war
We marched and groaned beneath our load,
While bombers bombed us off the road,
They chased us here, they chased us there
The blighters chased us everywhere
And while they dropped their loads of death,
We cursed the bloody R.A.F.
Yet the R.A.F. were there in force
They left a few at home of course
We saw the entire squad one day
When a Spitfire spat the other way
And when we heard the wireless news
When portly Winston gave his views,
The R.A.F. he said, in Greece
Are fighting hard to bring us peace!
And so we scratched our heads and thought,
This smells distinctly like a rort,
For if in Greece the air force be,
Then where the flamin hell are we?
And then at last we met the Hun
At odds of thirty-three to one
And tho he made it pretty hot
We gave the bugger all wed got.
The bullets whizzed, the big guns roared,
We howled for ships to get aboard
At length they came and on we got
And hurried from that cursed spot.
Extract from The Isle of Doom by Bouff1
1Extract from The Isle of Doom, draft synopsis of the 2/1st Battalion unit history, AWM
MSS0958.
contents
vii
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
List of Maps and Figures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
xviii
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Part One
Setting the Scene

1. Axis Ambitions in Europe and Greece 1933-1940: Greece is
assigned to the mercy of Italy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2. The Italo-Greek War, the Powers and the Balkans: My friend
Mussolini is a very sensitive gentleman. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3. Albania, the Bulgarian Frontier & Greek Defensive Schemes. . . 71
4. The Die is Cast: German and British Planning in Early March
1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5. The Gathering Storm: Mid-March and Early April 1941. . . . . . . . 115
Part Two
The Drama Unfolds

6. Opening Moves (6-7 April). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7. The Fall of Northeastern Greece (8-9 April). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
8. New Battle Lines (10-12 April). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
9. The Battle of Vevi (12-13 April) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
10. Pressure on the Passes (14-15 April). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
11. Allied Withdrawal Planning & Operations (15-16 April). . . . . . . 301
12. The Battle of Pinios Gorge (17-18 April). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
13. Across the Plains of Thessaly (17-18 April). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
14. The End in Epirus (19-21 April). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
15. Brallos and the Thermopylae Pass (22-24 April). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
16. Corinth and the Peloponnese (25-26 April). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
17. The Final Evacuations (27-28 April). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
viii
contents
Part Three
Evaluation
18. The Outcome Explained. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513
19. Justifications, Vindications and Unnecessary Debates . . . . . . . . . 543
20. Marita and Barbarossa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569
Epilogue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589
Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 599
Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 621
646
Contents
CONTENTS
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ix
LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES
xi
CONVENTIONS
xvii
Introduction
PART ONE
15
SETTING THE SCENE
15
Chapter One
17
Axis Ambitions in Europe and Greece 1933-1940: Greece is assigned to the mercy of Italy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Chapter Two
35
The Italo-Greek War, the powers and the Balkans: My friend Mussolini is a very sensitive gentleman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Chapter Three
71
Albania, the Bulgarian frontier & Greek defensive schemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Chapter Four
91
The die is cast: German and British planning in early March 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91
Chapter Five
115
The gathering storm: mid-March and early-April, 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

PART TWO
THE DRAMA UNFOLDS
Chapter Six
Opening moves (6-7 April)
Chapter Seven
147
147
149
149
179
The fall of Northeastern Greece (8-9 April) 179

Chapter Eight
207
New Battle Lines (10-12 April)
207
Chapter Nine
237
The Battle of Vevi (12-13 April)
237
Chapter Ten
271
Pressure on the Passes (14-15 April)

Chapter Eleven
271
301
Allied Withdrawal Planning & Operations (15-16 April). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

Chapter Twelve
329
The Battle of Pinios Gorge (17-18 April)
329
Chapter Thirteen
359
Across the plains of Thessaly (17-18 April) 359

Chapter Fourteen
The End in Epirus (19-21 April)
Chapter Fifteen
391
391
425
Brallos and the Thermopylae Pass (22-24 April). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .425

Chapter Sixteen
457
Corinth and the Peloponnese (25-26 April) 457

Chapter Seventeen
485
The Final Evacuations (27-28 April)
485
PART THREE
511
EVALUATION
511
Chapter Eighteen
513
The Outcome Explained
513
Chapter Nineteen
543
Justifications, Vindications and Unnecessary Debates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .543

Chapter Twenty
569
Marita and Barbarossa
569
Epilogue
589
BIBLIOGRAPHY
599
INDEX
621
acknowledgements
ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
One pleasant aspect of completing a book is that it brings with it the opportunity to give proper thanks to all the individuals and institutions that
helped to make it possible. We would first to acknowledge the generous
support provided to this endeavour by the Australian Research Council
and the Australian Army History Unit. Mr Roger Lee and his team at the
AHU remain a key institution in promoting the study and understanding
of Australian military history. Thanks also to the University of New South
Wales, and our Faculty, UNSW Canberra, for their generous support.
At a personal level we would like to thank a number of our colleagues
within the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at UNSW@ADFA for
their wise counsel and their patience with the ideas we raised in our tea
room discussions. We are particularly indebted to Emeritus Professor Peter
Dennis, Professor Jeffrey Grey, Dr John Connor, and Professor Robin Prior
for their advice, and Emeritus Professor Peter Dennis, Dr Elizabeth Greenhalgh, and Ms Miesje de Vogel for their invaluable editorial assistance. We
are grateful to Dr David Stahel for his stimulating advice and editorial suggestions, as well as his initial research assistance and troubleshooting in
Germany. We also wish to thank Mr Keith Mitchell for his provision of such
high quality maps.
Throughout the process of research and writing the helpfulness of archivists from various state offices of the National Archives and the Australian War Memorial was greatly appreciated, as was the cheerful support
offered from various state public record offices across Australia. For their
expert assistance while researching in Britain and Germany, we thank the
staff at the Cadbury Research Library at the University of Birmingham,
Churchill Archives Centre, the Imperial War Museum, the Liddell Hart
Centre for Military Archives, Kings College, London, the National Archives
of the United Kingdom, the Bundesarchiv Militrarchiv in Freiburg, the
Bundesarchiv Reich at Lichterfelde and the Politisches Archiv of the Auswrtiges Amt in Berlin, and the library of the Militrgeschichtliches Forschungsamt in Potsdam.
Craig Stockings: For me, as always, the most important factor in the completion of this book has been the unremitting support of my family. My wife,
acknowledgements
Emma, is a true partner. Let me also thank my children, Georgia, Charlotte

and Thomas, who never cease to lighten my heart.
Eleanor Hancock: I thank my friends, Christopher Diffey, Michael Fuery,
Philippa Horner, Susan Jones and Edward Wilson; for their friendship and
patience during the writing of the book. Christopher Diffey and Edward
Wilson let me use their home as a base during my research in London which
I appreciated very much. Above all, I thank Adamu Abbas for his support
and encouragement.
list of maps and figures
xi
LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES

Maps
P.1 The Mediterranean Theatre, 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
P.2 GreeceShowing various Allied defensive lines of critical
significance during the campaign, 6-28 April 1941. . . . . . . . . . . xviii
5.1 The German Plan of Attack and Allied Positions, 5 April 1941.135
7.1 The Battles of the Doiran-Nestos Line, 6-9 April 1941. . . 194-195
8.1 Planned Allied Positions, 11-14 April 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
9.1 The course of the Battle of Vevi, 13 April 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
10.1 The 4th NZ Brigade at Servia, 15 April 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
11.1 The planned withdrawal from Thermopylae, 14-18 April 1941.304
11.2 The withdrawal of the 16th and 19th Australian Brigades, 1516 April 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
11.3 The attack on the 21st NZ Battalion by elements of the German
2nd Armoured Divisions Battle Group 2, 15-16 April 1941 . . . 317
12.1 The Pinios Gorge Action, 17-18 April 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
13.1 The 5th NZ Brigade holding the Olympus Pass, 14-17 April
1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
13.2 The withdrawal of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade 14-17 April
1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
13.3 The withdrawal of the WMFAS (3rd Greek Corps), 12-20 April
1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
13.4 The 6th NZ Brigade rearguard action at Elasson, 18 April 1941.378
14.1 W Force withdrawal through Larissa, 18-19 April 1941 . . . . . . . 393
14.2 The withdrawal of the EFAS, 12-21 April 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
14.3 The German approach to the Thermopylae Line, 19-21 April
1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
15.1 The W Force Evacuation Beaches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
15.2 Action at the Brallos and Thermopylae Passes, 24 April 1941 . . 449
16.1 W Force Corinth Canal Positions, 26 April 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462
16.2 The situation in southern Greece on 26 April 1941 after the
German paratroop landings at Corinth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471
xii
Figures
1.1 Satirical cartoon on the professed disinterest of both German
Chancellor Adolf Hitler and Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in
the Balkan Nations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.1 A German anti-aircraft position deployed to protect oil tanks
at Ploesti in Romania in early 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2 January 1941, the Anglo-Greek war council in session. . . . . . . . 49
2.3 Anthony Eden greeted by cheering crowds when he visited
Athens in March 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.4 Italian dictator Benito Mussolini assesses the terrain through
a telescope behind the front lines during Italys campaign
against Greece, 1 March 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.1 Greek troops engaging an Italian position in Albania in early
1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2 A schematic representation of Fort Istibei in the Thylakas
Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.1 Four unidentified German soldiers walk along a Bulgarian
road towards their concentration area in preparation for the
coming invasion of Greece. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2 Alexandria, March 1941, W Force troops embarking for Greece.109
5.1 Members of the 2/1st Australian Field Regiment, Athens,
gamble at two-up before boarding a train to Larissa in April
1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.2 A group of German soldiers march down a Bulgarian street
lined with military and civilians towards the Greek frontier. . . 134
6.1 Damage sustained at Piraeus from German bombing on the
night of 6 April. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
6.2 Luftwaffe Stukas in flight in 1941. These aircraft failed to have
the impact expected by the Germans against the forts of the
Doiran-Nestos Line. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
7.1 Narrow mountain roads over which British and Dominion
troops travelled north to reinforce the Vermion-Olympus Line
on 8 April. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
7.2 W Force troops approaching the town of Kozani en route to
Major General Mackays blocking position at Kleidi Pass, 9
April 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
8.1 The bridge across the Aliakmon River, north of Servia, one of
the most vital keys in the defence system of northern Greece. . 216
xiii
8.2 German air attack was a constant concern for W Force. When
possible, all vehicles carried a man on the running board as
a lookout, and the heavier transports mounted light machine
guns in an anti-aircraft role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
9.1 Lieutenant Colonel I. N. Dougherty, Commanding Officer of
the 2/4th Australian Battalion, standing in the snow with the
commander of his neighbouring Greek battalion on Good
Friday, 11 April, the day before the German assault at Kleidi
Pass began. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
9.2 Soldiers of the 16th Australian Brigade after crossing the
Aliakmon River by ferry after withdrawing from the Veria Pass.261
10.1 German prisoners captured after the action fought at Servia
Pass on 15 April. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
11.1 A section of the town of Elasson, not far from the 6th NZ
Brigades rearguard position, under heavy bomb attack by
German aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
12.1 Survivors from the 2/2nd Australian Battalion after the
engagement at Pinios photographed on Euboea Island on the
eve of their escape from Greece to Turkey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
12.2 Field Marshal List congratulating German mountain troops
following the Battle of Pinios Gorge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
13.1 W Force transport withdrawing southwards. Note the lack of
vehicle dispersal which tended to encourage Luftwaffe strafing.381
14.1 A view of Brallos Pass. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
15.1 This photograph was taken from the site of the New Zealand
positions near Thermopylae, looking south from Lamia road
over the Sperkhios River. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
16.1 Navplion, from which allied troops were evacuated. . . . . . . . . . . 476
16.2 Australian troops resting under the trees in the Kalamata area,
26 April 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
17.1 W Force troops being taken ashore at Suda Bay, Crete, in a
small coastal steamer after being evacuated from southern
Greece on 27 April 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488
17.2 A convoy of troops from Greece arriving at Alexandria, Egypt,
28 April 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504
18.1 Greek forces in retreat during the campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518
18.2 German bombs bursting on the Domokos-Lamia Road in an
unsuccessful attempt to disrupt the flow of W Force traffic
south. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 531
xiv
18.3 German aircraft and supplies on a captured Greek airfield. The

impact of the Luftwaffe throughout the Greek campaign has
traditionally been overstated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 535
18.4 An unidentified group of German soldiers travelling down the
road in Greece. These troops, typical of the vanguard armoured
and reconnaissance units which usually engaged W Force
rearguards in Greece, are riding motorcycles and bicycles
not driving tanks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
19.1 A photograph taken during the visit to the Middle and Near
East of the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. Eden was
a key figure in shaping the original British decision to deploy
W Force to Greece. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 549
19.2 Lieutenant General Thomas Blamey; Lieutenant General
Henry Maitland Wilson; and Major General B.C. Freyberg.
Both Blamey and Freyberg faced the challenges in Greece of
acting as both Wilsons operational subordinates and national
contingent commanders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562
19.3 Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Blamey, commanding the 2nd
AIF, and Mr. Robert Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister,
meeting in February 1941 in Egypt. Mr. F. Shedden was the
Secretary of the Australian Department of Defence. The
Australian acceptance of the decision to deploy to Greece was
complicated by a lack of effective communication between
Menzies and Blamey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 566
20.1 German troops move along a road on bicycles, motor bikes,
and in trucks and tanks, during Operation Barbarossa in the
Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583
contents
xv
CONVENTIONS
As the Greek campaign of 1941 involved combatants from many different
nations, and was fought in a part of the world both rich and diverse in
ethnicity, culture, spoken and written languages, a degree of standardisation is necessary for ease of reading. Within this book, therefore, all place
and geographic namesvillages, towns, cities, rivers, mountains, and so
forthhave predominantly been taken from British military maps in use
in 1941. The primary source in this regard is the 1:1,000,000 scale map (TV
2758, J34Athens) compiled by the British War Office and printed by the
512th (A. Fd. Svy.) Company, R.E. This map, and those adjoining it, most
notably to the north (K34Sofia) are available for viewing in the map
reading room of the Australian War Memorial. The tendency within the
book, therefore, is generally towards an anglicised version of the Greek
name in common usage in 1941. The largest and longest river which flows
through Macedonia, for example, which is commonly referred to, depending on the location or nationality of the speaker, as the (Macedonian), Vardari (Albanian), Axis or Vardrs (Greek), is
referred to as the Axiosan anglicised version of the Greek name in use
by the British military in Greece in 1941.
Similarly, given the multiple nationalities of the belligerent troops involved in Greece in April 1941 a common approach to military ranks has
been taken. In this case, again for ease of reading for an English-language
audience, all ranks are referred to by the British World War II equivalent.
Again, for example, a Greek , a German Army Oberstleutnant, a German SS Obersturmbannfhrer, and an Italian Tenente
Colonnello, are all referred to as a Lieutenant Colonelthe British (and
Dominion) equivalent.
By convention, given often multiple archival references to incidents,
arguments and ideas, single footnotes have been used to cover each paragraph. The sources informing the paragraph in question are listed within
each of these notes. The exceptions in this regard are quotations, where
individual references have been used at the point at which the quotation
is used. Where a quotation falls at the end of a paragraph then the first
reference within the footnote refers to the quotation used.
xvi
contents
Madrid
Gibraltar
MOROCCO
Rabat
Casablanca
Tangier
Strait of Gibraltar
Lisbon
PORTUGAL
S PA I N
Oran
Barcelona
SARDINIA
Cagliari
A L G E R I A
Algiers
Tripolitania
Homs
Tripoli
Catania
El Agheila
Benghazi
Ionian
Sea
Sofia
Cyrenaica
Agedabia
Bardia
Istanbul
E G Y P T
Qattara
Depression
Cairo
Alexandria
LEBANON
Suez
Canal
Port Said
PALESTINE
Damascus
Red
Sea
Jerusalem
CYPRUS
Ankara
Black Sea
USSR
T U RK EY
MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
Dodecanese
Islands
Athens
Aegean
Sea
BULGARIA
Bucharest
RUMANIA
Derna
Cape
Matapan
GREECE
ALBANIA
Tirana
YUGOSLAVIA
L I B YA
Sirte
MALTA
SICILY
Palermo
Naples
Taranto
Rome
ITALY
Adriatic
Sea
Belgrade
Map P.1:The Mediterranean Theatre, 1941
TUNISIA
Tunis
Bizerta
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Marseilles
Milan
Genoa
SYRIA
DAN
F R A N C E
JOR
TRA
NS
Bay
of
Biscay
contents
xvii
Nil
xviii
contents
B U LG A R IA
Y U G OSL AV IA
Durazzo
Tirana
Elbasan
Kilkis
Edessa Yiannitsa
Florina
OLYMPUSKoritza
VERMIONALIAKMON
OLYMPUS
LINE
Salonika
Kastoria
LINE
Ptolemais
Kozani
Siatista
Katerini
Serrai
Kavalla
Argyrokastron
ia
km
on
ALBANIAN
FRONT
Drama
Lake
Dorian
Monastir
A L BA N IA
Valona
DOIRANNESTOS LINE
Rupel
Pass
Al
Aoos Grevena
PI
Mt Olympus
2917 Pinios
Gorge
ND
U
Corfu
Tirnavos
Kalabaka
Yannina
Pi n i o
Trikkala
Platamon
AEGEAN
Larissa
SEA
Volos
Karditsa
M
Almiros
OU
NT
Lamia
AI
NS
IONIAN
SEA
Molos
Brallos Pass
THERMOPYLAE
LINE
Agrinion
EUBOEA
Khalkis
Levadia
Patras
Thebes
Megara
Corinth
Pyrgos
Argos
Tripolis
Kalamata
0
0
Navplion
Athens
Porto Rafti
KEA
Sparta
80 kilometres
Yithion
40 miles
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Monemvasia
MILO
KITHIRA
Map P.2:GreeceShowing various Allied defensive lines of critical significance during

the campaign, 6-28 April 1941
introduction
Introduction
On 6 April 1941, Germany launched simultaneous invasions of Greece and
Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was defeated in a matter of days. The ensuing campaign in Greece (code-named Operation Marita), lasted just over three
weeks and ended in a complete Allied defeat.
Initially neutral, Greece had become involved in World War II on 28
October 1940 when Italy invaded the country from its Albanian territory.
In April 1939 Britain and France had issued a guarantee of military support
to the Greeks, should they be attacked by a foreign power, but Greece did
not need, ask for, or require any substantial British ground deployment to
repel the Italian incursion. The Greeks quickly drove Mussolinis troops
back across the Albanian frontier and held them there. As prospects of a
German intervention became greater in early 1941, however, the Greek
government reversed its earlier position and invited Britain to send what
ground forces could be spared. As a consequence, an imperial commitment
(W Force), based on a British armoured brigade and infantry divisions from
Australia and New Zealand, began landing in Athens in early March 1941.1
By 20 April, when it was clear that W Force could do little more to slow the
continuing German advance, the Greek Government agreed that this expeditionary force should be evacuated. Between 24 and 29 April more than
50,000 British and Dominion troops left the Greek mainland. On 25 April
the Greek government fled to Crete, which subsequently fell to German
forces on 30 May.2
1During the negotiations for its deployment the British and Dominion Force to be sent
to Greece was known as Lustreforce, after Operation Lustre, the codename for British naval
effort to ship it from Egypt. While in Greece, the headquarters of the force referred to itself,
in its operational and administrative instructions, as BTGBritish Troops Greece. For
ease of reference, throughout this book the name W Force will be used to represent the
force. The term W Force was initially given to the Imperial troops and the Central Macedonian Field Army Section (CMFAS) under Wilsons command from 12.00 p.m., 5 April.
This name was derived from the fact that troops were under the command of Lieutenant
General Henry Maitland Wilson. The use of the name W Force was common at the time,
has been used in official and general histories of the campaign ever since, and remains
recognisable todaymuch more so, for example, than BTG.
2M. Mazower, Inside Hitlers Greece: The Experience of Occupation, Yale University Press,
New Haven, 1993, p. 2.
introduction
For Greeks defeat meant the beginning of a harsh occupation and bitter
resistance. For New Zealand and Australia the manpower losses suffered
on the mainland (and immediately afterwards in Crete) significantly reduced the immediate military capability of both nations expeditionary
forces. In Britain the loss of mainland Greece represented another in a
series of serious military setbacks. For the Axis powers, although the fall
and subsequent occupation of most of Greece ended a costly and embarrassing stalemate in Albania for Italy, the subordination to Germany that
followed effectively meant the end of Mussolinis ability to conduct an
independent policy. For Germany, on the other hand, the success of the
invasion was important for its future plans against the Soviet Uniona
clash which was to be the decisive campaign of the war in Europe.
Despite the clear importance of the German invasion of Greece within
the international history of World War II, limited scholarly research has as
yet been conducted into the operational aspects of the mainland campaign,
apart from the generally narrative approach of the official histories.3 Often,
particularly in Australasia, those works that do take a battlefield focus
tend to limit themselves to traditional, non-academic narratives of events,
which are generally uncritical, unreflective and often subject to nationalist
and partisan agendas.4 The body of research conducted into the mainland
Greek campaign might thus be described as thinespecially when weighed
up against that which exists for the Battle for Crete which followed, or recent
investigations into the operational aspects of the fall of France, for example,
or the campaigns in North Africa.5 The battle for mainland Greece in April
3Some examples of works that do devote significant attention to operational events
include: J. Bitzes, Greece in World War II: To April 1941, Sunflower University Press, Manhattan, 1989; A. Terzakis and D. Connolly, The Greek Epic, 1940-1941, Greek Army Press, Athens,
1990; C. Polyzious, The Allied Campaign Corps in Greece (March May 1941), Hellenic Army
General Staff History Directorate, Athens, 1991; Anon., An Abridged History of the GreekItalian and Greek-German War, 1940-1941, Hellenic Army General Staff History Directorate,
Athens, 1997; R. Higham, Diary of a Disaster: British Aid to Greece, 1940-1941, University Press
of Kentucky, Lexington, 1986; M. Willingham, Perilous Commitments: The Battle for Greece
and Crete 1940-1941, Spellmount, Staplehurst, 2005; K.H. Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941,
Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, Hamburg, 2007. Some of the more analytical articles in question
include: R. Hobson, The Episode in Greece, Army Quarterly & Defence Journal, Vol. 120, No.
2, 1990, pp. 152-66; J. Sadkovich, Italian Morale During the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941,
War & Society, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1994, pp. 97-123; J. Sadkovich, Anglo-American Bias and the
Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941, Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, No. 4, 1994, pp. 617-42.
4See, for example, W. Phillips, The Middle East Campaigns of 1940-1942: Greece and Crete,
Phillips Publications, Coffs Harbour, 2000; P. Ewer, The Forgotten Anzacs: The campaign in
Greece, 1941, Scribe, Melbourne, 2008.
5For Crete see, for example, A. Beevor, Crete, Hodder, London, 2005; J. Forty, Battle for
Crete, Ian Allen Publishing, London, 2009; J.H. Spencer, Battle for Crete, Pen and Sword,
introduction
1941 has been neglected to some extent, andwhere it has been studied
often misunderstood. This study aims to begin its re-examination. It is a
critical operational history, with operations defined as being the management of campaigns and specific theatres of war. Operational history, in
Robert Citinos definition of the concept, is about explaining what actually happened in the course of a campaign, and why.6 It is also a modern
study in that it seeks to place the operation in its political, strategic and
economic context.
Within this context this book is an attempt to provide a modern, multinational account of the mainland Greek campaign. Although the fighting
which followed the German invasion was in many ways a continuation of
the ongoing Greco-Italian War, and the subsequent invasion of Crete a
consequence of the mainland campaign, our focus is on the crucial threeweek period, from 6 to 27 April, which decided Greeces wartime fate. It is
based on research on official records held by archives in Australia, Germany, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Some German records on
the mainland Greek campaign were damaged and others destroyed during
a fire in the army historical section in Potsdam during the war.7 Those German records that survive are not as comprehensive as their Allied equivalents, and the memoir literature by private soldiers is less extensive. Both
of these factors have meant that it has not been possible to give equal weight
to the experience ofboth sides. In addition, at least some of the German
reports were prepared weeks after the events they record, with resulting
inaccuracies in the times and dates of their accounts.
Limited resources meant that we were unable to undertake research in
Greek and Italian archives and that the information on Greek and Italian
forces and policies has therefore had to come from sources available
Barnsley, 2008; J. Sadler, Operation Mercury: & The Battle for Crete, 1941, Stackpole Books,
Mechanicsburg, 2008. See also (for France) K. Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend: the 1940 campaign in the West, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2005; J. Jackson, The Fall of France: the
Nazi invasion of 1940, OUP, Oxford, 2003; and (for North Africa and the Mediterranean as a
whole) M. Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of
19401943, CUP, Cambridge, 2000; D. Porch, Hitlers Mediterranean Gamble: the North African
and the Mediterranean Campaigns in World War II, Cassell, London, 2005.
6R.M. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942, University Press
of Kansas, Lawrence, 2007, p. 12. On operational history more generally: Bernd Wegner,
Wozu Operationsgeschichte?, in T. Khne, and B. Ziemann (eds), Was ist Militrgeschichte?,
Krieg in der Geschichte Band 6, Ferdinand Schningh, Paderborn, 2000, pp. 112-13; Snke
Neitzel, Des Forschens noch wert? Anmerkungen zur Operationsgeschichte der Waffen-SS,
Militrgeschichtliche Zeitschrift, 61/2 (2002), pp. 403-5, 427-9.
75. Panzer-Division, Ib, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 5 u. 6. 1.1.1941-17.6.1941., Bundesarchiv
Militrarchiv (BA MA), Series RH 27, Item 5/121.
introduction
in English and German. We are, at present, working on a separate project

concerning the Italo-Greek War from October 1940, which will make use
of Italian and Greek primary and secondary sources.
As a consequence of our archival findings and subsequent analysis, this
book will argue that the currently accepted English-language interpretations of the campaign are in many ways based on a misreading and misunderstanding of the evidence and of the campaign. Over the last seventy
years an accepted, yet imbalanced interpretation of the Greek campaign
has developed. Though there are variations in emphasis and detail, the
overall argument is generally consistent in that it attributes British difficulties in Greece to a range of factors beyond the control of W Force. There is
little blame attached to British and Dominion troops. The expeditionary
force was let down by its governments and, many authors have contended,
by its Greek allies. Even then W Force faced a set of military disadvantages
so severe that they both explain and excuse its withdrawals and eventual
ignominious evacuation from Greece.
Within this overall interpretation there are a range of different emphases. Some have argued that Imperial troops should never have gone to
Greece in the first place because political, rather than military factors,
convinced British policy-makers to mount the deployment. An extension
of this line of thinking is that W Force should not have been despatched to
Greece because the chances of military success were small and British and
Dominion soldiers were thus sacrificed for political ends. An Australasian
variation on the theme is that the Australians and New Zealanders were
somehow tricked into agreeing to go to Greece and risking a significant
proportion of their national military power to a lost cause. At the very least
they were denied important information by the British government.8 At a
strategic level others have sought vindication for the campaign, arguing
that, even if the deployment was made for the wrong reasons, and even
though it ended in an evacuation, it was crucial from an Allied perspective
because the campaign delayed the invasion of the USSR. This delay in turn,
it has been argued, led to Germanys defeat because it meant the campaign
in the Soviet Union lasted into the winter of 1941. The Greek intervention,
therefore, was justified because it was a crucial component of eventual
Allied victory in the east, and thus in Europe.9
8For an example of the use of such themes as underlying assumptions in a discussion
regarding the use of Dominion troops in Greece, see I. Chapman, Iven G. Mackay: Citizen
and Soldier, Melway Publishing, Melbourne, 1975, pp. 215-16.
9For a classic and influential example of this line of argument see W. Churchill, The
Second World War, Vol. 5, Cassell, London, 1964, p. 321. The notion has been repeated often
introduction
When authors have turned to the actual conduct of the campaign, they
have tended to stress, with different degrees of emphasis, Greek failure and
German material superiority. The Greek-W Force plan to defend the country, it has often been asserted, was fatally flawed as a consequence of Greek
intransigence and national pride, particularly concerning the location of
the defensive line to be held in Albania and eastern Thrace. Moreover, once
the German invasion was underway, a consistent series of Greek collapses
on the western flank of the line rendered British positions untenable, thus
necessitating reluctant withdrawals (only at the last minute, when all options had been exhausted) and eventually an evacuation. Simultaneously,
it is widely contended that it was the enormous numerical advantage of
German formations which forced Imperial troops from their defensive
positions, always after a heroic and stoic defence. After all, no force, no
matter its skill or bravery, could stand against such odds.10 In addition, a
huge disparity in airpower, particularly of dive-bombers, made it impossible to hold the German advance. It was the Royal Air Force, according to
many, that let W Force down. Other authors have pointed to the massed
tanks of multiple German armoured divisions for which the Greeks had no
defence and against which British troops could never hold without substantial armour of their own.11
Much of this now standardised interpretation originated in Allied wartime propaganda, which has never been adequately or critically scrutinised.
Christopher Buckleys monograph, published not long after the war in 1952
by the British government, for example, described how W Force was too
thin on the ground and how much it was overmatched by better equipped,
and far more numerous German adversaries.12 Nor was the situation helped,
according to Buckley, by the fact that the power of the Luftwaffe grew day
including, for example, in the New Zealand official history of the campaign. See W.G.
McClymont, To Greece, War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington,
1959, p. 484.
10This idea was particularly popular in the contemporary Australian press. In every
battle in the 300 mile retreat, claimed the Sydney Morning Herald on 1 May 1941, our men
fought against odds of three, four or five to one. Ordeal of Anzacs, Sydney Morning Herald,
1 May 1941, AWM, Series PR 88, Item 72. For examples in the secondary literature see
A. Heckstall-Smith, and H.T. Baillie-Grohman, Greek tragedy, 1941, W.W. Norton, New
York, 1961, p. 225; J. Connell, Wavell, Soldier and Scholar, Collins, London, 1964, pp. 411,
420.
11For a recent account that encapsulates most of these themes, especially the mismatch
in armour and airpower, see Ewer, Forgotten Anzacs.
12C. Buckley, Greece and Crete 1941, HMSO, London, 1952, pp. 138, 140-1.
introduction
by day.13 The Allied force could not compete with our adversary in the air
and this, in turn, had much to do with their defeat.14 That is, of course, not
counting how ill-equipped for modern warfare the Greeks proved to be,
how regrettable their decision to defend the Bulgarian border rather than
to reinforce the W Force position to the south prior to 6 April was, and how,
in the end, when Greek resistance weakened and collapsed, withdrawal
and evacuation became our only course.15
Other myths arose from the self-serving after-action reports and memoirs from senior Allied officers from the late 1940s onwards, conscious of
the need to protect their professional reputations. Lieutenant General
Henry Maitland Wilson, the officer in command of W Force, published an
account of Greece which, unsurprisingly, reinforced all of the arguments
described thus far.16 In his own influential history-cum-memoir of the war,
Winston Churchill wrote of poor Greek strategic planning with respect to
deployments in Albania and Thrace, how the Greek divisions under Wilsons
command began to disintegrate, and could no longer play an effective part
and, in fact, how the Imperial and British forces received no effective military assistance from their Greek alliesalthough the British Prime Minister was gracious enough to add that there were no recriminations.17 Nor
did Churchill stop with the Greeks for it was, of course, also German tenfold superiority in the air that explained for W Forces reversals.18
Subsequent memoirs, like those of Vice-Admiral Harold Tom BaillieGrohman, the British naval officer in charge of the landward side of the
eventual W Force evacuation from Greece, published in 1961, reinforced
such views. For Baillie-Grohman British and Dominion troops were beaten, not through lack of courage or skill, but because they did not possess
the quality and quantity of arms with which to win.19 With respect to the
decisive role of the Luftwaffe he lamented that Allied planners had failed
to emulate the German support of ground troops from the air. Furthermore,
for Baillie-Grohman, the British fatally overestimated the fighting endurance of the Greeks.20 In his 1964 biography of Field Marshal Sir Archibald
Wavell, the overall British commander in the Middle East in 1941, John
13Ibid., p. 142.
14Ibid., p. 140.
15Ibid., pp. 141-2.
16H. Wilson, Eight Years Overseas 1939-1947, Hutchinson & Co., London, 1949.
17Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 5, pp. 198-9, 201, 209-10.
18Ibid., p. 204.
19Heckstall-Smith and Baillie-Grohman, Greek tragedy, 1941, p. 225.
20Ibid., p. 228
introduction
Connell also described defeat in Greece as inevitable in ... the face of immense numerical superiority and in the context of how the Greek army
... disintegrated so rapidly ... 21 More specifically, British and Dominion
troops were forced to retreat down the Greek peninsula due to an initial
and flawed change in plan by the Greek Commander-in-Chief ..., and subsequently the collapse of the Yugoslavs and the Greeks.22 This was not to
mention being pressed out of key defensive localities like Pinios Gorge by
waves of German armour.23
These explanations of the causes of defeat in Greece were also reinforced
by the Allied official histories of the campaign published in the same period. In 1956, I.S.O. Playfairs volume on Britains war in the Middle East
accepted the argument of German numerical superiority.24 Playfair also
contended that as early as 13 April the Greeks had little capacity left for
opposing the Germans, and that overall they lacked the cohesion and
training to cope rapidly with the difficulties.25 W.G. McClymonts official
history of New Zealands participation in the campaign, published in 1959,
described the weakness of the Greek army, and the small Imperial force
available, the strength of the German army, and the lack of air support
on hand for the Allies.26 McClymont quotes W Forces commander, Lieutenant General Wilson, by no means an impartial source, in describing the
overall Imperial effort in Greece as an outstanding defensive battle.27 Gavin
Longs official history of Australian involvement, published three years
after McClymont, recognised that a lack of confidence in the Greeks by
W Force strongly influenced the conduct of the campaign.28 Although
Long was less inclined to blame W Forces allies, he was equally unwilling
to take issue openly with those other official historians who had done so.29
Again, Long reflected the growing orthodoxy in maintaining that the defeat
suffered by the [Anzac] corps was the result of an enemy force stronger
in both armour and infantry.30
21Connell, Wavell, Soldier and Scholar, pp. 411, 420.
22Ibid., pp. 418, 420.
23Ibid., p. 417.
24I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. 2, HMSO, London, 1956,
pp. 88, 90, 99.
25Ibid., pp. 87, 89.
26McClymont, To Greece, pp. 471, 478.
27Ibid., p. 472.
28G. Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1962, p. 194.
29Long thought it regrettable that efforts were made to place responsibility for failure
on the Greeks, ibid., p. 195.
30Ibid., p. 196.
introduction
In the absence of many detailed operational studies from which to

work, subsequent studies, especially biographies of other key W Force
commanders, have continued this pattern of interpretation. Ivan Chapmans 1975 biography of Major General Iven Mackay, the commander of
the 6th Australian Division in Greece, for example, depicted W Force as
facing hopeless odds numerically.31 He quoted Mackay in that no general
in his right mind would tackle them [the Germans] in open battle without
guaranteed superiorityin the number of divisions but especially tanks.32
Unstoppable German armour and airpower in Greece were decisive.33
Similarly, the failure of the Greeks is reaffirmed as a key cause of W Forces
difficulties: they were already showing signs of becoming a rabble.34 Of
course, Chapman is careful not to forget the Luftwaffe which was cut loose
in Greece, exposing the nakedness of the British in the air and placing
W Force at a terrific disadvantage.35 Similar arguments are reproduced
in the most recent biographies of Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Freyberg,
in command of the New Zealand division in Greece, and Lieutenant General Thomas Blamey, Freybergs superior and the commander of the Anzac
Corps.36 Unsurprisingly, both more general works on World War II that
deal with the Greek campaign, and more recent popular accounts, follow
the interpretation developed in earlier memoirs, official histories and
biographies.37
The most recent examples of the limited English-language academic
literature on the Greek campaign are still inclined to avoid detailed operational analysis and therefore also adopt the established explanation. In this
regard, particularly with respect to the alleged failure of the Greeks to support W Force adequately, Maria Hills 2010 study, Diggers and Greeks, is in
31Chapman, Iven G. Mackay, pp. 217-18.
32Ibid., p. 234.
33Ibid., p. 235.
34Ibid., p. 220. See also p. 224.
35Ibid., pp. 224, 227.
36P. Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg, VC: soldier of two nations, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1991, p. 252; D.M. Horner, Blamey: the Commander-in-Chief, Allen & Unwin, Sydney,
1998, p. 181; see also pp. 195, 197, 201, 205.
37General histories: see, for example, A.J.P. Taylor, The Second World War: an illustrated
history, Penguin, London, 1975, pp. 89-90; J. Keegan, The Second World War, Viking, New
York, 1990, pp. 157-8; Porch, Hitlers Mediterranean Gamble, pp. 141, 147, 154; E. Mawdsley,
World War II: a new history, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 140; Gerhard
L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, second edition, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 217, 222. Popular histories: Ewer, Forgotten Anzacs,
pp. 3-4, 171, 206-7; M. Johnston, The Proud 6th, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2008, p. 83.
introduction
some ways the harshest indictment of the Greeks yet seen. Hill concludes
that W Forces defeat was based on the fact that the most senior Greek
commanders obstructed the Allied campaign in Greece.38 For Hill it was
the collaboration of senior Greek officers that determined the actions of
the Greek military ..., for they wanted the British out of Greece as soon as
possible in order to facilitate a truce with Germany.39 She further claims
that, as a result of a decision taken by the senior Greek commanders, no
serious attempt was ever made by the Greeks to engage the Germansa
charge that, as the following chapters will show, might instead have been
levelled at W Force. 40
Greek military historiography has failed to influence wider Englishlanguage studies of the campaign. The major reason is probably most English speaking historians lack of knowledge of modern Greek. Greek
historians appear to have been far more interested (at least in terms of
published output) in the period of military success against the Italians from
October 1940 until the beginning of April 1941 than they have been about
a period that included defeat, accusations of betrayal and collaboration.
So too, from the perspective of Greek historiography, it appears that the
tragic period of occupation and the Civil War that followed have largely
overshadowed the events of April 1941. Studies of the war by American
historians of Greek extraction, while thorough, for example, are heavily
influenced by the politics of the period and the Civil War.41
Similarly, those few operational military histories and other studies of
the campaign that have been written and published in Germany and Italy
have also not influenced the wider international historiography of the campaign. Operational military history for the period 1939-45 has not been an
38M. Hill, Diggers and Greeks: the Australian campaigns in Greece and Crete, UNSW
Press, Sydney, 2010, p. 119.
39Ibid., pp. 119-20.
40Ibid., pp. 120, 123.
41See M. Hill, The Australians in Greece and Crete: a study of an intimate wartime
relationship, PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, 2008, pp. 13-16; G.C. Blytas, The
First Victory: Greece in the Second World War, Cosmos Publishing, River Vale, N.J., 2009; Bitzes,
Greece in World War II. On Greek historiography for this period in general see A. Kitroeff,
Continuity and Change in Contemporary Greek Historiography, European History Quarterly,
No. 19, 1989, pp. 282-4, 286; M. Mazower, Historians at War: Greece, 1940-1950 (review
article), The Historical Journal, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1995, pp. 499-506; N. Marantzidis and G. Antoniou, The Axis Occupation and Civil War: Changing Trends in Greek Historiography, 19412002, Journal of Peace Research, 41/2 (2004), pp. 223-321. On the survival of Greek military
records, see Hill, The Australians in Greece and Crete, pp. 15-16, and J. Koliopoulos, Greece
and the British Connection 19351941, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, p. 265 footnote 1.
10
introduction
area of much scholarly endeavour in either Italy or Germany. Furthermore,

the relatively small numbers of historians in each country with operational expertise that have examined the fighting in Greece have had little
international impact. For the Italians the campaign in April 1941 was in
itself nothing to commemoratea pyrrhic victory that represented a further step in the subordination of Italian wartime policy-making to Berlin.
Perhaps for this reason most Italian studies have focused on the earlier
Italo-Greek campaign.42 Even at the strategic and political levels, historical
study of fascist Italy is both thin and politicised, and remains in many ways
under-developed compared, for example, with the historiography of Nazi
Germany.
Since World War II there has been relatively little German operational
research into the campaign in mainland Greece.43 After all, for the German
war Greece was a minor operation within a much wider context. Detlev
Vogels analysis of the German campaigns in Greece and Yugoslavia in volume three of the German official history of World War II, Das Deutsche
Reich und das Zweite Weltkrieg, first published in 1984, gives a comparatively short eighteen-page account of the Greek campaign. Vogel emphasises the strength of Greek and other Allied resistance in delaying the
German advance, and suggests that Wilsons troops were in danger of
42In English M. Cervi, Hollow Legions, Doubleday, New York, 1971, is a solid, if uncritical, narrative. On Italian plans and strategies see M. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941,
CUP, Cambridge, 1982. In Italian see the official history: Ministero della Difesa, La Campagna
di Grecia, Ufficio Storico SMC, Rome, 1980 and M. Lazzarini, Ottobre 1940: La Campagna di
Grecia, Italia Editrice, Campobasso, 1995. For comment on the official history see L. Ceva,
La Guerra Italo-greco del 1940-1941 nella narrazione dellufficio storico, Risorgimento, No.
33, pp. 180-86. For the higher direction of the war see F. Rossi, Mussolini e lo stato maggiore.
Avvenimenti del 1940, Regionale, Rome 1951; F. Jacomoni, La politica dellItalia in Albania,
Capelli, Bologna, 1965; S.V. Prasca, Io o aggredito la Grecia, Rizzoli, Milan, 1946. For an
account of the front line see F. Balistreri, Coi bersaglieri nella campagna di Grecia, Baldini
& Castoldi, Milan, 1942. For further Italian studies, see James Sadkovich, Anglo-American
Bias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941, The Journal of Military History, 58/4 (1994), notes
88 and 89 on pages 641-2. On the historiography of Italian fascism more generally, see R.J.B.
Bosworth, The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism, Arnold, London, 1998, Introduction.
43For an early account see A. Buchner, Der Deutsche Griechenland-Feldzug: Operationen
der 12. Armee 1941, Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, Heidelberg, 1957. On the overall German abandonment of operational history: W. Wette, Militrgeschichte zwischen Wissenschaft und
Politik, Was ist Militrgeschichte?, pp. 59-62; Wegner, Wozu Operationsgeschichte?, ibid.,
pp. 105-12; D. Showalter, Militrgeschichte als Operationsgeschichte: Deutsche und amerikanische Paradigmen, ibid., p. 116. D. Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germanys Defeat
in the East, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 28-9.
introduction
11
being annihilated by the Luftwaffe during their withdrawal to the south.44

In part Vogel reproduces the conventional Allied interpretations because
his account of the W Force side of the campaign is based on the works of
earlier historians like Gavin Long. His conclusions may also reflect a politically correct desire to play down the effectiveness of the German attack
in Greece by emphasizing the strength of Greek and W Force resistance.
Vogel contends, for example, that:
The numerically inferior ... Empire troops took advantage of every opportunity to inflict losses on the attackers and were able to extricate themselves
repeatedly from threatening encirclements ... The course of the fighting
showed that highly mobile defenders with good morale in a mountainous
country could be pushed back only step by step and with considerable
forces.45
For their part more recent German studies have not yet influenced wider
writing on the topic. Heinz Richters Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg
1939-1941, first published in 1997, provides a narrative account of the campaign from the Greek and Allied side, using published sources only. Most
recently, in Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, published in 2007, Karl-Heinz Golla
has produced an operational study from the German side. While Golla has
clearly made extensive use of the German archival sources, he provides no
references for them. In his treatment of the Allied side of the campaign,
he relies on the Commonwealth official histories and digitised documents,
rather than on archival research in Britain, Australia and New Zealand. 46
In Part 1: Setting the scene, the books early chapters address a number
of fundamental issues relevant to the period leading up to the German
invasion. Why did Hitler decide to attack Greece? How important was the
ongoing Italo-Greek conflict in Albania to the outcome in April? How was
it that the United Kingdom (and the Dominions) came to be involved?
What plans and preparations were in train on both sides in the lead up to
44D. Vogel, Part III German Intervention in the Balkans III. The German Attack on
Yugoslavia and Greece, Militrgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA), Germany and the
Second World War, Volume III, The Mediterranean, Southeast Europe, and North Africa 19391941, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. 501, 504, 509-10.
45G. Schreiber and D. Vogel, Conclusion, Germany and the Second World War III,
p. 764.
46Heinz A. Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941: Contingenza Grecia
Operationen Barbarity, Lustre und Marita, Peleus Studien zur Archologie und Geschichte
Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 2, zweite erweiterte Auflage, Verlag Franz Philipp Rutzen,
Mainz, 2010; Karl-Heinz Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, Hamburg, 2007, p. 377.
12
introduction
6 April? Subsequent chapters of Part Two: The Drama Unfolds, which deal
with the three weeks of combat on the Greek peninsula involving W Force,
provide a detailed account and analysis of a victorious German advance
and a beleaguered Greek and Allied defence. The final three chapters,
within Part Three: Evaluations, will draw many of the conclusions of this
study together. Why, for example, were the Germans so successful so quickly in Greece? Why was the Allied decision to deploy in Greece so immediately controversial? What also of the role of Greece in influencing the
conductand even outcomein the ensuing German invasion of the
USSR?
Outwardly, operational military historians are usually methodologically, and epistemologically, unselfconscious, rarely commenting on the
assumptions and particular demands of their field. This reticence exists,
paradoxically, side by side with an acute private awareness of these difficulties as they affect their research. Historians who seek to analyse operations
are highly conscious that any single engagement, let alone a campaign, is
a complex, multi-facetted phenomenon that can never be represented in
its entirety. In practice they use interpretive rules of thumb (heuristics)
such as Alfred Burnes inherent military probability. Yet they are often
uncomfortable with setting out openly the principles of source evaluation
and phenomenology that they use in practice. It is not at all easy to describe
or analyse battles in detail or with much degree of accuracy. To do so is to
impart an order and sequence to events which contradict the experience
of battle with the inevitable fog and friction of combat. Below the overview
provided by the historian is the reality of battlefield chaos involving the
simultaneous interaction of skill, planning, courage, and simple luck.47
In developing an overall narrative and analysis of the Greek campaign
we have used a top-down perspective from senior officers and headquarters
staff, bearing in mind that what was known at that level was often a best
guess, an assumption or even a hope that events are unfolding as prescribed.
So too, we have used views from the bottom up where available to broaden
understanding of what occurred from 6 to 28 April 1941, with the full recognition that such perceptions are usually fragmented, personal, and distorted by the limits of each individuals experience. The authors fully
recognise and accept the inherent difficulties and challenges they face in
attempting an operational investigation.
47M. Howard, The Use and Abuse of Military History, Journal of the Royal United
Services Institute, No. 107, February 1962, p. 7.
introduction
13
The best place to begin tracing the saga of the Greek campaign is not,
as one might think, on Greeces northern borders in April 1941 but rather
in interwar political, diplomatic and strategic scheming in the period before
October 1940 throughout the Balkans and in London, Berlin and Rome.
14
introduction
introduction
PART ONE
SETTING THE SCENE
15
16
introduction
axis ambitions in europe and greece 1933-1940
17
Chapter One
Axis Ambitions in Europe and Greece 1933-1940: Greece is

assigned to the mercy of Italy1
In the late 1930s Greece was a poor and politically divided country under
an unpopular authoritarian regimea royalist dictatorship led by General Ioannis Metaxas, serving under King George II. Its entry into World
War II arose from the territorial ambitions of fascist Italy. During the 1930s
Greece had faced a continuing and latent threat to its independence from
this quarter. The consequences of the fall of France in mid-1940 converted
this menace into the reality of an Italian attack on 28 October 1940. The
origins of the Italian threat to Greek independence, however, predated the
1930s and can only be understood against the unravelling of the post-World
War I peace settlements. The outline that follows will trace those aspects
of the diplomatic and military history of Europes descent into war in 1939,
and the strategic ambitions and calculations of Italy and Germany in particular, which led to the invasion of Greece in 1940. All these issues have
been the subject of extensive research and considerable interpretative
disputes.2
In the 1930s Britain and France, the powers that maintained the postWorld War I peace settlements, faced increasing challenges to that system
in Europe and Asia. In the Mediterranean in the 1930s this challenge came
from fascist Italy, which aimed to dominate the region as the basis of a
revived and extended Italian empire. Italys ambitions directly threatened
both French and British interests and colonies. British and French policy
makers favoured compromise with Italy, as a consequence of their own
difficult strategic positions in Europe by the mid-1930s. The British Chiefs
of Staff considered that Britain could not meet simultaneous challenges to
1Mussolinis view as reported to the German Foreign Ministry by Italian ambassador
Attolico: Weizscker, Berlin, 14 April 1939, note St.S. Nr. 337, Das Politisches Archiv des
Auswrtigen Amts [henceforth PA AA] R 29611.
2See the overviews by D. C. Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second
World War, 1938-1939, Pantheon Books, New York, 1989; Z. Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark:
European International History 1933-1939, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, part II, passim; G. Weinberg, A World at Arms.
18
chapter one
its empire and interests from Japan, Italy and Germany. Of these powers
Italy was judged to pose the least threat and to be the most likely to be
satisfied at relatively minor cost. This evaluation was probably accurate so
far as many in the Italian armed forces and civil service were concerned,
but it failed to take into account the greater opportunities that simultaneous German pressure on the international system offered Italy, and how
quickly these opportunities would be grasped by Italys dictator, Benito
Mussolini. 3
Until the mid-1930s Italian foreign policy had been driven by a variety
of motivesan aspiration to maintain a position as the determining swing
power in the European system, a desire to compete with Nazi Germany,
and to cooperate with it. While Mussolinis attitude to the junior regime
and its dictator, Adolf Hitler, was more ambivalent than appeared to be the
case in public, and than Hitlers attitude to him, ultimately Mussolini could
not resist the opportunities Nazi policy offered Italy. In November 1936 the
two countries proclaimed the Rome-Berlin Axis, and in November 1937
Italy joined the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern pact. Such interaction
with Nazi Germany helped radicalise Italian foreign policy by the late 1930s.4
Meanwhile, the Nazi regime planned a bid for world power based on
the conquest of Europe. Hitler was willing to accommodate Italy as an ally
in this process for a variety of reasons, including his assessment from the
1920s onwards that alliance with Italy did not run counter to his ultimate
strategic aims, ideological affinities between the two regimes, and his personal friendship with Mussolini. Links between the two leaders, and therefore the two countries, grew stronger when Mussolini relinquished his
3Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies, pp. 7-9, 10, 12; A. Kallis, Fascist Ideology: Territory and
Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945, Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 12, 50-2, 97, 123,
126, 150, 172; Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection 1935-1941, pp. 32-3, 34; D. Reynolds,
Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century, second edition,
Longman, London, 2000, pp. 124-5; R. Salerno, Vital Crossroads: Mediterranean Origins of
the Second World War, 1935-1940, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002, passim; L. Pratt, East
of Malta, West of Suez: Britains Mediterranean Crisis, 1936-1939, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1975, passim.
4Kallis, Fascist Ideology, Ch. 5 passim; Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies, p. 3; R. DiNardo,
Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2005, pp. 25-7; P. Hehn, A Low Dishonest Decade: The Great Powers, Eastern Europe,
and the Economic Origins of World War II, 1930-1941, Continuum, New York, 2002, Ch. 2;
B. Sullivan, Where one man, and only one man, led. Italys path from non-alignment to
non-belligerency to war, 1937-1940, in N. Wyllie (ed.), European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 119-30
[henceforth cited as Sullivan, Italy]; Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, pp. 157, 240.
19
previous role of the protector of Austrian independence and supported the

forced union (Anschluss) of Austria and Germany in March 1938.5
As Germany increased its destabilization of central Europe in late 1938
by making territorial demands on Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland,
Mussolini used the situation to advance his own plans for expansion. By
early 1939 Italy raised claims to the territories that had been ceded to France
in 1860 as part of the process of Italian unification. At the same time Hitler
agreed that the Mediterranean should be Italys sphere of influence, and
German foreign policy showed little interest in the region throughout the
1930s. In keeping with its stated ambitions and this division of spheres of
influence, fascist Italy had played the major role in intervention on the side
of Francos Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War, seriously weakening its
own armed forces in the process. In addition, Mussolini had ambitions to
expand in the Balkans and even to invade Turkey. Further, Italy secretly
supported Croatian separatists against Yugoslavia and had exercised a de
facto protectorate over Albania.6
At the same time, the German-Italian partnership strengthened. By May
1939 Germany and Italy had concluded an alliance, the Pact of Steel, which
bound the two countries to fight as allies if either was involved in warlike
complications7 though Mussolini subsequently indicated to Hitler that
Italy would not be ready for war until 1943.
Germany and Italy were not the only nations interested in a revision of
the peace settlement of 1919. Smaller European powers such as Hungary
and Bulgaria had their own national grievances. The long-term effects of
the two Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and 1913, compounded by the post-World
War I peace settlement, meant there were unresolved territorial disputes
between the various neighbours. Hungary had territorial demands against
Yugoslavia, and Romania; Yugoslavia had latent territorial claims on Greece
and Italy; Greece had latent territorial demands on Albania and Italy, while
Bulgaria had similar claims against Greece and Romania. In the 1920s France
had made treaties with the countries of the so-called Little Entente, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania, to guard against a German resurgence,
5Kallis, Fascist Ideology, p. 157; DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers, pp. 24-6.
6Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies, p. 15; M. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941: Politics and
Strategy in Fascist Italys Last War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 38-9;
Kallis, Fascist Ideology, pp. 67-9, 72, 76-7, 110, 118, 122-9, 132-3, 134, 146-9, 169; Sullivan, Italy,
European Neutrals, pp. 133-8.
7Quoted in Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies, p. 15. M. Toscano, The Origins of the Pact of Steel,
second edition, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1967, passim; Knox, Mussolini
Unleashed 1939-1941, pp. 41-2; Sullivan, Italy, European Neutrals, p. 132; Steiner, Triumph of
the Dark, pp. 847-50.
20
chapter one
but by the mid-1930s these treaty obligations were difficult to fulfil. Most
significantly, the Soviet Union did not support the Versailles order, and
retained its own interests in the Balkans.8
In contrast, Britain and France sought to protect the status quo in the
Mediterranean and North Africa. Both countries had oscillated between
unsuccessful attempts to coax Italy over to their side and adoption of firmer policies towards the fascist regime. As late as January 1939 British Prime
Minister Neville Chamberlain visited Italy in an unsuccessful attempt to
entice it away from Nazi Germany. Both Britain and France rightly feared
Italian designs on the formers de facto protectorate of Egypt and their
North and East African colonies. Neither country had any intention of relinquishing any of its empire to satisfy Italian ambitions.9
With control of the exit points from the Mediterranean by means of
Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, if war broke out the British fleet planned to
contain the Italian navy in the Mediterranean in an unfavourable strategic
position. While the combined British and French naval forces in the area
were more powerful than the Italian fleet, and their ground forces in North
Africa were stronger than the Italian forces then in Libya, the expectation
that in the event of war the main military effort would be in Europe ensured
that the planned Allied strategy in the Middle East and Mediterranean was
defensive. An over-estimation of the Italian military threat and the hope
that Italy might remain neutral meant that French military plans to reactivate a Balkan front as in World War I remained hypothetical both before
and after the outbreak of war in 1939. The so-called Salonika option or front,
considerations of which influenced both sides in 1940 and 1941, was envisaged as a repeat of the World War I theatre established by Britain and France
from late 1915 on, directed against the Central Powers. Both sides in
1940 held inflated ideas of the effectiveness of the Salonika front in the
previous war.10
8Germany, the U.S.S.R. and southeastern Europe., 4 June 1941, TNA FO 371/29782,
pp. 1-25; Z. Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919-1933, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 270, 289, 395, 793; Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, Ch. 7; K.
Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 427-8; Weinberg, A World
at Arms, pp. 25, 162; E. Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941:
Interessengegenstze an der Peripherie Europas, Mathiesen Verlag, Husum, 2002, p. 165.
9S. Morewood, The British Defence of Egypt 1935-1940: Conflict and crisis in the eastern
Mediterranean, Frank Cass, London, 2005, passim; Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, pp. 741-3;
Kallis, Fascist Ideology, pp. 153, 169.
10See the papers on Anglo-French contacts with the Greek General Staff in 1939-40 on
TNA FO 371/24909. Morewood, The British Defence of Egypt 1935-1940, pp. 116, 115-17, 125-9,
136-7; G. Rendel, The Sword and the Olive: Recollections of Diplomacy and the Foreign Service
21
What did this mean for Greece? Intermittently in the interwar period,
Italy had threatened Greek independence and territorial integrity. Since
1912 Italy had ruled the ethnically Greek islands of the Dodecanese. Already,
in the August 1923 Corfu Incident, Italy had briefly occupied the Greek
island of Corfu as a response to the assassination of an Italian general in
northern Greece.11 In a speech to the fascist Grand Council in February 1939
Mussolini observed that Greece and Egypt were enemies of the Italian
expansion.12
In part as a competitive response to the German occupation of Czech
lands in March 1939, Italy annexed Albania over Easter (April 7-8) 1939.
Italys Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolinis son-in-law, was
the driving force behind this conquest. Such action alarmed Balkan and
Mediterranean states and drove them closer to Britain and France. It also
meant that Greece shared a land border with Italy from then on. Italy followed this invasion on 10 April 1939 by assuring the Greek government that
it would respect its territorial integrity. Nonetheless, after Albania was secured, Mussolini ordered the beginning of a road building programme in
its southan essential prerequisite for an attack on Greece.13
As war neared, Metaxas approached the Italian regime for joint troop
reductions on the border. This was agreed to in September 1939 but it did
not lead to a broader dtente. Indeed Greece had begun fortifying its border with Albania the month after Italy occupied the country.14 As war
1913-1954, John Murray, London, 1957, pp. 165-7; Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen
Beziehungen 1933-1941, pp. 148-54, 158-9; J. Piekalkiewicz, Krieg auf dem Balkan 1940-1945,
Bechtermnzverlag, Eltville, 1989, p. 28; Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection
1935-1941, p. 133; Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, pp. 951-3, 963-5; V. Dimitrov, Bulgarian Neutrality: domestic and international perspectives, European Neutrals, pp. 203-4 [henceforth
cited as Dimitrov, Bulgaria]; E. Barker, British Policy in Southeast Europe in the Second World
War, Macmillan, London, 1976, pp. 13-19.
11Kallis, Fascist Ideology, pp. 67-9, 72, 110, 132-3, 169; Sullivan, Italy, pp. 133-8; N.
Doumanis, Myth and Memory in the Mediterranean: remembering Fascisms Empire, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1997, Chs. 1 and 2; A. Cassels, Mussolinis Early Diplomacy, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1970, Chs 4, 16.
12Quoted in Kallis, Fascist Ideology, p. 169.
13Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, p. 242; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941, p. 41; A.
Papagos, The Battle of Greece 1940-1941, J.M. Scazikis Alpha Editions, Athens, 1949, pp. 31,
53; Kallis, Fascist Ideology, pp. 153-4; Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen
1933-1941, pp. 118-22. On Italo-Greek relations in this period, see also Richter, Griechenland
im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 12-15.
14Schnberg, Salonika to the Auswrtiges Amt, Berlin, 26 May 1939, Nr. 335 Pol. V.
Geh., Inhalt: Militrische Manahmen in Nordgriechenland., PA AA Deutsche Botschaft
Rom (Quirinal) 741b; Schnberg, Salonika, to the Auswrtiges Amt, Berlin, 7 June 1939,
Nr. 364 Pol. V. Geh., Inhalt: Militrische Manahmen Griechenlands an der albanischen
22
chapter one
approached, both the British and German governments were aware of Greek
popular and official fears of Italy, and vehement hostility to Italian expansion. As the Greek Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nikolaos Mavroudis,
observed in 1940, There are a lot of Germanophiles here, and a lot of Anglophiles, and many who care neither for Germany nor England in particular, but there are no Italophiles in Greece.15
The German occupation of the remaining Czech territories on 15 March
1939, the Italian attack on Albania over Easter 1939, as well as rumours of
possible German diplomatic and military moves against Romania, prompted Britain to extend guarantees of independence to Romania and Greece
(13 April 1939) as well as to Poland (31 March 1939). France was already
linked by treaty to Romania, and also extended a guarantee to Greece. With
this, both Allies risked potential involvement in military action in the Balkans. These guarantees were welcomed at the time in Greece, though
Metaxas sought to assure the Germans that the pledges were one-sided
and did not affect Greeces neutrality. For its part Britain intended these
guarantees more as a deterrent than as a commitment to military action.
In practice the guarantee to Romania in particular would be difficult to
implement militarily. To the east, negotiations about a British guarantee
of Turkey led to a mutual declaration on 12 May 1939 providing for assistance
in case of war in the Mediterranean and to ensure stability in the Balkans.
Further, in October 1939 Turkey concluded a formal pact with Britain and
Grenze., PA AA Deutsche Botschaft Rom (Quirinal) 741b, pp. 1-2; Papagos, The Battle of
Greece, pp. 35, 37-8, 41, 41-2, 43-6; Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp.
20-3; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941, p. 52; Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection 1935-1941, pp. 34-5; Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, pp. 730-2, 961; Zacharioudakis, Die
deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, pp. 134-8.
15Quoted in entry for 16 August 1940, MacVeagh diary, in J. Iatrides (ed.), Ambassador
MacVeagh Reports: Greece, 1933-1947, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1980, p. 216.
J. Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions: Ethiopia, 1935-1936, Royal Historical
Society, London, 1982, pp. 150, 205-6; G.i.R., German Embassy, Athens to the Auswrtiges
Amt, 29 May 1937, Politischer Bericht!, Die Achse Berlin-Rom und die Besserung der
italienisch-griechischen Beziehungen., PA AA Gesandtschaft Athen Band 10, pp. 1-3; Schnberg, German Consulate, Salonika, to the Auswrtiges Amt, Berlin, 11 April 1939, Nr. 221
Geh., Inhalt: Eindruck der Besetzung Albaniens in Salonika., pp. 1-2; Erbach, Athens to the
Auswrtiges Amt, 12 April 1939, Politischer Bericht., Griechenland und das italienische
Vorgehen in Albanien. , Abschrift Pol. IV. 2604, p. 1: both in PA AA Deutsche Botschaft
Rom (Quirinal) 741b; Weizscker, Berlin, note, 14 April 1939, St.S. Nr. 337, PA AA R 29611;
Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, pp. 126-7.
23
France which provided that it would assist Britain and France if the guarantee to Greece ever had to be activated.16
There is no question that the British guarantee to Greece came as a result
of wider British policy towards Germany rather than as a product of particular British interest in Greek territorial integrity. A year before, when
Metaxas tried to break Greeces economic dependence on Germany and
seek an alliance with the United Kingdom, the British rejected his proposal. Relations with Greece took a clear second place for the Foreign Office
after Britains relations with Italy and Turkey. This view was conveyed to
the Greek King who was in Britain on a private visit in November 1938. From
a military perspective, the Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the British
Chiefs of Staff was opposed in the mid-1930s to military links with either
Greece or Turkey and doubted Greek economic strength or capacity to
defend itself, the latter judgement being one the Greek General Staff
shared.17
Throughout the 1930s, the German position on the Balkans was unclear.
On a number of occasions, both Hitler and German Foreign Minister,
Joachim von Ribbentrop, had indicated to Italy that Germany had no territorial ambitions at all in the region. Both men had even on occasion encouraged Italian expansion into the Balkans. Such statements suggest that
the Nazi leadership had not focussed on Germanys strategic economic
interests there. In the course of the 1930s, the demands of rearmament led
Germany to exercise increasing economic dominance in the Balkans, which
16The wording of the guarantees to Romania and Greece is quoted in Zacharioudakis,
Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, p. 123. See also ibid., pp. 128-30, 139. Prinz zu
Erbach, German Embassy, Athens to the Auswrtiges Amt, 12 April 1939, Politischer Bericht.,
Griechenland und das italienische Vorgehen in Albanien., Abschrift Pol. IV. 2604, pp. 1-2;
von Selzam, London, 13 April 1939, Aufzeichnung., Abschrift zu Pol. II 1169, pp. 1-2; von
Rintelen, im Auftrag, Auswrtiges Amt, Berlin to the German embassies in London, Paris,
Brussels, Rome, San Sebastian, Moscow, Warsaw, Ankara and others, Pol. II 1261, p. 2: all
in PA AA Deutsche Botschaft Rom (Quirinal) 741b; Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, pp. 734-41,
743-9; Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. 130-1; Papagos, The Battle of Greece, pp. 31, 34, 58-62,
64-70; Barker, British Policy in Southeast Europe in the Second World War, p. 5. During the
League of Nations sanctions on Italy for its 1935 invasion of Abyssinia, Britain and France
had temporarily guaranteed those smaller powers, like Greece and Turkey, which observed
the sanctions: Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions, pp. 150, 205-6.
17Telegram from Sir S. Waterlow (Athens), 7 June 1938, No. 20.; Arthur Ross, 11 June
1938, internal Foreign Office memorandum, Anglo-Greek Relations., pp. 1-3; telegram from
Sir S. Waterlow (Athens), 3 October 1938, No. 177., pp. 1-5; telegram from Foreign Office to
Sir S. Waterlow (Athens), No. 157.: all in The National Archives [henceforth TNA] FO
371/22362; Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection 1935-1941, pp. 24-7, 32-4, 36, 85, 87,
89-91, 92, 93-5, 103; Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, pp. 960-1.
24
chapter one
was an important source of secure raw materials, particularly Romanian

oil. Germany imported bauxite from Yugoslavia and Greece, copper, lead,
and zinc from Yugoslavia and chrome from Yugoslavia and Turkey.18
Meanwhile, the Allied guarantee to Poland began to have significant
indirect consequences for Greece and other Balkan countries. In summer
1939 the Nazi regime had begun to pressure Poland to cede to Germany the
territory that gave Poland access to the Baltic (the Polish corridor). The
Polish government refused. In an attempt to reinforce their guarantee to
Poland, Britain and France half-heartedly pursued negotiations for a military pact with the Soviet Union so as to offer Poland immediate reinforcement in the event of a German invasion. They were, however, out-bid for
Soviet support by Germany: Ribbentrop flew to Moscow to negotiate a
non-aggression pact with Stalin which was concluded on 23 August 1939.
The German intention at this point was to forestall any wider war. Even
without Polands hostility to any pact with the USSR and their own hesitations about the proposed military alliance, Britain and France were always
at a disadvantage vis--vis Germany once both sides competed for Soviet
support. As upholders of the status quo, the Allies could never offer the
USSR the inducements that Germany could and did. In their desire to reach
an agreement the Nazi leadership agreed to a Soviet sphere of influence in
Estonia, Latvia and parts of Poland. In the secret protocols of the non-aggression pact the Soviet Union expressed its interest in the Romanian territory of Bessarabia, while Germany declared its complete disinterest in
this area. This Soviet expression of interest in the Balkans was further evidence of Stalins lack of support of the existing power balance in Europe.
Later in 1940 Ribbentrop reminded Hitler that he had given a particular
directive in these negotiations empowering Ribbentrop to state German
disinterest in the territories of southeast Europe, even if need be, up to
Constantinople and the Straits.19
18Sullivan, Italy, and D. ivojinovi, Yugoslavia, European Neutrals, pp. 141 and 222
respectively; Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, pp. 131, 140-3;
Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, pp. 952-3; D. Deletant, Hitlers Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu
and His Regime, Romania 1940-44, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2006, pp. 11-12; H.-A.
Reinartz, Der deutsche Balkanfeldzug 1941: Ursachen, Verlauf und Auswirkungen auf die
kriegspolitischen Entscheidungen des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Schriftliche Hausarbeit fr die
1. Staatsprfung fr das Lehramt an Volksschulen, Cologne, 1966, Bundesarchiv Militrarchiv
(BA MA) RH 20-12/83, pp. 1-4; Hehn, A Low Dishonest Decade, pp. 107-17.
19R[ibbentrop], 24 June 1940, Notiz fr den Fhrer, PA AA R 35566, p. 3. Weinberg, A
World at Arms, pp. 25, 164-5; Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, pp. 909-17; G. Gorodetsky, Grand
Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1999,
25
In Germany rearmament and economic policy had been directed since

1933 at creating and developing the forces needed for a bid for empire. This
was an attempt to break out of the geographic and economic restrictions
on the countrys power, and to create a territorial empire that would be
immune from blockade. Yet, by attacking Poland and disregarding British
and French assurances that they would uphold their guarantee, Germany
began what became World War II without any strategy to defeat its opponents.20 Hitlers concessions to the USSR were in fact part of a wider pattern
of strategic improvisation in these first years of the war in which he resorted to immediate expedients which would later present Germany with
even greater strategic dilemmas.
Germanys opponents were not in the same position: they did have a
strategy for victory. This was to start the conflict on the defensive while
building up the forces needed to go over to the offensive. In the meantime,
drawing on the success of the blockade of Germany in World War I, Britain
and France planned to wage economic warfare and restrict Germanys access to war-making materials. As part of this, the Allies also restricted Italys access to raw materials lest they be exported to Germany, which, in
practice, had the side effect of moving Italy closer to Germany and to war.21
The speed of the German victory in the West in 1940, which opportunistically brought Italy into the war on the German side, surprised the German
leadership. As a result Germany lost strategic momentum while it cast
around for means to force the United Kingdom out of the war, of which
the Battle of Britain and planning for an invasion of the British Isles were
part. Various strategic options were advanced in debates among the German leadership, with the head of the German navy, Admiral Erich Raeder,
urging Hitler to pursue a Mediterranean strategy aimed at weakening Britain by seizing Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, and supporting the Italians in
North Africa. Alternatively, Ribbentrop and the German Foreign Office
favoured the concept of a continental bloc with continued cooperation
with the Soviet Union. There has been considerable debate as to the seripp. 4-8. On its origins see R[ibbentrop], 24 June 1940, Notiz fr den Fhrer, PA AA R 35566,
pp. 1-3.
20A. Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: the Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy,
Penguin, London, 2007, pp. 366-7. On Germanys economic vulnerability, see also D. Reynolds, 1940: Fulcrum of the Twentieth Century?, International Affairs, 66/2 (1990), pp. 326-7.
21Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 66-7, 68-9; Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, p. 747; Reinartz, Der deutsche Balkanfeldzug 1941, BA MA RH 20-12/83, pp. 8-9. British measures were
also directed at reducing German access to Greek raw materials: Zacharioudakis, Die
26
chapter one
ousness of Hitlers interest in the Mediterranean strategy. Whatever potential advantages the proposed Mediterranean option offered for weakening
the United Kingdom, it was actually unfeasibleas Hitler recognized
because of the differing ambitions and territorial demands of the three
powers that would all need to be involved: Italy, Vichy France and Spain.
Put simply, these powers competing territorial ambitions made it impossible for them to work together in the way that would be needed for Raeders Mediterranean strategy to succeed. This was clear by December 1940.
Further ruling out such cooperation was the fact that Hitler always gave
first priority to satisfying Italian demands in any clash between such competing interests.22
Despite the seeming peril in which the United Kingdom found itself by
June 1940, facing air attack in the Battle of Britain and the imminent threat
of invasion, the British government continued its resistance and sought to
hit back at Germany as much as it could through bombing and encouraging resistance in Europe. It maintained its blockade of continental Europe
and its extant plans to sabotage and interrupt German access to raw materials.23
The swift defeat of France in May-June 1940 also shocked all other stillindependent states in Europe and forced them to re-evaluate their strategic
options. In the process this had the paradoxical effect of increasing Germanys strategic problems, particularly in the Balkans. In the east the Soviet Union moved to end the independence of the Baltic states in June 1940.
It had been putting pressure on Romania since 1939 and on 25 June 1940
presented the Romanian government with an ultimatum about its territorial demands on Bessarabia and on Bukovina as well. The Romanian King,
Carol II, turned to Nazi Germany for support, since the British guarantee
of 13 April 1939 did not extend to the Soviet Union. On 5 June 1940 Romania
publicly renounced the British guarantee. The Germans advised Carol to
22G. Schreiber, Political and Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 19391940, in MGFA, Germany and the Second World War Volume III, pp. 180-200; G. Megargee,
Inside Hitlers High Command, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2000, pp. 87-92; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, pp. 39-40; Kallis, Fascist Ideology, pp. 184-6; DiNardo, Germany and
the Axis Powers, pp. 46-7; S. Payne, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II,
Yale University Press, New Haven, 2008, Chs 5 and 6; I. Kershaw, Hitler 1936-45: Nemesis,
Allen Lane, London, 2000, pp. 325-32; Weinberg, A World At Arms, pp. 132-3, 171, 177-81, 2078; D. Eichholtz, Krieg um l: Ein Erdlimperium als deutsches Kriegsziel (1938-1943), Leipziger
Universittsverlag, Leipzig, 2006, pp. 55, 57-61; Tooze, Wages of Destruction, pp. 420-5;
23Weinberg, A World At Arms, pp. 144-6, 150-2.
27
acquiesce to the Soviet pressure and persuaded the Soviet Union to restrict
its demands to northern Bukovina. From 28 June to 2 July the USSR occupied
these territories, and later also seized several islands in the Danube.24
In 1939, out of desire to prevent meaningful military assistance to Poland,
the Nazi regime had offered considerable concessions to the Soviet Union
to win its non-belligerence. After victory in France, however, these concessions seemed overly generous and to have come at too high a price. Soviet
ambitions seemed to the Germans to have grown as the balance of power
in Europe was opened up for redistribution. The resentments and suspicions
that this created in Berlin were intensified by the Stalinist bargaining style
which refused to concede that it was negotiating from a position of weakness, but instead made maximal demands. Despite the agreement reached
in Moscow in August 1939, it was of course untrue that Germany had no
strategic interests in the Balkans. It had no territorial demands there but
the raw materials of the Balkan countries were vital for its continued war
effort. Above all, Romania was essential to Germany as a source of oil. Thus,
during the course of 1940 the Romanian oil industry came under German
control.25
German interests in 1940 were therefore best served by continued stability in the Balkans. Soviet territorial demandseven if defensive in intentionjeopardized Germanys economic war effort. They would, if
conceded, have allowed the Soviet Union to occupy a position where it
could potentially interdict the flow of raw materials from the Balkans and
thereby control future German decisions. This meant that Germany had
to switch its strategic focus to the region and impose a rough settlement
24Eichholtz, Krieg um l, p. 41; Schulenburg, Moscow, telegram to Auswrtiges Amt,
23 June 1940, Nr. 1205 v. 23.6., PA AA R 29697, pp. 1-2; Ribbentrop, Berlin, telegram to
Schulenburg, Moscow Embassy, 25 June 1940, 1074, PA AA R 29697, pp. 1-2; von Killinger,
Auswrtiges Amt, Berlin to Reichsauenminister, 30 June 1940, Bericht ber Rumnien,
die russische Krise betreffend. Unterredungen mit General Moruzow, Minister Urdarianu
und Knig Carol., PA AA R 35554, pp. 1-8; Fabricius, Bucharest, telegram to Auswrtiges
Amt, 2 July 1940, Nr. 1073 vom 2.7., PA AA R 29697; Ribbentrop, telegram to Fabricius,
Bucharest, 4 July 1940, Nr. 5 v. 3.7.40., PA AA R 29697, pp. 1-2; Hitchins, Rumania, pp. 4457; M. Pearton, Romanian neutrality, 1939-1940, European Neutrals, pp. 179, 188-9; Weinberg,
A World at Arms, pp. 135-6; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, pp. 29-30, 31, 33-4; Reinartz, Der
deutsche Balkanfeldzug 1941, BA MA RH 20-12/83, pp. 10-12; Deletant, Hitlers Forgotten Ally,
pp. 15-22. On Soviet moves into their spheres of influence from September 1939 on: Weinberg,
A World at Arms, pp. 98-107, 134-8; A. Nekrisch, Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet
Relations, 1922-1941, Columbia University Press, New York, 1997, pp. 179-81, 183.
25Deletant, Hitlers Forgotten Ally, pp. 25-7; Ribbentrop, Berlin telegram to Rome, 16
June 1940, Nr. 784 (Sonderzug Nr. 4) v.15.6., PA AA Botschaft Rom (Quirinal) geheim Bd 81
Nr. 399, p. 2; H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, Touchstone, New York, 1994, p. 355.
28
chapter one
Figure 1.1:Satirical cartoon on the professed disinterest of both German Chancellor Adolf
Hitler and Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in the Balkan Nations. (Source: ullstein bild/The
Granger Collection, New York: 0033448)
of the conflicting territorial demands of both Hungary and Bulgaria on

Romania. In July 1940 the USSR supported Hungarian territorial claims
against Romania for Transylvania. This led Germany and Italy to finalize
the so-called second Vienna arbitration in August 1940, drawing up a new
border between Hungary and Romania which ceded northern Transylvania
to Hungary. Romania also lost southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. After these
agreements Hitler offered a German guarantee of Romanias remaining
territory and independence. Out of concern of Soviet involvement,
Hitler subsequently urged caution on the Italians in pursuing their own
Balkan ambitions.26
*
26Fabricius, Bucharest, telegram to Auswrtiges Amt, 6 July 1940, Nr. 1118 v.6.Juli.,
PA AA R 29697, pp. 1-2; Schmidt, Vienna, Aufzeichnung ber die Unterredung zwischen
dem F h r e r und dem Grafen C i a n o auf dem Obersalzberg am 28.8.40 in Anwesenheit
des Reichsauenministers v. Ribbentrop und der Botschafter v. Mackensen und Alfieri
und des V.L.R. Hewel., PA AA RAM R 35560, pp. 1-5; entries for 6 and 14 August 1940, E.
Frhlich im Auftrag des Instituts fr Zeitgeschichte und in Verbindung mit dem Bundesarchiv (ed.), Die Tagebcher von Joseph Goebbels Smtliche Fragmenten Teil I Aufzeichnungen
1924-1941 Band 4 1.1.1940 8.7.1941, K.G. Saur, Munich, 1987, pp. 268 and 279 respectively;
entries for 22, 26 to 30 August 1940, R. De Felice (ed.), Diary 1937-1943 The complete, unabridged
29
As noted, in 1939 Italy had indicated to Germany that, despite their alliance, Italy was not in an economic position to enter the war until 1943.
This was reluctantly accepted by Germany. At the outbreak of war Italy
thus declared itself to be a non-belligerent rather than a neutral. Mussolinis
position in this period of non-intervention was one of ambivalence.27 An
abortive attempt to create a neutral Balkan block in September 1939 was
quickly abandoned by Italy. In February 1940 Mussolini rejected favourable
British trade offers for less favourable German offers, which prevented Italy from stockpiling raw materials in preparation for going to war. In March
that year Mussolini promised Ribbentrop that Italy would enter the war
against the west when its military preparations were in place. Hitlers victories in the West, however, altered this timetable. Italy entered the war on
10 June 1940 while the fighting in France was still underway but after its
outcome had become clear. Hitler then rejected Mussolinis offers of extensive Italian assistance in any attack on Britain, instead suggesting that
Mussolini should concentrate Italian efforts on the Mediterranean and
North Africa.28
The Italian fascist regime emphasized the virtues of war and placed
importance on the armed forces. Between 1935 and 1938 Italy spent 11.8 per
cent of its national income on military preparations and operations, close
behind Germanys 12.9 per cent. Yet the regime never succeeded in changing Italian society or military culture in the way that its ideology required.29
diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1936-1943 [henceforth
Ciano Diaries], Phoenix Press, London, 2002, pp. 378-80-; Hitchins, Rumania, pp. 447-50;
Dimitrov, Bulgaria, European Neutrals, pp. 206-7; Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 137-8,
184-5; Deletant, Hitlers Forgotten Ally, pp. 23-5; DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers, pp.
95-7; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, pp. 24-9, 41-4; Nekrisch, Pariahs, Partners, Predators,
pp. 186-7; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 142, 175; Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen
Beziehungen 1933-1941, pp. 215-16.
27Kallis, Fascist Ideology, p. 170. On the range of views at the outbreak of war, see Knox,
Hitlers Italian Allies, p. 16; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941, pp. 42-4, 50-1, 67-9; Kallis,
Fascist Ideology, pp. 168-9, 170-1, 173-4; Sullivan, Italy, European Neutrals, pp. 142-4. On
Italian planning and policy towards Greece before and after the outbreak of War: Richter,
Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 15-17, 24-32.
28Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941, pp. 69-75, 77-8, 81-3; Kallis, Fascist Ideology,
pp. 171, 174-6; DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers, pp. 34, 36; Weinberg, A World At Arms,
pp. 73-6; Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, pp. 146-8.
29The quality of Italys armed forces has been the subject of considerable historical
debate. While there have been some defenders of the prowess of Italys armed forces and
their leadership, a greater number of historians has been critical of their preparedness and
quality: J. Gooch, Mussolini and his Generals: The Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy,
1922-1940, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 1-3, Ch. 8, pp. 519-22; Kallis,
Fascist Ideology, pp. 38-52; Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies, p. 25.
30
chapter one
Despite fascist ambitions, Italy continued to be the least of the great

powers, because of its relative economic weakness, and the accompanying
social attitudes and values (traditional loyalties, a distrust of the state, and
high levels of illiteracy). All strategic raw materials except aluminium, for
example, needed to be imported. Mussolinis desire to prevent any rival to
his authority from emerging affected his decisions about appointments to
the armed forces leadership and the quality of his subordinates; and the
regime never succeeded in imposing its values upon the Italian officer
corps, which still saw its prime loyalty as being to the royal house rather
than the regime. In addition, Italys involvement in the Spanish Civil War
had been far more intensive than that of Nazi Germany. As a consequence,
the Italian armed forces had used up considerable war materiel that had
not been, and could not be, replaced by 1940. The alliance with Germany,
moreover, was not able to overcome the problem of Italys raw materials
shortages in the way that belligerency on the side of the Entente in World
War I had done. The Italian armed forces of 1915-1918 were better prepared
for conflict than in World War II and the fascist regime was less capable
than the liberal regime of 1915 of demanding and obtaining the national
sacrifice needed for a successful war effort.30
Yet on 23 January 1940 Mussolini told the Council of Ministers that Italy could and should undertake and sustain a parallel war. Italys lack of
preparedness was not apparent to Mussolini in the summer of 1940, though
it could be inferred from the lack of enthusiasm of his own commanders
for war, and from the logistical problems of the unopposed conquest of
Albania in 1939. Mussolinis plan was to take advantage of Germanys military conquests and to wage a separate war pursuing Italys own strategic
interests. The first steps in this process were attacks on British colonies at
a time when Britain itself was under siege. In July 1940 Italian forces attacked in East Africa and had initial successes in the Sudan and British
Somaliland. The Italian commander in North Africa, Field Marshal Rodolfo
Graziani, was extremely reluctant to attack. It took considerable pressure
from Rome before he mounted a slow advance from Libya on Egypt in
September 1940. In this attack Italian forces advanced to Sidi Barrani,
30Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941, pp. 7, 8-11, 16, 18, 22, 29, 30-1. On Italys economic
backwardness: Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies, Chapter 2 passim, and p. 170. While Knox argues
that ultimately that this was not the reason for Italys poor performance in the Second
World War, his own work provides many examples of the regimes inability to elicit such
sacrifice: ibid., pp. 32-3, 34-5, 37, 39, 170-7.
31
wheredespite further pressure from MussoliniGraziani failed to begin

the second phase of his offensive scheduled for October 1940.31
Aside from the campaigns in Africa, in 1940 Mussolini also ordered plans
for military action to be drawn up against Yugoslavia and Greece. Italian
pressure on the Greeks had increased from mid-1940. This pressure, however, had the counter-productive effect of strengthening the otherwise
unpopular Metaxas regime. 32
For his part, Metaxass constitutional position was similar to that of
Mussolinihe was a dictator but ruled dependent on royal support. The
monarchy under King George II had been restored in late 1935, and from
August 1936 the country was ruled by Metaxas, whose regime in many ways
emulated the fascist and Nazi dictatorships in its presentation and style.
Throughout the interwar period, Greek politics had been dominated by
fierce divisions, which dated back to the National Schism, the division over
the nations entry into the First World War. The conflict between Venizelists
(followers of Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos who had supported entry into the First World War on the side of the Allies) and royalists (supporters of the then King Constantine I who had wanted to maintain Greek
neutrality and was suspected of sympathy for Germany) continued throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Under Metaxas, the armed forces were purged of
those officers judged to be of different political viewsVenizelists and
republicans. Metaxass own foreign policy was carefully balanced between
the Axis and the Allies. Some sources suggest that he sought German
31Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941, p. 54; Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies, pp. 17, 96; Kallis, Fascist Ideology, pp. 176-7; DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers, pp. 49-51.
32Von Rintelen, der Militrattach Rome to the Generalstab des Heeres (Att Abt),
9 August 1940, g.K:Nr. 123/40, PA AA R 35484, pp. 1-2; ivojinovi, Yugoslavia, European
Neutrals, pp. 224-6; Kallis, Fascist Ideology, pp. 170-1, 173; Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies, p. 78;
Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941, pp. 53-4; G.i.R., German Embassy, Athens to the Auswrtiges Amt, 29 May 1937, Politischer Bericht!, Die Achse Berlin-Rom und die Besserung
der italienisch-griechischen Beziehungen., PA AA Gesandtschaft Athen Band 10, pp. 1-3;
Schnberg, German Consulate, Salonika, to the Auswrtiges Amt, Berlin, 11 April 1939, Nr.
221 Geh., Inhalt: Eindruck der Besetzung Albaniens in Salonika., pp. 1-2; Erbach, Athens
to the Auswrtiges Amt, 12 April 1939, Politischer Bericht., Griechenland und das ita
lienische Vorgehen in Albanien. , Abschrift Pol. IV. 2604, p. 1: both in PA AA Deutsche
Botschaft Rom (Quirinal) 741b; Weizscker, Berlin, note, 14 April 1939, St.S. Nr. 337, PA AA
R 29611; entries for 16 August, 24 August and 26 August 1940, MacVeagh diary, Ambassador
MacVeagh Reports, pp. 216, 217, 218-19 respectively; Erbach, Athens, telegram, 18 August
1940, Nr. 389 vom 18.8.40, PA AA R 29611; Erbach, Athens, telegram, 21 August 1940, Nr. 359
vom 21.8., PA AA R 29611; Erbach, Athens, telegram, 24 August 1940, Nr. 398 vom 24.8., PA
AA R 29611; Woermann, submission to Ribbentrop, 20 August 1940, PA AA R 29.880, pp. 1-2;
Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 32-3.
32
chapter one
support as a barrier to Italian demands on Greece, though a recent study

has rejected this argument. The King was unquestionably pro-British, with
close links to the British royal family.33
Prior to the Italian annexation of Albania, Greek defences and defence
policy had been designed primarily to protect Greece against Bulgarian
territorial claims. Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey were all linked
in the Balkan Pact which was agreed in 1934. In this they mutually guaranteed their frontiers and undertook to safeguard their borders against any
attack by a Balkan power. The annex to the pact provided that if a signatory was attacked by a non-Balkan power, and if a Balkan power subsequently joined the attack, then the pact would come into force against the
aggressor Balkan power. On 5 May 1936 Metaxas clarified the Greek position
in this regardGreece would remain neutral in the event of a Balkan conflict with Italy but would take part in a purely Balkan conflict. The Balkan
Pact was renewed for seven years in February 1940.34 The net result of the
various articles of the Balkan Pact was that it would not come into effect
if Italy attacked Greece, or if Bulgaria joined an Italian attack on Greece,
but it would only be activated if Bulgaria attacked Greece and Italy subsequently joined this attack. The pact only offered a guarantee in the event
of an attack by Bulgaria and/or Albania. At the same time various bilateral
pacts between Greece and Turkey concluded between 1930 and 1938 guaranteed the border between the two countries and confirmed each powers
neutrality if the other were involved in a war of self-defence.35
Overall, the diplomatic road to war for Greece was complicated and
tangled. It was the result of competing great power and Balkan interests
and imperatives, almost all of which were beyond Greek power to influence.
In the final analysis, Allied efforts to protect the status quo in Europe before
33J. Koliopoulos and T. Veremis, Modern Greece: A History since 1821, Wiley-Blackwell,
Chichester, 2010, Ch. 8; Mazower, Inside Hitlers Greece, pp. 11-14; Koliopoulos, Greece and
the British Connection 1935-1941, pp. 6, 38, 44-6, 60, 79; Zacharioudakis, Die deutschgriechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, pp. 72, 78, 118; Als Soldat und Diplomat in der Trkei
Aus nachgelassenen Aufzeichnungen des deutschen Militrattachees in der Trkei,
Generalleutnant Hans Rohde Niedergeschrieben von Dieter Rohde (1960), BA MA MSG
2/12541, p. 13; Erbach, Athens, to the Auswrtiges Amt, Berlin, 10 March 1937, II Ga 1,
Deutsche Kulturpolitik in Griechenland. (Ein Bericht des griechischen Gesandten in London)., PA AA Deutsche Botschaft Rom (Quirinal) 657b Griechenland pp. 1-2; Steiner,
Triumph of the Dark, pp. 959-61.
34Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection 1935-1941, p. 35; Papagos, The Battle of
Greece, pp. 34-41.
35Papagos, The Battle of Greece, pp. 35, 37-8, 41, 41-2, 43-6. On Greek military planning
see also Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 17-19.
33
September 1939 foundered on Germanys willingness to go to war over

Poland. Britain, however, fought on after the fall of France and sought means
to strike back at the Axis. Meanwhile, German success in the West in June
1940 fed Mussolinis ambitions to pursue a parallel war. At the same time
the economic importance of the Balkans forced Germany to show concern
for the politics of the region. The stage had been set for a clash of interests
between the belligerents in the region in the second half of 1940.
34
chapter one
the italo-greek war, the powers and the balkans
35
Chapter Two
The Italo-Greek War, the powers and the Balkans:

My friend Mussolini is a very sensitive gentleman1
On 28 October 1940 Italy launched an invasion of Greece from Albania. The
resulting Italo-Greek War led to the active involvement of first Britain and
then Germany in Greece. The Italian attack gave Britain the chance to regain
a foothold in mainland Europe, andfrom a German perspectiveraised
diplomatic and political issues which revealed its irreconcilable interests
and ambitions with regard to the Soviet Union in the Balkans. These factors
contributed to the decision of the German leadership to attack the Soviet
Union in June 1941. The interactions of the strategic decisions of the various
powers in the period from October 1940 to early March 1941 that led to the
German invasion of Greece and the pre-emptive deployment of BritishDominion troops to forestall it were complex and multi-faceted. The most
effective manner by which to examine them, therefore, is thematically
rather than chronologically.2
As set out in Chapter One, Italian entry into World War II, and Italian
war planning in general, was based on the assumption that Italy could
conduct a parallel and independent war of conquest from that of Germany. As with the Albanian attack in 1939, Italian Foreign Minister Ciano
was the main advocate of intervention in Greece. Italian pressure on Greece
began in July 1940 with Cianos vocal criticisms of Greeces alleged unneutral attitude. The next month a concerted Italian press campaign began,
focussed on the alleged murder by Greece of Daut Hoggia (Hoxha), a
member of the Cham Albanian minority in Greece. This agitation also
raised Albanian territorial claims to Epirus and Western Macedonia.
Greek attempts to elicit German support against this campaign were
1Hitlers comment to the German military attach to Turkey in February 1941: H. Rohde,
SOLDAT UND DIPLOMAT Militrattach in Ankara, Athen und Teheran 1936 1945, BA
MA MSG 2/12540, p. 10.
2See the studies by Barker, British Policy in Southeast Europe in the Second World War;
Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion; MGFA, Germany and the Second World War Volume III.
36
chapter two
rebuffed. Nonetheless, Metaxas told the German ambassador in August

that any direct Italian territorial demands would be resisted.3
Italian pressure against Greece continued throughout August and September 1940, though the controversial torpedoing of the Greek cruiser
Helli by an Italian submarine on 15 August was at the orders of the Italian
governor of the Dodecanese rather than the central government. Greek
government policy at this stage was to maintain strict neutrality and avoid
giving Italy any pretext for an attack. Mobilization was however begun in
secret. Both the British and German embassies concluded that the belligerent Italian approach was completely counter-productive.4
Both Hitler and von Ribbentrop warned Mussolini and Ciano to hold
off from attacking either Greece or Yugoslavia until after the defeat of Britain. The Italian leaders assured their German counterparts that they could
achieve their aims by diplomatic pressure alone, and that troop reinforcements sent to Albania were for this purpose. As late as 20 September, Mussolini assured the German Foreign Minister that Italy had no plans to move
against either Greece or Yugoslavia. Indeed, as winter approached, it appeared as if weather conditions would delay any surprise Italian attack
until spring 1941. On 4 October Hitler and Mussolini met at the Brenner
Pass. Crucially, the Italians came away from the meeting believing that
3Entries for 10 to 12 August 1940, Ciano Diary, pp. 375, 376; Mackensen, Rome, telegram
to the Auswrtiges Amt, Berlin, 6 August 1940, Nr. 1458 vom 6. AUGUST 40, PA AA Botschaft
Rom (Quirinal) geheim Bd 81 Nr. 363; Mackensen, Rome to the Auswrtiges Amt, Berlin,
12 August 1940, Nr. 1479 vom 12. AUGUST 1940, PA AA Botschaft Rom (Quirinal) geheim
Bd 81 Nr. 363, pp. 1-2; Woermann submission to Ribbentrop, 20 August 1940, PA AA R 29.880,
pp. 1-2; Erbach, Athens, telegram, 13 August 1940, Nr. 376 vom 13.8., PA AA R 29611, pp. 1-2;
Weizscker, 13 August 1940, St.S. Nr. 657, PA AA R 29.880, pp. 1-4; Woermann, unheaded
submission to Minister, 24 August 1940, PA AA R 29.880, pp. 1-2; Mackensen, Rome, telegram
to the Auswrtiges Amt, Berlin, 14 August 1940, Nr. 1515 vom 14. August., PA AA Botschaft
Rom (Quirinal) geheim Bd 81 Nr. 363, pp. 1-3; Sonnleithner, Fuschl, 27 August 1940, Abschrift
Pol. IV 2699 g, Aufzeichnung ber den Empfang des griechischen Gesandten Rizo Rangab
durch den Reichsausseminister am 26.8.1940 in Fuschl., PA AA Botschaft Rom (Quirinal)
geheim Bd 83 Nr. 431, pp. 1-2; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 54; DiNardo, Germany and the
Axis Powers, p. 33; Kallis, Fascist Ideology, p. 177; Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg
1939-1941, pp. 35-6.
4Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 173-4; entries for 16 August, 24 August and 26 August
1940, MacVeagh diary, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, pp. 216, 217, 218-19 respectively;
Erbach, Athens, telegram, 18 August 1940, Nr. 389 vom 18.8.40, PA AA R 29611; Erbach,
Athens, telegram, 21 August 1940, Nr. 359 vom 21.8., PA AA R 29611; Erbach, Athens, telegram,
24 August 1940, Nr. 398 vom 24.8., PA AA R 29611; Woermann, submission to Ribbentrop,
20 August 1940, PA AA R 29.880, pp. 1-2; telegram, Sir M. Palairet (Athens), No. 798.,
TNA FO 371/24910; Sir Michael Palairet, Athens, dispatch to Lord Halifax, 9 November 1940,
TNA FO 371/24921, p. 3; Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 36-43;
37
Hitler had given them freedom of action to act on Greece. It seems likely,
however, that Hitler expressed his position that Greece was part of Italys
sphere of influence but he did not intend to encourage Italian military
action.5
The final Italian decision to attack Greece was prompted by the German
deployment of troops to Romania on 12 October 1940. At the beginning of
September 1940, General Ion Antonescu had taken power in a coup and
forced Carol II to abdicate in favour of his son, Michael. Antonescu formed
an authoritarian dictatorship with German backing and adopted a proGerman economic and military policy while taking a strongly nationalist
stand. German troops were deployed to secure Romanian independence
against the USSR, protect the Romanian oilfields and to prepare for a future
attack on the Soviet Union. From an Italian perspective, however, the German move was an intrusion into Italys sphere of interest. The German
move into Romania came without sufficient prior notice and consultation
with the Italians, and no offer of a joint operation. It angered Mussolini
who saw it as a blatant sign of German disregard for Italian interests.
Accordingly, on 15 October Mussolini resolved to attack Greece without
notifying Germany; his plan was to occupy the entire country. With ongoing fighting in Africa, the attack marked an ambitious extension of a multiple front war for Italy.6
5Entries for 17 August 1940 and 4 October 1940, Ciano Diary, pp. 377, 387; Mackensen,
Rome, telegram to Auswrtiges Amt, Berlin, 14 August 1940, Nr. 1515 vom 14. August.,
PA AA Botschaft Rom (Quirinal) geheim Bd 81 Nr. 363, p. 1; Schmidt, Berlin, 17 August 1940,
Notiz ber die Unterredung zwischen dem R A M und dem italienischen Botschafter Alfieri
am 16.8.1940., PA AA RAM R 35560, p. 2; unheaded, unsigned one page note listing Italian
military preparations, 19 August 1940, PA AA Botschaft Rom (Quirinal) geheim Bd 81 Nr.
363; Schmidt, Rome, 20 September 1940, Aufzeichnung ber die Unterredung zwischen
dem Reichsaussenminister von Ribbentrop und dem Duce in Anwesenheit von Graf Ciano
sowie der Botschafter von Mackensen und Alfieri in Rom am 19. September 1940. PA AA
RAM R 35558, pp. 23-4; entry for 7 October 1940, Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch: Tgliche
Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939-1942, Band II: Von der geplanten
Landung in England bis zum Beginn des Ostfeldzuges (1.7.1940 21.6.1941), H.-A. Jacobsen,
(ed.), Arbeitskreis der Wehrforschung, Stuttgart, 1963, p. 128; Kallis, Fascist Ideology, p. 176;
vijinovi, Yugoslavia, European Neutrals, p. 226; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 202-3;
Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 32-3, 43-4, 46, 50-1, 52-5, 56-9;
6Fabricius, Bucharest, 6 September 1940, telegram Nr. 1536 vom 6.9., and other reports
on PA AA R 29698; Hewel, Aufzeichnung ber den Empfang des ungarischen Gesandten
Graf Stojay beim Fhrer am 10.9.1940 von 12.40 1.50. Anwesende: Staatsminister Meissner,
VLR Hewel. PA AA RAM R 35544, pp. 1-4, 12; Ribbentrop, Berlin, telegram to Schulenburg,
Moscow, 5 September 1940, Nr. 1609, PA AA R 29698, pp. 1-3; Weizscker, Berlin, telegram
to Bucharest, 12 September 1940, unnumbered, PA AA R 29698; Fabricius, Bucharest, telegram to Auswrtiges Amt, Berlin, 13 September 1940 Nr. 1531 vom 13.9., PA AA R 29698;
J. Frster, V. Germanys Acquisition of Allies in Southeast Europe, MGFA, Germany and
38
chapter two
Figure 2.1:A German anti-aircraft position deployed to protect oil tanks at Ploesti in
Romania in early 1941. (Source: ullstein bild/The Granger Collection, New York: 0083474
In ordering an invasion of Greece, Mussolini overruled the warnings of

his military chiefs of staff against the late start to the operation. Attempts
to secure Bulgarian participation in the invasion were also unsuccessful.
On 16 October Filippo Anfuso, Cianos chief of staff, travelled to Sofia with
a personal message from Mussolini to King Boris of Bulgaria. In it Mussolini
encouraged Bulgaria, which had territorial claims against Greece in Macedonia and western Thrace, to support the Italian attack militarily. King
Boris replied that his army was too weak and his people did not support
war. Above all the King feared the attitude of Turkey and the USSR.7
the Second World War, Volume IV The Attack on the Soviet Union, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
2009, pp. 395-8; Hitchins, Rumania, pp. 451-8; Deletant, Hitlers Forgotten Ally, Chs 2-4;
Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 185, 195-6; Eichholtz, Krieg um l, p. 34; entries for 8, 12 and
15 October 1940, Ciano Diary, pp. 387, 388-9; Mackensen, Rome to von Weizscker, Auswrtiges Amt, Berlin, 18 October 1940, PA AA Botschaft Rom (Quirinal) geheim Bd 85 Vorgang
Nr. 468, pp. 1-3; Weizscker to Mackensen, 21 October 1940, PA AA Nachlass Mackensen
Bd 4, pp. 1-2; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 201-3, 205-7; Kallis, Fascist Ideology, pp 177, 178;
DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers, pp. 96-7, 99; Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen
Beziehungen 1933-1941, p. 199.
7Entries for 17 to 19 October 1940, Ciano Diary, pp. 389-90; P. Fabry, Balkan-Wirren
1940-41: Diplomatische und Militrische Vorbereitung des deutschen Donauberganges, Wehr
und Wissen Verlagsgesellschaft MBH, Darmstadt, 1966, pp. 36-7.
39
Doubts about the looming winter notwithstanding, the Italian military

and political leadership were confident of victory over the Greeks in a short
campaign expected to last a few weeks. As one general, Ubaldu Soddu,
Under-Secretary of the Ministry of War at the time of the invasion, noted,
the war against Greece was begun in the conviction, common to all, that
the enemy was devoid of serious military qualities.8 Such faulty and unfounded assumptions about the campaign contributed to a somewhat
disorganized preparation of the attack.
As the date of the invasion approached, Italy evaded continuing efforts
by the German embassy in Rome and other German political and military
figures to ascertain its military plans. The German embassy in Rome reported the indications of an imminent attack, but the series of crises in
Italo-Greek relations from August on, and the assessment that Italian planning was not serious, lessened the impact of this reporting in Berlin. It was
not until 27 October 1940, just hours before the Italian ultimatum to Greece
was handed over, that Ciano summoned the German charg daffaires to
notify him of the planned attack.9
In his letter to Hitler of 19 October (not delivered until 25 October) advising him of the attack, Mussolini described Greece as a key part of British
naval strategy which had to be neutralised. While Hitler may have intended to prevent any Italian attack on Greece in his meeting with Mussolini
in Florence on 28 October, presented with an Italian fait accompli, he confined himself to offering military assistance to Italy, should it be required.10
8Quoted in Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 221. See also ibid., pp. 209-23; Kallis, Fascist
Ideology, p. 178; Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 62-71; Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, pp. 200-1.
9Rintelen, Aufzeichnung, undated but covering note says 28 October 1940, Betr.:
Bericht des Militr-Attachs Rom., PA AA R 29.880, p. 2; Mackensen, German embassy,
Rome telegram to the Auswrtiges Amt, 18 October 1940, Nr. 473/40 g, Inhalt: Italienischgriechische Beziehungen. pp. 1-3 and subsequent reports in PA AA Botschaft Rom (Quirinal) geheim Bd 85 Vorgang Nr. 473; Bismarck, Rome telegram to 1.) Auswrtig Berlin 2.)
Sonderzug Heinrich., 27 October 1940, Nr. 1946 vom 27.10., PA AA R 29.880, pp. 1-4; entry
for 22 October 1940, Ciano Diary, p. 390; entry for 28 October 1940, Halder, Kriegstagebuch
II, pp. 152-3; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 223-6, 228-9; DiNardo, Germany and the Axis
Powers, pp. 74-5; Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 76-8.
10Mussolini to Hitler, 19 October XVIII (1940), PA AA RAM R 35519, pp. 5-6; Schmidt,
Florence, Aufzeichnung ber die Unterredung zwischen dem Fhrer und dem Duce in
Anwesenheit des Reichsauenministers und des italienischen Auenministers in Florenz
im Palazzo Vecchio am 28. Oktober 1940., PA AA RAM R 35571, p. 1; entry for 28 October
1940, Ciano Diary, p. 391; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 222-3, 226-30; DiNardo, Germany
and the Axis Powers, pp. 75-6; Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 78-9;
Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, pp. 203-7. Post-war claims
by Hitlers entourage that he was angry at the news of the invasion are given indirect
40
chapter two
The initial Italian advance against Greece was in three separate axes
across the border with Albania. The Italian plan was simple. The main attack would be an advance into Epirus by a range of routes to allow freedom
of operation for Italian infantry divisions and the movement of armoured
fighting vehicles. At the same time the Italian Guilia Division would advance
into the Pindus to cut Greek lines at Metsovo. The third line of attack was
to be a limited advance into Koritza in order to occupy points that would
enable a defence of the Mt Morava position covering the town, and to
cover the flanks of the main attack in Epirus. An Italian advance from
Koritza to Salonika was envisaged at a later date. The Greek plan, on the
other hand, was to allow the Italians to advance into Greece and then defeat
them on their own territory. This plan depended on a widespread Greek
national mobilization to be completed in ten days. Until this mobilization
was complete Greeces position would be critical.11
At 3.00 a.m. in the morning of Monday 28 October, General Metaxas was
awoken at his residence to receive a call by the Italian ambassador, Count
Emmanuel Grazzi, who delivered an ultimatum demanding Greece hand
over unspecified territory within three hours or face invasion. Metaxas
rejected it, noting in passing the time allowed for him to take a decision
was derisory. Some Italian troops in Albania had, in fact, started their attack
even before the ultimatum had expired. The Italo-Greek war had begun.
Metaxas rejection of the Italian ultimatum expressed Greek national feeling. For the first time his regime was overwhelmingly popular. Political
divisions were temporarily silenced in a mood of national unity that lasted
until the end of the year.12
support by MacVeagh: P. Schmidt, Hitlers Interpreter, Heinemann, London, 1951, pp. 199200; entry for 28 October 1940, G. Engel, At the Heart of the Reich: The Secret Diary of Hitlers
Army Adjutant, Greenhill Books, London, 2005, p. 98; N. von Below, At Hitlers Side: The
Memoirs of Hitlers Luftwaffe Adjutant, 1937-1945, Greenhill Books, London, 2001, p. 76; entry
for 24 December 1940, MacVeagh diary, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, p. 267.
11An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War 1940-1941, pp. 37-8;
Brief General Account of military operations in Albania from 28 October, 1940 to 23rd April,
1941, TNA WO 201/68; Piekalkiewicz, Krieg auf dem Balkan 1940-1945, p. 48; Commander
Baker-Creswell, NOTES ON THE SITUATION IN GREECE, 1st NOVEMBER, 1940. A Summary
of Opinions Expressed by the British Minister and the Service Attaches at Athens., TNA
WO 201/55, p. 1; telegram from British Military Mission Athens to War Office, 2 November
1940, TNA WO 106/2146; Ein berblick ber die Operationen des griechischen Heeres und
des britischen Expeditionskorps im April 1941. (1. Teil.) I. Die griechischen Verteidigungsplne, die Mobilmachung und der Aufmarsch der verbndeten Streitkrfte., Militrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 8/1 (1943), pp. 69-72; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 218;
Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, p. 202.
12Sir M. Palairet, British Legation, Athens, telegram to Lord Halifax, 28 October 1940,
No. 271, TNA FO 371/24920, which includes a French version of the Italian ultimatum on
41
The balance of forces, armaments and economies so favoured Italy on

paper that neither Britain nor Germany expected Greek resistance to last.
The German military assessment was that the Greek army will scarcely
be able to mount military operations from its own strength let alone defend
its own country without foreign help.13 The British were more optimistic,
concluding: While there is no doubt that, given time, the Italians could
eventually defeat the Greeks, Greece might hold out for a considerable
period against an attack by Italy alone.14
Immediately upon news of the invasion, and without orders from his
government, Air Chief Marshal Arthur Longmore, the Air Officer Commanding Middle East, sent a squadron of Blenheims to support the Greek
war effort. This decision was subsequently approved in London. The eventual British contribution of five air squadrons, known as Barbarity Force,
(see below) was one whichin the event of a Greek collapsecould easily be withdrawn. On 1 November Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for War,
during a tour of the Middle East theatre, urged that no British force should
be diverted to Greece as it would never have sufficient strength to be decisive. The best place to help Greece, noted Eden at this point, was to strike
Italy in North Africa. In this context, despite the urging of the British ambassador in Greece, Sir Michael Palairet, and the Yugoslav government, the
British government did not send any more aid. Yugoslavia also helped the
Greeks in November and December 1940 by secretly sending supplies of
armaments, ammunition, food and horses overland.15
pp. 2-3; Erbach, Athens telegram to Auswrtiges Amt, 28 October 1940, Nr. 523 v. 28.10.,
PA AA R 29.880; Sir Michael Palairet, Athens, dispatch to Lord Halifax, 9 November 1940,
TNA FO 371/24921, pp. 1-4; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War,
pp. 44-6, 47; Koliopoulos and Veremis, Modern Greece, p. 107. According to Ciano, the wideranging Italian territorial claims included Corfu, Cephalonia, Leukas, Zante, Salonika,
Athens and Lepanto: Bismarck, Rome telegram to 1.) Auswrtig Berlin 2.) Sonderzug
Heinrich. 27 October 1940, Nr. 1946 vom 27.10., PA AA R 29.880, p. 4. Entries for 2 October
1940, 16 November 1940 in MacVeagh diary and letter from MacVeagh to President Roosevelt,
28 November 1940, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, pp. 229, 248 and 255 respectively; Sir
Michael Palairet, Athens, dispatch to Lord Halifax, 9 November 1940, TNA FO 371/24921,
pp. 3-4; telegram from Sir M. Palairet (Athens), 19 November 1940, No. 1165.; and telegram
from Sir M. Palairet (Athens), 8 December 1940, No: 1300.: both TNA FO 371/24910.
13Kramarz, Pol. I M g,, Aufzeichnung. Betr.: Militrische Lage Griechenlands (zusammengestellt nach Unterlagen des O.K.W.), 28 October 1940, PA AA R 29.880, p. 2.
14Daniel, Playfair, Medhurst, 4 November 1940, SECRET C.O.S. (40) 901 (J.P.)., WAR
CABINET CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE ASSISTANCE TO GREECE Appreciation by the
Joint Planning Staff, TNA CAB 80/22, p. 3.
15Telegram from C.-in-C., Middle East to the War Office, Private from S. of S. for C.I.G.S.
and P.S. to S. of S. for Prime Minister, 1 November 1940, Last Part., TNA WO 193/963; extracts
from printed cables A.E. 53, 3 November 1940, Private from S. of S. for C.I.G.S. and P.S. to
42
chapter two
The initial Italian advance into Greece was not prosecuted with much
vigour. In the first week of fighting Italian forces penetrated sixty kilometres
past the Greek border along the Ionian coast, but the other axes of attack
were less successful. Not all Greek commanders obeyed their orders to
retreat to buy time for mobilisation. On 29 October the Italian High Command postponed a planned attack on Corfu because of bad weather. By
8 November the Italian advance had come to a standstill and Greek forces
were already launching local counter-attacks. This led to rapid changes in
the Italian command arrangements. General Soddu was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Albania and Sebastiano Visconti Prasca
demoted from overall commander to head the Italian 11th Army. Within
days Prasca was replaced, and, by 30 November, sent on permanent leave.
Reinforcements were rushed from Italy to Albania, while Soddu authorized
his subordinates to make local withdrawals to better defensive positions.
On 10 November Mussolini ordered an end to the initial Italian offensive,
further increases in the number of troops in Albania, and a resumption of
the invasion by 5 December. The Italians had encountered unexpectedly
strong resistance but began preparations for another offensive.16
On the other side of the front, the Greeks succeeded in getting through
their period of mobilization without a decisive defeat. The Greek Government had always intended to counter-attack as soon as possible, and on 14
November the Greek Commander-in-Chief, General Alexandros Papagos,
S. of S. (for Prime Minister)., TNA WO 193/963, pp. 13-14; extracts from printed cables A.E.
54, 3 November 1940, Personal for C.I.G.S. and P.S. to S. of S. (for Prime Minister), TNA WO
193/963, pp. 14-15; entries for 1 and 3 November 1940, Eden diary Egypt and Sudan October
1940, University of Birmingham, Cadbury Research Library (UBCRL) AP 20/3/1. The repeated
urging of more aid by Palairet and Yugoslavia is found in papers in TNA FO 371/24921. S.
Lawlor, Churchill and the politics of war, 1940-1941, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1994, pp. 113, 122; J. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis 1934-1941, Columbia University Press, New
York, 1962, pp. 191-2.
16Rintelen, Rome, telegram to O.K.W. Ausland and others, 29 October 1940, BA MA
RM 36/182; Mackensen, Rome, telegram to Auswrtiges Amt, Berlin, 30 October 1940, Nr.
1965, PA AA Botschaft Rom (Quirinal) Geheim Bd. 85 Nr. 469, pp. 1-2; Militrattach, Luftattach, Erbach, telegram to the O.K.H. Attachabteilung, Reichsluftfahrtministerium and
O.K.W.Abwehr, 31 October 1940, Nr. 556 vom 31.10., PA AA R 29611; Mackensen, Rome,
telegram to von Ribbentrop, Nr. 1976 v. 1.11., 2 November 1940, PA AA R 29611, pp. 1-2;
telegram from Sir M. Palairet (Athens), No. 1145, 15 November 1940, TNA FO 371/24921.
Cianos diary entries are relatively optimistic until mid-November: entries for 15, 16 and
18-19 November 1940, Ciano Diary, pp. 396-7. British reporting of the early Greek advances
is in TNA WO 106/2146 and German reporting for the same period is in PA AA R 29611. Knox,
Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 219, 232; Blytas, The First Victory, pp. 80-6; An Abridged History of
the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 55-6, 63; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 235,
237-8.
43
launched a general offensive towards Koritza in Albania. Greek forces advanced across the front, capturing the town on 21 November and pushing
all Italian forces out of Greek territory by 23 November, despite meeting
strong opposition.17
There were immediate repercussions in Rome. Comments made by Field
Marshal Pietro Badoglio, the head of the Italian High Command (Commando Supremo), suggesting the political leadership was responsible for
the failures in Greece, prompted an attack on him by the fascist leader
Roberto Farinacci in Farinaccis paper Regime Fascista, and Badoglios submission of a letter of resignation on 28 November. This appears to have
been an attempt by Badoglio to have his authority reinforced by Mussolini;
but instead it led by 4 December to his dismissal and replacement by Ugo
Cavallero, a general whose previous experience was as a senior industrial
manager and Undersecretary of War.18
From 22 November to 4 December Italian forces on the Albanian front
were pushed even further back with the Greeks securing a key breakthrough
in the Permeti sector on 2 December. The war by this time was being fought
in extremely demanding climatic conditions which tested the endurance
of troops on both sides. Italian forces were handicapped by their poor staff
work, training and logistics. Greek troops on the other hand had been
trained for fighting in the mountains and were supported by a national
effort that saw men, women and children build roads and carry supplies
to them. Greek tactics, which required initiative and offensive spirit on the
part of commanders and troops, were to move along the hills and mountains, avoiding the roads, outflanking and turning Italian positions as they
were found.19
Italian forces in Albania faced a day of crisis on 4 December 1940 when
Greek troops took Pogradec, north of Koritza. As a result, Soddu reported
to Rome that further military action was impossible and political intervention (by the Germans) was needed to end the campaign. Mussolini sent
Cavallero to Albania with orders that the Italians should fight on and defend
in place rather than seek to shorten their lines. The following day the
17Blytas, First Victory, pp. 102-7.
18Entries for 22, 23, 26, 27 and 30 November 1940, Ciano Diary, pp. 398-400; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 243-8; DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers, p. 55.
19Brief General Account of military operations in Albania from 28 October, 1940 to
23rd April, 1941, TNA WO 201/68; Comments on Italian organization, training, armament,
etc, in Albania, TNA WO 201/11; Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies, p. 96; S. Casson, Greece against
the Axis, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1941, pp. 24-5, 40-1.
44
chapter two
Italian leadership agreed to seek German help. At the end of December

1940 Soddu was recalled in disgrace and replaced by Cavallero who from
this point served simultaneously as theatre commander and head of the
general staff. Fortunately for the Italians, bad weather conditions soon
slowed the Greek advance and kept the front largely unchanged until the
Greeks captured Klissoura on 10 January 1941. Throughout the period Italian forces successfully held off repeated Greek efforts to take Valona.20
By the beginning of 1941, Italian military failures were having serious
repercussions at home. The replacement of Badoglio, as well as the retreats
in Albania and Libya, led to considerable criticism of the regimes strategic
decision making. By mid-January 1941 Mussolini forced fascist leaders to
serve at the front in an attempt to deflect this. In the western desert Graziani
had earlier refused to advance past Sidi Barrani. From 9 to 11 December the
British had attacked the Italian 10th Army in this location and began a
counter-offensive which continued into the New Year. By February 1941
most of the remaining Italian force in Libya was destroyed in the battle of
Beda Fomm. The British simultaneously attacked Italian forces in Ethiopia.
After the fall of Bardia to the Allies on 3 January 1941, Hitler and Mussolini
met at Berchtesgaden on 20 January, and a decision was reached that Germany would provide support for Italian forces in North Africa in order to
forestall an Italian collapse in Mediterranean. Mussolini still hoped, however, to be able to secure a victory against Greece without German troops,
ordering in January 1941 further plans for attack to be drawn up. 21
Meanwhile, in Greece, Metaxas died on 29 January 1941 after a short and
unexpected illness. King George appointed the governor of the Greek National Bank, Alexandros Koryzis, as the new Prime Minister. For their part,
the British considered Koryzis intelligent and honest but weak.22 He was
20Entries for 4 to 6 December 1940, entry for 11 January 1941, Ciano Diary, pp. 400-1, 412
respectively; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 250-1, 257-8; Blytas, First Victory, pp. 125, 143-6,
198, 201-7.
21Schmidt, Fuschl, Aufzeichnung ber die Unterredung zwischen dem Fhrer und
dem Duce in Anwesenheit des Reichsaussenministers und des Grafen Ciano, sowie des
Generalfeldmarschalls Keitel, Generals Jodl, Generals v. Rintelen und der italienischen
Herren General Guzzoni und General Marras am 20. Januar 1941., PA AA R 35509 pp. 1-20;
entry for 18-21 January 1941, Ciano Diary, pp. 414-15; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 260-72;
Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies, p. 102; DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers, pp. 54-5, 57;
Weinberg, A World At Arms, pp. 210-12; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, p. 50. On February
12 Rommel arrived in Tripoli to take charge of the German force: Weinberg, A World at
Arms, p. 215.
22Telegram, British Military Mission to Wavell, 30 January 1941, TNA FO 371/28918. For
other examples, see TNA FO 371/28803, and TNA FO 371/289113.
45
also less confident in military matters than Metaxas had been and certainly less adroit and determined in his dealings with the British. Koryzis
reiterated in writing Metaxas previous undertaking to allow British troops
to land in Greece if Germans entered Bulgaria.23
Up to this point, beyond the Barbarity Force squadrons, British assistance
to Greece in early 1941 had been limited. The Greeks requested equipment
from the British and the US, but the British ensured that they themselves
got first priority from US production. The result was that Greek needs in
aircraft, weapons and ammunition were never met. The British supplies
provided to Greek forces in Albania were relatively small.24 The resulting
steady degradation of Greek logistic capability slowly but surely meant the
end of effective Greek resistance in Albania. The only question was how
long the Greeks could continue to hold out.
Throughout February the Greek forces were continuing to advance but
their gains were minor. Greek troops could not be relieved whereas the
Italians could rest and rotate their forces, and fly in new equipment with
German help. By the end of the month the Greek Army was estimated to
have only two months worth of artillery ammunition left. Throughout the
country there were widespread material, and even food, shortages. The
general Greek mobilization and fighting had also severely disrupted and
weakened the countrys ability to overcome such shortfalls.25
*
The early Greek victories against the Italians created temptations for both
Greece and Britain. Success made it difficult for the Greek leadership to
negotiate an end to the war before the Germans could become involved. It
also allowed the small British Barbarity Force to settle in strategically important parts of Greece and, more significantly, enabled the British to
23Telegram from Sir M. Palairet (Athens), 29 January 1941, No. 135.; telegram from Sir
M. Palairet (Athens), 29 January 1941, No. 139.: both in TNA FO 371/29862.
24An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 49-50. G. Warne,
internal Foreign Office file note, Greek munitions situation, 7 February 1941, TNA FO
371/29776, pp. 1-3; P. Nichols, Foreign Office, minute, 9 February 1941, TNA FO 371/29795,
p. 2; entry for 24 March 1941, MacVeagh diary, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, p. 318; Higham,
Diary of a Disaster, pp. 49, 50; D.J. Delivanis, Greek Economic and Financial Efforts 19401941, Balkan Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1982, pp. 219-24.
25Extract of telegram, Military Mission in Athens to Foreign Office, 4 February 1941,
TNA WO 106/3161; G. Warne, internal FO file note, 7 February 1941, Greek munitions situation., TNA FO 371/29776, pp. 1-3; entry for 8 February 1941, Eden diary, UBCRL AP 20/1/21;
Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies, pp. 146-7; Koliopoulos and Veremis, Modern Greece, pp. 109-10.
The British approach was paralleled by German failures to supply materials to Italy: DiNardo,
Germany and the Axis Powers, p. 193.
46
chapter two
enhance their influence in the region, especially with Turkey, and potentially to threaten the Romanian oil fields. British leaders ultimately decided in early 1941 to deploy a force to Greece as part of an effort to form a
Balkan front of Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey against the Axis. This plan
to engage enemy forces on the periphery of Europe, with a limited British
contribution to a larger coalition, drew on long-standing British strategic
traditions and what might even be called a British way of war. The hopes
placed on such a front were, however, based on an optimistic emphasis on
the size of the force that would then be assembled, without any realistic
assessment of its quality. At the same time British efforts to form such a
coalition were undermined by their inability to offer the countries involved
major military assistance.26
The British Governments initial response to the invasion of Greece was
thus simultaneously decisive and restrained. Earlier Greek appeals for assistance in August had been deflected; Britain was only interested in gaining a base in Crete and offered Greece aid to hold this island only.27 On 28
October, however, the response of the British government was immediate.
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill pledged: We will give you all the
26The Germans made soundings for a peace between Greece and Italy but this would
have required Greece to surrender territory: telegram from Sir S. Hoare (Madrid), 5 December 1940, No. 399, TNA FO 371/24921; telegram from Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora),
12 February 1941, No: 295., TNA FO 371/29843; telegram from Sir M. Palairet (Athens),
19 February 1941, Following from Air Attach to Air Minister., TNA FO 371/29778; signature,
Angora Chancery, letter to Southern Chancery, Foreign Office, 12 March 1941, TNA FO
371/29843; Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 132-43; Zacharioudakis,
Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, pp. 220-3, 258-61. In the event of Italy making peace with Greece, the British Government was determined to stay in Crete: J. Nichols,
unheaded file note, 5 January 1941; Eden, minute to Churchill, 26 December 1940: both in
TNA FO 371/29844. For the contested concept of a British way of war, see A. Danchev,
Liddell Hart and the British Way in Warfare, in M. Duffy, T. Farrell and G. Sloan (eds),
Culture and Command: Proceedings of the Conferences held at the Britannia Royal Naval
College in September, 1998, and at the University of Exeter, in September, 1999, Strategic Policy
Studies 3, University of Exeter, Exeter, 2000, pp. 86-95; David French, The British Way in
Warfare 1688-2000, Unwin Hyman, London, 1990, passim. The hopes placed on numbers:
War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, 28 March 1941, an intelligence appreciation of possible action by yugoslavia., J.I.C. (41) 123., TNA CAB 121/674, pp. 1-2.
27War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of Meeting held on 16th August,
1940, at 10.30a.m., TNA FO 371/24948, p. 4 and other papers on this file; J. Bitzes, Hellas and
the War: trials, triumph, tragedy, 1939-1941, Ph. D. thesis, University of Nebraska, Lincoln,
1976, pp. 114-15; Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection, pp. 140-1; telegram from Sir
M. Palairet, Athens to General Officer Commanding in Chief Middle East, 17 October 1940,
Following for Mr. Eden.; TNA AIR 8/544, p. 1; L.C. Hollis, 20 October 1940, WAR CABINET
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE. ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY AND GREECE. Note by Secretary., C.O.S. (40) 846., TNA CAB 80/20.
47
help in our power.28 In Egypt on a visit, however, Edens initial reaction

was: We are not in a position to give effective help by land or air, and another guaranteed nation looks like falling victim to the axis.29 A meeting
of the British Chiefs of Staff on 3 November decided to confirm and reinforce
Longmores air component with one each of heavy and light anti-aircraft
batteries. Further British military assistance, however, could only come
from a redistribution of forces in the Middle East theatre. The British Chiefs
of Staff believed acquisition of bases in Greece to attack Italy and Romanian
oil would be a benefit, but at the same time feared that it was possibly part
of a planned Axis campaign to distract them from Egypt. Only forces not
vital to the defence of Egypt or easily returned were thus to be sent. At this
stage it seemed clear that nothing could be done if Germany became involved. On 4 November the Greeks approached Britain, taking up the offer
to defend Crete. If British forces took over on the island, then Greek forces
could be withdrawn to reinforce the Albanian front. This move was welcomed by Britain for whom the island was a useful base for the naval defence
of the eastern Mediterranean.
28Foreign Office telegram to Sir M. Palairet, Athens, 28 October 1940, No. 774., TNA
WO 106/2146.
29Entry for 28 October 1940, Eden Egypt and Sudan diary October 1940, UBCRL AP
20/3/1. Telegram from Sir M. Palairet, Athens, to General Officer Commanding in Chief
Middle East, 17 October 1940, Following for Mr. Eden.; TNA AIR 8/544, p. 1; L.C. Hollis, 20
October 1940, war cabinet Chiefs of Staff committee. assistance to turkey and
greece. Note by Secretary., C.O.S. (40) 846., TNA CAB 80/20; telegram from C-in-C Middle
East to the War Office, 1 November 1940, AE 45, Private from S. of S. for C.I.G.S. and P.S. to
S. of S. for the Prime Minister, UBCRL AP 20/8/347, pp. 1-4; telegram from C. in C. Middle
East to the War Office, 3 November 1940, AE/54, Personal for C.I.G.S. and P.S. to S. of S.
(for P.M.), UBCRL AP 20/8/352, pp. 1-2; telegram from C. in C. Middle East to the War Office,
3 November 1940, No. A.E. 53, Private from S. of S. for C.I.G.S. and P.S. to S. of S. (for Prime
Minister)., UBCRL AP 20/8/353, pp. 1-3; telegram from Foreign Office to Sir M. Palairet
Athens, 28 October 1940, No. 769, TNA WO106/2146; W.M. (40) 282ND CONCLUSIONS,
MINUTE 2. Confidential Annex. (4th November, 1940 5.0 p.m.) GREECE. Military Assistance., TNA CAB 65/16, pp. 1-7; telegram from the War Office to C. in C. Middle East,
4 November 1940, 87531, TNA WO106/2146, pp. 1-3; telegram from the War Office to C. in
C. Middle East, 29 October 1940, Following for Secretary of State for War from Prime Minister., UBCRL AP 20/8/343; telegram from Major-Gen. Commanding Troops Sudan to the
War Office, 29 October 1940, Following for Prime Minister from S. of S. for War, UBCRL AP
20/8/344; entries for 28 October 1940 and 4 November 1940, D. Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir
Alexander Cadogan O.M. 1938-1945, Cassell, London, 1971, [henceforth cited as Cadogan
Diaries], pp. 333 and 334 respectively; entry for 6 November 1940, Eden Egypt and Sudan
diary October 1940, UBCRL AP 20/3/1; notes of a meeting of ministers held on the
13th november, 1940, at 4 p.m., UBCRL AP 20/8/316, pp. 1-2; M. Gilbert, Finest Hour: Winston
S. Churchill 1939-1941, Heinemann, London, 1983, pp. 898-9, 933.
48
chapter two
Throughout the period from November 1940 to February 1941, British

policy choices continued to fluctuate between emphasis on campaigns
against Italian forces in North and East Africa, and assistance to Greece.
Planning was also under way for an operation designed to force the Italians
out of the Dodecanese (Operation Mandibles). A British battalion arrived
to defend Crete in early November and the decision was taken to send from
the Middle East an expanded Barbarity Force of five squadrons (two Blenheim bomber squadrons, one mixed fighter/bomber squadron, and two
Gladiator Squadrons) with army auxiliaries under the command of Air
Vice-Marshal John DAlbiac. This force was supplemented by a Military
Mission, created on 14 November. The Military Missions tasks included
liaison with the Greeks, preparations to destroy oil stocks in the event of a
German attack, and transmission of Greek requests for supplies. In practice
it also undertook military training. Yet, crucially, as already noted, many
Greek supply needs could not be met.30
In an important policy step, prompted by knowledge of German plans
to intervene in Greece gained from ULTRA, and with victory over the Italian forces in North Africa seeming to be just a matter of time, Churchill
decided to offer Greece additional aid in January 1941. Writing to Longmore
on 7 January, the British Prime Minister outlined the new policy: Sustaining of Greek battle, thus keeping in the field their quite large army, becomes
an objective of prime importance.31 The Admiralty advised Admiral Andrew
Cunningham, the Royal Navys Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, that
30The first commander of the Military Mission was Major-General Michael GambierParry who was replaced towards the end of the year by Major-General T.G. Heywood who
had previously been military attach in Paris. Telegram from Military Attach Athens to
War Office, 2 November 1940, TNA WO106/2146 2/11/40 pp. 1-2; W.M. (40) 281ST CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 1. Confidential Annex. (1st November, 1940 12 Noon.) GREECE. Military
Assistance., TNA CAB 65/16; signature for Major-General Gambier-Parry, 31 October 1940,
CRME/1480/G(O)., INSTRUCTIONS TO MAJOR-GENERAL M.D. GAMBIER-PARRY, MC.,
A.D.C., TNA WO 201/55; telegram from British Military Mission Greece to H Q. M.E.,
3 November 1940, No:- 5, TNA WO 201/55, pp. 1-2; Major-General Heywood, 10 July 1941,
Report on 27 British Military Mission to the Greek Army, November, 1940 to July,
1941, TNA WO 201/119, pp. 1-8; records of the Mission on TNA WO 201/2730; Gilbert, Finest
Hour, p. 904; Higham, Diary of a Disaster, pp. 18-19, 20-1, 38-9, 44-5, 51, 52; Zacharioudakis,
Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, p. 254; Eden to Sir M. Palairet (Athens),
7 January 1941, UBCRL AP 20/8/739, pp. 1-5; D. Hunt, A Don at War, revised edition, Frank
Cass, London, 1990, pp. 26-8. Barbarity Force landed at Piraeus from 16-19 November and
consisted of 284 officers (130 army) and 3713 other ranks (1850 army). The army component
consisted of anti-aircraft, engineering, medical, service corps and ordnance personnel. See
The Campaign in Greece, April 6 28, 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/36.
31Copy of a telegram dated January 7, 1941 from the Air Ministry to the Air Officer
Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East, Following from Prime Minister, TNA PREM 3/309/1.
49
Figure 2.2:January 1941, the Anglo-Greek war council in session. Left to right: General
H.D. Gambier-Parry, British General Staff; President Metaxas of Greece; His Majesty King
George of Greece; Air Vice-Marshal J.H. DAlbiac, Air Officer Commanding in Greece, and
General A. Papagos, Commander-in-Chief, Greek Army. (Source: Australian War Memorial:
128421)
the new policy was to give Greece the maximum possible assistance with
the objective of ensuring that they resist German demands by force.32 Such
assistance, the British government considered, would determine the attitude of Turkey and influence both the US and the USSR. (The Lend Lease
Act to extend aid to Britain was passing through Congress and did not
become law until 11 March 1941.) The British Ambassador to Moscow, Stafford Cripps, made independent efforts to warn the Soviet Union of the
dangers it faced from Germany, which included his travelling to Turkey to
meet Eden during Edens visit there. Cripps proposed that Eden should
travel to meet Stalin, but Churchill and Eden declined.
F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and
Operations Volume One, Her Majestys Stationery Office, London, 1979, p. 259.
32Copy of a telegram dated January 10, 1941, from the Admiralty to the Commanderin-Chief, Mediterranean, TNA PREM 3/309/1. C. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull Volume
One, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1948, pp. 872-3; C. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull
Volume Two, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1948, pp. 923-5; Lawlor, Churchill and the Politics
of War, pp. 176-83; W.M. (41) 20TH CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 4. Confidential Annex. (24th
February, 1941 5.0 p.m.) THE BALKANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Future Military Policy.,
TNA CAB 65/21, pp. 4-5; telegram from Sir S. Cripps, Moscow, to Foreign Office, No. 155.,
TNA FO 371/29778, pp. 1-2; telegram from Sir. H. Knatchbull Hugessen (Angora), No. 544.,
TNA FO 371/29780; Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, p. 237. On Cripps efforts to split the Soviets from the Germans: S. Burgess, Stafford Cripps A Political Life, Victor Gollancz, London,
1999, pp. 141-50.
50
chapter two
Churchills belief of the need for military theatre in Europefor action

and gestures designed to buoy public opinion at home and abroadplayed
an important role in this decision. Max Hastings draws specific attention
to the comment by Roosevelts emissary Harry Hopkins on 10 January 1941
that Churchill believed Greece was lost even as he moved to reinforce the
Greeks. The political reasons that drove these initial decisions continued
to prevail up to March even as some of the strategic assumptions about the
chances of creating a Balkan front had been undermined.33
From 13 to 15 January, the British Commander-in-Chief, Middle East
Command, General Archibald Wavell, visited Athens. There he offered the
Greeks artillery and tank units, but capped potential British ground force
assistance at two to three divisions to be deployed in Salonika and other
strategic locations. Metaxas, who considered nine British divisions at least
were needed to protect Salonika, declined the British offer as insufficient
to protect Greece from German intervention, but enough to encourage it.
Metaxas sought to avoid provoking Germany before the Italians could be
defeated. On 18 January Greece did agree to accept a British force (presumably the two to three divisions discussed) if the Germans entered Bulgaria.
After this Greek refusal of immediate aid, British priorities switched to
North Africa, planning for Mandibles, and creating a strategic reserve of
some four divisions in two months to help Greece and Turkey if required
in the near future. 34
Meanwhile, in North Africa, by 7 February British forces had expelled
the Italians from Cyrenaica. Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff were thereafter prepared to give priority to aiding Greece. ULTRA decrypts gave
33Hopkins comment: M. Hastings, Finest Years: Churchill as Warlord 1940-45, HarperPress, London, 2009, p. 125; for the role of military theatre in this decision: ibid., pp. 111-37.
See the consideration of the entire British decision-making process in Lawlor, Churchill and
the Politics of War, Parts II and III, passim.
34Copy of a telegram dated January 15, 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle
East, to the War Office.; Copy of a telegram dated January 21, 1941, from the Admiralty to
the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean: both in TNA PREM 3/309/1; entries for 16, 17 and
18 January 1941, Alex Danchev (ed.), Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance: the Second
World War Diaries of Brigadier Vivian Dykes, Brasseys, London, 1990, pp. 35-7; entries for 12
to 16 January 1941, Cadogan Diaries, pp. 349-50; Gilbert, Finest Hour, pp. 978-80; Koliopoulos
and Veremis, Modern Greece, pp. 108-9; Higham, Diary of a Disaster, pp. 58-69. Wavell
opposed this offer: Copy of a telegram dated January 10, 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief,
Middle East, to the War Office, with reference to telegram No. (39).; Copy of a telegram
dated January 11, 1941, from the War Office to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East., Following from Prime Minister for General Wavell and Air Marshal Longmore:-; Copy of a
telegram dated January 18, 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to the War
Office.: all in TNA PREM 3/309/1.
51
continuing intelligence about German troop movements into Bulgaria and

Romania from mid-January, and by 11 February the British had concluded
that Greece, not Turkey, was the likely target of any German intervention
in the Balkans. As a result, Churchill telegrammed Wavell that we should
try and get in a position to offer the Greeks the transfer to Greece of a fighting portion of the army which has hitherto defended Egypt.35 Wavell indicated that by the end of April he could make available two Australian
divisions, the New Zealand division and two armoured brigades.
The British decisions of January 1941 thus created a momentum for deployment in Greece, with the various commanders starting the process of
assembling the required force. It became increasingly difficultthough by
no means impossibleto alter this course, even as some of the assumptions on which it was made became more and more doubtful. On 15 February Anthony Eden (Foreign Secretary since 22 December 1940) and
General John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, were sent from London on a fact-finding mission to the Middle East to investigate what sort
of military aid might be given to Greece, and, in an attempt to create the
Balkan front, to see what might be done to win the entry into the war of
Yugoslavia and Turkey on the Allied side. Even as Eden and Dill were on
their way to Cairo, news came that suggested British hopes of gaining active
Turkish support were unrealistic, as Turkey and Bulgaria signed a nonaggression pact.36
35Telegram, Churchill to Wavell, 11 February 1941, TNA AIR 8/914. Hinsley, British Intelligence Volume One, pp. 347-58; M. Dockrill, British Strategy in Greece, the Aliakmon Line,
International Commission of Military History, International Congress for the 50 Years from
the 1940-1941 Epopee and the Battle for Crete, International Commission of Military History,
Athens, 1991, pp. 115-16; Copy of a telegram dated January 26, 1941, from the War Office to
the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East., TNA PREM 3/309/1; Copy of a telegram dated
February 11, 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to the War Office, repeated
to the British Military Mission, Athens, with reference to telegram No. (102)., TNA PREM
3/309/1; minutes of War Cabinet Defence Committee meeting, 11 February 1941, TNA AIR
8/914; Lawlor, Churchill and the Politics of War, pp. 180, 206-11.
36Statement by Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs about the Turco-Bulgarian Agreement, undated, TNA FO 371/29802; M. Miller, Bulgaria during the Second World War,
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1975, pp. 43-4. On Eden-Dill mission see also entries for
22, 23, 24 and 28 February, and 1 to 7 March, Cadogan Diaries, pp. 357-62; J. Kennedy, The
Business of War The War Narrative of Major-General Sir John Kennedy G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.,
K.B.E., C.B., M.C., William Morrow and Company, New York, 1958, pp. 75-6, 92-3. The mission
is the subject of a forthcoming book by S. Morewood, Defending Greece Against Nazi Germany: Diplomacy, Strategy and the Eden Dill Mission in World War Two (I.B. Tauris, London,
2013). Unfortunately we have not been able to access the manuscript ahead of publication.
We have however drawn on an article by the same author: S. Morewood, Edens Balkan
Odyssey, History Today, 58/9 (2008), pp. 34-41.
52
chapter two
For his February visit to the Middle East Eden was given sealed instructions by Churchill not to be opened until he left Britain. Their general
tenor was to send speedy succour to Greece as priority one, then make
Turkey or Yugoslavia fight as best they could, feel the way for potential
support from Turkey; and to arrange for the formation in the Delta of the
strongest and best equipped force possible for Greece at the earliest possible moment.37 On their arrival in Cairo, Eden and Dill found Wavell and
his air and naval commanders-in-chief surprisingly enthusiastic about an
expedition and proposing to send up to five divisions.38 The basis for such
enthusiasm at this time is not clear. On 20 February, immediately after his
arrival, Eden recorded that there was agreement on utmost help to Greece
at earliest possible moment, even though there was a serious risk in doing
so.39 This enthusiasm seems to have converted Eden, who had been hesitant
about any involvement in Greece on 10 February, into becoming an advocate
of the intervention. Eden and Dill then held a formal meeting with the
Commanders-in-Chief of Middle East Command in Cairo on 21 February,
which agreed that Greece should receive further British aid in the face of
imminent German attack. At the same time Eden advised Churchill that it
was of course, a gamble.40
The Eden-Dill mission of February 1941 was responsible for the decisions
that finalised the nature of British intervention, and also for a key difference
between Greek and British understandings of a crucial aspect of the
37APPENDIX I. NOTES ON APPROACH TO TURKISH, GREEK AND YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENTS. 17 February 1941, TNA WO 106/2145, p. 1. See also (20) Copy of a telegram dated
February 18, 1941, from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, through the Governor and
Commander-in-Chief, Gibraltar, to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, repeated to the
War Office, with reference to telegrams Nos. (2) and (1)., War Cabinet, 7 April 1941, The
principal telegrams relating to operations in the Middle East, TNA PREM 3/309/2,
p. 11; diary entry for 15 February 1941, Piers Dixon, Double Diploma: The Life of Sir Pierson
Dixon Don and Diplomat, Hutchinson, London, 1968, p. 60.
38Diary entries for 20 and 21 February 1941, Dixon, Double Diploma, p. 63.
39Entry for 20 February 1941 [Thursday], Eden Greece diary, UBCRL AP 20/3/2.
40(39) Copy of telegram dated February 21, 1941, from Sir Miles Lampson to the Foreign
Office., Secretary of State for Foreign affairs to Prime Minister telegram No. 14 : , War
Cabinet, 7 April 1941, The principal telegrams relating to operations in the Middle
East, TNA PREM 3/309/2, p. 22. Eden, minute to the Prime Minister, 10 February 1941,
UBCRL AP 20/8/459, pp. 3-4; (35) Copy of a telegram dated February 21, 1941, from Sir Miles
Lampson, Cairo, to the Foreign Office., War Cabinet, 7 April 1941, The principal telegrams
relating to operations in the Middle East, TNA PREM 3/309/2, pp. 19-20. Wavells
appreciation: [Wavell], C-in-C, G.H.Q., M.E. to D.D.M.I. (I), 19 February 1941, WAR IS AN
OPTION OF DIFFICULTIES (WOLFE), TNA WO 201/1574, pp. 1-2. Dills view: telegram from
C.-in-C., Middle East to the War Office, 21 February 1941, O/43125, For V.C.I.G.S. from
C.I.G.S., TNA PREM 3/206/3.
53
d eployment. On 22 and 23 February Eden and Dill visited Athens secretly

and held a series of discussions with the King, Koryzis and Papagos. Before
discussions began, Koryzis handed over a statement setting out that Greece
was determined to resist and was grateful for any aid, although the Greeks
still feared provoking a German attack. At a later meeting of military representatives on 22 February, Papagos set out the Greek plans to meet such
an attack if and when it came. Greek forces in Macedonia were little more
than four divisions in Thrace with no anti-aircraft or anti-tank weapons.
The choice of a defensive line would thus be dependent on whether Yugoslavia entered the war or not. Papagos wanted to establish a line behind
which the army in Albania could withdraw, and behind which with Yugoslav
support, Salonika could be protected. This would be the forward and fortified Doiran-Nestos Line (see Chapter 3). Without Yugoslavia Greek forces
would have to defend on the more southerly Vermion-Olympus Line, and
Greek forces in Albania would have to be drawn in or risk being cut off.
Papagos estimated that Greek forces needed twenty days to withdraw to
this second line from their positions in Macedonia and Thrace. When complete, there would be thirty-five Greek battalions on the Vermion-Olympus
Line and two divisions in reserve. Should a forward line protecting Salonika prove unfeasible, Papagos proposed to use any British-Dominions force
on this rearward Vermion-Olympus Line, which would have to hold for 20
to 25 days to enable withdrawal from Albania. Wavell and Dill agreed.41
Crucially, at a subsequent plenary meeting on 21 February, a key BritishGreek misunderstanding took place. The Greek side believed that no final
decision about the withdrawal of Greek forces to the Vermion-Olympus
Line would be made until after Yugoslav and Turkish intentions were known,
while the British assumed that the withdrawal to the Vermion-Olympus
Line would commence forthwith. No common record of the meeting was
taken, at which Major General T. G. Heywood of the British Military Mission
acted as interpreter. The British and Greek records of this meeting were at
variance because they reflected the two sides differing interpretations of
41P. Dixon, 23 February 1941, PREFACE TO APPENDIX V., NOTE., TNA WO 106/2145,
pp. 1-2, contains the text of the Greek statement handed over by Koryzis; telegram from Sir
M. Palairet (Athens), 22 February 1941, No. 263, Following for Sir A. Cadogan from Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs., TNA FO 371/29798; RECORD OF MEETING OF THE BRITISH
AND GREEK MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES HELD AT ROYAL PALACE AT TATOI
22 FEB. 41, TNA FO 371/29782, pp. 1-2; App V (iii).; ANGLO GREEK CONVERSATIONS.
RECORD No. 3. Informal Meeting of British representatives held at 7.45 p.m. on February
22nd. at the Royal Palace at Tatoi., 23 February 1941, TNA WO 106/2145, p. 1.
54
chapter two
the discussion.42 Edens diary entry for 22 February 1941 contains only
sketchy details of the political agreements made and no detail at all of the
military discussions. He did note that from first to last Greek attitude has
been entirely resolute.43 The British record also noted a promise to send a
staff officer to brief Prince Paul, the Regent of Yugoslavia, a decision which
the British did not act upon. The extent and implications of the misunderstanding were not clear until Eden and Dills return to Greece on 2 March.
After the war both the British and the Greeks officially supported the
view that a mutual misunderstanding of what had been agreed at the
22 February meeting had occurred but that both sides had acted in good
faith. Historians examinations of the clashing understandings, however,
favour the view that the error arose on the British rather than the Greek
side, and that Edens own contribution to the discussions probably contributed to it. It may have been a product of his desire to keep his options
open for negotiations with Yugoslavia, the linguistic difficulties of the
negotiations, or a product of wishful thinking on the British side. It is noteworthy that the British did not inform the Greeks of the various rebuffs to
their diplomatic efforts by the Yugoslav and Turkish governments, news
upon which Papagos was eagerly waiting in order to make the decision of
which line to defend, until Edens return to Athens on 2 March.44
42The depth of this misunderstanding was not revealed until the British and Greek
records could be compared when the latter was published in 1980, though Papagos had
made the Greek case in his post-war memoirs. The British record contains the words
preparations should at once be made and put into execution to withdraw the Greek advance
troops in Thrace and Macedonia to the line we would be obliged to hold if the Yugoslavs
did not come in: APPENDIX V (iv)., ANGLO-GREEK CONVERSATIONS RECORD No. 4.
SECOND ANGLO-GREEK PLENARY MEETING AT 10.45 P.M. ON FEB. 22nd AT THE TATOI
PALACE., 23 February 1941, TNA WO 106/2145, p. 2, on the staff officer see pp. 3 and p. 5
ADDENDUM.; Pierson Dixon, Foreign Office, 21 April 1941, Report on the Mission of the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Eastern Mediterranean, FebruaryApril, 1941,
TNA FO 371/33145, pp. 7-8; Papagos, Battle of Greece, pp. 322-6; Blytas, First Victory, pp. 2313; C.M. Woodhouse, The Aliakmon Line: an Anglo-Greek Misunderstanding in 1941, Balkan
Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1985, pp. 159-93, contains a detailed comparison of the records taken
by both sides.
43Entry for 22 February 1941, Eden Greece diary, UBCRL AP 20/3/2
44See the detailed examination in Woodhouse, The Aliakmon Line, pp. 167-78; and
for Edens own role, see David Carlton, Anthony Eden A Biography, Allen Lane, London,
1981, pp. 173-7, 179. Higham, Diary of a Disaster, pp. 120-2; C.M. Woodhouse, The Drama of
the Aliakmon Line, International Congress for the 50 Years from the 1940-1941 Epopee and
the Battle for Crete, pp. 46-7; K. Kanakaris, The Greco-German War 1941: International
Congress for the 50 Years from the 1940-1941 Epopee and the Battle for Crete, p. 104-5;
G.C. Cruickshank, Greece 194041, Davis-Pointer, London, 1976, pp. 179, 180; Blytas, First
Victory, p. 233.
55
Eden and Dill returned to Greece for an official visit on 2 March 1941 and
further discussions ensued concerning the imminent British deployment.
On his return to Athens Eden was surprised and concerned that the Greeks
had not moved their forward units and no efforts had yet been made to
prepare the Vermion-Olympus line. On 4 March Eden used the threat of a
complete withdrawal of the British deployment to ensure that the King
overruled Papagos in favour of a deployment on this rearward line. At a
final third session late on 4 March Dill and Papagos signed an agreement
governing the British deployment.45
While Eden was in the Middle East, the decision to deploy a BritishImperial force in Greece was considered in seven War Cabinet meetings
(24 and 27 February, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 March). These deliberations revealed
the wider political basis for the British commitment to Greece and
Churchills awareness that the decision was finely balanced. On 24 February the British Prime Minister told the British War Cabinet that Eden, Dill
and Wavell all favoured opening a front in Greece, and that such a deployment stood a reasonable chance of resisting German attack. Australian
Prime Minister Robert Menziesattending the meeting while on a visit
to Britainrequested reassurance about timings, shipping and equipment
before he would commit Australian troops; and further asked whether the
proposed operation was a forlorn hope without any chance of success.
45Woodhouse, The Aliakmon Line, pp. 179-90; RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT
THE BRITISH LEGATION, ATHENS, AT 1745 HOURS ON 4th MARCH 1941., TNA WO 201/17,
pp. 4-5. Record of Meeting held by British Representatives, 2 March 1941, 7 March 1941,
TNA WO 201/2734; Record of Anglo-Greek meeting, 2 March 1941, 7 March 1941, TNA WO
201/2734; Record of Anglo-Greek meeting (1830hrs), 3 March 1941, 7 March 1941, TNA WO
201/2734; RECORD OF MEETING HELD AT H.M. LEGATION AT ATHENS ON MARCH 2nd,
1941., TNA WO 201/17, pp. 1-5 ; RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT THE BRITISH LEGATION, ATHENS, AT 1830 HOURS ON 3rd MARCH 1941., TNA WO 201/17, pp. 1-9; RECORD
OF A MEETING HELD AT THE BRITISH LEGATION, ATHENS, AT 1100 HOURS ON 4th
MARCH 1941., TNA WO 201/17, pp. 1-4; telegram from Sir M. Palairet (Athens), 5 March 1941,
No. 313., Following from Secretary of State and C.I.G.S. for Prime Minister., TNA CAB 65/22,
pp. 1-3; Woodhouse, The Drama of the Aliakmon Line, pp. 46-7; Dixons recollections of
12 December 1951, Dixon, Double Diploma, pp. 71-2; R. Higham, The myths of the defence
of northern Greece, International Congress for the 50 Years from the 1940-1941 Epopee and
the Battle for Crete, p. 142; Blytas, First Victory, pp. 241-2. The Dill-Papagos agreement: (77)
Copy of a telegram dated March 5, 1941, from Sir Michael Palairet, Athens, to the Foreign
Office, with reference to telegram No. (73)., War Cabinet, 7 April 1941, The principal
telegrams relating to operations in the Middle East, TNA PREM 3/309/2, p. 42.
56
chapter two
Figure 2.3:Anthony Eden greeted by cheering crowds when he visited Athens in March
1941. With him is Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Chief of the Greek
General Staff, General Papagos, and the Greek Prime Minister Koryzis. (Source: Australian
War Memorial: 006386)
Churchill replied that, at worst, in case of a defeat, most men could be

taken back to Egypt where they could be re-equipped. An expedition to
Greece was, for the British Prime Minister at this point, an advance position we could try and hold without jeopardising the main one.46 All British
ministers supported deploying, but the unease of the Dominions continued
(see Chapter 19).47
From this point, the decision-making process was neither smooth nor
consistent. By 4 March Churchill was pessimistic about Allied prospects in
the Balkans because Bulgaria was completely under German control, and
Yugoslavia was not willing to act until attacked. He did not want to halt the
movement of troops to Greece scheduled that day but suggested Cabinet
review the whole position in the light of the next few days. On 5 March
46W.M. (41) 20TH CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 4. Confidential Annex. (24th February,
1941 5.0 p.m.) THE BALKANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Future Military Policy., TNA
CAB 65/21, p. 3. The whole discussion is recorded on pp. 1-5. Churchill telegram to Eden, 24
February 1941, TNA PREM 3/63/11.
47W.M. (41) 21ST CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 2. Confidential Annex. (27th February, 1941
5.30 p.m.) THE BALKANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Future military policy., TNA CAB
65/21, pp. 1-3, with 7 pp. of annexes; telegram from Prime Minister of New Zealand, 26
February 1941, No. 76., and telegram from the government of New Zealand, 26 February
1941, No. 78., both in TNA PREM 3/63/11.
57
Churchill noted that failure of a British attempt to seize the Dodecanese

island of Castellorizzo on 24 February (a prelude to Operation Mandibles),
and the subsequent postponement of Mandibles until after the Greek deployment, had worsened the air situation. Cabinet agreed that it might be
necessary to reconsider. Much was to be left to Edens continuing advice.48
On 6 March, when it learned of the agreement signed between Papagos
and Dill in Greece 48 hours earlier, the War Cabinet realized that, despite
its reservations of the past two days, the decision had effectively already
been taken on its behalf. Churchill felt, though, that Britain could not renege
on it. The next day the British Chiefs of Staff informed the War Cabinet
that they deferred to commanders on the spot and in this context still supported sending troops to Greece. At this point Churchill had a resurgence
of confidence. Yugoslavia, he thought, might yet be an ally and if BritishDominion forces were compelled to retire, it would be down a peninsula
with strong natural delaying positions. Cabinet gave final approval for the
operation. On 7 March Eden reinforced the decision when he sent a telegram to Churchill that the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East and
South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts (a personal friend of, and trusted
strategic adviser to Churchill), who had also been consulted, still believed
that help could and should be given to Greece. 49
48W.M. (41) 22ND CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 4. Confidential Annex. (3rd March, 1941
5.0 p.m.), THE BALKANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Future Military Policy., TNA CAB
65/22; W.M. (41) 23RD CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 3. Confidential Annex. (4th March, 1941
6.15 p.m.) THE BALKANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Future Military Policy., TNA CAB
65/22; telegram from Sir M. Palairet (Athens), 5 March 1941, No. 314., Following from
Secretary of State and Chief of the Imperial General Staff for Prime Minister. Personal.,
Attachment pp. 1-2, TNA CAB 65/22; W.M. (41) 24th CONCLUSIONS. Confidential Annex.
(5th March, 1941 5.30 p.m.) THE BALKANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Future Military
Policy., TNA CAB 65/22, pp. 1-5.; B [undated; after Cabinet meeting of 5 March 1941] Prime
Minister to Mr. Eden., TNA CAB 65/22 p. 2; Gilbert, Finest Hour, pp. 1014-5; Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 203-4.
49W.M. (41) 25TH CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 1. Confidential Annex. (6th March, 1941
6 p.m.), THE BALKANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Future Military Policy., TNA CAB
65/22, pp. 1-5 with 9 pp. of attachments; W.M. (41) 26TH CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 1. Confidential Annex. (7th March, 1941 12 Noon). THE BALKANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST.
Future Military Policy., TNA CAB 65/22, pp. 1-6 with 16 pp. of attachments; Sir M. Lampson
(Cairo) telegram, 7 March 1941, No. 463., Following from Secretary of State for Prime
Minister., TNA PREM 3/206/3, pp. 1-3; APPENDIX XI. ASSISTANCE TO GREECE. Record
of meeting held at General Headquarters Middle East on 6th March, 1941 at 5.p.m., TNA
WO 106/2145, pp. 1-3; APPENDIX XII. Record of a meeting held at His Majestys Embassy,
Cairo, at 10.15 p.m. on the 6th March, 1941., TNA WO 106/2145, pp. 1-4; telegram from Sir M.
Lampson (Cairo), 7 March 1941, No. 461., Following personal message for the Prime Minister from General Smuts Cairo 7th March., TNA CAB 65/22; telegram to Sir M. Lampson
(Cairo), 7 March 1941, No. 607., Following from Prime Minister for Mr. Eden., TNA CAB
58
chapter two
While the British Cabinet had been deliberating on the wisdom of dispatch of a force from Middle East Command to Greece, its preparation had
been going on for some time. Wavell told Dill and Eden en route to Athens
for their 22 February conference that the force would be commanded by
Lieutenant General Henry Maitland Jumbo Wilson. Wilson himself flew
to Athens on 4 March and was invited to offer his opinions regarding the
use of British-Dominion troops for the Vermion-Olympus line. Wilson contended that strictly military factors would encourage the deployment to
be abandoned but without a British presence in Greece, Yugoslavia and
even Turkey might fall with or without a fight to the Axis. Wilson, like
Wavell, was weighing up more than strictly operational concerns. If these
countries came into the war, Wilson considered, the odds against being
able to hold them were not so hopeless.50
Concurrently, Eden was seeking to secure diplomatic and military support for the imminent deployment to Greece from Turkey and Yugoslavia.
Ideally, he wanted a commitment from both Yugoslavia and Turkey to declare war in the event of an attack on Greece. On 27 February, in Ankara,
Eden met with Turkish leaders. Turkey asked for maximum material aid
and promised only to enter war at a time of its choosing. It would fight if
attacked, but kept its options open. In subsequent meetings in Cyprus on
18 and 19 March, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, kr Saracolu,
promised that his country would send a message to Yugoslavia indicating
that Turkey would see an attack on Salonika as a casus belli if the Yugoslavs
did the same. Once Saracolu returned to Ankara, however, his colleagues
were uncomfortable about the promise and no Turkish action was taken.51
65/22; telegram from Sir M. Lampson (Cairo), 6 March 1941, No. 455., Following from
Secretary of State for Prime Minister., TNA CAB 65/22; telegram from Sir M. Lampson
(Cairo), 7 March 1941, No. 470., Following from Secretary of State for the Prime Minister.,
TNA CAB 65/22; telegram from the government of New Zealand to the Dominions Office,
9 March 1941, No. 95, TNA PREM 3/63/11, pp. 1-4. On Menzies role: diary entries for
24 February 1941, 27 February 1941, 4 March 1941, 5 March 1941, 6 March 1941, 7 March 1941,
A.W. Martin and P. Hardy (eds), Dark and Hurrying Days: Menzies 1941 Diary, National
Library of Australia, Canberra, 1993, pp. 65-6, 68, 81, 82, 83; A.W. Martin, Robert Menzies A
Life Volume 1 1894-1943, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1993, Ch. 14; R. Tove,
Churchills Empire: The World that Made Him and the World He Made, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2010, pp. 209-10.
50Wilson, Eight Years Overseas 1939-1947, p. 73. See also ibid., pp. 65-6; Dockrill, British
Strategy in Greece, the Aliakmon Line, p. 110.
51The British records of these meetings are: APPENDIX VII(i). ANGLO-TURKISH
CONVERSATIONS. Record of the meeting held at 11 a.m. on February 27th at the Presidency
of the Council Angora., 27 February 1941, TNA WO 106/2145, pp. 1-12; App. VII (2nd part),
RECORD OF A MEETING OF BRITISH AND TURKISH MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES
59
The consistent position of both the Turkish and Yugoslav governments

was to seek to stay out of any conflict. In Ankara the Yugoslav minister there
told Eden on 27 February that his country would look after its own interests.
This information was not passed back to the Greeks. Prince Paul refused
Eden a visit to Belgrade and instead on 4 March Ronald Campbell, the
British ambassador in Belgrade, handed the prince a letter from Eden asking him to send a staff officer to Belgrade. By mid-March, with Campbell
reporting that Yugoslavia was on the verge of signing the Tripartite Pact,
Eden sent another letter to the Prince via Terence Shone, the minister at
Cairo and a friend of the prince, urging him to stand firm against Germany
and attack the Italians in Albania. As it became clear that Yugoslavia was
about to accede to the Tripartite Pact, Eden authorized Campbell to support
regime change in Belgrade. 52
HELD AT THE GENERAL STAFF ANKARA 27TH FEBRUARY 1941 100 HOURS., 27 February
1941, TNA WO 106/2145, pp. 1-5; APPENDIX VIII., Meeting of the President of the Republic
with the Secretary of State and C.I.G.S. 6.30 to 8.20 p.m. February 27th., TNA WO 106/2145,
pp. 1-6; line with the turks., 17 March 1941, WO 106/2145, pp. 1-2. See also Pierson Dixon,
Foreign Office, April 21 1941, Report on the Mission of the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs to the Eastern Mediterranean, FebruaryApril, 1941 , TNA FO 371/33145, pp. 6-7,
10-11, 12; entries for 18 and 19 March 1941, Eden Greece diary, UBCRL AP 20/3/2; telegram
from Sir M. Lampson (Cairo), 19 March 1941, Following from Secretary of State for Prime
Minister, TNA CAB 121/674; telegram from Sir M. Lampson (Cairo), 13 March 1941, No. 541.,
Following from Secretary of State., TNA FO 371/29870; telegram from Sir M. Lampson
(Cairo), 13 March 1941, No. 546., Following from Secretary of State., TNA FO 371/29870;
entries for 26, 27, 28 February and 18 and 19 March 1941, Dixon, Double Diploma, pp. 67-70,
74-7 respectively. On the efforts to get Turkey to take an active part in the war: J. MarshallCornwall, Wars and Rumours of Wars: A Memoir, Leo Cooper, London, 1984, pp. 172-9,
180-1.
52Telegram from Sir M. Palairet (Athens), 23 February 1941, No. 261., Following from
Secretary of State ., TNA FO 371/30205; telegram from Sir M. Palairet (Athens), 5 March
1941, No. 312., Following from Secretary of State for Prime Minister:, TNA CAB 65/22, pp.
1-2; Pierson Dixon, Foreign Office, 21 April 1941, Report on the Mission of the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs to the Eastern Mediterranean, FebruaryApril, 1941, TNA FO
371/33145, pp. 6, 8, 12; telegram from Mr. Campbell, Belgrade, 22 March 1941, No. 488. TNA
FO 371/30243; letter from King George VI to Prince Paul in Foreign Office telegram to
Campbell, Belgrade, 24 February 1941, No. 242., TNA FO 371/30205, pp. 1-2; telegram from
Mr. Campbell, Belgrade, to Foreign Office, 25 February 2011, No. 304., TNA FO 371/30205,
pp. 1-2; telegram from Mr. Campbell (Belgrade) to Cairo, No. 429., Following for Secretary
of State., TNA CAB 121/674, pp. 1-2; diary entry for 17 March 1941, Eden Greece diary, UBCRL
AP 20/3/2; O.G. Sargent, unheaded file note, 25 March 1941, TNA FO 371/30243, pp. 1-2;
Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, pp. 102-3; Higham, The Myth of the Defence of Northern Greece
October 1940 April 1941, p. 141; Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, Ch. VIII; ivojinovi, Yugoslavia, European Neutrals, p. 234. See also the reporting on the lead-up to Yugoslavias
signing the pact in TNA FO 371/30206.
60
chapter two
Meanwhile, the US sought to stiffen Balkan resistance to the Axis threat

through diplomatic channels using a mixture of warnings and threats.
Roosevelt sent his personal envoy, Colonel Bill Donovan, to the region, and
on 25 January Donovan reported that the Yugoslavs had assured him Germany would have no free passage through Yugoslav territory if they moved
against Greece. The British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax, urged
Secretary of State Cordell Hull on 5 February to support the British drive
to unite the Balkans against the Axis. Hull cabled Belgrade and Turkey on
9 February with assurances that Britain, with US support, would eventually win the wider war. By 14 February Hull had promised lend-lease to
Yugoslavia and Turkeythough the latter would still make no anti-Axis
commitment. Yugoslavia re-affirmed it would fight if attacked. By 1 March
the US knew that Turkey would not get involved should Greece be invaded
by Germany, and that Yugoslav resistance was uncertain at best. Ironically,
the pressure the US and Britain had placed on Yugoslavia to come into the
war on the Allied side intensified the internal ethnic divisions in the countrys politics, and thus made it harder for Prince Paul to accede to their
wishes.53
Eden and Dill stayed in the region until early April, continuing to seek
Yugoslav and Turkish involvement in the coming campaign. Their mission
was crucial in the British decision to deploy to Greece, butat least by 6
March 1941they had not succeeded in its wider aim of creating a firm
Balkan front. The responsibility for the decision in favour of the British
53Entry for 19 February 1941, Eden Greece diary, UBCRL AP 20/3/2; telegram from Sir
M. Palairet (Athens), 18 February 1941, No. 2., TNA FO 371/29792; telegram from Sir M.
Lampson (Cairo), 20 February 1941, No. 345., TNA FO 371/29778, pp. 1-3; America + the
Balkans., 21 February 1941, TNA FO 371/29795, p. 2; telegram from G.O.C. Palestine and
Trans-Jordan to the War Office, 5 February 1941, HP/MS/4502 Cipher 5/2., Personal for
C.I.G.S. from Lt.-Col. Dykes., TNA FO 371/29795; P. Nichols, Foreign Office, minute, 9 February 1941, TNA FO 371/29795, pp. 1-2; telegrams from Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora),
4 February 1941, No. 250. and No. 251., pp. 1-2: both in TNA FO 371/29777; telegram from
Foreign Office to Viscount Halifax (Washington), 18 February 1941, No. 892., TNA FO
371/29777; telegram from C.-in-C., Middle East to the War Office, 21 February 1941, O/43125,
For V.C.I.G.S. from C.I.G.S., TNA PREM 3/206/3; telegram from British military attach
Ankara to War Office, 28 February 1941, No. 29828, Private for V.C.I.G.S. from C.I.G.S.,
LHMA DILL 3/2/8; telegram from Mr. Campbell (Belgrade), 1 March 1941, No. 326., FO
371/29778; entries for 20 January to 10 February 1941 and for 15 February 1941, Dykes diary,
Danchev, Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance, pp. 39-54 and 55-6 respectively;
Dimitrov, Bulgaria, and ivojinovi, Yugoslavia, European Neutrals, pp. 214 and 232-3, 235
respectively; Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, pp. 205, 222-4; Hull, Cordell Hull Memoirs Volume
One, p. 886; Hull, Cordell Hull Memoirs Volume Two, pp. 929-33.
61
deployment in Greece, and its advisability, was controversial at the time

and later. Eden was sensitive to criticism of his role in bringing it about.54
The initial British commitments were made under the impact of the
victories against the Italians in North Africa and when there were still hopes
that a Balkan frontat least involving Yugoslavia if not Turkeywould
eventuate. British hopes in this regard were based on an optimistic assessment of the possibilities. The British decision-makers at the time recognized
that the decision was a finely balanced one. This awareness meant that
some were not persuaded of the decision at the time, which played a role
in the amount of counter-factual criticism subsequently devoted to it (see
Chapter 19).
From October 1940 until March 1941, both Churchill and Eden wavered
about a deployment to Greece, but never at the same time. Public opinion,
both domestic and internal, a national strategic culture that accepted the
concept of a peripheral strategy and a limited commitment, and the personalities of those involved all contributed to the British decision to send
a force to the Greek mainland. This decision was, unsurprisingly, over-determined.
*
The Balkan theatre looked markedly different to the Germans. Britains
continued resistance from June 1940 led the Nazi leadership to develop
plans designed to remove any potential support Britain might receive from
the USSR and from the United States. By June 1940 the German military
was drawing up plans for an invasion on the Soviet Union, eventually codenamed Operation Barbarossa. These plans were kept secret from their Italian allies, in part because of fear that they would leak out. The search for
a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union continued, though, until December.
The United States, on the other hand, could not be attacked directly. Instead,
by September 1940 Germany was seeking to create an alliance with Japan
aimed at containing the United States.55
Incremental British assistance to Greece meant that the Germans had
been forced to start drafting plans for a possible involvement in Greece.
54Carlton, Anthony Eden, pp. 181-2; D.R. Thorpe, Eden: The Life and Times of Anthony
Eden First Earl of Avon 1897-1977, Chatto & Windus, London, 2003, pp. 258-60; Cruickshank,
Greece 194041, p. 184.
55Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, pp. 48-9, 71-2; Kallis, Fascist Ideology, p. 180; Weinberg,
A World At Arms, pp. xiv, 182. On the overall strategic pressures on the German regime in
this period see A. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegfhrung 1940-1941, Bernard
& Graefe Verlag fr Wehrwesen, Frankfurt a. M., 1965, sections B and C.
62
chapter two
On 1 November Hitler resolved to leave Italy to fight the campaign on its

own. Three days later, however, when it was erroneously reported that the
British were in the process of setting up air bases in Lemnos and Salonika,
Hitler ordered the Army Supreme Command (Oberkommando des Heeres
OKH) to plan for a speedy march into Turkish Thrace, and to consider a
similar operation in Greece. Colonel Heusinger of OKH had subsequently
submitted a draft plan for an operation against northern Greece on 7 November.56
On 12 November 1940 Hitler issued Directive 18, concerning the further
conduct of the war in the Mediterranean. It noted that preparations were
being made for an occupation of Greece north of the Aegean, and the use
of the Luftwaffe against targets in the eastern Mediterranean, especially
those British bases that might threaten the Romanian oilfields. The use of
an army group of some ten divisions was envisaged at this stage to meet
all possible eventualities, including Turkish intervention. An occupation
of Yugoslavia was not anticipated. Such an operation, the Germans realized
from the beginning, could only be carried out with Bulgarian cooperation.
Hitler informed the Italian leadership that they had to isolate Yugoslavia
from Allied influence and neutralize it politically as a first priority, because
German military intervention in the Balkans was not possible until March
and only if Yugoslavia was neutral. 57
As a result of these plans and imperatives, hectic German diplomatic
activity was initiated to prevent the British establishing themselves in
Greece and from courting Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Turkey. At this stage
Hitler became personally and intensively engaged in Balkan diplomacy, an
area that he had previously barely taken note of. At the beginning of October, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania were all approached to join
the Tripartite Pact. Hungary, Romania and Slovakia agreed, joining on 20,
23 and 24 November respectively.58
56Entries for 1 November 1940, 4 November 1940 and 7 November 1940, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, pp. 158-9, 164-5 and 170 respectively; MGFA, Germany and the Second World
War Volume III, pp. 455-6; Major L. Glombik, Intelligence Officer, 12th Army, 23 June 1947,
The German Balkan Campaign, AWM67, 624/7/2; Fabry, Balkan-Wirren 1940-41, p. 35.
57Directive 18, 12 November 1940, H. R. Trevor-Roper (ed.) Hitlers War Directives 19391945, Pan Books, London, 1966, pp. 81-7; Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, pp. 209-10; Fabry, Balkan-Wirren 1940-41, pp. 35-6; ivojinovi, Yugoslavia,
European Neutrals, p. 228; Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, pp. 188-9; Zacharioudakis, Die
58Dimitrov, Bulgaria, European Neutrals, p. 207.
63
From this point, Hitlers main focus was on Bulgaria which was strategically crucial for any German assistance to the Italians in Greece. The difficulty was, however, that the USSR made it clear that it considered
Bulgaria part of its sphere of influence. This point of competition intensified latent German-Soviet opposition. The Germans expected that Bulgaria would be interested in reclaiming the territory it had lost to Greece
after World War I but had to persuade the Bulgarians that joining the Tripartite Pact would bring more benefits than dangers. At this stage Bulgaria was able to balance off the interests of the USSR and Germany as well
as making use of the uncertain position of Turkey.59
On 25 October the British ambassador in Bulgaria, G.W. Rendel, handed
King Boris a personal letter from King George VI advising that Bulgaria
should maintain its policy of neutrality. The Bulgarian government, however, suspected British influence in Turkish warnings that Bulgarias accession to the Axis would threaten Turkish security. Thus, on 22 October King
Boris wrote to Hitler that it was not opportune for his country to accede to
the pact. While he conceded that Bulgaria and Germanys interests were
the same, Bulgaria was not in a position to defend itself against those of its
neighbours [Turkey] who would feel threatened by the alliance. The German reaction to the letter was cool.60
The Germans next sought Bulgarian approval to build a German air
warning system on the southern Bulgarian border to provide advance warning of any British air attack on Romania. On 6 November at the suggestion
of the German Armed Forces Supreme Command (Oberkommando der
WehrmachtOKW), the German Foreign Ministry asked the German ambassador in Sofia to convince the Bulgarian government that the deployment of German air force intelligence units to the Bulgarian-Greek border
was necessary. The Germans planned to send 200 men. In order to avoid
the impression that the request was a form of German pressure for Bulgaria to join the Axis, senior Luftwaffe officers were advised to approach
the Bulgarian authorities about this issue through the German embassys
military attachs. On 9 November, days before Molotov visited Berlin,
the Soviet Union offered Bulgaria a guarantee of its independence.
59Fabry, Balkan-Wirren 1940-41, pp. 34, 35, 37; DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers,
p. 76.
60King Boris to Hitler, 22 October 1940, PA AA RAM R 35553, pp. 1-5; Gorodetsky, Grand
Delusion, pp. 63-4; Fabry, Balkan-Wirren 1940-41, pp. 38, 39; Rendel, The Sword and the Olive,
pp. 168-79.
64
chapter two
Bulgaria had rejected the offer, but continued to delay signing the Tripartite
Pact.61
The reasons for German intervention in Greece are usually seen solely
through the prism of the German plan to attack the USSR. Operation Barbarossa both heightened the German anxiety to ensure that the British did
not get a foothold back on mainland Europe, and intensified the time pressure on German diplomatic and military efforts to prevent this. But even
without Barbarossa, Hitler would not have been prepared to accept British
bases in mainland Greece or an Italian defeat. Romania was vital to the
overall German war effort. As Eichholtz demonstrates, Romanian oil was
and remained until the middle of 1941 the most important source of foreign
raw materials for the German conduct of the war.62 Hitler remained concerned about any danger to Romanian oil deliveries throughout the war.
The British were aware of this point of German economic vulnerability and
had been attempting, without significant success, to sabotage the installations in Romania. As it happened, both sides over-estimated the effect
bombing raids could have on oil production, but Hitler could not afford to
take the risk.
Equally, Hitler sensed the fragility of the Italian regime should its defeats
continue. He abruptly rejected the suggestion of the German military attach to Turkey that Germany should leave Italy to reap the consequences.
By December, the Germans were aware of the crisis at the highest levels of
the Italian regime as a result of the setbacks in the war with Greece. German officials reported that the criticism of, and blame attributed to, the
Italian generals masked a greater criticism of Ciano who was considered
largely responsible for the failed invasion.63 While the fascist regime itself
61Fabry, Balkan-Wirren 1940-41, pp. 39-40; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, pp. 82-5.
62Eichholtz, Krieg um l, p. 39. See also ibid., pp. 43-4; Weinberg, A World at Arms,
pp. 213, 214; Paerton, Romania, European Neutrals, p. 190; Zacharioudakis, Die deutschgriechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, p. 228. British attempts at, and plans for, sabotage: papers
on TNA CAB 77/18, TNA CAB 63/124 and TNA FO 371/24978; on plans to bomb the fields:
(50) Copy of a telegram dated February 24, 1941, from Sir Miles Lampson, Cairo, to the
Foreign Office., War Cabinet, 7 April 1941, The principal telegrams relating to operations in the Middle East, TNA PREM 3/309/2, p. 28; papers in FO 371/29992 and
FO 371/30000.
63Als Soldat und Diplomat in der Trkei Aus nachgelassenen Aufzeichnungen des
deutschen Militrattachees in der Trkei, Generalleutnant Hans Rohde Niedergeschrieben
von Dieter Rohde (1960), BA MA MSG 2/12541, pp. 31-2; H. Rohde, SOLDAT UND DIPLOMAT
Militrattach in Ankara, Athen und Teheran 1936 1945, BA MA MSG 2/12540, p. 10; 1940
Mackensen, Rome telegram to the Auswrtiges Amt, 14 December 1940, No. 510/40 g,
Betrifft: Wechsel im Oberkommando der italienischen Armee und Flotte., PA AA Botschaft
Rom (Quirinal) geheim Bd 87 Nr. 510, pp. 1-4; Mackensen, Rome telegram to the Auswrtiges
65
was not judged by the Germans to be at imminent risk yet, the situation
caused marked concern to the Nazi leadership. Hitler was ever conscious
of the need to protect Mussolinis political position at home because he
recognized that it was the Duce alone whose support maintained the German-Italian alliance. Hitler also realized that any German intervention in
Greece had to have some face-saving elements for the Italian leadership.64
On 10 December the German military attach in Rome, Enno von Rintelen,
visited Albania, and Hitler ordered fifty Junkers aircraft to help transport
reinforcements and supplies between Italy and Albania. This gesture of
support was greatly appreciated by the Italians.65 Three days later, in his
Fhrer Directive 20, Hitler justified military intervention in the Balkans as
required to forestall any British attempt to establish airbases in Greece or
a Balkan Front in general. Such developments would pose a constant danger and would require forces stationed in the area placed on permanent
alert. If British airbases were permitted, they would threaten not only Romanian oil but also German lines of communication in the southeast and
across the German-Italian southern flank.66
Back on the Albanian front, even though the military situation had temporarily stabilized, there was still the possibility that Italian resistance
might collapse. This danger was heightened when the Greeks attacked
again in early January 1941, and by the continuing British victories against
Italian troops in Libya. In the New Year, Hitler issued Fhrer Directive 22
foreshadowing the deployment of German troops to Albania and the Middle East to prevent a total Italian military and political collapse. On
11 January von Rintelen visited Albania again and Hitler ordered plans be
Amt, 12 December 1940 Nr. 2280 vom 12. DEZEMBER 1940; and Mackensen, Rome telegram
to the Auswrtiges Amt, 12 December 1940, Nr. 2282 vom 12. DEZEMBER 1940, pp. 1-3: both
in PA AA Botschaft Rom (Quirinal) geheim Bd 97 Nr. 23B; Weinberg, A World at Arms,
p. 214.
64W. Warlimont, Inside Hitlers Headquarters 1939-45, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1964, p. 65. For British awareness of this: entry for 31 December 1940, Eden diary, UBCRL
AP 20/1/20; entry for 4 January 1941, Eden diary, UBCRL AP 20/1/21.
65Pfeiffer, Tirana report to embassy Rome, 12 March 1941, Nr. 171/Pol. 4., PA AA
Botschaft Rom (Quirinal) Geheim Bd. 89; entry for 10 December 1940, Halder, Kriegstagebuch
II, p. 220; Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, p. 226; Golla, Der
Fall Griechenlands 1941, p. 65. Gundelach dates this help from mid-November: Karl
Gundelach, Die deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer 1940-1945 Band 1, Europische Hochschulschriften Reihe III Band 136, Peter d. Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1981, p. 81.
66Directive No. 20, Undertaking Marita, 13 December 1940, Hitlers War Directives,
pp. 90-2; Preliminary history of the Balkan campaign, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal
S.W. List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM67 624/7/2.
66
chapter two
drawn up for the employment of German mountain troops on the Albanian

front. 67
Throughout late 1940 German pressure on Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to
join the Tripartite Pact had continued as abortive German and Greek attempts to find a formula to end the war with Italy without the need for
German intervention failed. By 5 December, with prospects of a diplomatic solution to the Greek problem looking slim, Hitler ordered preparations for the attack on northern GreeceOperation Maritato move
forward. As Directive 20, of 13 December, made clear:
In light of the threatening situation in Albania it is doubly important for us
to frustrate English efforts to establish, behind the protection of a Balkan
front, an air base which would threaten Italy in the first place and, incidentally, the Romanian oil fields ... At the conclusion of undertaking Marita,
the forces envisaged will be withdrawn for new employment.68
Such new employment was of course the invasion of the USSR. When the
order to mount Barbarossa was confirmed on 18 December, concurrent with
Hitlers final abandonment of a hope for a diplomatic solution to the Greek
problem, control of the Balkans and the occupation of northern Greece
were made a primary condition for the operation against the Soviet Union.
Hitler could not allow any potential Allied lodgment in Salonika which might
threaten the advance of Army Group South as it pushed through Galicia
into the Ukraine towards the lower Don. The German attack on Greece was
in this sense and by this stage a precautionary measure.69
From late 1940, in line with directions from OKW, OKH began mobilizing and concentrating formations of the 12th Army, under the command
of Field Marshal Wilhelm List, in western Romania with the full cooperation of the Romanian and Hungarian governments who had signed the
67Directive No. 22 German support for battles in the Mediterranean area, 11 January
1941, Hitlers War Directives, pp. 98-100; Preliminary history of the Balkan campaign,
reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June
1947, AWM67 624/7/2. On 30 January 1941 in his speech on the anniversary of the Machtergreifung, Hitler held out the prospect of military action if British troops landed in the Balkans: Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, p. 264. The attempts
to avoid a German-Greek war continued unsuccessfully until the start of hostilities: Richter,
Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 276-9.
68Directive No. 20, Undertaking Marita, 13 December 1940, Hitlers War Directives,
p. 92. Italics in the original.
69ivojinovi, Yugoslavia, European Neutrals, pp. 229-30; Zacharioudakis, Die deutschgriechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, pp. 258-69, 271-2; MGFA, Germany and the Second World
War Volume III pp. 455, 477; B. Freyberg, Detailed comment upon draft of Mr. Buckleys
popular history of the Greek Campaign, AWM 67, 5/17.
67
Tripartite Pact on 20 and 23 November respectively. From this point operational planning against Greece took more definite form. On 11 December
OKW ordered List to move his army into Romania in three echelons and
be ready, by 25 January 1941, to cross the Danube into Bulgaria. Not more
than 35 days after entering Bulgaria, the 12th Army was to cross the Greek
frontier and occupy Greek Macedonia and Greek Thrace. On 23 January
1941, Bulgaria finally agreed to join the Tripartite Pact and soon after the
Germans began to build bridges across the Danube into Bulgaria, the necessary preliminary to the movement of German troops into the country
from Romania.70
The 12th Armys move into Romania met with many difficulties, mostly
due to the harsh winter. Heavy snow in early January meant that from 4
January rail traffic from Germany was halted. By the end of the month only
two of Lists armoured and two infantry divisions were in place in Romania.
The planned move into Bulgaria on 25 January was impossible. Had this
relatively weak force deployed, it might have attracted British bombing
against Sofia or vital railway bridges. Nor could lead elements advance into
Bulgaria without sufficient forces to defend against Turkey. The preparation
of Bulgarian roads and bridges had not even begun. Finally, the Danube
itself was frozen, and did not appear likely to be crossed until mid-February
at the earliest.71
As a result of such delays Hitler first changed the date of the 12th Armys
crossing of the Danube to 24 February, after new bridges were built. The
Romanian airfields were in such a bad state that Luftwaffes 8th Air Corps,
supporting the 12th Army, could not be ready to even use them before late
February. In addition, supply arrangements for an offensive campaign
against northern Greece could not be completed before March. On 16
70MGFA, Germany and the Second World War Volume III, pp. 457-8; entries for 24 and
28 January 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, pp. 252 and 261 respectively; dispatch from G.
W. Rendel to Eden, 27 March 1941, TNA FO 371/29750, pp. 1- 22; Extracts from 12th Armys
campaign in the Balkans a strategic survey, AWM 67, 5/17; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands
1941, pp. 43-4. On Lists qualifications for the command: L. Hepp, Die 12. Armee im Balkanfeldzug 1941, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 5/2, February 1955, pp. 199-200.
71MGFA, Germany and the Second World War Volume III, p. 466; Meise, Generalmajor,
Pionierfhrer beim Oberrkommando der Truppen des deutschen Heeres in Rumnien, 17
January 1941, Nr. 143/51 g. Kdos. Chefs., Beurteilung des Donauberganges in Rumnien.,
in Hepp, Die 12. Armee im Balkanfeldzug 1941, pp. 213-15, see also p. 200-1; Extracts from
12th Armys campaign in the Balkans a strategic survey, AWM 67, 5/17; Golla, Der Fall
Griechenlands 1941, pp. 55-7.
68
chapter two
February, therefore, List requested the advance into Bulgaria be delayed

until 1 March. Hitler agreed.72
*
As has been noted, Bulgarian acquiescence remained a necessary precondition as the German military planning process for intervention against
Greece unfolded. During this time period, the Soviet Unions continued
pursuit of its claim of a sphere of influence over Bulgaria was a clear threat
to German plans and this contributed to a wavering Hitlers decision to
proceed with the planned attack on the USSR. Historians increasingly see
the decision to mount Barbarossa as not actually being made until after
Hitlers meeting with Molotov in November 1940, and therefore as not
originating as much in ideological motives as once was supposed.73
To the east, Soviet nervousness about British and German intentions
translated into frantic efforts to strengthen its defensive periphery by seeking influence over Bulgaria, control of the Straits of the Bosphorus, and
joint control of the mouth of the Danube with Romania. Attempts by the
British to intensify tensions between Germany and the USSR also played a
role in heightening mutual suspicion. Thus, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Turkey
all faced simultaneous pressure from the Soviet Union as well as Germany.74
On 12 and 13 November the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov visited
Berlin. The resulting negotiations were unsuccessful and put an end to
Ribbentrops hopes of diverting Soviet expansionist goals towards Iran and
India, and thereby averting a German attack against the Soviet Union. Instead, Molotov insisted on Soviet interest in Finland, the Balkans and Turkey, and demanded Germany revoke its guarantee to Romania. Soviet
political conditions for joining the Tripartite Pact included bases in Turkey
and recognition of Bulgaria as part of the Soviet sphere of interest. For his
part, Hitler had been willing to accept the concept of a continental bloc if
the Soviets accepted German influence in the Balkans. He concluded from
the Molotov visit and other developments, however, that German and
72MGFA, Germany and the Second World War Volume III, p. 466; Hepp, Die 12. Armee
im Balkanfeldzug 1941. p. 200; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 66-7.
73The more recent interpretations are put forward by Gorodetsky and Kershaw. Justification can also be found in Tooze, Wages of Destruction, p. 425, though this is not his
overall interpretation. For the more conventional older interpretation see Weinberg,
A World at Arms, pp. 164-5, 198-9, 200-4.
74Telegram from Mr. Campbell (Belgrade), 1 March 1941, No. 328., TNA FO 371/30206;
APPENDIX VIII., Meeting of the President of the Republic with the Secretary of State and
C.I.G.S. 6.30 to 8.20 p.m. February 27th., TNA WO 106/2145, p. 3.
69
Soviet strategic goals were incompatible: the decision to attack the Soviet
Union in the following year was confirmed.75
The results of these great power manoeuvrings in the Balkans became
clear at the beginning of March 1941. On 1 March, the day before Eden and
Dills public return to Athens, Hitler wrote to Turkish President smet nonu
affirming that Germany had no territorial demands on Turkey. The same
day, Bulgaria signed the Tripartite Pact, with a promise from Italy and Germany of an outlet to the Aegean from Greek territory, and German forces
entered Bulgaria a day later. Soviet pressure was an important factor tipping
Bulgarian policy towards Germany. There was no reaction to the Bulgarian
move from Yugoslavia or Turkeya bitter disappointment to the Greek
governmentespecially when Turkey withdrew its previous commitments
to British and Greek representatives at Ankara that a move by the Germans
into Bulgaria would be a cause for war. The Greeks never expected much
from Yugoslavia, but Turkeys passivity was a shock. Three days later, Hitler
met Prince Paul at Berchtesgaden, beginning the process of negotiation
that would lead Yugoslavia to accede to the Tripartite Pact on 25 March.
Meanwhile, Mussolini personally visited Albania in preparation for an
Italian offensive on 9 March designed to achieve victory before German
intervention took effect.76
The movement of 12th Army into Bulgaria began at 6 a.m. on 2 March.
List issued his Order of the Day, 1 March:
The Fhrer calls us to new deeds. This advance means the protection of
Bulgaria; our struggle is with England, if she dares threaten our German soil
from the fringes of the Balkans. I place my faith in the spirit of determination of the veteran formations of the 12th Army and am sure that neither
the rigours of weather nor the difficulties of terrain will halt our victorious
advance.77
75Kershaw, Hitler 1936-45, p. 334; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, pp. 44-7, 49-51, 52, 69-71,
73-6, 85-6, 88, 95; Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, pp. 223-4.
76M. Palairet, Political review of the Year 1941, 28 April 1942, TNA CAB 21/1494; telegram
from Sir M. Palairet (Athens), No. 374., TNA CAB 121/674; telegram from Sir H. KnatchbullHugessen (Angora), No. 520., Following for Secretary of State., TNA CAB 121/674; telegram
to Sir S. Cripps (Moscow), No. 193., TNA CAB 121/674; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, pp. 62-3,
97-102; DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers, pp. 78-9; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp.
259-60. The Yugoslav government gained secret commitments from Germany and Italy
respecting its territorial integrity and exempting it from military commitments: see attachments to letter from Terence Shone, British Embassy, Cairo, to P. Nichols, Foreign Office,
10 July 1941, TNA FO 371/30222, pp. 2-5.
77Quoted in Extracts from 12th Armys campaign in the Balkans a strategic survey,
AWM 67, 5/17. Entry for 2 March 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, p. 298; K. von Tippelskirch,
70
chapter two
Figure 2.4:Italian dictator Benito Mussolini assesses the terrain through a telescope
behind the front lines during Italys campaign against Greece, 1 March 1941. Count Ugo
Cavallero, commander of the Italian forces, is shown at left. (Source: ullstein bild/The
Granger Collection, New York: 0084723)
While Lists statement reflected Nazi propaganda, there was some accuracy in his message to his troops. The decision to create a contested theatre
of military operations in Greece was essentially one made in the UK, with
the Dominion governments following Londons lead. The Germans had
never wished to become entangled in the Balkans. The original German
plan to occupy northern Greece, then the entire Greek mainland, was a
reluctant response to British involvement. Even the Yugoslav coup, which
would seal the fate of that nation and precipitate the final plans of the
protagonists, would not have unfolded as it did without a British presence
and support. Leaving aside the perceived need to guarantee the Italian
position in Albania, the German invasion of Greece and the campaign that
followed in April 1941 was thus largely a consequence of British decisionmaking. When the German invasion began, however, it would not in the
first instance fall upon British and Dominion troops. It would be Greek
forces who would first be in the path of Lists 12th Armyand it is to Greek
plans and preparations that attention now turns.
Der Deutsche Balkanfeldzug 1941, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1955,
p. 52.
albania, the bulgarian frontier & greek defensive schemes
71
Chapter Three
Albania, the Bulgarian frontier & Greek defensive

schemes
In the first week of March 1941 the Greek General Staff was facing a number
of serious problems. First, the war with the Italians in Albania was intensifying, while Greek reserves of men and war material were running thin.
The Italian threat was existential and pressing, it still occupied the attention of the bulk of the Greek Army, and quite understandably still held
centre-stage in the minds of Greek strategic and operational planners. At
the same time, by early March German intentions were becoming increasingly apparent. The danger of a German thrust into Macedonia and Thrace
from Bulgaria was serious, would be difficult to counter, and could not be
ignored. All the while the potential involvement of Yugoslavia, a strategically crucial player with its position not yet decided, continued to complicate Greek planning. None of these three crucial factors could be ignored
or even neglected lest they lead to disaster. Before examining how Greek
planners sought to deal with their manifold problems, however, attention
must be paid to the geography of the country. The widely varied and often
spectacular topography of Greece was central to the coming campaign and
largely determined its course. The challenges it posed, and the opportunities it presented, shaped the planning process on both sides as well as
influencing the conduct of military operations which followed.
Mainland Greece is a mountainous country with less than a third of its
territory consisting of plains. Its high ranges, and the passes which ran
through them, perhaps more than any other physical characteristic, defined
the nature of the Greek campaign. In 1941 Greeces frontiers to the north
were bordered by a spine of peaks passable to vehicles only at limited points.
The southern section of the border between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was
delineated by rugged ranges and the Bulgarian-Greek frontier was divided
by the Rhodope Mountains, with only a few passes and river valleys which
permitted the movement of large military formationsthe two most
significant of which were the Struma and Nestos Rivers.1
1G.E. Blau, Invasion Balkans! The German Campaign in the Balkans, Spring 1941, Burd
Street Press, Shippensburg, 1997, p. 73.
72
chapter three
Below these northeastern ranges, starting from the port of Salonika looking west along the valley of the Axios River, lay a flat and featureless plain
which was seen by commanders on both sides as being ideal country for
rapid armoured movement. Enclosing this plain from the west, and running
in a rough arc, is another line of mountains. Mt Olympus and its foothills
stood in the southeast of this arc, with a narrow coastal strip to its east,
along which ran the Athens-Salonika railway. Moving northwest, the Pieria Mountains (near Servia) were separated from Mt Olympus by the Olympus (Katerini) Pass. Further north, the Servia Pass (through which flowed
the Aliakmon), divided the Pieria range from Vermion ranges. The Vermion
Mountains (running to the immediate west of Veria) then continued as far
north as the Edessa Pass. North of Edessa, looking west, ran the rough
frontier country on the Greek-Yugoslav border. This last range was, however, not continuous. As it ran westwards it was pierced by the Monastir
Gap, a wide valley running from Prilep in the north (in Yugoslavia) to Servia (near the Aliakmon River) in the south. Apart from this wide and inviting valley, the ring of features described formed a formidable natural
barrier. Assuming an attack would be launched only from Bulgarian territory, there were only four substantial routes through it: the coastal pass
east of Olympus thence through Pinios Gorge (the historic Vale of Tempe),
the Olympus, the Veria and the Edessa Passes.2
In addition to these formidable northeastern barriers, further west and
south a number of other alpine and sub-alpine ranges defined the Greek
landscape. In the west the rugged Pindus Mountains stretched from Albania deep into the Greek interior and terminated at the Thermopylae Range.
Further south the almost inaccessible Peloponnese Mountains, separated
from the mainland by the Gulf of Corinth, hampered military operations
and movement in the southern provinces. Some of the mountain ranges
noted proved impassable in some places, even to pack animals. Most, however, possessed difficult but accessible mountain trails which proved hard,
but often not impossible, for small numbers of men and even machines to
traverse. In all these mountainous areas dwellings were few and scattered,
while stones, rocks and low bushes made observation and cross-country
movement difficult.3
2S.F. Rowell, The campaign in Greece, April 1941, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A),
[1-4].
3Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 74; Cruickshank, Greece 194041, p. 142; Golla, Der Fall
73
The valleys between the Greek mountains are deep, often with precipitous sides falling to rocky boulder-strewn watercourses liable to heavy and
immediate flooding during winter and spring rains. Where they were not
so harsh, many valleys were home to villages and cultivated fields, connected to their neighbours by more sheer and rugged passes. Apart from
the Axios River plain noted, flat areas between Athens and the Aliakmon
River to the north are restricted to the plains of Larissa, Trikkala, Lamia
and Thebes. On these plains, which contained most of the countrys arable
and cultivated land, there was very little cover from enemy fire. Such fields,
robbed of their usual workers by the needs of war, were farmed in early
1941 by the old, by women, and by children. Sheep and goats grazed the
pastures which further south gave way to the hills of Attica, covered in
pines.4
In general terms the Greek climate is milder than the northern Balkans.
Snow in Athens is rare, but further north the winter becomes more severe.
The weather in the high country is also often inclement and prone to sudden drops in temperature. In April 1941 the upper mountain slopes were
deep in snow. In the plains of northern Greece, snow seldom lies in the
lowlands, but the frost is sharp. In the mountains, even in the Peloponnese,
snow is common, deep and persistent. March is usually rainy, although in
April the poor weather traditionally tended to trail off. Atmospheric conditions were not considered reliable however, until June.5
Aside from its natural wonders, the built environment in Greece in 1941
played only a slightly lesser role in shaping the battle plans of the combatants. To begin, road communications between Athens and the few other
large towns in Greece were difficult. Throughout the countryside oxen and
pack animals predominated. Well-formed roads, particularly in remoter
country areas, were rare, and in the mountains mules were often the only
means of transportation. Depending on the route chosen, sealed roads
faded only 20 kilometres from Athens. Where the few graded routes crossed
the mountain passes they were narrow, mostly one-way, and not built for
heavy traffic or rain. Roads through the hills wound steeply through defiles
and were challenging for drivers on both sides of the campaign. There was
only one main north-south thoroughfare from Athens to Florina with roads
4The 6th Division in action, G. Long, AWM PR88/72; Playfair, The Mediterranean and
Middle East, pp. 77-8; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 32.
5History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941,
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; draft manuscript Medical History of the War: Greece (19401941), TNA AIR 49/11.
74
chapter three
running off it from Lamia (via Volos) to Larissa, from Elasson to Katerini,
and from Kozani (via Veria) and Florina (via Edessa) to Salonika. There was
also a smaller loop road (via Levadia and Atalandi) to Lamia which avoided the difficult Brallos Pass through the Thermopylae Range on the main
Athens-Lamia road. This long, narrow main north-south route travelled
through a series of wide, fertile valleys, separated by mountain ridges
through which it climbed in steep zigzags. After moving north out of Athens and ascending through well-wooded hills to Thebes, it followed an easy
track through Boeotia then soared to the top of Brallos Pass, next to Thermopylae, from which looking north the plain of Lamia could be seen 600
metres below. The road leading down from Brallos to Lamia was a ledge
jutting from the mountain. At Domokos, north of Lamia, it hurdled another, lower ridge before stretching out to the wide plans of Larissa. North
still of Larissa was another steep climb and descent over the foothills of
Olympus and beyond it the plain where the road ran through Kozani, where
it branchedone going east through Veria Pass to Salonika and the other
continuing north through the Monastir Gap to Yugoslavia.6
While it was a scenic drive, the main Athens-Florina road was by no
means a first-class highway. Its surface was mostly bitumen with stretches
of compounded earth and gravel. It was also too narrow for two vehicles
to pass comfortably, particularly in areas of steep terrain and cuttings. A
number of bridges were single lane, and hairpin bends in the mountains
were dangerous and subject to closure by landslides or snow. Writing after
the campaign, Brigadier S.F. Rowell (of the 1st Australian Corps) thought
it a mystery that, given the state of the Greek roads, we achieved so much
in the way of movement with as little loss, damage or delay from accidents.7
Perhaps the singular strategic advantage of the main road system from an
Allied perspective was that it ran northwest from Larissa via Kozani to
Florina and the Monastir Gapto the rear of the likely British positions
which could thus be supplied by eastwards branching side roads. Much
further to the west the Greek road system was similarly limited.8
The under-developed Greek road system was not prepared to cope with
large-scale military traffic, yet unlike the Greek Army, both the German
12th Army (at least in its spearhead units), and the Imperial troops of
6McClymont, To Greece, pp. 152-3; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 29; Golla, Der Fall
[1-4].
8McClymont, To Greece, p. 152.
75
W Force for that matter, had few carts or mulesthey were tied to the
roads. Compounding such difficulties, snow falling at low altitudes regularly blew though the same passes through which such primitive roads ran.
Heavy and frequent rain in March and early April 1941 made the roads and
surrounding areas slippery and muddymaking on-road movement difficult and off-road driving next to impossible. Sunshine on wet roads produced very sticky clay which dramatically reduced movement without
wheel chains. The Greeks, therefore, relied heavily on the coastal belts for
military communication. Before the German invasion casualties from
Yannina, for example, were transported to Athens by sea rather than by
road. This was not, of course, going to be an option if and when hostilities
with Germany began.9
In 1941 Greeces railway system was no more developed than its road
network. Only one railway ran from Athens to Salonika. This single standardgauge line more or less followed the course of the main north-south road
to Larissa, where it turned northeast through the narrow pass between Mt
Olympus and the sea, across the Aliakmon River. A smaller gauge side
branch linked to Volos, the only substantial port between Athens and Salonika. North of the Aliakmon the line branched east to Salonika and west
climbing first through the Edessa Pass, through the valley of Florina, and
from there into Yugoslavia. A second rail line ran from Salonika to Yugoslavia through the Doiran Gap. It was through this line, dangerously close to
the Bulgarian frontier, that Greek troops in Thrace were supplied by rail
from Athens. The important point here is that this limited railway system
was already operating at its maximum capacity supporting the Greek Army,
before any British or Dominion troops arrived in Greece. The pressure
placed on this rail system, like the restricted road network, would invariably
and dramatically increase once the fighting began. It was also exposed and
vulnerable, especially so close to the Albanian front, whose rail supply line
ran north of the Vermion ranges. If fighting broke out in northeastern Macedonia, for example, then it was potentially within German capabilities to
render the railway line from Katerini to Edessa unusable, if not by direct
ground attack then certainly by air interdiction. If this was the case, the
Greek positions in Albania would have to be supplied from road from
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; draft manuscript Medical History of the War: Greece (19401941), TNA AIR 49/11; UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm
3618]; McClymont, To Greece, p. 152; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 29.
76
chapter three
Larissa through Kozani to Florinaassuming these areas were themselves

not under threat. Again, this was not a well-developed or even two-way
road. It was a steep, dangerous and vulnerable artery; and the Greeks were
already short of trucks.10
Regardless of the final form of Greek, Allied or Axis military plans, the
restricted road and rail networks would of necessity become vital logistic
lifelines for both sides, and therefore key operational considerations. The
only other possible way by which battling armies might be sustained in the
northern sections of the country was by sea. The issue here, however, was
the state of the Greek ports. Although affecting Allied planning considerations far more than German schemes, these portsor the lack of them
nonetheless played an important role in shaping military plans as they
evolved north, as well as south of the Greek-Bulgarian border. On the one
hand the main W Force port was always going to be Piraeus, near Athens,
with Volos the secondary option. The port of Volos, however, was a lowcapacity facility and British planners realised full well and at an early stage
that they would be reliant on Piraeus. The only other port option was Salonika, a tempting target for German planners and far too close to the Greek
frontier and the likely path of any 12th Army attack for W Force commanders to make long-term plans for its use. The Greeks, however, had few alternatives with around a third of the Greek Army in Albania supplied from
Athens by sea to Salonika, and thence along exposed and vulnerable land
routes from Salonika to Florina. The important difficulty for high level
British and Greek headquarters staff, however, was that the distance from
the inevitable disembarkation point for British-Dominions men and material at Piraeus and the advanced logistics bases inevitably required further
north would be close to 320 kilometresusing the vulnerable single-line
railway and fair-weather roads described.11
The key elements of topography and infrastructure shaped the military
planning process of all combatants. In addition, Greek defensive schemes,
10G.S. Brunskill, The Administrative Aspect of the Campaign in Greece in 1941, October 1949, AWM 113, 5/2/5; G. Long, The 6th Division in action, AWM PR88/72; History of
the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/139; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 29; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East,
pp. 77-8.
11G.S. Brunskill, The Administrative Aspect of the Campaign in Greece in 1941, October 1949, AWM 113, 5/2/5; UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4;
History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ
ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; British Narrative, The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ
ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618].
77
as they evolved throughout March and early April 1941, faced further specific constraints. In line with the basic agreements reached at the AngloGreek meetings of 2-4 March, the first element of Papagos overall plan for
the coming campaign was to maintain the bulk of the Greek Army, 14 of 20
available divisions, in Albania to continue the fight with the Italians. Occupying the left of a line running approximately northeast to southwest
from Lake Ochrida near the Yugoslavian border to Himara on the Adriatic
coast was the Epirus Field Army Section (EFAS) with its headquarters based
at Yannina, under the command of Lieutenant General Ioannis Pitsikas.
On the right of the line in Albania was the Western Macedonian Field Army
Section (WMFAS), under Lieutenant General Georgios Tsolakoglou, with
its headquarters at Kastoria. Pitsikas command was split into two separate
corps. The 1st Corps was composed of the 2nd, 3rd and 8th Greek Divisions
(with a combined total of three light infantry and eight standard infantry
regiments), and a single horsed cavalry regiment. Pitsikas 2nd Corps consisted of the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 11th, 15th and 17th Greek Divisions (a total of
21 infantry regiments). For its part Tsolakoglous force contained the 9th,
10th, 13th, 16th, Greek Divisions (each of three infantry regiments), the
Greek Cavalry Division (of two cavalry regiments) and the independent
21st Brigade (an infantry regiment and an independent battalion). Although
originally divided up into the 3rd and the 5th Corps, from the end of March
these intermediate formations were disbanded and Tsolakoglou commanded the WMFAS divisions directly.12
Despite the obvious and ever-growing German threat to Macedonia and
Thrace from Bulgaria during March, and beyond the practical, logistical
and operational risks involved if he had decided to move them (especially
if this move was in progress when the German attack began), there was
sound strategic logic in Papagos decision to hold the EFAS and WMFAS in
Albaniaeven if it did not suit the plans, hopes and operational conceptions of his British counterparts in Greece. The key point was that the bulk
of the Greek Army was already fully engaged against the Italians in Albania.
Operational reality meant that such troops could not easily be withdrawn.
In early March the threat of continuing Italian attacks was still very real. It
had, in the last month, required the Greek General Staff to draw reinforcements from Macedonia and western Thrace continuallyjust as the
12Telegram, British Military Mission to Wavell, TNA WO 106/2446; W.E. Murphy (NZ
War History Branch), Comments on Buckleys popular history of the Greek campaign,
January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17.
78
chapter three
German air force stepped up its systematic aerial reconnaissance over

northern Greece. Such reinforcements could not hope to redeployed back
east with any haste.
Nor did the Italians do anything to encourage Papagos to change his
mind about the need to hold troops in Albania. Rather, heavy Italian counter-attacks north of Tepelene began, without preparatory artillery barrages,
on 10 March and were pressed hard for the next six days. Mussolini himself
visited this sector of the Albanian line and, with German observers present,
the Italian command placed great store on the Tepelene push. The assault
itself was launched on a 32-kilometre front between Mt Tomor and Vijose
River in the central sector of the Albanian front. Accompanied by an operational feint against the northern sector near Pogradets, the main attack
was the fiercest and most determined yet conducted by the Italians in this
theatre. In total, the Italian offensive threw 12 divisions and detached independent Blackshirt and metropolitan battalions against a Greek sector
which was held by half that number. A large proportion of this attacking
force had been reorganised from fresh drafts from Italy, and the offensive
made use of two fresh recently arrived Italian divisions. Between 14 and 15
March the Greeks were very hard pressed to hold the important line between Bubes and the southern slopes of the Trbshinji ridgeline, and for
a time the situation was considered by the Greek General Staff to be extremely critical. The difficulty of the terrain in this area and a lack of available animal or mechanical transport meant that if pressed to retire even
as little as 5-6 kilometres the Greeks would have been forced to leave behind
two-thirds of their artillery in this sector. Had the line broken the Italians
would have driven a wedge between EFAS and WMFAS which would have
been difficult, if not impossible, to recover. In the end the Tepelene offensive was successfully repulsed by the Greeks, with heavy Italian casualties,
without the loss of much ground. Out of twelve that had participated in
the offensive, two Italian divisions were subsequently withdrawn from the
line with unknown, but certainly significant, casualties. Greek sources concluded that two more were left below half strength.13
Despite the fact that the Greeks held off the Italian Tepelene push, from
mid-March it was clear to Papagos that there were simply not enough Greek
troops available to hold against both the Italians and a potential German
thrust on the Bulgarian front. There were, perhaps, sufficient to hold in
Albania alonebut that was all. In fact, so hard pressed were Pitsikas and
13Papagos, Battle of Greece, pp. 303-7.
79
Figure 3.1:Greek troops engaging an Italian position in Albania in early 1941 (Source:
Australian War Memorial: 007077)
Tsolakoglou at this time that Papagos decided not to launch any further
large-scale operations in Albania without Yugoslav assistance. Only local
attacks designed to improve the tactical line, and to maintain morale, would
henceforth be authorised. The obvious conclusion was that if the Bulgarian front was strengthened at the expense of Albania (thus reversing the
ongoing flow of reinforcements), then neither line would have been able
to offer an effective resistance. In addition, Papagos reasoned that when
the German attack came it would inevitably be timed with the Italians to
press both fronts at once. Was it not better then to hold a single front, where
fighting was ongoing, than lose both? In addition, in the wake of the Tepelene offensive, Papagos and his staff were increasingly fearful of the state
of mind of Greek soldiers in Albania. The Greek Commander-in-Chief had
long fretted over the potentially negative effects on morale and cohesion
of a withdrawal in Albania. Now, as the German intentions became increasingly obvious, even British observers began to note that a proportion of
soldiers in the WMFAS, in particular, were beginning to show signs of serious misgivings regarding the impending attack. This was especially so for
troops from the north where the evacuation of some towns was already
80
chapter three
under way. Now was not the time to place the burden of a withdrawal upon
their shoulders. The Greek High Command therefore decided that, in event
of German invasion, priority of effort should remain in Albania. This would
prop up the left flank at least with the chance that the British (hopefully
with Yugoslav help) could hold on the Bulgarian front. In addition, if Yugoslavia entered on the Greek side it might even be possible to make a
combined attack in Albania to clear out Italian troops, thereby opening
the realistic option of transferring troops east.14
Greek strategic plans throughout March were thus, at their heart, contingent upon Yugoslav action, particularly a strong defence of southern
Serbia (with the less likely hope of Turkish involvement in Thrace). Some
high-level British commanders outside Greece similarly recognized the
pivotal role of Yugoslavia, which could be either a strong or weak spot in
the Allied operational plans. The British Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Robert Haining, for example, noted that
so important would be the entry of Yugoslavia into the war that it would
be worth running considerable risks in Macedonia if we could thereby
ensure the Yugoslavs joining us.15 Only by concentrating in the south could
the Yugoslavs hope to hold a potential German southwestern thrust from
Bulgaria. The consequent abandonment of such a large portion of their
national territory in the north was, however, never likely to be an acceptable
option to the Yugoslav government and High Command. It was far more
likely that the Yugoslavs would attempt to defend on all frontiers and hold
all sovereign territory. Such a decision would in many ways settle the outcome of the coming campaign before it began. It would result in a Yugoslav
dispersal of effort and guarantee weakness in the south, which would
likely seal the fate of both Yugoslavia and Greece.
Even prior to the Italian Tepelene push, Papagos conveyed this fear to
Lieutenant Colonel Peresi, of the Yugoslav General Staff, who arrived under cover in Athens on 8 March to conduct secret meetings with Papagos
and senior British commanders. Up to this point the Yugoslavs had been
reluctant to make military arrangements with the British or the Greeks
but given the continuing German build-up in Bulgaria, it seemed Belgrade
was re-considering its options. Peresi was specifically sent to ask about
what type of assistance could be given in the event of Yugoslavia opposing
14Bitzes, Hellas and the War, p. 219; A. Papagos, The German Attack on Greece, Greek
Office of Information, London, 1946, pp. 5-6; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 70.
15Comments on General Heywoods telegram, 21 March 1941, TNA CAB 120/564.
81
the Axis. He was told, rather cryptically, that his country would of course
receive all the help that was availableavailable being the operative word.
Given the enduring hope for Yugoslav involvement on the part of the Allies,
details of exactly what this help might (or might not) amount to were assiduously avoided. Nor, for its part was Peresis brief fact-finding mission
in any way authorised or interested in making any detailed military plans
for cooperation with the Greeks or W Force when the German invasion of
Greece, or Greece and Yugoslavia, materialised. Peresi did, however, on
behalf of his political and military superiors, again emphasize the vital
importance of Salonika as a port of resupply for any potential Yugoslav
military operations. This message reinforced the existing Greek desire and
intention to defend northern Thrace. The argument did little to impress
most British operational commanders in Greece who were ever-hopeful of
a Greek withdrawal in Thrace to form a more southern and more defensible line and who were, perhaps, somewhat more appreciative of the vulnerability of Salonika from the air, regardless of whether or not it was
assaulted by the Germans on the ground. Shipping could never clear it and
get out of range of German aircraft from Bulgaria, even if operating during
the night. Irrespective of the fortunes of any ground war in northern Macedonia or Thrace, in truth Salonika could expect to be devastated at any time
the Luftwaffe chose. In any case, Peresis flying visit provided little but
frustration on both sides. He departed the following day.16
One important aspect of the Italian Tepelene offensive of early March
masked to some degree by the fact that it was defeatedwas what it revealed of the condition of the Greek Army. The British assessed that the
Greeks lost some 5000 casualties during the Italian pushand Papagos
had far fewer manpower reserves than Mussolini. British intelligence also
estimated that at this time Greeks had between 200,000-300,000 reservists,
but critically this partially-trained mass, which included three years of
reserve cohorts, could not be mobilized due to chronic shortages of arms
and equipment.17 After the conclusion of the Tepelene push, the Greek
Army had a single months supply of 105mm, 85mm and 155mm artillery
16M. Palairet, Political review of the Year 1941, 28 April 1942, TNA CAB 21/1494; UK
War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative The Campaign
in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; Wilson, Eight Years
Overseas, pp. 70-1, 75.
17The Greek Army up to 1941, 28 March 1945, TNA WO 167/3187; Situation in Albania,
British Military Mission to Wavell, 17 March 1941, TNA WO 169/2146; Notes of Conversation
between Colonel Cotoleon (Greek Army) and Captain L.E.D. OToole, M.I.3(b), 18 March
1941, TNA WO 169/2146.
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chapter three
ammunition left. Even before the Italian offensive was launched, on 7 March
the British Military Mission had already relayed a desperate Greek request
to London for 5 million 75mm, 200,000 105mm, 120,000 85mm, 120,000
125mm, and 75,000 155mm shells. This was not to mention additional pleas
for 30 million rounds of 6.5mm and 11.5 million rounds of 7.92mm small
arms ammunition. Less than a month earlier the British had already supplied some 120 anti-tank rifles (with ammunition), 3,500 Vickers machine
guns, 1000 Hotchkiss light machine guns, 50 2-inch mortars, 100 3-inch
mortars, 200,000 hand grenades, and 40 million rounds of 7.92mm ammunition. The British were also yet to fill a mid-January Greek request for
300,000 uniforms and shoes.18 The Greek Army in Albania had been bleeding supplies since October 1940supplies that could not be replaced locally and which exceeded British capacity to import. Despite denuding the
defences of eastern Macedonia and Thrace, which had been left by late
February with only around 100 artillery pieces, the Greeks were fast approaching the end of their logistic tether. Greek soldiers, already exhausted and continuously in the line for an extended period with no rotation
for rest and refit, were running short of the tools needed to continue to
resist. This fragile state of affairs only encouraged Papagos reluctance to
withdraw the EFAS and WMFAS, in combat, against an Italian adversary
with far deeper reserves of men and material in Albania. Again, this was a
fact never fully appreciated by W Force plannersdespite the British
Military Missions intimate involvement with, and observation of, the Albanian situation (and claims to have made such information available to
Wilsons staff).19
Moving from Albania in the northwest, the second basis of overall Greek
defensive planning in March 1941 was to hold out as long as practical or
possible against any German push directly from Bulgaria along the DoiranNestos Line. This was a defensive string of fortifications extending almost
18British Foreign Office representatives later complained that the Military Mission
have all along been a most unsatisfactory body from the supplies point of view and their
inefficiency has seriously handicapped us in our efforts to meet Greek needs. Their complete
inability to give correct specifications has been the cause of much delay. Minute, Assistance
for Greece, 13 April 1941, TNA FO371/28815.
19Telegram, British Military Mission to War Office, 22 March 1941, TNA WO 169/2146;
telegram, British Military Mission to Wavell, 17 January 1941, TNA WO 193/551; telegram,
War Office to British Military, 5 February 1941, TNA WO 193/551; telegram, British Military
Mission to War Office, 11 February 1941, TNA WO 193/551; telegram, British Military Mission
to War Office, 7 March 1941, TNA WO 193/551; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 80; Higham,
The Myth of the Defence of Northern Greece, October 1940 April 1941, p. 140.
83
170 kilometres along the southeastern Yugoslavian and Bulgarian frontiers.

It ran basically from where the Axios River cut the Greek/Yugoslav border,
all the way east to the Turkish border. At the western tip of this line the
Axios flows south into Greece between the mountainous areas of Voras to
the west and Beles to the east. The Axios valley, as it crosses the Greek
frontier, widens continually moving north to south and makes a natural
corridor of invasion from southeastern Yugoslavia. Further east along the
Doiran-Nestos Line, the Struma River cuts the mountainous border area
between Greece and Bulgaria at the Rupel Pass before flowing south through
the plains of Serres and Nigrits and emptying into the Aegean. This pass
and valley constituted another natural axis of advance for an invader entering Greece, this time from Bulgaria. Its many defiles, however, made it more
difficult than the Axios valley. Further east still the Nestos River valley was
naturally unsuitable as an avenue of invasion due to the rivers constriction
between near vertical mountains and its southeasterly rather than southern
course. The Nestos was thus better described as a natural defensive obstacle.20
Prior to the war the Greeks had constructed a series of fortifications
along most of the Doiran-Nestos Line. These defensive works, often referred
to as the Metaxas Line, were not continuous. There were two areas completely devoid of fortsfrom the Axios River to Lake Kerkini on the western flank, and east from the Nestos River extending to the Turkish border.
The Doiran-Nestos Line was built from 1936-40 as a defence specifically
against Bulgaria, not Yugoslavia. Its original purpose was, in the event of
war with Bulgaria, to cover Greek mobilisation and concentration in the
area to its immediate south. It would then form a base from which to launch
offensive operations. The Doiran-Nestos Line consisted of 21 permanent
forts, mostly sited to block mountain passes. Each of these forts was supposed to be manned by around 10,000 Greek soldiers and each had a main
defensive area comprising of one or more self-contained strong points
designed to defend from attack in any direction. Each strong point contained gun and machine-gun emplacements, pill-boxes, observation posts
and communications stations, and exits for resupply and counter-attack.
All the forts also contained underground quarters, supplies for 15 days
without relief, command posts, dressing stations, sanitary installations,
kitchens, water supplies, and other facilities. In the larger forts ventilation
and lighting were provided by electricity stations. The smaller ones used
20An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 175.
84
chapter three
manually operated fans and oil lamps. Between the forts of this Greek
Maginot Line and the Bulgarian border to its immediate north, hasty field
fortifications were also erected throughout March to delay any German
advance. This included passive anti-tank obstacles, active (manned) antitank positions, and a comprehensive demolition plan to disrupt German
movement by denying them the use of bridges, roads and even formed
tracks.21
The Doiran-Nestos Line was manned by the Eastern Macedonian Field
Army Section (EMFAS) under Lieutenant General Konstantinos Bakopoulos, who chose to divide his command into a Divisions Group placed on
the more vulnerable left flank, an independent division in the centre, and
two independent brigades on his right of his line. The area occupied by the
Divisions Group, commanded by Lieutenant General Panagiotis Dedes,
had on its left the 18th Greek Division (Major General Leonidas Stergiopoulos) stretched from the area of Beles to the Struma River. In order to
cover this 40-kilometre front, which included five forts, Stergiopoulos divided his defensive area into three sectors, from left to rightthe Rodopolis Sector, the Roupesko Sector and the Thylakas Sector. The Rodopolis
Sector on the divisions left had no forts, while the Roupesko Sector in the
centre contained Fort Popotlivitsa held by the 70th Greek Regiment. The
Thylakas Sector on the 18th Greek Divisions right, which contained Forts
Istibei, Kelkayia, Arpalouki and Paleouriones, was held by the 91st Greek
Regiment. Moving east, the 14th Greek Division, under Major General Konstantinos Papakonstantinou, occupied a line from the east bank of Struma
River to the western approaches to the Kato Nevrokopi plateau. In order
to cover his 80 kilometres of front Papakonstantinou also divided his divisional area into sectors. To the west was the Sidirokastro Sector, held by the
41st Greek Regiment and troops of forts Rupel, Karatas, and Kali. To its right
was the Karadag Sector held by the 73rd Greek Regiment and Forts Persek,
Babazora, Maliaga, Perithori and Partalouska. The Divisions Group reserve
consisted of a battalion from the 81st Greek Regiment.22
Extending the Doiran-Nestos Line west from the positions held by Lieutenant General Dedes corps-sized formation was the 7th Greek Division,
under the command of Major General Christos Zoiopoulos. The 10
battalions this division were deployed across an 85-kilometre front from
Libahovo in the west to Mt Kouslar in the east. On the left of Zoiopoulos
21Ibid., p. 176.
22Ibid., p. 183.
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Wire and obstacles
85
Figure 3.2:A schematic representation of Fort Istibei in the Thylakas Sector
divisional line was the Falakro Sector, manned by the 26th Greek Regiment
and the troops of Forts Lisse, Pyramidoeides, Dasavli, Kastillo, Agios Nikolaos and Bartiseva. The Touloubar Sector in the middle of the 7th Greek
Division position held no forts and was defended by the 92nd Greek Regiment. Similarly, Zoiopoulos eastern Paranesti Sector also held no forts and
was guarded by the 71st Greek Regiment.
The eastern portion of the Doiran-Nestos Line was held by the Nestos
Brigade, commanded by Colonel Anastasias Kalis, and the Evros Brigade
under Major General Ioannis Zissis. The battalions of the Nestos Brigade
were deployed from its boundary with 7th Greek Division in the east at the
86
chapter three
village of Pashalia, around 90 kilometres west to its boundary with the

Evros Brigade. This area also held Fort Echinos. The thin Evros Brigade,
covering the rest of Thrace, held Fort Nimphaea and provided screening
forces further forward.
Supporting the troops of EMFAS in the Doiran-Nestos Line (from 27
March) was the 19th Greek Motorised Division, commanded by Major General Nikolaos Liubas, stationed in the Kilkis area. The divisions 191st Greek
Regiment was deployed in the vicinity of Sidirokastro at the disposal of the
Divisions Group. To the northeast of Kilkis, in the Krousia area, was a
motorised detachment under the command of the 81st Greek Regiment
(consisting of infantry battalion and cavalry regiment). A reinforced infantry battalion from 19th Greek Motorised Division was also deployed in the
Salonika area to defend against any German parachute attack.23
The natural defensive potential of the Doiran-Nestos Line was considerable and in many ways its strength rested as much on the inaccessibility of
the rugged countryside leading up to the defensive positions as on the
fortifications themselves. Nonetheless, the Greek defences had been skilfully adapted to the terrain and the defensive system well-covered the few
tracks and trails leading south from Bulgaria. The points where the Struma
and Nestos rivers cut the mountain range along the border were particularly well defended. The Greeks used rivers as vehicle obstacles and placed
tank-traps where rivers were considered passable. At various small and
large defiles throughout the line concrete casements and fieldworks had
been built to cover crossing points, and bridges were prepared for demolition. Greek artillery was sited on reverse slopes to the rear of the line with
adequate tracks prepared for ammunition re-supply. Moreover, neither
German nor Bulgarian intelligence ever truly comprehended the defensive
capability of the Doiran-Nestos Line. When it was eventually tested, the
shape, armament and design of forts were a complete and unwelcome
surprise.24
At the same time, the Doiran-Nestos Line was not without its weaknesses. First and foremost, the ongoing commitment to the Albanian front
meant that Bakopoulos three infantry divisions and attachments were all
severely under-strength. His line thus held an insufficient number of
23Ibid., pp. 183-4.
24Nestos Line, March 1941, TNA CAB 120/564; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian
and Greek-German War, p. 176; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 74; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands
1941, pp. 95-104.
87
troopsparticularly to cover the flanks of the forts or to conduct counterattacks. With its headquarters in Salonika, the EMFAS had an establishment
strength of around 32 battalions. In late March the 18th Greek Division, for
example, physically fielded sufficient troops for only five full battalions
rather than its paper strength of nine, and a paltry three-and-a-half artillery
batteries. The independent Evros and Nestos Brigades had no artillery at
all. Including fortress and garrison troops total strength of the EMFAS on
Bulgarian border was 70,000 mostly older reservists or troops freshly called
up. The line of forts was designed to hold closer to 200,000. In this context
it could only be described as a small force, extended over an impossibly
long front.25 In practice, the shortage of troops within the EMFAS meant
that while the forts were adequately manned, the intervals between them
were very thinly held, with no reserves. Senior British officers, like senior
Greek commanders within the EMFAS, understood the basic inability of
Bakopoulos immobile force to fight a delaying withdrawal if the DoiranNestos Line was breached. They expected, on account of the dearth of
available Greek troops, that the Germans were likely to penetrate between
the forts, yet the defenders would have to stay in place. It was primarily for
this reason that British planners gave the Doiran-Nestos Line no chance of
standing once the German onslaught fell upon it.
In addition, along with its manpower shortages, and despite Bakopoulos
concentration of the Divisions Group on this flank, the lightly defended
western edge of the line remained a key vulnerability. It was a natural salient
at the junction of Greece/Bulgaria/Yugoslavia. While positions near Drama
and the Rupel Gap had their concrete works completed, those west of Beles
Mountain were in the least developed state. To hold this area would require
a large mobile reserve near Lake Doiran, but the scattered units of 19th
Greek Motorised Division in this area were far from constituting such a
force. Major General Heywood visited the line on 19 March and correctly
identified this weak spot as the Beles area west of Rupel Pass, from the
Strumica River Valley to the top of the border ranges. If the Germans drove
through the Strumica Valley (a tributary of the Struma), west of Petrich,
the left of the line would be turnedand as it happened the Bulgarians,
25The isolated position of the Evros Brigade in Thrace, east of the Doiran-Nestos Line,
had already denuded it of all troops apart from those stationed in its two fortresses. The
brigade had no hope of reinforcement. Comments on General Heywoods telegram,
21 March 1941, TNA CAB 120/564; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German
War, p. 176; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 78; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East,
p. 76; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 39.
88
chapter three
not coincidentally, had already been clearing tracks in this area. If Bakopoulos did not have enough problems, the EMFAS also faced severe deficiencies in anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, as most had been sent to
Albania, yet the Doiran-Nestos Line could expect the full weight of the
Luftwaffe and German armour concentrated in Bulgaria to be thrown
against it.
There were some rather tentative Greek plans developed should the
EMFAS line be brokenbased more on wishful thinking than military
practicality. The idea was that if compromised, or exhausted, the force
could withdraw either in the direction of Salonika or towards Kavalla and
then to redeploy by sea. Exactly where the transportation, by land and sea,
for such manoeuvres would come from was never specified. In this scenario the 81st Greek Regiment/19 Greek Motorised Division Krousia detachment was to protect its area and block any German penetration towards
Salonika, while the Evros brigade would protect a beachhead of Pythio but
withdraw into Turkey (assuming Turkish consent) if it was unable to hold.
Such plans were, at best, speculative.26
What might be said then in summary about the evolution of Greek defensive planning and strategic/operational thinking in March and early
April 1941? Traditional English-language narratives of the Greek campaign
are reasonably consistent in this regard. The dominant interpretation is
that it was a grave mistake for Papagos to insist, with almost dogmatic resolve, not to withdraw from Albania, and in keeping the EMFAS forward in
the Doiran-Nestos Line. It would have made much more military sense,
so the story goes, to withdraw south to reinforce the proposed British line
in the vicinity of the Aliakmon and perhaps even extend it across the Greek
peninsula to the Adriatic. There were certainly a sound set of military considerations, from a British perspective, that might make such Greek withdrawals and re-deployments an attractive operational option.
Papagos was not, however, an operational commander. Rather his focus
was on the strategic level of war. Given the balance of forces arrayed against
it, Greece could not be saved by clever operational positioning. Its only
slender hope lay with a wider political-military strategy that might even
the oddshowever marginallyand this meant full-blown Yugoslav mil26Telegram, Heywood to Wavell, TNA CAB 120/564; Comments on General Heywoods
telegram, 21 March 1941, TNA CAB 120/564; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and
Greek-German War, p. 185; McClymont, To Greece, p. 152; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas,
p. 67.
albania, the bulgarian frontier & greek defensive schemes 89

itary involvement on the Allied side. Yugoslavia was the key. Due to the
perceived importance in Belgrade of holding Salonika as a potential logistic lifeline, Yugoslavia kept the Greeks in the Doiran-Nestos Line. Yugoslavia offered the potential for helping W Force hold the Germans in the east.
Yugoslavia might help end the war in Albania. The smallest chance of enticing Yugoslavia into the coming conflict effectively locked Papagos into the
deployments he chose. This was not a mistake, nor the product of stubbornness or pride. This was Greeces best and perhaps only hope. As the
British Military Mission tried to make clear to W Force headquarters, the
vast possibilities offered in Albania should explain the reluctance of Papagos prematurely to withdraw.27 It is worth quoting the July 1941 British
inter-service committee report on the campaign in Greece, a report that
was severely criticized by senior British and dominion officers in Greece.
According to that committee, as long as the faintest hope of holding the
Doiran-Nestos Line, or achieving victory in Albania (thus freeing up Greek
forces to face the Germans) remained, then it was considered that General Papagos was justified in his great but unhappy gamble.28 Few commanders, noted the report, can have been faced with a greater dilemma
than was General Papagos.29
Lieutenant General Wilson later criticized Papagos for his unwavering
concentration on the potential of Yugoslav assistance which required
forward defence, especially of Salonika. It seemed to him that this consideration had priority over any British offer or calculation, like a motif running through an opera.30 This then was a key cause of Greek/British friction
and the strategical gymnastics in the planning process that followed. The
point here that Wilson did not acknowledge was that Papagos was right in
his focus. Northern Greece could never be held without Yugoslav assistance,
and most assuredly not if Yugoslavia joined the Axis. Belgrade would never help if the Doiran-Nestos Line, and thus Salonika, was abandoned.
Papagos desire to defend forward and protect Salonika was the logical
result. If this hope came to fruition, Yugoslav involvement in Albania might
remove the Italian threat and make reinforcement of the Bulgarian front
a real, rather than imagined, possibility. Major General Bernard Freyberg,
in command of New Zealand troops in Greece, was one of the few after the
28Report, Inter-services committee on the campaign in Greece, July 1941, TNA WO
106/3161.
29Ibid.
30Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 73.
90
chapter three
campaign to recognise the reasoning behind what was at the time perceived
by the British as foolish Greek obstinacy. The more I read of the Greek C.
in C., he wrote, the more I admire his wisdom.31
It is also true, however, that as strategically correct as Papagos decision
to hold Greek forces in Albania and on the Doiran-Nestos Line might have
been, the net result, should the Yugoslavs not join the Allies (or provide
significantly less military capability than Papagos hoped if they did choose
to fight the Germans), would be a very weak Allied operational position.
Holding on in Albania and on the Bulgarian frontier, if forced to fight without effective Yugoslav assistance, would leave Greek troops dangerously
exposed on both fronts. In Albania Pitsikas and Tsolakoglou commanded
exhausted and depleted formations, running chronically short of military
supplies. Many of their troops kept one eye on the Italians to their north
and another on their homes to the east. In the Doiran-Nestos Line Bakopoulos knew, despite the difficult terrain which worked in his favour, that
he faced the type of pending German air and armoured onslaught that had
so recently brought the Poles and the French to their knees. He faced this
prospect without sufficient anti-air or anti-armoured defences and with
around 35 per cent of the troops that his fortifications were designed to
hold. As some of the last units called up, his men were also among the least
well-trained, experienced, and equipped of all Greek formations. He had
an exposed left flank, no way to repel any German infiltration, and no real
withdrawal options. Both he and Papagos knew all this.
In the final analysis, however, weak though Papagos deployments in
Albania and on the Bulgarian frontier might have been, and as contingent
on effective Yugoslav cooperation as his plans were, they represented the
best of an almost impossible strategic situation. From a Greek perspective
there was simply no other option. How well such calculations meshed with
those of his British allies, and indeed how the Germans planned to overcome
any obstacles either the Greeks or W Force placed in their way, however,
were entirely different questions.
31B. Freyberg, Detailed comment upon draft of Mr. Buckleys popular history of the
Greek Campaign, AWM 67, 5/17. UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ
W3799/4; British Narrative The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2
[Microfilm 3618]; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 69.
german and british planning in early march 1941
91
Chapter Four
The die is cast: German and British planning in early

March 1941
In early March, while the Greeks combined ongoing operations in Albania
against the Italians with preparing the Doiran-Nestos Line, the newcomers
to the theatre, both German and British, were on the move. As the German
12th Army pushed south from Romania into Bulgaria and towards the Greek
frontier, British and Dominion troops began to arrive at the port of Piraeus,
Athens, in a series of naval convoys from Egypt. In the first half of the month
such movements were accompanied on both sides by the rapid development of operational plans. In many ways, because of the much greater need
for coordination and cooperation between the Greek and Imperial forces,
the evolution of Allied preparations to counter the looming German invasion in this period were even more complex and than those of their adversariesand yet at the same time Field Marshal Lists army was beset with
its own set of problems. The period was a particularly hectic period for
both sides. It was also a crucial phase insofar as the decisions made and
plans set in train in this period shaped the course and conduct of what
followed.
With German plans for military action against Greece crystallising up
to February 1941, the first practical operational step had was to move the
12th Army through Bulgaria up to the Greek border. As noted in Chapter 2,
a number of German air bases had already been constructed in semi-secret
in Bulgaria by Luftwaffe ground staff dressed as civilians. The move of such
a large force, however, proved a much more difficult proposition. Two earlier separate German reconnaissance missions into Bulgaria in November
and December 1940 confirmed the difficulty in marching through the country before spring, given the winter weather and the state of the roads.
As ordered by OKW, the 12th Army then began to cross into Bulgaria on
2 March with instructions to occupy various assembly areas in the southwest
part of the country, near the Greek frontier. Even without enemy air interdiction, however, this approach march of up to 640 kilometres was not
without considerable problems which included the worst possible roads,
terrible weather, poor accommodation, traversing mountain passes still
92
chapter four
choked with snow, and the fact that only one reliable rail line was available
to support the 12th Armys advance. According to List such conditions
highly taxed the strength of both commanding officers and men.1 German
horse-drawn columns, in particular, were badly broken up and only successful eventually due to Bulgarian oxen placed at the 12th Armys disposal along a string of relay stations. This system allowed the steepest
gradients to be overcome without the loss of too many horses. In the end
such measures, a strong force of military police for traffic control, the Bulgarian Labour Service, the active cooperation of Bulgarian officials and the
very friendly spirit of the Bulgarian population, helped ensure a successful
German transit.2 Even once assembled in southern Bulgaria, however, poor
local infrastructure meant List had considerable difficulty in adequately
accommodating and supplying his formations, particularly with respect to
food, fodder, and medical supplies. All of this was in addition to ongoing
uncertainty regarding Yugoslav intentions, the Greeks backed by the British,
and the Turkish Divisions currently stationed in eastern Thrace. On the
other hand by 6 March Hitler was confident that there was little danger of
a Turkish intervention and, at least according to Lists Chief of Staff General H. von Greiffenberg, there was still thought in some German military
circles that an invasion may not be necessary. Perhaps, even at this late
stage the 12th Armys occupation of Bulgaria alone might be sufficient to
achieve Germanys political objectives of convincing the Greeks to seek an
armistice in Albania and declare their absolute neutrality. By then, however, the Greeks had cast in their lot with the Allies. As Lists formations
concentrated near the Greek border from 7 March the first British and
Dominion troops of W Force began to land in Athens.3
1Preliminary history of the Balkan campaign, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal
S.W. List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2.
2Major L. Glombik, Intelligence Officer, 12th Army, The German Balkan Campaign,
23 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2. Preliminary history of the Balkan campaign, reviewed and
edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54,
624/7/2; General H. von Greiffenberg, Answers to a questionnaire given by the Australian
Historical Section, 4 July 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; Hepp, Die 12. Armee im Balkanfeldzug
1941, pp. 203-4; D. Garnett, The Campaign in Greece and Crete, HMSO, London, 1942, p. 11;
M. van Creveld, Hitlers Strategy 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue, Cambridge University Press,
London, 1973, pp. 99, 97, 102, 109.
3Hitlers Reichstag speech after the campaign on 4 May 1941 again emphasised he would
have preferred a political rather than military solution to Greece, but nonetheless a friendly
southern flank was a military necessity. OKW/WFSt., Abt. L (I Op.) 44274/.41 gK Chefs.,
5 March 1941, Bundesarchiv Militrarchiv (BA MA), RW 4/588; Preliminary history of the
Balkan campaign, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and General H. von
Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; A few war experiences, reviewed and edited
93
Figure 4.1:Four unidentified German soldiers walk along a Bulgarian road towards their
concentration area in preparation for the coming invasion of Greece. (Source: Australian
War Memorial: P02767.002)
With the EFAS and WMFAS holding the Albanian line in the northwest,
and the EMFAS in the Doiran-Nestos Line protecting Salonika and Thrace,
the third element of the overall plan to defend Greece from continuing
Italian pressure and a looming German invasion involved a combined
Greek-W Force commitment to the Vermion-Olympus Line, a compromise
reluctantly and unhappily agreed to by both Papagos and British representatives in the key meetings of 2-4 March. The basic idea was that in the
event that the Doiran-Nestos Line did not stop German penetration of the
Greek border directly from Bulgaria, or else that the Germans entered northern Greece by first invading Yugoslavia and then crossing the southeastern
Yugoslav frontier, then Lists Army would be held at a new line running
along the natural mountain barriers and defendable passes from the Aegean, along the northern slopes of the Olympus-Veria mountains from near
the mouth of Aliakmon River, northeast to the Yugoslav border beyond the
Edessa Passa distance of 110 kilometres by map, not including ascents
by Field Marshal S.W. List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2;
Major L. Glombik, Intelligence Officer, 12th Army, The German Balkan Campaign, 23 June
1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2.
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and descents. The lower forward slopes of this line were steep, rugged and
an obstacle to vehicles, except at the four key passes described in the previous chapter. Importantly, through these passes at Edessa, Veria, Olympus
(Katerini), and between Mt Olympus and the sea ran key arterial roads and
railways which had to be denied a motorised enemy. All except Edessa,
which was wider and substantially easier going, were formidable choke
points which might potentially be held with relatively few troops. The
Edessa Pass lay on an escarpment several hundred feet above the plain
between the Axios and the Aliakmon Rivers.4 Unknown to W Force at the
time, and as yet undiscovered by the Germans, was that apart from these
four passes a number of difficult, yet passable tracks approached and even
crossed the Vermion-Olympus Line. Two of the more crucial led from
Skala Leptokaria to Gonnos, and from Kato Melia to Elasson. In spite of the
hurried and ongoing defensive work conducted in this area during March
and early April, the Vermion-Olympus position had nothing like the
prepared fortifications of the Doiran-Nestos Line.5
Allied preparations to occupy and defend the Vermion-Olympus Line
were frustrated from the outset by W Forces frantic and last-minute attempts to raise a viable headquarters. Brigadier G.S. Brunskill, the chief
administrative and logistics officer of the British Imperial force, had arrived
in Athens on 23 February and taken over all army staff previously attached
to RAFs Barbarity Force. His ability to make any firm plans or take decisive
action was, however, sorely undermined by a lack of certainty at that point
as to what formations would actually be despatched to Greece from Egypt.
More problematic still was Greek insistence that all preparations had to be
kept secretlest they prompt the Germans into immediate action. Wilson
himself did not arrive in Greece until 4 March; and the chief operations
officer for W Force, Brigadier Sandy Gallowaythe individual responsible
more than anyone else apart from Wilson with preparing operational
plansand most of the W Force headquarters staff, did not land in Athens
until 7 March, along with the first convoy of fighting units. Until this date
4Letter, Charrington to Cynth, 29 April 1941, LHCMA Charrington 4/75a.
5Between Mt Olympus and the sea along which ran the Athens-Salonika Railway; the
Katerini Pass to the west of Mt Olympus connected Katerini to Elasson; the Veria Pass
through which ran the Salonika-Kozani Road; and the Edessa Pass in the north connecting
Edessa with Florina. The Campaign in Greece, AWM 54 534/5/13; Comment on General
Blameys Report, B Freyberg, AWM 54, 534/5/24; UK War Narratives The campaign in
Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ
188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 77;
An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 177, 185.
95
neither Brunskill nor Wilson had a general staff with which to plan.
Furthermore, throughout the period direct contact between W Force personnel and Greek forces (or Greek headquarters staff) was forbidden.
Rather, all liaison and information had to pass laboriously through Heywood
and the British Military Mission. Despite Brunskills urgings to Wilson that
Heywoods organisation be abolished and its staff absorbed into the meagre W Force Headquarters, orders to W Force troops as they arrived in Greece
nonetheless passed under the signature of Colonel G. Salisbury-Jones, of
the Military Mission. Such responsibilities were well outside the bounds
of Heywoods charter. Yet Salisbury-Jones toiled desperately to do the job
Galloway ought to have been allowed to do.6
Worse still, even after his arrival Wilson was forced, at the express wish
of the Greek Government, to remain incognito as Mr Watt and in plain
clothes under the delusion that Germans might be fooled into thinking
that W Force, without a commander, might not be ready for action. Papagos
memoirs provide no explanation for this procedure, which can probably
be explained as arising out from a Greek hope that German intervention
could be delayed or preventedwhat one British Foreign Office official
called in the context of the Yugoslavs an ostrich-like attitude.7 This position
was actually supported by Wavell, who himself insisted on keeping the
build-up of W Force in Greece a secret. This is doubly perplexing from a
British perspective given that the political capital to be gained by overtly
supporting the Greeks was much more than the advantages that might
come from keeping it clandestineand such political considerations were,
as noted earlier, a key reason for deploying to Greece in the first place. It
also assumed that the Germans did not already know of W Forces arrival
which of course they did. British preparations and landings were far from
a well-kept secret. The Western media, particularly the British press, had
been talking of possible large-scale lodgement in the Balkans from the time
of the Italian attack on Greece in October 1940. Reports in all major Allied
newspapers and periodicals ran a consistent theme that we are or we
ought to be with the Greeks. British security guarantees were reiterated
daily. Explicit public pleas for intervention were common. In Greece itself,
the Athens telephone exchange had been installed by a German company
6Letter, Charrington to Cynth, 29 April 1941, LHCMA Charrington 4/75a; W.G. Stevens,
Draft narrative on Administration of the 2nd NZEF, (pp. 44-65), ANZ ADQZ 18908 WAII,
11/25; G.S. Brunskill, Draft Manuscript, IWM, PP/MCR/136.
7P. Dixon, handwritten note dated 6 January [1941] on telegram from Mr. Campbell
(Belgrade), 2 January 1941, TNA FO 371/29770, p. 1.
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and 50 German nationals were still running it at the beginning of April 1941.
In fact, W Force convoys unloaded at Piraeus under the watchful eye of the
German legation in Athens, who dutifully set up a roster of observers to
report all they saw by radio back to Berlin. The Legation was assisted in its
efforts by a host of German tourists staying at the King George Hotel and
other places in Athens. Even Turkish radio broadcast on 7 March that German forces would soon try and invade Greece and that the British were
preparing a campaign to thwart them. With considerable audacity on 12
March the German military attach actually complained to the Greek authorities about their not informing him of the arrival of British troops. For
their part the Germans did not yet publicize what they knew of the British
deployment. Such an open admission might influence the Yugoslavs towards
the Allied cause and, moreover, it was best saved to be used as a pretext
when Lists invasion force was ready. Hitler stood to gain, once more, considerable political mileage out of a lightning reaction to unbearable Allied
provocation.8 In any case news of British landings certainly did not perturb
OKW. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel described them as in accordance with
our hopes.9 With a sound excuse for launching the invasion against Greece
thanks to an obviously growing British presence, he believed Turkey would
not react, and he anticipated no Soviet interference. Control of the Balkans,
Keitel predicted, would be secured by the end of April or early May.
So much for secrecy.10
Nonetheless, this rationale stopped Wilson from taking overt command
of the force he was to lead. He was restricted to the British Legation and
his ability to make operational plans was unquestionably hindered. He was
unable, for example, to make a thorough reconnaissance of the ground he
was supposed to hold along the Vermion-Olympus Line. Wilson was allowed
only one car trip from Katerini to Edessa and back through Kozani to Larissa in the month after his arrival. According to Brigadier H.V.S. Charrington
(commanding the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade in Greece), Wilson, who
spoke not a word of Greek and whose ability to liaise on even a personal
level was therefore limited, never recovered from being forced incognito
8Telegram, Minister for Information to Eden, 14 March 1941, TNA INF 1/892.
9Operations following the Balkan campaign, 18 March 1941, TNA CAB 79/10.
10Telegram, Palairet to Foreign Office, 12 March 1941, TNA FO 371/29814; Report on
Foreign Broadcasts, War Cabinet Paper, 8 March 1941, TNA INF 1/892; Report of activities
in Greece Apr 41 by Lt. Col. R.R. Vial, 12 January 1945, AWM 54, 534/2/32; letter, Blumentritt
to Liddell-Hart, 17 March 1948, LHCMA 15/15/14; Operations following the Balkan campaign,
18 March 1941, TNA CAB 79/10; C. Mott-Radclyffe, Foreign Body in the Eye: A Memoir of the
Foreign Service Old and New, Leo Cooper, London, 1975.
97
at this point. He neither properly reconnoitred the front nor got to know
his staff. It is axiomatic that the whole situation made the administrative
and operational tasks of his fledgling and newly-arrived headquarters even
more difficult. The net result throughout March was a force headquarters
without a leader, scrambling to establish itself and forbidden to liaise with
the Greek troops with which it was to cooperate and even command. The
situation was made worse by what Salisbury-Jones described as a fractious
personal relationship between Wilson and Heywood (and between their
staffs), which did nothing to facilitate a smooth flow of information. Meanwhile, senior visitors like Eden, Dill and Wavell, continued an unusual and
dangerous habit of making vague campaign plans without specific details,
Wilsons input or any staff of their own, except the dubious assistance of
Heywoodwhose real role as the head of the Military Mission was ostensibly to help train Greek soldiers and facilitate overseas suppliesbut who
nonetheless was invited to high level conferences and expected to voice an
opinion.11
In such an atmosphere of hurried confusion Wilson, in disguise, opened
his headquarters in the Acropole Hotel, Athens, on 7 March. Even leaving
aside the difficulties imposed by the Military Mission and other external
factors, the establishment of W Force headquarters was also complicated
from within. First, time was always against it. Wilsons headquarters staff
should have arrived before, not concurrently with, the formations they
were to direct. W Force Headquarters should also have arrived complete,
not broken up into packets all arriving at separate times. Second, it was not
an established headquarters. Wilson succeeded in securing Galloway from
Crete, where he had been commanding a brigade, and Brunskill from Palestine. As an ad hoc organisation, W Forces headquarters staff were collected from across the Middle East. Cohesion, therefore, was neither
immediate nor guaranteed. Third, parallel command relationships were
distinctly problematic. Wilson was under the operational command of
Papagos, but had direct access to Wavell for administration and a right of
11In late March the flat used by the German legation was targeted in an attempt to
knock out its radio transmitter by spiking the voltage. Communications were temporarily
incapacitated, but the Germans had a spare radio. The attack also brought protests from
other nearby buildings whose occupants included the US Minister and a dentist drilling a
tooth at the time of the attack. Letter, Charrington to Cynth, 29 April 1941, LHCMA Charrington 4/75a; Headquarters BTE War Diary, 7-10 March 1941, TNA WO 169/994B; Foreign
Office Circular (No. 588), 21 March 1941, TNA FO 371/29814H; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas,
pp. 75, 84; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, pp. 76-7; Cruickshank, Greece
194041, p. 143.
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appeal on operational matters. Air Vice Marshal DAlbiac, in command of

RAF forces in Greece, and with whom W Force would invariably need to
liaise closely, was himself under the operational control of Papagos but
answerable also to Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Middle East. DAlbiac also refused to relocate his headquarters to co-locate it with Wilsons and the two, though in Athens,
remained separated by more than three kilometres throughout the campaign. Last, in an atmosphere of growing tension, events themselves seemed
to be distracting the headquarters from its preparations on the VermionOlympus Line. With German troop-carrying aircraft with a capacity to lift
around 4000 troops known to be in Bulgaria, for example, throughout March
a great many parachute scares rippled through W Force. Wilson attributed
most false alarms to flocks of migrating storks. At one stage his headquarters was contacted in the early hours to be told German parachutists were
descending on the streets of Athenssome dressed as nuns and maids!12
As if W Force Headquarters did not face enough challenges, Wilson soon
decided to raise a battle headquarters at Elasson, the best place to command the Vermion-Olympus Line, which opened on 26 March. He hoped,
in vain, that the Greek General Staff might also re-locate to a forward position. This further separated Wilson from his main headquarters in Athens,
and from DAlbiac. It also left the rear W Force Headquarters too weak to
compete with the Military Mission for direct access and influence over (or
even proper liaison with) the Greek General Headquarters once the fighting began. Wireless communication back to Athens from Elasson was also
unreliable, it took eight hours for a car to make the journey in fair (peacetime) traffic conditions, and there were no spare liaison aircraft. In Brunskills
words, [t]his staff machinery, hurriedly improvised, naturally creaked
badly.13
Along with a headquarters that faced significant challenges before a shot
was fired in anger, Wilson also had what might be best described as limited resources with which to hold his designated position on the Vermion
Olympus Line. British and Dominion forces under his command in W Force
12G.S. Brunskill, Draft Manuscript, IWM, PP/MCR/136; Inter-service lessons learnt in
the campaign in Greece, March to April, 1941, 12 March 1942, TNA WO 106/3120;
G.S. Brunskill, The Administrative Aspect of the Campaign in Greece in 1941, October 1949,
AWM 113, 5/2/5; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 78; R. Crisp, The gods were neutral, White
Lion, London, 1975, p. 103.
13Draft Manuscript, Brigadier G.S. Brunskill, IWM, PP/MCR/136; H.M. Wilson, Report
on Greek campaign, TNA WO201/53; Headquarters BTE War Diary, 26 March 1941, TNA
WO 169/994B; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 67.
99
included the 1st Australian Corps whose advance party arrived with the
first W Force convoy on 7 March but whose commander, Lieutenant General Thomas Blamey, did not himself arrive until 12 days later. This corps
held two infantry divisionsthe 2nd New Zealand Division and the 6th
Australian Division. It was further supplemented by two regiments of British medium artillery (64th and 7th Medium Regiments) and by the 2nd
Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery. Apart from the Australian
Corps, Wilson also commanded the independent 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade, which was itself reinforced by part of the Support Group from the
2nd British Armoured Division. In total, these formations incorporated 38
fighting units16 from New Zealand, 14 from Australia and eight from the
UK.
Along with divisional and ancillary troops the New Zealand division,
under Major General Freyberg, contained the 4th, 5th and 6th New Zealand
Infantry Brigades. Each of these brigades held three infantry battalions,
with an additional unit, the 28th (Maori) Battalion, attached to the 5th NZ
Brigade. Each New Zealand brigade was supported by a field artillery regiment and the division also held a cavalry regiment, an anti-tank regiment
and a machine-gun battalion. The first NZ units began arriving in Athens
on 7 March, closely followed by those of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade.
This armoured formation, commanded by Brigadier Charrington, included
the 3rd Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment (3 RTR) with 52 A10 cruiser tanks
(and seven A13 cruiser tanks in a Brigade Headquarters protective troop),
the 4th Regiment, Queens Own Hussars (4th Hussars) with 52 light MkVIB
tanks (better described as tracked machine-gun carriers), the 9th Battalion,
Kings Royal Rifle Corps [The Rangers] (1st Rangers) which was a motorised
infantry battalion,14 the 2nd Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (2 RHA), and
the 102nd Anti-tank Regiment [The Northumberland Hussars].15 On the
eve of the campaign, to increase the reconnaissance capability of the 1st
(UK) Armoured Brigade, the NZ divisional cavalry regiment swapped two
troops of armoured cars for two troops of cruiser tanks from 3 RTR. The
14In September 1939 the 1st Rangers, a Territorial Army unit, was re-named the
1st Battalion, The Rangers, stationed in London as part of 3rd London Infantry Brigade, 1st
London Division. It was renamed 9th Battalion (The Rangers), The Kings Royal Rifle Corps,
in March 1941. The 102nd Anti-tank Regiment and the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigades engineers
and signals units were also Territorial Army units while the 4th Hussars, 3 RTR and 2 RHA
were from the regular army. 1st Armoured Brigade Group notes on operations in Greece,
April, 1941, 8 May 1941, TNA WO 201/2749.
15This unit is sometimes referred to as the 102nd Anti-tank Regiment, Royal Horse
Artillery (The Northumberland Hussars).
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last units of W Force to come under Wilsons command were those of the
6th Australian Division. This formation was structured similarly to the New
Zealand division in terms of fighting units, with the exception that it had
no cavalry regiment of its own.16
The German force assembling in southern Bulgaria to face the Greeks
and W force was formidable. Strung out as it was as a consequence of a
difficult transit through Bulgaria, the 12th Army was nonetheless impressive. In many ways the Germans had been forced to allocate to Lists army
a far greater number of troops for the Greek operation than they would
have liked, and given what OKW knew of the balance of British forces in
Greece by mid-March, than ought to have been necessary to conquer the
country. Sufficient numbers, however, had to be employed as insurance
against potential Yugoslav, Turkish or even Soviet involvement. At the time
of its deployment into Bulgaria, Lists army contained the powerful 1st
Armoured Group, under General Ewald von Kleist (containing the 5th Armoured, 11th Armoured, 60th Motorised, 4th Mountain, 294th Infantry, and
198th Infantry Divisions).17 Lists command also held the 41st (Motorised)
Corps commanded by Lieutenant General Georg-Hans Reinhardt (Das
Reich SS Motorised Division, Grossdeutschland Regiment, and Hermann
Goering Regiment); Lieutenant General Georg Stummes 40th (Motorised)
Corps (9th Armoured Division, 73rd Infantry Division, and the Leibstandarte
SS Adolf Hitler Regiment18); Lieutenant General Franz Boehmes 18th
(Mountain) Corps (2nd Armoured Division, 5th Mountain Division,
16Memoir, Campaign Greece 1941, Papers of Lieutenant Colonel C.M.L. Clements,
IWM, 98/21/1; 1st Armoured Brigade Group notes on operations in Greece, April, 1941, 8
May 1941, TNA WO 201/2749; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece,
March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; W.G. Stevens, Draft narrative on Administration of the 2nd NZEF, (pp. 44-65), ANZ ADQZ 18908 WAII, 11/25; Long, Greece, Crete
and Syria, p. 30; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 77.
17The German 1st Armoured Group was in fact a small army in that it commanded
two corpsthe 11th Infantry and 14th Armoured Corps. It is also significant that German
armoured divisions in 1941 had an establishment strength of 416 tanks, including models
heavier than any the British then possessed. Each armoured division consisted of one tank
regiment (usually with two tank battalions), a motorised brigade (consisting of two regiments of two motorised battalions each) and a motorcycle reconnaissance battalion.
Armoured cars, cyclists, and anti-tank/anti-air battalions were also usually attached. Garnett,
The Campaign in Greece and Crete, p. 20.
18By 1939 the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler was a full infantry regiment with three
infantry battalions. After the invasion of France, this formation was expanded into a large
brigade of around 6500 soldiers, although it remained designated as a regiment. Following
its outstanding performance during the invasion of Greece, Heinrich Himmler directed the
regiment be upgraded to divisional status, although the formation had little time to fully
refit as such before participating in the invasion of Russia. See J. Keegan, Waffen SS: the
101
6th Mountain Division, 72nd Infantry Division, and 125th Infantry Regiment
(reinforced)); and Lieutenant General Otto Hartmanns 30th Corps (50th
and 164th Infantry Divisions). Thus the equivalent of around eighteen wellarmed and well-trained divisions (four of them armoured and three specially prepared for mountain warfare) dramatically outnumbered those
waiting across the Bulgarian/Greek border and gathering on the VermionOlympus Line. Formations that were eventually part of the 12th Army but
which were not initially earmarked for the invasion of Greece at this stage
included the 50th Corps (46th, 76th and 19th Infantry Divisions) which
remained in Romania and the 16th Armoured Division which was eventually deployed behind the Turkish-Bulgarian border just in case of the unlikely eventuality that the Turks chose to become involved on the Allied
side.19
On 6 March, the day before Wilson opened his headquarters, he was
informed by Papagos that a brand-new Greek formation, the Central Macedonian Field Army Section (CMFAS), under the command of Lieutenant
General Ioannis Kotoulas, had been placed at his disposal. Like W Force,
the CMFAS was a distinctly ad hoc organisation. It consisted of the 12th
Greek Division (Major General Napoleon Batas), the 20th Greek Division
(Major General Christos Karassos), and at this stage the 19th Greek Motorised Division (which was transferred to the EMFAS on 27 March). The 12th
Greek Division held the 82nd, 84th, 86th, and 87th Greek Regiments (each
the rough paper equivalent to a British brigade). The 20th Division contained the 35th, 80th and the Dodecanese Regiments, and the 19th Motorised Division fielded the 191st, 192nd and 193rd Motorised Regiments.20
Papagos had already ordered the CMFAS to cover the main passes of the
Vermion-Olympus Line while W Force deployed. To that end, the 19th Motorised Division was deployed in the eastern coastal sector forward of Olympus Pass; the 12th Division was guarding the Veria Pass, and the 20th Greek
Division was positioned further north in the Edessa Pass.
During his limited reconnaissance, Wilson decided that in order to make
the best out of the respective capabilities of his mixed force, he would
use Imperial troops to hold Vermion-Olympus Line defiles and Greek
asphalt soldiers, Ballantine Books, New York, 1970; R. Lehmann, Die Leibstandarte Band I,
2nd revised edition, Munin Verlag, Osnabrck, 1978, p. 429.
19van Creveld, Hitlers Strategy 1940-1941, p. 181; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 49-50;
An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 181; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 149.
20An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 173-4.
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formations to defend more mountainous terrain. The eastern sector to

Veria was, therefore, to be held by the 1st Australian Corps, and the western
sector by the CMFAS. Once the Australian and New Zealand divisions had
occupied their positions, the plan was for the CMFAS then to shift northwest
to defend the Vermion Range north of Veria including the Edessa Pass. The
20th Greek Division would secure the passes in the northern Vermion Mountains, the Edessa Pass, and the passageways between Lake Vegorritis and
the Yugoslav border at Mt Kaimakchalan. For its part the 12th Greek Division would redeploy to hold the high ridgeline running northeast along the
border from Mt Kaimakchalan to the vicinity of Ghevgheli. The old 12th
Greek Division position at Veria Pass would be guarded by the 6th Australian Division with the coastal sector blocked by the 2nd New Zealand Division and (temporarily) by the 19th Greek Motorised Division. More
specifically, the Greek motorised division was to occupy 11 kilometres of
open country north of Katerini while New Zealanders held 13.5 kilometres
of more rugged country to their left. Out on the Macedonian plain, north
of the Vermion-Olympus Line, the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade was to deploy
forward to hold the line of the Axios River in order to delay any German
advance and to cover demolitions before withdrawing through the Edessa
Pass to a position on the left flank of W Force near Florina. Any subsequent
formations despatched to Greece from Egypt, such as the Polish Brigade or
the 7th Australian Division, would not be landing in the immediate future
and would therefore be deployed, if and when they arrived, as the situation
warranted.21
Leaving the Vermion-Olympus Line momentarily to one side, the Allied
air component of the defence of all three potential fronts in northern
Greece was from the outset a significant concern to both Wilson and Papagos. The Greek contribution in this regard was negligible. In January 1941
the Greek Air Forces fighter strength amounted to 12 Gladiator bi-planes,
28 P.Z.L. 24s, and six Bloch 151 aircraft. Its bomber arm fielded eight Potez
63s, six Blenheims, and seven Fairey Battle machines. There were also
48 aging and mixed army cooperation and 20 naval cooperation aircraft.
The serviceability of this force, however (except for the British-sourced
Gladiators), did not often exceed 50 per cent. According to the British Air
Attach this situation was not helped by the Greek Air Minister who was
21The Campaign in Greece, AWM 54 534/5/13; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 76-7;
McClymont, To Greece, p. 122; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German
War, p. 184; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 33.
103
apparently completely lacking in knowledge with regards [to] the requirements of a modern air force.22 Around two thirds of all Greek machines
were considered by British to be old or obsolete, and 60 more modern
aircraft ordered from the US were a long way from being delivered. This
small force had also been decimated in combat in the Albanian theatre
against the Regia Aeronautica. By April, the Greek Air Force had a meagre
total of around 20 flying aircraft left. For its part the relatively small and
aging Yugoslav Air Force, even should the Yugoslavs choose to fight on the
Allied side, could not be expected to offer much assistanceits hands
would likely be full defending Yugoslav fronts. Air defence and interdiction
would, therefore, be overwhelmingly a task for the RAF.23
The problem was that W Forces arrival from early March forced the
whole British air strategy in Greece to change without a commensurate
increase in resources. At this time only seven RAF squadrons in total were
available with two more on the wayfar from the promise of 14 made at
the time of the Athens conference of 22 February. This over-optimistic
figure had been predicated on continuing success in the Western Desert.
The arrival of the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean in early 1941, however,
had resulted in significant RAF losses in this theatre which outstripped
replacements. In fact, on 11 March RAF Headquarters, Middle East, described the shortage of aircraft as having reached the most acute stage
since the war broke out ... it will be impossible to keep all our existing
squadrons up to establishment.24 Added to this were ongoing RAF requirements to protect Malta, to cover dispersed ground forces in North Africa,
and safeguard convoys in the Mediterranean. It was clear that the supply
of further British aircraft to Greece would not increase any time soon.
22Memo, The Greek Air Force as at January 14th 1941, TNA AIR 40/1405.
23The issue of US supplied fighter aircraft to Greece is a long, complicated affair. The
genesis of the saga was a personal plea for aircraft from General Metaxas to President
Roosevelt in early 1941. Roosevelt promised thirty fighters of the most recent type without
any consideration of the military and logistic implications of such an undertaking. From
that point questions about the type, number and delivery date of these aircraft bounced
around diplomatic circles in London, Washington and Athens to no ones satisfaction. In
any case, no US aircraft were delivered before the German invasion in April. For its part
the British estimated the Yugoslavs to have 163 modern fighters, 107 modern bombers
(52 obsolete), 120 obsolete reconnaissance aircraft, and 30 modern (18 obsolete) naval
cooperation aircraft. Memo, Greek Air Force Order of Battle, British Air Attach, February
1941, TNA AIR 40/1405; table, Balkan Air Force Comparative First-line Strengths, January
1941, TNA AIR 40/1412; see also correspondence on this issue for January-March 1941 within
TNA AIR 8/532.
24Message, Headquarters R.A.F. Middle East to DAlbiac, 11 March 1941, TNA AIR 23/6391.
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Rommels attack in the Western Desert in the first week of April subsequently made it inconceivable that any further RAF reinforcements could
be sent to Greece. The result was that by the first week in April only eight
RAF combat squadrons and one army cooperation squadron were stationed
in Greece. This equated to around 80 aircraft to face close to 800 aircraft of
the German 8th Flying Corps and 300 Italian machines in the Albanian
theatre, or on call from Italy. This is not to mention the important fact that
at the time W Force began to concentrate in Greece, all of these RAF squadrons were already below strength and their pilots strained from high-tempo operations over the winter.25
DAlbiac had no choice but to devise a new plan for his small force. He
decided to split his RAF squadrons in Greece into Eastern and Western
wings. The Eastern wing of four squadrons was to be stationed northwest
of Larissa to be close to Wilsons advance headquarters. Using airfields on
the Larissa plain this group was to support British and Greek units against
a German thrust from the north. Its Hurricane fighter squadron was based
at Larissa, a Hurricane army cooperation squadron at Ambelon, and two
Blenheim squadrons at Almiros and Larissa (later moved to Niamata). The
handful of Hurricanes of this wing had to conduct close reconnaissance,
escort bombers, interdict German fighters, and defend their own airfields,
the port of Volos, and Allied lines of communication south. The Blenheims
were to conduct daytime reconnaissance, strategic bombing by night, and
close (escorted) bombing by day against enemy air bases in Bulgaria and
the Dodecanese, as well as roads, railways, and enemy troop concentrations
in difficult terrain. It was clear that this tiny force was always going to be
stretched beyond its limits. 26
DAlbiacs Western wing, with its headquarters at Yannina and flying
from Paramythia, was equipped with a squadron each of Gladiators and
Blenheims. This force was complemented on 11 March by the arrival of six
Royal Navy Swordfish torpedo bombers ordered to attack Durazzo and
Valona harbours. The remaining Blenheim squadron and eventually two
fighter squadrons (as well as Wellington bomber detachments visiting from
25For a breakdown of the balance of opposing air forces see J.S. Corum, Wolfram von
Richthofen: Master of the German Air War, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2008,
pp. 244-5. Draft Manuscript Medical History of the War: Greece (1940-1941), TNA AIR 49/11;
Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 78; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 153-4; Playfair, The Mediterranean
and Middle East, p. 81.
26Draft Manuscript Medical History of the War: Greece (1940-1941), TNA AIR 49/11;
Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, pp. 81-2.
105
Egypt during periods of full moon) were based for local defence in aerodromes in the Athens area. DAlbiac was under no illusions. He called the
air defence of Greece an almost impossible task.27 On 18 March he warned
that: Owing to small numbers of RAF squadrons that can be made available, the lack of suitable aerodromes in this country and the fact that we
have to fight on two fronts, it will be apparent that the air support which
can be provided at any rate for some time to come will be far below that
considered necessary for the efficient conduct of war.28
A shortage of planes and pilots was not the only cause for concern regarding the Allied air defence of Greece. Wilson, for example, was worried
by the congestion of aircraft around Athens, but understood that alternate
airfields were few. Much potential ground for their construction was either
too wet or too mountainous, and labour to build facilities had proven difficult to obtain. There was also a chronic shortage of anti-aircraft units to
protect airfields and other key installations. By April, only three batteries
were under RAF control, and one other was with the 1st (UK) Armoured
Brigade. Last, of the RAFs meagre force in Greece by 22 March, 18 Blenheims
(21 per cent), five Hurricanes (20 per cent), and 15 Gladiators (28 per cent)
were unserviceable and could not be repaired within 14 days. There were
alliance considerations as well. In mid-March, as the Italian Tepelene offensive raged in Albania, the Greeks begged Churchill (through Palairet)
for greater RAF support. A week later the Greek Minister in London, M.C.
Simopoulos, passed a personal plea to Churchill from Koryzis for more
planes. Eden fretted and on 25 March, Greek Independence Day, he sent a
telegram to Churchill noting that he was greatly pre-occupied by the continued lack of substantial air re-enforcements here, particularly in fighters.29 Eden considered Greek morale to be to some degree contingent on
27Report on the operations carried out by the Royal Air Force in Greece: November,
1940 to April, 1941, 15 August 1941, AIR 23/1196.
28DAlbiac had to place the available Hurricanes in the Eastern Wing as British Gladiators were completely outclassed by German Me.109 aircraft. The Me.109 had a maximum
speed of 395mph, was armed with two 7.9mm machine guns and three 20mm cannon.
Gladiator biplanes had a maximum speed 245mph and were armed with four .303 calibre
machine guns. The Swordfish bombers made successful attacks against both harbours on
the night 16-17 March, the results of which were quickly passed to the Greeks and Yugoslavs.
Draft Manuscript Medical History of the War: Greece (1940-1941), TNA AIR 49/11; Report
on the operations carried out by the Royal Air Force in Greece: November, 1940 to April,
1941, 15 August 1941, AIR 23/1196; telegram, Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, 12 March
1941, TNA FO 371/29814; Memorandum of Air Policy, Greece, March 1941, AIR 23/6375;
Crisp, The gods were neutral, p. 99; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 151, 154.
29Draft message, Foreign Office to Palairet, 21 March 1941, TNA FO 371/28918.
106
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protection from above and as Churchills personal intervention had resulted in the original despatch of Barbarity Force, he begged the Prime
Minister to intercede once again. Not even Churchill, however, could manufacture pilots and aircrew from rhetoric alone.30
With a dangerously thin air component, and with a headquarters beset
by a range of difficulties, the balance of W Force continued to arrive throughout March. Lieutenant General Blamey landed in Greece on 19 March. Three
days later (the same day that the diplomatic situation in Yugoslavia took a
turn for the worse for the Allies as pro-British Ministers were pushed out
of the Yugoslav Cabinet), Blamey, accompanied by Brigadiers Galloway and
Rowell, conducted his own rapid reconnaissance of the northern defensive
positions. They visited the New Zealand division, the 12th and 20th Greek
Divisions, and called on Kotoulas Headquarters at Kozani. Rowell, for one,
was not filled with confidence from what he observed there. Ive never
seen anything, he later wrote, worse than the state of jitters of the Greek
Commander. Kotoulas was, in fact, replaced as the commander of the
CMFAS by Major General Karassos two weeks later after Wilson made
similar observations.31 Two days after Blameys reconnaissance, on 24
March, he was invited to a meeting at the British Embassy, Athens, with
Wilson and Galloway and told of the plan to hold the passes of the VermionOlympus Line, of the scheduled relief of CMFAS formations at Katerini and
Veria, and to establish his headquarters as soon as possible at Gerania, a
small village off the main road on high ground just south of Servia Pass.32
The first Imperial formation of W Force rushed northwards from Athens
was not under Blameys control. As soon as the units of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade arrived they were despatched forward under Wilsons direct
command as quickly as transport allowed. The 4th Hussars and a battery
from 2 RHA were deployed near the Axios River to cover hastily prepared
demolitions and fight a delaying action if the Germans advanced across
the plain. The 1st Rangers, a motorised unit, was posted in the entrance to
the pass behind Edessa with the balance of 2 RHA and the 102nd Anti-tank
Regiment. Given his task was primarily to delay, not halt any German
30Memo, Serviceability state of operational aircraft at 6 April 1941, TNA AIR 20/1901;
telegram, Eden to Churchill, 25 March 1941, TNA AIR 8/544; telegram, Palairet to Churchill,
15 March 1941, TNA FO 371/29814; McClymont, To Greece, p. 151; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas,
p. 74.
[1-4].
32Note on interview at British Embassy, Athens, 24 March 1941, AWM 3DRL6643, 1/1;
War Diary HQ 1 Aust Corps Campaign in Greece, AWM 3DRL6643, 1/1.
107
advance, Brigadier Charrington was ordered on 17 March to prepare a withdrawal route back through the Edessa Pass and into the Florina Valley. As
such, he chose to leave 3 RTR at Amyndaion on the western side of the
mountains in the vicinity of the lake area. There were three reasons for this.
First, the poor state of the 3 RTR tanks, described as mechanically decrepiteven by their own crewswas such that operations on the open Axios
plain would be problematic. Their tracks, for one, simply could not handle
the wear. This position would also provide a reserve, or an anchor should
the rest of the brigade be forced to withdraw west through the Edessa Pass
in a hurry. Last, there was a nagging concern, even in mid-March, in the
minds of some senior Allied commanders over the vulnerability of
the Monastir Gap. While this single tank unit could not possibly hold it
if the Germans advanced into Yugoslavia and turned south, at least the gap
was not to be left completely undefended.33
The 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade was concentrated in its assigned positions by 21 March. Charrington was, however, far from happy. Aside from
the fact that he had, in effect, three widely-strung-out units awaiting the
potential advance of the German 12th Army, he was constantly pestered by
both Kotoulas (under whose local control he was to operate), and Bacopoulos in the Doiran-Nestos Line. Both Greek commanders, equally uncomfortable about their prospects of holding a German thrust, asked for
Charringtons help in trying and persuade Papagos to go forward to help
coordinate the defence of Macedonia. The Greek commander-in-chief,
however, never visited. So too, Charrington worried about a potential unauthorised retirement of EMFAS personnel through his Edessa position if
Bakopoulos line cracked. All the while during this period of concentration
the Luftwaffe conducted strategic reconnaissance flights over Edessa and
Veria. Charrington warned his subordinate commanders that a German
attack could be expected in the first week of April.34
As Charringtons brigade deployed in the north, the 2nd New Zealand
Division began its own movement to the eastern flank of the VermionOlympus Line. Apart from some transport and signals elements this division, although training in Egypt since early 1940, had not yet seen combat.
The first of its fighting units embarked from Egypt on 6 March with their
33Crisp, The gods were neutral, pp. 99-101.
34Extract from 102 Regiment, RHA War Diary, 29 March 1941, TNA WO 196/1490; letter,
Charrington to Cynth, 29 April 1941, LHCMA Charrington 4/75a; H.M. Wilson, Report on
Greek campaign, TNA WO 201/53; Garnett, The Campaign in Greece and Crete, p. 15.
108
chapter four
destination officially revealed in Freybergs Special Order of the Day which

was opened after ships had left the harbour. At lunchtime the next day the
Royal Navy cruisers carrying the New Zealanders drew into the Piraeus
harbour. Athens lay less than five kilometres inland behind a slight rise to
the northeast. The next day Freyberg flew forward on a quick reconnaissance of ground to be occupied by his division. Second and subsequent
convoys from Egypt did not have such an easy transit. It was an inherently
dangerous route as the passage from Egyptian ports to Piraeus led past
enemy bases in the Dodecanese from which air and sea forces could threaten lines of communication. Rather than fast cruisers, the troops in subsequent convoys also endured slow crossings in cargo boats whose previous
passengers were sheep. The second convoy to Greece from Egypt was at
sea from 9-17 March in terrible weather. The third and fourth convoys
crossed 17-22 March and, while less affected by weather, were attacked by
the Luftwaffe. Ships were dive-bombed on a number of occasions but no
damage was causedexcept for a tanker that was hit and towed to Suda
Bay in Crete. The fifth convoy flight carrying the final formation of the New
Zealand division, the 5th (NZ) Brigade, crossed between 22-29 March. During these convoy runs to Greece seven ships in total were lost and a number
of others damaged.35
On 9 March Freyberg received formal orders from W Force to deploy
onto the Vermion-Olympus Line, and he left by road for Katerini six days
later. The most significant changes from the plan discussed at the conferences in Athens the week before was that the New Zealanders were to be
placed well forward of the Olympus pass and north of Katerini village. This
meant the 4th and 6th (NZ) Brigades would thus need to defend a very
large triangle of open ground between the mountain ranges and the sea,
while the 5th (NZ) Brigade remained in reserve south of Veria Pass. With
35A large proportion of the 5th New Zealand Brigade had earlier been temporarily
diverted to the UK en route from New Zealand to the Middle East and on its eventual arrival
in Egypt had only three weeks to reorganise and complete its training after nine weeks at
sea prior to the deployment to Greece. The use of cruisers was rendered necessary for the
first convoy as mining of the Suez Canal prevented sufficient troop ships from doing it alone.
Summary of operations of 5 NZ Infantry Brigade in Greece, 29 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/156; letter, Bates to Wards, 16 June 1950, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/13; W.G. Stevens,
Draft narrative on Administration of the 2nd NZEF, (pp. 44-65), ANZ ADQZ 18908 WAII,
11/25; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941,
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; New Zealand Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105;
AWM PR83/137; Transportation of the Army to Greece and evacuation of the Army from
Greece,1941, AWM 67, 6/61; diary of Trooper C.B. McIntosh, Kippenberger Military Archives
and Research Library (KMARL), 2008.699; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 118-20.
109
Figure 4.2:Alexandria, March 1941, W Force troops embarking for Greece. (Source:
the departure of the 19th Greek Motorised Division on 20 March to Doiran

on anti-parachute duties, this would leave Freybergs two forward brigades
with some 23 kilometres of front to cover from the coast to the mountain
ranges immediately north of Olympus. In the flat ground near the coast a
deep anti-tank ditch was being dugbut this was still no standard task
for two infantry brigades. Freyberg believed his forward line would have
required four full divisions to hold and even then it would not have been
strong.36 At the same time the New Zealand commander ordered the development of fall-back positions within the Olympus Pass itself.37 Artillery
support for these two forward NZ formations consisted of two field regiments for the left infantry brigade and one for the right. The divisional
frontage was so large, however, that it could not concentrate more than
36Letter, Freyberg to Kippenberger, 16 January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17.
37New Zealand Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105; AWM PR83/137;
WAII1/156; War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658; McClymont, To Greece,
p. 123.
110
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one artillery regiment on any single area at a time and for this reason,
among others, later concluded Blameys headquarters, it is fortunate that
the NZ Div was not required to resist serious attack on this line.38
Nonetheless, those elements of the New Zealand division which had
thus far landed moved north by train from Athens on 13 March and arrived
in their forward positions 22 hours later. For the most part the trip was
made in cattle trucks and goods wagons on hard rations. First to arrive at
the front, the 4th NZ Brigade under the command of Brigadier E. Puttick,
moved forward of Katerini and filled half the gap between the 19th Greek
Motorised Division on the coast and the 12th Greek Division in the mountains to the west. Within his headquarters placed at Palionellini, Puttick
deployed the 18th NZ Battalion to Mikri Milia on the right of his brigade
line. On 19-20 March the 20th NZ Battalion arrived and occupied a position
near Riaka, six-and-a-half kilometres to the west of Mikri Milia. The New
Zealanders began the difficult task of digging in their defensive position
across the brigades precipitous and rocky line immediately. The next day
the 19th NZ Battalion deployed as the 4th NZ Brigade reserve, with detachments sent a week later to prepare demolitions to the rear in the Olympus
Passes through which a road climbed from Katerini to the main LarisaFlorina Road near Elasson. As Brigadier H.E. Barrowcloughs 6th NZ Brigade
arrived from 22-25 March it was ordered to fill the rest of the gap beside
Putticks formation. Barrowcloughs 24th and 25th NZ Battalions immediately manned the forward line in the old 19th Greek Motorised Division
position, while the 26th NZ Battalion was soon sent to join the 19th NZ
Battalion from Putticks brigade in developing defences back in the Olympus Pass.39
38HQ RAA Anzac Corps Summary of the Operations of the Arty of the Anzac Corps in
Greece, AWM 54, 75/4/3; Anzac Corp War Diary, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/9; Narrative
of 2 NZ Div. Arty. The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, W.E. Murphy, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/240; Narrative of action of Div. Arty. in Greece (with appendices), ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/113.
39Campaigns in Greece and Crete, B. Freyberg, October 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6; Draft Narrative Greece, N.J. Mason, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/170; War Diary
of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658; Report on operations in Greece, 4 Inf. Bde.,
30 April 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK4/2/4; diary of Brigadier E. Puttick (24 March
3 August 1941), ANZ ACGR 8479, PUTTICK7/1/1; correspondence, narrative and draft notes
(various) concerning the activities of the 26th (NZ) Battalion in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/172; WAII1/173; correspondence (various) concerning the 20th Battalion in Greece,
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/155; Draft Narrative 18 (Auckland) Infantry Bn., NZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/150; A.S. Playle, HQ Company, 18 Battalion in Greece, 7 March 27 April 1941, ANZ
ADQZ 18886, WAII1/148; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March
to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece,
111
During their passage northwards the New Zealanders, like all BritishDominion troops that landed in Greece (and later on the Germans during
their march south from Bulgaria) were starkly and self-consciously aware
of the beauty of the Greek landscape, the historical and cultural significance
of the setting in which they were fighting, and to some degree possessed a
sense of themselves as actors on the stage of world history. Troops from
both sides were also surprised by the welcome they received from Greek
civilians.40
Meanwhile, as W Force enjoyed its Greek welcome in early March, the
Germans developed their operational plans. The basic concept of the coming invasion in early-March was to use the 12th Army to attack the DoiranNestos Line from Bulgaria with Lists right wing aiming for Salonika and
his left for Alexandropoulos. Once the coast was reached the Bulgarians
could take over the occupation of northern Greece, thus freeing up the 12th
Army to return and prepare for its role in on the southern flank of the
planned Eastern Front. In early 1941 aerial reconnaissance was providing
increasing details with which to flesh out such plans. On 19 January, for
example, German aircraft spent two hours above the ceiling of British and
Greek fighters in the Corinth-Athens area taking pictures. Flights were
mounted almost daily from mid-February and by March much of northern
Greece had been photographed. By mid-March the Greek Legation in
Berlin believed that Germans regarded the prospect of an attack as unpalatable but certain.41 King Boris of Bulgaria voiced his concerns, worrying
about Yugoslav interference, but German planners remained confident
of success.42
ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999,
WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; diary of W.F. Marshall, KMARL, 1993.1351; McClymont, To Greece,
p. 127.
40C. Wilmot, A letter from the front [transcript], AWM 27, 116/1; diary of Sergeant
D. Reid, 2/8th Australian Infantry Battalion, AWM 54, 253/4/3; 7 NZ Anti-Tank Regiment
Campaign in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/130; extracts from the diary of Captain
K.M. Oliphant, 2/3rd Field Regiment, TNA CAB 106/555; G. Long, The 6th Division in action,
AWM PR88/72; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 31-2; entry for 14 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der 6. GEB. DIV., BA MA RH 28-6/8; entry for 18 April 1941, Fred Deckert, Mit
Lore und Inge bei den Feldhaubitzen: Kriegstagebuch Teil E Der Krieg auf dem Balkan (1.1.194115.6.1941), DEUGRO Schulbuchverlag, Esslingen, undated [1985], p. E 7/6.
41Cablegram, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Menzies, 14 March 1941,
NAA A5954, 446/3.
42Letter, Blumentritt to Liddell-Hart, 17 March 1948, LHCMA 15/15/14; Higham, The
Myth of the Defence of Northern Greece October 1940 April 1941, p. 137; McClymont, To
Greece, p. 157; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 213;
K. Svolopoulos, Aspects of the Impact of World War II in the Balkans, International Congress
112
chapter four
Crucially, the steady buildup of British and Imperial troops in Greece in

the first two weeks of March gradually convinced Hitler and OKW that the
original 13 December plan to occupy only northern Greece was inadequate.
On 17 March, therefore, Hitler ordered that the coming invasion be extended to include the occupation of the entire mainland, including the
Peloponnese (as well as Lemnos, Thasos and Samothrace) to remove the
British presence completely. Ironically, only days earlier the British Foreign
Office had correctly predicted such a response to the threat of a strengthening Allied front in Greece, while for its part Radio Rome announced the
British buildup was bound to draw decisive German action. As long as the
British remained so too did the threat to the Romanian oil fields. Again, at
least according to post-war testimony from List and General Franz Halder,
head of the German Army General Staff, this was a decision taken reluctantly. It was not essentially about the strategic benefits of the possession
of the southern portion of the Balkan Peninsulaalthough commanding
the eastern end of Mediterranean would give an added bonus of isolating
Britain and cutting its communications east. Rather, in addition to the
direct threat the ever-growing British presence represented, troops on the
ground in Greece raised Britains diplomatic credentials in the Balkans.
Sooner or later the British might even succeed in drawing Yugoslavia into
the warand from a German perspective this was just too dangerous to
be allowed to happen during the coming invasion of the USSR. Although
the Allies were not aware of it, the stakes had increased. All of mainland
Greece was now the prize of the coming contest.43
The first half of March 1941 was a key period of planning and preparation
for all sides in Greece. British and German staffs in particular struggled
simultaneously to deploy and develop their operational schemes. For the
British, faced with the reality of Greek insistence on defending in Albania
and along the Bulgarian frontier, the focus was on the Vermion-Olympus
Line. Although a naturally strong position, the preparation of this line was
itself disrupted by a number of important impediments. First, Wilsons ad
hoc headquarters was late arriving in Greece, it failed either to subsume
the staff of the British Military Mission or overcome interference from it,
for the 50 Years from the 1940-1941 Epopee and the Battle for Crete, p. 151; van Creveld, Hitlers
Strategy 1940-1941, pp. 180-1.
43For a host of British newspaper articles dealing with a possible Allied lodgement of
military assistance to Greece from October 1940 see LHCMA 15/4/50. Telegram, British
Consul General (Salonika) to Foreign Office, 10 March 1941, TNA FO 371/29813; Extract from
Rome Broadcast, 18 March 1941, TNA FO 371/29814; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 71.
113
and succeeded neither in establishing effective liaison with the Greek headquarters in Athens nor even in co-locating itself with DAlbiacs RAF headquarters. The inefficient establishment and early functioning of this
headquarters was made worse still by Wilsons decision to split it into a
forward element at Larissa and a rearward section in Athens. Its effectiveness was further eroded by the perplexing decision to force Wilson to remain
incognito in the face of obvious German knowledge of W Forces arrival
and deployment in Greece. Even had such factors not been undermining
the British build-up in Greece in early March, the glaring disparity of forces, even more pronounced with regard to the opposing air forces, was
knownon both sides.
This is not to suggest that everything went smoothly for the Germans.
Lists movement into and transition across Bulgaria proved a difficult undertaking. Bulgarian diplomatic hesitancy, a late thawing Danube, difficult
weather and terrain, and the glaring inadequacy of Bulgarian infrastructure
to cope with the movement and deployment of a force such as the 12th
Army were causes of significant frustration and concern. Crucially, as Lists
formations laboured towards their assembly areas in southern Bulgaria,
the continuing British buildup at last tipped Hitlers hand. Unable to accept
the strategic risk that the growing British presence in Greece represented
to the overall German war effort as well as to the imminent invasion of the
USSR, the decision to occupy all of mainland Greece was at last taken. Lists
planning staff needed to reformulate their schemes in a hurry. The Germans
were, however, most assuredly on their way.
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the gathering storm: mid-march and early april 1941
115
Chapter Five
The gathering storm: mid-March and early April 1941

By mid-March 1941 plans for the opening stages of Operation Marita were
firming up on all sides. On the Vermion-Olympus Line W Forces hurried
deployments continued with the first units of Wilsons last division, Major
General Iven Mackays 6th Australian Division, landing at Piraeus on 21-22
March.1 Soon after disembarking the leading battalion of Brigadier Arthur
Tubby Allens 16th Australian Brigade moved by rail and road up over
Brallos Pass, across the plain of Thessaly, up over snow-clad mountains
through Elasson to Larissa, and then to Servia Pass, in preparation to relieve
the 12th Greek Division in the Veria-Kozani defile. An officer on Allens
headquarters remembered his first night at Servia as one of the coldest Ive
ever spent.2 The terrain in this location was a serious challenge for the
newly arrived Australian units which had difficulty even reaching their
positions in the mountains. The second of Mackays formations, the 19th
Australian Brigade under Brigadier George Vasey, landed in Athens on
3 April, while the last to arrive, the 17th Australian Brigade under Brigadier
Stan Savige (with a battalion from Vaseys brigade), had by 6 April not yet
set sail for Greece from Egypt.3
Meanwhile, a number of important developments were unfolding back
with the New Zealanders in the vicinity of Katerini. First, on 27 March a
1That the Australians were so late was largely a consequence of Blameys insistence
that the 6th Australian Division be sent to Greece first on account of its experience and
training, rather than the 7th Australian Division. Consequently, Mackays men had a distinctly rushed move from North Africa. On 8 March, the day after the first elements of W
Force had landed at Piraeus, his brigades were still spread from Tobruk to Tocra in western
Cyrenaica, and to the Tripolitanian frontier at Agadabia. The next day the Australians
received a warning order for re-deployment and thus very little rest between their campaign
in the desert and embarkation to Greece. After a rapid concentration, which included a
disorderly recall from leave for some battalions in Alexandria, Allens brigade departed
Egypt (with corps headquarters) as part of the fourth Lustre convoy: G. Long, The 6th Division in action, AWM PR88/72; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 30-1.
2G. Long, The 6th Division in action, AWM PR88/72.
3Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9
[6-14]; Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Zentralmazedonien (T.S.K.M.)
im Kmpfe gegen die Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 1; Material copied for use in the
compilation of New Zealand War History, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3650].
116
chapter five
Figure 5.1:Members of the 2/1st Australian Field Regiment, Athens, gamble at two-up
before boarding a train to Larissa in April 1941. (Source: Australian War Memorial: 069830)
company of the 26th NZ Battalion was despatched to the Plantamon Tunnel, where a Greek railway passed between Mt Olympus and the sea. This
narrow coastal pass began at Pinios Gorge, which separated Mt Olympus
and Mt Ossa, and continued north as a narrow coastal strip ending as a
ridge running east of Olympus to the coast. Access to Pinios Gorge, and
from there the Larissa plain, was either by road over this ridge and down
into the gorge, or by rail through the Plantamon Tunnel into the gorge. This
coastal pass would later prove to be of pivotal importance. The New Zealand
company sent to Plantamon was ordered to prepare a defensive position
for subsequent occupation by a battalion-sized group, which Freyberg assessed would be sufficient to block the pass, so long as enough demolitions
were used to destroy the railway tunnel.4
The last of Freybergs formations to arrive in Greece, Brigadier J.E.
Hargests 5th NZ Brigade, began moving into a reserve position in the
4Correspondence, narrative and draft notes (various) concerning the activities of the
26th (NZ) Battalion in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/172; WAII1/173; New Zealand
Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105; AWM PR83/137; GOCs [Freybergs] Diary
(extracts), 2 January 2 September 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/5/42-43; Campaigns in
Greece and Crete, B. Freyberg, October 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6; McClymont,
To Greece, p. 146.
117
Olympus Pass from 31 March, thus releasing the 19th and 26th NZ Battalions
back to their parent brigades. This pass position was over 900 metres above
sea level. Down its northern side ran a steep gorge through which wound
a road and a river. Hargest placed his 22nd NZ Battalion astride the road in
the pass itself, with the 28th (Maori) Battalion to the left, to link up with
the 16th Australian Brigade in the Veria Pass (when it arrived). He placed
his 23rd NZ Battalion on the right of the brigade line along a ridge which
ran parallel to the main range, resting on the slopes of Mt Olympus. Like
the 4th and 6th NZ Brigade positions to the north, with a frontage of almost
14 kilometres Hargests force was far too stretched to deploy in an extended line. Instead, a system of outposts, or island defence, was adopted by
small groups on high ground. These posts were physically separated from
each other and situated in very broken country. All were vulnerable to infiltration.5
By the end of March, with the deployment of Hargests brigade, the New
Zealand division was firmly in place in the Katerini-Olympus area. Freybergs divisional cavalry regiment, with an artillery detachment, waited
north of an anti-tank ditch on the Katerini plain, near the Aliakmon River,
with orders to delay any German attempt to cross for as long as possible
and then to withdraw through the main divisional position. Though successful, the New Zealand deployment proved slower and more difficult
than it should have been. Freyberg had been frustrated by the dispersal of
his units across several convoys to Greece. Those that should have been
first at Katerini were slowed by days or even weeks. Artillery regiments
were among the last to move in, and the divisional anti-tank gunners appeared only a few days before the German invasion began. During this
period some early indications of command friction between W Force and
its subordinate headquarters also emerged. Freyberg grew incensed that
5Summary of operations of 5 NZ Infantry Brigade in Greece, 29 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/156; Report by Brig. Hargest on Greek Ops, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162; War
Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658; UK War Narratives The campaign in
Greece, ANZ W3799/4; Correspondence, narrative and draft notes (various) concerning
the activities of the 26th (NZ) Battalion in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/172; WAII1/173;
British Narrative The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; GOCs [Freybergs] Diary (extracts), 2 January 2 September 1941, ANZ ADQZ
18906, WAII8/5/42-43; New Zealand Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105;
AWM PR83/137; 23 NZ Bn, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162; Summary of War Diary material
for 22nd (NZ) Battalion, 12 January 1940 31 October 1943, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/160;
Correspondence (various, including interview transcripts) concerning the 22nd Battalion
in Greece, 22nd Battalion veterans to J.H. Henderson, 1950, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156;
Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 36.
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Wilsons headquarters seemed not to understand the importance of the

military organisation of a division in that it kept trying to detach his units,
including an engineer company needed to dig-in the Katerini position.6
Brigadier Galloway responded that: the best way I can put it is that we are
all trying to make this show work at short notice and under great difficulties, and what we fix here temporarily simply must be done or we might as
well go back to Egypt.7 It was not the most inspiring start.8
Of even more concern to Freyberg (and Blamey) was a serious and ongoing debate about using the New Zealanders to defend north to secure Katerini, rather than south in the Olympus Pass, as was originally intended.
The problem was that Freybergs forward line in the open ground north of
the town was so wide that areas that should have been defended by battalions were instead allocated to isolated companies sited on spurs or high
ground. There was, for example, a substantial undefended gap between the
left flank of the 4th NZ Brigade and the 12th Greek Division, which was to
be filled by artillery if required, and much was made of the supposed
anti-tank nature of the country in these areas.9 Freyberg, of course, knew
better. He complained vigorously that his two forward brigades were insufficient to hold this frontage and urged them to be moved back to the Olympus Pass. If they remained forward the enemy will have no difficulty, he
declared, in penetrating at any place where he chooses to concentrate.10
Blamey visited Freyberg on 23 March and agreed that the forward New
Zealand line would never hold against a serious German attackespecially one supported by tanks. W Force headquarters, however, refused
Blameys request to move it back to the Olympus Pass on the grounds that
the Katerini position was not yet in peril as four Greek divisions stood
between it and the Germans. Blamey again put the idea personally to Wilson, thereby bypassing Galloway and W Force Headquarters, when he returned to Athens on 25 March. Wilson finally conceded that while Freyberg
was to maintain his forward line on the Katerini plain, he was henceforth
6B. Freyberg, Campaigns in Greece and Crete, October 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476,
PUTTICK2/4/6.
8Diaries of Private A.E. Lilly, KMARL, 1997.6; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 123, 141.
9H.M. Wilson, Report on Greek campaign, TNA WO201/53; letter, Kippenberger to
McClymont, 11 July 1950; letter, McClymont to Kippenberger, 16 February 1954, ANZ ADQZ
18902, WAII3/1/16b; Report on operations in Greece, 4 Inf. Bde., 30 April 1941, ANZ ACGR
8476, PUTTICK4/2/4; diary of Brigadier E. Puttick (24 March 3 August 1941), ANZ ACGR
8479, PUTTICK7/1/1; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 136-7.
119
authorised to develop defences in the Olympus Pass. Wilson refrained,

however, from allowing the whole division to fall back and occupy this
position.11
While Wilsons reluctance may have frustrated and even bewildered
Blamey and Freyberg, in truth these subordinate commanders were unaware of and thus unrestricted by the strategic considerations that stayed
Wilsons hand. The commander of W Force was still bound by a tacit agreement with Papagos to try and protect the Katerini railhead and the important line which lay between Katerini and Edessaover which travelled
most of the supplies to the Greek army in Albania. Of course, the proximity of the railhead to the front left it open to air attack regardless of where
the New Zealanders deployed. But the Greek attitude to Salonika had, however, already shown a reluctance to acknowledge the reach and destructive
potential of modern aircraftan attitude left largely unchallenged despite
Italian air operations since October 1940. Furthermore, from a Greek perspective a withdrawal to the Olympus Pass before the German invasion
even began was tantamount to giving up hope that the Doiran-Nestos Line
could stand and the possibility, if the Yugoslavs fought and fought well in
Serbia, that W Force might be used for offensive operations further north.
Wilson was thus constrained as much by political considerations as operational concerns in this regard. His subordinates, while quick to criticise,
found it much harder to grasp or acknowledge such restrictions.
Aside from the disagreement regarding the position of the forward New
Zealand brigades, the senior commanders of W Force were generally settled
on a range of other weaknesses of the Vermion-Olympus Line. In this regard
Wilsons attention was increasingly drawn further north towards the Monastir Gap. From as early as mid-March he had been wrestling with the
potential vulnerability of this natural corridor of advance from the northern Greek-Yugoslav border which, if penetrated, would split troops of the
WMFAS and those destined for the left flank of the Vermion-Olympus Line.
It was an open and inviting axis of attack for the Germans if they decided
to violate Yugoslav neutrality (as they had done in Belgium through the
Lige Gap) and managed to penetrate through the Struma Valley and break
the southern Serbian defences. Worse, should the Germans advance in
depth through this gap, it might allow them to turn both the VermionOlympus and WMFAS positions from the rear. The whole area at the south11Ibid.; letter, Kippenberger to McClymont, 11 July 1950; letter, McClymont to
ippenberger, 16 February 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16b; McClymont, To Greece,
K
pp. 134-6.
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ern end of the Monastir corridor was itself of vital strategic importance as
the meeting place for roads from central Greece, Albania, Salonika and
Yugoslavia. From mid-March RAF reconnaissance aircraft had been flying
over this dangerous gap, but as German concentrations in Bulgaria and
intentions for Greece grew more obvious, this thin attempt at early warning
was no longer sufficient.12
As a consequence, on 21 March Wilson ordered half of the 27th New
Zealand Machine Gun Battalion to reinforce 3 RTR (already stationed close
to the small town of Amyndaion, southeast of Florina). Further, Brigadier
E.A. Lee, a British officer commanding the medium artillery of the 1st Australian Corps, was warned that if the Germans approached Monastir he
was to take command of this combined Amyndaion Detachment. A little
later Lees force was expanded to include the 1st Australian Anti-tank Regiment and the British 64th Medium Regiment. The emerging idea was for
this small force to block any German thrust in the Florina Valley where it
was narrowed by two large lakesVegorritis and Petron. The key to this
position was the Kleidi Pass, which lay in the ridges between Amyndaion
and the small town of Vevi, east of Florina, through which ran both the
road and railway line north to Yugoslavia. By 1 April the threat of Monastir
was being described by Wilsons headquarters as a chief danger to the
overall Allied position in Greece.13 A quick visit to units of the Amyndaion
Detachment on 3 April by Dill and Eden, presumably to see for themselves
what was readily apparent from a map, did little to fortify the thin Allied
line in this area.14
Away from the vulnerability of the Monastir Gap, Wilson hoped the
tank-proof mountains elsewhere on the Vermion-Olympus Line would
negate German superiority in armour and thus rob German infantry of the
perceived prop up upon which he has been trained to lean.15 Fighting
would devolve onto the foot soldiers and Imperial officers assumed their
12Draft Manuscript, Brigadier G.S. Brunskill, IWM PP/MCR/136; H.M. Wilson, Report
on Greek campaign, TNA WO201/53; letter, Atchison to Wards, 15 November 1951, ANZ
ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; letter, Sutherland to Wards, 12 March 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18902,
WAII3/1/2; diary of Corporal R.F. White, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; Headquarters BTE
War Diary, 16 March 1941, TNA WO 169/994B.
13Force Instruction No. 7, 1 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/3/5.
14Extract from Headquarters Anzac Medium Artillery War Diary, 29 March 1941, TNA
WO 196/1490; extract for 64th Medium Regiment War Diary, 3 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1492;
Anzac Corps War Diary, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/9; Playfair, The Mediterranean and
Middle East, p. 80.
15Probable German tactics in Greece, 25 March 1941, TNA WO 201/19.
121
infantrymen to be superior to their German equivalents. The basis for such

an assumption was unclear; although it is possible, at least in part, that it
was a consequence of holding out successfully at Dunkirk without realising
to what degree the Germans had been holding forces back for the conquest
of the remainder of France. Even if this proposition were justified, however, there were precious few Allied soldiers available. Freyberg later assessed that it would have taken an army group of four corps to defend the
Vermion-Olympus Line, even if Yugoslavia stayed neutral and the Monastir
Gap was successfully closed. As it stood, Wilson would be lucky to command
four divisions, half of them Greek. Wilson also knew that Kotoulas command, like the rest of W Force, was neither a standing nor experienced
formation. It was only raised as Imperial troops began to land in Greece
and was, from the outset, an improvised corps of three well under-strength
formationsthe 12th and 20th Greek Divisions (recruited from Macedonia
and Florina respectively from soldiers called up before the war, convalescents, older men and reservists), and the 19th Greek Motorised Division
(which was removed from the CMFAS to reinforce the EMFAS from 27
March). The infantry divisions fielded sufficient infantry for two regiments
each instead of three and they held only a handful of field and mountain
artillery batteries between them.16
Apart from manpower shortages, all three CMFAS divisions were provided with even less equipment than the divisions in Albania and in the
Doiran-Nestos Line as all surplus Greek war material was already in use.
They had no armoured vehicles, anti-tank weapons or anti-air weapons.
Modern automatic weapons were also in short supply. Many of Kotoulas
men deployed without helmets or tents, and in some cases without greatcoats or blankets. In early March the 12th Greek Division possessed a total
of six vehiclesfive trucks and a car; all other transport was by ox wagons
and pack animals. Wilson inspected a Greek battalion of the CMFAS on 2
April only to note how his heart sank when ... one realised the degree of
mobility to be expected from divisions thus equipped.17 For its part, the
16The standard Greek infantry division already had a comparatively small artillery
establishment of four 75mm, four 65mm, and eight 105mm guns. Bericht ber die Ttigkeit
der Armeeabteilung von Zentralmazedonien (T.S.K.M.) im Kampfe gegen die Deutschen.,
BA MA RH 67/1, p. 1; S.F. Rowell, The campaign in Greece, April 1941, 6 June 1941, AWM
3DRL 6763(A), [1-4]; Detailed comment upon draft of Mr. Buckleys popular history of the
Greek Campaign, B. Freyberg, AWM 67, 5/17; K. Argyropoulo, From Peace to Chaos: A Forgotten Story, Vantage Press, New York, 1975, p. 128; Garnett, The Campaign in Greece and
Crete, p. 16; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 76.
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chapter five
19th Greek Motorised Division was only ever notionally motorised. It was
incompletely equipped with a mixture of taxi cabs from Athens, captured
Italian vehicles and weapons, and newly delivered British Bren carriers
for a total of 24 light tanks and carriers. Brigadier Charrington described
its members as recently enlisted garage hands, and the formation as one
which had no possible prospect of fighting usefully as a mobile force.18
Just how desperate the wider Greek logistic situation had become, and
how much it was relying on British supplementation, was evidenced by the
amount of war materiel being poured into Greece in late March and early
April which included uniforms, weapons and ammunition of all types.19 It
was still not enough. Greek authorities, in desperation, attempted to secure
vehicles and additional supplies from the US. On 2 April Eden sent a telegram to Churchill, confirming once more the desperate need for military
supplies, particularly within the CMFAS. On the same day the Greek Prime
Minister implored the British to provide an emergency supply of 700,000
desperately needed shells and 30,000 more rifles. Even if stocks could be
found, however, such quantities could never hope to be sent in time. In the
words of Brigadier W. dA. Collins, W Forces Director of Supply and Transport, [t]he Greek Army lived from hand to mouth with regards [to] supplies.20 Taken in total, the CMFAS was poor substitute for the larger, better
Greek Campaign, AWM 67, 5/17; UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece,
WAII2 [Microfilm 3618].
19Official receipt was provided by Greek authorities to British suppliers during the
campaign for 200,000 boots, 50,000 blankets, 100,000 water bottles, 50,000 helmets, 140
jumpers, 23,000 tents, 45 tons of uniform cloth, 200 cars, 75 Austin ambulances and trucks,
150 Bedford trucks, 180 Chevrolet trucks, 78 Ford trucks, 44 Ford 15-cwt trucks, 122 Ford
lorries, 160 Italian trucks, 120 tractors, 490 motorcycles, 1.8 million tins of beef, 11,000 tins
of herrings, 10,000 sacks of rice, 104 horses, 100 cases of tea, 34 anti-aircraft guns, 94 carriers,
10 light tanks, 600 cases .303 calibre ammunition, 2000 cases of artillery fuses, 14,000 hand
grenades, 30 mountain guns, 1000 cases of Hotchkiss and Thompson ammunition, more
than 40,000 cases of shells, 5200 Italian Mannlicher rifles, 8100 Italian 6.5mm rifles, 5000
Mauser rifles, 5 million rounds of captured Italian ammunition, 200,000 Italian mortar
bombs, 1000 Italian machine guns, 18,000 cases of Italian 75mm shells (and other types),
49,000 coils of wire, and hundreds of tons of explosives ingredients: General list of material
handed over to the Greek government (exclusive of Crete) for which an official receipt was
obtained, 1 July 1941, TNA WO 201/119.
20W. dA. Collins, Report on St Services during the campaign in Greece March and
April, 1941, 2 May 1942, TNA WO 201/40; The Greek Army up to 1941, 28 March 1945, TNA
WO 167/3187; Comments of Greek organisation, training, armament, etc, TNA WO201/11;
G.S. Brunskill, Draft Manuscript, IWM PP/MCR/136; memo, Simopoulos to Butler, 29 March
1941, TNA FO 371/29814; telegram, Secretary of State (Athens) to Prime Minister, 2 April
1941, TNA FO 371/29815; extract of telegram, Military Mission in Athens to Foreign Office,
the gathering storm: mid-march and early april 1941 123

organised, first-line force Papagos was understood by the British to have
offered to W Force in the meetings of 2-4 March. Indeed the state of Kotoulas command was such that as senior W Force officers deployed onto the
Vermion-Olympus Line it was with distinctly mixed feelings about their
Greek allies. Such impressions were to have powerful influences in the coming weeks.21
Although quick to identify weaknesses in the CMFAS, W Force did not
need to look too far to find significant problems within its own organisationparticularly with regard to its lines of communication. Until he
landed in Greece, for example, Brigadier Brunskill had no idea of the limited logistics infrastructure and transport capability available in Greece.
Indeed, for some time after his arrival the only accurate map he had for the
Greek road and railway system was one given to him in World War I by a
Greek colonel. Nor did Brunskills anxiety lessen when informed of the plan
to hold northern Greece. From a logistic point of view, the compromise
solution of manning both the Vermion-Olympus and Doiran-Nestos Lines
was a shock to Brunskill and the more its administrative effects were
explored, the worse the possibilities seemed.22 The landward supply of all
forces in Macedonia, Albania and Thrace was predominantly from Athens
via Larissa, and Brunskill assumed that the single, inadequate road linking
Larissa to the Vermion-Olympus Line was bound to be a key target of German air attack. There was no way this route could be improved, or alternatives developed, as all available Greek engineers were in Albania, and W
Force had precious few of its own to spare. If this road was blocked, the
route from Kalabaka to Kozani (via Grevena) could not hope to take up the
slack. Nor could the port of Salonika, given its obvious vulnerability and
proximity to the front line, be relied upon to land supplies in regular or
substantial quantities.23
8 March 1941, TNA WO 106/3161; telegram, British Military Mission to Wavell, 18 March 1941,
TNA WO 169/2146; W.E. Murphy (NZ War History Branch), Comments on Mr. Buckleys
popular history of the Greek campaign, January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; telegram, Eden to
Churchill, 2 April 1941, Churchill Archives Centre (CAC), CHAR 20/37/16; telegram, Eden
to Churchill, 2 April 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/37/60; H.M. Wilson, Report on Greek campaign,
TNA WO 201/53; Cruickshank, Greece 194041, pp. 140-1; Garnett, The Campaign in Greece
and Crete, p. 16; Argyropoulo, From Peace to Chaos, p. 129.
21Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 34.
22G.S. Brunskill, Draft Manuscript, IWM PP/MCR/136.
23On the eve of the arrival of the first Imperial troop convoys to Greece Brunskill learned
it would be possible to increase the number of trains available to W Force from two per day
to six per day only from 15 March. There was insufficient coal or trains available for any
greater allocation. There were also no ambulance trains for W Force as all were in use for
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In anticipation of such problems, Brunskills logistics plan was to ferry

forward as much as possible from the British logistics bases in Athens to
Larissa, and from there to establish a series of forward dumps. These stores
would, of course, be lost if W Force was forced to withdraw, but Brunskill
had no other option. The supply dumps, and the lines of communication
to and from them, were to be administered by Headquarters, 80th Base Sub
Area (from Athens to Pharsala), and Headquarters, 81st Base Sub Area (from
the Larissa plain northwards). Again, the sequence of W Forces deployment
did not help here as the 81st Sub Base Area staff, for example, did not arrive
at Larissa to meet their commander, Brigadier L. Parrington, until 3 April.
This, to some degree, explains the fact that in early March the W Force
logistic storage situation was a shambles, with the main British supply
depot set up at the Athens racecourse consisting of four furlongs of track
as one almost solid stack of supplies.24 Despite such difficulties, by the
first week in April Brunskills dumps had been established. In total around
60 days of food, 40 of fuel and 70 days of ordnance were either in the dumps
or on their way northwards. It was a total significantly short of the 90 days
logistics target set by Headquarters Middle East, but in the circumstances
still a credit to Brunskills administrative ability. Yet the W Force supply
dump scheme, and the urgency and confusion surrounding its implementation, was a tenuous and ad hoc solution.25
For all Brunskills forced improvisation the British logistics plan was still,
in many ways, far more comprehensive than the German. The issue of inadequate supply and logistics was also a considerable point of concern
within the 12th Armys planning process from mid-March. In order to deal
with the obvious supply problems that would accompany German forces
as they advanced down into Greece, with lengthening lines of communication and limited roads, the Germans established a set of mobile supply
Greek casualties. Nor would the Greeks allow the use of the port of Stylis, which was railserved, as they wanted the dead end line in this location to store rolling stock in case of
withdrawal south from Macedonia. G.S. Brunskill, The Administrative Aspect of the Campaign in Greece in 1941, October 1949, AWM 113, 5/2/5; G.S. Brunskill, Draft Manuscript,
IWM PP/MCR/136; Higham, The Myth of the Defence of Northern Greece October 1940
April 1941, p. 142.
24W. dA. Collins, Report on St Services during the campaign in Greece March and
April, 1941, 2 May 1942, TNA WO 201/40.
25G.S. Brunskill, Draft Manuscript, IWM PP/MCR/136; report on Greek campaign,
General H.M. Wilson, TNA WO201/53; The Campaign in Greece, AWM 54 534/5/13; L.
Parrington, Greece 1941: Diary of 81. Adv. Base Sub Area with Addenda, IWM 76/118/2;
G.S. Brunskill, The Administrative Aspect of the Campaign in Greece in 1941, October 1949,
AWM 113, 5/2/5.

convoys close to the Greek border, each holding around 10 days rations,
ammunition and fuel. So too, German logisticians had packed freighters
standing-by in Romanian Black Sea ports ready to sail for Salonika when
it fell. The supply situation was still, however, expected to be tight. The
Germans had planned only for success in this regard, and had no contingency should operations not go to plan. List informed his subordinates that
the distances from Germany and the transport situation make it necessary
to economise [on] all types of supplies.26 His chief quartermaster ordered
no supplies or ammunition were to be left behind during the advance, even
at the expense of food. Much would rely, in this regard, on captured supplies.27
It was mostly due to difficulties on its lines of communication and its
troubled logistic buildup that the 12th Army, still forming up along Bulgarian-Greek frontier, was in no position to mount any immediate offensive
operation, even to spoil or interrupt the British preparations in northern
Greece, in the first half of March. It was not until around 20 March, due to
bad weather and primitive roads in Bulgaria, that Lists initial deployments
were completed and his logistic chains finally secured. At OKW, however,
the pressure was mounting to speed up Marita so that it could end in time
for Barbarossa to begin. On 22 March an order was sent to List, full of language stressing the need for haste, and directing the invasion of Greece to
begin no later than 7 April. Two days later, as it became clearer that Turkey
would remain uninvolved, List reported that he would be ready to invade
Greece, not on 7 April, but on the first of the month. On the same day
Lieutenant General Alfred Jodl (Chief of Operations at OKW) authorised
the Luftwaffe in Sicily and southern Italy to attack all Greek and Allied
shipping within Greek territorial waters. 28
The operational plan developed by the 12th Army to invade Greece from
Bulgaria was significantly influenced by the experience in France. The concept was to use infantry attacks to breach Greek border defences in terrain
not favourable to tanks. Where gaps were subsequently forced open, mobile
26Extracts from Special instructions for attack on Greece and Jugoslavia, 12th Army
Headquarters, 3 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/27.
27The 12th Armys infantry units were to carry four days rations and an emergency
iron ration, while mobile troops were to carry a weeks worth of supplies with them. Blau,
Invasion Balkans!, p. 82.
28Minute, Sir A. Cadogan, 14 March 1941, TNA FO 371/29814; Notes by Editor-in-Chief,
New Zealand War Histories on Christopher Buckleys narrative on Greece, AWM 67, 5/17;
Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 213; Van Creveld, Hitlers
Strategy 1940-1941, pp. 94, 134-6; McClymont, To Greece, p. 157.
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forces were to exploit them before defenders could react or regroup. More
specifically, Lists initial main effort, Boehmes 18th Corps, was to break
through the Greek frontier defences on both sides of the Rupel Pass. The
5th and 6th Mountain Divisions, together with the 125th Infantry Regiment
(with heavy artillery support), were thus to create a hole for Kleists 1st
Armoured Group to drive through, and on to Salonika. At the same time
the troops of the 30th Corps were to advance through the Doiran-Nestos
Line further to the east in the direction of Cavalla. It was expected that
under such pressure Greek frontier resistance would quickly crumble. In
the context of ongoing German diplomatic efforts in Belgrade, entering
Yugoslav territory was at this stage strictly forbidden. Meanwhile, Lists
spearhead forces continued their preparations in the Sofia-Maritza ValleyPlovdiv area with covering forces out to the Greek border. Such was the
size of his force, and so difficult the road conditions, that some rear German
detachments had still not entered Bulgaria at this time.29
Back in Athens, Allied planners were dismayed to learn on 25 March
that the Yugoslav Regent, Prince Paul, had signed the Tripartite Pact in
Vienna. Papagos hopes for the defence of northern Greece were dashed
and British worst case fears were realised. The immediate issue in the wake
of this disaster, therefore, was a potential merger of the Doiran-Nestos and
Vermion-Olympus Lines. After exchanges between various headquarters a
meeting was held the same day in Salonika chaired by Bakopoulos. The
Greek commander concluded that since the threat to the western flank of
the EMFAS had increased exponentially with the Yugoslav decision to join
the Axis, the two defensive areas should be merged, and the obvious choice
was the Doiran-Nestos Line. Imperial troops should therefore rush northward to reinforce the EMFAS. Unsurprisingly, British representatives argued
for the exact opposite. With Yugoslavia out of the equation, the strategic
rationale for defending Salonika had melted away and therefore all EMFAS
forces should be transferred immediately to the Vermion area. For the time
being Greek General Headquarters decided the issue by claiming any withdrawal from the Doiran-Nestos Line was impossible as it would require
time that was not available, and also risked the EMFAS being caught in the
open by the German invasionnot to mention the political ramifications
29The mission of the Army and its battle formations, reviewed and edited by Field
Marshal S.W. List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; Fighting
in Yugoslavia and Greece, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and General
H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 81.

in Greece and Yugoslavia of abandoning Salonika. Bakopoulos was ordered
to hold where he stood.30
Events, however, were moving quickly and the following day (26 March)
another meeting was held, this time in Athens. Lieutenant General Kotoulas, commanding the CMFAS, now supported British demands to transfer
the EMFAS back to the Vermion-Olympus Line. The view was eventually
accepted by Bakopoulos as the untenablility of his forward position became
increasingly obvious. In the face of such pressure Papagos at last reversed
his long-standing decision. According to the Greek Commander-in-Chief,
the British immediately offered to provide transport to ferry the EMFAS
back to the Vermion-Olympus Line and he accepted. According to Wilson
the request first came from Papagos. Whatever the case, hasty W Force
arrangements ensued and by 11.00 p.m., 26 March, Wilsons headquarters
was ready to present Papagos with a plan to withdraw the EMFAS southwards.
In the meantime, however, word was received in Athens of an impending coup in Yugoslavia to overthrow both the Cvetkovi government and
the new treaty with Germany. Such news immediately revived Greek hopes
for the Doiran-Nestos Line and the defence of northern Macedonia. At 1.00
a.m., 27 March, three hours after Wilsons staff had come up with a plan to
retire the EMFAS to Vermion, the Greek General Staff informed Wilson that
the plan was now off and, furthermore, on the strength of news from
Belgrade, it asked if it would be possible to use the British transport earmarked to move the EMFAS rearwards instead to ferry W Force forward to
the Doiran-Nestos Line. British surprise at the snap Greek change of heart
once again underscores a serious underestimation of the Greek strategic
imperative to defend forward. British lobbying to withdraw the EMFAS to
the W Force line, while understandable on tactical grounds, ignored the
fact that Bakopoulos troops were defending their homes, the perils of the
EMFAS being caught on the move by a German invasion, and the strength
of the existing Doiran-Nestos positions. Papagos, faced with military reality once Yugoslavia joined the Axis, had nonetheless decided to withdraw
the EMFAS. His decision, however, was made reluctantly and it was always
unpopular with the King and members of the Greek government. Any
change in the Yugoslav position was all that was needed to reverse it.31
31H.M. Wilson, Report on Greek campaign, TNA WO201/53; An Abridged History of the
Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 178; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 71.
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Talk in Athens of an impending Yugoslav coup proved accurate. The

signing of the Tripartite Pact was deeply unpopular amongst Serb antiAxis public and military figures. As a consequence, and with considerable
British support and encouragement, on 27 March Brigadier Bora Mirkovi
executed a military coup in Belgrade. The regency was dissolved and seventeen-year-old King Peter proclaimed to be of age, with General Dusan T.
Simovi the new Yugoslav Premier. Anthony Eden, who had once again
been unsuccessful in getting a Turkish commitment to the Allied cause at
a meeting with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cyprus on 18
March, had left Egypt on 25 March disappointed. On 27 March, however,
en route home and in Malta, he learned of the coup and returned immediately to Athens with Dill. On arrival Eden was greeted with the happy
news that the new regime in Belgrade had already made it known that it
was pro-British, recognised the inevitability of war despite assurances of
German neutrality, and was mobilising as fast as possible.32 Back in London
Churchill relished the news. He wrote to Arthur Fadden, the acting Australian Prime Minister, to tell him that he might now cherish renewed hope
at forming a Balkan front with Turkey comprising 70 Allied divisions.33 The
result remained unknowable, noted Churchill, but the prize has increased
and the risks have somewhat lessened.34 The British deployment to Greece,
Churchill continued, was now in its true setting, not as an isolated military
act, but as a prime mover in a grand design.35
With Eden and Dill back in Greece a new meeting was held in Athens
at 12.30 p.m., 28 March. Apart from these two men, Koryzis, Papagos, Palairet,
32Entry for 27 March 1941, Eden Greece diary, UBCRL AP 20/3/2; Report of War Cabinet Joint Intelligence sub-committee on possible action by Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941, TNA
CAB 79/10.
33Cablegram, Churchill to Fadden, 30 March 1941, NAA A5954, 528/1.
34Ibid.
35Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 5, p. 1. The coup had encouragement from
within the British embassy and from Special Operations Executive (SOE). Four days earlier
Papagos had told British representatives that such a coup was possible if the British supported the ringleaders. Political review of the Year 1941, Sir M. Palairet, 28 April 1942, TNA
CAB 21/1494; telegram from Foreign Office to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo), 21 March 1941, No.
821, TNA FO 371/30250; papers on TNA FO 371/30207 and TNA FO 371/24994; Hull, Memoirs
of Cordell Hull Volume Two, pp. 932-3; D. Stafford, SOE and British Involvement in the
Belgrade Coup dtat of March 1941, Slavic Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, 1977, pp. 399-419; entries
for 27 and 28 March 1941, Cadogan Diaries, pp. 366-7; Hinsley, British Intelligence Volume
One, pp. 369-70; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 214;
McClymont, To Greece, p. 131-2; Sue Onslow, Britain and the Belgrade Coup of 27 March
1941 revisited, Electronic Journal of International History, No. 8, 2005, pp. 1-57. For Prince
Pauls view of events, see Extract from letter dated August 18th 1941, TNA FO 371/30255,
pp. 1-5.

Wilson and Heywood were also present. The purpose of the meeting was
to amend standing military plans in light of the Yugoslav coup. Papagos
began by noting that there had not yet been any formal Greek military
agreements with the new Yugoslav government, but that he was excited by
the prospect of a continuous defensive front from the Adriatic to Black Sea.
With faith in the Yugoslavs which complemented his long-term strategic
preferences, Papagos now hoped once again that the EMFAS might link
with the Yugoslav Army to defend Greece at its northern border. For this
he needed rapid decision-making and action. Papagos wanted first to finish
off the Italians in Albania and had already asked the Yugoslavs to attack in
the direction of Durazzo, Kukes and Elbasson. This was to be coordinated
with a Greek push against Berat and Valona. The predicted defeat of the
Italians, as Papagos had long hoped, would free troops for the defence of
Macedonia. In the meantime, until Albania was taken, all that was needed
was to hold the line in Macedonia and Thrace. To this end he urged the
British once again to reinforce the Doiran-Nestos Line at the expense of
the Vermion-Olympus position, reminding them once more that Salonika
must be held if the Yugoslavs were to fight on the Allied side.36
British representatives at the 28 March conference were much more
cautious. Eden warned that no replies had yet been received from messages sent to Belgrade and that the Turks would not likely be inclined to
fight to protect Salonika. He wanted to talk to both governments before
making any rash decisions. For his part Dill explained the risks of trying to
hold a continuous front as there would be a dangerous lack of depth to it,
and that the Macedonian and Thracian ports remained vulnerable to the
air. Wilson, with far less faith in Yugoslav military capability than Papagos,
and now faced with the previous Greek dilemma of his troops potentially
being caught in the open during a move north of the Vermion-Olympus
Line, had no real intention of going anywhere. The British therefore confirmed there would be no W Force advance north of the Aliakmon until
the Yugoslav situation had been fully clarified.37
Two days later, on 30 March, Eden, Dill, Wilson and DAlbiac held their
own conference at the British Legation. There they resolved to discuss with
the Greeks the possibility of air attacks against the Italians and, if Yugoslavia
36Meeting held at the Presidency of the Council, Athens, on Friday 28th March 1941,
at 12.30p.m., 28 March 1941, TNA AIR 23/6371; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 26.
37Ibid. The Eden diary simply notes satisfactory talks with Koryzis, Papagos and King
George: entry for 28 March 1941, Eden Greece diary, UBCRL AP 20/3/2.
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chapter five
entered the war, of coordinating RAF activity with the proposed GreekYugoslav attacks into Albania. Despite ongoing Greek pleas to move north
immediately, the conference decided W Force would stand on the VermionOlympus Line for at least the next three weeks to complete the concentration of its troops, and from there to move to the Rupel and Struma areas,
as the Greeks had asked, only if the Yugoslavs agreed to the combined actions proposed. What British planners failed to grasp at this critical stage
were the important internal political dynamics set in motion within Yugoslavia as a consequence of the coupmany of which had a direct bearing
on Yugoslav military capability. First among them was a clear and widening
division within a nation already suffering from a lack of national cohesion.
As a result of these internal pressures, the new government rapidly found
that it had to adopt a similar foreign policy approach to its predecessor.
Even within the military there was a general separation between a CroatSlovene pro-Axis camp on one side and a Serb pro-Allied faction on the
other.38
German responses to news of the coup in Yugoslavia were even faster
than those of the Allies. It had come as a complete surprise to German
planners, who for the preceding 48 hours had been pleased with their diplomatic efforts in Belgrade. At the same time, however, the coup represented a significant opportunity. Simovi refused to repudiate the Tripartite
Pact immediately. This position prevented any real military cooperation
with the Allies, while at the same time it gave the Germans the pretext
needed to make military use of Yugoslav territory. This prospect had been
unavailable when the Regent had insisted that Yugoslav adherence to the
Pact must come with a German guarantee that it would not use Yugoslavia
for transit, or as a base from which to attack Greece. Hitler acted decisively. He recognised immediately that the British position in Greece had
been strengthened at a single stroke, and Churchills dreams of a Balkan
front were markedly closer to reality. Moreover, he, and his strategic planners at OKW, could not risk the planned timeline of invasions of Greece
and the USSR. Without waiting for the position of the new Yugoslav government to clarify, an emergency meeting was held in Berlin on the same day
38Minutes, Meeting held at the Presidency of the Council, Athens, on Friday 28th
March 1941, at 12.30p.m., 28 March 1941, TNA AIR 23/6371; Minutes, Discussion at H.M.
Legation Athens 30 March 1941 10.30hrs, 30 March 1941, TNA AIR 23/6371; entries for 29,
30 and 31 March 1941, Eden Greece diary, UBCRL AP 20/3/2; Bitzes, Hellas and the War:
Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, pp. 214-15; McClymont, To Greece, p. 134; Hoptner,
Yugoslavia in Crisis, pp. 274-5.
131
as the coup, over which Hitler presided. There he ordered Yugoslavia be

destroyed militarily and as a national unit, using such unmerciful harshness and lightning speed that Turkey would be further convinced to remain
neutral. A new plan involving a simultaneous invasion of both Greece and
Yugoslavia was thus decided. Its operational outline was drawn up within
24 hours.39
The standing 12th Army plan to invade Greece now required an overhaul
in order to incorporate Hitlers directive to occupy Yugoslavia as well. The
crux of the new scheme was to use the hastily reorganised German 2nd
Army, based in southern Austria under Field Marshal Maximilian von
Weichs, to crush the core of Yugoslav resistance with a drive on Belgrade,
while the 12th Army concurrently executed a modified version of its existing plan to invade Greece. To carry out the new combined invasions of both
Yugoslavia and Greece, the original allocated German force of 18 divisions
(12th Army) was expanded to 28 divisions (12th and 2nd Armies). This combined force now included seven of Germanys 19 armoured divisions and
three of its twelve motorised divisions. A new date for the commencement
of this double invasion was set for 6 April.40
For List the practical consequences of the decision to invade both Greece
and Yugoslavia simultaneously were significant. His attack on Greece was
now to be carried out not only concurrently with operations against Yugoslavia, but with fewer troops. The 12th Army lost (at least temporarily) the
use of 1st Armoured Group and the 41st Corps. List protested vigorously.
General Halder, however, denied his heated requests to retain Kleists group
in Greece in favour of using it in Yugoslavia. Hitler agreed with Halder and
Kleist was ordered to redeploy northwest of Sofia. Now under Weichs command, the 1st Armoured Group was to advance northwest along the highway
from Sofia towards Belgrade on 8 April while Reinhardts corps advanced
on Belgrade, southwest from Timisoara in Romania, two days later. It was
difficult for List to move the divisions now attached to the 2nd Army
39Von Brauchitsch, Oberkommando des Heeres, Gen St d H Op. Abt. (I) Nr. 540/41
g.K.Chefs., 30 March 1941, Aufmarschanweisung fr Unternehmen 25 sowie ergnzende
Weisung fr Marita., BA MA RH 2/466, pp. 1-3 and attachments. Entries for 27 March, 28
March and 29 March 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, pp. 330-1, 331-3, 333-5 respectively;
Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, pp. 214-15; Megargee, Inside
Hitlers High Command, pp. 100-1; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German
War, p. 178; McClymont, To Greece, p. 157; Corum, Wolfram von Richthofen, pp. 242-3; Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 259-68.
40Entwicklung der politischen Lage., Kriegstagebuch Begonnen: 28.3.41 Abgeschlossen: 24.4.41 A.Ob.Kdo. 2, BA MA RH 20-2/130, pp. 5-8; McClymont, To Greece, p. 158.
132
chapter five
east-west across Bulgaria, and to develop new supply routes for them, in
readiness for the attack on Yugoslavia. Instead of being able to wait to
complete their assembly, these columns were instead forced to use a flying
start method whereby their leading elements would begin their attack
before the arrival of all forces detailed to participate.41
Meanwhile, the balance of the German 2nd Army was to mount a converging attack from the northwest into Yugoslavia. The assault was also set
to begin on 10 Aprilthe earliest date Weichs formations could possibly
move. Lieutenant General Heinrich von Vietinghoffs 46th Motorised Corps
was ordered to move from its base in western Hungary across the Yugoslav
border and then advance on Belgrade between the Drava and Sava rivers.
One of its armoured divisions was to be detached from this main thrust to
advance on Zagreb once the Drava was crossed, thereby meeting Hungarys
condition for participating militarilythe proclamation of a Croat state.
Lieutenant General Hans-Wolfgang Reinhard (not to be confused with the
commander of 41st Corps) was to lead his 51st Corps behind Vietinghoffs
armoured thrust by moving first towards Zagreb and then wheeling towards
Belgrade. Lieutenant General Ludwig Kueblers 49th Mountain Corps was
to secure this general advance by covering the mountains on the western
flank.42
Despite the loss of the 1st Armoured Group and the 41st Corps, Lists
reduced command remained responsible for invading and occupying all
of mainland Greece. He still intended to use the 18th Corps against the
Greek border defences on the Bulgarian frontier, in the vicinity of Rupel.
Importantly, Boehmes men were now, however, able to pierce the Greek
line in two ways. One column was to aim at driving through the Rupel Pass
(as Papagos had always feared), with the 72nd Division to be brought into
action from southwest of Nevrokop via Serrai into the rear of the Rupel
Pass defile. Meanwhile, thanks to newfound permission to violate Yugoslav
territory, a second thrust could now bypass prepared Greek defences by
entering southeast Yugoslavia via the Strumitsa Valley, a difficult but not
impassable mountain passage, before turning south towards Lake
Doiran. One or both columns would then race across the Macedonian
Plain and capture Salonika, before turning to pressure W Force on the
41Entry for 30 March 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, pp. 335, 337; MGFA, Germany and
the Second World War, Volume III, pp. 490-1.
42MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume III, pp. 490-1; Hepp, Die 12.
Armee im Balkanfeldzug 1941, pp. 204-5; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and GreekGerman War, p. 181; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 50-1.
133
Vermion-Olympus Line. German planners expected the toughest Greek

resistance to be on the Doiran-Nestos Line, but were entirely confident in
their ability to break it. They also correctly assessed Greeks as incapable,
should this line be breached, of falling back to a second line of resistance
on this front. Meanwhile, Hartmanns 30th Corps was to continue with its
previously allocated task of breaking through the Greek border fortifications further east.43
More specifically, in order to exploit the newly available opportunity to
thrust into southeast Yugoslavia, List re-directed Stummes 40th Corps to
crash through the thin frontier defences to the east of Krytendil and Gorna
Dznaya. There were no continuous fortifications erected along this portion
of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border, which was protected only at recognised
crossing points with road blocks and a few scattered minefields. Once across
the frontier, Stummes columns would then aim to break up suspected
concentrations of Yugoslav forces in the area of Skopje and Veles in the
Axios Valley, thereby cutting the line of communication from Salonika to
Belgrade. From there, Stumme could drive further west to link up with
Italian troops at the northern tip of Lake Ochrida. Thus, 40th Corps would
have protected the Italians from any concerted Yugoslav attack, make safe
the right flank of the 18th Corps advance against the Doiran-Nestos Line,
and at the same time doom any hope of coordinated defensive action between the Yugoslavs and the Greeks/British. Importantly, if the 40th Corps
was successful, the way would also be open for List to send more divisions
into Greece through the Monastir Gap, then south though Amyndaion to
the rear of W Force, and towards Kozani and Larissa. Much of Greeces fate,
therefore, as always, rested on Yugoslav powers of resistance.44
43Signature, I.A. und I.V., Oberkommando des Heeres, Generalstab des Heeres, Qu IV
Abt. Fr. H. Ost (I) Nr. 1126/41 geh., 25 March 1941, Vortragsnotiz. Wahrscheinliche
griechische Kampffhrung., BA MA RH 20-12/211, pp. 1-2; entry for 1 April 1941, Richthofen
diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 145; Fighting in Yugoslavia and Greece, reviewed and edited by
Field Marshal S.W. List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2;
McClymont, To Greece, p. 158; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 73; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands
1941, pp. 441-2.
44Signature, 9. Panzer Division, Ia Nr. 126/41 g.Kdos., 27 March 1941, Div. Befehl Nr. 6
fr den Einmarsch in Griechenland., BA MA RH 27-9/3, pp. 1-5; The mission of the Army
and its battle formations, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and General H.
von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; Tippelskirch, Der Deutsche Balkanfeldzug
1941, p. 54; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 74; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 117-29; Long,
Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 122; MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume III,
p. 481; McClymont, To Greece, p. 158.
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chapter five
Figure 5.2:A group of German soldiers march down a Bulgarian street lined with military
and civilians towards the Greek frontier. (Source: Australian War Memorial: P02767.007)
The implications of the Yugoslav coup, and Hitlers subsequent decision

to invade Yugoslavia and Greece simultaneously, also influenced the Luftwaffes plans to support the 12th Army. The original Greek operation envisaged the 8th Flying Corps, commanded by General Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofena distant relative of the German World War I flying ace Manfred von Richthofen (the Red Baron)operating primarily in support of
the 18th Corps attack on the Doiran-Nestos Line. Richthofens force consisted of 280 bombers, 150 Stuka dive-bombers, 90 fighters, 90 twin-engine
fighter-bombers, and 40 reconnaissance planes. With Lists new plan to
despatch Stummes 40th Corps concurrently into southern Yugoslavia, Richthofen was forced to split his resources. On 27-28 March his air corps was
supplemented in the Balkan theatre as a result of Reich Marshal Hermann
Goerings decision to transfer an additional 576 aircraft from Sicily, France
and Germany to Richthofens parent formation, the Luftwaffes Air Fleet
Four, under General Alexander Lhr, to form a second Balkan attack group
south of Vienna. On 2 April the 8th Flying Corps was directly reinforced
with three more groups of dive bombers, transferred without ground units
to Bulgaria. It was expected that the Luftwaffe effort in Greece and southern Yugoslavia would be further supplemented by another 168 on call
aircraft from the 10th Flying Corps mounting missions from Sicily. Finally,
Amyndaion
Det
Siatista
Grevena
Bde
20 Gk
Div
Kalabaka
12 Gk
Div
Yiannitsa
D/26
Mt Olympus
2917
5 NZ Bde
Katerini
NZ Div
1 UK Armd Bde
patrols
Tirnavos
16 Aust Bde
Kozani
Ptolemais
Amyndaion
Lake
Vegorritis
Florina 1 UK Armd Edessa
Monastir
Prilep
Kilkis
Salonika
Platamon
Serrai
72 Div
Nestos
Bde
Xanthi
AEGEAN
SEA
Kavalla
17 Gk Div
Drama
B U LG A R IA
20 miles
40 kilometres
164 Div
Map 5.1:The German Plan of Attack and Allied Positions, 5 April 1941
Pinios
Gorge
Lake
Doiran
Rupel Pass
72 Div
14 Gk Div
5 Mtn Div
and 125 Regt
2 Pz Div and
6 Mtn Div
18 Gk Div
19 Gk Krousion Det
Div
NZ Div Cav
Y U G OSL AV IA
km
on
ia
Al
Kastoria
9 Pz Div, 73 Div and

Adolf Hitler Regt
(attacking south after

crossing the Yugoslavia border
and moving to Skopje)
Evros Bde
Alexandroupolis
Komotini
50 Div
TURKEY
TURKEY
Edirne

135
136
chapter five
for airborne operations, the 11th Flying Corps was made available near
Bucharest. Hastily rearranged German air plans for Yugoslavia and Greece,
therefore, amounted to the use of a full quarter of the entire Luftwaffe,
around 1000 aircraftin Richthofens words, a very powerful fleet strength
indeed.45
British intelligence was well-informed about the change to German plans
caused by the Yugoslav coup, particularly the Luftwaffe aspects, but such
information did not give rise to any fixed plans as to what might be done
to counter them. In any case, back in Athens, before any Allied plans to
exploit the Yugoslav coup could come to fruition, firm military commitments from Belgrade were required. In response to British requests for
discussions, the Yugoslavs initially agreed to a meeting with Eden and Dill,
but then drew back and accepted a secret visit by Dill only. Dill arrived in
Belgrade, incognito, on the evening of 1 April and departed the next morning. During the meeting Dill assured Simovi that Salonika was covered by
the Greeks and that the British would strengthen the line so long as the
Yugoslavsonce a German attack was launchedthemselves advanced
into the upper Struma Valley (thus protecting the exposed west flank of
the EMFAS), and attacked into Albania with an eye to the early release of
Greek divisions for the Macedonian front. Dill suggested that formal staff
talks begin at once if these conditions were acceptable. However, to Dills
surprise and consternation, he found Simovi reluctant to commit to anything concrete. The new Yugoslav Premier would sign no proposals and
promised military support only if the Germans attacked Salonika. Nor was
he prepared to establish direct military liaison with the Greeks or British
until after the fighting began. Dill concluded that the new Yugoslav government, having succeeded in its coup, was now unsure of what to do next. It
was all Dill could do to arrange another meeting, this time at Kenali near
the Greek-Yugoslav border. These talks were to be between General Jankovi,
Director of Operations of the Yugoslav Army, Papagos and Wilson. The
immediate outlook was not quite as promising as the potential of the coup
had implied.46
45Entry for 5 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 147. An Abridged History of
the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 181; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 149; Playfair, The
Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 85; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy,
1939-1941, p. 220; MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume III, pp. 492-3.
46Telegram, Mr. Campbell (Belgrade) to Athens, 31 March 1941, No. 263., Following
for Secretary of State from Chief of Imperial General Staff, TNA FO 371/30208; telegram,
Dill to War Office, 31 March 1941, TNA WO 106/3132; Summary of War Cabinet conclusions
dealing with the Balkans and the Middle East and with military assistance to Greece,
137
The proposed meeting between Jankovi, Wilson and Papagos went

ahead in a railcar on the evening of 3 April. After being delayed by a train
break-down, Jankovi arrived at 9.00 p.m. and the meeting began an hour
later. From the very outset, however, it appeared there were some serious
misconceptions about its purpose. Wilson and Papagos expected to make
joint military plans to defeat the Italians in Albania and foil a German invasion from Bulgaria. Jankovi, on the other hand, was prepared to discuss
common action only insofar as it pertained to responding to a German
attack against Salonika. Yugoslavia would enter the war, Jankovi confirmed,
only if this key port was threatened. In such a circumstance Jankovi suggested that, while the Greeks in their forts on the right bank of Struma held,
a combined British/Yugoslav attack might be mounted against the line
Petrich-Djumaya-Kystendilthe flank and rear of the likely German advancewith the Yugoslav government reserving the right to decide when
to launch it. For this plan he astounded Wilson by asking for a British armoured division and four infantry divisions to concentrate in the StrumicaDoiran area northwest of Lake Doiran, along with the largest possible RAF
presence to negate the inevitable Luftwaffe swamping of the Yugoslav air
force. A shocked Wilson told Jankovi of the forces actually available. Now
it was Jankovis turn to be surprised and disappointed. He claimed that
five British divisions had been discussed by Dill at his earlier meeting with
Simovi. Such news could have done nothing to steel Yugoslav resolve and
Jankovi refused to leave his single paper copy of his proposed plan with
either Wilson or Papagos.47
Aside from the specific problems and misunderstandings regarding potential joint action to defend Salonika, Papagos did his best to convince
Jankovi that the Yugoslavs should deploy as much as possible of their sizable army of just under a million men (fully mobilised), into southern Serbia. The Greek commander stressed the dangers to both countries should
Germans burst through the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border and advance towards
the Skopje plateau, and from there towards Monastir. Papagos suggested
these concentrated Yugoslav forces should advance and capture the Ograzohen Ridge as the easiest way to defend southern Serbia and thus block the
14 January 1941 to 21 April 1941. NAA A5954, 626/6; entries for 1 and 2 April 1941, Eden Greece
diary, UBCRL AP 20/3/2; Hinsley, British Intelligence Volume One, pp. 370-2; Dockrill, British
Strategy in Greece, the Aliakmon Line, p. 114.
47Telegram, Wilson to Wavell, 5 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3132; entry for 3 April 1941,
Eden Greece diary, UBCRL AP 20/3/2; telegram, Sir M. Lampson to Belgrade, 6 April
1941, TNA FO 371/29815.
138
chapter five
upper Axios River valley and the corridor west to Monastir-Prilep. Jankovi,
however, had neither the inclination nor authority to make any such undertaking. He suggested that the Yugoslav 5th Army (the equivalent of a
British corps) already allocated to defend southern Serbia, stationed between Kriva Planka and the Greek border, would be enough to blunt any
German advance from Bulgaria into the Struma Valley. But that was all. No
additional forces would be withdrawn from the northern Yugoslav frontiers
to defend the south.48
With respect to potential joint Greek-Yugoslav offensive action in Albania, another of Papagos long-term hopes, at the Greek generals insistence
all three representatives agreed on the possibility of some sort of combined
offensive, with Tirana and Valona as the objectives. The hope remained
that swift success would free up forces that could then be used against the
Germans to the east. Lieutenant General Tsolakoglou, commanding the
WMFAS, had only recently informed Papagos that if Italian troops to his
front were removed, he could redeploy his five divisions to the Struma Valley in 12 days, or faster with British transport. However, as was the case for
plans discussed regarding action to defend Salonika and southern Yugoslavia, details were scant, binding agreements absent, and real planning lax
and inadequate. Apart from a number of vague promises and generalisations the meeting of 3 April provided no real coordination for common
defence. Jankovi departed at 2.00 a.m., 4 April, four hours after arriving,
and thus ended, wrote Wilson, one of the most unusual and at the same
time most unsatisfactory conferences I have ever attended.49
There were a number of important reasons for Yugoslav hesitancy at
this key point. First, Simovi realised (to a far greater extent than the Greeks
or British) the real extent of Yugoslav military weakness. Despite its size,
the Yugoslav army, like the Greek, possessed very few anti-air and anti-tank
weapons of the type needed to meet any German armoured advance. This
was compounded by the fact that the Yugoslav border defences were unfinished and at their weakest in the Struma and Strumica Valleysthe
most likely avenues of German thrust into southern Yugoslavia. Second,
48Summary of War Cabinet conclusions dealing with the Balkans and the Middle East
and with military assistance to Greece, 14 January 1941 to 21 April 1941, NAA A5954, 626/6;
Dockrill, British Strategy in Greece, the Aliakmon Line, p. 114; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas,
p. 80; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 34.
49Telegram, British Military Mission to Wavell, TNA WO 106/2446; telegram, Wilson
to Wavell, 5 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3132; Greek Campaign 1940-41, TNA WO 201/124; Long,
Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 40; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 82-3; Blau, Invasion Balkans!,
p. 73.

Yugoslav hesitancy was in part motivated by the political complexities of
holding the country together, and partly too by a hope that invasion could
be staved off by a policy of trying not to give Germany a pretext for military
action against itwhile at the same time recognizing the largely forlorn
nature of such a hope. The latter motive was thus similar to the Greek insistence on Wilsons incognito visit as Mr Watt. Such factors directly impinged on the speed of Yugoslav mobilisation. Reservists were not called
up, for example, until three days after the coup. Last, the reality was that
after the coup Simovi had no real chance of re-concentrating Yugoslav
forces south in the time available with so few railways and such little transport availableeven if he had wanted to. In the wake of his brief meeting
with Jankovi, Wilson concluded that the Yugoslavs were in a defeatist
moodJankovi might have called it a realist moodand that their plans
were confused and underdeveloped. This confirmed to both Wilson and
Dill (as if they needed more convincing) that the Doiran-Nestos Line could
not be held. Wilson would sit firm on the Vermion-Olympus Line, gazing
apprehensively towards the Monastir Gap.50
From an Axis perspective, the impending German invasions of Greece
and Yugoslavia brought significant implications for Germanys Balkan allies.
Yet following the coup in Belgrade, rushed German invasion plans took
little account of their military capabilities. The Germans required no combat power from any Balkan nation, and German plans were never going to
be beholden to or reliant upon external agencies. Thus Germanys allies
were not so much consulted but rather directed to conduct operations
that would facilitate the German dual offensive without unduly interfering.
Together with German units already resident in the country, Romania was
to provide a measure of protection against the USSRnot that Soviet interference was expected. Hungary undertook to support Germany against
Yugoslavia in order to recover its lost province of Banat, northwest of Belgrade. For its part, although offered part of Yugoslav Macedonia as a reward,
and prepared to declare war, Bulgaria refused to participate in immediate
hostilities. Bulgarian authorities did, however, agree to leave defensive
50Anglo-Greek-Yugoslav discussions at Florina 3rd April, 1941, TNA WO 201/53; H.M.
Wilson, Report on Greek campaign, TNA WO201/53; Ein berblick ber die Operationen
des jugoslawischen Heeres im April 1941. (Dargestellt nach jugoslawischen Quellen.) I. Teil,.
Die Mobilmachung und die Kmpfe vom 6. bis 8. April., Militrwissenschaftliche Rundschau,
7/4 (1942), pp. 276-9; Tippelskirch, Der Deutsche Balkanfeldzug 1941, pp. 59-60; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 77; MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume III, pp. 493-4;
Dockrill, British Strategy in Greece, the Aliakmon Line, p. 114; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands
1941, pp. 112-14.
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forces on the Turkish frontier, and to occupy conquered territory close to

its Yugoslav border in the wake of a successful German advance.51
A conference regarding the impending Balkan operation between Italian
and German representatives took place on 29 March, two days after the
Yugoslav coup. However, as Halder did not expect the Italians would be
prepared to offer any significant material military assistance in support of
the planned German invasions, Italy was asked only to continue to use the
9th and 11th Italian Armies to push south from Albania (west of the Pindus
towards Yannina), to provide increased security in northern Albania, and
to complement operations in Yugoslavia by using elements of the 2nd Italian Army to invade the northeastern part of Slovenia.52 The Italians were
never happy with the German plan. At an operational level General Mario
Roatta, Chief of the Italian General Staff, for example, wanted Weichs 2nd
Army to relieve the pressure on his own formations with an advance southwest towards Albania rather than southeast on Belgrade. Politically, the
Germans had even more of a challenge in that they had to assuage Mussolinis pride by giving the impression and appearance of joint action, while
in fact keeping the Italians in a subservient role. This was no easy task.
Initially, Italian dissatisfaction went as far as at first to decline the German
request for a simultaneous Italian push against Slovenia. In the end Hitler
solved the issue by writing to Mussolini explaining his reluctant decision
for the invasion and stressing Mussolinis key role of holding in Albania
and repelling any potential Yugoslav attack there. He also proposed to
51MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume III, p. 486; McClymont, To Greece,
p. 158.
52The Italian 2nd Army consisted of the 5th Corps (two infantry divisions), 6th Corps
(two infantry and a mountain division), 11th Corps (two infantry and a mountain division),
a Motorised Corps (one armoured and two motorised divisions), a Cavalry Corps of three
cavalry divisions, and significant other reinforcements. As it panned out the Italian 14th
Corps (two mountain divisions and a cavalry regiment) and 17th Corps (an armoured division, a mountain division, an infantry division, seven Blackshirt legions and a cavalry regiment), both of the 9th Italian Army, were also used to attack into Yugoslavia, but from the
Albanian front. Italian troops tasked to continue their attacks into Greece from Albania in
conjunction with the German invasion included the 3rd Corps (three infantry and a mountain division) and the 26th Corps (two infantry and a mountain division) from the 9th
Italian Army. They also included, from the 11th Italian Army, the 4th Corps (two mountain
divisions), the 8th Corps (four infantry divisions), and the 16th Corps (six infantry and a
mountain division). This combined 9th/11th Army Group had another four infantry divisions
and a mountain division in reserve. MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume
III, p. 486; http://www.comandosupremo.com/Yugoslavia.html; Invasion of Greece, 6 April
1941, <http://www.comandosupremo.com/Greece1941.html>, accessed 19 March 2011; entry
for 30 March 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, p. 337.
141
i nform Mussolini personally of his own wishes and intentions as they arose.
The Duce could then issue orders in line with German policy without appearing as a puppet. Mussolini told the German Ambassador at 2.00 a.m.,
6 April, that he was in full agreement.53
With both German and Allied decisions made and plans for Greece set
in motion, the last few days of March and the first days of April nonetheless
saw a number of significant developments. First, the naval Battle of Matapan took place on the night of 28-29 March. With the advantage of signals
intelligence concerning the location of the Italian fleet, during the action
the Royal Navy sank two Italian cruisers and a light cruiser for the loss of
one British aircraft. The German-instigated objective of the Italian fleet
had been to attack British lines of communication to Greece, but after this
loss the Regia Marina stayed mostly in port and played very little part in
the coming campaign. Matapan therefore secured the British sea flanks
from surface attack.54 In addition, Rommel had from 24 March opened a
spectacular if unsanctioned offensive to recover Cyrenaica in North Africa.
Anxious messages from Wavell to Eden ensued. In weighing the balance of
risks in sending W Force to Greece Middle East Command never expressed
doubt as to its ability to hold in the Western Desert. But Egypt is the base
upon which everything depends, wrote Eden, and to lose it would be worst
calamity.55 Meanwhile in Greece, Wilson, still looking towards Monastir
from his battle headquarters near the village of Tsaritsani on the main
Larissa-Florina Road, formally ordered the Amyndaion Detachment to
close the Florina-Kozani Gap.56 Blamey simultaneously ordered Mackay
to reroute the 2/8th and 2/4th Australian Battalions of the recently arrived
19th Australian Brigade, to the Kozani area to further reinforce Lees small
force. It was by now, however, quite clear that the time for organisation and
preparation had passed. Acting on information received late on 5 April an
order was issued by Greek General Headquarters to demolish all installations forward of the Doiran-Nestos Line. The Germans were on their way.57
23 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; K. Vavouskos, Political Consequences of the 1940-41 War
on the Balkan (Aimos) Peninsula, International Congress for the 50 Years from the 1940-1941
Epopee and the Battle for Crete, p. 73; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 50-1; Cruickshank,
Greece 194041, pp. 137-9.
54Hinsley, British Intelligence Volume One, pp. 405-6.
55Entry for 4 March 1941, Eden Greece diary, UBCRL AP 20/3/2.
56British Troops in Greece Operation Instruction No. 8, 5 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/26.
57Extract from the 64th Medium Regiment War Diary, 3 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1492;
1 Aust Corps Operational Instruction No. 2, 5 April 1041, AWM 54, 534/2/23; extract from
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chapter five
Although by 6 April Allied plans to defend Greece were in place, the true
state of affairs for the defenders was much more confused than a straightforward description of units, their roles and their locations implies. For
example, despite the growing importance of the Monastir Gap, on 4 April
3 RTR was ordered to withdraw and a portion of the battalion had loaded
onto railcars, only to unload again the next morning. Two days earlier, as a
consequence of fear of German infiltration and parachute attack, W Force
released an order that on receipt of code word fighting all British troops
in base areas would wear a metal disc (cigarette tin type) on their necks to
identify themselvesbut this did not apply to Greeks. Nor at this stage was
effective liaison established between the CMFAS and W Force headquarters.
In fact, Kotoulas complained on 5 April that his men had been engaging
RAF aircraft because no one had bothered to inform him of forecast flights.58
If any element of the German invasion plan was weak, it was the extent
and accuracy of the intelligence on which it was based. The Germans knew
that the bulk of the Greek Army was engaged in Albania. The extent and
exact nature of the Doiran-Nestos fortifications, however, was not known
to the 12th Armythe Greeks had largely used labour from the islands for
its construction so the German intelligence services got little from talking
to and monitoring the local population. Bulgarian intelligence was also
unaware of the strength of the Greek fortifications. German planners knew
that the Greek fortress units of the Doiran-Nestos Line had field formations
in support, but had little information about which or how many. German
intelligence also provided List with an incorrect estimation of three Greek
divisions stationed in the Florina area with no clear picture of reserves or
indeed anything further south. The same lack of accurate information also
applied to southern Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav concentrations in the upper
Morava valley, mainly around Skopje and Veles, were over-estimated at 16
divisions. Indeed, had German intelligence provided a more accurate picture of what the 12th Army faced, that is, a significantly inferior force than
Headquarters Anzac Medium Artillery War Diary, 4 April 1941, TNA WO 196/1490; minutes
of meeting between Wilson and Kotoulas, 5 April 941, AWM 54, 234/2/23; S.F. Rowell, The
campaign in Greece, April 1941, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A), [1-4]; letter, Atchison to
Wards, 15 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; letter, Sutherland to Wards, 12
March 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; diary of Corporal R.F. White, ANZ ADQZ 18902,
WAII3/1/2; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 80.
58Greece 1941: Diary of 81. Adv. Base Sub Area with Addenda, Brigadier L. Parrington,
IWM, 76/118/2; minutes of meeting between Wilson and Kotoulas, 5 April 1941, AWM 54,
234/2/23; Greek Campaign 1940-41, TNA WO 201/124; Crisp, The gods were neutral, p. 101.

that estimated, List would perhaps have been even more confident of success.59
What then might be concluded from the preceding examination of the
Allied and German operational planning process for the Greek campaign
from mid-March to 6 April? The first and most obvious element is the
surprising battlefield optimism of those who brought about the deployment of W Force. The Greeks had no choice but either to defend their
homeland or else surrender upon a German attack. The British, on the
other hand, chose to become involved. The wisdom of that decision will
be discussed at length in Chapter 18. The point, however, is that such optimism was maintained throughout, and, in turn, influenced the planning
process despite the obvious military weaknesses of the Allied position. On
7 March Eden noted that we are all convinced, not only that there is a
reasonable fighting chance but that we have here the opportunity, if fortune
favours us, of perhaps seriously upsetting the German plan.60 On 18 March
the British Chiefs of Staff maintained, without any real discernible reason
or justification other than pure optimism, that there was a reasonable
chance of holding [the] German attack, thereby encouraging Turks and
Yugoslavia to resist.61 Understandably ignorant of the bigger picture, such
sentiments were often reflected by W Force troops. Lieutenant R.A. Barnett,
of 102nd Anti-tank Regiment, described his unit as full of confidence.62
Dill and Eden left Greece on 5 April without the opportunity to witness
firsthand the fruits of what they had set in motion. Wilson, for his part, had
a clearer sense of reality when he wrote, upon assuming command of
59At the beginning of April 1941 the German Army contained 124 infantry, fourteen
armoured, eight motorised, six mountain and one cavalry division. Although the proportion
of overall German troop numbers to be committed to the Balkan campaign was small, the
proportion of Germanys most powerful formations was high with six of the twelve available
armoured divisions and four of the six mountain divisions deployed. Signature [Siebeck?].
Oberleutnant u. Ic, Abt. Ic, 6.Geb.Division, 15 May 1941, Ttigkeitsbericht der Abt. Ic., BA
MA RH 28-6/10, pp. 4-5; The mission of the Army and its battle formations reviewed and
edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54,
624/7/2; The German Balkan Campaign, Major L. Glombik, Intelligence Officer, 12th Army,
23 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; entry for 9.50 a.m., 9 April 1941, Generalkommando XXX.A.K.,
Abteilung Ic, TTIGKEITSBERICHT SDOST BEGONNEN AM 9.1.1941 IN ROSIORII DE
VEDE BEENDET AM 21.5.1941 IN KAWALLA GEFHRT DURCH OBLT. HAMMER, O.3 VOM
9.1. BIS 21.5.1941, BA MA RH 24-30/110, pp. 32-3.
60Cablegram, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to (Australian) Prime Ministers
Department, 14 March 1941, NAA A1608, E41/1/3.
61Telegram, Chiefs of Staff to Commander-in-Chief Far East, 18 March 1941, TNA CAB
79/10.
62Letter, Barnett to anon., 5 January 1942, IWM 07/23/1.
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W Force, that the prospect was not too cheerful and one envied the Commander who had a firm base from which to fight a campaign; ours might
be described as flimsy.63 My new command, he lamented, was likely to
be a pretty tough one.64
Many of the manifold weaknesses of the Allied line have already been
noted but some of the more important merit further emphasis. The DoiranNestos Line, strong as it was, was open to being turned on its left flank by
a thrust through southeastern Yugoslavia. There was nothing to stop such
a push, but difficult terrain and faith in the Yugoslavs. In Albania, though
holding their line, the troops of the EFAS and WMFAS, having absorbed
the Italian Tepelene offensive, were exhausted and short of supplies.65
Moreover, to the east of the Greek Albanian armies and to the west of the
Vermion-Olympus Line, lay the Monastir Gap. Again, this natural invasion
route into Macedonia was defended primarily by reliance on the Yugoslavs
to keep the Germans out of Serbia, and by the token Amyndaion Detachment. If this gap was forced, W Force and the Greek divisions in Albania
would be split and the path to Florina, then Kozani, Larissa and Athens
would be open. Fortunately for the Allies, the Germans had noted the Monastir Gap as a potential axis of advance, but poor intelligence had, at this
stage, convinced List to keep his main effort with the 18th Corps against
the Doiran-Nestos Line.66
There is no question that, in this context, the Allied plan to defend Greece
was weak. But too much blame for the compromise scheme that split the
defenders between Albania, Thrace, Vermion and Florina has traditionally
been laid at Papagos door. Splitting forces, particularly between the DoiranNestos and Vermion-Olympus positions, was inherently dangerous and
most British and Dominion post-campaign reports, for example, blamed
64Ibid., p. 66.
65The Germans consistently underestimated the scale of the Tepelene Offensive and
its impact on the Greeks. Signature, Generalstab des Heeres, Abt Frd Heere West (IV) Nr.
104 /41 g.Kdos. Chefsache, 6 March 1941, BA MA RH 2/1928.
66In this scenario the Vermion-Olympus right wing could stay put, while units would
be withdrawn from Veria (Australian) and Edessa (Greek) to form a new line running
Olympus-Servia-Grevena. The roads south of Florina and Kastoria would thus remain
blocked to the Germans. Under such an eventuality Papagos might then withdraw the
armies in Albania to link with the left hand of W Force and form a continuous running
east-west across the country. This was the original Greek Aliakmon-Venetikos Line concept.
It was theoretically possible, provided such moves could be made in time, in contact with
the enemy, and that W Force withdrawals could be mirrored to the west by the WMFAS
and the EFAS, which would need to conform, with next to no transport of their own, or risk
being cut off. Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 122; McClymont, To Greece, p. 128.

Greek stubbornness for a plan which on practical lines should have abandoned. The Doiran-Nestos Line ought to have been abandoned for a defence
of the much shorter and naturally formidable Vermion-Olympus Line.67
This line of argument, however, ignores the unavoidable Greek strategic
necessity of defending forward. Papagos was always locked into encouraging and facilitating Yugoslav involvement, which would have been ruled
out had the Doiran-Nestos Line stood empty. The decision to split available
forces in Macedonia was, therefore, was essentially one to be made, by
default, by the British. Wilson could defend forward with the Greeks, or on
the Vermion-Olympus Line. He chose the latter. When, for the few days
prior to the coup it seemed Papagos hopes for Yugoslavia were dashed, the
Greek Commander-in Chief ordered a withdrawal from the Doiran-Nestos
Line. That his decision was so rapidly reversed was a return to the basic
and indisputable strategic logic that had long guided his actions.
At the same time it is true that there were sound strategic factors, from
a British perspective, which made the Vermion-Olympus Line an attractive
option, not least of which was that it offered the opportunity to retreat
while the Doiran-Nestos Line was more of an all-or-nothing calculation
which risked the loss of W Force in its entirety. It must be emphasized at
this point that preliminary plans for a potential W Force evacuation from
Greece had already begun before the Germans launched their attack.
Largely due to his own insistence on the importance of such contingency
planning, Major Freddie de Guingand, of the Middle East Joint Planning
Staff, had already been sent to Athens to discuss such a possibility with
Wilson and other senior officers. Special reconnaissance of various beaches was conducted prior to 6 April which, according to Brunskill, was at least
partly for the purpose of a possible evacuation. Such actions at this stage
were by no means a British betrayal as much as sound contingency planningbut they do indicate from the very beginning that the possible need
for a withdrawal south was in the back of Wilsons mind. Such a withdrawal would have been all but impossible had W Force moved forward to
the Doiran-Nestos Line. The important point here is that responsibility cuts
both ways. If the compromise plan was a bad one, it was as much a consequence of British priorities and agendas as Greek.68
67A summary of the participation of the A.I.F. in the Lustreforce Expedition in Greece
March-April, 1941 AWM 54, 534/5/7.
68G.S. Brunskill, The Administrative Aspect of the Campaign in Greece in 1941, October 1949, AWM 113, 5/2/5; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas 1939-1947, p. 75.
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With all of this in mind the defining problem of the Allied planning
process was always Yugoslavia. Belgrades ambiguous posture until the last
moment created intractable problems. Unlike the Germans who, though
unbalanced by the implications of the Yugoslav coup, were able to react
quickly enough to adjust their schemes, the Allies remained caught in a
planning dilemma. Inexplicably, however, given Yugoslavia was so central
to Allied decision-making, there was little Anglo-Greek effort, and even
less success, in establishing effective military liaison. Edens diplomacy,
Dills last-minute dash to Belgrade, and the unproductive 3 April meeting
at Kenali were all grossly insufficient in this regard. In truth, beyond Greek
faith born of necessity and vague British apprehensions, on the eve of the
German invasion neither knew much about Yugoslav intentions or capabilities. Certainly nothing was guaranteed. Nor were there any mechanisms
for continuing liaison with the Yugoslavs in place once the fighting began.
Policy, strategy and operational planning in this regard were clearly out of
alignment. This issue, perhaps more than any controversy surrounding the
almost inevitable splitting of Allied forces, illustrates the inadequacy of
Greek and British planning efforts. Of course the Germans, with no reliance
of third-party actions or capabilities, had no such quandaries.69
69Report of activities in Greece Apr 41 by Lt. Col. R.R. Vial, 12 January 1945, AWM 54,
534/2/32; Draft notes on the Greek campaign, G. Long, AWM 3DRL 8052/109; Kanakaris,
The Greco-German War 1941, p. 107.
PART TWO
THE DRAMA UNFOLDS
148
chapter five
opening moves (6-7 april)
149
Chapter Six
Opening moves (6-7 April)

At 5.15 a.m. on 6 April 1941Palm Sundaywithout any of the typical
diplomatic precursors such as an ultimatum, German troops struck simultaneously into Greece and southern Yugoslavia. Fifteen minutes after the
leading 12th Army units had begun to move the German ambassador, Prince
Viktor zu Erbach-Schnberg, delivered a note to Koryzis alleging that Greek
neutrality had been breached and that a German invasion had, as a consequence, begun. Germany could no longer tolerate, the message explained,
continuing and overt Greek military cooperation with Britain which included the acceptance of British guarantees, staff conventions, military
bases on Greek islands placed at British disposal, and the acceptance of
British military support, including whole units, during the ongoing ItaloGreek war. The risk to Germany of a front in southeast Europe was too great.
Nevertheless, the note falsely emphasized, the attack would be aimed at
the British not the Greeks. Koryzis replied that he refused to accept German
occupation and that Greece would resist, just as it had against the Italians.
The simultaneous German attack on Yugoslavia was launched without even
the pretence of such diplomatic niceties. Hitler ordered the operation begun with the intensive bombing of Belgrade under the codename Retributionpresumably as a consequence of the coup mixed with the Serbian
legacy of World War I. From Athens, at 8.00 a.m. the Greek people were
informed that: Since 0515 hrs, the German Army that was in Bulgaria all of
a sudden attacked our troops on the Greek-Bulgarian border. Our troops
are defending our fatherland.1 Eden sent a message to the Greek Prime
Minister assuring him that Great Britain is with you until the end ... Your
fight is ours. We shall defend your soil as if it were our own.2 All
German nationals in Athens, including the German Legation, were immediately confined to their houses. Before news of the German invasion
was publicly released, a number of street demonstrations were already
1An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 186; Bitzes, Hellas
and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 220.
2Message (draft), 6 April 1941, Eden to Koryzis, TNA FO 371/29815.
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underway in the capital. Somehow, however, they seemed to lack the spontaneous enthusiasm that marked similar protests on 28 October 1940.3
As the spearhead units of the 12th Army moved, Hitler gave his personal perspective on unfolding events in a proclamation to the German
people. He placed the Balkan campaign in a broader perspective of a British plan to conquer the world in conspiracy with Jewish high finance, British schemes in goading Poland to provoke Germany, the failed attempt to
attack the German right flank in Norway, and British use of France as a cats
paw to threaten the Ruhr. Rejecting peace proposals, Hitler contended,
Churchill then tried to direct attacks against Italy in North Africa. Ideological and anti-Allied rhetoric to one side, Hitler quite accurately claimed
that it had always been a British (and French) hope to make the Balkans
an active theatre on the model of the previous war. While Hitler had no
direct quarrel with the Greeks, Germany, in his words, shall never, as in the
World War, tolerate a Power establishing itself on Greek territory with the
object, given time, of being able to advance thence from the southeast into
German living space.4 Hitler also pointed to the British involvement in the
Yugoslav coup. The same Serbian plotters, he railed, who plunged the world
into misery by assassinating the Archduke in Sarajevo in 1914, had provoked
a force which would now destroy them!5 May the unfortunate, misguided
peoples of Yugoslavia, he mused, recognise that they owe this solely to the
worst friend the continent has had for the last 300 years and still has
Britain!6 Meanwhile, German diplomats in Turkey assured their hosts that
the attack was a consequence of British troop concentrations in Greece
and staff talks between them and the Yugoslavs. This was not a conquest,
and the removal of British troops was the only limited objective. The German Ambassador in Ankara sought to confirm Turkish intentions and was
pleased to inform Berlin his hosts would not likely become involved.7
3Text of German note the Greek Government (Transocean), 9 April 1941, TNA FO
371/28855; telegram, Palairet to General Headquarters, Middle East, 6 April 1941, TNA FO
371/28855; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 221; MGFA,
Germany and the Second World War, Volume III, p. 497.
4Proclamation of the Fuhrer to the German People, within German White Book
Containing Documents Relating to the conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece, 6 April 1941,
TNA FO 371/29803.
5Ibid.
6Ibid.
7Official statement of the German Government dated April 6, 1941, within German
White Book Containing Documents Relating to the conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece,
6 April 1941, TNA FO 371/29803; memos (from Greek sources), Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen
151
The first German blow fell on Yugoslavia with the Luftwaffes attack on
Belgrade, which began without warning at 5.30 a.m., 6 Apriljust as the
Yugoslavs were signing a friendship pact with the Soviets aimed at deterring
German aggression. Within an hour half the city was aflame with around
17,000 dead. In terms of scale this was a greater singular loss from aerial
bombardment than at any time during the Blitz against Britain. Although
Greeks feared an equivalent attack on Athens, this did not occur. Hitler had
given orders that the city should not be bombed because of its cultural
significance.8
In addition to killing thousands, the attack paralysed the command
centres of the Yugoslav military and state. The Yugoslav air force was quickly all but eliminated, and after the first air raid, Simovi was forced to flee
the capital. From this point onwards he was unable to re-establish continuous contact with the military and other state institutions. In desperation Simovi issued an order to all units to act according to their own
judgement, without waiting for higher instructions. On the ground in northern Yugoslavia Weichs 2nd Army conducted its preliminary operations,
the most important of which was to secure passage across narrow mountain
border roads and the swollen Drava and Sava rivers. In the face of weak
frontier resistance, these important bridges were taken intact and many
prisoners fell into German hands. Deserters from the Yugoslav air force flew
to Graz in Austria to surrender themselves and their aircraft. Nonetheless,
the difficulty of movement encouraged von Brauchitsch to wait until
10 April, in accordance with the original plan, before launching the main
2nd Army thrust against Belgrade. With recent political turmoil, split military loyalties, and general command disorganisation, well-organized Yugoslav resistance in the north to this push, from anything other than small
(Ankara) to Foreign Office, 9 April 1941, TNA FO 371/29814; cablegram, Secretary of State
for Dominion Affairs to (Australian) Prime Ministers Department, 6 April 1941, NAA A816,
19/301/1061; J.S. Blunt, Military Attach, Athens, 8 January 1940, Greek Military situation,
pp. 1-2; Reddes, Paris, letter to Captain A.W. Clarke, Anglo-French liaison Section, War
Cabinet Secretariat, 23 January 1940, pp. 1-3; Lt. Col. Clarke, Military Attach, Belgrade to
H.M. Minister, pp. 1-2: all in TNA CAB 21/1179.
8Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, pp. 142-52; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 48; entry for 8 April
1941, Goebbels Tagebcher, Band 4, p. 576; H. Boog, The Luftwaffe and Indiscriminate Bombing up to 1942, in H. Boog, (ed.) , The conduct of the air war in the Second World War: an
international comparison: proceedings of the International Conference of Historians in Freiburg
im Breisgau, Federal Republic of Germany, from 29 August to 2 September 1988, Berg, Oxford,
1992, pp. 393-4. For the Luftwaffes role in the Yugoslav campaign more generally: K.
Gundelach, Die deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer 1940-1945 Band 1, Europische Hochschulschriften Reihe III Band 136, Peter D. Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1981, pp. 167-77.
152
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determined groups, was not likely to be high. Meanwhile, the Italian 2nd
Army crossed the Julian Alps, and began to move into Yugoslavia with an
advance in the direction of Ljubljana, and along the Adriatic coast in Croatia. The Italians encountered only limited resistance from the 7th Yugoslav
Army stationed in the region and subsequently occupied parts of Slovenia,
Croatia, and the coast of Dalmatia. The Italian air force attacked the port
of Spalato and an air base at Mostar among other targets. In response, a
few surviving Yugoslav aircraft raided Scutari in Albania.9
The 12th Armys attack into southeastern Serbia, defended closest to the
Bulgarian border by the 7th Yugoslav Division, also began at dawn on 6
April. Stummes 40th Corps divided its forces into two columnson the
right the 9th Armoured Division and the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler
Regiment (henceforth Adolf Hitler Regiment) moved through the pass at
Kriva Palanka towards the Axios sector of Skopje, and south of it, by way
of Kriva and Kumanovo. Meanwhile, on the left Stummes 73rd Division
column advanced from Gorna Dzhumaya, via Carevo Selo-Stip, to Veles in
the upper Axios valley. The timing of the attack could not have been worse
for the Yugoslav defenders in southern Serbia. Tens of thousands of troops
were on the march in the south, carrying packs and rifles, with their baggage in oxen trainsand that is how the Luftwaffe found them. Almost
240 kilometres of almost stationary Yugoslav columns were subsequently
bombed and machine gunned. This was the end for the local reinforcements
which would have been used to guard the southern passes from Bulgaria
had they begun moving at an earlier date. Nonetheless, the Yugoslav defenders who were in position managed, initially, to delay Stummes motorised column by stiff resistance, obstructions and road blocks along the
mountain passes. The 73rd Division was similarly, and momentarily, delayed
near Cerevo Selo. After several hours, however, resistance slackened and
the first large groups of Yugoslav prisoners began appearing. By evening
two German divisions had reached the Axios River, in an area east of Kumanovo and Kocane. Stummes heavy forces moved up during the night in
preparation for a further press towards Lake Ochrida. Thus, on the very first
day of the invasion, a large number of Yugoslav formations in the south
9Texts of official war communiqus extracted from the New York Times, AWM 54,
534/5/25; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 221; Papagos,
The German Attack on Greece, p. 27; MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume
III, p. 498; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 52; McClymont, To Greece, p. 159.
153
were cut off, dispersed and out of touch with high command. Where not
captured, many began to disband.10
On the Greek-Albanian front, news of the German invasion prompted
Papagos, following the sketchy agreements made with Jankovi at Kenali
three days earlier, to order Tsolakoglous WMFAS to attack into Albania the
next day. The EFAS, not in a position to mount a similar offensive so soon,
was to hold its position. Tsolakoglous thrust was to be aimed at Dyrrahio,
in cooperation with an expected Yugoslav push against the Pogradets area
from the east (from Debar-Strouga towards Elvasan). Predictably, however,
coordination for this joint offensive proved difficult for the Greek General
Staff and was only partially achieved via a telephone conversation conducted at 2.30 a.m., 7 April, with the Yugoslav commander in the Ochrida
area. Nonetheless, a joint operation was agreed. It was to be conducted at
first light by a simultaneous advance by both Greek and Yugoslav troops
if possible.11
The main thrust of the German attacks of 6 April, however, was not
against southeastern Yugoslavia, and was almost entirely unconcerned with
developments in Albania. As List had planned, his foremost effort was
invested in the 18th Corps, directed against the Doiran-Nestos Line.
Boehmes plan was straightforward. Tasked to break the Greek frontier
defences on both sides of the Rupel Pass, he decided to throw the 5th and
6th Mountain Divisions directly against Lieutenant General Dedes Divisions Group on the left of the Greek line. Here the 18th and 14th Greek
Divisions waited within, and between, a string of well-camouflaged forts.
At the same time the German 72nd Division was to advance from Nevrokop
with an eye to penetrating the Doiran-Nestos Line between the 14th Greek
Division and Major General Zoiopoulos 7th Greek Division, so that the
Rupel Pass could be secured from the rear, just in case the mountain troops
failed to smash the Greeks to their front.
The German attack in the Beles area against the Divisions Group began
at dawn on 6 April supported by dive bombers and intense artillery fire.
On the far left of the Greek line, in Major General Steriopoulos Rodopolis
10Fighting in Yugoslavia and Greece, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List
and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; Garnett, The Campaign in
Greece and Crete, p. 18; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 84; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 52;
McClymont, To Greece, p. 159.
11Greek Campaign 1940-41, TNA WO 201/124; UK War Narratives The campaign in
Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ
188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German
War, pp. 201-2; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 40.
154
chapter six
Sector, troops of the German 6th Mountain Division moved against the
heights of Demir Kapou and Kale Bair. By 7.00 a.m. the main line of Greek
defence along Beles ridge had been taken and four hours later the Germans
had established themselves in the western portion of the sector, occupied
the villages of Plantanakia and Kalochori, and taken large number of prisoners. At dusk, the remaining 18th Greek Division troops in the western
Rodopolis Sector withdrew into the Krousia area. A little further east, but
still in the 18th Greek Divisions defensive area, the German 5th Mountain
Division attacked both Roupesko and Thylakas Sectors supported by a
Greek estimate of at least 165 guns. The brunt of the attack in this area fell
at 7.00 a.m. upon Forts Istibei and Kelkayiathe keys to the 18th Greek
Division position. By 8.00 a.m. the Germans were on the surface of Fort
Istibei. Its commander requested artillery fire to fall directly on his own
position and ordered an infantry counter-attack. The Greek counter-attack
was launched at 12.00 midday and met the Germans at a nearby gorge. The
Greeks faltered against the German mountain troops, by now reinforced
and in possession of the heights further east between the two forts. One
report claimed only 15 of the 300 Greek soldiers who mounted the action
survived it. Yet the toll on the attackers was equally heavy. The 3rd Battalion,
85th Mountain Regiment, having lost over thirty per cent of its men dead
or wounded had been withdrawn from the line. Nonetheless, by 1.00 p.m.
German troops were walking on the top of Fort Kelkayia until a counterattack by the forts garrison temporarily cleared the area. Elsewhere, across
the 18th Greek Divisions front, Fort Arpalouki was subject to shelling and
bombardment but no ground attack, while Fort Paliouriones successfully
repulsed some minor German attempts at infiltration.12
By end of the day, despite the fact that none of Steriopoulos forts had
fallen, German occupation of the western section of the Beles ridgeline
and the infiltration of German troops into the Rodopolis Sector posed a
real threat for the whole Doiran-Nestos Line. Lieutenant General Bakopoulos,
12Entry for 10.10 6 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch der Fhrungsabteilung 5. Geb. Div.
25.10.1940 bis 10.7.1941 gef.d.Oblt. Zimmermann, BA MA RH 28-5/1; Geb. Jg. Rgt. 100, 13 May
1941, Gefechtsbericht des Geb. Jg. Rgt. 100 Durchbruch durch die Metaxas-Linie vom 6.4.
bis 10.4.1941, BA MA RH 37/2181, p. 6; Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Divisionsgruppe (O.M.)
whrend des griechisch-deutschen Krieges 1941, Anl. 2 zu Nr. 25/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen,
BA MA RH 67/1, p. 1; Kommandeur, 5. Gebirgsdivision, beginning of May 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber die 4tgigen Kmpfe vom 6.-9.4.41 und den Durchbruch der verst. 5. Gebirgs
division durch die Metaxas-Linie sdlich Petritsch., BA MA RH 28-5/2, p. 9; Argyropoulo,
From Peace to Chaos, p. 143; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 138-9; An Abridged History
of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 186-7.
155
in anticipation, had earlier ordered 19th Greek Motorised Division (minus

the 191st Regiment attached to the Krousia Detachment) moved north to
Kilkis to block any further German advance between Lake Doiran and Lake
Kerkiniand with the lingering hope it might still link up with the Yugoslavs. By the afternoon, however, elements of the German 6th Mountain
Division were at Rodopolis on the Salonika-Serai railway and were threatening to outflank the Doiran-Nestos Line from the west.13 During the night
the Germans continued to infiltrate south and eventually made contact
with Greek troops in the Krousia area. The battered 18th Greek Division
was ordered to regroup and form a line between Lake Kerkini and the bridge
at Sidirokastro, and to establish liaison with Krousia area. In order to maintain the continuity of the front, the 41st Greek Regiment was directed to
link the eastern bank of the Struma River at the Sidirokastro Bridge with
Fort Rupel. Overall, by the end of 6 April, the position of the left of the
EMFAS was tenuous but intact. Bakopoulos ordered his forts in the area to
hold to the last man.14
Concurrent with the strong attacks made against the 18th Greek Division,
similar pressure was placed on Major General Papakonstantinous 14th
Greek Division on the extreme left of the Doiran-Nestos Line. At dawn
concerted German assaults were mounted against both the Sidirokastro
and Karadag Sectors of Papakonstantinous divisional defensive area. The
strongest assault was, predictably, against Fort Rupel, whereas Fort Kali
and Fort Karatas were subjected to bombardments only. The attack on Fort
Rupel was made by Boehmes independent 125th Infantry Regiment, reinforced with a battalion from the 5th Mountain Division. This regiment,
commanded by Brigadier Wilhelm Schneckenburger, had experience in
France against the Maginot Line. Schneckenburgers assault on Fort Rupel
began with Stuka and artillery bombardment and at 6.00 a.m. motorised
infantry, assault guns and motorcycle troops crossed the border and
streamed straight for the fort while German direct fire weapons pounded
the fort openings. By 11.00 a.m. German troops had pushed back the Greek
outposts and were attacking Fort Rupel itself. With the defenders under
constant bombardment from the air, small numbers of Germans temporarily managed to reach the Molon Lave [Come and take it] monument on
13Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 52; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 161-2.
14An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 189; Greek Campaign 1940-41, TNA WO 201/124; Fighting in Yugoslavia and Greece, reviewed and edited
156
chapter six
the surface of the fort before being driven off. Soon afterwards, a detachment of around 200 German paratroopers was dropped to the immediate
south of Fort Rupel. The Greeks reacted fast, intercepting and surrounding
the Germans as they collected themselves and gathered their equipment.
Around 170 paratroopers were killed in the ensuing skirmish, with the remainder taken prisoner. As the major frontal and airborne assaults were
being repulsed, however, a German battalion managed to infiltrate between
Forts Rupel and Karatas, assisted by local (mainly Macedonian) guides who
knew the area and trails. From here, despite taking considerable casualties,
it managed to take and hold a small village to the rear of the forts. Yet Fort
Rupel fought on. A little to the right of the 14th Divisions position, in
Karadag Sector, Major General Franz Mattenklotts 72nd Division directed
its attacks primarily against Fort Perithori, but pressure was also placed on
Forts Maliaga and Babazoraall of which held out throughout 6 April.15
Aside from the concerted German assaults mounted in the left hand
sectors of the Doiran-Nestos Line, primarily against the Greek Divisions
Groupthe 18th and 14th Greek Divisionsthe rest of the Bulgarian frontier was less active on 6 April. A portion of the German 72nd Division not
involved in action against the 14th Greek Division in the Karadag Sector
made a limited attack into the left hand units of the 7th Greek Division (to
the east of the 14th Greek Division). Apart from forcing back Greek screening forces, however, little German progress was made in this area. At 10.00
a.m., after forcing Greek covering forces to withdraw directly north of Kato
Nevrokopi, elements of Mattenklotts division then attempted to infiltrate
between Fort Pyramidoeides and Fort Lisse. Fire from these forts, however,
once again halted their advance. The Germans then tried to infiltrate between Fort Lisse and Fort Perithori (on the boundary between the 14th and
7th Greek Divisions), but were again repulsed, and took considerable casualties as night fell.16
It was a similar situation moving further east along the Doiran-Nestos
Line. As dawn broke on 6 April the German 30th Corps began its attempt
15Signature [Kranef?], Oberst und Kommandeur, Pi. Rgt. Stab 690, Abt. Ia, 11 April
1941, Bericht ber die griechische Befestigungsanlage auf Hhe 510 bei Nimfea, nrdlich
Komotini. (Zur Einnahme des Werkes durch 30.J.D. am 7.4.41.), BA MA RH 24-30/36,
pp. 1-4; entries for 6 to 9 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 der Fhrungsabt. 50.I.D. ber den
Feldzug in Griechenland vom 6.2.41.-15.5.41., BA MA 26-50/18, pp. 21-33; Major L. Glombik,
Intelligence Officer, 12th Army, The German Balkan Campaign, 23 June 1947, AWM 54,
624/7/2; S. Casson, Greece Against the Axis, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1941, pp. 187-8;
Garnett, The Campaign in Greece and Crete, p. 17.
157
to break the Doiran-Nestos Line east of the Nestos River and to push through
it to the Aegean. Colonel Anastasias Kalis Nestos Brigade position was
attacked by elements of the German 164th Division, commanded by Major
General Josef Folttmann.The Germans advanced in this sector along the
axis Melivia-Echinos-Xanthi, descending down treacherous and difficult
mountain paths near the Bulgarian frontier. After pushing back screening
and outpost troops, the main Greek point of resistance at Fort Echinos was
encountered by the Germans in the early afternoon. Folttmanns men were
held in this position by the fire of the fort until nightfall.
On the extreme eastern flank of the Doiran-Nestos Line, the area held
by Major General Georgios Sissis Evros Brigade, the German 50th Division,
led by Lieutenant General Karl-Adolf Hollidt, also crossed the Bulgarian
border at dawn on 6 April. Here the German advance aimed at Fort Nimphaea, en route to Komotini. After delaying the attackers, Sissis screening
companies withdrew south and by 7.00 a.m. Fort Nimphaea was under
effective German artillery fire from distances as close as 600 metres. By
10.00 a.m. the fort was encircled but the Germans were unable, however,
to move onto or into it and the bombardments continued until nightfall.
After dark, troops of the German 50th Division bypassed Fort Nimphaea
and moved south towards Komotini. So too, while Fort Echinos yet stood,
elements of the German 164th Division bypassed it during the night along
mountain routes leading south.17
Along with the infiltration of German mountain troops through the
western sections of the Beles ridge, the second serious threat to the DoiranNestos Line which developed on 6 April was from the German 2nd Armoured Division, under the command of Major General Rudolf Veiel.
Concurrent with the frontal attack of most of the 18th Corps against the
Greek line, Veiels division drove into southern Yugoslavia through the Strumitsa Valley. As it progressed the division met little Yugoslav resistance but
was delayed by muddy roads, minefields and demolitions. Nonetheless, it
reached the town of Strumitsa that day and beat off a few attacks from
units of the Yugoslav 3rd Army brought up from Shtip, which fought much
more tenaciously at this point than had been anticipated by the Germans.
Those Yugoslavs not killed or captured in front of Veiels division fled west.
By the evening of 6 April, having bypassed the Doiran-Nestos fortifications
by driving into Yugoslavia, little stood in the way of a sharp left turn by the
2nd Armoured Division, and an advance towards Lake Doiran and/or down
17Ibid., pp. 188-9.
158
chapter six
the Axios Valley. The 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade saw and reported this
danger. What might be done about it, however, was another issue entirely.18
By 9.00 p.m., 6 April, General Papagos at the Greek General Headquarters
had a reasonable picture of the days developments on the Doiran-Nestos
Line. The all-important Rupel Pass held but the defensive positions in the
area (and across the Bulgarian frontier) had been battered. Bakopoulos
begged for reinforcements. Papagos could only refuse himthere were not
the troops, the time, nor the transport available to help. Above all, with
little knowledge of the difficulties the defenders faced in southern Serbia,
Papagos was concerned that the Yugoslavs had not attacked west of Beles
as discussed. A strong Yugoslav attack on the flank of the German 2nd
Armoured Divisions advance towards the Strumitsa Valley was all that
might stop it. A liaison officer with such a request was despatched from
Bakopoulos headquarters at once. He had no chance of success. Without
Yugoslav help this western flank, however, already opening up as a result
of infiltration by German mountain troops, faced the prospect of being
turned completely. Papagos was trying desperately to plug the looming hole
with a reserve, based on the 19th Greek Motorised Division, to be rushed
into position east of Doiranbut it was a thin line with no prospect of
reinforcement.19
Even though the situation on the Greek-Bulgarian border was critical,
the outstanding feature of the first day of German attacks against the Doiran-Nestos Line was the tenacity of the defenders and the effectiveness of
their fortifications. Certainly, the attackers, especially in the key western
flank of the Doiran-Nestos Line, had managed to push back Greek field
troops and infiltrate between the forts (as expected by British and Greek
commanders), but as yet not a single fort itself had fallen. This was in spite
of fierce and consistent bombardment by land and from the air. Aircraft of
the 8th Air Corps and the 18th Corps artillery concentrated their bombardments on both sides of the Rupel Pass in order to achieve a breakthrough
to the Struma valley, to open the way to Salonika. At same time the Luftwaffe
attacked roads and installations to the rear of EMFAS. British air photo18See BA MA RH 27-2/20 for various battle reports written by sections of 2nd Armoured
Division concerning their actions in Yugoslavia in the first days of the campaign. Entry for
17.37 6 April 1941, 2. Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 Ia und Anlagen 1.1.41 14.6.41.,
BA MA RH 27-2/20, p. 17; extract from 102nd Anti-tank Regiment, War Diary, 6 April 1941,
TNA WO 196/1490; MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume III, p. 502; Blau,
Invasion Balkans!, pp. 84-5.
19Message, Greek GHQ to Belgrade, 6 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6371; telegram, British
Military Mission to W Force Advance Headquarters, 7 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124.
159
graphs revealed German batteries firing on almost every fort. Black smears
of smoke darkened the entire Mt Beles ridge. Fort Rupel, in particular, was
an inferno of shelling and bombs. The Greeks in the Doiran-Nestos Line
had no real defence against such air attacks. It is true that a sweep of 12
RAF Hurricanes sent over the Greek positions at Mt Beles and Rupel Pass
met a flight of 20 German Me109s, and shot down five for no lossbut this
was a drop in the ocean and had no impact on German air operations. It
was somewhat of a surprise, therefore, that even German observers were
forced to conclude that their air attacks had met with no result.20 What is
even more remarkable about the tenacity of the Greek forts was the fact
that the defenders were older, poorly trained and equipped, and well aware
of their predicament and negligible chances of success. The Greeks fought
on for as long as they had the means to do so and the Germans had to win
territory in close conflict.21 At the same time it is important to acknowledge
the difficulties faced by the German attackers, which went beyond the
determination of the Greek forts. On all avenues of its attacks the 18th Corps
faced, for example, extreme difficulties imposed by terrain and mountains.22
Throughout the morning of 6 April at Headquarters W Force information
was hard to come by. The Germans had struck within mere hours of Wilson
being warned by Ultra intelligence of movements on the Bulgarian border and his headquarters only received solid reports of a German attack
on the Beles area at around 7.30 a.m. Wilsons subordinate headquarters
were given the information at around 10.00 a.m. Even less was known about
developments in Yugoslavia. Major Stanley Casson, an intelligence officer
with W Force Headquarters, observed that the famous fog of war was
thicker there than anywhere else in Europe.23 For many W Force troops
still in Athens or en route north news of the German invasion meant few
immediate concerns. A few air raid warnings have boomed out in Athens,
wrote a member of the 18th NZ Battalion, but we have gone on washing
23 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2.
21Entry for 6 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der 6.GEB.DIV., BA MA RH 28-6/8.
22Signature, Ia, 6. Gebirgs-Division, Gefechtsbericht der 6. Geb.Div. ber den Durchbruch durch die Metaxaslinie., BA MA RH 20-12/105, p. 2; Report on the operations carried
out by the Royal Air Force in Greece: November, 1940 to April, 1941, 15 August 1941, TNA
AIR 23/1196; Fighting in Yugoslavia and Greece, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W.
List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; entry for 6 April 1941,
Deckert, Mit Lore und Inge bei den Feldhaubitzen, p. E/9; Casson, Greece Against the Axis,
p. 126; entry for 6 April 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, pp. 351-2; von Greiffenberg, 9 June
1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 130-49.
23Casson, Greece Against the Axis, p. 128.
160
chapter six
our clothes as usual!24 What was known with certainty at this crucial junction was that the 7th Australian Division and the Polish Brigade would no
longer be deploying to Greece. Apart from the increased danger of shipping
and maintaining more troops at Piraeus under potential German air attack,
Rommels advance in North Africa had, by 11 April, surrounded Tobruk and
was threatening Egypt. Both formations were thus needed where they were.
When he learned of this decision, Blamey cabled Wavell urging him that
retention of Libya was not essential but that his corps in Greece was in
grave danger if it was not reinforced. Wavell disagreed.25
Despite a lack of accurate intelligence at Headquarters W Force, the
German attack across the Yugoslav and Bulgarian frontiers triggered a number of critical responses from Wilson. First, orders were confirmed to the
16th Australian Brigade to take over the forward and eastern ends of Veria
Pass from the 12th Greek Division the following day. Next, since Wilson
remained uncomfortable with the danger represented by the Monastir Gap,
Blamey was instructed to conduct further reconnaissance for a defensive
position that might block a German breakthrough in this area into the open
valley running from the Yugoslav frontier south to Servia. He was to report
within 24 hours to Wilson on the minimum force required to reinforce the
Amyndaion Detachment, particularly in anti-tank weapons. Such reinforcement, at least in the eyes of those already stationed with the Amyndaion
Detachment, would not come a moment too soon. In the meantime, as the
rain poured down upon them, Lees small force was, in the words of Blameys
artillery headquarters, in a rather perilous situation.26
On the eastern flank of the Vermion-Olympus Line, within hours of the
German attack Blamey despatched Brigadier Rowell to Wilson to argue
once again for withdrawal of the New Zealand division back to the Olympus Pass. The request, however, was again denied on the grounds that the
railhead at Katerini still had to be protected. Believing Wilson must soon
24Diary of Private H. Loftus, KMARL, 1996.1220.
25Extract from HQ Medium Artillery War Diary (Anzac Corps), 6 April 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/29; cablegram, Menzies to Fadden, 8 April 1941, AWM 52, 534/1/1; Anzac Corps War
Diary, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/9; Headquarters BTE War Diary, 6 April 1941, TNA WO
169/994B; The campaign in Greece, April 1941, Brigadier S.F. Rowell, 6 June 1941, AWM
3DRL 6763(A), [1-4]; Higham, The Myth of the Defence of Northern Greece October 1940
April 1941, p. 143; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 37; McClymont, To Greece, p. 121.
26Extract from HQ Medium Artillery War Diary (Anzac Corps), 6 April 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/29. Report on operations of the 6th Australian Division in Greece, Major General I.
Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34; 1 Aust Corps Operations Instruction No. 2, AWM 54
534/5/24; extract from 64th Medium Regiment War Diary, 6 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1492.
161
change his mind, Freyberg nonetheless began preparing his forward brigades to retire. The 22nd NZ Battalion was ordered from Katerini back to
Olympus and the 21st NZ Battalion to move forward from Athens to
Plantamon.27
Wilson was hedging his bets. He could easily see the obvious danger of
the exposed New Zealand position. At the same time, a withdrawal to the
Olympus Pass would cost the Greeks Katerini and their primary rail supply
line to Albania. It was not an order to be given lightly, or too earlybut
that did mean he failed to see the necessity of it. This is why Wilson had
allowed the further preparation of the defensive positions in the Olympus
Pass without yet authorising their occupation. In fact, a larger withdrawal
than simply adjusting the New Zealand divisions line was already on Wilsons mind. Early on 6 April, at the same time as ordering Freyberg to hold
his forward positions, Wilsons staff began developing plans for a fall-back
defensive line covering the Olympus Passes, pivoting on the Veria Mountains
and running northwest to the Amyndaion Detachment. This new intermediate line was itself likely to be the precursor to further adjustments. W
Force Headquarters sent out warning orders to select formations before
midday concerning the potential requirement for a reorganisation of W
Force and the CMFAS in event of a more general Allied withdrawal west of
the Axios. One factor that is difficult to reconstructbecause of the secrecy with which it was surrounded at the timeis the role the British
ULTRA decrypts of Luftwaffe messages played in Wilsons decision making
on this and later withdrawals. The Greek campaign was the first in which
Allied commanders were made aware that information from this source
was to be regarded as completely reliable. It is likely such intelligence was
one factor among many in framing Wilsons overall orders to withdraw from
one defensive line to the next.28
27Letter, Kippenberger to McClymont, 11 July 1950 and letter, McClymont to Kippenberger, 16 February 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16b; letter, Ross to Wards, 29 July 1950,
ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/9; War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658; Summary
of War Diary material for 22nd (NZ) Battalion, 12 January 1940 31 October 1943, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/160; correspondence (various, including interview transcripts) concerning
the 22nd Battalion in Greece, 22nd Battalion veterans to J.H. Henderson, 1950, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/156; 23 NZ Bn, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162; Campaign narrative of 2 New
Zealand Division, I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal
Affairs, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ
[Microfilm 3618]; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 40; McClymont, To Greece, p. 160.
28Headquarters BTE War Diary, 6 April 1941, TNA WO 169/994B; R. Bennett, Ultra and
Mediterranean Strategy 1941-1945, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1989, p. 50. Hinsley, British
162
chapter six
News received during the evening of 6 April did little to lift Wilsons
spirits. Reports that a force of six RAF Wellington bombers had wrecked
an ammunition train and railway facilities in Sofia, Gorna Djumaya, Simitli and Petrich, while lighter Blenheim bombers attacked railway stations
further south in Bulgaria was welcomebut of little consequence. In fact,
during this opening phase of the campaign the small RAF bombing force
in Greece struggled to reach even its limited potential. Few Eastern Wing
landing grounds were fit for use due to recent heavy rain and the wings
headquarters never had time to forma hasty ad hoc organisation was
instead set up next to Wilsons headquarters at Elasson.29 Meanwhile, information about one German column racing westwards across Yugoslavia
to the Axios Valley while another was approaching the Strumica Pass, from
which it could approach Lake Doiran and thus flank the Doiran-Nestos
Line towards Salonika, grew more definite. A brief visit from Wavell, who
met Wilson at Tsaritsani on the night of 6 April to discuss the situation in
Cyrenaica and future trends in Greece, gave W Forces commander plenty
of cause for anxiety.30
Unsurprisingly, news that the long-feared German invasion was underway had significant repercussions in Athens. News of the Luftwaffes devastating attack on Belgrade sobered the mood of Athenians who waited for
their turn. During the day the first German reconnaissance aircraft flew
over Athens en route to Piraeus. That evening, Brigadier Brunskill met his
RAF counterpart who told him nonchalantly (presumably from ULTRA
decrypts) that Piraeus was to be bombed later that night and suggested
they watch it together from their hotel roof. Brunskill arrived at 9.00 p.m.
and settled in to observe. At 11.00 p.m. the attack on the port began and
lasted for the next two hours. The British cruisers Ajax and Calcutta escaped
to sea and at first the damage did not look too severe. Soon, however,
Brunskill noticed a fire and raced to the port in his car. A barge next to
transport Clan Fraser had received a direct hit and burned. The Clan Fraser,
Intelligence in the Second World War, pp 115, 406-7. See also R. Lewin, ULTRA Goes to War,
Hutchinson & Co., London, 1978; & Hunt, A Don at War.
Report on the operations carried out by the Royal Air Force in Greece: November, 1940 to
April, 1941, 15 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/1196.
30Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 85; Draft Manuscript Medical History of the War:
Greece (1940-1941), TNA AIR 49/11; Report on the operations carried out by the Royal Air
Force in Greece: November, 1940 to April, 1941, 15 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/1196; Playfair,
The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 86; MGFA, Germany and the Second World War,
Volume III, p. 501.
163
unloaded previous day and supposedly empty, also caught fire and burned
slowly. To his horror Brunskill was then informed that the Clan Fraser still
held 250 tons of explosives from the UK for the Greek army that had been
barricaded behind a closed door and thus remained unnoticed by Greek
stevedores. The explosives had probably been hidden due to repeated requests by Greek authorities to avoid unloading ammunition and explosives
at Piraeus. Suddenly, Brunskill and others on the scene realised the danger
and tried in vain to extinguish the flames and tow the cargo ship away. The
Clan Fraser burned until little after midnight until it was ripped apart in a
huge explosion.31
The loss of the Clan Fraser was the least of the problems caused by its
explosion. When it blew up, the remains of the ship showered down as hot
fragments of metal, some of them two metres long, which started fires
wherever they dropped. Seven merchant ships, 60 lighters, and 25 wooden
fishing boats were destroyed immediately. An ammunition barge and train
were also wrecked, as were most port facilities and storehouses full of food,
while significant numbers of skilled workers either perished or abandoned
their work. Piraeus was forced to cease port operations for two crucial days
and its ability to sustain and reinforce W Force was reduced greatly. Even
once the port reopened only five of 12 berths could henceforth be used. In
addition, so many tugs and small craft had been destroyed that neither coal
nor water could from this point be reliably provided to ships in port. Unloading cargo was a problem at the port for the rest of the campaign. Shipping programs had to be adjusted and more use made of small east coast
ports at Khalkis, Stilis and Volos. At same time the Luftwaffe began laying
magnetic mines at Piraeus and other Greek harbours and the Greeks had
no way to remove them. A British report later criticized Greek precautions
for unloading explosives as inadequate. This was perhaps so, but at the
same time Greeks did not know that part of the Clan Frasers cargo had
been hidden by British seamen. In any case, Brunskill reflected that one
chance bomb had lost us the use of the one good port by which the expeditionary force could either be maintained or evacuated.32 Brigadier
31The US Ambassador to Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, thought that the explosives would
have been unloaded the previous day but the British had baulked at paying the Greek
stevedores Sunday rates: entry for 7 April 1941, MacVeagh diary, Ambassador MacVeagh
Reports, p. 329. See also E.G. Smith, Bombing of Piraeus, April 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902,
WAII3/1/7; W.J.H. Sutton, The Greek Debacle 1941: the beginning and end, KMARL,
1999.1051; Argyropoulo, From Peace to Chaos, p. 135; A. Fort, Wavell: The Life and Times of an
Imperial Servant, Jonathan Cape, London, 2009, p. 204.
32G.S. Brunskill, Draft Manuscript, IWM PP/MCR/136.
164
chapter six
Figure 6.1:Damage sustained at Piraeus from German bombing on the night of 6 April.
(Source: Australian War Memorial: 134866)
Parrington called it a major disaster as the whole supply arrangements

depended on the use of Piraeus.33 While British authorities were quick to
point out that had a senior Royal Navy officer been despatched to Greece
to control the movement of British supplies at the port this disaster would
perhaps have been prevented, it is equally certain that there would have
been no disastrous explosion at all had the Clan Fraser not attempted to
ignore Greek orders to keep explosives away from Piraeus.34
The first piece of worrying news to reach the Allies on 7 April was confirmation from the Turkish Cabinet that it intended to remain non-belligerent. Subsequent British and Yugoslav pleas to reverse this decision proved
IWM 76/118/2.
34Inter-service lessons learnt in the campaign in Greece, March to April, 1941, 12 March
1942, TNA WO 106/3120; autobiography of Captain D.R. Jackson, Anzac Corps, AWM 3DRL
8052/109; E.G. Smith, Bombing of Piraeus, April 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/7; telegram,
Palairet to Wavell, 7 April 1941, TNA FO 371/29815; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 40-1;
Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 221; Cruickshank, Greece
194041, p. 4; Argyropoulo, From Peace to Chaos, pp. 135-7; McClymont, To Greece, p. 161.
165
fruitless. The Turkish Army may have been drawn up across the Maritsa
River east of the Doiran-Nestos Line but it had no intention of moving.
Worse still, with Belgrade still under air attack, the German 40th Corps
push into southern Yugoslavia continued successfully. During the day the
advance guard of Stummes 9th Armoured Division (followed closely by
the Adolf Hitler Regiment) reached the key point of Skopje, 100 kilometres
west of the Bulgarian border, while the vanguard of the 73rd Division
reached Veles. Stummes columns had already destroyed the Yugoslav Moranska and Barsko Divisions, with two other Yugoslav divisions withdrawing at best speed towards Pristina. Less than three German divisions were
thus deep into enemy territory without flank or rear protection, yet little
looked likely to stop them. The commander of the Yugoslav Southern Army
pleaded, in vain, that the Greeks or British apply immediate pressure against
Stummes thrust from the south. Even if such forces were available, the sole
and intermittent contact between the British and Yugoslavs at this time
was through the RAF Air Attach in Athens. There was no guarantee that
any messages, let alone coordinated plans for joint operations, would ever
get to Belgrade. A Yugoslav reserve division was rushed northeast of Skopje
with orders to slow Stummes advancebut its prospects were grim.35
Meanwhile, the second 12th Army thrust into southern Yugoslavia (that
of the 2nd German Armoured division through the Strumitsa Valley), looked
equally dangerous for the Allies. During the day, after a difficult move along
the Strumitsa thanks to terrain which was especially unfavourable for vehicles, and an ineffective Yugoslav counter-attack against the flank of
Veiels division, this armoured column turned south and by evening had
reached the Yugoslav-Greek border near Lake Doiran, at the edge of the
Axios River Valleyexactly as Papagos had feared. With the Yugoslavs in
its vicinity falling back in disorder, this 2nd Armoured Division thrust endangered the whole Greek front. Very little now lay between it and Salonika, except for the continuing rushed re-deployments of elements of the
19th Greek Motorised Division, reinforced with some anti-paratrooper
companies from Salonika. By the evening of 7 April the leading elements
Department, 9 April 1941, NAA A816, 19/301/1061; Texts of official war communiqus
extracted from the New York Times AWM 54, 534/5/25; I. Wards, New Zealand War History
Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division,
1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; message, W Force to W Force Advance Headquarters, 8 April
1941, TNA WO 201/45; telegram, Palairet to Foreign Office, 7 April 1941, TNA FO 371/28855;
Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 158-9; Casson, Greece Against the Axis, p. 131; Blau,
Invasion Balkans!, p. 84; MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume III, p. 504.
166
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of the 2nd Armoured Division had entered Doiran and were set to sweep
around the left flank of the Doiran-Nestos Line. List sensed the growing
opportunity and by means of constant air attack prevented Greek troops
southwest of Doiran from establishing a coherent defensive line. Papagos
passed these bad tidings on to Wilson in the evening. They contrasted
sharply with an erroneous report Wilson had just received from his rear
headquarters in Athens that the Yugoslavs were successfully holding Kosturino Pass, between Strumica and Valandovo. Some limited bombing by
British Blenheims late in the day against German concentrations at Strumitsa blocked in by marshes, river and mountains, was insufficient to stem
the tide.36
On the Doiran-Nestos Line the remainder of Boehmes 18th Corps continued its attack. By first light on 7 April the pressure placed on the 18th
Greek Division on the left of the line the previous day was showing. The
division was ordered during the night to withdraw to the line from Sidirokastro Bridge to Kerkini Lake to reinforce the 19th Greek Motorised Division
and try and block further penetration of its left flank by German mountain
troops from Beles ridge and the looming advance of the 2nd Armoured
Division from Doiran. Such moves, however, left the forward forts in the
divisional sector without field support. Subsequently, at Fort Kelkayia the
Germans blocked off openings and ventilation shafts during the night and
began to pipe in smoke and choking gas. The Greek garrison was forced to
surrender at 11.30 a.m., 7 April. Fort Istibei also surrendered at 4.00 p.m.,
again as a consequence of German smoke and also, in this case, the use of
flame throwers. After the fall of Fort Kelkayia, Fort Arpalouki was dangerously encircled and during the night of 7 April its garrison of 200 men
withdrew. The party soon found the bridges over Struma River destroyed
and was discovered by the Germans while attempting to cross it on rafts.
The Greek detachment was overpowered after a three-hour battle with
most either killed or captured. Fort Popotlivitsa, however, and a num
ber of stand-alone pill-boxes in Roupesko Sector, managed to hold out
36Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Divisionsgruppe (O.M.) whrend des griechischdeutschen Krieges 1941, Anl. 2 zu Nr. 25/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, BA MA RH 67/1, p. 13;
Greek Campaign 1940-41, TNA WO 201/124; message, W Force to W Force Advance Headquarters, 7 April 1941, TNA WO 201/45; War for the Passes, extract from the American
Infantry Journal, October 1941, AWM 3DRL6643 3/42; I. Wards, New Zealand War History
1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War,
pp. 192-3; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 156-8; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 85; Long,
Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 41.
167
throughout the day. By the evening elements of the German 5th Mountain
Division had thus broken through west of the Rupel Pass even though some
Greek units and forts were still fighting on to its rear and one of its regiments still being pinned in the pass itself.37
Further east, morning rain and fog did not reduce German pressure in
the 14th Greek Division area. The German 125th Regiment again threw itself
against Fort Rupel but to no avail. The attackers in this sector did manage,
however, to infiltrate 200 men onto the Goliama heights to the south from
where they could harass the fort and cut its communications, as well as
direct continuing artillery and air attacks. A Greek counter-attack against
this German detachment failed but Fort Rupel nonetheless held out. In the
Karadag Sector at dawn the Germans launched a surprise attack and seized
the Stavros heights only to lose them again to a Greek counter-attack supported by fire from Fort Maliaga. At 9.00 a.m., 7 April, the attackers managed
to force their way into Fort Perithori and enter its underground galleries.
This initiated a fierce hand-to-hand struggle that lasted two hours before
all the Germans who had entered were killed and the fort again made secure.
A counter-attack on the surface of the fort also removed a second party of
Germans waiting to enter. At 4.30 p.m. another German attack on the Fort
Perithori, of perhaps battalion strength, was repulsed with heavy loss to
the attackers.38
To the right-hand flank of the 14th Greek Division, the German 72nd
Division began the day with renewed pressure against the 7th Greek Divisions Falakro Sector. During night German troops had closed in to Fort
Lisse and began a morning attack by blocking the exits to the fort with
machine-gun fire, while mounting an assault on nearby Fort Dasavliwithout success. A little further east of Fort Dasavli, by 4.00 p.m. a German force
had infiltrated through the Yiannen valley and seized the Ousoyia heights.
A Greek counter-attack, launched against this party during the night of 7
April, was unsuccessful. Another German infiltration force, using fog and
ground cover, managed to pass between Forts Dasavli and Perithori during
the day to seize the Kresti heights. In response, the 7th Greek Division
37An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 190; Long, Greece,
Crete and Syria, p. 52; Geb. Jg. Rgt. 100, 13 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht des Geb. Jg. Rgt. 100
Durchbruch durch die Metaxas-Linie vom 6.4. bis 10.4.1941, BA MA RH 37/2181, pp. 7-10;
Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 150-6.
38Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Divisionsgruppe (O.M.) whrend des griechischdeutschen Krieges 1941, Anl. 2 zu Nr. 25/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 11-13;
An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 190-1.
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formed a force at Kalapotio and ordered it to recapture the position at

dawn. Nonetheless, the German 72nd Division had thus, mostly by infiltration, broken through south of Nevrokop and was poised to move towards
Serai to the rear of Rupel Pass.39
On the eastern flank of the Doiran-Nestos Line the Nestos Brigade screening forces continued falling back to avoid useless sacrifice, destroying the
Nestos River bridge at Toxotes and moving towards prepared positions on
the river at Stavropoulos. Fort Echinos, however, despite continuing bombing, held off German attacks throughout 7 April. At the same time, further
to the east, the field portion of the Evros Brigade, around 100 officers and
2000 men, withdrew across the Turkish frontier where all but a few who
escaped towards Makri were disarmed. Major General Zissis, profoundly
shaken by the ineffectual resistance put up by his brigade, committed suicide two days later. Meanwhile, advancing German troops continued to
bypass Fort Nimphaea to reinforce the detachments that had already arrived at Komotini the previous night. Despite being surrounded and cut
off, like Fort Echinos, Fort Nimphaea continued to resist. It held out throughout 7 April under constant infantry, artillery and air assault. At around 9.00
p.m., after a climax of bombardment from more than 100 German guns
which blocked and broke down many of the exits and pulverised most of
the firing bays of the fort, German troops finally reached its surface. Even
then, those Greeks trapped underground continued to fight until 11.30 p.m.,
when the air below had become unbreathable due to smoke bombs and
destroyed ventilation shafts, before surrendering. After effectively breaking
through the eastern wing of the Doiran-Nestos Line, Hartmanns 30th Corps
now divided, with the 50th Division ordered to Salonika, while the 164th
Division turned east towards Alexandroupolis and Kavalla, and from there
towards the islands of Samothrace, Thasos, Lemnos, Lesbos and Chios. 40
As was the case the previous day, the fighting for the Doiran-Nestos Line
was fiercely contested by both sides. The commander of the German 5th
Mountain Division reputedly (and cynically) remarked that: It seems the
and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; An Abridged History of the
Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 191.
40Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Brigade Evros im griechisch-deutschen Kriege., Anl.
1 zu Nr. 23/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 3-6; Texts of official war communiqus extracted from the New York Times, AWM 54, 534/5/25; An Abridged History of the
Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 191-2; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 52; McClymont, To Greece, p. 159.
169
Greeks are prepared to fight to the last man for Englands sake.41 The 18th
Corps attacks might have been progressing, but slowly and against stubborn resistance.42 Despite the loss of Forts Istibei, Kelkayia and Arpalouki,
throughout 7 April most of the fortifications of the Doiran-Nestos Line still
remained intact. At the same time, however, the Germans had made some
crucial breakthroughs. On the western flank elements of the German 6th
Mountain Division crossed a 2100 metre-high snow-covered mountain range
and infiltrated through a point considered inaccessible by the Greeks. For
its part, the 5th Mountain Division, after attacking to the west of the Struma River, and after repelling several counterattacks, reached Neo Petritsi
at the southern opening of the Rupel Gorge. The German 125th Regiment,
however, which had been attacking Rupel Gorge from the north on the
eastern side of a river, had by this stage suffered so much damage it was
retired and took no further part in the campaign. Further east the 72nd
Division, hampered by a lack of pack animals and mountain equipment,
had nonetheless advanced from Nevrokop across the mountains. In such
circumstances during the night Papagos asked Wilson for help evacuating
what could be saved of EMFAS westward across the Aliakmon. Wilson had
foreseen this requirement the day before and wanted as many as possible
of Bakopoulos men rescued to reinforce W Force. Any thought of withdrawal of the entirety of the EMFAS was, of course, impossible but Wilson
ordered 50 lorries from the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade despatched at once.
Before this column had moved far, however, it found that the Germans were
between it and its destination and turned back.43
Meanwhile, far to the west, the Albanian front sprang to new life on 7
April as General Ilija Brasics 3rd Yugoslav Army, in cooperation with the
Greeks, finally launched an offensive against elements of the Italian 9th
Army on the Yugoslav border with northern Albania. Such an offensive was,
in fact, a consequence of much more than the brief plans discussed on 3
April at Kenali, or Greek pleas of 6 April. The longstanding Yugoslav war
plan, in the face of a massive Axis attack, was to create space in the south
to enable the eventual withdrawal of the main Yugoslav Army. This would
41MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume III, p. 501.
534/5/25.
43Greek Campaign 1940-41, TNA WO 201/124; Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand
Division, I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1952,
AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, pp. 85-6; An Abridged History of the GreekItalian and Greek-German War, p. 193.
170
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be via Albanian territory in order to reach Greece and the Allied forces
based there. Thus, according to the pre-war plans, the Yugoslav Army would,
together with the Greek and British Armies, form a new version of the
Salonika Front of World War I. For its push into Albania the 3rd Yugoslav
Army had concentrated four infantry divisions and one combined cavalry
regiment in the Montenegro and Kosovo regions. The plan was for this force
to advance from the direction of Debar, Prisrend and Dodgorica. In addition, a limited offensive operation against the Italian enclave of Zara on
the Dalmatian coast was to be undertaken by the 12th Jadranska Division
(from the Yugoslav Coastal Army).44
The combined Greek-Yugoslav Albanian offensive did not, however, get
far. The 31st Kosovska Division crossed the border in the Prizren area of
Kosovo and managed to advance through the Drin River valley, while the
25th Vardarska Division found some local success at Debar. The remainder
of the 3rd Yugoslav Army, however, was still assembling and failed to move
at all. On the Greek side, the WMFAS made its planned attack with the
single 13th Greek Division into the Pogradets area. Without the expected
Yugoslav advance towards Lin, however, this attack did not achieve as much
as Papagos had hoped. Some minor territorial gains were made and around
500 Italian prisoners were captured. The Greek division held on to its meagre gains until nightfall, 7 April, with heavy losses. Crucially, however, the
German 40th Corps advance to the Skopje/Kunanovo area now threatened
the rear of the whole operation.45
Back on the Vermion-Olympus Line, by the afternoon of 7 April the
developing situation, and a brief tour of his forward units, began to convince
Wilson that time was running short to occupy his intermediate line. Such
an order was, however, not to be given lightly. First, if Wilson acted immediately it would be without approval from Papagos, his superior officer.
So too, if all W Force troops were withdrawn from the Macedonian plain
the New Zealand division from forward of Katerini and the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade from the Edessa sectorthere would also be important
45Message, British Liaison to Yugoslav Headquarters, 8 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124;
Texts of official war communiqus extracted from the New York Times, AWM 54, 534/5/25;
Anl. 1 zu Nr. 12/42 geh.Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von
Westmazedonien (A.A.W.M.) whrend der Kampfhandlungen mit den Deutschen., BA MA
RH 67/1, pp. 1-2. On this see also Anl. 1 zu Nr. 21/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht der 13.
Division ber ihre Kampfhandlungen gegen die Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 1; Golla,
Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, p. 160; MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume III,
p. 506.
171
logistics ramifications. With the loss of the railhead at Katerini W Force

would henceforth have to be supplied by truck on the vulnerable and
crowded road from Larissa, and the WMFAS would need to have its supplies
brought up the long narrow valley from Larissa to Grevena and Kastoria.
This situation would make it doubly essential for the Amyndaion Detachment, busy developing its position, to hold fastfor now not only did it
protect Larissa and Kozani but also the logistic lifeline to the WMFAS.
Wilson had not yet given formal orders to occupy the intermediate line
but he was clearly moving in that direction. He verbally briefed his subordinates to that effect and, with an eye to Amyndaion, the 19th Australian
Brigadethe latest Australian formation to arrive in Greecehad its deployment orders changed from going into the line west of the 16th Australian Brigade to concentrating near Kozani.46
Meanwhile, throughout 7 April the 16th Australian Brigade was situated
where the Aliakmon flows through the mountains to Salonika, with the
brigades right flank resting on the Aliakmon River.47 The Australians began
digging into their new positions in rugged country more than 900 metres
above sea level, above the snow linequite a contrast for troops still adjusting from the sand and grit of the Western Desert. As soon as they occupied Veria the weather turned bad and it began snowing and raining
almost continually. Conditions were harsh. Men had moved without tents
or any shelter and they worked, wet to the skin, improving the old Greek
defences. Digging was difficult in rocky ground. Stores and ammunition
had to be carried by hand. For water we had to melt snow, one soldier
recalled, which took three hours to boil over a primus at night it became
clear and frosty, we slept between a doubled tarpaulin that got stiff with
ice.48 Again the defensive frontages were wide. The 2/1st Australian
46I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; 1 Aust Corps
Operational Instruction No. 3, 7 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/23; McClymont, To Greece,
47The 16th Australian Brigade actually occupied the old positions of the 1st Battalion,
82nd Greek Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion, 87th Greek Regiment, in the Veria Pass. The
front previously occupied by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 86th Greek Regiment and
the 1st Battalion, 87th Greek Regiment, were to be reconnoitred for future occupation by
the 19th Australian Brigade. The last battalion of the 12th Greek Division, the 2nd Battalion,
82nd Regiment, was to stay in its location for the time being and come under command of
the 6th Australian Division. I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of
Internal Affairs, Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26
[1]; message, W Force to CMFAS, 6 April 1941, TNA WO 201/45.
48G. Long, The 6th Division in action, AWM PR88/72; Report on operations in Greece
16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9 [6-14]; Material copied for use in the
172
chapter six
Battalion, for example, had a map frontage of 4500 metres, which was, in
fact, much longer due to the undulations of the mountains. Each rifle company deployed on different peaks obscured from each other by mist and
clouds.49 With no knowledge of wider events at the unit level, the liaison
officer from Anzac Corps to Force Headquarters in Athens noted that
[t]here was a growing air of quiet desperation about as our troops were
pushed on to the Veria Pass barring the way from the plains of Salonika.50
Taken in total the first two days of Operation Marita to some degree set
the foundation for the campaign that followed. Perhaps the most outstanding surprise to German and British observers was the tenacious Greek
defence of the Doiran-Nestos Line in the first two days of the campaign.
During this 48 hours Greek forces saw no allied aircraft. Key formations,
such as the 14th Greek Division, lacked supplies, anti-tank and anti-aircraft
guns, technical troops and explosives, and relied on older model artillery
pieces. The staff of the division did not have enough officersonly half of
those requiredand this gap was only covered by intensive productivity
on the part of the officers present. These problems were replicated across
the Doiran-Nestos Line. Yet this line represented the most formidable line
of resistance met by the Germans anywhere in mainland Greece at any
time. (This fighting was also responsible for more than half of the German
casualties in the whole campaign.) German reports contained consistent
messages of surprise at the doggedness of the Greek forts. The limited German success at infiltration of the Greek line during this period was only
accomplished due to the severe undermanning of the Doiran-Nestos Line
defensive sectors by field troops.51
compilation of New Zealand War History, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3650].
49F.J. Embrey, 1 Battalion in Greece and Crete, March 1942, AWM 54, 534/2/21; Report
of activities in Greece Apr 41 by Lt. Col. R.R. Vial, 12 January 1945, AWM 54, 534/2/32; Chronology of Operations, 16 Aust Inf. Bde. Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; E.D. Ranke, Notes of
Operations 16 Bde Greece, AWM 27, 116/2; HQ 1 Aust Corps Campaign in Greece War
Diary, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/1; 2/2 Battalion sequence of events, AWM 54 534/5/10.
50Autobiography of Captain D.R. Jackson, Anzac Corps, AWM 68, 3DRL 8052/109.
51Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der 14. Division vom 6. Mrz 10. April 1941, Anl. 2 zu Nr.
24/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, BA MA RH 67/1, p. 11; Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Divisionsgruppe (O.M.) whrend des griechisch-deutschen Krieges 1941, Anl. 2 zu Nr. 25/42 geh. Mil.
Att. Athen, BA MA RH 67/1, p. 15; signature, Gebirgs-Jger-Regiment 85, 1 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht fr den Angriff und Durchbruch des verst.Geb.Jg.Rgt.85 durch die griech.Befestigungszone sdl. Petritsch., BA MA RH 28-5/2, pp. 4-5; Heeresarchivsrat Dr. Ernst Wisshaupt,
undated, Der Balkanfeldzug der 12. Armee, Generalfeldmarschall List Ein strategischer
berblick, BA MA MSG 2/3963, p. 17; entry for 11 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der
6.GEB.DIV., BA MA RH 28-6/8; entry for 7.30 6 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 8 Generalkommando XVIII. Armeekorps, Fhrungsabteilung Begonnen: 6. April 1941 Abgeschlossen:
173
Although the focus and perceived high point of many Greek contemporary recollections of the campaign, the first phase of the battle for the
border forts has tended not to capture much attention in English-language
historiography. This may reflect the fact that no W Force personnel were
involved. Perhaps also, however, a stoic and surprisingly successful defence
of the line by the Greeks did not fit easily with many of the assumptions
of their Imperial allies. This was, after all, the line that W Force had refused
to reinforce under the principle that it could not be held. In addition, Greek
capacity to resist German attacks in prepared mountainous positions undermined the justification for certain key W Force decisions taken later in
the campaign. In short, the tenacity of the EMFAS on the Doiran-Nests Line
does not align comfortably with how many English-language authors have
chosen to interpret the powers of Greek resistance throughout the campaign.
This resolute Greek stand on the Doiran-Nestos line raises a number of
additional questions. Why, for example, did List and Boehme continue to
throw troops against the forts in an attempt to penetrate the line, and pay
such a high price, when it might have been flanked just as quickly and with
lighter casualties? First, the Germans did not expect the Greeks would offer such fierce resistance in this area. The opportunity to outflank the
Doiran-Nestos Line was also dependent on overwhelming Yugoslav resistance in the southeast of that country. List could not assume, at the outset,
that this would happen so decisively that his forces would be free at an
early date to turn south into Greece. The lack of organisation and coordination between the British, Greeks, and Yugoslavs was not known to him. Nor
was the extent of Yugoslav ineffectiveness easily predicted. Headquarters
12th Army expected a tougher fight in southern Yugoslavia and later noted
that with more determination and higher direction Yugoslav forces in the
south would have dramatically delayed the German penetration. The net
result was a consistent focus on breaking the Doiran-Nestos Line, predominantly by way of frontal attacks.52
2.Juni 1941, BA MA RH 24-18/75; entry for 7 April 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, pp. 353-5;
Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, p. 432; Texts of official war communiqus extracted from
the New York Times, AWM 54, 534/5/25; N. Martis, The Battle for the Fortified Positions
of Macedonia and Thrace, International Congress for the 50 Years from the 1940-1941 Epopee
and the Battle for Crete, p. 48.
and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; MGFA, Germany and the
Second World War, Volume III, p. 503.
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chapter six
Perhaps the most important reason, however, for the German concentration on the Rupel Pass before and during the opening phases of the invasion
was that German planners failed to foresee the relative ineffectiveness of
their air attacks against the Greeks in the Doiran-Nestos Line. This in itself
is an important issue, although the lack of surviving Luftwaffe records makes
further investigation difficult. The experience of the Greek border forts provides the first, but by no means the last, piece of evidence against the often
advanced notion of a decisive role for the Luftwaffe in Greece. Although the
forts were pounded from the air for two straight days, in cooperation with
substantial ground bombardment, the German air force achieved little. The
difficulties of the terrain and of identifying targets contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Stuka attacks. Material damage from the air was negligible
and the Greeks fought on. In late March Richthofen had visited the Bulgarian-Greek border and observed likely Stuka targets. He thought the Greek
fortification looked strong, but in discussions with Boehmes divisional commanders, never anticipated the lack of impact of his dive-bombers.53 On
the first day of attacks against the Doiran-Nestos Line, Richthofen was appalled at German bombs falling on German troops, that the Stukas aim very
badly, and that his aircraft failed to overcome the enemy. It was, for Richthofen, a terrible day in its lack of success on the ground.54 Richthofen
consoled himself with the mistaken belief that the devastation of Piraeus
was the work of the Ju 88s, rather than a consequence of prohibited British
explosives aboard the Clan Fraser.55 The material ineffectiveness of the
Luftwaffe, as opposed to perceptions of its critical effect in Greece, is an
argument that will be taken up in later chapters.
Another significant question posed by Greek tenacity on the DoiranNestos Line was what might have happened if W Force had chosen to reinforce the EMFAS as the Greeks had so often pleaded? For their part the
Germans were surprised that the British had chosen not to do so. So too,
American observers later concluded failure to reinforce the western wing
the Doiran-Nestos Line was a fatal and inexplicable blunder.56 Without
53Entry for 25 March 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 141; signature [Ringel?],
Gefechtsbericht ber den Durchbruch durch die griechische Befestigungszone westl. der
Rupelenge am 6.-8.4.41., BA MA RH 28-5/2, p. 3; entry for 7.30 6 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch
Nr. 8 Generalkommando XVIII. Armeekorps, Fhrungsabteilung Begonnen: 6.April 1941
Abgeschlossen: 2.Juni 1941, BA MA RH 24-18/75; Corum, Richthofen, p. 246; Gundelach,
Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer Band 1, pp. 150-1, 172.
54Entry for 6 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, pp. 147-8.
55Entry for 29 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 180.
56War for the Passes, an extract from American Infantry Journal, October, 1941, AWM
3DRL6643 3/42.
175
Figure 6.2:Luftwaffe Stukas in flight in 1941. These aircraft failed to have the impact
expected by the Germans against the forts of the Doiran-Nestos Line. (Source: Australian
resorting to the realm of counter-factual history, it is safe to conclude that

if the Germans had trouble penetrating a line held by three Greek divisions,
then that difficulty would have grown exponentially had it been manned
with another two Imperial divisions and a British armoured brigade. Here,
however, we must return to the basic incompatibility of British and Greek
strategic aims. Papagos was always going to try and hold the Doiran-Nestos
Line as it was the only hope of ensuring Yugoslav involvement, which itself
represented the only chance of staving off a German invasion. Wilson,
however, had options the Greeks did notW Force could withdraw and
fight another day. If Wilson had deployed on the Doiran-Nestos Line it
would have been an all-or-nothing gamble. The line would have held or W
Force in its entirety would have been lost. In the context of the wider British strategic circumstances of early 1941 this was too great a risk.57
Once again, any analysis of the first 48 hours of the German invasion of
Greece thus returns to the Yugoslavs. The fate of the Doiran-Nestos Line,
and any chance of success in Albania which might lead to freeing up Greek
57Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 224.
176
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divisions stationed on that front, and the developing risk of the Monastir
Gap, all hinged on the defence of southeastern Yugoslavia. The first two
days of the German invasion, however, had begun to show how weak that
defence was going to be. According to Dill, his visit to Belgrade on 1 April
revealed that the Yugoslav General Staff had reckoned on another month
before any German attack and had been caught while mobilising. This is
perplexing given that the growing concentration of troops in Bulgaria
should have been sufficient warning of German plans. Yet not until 3 April
did Yugoslav troops begin to move from the interior to the Bulgarian frontier. Perhaps part of the answer lies with the fact that Yugoslav authorities
had, in the wake of the coup, initiated a nation-wide shake up of army
commanders, removing those thought to be inefficient or opposed to the
new regime. In addition, contrary to Papagos post-war complaints about
the Yugoslav failure to concentrate troops in the south, the situation in
southern Yugoslavia could not have been significantly altered after the coup
no matter what Simovi did. There was, as previously noted, neither the
time, transport or rail capability for significant reinforcement, regrouping
or redeployment.58
The Germans thus attacked Yugoslavia with its government in confusion;
while some Yugoslav formations were trekking south to defend the Bulgarian passes through roads jammed with the ox carts of endless columns of
freshly mobilised troops. The frontier defences they were en route to defend,
though built around formidable natural obstacles, lacked any depth. In any
case, Yugoslav troops never had a chance to position themselves tactically
behind them. In addition, prisoner reports later showed that the Yugoslav
divisions in the south contained a higher proportion of disaffected ethnic
Macedonians and Bulgarians, some of whom allegedly shot their officers
and dispersed.59 The Serb-Croat division was equally problematic, and in
this regard the well-known tensions within the country had a direct military
effect. A number of Croat officers, usually more sympathetic to the Axis
then the Serbs, committed outright treason. An air force officer had flown
from Belgrade to Graz on 3 April, for example, and handed the Germans
classified lists of Yugoslav airfields and aircraft deployments. Some Croat
units refused to fight at all. In other instances Croat officers led men against
58H.K. Kippenberger, Notes by Editor-in-Chief, New Zealand War Histories, on
Christopher Buckleys narrative on Greece, AWM 67, 5/17; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, pp. 65-6.
106/3161; Papagos, The German Attack on Greece, p. 28.
177
Serb forces resisting the German advance. On 8 April Croat troops openly
revolted at Vinkovci, a main rail junction along the vital Zagreb-Belgrade
line, and launched an attack against Headquarters, 1st Yugoslav Army Group,
and for a time held its commander and his staff as prisoners. Some Yugoslav
units on the Bulgarian border nonetheless fought well, but their front was
in a state of flux that could not be stabilised. This was all set against the
backdrop of a Greek/British inability to establish any form of effected coordination or liaison after the fighting began. There was simply no machinery to cope with the situation that arose. The consequences for the
defenders were grave.60
IWM 76/118/2; Report, Inter-services committee on the campaign in Greece, July 1941, TNA
WO 106/3161; Papagos, The German Attack on Greece, p. 28; Argyropoulo, From Peace to
Chaos, p. 140; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, pp. 35-6, 66.
178
chapter six
the fall of northeastern greece (8-9 april)
179
Chapter Seven
The fall of Northeastern Greece (8-9 April)

The morning of 8 April brought no respite for the Greeks as the Germans
renewed their attacks against the Doiran-Nestos Line with unabated vigour.
More pressure than ever was placed, in particular, upon Lieutenant General Dedes Divisions Group on the left of the Greek line. On Dedes western flank advancing German mountaineers made early morning contact
with the new and hastily constructed 18th Greek Division line in the vicinity of Megalochori Bridge. The Greek forts in this sector held out all day
against continuing bombardment and assault, as did a series of three independent pillboxes at the foot of the Roupesko heights. Eventually, however, at 7.00 p.m. Fort Popotlivitsa was forced to capitulate.
To the east of the 18th Greek Division, the fight for the Rupel Pass still
raged. Concerted German morning attempts to take Fort Rupel and Fort
Karatas were again repulsed with heavy losses. However, German detachments which had the previous day taken up positions in the Goliama
heights, in conjunction with the concurrent movement south of 5th Mountain Division into the Rodopolis valley, began to threaten the left flank of
the 14th Greek Division. Meanwhile, the defenders in this vicinity were
starting to suffer from acute ammunition shortages. In the eastern Karadag
Sector of the 14th Divisions area night attacks on Forts Maliaga and Forts
Perithori were similarly unsuccessfulculminating in a Greek infantry
counterattack against German troops that appeared on the surface of Fort
Perithori. The fighting was desperate and at close quarters but the Germans
were eventually forced off the fort. A little after midnight, 8 April, both forts
and their surrounding heights were once again attacked, this time by two
German regiments, which were halted after a three-hour struggle.1
Moving further east along the Doiran-Nestos Line, in the 7th Greek Divisions sector, the German 72nd Division spent the day again attacking
Fort Pyramidoeides, Fort Lisse and Fort Dasavlibut was again unsuccessful. The Germans in this area did, however, manage to hold the Kresti heights
1Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Divisionsgruppe (O.M.) whrend des griechischdeutschen Krieges 1941, Anl. 2 zu Nr. 25/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, BA MA RH 67/1, p. 15;
An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 193-4.
180
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against a dawn Greek counterattack. On the far eastern edge of the DoiranNestos line the advancing troops of the German 164th Division made contact with the Greek defensive line on Nestos River near Stavroupolis, while
Fort Echinos continued to resist. The German left wing was slowed more
in this area at this stage by road conditions than by combat. At 9.00 p.m.,
the Germans managed to approach Fort Echinos and began piping smoke
into its underground shelters. This led the garrison of around 570 Greeks
to abandon the fort to move towards the eastern bank of the Nestos River.
Upon arriving at Kentavros village in the pre-dawn darkness, however, the
group was told that the Germans already held Xanthi and Komotini. With
no means of escape the garrison surrendered. By the evening of 8 April the
German 164th Division captured Xanthi and the 50th Division had advanced
far beyond Komotini towards the Nestos River.2
Although the Doiran-Nestos fortifications were pressed hard by the Germans throughout 8 April, and a number of forts were lost, the real danger
to the EMFAS was still the vulnerable gap which had opened between Lake
Doiran and the Axios River. The bulk of the 19th Greek Motorised Division,
hastily ordered to plug the hole, were not able to make it to their new positions in time to prepare to meet the advance elements of the German 2nd
Armoured Division. At 6.00 a.m. Veiels formation crossed the Greek border
at the western edge of Lake Doiran. It was an unequal struggle. Weak Greek
forces in the vicinity of Akritas were immediately thrown aside and German
columns drove towards Kilkis. Remnants of the Greek blocking force withdrew with heavy losses eastwards in the direction of Struma valley. At the
same time a two-regiment force from the German 5th Mountain Division
attacked into the Krousia area and created a gap west of the Dova Tepe
heights. By 11.00 p.m. the village of Metalliko was seized and the headquarters of the 19th Greek Motorised Division, surprised by the speed of the
German advance in its area, was forced to flee to Kentriko. Bakopoulos
again pleaded for RAF intervention but limited by the weather the British
chose to continue their pinprick and harassment sorties against the German concentrations at Strumitsa rather than waste resources on what
increasingly appeared to be a lost cause from the British perspective.3
2An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 193-4; Golla, Der
Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 164-7; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 87.
3On 8 April, nineteen Blenheims bombed German transports and armoured columns
in the Strumitsa valley, while a flight of twelve others had to abandon a similar mission due
to mist and rain. The following day a dozen more Blenheims attacked targets in the same
area but again an equal number failed to find them. Despite all this, even had the weather
181
The deep penetration of German troops towards Kilkis was a disaster

for EMFAS as advance German elements raced across the almost undefended country towards Salonika. The city must soon fall and the troops in
the Doiran-Nestos Line would thus be cut off and captured if they stayed
in place. Bakopoulos therefore decided upon a general withdrawal towards
the harbours of Eastern Macedonia, as any retreat west of the Axios was
now blocked by the German 2nd Armoured Division. The situation was
grim. The available vessels in eastern Macedonia would never be sufficient
to evacuate the EMFAS and it was certain that the Germans would interfere
with any attempted withdrawal. Nonetheless, at 4.30 p.m. Bakopoulos telephoned Papagos to inform him of the decision to withdraw. Five minutes
later, however, Bakopoulos received orders from Greek General Headquarters authorising him to enter into surrender negotiations with the commander of local German forces. Papagos had assessed the situation as
hopeless and continuing the struggle a futile loss of life. In fact, by lunchtime, 8 April, he had already drafted written orders authorising the capitulation of the EMFAS.4
At 9.00 p.m. Bakopoulos sent a letter to Major General Veiel proposing
a surrender of the EMFAS on the condition that Greek soldiers be allowed
to keep their weapons, or failing that for the Germans to agree on returning
them to Greece after the war. Bakopoulos briefed his senior commanders,
stressing the need to hold their positions until a surrender document was
signedboth as a matter of honour and to ensure favourable terms. Veiel
passed the Greek terms on to Field Marshal List who agreed on a ceasefire
to begin the next morning. The last train from Salonika to Athens departed
at 3.00 p.m. to the sound of W Force engineers detonating demolitions on
bridges, roads and railways in the vicinity of the city. At 11.00 p.m. the Military Commander of Salonika, Lieutenant General Nikolaos Rizos Rangavis,
been good, such token efforts could do no more than harass an occasional column of enemy
fighting vehicles. It was the same story for RAF fighter success. A few German machines
were downed in the first two days of the invasion but these were numerically insignificant,
and all the while the RAF squadron were losing casualties that could not be replaced. Draft
Manuscript, Medical History of the War: Greece (1940-1941), TNA AIR 49/11; Report on the
operations carried out by the Royal Air Force in Greece: November, 1940 to April, 1941, 15
August 1941, TNA AIR 23/1196; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German
War, pp. 194-5; Casson, Greece Against the Axis, pp. 131-2; Garnett, The Campaign in Greece
and Crete, p. 22; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 169-71, 172-3.
4Greek Campaign 1940-41, TNA WO 201/124; UK War Narratives The campaign in
Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative, The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ
188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; McClymont, To Greece, p. 159; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands
1941, p. 175.
182
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received a letter from the commander of the approaching German advance

guard demanding surrender by midnight. He accepted and the surrender
of the city was carried out the following morning by a committee containing the Metropolitan Bishop of Salonika, the Mayor and the Chief of Police.5
Throughout 8 April Papagos faced not only looming disaster in the Doiran Gap (Axios River valley) that was turning the EMFASs left flank, but
also a rapidly deteriorating situation further west. He feared that elements
of Stummes 40th Corps, which had struck into southeast Yugoslavia, might
soon advance south through the barely defended Monastir Gap. Papagos
reacted quickly. He decided at once to put into action long-held plans,
developed as early as February, to be executed in the event of a general
breakthrough in Macedonia. This plan, which entailed the painful abandonment of many Greek gains in Albania, was to form a new and shorter
line running east-west across the Greek peninsula. W Force (including the
12th Greek Division) was to hold its line from Olympus in the east to the
Vermion Range. Meanwhile, elements of the 20th Greek Division would
withdraw from the mountainous Kaimakchalan area north of the Edessa
Pass to Lake Vegorritis, where they could link with the Amyndaion Detachments proposed defensive line across the Florina Valley at Vevi. That evening Papagos also ordered the partial withdrawal of the Greek WMFAS,
which began preparations for such a move while beating off local Italian
attacks in the Koritza sector. The Greek Cavalry Division, withdrawn hastily from the Albanian front and reinforced by the 21st Greek Brigade the
previous night, was ordered to deploy to the Pisoderion and Klisoura Passes, the northern and central of three passes leading through the mountain
range to the west of the Florina Valley. There the Greek cavalrymen would
link W Forces western flank at Vevi with the eastern flank of Tsolakoglous
WMFAS at Lamos, which itself would join with the EFAS further west to
form an east-west defensive line across the country. Finally, Papagos instructed Wilson to send his armoured brigade north into the Monastir Gap
to slow the German advance.6
5Greek Campaign 1940-41, TNA WO 201/124; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian
and Greek-German War, p. 196; Casson, Greece Against the Axis, p. 133; entry for 8 April 1941,
Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, pp. 355-6; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 171-2.
6Message, Salisbury-Jones to Wilson, 8 April 1941, TNA WO 201/45; Greek Campaign
1940-41, TNA WO 201/124; Anl. 1 zu Nr. 12/42 geh.Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die Ttigkeit
der Armeeabteilung von Westmazedonien (A.A.W.M.) whrend der Kampfhandlungen mit
den Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 2. On this see also Anlage 1 zu Nr. 28/42 geh. Mil. Att.
Athen, Landesverteidigungsministerium, Kriegsgeschichtliche Abt., Bericht. ber die
183
Papagos fears about the Monastir Gap were well justified. It became
increasingly apparent throughout 8 April that resistance in southern Yugoslavia was crumbling and only isolated fragments of Yugoslav troops in
the area were interested in fighting on. The German 40th Corps had by now
effectively eliminated the eastern units of the 3rd Yugoslav Army or forced
them to flee back across the Axios River. Stummes corps crossed the Axios
with ease and by evening, 8 April, advance elements of the Adolf Hitler
Regiment, having moved out from behind the 9th Armoured Division (along
with vanguard elements of the German 73rd Division), had wheeled south
and captured Prilepsevering the important rail line between Belgrade
and Salonika. From here the force could either turn west to link up with
the Italians or south towards the Monastir Gap. By evening the Germans
claimed to have taken some 20,000 prisoners, including six Yugoslav generals, in southern Serbia. As a consequence of its lightning success, during
the day List decided to reinforce Stummes corps further by the transfer
south of the 5th Armoured Division from the Kleist Group.7
True to undertakings given to the Greeks the previous day, despite confusion caused by the planting of a bogus order by Italian military intelligence, and the ongoing disintegration of its eastern flank, the Yugoslav 3rd
Army continued its offensive into northern Albania throughout 8 April.
During the day a Yugoslav cavalry screen successfully crossed the Prokletije Mountains and reached the village of Koljegcava in the Valjbone River
Valley. South of them the 31st Kosovska Division at last broke through the
Italian defences in the Drin River Valley. The Greek WMFAS also resumed
its push and re-launched the 9th and 13th Divisions against the Italians.
The start of the Greek attack was postponed, however, due to the late arrival of artillery ammunition and bad weather, but elements of the 9th
Greek Division, apparently unaware of the delay, advanced anyway. Some
Ttigkeit der 21. Inf. Brigade whrend der deutsch-griechischen Kampfhandlungen.,

BA MA RH 67/1, p. 1; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 167-8.
7I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign
narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Texts of official war communiqus extracted from the New York Times, AWM 54, 534/5/25; message, W Force to
W Force Advance Headquarters, 9 April 1941, TNA WO 201/45; Ein berblick ber die
Operationen des jugoslawischen Heeres im April 1941. (Dargestellt nach jugoslawischen
Quellen.) I. Teil. pp. 280-8; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 84; MGFA, Germany and the Second
World War, Volume III, p. 504; McClymont, To Greece, p. 159; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria,
p. 52; Lehmann, Die Leibstandarte Band I.
184
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Greek units infiltrated Italian lines and took around 250 prisoners before
being forced to withdraw with heavy casualties of their own.8
The reality of the developing situation in southern Yugoslavia, however,
soon ended the Greek-Yugoslav Albanian offensive. General M. Nedic commanding the Yugoslavian southern artillery group, repeated the standing
Yugoslav plea for RAF support and a British drive into southern Yugoslavia
that could never come. The fall of Skopje, in particular, threatened to iso
late the Yugoslav divisions attacking into Albania. The next morning, although the Yugoslav 15th Zetska Division continued advancing towards
Shkoder (its cavalry screen had reached the Drin River), soon both it and
the 31st Kosovska Division had to halt all offensive actions in Albania due
to the appearance of German troops in Prizren. From this point the Yugoslavs attacking in Albania were forced to take a defensive stance to hold off
increasing pressure from German troops. On the Greek side, intelligence
reports arriving at General Headquarters were incrementally building a
picture of the crumbling Yugoslav defences in the south. As a consequence
Tsolakoglou, with Papagos approval, postponed any further attacks against
Pogradets. The 9th and 13th Greek Divisions returned to their original positions and soon it was the Italians who applied pressure back across the
Albanian line, particularly northwest of Pogradec, in the Bubes area, and
north of Trebesinji. The combined Yugoslav-Greek gains in Albania were
thus negligible, short-lived and inconsequential.9
For Wilson, and his prospects on the Vermion-Olympus Line, the morning of 8 April brought more bad news. The optimism associated with news
of a Greek-Yugoslav attack in Albania was soon overshadowed by the course
of events elsewhere across the front. The impact of the Yugoslav air force,
upon which the British had pinned some faith, was proving negligible. So
too, lingering Allied hopes of a Yugoslav counter-attack into Bulgaria were
no longer sustainable. Early in the morning of 8 April W Force Headquarters
received word from a British patrol moving north of Monastir which described the collapse of the 3rd Yugoslav Army, and the German occupation
8Anlage 1 zu Nr. 20/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die Operationen der Armeeabteilung von Ost Makedonien (A.A.O.M.) whrend des deutsch-griechischen Krieges
vom 1941, BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 1 -19; Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies, p. 122.
534/5/25; message, British Liaison to Yugoslav Headquarters, 7 April 941, TNA WO 106/3124;
message, British Military Mission to General Headquarters, Middle East, 12 April 1941, TNA
WO 201/49; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 202.
185
of Veles and Skopje.10 Fleeing Yugoslav troops began collecting in Florina.

At the same time Wilson was receiving accurate ULTRA intelligence as to
the positions of the leading German units as they moved through Monastir.
So too with the complete aerial destruction of Belgrade, British diplomats
reported the breakdown of the Yugoslav General Staff which was by then
well out of touch with its own forces. Last, Wilson was being made increasingly aware of the dangerous German advance through the western edge
of the Doiran-Nestos Line. From Athens, Brigadier Salisbury-Jones signalled
Wilson that German tanks and infantry were moving south of the road
leading to the west edge of Lake Doiran and also south down a parallel,
more westerly road leading along the west bank of Axios to Devdelija.
Other German columns had skirted the line to the west and were striking
south to Salonika. The forward elements of the German 18th Corps, still
mounting frontal attacks on the Doiran-Nestos Line, appeared by now to
be almost clear of the Rupel Pass. More worrying still was mounting evidence of German troops in Serbia poised to move through the Monastir
Gap towards Florina and to the rear of W Force position.11
Under such circumstances, and yet to receive Papagos orders to adjust
his line (which did not arrive at W Force Headquarters that evening), Wilson called a crucial meeting at 11.00 a.m., 8 April, at Headquarters 1st Australian Corps. The decisions taken at this meeting were made without the
knowledge or blessing of Greek General Headquarters. That they aligned
quite closely to Papagos instructions, when they arrived at W Force Headquarters 7.50 p.m., was coincidental. Wilson actedwithout reference to
his commander. Nonetheless, the decision taken by Wilson, and subsequently ratified by Papagos, amounted to planned abandonment of the
10The patrol in question led back three Yugoslav tanks and four anti-aircraft guns: Long,
11Up to 8 April Wilson was getting varied and sometimes contradictory information
from three sourcesColonel Salisbury-Jones in Athens (from Greek GHQ), from ULTRA,
Heywoods Mission and the British Embassy in Athens, and from special reconnaissance
radio detachments at Salonika. All sources of information, however, were slow due to
distance and terrain. It took relayed wireless messages from Athens, for example, 4-8 hours
to reach Wilsons forward headquarters. I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54,
534/2/26 [1]; message, British Liaison to Yugoslav Headquarters, 8 April 1941, TNA WO
106/3124; Hinsley, British Intelligence Volume One, p. 409; Lewin, ULTRA goes to War, p. 156;
Hunt, Foreword to the 1990 Edition, A Don at War, p. xv; Casson, Greece Against the Axis,
pp. 132-5; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 169-70. Entry for 9 April 1941, Der JugoslavienFeldzug., BA MA RH 20-12/88, p. 2; Wisshaupt, Der Balkanfeldzug der 12. Armee, BA MA
MSG 2/3963, p. 16.
186
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Vermion-Olympus Line by an adjustment of his forces into an intermediate line. No date was given as to how long this intermediate line was to
hold but it was to be long enough to ascertain the precise state of the 3rd
Yugoslav Army, to enable the WMFAS to withdraw from Albania to the
upper Aliakmon valley, and to allow W Force to establish a more permanent
Olympus-Aliakmon Line which would run from Olympus, north to Aliakmon River, then southwest to the mountains west of Servia where it would
link with the new Greek line. The proposed W Force intermediate line,
however, was still some 170 kilometres in length, sparsely manned, and
looked no more suitable for determined or prolonged defence than the
previous position. Nonetheless, the W Force adjustment was ordered; and
it entailed a number of important and immediate movements, all to be
completed by the morning of 10 April.12
The northwestern anchor of the new W Force intermediate line would
be Lees force in the Amyndaion area guarding the Monastir Gap. The first
move, therefore, was to reinforce this position further in order, as described
by Blameys headquarters, to stop a blitzkrieg down this corridor.13 What
troops could be spared from the 6th Australian Division, including its headquarters (but not including the 16th Australian Brigade digging in at Veria),
were to deploy immediately into the gap at the Vevi Pass to forestall any
German armoured advance. General Mackay was chosen to lead the expanded force and was placed directly under Wilsons command, with his
headquarters co-located with Headquarters CMFAS at Perdika. Mackays
force was to be composed initially of two battalions of the 19th Australian
Brigade, the 2/3rd Australian Field Regiment, the 2/1st Australian Anti-tank
Regiment, the 64th Medium Regiment and Lees existing detachment (3
RTR, 2 RHA, and elements of the 27th NZ Machine Gun Battalion). The
Greek Dodecanese Regiment (part of the 20th Greek Division), which had
been guarding the Vevi-Kleidi area since late February, was also to fall under Mackays command on his right flank. As Imperial troops arrived in
this location, amidst sunshine, rain, fog and snow (which seemed to alternate every hour), the mood was sombre. Mackay went forward to Perdika
narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; UK War Narratives The
campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative The Campaign in Greece, April
1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; MGFA, Germany and the Second World
War, Volume III, p. 507; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 42-4; An Abridged History of the
Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 203-4.
13Extract from HQ Medium Artillery, Anzac Corps, War Diary, 6 April 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/29; Anzac Corps War Diary, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/9.
187
Figure 7.1:Narrow mountain roads over which British and Dominion troops travelled
north to reinforce the Vermion-Olympus Line on 8 April, while at the same time Lieutenant
General Wilson planned the first W Force withdrawal to an intermediate line position.
to meet Kotoulas at 10.00 p.m., then on to Sotir to consult Brigadier Lee

where he described the Allied position as rather acute.14 The commander
of the 2/3rd Australian Battalion, watching refugees streaming south, worried that if Mackays force broke we had no earthly chance of getting out
on the right flank, while if the Hun came at us it is very doubtful that our
Brigade group could hold him.15 During the afternoon the road south of
the Monastir Gap thickened with refugees, and straggling Greek and Yugoslav troops. After dusk two American journalists arrived at Mackays headquarters from Monastir with reports of Germans advancing through Stip
and Skopje and within hours of the thin Allied line.16
14I. Mackay, Report on operations of the 6th Australian Division in Greece, May 1941,
AWM 54, 534/2/34.
15W. Cremor, A Quick Tour of Greece, AWM 54, 253/4/2.
16Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Zentralmazedonien (T.S.K.M.)
im Kampfe gegen die Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 1-2; Chronology of Operations,
188
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The second consequence of Wilsons meeting at Blameys headquarters

on 8 April was an order for the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade to detonate its
prepared demolitions in Axios Valley and withdraw during the night to the
vicinity of Amyndaion, and once there to come under Mackays command.
Brigadier Charrington wasted no time. Soon after 12.00 p.m., 8 April, the
4th Hussars, as part of a screen on the Axios plan, detonated their charges
which were only partially successful in destroying two railway bridges and
a road bridge over the Axios Riverbefore beginning their withdrawal
through to Kozani via the Edessa Pass, and on towards Veria. Major R. Hobson, Charringtons Brigade Major, complained that we had prepared to
fight one battle and we never fought it.17 Moreover, the blowing of the
demolitions was foul ... here we were laying their [the Greeks] country
completely to waste, and running away apparently without a fight, and
certainly there were no Germans anywhere near the place at all.18 One such
demolition destroyed a railway bridge and trapped a number of Greek
hospital carriages, which, reflected Charrington, lay very heavily upon my
conscience for days.19 For a large portion of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade
progress was slow, thanks to roads made almost impassable from two days
of rain east of Lake Vegorritis with Greek bullock transport further adding
to the congestion. Charrington grew nervous. The problem was that his
brigades line of retreat saw it moving northwest then back through the
Monastir Gap. It appeared, therefore, that it was a race against time to get
it back behind the Gap before the Germans flooded into it. As it happened,
there was no interference from the Germans, however, and Charringtons
troops began passing through Mackays force from 7.00 p.m., and were in
position south of Vevi by early hours of the next day.20 Charrington tried
Q Branch HQ 6 Aust Div Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; extract for 64th Medium Regiment
War Diary, 8 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1492; diary of Iven Mackay, 9 April 1941, AWM 3DRL
6850; extracts from the diary of Lieutenant B.H. Travers, AWM 3DRL 6850, 110; HQ 1 Aust
Corps Campaign in Greece, War Diary, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/1; 1 Aust Corps Operational
Instruction No. 4, 8 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/23; extract from HQ Medium Artillery, 1
Anzac Corps, War Diary, 6 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/29; The Campaign in Greece, AWM
54 534/5/13; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 43; W. Scarfe and A. Scarfe, No Taste for Carnage,
Seaview Press, Henley Beach, 1998, p. 77.
17Letter, Hobson to anonymous, 4 May 1941, TNA CAB 106/374.
18Ibid.
19Letter, Charrington to Cynth, 29 April 1941, LHCMA Charrington, 4/75a.
20Extract from 102nd Anti-tank Regiment War Diary, 8 April 1941, TNA WO 196/1490;
letter, Atchison to Wards, 15 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; letter, Sutherland
to Wards, 12 March 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; diary of Corporal R.F. White, ANZ
ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; The Campaign in Greece, AWM 54 534/5/13; extract from 1st
Rangers War Diary, 8 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1739; Report on demolitions carried out by
189
to steel the hearts of his men, reminding them that the eyes and ears of the
whole world would follow with heartfelt interest during the next few days
the deeds of the first British troops to go into action against Germans since
the operations in Norway and around Dunkerque.21
Continuing the W Force adjustments onto its intermediate line, further
east Wilson ordered the 4th NZ Brigade to move back over the Olympus
Pass during the night of 8 April to a temporary corps reserve position near
Kato Philippaidi in the mountains just north of Servia, recently vacated by
the 16th Australian Brigade. Once there the New Zealand brigade began
digging in a defensive line from Kastania-Servia-Prosilion. This was a vital
position as any future W Force withdrawals would have to go through this
pass. The remainder of the New Zealand division was at last now ordered
to move south to the mouth of the Olympus Pass, with the 6th NZ Brigade
behind 5th NZ Brigade, leaving only the cavalry regiment forward. This
Servia-Olympus position was to be held to the last man and the last round.22
Two days before such moves had been specifically refused by W Force Headquarters, yet now Freyberg had finally received the orders he had been
lobbying for. The decision to send the New Zealand brigades back to the
passes, however, effectively lost a months hard work and a large proportion
of the divisions wire and mines. Yet had it stayed, according to Freyberg
the whole New Zealand Expeditionary Force would have been captured
in a few hours and the Germans would have been in Larissa next day.23
Aside from a redeployment of Imperial troops, Wilsons new intermediate line also required the withdrawal of the 20th Greek Division from the
Kaimakchalan sector north of Edessa to fill the gap between Mackays force
covering the Monastir Gap and Mt Vermion. Wilson subsequently met
1 Armd Bde on April 8/9 1941, TNA WO 201/509; Engineer Summary of the campaign, May
1941, TNA WO 201/118; MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume III, p. 450; Long,
211st Armoured Brigade Special Order of the Day, 8 April 1941, IWM 77/149/1.
225 New Zealand Infantry Brigade Operation Instruction No. 4, 8 April 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/26 [1].
Greek Campaign, AWM 67, 5/17; letter, Freyberg to Kippenberger, 16 January 1950, AWM
67 5/17; S.F. Rowell, The campaign in Greece, April 1941, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A),
[1-4]; message, Blamey to Freyberg, 8 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 643, 1/3; I. Wards, New Zealand
War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand
Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658;
GOCs [Freybergs] Diary (extracts), 2 January 2 September 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906,
WAII8/5/42-43; New Zealand Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105; HQ RAA
Anzac Corps, Summary of the Operations of the Arty of the Anzac Corps in Greece, AWM
54, 75/4/3; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 171-3; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 42.
190
chapter seven
Kotoulas at Kozani at 1.30 p.m., 8 April, and ordered him to initiate such a
movement.24 The 20th Greek Division (minus the Dodecanese Regiment
detached to Mackay) was to secure the heights just west of Lake Vegorritis
and block the Agra Pass and other routes from Edessa westwards. Veria Pass
would still be held by the 16th Australian Brigade with elements of the 12th
Greek Division between it and the new 20th Greek Division position. At
this stage the 20th Greek Division also gained a new commander with
Major General Christos Karassos promoted to replace Kotoulas, whose
apparent nervous disposition and defeatist attitude had lost him Wilsons
confidence. In due course Karassos was himself replaced as commander
of the 20th Greek Division by Colonel Miltiades Papakonstantinou.25
That Wilsons orders to abandon the Vermion-Olympus Line for an intermediate line position coincidentally aligned with Papagos overall intent,
did not mean they matched perfectly with the orders he subsequently received from the Greek General Headquarters. One significant difference
was that Papagos directed the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade to advance into
the Monastir Gap to make contact with, and delay, the advancing Germans.
Wilson preferred to leave it in its reserve position south of Vevi. As was the
case earlier when Papagos had ordered the British armoured brigade forward to slow the German 2nd Armoured Division advance in the vicinity
of Lake Doiran, it seemed Wilson felt free to choose which orders he would
follow, and which he would disregard. In neither case did Wilson order
Charringtons brigade to move. It was staying exactly where Wilson wanted
itin reserve south of Mackays force.26
By the evening of 8 April Wilsons formations waited nervously as streams
of refugees continued to pour south. The Germans now controlled most of
Eastern Macedonia with a forward screen moving from Kilkis towards Yiannitsa. It could not be long before the leading German units made contact
with W Force. On dusk forward Dominion troops could see smoke pouring
from Salonika from oil stocks set ablaze by the Canadian Kent Corpsa
commando party under the direct control of the British military mission.27
im Kmpfe gegen die Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 1- 2.
25Headquarters BTE War Diary, 8 April 1941, TNA WO 169/994B.
26Headquarters BTE War Diary, 8 April 1941, TNA WO 169/994B; I. Wards, New Zealand
Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, p. 177; McClymont,
To Greece, pp. 165-7.
27This detachment demolished a range of essential stores and facilities including the
Shell, Standard and Steaua-Romana installations, Fixs brewery, a machine shop in Betchinar
191
At 7.25 p.m. the Germans crossed the Axios River at Axiopolis and half an
hour later W Force Headquarters ordered all supply dumping north of
Aliakmon to cease. Colonel Salisbury-Jones, now appointed liaison between
W Force and Greek General Headquarters, reported that the Greeks believed
the whole of the EMFAS lost. Back in London the British War Cabinet Joint
Planning Staff by now considered Yugoslav resistance to have folded in
Serbia and that the WMFAS in Albania was in a difficult position, with
little chance of an orderly withdrawal south as ordered by Papagos. This,
combined with inevitable German air attacks when the bad weather which
had waterlogged Bulgarian airfields eventually lifted, was assessed as likely to produce chaotic conditions.28 With little other choice for the time
being, the Joint Planning staff recommended W Force stay in Greece, but
that it receive no additional reinforcement.29
On the other side of the front line, 9 April brought a continuing string
of good news to the headquarters of the German 12th Army. Turkey was
neutral. Piraeus was still burning. Salonika had fallen and the Yugoslav army
had disintegrated, especially in the south of the country. News of Rommels
attacks in North Africa lifted spirits further. The 2nd Armys invasion of
north and central Yugoslavia was also going well. Lieutenant General Vietinghoffs 46th Motorised Corps began its drive on Belgrade during the morning on a 160 kilometre front. To the southeast, von Kleists 1st Armoured
Group was by 11.00 a.m. advancing through Nish and pursuing Yugoslav
troops up the Morava valley. In northern Greece negotiations to accept
the surrender of Bakopoulos EMFAS had already begunalthough
fighting continued.30
Gardens, a pressure gas-producing plant, a flour mill, and facilities including cranes, barges,
tugs, warehouses at docks. Once back in Athens this party prepared various British dumps
for destruction. Report on Demolitions carried out by Detachment, Kent Corps Troops
Engineers at Salonika and Athens, 10 May 1941, TNA WO 201/119, pp. 1-2; McClymont, To
Greece, pp. 170-1.
28Report by the Joint Planning Staff on military policy in the Middle East, 8 April 1941,
TNA CAB 79/10.
29I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Report by the Joint
Planning Staff on military policy in the middle east, 8 April 1941, TNA CAB 79/10; message,
Wavell to Advance Headquarters, W Force, 8 April 1941, TNA WO 201/114; Wilson, Eight
Years Overseas, p. 86; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 42; Crisp, The gods were neutral,
p. 105.
30Entry for 9 April 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, p. 357; Papagos, The German Attack
on Greece, p. 27; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 225;
192
chapter seven
On the left of the Doiran-Nestos Line, in the 18th Greek Divisions sector,
throughout 9 April the Germans continued to mount a series of unsuccessful assaults against Fort Paleouriones. So too, although already bypassed
by significant numbers of Germans, from dawn the forts in the 14th Greek
Divisions defensive area continued to resist. Fort Rupel yet held fast against
severe shelling, with its commander reputed to have answered German
demands to capitulate: Fortresses do not surrender until the enemy manage to seize them.31 In the Karadag Sector an attempted infiltration of a
German battalion during previous night between Forts Maliaga and Perithori was repulsed with heavy losses on both sides. Another simultaneous
battalion infiltration between Forts Perithori and Partalouska was successful, and a German attack was mounted on the rear of these positions during the morning of 9 Aprilonly for the German force itself to be pursued
and attacked by Greek reserves who subsequently took 102 German prisoners. A third infiltration the previous night had succeeded in occupying the
Agios Konstantinos heights, only to be retaken during the day by another
Greek counter-attack, this time taking 250 German prisoners. Within the
Falakro Sector to the east the Germans who had taken the Ousoyia Heights
the previous day remained pinned by fire from Fort Pyramidoeides, while
at 10.00 a.m. the German detachment on the Kresti Heights was destroyed
after a three-hour fight. The 5th Mountain Division noted that, to its front,
as before the enemy defends himself ferociously ... in the positions he still
completely occupies.32 Even in the Nestos Brigade area far to the east,
a morning attempt by Germans to cross the Nestos River in the area of
Paradeisos village was successfully repulsed.33
31S. Papathemelis, The Northern Frontiers and the Macedonian Hellenism, International Congress for the 50 Years from the 1940-1941 Epopee and the Battle for Crete, p. 40.
32Entry for 9 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch der Fhrungsabteilung 5. Geb. Div. 25.10.1940
bis 10.7.1941 gef.d.Oblt. Zimmermann, BA MA RH 28-5/1. See also Bericht ber die Kampf
handlungen des 7. Division vom 6. 9. April 1941., Anl. 1 zu Nr. 19/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen,
BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 10-11.
33In the Nestos and Evros Brigade areas, after reaching the coast the 50th German
Division veered in the direction of Salonika where it was subsequently removed from Lists
command, made directly accountable to OKH, and saw no further action. The rest of the
30th Corps, based on the 164th Division, was tasked to cover the coast from Nestos to the
Turkish frontier. With little time to prepare for amphibious operations, units of this division
in the Kavalla area went on to carry out the occupation of key Aegean islands (see Chapter
14). Occupation of the Aegean Islands, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and
General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; An Abridged History of the
Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 197-8. For reports of action on the Agios Konstantinos heights, see Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Divisionsgruppe (O.M.) whrend des
193
Yet, after three days of vigorous German assaults, and despite the fact
that east of the Struma River Greek forces had yielded little ground, Bakopoulos force was hopelessly isolated and in an untenable position. At 2.00
p.m., 9 April, the EMFAS formally capitulated when surrender documents
were signed at the German Consulate in Salonika between Bakopoulos and
Veiel. Greek officers kept their swords. At 4.00 p.m. Bakopoulos notified his
units of the surrender terms and ordered a ceasefire. Over the next few
hours the remaining Greek forts were ordered to lay down their arms and
mutual cease-fires were arranged. At Fort Paleouriones a German battalion
paraded at the fort the next morning to honour the surrender. The battalion commander addressed the Greek garrison and then led its garrison
commander to inspect the paraded German unit. The German flag was
hoisted only after the Greek garrison had departed. Similar ceremonies
were conducted at Forts Rupel, Lisse, Pyramidoeides, Perithori, Echinos,
Nimphaea, Istibei and Kelkayia. Many Greek accounts convey a sense of
pride in the resistance offered by the forts and German recognition of the
tenacity of their defence. Major General Mattenklott, of the 72nd Division,
reportedly declared that he had seen no such effective resistance in Poland
or France and that the Greeks were the first Allied troops not to panic at
the sight and sound of German dive-bombers. The reference to France was,
to some degree, well-made for there were some striking parallels. In both
cases the Germans advanced through the territory of a third party and
flanked a strong fortified line, while the defenders had no forces at hand
or mobile enough to block or counter-attack the German armoured encirclement. The sentiment was echoed after the war by Major Leo Hepp, a
staff officer on Lists headquarters during the campaign, who described the
fighting in the Doiran-Nestos Line as unexpectedly difficult and costly,
while the Greek Army had undoubtedly shown itself to be the strongest
enemy that the German soldier had encountered in the course of the war
till then.34 It was noteworthy also that the order to stop fighting was not
well received by some Greek units who were unaware of German breakthroughs or the hopelessness of long-term resistance. Some Greek units
in the Rupel area made such spirited local counter-attacks even after news
of the surrender that air attacks were needed to help German infantrymen
disperse them. Richthofen, like Mattenklott, praised such dashing, brave
griechisch-deutschen Krieges 1941, Anl. 2 zu Nr. 25/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, BA MA RH 67/1,
pp. 16-17; more generally, Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 178-81.
34Hepp, Die 12. Armee im Balkanfeldzug 1941, p. 207.
194
chapter seven
Ne
sto
72 Div
Valandovo
KELKAYIA
POPOILIVITSA
III
v
Di
18 Div
19
Lake
Doiran
RODOPOLIS SECTOR
ISTIBEI
ROUPESKO
SECTOR
RUPEL
KARATAS
KALI
Klidi
BABAZORA
MALIAGA
PERSEK
PARTALOUSKA
SIDIROKASTRO
GROUP
18 Div
14 Div
Lake
Kerkini
Gevgeli
Akrino
ARPALOUKI
RIONE
River
III
125 Regt
Marinoupoli
2 Pz Div 5 Mtn Div

Petritsi
6 Mtn Div
Lefkogia
PERITHORI LISSE
PYRAMIDOEIDES
DASAVLI
um
PALIO
U
Str
FALAKRO
Seres
14 Div
7 Div
KARADAG
SECTOR
Polikastro
Strimoniko
Kilkis
Str
um
0
0
er
Riv
Y U G O S L AV I A
River
20 kilometres
10 miles
Map 7.1:The Battles of the Doiran-Nestos Line, 6-9 April 1941
people!35 The first thought of others was to escape out of Eastern Macedonia to continue fighting elsewhere. Greek field troops still in the Roupesko Sector, for example, managed to slip away during the night of 9 April
without the Germans noticing. In any case, Eastern Macedonia and Thrace
were now in German hands. All 60,000 Greek soldiers east of the Axios
River were thus removed from the Allied order of battle. EMFAS casualties
for the four day struggle were fewer than 1200 killed and wounded. For
their part the Germans lost around 720 killed and missing, and close to
2200 wounded.36
36An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 196-9; Long,
Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 45; MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume III,
pp. 502-3. Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der 14. Division vom 6. Mrz 10. April 1941, Anl. 2 zu
Nr. 24/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, BA MA RH 67/1, p. 10; entries for 14.47 and 17.00 9 April 1941,
Kriegstagebuch Nr. 8 Generalkommando XVIII. Armeekorps, Fhrungsabteilung Begonnen:
6.April 1941 Abgeschlossen: 2.Juni 1941, BA MA RH 24-18/75; Bericht ber die Operationen
der Nestos Brigade whrend der Griechisch Deutschen Kmpfe (6.- 9. April)., Anl. 1 zu Nr.
18/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, BA MA RH 67/1, p. 11; entry for 9 April 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch
II, p. 356; Ein berblick ber die Operationen des griechischen Heeres und des britischen
195
Kirtzali
50 Div
BULGARIA
164 Div
BARTISEVA
Melivia
Paranesti
II
Stavroupoli
NYMFAEA
PARANESTI
SECTOR
XXXX
Drama
EHINOS
Xanthe
Komotine
Lake
Bourou
Nest
os Bd
e
Evro EMFAS
s B de
TOULOUBAR
SECTOR
7 Div
Nestos Bde
SECTOR
III
III
AG. NIKOLAOS
II
KASTILO
Map 7.1:Cont.
With the Doiran-Nestos Line as good as broken, by the morning of 9

April Field Marshal Lists attention was drawn towards W Force. He believed
that, due to the swift advance of his forces thus far, the 12th Army was in a
good position to enter central Greece by smashing through Wilsons line.
List correctly deduced that the British commander intended to delay on a
line from Olympus northwest to the Vermion Mountains as long as possible,
and that any premature W Force withdrawal would endanger the Greeks
in Albania by leaving open their eastern flank. Lists staff also figured, correctly, that an advance through the Monastir Gap was the key to unhinging
W Forces position. At this point, however, the Germans made the understandable error of assuming that this gap would be well defended. It was
on the basis of this estimation that List had requested that the 5th Armoured
Division be detached from the 1st Armoured Group and attached to the
Expeditionskorps im April 1941. (1. Teil.) I. Die griechischen Verteidigungsplne, die Mobilmachung und der Aufmarsch der verbndeten Streitkrfte., Militrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 8/1 (1943), pp. 81-7; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 182-3, 188-9; Hepp, Die 12.
Armee im Balkanfeldzug 1941, p. 207.
196
chapter seven
40th Corps. Lists staff believed the extra armoured division would provide
the necessary power to punch through the Monastir position. When this
was agreed by OKW List formed his forces up into two main groupsan
eastern wing under Boehmes 18th Corps containing the 2nd Armoured,
72nd (infantry) and 5th and 6th Mountain Divisions, and a western wing
under Stummes 40th Corps now made up of the Adolf Hitler Regiment,
the 73rd (infantry) Division, and the 5th and 9th Armoured Divisions (with
an air landing regiment to be raised and based at Skopje under 40th Corps
command). Boehmes eastern group was to advance with mountain troops
through Edessa, and with the 2nd Armoured Division through Veria to
Kozani and further south. Stumme was ordered to close his western group
up in the Prilep-Bitolj area with the objective of pushing a force through
Florina to Kozani (through the Monastir Gap) as soon as possible. This
double thrust towards Larissa and Kozani, concluded German planners,
would be fatal to both British and Greek forces. Perhaps the only issue of
serious concern for List at this stage of the campaign was logistics. By
8 April, most German forward units could no longer be supplied and had
to live off the supplies they brought with them or captured. This was in
stark contrast to the generous and extensive Allied provisioning organised
in a hurry by Brigadier Brunskill.37
During the morning of 9 April Wilson issued his second set of orders
concerning the occupation of his intermediate line, this time with much
more detail about it and the final occupation of the rearward OlympusAliakmon Line. The intermediate line was confirmed as consisting of
Mackays force near Vevi, the 20th and 12th Greek Divisions to the east and
southeast of Vevi in the Vermion Mountains, the 16th Australian Brigade
south of the Greeks at Veria, the 4th NZ Brigade further south at Servia,
and the rest of the NZ Division at Olympus. Though only a temporary arrangement, it was vital for W Force that the intermediate line hold fast
particularly Mackays force which needed to stave off any German thrust
through the Monastir Gap in order to buy time for our allies to adjust their
37List, Generalfeldmarschall, A.O.K.12, Ia Nr.874/41 g.Kdos., 20.00, 9 April 1941, Fernschreiben to XXXX.A.K. and others, BA MA RH 20-12/93, pp. 1-2; entry for 9-10 April 1941,
Gen. Kdo. (mot) XXXX. A.K., Abt. Qu., 16 March 1941, Fortsetzung des Kriegstagebuches
(Band 2 Begonnen am 16.3.41 Beendet am 1.6.41., BA MA RH 24-40/153, p. 52; Extracts from
12th Army orders in Greece & Crete, AWM 67, 5/17; message, W Force to W Force Advance
Headquarters, 9 April 1941, TNA WO 201/45; Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division,
I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1952, AWM 54,
534/2/26 [1]; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 189-90; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 87.
197
dispositions, including forces in Albania and for the 16th Australian Brigade
in the Veria area which still had to cover the ongoing redeployment of the
CMFAS to the Vermion range.38 Still no estimate was provided on how long
the intermediate line might need to last but Wilson warned a withdrawal
from it to the rearward Olympus-Aliakmon Line might need to be conducted at very short notice. W Force was moving further backwards, the
only question was when.39
After the W Force intermediate line had served its purpose, Wilsons
orders continued, then W Force would again fall back, this time for a protracted defence on the Olympus-Aliakmon Line which would run from
Olympus to Rimnion, to Servia, and along the Aliakmon River to a southerly bend near Deskates. This was the W Force section of Papagos wider
concept of an Aliakmon-Venetikos Line to stretch across the country. Again,
there would be some difficult movements required hereeven without
German interference. The two Greek CMFAS divisions would have to redeploy once more from the positions they were currently occupying in the
Vermion Range on the right flank of Mackays force to positions in the Siatista and Kleissoura Pass areas to the west. This would necessitate a hard
and hazardous march across the only line of withdrawal for Mackays force.
If successful, however, it would put the Greek divisions on W Forces left
flank bordering the WMFAS. Keeping the Greeks together, Wilson believed,
would help simplify command and supply problems. After completing its
own withdrawal, the new WMFAS position would extend the line further
west across the Greek peninsula to Mt Vasilisa. The EFAS would then adjust
its disposition to man a line from Mt Vasilisa to the Ionian Sea. For its part,
when ordered to withdraw after blocking the Monastir Gap for as long as
was required, Mackays force would dissolve. The 19th Australian Brigade
would move south to hold a portion of the new front north of Aliakmon to
the east of the 12th Greek Division, while the 1st UK Armoured Brigade
would become the W Force reserve.40
38UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4.
39Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, I. Wards, New Zealand War History
Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; UK War Narratives
The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative The Campaign in Greece, April
1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; McClymont, To Greece, p. 169.
40The Campaign in Greece, AWM 54 534/5/13; Headquarters W Group Operation
Instruction No. 10, 9 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Order of Battle Greece, TNA WO
201/122; HQ W Gp Operation Instruction No. 9, 9 April 1941. TNA WO 201/53; HQ BTG
Instruction No. 10, 9 April 1941, AWM 3DRL6643, 1/1; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 46-7;
198
chapter seven
Yet even after issuing his confirmatory orders for his intermediate line
and preliminary instructions for the subsequent occupation of the Olympus-Aliakmon Line, Wilson remained uncomfortable. He feared the Greek
Cavalry Division moving to the left of Mackays force was far too extended
and had yet made no proper contact with Mackay. He also had his doubts
about the ability of the 12th and 20th Greek Divisions to move in good
order and at speed east-west from the Vermion Ranges to the Siatista and
Kleissoura Passes on the order to abandon the intermediate line and occupy the Olympus-Aliakmon Line. Should these Greek divisions fail to make
the move in time then the left flank of W Force at Servia would be exposed.
Wilson therefore directed the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade, when Mackay
Force was ordered to withdraw, to redeploy through Siatista Pass into the
upper Aliakmon Valley to protect his flank and support the junction of
British/Greek forces. The pace of unfolding events, however, meant Wilson
had little time to dwell any further on such concerns. A telephone call to
Papagos late in the day confirmed the German approach to the Monastir
Gap and that, with Salonika fallen, elements of the German 18th Corps
were now advancing from Kilkis towards Yannitsa. The 16th Australian
Brigade was ordered to destroy the bridges and detonate other demolitions
at Veria, amidst the disturbing feeling that locals in the area were preparing
to welcome the imminent arrival of the Germans. Headquarters W Force
assessed that an attack on Monastir could be expected with 48 hours while
an attack from the east might develop within 72 hours.41
Meanwhile, on the southeast portion of the W Force intermediate line,
the New Zealanders continued to prepare their positions. At Servia Pass
the 4th NZ Brigade readied itself to repel any German attack from both the
north and east. The pass itself was 450 metres wide through which ran the
main road to Elasson. It was a naturally strong position with limited approaches, good observation and not much room for vehicles off the road.
All of Brigadier Putticks men were in location by 9.00 p.m., 9 April, as heavy
rain and snow fell. To the east, after detonating its bridge and other demolitions during the day, the 6th NZ Brigade retired during the night from the
Katerini plain back through the 5th NZ Brigade at the Olympus Pass. Further
east, the 21st NZ Battalion (from the 5th NZ Brigade) was also on the move
41H.M. Wilson, Report on Greek campaign, TNA WO 201/53; Record of conversation
between General Papagos and General Wilson, 9 April, TNA WO 201/51; The campaign in
Greece, April 1941, Brigadier S.F. Rowell, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A), [1-4]; Campaign
narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 86-7.
199
during 9 April. Released from guard duties in Athens this unit, travelling
in railway cattle trucks, reached Larissa by midday and from there was
sent to take over the defences above the Plantamon Tunnel with orders to
defend this position, from which there will be NO retreat.42 As the 21st NZ
Battalion settled in, late in the night a party of engineers arrived to prepare
the demolition of the railway tunnel in its area, using marine depth charges, mines and 160 kilograms of gelignite. Together such moves left the New
Zealand divisional cavalry regiment as the only one of Freybergs units
forward on the Axios plain. Just before 5.00 p.m., 9 April, NZ cavalry patrols
made contact with scouting German tanks which had approached the
Aliakmon.43
Perhaps the strangest development during 9 April from an Allied perspective was that by nightfall the Germans had still not poured through
the Monastir Gap. There were a number of reasons for the delay. The first
was the simple issue of extended supply lines and the problem of bad roads
in southern Yugoslavia. The advancing 40th Corps columns were very strung
out. In addition, at this stage Hitler specifically directed, against the wishes and advice of Halder, that a significant portion of the leading 9th Armoured Division and Adolf Hitler Regiment elements be diverted west into
Albania to link with the Italians. Nonetheless, Monastir was occupied during the day by the Adolf Hitler Regiments reconnaissance battalion, and
a German motorcycle company crossed the Greek frontier and reached
Florina at 8.30 p.m.44
Meanwhile, Major General Mackay, who had arrived at Lees headquarters at Sotir late the previous night to take command of the area, organised
425 New Zealand Infantry Brigade Operation Instruction No. 4, 8 April 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/26 [1].
43War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/1658; correspondence
(various) concerning the 20th Battalion in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/155; Draft
Narrative 18 (Auckland) Infantry Bn., NZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/150; HQ Company, 18 Battalion in Greece, 7 March 27 April 1941, A.S. Playle, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/148; History
of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/139; 4 NZ Inf Bde Group The engagement at Servia, 9/18 April 41, 30 April 1941,
AWM 3DRL6643 1/44; Headquarters BTE War Diary, 9 April 1941, TNA WO 169/994B; 1 Aust
Corps Operational Instruction No. 5, 9 April 1041, AWM 54, 534/2/23; War Diary HQ 1
Aust Corps Campaign in Greece, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/1; 6 New Zealand Infantry Brigade
Operation Instruction No. 1, 9 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; New Zealand Division in
Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105; GOCs [Freybergs] Diary (extracts), 2 January 2
September 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/5/42-43; H.M. Wilson, Report on Greek campaign,
TNA WO201/53; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 173, 177; Casson, Greece Against the Axis, p. 140.
44Entry for 9 April 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, pp. 357-8; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 190-1; McClymont, To Greece, p. 177.
200
chapter seven
his blocking position as best he could. His force was to deploy on the line
of a ridge running to the east of the village of Kleidi and crossing the road
to the Mala Reka ridge. It was a sound defensive position. The mastiff of
Mala Reka, running from west to east at more than 900 metres high, blocked
the valley except for a narrow gorge south of Vevi. Here the broad valley
running south from Monastir narrowed to the defensible Kleidi Pass which
varied in width from 100450 metres across and followed a winding course
through steep rocky hills with few trees. A road from Salonika approached
the pass from the east. Another, from Monastir, only 32 kilometres away
(paralleled by a rail line), approached from the northwest. The ridge continued east of this pass and within two kilometres of its foothills was Lake
Petersko, swollen with recent rain. Two kilometres further east was Lake
Ostrovon which continued the natural barrier east to the Vermion range.
To infiltrate to the west of Mackays line the Germans would have to go
over Kleissoura Pass, defended by the Greek Cavalry Division. The vehicle
movement off the road to the north of the pass was very difficult, with wet
swamps and ploughed fields, now soaked with sticky mud.45
In the pre-dawn darkness of 9 April there were as yet no Imperial infantry units in the Kleidi Pass position. Brigadier Vaseys 19th Australian Brigade
had a battalion moving forward, one at Veria, and a third yet to land in
Greece. Nonetheless, Mackay decided to place Vasey in charge of defending
the pass with his two arriving Australian battalions reinforced by the 1st
Rangers (of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade), an Australian anti-tank regiment and detachments of New Zealand machine gunners. The rest of the
1st (UK) Armoured Brigade was to be held in reserve. Specifically, a squadron of 3 RTR was to move to Sotir to cover south of the pass while the rest
of the regiment waited south of Amyndaion. Brigadier Herring, Mackays
artillery commander, was given control of two regiments of field and one
of medium artillerya reasonably strong artillery force with which to
hinder German columns that ought to be strung out and slowed down by
boggy roads and previous British demolitions.46
As the morning broke bringing bleak winds and rain, a number of Mac
kays reinforcement units began to arrive. In the centre of the position the
Rangers (less a company still arriving) occupied a 5600-metre line behind
45Anl. 1 zu Nr. 12/42 geh.Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung
von Westmazedonien (A.A.W.M.) whrend der Kampfhandlungen mit den Deutschen.,
BA MA RH 67/1, p. 2; Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, I. Wards, New Zealand
War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1].
46Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 43-5.
201
a minefield being laid by Australian engineers across the Kleidi Pass from
Vevi to the slopes to the west. The units second-in-command, Major D.R.C.
Boileau, grumbled at his unit now not being used as a Motor Battalion.47
To the front of the dismounted British infantrymen the 2/1st Australian
Anti-tank Regiment was deployed, covered by NZ machine gunners. After
a long nights journey in trucks the 2/4th Australian Battalion (less a company still at Volos) arrived at sunrise and marched into the hills along Mala
Reka ridge to the west of the pass, on the Rangers left. This battalion formed
a 6500m front between the Englishmen and the right flank of the 21st Greek
Brigade at Nympheon, 24 kilometres east of Kastoria. As they dug in on
ridges and spurs the Australians could see the mountains in the distance
that formed the Yugoslav border. Below the defensive position was a plain
dotted with villages. The third of Vaseys infantry units, the 2/8th Australian
Battalion, arrived later in the morning. After a night camping in the snow
the next day the 2/8th Australian Battalion moved across the pass to the
right of the Rangers to hold a sector of ridge from the west of Vevi to the
north of Lake Petersko. There it linked with the 20th Greek Division moving
into position from Kaimakchalan, with the Greek Dodecanese Regiment
deploying between Lake Petersko and Lake Vegorritis. There was, however,
a substantial gap left between the 2/8th Australian Battalion and the
Rangers.48
Despite the successful establishment of the Kleidi Pass blocking position
during 9 April Mackay and Vasey had good reason to worry. First, under
orders from Blamey, Headquarters 6th Australian Division withdrew from
Sotir to Perdika, to be adjacent to Headquarters CMFAS so that the Greeks
could make use of the Australian communications. Mackay, however, knew
this put him too far to the rear of his forces. On the front line none of Vaseys
infantry positions had been properly developed due to the speed with which
they had been occupied. Links with neighbouring Greek units were tenuous
and reliable contact, typically in broken French, was not made with them
until the next day. A three-hour morning conference between Mackay and
Karassos at Kozani achieved little due to language difficulties. Moreover,
47Letter Boileau to anon., 7 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Major R.R.C. Boileau, 1 Rangers,
77/149/1.
48Diary of Sergeant D. Reid, 2/8 Australian Infantry Battalion, AWM 54, 253/4/3; letter,
Lieutenant K.L. Kesteven, 2/4 Battalion, 17 May 1941, AWM 54, 234/2/17; H.M. Wilson, Report
on Greek campaign, TNA WO201/53; I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54,
534/2/26 [1]; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 191-2.
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chapter seven
Figure 7.2:W Force troops approaching the town of Kozani en route to Major General
Mackays blocking position at Kleidi Pass, 9 April 1941. (Source: Australian War Memorial:
007626)
the 19th Australian Brigade front was some 18.3 kilometres in length and
thus very thinly held. Indeed, Mackay considered his infantry frontages
beyond their resources in firepower.49 Three companies of the 2/4th Australian Battalion, for example, held 6400 metres of line, with nothing in
reserve behind them. There were gaps each side of the Kleidi Pass which
could only be covered by patrolling. There was also a ridge to the front of
the Allied line, near Lophoi, behind which enemy could form up without
being observed. The rugged terrain also precluded any rapid movements
in response to whatever the Germans might attempt and the line of communication south, a single wet and greasy road to Kozani and beyond that
a single railway track to Athens, was already congested with straggling
Greek troops, evacuees and animals.50
49Report on operations of 6th Australian Division in Greece, Major General I. Mackay,
May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34.
50Extract of a report [translated] of the Central Macedonian Army Group Section,
AWM 3DRL6433; Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, I. Wards, New Zealand
War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Long,
Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 47-8.
203
Nor were many of Mackays men in the best of physical shape. By 9 April
it had already been raining for two days in the valley at Vevi and snow had
been falling in the foothills where many of the defenders now shivered.
The line taken up was 300450 metres above sea level and it was bitterly
cold among the bare grey hillsquite a difference from Egypt. Major R.
Hobson, the Brigade Major of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade, noted that
without time to acclimatise [t]he Aussies suffered a great deal from the
cold, more than us chaps.51 The defenders had their heads in the clouds
and feet into mud.52 The Australians in particular were exhausted after
several days on the move. The 2/8th Australian Battalion had marched 26
kilometres from Larissa to Tyrnavos before being trucked to Veria, then
straight through to Florina with no rest. Many of this unit suffered further
on their last climbs into position, another 16 kilometres across rocky ridges and stony valleys, only then to start digging. Tensions ran high across the
line. A British motorised reconnaissance patrol had skirmished with the
Germans at Monastir during the day. A Rangers sentry was shot dead that
night while guarding a gap in the minefield. Further north, headlights could
be seen in the distance. Mackay was certain that the Germans were on their
way.53
By the end of 9 April, after four days of fighting, from a German perspective the campaign was unfolding at least as well as planned and probably
better than expected. Salonika had fallen. In some cases German formations
had advanced in excess of 160 kilometres through very difficult terrain.
Though it had come with an unexpectedly high price in terms of losses and
effort, the stoic Greek defence of the Doiran-Nestos Line had been broken.
Conversely, the situation for the Allies looked grim. Mobile German forces
were fast approaching W Force positions from across the Axios plain and
also from southern Yugoslavia via the Monastir Gap.
51Letter, Hobson to anonymous, 4 May 1941, TNA CAB 106/374.

52Chester Wilmot, A letter from the front [transcript], AWM 27, 116/1.
53New war scene the A.I.F. in Greece, Sydney Morning Herald, 9 April 1941, AWM
PR 88/72; A summary of the participation of the A.I.F. in the Lustreforce Expedition in
Greece March-April, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7; The 6th Division in action, G Long, AWM
PR88/72; extract from War Diary of HQ Medium Artillery, 1 Anzac Corps, 6 April 1941, AWM
54, 534/2/29; The Twenty Days in Greece, Public Relations Pamphlet, 1941, AWM 54 534/5/4;
extract from 1 Rangers War Diary, 9 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1739; letter, Barnett to anon.
(his mother), 5 January 1942. IWM Papers of Major R.A. Barnett, 102 AT Regt, 07/23/1; letter
Boileau to anon., 7 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Major R.R.C. Boileau, 1 Rangers, 77/149/1;
Garnett, The Campaign in Greece and Crete, p. 23.
204
chapter seven
It is worth noting, however, that German success thus far had not quite
matched some of the more popular conceptions of Blitzkrieg. The decisive
impact of German armour at this stage of the campaign, for example, has
often been misunderstood. Stummes 40th Corps (like other German motorised and mechanised formations in Yugoslavia) was extremely effective.
But at the same time in many cases it was the vanguards of such forces
the reconnaissance and motorcycle unitsthat met and routed their enemies before the tanks arrived. In addition, and as noted, the Yugoslav 3rd
Army in Serbia had a degree of internal weakness that meant it did not
need to be pushed very hard before it crumbled. The important point here
was the mobility of the German armoured columns over difficult terrain,
much more than the firepower of the tank regiments. The speed of Stummes
approach to Monastir dislocated the Yugoslavs and threatened the Allied
line in Greece. The massed steel and firepower of those divisions was as
yet of secondary and unrealised importance.54
The same was true of the 2nd Armoured Divisions flanking of the Doiran-Nestos Line and its advance on Salonika. The strength of this formation,
the key to its achievements thus far, was its ability to traverse the difficult
terrain of the Strumitsa Valley in order to place itself in a position to turn
the left flank of the EMFAS. The German higher command had doubted
that this was possible, and feared that it would lose both time and material.
Nonetheless the attempt succeeded. With much difficulty, and after losing
a number of vehicles to mechanical problems, the 2nd Armoured Division
overcame mountains, boggy paths and inundated country to reach the
open terrain south of the mountain with sufficient vehicles to make a decisive breakthrough towards Salonika.55 Again, here the leading elements
of Veiels division, the aggressive but mostly non-mechanised reconnaissance and vanguard units, not the armoured regiments, met and broke
through the thin curtain of defenders. It was not that the German tanks
had yet played no role, but rather it was far less important than the overall
speed of manoeuvre of the divisions of which they were a part. Where tanks
were used for set-piece attacks, such as in a few thrusts against the Greek
forts, their success was very limited. Concurrent with the 2nd Armoured
Divisions flanking manoeuvre, it is worth remembering that ordinary
54Garnett, The Campaign in Greece and Crete, p. 19.
55The same regiment later conducted an equally difficult move in the Tempe Valley:
A few war experiences, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and General H. von
Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2.
205
erman infantry as well as mountain troops had infiltrated and penetratG

ed the Doiran-Nestos Line at multiple points. Had the 2nd Armoured Division never moved, Salonika would still have fallen, and soon.
A second key observation to be drawn from the events of 8-9 April concerned Papagos ready acceptance, once the true level of Yugoslav resistance
in the south was known, of the need to initiate the withdrawal of the WMFAS in Albania to form the central component (with W Force on its right
and the EFAS on its left) of the new Aliakmon-Venetikos Line to stretch
across the Greek peninsula. This is further evidence against the claim made
at the time of Greek stubbornness regarding Albania described in earlier
chapters. Papagos had a good strategic reason to hold in Albania and at the
same time the pragmatism to plan for, and order the execution of a withdrawal when those reasons were no longer valid. That this withdrawal might
be difficult, or might have been considered to have come too late by a
number of contemporary observers, is largely beside the point. It could not
have come any earlier. Subsequent criticisms of Papagos decision-making
processes regarding the continuing Greek presence in Albania prior to and
during the first few days of the German invasion were unjustified.
The final conclusion which can be drawn from this phase of the German
invasion of mainland Greece concerned Wilsons decision to withdraw from
the Vermion-Olympus Line to an intermediate line, as a precursor to moving to the Olympus-Aliakmon Line. While it was certainly true that the
German invasion came before W Force completed deployment on the
Vermion-Olympus Line, and that there were sound operational reasons
(based on accurate intelligence) for Wilson to adjust his dispositions, it was
nonetheless also true that W Force had thus far decided to withdraw twice
before any significant contact with the Germans had been made. This pattern would be repeated throughout the campaign. In fact, as will be seen
in future chapters, no W Force soldier ever engaged a German without
already having orders to withdraw. Though some units were required to
hold their positions for specified amounts of time, no W Force soldier ever
had orders to fight to the last at the time of a German attack.56 This is not
to pre-judge the operational or even strategic wisdom of retrograde operations by W Forceespecially given the wider importance to Britain and
the Dominions to preserve as much as possible of the force sent to Greece.
56In a number of cases, such as the 21st NZ Battalion at Pinios Gorge, individual units
were ordered to hold out at all costs but, by the time the Germans had arrived, such instructions had been superseded.
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Rather, acknowledging this pattern sets the W Force campaign in a more

accurate context. W Force was not pushed out of the Vermion-Olympus
Line. Nor would it be forced from the intermediate line. Wilson chose to
withdraw. There is an important distinction here and it belies the clich of
besieged defenders fighting desperately to the last until pushed by weight
of numbers from their positions. For a few units something similar to this
scenario did play outbut it was by no means representative of the experience of the bulk of the force.57
Greek Campaign, AWM 67, 5/17; G.C. Cruickshank, Greece 194041, p. 145.
new battle lines (10-12 april)
207
Chapter Eight
New Battle Lines (10-12 April)

By the morning of 10 April, four days after the beginning of the German
invasion, the first phase of the Greek mainland campaign was essentially
complete. Any hope of a united Greek-Yugoslav-W Force front had been
shattered in southern Serbia, the Doiran-Nestos Line was breached, and
Salonika had fallen. Further north in Yugoslavia, after stiff struggles on the
Drava and Sava Rivers throughout the day, Zagreb and Ljubljana fell to
Weichs 2nd Army. Resistance in northern Yugoslavia was effectively broken
and, as a consequence, Croatia declared its independence. General Friedrich Khns 14th Armoured Division, in the vicinity of Zagreb, was at this
point joined by Major General Walter Neumann-Silkows 8th Armoured
Division and both advanced towards Belgrade, aiming a path through Barcs,
Vukovar and Mitrovica. Meanwhile, Kleists 1st Armoured Group was leaving Nish, with its sights also set on Belgrade. Yugoslav troops still willing to
fight on, pursued by German and Italians (from Albania), withdrew towards
the mountains adjoining the Adriatic and were soon hemmed in the area
of Sarajevo and Mostar. With its northern flank secure, the next significant
obstacle in the path of the 12th Armys continuing advance from northern
Macedonia down the Greek peninsula was W Force. Wilsons troops, in the
process of re-deploying onto their intermediate line, and with plans in
train for further withdrawals to the Olympus-Aliakmon Line, had not yet
been tested against the advancing Germans. The Greeks had put up a sturdy defence on the Greek-Bulgarian frontier, but had ultimately failed to
halt Lists columns, or even delay them significantly. How would the BritishImperial forces fare against such a foe?1
By 10 April it was obvious to both sides that the answer to such a question would first be decided first in the vicinity of the Monastir Gap. By the
1Kriegstagebuch Begonnen: 28.3.41 Abgeschlossen: 24.4.41 A.Ob.Kdo. 2, BA MA RH
20-2/130; entry for 10 April 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, pp. 358, 359; Golla, Der Fall
Griechenlands 1941, pp. 194, 212-13; Texts of official war communiqus extracted from the
New York Times, AWM 54, 534/5/25; Greek Campaign 1940-41, TNA WO 201/124; War for
the Passes, an extract from the American Infantry Journal of October, 1941. AWM 3DRL
6643 3/42; Papagos, The German Attack on Greece, p. 27; McClymont, To Greece, p. 192; Long,
208
chapter eight
morning of 10 April Stummes 40th Corps had finished preparations for a

drive into Greece through Monastir, with the mopping up of Yugoslav remnants in Serbia left to Kleists Armoured Group. The stakes were high. List
had always appreciated the potential of a thrust through the Monastir Gap.
In fact, when on 7 April Greek resistance on the Doiran-Nestos Line was
stiffer than expected, he momentarily considered halting the direct advance
on Salonika in favour of a rapid thrust through the Monastir Gap to the
rear of the Allied positions. Fortunately for the defenders such a change
on the German main effort was not ordered at this time. Three days later,
however, its potential could not be ignored. List thus directed the 40th
Corps (including the 5th and 9th Armoured Divisions, the Adolf Hitler
Regiment and the 73rd Division), to advance through the Gap on the axis
Florina-Larissa. Meanwhile, Boehmes 18th Corps (containing 2nd Armoured Division, 5th and 6th Mountain Divisions and 72nd Division) would
advance south from Salonika along the east coast through Katerini and
Larissa.2
More specifically, Stummes objective was first to pass through Florina
to Kozani and thereby penetrate the junction of the Greek WMFAS and W
Force, allowing them to be taken from the flank and rear. The Greek withdrawal from Albania and W Force in its entirety might be cut off by such a
thrust. The reconnaissance battalion of the Adolf Hitler Regiment had
already been sent ahead and had encountered little opposition as it occupied Florina. Against German expectations it seemed the enemy had all
but left Monastir Gap open. Further, an intercepted radio message showed
W Forces surprise at the rapidity of the German advance thus far and tantalised List with scattered details of the W Force adjustments, interpreted
by the Germans as orders for an immediate withdrawal.3 According to List
this intercepted message had an immediate and electrifying effect on our
commanders and troops.4 Stumme did not hesitate and pushed even harder, despite boggy ground, for a drive on Kozani. His most significant problem
in this regard, however, was the speed of his corps previous advances. The
bulk of the 40th Corps was at this stage still crossing the mountains and its
3Although this was more likely to have been a communication between W Force units
concerning the re-deployment onto the intermediate line or plans to occupy the OlympusAliakmon Line, it is possible that the intercepted message might have come from an
armoured patrol north of Mackays force discussing its own withdrawal back to Kleidi Pass.
4Extracts from 12th Armys campaign in the Balkans a strategic survey, AWM
67, 5/17.
209
armoured screen was not considered powerful enough to dislodge the defenders from Kleidi Pass. Stummes advance guard, the 2nd Reconnaissance
Battalion (Adolf Hitler Regiment), was therefore sent west towards Struga,
to the north end of Lake Ochrida, where on 10 April it broke through the
Vardar sector and linked up with the Italians advancing from Albania towards Debar.5 More units had to be brought south from Skopje. The main
bodies of the 9th Armoured Division and the Adolf Hitler Regiment were
thus sent south to force the Gap. At this stage Stumme was relying on German intelligence reports, likely sourced from agents in Egypt, which still
suggested the presence in Greece (locations unconfirmed) of the 7th Australian Division and most of the 2nd British Armoured Division. Had he
realised the true composition of Mackays blocking force, he may well have
been less cautious.6
Nonetheless, the 40th Corps was on its way south. In order to protect
the western flank of his advance, Stumme ordered a motorised column to
detach from the main thrust at Florina and to proceed west across the Pisoderion Pass (west of Mackays force at Vevi) to Koritza and down the
valley through Kastoria to Grevena. During 10 April the lead elements of
this force were surprised and repulsed tirelessly by the Greek Cavalry
Division, positioned earlier by Papagos to protect the withdrawal of the
WMFAS onto its new southerly line. Meanwhile, back in the Monastir Gap
itself, the Adolf Hitler Regiment took the lead. The Witt Battle Group, based
on the 1st Battalion, Adolf Hitler Regiment, and named after its commander, Major Fritz Witt, formed the Regiments vanguardthe tip of a long
and extended German spearhead now poised to strike at Mackays blocking
force at Kleidi Pass.7
A minor blizzard the previous night meant that the defenders at Kleidi
Pass woke on 10 April to a blanket of white. To the left of the position the
2/4th Australian Battalions ridgeline was now 30 centimetres deep in snow.
5Extracts from evening reports from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete), AWM 67,
5/17.
6Ibid.; Fighting in Central and Southern Greece, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal
S.W. List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; McClymont, To
Greece, p. 193; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 89; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 70-1.
7Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, 30 April 1941, Gefechtsbericht der L.SS A.H. fr die Zeit
vom 6.4.41 29.4.41., BA MA RH 24-40/17, pp. 2-3; Anl. 1 zu Nr. 12/42 geh.Mil. Att. Athen,
Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Westmazedonien (A.A.W.M.) whrend
der Kampfhandlungen mit den Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 3; Greek Campaign 1940-41,
TNA WO 201/124; I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs,
Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Long, Greece,
Crete and Syria, p. 54; McClymont, To Greece, p. 193.
210
chapter eight
The Australians had no blankets and no means to warm food. During the
morning the 2/8th Australian Battalion marched east over the pass to begin
digging their positions to the east of the 1st Rangers. Mackays force thus
completed the occupation of its linesuch as it waswith three infantry
battalions strung out over 16 kilometres with no real depth, except for elements of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade earmarked as a mobile reserve.
Moreover, the 1800-metre gap between the 1st Rangers and the 2/4th Australian Battalion, while subsequently shortened, remained open and liaison
between the Rangers and their flanking Australian unit remained problematic at best.8 Nor was formal contact yet made between this Australian
battalion and the Greek Cavalry Division to its west, leaving another gap
in the Flabouron area.9 Streams of Greek and Yugoslav refugees, some
of them recently routed soldiers, continued to move south through the
Kleidi Pass, as they had done for several days. The defenders worried that
German infiltrators might be mixed among them.10
Mackay was desperate for information. During the morning he despatched an armoured car patrol north into Yugoslavia which soon discovered two German columnsone 9500 metres from Vevi (Witt Group) and
another at Sitaria. Orders were given to the patrol to destroy a number of
bridges just across the border as it withdrew. Witts force, however, after
crossing the Greek border at 9.40 a.m. advanced with enough speed to foil
such attemptsat one point a British armoured car detachment found
itself cut off from Mackays position by a column of German motorcyclists
and was forced to charge with weapons blazing back south through the
startled German patrol to safety. At 10.00 a.m., with Germans spotted at Itia
and Vevi, Mackay ordered the road north of the Kleidi Pass demolished,
effectively (if unknowingly) trapping a number of Greek units yet to pass
through his position. The tension mounted. Air reports indicated a large
8As part of this adjustment a Ranger platoon was redeployed 1200 metres to a new
position. The platoon, however, got lost en route and trekked 19 kilometres northeast of
Vevi, almost to the Yugoslav border and back, before returning to the line while dodging
friendly artillery: extract from 1 Rangers War Diary, 10 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1739; letter,
Boileau to anon., 7 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Major R.R.C. Boileau, 1 Rangers, 77/149/1.
9Extract of a report [translated] of the Central Macedonian Army Group Section, AWM
3DRL6433.
10Letter, Lieutenant K.L Kesteven, 2/4 Battalion, 17 May 1941, AWM 54, 234/2/17; extracts
from the diary of Captain K.M. Oliphant, 2/3 Field Regiment, TNA CAB 106/555; I. Wards,
New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign narrative of
2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Report of activities in Greece Apr 41
by Lt. Col. R.R. Vial, 12 January 1945, AWM 54, 534/2/32; Scarfe and Scarfe, No Taste for
Carnage, pp. 75, 79; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 190-5.
211
concentration of German vehicles on the north bank of the Crna River in

southern Yugoslavia moving south. An afternoon reconnaissance of Vevi
by the Rangers found it occupied by German speaking people.11
Finally, at 12.30 p.m., 10 April, German motorised columns came into
clear view of Mackays position on the road near Sitaria. Within 30 minutes
Allied guns began long-range salvos. The first volley made a direct hit on
the lead German vehicles, but this type of flukish accuracy was impossible
to maintain. Nonetheless, thanks to a lack of accurate intelligence on Allied
forces in the area and having met what he thought to be a significant Allied
artillery concentration, Witt decided to halt his advance guard and wait for
more troops and heavy weapons to be brought forward before pressing
Mackays position. Such moves, however, took time. The first German vehicles got the best use of the restricted and sodden roads. Subsequent columns were forced to use fighting troops as labour to improve them on the
march. Meanwhile, the Allied defenders watched nervously the plain to
their north and the slow, dark caterpillar of German vehicles steadily approaching. By mid-afternoon German tanks and infantry were seen deploying behind the cover of a ridge five kilometres to the north of the Kleidi
Pass between Lophoi and Sitaria. Allied guns continued to shell the evergrowing concentrations of German vehicles and men while RAF Hurricanes
and Blenheims attacked the jam of German vehicles on the Prilep-Monastir
Road. The Luftwaffe, largely on account of poor weather in Bulgaria, was
all but absent. A lack of return artillery fire on Mackays men as they desperately continued to dig in suggested that the German guns were still to
the rear.12
By dusk, as the main body of the Adolf Hitler Regiment closed up, Witt
Group was just outside Vevi and had begun to probe and infiltrate Mackays
force in the vicinity of the Kleidi Pass itself. A heavy screen of German
night-time infantry patrols kept the defenders edgy and restless. At around
11Extract from 1 Rangers War Diary, 10 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1739. Notes on Engineer
Operations in Greece, April 1941, 14 June 1941, AWM 54, 313/4/52; A summary of the participation of the A.I.F. in the Lustreforce Expedition in Greece March-April, 1941, AWM 54,
534/5/7; I. Mackay, Campaign in Greece [transcript], 15 June 1941, AWM 27, 116/1; I. Wards,
New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign narrative of
2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Scarfe and Scarfe, No Taste for Carnage,
p. 76.
12I. Mackay, Campaign in Greece [transcript], 15 June 1941. AWM 27, 116/1. Extracts
from 12the Armys daily intelligence reports (Greece), AWM 54, 534/2/27; War for the
Passes, an extract from the American Infantry Journal of October, 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643
3/42; entry for 10 April 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, p. 360; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands
1941, pp. 213-15; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 194-5.
212
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midnight, for example, a force of about 20 Germans making no effort to

conceal their approach moved towards the forward positions of the 2/8th
Australian Battalion. One of the Germans, with no hint of an accent, began
calling out: Where are you, Steve? I cant see you.13 An Australian soldier
stood up to greet them. After a short conversation, during which the Germans must have explained the predicament the defenders now found
themselves in, the enemy patrol, and the Australian section, both disappeared back towards German lines. In the centre of Mackays line, a similar
ruse was used against the Rangers, while a section of New Zealand machine
gunners manning the Kleidi Pass road block was also taken unawares by
Germans dressed in Greek uniforms.14 Such tactics, apart from the intelligence value of captured prisoners, were no doubt designed to have a psychological effect on the defenders.15
Aside from clandestine infiltration, more conventional German preparations for a looming attack unfolded during the evening of 10 April. Several German tanks were lost on a minefield testing the approach to Kleidi
Pass and heavy German mortar fire fell on certain areas of Mackays line
particularly machine-gun positions. All the while the defenders could
plainly hear German truck movement and see vehicle lights and other signs
of activity in and around Vevi, which the Allies continued to shell. In Mackays reserve position a little to the rear of Kleidi Pass, west of the road near
Ptolemais in a dry river bed, Major C.M.L. Clements, commanding B Squadron, 4th Hussars, tuned to the BBC for the evening news to hear that that
two German armoured divisions were apparently headed to the Monastir
Gap, though what we can be expected to do about it, he noted, goodness
knows.16 You cant kill elephants with a pea shooter, wrote Clements, but,
he hoped, there may be some smaller game accompanying them.17
The slim likelihood of Mackays force being able to stop the inevitable
attack through the Monastir Gap was a subject on both Papagos and
13Minute, HQ 6 Division internal Methods Employed by German Patrols, 15 April 1941.
AWM 3DRL 6850, 108.
14Ibid.
15Ibid.; R. Monson, The Battle of Greece, Argus and Australasian Ltd, Melbourne, 1941,
p. 5; McClymont, To Greece, , p. 194.
16Memoir, Campaign Greece 1941, IWM, 98/21/1.
17Ibid. extract for 64 Medium Regiment War Diary, 10 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1492;
The 6th Division in action, G. Long, AWM PR88/72; letter, Boileau to anon., 6 May 1941,
IWM, 77/149/1; letter, Lieutenant K.L Kesteven, 2/4 Battalion, 17 May 1941, AWM 54, 234/2/17;
I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign
narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; McClymont, To Greece,
p. 196.
213
ilsons minds as well. During the morning of 10 April Wilson was informed
W
that Papagos had decided to authorise W Force to withdraw from its intermediate line to the proposed Olympus-Aliakmon Line as the first phase of
withdrawal by all Allied forces to the Aliakmon-Venetikos Line across
Greece. Such permission was fortunate for Wilson who had already signalled
his intention to make such a move to his formations. For a second time
Wilsons verbal orders to his troops to withdraw pre-dated the authority he
received from his superior headquarters to issue them. In any case, the key
point for W Force now was how to get the 12th and 20th Greek Divisions
safely from their current locations between the 16th Australian Brigade at
Veria and the blocking position at Kleidi Pass to their new positions in the
Vernion Range (to the west of Mackays force) at the Siatista and Klisoura
Passes respectively. The CMFAS was to be in its new locations by the end
of 13 April, where it would transition from under the command of W Force
to WMFAS, as Tsolakoglous formations continued to concentrate for their
own withdrawal.18
From a British perspective, ordering the two CMFAS divisions from their
positions in the mountain passes on the eastern side of the Florina Valley
to the western side to link with the Greek Cavalry Division solved a number
of internal problems. Cooperation and communication with these divisions
had always been difficult and this move would physically separate Greek
and British sectors on the new line which might help smooth problems of
command, language and mutual understanding. It would also place the
CMFAS in mountainous country which suited its equipment, offset its material deficiencies and which best fitted the Greek methods of non-mechanised re-supply. At the same time the more developed areas would be left
for W Force whose equipment and logistics demanded the best roads. Once
the redeployment to the Olympus-Aliakmon Line was complete Mackays
force was to disband with its miscellaneous units returning to their parent
formations, the 19th Australian Brigade withdrawing south to a bend in
Aliakmon west of Servia (touching the right flank of the new 12th Greek
Division location), and the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade taking up a new
reserve position protecting W Forces left flank in the vicinity of Grevena.
The new line was naturally strong and stood better chance of holding than
18Message, W Force to W Force Advance Headquarters, 10 April 1941, TNA WO 201/45;
Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch,
Department of Internal Affairs, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Anl. 1 zu Nr. 12/42 geh.Mil. Att.
Athen, Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Westmazedonien (A.A.W.M.)
whrend der Kampfhandlungen mit den Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 3.
214
chapter eight
the intermediate line, so long as the two Greek divisions had time to get
to new positions in time.19
To this end Wilson conducted a meeting at 2.00 p.m., 10 April, at Mackays headquarters at Perdika with Mackay, Brigadier Charrington, and Karassos, the newly appointed commander of the CMFAS. There Wilson
directed that Mackay was to hold his line until after dusk on 12 April, thus
covering the redeployment of the 12th and 20th Greek Divisions which was
to be conducted over three nights (due to the lack of trucks in the Greek
formations) assisted by whatever British transport that could be mustered.
Administrative arrangements were complex. The Dodecanese Regiment
would come under Mackays command from 11 April to coordinate its withdrawal, while the rest of the 20th Greek Division remained under Karassos
control. Meanwhile, the 12th Greek Division, until the time its move was
completed, remained under Blameys direct command from Headquarters,
1st Australian Corps. (It did not help that Blameys earlier instructions, issued at 12.10 p.m., 10 April, although correctly anticipating the withdrawal
to the new Olympus-Aliakmon positions, gave contradictory routes and
final locations to the 12th Greek Division than those ordered by Wilson.)
When Mackays force withdrew, sometime after dusk on 12 April, it was to
be covered by the 1st Rangers holding at Kleidi Pass. Just in case of German
pressure during this withdrawal, two 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade rearguard
positions were chosen at Sotir and Ptolemais.20 Karassos later claimed,
contrary to British reports of this meeting, that he was given no indication
of how long Mackay had been ordered to hold his position if the Germans
attacked. When he had asked, Karassos remembered, he was simply assured
by Wilson and Mackay that it would be long enough to cover the full
withdrawal of CMFAS.21
19Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 88; McClymont, To Greece, p. 197; An
Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 205; Long, Greece, Crete and
Syria, p. 77.
20At the conclusion of the meeting Wilson told Karassos future orders to him would
come through Mackay. Karassos was immediately resentful that receiving orders through
Mackay was, in fact, making him subordinate to Mackay. He protested as such to Greek
General Staff but received no answer. He also sent a message to W Force Headquarters
requesting direct contact with Wilson. Again he received no reply: extract of a report
[translated] of the Central Macedonian Army Group Section, AWM 3DRL 6433.
21, I. Mackay, Report on operations of 6th Australian Division in Greece, May 1941,
AWM 54, 534/2/34; extract of a report [translated] of the Central Macedonian Army Group
Section, AWM 3DRL 6433; 1 Aust Corps Operational Instruction No.6, 10 April 1941, AWM
54, 534/2/23; Headquarters BTE War Diary, 10 April 1941, TNA WO 169/994B; Bericht ber
die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Zentralmazedonien (T.S.K.M.) im Kampfe gegen die
215
Of course, within W Force the order to occupy the Olympus-Aliakmon

line affected more than Mackays force in the vicinity of Kleidi Pass. Concurrent with the 40th Corp advance through the Monastir Gap, List had
ordered Boehmes 18th Corps to penetrate through the W Force EdessaVeria-Katerini defences to Larissa. As his formations were spread across
the Macedonian plain, and in Salonika, Boehme needed time to regroup
before executing such orders, but lead elements nonetheless began to approach the eastern flank of the W Force line. For Wilson speed, therefore,
was essential. The 16th Australian Brigade, having so recently occupied its
position at Veria, was ordered back south once again to a position on the
right flank of the 4th NZ Brigade at Servia. Blamey, however, doubted Mackay could hold the Germans at Kleidi for any length of time and feared any
breakthrough might catch Brigadier Allens men mounted in trucks on the
main Kozani-Servia Road, likely to be congested with traffic if Mackay was
forced to retire ahead of schedule. Consequently, the 16th Australian Brigade
was ordered to walk. The mountains were safereven if they entailed an
exhausting infantry march of 48 kilometres, not accounting for the ups and
downs of the Veria Mountains and valleys, to new positions themselves
some 900 metres above sea level. All equipment, excepting rations and
ammunition, was to be abandoned. The first of Brigadier Allens units, the
2/3rd Australian Battalion, began the trek on the afternoon 10 April. For the
remainder of the brigade it was: Another night wet and cold ... impossible
to sleep, a man lapses into a sort of coma, half asleep, yet conscious of what
is going on.22
On the right of the W Force line, the New Zealanders worked frantically to prepare their positions. At Servia Pass the 4th NZ Brigade, expecting Germans in this area at short notice, continued digging along a steep
ridge at whose northern base nestled the town of Servia. High above the
town perched the 18th NZ Battalion, with the 19th NZ Battalion in position
to its left and responsible for the actual road cutting or pass through the
brigade position. One member of the former complained of very cold nights
Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 2; I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department
of Internal Affairs, Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26
[1]; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. 2, p. 88; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas
1939-1947, p. 87.
22Diary extract from Lieutenant R. Blain, 2/2 Battalion. AWM PR03/134. Report on
operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9 [6-14]; War Diary
HQ 1 Aust Corps Campaign in Greece, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/1; Material copied for use in the
compilation of New Zealand War History, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3650];
Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 55-6.
216
chapter eight
Figure 8.1:The bridge across the Aliakmon River, north of Servia, one of the most vital
keys in the defence system of northern Greece. The bridge was demolished the night after
this picture was taken on 12 April. (Source: Australian War Memorial: 007827)
... very hard going ... getting tired as hell.23 The 20th NZ Battalion was initially deployed to the rear, southwest of Lava, but was subsequently moved
to extend the brigade line further west along the ridgeline. Looking down
northwards from the ridge occupied by the brigade, a road ran south from
Kozani, across the Aliakmon River and into Servia. From there it ran southwest across the front of the 18th NZ Battalion before passing through Servia
Pass (19th NZ Battalion) and branching southeast to Olympus and southwest
to Mikrovalton. This high ridge position offered a clear field of artillery fire
north and northwest overlooking the road all the way to the Aliakmon
Bridge a little over six kilometres to the north. 24
23Diary of Private V.R. Ball, KMARL, 1994.1825.
24Correspondence (various) concerning the 20th Battalion in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/155; Draft Narrative 18 (Auckland) Infantry Bn., NZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/150. HQ
Company, 18 Battalion in Greece, 7 March 27 April 1941, A.S. Playle, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/148; 4 New Zealand Infantry Brigade Operation Order No. 3, 10 April 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/26 [1]; Report on operations in Greece, 4 Inf. Bde. , 30 April 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476,
PUTTICK4/2/4; diary of Brigadier E. Puttick (24 March 3 August 1941), ANZ ACGR 8479,
PUTTICK7/1/1; Short notes describing the arrival and withdrawal from Greece, 1941,
217
Further east, by 4.00 p.m., 10 April, the remainder of the New Zealand
division had completed its withdrawal to the Olympus area, the 5th NZ
Brigade in the pass itself and the 6th NZ Brigade into a reserve position in
the vicinity of Dolikhe. Only the divisions cavalry screen remained further
north in its delaying position on the southern bank of the Aliakmon River.
In the coastal Plantamon Tunnel sector, the 21st NZ Battalion was sent a
message from Freyberg informing its commander, Lieutenant Colonel N.L.
Macky, that if his position was pressed by the Germans it would only be by
infantrymen and was to be held at all costs.25 This was strange advice indeed given that Freybergs own divisional intelligence had already suggested armoured vehicles might attempt to use this coastal pass south.
Furthermore, only a few hours earlier Allied support units had reached the
21st NZ Battalion from Katerini by driving trucks exactly along the expected German line of advance over the ridge to Plantamon with no trouble.
Nonetheless, Mackys men rushed to prepare their defences to deny German entry into the coastal gap and the Pinios Gorge south of it. The position
Macky chose on the ridgeline looked strong. There were no covered approach from the north, the castle and sea cliffs lay to the east and the apparently impassable Mt Olympus to the west meant little chance of
flanking. On the other hand most of the area was heavily wooded and thus
ideal for enemy troops trained to infiltrate and operate in mountainous
areas.26
Early on Good Friday, 11 April, the steady advance of the German 18th
Corps reconnaissance elements across the Axios plain towards W Force
continued, despite the ongoing difficulties of terrain and bad roads which
frustrated attempts to concentrate the bulk of Boehmes formations rapidlya situation partially alleviated that afternoon with the opening of the
W. Batty, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 184-85; Wilson, Eight
Years Overseas, p. 88.
255 New Zealand Infantry Brigade Operation Order No. 1, 10 April 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/26 [1].
26Summary of operations of 5 NZ Infantry Brigade in Greece, 29 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/156; Report by Brig. Hargest on Greek Ops, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162; War
Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers.
Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; comments by W.E.
Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, January 1950, AWM 67,
5/17; 5 New Zealand Infantry Brigade Operation Order No. 1, 10 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/26
[1]; I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign
narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; GOCs [Freybergs] Diary
(extracts), 2 January 2 September 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/5/42-43; New Zealand
Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105.
218
chapter eight
Rupel Pass road. Nonetheless, at 9.00 a.m. spirits were buoyed spirits in
headquarters across the 18th Corps with reports that the English are already
retreating south.27 While W Force redeployments to the Olympus-Aliakmon
Line were not strictly a retreat, the news nonetheless encouraged Boehme
to order a general attack with whatever forces were available in the general line Edessa-Katerini and into the Larissa basin as soon as possible. To
this end the bulk of the 72nd Division was rushed to Salonika to relieve the
2nd Armoured Division for operations to the south. Meanwhile, the vanguard of the 6th Mountain Division was already moving west of the Axios.28
Not surprisingly, at least according to British sources, the mood on the
other side of the front was not quite so upbeatparticularly back in Athens. Throughout 11 April the city began to show signs of serious political
and social stress. Streams of incoming refugees, military reverses in the
north and news of the disaster in Yugoslavia combined to fan a slow but
rising climate of desperation. Papagos was distracted trying to coordinate
the front. The King, who had been criticised in the past for exerting undue
political influence, held back. Meanwhile, old political feuds and rivalries,
suppressed by Metaxas, had re-emerged and were exacerbated by the unfolding situation. In some quarters defeatist, republican and even proGerman views gathered momentum. Control became increasingly difficult
for the government, especially after a rumour that it was about to depart
gathered momentum. Security and caution were neglected. Important
political decisions were hotly debated by policy-makers and senior military
figures in cafes and public places. Hearsay was rife and fed off such leaked
information.29 It was into such an environment that the last W Force troops
were finally landed. The most significant of these was Brigadier S. Saviges
17th Australian Brigade whose headquarters had arrived at Volos the previous day and whose units were now disembarking at Piraeus. Any optimism
within Saviges 2/7th Australian Battalion must surely have been shaken by
27Extracts from 72 Inf Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 534/2/27.
28Ibid.; Extracts from morning reports from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete),
AWM 67, 5/17.
29Not that such rumours were entirely without substance. The next day, on 12 April,
the Greek King proposed to that the British might consider Cyprus as the future seat of the
Greek government and some 40,000 military recruits from Peloponnese might be sent to
the island to complete their training. The idea was rejected, however, mostly on the grounds
of the Turkish claim on Cyprus, and a British desire not to encourage Greek claims to the
island in the longer term: Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941,
p. 234.
219
the commander of the units landing craft who quipped on its disembarkation that the best that can happen to you will be to become prisoners of
war.30
Wilson had little time to worry about the mood in Athens. The previous
night he had met Papagos at Pharsala to discuss the multitude of problems
faced by the Allies. Papagos began by explaining the scale of the disaster
in Yugoslavia. Closer to home, both commanders confirmed the presence
of German armoured formations east of the Axios River. Papagos reiterated his approval for Wilsons occupation of the Olympus-Aliakmon Line
although he feared (like Blamey and the British Military Mission) that
Mackays force would not hold long enough to protect the movements of
the CMFAS to the Siatista and Klisoura Passes. Papagos undertook to try
and reinforce Mackays position with troops from the right flank of the
WMFAS. This, however, would take 5-6 days as such troops would have to
come from the line in Albania: there were no reserves available. It was
unlikely the Adolf Hitler Regiment would wait this long before attacking.
Nonetheless, Wilson wanted two more Greek divisions to cover Koritza and
another brought from Yannina as soon as possible. Papagos said he would
try.31
After returning to his headquarters and a few hours sleep Wilson awoke
to oversee the ongoing occupation of the Olympus-Aliakmon Line. The
12th Greek Division had asked to begin withdrawing units immediately due
to the distance to be covered, but the request was denied and the first battalion of the division did not begin to move until late afternoon. Meanwhile,
further north, the preliminary movements of the 20th Greek Division to
the Klisoura and Vlaste areas continued, although the bulk of its troops did
not begin their redeployment until after dusk. It did not help that during
the day Karassos decided to shift his headquarters, without informing
Mackay, which certainly worsened efforts to coordinate a complicated
withdrawal. Of most concern for Wilson, however, was that the time remaining to complete W Forces redeployment to the Olympus-Aliakmon
30Diary of Major H.C.D. Marshall, 27 Battalion, AWM PR03/058. Greece 1941: Diary of
81. Adv. Base Sub Area with Addenda, Brigadier L. Parrington, IWM, 76/118/2; telegram,
Wavell to Churchill, 10 April 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/37/80; notes by Lieutenant General
S. Savige on Australia in the War on 1939-45, AWM 3 DRL 2529 [12]; Chronology of
Operations, 17 Aust Inf Bde Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials,
Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, pp. 232-3.
31Record of conversation between General Papagos and General Wilson at Pharsala,
TNA WO 201/51; Headquarters BTE War Diary, 10 April 1941, TNA WO 169/994B; Wilson,
Eight Years Overseas, p. 88.
220
chapter eight
Figure 8.2:German air attack, particularly from 11 April with the weather clearing, was a
constant concern for W Force. When possible, all vehicles carried a man on the running
board as a lookout, and the heavier transports mounted light machine guns in an antiaircraft role. (Source: Australian War Memorial: 007648)
Line was running out fast. During the day the New Zealand divisional cavalry reported signs of Germans on the east bank of Aliakmon. Moreover,
with the weather slowly improving the Luftwaffe was more active. W Force
artillery positions south of Servia were bombed and Kozani was raided
heavilyputting flight not only to most of the population but the towns
police and military garrison as well.32 With a nervous eye not only to the
east, but to Kleidi Pass in the northwest, Brigadier Galloway at Headquarters W Force warned his Deputy Director of Supplies and Transport that
there might be a lot of transport moves in the near future.33
32Entries for 10-12 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 154; New Zealand
Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105; GOCs [Freybergs] Diary (extracts), 2
January 2 September 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/5/42-43; UK War Narratives The
campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; W.J.H. Sutton, The Greek Debacle 1941: the beginning
and end, KMARL, 1999.1051; British Narrative The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ
ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618].
33W. dA. Collins, Report on Services during the campaign in Greece March and
April, 1941, 2 May 1942, TNA WO 201/40; War Diary HQ 1 Aust Corps Campaign in Greece,
221
Despite frantic activity across the W Force Line, it was, of course, the
German advance against Kleidi Pass which was both the greatest danger
to the Allied cause and the most significant opportunity for List to exploit
the success he had found thus far. The freezing winds and black, wild clouds
over Vevi as dawn broke on 11 April, and the subsequent blizzard of snow
they threw onto mountains and into valleys, were ominous signs of the
clash to come. The bulk of the Adolf Hitler Regiment, by now reinforced
by tanks from the 9th Armoured Division, spent the morning closing up to
Witt Groupstill under the mistaken impression that the majority of up
to four Imperial divisions were in the vicinity of Kozani with an advance
guard forward. Meanwhile, under ongoing if intermittent shellfire, Major
Witt coordinated reinforcements arriving at Vevi and Kelli as he prepared
to mount an attack through the Kleidi Pass. Part of these preparations, by
late morning, included German artillery barrages from recently arrived
batteries, to compliment ongoing mortar and machine-gun attacks against
Mackays line. Neither was Witts battalion, (by now reinforced by the 7th
and 8th Companies (2nd Battalion, Adolf Hitler Regiment) and two troops
of tanks), idle at this time. With snow and mist reducing visibility to less
than 100 metres in places German soldiers continued to probe and reconnoitre the Allied line.34
Mounting German pressure across the line at Kleidi Pass during the day
had an effect on Mackays men. Seven cruiser tanks of 3 RTR, which could
ill afford to be lost, were abandoned due to mechanical failure after an illinformed and panicked rush to prevent a non-existent German armoured
breakthrough in the 20th Greek Divisions sector. Around 15 per cent of W
Forces total tank strength was thus lost with still no Germans in sight.
Across the infantry line harassing German small arms fire whined over the
heads of digging defenders. Distracted by such fire and the German concentration clearly visible around six kilometres to the north (when breaks
AWM 3DRL6643, 1/1; I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal
Affairs, Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; C.E. 1
Aust Corps Technical Instruction No. 7, AWM 54, 534/2/34; H.M. Wilson, Report on Greek
campaign, TNA WO201/53; extract from 7 Medium Regiment War Diary, 11-15 April 1941,
TNA WO 169/1491.
534/2/32; extract from War Diary of HQ Medium Artillery, 1 Anzac Corps, 6 April 1941, AWM
54, 534/2/29; Extracts from evening reports from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete),
AWM 67, 5/17; letter, Boileau to anon., 6 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Major R.R.C. Boileau, 1
Rangers, 77/149/1; SS Adolf Hitler Orders for the attack on Vevi, 11 April 1941, AWM 54,
543/2/27; Crisp, The gods were neutral, p. 56.
222
chapter eight
in the rain, snow and mist allowed), many defenders struggled to cope. A
number of Australian infantrymen were withdrawn from the line with
frostbite. At first those of us who had not seen snow were rather thrilled,
remembered an officer of the 2/4th Australian Battalion, but our enthusiasm was quickly dampened as our fingers and toes froze and the snow
melted down our necks and the mud in our trenches turned to slush.35 To
the east of the pass troops of the 2/8th Australian Battalion were showing
clear signs of fatigue, with stragglers still arriving. It did not help that their
commander, Lieutenant Colonel J.W. Mitchell, spent most of the day in the
custody of Greek police when he was mistaken, during a reconnaissance,
for a German spy. By lunch time, 11 April, it was clear that an attack of some
sort was imminent. German shelling and mortar fire began to intensify.36
Predictably, the first serious pressure placed on the defenders at Kleidi
Pass developed in the early afternoon. Major Witt had wished to attack
with his whole force in one blow but was forced to wait for heavy weapons
and the end of the snow storms which would have hampered artillery observation. He was forced, therefore, to ratchet up the pressure on the Allied
line progressively. At 1.00 p.m. Witts 7th Company was sent to reconnoitre
Vevi but as it advanced southeast the company came under Allied shelling
and machine-gun fire from high ground to the east 1500 metres short of the
village. A patrol from the 7th Company, however, soon discovered that Vevi
itself was clear. At 5.00 p.m. Witt ordered the 7th Company (now reinforced
by two infantry support guns) to attack the high ground east of Vevi, at the
junction of the 2/8th Australian Battalion and the Greek Dodecanese Regiment, to secure an observation post for a subsequent and much larger
attack planned on Kleidi Pass. The 7th Companys attack began at 7.30 p.m.
with its two supporting assault guns opening fire from positions close to
Vevi. Thus alerted, the defenders responded with accurate, methodical
artillery fire (despite the poor visibility) which covered the entire west side
of the village. The assault guns drew back but the infantry company pressed
its attack. After forcing the defenders from a number of forward posts, but
stalling in the face of concerted machine-gun fire, the German company
35Letter, Lieutenant K.L Kesteven, 2/4 Battalion, 17 May 1941, AWM 54, 234/2/17.
36I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; diary of Sergeant
D. Reid, 2/8 Australian Infantry Battalion, AWM 54, 253/4/3; extract for 64 Medium Regiment War Diary, 11 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1492; Crisp, The gods were neutral, p. 110.
223
was called back to the southern outskirts of Vevi, and ordered to dig in and
maintain contact with Mackays force by strong patrols.37
Meanwhile, additional German patrols increased the pressure on the
2/4th Australian Battalion, on the eastern wing of Mackays line. At 2.30
p.m. a snow flurry lifted to reveal a strong German force 1400 metres to the
battalions front. Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Doughertys men waited until
the Germans were well within artillery range and called down their fire.
The Germans were pinned down and spasmodic firing continued until
around 5.30 p.m., when it began snowing again. An hour later the snow
again lifted to reveal the same tenacious German patrol as close as 90 metres from Doughertys front attempting to infiltrate before it was at last
driven back. Further to the northwest, during the day and early evening,
the Greek Cavalry Division at Pisoderion Pass was again attacked by German reconnaissance elements and again repulsed them. By 9.30 p.m. Brigadier Vasey reported to Mackay that the situation was in hand, although
skirmishing continued in front of both Australian battalions throughout
the night.38
Throughout 11 April Mackays attention was divided between defending
his front and preparing to abandon it. He ordered the Dodecanese Regiment
to begin withdrawing at 3.00 p.m., using 30 of his 3-ton lorries to help carry 1200 sick and wounded and 500 able-bodied Greek soldiers (from a total
strength of 4500 men). The balance was to remain and protect the right
flank of the 2/8th Australian Battalion until Mackey ordered a general withdrawal. To that end, during the morning Mackay issued a warning order,
followed by formal orders that evening, for the two Australian battalions
and what remained of the Dodecanese Regiment to retire from their positions during the next day (12 April) covered by the 1st Rangers and the NZ
machine gunners who would withdraw that night. All the while the rest of
the 20th Greek Division continued to thin out from east and south of Lake
37SS Adolf Hitler Action at Vevi, 11 April 1941, AWM 543/2/27; I. Wards, New Zealand
Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Major L. Glombik, Intelligence Officer, 12th Army,
The German Balkan Campaign, 23 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; McClymont, To Greece,
38Letter, Lieutenant K.L Kesteven, 2/4 Battalion, 17 May 1941, AWM 54, 234/2/17;
E.D. Ranke Notes of Operations 19 Bde Greece, AWM 27, 116/2; Anl. 1 zu Nr. 12/42 geh.
Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Westmazedonien
(A.A.W.M.) whrend der Kampfhandlungen mit den Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 3;
Extracts from 12th Armys campaign in the Balkans a strategic survey, AWM 67, 5/17;
War Diary of 2 RHA, 11 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1427; message HQ BTG to 1 Aust Corps, 12
April 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/10; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 58.
224
chapter eight
Vegorritis and units of the 12th Greek Division began their long march to
Kteni and Siastia. Meanwhile, further preparations by the 1st (UK) Armoured
Brigade were carried out at the fallback positions at a ridge behind Sotir
and in the hills behind Ptolemais, near the village of Proasteion. Both could
be used it was hoped, in a worst case scenario, to delay the Germans and
allow Mackays force to withdraw through Kozani to Servia. A final armoured
blocking position was selected at Mavrodendri, should it be required.39
Importantly, a number of British and Dominion officers, observing the
early stages of the 12th and 20th Greek Divisions withdrawals, were shocked
at the style of Greek movements. They do not march, noted Major Clements
of the 4th Hussars, they have no formation and apparently no officers, they
just shuffle along, mostly carrying some sort of weapon and each man carrying a pathetic bundle of belongings.40 The key point here is that such
movement, which was typical for Greek units, was interpreted by most W
Force observers as representative of broken spirit, poor discipline, and unit
disintegration. This was not necessarily the case for the Greeksas it probably would have signalled for Imperial troops who moved by convention
in vehicles or in formed bodies. Nonetheless, it was a feeling and an interpretation that moved up the chain of command to Wilson.41 Interestingly,
such impressions and conclusions were not shared by the Germans. Writing during the war, for example, a German military historian came to the
opposite judgement with respect to a later Greek withdrawal on the Albanian front which kept contact with the British through a correctly timed
and skilful withdrawal of its right wing unnoticed by the Italians. It is also
noteworthy that the British Military Mission had earlier explicitly described
the unconventional style of Greek withdrawals to W Force. This was, however, to no apparent effect and Wilsons staff drew their own conclusions.42
As night fell and the snow eased the Germans north of Kleidi Pass
planned the new day. Stumme believed that a deliberate attack was required
to break Mackays line and he favoured methodical preparations for a
May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34; extract from 102 Regiment, RHA War Diary, 11 April 1941, TNA
WO 196/1490; extract from 1 Rangers War Diary, 11 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1739; Headquarters BTE War Diary, 11 April 1941, TNA WO 169/994B.
40Memoir, Campaign Greece 1941, IWM, Papers of Lieutenant Colonel C.M.L.
Clements, 98/21/1.
534/2/32.
42Wisshaupt, Der Balkanfeldzug der 12. Armee, BA MA MSG 2/3963, p. 25. Memo,
Heywood to Salisbury-Jones, 10 July 1941, TNA WO 106/3169.
225
double envelopment using elements of the 9th Armoured Division (which

he had ordered to close up and whose headquarters was now at Monastir)
as well as the Adolf Hitler Regiment. Lieutenant General Josef Sepp Dietrich, in command of the latter, convinced Stumme, however, to grant permission for an attempt at a frontal attack to be launched next day. Unaware
of the process thus set in train, the defenders set themselves for another
cold and nervous night. The 1st Rangers issued a rum rationan unusual
decision given the likelihood of battle and active German probes during
the night. Troops of the 2/8th Australian Battalion were ordered to shoot
anyone moving in their vicinity after 8.00 p.m. Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell
felt it necessary to remind his men that: You may be tired. You may be
uncomfortable. But you are doing a job important to the rest of our forces.
Therefore you will continue to do that job unless otherwise ordered.43
While for W Force and the German 40th Corps the focus of unfolding
events on 11 April was certainly at Kleidi Pass, a significant measure of Greek
(and Italian) attention remained in Albania. During his meeting with Wilson the previous night Papagos described in more detail than at previous
meetings his plan to withdraw the WMFAS and EFAS from Albania to form
the central and western sectors of the planned Olympus-Venetikos Line
(with W Force on the right sector in its own Olympus-Aliakmon Line).
Tsolakoglous force had already been ordered to concentrate for such a
withdrawal and was now instructed, along with Lieutenant General Ioannnis Pitsikas EFAS, to begin a staged movement south. Such moves, of almost
160 kilometres for some divisions, were to commence on the night of 12-13
April. Meanwhile, it would be absolutely essential that the CMFAS divisions
deploying onto the Siatista-Klisoura Passes, and the Greek Cavalry Division
at Pisoderion Pass, hold on until at least 16 April, when the WMFAS should
be clear of Grevena. If the Germans broke through these passes and took
Kastoria, they would be in the rear of the WMFAS and would cut off its line
of retreat in direction Koritza-Kastoria-Grevena. Any further German advance to Grevena and on to Yannina would also cut off the retreat route of
43Diary of Sergeant D. Reid, 2/8 Australian Infantry Battalion, AWM 54, 253/4/3.
A summary of the participation of the A.I.F. in the Lustreforce Expedition in Greece MarchApril, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7. War for the Passes, an extract from the American Infantry
Journal of October, 1941, AWM 3DRL6643 3/42; letter, Boileau to anon., 7 May 1941, IWM,
Papers of Major R.R.C. Boileau, 1 Rangers, 77/149/1; Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary (Greek
Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; minute, HQ 6 Division internal Methods Employed by
German Patrols, 15 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 6850, 108; SS Adolf Hitler Orders for the attack
on Vevi, 11 April 1941, AWM 54, 543/2/27; MGFA, Germany and the Second World War,
Volume III, p. 506.
226
chapter eight
the EFAS. As a further indication of the dire risk posed to the safe withdrawal of the Greek Albanian armies by the German 40th Corps advance,
especially if the Siatista-Klisoura-Pisoderion Passes fell, during the day
Papagos also ordered the 11th Greek Division to redeploy from Leskoviki to
Metsovon Pass, to protect the rear of the Albanian armies, just in case the
Germans broke through. Importantly, Papagos requested from W Forces
rear headquarters in Athens an assurance that the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade would be available to operate in the Florina Valley to cover the withdrawal of the CMFAS and Greek divisions in Albania. The British
headquarters readily agreedapparently ignorant of Wilsons unfolding
plan at the front to withdraw this formation, along with the rest of Mackays
force, south into the Olympus-Aliakmon Line during 12 April.44
There were, of course, always going to be significant problems withdrawing Greek forces from Albania. Despite German assessments that the Italians at this time had little desire to attack, were hesitant and not
independent, the Italians would never let such a withdrawal unfold unmolested.45 In fact the Albanian front remained active in this period with a
number of strong Italian patrols and probes, well supported by artillery,
applying constant pressure. Even without interruption from the Italians
(and Germans) such a move still represented a significant risk in terms of
unit disorganisation after five months of hard winter campaigning. The
men of the EFAS and WMFAS were physically and psychologically shaken
by the Italian spring offensive, obvious Yugoslav weakness, and subsequent
German successes. Divisional manning in these formations was already
down by between ten to twenty per cent on establishments. Infantry battalion firepower, due to losses and ammunition deficiency, was estimated
to be at around fifty per cent, and there were chronic shortages of the pack
animals essential for such a withdrawal. Perhaps most importantly, there
was a spreading feeling of the futility of resisting the Germans. The first
official manifestation of such an attitude was a letter sent by Lieutenant
General Panagiotis Demestichas, commanding the 1st Greek Corps, to his
IWM, 76/118/2; Anl. 1 zu Nr. 12/42 geh.Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Westmazedonien (A.A.W.M.) whrend der Kampfhandlungen mit den
Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 3; Anl. 2 zu Nr. 9/42 geh.Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die
Ttigkeit der 11. Division in der Gegend von Metsovon whrend des griechisch- deutschen
Krieges., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 1; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 198-201; An Abridged History of
the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 213-14; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 46.
45Armee-Oberkommando 2 Abt. I a, 10 May 1941, Betr.: Erfahrungsbericht., BA MA RH
20-2/148, p. 3.
227
superior, Pitsikas, in which Demestichas openly proposed capitulation to

the Germans. There were similar problems in the EFASs 2nd Greek Corps.
Its commander, Lieutenant General Georgios Bakos, and a number of his
divisional commanders, considered their formations were in such a state
that any attempt at withdrawal would herald disintegration. Such views
were also sent on to Pitsikas who, having by now forbidden further talk of
surrender in the EFAS, sent a report to Papagos noting: Corps Commanders inform me recent events following the German invasion have affected
troops. They believe that retrograde manoeuvres in great depth will not be
devoid of the dangers of an inglorious disintegration of the Army. They
request a solution be found ensuring the salvation and the victorious prestige of our Army.46 The only solution was, of course, surrender.47
The situation was a little different in the WMFAS where orders to withdraw were received with more composure. In fact, Tsolakoglou believed
Papagos withdrawal timetable was too slow and began initiating his own
movements at once. Such feelings were replicated from below. The commander of the 16th Greek Division, for example, signalled his impatience
by informing Tsolakoglou that he would withdraw his division, with or
without approval, on the night of 11 April.48 Nonetheless, at the same time
many of the feelings of desperation that were growing in the EFAS were
also present in the WMFAS. Papagos was told by Tsolakoglous Chief of
Staff, when the latter was ordered to produce specific withdrawal plans,
that the opportunity to assume retrograde manoeuvre [a withdrawal] has
gone by at the expense of the army.49
The next day, 12 April, proved to be a critical 24 hours. In Yugoslavia
desperate government officials were forced to remain on the move to avoid
German air attack and internal communications were consequently hamstrung. By this stage capitulation had already been discussed within the
government. Yet pleas for British support continued; the most ambitious
of them asked for Royal Navy transport to be sent to Kotor so that the army
might fall back on that port and be evacuated if necessary. Real British
assistance was, of course, impossible. Limited air and submarine transport
vom 1941, BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 1-19.
48Ibid., pp. 213-15; Texts of official war communiqus extracted from the New York
Times, AWM 54, 534/5/25.
228
chapter eight
was made available, while abundant encouragement was given to ongoing

Yugoslav resistance in the mountains.50 Meanwhile, the German 2nd Armys
advance continued, impeded more by boggy roads and destroyed bridges
than the Yugoslav Army. Toward early evening a patrol of the SS Reich
Motorised Division (41st (Motorised) Corps) crossed the Danube from the
west in captured pneumatic rafts and entered Belgrade. At 5.00 p.m. the
patrol hoisted the German flag atop the German legation. Shortly afterwards, the city was also entered by elements of Reinhards 51st Corps from
the northeast and from troops from Kleists 1st Armoured Group from the
south. At 7.00 p.m. the mayor of Belgrade officially handed over the city.51
As if the situation for the Yugoslavs was not serious enough, during the
day the Hungarian 3rd Army (consisting of one cavalry, two motorized and
six infantry brigades) also crossed the Yugoslav frontier between the Danube and Tisza (and also at Varanya, the district immediately west of the
Danube). The Yugoslav 1st Army in the path of the Hungarians managed
little resistance, except for troops manning the frontier fortifications, who
had held up the advance for some time and inflicted around 350 casualties.
The Hungarians, however, soon moved into a triangular shaped area between the Danube River and the Drava River, and the Baka region in Vojvodina. Hungarian forces subsequently occupied all territories which had
been part of Hungary before the post-World War I Treaty of Trianon had
stripped them away.52
Further south claims in the German press that the Yugoslav army in
southern Serbia had been destroyed were very close to the mark. With his
northern flank completely secure, List was free to issue new orders which
confirmed various of his directives already in train. Two separate and concurrent thrusts were to be made against Allied positions in northern Greece.
In the west, once the Kleidi Pass had been broken by reinforced elements
of the Adolf Hitler Regiment, List ordered Stumme to push the 9th
Armoured Division forward through to Kozani and then south to Larissa
to the west of Mt Olympus. Meanwhile, the Adolf Hitler Regiment and
the 5th Armoured Division would despatch a strong combined column
51Ibid. Von Weichs, Balkan-Feldzug 1941 (Fortsetzung), BA MA N 19/9, pp. 1-4; Wisshaupt, Der Balkanfeldzug der 12. Armee, BA MA MSG 2/3963, p. 21; entries for 12 April 1941
and 13 April 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, pp. 361-2, 364.
52Entry for 11 April 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, p. 361; cablegram, Secretary of State
for Dominion Affairs to (Australian) Prime Ministers Department, 15 April 1941, NAA A816,
19/301/1061; telegram, W Force to War Office, 13 April 1941. TNA WO 106/3124; Golla, Der Fall
Griechenlands 1941, pp. 212-13; Papagos, The German Attack on Greece, p. 27.
229
southwest through the Klisoura Pass and on to Koritza (to destroy Headquarters WMFAS situated in the town), and to isolate the most northern
section of Greek Army in Albania. At the same time the German 73rd Division was directed to push to the Pisoderion Pass, to reinforce the reconnaissance troops which had already been probing the Greek Cavalry
Division, and to advance through this pass towards Kastoria.53
To the east List confirmed orders to Boehmes 18th Corps to break the
W Force Olympus-Aliakmon Line with an advance directly on Larissa (a
key town through which any further W Force withdrawal would have to
run), with its main effort through Katerini. The 2nd Armoured Division was
therefore directed to proceed through the coastal gap covered at Plantamon
by the 21st NZ Battalion and through the Olympus Pass in the 5th NZ Brigades sector. Perhaps influenced by inaccurate intelligence assessments
of up to 250 British tanks still south of the Aliakmon, at the same time
Boehme formed a western flank guard based on a reinforced battalion
group from the German 72nd Division. This Baacke Group, named after
its commander, Captain Karl Baacke, consisted of three infantry companies
from the 3rd Battalion (124th Infantry Regiment), a battalion of artillery,
the reinforced 72nd Cycle Squadron, and a company each of engineers,
anti-tank and anti-air troops, along with a detachment of assault guns. The
Baacke Group was directed to move against the Servia Pass.54
On the other side of the front, an increasingly apprehensive Wilson
gave formal orders at 3.45 a.m, 12 April, for all units under his command to
fall back to the Olympus-Aliakmon Line as soon as possible.55 Many CMFAS
units were, of course, already moving, as was a battalion from the 16th
Australian Brigade as a consequence of Wilsons warning order two days
earlier. None of these moves proved as easy as they might have appeared
on a planners map. The Australians marching south from Veria, to plug the
hole at Servia between the 4th NZ Brigade and the rest of the New Zealand
Division, suffered badly. Largely unaware of why they were retreating, they
struggled with precipitous terrain, severe weather, slippery mountain tracks,
the Aliakmon River, and a shortage of pack animals which necessitated
53German and Imperial forces now fighting, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 April 1941,
AWM PR 88/72; Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
54Extracts from 12th Army orders in Greece & Crete, AWM 67, 5/17; Extracts from 18
Corps intelligence report (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from evening
reports from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete), AWM 67, 5/17; Extracts from 72 Inf Div
War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 534/2/27; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 189, 218;
An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 211.
230
chapter eight
manhandling most of what was to taken. Moving down these passes at

night without lights is a pastime, noted the commander of the 2/2nd Australian Field Regiment, which lost five guns and 16 vehicles over mountain
embankments, which cannot be recommended to people who suffer from
heart trouble.56 The disorganisation such moves wrought on W Force was
considerable. According to Freyberg at least, Wilson may well have drawn
a line in his Headquarters and gave orders but we were in such a state of
disorder there was no question of establishing a proper defensive position.57
Meanwhile, the slow re-deployment of the 12th and 20th Greek Divisions
continued. Wilson had directed the 12th Greek Division to be clear of the
Kozani-Servia Road by 12.00 p.m., 13 April, with 20th Division to be west of
the same road by 2.00 p.m. the same day. This was, by any measure, a very
tight time frame considering the distances involved, the terrain, and the
lack of motorized transport within the Greek formations. In fact, Freyberg
later criticized such instructions pointing out that the immobility of the
Greek divisions was obvious and should have been so to Wilson before
ordering such a re-deployment under such time pressure, adverse weather
conditions and enemy action. The previous day the commander of the 12th
Greek Division had pleaded to Blamey that he simply could not make it
out in the time allocated. Blamey agreed and the message was passed to
Brigadier Galloway at W Force Headquarterswhere it was ignored.58
Nonetheless, the tired Greeks set out, mostly by foot, without adequate
food, in long streams of poorly clad men, rifle on one shoulder and blanket
on the other plodding down the mountains across to the west.59 It was the
style of this movement, first noted the previous day, which continued to
mislead many Imperial officers into concluding that these two divisions
were falling apart and had no chance of reaching their positions at the
Klisoura and Siatista Passes. Major Hobson, the Brigade Major of the 1st
(UK) Armoured Brigade, described the way they cluttered up the only road
57Diary extract from Lieutenant R. Blain, 2/2 Battalion, AWM PR03/134; B. Freyberg,
Detailed comment upon draft of Mr. Buckleys popular history of the Greek Campaign,
AWM 67, 5/17; W. Cremor, A Quick Tour of Greece, AWM 54, 253/4/2; E.D. Ranke, Notes
of Operations 16 Bde Greece, AWM 27, 116/2; W GP Operational Instruction No. 1, 12
April 1941, AWM 3DRL6643, 1/10; G. Long, The 6th Division in action, AWM PR88/72;
A summary of the participation of the A.I.F. in the Lustreforce Expedition in Greece MarchApril, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7; draft report written by G. Long, 12 April 1941, AWM 67 3/220A;
I. Mackay, Campaign in Greece [transcript], 15 June 1941, AWM 27, 116/1.
58Record of conversation, Blamey to Wilson, 13 April 1941, 3DRL 643, 1/3; note of conversation Blamey to Galloway, 12 April 1941, 3DRL 643, 1/3.
59The Twenty Days in Greece, Public Relations Pamphlet, 1941, AWM 54 534/5/4.
231
with their bullock carts and donkey carts, and thought the Greek divisions
washed out.60 For his part Blamey thought it clear that the CMFAS was
in considerable confusion.61 British perceptions were not helped by the
fact that detachments of the 20th Greek Division arrived at their rendezvous
with waiting British vehicles hours late and in disorganised groups with no
provision of Greek guides. Wilson later wrote that the Greek Central Macedonian Army failed in every way to carry out its role in the withdrawal.62
But this was mistaken. These withdrawals were conducted, albeit in disordered and uncoordinated groups, without much oversight from their respective headquarters, throughout 12 April and into the night.63
There remains no firm record of exactly how many men of the two
CMFAS divisions actually made it to their new positions. According to Greek
General Headquarters in Athens by the morning of 13 April, after marching
through a snow storm, most of the 12th Greek Division had redeployed
successfully while multiple detachments of the 20th Division had made it
to Vlasti and the Klisoura Pass. There is no doubt that during the day Brigadier Charrington despatched 12 anti-tank guns to bolster the Greek defence
of Siatista Passan unlikely decision if no Greek infantry had arrived to
defend the position. At the same time, however, it is obvious that not all
CMFAS units arrived at their destinations, or with their full complement
of troops. A proportion of Greeks, especially those who came from areas
now occupied by the Germans, melted away or continued moving south
through Kozani to Grevena and beyond. Other columns broke up during
the march or were taken prisoner in the days that followed. Wilsons conclusion, however, that the Greek 12th and 20th Divisions never regained
control after their withdrawal from the Vermion positions, but continued
to disintegrated into a disorganised rabble whose main objective was to
reach Athens, was mistaken.64 Various first-hand accounts by W Force units
60Letter, Hobson to anon., 4 May 1941. TNA CAB 106/374.
61Report, Blamey to Minister for Army, Withdrawal on Imperial Forces from Greece,
26 April 1941, 3DRL 643, 1/4.
62Report on Greek campaign, General H.M. Wilson, TNA WO 201/53.
im Kampfe gegen die Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 2-3; Anlage 1 zu Nr. 17/42 geh. Mil.
Att. Athen, Bericht Ttigkeit der 12. Division whrend der deutsch-griechischen Kampfhandlungen., BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 4-5; Anlage 1 zu Nr. 16/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht
ber die Ttigkeit der 20. Division whrend der deutsch-griechischen Kampfhandlungen.,
BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 5-8; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 89; An Abridged History of the
Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 207.
64Report on Greek Campaign, General H.M. Wilson, TNA WO201/53. Reports on Greek
moves: Anlage 1 zu Nr. 17/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht Ttigkeit der 12. Division whrend
232
chapter eight
make it quite clear that a significant proportion of both formations eventually arrived at their objectives, most of them during the night, and took up
hastily prepared defensive positions. Yet Wilsons impression of Greek collapse, itself feeding to some degree his pre-conceived notions of the fighting capacity of these two CMFAS divisions, remained deeply entrenched.65
Meanwhile, at 2.00 p.m., much further to the east on the Olympus-Aliakmon Line, the NZ cavalry regiment sighted the leading vehicles of the longawaited German advance in its sector. As the German column approached
the demolished bridge over the Aliakmon the cavalrymen opened fire. The
Germans was forced to deploy under fire but the New Zealanders could
not stop them from establishing themselves on the northern bank. Just
before dusk 30 more German lorries drew near, and during the night the
Germans assembled assault teams and prepared to cross the river. A little
earlier, at 6.00 p.m., Blameys headquarters announced that forthwith the
1st Australian Corps would be known as the Anzac Corpsto mark
the reunion of Australian and New Zealand divisions which had fought
under this corps designation 36 years earlier at Gallipoli.66 Such appeals
to Anzac sentiment, however, were unlikely to have influenced Blameys
unitsoccupied as they were with pressing difficult and dangerous tasks.67
der deutsch-griechischen Kampfhandlungen., BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 4-5; Anlage 1 zu Nr. 16/42
geh. Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der 20. Division whrend der deutschgriechischen Kampfhandlungen., BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 5-8; Anlage 1 zu Nr. 28/42 geh. Mil.
Att. Athen, Landesverteidigungsministerium, Kriegsgeschichtliche Abt., Bericht. ber die
Ttigkeit der 21. Inf. Brigade whrend der deutsch-griechischen Kampfhandlungen.,
BA MA RH 67/1, p. 4; Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Zentralmazedonien
(T.S.K.M.) im Kampfe gegen die Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 3.
65W Group Operation Instruction No. 11, 12 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; BTG
Operation Instruction No. 11, 12 April 1941, 3DRL 643, 1/1; B. Freyberg, Detailed comment
upon draft of Mr. Buckleys popular history of the Greek Campaign, AWM 67, 5/17; draft
report written by G. Long, 12 April 1941, AWM 67 3/220A; I. Mackay, Campaign in Greece
[transcript], 15 June 1941, AWM 27, 116/1; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and GreekGerman War, p. 208; McClymont, To Greece, p. 202.
66Message, 1 Australian Corps to Advance NZ Divisional Headquarters, 12 April 1941,
AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Message, NZ Division to Anzac Corps, 13 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/26
[1].
67Diary of Trooper C.B. McIntosh, KMARL, 2008.699; W.J.H. Sutton, The Greek Debacle 1941: the beginning and end, KMARL, 1999.1051; Anzac Corps War Diary, ANZ ADQZ
18906, WAII8/2/9; UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British
Narrative The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm
3618]; comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs,
January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; War Diary HQ 1 Aust Corps Campaign in Greece, AWM
3DRL6643, 1/1; letter, Stewart to Chapman re: Biography of Iven Mackay, 15 August 1968,
AWM 3DRL 6433; McClymont, To Greece, p. 236.

Tirana
Line held 10 April (W Force Intermediate Line)

W Force Olympus-Aliakmon Line
WMFAS and EFAS Intermediate Line
Final position
Lake
Boundaries, Greek forces and W ForceDorian
Y U G OSL AV IA
Elbasan
Monastir
Lake Megali
Prespa
Ca
Florina
v
orce
ays F
Mack
2G
Salonika
n
mo
ak
Bde
Aust
5N
ZB
de
Mt Olympus
2917
US
Kalabaka
Yannina
MO
Trikkala
UN
Tirnavos
Katerini
Platamon
AEGEAN
Pinios
Gorge
SEA
Larissa
iver
os R
Pi n i
TA
Volos
IN
S
20 miles
Di
River
ND
Kozani
k
12 G
Aoos
40 kilometres
v 16
k Di
k Div
20 G
Siatista
Kteni
Grevena
Argyrokastron
PI
Yiannitsa
Klisoura
Ptolemais
Kastoria
Corfu
kD
v1
Koritza
Valona
I O N I AN
SEA
Edhessa
20
G
Di
A L BA N IA
Kilkis
Al
i
Durazzo
233
Almiros
Map 8.1:Planned Allied Positions, 11-14 April 1941
Throughout the period 10-12 April new battle lines were drawn by both
sides. With the German 2nd Army securing Zagreb and Belgrade the Yugoslavs were all but defeated. Certainly the neutralization of all effective Yugoslav resistance in southern Serbia secured Lists northwestern flank for
operations in Greece. Meanwhile, German forces had closed up to the Allied line in two axes of advance. The first was to be conducted by the 40th
Corps in the Monastir Gapwhere Mackays force struggled not only with
the terrain and temperature but with aggressive German patrolling and
probes. The second was to be undertaken by 18th Corps aiming primarily
at the Olympus and coastal passes in the New Zealand sector of the W Force
line. Meanwhile, that line had itself been in a state of flux. As a consequence
of the speed of the German advances thus far, and the ineffectiveness of
the southern Yugoslav defences, the W Force intermediate line was abandoned for the new Olympus-Aliakmon Line. At the same time the longanticipated Greek withdrawal from Albania, preparations for which
had been ongoing (particularly in the WMFAS), was at last ordered
into execution.
234
chapter eight
A close investigation of this process of reorientation in this period, for

both sides, is revealing. Wilsons decision to re-deploy from the intermediate line to the Olympus-Aliakmon Line, for example, was the second W
Force withdrawal in the face of the German advancewithout yet being
pressed by combat action. The threat of Lists thrusts brought about the
decision to draw back, not the actuality of German combat power. Once
again, W Force was not pushed from one line to the next; rather Wilson
chose to abandon one defensive position for another before serious fighting began. This is not to suggest such a decision was mistaken in any operational or strategic sense. As has been noted, from an Imperial
perspective the preservation of W Force was a crucial concern. Wilson could
not countenance a defensive line that risked his force being cut off without
an option of further withdrawal. In this regard Blamey cabled back his
superiors in Australia on 12 April noting the weaknesses of the OlympusAliakmon Line, and that he anticipated further withdrawals without serious
loss.68
A second important issue associated with W Forces re-deployment onto
the Olympus-Aliakmon Line was the movement of the CMFAS divisions
from the Vermion Ranges (to Mackays east and southeast), to the Klisoura
and Siatista Pass positions (to the west and southwest of Vevi). Again, such
a redeployment made sense from an operational point of view. These
passes needed to hold to protect the withdrawal of the WMFAS and moving
these Greek formations into mountainous terrain which suited their military strengths, and to place them in contact with like Greek divisions, was
a logical choice. The practical difficulties involved in conforming to Wilsons
timeline and the absence of any British empathy with and understanding
of what could legitimately be asked of these divisions was, however, another story. Be this as it may, the key point here is the impression that the
CMFAS redeployments began to create in the minds of senior W Force officers. The unorganised and rag-tag look of these Greek divisions as they
trudged west in unformed and ill-disciplined-looking bodies had a deep
impact on Wilson, and on his staff. Had British or Dominion troops moved
in such a manner it would no doubt have signified some level of break-down
in command, morale and fighting potential. That Imperial officers began
to project this conclusion onto the 12th and 20th Greek Divisions was, however, a cultural misconception. Despite their difficulties large portions of
these formations did make it to their new positions and were prepared to
68Message, Blamey to Army Headquarters, 12 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/1/1.
235
fight. But the die was cast. Wilson began to lose faith in his left flank. This
theme, of unreliable Greek divisions on W Forces flank, was used consistently from this point as a reason, explanation and justification for subsequent British decision-making. Such reasoning and such an interpretation
was, however, flawed from the start.
The final notable aspect of operations connected with the formation of
new battle lines in the period 10-12 April was Papagos order to withdraw
the Greek armies from Albania back onto the central and western sectors
of the planned Aliakmon-Venetikos Line. Although preliminary instructions
had already been sent, and initial movements were already underway, on
11 April both the WMFAS and EFAS were formally ordered to develop and
implement immediate withdrawal plans. As was well-recognised by these
formations at the time, it was a very late stage of the campaign in northern
Greece in which to execute such moves. These Greek armies were in contact
with Italian troops and under immediate threat from a potential German
breakthrough in the Monastir Gap. Even Greek commanders in Albania
concluded their chances of a successful withdrawal were slim. Papagos, as
a consequence, has received significant historical criticism for not ordering
such a move much earlier. There is no doubt that he was always reluctant
to issue such an order and wished to remain in Albania as long as possible.
The events of 10-12 April demonstrate a range of additional reasons why
Papagos decision to hold as long as possible in Albania was, in fact, correct.
Only once this retreat was ordered was the truly desperate state of the
Greek forces in Albania revealed. Reactions from Greek commanders in
Albania at this time show clearly the impact of prolonged Italian pressure
on this front. They, like Papagos, knew that their troops were not likely to
be able to absorb the additional pressure of a withdrawal. Even Brigadier
Brunskill later concluded that as early as mid-March the Greeks in Albania
were physically incapable of extricating their forces.69 Papagos had always
feared a retreat in Albania might begin the disintegration of the Greek
armies on this front. This, as much as any other factor, was a good reason
to keep such forces static. Now that there was no choice but to withdraw,
the wisdom of Papagos previous position was again demonstrated.
In the preceding discussion of the events unfolding from 10-12 April, one
crucial piece of the puzzle has not yet been considered. In the morning of
12 April the German attack poised to strike in the Monastir Gap finally
69G.S. Brunskill, The Administrative Aspect of the Campaign in Greece in 1941, October 1949, AWM 113, 5/2/5.
236
chapter eight
began, a critical point of contact between W Force and the German 40th
Corpsthe Battle of Vevi.
the battle of vevi (12-13 april)
237
Chapter Nine
The Battle of Vevi (12-13 April)

Early in the morning of 12 April, after another night spent listening to German troop-carrying and armoured vehicles deploying to their front, Mackays men holding the line at Kleidi Pass received reports of German
infantry massing in the vicinity of Vevi. Meanwhile, German artillery was
seen through the gloom moving into position to the north, and tanks lumbered forward to probe between the 2/4th Australian Battalion and the
Greeks to their left. The night had been icy and a blanket of snow lay over
30 centimetres deep. Incidents of Allied frostbite were growing. At first
light an entire NZ machine-gun platoon reported itself unfit to handle its
guns while men from the 2/8th Australian Battalion were being evacuated
from the line with hypothermia.1 At the same time, the defenders knew
they had only to hold for another thirty-six hours before they could retire
south to the Olympus-Aliakmon Line. Although for the last two days they
had endured significant probing, shelling and machine-gun fire, their line
had still not been seriously threatened. It was clear from German preparations, however, that a significant attack was imminent. An anxious Mackay
urged Brigadier Charrington to continue preparing the two allotted fallback
positions at Sotir and Ptolemais. With the Germans poised to strike it was,
for the defenders, a race against time.2
The Germans, however, were not inclined to comply with Mackays withdrawal schedulethey were now ready to move against the Allied line.
Orders were issued at dawn. The overall German plan was to deploy the
available forces in the Vevi area into three battle groups. To the west the
Appel Group (from the 9th Armoured Division) was ordered to pass
1Perhaps the only positive outcome of the freezing conditions for both sides was the
fact that injuries and wounds, even those that went untreated for 3-4 days covered only by
dressings, tended to show very little sepsis: 5 Australian General Hospital Report of Events
in Greece, 9 June 1941, AWM 54, 403/7/17.
2Letter, Wains to Wards, 26 April 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/11; letter, Robert to
Wards, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/11; I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54,
534/2/26 [1]; Greece Comments on TSS, from Gavin Longs Extract Book No. 18, AWM 67
5/18; 1 Armoured Brigade Operation Order No. 5, 12 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Long,
238
chapter nine
between Mackays left flank and the 21st Greek Brigade, and on through
Xinon Neron to Kozani. The centre Witt Group was directed to advance
south of Vevi village and on through the Kleidi Pass to Sotir, to capture the
road to Ptolemais and Kozani. On the eastern flank the Weidenhaupt Group
(based on the 3rd Battalion, Adolf Hitler Regiment) was ordered to move
to Kelli village from the north, in front of the area occupied by the Greek
Dodecanese Regiment, then on towards Amyndaion. The attacks by the
Witt and Weidenhaupt Groups were scheduled to begin at 2.00 p.m., 12
April, after an hours opportunity shelling rather than a traditional barrage.
The obvious German main effort was with Witt Group, as the task of breaking the Kleidi Pass, and thus securing the most direct road route south, was
of vital importance. After examining reconnaissance reports Witt decided
that two high points, both within the area occupied by the 2/8th Australian
Battalion, were themselves the key to the pass. He therefore ordered his 1st
and 7th Companies to mount preliminary assaults on each feature before
the main attack was launched. These preliminary operations initiated what
has become known as the Battle of Vevi.3
At 8.30 a.m., supported by intense mortar and machine-gun fire, Witts
1st Company advanced in close order to the east of the Vevi road against
the boundary between the 2/8th Australian Battalion and the 1st Rangers.
The German company attack was ferocious and determined in the face of
considerable Allied shellingtwo German platoon commanders and a
number of section commanders soon fell as casualties. By 11.00 a.m., however, by grenade and bayonet, the attackers had forced out the left hand
Australian companies, which retreated up the ridge, and captured their
objective. Further advance by Witts 1st Company was only checked by the
defenders by transferring troops from the right flank of the Australian battalion. The German company consolidated, made no further attack, and
awaited the main Witt Group assault.4
3Der Feldzug im Sdosten!, BA MA RH 20-12/105, p. 5. See also v. Apell, Generalmajor
und Brigadekommandeur, Gefechtsbericht der Gruppe von Apel., BA MA RH 24-40/17, pp.
1-4; SS AH Orders for attack, 12 April 1941, AWM 54, 543/2/27; II Bn SS AH Operation
Order, 12 April 1941, AWM 54, 543/2/27; SS Adolf Hitler Orders for the attack on Vevi,
11 April 1941, AWM 54, 543/2/27; entry for 11.00 a.m., 11 April 1941, Generalkommando
XXX.A.K., Abteilung Ic, Ttigkeitsbericht Sdost Begonnen Am 9.1.1941 In Rosiorii De
Vede Beendet Am 21.5.1941 in Kawalla Gefhrt Durch Oblt. Hammer, O.3 Vom 9.1. Bis
21.5.1941, BA MA RH 24-30/110, p. 34; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 215-16; Lehmann,
Die Leibstandarte Band I, pp. 362-9.
4Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, 30 April 1941, Gefechtsbericht der L.SS A.H. fr die
Zeit vom 6.4.41 29.4.41., BA MA RH 24-40/17, p. 5; 1 Rangers account of action at Vevi,
239
Figure 9.1:Lieutenant Colonel I. N. Dougherty, Commanding Officer of the 2/4th Australian

Battalion (right), standing in the snow with the commander of his neighbouring Greek
battalion on Good Friday, 11 April, the day before the German assault at Kleidi Pass began.
The lodgement of Witts 1st Company in the high ground at the boundary
of the 2/8th Australian Battalion and the 1st Rangers had significant and
immediate implications for the defenders. The Rangers had seen the withdrawal of the two left-hand Australian companies and incorrectly concluded that the entire battalion had been routed, and that their right flank
was open. In addition, the British infantrymen were now beginning to take
machine-gun and accurate mortar fire into this flank from the German
company. The decision was taken to withdraw. Officers of the Rangers
later claimed they intended to fall back to take up a line further inside the
pass, from which they were subsequently forced by rolling German attacks,
but there is no evidence to support this notion. Indeed, a great deal of heavy
equipment was left behind. Most of the Rangers were eventually collected
well to the rear and ferried, at 5.30 p.m., back to Proasteion. Most importantly, however, the Kleidi Pass, the centre of the Allied line and most
AWM 67, 5/4; Notes on 2 NZ Division, Campaign in Greece, Part II, G. Long, ANZ ADQZ
18902, WAII3/1/14.
240
chapter nine
critical German objective, was now open. Only a lack of awareness of how
vulnerable the Allied line now was, and strict pre-arranged orders to begin
its main assault at 2.00 p.m., prevented any immediate exploitation by Witt
Group. Yet with the pass essentially defenceless the battle was effectively
won by the Germans, before the main Witt Group attack had even been
launched.5
At 1.30 p.m. the second Witt Group preliminary operation was completed with the 7th Companys occupation of a second high point within
the 2/8th Australian Battalion defensive area. Meanwhile, the low ground
to the front of this Australian battalion had been filling with tanks and
trucks in preparation for the main Witt Group assault. At 2.00 p.m. the
whole of Witt Group advanced. To the west of the main road Witts 8th,
2nd and 3rd Companies pushed forward, while to the east the 1st and 7th
Companies resumed their attacks, now accompanied by tanks and anti-tank
guns. Assisted by the fact that the German companies in his sector were
now pushing southwards, Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell of the 2/8th Australian Battalion ordered a counter-attack which regained the crest previously occupied by Witts 1st Company. The position was a dangerous salient,
however, with the 1st Rangers now kilometres to the rear.
The defence of Kleidi Pass was more difficult by the fact that Brigadier
Vasey had no real grasp of what was unfolding. He had already ignored
earlier pleas from his artillerymen that there was no friendly infantry left
within the Kleidi Pass. Instead, refusing to countenance the idea that the
Rangers had withdrawn prematurely, Vasey ordered the absent British battalion to hold until dark. It was only at around 3.00 p.m., when Major Boileau (second-in-command of the Rangers) arrived at his headquarters and
confirmed his units retreat, that Vasey began to accept what had happened.
Boileau departed to re-join his unit, which was continuing to pull back
with little coordination and onto no line of reorganisation.6 From this
point Boileau tried desperately to hold the retreating Rangers companies
at Sotir or Ptolemais. The bad news was confirmed at Headquarters 19th
Australian Brigade shortly thereafter as the 64th Medium and 2/3rd
5Extract from 1 Rangers War Diary, 12 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1739; 1 Rangers account
of action at Vevi, AWM 67, 5/4; letter, Gwilliam to Wards, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/11;
letter, Wains to Wards, 26 April 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/11; I. Wards, New Zealand
Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; G. Long, Notes on 2 NZ Division, Campaign in Greece,
Part II, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/14; McClymont, To Greece, p. 205.
6Letter, Boileau to anon., 7 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Major R.R.C. Boileau, 1 Rangers,
77/149/1.
241
ustralian Field Regiments radioed in their surprise as English infantrymen

A
passed through their lines headed south.7
Meanwhile, at Mackays headquarters it was also becoming evident that
his carefully laid withdrawal plans, and indeed the whole Allied position
at Kleidi, were rapidly unravelling. Witts companies were following the
Rangers through the pass and were taking position on the hills either side
of the road (to the flanks of Vaseys artillery). The heavy and light weapons
abandoned by the enemy, noted the Germans, were too numerous to
count.8 All that stood in their way was a British artillery regiment, some
NZ machine-gun detachments, and two Australian anti-tank guns dug in
astride the road south of Kleidi Pass. This thin screen had been holding the
oncoming waves attacks by firing over open sights, and under small arms
fire from less than 370m away, before leapfrogging rearwards. Only their
tenacity prevented what may have been an even more significant and
rapid German breakthrough. Nonetheless, Mackay had no choice, with
infantrymen retiring through the guns and command and control degenerating fast, but to order his artillery to withdraw south to the OlympusAliakmon Line. Not that such a withdrawal was itself easily accomplished.
It was a hell of a job getting the guns out, recalled one member of the 64th
Medium Regiment, OK at the last but near thing.9 Even once on the road
southwards artillery convoys were slowed by poor march discipline and a
route all but blocked with congestion.10
7Letter, Grant to Wards, 7 February 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/11; letter, Boileau
to anon., 7 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Major R.R.C. Boileau, 1 Rangers, 77/149/1; Long, Greece,
Crete and Syria, pp. 59-60; Notes on 2 NZ Division, Campaign in Greece, Part II, G. Long,
ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/14; McClymont, To Greece, p. 206.
8SS Adolf Hitler Orders for the attack on Vevi, 11 April 1941, AWM 543/2/27; UK
War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative The Campaign
in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618].
9Diary entry, W.D. McClure, 64 Medium Regiment, 10 April 1941, IWM, Papers of Lieutenant Colonel W.D. McClure, 64 Medium Regiment, 94/47/1.
10Greece Comments on TSS, from Gavin Longs Extract Book No. 18, AWM 67 5/18;
Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Zentralmazedonien (T.S.K.M.) im
Kampfe gegen die Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 3; extract for 64 Medium Regiment War
Diary, 12 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1492; The campaign in Greece, April 1941, Brigadier
S.F. Rowell, 6 June 1941. AWM 3DRL 6763(A), [1-4]; Notes on 2 NZ Division, Campaign in
Greece, Part II, G. Long, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/14; I. Wards, New Zealand War History
1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Report of activities in Greece Apr 41 by Lt. Col. R.R. Vial,
12 January 1945, AWM 54, 534/2/32; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 225-6; McClymont,
To Greece, p. 207; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 62.
242
chapter nine
To the east of Kleidi Pass the Weidenhaupt Groups attack towards Kelli had been delayed by congested roads and only began at 4.20 p.m., not at
2.00 p.m. in conjunction with the Witt Group as planned. This delay gave
the Greek Dodecanese Regiment just enough time to complete its withdrawal without much interference. After slow going across terrain unsuited to motorized troops or even motorcycles, and minor clashes with Greek
rearguard elements, the Weidenhaupt Group reached Kelli at 6.15 p.m. Its
advance then continued through the vacated Greek line to Petres, which
was occupied two hours later. One consequence of the Dodecanese Regiments successful escape however, is that it now left the besieged 2/8th
Australian Battalion under fire from both the left and the right flanks. In
Brigadier Rowells words Mitchells men were even more left ... in the air
than ever.11
With a long overdue acceptance by Vasey that the front had lost all cohesion, at 5.00 p.m. he ordered the 2/4th Australian Battalion on his left flank
to retire to its embussing point south of Rodona. This battalion had thus
far not been seriously engaged but was now in danger of being cut off by
German infiltration to its left and rear. The risk was that with the Rangers
gone, and the left hand of the 2/8th Australian Battalion position still occupied by the Germans, the battalion might not be able to reach the main
highway south. Predictably, in a confusion of communication in the difficult
terrain a party of 70 men from the 2/4th Australian Battalion moving east
found itself behind the German advance guard and was taken into captivity.
As Mackays original withdrawal plan was ruined, his priority became
to reinforce the Sotir delaying position as fast as possible. Vaseys headquarters and two field artillery regiments hurried to join troops of the 1st
(UK) Armoured Brigade troops already there. The half-battalion of the 2/4th
Australian Battalion that managed to get away in some state of good order
was also halted, at Brigadier Charringtons request, to reinforce the line at
Sotir, rather than continuing on to the Olympus-Aliakmon Line as had been
planned. By 9.15 p.m. these Australian companies were again digging in,
this time to the right of the Rangers reserve company (which had been
[1-4]. Entry for 13 April 1941, Reichsfhrer SS Fhrungshauptamt, Einsatz der verst. L. SS.
A. H. im Sdostfeldzug 1941., BA MA RH 20-12/466, p. 3; SS Adolf Hitler Orders for the
attack on Vevi, 11 April 1941, AWM 54, 543/2/27; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 71.
243
redeployed from Kleidi Pass to reinforce the Sotir position before the German had attacked) already occupying this position.12
Meanwhile, by late afternoon the situation for the 2/8th Australian Battalion, steadily being pushed eastwards away from the line of withdrawal
it had been ordered to follow, was becoming critical. At 5.30 p.m. Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell issued orders for a night withdrawal, but before they
could be disseminated German tanks (appearing in the vicinity of Kleidi
village for the first time) and infantrymen made a renewed assault across
the battalions front. Contact with Vaseys headquarters was lost. Fire was
also being taken from the left, the rear, and from German forces closing on
the Dodecanese Regiments former position to the east. The battalion position was quickly penetrated and control was lost. With the main withdrawal route (the road) under fire the Australians disintegrated into small
groups and took shelter behind the ridge to the east before eventually making their way southmany without their equipment. Moving in a line
roughly parallel to the road inside the pass, along which Germans were
advancing, the lead elements of what remained of the 2/8th Australian
Battalion reached Sotir, 20 kilometres from Kleidi Pass, at around 9.00 p.m.
Two hours later the disorganised remnants of the unit began collecting at
Rodona, where vehicles awaited. Half the officers and two-thirds of its men
were unaccounted foronly 50 still carried their weapons.13 It was only
with good luck and the failure of the Germans to press the battalion, that
any part of it got away.14
Even before the Australian battalions either side of Kleidi Pass had been
forced from their positions it was clear that the German breakthrough was
becoming a rout for the defenders. By 6.00 p.m., from the southern exit of
narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; letter, Lieutenant
K.L Kesteven, 2/4 Battalion, 17 May 1941, AWM 54, 234/2/17; Report on operations of 6th
Australian Division in Greece, Major General I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34;
13Major General Mackay intended to launch an inquiry about this battalions abandonment of its weapons but at the conclusion of the Greek campaign Brigadier Vasey was held
up in Crete, making it impossible. Report on operations of 6th Australian Division in Greece,
Major General I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34.
14Diary of Sergeant D. Reid, 2/8 Australian Infantry Battalion, AWM 54, 253/4/3;
narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; A summary of the participation of the A.I.F. in the Lustreforce Expedition in Greece March-April, 1941, AWM 54,
534/5/7; S.F. Rowell, The campaign in Greece, April 1941, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A),
[1-4]; Greece 1941: Diary of 81. Adv. Base Sub Area with Addenda, Brigadier L. Parrington,
IWM, 76/118/2; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 61-2.
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chapter nine
the pass, as far as the eye could see, claimed the Germans, stretched enemy motorised columns of infantry and artillery retreating towards Ptolemais.15 The attackers could not, however, immediately exploit the situation
as their armoured vehicles and heavy equipment had been slowed by road
demolitions and congestion. Meanwhile, Brigadier Charrington had taken
personal command of the small blocking force gathered at Sotir. Charringtons strength was his mobile armoured assets, (two squadrons of 3 RTR
and one of the 4th Hussars), in reserve behind Sotir ridge. In addition, by
nightfall Boileau had managed to arrange for the Ranger companies that
had prematurely withdrawn from Kleidi Pass to re-group at the second
delaying position at Ptolemais. Fortunately for the defenders, the Appel
Battle Group (to the west of Witt Group) had been slowed throughout the
day by the very broken nature of the ground it was attempting to traverse
and by effective Greek artillery fire. By late afternoon it was still around
three kilometres northeast of Xinon Neron, but did not move through it
until 2.00 a.m. the next day. Had it arrived earlier Mackays force would
have been lost.16
As dusk fell one of Witts companies edged forward from Kleidi Pass and
made brief contact with the first Allied delaying position at the Sotir position before being called back to dig in astride the road for the night.17 Soon
afterwards the defenders at Sotir destroyed the bridge to their front in the
hope of further slowing the German pursuit. Small German motorcycle
reconnaissance patrols again approached the Sotir position at 7.30 p.m.
and at 10.30 p.m. but withdrew when fired upon. Witt had decided to wait
for the next morning, and the heavy equipment (particularly artillery) it
15Quoted in McClymont, To Greece, p. 209.
16Der Feldzug im Sdosten!, BA MA RH 20-12/105, p. 5. See also v. Apell, Generalmajor
und Brigadekommandeur, Gefechtsbericht der Gruppe von Apel., BA MA RH 24-40/17,
pp. 1-4; Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, 30 April 1941, Gefechtsbericht der L.SS A.H. fr die
Zeit vom 6.4.41 29.4.41., BA MA RH 24-40/17, pp. 7-10; 1 Rangers account of action at Vevi,
AWM 67, 5/4; War Diary of 3 RTR, 12 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1411; letter, Boileau to anon.,
6 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Major R.R.C. Boileau, 1 Rangers, 77/149/1; I. Wards, New Zealand
Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in
Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; entry for 11 April 1941, Gen. Kdo.
(mot) XXXX. A.K., Abt. Qu., 16 March 1941, Fortsetzung des Kriegstagebuches (Band 2)
Begonnen am 16.3.41 Beendet am 1.6.41., BA MA RH 24-40/153, p. 56; Golla, Der Fall Grie
chenlands 1941, p. 229; McClymont, To Greece, p. 207.
17The isolated company of 2/4th Australian Battalion found itself behind this leading
German company, and surrendered to it. I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch,
Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM
54, 534/2/26 [1].
245
would bring, before continuing his advance. Unknown to Witt, his superiors were also thinking in terms of reinforcementand with the types of
troops suitable for a rapid pursuit of Mackays retreat. During the evening
the German 9th Armoured Division, with its headquarters now at Florina,
was directed to form an advance guard under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel Willibald Borowietz. This Borowietz Group, based on the reinforced
59th Motorcycle Battalion, was ordered to pass through the foremost of
Witts troops at 7.00 a.m., 13 April, and advance on Kozani, followed closely by the 33rd Armoured Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel Hans-Joachim von Koeppen.18
As Witt gathered his forces during the night for a morning push south
and Borowietz prepared to leapfrog the leading elements of the Adolf Hitler Regiment, Mackays headquarters retreated to Kozani, while Mackay
remained at Perdika until midnight surveying his bleak situation. The
Kleidi Pass was lost, two Australian battalions had been mauled and the
Rangers were depleted. Some 18 anti-tank guns and 21 artillery pieces had
also been abandoned. Total German casualties amounted to only 37 killed
and 98 wounded.19
At the same time the worse-case scenario had not yet come to pass for
W Force. While the Germans had broken through, the front was not completely shattered. The Greek Dodecanese Regiment had successfully (if
unsystematically) withdrawn from its position to the east. Meanwhile, the
21st Greek Brigade to Mackays left had also managed to retreat southwest
towards the Vernion passes. In the process this brigade and elements of the
Greek Cavalry Division which had pushed forward towards Florina in the
hope of slowing the German advance, was forced into some bitter fighting
that became the focus of German post-battle reports in this sector of the
front. Lieutenant Colonel Georgios Hondros, commanding the 88th Greek
Regiment (21st Greek Brigade) was killed leading a counter-attack from the
front, revolver in hand. The Germans reported that fire from Hondros
181 Rangers account of action at Vevi, AWM 67, 5/4; Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary
(Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; G. Long, Notes on 2 NZ Division, Campaign in
Greece, Part II, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/14; McClymont, To Greece, p. 209.
19Anzac Corps War Diary, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/9; HQ RAA Anzac Corps Summary of the Operations of the Arty of the Anzac Corps in Greece, AWM 54, 75/4/3; Chronology of Operations, HQ RAA 6 Div Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; letter, Long to Anonymous,
AWM PR88/72, 3/18; I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal
Affairs, Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; extracts
from the diary of Lieutenant B.H. Travers, AWM 3DRL 6850, 110; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands
1941, p. 230, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 71; Lehmann, Die Leibstandarte Band I, pp. 362-9.
246
chapter nine
regiment caused them significant losses even though their advance in this
sector had been made easier by the withdrawal of the Australians, which
had left the Greek right flank unprotected and without artillery support.
The Greeks claimed to have killed 100 Germans and wounded 150 while
their own losses were twelve to thirteen dead, eighteen wounded, ninety-six
prisoners and 100-120 missing. The 21st Greek Brigade eventually managed
to extricate itself to a position on the Klisoura heights forming a link between the Greek Cavalry Division to its north and 20th Greek Division to
its south. Its efforts against the advancing Germans, more than Mackays
force, shielded the movements of the CMFAS units to their new line. There
was no time to lose in this regard as during the night German reconnaissance units began probing the main Greek Cavalry Divisions line at the
Pisoderion Pass. What CMFAS units that had thus far made it to their new
positions had little time to settle in.20
Papagos later wrote in scathing terms concerning the withdrawal of
Mackays force and its failure to hold long enough to cover the withdrawal of the 12th and 20th Greek Divisions properly. He considered that Mackays losses did not warrant such a retreat during 12 Aprilhe should have
held longer. Moreover, although Papagos stressed thatcontrary to later
W Force conclusionssizable elements of both CMFAS divisions did indeed make it to their new positions, he observed that the fighting strength
of both formations was badly reduced by the need for haste. This rush was
necessitated, he argued, by Mackays premature withdrawal. Furthermore,
no warning of the early retreat was provided to the Greeks on the western
flank, or to Greek General Headquarters. While there were certainly additional reasons for the difficulties faced by these Greek divisions during
their redeployment, Papagos criticism has never been refuted. The 21st
Greek Brigade was both ignorant of, and left isolated by, Mackays early
retreat. To his credit Mackay had, however, managed to construct successful fallback positions at Sotir and Ptolemaisand it was upon these that
the responsibility for delaying further German advances now rested.21
BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 3-4; memo, Wards to Kippenberger, 8 September 1952, ANZ ADQZ
18908, WAII11, 24(30); Despatches by Mr R.T. Miller, NZEF Official War Correspondent,
ANZ ACHR 8632, FRASER-P4/1/2; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German
War, p. 207; I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs,
Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Headquarters
BTE War Diary, 12 April 1941, TNA WO 169/994B.
21Papagos, The Battle of Greece 1940-1941, p. 372; Greece Comments on TSS, from
Gavin Longs Extract Book No. 18, AWM 67 5/18; extract from 102 Regiment, RHA War Diary,
247
As the Battle for Vevi unfolded throughout 12 April the withdrawal of

the Greek armies in Albania accelerated. Such movements were, after all,
one of the primary reasons why Mackays force was trying to hold at Kleidi
Pass in the first place. While the Greek Cavalry Division held its position
in the vicinity of Pisoderion Pass as the right-hand pivot, Papagos allocated
concentration zones for the WMFAS and EFAS in the Koritza-KastoriaGrevena area as preliminary to occupying their final more southern positions. Should the Pisoderion Pass fall then the main supply (and
withdrawal) route of the WMFAS, through Koritza and along the upper
Aliakmon Valley, would be cut. During the morning Papagos informed
Wilson of these plans and again asked for transport, but the promised
vehicles could not be spared and never appeared.22
An important divergence of expectation and agenda regarding the withdrawal of Greek Albanian forces also opened between Papagos and Wilson
at this point. As previously noted, Papagos had ordered Wilson to use the
1st (UK) Armoured Brigade up to the end in the vicinity of Kleidi Pass to
protect the re-deployment of the CMFAS and the Pisoderion Passthe
keys to the Greek withdrawal from Albania. Wilson, however, had no intention of complying. His purpose was to use Charringtons brigade to protect
the withdrawal of Mackays force and the western flank of W Force. In truth,
Wilson considered Papagos plan to hold Siatista-Klisoura-Pisoderion passes until the safe withdrawal of the WMFAS and EFAS was impossible. He
believed that the CMFAS was a broken force and Greek powers of resistance
at the Siatista and Klisoura Passes were thus negligible. Charringtons
brigade would operate for W Forcenot for Papagos.23
12 April 1941, TNA WO 196/1490; War for the Passes, an extract from American Infantry
Journal of October, 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643 3/42; War Diary of 2 RHA, 11 April 1941, TNA WO
169/1427; Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Anlage 1 zu
Nr. 28/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, Landesverteidigungsministerium, Kriegsgeschichtliche Abt.,
Bericht. ber die Ttigkeit der 21. Inf. Brigade whrend der deutsch-griechischen Kampfhandlungen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 2; Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von
Zentralmazedonien (T.S.K.M.) im Kampfe gegen die Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 2; Golla,
Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, p. 227; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 66.
22UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative The
Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; Anl. 1 zu Nr.
12/42 geh.Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Westmazedonien (A.A.W.M.) whrend der Kampfhandlungen mit den Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1,
p. 3.
23Headquarters BTE War Diary, 12 April 1941, TNA WO 169/994B; I. Wards, New Zealand
Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Dockrill, British Strategy in Greece, the Aliakmon
248
chapter nine
Nonetheless, the withdrawal of Greek forces from the Albanian front

was underway under the cover of snow and low visibility. At first light, 12
April, the WMFAS was deployed (in order running east to west from Lake
Ochrida to the river running southeast from Berat)13th, 9th, 10th, and
16th Greek Divisions. The first phase of the withdrawal of Tsolakoglous
divisions was to be from their current positions to a line across the Apsos
River-Mt Grammos-Klisoura Pass, to be completed by 15 April. The route
was basically along the axis of the Devolis and Aliakmon valleys with delaying forces to be left at Koritza and the Kiafe Kirit Pass. Accordingly, Headquarters WMFAS relocated to Kastoria during the night of 12 April and
movement of units began. The most northerly WMFAS formation, the 13th
Greek Division, was first ordered to hold the Tsahgoni defile until the 9th
and 10th Greek Divisions were east of Darza, then make a second move to
Smixi. By midday 13 April Headquarters, 13th Greek Division, was at Bilista,
more than halfway to its final destination. For its part the 9th Greek Division had begun thinning out its troops along two mountain tracks on the
night of 11 April. Once at Makiki Lake this formation continued along the
axis Maliki-Koritza-Darza and by early afternoon, 13 April, it was situated
between Maliki and Koritza, and by next morning was east of Morova.
Meanwhile, the 10th Greek Division followed the Devolis River to Koritza
during the first stages of its withdrawal. Its passage to Nestori, reached on
the 15 April, was generally uneventful except for crowding and confusion
on the Koritza plain due to congestion with the 9th Greek Division. The
first phase of movement for the 16th Greek Division, the final and most
western formation of the WMFAS, was to withdraw to the Kiafe Kiarit
saddle, southwest of Koritza, to cover the eastern flank of the EFAS against
a potential Italian thrust along the KoritzaLeskoviki Road. The 1st Greek
Division, of the EFAS, was also moved into the same area on this task. From
13 April, these two divisions constituted the Borova Division Group. Across
the rest of the EFAS preparations continued and Lieutenant General Pitsakas issued orders for his divisions to begin moving the following night.
Overall the Greek formations in Albania successfully disengaged from the
front line. The Italians followed cautiously but, at this stage, did little
to interfere.24
Line, p. 117; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 216; Long,
BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 2-3; Greek Campaign 1940-41, TNA WO 201/124; I. Wards, New Zealand
249
News received at Headquarters, 12th Army, on the morning of Easter

Sunday, 13 April, was encouraging. In Yugoslavia German forces were by
now in effective possession of the country north and west of a line through
Zagreb, Belgrade, Nish and Skopje. Meanwhile, the Italians were advancing
through Ljubljana. Croatian leaders, who had welcomed the Germans in
Zagreb, declared no resistance would be offered in Croatia, Dalmatia or
Bosnia. Hitler issued a directive noting that the Yugoslav army was in the
process of dissolving. Its remnants still interested in fighting continued to
flee west into the mountains. The task of mopping them up had begun, and
would remain uncompleted for the duration of the war, but ongoing Yugoslav resistance could have no bearing on operations in Greece. In northern
Greece Boehmes 18th Corps push towards the southeastern section of W
Forces line gathered momentum, with elements of the 2nd Armoured
Division and Brigadier Ferdinand Schrners 6th Mountain Division leadingdespite the fact that the latter had been without field kitchens and
living off the land from 8 April on. The latters tenuous supply situation
was eased with the capture of a British dump at Edessa.25 That evening
Schrner received instructions to advance the following day, and extend a
bridgehead across the Aliakmon southeast of Veria. Meanwhile, early in
the afternoon, leading 2nd Armoured Division elements managed to cross
the Aliakmon in Kapok floats south of Nicelion.26
Back in the Monastir Gap on the morning of 13 April Lieutenant General Stumme was busy rearranging his forces. He ordered the Adolf Hitler
Regiment, having broken through the Kleidi Pass, to cease its southward
Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and GreekGerman War, pp. 216-17; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941,
p. 230.
25At this point time Schrners mountain troops were further surprised at the friendly
Greek civilian welcome for them in occupied Macedonia. When the Weidenhaupt Group
pushed on from Petres to Amyndaion at first light on 13 April, for example, it was enthusiastically received by the populace, sometimes with flowers; Extracts from 12th Armys daily
intelligence reports (Greece), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from War Diary of III BN SS AH
in Greece, AWM 54, 543/2/27.
26Adolf Hitler, der Fhrer und Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, OKW/WFSt/
Abt.L(I Op.) Nr. 44530/41 gK Chefs., 13 April 1941, Weisung Nr. 27, BA MA RW 4/588,
pp. 1- 4; entry for 13 April 1941, 2. Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 Ia und Anlagen 1.1.41
14.6.41., BA MA RH 27-2/20, p. 32; entry for 9 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der
6.GEB.DIV., BA MA RH 28-6/8; entry for 13 April 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, p. 362;
Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Texts of official
war communiqus extracted from the New York Times, AWM 54, 534/5/25; Golla, Der Fall
Griechenlands 1941, pp. 217-18, 219-20; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 94.
250
chapter nine
advance and instead wheel west towards the Greek Cavalry Division at the
Pisoderion Pass. Once it had broken through Dietrichs regiment was to
advance on Kastoria, either side of Lake Himazitzas, and from there send
a strong force further west to Koritza to destroy Headquarters WMFAS, and
force the surrender of Tsolakoglous northern flank. From there the Adolf
Hitler Regiment could press on to Yannina. Such a southwestern thrust
would cover the right flank of the German 40th Corps and also give information regarding the Greek armies west of the Pindus Range still fighting
in Albania. The pursuit of Mackays force towards Kozani, giving no time
to prepare any organised resistance, was to be conducted by the newly
formed Borowietz Group, followed closely by the 33rd Armoured Regiment.27 With the weather clearing the leading German units expected a
sharp increase in the air support available to them.28
Dawn thus revealed new battle lines for both sides in the vicinity of Sotir
ridge. The defenders were dug in astride the main road south of Vevi on a
180 metre-high ridgeline across an eight-kilometre neck of land between
Lake Vegorritis and some marshland to the southwest. The ridge was protected by a stream to its north. Behind the thin line of W Force infantrymen
waited a mixed force of two British tank squadrons and a 4th Hussars squadron, supported by a field artillery regiment and some NZ machine gunners.
Facing this line, dug in 900 metres away on the flats to the north, were the
advance elements of Witt Group. Germans also could be seen by the defenders unloading from their vehicles near the railway station at Amyndaion, and this group was engaged by the New Zealand machine gunners
and some sections of the 2/4th Australian Battalion. A mixed group of
Imperial and Greek prisoners in the area, however, suffered much more
than did the Germans. A number were killed and more than 30 from a group
of 123 wounded. This action also provoked a series of uncoordinated German infantry attacks against the Sotir ridge by elements of the Witt Group
still in the forward area and detachments of the Borowietz Groups vanguard
attempting to pass through them. Small groups of German infantry under
well-aimed W Force artillery and machine-gun fire, moved forward, deployed, and joined the attack. By 7.30 a.m., a small party had succeeded in
crossing the stream near the demolished bridge and reached the Rangers
narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; McClymont, To Greece,
p. 210.
28Extract from SS AH order, 13 April 1941, AWM 54, 543/2/27; An Abridged History of
the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 210.
251
company position where a bank overhanging the road provided them good
cover. In response, Charrington ordered a squadron of his tanks onto the
ridge, where they adopted hull-down positions and along with sorties of
Ranger carriers stopped any further German advance there. In order to
discourage further German infantry approaches, the same tanks were then
ordered to drive up to the crest of the ridge at different points every 30
minutes to fire their machine guns into the gullies through which German
infantry was attempting to infiltrate in order to give the impression of a
counter-attack. German reports of multiple British tank attacks, and concerns of their own lack of anti-armoured weapons forward, indicated the
effectiveness of the ruse.29
Throughout the morning, as the Germans were held at bay, Charrington
began progressively withdrawing the Sotir force back to the second delaying position at Ptolemais. The first to leave were the two companies of the
2/4th Australian Battalion, which were clear of Sotir ridge (apart from a
single section that received no orders and fought on) by 8.55 a.m. At 10.00
a.m. the Rangers company was ordered to withdraw, followed closely by
the last squadron of 3 RTR. This extraction was timely for as the last Allied
units departed the ridgeline was shaken by a powerful German mortar and
artillery barrage which preceded a fresh and this time well-coordinated
infantry attack from the direction of Xinon Neron. Again, the Allied force
had escapedbut at the price of five more abandoned British tanks. The
Borowietz Group continued the pursuit astride the main road south. By
this stage German air reconnaissance had identified the growing Allied
concentration in the vicinity of Ptolemais and the German 33rd Armoured
Regiment was ordered forward to deal with it. Koeppens tank regiment
reached Kleidi at the same time the Sotir ridge fell.30
29Entry for 13 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 9. Pz Division Begonnen: 11.7.40 Abgeschlossen: 18.5.1941., BA MA RH 27-9/2; letter, Boileau to anon., 7 May 1941, IWM, Papers of
Major R.R.C. Boileau, 1 Rangers, 77/149/1; letter, Atchison to Wards, 15 November 1951, ANZ
ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; letter, Sutherland to Wards, 12 March 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18902,
WAII3/1/2; diary of Corporal R.F. White, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; letter, Hatton to
Wards, 4 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/11; letter, Gwilliam to Wards, ANZ
ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/11; Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, I. Wards, New
Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1];
extracts from the 102 Regiment, RHA War Diary, 12-13 April 1941, TNA WO 196/1490; SS
Adolf Hitler Orders for the attack on Vevi, 11 April 1941, AWM 543/2/27; War for the
Passes, an extract from American Infantry Journal of October, 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643 3/42;
30Entry for 13 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 9. Pz Division Begonnen: 11.7.40 Abgeschlossen: 18.5.1941., BA MA RH 27-9/2; extract from 1 Rangers War Diary, 13 April 1941, TNA
252
chapter nine
The second Allied fallback line at Ptolemais, at the northern entrance

to the Komanos Gap was, as at Sotir, also protected by a stream flowing to
its north which formed a natural anti-tank obstacle. Above it ran a 450
metre-high ridge extending northeast-southwest with a commanding view.
This ridge was cut by a gorge through which ran the road: a company each
of the 1st Rangers was stationed on the forward slopes on either side, with
a third in nearby Proasteion village. On the right flank were positioned
most of the 4th Hussars and a squadron of British tanks. A squadron of the
4th Hussars and a battery of anti-tank guns covered the left of the position,
1200 metres from the road, where the ground fell away from the ridgeline
and was not protected by the stream. The British squadron commander on
this flank, Major Clements, was anxious. The ground to his front was broken
but not impassable, and the machine guns of his light tanks were powerless
should German armour appear. It should be a good introduction to battle,
he mused, provided we are not asked to stay long.31 But Charrington was
instructed during the morning to impose maximum delay on any German
advance before falling back to Mavrodendri and on to Grevena.32 How long
was long enough?
By 12.00 midday, on the heels of the last British tanks arriving from Sotir,
German forces could be seen concentrating north of Ptolemais. At this
point the 1st and 2nd Battalions (33rd Armoured Regiment) had joined up
with infantrymen from the 59th Motorcycle Regiment (of the Borowietz
Group). At around 2.00 p.m. German foot troops advanced and initiated a
sporadic infantry battle with patrols from the Ranger companies, supported by anti-tank batteries astride the road and dive-bombers. Around
an hour later pressure was increased as the first accurate German shellfire
WO 169/1739; War Diary of 3 RTR, 13 April 194, TNA WO 169/1411; letter, Atchison to Wards,
15 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; letter, Sutherland to Wards, 12 March 1952,
ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; diary of Corporal R.F. White, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2;
letter, Gwilliam to Wards, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/11; letter, Hatton to Wards, 4 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/11; I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54,
534/2/26 [1]; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, p. 229; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 68;
McClymont, To Greece, pp. 211-12.
Clements, 98/21/1.
32Letter, Hatton to Wards, 4 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/11; letter,
Atchison to Wards, 15 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; letter, Sutherland to
Wards, 12 March 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; diary of Corporal R.F. White, ANZ
ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; letter, Gwilliam to Wards, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/11; Campaign
narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1].
253
began falling on the Ptolemais ridgeline, and by the arrival of the leading
German tanks which pushed steadily forward towards Ptolemais village
under intermittent shellfire. Nonetheless, the first few hours of the battle
went reasonably well for the defenders, despite the ever-building pressure.
The most puzzling aspect was the absence thus far of German tanks. They
had been seen approaching Ptolemais but had not yet made their presence
felt.33
Unknown to Charrington the German tank crews, already having been
frustrated by the effectiveness of Allied demolitions north of Ptolemais,
had no intention of making a frontal approach against an Allied line wellsuited to anti-armoured defence. Rather, behind the screening infantry
attacks which were held by the Rangers astride the road, a force of 32 German light and medium tanks began swinging to the west with the intention
of moving through Mavropege village, then back to main road to take the
Ptolemais position from the flank and rear. Mavropege was, coincidentally,
the site of Charringtons headquarters. But the German armoured encirclement was slowed to a walking pace by sodden ground. German tanks were
forced to move in a creeping single file and no less than seven were lost in
the swamp along the way. All afternoon the slow stream of German vehicles
moved around this flank through Asvestopetra village, before swinging
back towards Mavropege. Suddenly, with dusk falling, the leading German
tanks appeared within a few hundred metres of Charringtons headquarters.
A fierce battle ensuedthe only significant clash of armoured forces
throughout the campaign.34
The immediate risk to Charrington was that his brigade might be cut
off. He scrambled to re-deploy some New Zealand machine gunners and a
British tank troop, which happened to be passing his headquarters, into
33Entry for 13 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 9. Pz Division Begonnen: 11.7.40 Abgeschlossen: 18.5.1941., BA MA RH 27-9/2; Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary (Greek Campaign),
AWM 54, 534/2/27; letter, Atchison to Wards, 15 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2;
letter, Sutherland to Wards, 12 March 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; diary of Corporal
R.F. White, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; letter, Hatton to Wards, 4 November 1951, ANZ
ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/11.
34Entry for 13 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 des Kradschtzenbataillon 59 Begonnen:
1. August 1940 Abgeschlossen: 15. Mai 1941., BA MA RH 39/699; Schilderung des Einsatzes
des Panzer-Regimentes 33, BA MA RH 20-12/105, pp. 3-5; von Kppen, Panzer-Regiment 33,
14 April 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber das Gefecht sdlich Kato Ptolemais am 13.4.41., BA MA
RH 24-40/17, pp. 1-2; entries for 12 and 13 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 des Kradschtzenbataillon 59 Begonnen: 1. August 1940 Abgeschlossen: 15. Mai 1941., BA MA RH 39/699; entry
for 13 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 9. Pz Division Begonnen: 11.7.40 Abgeschlossen:
18.5.1941., BA MA RH 27-9/2.
254
chapter nine
position on his left, while troops deployed further north raced to his aid.
In the end, the position at Ptolemais was saved by some sacrificial attacks
by the light tanks of the 4th Hussars against much heavier German vehicles,
and by the troop of gunners from 102nd Anti-tank Regiment who had been
covering the left and left rear of the Allied line. By skilful use of ground this
anti-tank troop managed to block German tank entry to Mavropege. Under
heavy fire the British portee guns fired steadily and accurately. Although
two anti-tank guns were lost, six German tanks were destroyed and the rest
had been delayed long enough for the arrival of a troop of 3 RTR cruiser
tanks. Meanwhile, continuing German infantry attacks on the eastern flank,
supported by a scattering of additional tanks, were held within 600 metres
of the main road by the balance of 3 RTR and the Ranger companies. As
dusk fell Charrington ordered a general withdrawal. The last British tank
troop withdrew through a smokescreen at Mavropege while firing a broadside at German tanks less than 200 metres away. It had been a spectacular
and violent 90 minutes.35
After his brigades hasty departure from Ptolemais, Charrington sorted
out what was left of it at Mavrodendri village in preparation for a further
withdrawal to Grevena. His brigade had done well to this point in delaying
the Germans, at both Sotir and Ptolemais, before slipping away. It was,
however, at a price. The 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade was all but a spent
force. Its most powerful unit, 3 RTR, could field only a single squadron of
tanks and there was no possibility of replacements. Again it had not been
enemy fire that had decimated the British ranks but mechanical unreliability. After the action the Germans claimed to have destroyed 68 tanks
and 2 anti-tank portees in battle, but 21 more British vehicles had been set
on fire by their own crews.36 Against this the Germans lost only a few
35Memoir, Campaign Greece 1941, IWM, Papers of Lieutenant Colonel C.M.L. Clements, 98/21/1; letter, Hatton to Wards, 4 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/11;
Notes on translations of German documents relating to the Greece Campaign 1941, AWM
67, 5/17; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 247-9.
36The Germans claimed 32 British tanks were destroyed. Major General Freyberg later
contended that the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade should never have been used forward and
on the passes. The distances were too great and wore out vehicle tracks. The cruiser tanks
in particular were thus wasted as W Force was unable to use them fully due to chronic
mechanical failure. 1st Armoured Brigade Group notes on operations in Greece, April, 1941,
8 May 1941, TNA WO 201/2749; Extracts from evening reports from 12th Army to GHQ
(Greece & Crete), AWM 67, 5/17; B. Freyberg, Detailed comment upon draft of Mr. Buckleys
popular history of the Greek Campaign, AWM 67, 5/17; I. Wards, New Zealand War History
1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; entry for 13 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 9. Pz Division
255
Palaistra
Lophoi
Kelli
Vevi
Fo r c e
Ma
cka
1 Rangers
Do
2/8 Bn
dec
ane s e R e g t
Kleidi
Lake
Vegorritis
Lake
Petersko
2/4 Bn
de
kB
Xinon Neron
21
Flambouron
Amydaion
Sotir
First
rearguard
Lake
Rudnik
Perdika
Ptolemais
Second
rearguard
Proasteion
0
0
4 kilometres
Asvestopetra
2 miles
Mavropege
Map 9.1:The course of the Battle of Vevi, 13 April 1941
Pandeleimon
256
chapter nine
v ehicles damaged beyond repair. Thus began a long withdrawal. One troop
commander of 3 RTR felt like we were on the front end of a long, long
retreat which stretched out behind us like an endless canyon of fear and
uncertainty.37 At the same time things might have gone worse still for
Charringtons brigade had the Germans been able to continue their pursuit.
It was taking three days, however, for the German 40th Corps to get fuel
from Skopje to Monastir and a subsequent shortage of fuel and ammunition
prompted the commander of the German 33rd Armoured Regiment to call
an overnight halt at Ptolemais, after the British had withdrawn.38 Serious
traffic problems for German columns still streaming through Monastir Gap
had resulted in mixed-up convoys and route blockages. The Kleidi Pass was
not cleared until well into the evening and the German 9th Armoured
Divisional headquarters did not arrive at Ptolemais until the morning of
14 April.39 Major General Alfred Ritter von Hubicki, commanding this division, later described the fighting at Ptolemais as a fierce tank battle, as
opposed to the preliminary fighting at Kleidi Passa comment which
accurately reflected the German view of the effectiveness of Mackays defensive line at Kleidi Pass. 40
Begonnen: 11.7.40 Abgeschlossen: 18.5.1941., BA MA RH 27-9/2; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands
1941, pp. 232-3.
37Crisp, The gods were neutral, p. 112.
38The war diary of the 9th Armoured Division noted for 13 April that since no substantial captured petrol was found in the area of Florina and since the only road for the advance
also had to be used for supply, the division can only be supplied with the greatest difficulty:
entry for 13 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 5 9. Panzer-Division, Abt. Ib Begonnen: 6. 7. 1940
Abgeschlossen: 18. 5. 1941, BA MA RH 27-9/30. See also entry for 13 April 1941, Gen. Kdo.
(mot) XXXX. A.K., Abt. Qu., 16 March 1941, Fortsetzung des Kriegstagebuches (Band 2)
Begonnen am 16.3.41 Beendet am 1.6.41., BA MA RH 24-40/153, p. 59; von Kppen, PanzerRegiment 33, 14 April 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber das Gefecht sdlich Kato Ptolemais am
13.4.41., BA MA RH 24-40/17, p. 2.
39Der Feldzug im Sdosten!, BA MA RH 20-12/105, p. 5. Contrary to the contentions
of many authors and veterans, including Brigadier Charrington, this halt had nothing to do
with any damage inflicted by the British defenders: letter, Charrington to anon., 5 May 1941,
LHCMA, Charrington 4/5; letter, Boileau to anon., 7 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Major R.R.C.
Boileau,1 Rangers, 77/149/1.
40Entry for 13 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 9. Pz Division Begonnen: 11.7.40 Abgeschlossen: 18.5.1941., BA MA RH 27-9/2; Fighting in central and southern Greece, reviewed
and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM
54, 624/7/2; Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; war
diary of 2 RHA, 13 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1427; extract from 102 Regiment, RHA War Diary,
13 April 1941, TNA WO 196/1490; letter, Boileau to anon., 7 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Major
R.R.C. Boileau, 1 Rangers, 77/149/1; letter, Atchison to Wards, 15 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ
18902, WAII3/1/2; letter, Sutherland to Wards, 12 March 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2;
diary of Corporal R.F. White, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; letter, Gwilliam to Wards, ANZ
257
To the west, the hurried withdrawal of Mackays force during 13 April

placed elements of the retreating Greek WMFAS in a dangerous triangular
salient. With the Germans now well into the Florina Valley the western face
of this salient was particularly open to attack through the three key passes
Pisoderion (Greek Cavalry Division), Klisoura (20th Greek Division) and
Siatista (12th Greek Division)which pierced the 1800-metre Vernion
mountain range. A defence of these passes was therefore now more essential than ever to buy time for the WMFAS (and the EFAS) to complete
their retreat. In addition, since the Florina railway lines and the LarissaFlorina road had fallen to the Germans, the only way now to supply the
WMFAS and the EFAS was via the poor roads running along the valley from
Larissa to Kastoria (and to Epirus via the Metsovon Pass).41
Throughout 13 April Papagos continued to monitor the withdrawal of
the Greek Albanian armies closely. He directed that when the WMFAS had
withdrawn to the upper Aliakmon Valley it would absorb the CMFAS divisions under its command before continuing its move south along the
Kastoria-Grevena Road to its new defensive line. Once there, Tsolakoglous
expanded force would anchor its right flank against the new 19th Australian
Brigade position at a line running directly south of Kozani. What sounded
good in theory would, of course, be much more difficult in practice. Even
after a nights hard marching, some WMFAS formations still had a trek of
more than 150 kilometres before them. The question then was how long
the passes on the eastern flank of the WMFAS could holdespecially as
the vanguard of the Adolf Hitler Regiment had already begun to press the
Pisoderion Pass. Although the line in this vital sector held, some ground
was lost and Papagos, perhaps optimistically, ordered the Greek Cavalry
Division to mount a counter-attack the next morning to recover it. As his
own headquarters redeployed to Grevena, Tsolakoglou was assisted by the
continuing inability of the Italians to apply significant pressure to his
withdrawing units.42
ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/11; letter, Hatton to Wards, 4 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902,
WAII3/1/11; Notes on translations of German documents relating to the Greece Campaign
1941, AWM 67, 5/17; Crisp, The gods were neutral, p. 128; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 91.
41Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, I. Wards, New Zealand War History
Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; UK War Narratives
The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative The Campaign in Greece, April
1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 76.
BA MA RH 67/1, p. 4; Headquarters BTE War Diary, 13 April 1941. TNA WO 169/994B; Cam-
258
chapter nine
To the west of the WMFAS, Pitsikas EFAS began its own withdrawal
during the night of 13 April. The plan was for the 2nd Greek Corps divisions
west of the Aoos River to move to and occupy a defensive line running
northeast AoosKlissouraSevraniMali by the morning of 16 April; then,
in a second phase, for these divisions to move to their final positions on
the VouthrotosVenetikos River. The nature of the terrain to their south
meant these divisions would inevitably converge into a corridor between
Borova and Mt Nemertska. Also on 16 April, when the 2nd Greek Corps
phase one positions were reached, the 1st Greek Corps would begin its
movements south. The boundary between the two EFAS corps was the
mountain ridge of Nemertska.43
The retreat of the EFAS, however, was a disaster from the outset. The
first 2nd Greek Corps formations to move, the 5th Greek (Cretan) Division
and the 4th Greek Division, began marching from 9.00 p.m., 13 April. The
exhausted Cretans, however, soon disintegrated into a flight of panic-stricken soldiers. All efforts at regaining control with the 5th Greek Division failed
and 36 hours later its divisional commander was sacked. The change of
command did little to stem the flow and by morning 16 April what was left
of the division was an unorganised mass in the vicinity of Petrani-Fourka.
Meanwhile, the withdrawal of the 4th Greek Division was complicated by
the Italians opposite noticing their movements and attacking. From this
point retreating EFAS columns were regularly machine gunned by Italian
fighters. Desertions were soon rife and in many cases the officers of those
units were required to man automatic weapons by themselves.44 By nightfall what remained of this division was west of Aoos River and was placed
under the command of the 1st Greek Corps. Elsewhere in the EFAS, from
the moment withdrawal from Albania began, the dangers of encirclement
by Germans and Italians created widespread alarm. A sense of futility began to prevail and encouraged serious insubordination and desertion. Such
feelings were no doubt obvious to the upper echelons of command within
the EFAS, likely further eroding an already questionable resolve.45
paign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch,
Department of Internal Affairs, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria,
pp. 77, 83; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 217.
44Ibid.
45Telegram, British Military Mission to War Office, 13 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124;
Texts of official war communiqus extracted from the New York Times, AWM 54, 534/5/25;
An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 220, 230.
259
As Mackays rearguard fought their delaying actions at Sotir ridge and

Ptolemais, and the Greek forces in Albania withdrew south, the balance of
W Force awaited the inevitable German advance. Mackays headquarters,
back on the Olympus-Aliakmon Line near Servia Pass, assumed command
of the 4th NZ Brigade in this area, the 16th Australian Brigade (as it arrived
in the area from Veria), and the 19th Australian Brigade (withdrawing from
Kleidi Pass). The latter, Brigadier Vaseys two weary and depleted battalions,
limped back to the Kerasia area and the ridges near Kteni during the day
and were ordered to form a line in the hills north of the Aliakmon to link
Servia with the new 12th Greek Division position at Siatista Pass (although
a physical link was never made with the Greeks). There had been no time
to conduct a reconnaissance of the 19th Australian Brigades new defensive
positionit was picked from a map and from local reports. Consequently,
Vasey found himself bottled up north of the Aliakmon River without either
tracks or a bridge south for re-supply or further withdrawal. The average
time taken for orders to reach him by runner from Mackays headquarters
was eight hours. According to Rowell at Headquarters, Anzac Corps, Vaseys
formation was by this stage but a token force, sent there as a gesture to
the Greeks.46
To the right of the 19th Australian Brigades position at Kerasia, the 4th
NZ Brigade continued to dig in astride the Servia Pass. Clearing weather
gave the Luftwaffe a chance to assert itself in this sector and during the day
the New Zealanders suffered their first taste of Heinkel bombing and Stuka dive-bombinga psychologically disturbing experience given the lack
of RAF presence or anti-aircraft guns (except for a Yugoslav battery and
four aging Greek guns that had been positioned in the area).47 Yet such
[1-4]. Greece Comments on TSS, from Gavin Longs Extract Book No. 18, AWM 67 5/18;
E.D. Ranke Notes of Operations 19 Bde Greece, AWM 27, 116/2; C.E. 1 Aust Corps Technical Instn No. 7, AWM 54, 534/2/34; diary of Major W.M. Moffat, KMARL, 1996.356; correspondence, narrative and draft notes (various) concerning the activities of the 26th (NZ)
Battalion in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/172; Report of activities in Greece Apr 41 by
Lt. Col. R.R. Vial, 12 January 1945, AWM 54, 534/2/32; I. Mackay, Report on operations of
6th Australian Division in Greece, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34; War Diary HQ 1 Aust Corps
Campaign in Greece, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/1; Report on operations in Greece, 4 Inf. Bde.,
3 August 1941), ANZ ACGR 8479, PUTTICK7/1/1.
47The RAF had, in fact, taken a beating earlier in the day when only one severely injured
aircrew returned alive from a No. 211 Blenheim Squadron attack on German troops and
vehicle concentrations on road north of Lake Ochrida. Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 86;
entry for 14 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 156.
260
chapter nine
bombing failed either to undermine the resolve, or cause significant casualties among the defenders. During the day the Servia Bridge was demolished in front of the brigade, but the demolitions were not covered by direct
fire and approaching German reconnaissance units were soon able to secure
a bridgehead, under sporadic Allied shelling. Meanwhile, by the evening
of 13 April the exhausted men of the 16th Australian Brigade began to arrive
after their gruelling march south from Veria into their new positions to the
right of the 4th NZ Brigade. Many veterans of the brigade later recalled the
march as at least equal to the physical requirements of the Kokoda Track
in Papua New Guinea in 194243. The snow had ceased during their march
but surfaces had become frozen and slippery. In the valleys they traversed
the ice turned to mud. A number of donkeys had slipped off ledges. Periodically the marching troops had to take cover from German aircraft.
At last, however, they had made it to the rough 1500 metre snow-capped
ridges of their new defensive line. But what a hopeless position it was,
recalled one member of the brigade, We were all wet to the skin, our rations
were exhausted; the position was in a dense snow covered forest and once
more it was raining heavily.48
Meanwhile, further to the east, contact was resumed between the New
Zealand cavalrymen on the south bank of the Aliakmon and the vanguard
of the German 18th Corps. Around 9.00 a.m., 13 April, German troops attempted to cross the river at the site of a blown road bridge. The New
Zealanders were well-positioned, however, and their machine guns raked
the Germans on the northern bank, and in rubber assault boats attempting
to cross, while mortars and guns shelled German concentrations further
north. The action could not be prolonged indefinitely as the defenders
position could be easily flanked on both sides. At 1.30 p.m. the cavalry screen
48F.J. Embrey, 1 Battalion in Greece and Crete, March 1942, AWM 54, 534/2/21; draft
manuscript, Medical History of the War: Greece (1940-1941), TNA AIR 49/11; A summary
of the participation of the A.I.F. in the Lustreforce Expedition in Greece March-April, 1941,
AWM 54, 534/5/7; 4 NZ Inf Bde Group The engagement at Servia, 9/18 April 41, 30 April
1941, AWM 3DRL6643 1/44; GOCs [Freybergs] Diary (extracts), 2 January 2 September
1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/5/42-43; New Zealand Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/105; Report on operations in Greece, 4 Inf. Bde., 30 April 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476,
PUTTICK7/1/1; W. Batty, Short notes describing the arrival and withdrawal from Greece,
1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126; Anzac Corps War Diary, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/9;
extract from War Diary of HQ Medium Artillery, 1 Anzac Corps, 6 April 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/29; The Twenty Days in Greece, Public Relations Pamphlet, 1941, AWM 54 534/5/4;
Corporal Rawson, 16 Australian Brigade (as told in March 1945), Withdrawal and Evacuation
from Greece, AWM 54 534/3/3; 2/2 Battalion sequence of events, AWM 54 534/5/10.
261
Figure 9.2:Soldiers of the 16th Australian Brigade after crossing the Aliakmon River by
ferry after withdrawing from the Veria Pass. (Source: Australian War Memorial: 007848)
was withdrawn and by 5.00 p.m., in the vicinity of Elevthorhorion, the retreating New Zealanders lost contact with the Germans for the night. The
enemy, however, had managed to cross the Aliakmon River and it was quite
clear the build-up of troops to the front of the New Zealand Division was
continuing in earnest. In fact, so eager was Boehme to press his advance
south he ordered all non-combat vehicles left north of the Aliakmon to
keep the roads clear and his forward units to make full use of the resulting
mobility.49
Back at Headquarters W Force, Wilson was becoming increasingly preoccupied with the perceived risk to his western flank. As noted, he was
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; Extracts from 72 Inf Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM
54, 534/2/27; New Zealand Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105; GOCs [Freybergs] Diary (extracts), 2 January 2 September 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/5/42-43;
letter, Rudd to Wards, 25 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/4; H.M. Wilson, Report
on Greek campaign, TNA WO201/53; War Diary HQ 1 Aust Corps Campaign in Greece. AWM
3DRL6643, 1/1; comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of Internal
Affairs, January 1950. AWM67, 5/17.
262
chapter nine
convinced on thin evidence that the CMFAS divisions could not hope to
hold their pass positions. Inaccurate intelligence and other reports throughout the day further confirmed in his mind that Greek disorganisation to
his left risked an unopposed German advance to Yannina and Grevena on
either sides of the Pindus rangeboth of which would flank W Force and
cut the roads to Athens. Wilson further concluded that Papagos was losing
control and that Greek formations could no longer be relied upon to fight.
Therefore, he visited Blameys corps headquarters at Gerania and began
discussing the use of the newly landed 17th Australian Brigade to plug the
perceived hole and bolster this western flank. Blamey was unmoved. He
wanted to use Brigadier Saviges battalions to strengthen his own front
rather than have them detached. Blamey had little choice, however, than
to accede to Wilsons wishes and Savige, who sat in on the conference, was
ordered to conduct an immediate reconnaissance in the area of TrikkalaKalabaka-Grevena Road.50
In this context Wilson had begun once more, and for the third time, to
consider retreat. The previous evening he and Wavell had met at Larissa to
discuss the future of W Force. There Wilson described the difficulties of
working with the Greeks, the German columns rushing south, the state of
his armoured brigade, and the lack of clear direction from London. At that
point the two generals decided, in principle, to withdraw W Force further
south. Wilson was more specific in his discussions on the issue with Blamey
during 13 April. He pointed to the mounting and inevitable ineffectiveness
of the RAF in the face of a growing Luftwaffe presence. More importantly,
Wilson repeated his conviction that the Greeks on his left flank were no
longer effective or reliable. Blamey agreed. Wilson was thus set on the need
to withdraw W Force 160 kilometres south to the Thermopylae Line. This
would entail the abandonment of all of Greece north of the Peloponnese
with the exception of a small peninsula, 56 kilometres wide, between Lamia
and Athens. It was primarily the alleged untrustworthiness of the Greeks
that made it necessary in Wilsons mind to withdraw to a position which
the British Imperial troops could hold without reliance on Allied support.51
Of course, the movement to it would necessitate the complete abandonment of all further cooperation with the main body of the Greek Army
50Notes by Lieutenant General S. Savige on Australia in the War on 1939-45, AWM
3DRL 2529 [12]; diary extracts from Private F.J Gorman, 2/6 Battalion, AWM PR85/250; P.J.
Hurst, My Army Days, 2/7 Battalion, AWM MSS1656; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 78-9.
51Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, quoted in Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 80.
263
indeed that was the intention. Allied forces, with their vehicles, might make
the move in a few days but it would take Greek formations weeks to walk
so far south. For their part the Germans certainly concluded that the speed
of the British withdrawal destroyed the connection between British and
Greek forces, so that the Greeks were forced to evacuate towns such as
Koritza.52
Not surprisingly the moment Wilson decided to withdraw W Force to
the Thermopylae Line, thereby leaving the Greek army to its fate, the more
obvious it was that Greek and British-Imperial commanders were at cross
purposes. Although ordering preliminary preparations for the retreat within W Force almost straight away, which included a withdrawal of his own
headquarters to Pharsalus, Wilson failed to inform Papagos, his immediate
superior, of his decision for three more days. Meanwhile, the Greek commander continued planning for a Greek-W Force deployment along the
Aliakmon-Venetikos Line. In his ignorance Papagos was frustrated, for example, by Wilsons orders to demolish roads from Argos Orestikon to
Grevena and Kalabaka. Such action would delay the Germans and assist
W Force to escape southbut these roads were also necessary to withdraw
the CMFAS and WMFAS.53 Rowell summed up the mood within W Force
in that it was obvious that we would have to look after ourselves.54
Wilsons decision, without Papagos assent, was an extreme choice
especially as apart from the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigades delaying manoeuvres, the Anzac Corps was not during 13 April in any significant contact
with the Germans. True, large German concentrations were known to be
massing to the front of the three main passes held by the Anzac Corps, but
contrary to Wilsons pessimistic predictions the CMFAS had not yet yielded their passes to the enemy. The risk of encirclement for W Force was by
52An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 209; Long, Greece,
Crete and Syria, p. 81; Cruickshank, Greece 194041, p. 146; Wisshaupt, Der Balkanfeldzug
der 12. Armee, Generalfeldmarschall List Ein strategischer berblick, BA MA MSG 2/3963,
p. 25.
53A similar incident had occurred earlier when the British prepared demolitions on
the lower Axios River without the slightest consideration being given to the interests of the
EMFAS. Ein berblick ber die Operationen des griechischen Heeres und des britischen
Expeditionskorps im April 1941. (1. Teil.) I. Die griechischen Verteidigungsplne, die Mobilmachung und der Aufmarsch der verbndeten Streitkrfte., Militrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 8/1 (1943), p. 80.
54The campaign in Greece, April 1941, Brigadier S.F. Rowell, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL
6763(A), [1-4]. Greece Comments on TSS, from Gavin Longs Extract Book No. 18, AWM
67 5/18; report on Greek campaign, General H.M. Wilson, TNA WO201/53; McClymont, To
Greece, pp. 203, 217.
264
chapter nine
no means immediate. At this time the Greek Albanian armies were moving
south through Grevena, Luftwaffe attacks notwithstanding. So too, despite
its last-minute occupation, the Olympus-Aliakmon Line offered sound
natural defences and reasonable prospects for a protracted stand.
Many factors above and beyond the current tactical situation were influencing Wilsons decisions. Before the campaign had even begun, many
British leaders had reservations about its prospects of success. Barely half
of the Imperial force earmarked for Greece had landed before the German
invasion. The Germans, on the other hand, could afford to throw considerably more forces into Greece than Britain could ever bring to bear. So too,
the collapse of Yugoslavia and the crisis in North Africa had robbed Greece
of any real prospect of reinforcement, and destroyed any hope of a Balkan
Frontone of Churchills original purposes.55 As well, many in W Force
had had little confidence in their allies, even before the fighting began.
How well the Olympus-Aliakmon Line could have held the Germans was,
in the end, a moot point. The line was in fact broken before it could be
fully mannedby Wilsons choicenot by German combat action.56 For
the third time Wilson was now planning to depart his defensive positions
before they had been seriously tested by the enemy.
Perhaps the most important factor in the back of Wilsons mind in deciding to abandon the Olympus-Aliakmon Line for Thermopylae was the prospect of an eventual evacuation of W Force from Greece. Even at this early
stage, a week into the campaign, it was obvious to British planners that it
would become increasing difficult for W Force to remain indefinitely. If
evacuation was to be an option for W Force it could not afford to get caught
too far north. The heavier any engagement with the Germans grew, the less
likely a successful evacuation would become. Wilson was not, however,
alone in this line of thought, or even the prime mover behind the idea of
an eventual W Force departure from Greece. In fact, in March, when W
Force was assembling in Greece, Wavells Joint Planning Staff in Cairo had
believed it necessary to study the possibility of an evacuation. Shortly after
Wilson arrived in Greece an officer had been attached to his staff from
55On 13 April a correspondent for New York Times, Sy Sulzberger, who had fled the
bombs at Skopje and almost been shot as a spy on several occasions, arrived at headquarters
W Force and described the debacle in southern Yugoslavia in detail: Casson, Greece Against
the Axis, pp. 142-3.
March-April, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7; McClymont, To Greece, p. 217; Long, Greece, Crete and
Syria, p. 81.
265
Wavells headquarters to study the problem of withdrawal and evacuation.57

A number of beaches were reconnoitred with this in mind before 6 April.
Ostensibly this was to identify likely supply points should Volos or Piraeus
be captured, but Brigadier George Brunskill, Wilsons chief administrative
officer, was later unequivocal that there was a secret underlying motive
the possible use for an evacuation.58
On 13 April, as Wilson told Blamey of his decision to withdraw to the
Thermopylae Line, the issue of evacuation was very much under discussion
in Cairo. That morning Rear Admiral C.E. Turle, the British Naval Attach
to Greece, had sent a signal to Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, the Royal Navys Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, giving his opinion that an
evacuation of W Force would soon be required. Soon afterward, Rear Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman, chairman of the Combined Operations Committee at General Headquarters Middle East, was called to a meeting by
Wavell, recently returned from Greece and discussions with Wilson, to
examine the outline concept for Operation Demonthe proposed codename for the evacuation of W Force from Greece. Baillie-Grohman was told
he was to proceed immediately to Athens to take charge of the landward
side of this evacuation should it be ordered. He was shocked, having just
left that morning a Staff Meeting at G.H.Q., with General Wavell in the
Chair, at which there had been no mention of any evacuation in the foreseeable future. 59
Wavell also discussed Operation Demon with Lieutenant Colonel Francis de Guingand, of his Joint Planning Staff, and by the end of the day a
small inter-service committee was formed. An outline plan was hatched
within 24 hours. The dangers were obvious. It would be politically difficult
for W Force to be evacuated without the assent of the Greek government.
Even then an evacuation, if Narvik and Dunkirk were any guides, would be
costly. The distances were much greater than the breadth of the channel.
This time there could be no fighter protection and ships going both ways
could be expected to be bombed from the Dodecanese. Nor could W Force
withdraw into a single perimeter as Piraeus was already devastated and
mined. Allied troops might well have to be taken off beaches by small craft,
57McClymont, To Greece, pp. 215, 218; Inter-service lessons learnt in the campaign in
Greece, March to April, 1941, 12 March 1942, TNA WO 106/3120.
59H.T. Baillie-Grohman, Flashlights on the past, 1976, NMM, GRO/33.
266
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but unlike Dunkirk there was no fleet of old paddle steamers and yachts
to ferry them.60
Overall, the Battle of Vevi and other operations of 12-13 April had not
gone well for the Allies. By the evening of 13 April the 9th Armoured Division had completed its action at Ptolemais and was awaiting first light to
resume its southward advance. The leading elements of the Adolf Hitler
Regiment were pressuring the WFMASs line of retreat at Pisoderion Pass.
Meanwhile, the 2nd Armoured Division had the leading elements of two
battalions in a bridgehead over Aliakmon south of Jida, with the 6th Mountain Divisions vanguard in a bridgehead across the same river southeast
of Veria. Although Mackays force had managed to escape, it had not been
an orderly withdrawal. The battered 19th Australian Brigade was at Kerasia,
the 1st (UK) Armoured Division was a spent force, and the CMFAS had been
badly shaken in its march to the Klisoura/Siatista Passes. British propaganda that the Germans had lost in excess of 20,000 men at Vevi, and Australian newspapers running headlines such as Nazi attacks repulsed, could
not hide the true course of events.61
There were many good reasons for Mackays failure to hold until nightfall on 12 April. His exhausted and shivering troops, some of whom had not
eaten or rested properly since leaving Athens a week before, were spread
thinly and were without depth or any reserve. Mistakes were also made by
the defenders. Mackays anti-tank guns, for example, were sited before the
infantry arrived and were too far forward. Nevertheless, the factors typically used to explain Allied defeat at Kleidi Pass are insufficient.62
First, the widely accepted view that Mackay could do nothing in the face
of overwhelming German numbers is mistaken.63 The German force actually in combat at the Kleidi Pass on 12 April was numerically inferior at the
point of contact. The Adolf Hitler Regiment attacked with two reinforced
60Letter, Heckstall-Smith to Baillie-Grohman, 30 March 1960, IWM, Papers of ViceAdmiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet catalogued); Inter-service lessons learnt in the
campaign in Greece, March to April, 1941, 12 March 1942, TNA WO 106/3120; Heckstall-Smith
and Baillie-Grohman, Greek Tragedy, pp. 54-5, 78-9.
narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Extracts from evening
reports from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete), AWM 67, 5/17; Diggers in action. War
in snow and Withdrawal under fierce fire, Sydney Morning Herald, 13 April 1941, AWM PR
88/72; Monson, The Battle of Greece, p. 5.
62Engineer Summary of the campaign, May 1941, TNA WO 201/118; letter, Boileau to
anon., 7 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Major R.R.C. Boileau, 1 Rangers, 77/149/1.
March-April, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7.
267
battalion groups. Only the Witt Group was directed at the pass. The other
(the Weidenhaupt Group) was directed to the east against Kelli and Petres
through remnants of the Greek Dodecanese Regiments position. The third
German battle group, the Appel Group, operated to Mackays left flank and
had a negligible bearing on the outcome of the battle. The 19th Australian
Brigade defended Kleidi Pass and either side of it with a brigade group of
three battalions, an anti-tank battalion, half of a machine-gun battalion,
two field and one medium artillery regiments. Thus, Witts one and a half
battalions attacked Vaseys three battalions. During their advance the righthand elements of Weidenhaupt Group probably made contact with the
right flank of the 2/8th Australian Battalion, which only raised the ratio to
perhaps two attacking against three defending battalions. The key Kleidi
Pass road position was assaulted by the equivalent of three companies from
Witt Group at a maximum. The truth is that the Allies were shifted from
their line by a considerably smaller force than their own.64
Nor can German airpower or armour be said to have made up for the
numerical mismatch. German tanks were not present until the rout had
begun. Later, after the tank engagement at Ptolemais, the 1st (UK) Brigades
own notes concluded poor German armoured manoeuvre, inadequate
tactical precautions, and inaccurate gunnery was a key component in allowing the British to escape. It is true the RAF were not present in numbers
at Kleidi as DAlbiacs miniscule force was busy losing machines and men
in a futile attempt to interrupt German lines of communication further
north, but German air attacks on the pass were infrequent and caused
insignificant damage. It should be noted that the German pursuit was also
delayed by traffic congestion, and a lack of petrol and other supplies, not
by this ineffectual RAF action. While they might sometimes have served as
convenient justifications for events at Kleidi Pass, notions of German
numerical superiority and a decisive airpower/armoured advantage have
no basis.65
Greek Campaign, AWM 67, 5/17; letter, Freyberg to Kippenberger, 16 January 1950, AWM
67 5/17; Notes on English methods of fighting (Greece), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
65Immediately before and after the Battle of Vevi all RAF bombing effort was put into
interdicting German supply lines. It was a costly task. During one mission alone six Blenheims of No. 211 Squadron were lost along with the squadron commander and the commander of the RAF Western Wing. For its part the Luftwaffes attention in this period was
focused on infrastructure further south, over battlefield interdiction at Kleidi. Golla, Der
Fall Griechenlands 1941, p. 193; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. 2, p. 92;
268
chapter nine
What, then, decided events at Kleidi Pass? To answer this question it is

first necessary to acknowledge that once again the defenders chose to withdraw. They were not forced from their position by hopeless odds. Standing
orders to withdraw were in place well before the Witt Group attacked. For
Mackay it was a question of delaying long enough, and well enough, to
cover wider W Force re-deployments while salvaging as much of his force
as possible. He was partially successful on both counts. The picture of an
interrupted Allied withdrawal is thus the proper context for the battlenot
a stoic and desperate defence against overwhelming German numbers.
Subsequent bravado from men like Rowell, that the pass could have been
held indefinitely had the Greeks lost in the Doiran-Nestos Line been available to help defend it, was ridiculous. There is no question that had Mackay held on to the last then the German 40th Corps would have crushed him.
The point is, however, that he had orders not to hold on and he was shifted
before he had planned before the bulk of German forces could arrive. This
is the story of Allied defeat at the Battle of Vevi.66
The second part of the answer as to why the Allied line at Kleidi was
broken is that the Rangers and the Australian battalions either side of it,
on the eve of their planned departure, were out-fought by a smaller number
of spirited German infantrymen. Allied infantry posts often withdrew before it was strictly necessary when German infantry appeared to their flank
or rear. Such infiltration surprised the defenders who were not trained or
prepared for it. In Mackays unusually candid words: In some cases infantry did not show that essential determination to stay and fight it out.67 The
apportionment of blame began immediately. The Australians were determined to hold the Rangers responsible for breaking, while the Englishmen
were at pains to point out that the Germans initially got amongst the
exhausted Australians.68
April, 1941, 15 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/1196; 1st Armoured Brigade Group notes on operations in Greece, April, 1941, 8 May 1941, TNA WO 201/2749; entry for 13 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 9. Pz Division Begonnen: 11.7.40 Abgeschlossen: 18.5.1941., BA MA RH 27-9/2;
entry for 13 April 1941, Gen. Kdo. (mot) XXXX. A.K., Abt. Qu., 16 March 1941, Fortsetzung
des Kriegstagebuches (Band 2) Begonnen am 16.3.41 Beendet am 1.6.41., BA MA RH 24-40/153,
p. 59; entry for 13 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 5 9. Panzer-Division, Abt. Ib Begonnen: 6.
7. 1940 Abgeschlossen: 18. 5. 1941, BA MA RH 27-9/30.
66Tippelskirch, Der Deutsche Balkanfeldzug 1941, p. 63; The campaign in Greece, April
1941, Brigadier S.F. Rowell, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A), [1-4].
May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34.
68Both the 2/4th and 2/8th Australian Battalions officially recorded that it was the
German piercing of the Rangers front which necessitated their own retreats while Mackays
269
On the balance of evidence, however, it is clear that the Rangers withdrew

first. The primary cause of the Rangers difficulties in this regard was ineffective leadership. On the eve of battle the units adjutant, was, according
to Major Boileau, ill with worry and forced to turn to me for decisions as
the battalions commander seemed dazed.69 No orders at all were given
to the battalion once the retreat was underway and any subsequent organisation was imposed on the run by Boileau. The offending officer was
removed by the evening of 13 April and Boileau was given command. Outside the Rangers, not even fellow Englishmen could pretend that they had
not withdrawn prematurely. Major Clements of the 4th Hussars, a sister
unit within the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade, as a consequence of events at
Kleidi described the Rangers as a very bad London territorial unit.70 This
sentiment was repeated by Ian Wards, chief historian of the NZ War History Branch, whose conclusions, given the lack of New Zealand involvement
in the action, were more neutral: 1 Rangers were a sad sort of outfit, and
as far as I can see didnt fight at all, noted Wards.71 But unit pride was a
powerful force and the subsequent enmity between the 19th Australian
Brigade and the 1st Rangers was bitter and enduring. Boileau, no doubt
aware of Australian opinions of events at Kleidi Pass, later congratulated
his troops for their endurance and discipline, and wrote that: They have
twice the guts of the N.Zs. and 500 times the guts of an Aussie.72 In any
case, Kleidi Pass was breached and the Germans were free to move against
the line of passes held by W Force along the Olympus-Aliakmon Line.
position was quite clear regarding the sector lost by 1 Rangers early in the afternoon. Such
conclusions were echoed in an Australian official report of the action. Report on operations
of 6th Australian Division in Greece, Major General I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34;
A summary of the participation of the A.I.F. in the Lustreforce Expedition in Greece MarchApril, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7; 1 Rangers account of action at Vevi, AWM 67, 5/4; Rangers
account of actions at Vevi (in the Papers of Gavin Long), AWM 67, 5/4; letter, Boileau to
anon., 7 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Major R.R.C. Boileau, 1 Rangers, 77/149/1.
77/149/1.
Clements, 98/21/1.
71Letter, Wards to McClymont, 19 December 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/15. See
also memo, Wards to Kippenberger, 8 September 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18908, WAII11, 24(30);
A summary of the participation of the A.I.F. in the Lustreforce Expedition in Greece MarchApril, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7; letter, Wains to Wards, 26 April 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18902,
WAII3/1/11; Chronology of Operations, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2.
77/149/1; Special Order of the Day by Major D.R.C. Boileau, IWM, Papers of Major R.R.C.
Boileau, 1 Rangers, 77/149/1; letter, Boileau to anon., 7 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Major
R.R.C. Boileau, 1 Rangers, 77/149/1.
270
chapter nine
pressure on the passes (14-15 april)
271
Chapter Ten
Pressure on the Passes (14-15 April)

By the morning of 14 April the Axis invasion of Greece had entered a new
phase. By now W Force was firmly on the Olympus-Aliakmon Line, the
British-Dominion right flank of Papagos Aliakmon-Venetikos Line, which
the Greek Commander-in-Chief still intended to stretch across the Greek
peninsula. To the west of W Force the Greek WMFAS and EFAS were withdrawing to their allocated positions on this latest defensive line. Papagos
still had hopes for this new front as Wilson had yet failed to inform the
Greek High Command of his own quite divergent plan to withdraw W Force
further south to a position at Thermopylae. For both of these now conflicting operations to succeed, howeverWilsons retreat to the Thermopylae
Line and the Greek Albanian armies withdrawal to the Aliakmon-Venetikos
Linea series of critical passes needed to be held. Moving from west to
east the first crucial string of such passes were at Pisoderion (Greek Cavalry Division), Klisoura (20th Greek Division), and Siatista (12th Greek Division). These three gaps in the mountain range southwest of Vevi
protected Kastoria, Grevena and the line of retreat for the bulk of the Greek
Albanian armies. Further east, W Force was positioned to defend the key
passes along three routes leading south through the Olympus-Aliakmon
Line: the Kosani-Elasson-Larissa road (at the Servia Pass); the KateriniElasson-Larissa road (at the Olympus Pass); and the Katerini-Tempe-Larissa
railway (Plantamon tunnel pass leading to the Pinios Gorge). The key point
for W Force was the town of Larissa, as all routes led through it. If the
Olympus-Aliakmon passes were breached and Larissa taken, then further
W Force withdrawal would be unlikely. The following phase of the campaign
was therefore to be defined and decided by how much pressure the Germans
could apply to these passes and how well the Allies could resist them. With
little knowledge of how easily any of these passes could be forced, believing the British to be in full retreat towards Larissa, and with troops to spare,
List decided to press them all at once.1
1List, Generalfeldmarschall, A.O.K.12, Ia Nr.810/41 geheim, 20.10, 14 April 1941, Fern
schreiben oder Funk to XXXX.A.K. and others, BA MA RH 20-12/93, pp. 1-2; War for the
Passes, an extract from American Infantry Journal of October, 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643 3/42.
272
chapter ten
As 14 April dawned clear and sunny, with temperatures seemingly on

the rise, the German push south continued. The western German axis of
advance, Stummes 40th Corps, was preparing to continue its advance from
Ptolemais. To this end a pursuit group from the German 9th Armoured
Division was formed under the control of Colonel Graf von Sponeck, based
on Sponecks own 11th Infantry Regiment, reinforced with motorcyclists
from the 59th Motorcycle Battalion, a troop of tanks, and various artillery
elements. Sponeck was instructed to advance immediately upon Kozani,
and, if possible, to push reconnaissance elements onwards as far south as
the Servia Pass. The eastern German wing, Boehmes 18th Corps, was similarly ordered to pursue the withdrawing Allies south with all available
forces, with Larissa as its target. Boehmes plan was to thrust the leading
elements of the 6th Mountain Division through Veria and of the 2nd Armoured Division through Katerini to destroy the English wherever they
are found.2 The most significant obstacle predicted by the Germans was
Allied demolitions, which had damaged the roads to such an extent that
the pursuit would no doubt entail much loss of time.3
From a W Force perspective the immediate impact of Lists plans for 14
April fell upon the New Zealand cavalry regiment. At first light, with Luftwaffe reconnaissance overhead, forward infantry elements of the German
2nd Armoured Division advanced in trucks from the south bank of the
Aliakmon and approached the anti-tank ditch that had been dug north of
Katerini. At this point they jumped from their lorries and began filtering
across the ditch. NZ cavalrymen in the vicinity, having retired from the
Aliakmon the day before, opened fire and German mortars and machine
guns replied. Despite the fire directed upon them German infantrymen
soon managed to scramble across the ditch, while tanks began to flank it
on the coastal side. No further delaying action was possible from this point
2Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 534/2/27; Appendices
to 2 Pz Div Admin Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 534/2/27.
3Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 534/2/27. Entry for
14 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der 6.GEB.DIV. BA MA RH 28-6/8; Eberl, Lt., Katerini an 6. Geb.Div/Ia, 1530 14 April 1941, and Eberl, Lt., Katerini an 6. Geb.Div/Ia, 20500 14
April 1941, BA MA RH 28-6/9a; entry for 14 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 8 Generalkommando XVIII. Armeekorps, Fhrungsabteilung Begonnen: 6.April 1941 Abgeschlossen: 2.Juni
1941, BA MA RH 24-18/75; Bericht ber den Einsatz Sdost der Panzerjgerabteilung 38,
BA MA RH 20-12/105, p. 7; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece,
March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; draft report written by G. Long, 12 April
1941, AWM 67 3/220A; Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54,
534/2/27; War for the Passes, an extract from American Infantry Journal of October, 1941,
AWM 3DRL 6643 3/42; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 233-4.
273
and the cavalry regiment began to retire south through Katerini after blowing three bridges between north of Olympus. By 4.00 p.m. the New Zealand
cavalrymen were safely behind the 5th NZ Brigade line at the Olympus Pass.
The cavalrymen suffered only two casualties during this action, and were
subsequently re-deployed west under Anzac Corps control, from Elasson
towards Kaperon, to stop any sudden German incursion along this road.4
Once Katerini had been taken, an advance detachment from the 2nd
Armoured Division (based primarily on the 1st Battalion, 304th Regiment
and the 8/800th (Brandenburg) Special Unit) was sent to reconnoitre the
roads south. At 5.00 p.m., a scant hour after the New Zealand cavalry regiment had passed through the 5th NZ Brigades line, observation posts forward of the Olympus Pass began reporting the approach of German vehicles
from this group along the road from Katerini. An hour later German motorcyclists were sighted moving up the Olympus Pass road to the first set
of demolitions in front of the 5th NZ Brigade. As the motorcyclists halted
they were engaged by machine guns and destroyed. The New Zealanders
then waited nervously, deployed in a linear fashion with the 28th NZ (Maori) Battalion on the left, the 22nd NZ Battalion in the centre astride the road
within the pass, and the 23rd NZ Battalion on the right. Throughout the
night they listened to German lorries in the distance, headlights on, no
doubt ferrying troops forward. A number of German machine guns fired
indiscriminately at several places to test defences and draw fire. At 11.00
p.m. another group of motorcyclists drove straight up to the pass only to
be again scattered by more machine-gun fire. Five German motorbikes lay
abandoned by the side of the road the next morning. Meanwhile, during
the night the 6th NZ Brigade, which had been made responsible for closing
the gap between the western flank of 5th NZ Brigade and the eastern flank
of 16th Australian Brigade, received new orders to re-deploy to Elasson to
cover the looming W Force withdrawal to the Thermopylae Line.5
4Entry for 10.45 14 April 1941, 2. Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 Ia und Anlagen
1.1.41 14.6.41., BA MA RH 27-2/20, p. 32; letter, Rudd to Wards, 25 November 1951, ANZ
ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/4; Report by Brig. Hargest on Greek Ops, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162;
WAII1/156; The campaign in Greece, April 1941, Brigadier S.F. Rowell, 6 June 1941, AWM
3DRL 6763(A) [1-4]; comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of
Internal Affairs, January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; W.J.H. Sutton, The Greek Debacle 1941: the
beginning and end, KMARL, 1999.1051; Headquarters BTE War Diary, 14 April 1941, TNA
WO 169/994B; B Freyberg, Comment on General Blameys Report, AWM 54 534/5/24;
5Appendices to 2 Pz Div Admin Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Summary of operations of 5 NZ Infantry Brigade in Greece, 29 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
274
chapter ten
Once the German 2nd Armoured Division had taken Katerini and ordered reconnaissance elements up the Olympus Pass, a second advance
detachment (based on the reinforced 2nd Motorcycle Battalion) was dispatched towards Larissa via an eastern coastal route through Litohoron
and Pandeleimon. This route along the Aegean coast was the shortest path
to Larissa and a traditional access route to the Plain of Thessaly for invading armies. In the path of this detachment, and blocking the narrow coastal pass at Platamon, along which a road and railway travelled, was
Lieutenant Colonel Mackys 21st NZ Battalion. During the morning of 14
April a train stopped at Plantamon and a Greek officer informed Macky
that this would be the last Allied train from Katerini as the Germans were
approaching the town. At 3.00 p.m. Freyberg arrived to explain once again
to Macky the vital importance of holding the coastal pass to prevent a German drive on Larissathe vital choke point for the impending W Force
withdrawal south. Freyberg assured Macky that he faced a small German
infantry attack at most. At 6.30 p.m. Mackys observation posts reported
the approach of a German patrol and he ordered the railway tunnel demolitions in his sector blown. The main charge, however, had no noticeable
effect on the tunnel, but the railway track was blocked.6 Charges on the
rough vehicle track over the ridgeline saddle were also fired and an antitank minefield was hastily laid to cover it further. Shortly thereafter Allied
artillery firing in support of the 21st NZ Battalion scattered the leading
German reconnaissance patrols to its immediate north. The commander
of the German 2nd Motorcycle Battalion subsequently decided that the
WAII1/156; Report by Brig. Hargest on Greek Ops, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162; War Diary
of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658; N.J. Mason, Draft Narrative Greece, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/170; GOCs [Freybergs] Diary (extracts), 2 January 2 September 1941, ANZ
ADQZ 18906, WAII8/5/42-43; New Zealand Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105;
23 NZ Bn, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign
in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; Summary of War Diary material for 22nd (NZ) Battalion, 12 January 1940 31 October 1943, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/160;
correspondence (various, including interview transcripts) concerning the 22nd Battalion
in Greece, 22nd Battalion veterans to J.H. Henderson, 1950, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156;
comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 84 , 94; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands
1941, p. 239; McClymont, To Greece, p. 238.
6It is worth noting, however, that better demolitions on the tunnel and saddle would
not have held the Germans up for more than a few hoursnot days. In any case the position could always be bypassed by the Germans if they so chose by a well-used track which
led up to Pandeleimon to the left of the New Zealand battalion and from there over foothills
to Rapsani. Comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of Internal
Affairs, January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17.
275
castle area of the ridgeline was the key to forcing the position and an attack
on it was ordered to commence the next morning. During the night the
New Zealanders watched the movement of German transports to their
north making no attempt at concealment. Macky reported a force of 50
tanks and 150 other vehicles was bearing down on upon him. The sheer
numbers of German vehicles reported, however, led both his divisional and
corps headquarters to question the accuracy of the message.7
Further west over the other side of Mt Olympus, during 14 April German
dive-bombing of the 4th NZ Brigade position in the vicinity of the Servia
Pass continued. In the afternoon observation posts to the front of the brigade, looking down to the Aliakmon and beyond, watched columns of
German vehicles from the Sponeck Group moving south. Sponecks troops
had occupied Kozani without opposition just before midday and the 8th
Company (2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment) was sent on towards the
Aliakmon northwest of Servia. This German company reported a bridge
blown but no sign of defenders on the opposite bank. Sponeck received
orders to force a river crossing as soon as possible at this demolished bridge
site and then send a fast, mobile column to capture Servia Pass. The Germans believed the defenders were moving back and expected that a quick
attack, even by a small force, could capture the important pass. At 2.00 p.m.
a dense German vehicle column was spotted at Petrana, 10 kilometres north
of the river, which included 30-50 tanks. At dusk German artillery sent
ranging shots across the Aliakmon and at 7.00 p.m. they opened mortar
and machine-gun fire on a hill forward of the main New Zealand brigade
position. An hour later the headlights of more German columns could be
seen advancing not only on Servia but west into the hills towards Grevena.
At the same time the German 8th Company, now joined by the 6th Company of the same battalion, began clambering across the blown bridge with
the idea of advancing astride the road through Servia village to the top
of the pass. Sponeck ordered two of his motorcycle squadrons to follow
these two lead infantry companies, then to climb the hills south of Servia
to open the pass from the rear. Initially, the 6th and 8th German infantry
companies managed to make a shallow bridgehead across the river but
work on a bridge during the night was, however, a disaster. The chief cause
7Appendices to 2 Pz Div Admin Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 534/2/27; New Zealand Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105; GOCs [Freybergs] Diary (extracts),
2 January 2 September 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/5/42-43; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139;
Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 84; McClymont, To Greece, p. 246; Blau, Invasion Balkans!,
p. 95; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 234-5.
276
chapter ten
was accurate artillery fire from the guns of the 4th NZ brigade (supplemented by fire from medium British guns) which fell not only on those
attempting to build a crossing but on German troops dismounting from
their vehicles on the opposite side of the Aliakmon. Just before midnight
steady German shelling of the brigade, and neighbouring Anzac Corps
positions, commenced.8
Further northwest, throughout the day the remnants of the 1st (UK)
Armoured Brigade continued to withdraw southwards towards Grevena,
with small detachments detailed to reinforce the 12th Greek Division at
Siatista Pass. The withdrawal of the British brigade was hammered at every
turn by the Luftwaffe, which at one stage launched three raids along the
Grevena road in the space of 90 minutes, leaving the route littered with
refuse and wrecked vehicles. At 10.45 a.m. Charrington was ordered to block
the road along a ridgeline north of the town. By now, thanks to continuing
mechanical failure, the armoured brigade was down to six of its original 53
tanks. Charrington was nervous and concerned that the Greeks to his north
were melting away and that his flanks were exposed. Moreover, he believed
if he did not withdraw soon it would become impossible due to the speed
of the German advance and the congestion of the roads. This was, perhaps,
a little too alarmist given that a 4th Hussars patrol sent out during the
evening of 14 April confirmed the Germans were still not across the Aliakmon River in this sector, nor had they yet occupied Grevena. Nonetheless,
Charrington, himself injured earlier that day after being washed away in a
torrent of water after insisting on a bath in a sulphurous spring, decided to
retreat. The detachments with the Greeks at Siatista Pass were withdrawn
and by midnight the brigade was on its way south of the Venetikos River.
Charrington fell asleep giving his orders that night. It was fortunate for W
Force that during the day Charringtons brigade was not pressed by the
Germansit was in a less than optimal condition to resist.9
8Entry for 14 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 9. Pz Division Begonnen: 11.7.40 Abgeschlossen: 18.5.1941., BA MA RH 27-9/2; Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary (Greek Campaign),
AWM 54, 534/2/27; GOCs [Freybergs] Diary (extracts), 2 January 2 September 1941, ANZ
ADQZ 18906, WAII8/5/42-43; New Zealand Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105;
War for the Passes, an extract from American Infantry Journal of October, 1941, AWM
3DRL6643 3/42; 4 NZ Inf Bde Group The engagement at Servia, 9/18 April 41, 30 April
1941, AWM 3DRL6643 1/44; correspondence (various) concerning the 20th Battalion in
Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/155; McClymont, To Greece, p. 240; Golla, Der Fall Grie
chenlands 1941, pp. 252-3.
9Entry for 14 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 156; letter, Hobson to anon.,
4 May 1941, TNA CAB 106/374; war diary of 3 RTR, 14 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1411; McClymont,
To Greece, p. 221; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. 2, p. 90.
277
To the north, throughout 14 April, all three Greek divisions defending

the key Pisoderion, Klisoura, and Siatista Passes were pressed by the Germansand hard. It was here that the Stumme Groups main effort fell
during the day, and here that the most crucial issues of the day were decided. From dawn the leading elements of the Adolf Hitler Regiment and
vanguard units from the German 73rd Division, which had been following,
began a serious and escalating attack against the 20th Greek Division position astride the Klisoura Pass, and a simultaneous but less intense operation
against the 12th Greek Divisions position at Siatista. The 20th Greek Division found itself in immediate trouble. This formation, still technically
under W Forces command, begged for the immediate despatch of additional anti-armoured weapons, but with the closest Imperial unit (Charringtons brigade) conducting its own withdrawal none could be sent. Heavy
Luftwaffe attacks against both axes began from midday. Given the wastage
of troops and exhaustion caused by its hasty redeployment from the right
flank of Mackays force at Kleidi Pass which had begun two days earlier,
the 20th Greek Divisions position was always tenuous. The Klisoura Pass
was itself difficult to defend with the insufficient number of Greek infantrymen in position. It was some 3200 metres wide, with steep mountains on
both sides, with a road running up the centre from the plain to the east. At
the narrowest point the Greeks had begun, but not finished, an anti-tank
ditchand into this gap the Germans drove. Just before midday the Greek
division began to break. Advance elements of the Adolf Hitler Regiment
streamed through the Klisoura Pass and began moving west.10
Papagos reacted quickly to the disaster unfolding at the Klisoura Pass.
The immediate concern was that the Greek Cavalry Division still at
im Kampfe gegen die Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 4; Anlage 1 zu Nr. 20/42 geh. Mil. Att.
Athen, Bericht ber die Operationen der Armeeabteilung von Ost Makedonien (A.A.O.M.)
whrend des deutsch-griechischen Krieges vom 1941, BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 1 -19; Anl. 1 zu
Nr. 12/42 geh.Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Westmazedonien (A.A.W.M.) whrend der Kampfhandlungen mit den Deutschen., BA MA RH
67/1, p. 4. On this see also Anl. 1 zu Nr. 21/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht der 13. Division
ber ihre Kampfhandlungen gegen die Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 2; copy of Greek
situation report, W Force to War Office, 15 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124; Force HQ Operation Order No. 12, 15 April 1941, AWM 3DRL6643, 1/10; Headquarters BTE War Diary, 14 April
1941, TNA WO 169/994B; letter, Barnett to anon. (his mother), 5 January 1942, IWM Papers
of Major R.A. Barnett, 102 AT Regt, 07/23/1; I. Wards, New Zealand War History Branch,
Department of Internal Affairs, Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM
54, 534/2/26 [1]: Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 230-1; Lehmann, Die Leibstandarte
Band I, pp. 379-86.
278
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Pisoderion Pass and what remained of the two CMFAS divisions at the
Klisoura and Siatista Pass areas, would be trapped in their mountain positions between two German southerly advancestowards Grevena by the
Adolf Hitler Regiment to the west and to Kozani by the 9th Armoured
Division to the east. What remained of the 20th Greek Division was thus
first ordered to blocking positions south along the Kastoria-Grevena Road
to obstruct German movement from the north. Thereafter the 12th and 20th
Greek Division (the former having successfully held at Siatista Pass thus
far) were ordered to withdraw west of the Aliakmon that night. The withdrawal of the remnants of both divisions across the bridges at Giagovo and
Neapolis was, in fact, successful but only because both formations were
already moving away from the Germans. Under heavy pressure from German troops, armour and aircraft, their fighting spirit was by now broken
and all efforts to reorganise them from this point proved fruitless. The driving motivation within these shattered units now seemed to be to avoid
capture. The Greek Cavalry Division and the 21st Greek Brigade still to the
north were in better shape and in the wake of the German breakthrough
at Klisoura were ordered to abandoned their now bypassed position at
Pisoderion and to do what they could to prevent the Germans moving south
down the Grevena Road. If the Germans made it to Grevena, the Greek
High Command concluded, then they must be stopped by the 1st (UK)
Armoured Brigade, until another line could be developed to the rearthus
Charringtons thin and distinctly temporary line at the ridge north of the
town during the day. It was hoped that the combination of these orders
would allow the WMFAS divisions to continue moving south towards and
through Grevena. Meanwhile, in the last 48 hours five battalions of the 11th
Greek Division had made it to and blocked Metsovon Pass in the Pindus
Mountains to stop any incursions onto this line of retreat from Epirus
the rest of the division was still marching south in Albanian territory. During the day four of these five battalions, as a consequence of the German
breakthrough at Klisoura Pass, were despatched to Elefterochori (south of
Grevena) to cover left flank of W Force.11
11These four battalions subsequently dissolved into the flight of Greek troops retreating
from central Macedonia.Anl. 2 zu Nr. 9/42 geh.Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die Ttigkeit
der 11. Division in der Gegend von Metsovon whrend des griechisch- deutschen Krieges.,
BA MA RH 67/1, p. 2; Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Zentralmazedonien
(T.S.K.M.) im Kampfe gegen die Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 5; Anl. 1 zu Nr. 12/42 geh.
Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Westmazedonien
(A.A.W.M.) whrend der Kampfhandlungen mit den Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 4; Anl.
1 zu Nr. 21/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, Anlage 1 zu Nr. 17/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht
279
The penetration of the passes was a catastrophe for the continuing withdrawal of Tsolakoglous WMFAS. Once through the Klisoura Pass the Germans sent detachments not only south towards Grevena but west and
northwest towards Koritza and Kastoria as well. The problem was that by
midday 14 April only two companies of the 13th Greek Division were yet in
place south of Lake Kastoria to cover the Kastoria-Grevena withdrawal
route. The rest of the division was en route from Tsangoni-Biglista to Smixi.
Units from the Greek Cavalry Division were therefore rushed to reinforce
this meagre force, while other Greek cavalrymen were sent to blocking
positions to the east and north of the lake. The hard-pressed Greek Cavalry Division did a magnificent job, with limited resources, throughout the
afternoon. Columns from both the German 73rd Division and the Adolf
Hitler Regiment heading towards Koritza and Kastoria, met stout resistance,
especially in the vicinity of Lake Kastoria. Meanwhile, despite the growing
threat to its rear, the rest of WMFAS had no choice but to continue its
withdrawal. The 9th and 10th Greek Divisions trudged south throughout
the day and crossed the Albanian border the following morning. The progress of the latter was not helped by a serious incidence of desertion in the
30th Greek Regiment, 10th Greek Division, when during night of 14 April
two second lieutenants led 280 soldiers away towards Grevena intent on
surrendering to the Germans. Surprisingly, despite German troops to its
immediate east, and its lead elements deployed just east of Kastoria all but
surrounded by Germans, most of the 13th Greek Division managed to escape
south during the night. At the same time, on the western flank of the
WMFAS, the 16th Greek Division arrived at Kiafe Kiarit during the night of
14 April and continued south the next day.12
Ttigkeit der 12. Division whrend der deutsch-griechischen Kampfhandlungen., BA MA
RH 67/1, p. 7; Bericht der 13. Division ber ihre Kampfhandlungen gegen die Deutschen.,
BA MA RH 67/1, p. 2; Anlage 1 zu Nr. 20/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die Operationen der Armeeabteilung von Ost Makedonien (A.A.O.M.) whrend des deutschgriechischen Krieges vom 1941, BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 1-19; Greek Campaign 1940-41, TNA
WO 201/124; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 209-10,
221; McClymont, To Greece, p. 219.
12Wisshaupt, undated, Der Balkanfeldzug der 12. Armee,, BA MA MSG 2/3963, p. 26;
Anl. 1 zu Nr. 12/42 geh.Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von
Westmazedonien (A.A.W.M.) whrend der Kampfhandlungen mit den Deutschen., BA MA
RH 67/1, p. 4; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 218;
narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Bitzes, Hellas and the
War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 234; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 93; Golla, Der
Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 258-60.
280
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The situation for the ongoing withdrawal of the EFAS to the northwest
of the WMFAS was little better. Here, however, rather than the Germans it
was the Italians advancing towards Koritza from the southern edge of Lake
Ochrida who were causing difficulties. During the day ten Greek infantry
divisions of the EFAS, in positions from Mt Tomoros to the sea, began to
march south. The first troops to move were those in advance positions
around Treeshinj and Shendeli. Progress, however, was hindered by Italian
air attacks, especially in the area north of Aoos River where six EFAS divisions were endangered by significant disruption to their lines of communicationparticularly attacks against the bridge at Merzani, the only one
available to these retreating forces. The 1st Greek Division, which with the
16th Greek Division of the WMFAS constituted the Borova Division Group,
arrived in the area of Kiafe Kiarit on the morning of 14 April to defend
passes running south in the vicinity of Rrehova-Bataros. Its units had by
this point lost heart, however, and desertion was rife. In the 5th Greek
Regiment infantry companies were reduced to 40-50 men, despite the summary execution of deserters on the spot as exemplary punishment. Further
west, after some earlier thinning out, the bulk of the 6th Greek Division
began its withdrawal. Its movements were, however, noticed by the Italians
who responded with local attacks and artillery fire at various parts of the
divisional front. Without a coordinated Italian effort, however, the 6th
Greek Division was able to break free. To its left, the 17th Greek Division,
in the Trebessini-Bubousi area, also came under Italian ground attack at
dawn on 14 April. The division held, however, and by 8.30 a.m. the Italian
attack slackened, although heavy shellfire continued. A second Italian attack at 5.30 p.m. was once again repulsed but the two actions had delayed
any movement by the 17th Greek Division during daylight hours. It was
therefore only able to commence its withdrawal south at 8.30 p.m. Further
west, the 4th and 5th Greek Divisions had significant difficulty in coordinating their movementsdue in this case, however, more to degenerating
internal cohesion than Italian interference. In some areas movement south
by units in these formations more closely resembled a rout than a planned
withdrawal. The men of the 15th Greek Division, in reserve in the area of
Tabayian village to the rear of these formations, were adversely affected,
particularly by the disorderly conduct of soldiers from the 5th Greek Division, as they abandoned their forward positions and fled to the rear. The
commander of the 5th Greek Division adopted harsh measures. Two deserters from the 90th Greek Regiment were sentenced to death, and desertion
rates within this division stabilised. Meanwhile, the 2nd, 3rd and 8th Greek
281
Divisions, on the western flank of the EFAS line, continued to prepare to

withdraw without interference.13
By the evening of 14 April List was reasonably satisfied with the success
of the dual 40th and 18th Corps thrusts south, although a little frustrated
at the relatively slow speed of the German advance. On the strength of
aerial reconnaissance in Albania and Macedonia, during the day he had
told his formations that the English are in full retreat to Larissa and south,
and that W Force troops were already embarking away from Greece at the
mouth of the Pinios River, and at the ports of Piraeus and Volos.14 List had
urged a rapid pursuit. Many leading German units, however, had been
badly delayed by road demolitions and destroyed bridges which had been
easily and effectively carried out in the often difficult Greek terrain.15
As a consequence, during the night the Germans once again re-grouped
in order to accelerate their advance at first light on 15 April. More specifically, the 2nd Armoured Division, which had reached Katerini and pushed
reconnaissance troops as far south as Litohoron on the eastern slopes of
Olympus, formed two forward battle groups. Battle Group 1 was based on
the 2nd Infantry Regiment (three battalions), reinforced with the 2nd Battalion (3rd Armoured Regiment), the 8/800th Special Unit, a detachment
of the 38th Anti-tank Unit, and various engineer and artillery attachments.
This group was ordered to advance through the 5th NZ Brigades blocking
position at the Olympus Pass and on to Elasson and Larissa. Meanwhile,
Battle Group 2, built around on the two battalions of the 3rd Armoured
Regiment, reinforced with the 2nd Motorcycle Battalion, the 1st Battalion
(304th Infantry Regiment), the balance of the 38th Anti-Tank Unit, and
attached artillery, was also tasked to reach Larissa, but via the coastal route
through Pandeleimon (defended by the 21st NZ Battalion) and on through
the Pinios Gorge. To assist these two 2nd Armoured Division battle
groups, the main body of the German 6th Mountain Division was also diverted south towards Katerini (its leading patrols had already entered the
town by around 3.00 p.m., 14 April), along the coast road to the rear of
13Halder considered the Italian pursuit to be cautious: entry for 14 April 1941, Halder,
Kriegstagebuch II, p. 366. Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54,
534/2/27; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 220-1.
5/17.
15Extracts from 12th Army orders in Greece & Crete, AWM 67, 5/17; Extracts from
6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 534/2/27; History of the 2 NZ Division
Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; Extracts
from 18 Corps intelligence report, AWM 54, 534/2/27.
282
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Battle Group 2. As they started off the mountaineers sent a patrol to hoist
the German flag from the summit of Mt Olympusa mission completed
late the following night in the middle of a heavy snowstorm. To ease road
congestion the 5th Mountain Division was told to hold north of the Aliakmon until ordered forward and the German 72nd Division (minus a cyclist
battalion instructed to move with the 6th Mountain Division) was ordered
to concentrate in the Salonika area.16
These 2nd Armoured Division re-deployments explain the very large
assembly of mechanised forces observed to the front of the 21st NZ Battalion during the night. As yet none of these forces were actually tanks, as
Lieutenant Colonel Macky reported, but rather a long string of German
trucks and armoured troop carriers. To the west, late in the evening Stumme
gave formal orders reiterating his intention to send strong covering forces
from the Adolf Hitler Regiment westwards from the newly captured Klisoura Pass towards Kastoria and Koritza to prevent further Greek withdrawal from Albania and to make contact with the Italians at the town. His
main effort, however, was on pushing south towards Larissa to prevent the
enemy from embarking.17 To this end it was a race with Boehmes corps.
Stumme instructed the 9th Armoured Division to enlarge its bridgehead
at Servia and to push through to Elasson before making contact with the
2nd Armoured Division advancing from Katerini. Meanwhile, both the 73rd
Infantry Division and the 5th Armoured Division were to concentrate
around the Monastir Gap for further tasking.18
By the evening of 14 April the seriousness of their position was obvious
to the Allies. The rapidity of German advance during the day encouraged
Pitsikas corps commanders in Albania to conclude, with even more conviction than ever, that their position was becoming increasingly untenable.
For the last two days Pitsikas had been dutifully conveying such sentiments
to Papagos, and even going as far as to request that hostilities cease as soon
as possible. In this regard Pitsikas and his corps commanders were thinking
of a contingency plan which had been in place should Greece have found
itself facing a German invasion from Bulgaria without British support.
16Appendices to 2 Pz Div Admin Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts
from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Fighting in central and
southern Greece, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and General H. von Greif
fenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and
Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
17Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27. Entry for
15 April 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, pp. 366-7; McClymont, To Greece, p. 246.
18Lehmann, Die Leibstandarte Band I, pp. 362-9.
283
Under this plan the line in Albania was to be held while resisting the
Germans only for long enough to preserve the honour of the army. The
objective was to surrender to the Germans, not the Italians, who had thus
far failed to break the Greek lines. Lieutenant Generals Tsolakoglou (WMFAS), Bakos (2nd Greek Corps, EFAS) and Demestihas (1st Greek Corps,
EFAS) were increasingly determined to implement this plan and pressured
Pitsikas more and more to take matters into his own hands. Pitsikas thus
found himself caught between Athens and his obligation to follow orders,
and his corps commanders whose arguments seemed ever more convincing each dayand with whom he privately agreed. To this mix was added
the political influence of the Metropolitan Bishop of Yannina, Spyridon,
previously known as a fiery patriot but who had been witnessing first-hand
the death and destruction continuing resistance had wrought. By 14 April
Yannina had been virtually destroyed by air attacks and Spyridon was pleading with Pitsikas to surrender. Pitsikas was besieged, but yet stood fast and
followed Papagos instructions to fight on.19
Although throughout 14 April the Anzac Corps had seen very little actual fighting, the lack of action had not prevented Wilson from worrying,
planning and preparing for his next withdrawal to the Thermopylae Line.
Contrary to his conclusions of the previous day, upon which his decision
to withdraw to the Thermopylae Line was ostensibly based, Wilson was
surprised on the morning of 14 April to learn that the 12th and 20th Greek
Divisions were both still successfully holding in their positions in the Klisoura and Siatista Passes to his northwest. So too, the Greek Calvary Division,
with its eastern regiment holding the Pisoderion Pass, was still successfully resisting the German advance. Wilson was saved however, from either
a need to reverse his decision to withdraw, or else an embarrassing retreat
without clear cause, by receipt of the news at midday that the Klisoura Pass
had fallen. His pre-existing desire and verbal instructions to fall back to
Thermopylae, thus far informed by an inaccurate picture of the state of the
defensive state of the CMFAS, now had concrete operational justification
albeit one that post-dated his decision. Wilson was, however, now more
convinced than ever that the Greek Army could no longer be relied on as
a fighting force.20
19Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, pp. 235-6; Papagos,
The Battle of Greece, 1940-1941, p. 382.
20H.M. Wilson, Report on Greek campaign, TNA WO201/53. UK War Narratives The
campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative, The Campaign in Greece, April
1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; Summary of operations of 5 NZ Infantry
284
chapter ten
A second factor confirming the need in Wilsons mind for the withdrawal during 14 April was the sharp intensification of German air attacks. Bad
weather had hampered air operations from 8-12 April, but 48 hours later
German aircraft operating from rough airfields in Prilep and Monastir were
much more active and many of W Forces forward positions on the OlympusAliakmon Line were bombed and strafed, as was Piraeus in Athens. German
Dorniers in flights of 30 were a powerful visual image. The message was
underscored when 18 of them bombed Elasson, where Anzac Corps headquarters was established. Overall material damage was slightless, perhaps,
than the impact such air operations had on Wilsons perceptions of the
imperative to retire south. Beyond these immediate operational concerns,
Wilson may also have been influenced by his earlier conclusions about the
residual fighting potential of the Greeks to his west, a continuing flow of
strategic intelligence reminding him of the 12th Armys order of battle and
intentions, and wider contextual considerations. In London, Dill was reporting to the British War Cabinet that the situation in Greece was serious.21
The Yugoslav government was requesting the British fly a high personage
and ranking members of the government to safety as the 2nd Yugoslav
Army, defending the region between the Iron Gates on the Danube and the
Drava River, sued for peace. Last, at this time the British began to increasingly fear the shadow of fifth column activity in the field (particularly in
reporting locations of troops and airfields). There was little evidence of
thisthe Luftwaffe garnered such information with ease and without the
help of collaborators. Nonetheless, the idea interacted with and reinforced
the idea that the Greeks were no longer trustworthy and that W Force must
look after itselfand this is exactly what Wilson intended.22
The first significant step in executing W Forces withdrawal to the Thermopylae Line, for which formal written orders had not yet been given, was
to establish a blocking force on its western flank to guard against a German
Brigade in Greece, 29 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156; Report by Brig. Hargest on
Greek Ops, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162; Report on operations in Greece, 4 Inf. Bde. ,
3 August 1941), ANZ ACGR 8479, PUTTICK7/1/1; McClymont, To Greece, p. 223.
21Cruickshank, Greece 194041, p. 147.
22Anzac Corps War Diary, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/9; G. Long, The 6th Division in
action, AWM PR88/72; Telegram, W Force to Wavell, 15 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124; Report
on operations in Greece, March-April 1941, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral H.T. BaillieGrohman (not yet catalogued); telegram, unknown in Belgrade to AOC Greece, 14 April
1941, TNA AIR 23/6371; A summary of the participation of the A.I.F. in the Lustreforce
Expedition in Greece March-April, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria,
pp. 80-1.
285
thrust towards Grevena. To this end, the 17th Australian Brigade had already
been ordered to be prepared for deployment to a position covering Kalabaka and the roads in this vicinity to both Grevena and through the Pindus
mountains. This Savige Force was also to assist what remained of the 1st
(UK) Armoured Brigade to his north near the Venetikos River. Brigadier
Saviges warning order became a reality at midday, 14 April. Savige was in
conference with Blamey at the Anzac Corps headquarters at the time when
Brigadier Rowell burst into the room with news that the Germans had
broken through the Greeks on our left.23 Blamey quietly turned to Savige
and told him that: it appears there is nothing else but for you to go to
Kalabaka.24
At this stage, however, Savige Force was a paper tiger. Seven cruiser tanks
of 3 RTR, which had been on loan to the New Zealand cavalry regiment,
joined the force in the afternoon, along with anti-tank and engineer detachments. The first two of Saviges infantry battalions, the 2/5th and 2/11th
Australian Battalions did not arrive at Larissa until 7.00 p.m. that night. The
leading elements of the former did not make it to the Kalabaka position
until 1.00 a.m. and the latter settled into position around an hour and a half
later. Saviges artillery did not begin to arrive until the following day. Meanwhile, Saviges other two battalions (2/6th and 2/7th Australian Battalions),
ordered to move to Larissa from Daphne Camp, got only as far as Orphana
thanks to road congestion, refugees and the desertion of Greek railway
operators.25
The new dawn of 15 April saw mounting concerns in Athens and at W
Force headquarters. To the north, the Yugoslav government requested a
general armistice with Germany as a precursor to capitulation. Late that
night General Simovi and most of his key government colleagues arrived
in Greece seeking sanctuary. News was also received that British forces in
the Western Desert had been pushed back to the Egyptian border, with
Rommel having recaptured all of Libya except for Tobruk. Meanwhile,
3DRL 2529 [12].
24Ibid. Anzac Corps Operation Instruction No. 9, 14 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/1;
E.D. Ranke, Notes of Operations 16 Bde Greece, AWM 27, 116/2.
25Narrative of Captain H.A. Dean, 2/6 Battalion, 5 July 1945, AWM 54, 234/2/16; notes
by Lieutenant General S. Savige on Australia in the War on 1939-45, AWM 3DRL 2529 [12];
diary of Major H.C.D. Marshall, 27 Battalion, AWM PR03/058; diary extracts from Private
F.J Gorman, 2/6 Battalion. AWM PR85/250; extract from 64 Medium Regiment War Diary,
14-15 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1492; H.M. Wilson, Report on Greek campaign, TNA WO
201/53; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 221-2; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 90.
286
chapter ten
throughout the day the Luftwaffe once again stepped up the intensity and
scope of its attacks. Piraeus harbour was by now wholly disorganised.
Smaller alternative harbours at Khalkis and Volos had also been bombed
and German mines placed across the Saronic Gulf. The pressure increased
on DAlbiacs small and dwindling RAF force. At first light on 15 April, after
the break-down of the Greek aerial observer system, Hurricanes at Larissa
and Blenheims at Niamata had been attacked on the ground. Two fighters
were lost while trying to take off. Every aircraft of the Blenheim squadron
was destroyed. DAlbiac, who was present for the Larissa raid, decided to
send his few remaining aircraft back to Athens. If he left them forward to
support Wilsons men they risked continuing strafing on the ground. As it
was, however, although safer near Athens they were now all but out of range
of the front line and W Forces road columns. Larissa was also bombed
throughout the day. The town was soon a mess of dust and smoke.26 Its
telephone exchange was broken and Greek train staff at Larissa packed up
and left. There was, according to Brigadier Parrington, a good deal of panic. 27 Elasson (and Blameys headquarters located there) was similarly attacked by the Luftwaffe, whose activities, the Allies knew, would only grow
in intensity from this point.28
Not all the action on 15 April, however, was in the air. Throughout the
day leading German units continued to run up against various Greek and
W Force positions across the front. To the west the continuing withdrawal of the EFAS in Albania was progressing, if slowly, without too much
ongoing Italian interference. Towards the centre of the EFAS line the 17th
Greek Division, which had suffered an Italian attack the previous day, managed to reach Kossina village by the evening of 15 April. Meanwhile, the
previously orderly retreat of the WMFAS was unravelling. During the morning the Adolf Hitler Regiment, although now in possession of the Klisoura
Pass, was contained by detachments of 13th Greek Division that had been
sent the previous day to blocking positions south of Lake Kastoria and
which provided, according to List, unexpectedly stubborn resistance.29
IWM, 76/118/2.
27Ibid.
28Entry for 15 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 158; Report on the
operations carried out by the Royal Air Force in Greece: November, 1940 to April, 1941,
15 August 1941, AIR 23/1196; cablegram, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to (Australian)
Prime Ministers Department, 16 April 1941, NAA A816, 19/301/1061; McClymont, To Greece,
5/17.
287
The fighting in the area of Maniaki (battle of Argos Orestikon) continued

until 5.15 p.m. when the division ordered a retreat to the western bank of
the Aliakmon. Elements of the Greek Cavalry Division in the vicinity of
Pisoderion Pass also held despite savage tank and air attack and, in the
words of the Germans, the hopelessness of their situation.30 In fact, from
midday, German infantry with armoured support attacked the pass four
times but was repulsed. Attacks against the Greek cavalrymen ceased at
7.00 p.m. and two hours later the defenders began to withdraw south.31
The front in this sector had not collapsed to anything like the extent
predicted by Wilson. In fact, Stumme was concerned enough to move the
German 73rd Division forward to protect the western flank of the 40th
Corps. By late afternoon, however, the Adolf Hitler Regiment had at last
broken through to the Kastoria-Grevena Roadeffectively blocking any
further WMFAS withdrawal using this route. The Greek Cavalry Division
and the 13th Greek Division, along with the 9th and 10th Greek divisions
which were in the area moving south, were forced to withdraw southwest
toward Metsovon using the mountain tracks of the Pindus Mountains. Cut
off from supplies, from this point most units within these formations began
to disintegrate. Further south, the 12th Greek Division, which had been
pushed from the Siatista Pass area, was re-assembling, as best it could, to
the west of Grevena. On the western flank of the WMFAS the 16th Greek
Division made it to Hairopouli village and Tsolakoglou hurriedly relocated
his headquarters to Kalabaka. Meanwhile the 2nd and 4th Companies of
the German 59th Motorcycle Battalion pushed forward to Lipsista but could
not prevent the blowing of Aliakmon Bridge near the village.32
30Wisshaupt, Der Balkanfeldzug der 12. Armee,, BA MA MSG 2/3963, p. 26; Major
L. Glombik, Intelligence Officer, 12th Army, The German Balkan Campaign, 23 June 1947,
AWM 54, 624/7/2.
31Anlage 1 zu Nr. 28/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, Landesverteidigungsministerium, Kriegsgeschichtliche Abt., Bericht. ber die Ttigkeit der 21. Inf. Brigade whrend der deutschgriechischen Kampfhandlungen., BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 7-9; Anl. 1 zu Nr. 12/42 geh.Mil. Att.
Athen, Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Westmazedonien (A.A.W.M.)
whrend der Kampfhandlungen mit den Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 4; Anl. 1 zu Nr.
21/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht der 13. Division ber ihre Kampfhandlungen gegen die
Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 4-7.
BA MA RH 67/1, p. 5; Anl. 1 zu Nr. 21/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht der 13. Division ber
ihre Kampfhandlungen gegen die Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 3; entry for 14 April 1941,
Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 9. Pz Division Begonnen: 11.7.40 Abgeschlossen: 18.5.1941., BA MA RH
27-9/2; Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Zentralmazedonien (T.S.K.M.)
im Kampfe gegen die Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 5-6; Extracts from 9 Pz Div War
288
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Further to the south of Greek-German clashes in the vicinity of Kastoria,

the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade continued to retreat south of Grevena, which
was not actually occupied by the Germans until nightfall, 15 April. So congested was the rough, narrow, winding road it followed with intermingled
Greek and Yugoslav motor traffic, civilians, horse and ox transport, that the
move to another blocking position on the south bank of the Venetikos
River took until evening to completein all around 16 hours to travel 19
kilometres. All the while the Luftwaffe mounted dive-bombing and
machine-gun attacks up and down the road leaving a shambles of bomb
craters and abandoned equipment in its wake. Even in his new position
Charrington was still unhappy and under-confident. The Venetikos River
was not an adequate barrier to infantry or tanks. His brigade was sighted
on a steep forward slope of a valley running down to the river which was
itself covered with scrub, which would make the prevention of German
infiltration an impossible task. Charrington reported to W Force that the
Greeks to his north were incapable of further resistancewhich was a very
dubious claim given the fight going on to his north and the fact that he had
been out of touch with them for more than 12 hours. Spirits in the brigade
were, according to one officer, not very high that night.33 We were all
really tired, he went on, and it looked as though the morrow was the end.34
At 11.00 p.m., however, Charrington informed his men that they would make
no stand at the Venetikos and that the next day he intended to withdraw
through Kalabaka.35
As the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade withdrew south, the 2/11th and 2/5th
Australian Battalions of Savige Force were preparing their position in the
Kalabaka area. Brigadier Savige had chosen a defensive sector four kilometres west of Kalabaka, with the upper Pinios River on his left flank, a stream
to the front and open country on the right that required defending in depth.
At 4.00 p.m., 15 April, Savige, dozing under an olive tree to catch up on some
Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; telegram, W Force to Wavell, 15 April 1941,
TNA WO 106/3124; Greek Campaign 1940-41, TNA WO 201/124; Long, Greece, Crete and
Syria, p. 94; McClymont, To Greece, p. 224; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and
Greek-German War, pp. 219-21.
33Letter, Barnett to anon. (his mother), 5 January 1942, IWM Papers of Major R.A.
Barnett, 102 AT Regt, 07/23/1.
34Letter, Barnett to anon. (his mother), 5 January 1942, IWM Papers of Major
R.A. Barnett, 102 AT Regt, 07/23/1. Letter, Boileau to anon., 6 May 1941, IWM, Papers of
Major R.R.C. Boileau, 1 Rangers, 77/149/1.
35Headquarters BTE War Diary, 15 April 1941, TNA WO 169/994B; entry for 16 April 1941,
Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 9. Pz Division Begonnen: 11.7.40 Abgeschlossen: 18.5.1941., BA MA RH
27-9/2; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 90; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 224-5, 232.
289
sleep, was woken with news that Wilson was walking across to his headquarters from a nearby road. Wilson had actually come at Kalabaka to speak
with Tsolakoglou but had failed to locate him. Savige was told that the
planned addition to his force of the 2/1st Field Regiment, the 2/6th, 2/7th,
and final company of the 2/5th Australian Battalions would no longer happen. With the 19th Australian Brigade, which was to withdraw that night
from hills west of Servia, these units would form a rearguard force at Domokos, a town in the hills north of Lamia, to cover W Forces withdrawal south.
Savige was also told by Wilson to keep enough transport close at hand to
be able to move his force at short notice. Kalabaka itself was by now descending into a scene of chaos of looting. Straggling Greek troops, aimlessly milling around with vague orders to fall back to Trikkala for resupply
from stores dumps that did not exist, were without food and took what
they needed from shops and houses. In return they were shot at by locals
who had already raided nearby weapons dumps. Saviges artillerymen,
fearful of fifth columnists, added to the confusion by shooting at suspected
spies flashing lights in the town and occupied caves nearby.36
Late in the afternoon, as heavy rain poured down, Savige met with a
British officer who was part of the liaison team at Headquarters WMFAS,
now situated in a two-storey stone house in a village two-and-a-half kilometres north of Kalabaka. They met again that night, this time along with
Lieutenant Colonel A.R. Barter, the senior British liaison officer on Tsolakoglous headquarters. Both British officers expressed little hope of
Tsolakoglou assisting in the clearance of Greek troops in Saviges area. Nonetheless, a meeting was arranged between Savige and Tsolakoglou for 9.00
a.m. the next day.37
To the east of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade and Savige Force, at Servia
Pass, the Germans continued to press the 4th NZ Brigades line. Frustrated
by an inability to build a bridge across the Aliakmon north of the pass during the night, before dawn on 15 April Sponeck ordered the two leading
companies of his group (still the 6th and 8th Companies, 2nd Battalion,
11th Infantry Regiment) across the river to find and silence the troublesome
36Copied extracts from 17 Australian Infantry Brigade War Diary, AWM 54, 253/4/2;
notes by Lieutenant General S. Savige on Australia in the War on 1939-45, AWM 3DRL 2529
[12]; E.D. Ranke Notes of Operations 17 Bde Greece, AWM 27, 116/2; McClymont, To Greece,
pp. 225-6; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 90-1.
3DRL 2529 [12]; extract from 64 Medium Regiment War Diary, 15 April 1941, TNA WO
169/1492; Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der Armeeabteilung von Zentralmazedonien (T.S.K.M.)
im Kampfe gegen die Deutschen., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 6.
290
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allied guns which had been causing such difficulties. Before dawn the two
companies gingerly waded across the river near the blown road bridge and
crept forward. A kilometre short of the Servia Pass, two Greek soldiers on
horseback were captured trying to escape, which strengthened the German
idea that the defenders were withdrawing. As the two German companies
edged forward, troops of the 19th NZ Battalion situated within the pass and
on the high ground on either side, allowed both to come right up into the
saddle at its crest. At this point, not long before dawn, the defenders initiated what amounted to an ambush at point blank range with small arms,
mortars and grenades. It was a fierce exchange of fire with the Germans
silhouetted by moonlight. As dawn broke the German companies found
themselves trapped. Allied artillery was soon added to the mix. German
soldiers began to run out of ammunition. The commander of the German
8th Company, for one, had the impression the enemy was firing accurately on every individual man who emerged from cover anywhere.38 Prisoners taken from these two companies later reported they were appalled
at the intensity of small arms fire they had faced.39 At the same time, dawn
also found the 1st and 3rd Companies of the 59th Motorcycle Battalion,
also of Sponeck Group and which had been following the 6th and 8th
Companies, also in a serious position. Only the fact the motorcyclists had
crossed the river later spared them a similar fate to the two leading German
infantry companies. The New Zealanders now pinned the German motorcyclists with withering fire in Servia village and just north of it.40
By 5.30 a.m. Sponeck had lost contact with all four of his leading companies and knew nothing of what was happening across the Aliakmon. At
9.00 a.m., therefore, he ordered the 1st Battalion, 11th German Infantry
Regiment, to cross the river the best it could and to support the German
companies engaged near the pass. His engineers, however, under constant
shelling, were still unable to construct a bridge over the river and a tank
38Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
39S.F. Rowell, The campaign in Greece, April 1941, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A)
[1-4].
40Entry for 14 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 9. Pz Division Begonnen: 11.7.40 Abgeschlossen: 18.5.1941., BA MA RH 27-9/2; signature, Schtzenregiment 11, Ia, 16 April 1941, to
9. Panzer-Division, Betr.: Bericht ber den Angriff auf die Stena Portas., BA MA RH 27-9/3,
pp. 3-5; W.R. Creswell, Battle of Servia Pass, northern Greece, 1950, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/153; 4 NZ Inf. Bde. Gp. Preliminary Report of Operations, E. Puttick, 30 April 1941,
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/146; letter, Bedding to Wards, 26 June 1956, ANZ ADQZ 18902,
WAII3/1/6; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April
1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; Notes on activities of 6 NZ Field Regiment in Greece,
28 Mar to 29 Apr 41, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/123.
291
was lost testing the current of the swift flowing water. The 1st Battalions
crossings thus took a long time and more pontoon boats, full of men, were
lost during the attempt. By late morning Sponeck was informed by stragglers of the ambush on the Servia saddle and the destruction of the 6th
and 8th Companies. At midday he swam the river himself to assess the
situation and reported his difficulties to Headquarters, 9th Armoured Division. For the rest of the day the Germans tried to silence the defending
artillery with Stuka dive-bombing attacks as the motorcycle troops still
pinned in the vicinity of Servia village were heavily shelled and sniped. The
Luftwaffe had little success, however, against what the 9th Armoured Division called fortress-like, dug-in positions.41 A counter-battery operation
was attempted but the limited range and availability of German guns undermined it. Continuing attempts at bridge building were similarly unsuccessful. By midday, expecting that the dive-bombing would have softened
the New Zealand positions, a small impromptu attack was again launched
on the pass, this time by elements of the German 1st Battalion, but was
easily repulsed at a cost of another 20-30 killed. This attempt was repeated
again at 5.45 p.m. with a similar result.42
Lieutenant General von Hubicki, commanding the German 9th Armoured Division, gave permission to Sponeck to withdraw both of his battered motorcycle companies from the vicinity of Servia village after dusk.
That night Stumme ordered Hubicki to mount a larger frontal attack on
the pass on 17 April. Hubicki, however, now knowing the country and the
state of the New Zealand defences, believed such an attack with what 9th
Armoured Division troops that could be in position by that time would be
pointless.43 He held a meeting with Stumme the next day and convinced
his superior to call it off. Sponeck lamented that neither German intelligence
42Signature, Schtzenregiment 11, Ia, 16 April 1941, to 9. Panzer-Division, Betr.: Bericht
ber den Angriff auf die Stena Portas., BA MA RH 27-9/3, p. 3; signature, Schtzenregiment
11, Ia, 16 April 1941, to 9. Panzer-Division, Betr.: Bericht ber den Angriff auf die Stena Portas., BA MA RH 27-9/3, pp. 4-5; E. Puttick, 4 NZ Inf. Bde. Gp. Preliminary Report of Operations, 30 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/146; HQ RAA Anzac Corps Summary of the
Operations of the Arty of the Anzac Corps in Greece, AWM 54, 75/4/3; W.R. Creswell,
Battle of Servia Pass, northern Greece, 1950, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/153; Notes on
activities of 6 NZ Field Regiment in Greece, 28 Mar to 29 Apr 41, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/123; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April
1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch,
Department of Internal Affairs, January 1950. AWM 67, 5/17; Playfair, The Mediterranean
and Middle East, Vol. 2, p. 90.
292
chapter ten
Figure 10.1:German prisoners captured after the action fought at Servia Pass on 15 April.
nor air reconnaissance had suggested that the Servia Pass was well-defended and that his orders for speed had forced a bold and disastrous attempt
to force it. Some of his fellow officers, however, were unforgiving. Richthofen
criticised Sponeck for leading his regiment lamely and so far to the rear.
The attackers, in Richthofens opinion, showed insufficient hardness as
they had been spoiled through quick successes and a soft enemy. Yet between them the German 6th and 8th Companies lost 79 and 111 men respectively killed, wounded or captured. This does not include losses of close
to 100 more from the two motorcycle companies and from the 1st and 2nd
Battalions, 11th Infantry Regiment, from poorly coordinated and supported
frontal attacks. Throughout the day two New Zealanders had been killed
and six wounded.44
44Hofmann, Oblt.u.Kompanie-Chef, 8./Schtz.Rgt.11, 17 April 1941, Bericht ber die
Kampfhandlungen der 8.Kp. am 14. und 15. April 1941., BA MA RH 27-9/3, pp. 1-3; signature,
Schtzenregiment 11, Ia, 16 April 1941, to 9. Panzer-Division, Betr.: Bericht ber den Angriff
auf die Stena Portas., BA MA RH 27-9/3, pp. 3, 6; entries for 15 and 16 April 1941, Richthofen
diary, BA MA N 671/7, pp. 159-60; Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary (Greek Campaign),
AWM 54, 534/2/27; diary of W.M. Marshall, KMARL, 1993.1351; 4 NZ Inf. Bde. Gp. Preliminary
Report of Operations, E. Puttick, 30 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/146; Battle of
293
To Veria
0
10 kilometres
5 miles
Kozani
To Siatista
Petrana
Sponeck Gp
9 Pz Div
on
a km
Ali
er
R iv
Velvendos
I/11
Inf Regt
Kerasia
Kranidhia
Kteni
Moskhokhori
II/11 Inf Regt

2 and 3 MC Coys
Servia
16 Aust Bde
withdrawn
15/16 April
Kastania
19 Bn
19 Aust Bde
withdrawn
15/16 April
Rimnion
Prosilion
18 Bn
Lava
1829
C/20
20 Bn
Livadion
Ferry
4 NZ Bde
1142
Embussing area
4 Bde, night
17/18 April
Mikrovalton
To Katerini
Dholikhi
To Karperon
1478
To Elasson
To Elasson
Map 10.1:The 4th NZ Brigade at Servia, 15 April 1941
Stumme realized that dislodging W Force from Servia Pass and crossing the
Aliakmon in its vicinity might be a tougher proposition than expected.
Stumme therefore decided, with Lists consent, to bypass the W Force
defences near Servia by sending Lieutenant General Gustav Fehns 5th
Servia Pass, northern Greece, W.R. Creswell, 1950, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/153; War for
the Passes, an extract from American Infantry Journal of October, 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643
3/42; 4 NZ Inf Bde Group The engagement at Servia, 9/18 April 41, 30 April 1941, AWM
3DRL 6643 1/44; letter, Bedding to Wards, 26 June 1956, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/6; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/139; comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of
Internal Affairs, January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; Despatches by Mr. R.T. Miller, NZEF Official
War Correspondent, ANZ ACHR 8632, FRASER-P4/1/2; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941,
pp. 237-8; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 87, 93.
294
chapter ten
Armoured Division (under Stummes command since April), to exploit the

breakthroughs made in the west by the Adolf Hitler Regiment, and advance
towards Lamia via Kozani-Grevena-Kalabaka. The only problem in this
regard was that after crossing the Aliakmon in the vicinity of Grevena the
5th Armoured Division would be forced to enter difficult terrain without
roads, but with plenty of ravines. Nevertheless, Stumme chose to go ahead
with this plan. During the late afternoon of 15 April Fehns advance guard
moved out with the mass of the division the following day.45
To the east, as a result of orders given the previous night by Headquarters
2nd Armoured division, during the early morning of 15 April the leading
elements of Battle Group 1 moved cautiously forward of the 5th NZ Brigade
positions. They were soon spotted in front of the 22nd NZ Battalion and a
quick bombardment of German vehicles and infantry in front of the battalion followed. Mortars and machine guns supporting the 28th (Maori)
Battalion also engaged the Germans who were apparently seeking protected routes by which to approach the New Zealand line, possibly trying
to by-pass demolitions. A small detachment of German motorcycle troops
pressed a quick attack against the 22nd NZ Battalion but they were easily
driven off by more machine-gun fire. At 8.00 a.m. the Maoris reported having repulsed five German tanks with mortar and rifle fire. Although these
tanks retired, more soon appeared and were engaged by artillery. German
guns began to reply from 4.30 p.m., but their fire was inaccurate due to
problem of crest clearance. During the afternoon fighting gradually spread
across the 5th NZ Brigades front, with the 23rd NZ Battalion in particular
pressed hard by parties of German infantry, but night fell without having
seen a large-scale coordinated German assault and the defenders lines held.
Nonetheless, Freyberg was anxious. The 22nd NZ Battalion had held the
attack on the main road, but he believed the 28th (Maori) Battalion on the
left had been temporarily surrounded and the 23rd NZ Battalion on the
right had run a constant risk of being outflanked. At one stage Freyberg
took a call from Brigadier Hargest informing him that both flank battalions
5/17; Campaign narrative of 2 New Zealand Division, I. Wards, New Zealand War History
Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1952, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [1]; Fighting in central and
southern Greece, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and General H. von Greif
fenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; letter, Bedding to Wards, 26 June 1956, ANZ ADQZ
18902, WAII3/1/6; War for the Passes, an extract from American Infantry Journal of October, 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643 3/42; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German
War, p. 211.
295
were lost and captured. Only at dawn the next day was contact re-established with them.46
Further east, to the right of the 5th NZ Brigade, the German 2nd Armoured Divisions Battle Group 2 pressed on during 15 April against the
21st NZ Battalions blocking position near Plantamon on the coastal pass.
Still under the impression that the terrain in the area was impenetrable to
German tanks, Freyberg asked Blamey during the morning to command
the 21st NZ Battalion directly, as his hands were full on his Servia-Olympus
front. By 11.00 a.m., soon after Blamey had agreed, advance elements of the
Battle Group 2 reached Pandeleimon. Difficult going, however, prevented
the main body of the group from advancing south of Katerini that day.
Nonetheless, in the vicinity of the Plantamon Tunnel shelling continued
by both sides throughout the day.47
German bombardment of the 21st NZ Battalion gradually increased to
6.00 p.m. when an attack by elements of the German 2nd Motorcycle Battalion was launched against the right and centre of Mackys line, strung out
along the ridgeline running to the sea. This initial attack was driven off but
by 7.00 p.m. German infantry were reported in a small village to the left
flank of the New Zealand battalion. A counter-attack was made in the darkness and the Germans were temporarily driven from this area. Lieutenant
Colonel Macky was, however, in a difficult situation. He had not had much
contact with Freyberg or Blamey and had no clear picture of what to do if
he could not hold off the further German attacks. At 8.00 p.m. German
tanks from the 1st Battalion (3rd Armoured Regiment), having rushed south,
had arrived on the scene and began to fire on the left of Mackys position
in support of a new attempt at encirclement by the 2nd Motorcycle
46Entry for 0.30 15 April 1941, 2. Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 Ia und Anlagen
1.1.41 14.6.41., BA MA RH 27-2/20, p. 33; Summary of operations of 5 NZ Infantry Brigade
in Greece, 29 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156; Summary of War Diary material for
22nd (NZ) Battalion, 12 January 1940 31 October 1943, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/160; correspondence (various, including interview transcripts) concerning the 22nd Battalion in
Greece, 22nd Battalion veterans to J.H. Henderson, 1950, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156; 23
NZ Bn, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162; letter, Dyer to Wards, 5 March 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18902,
WAII3/1/12; New Zealand Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105; History of the
2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/139; Despatches by Mr. R.T. Miller, NZEF Official War Correspondent, ANZ ACHR
8632, FRASER-P4/1/2; B. Freyberg, Detailed comment upon draft of Mr. Buckleys popular
history of the Greek Campaign, AWM 67, 5/17; comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History
Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; GOCs [Freybergs]
Diary (extracts), 2 January 2 September 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/5/42-43.
47Letters (various) from 21st (NZ) Battalion veterans to I.McL. Wards. ANZ ADQZ 18902,
WAII3/1/7; Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
296
chapter ten
Battalion in the vicinity of the castle. Meanwhile, in the centre of the New
Zealand line, light tanks advanced from where the earlier infantry attack
failed. At 8.16 p.m. a desperate Macky sent a message to Anzac Corps headquarters to the effect of enemy infantry and tanks massing opposite my
centre.48 Four minutes later he reported enemy attacking my centre and
shortly thereafter centre penetrated, position serious.49 The situation was
not, in fact, quite as desperate, as these German thrusts were ordered to
stop after dusk. Only a single German light tank probing the centre of the
21st NZ Battalions line had actually made it to the top of the ridge and then
it had retired when its supporting infantry failed to appear. During the day
every other vehicle in the German 3rd Armoured Regiments light troop
had shed its tracks. Further to the west, the German infantrymen trying to
encircle the New Zealanders were foiled by the difficult terrain at the foot
of the castle. Mackys position was, however, undeniably tenuous. Meanwhile, forward Battle Group 2 elements at Pandeleimon were reinforced in
the darkness by the 1st Battalion (304th Infantry Regiment). At the same
time the forward elements of the 6th Mountain Division began moving
high up round the eastern slopes of Mt Olympus, looking to bypass Pinios
Gorge altogether. Orders were also issued to the 8/800th Special Unit to
outflank Mackys battalion by sea by sailing up the Pinios River to capture
the bridge on the road to Larissa, but heavy swells caused the plan to be
cancelled. It was unlikely, in this context, that Mackys men could stave off
the next German push.50
Overall, the period 14-15 April had seen German troops placing everincreasing pressure on the Greek and Allied defences across the line. North
of Grevena the Adolf Hitler Regiment had at last broken through the Klisoura Pass, thus interfering with the withdrawal of the Greek WMFAS and
potentially threatening the left flank of W Force. At Servia an impromptu
and badly mounted German plan to rush the pass had been beaten back,
but the German force north of Servia, and the stream of traffic rolling south
6763(A) [1-4].
49Ibid.
50GOCs [Freybergs] Diary (extracts), 2 January 2 September 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906,
WAII8/5/42-43; letters (various) from 21st (NZ) Battalion veterans to I. McL. Wards. ANZ
ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/7; New Zealand Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105;
Extract of report by 3 Pz Regt (2 Pz Div), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from 18 Corps intelligence report, AWM 54, 534/2/27; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 241-2, 256-7;
McClymont, To Greece, p. 248; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 95; Blau, Invasion Balkans!,
p. 95.
297
towards it, were far from a spent force. Further east, the pressure was mounting at the Olympus Pass and on the 21st NZ Battalion above the Plantamon
Tunnel. Wilson had already decided to evacuate all of these positions in
favour of the Thermopylae Linethe question was, would W Force be able
to disengage in time and in good enough order to make a new stand far to
the south?
What were the most notable characteristics of the developments of 14
and 15 April? The skirmishes in the vicinity of Katerini, by the NZ cavalry
regiment, were designed to delay, not to stop, the German advance south
of the Aliakmon in that sector. So too, the actions at the Servia and Olympus Passes (and at Plantamon for that matter) were undertaken, from a
New Zealand perspective, within the context of a looming withdrawal to
Thermopylae. The defenders were not there to fight to the last; or to stop
any further German advance. Their orders were to hold only for so long as
a withdrawal could be arranged. When the order to fall back was eventually given, it may have come as a surprise to many private soldiersone
member of the 5th NZ Brigade recalled that no reason was given and it
came as a shock to us as it seemed we could have held that position indefinitelybut it was no surprise to their senior officers.51
Further west, Brigadier Charrington was leading his armoured brigade
progressively south from its earlier battle at Ptolemais without making any
further contact with the Germans, who were busy dealing with Greek positions with no option but to make their final stands. The British armoured
brigade did not stay to assist in the defence of Grevena as ordered by Papagos. One troop commander in 3 RTR noted: Ive been a rearguard or a
road block for two days and two nights, and I havent seen or heard a German since Amindaion.52 He went on to ask, what the devil are we running
away from?53 On a general level, according to the German 2nd Armoured
Division, the enemy to its front has not yet ventured to fight.54 Again,
W Forces actions during this phase of the campaign, from beginning to
end, represented delay and withdrawal, not defensive operations. This remains the correct context through which to interpret W Force action
throughout the campaign.
51Diaries of Private A.E. Lilly, KMARL, 1997.6.
Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; Crisp,
The gods were neutral, p. 157.
54Appendices to 2 Pz Div Admin Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
298
chapter ten
What of the supposed decisive effects of German armour in the period

14-15 April? The first thing to note here is that while the campaign might
have been moving at a rapid rate, there was nothing lightning about the
operations of the German 2nd Armoured Division (at Olympus and
Plantamon) or the 9th Armoured Division (at Servia) in this period. Rather, these powerful formations were held up for considerable time by terrain,
demolitions and delaying forces. Thus, when they met the W Force line it
was piecemeal and it was with vanguard and reconnaissance elementsnot
massed tanks. It was motorcyclists who were stopped in their tracks at the
Olympus Pass and it was the infantrymen and motorcyclists of Sponeck
Group who were so roughly handled by the 4th NZ Brigade at Servia. These
were all soldiers of their respective armoured divisionsbut they were not
armoured soldiers. They drove no tanks. This is too often forgotten when
authors discuss the operations of such divisions in Greece.55 Where German tanks were employed in this period it was with less than decisive results. The troop that attacked the 28th (Maori) Battalion at the Olympus
position were beaten off without undue concern. So too, terrain limited
the employment of all but light tanks in the failed 15 April assault against
the 21st NZ Battalion at Plantamon.56
The theme of remarkable Luftwaffe ineffectiveness also continued in
this period. As had been the case against the Greek frontier forts at the
Doiren-Nestos Line, the operational and tactical results obtained by
German bombing, included the dive-bombing of the dreaded Stukas,
were poor. Not one of the defending guns at Servia Pass during this period
was put out of action by the series of spectacular and nerve-wracking dive
bombing attacks against them, nor did ground strafing cause more than a
few casualties. To Sponecks disappointment such attacks failed markedly
to soften up the Servia position in any way. Such poor results contributed
in a significant way to Hubickis subsequent arguments to Stumme to call
off any further frontal attacks against the 4th NZ Brigade. Even the defenders described the dive-bombing at Servia as spectacular and impressive
55Mellenthin, for example, actually describes the action at Olympus as an armoured
battle. F.W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the
Second World War, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1956, pp. 33-7.
56Entry for 15 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 8 Generalkommando XVIII. Armeekorps,
Fhrungsabteilung Begonnen: 6.April 1941 Abgeschlossen: 2.Juni 1941, BA MA RH 24-18/75;
War for the Passes, an extract from American Infantry Journal of October, 1941, AWM
3DRL 6643 3/42; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to
April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139.
299
but singularly ineffective.57 Similarly, the Luftwaffe attack against the 5th
NZ Brigade at Olympus was remembered by one New Zealander as nerve
wracking the first time. The noise was terrific, what with bursting bombs
and machine-gun fire, and the screaming of the planes.58 The same soldier,
however, went on to note in his diary that: When the raid was over ... we
thought that they would have lost a lot of men, but actually I dont think
anyone was killed, and only one or two injured.59 The concentrated bombing of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade during its withdrawal was also ineffective. Luftwaffe attack against this formation neither prevented its
withdrawal, on constricted and slow-moving tracks, nor caused significant
casualties. Much more damage was done to Charringtons brigade during
its retreat by continuing mechanical failure. All of this was further evidence
that the material effects of German air attack in Greece against prepared
ground troops were negligible.60
Last, German numerical superiority was once again not a factor during
14-15 April, particularly in the skirmishes against the W Force line. Sponeck
Groups disastrous assault at Servia was led initially by two infantry companies, later supported by two more companies of German motorcycle
troops. Later in the day a second battalion entered the fray but it never
pressed a coordinated battalion-sized attack against defenders. The New
Zealanders at Servia Pass, therefore, faced attack by no more than four
infantry companies, without adequate heavy weapons, indirect and other
forms of fire support, at any one time. This piecemeal German effort was
pitched against a full New Zealand brigade group in well-prepared dug-in
positions, with efficient and effective artillery support. The same was true
at the Olympus Pass. Action in this sector began with a small German motorcycle detachment closing on the 22nd NZ Battalion. Subsequently a
troop of German tanks momentarily pressed the 28th (Maori) Battalion.
Later probing and attempts at German infiltration were uncoordinated and
by no means represented a large-scale attack. Even if the German 2nd Armoured Divisions Battle Group 1 at the Olympus Pass did attack with the
full weight of troops available to itand it did not as many of its units were
not in position or ready to fightthis would have represented a clash of
two brigade-sized groups. As it was the defenders were not even close to
574 NZ Inf Bde Group The engagement at Servia, 9/18 April 41, 30 April 1941, AWM
3DRL 6643 1/44.
59Ibid.
60G. Long, The 6th Division in action, AWM PR88/72.
300
chapter ten
being matched, let alone outnumbered. The closest the Germans came to
numerical equivalence in this period was at Plantamon. Here, Mackys
battalion was initially pressured by elements (not the whole) of the German
2nd Motorcycle Battalion. Later in the day he was attacked again by this
battalion, supported by tank fire (and a limited light tank thrust up to the
centre of Plantamon ridge.) Such actions represented something close to
numerical parity between defender and attacker.
Meanwhile, more was happening for W Force than that which was unfolding at the front line in the period 14-15 April. Back at W Force and Anzac
Corps headquarters considerable energy was being spent trying to organise
not how to stop the German advance, but rather how to outrun it.
allied withdrawal planning & operations (15-16 april) 301
Chapter Eleven
Allied Withdrawal Planning & Operations (15-16 April)

As various Greek formations tried desperately to fend off Italian pressure
in Albania and to stem the tide of the German breakthrough to the north
of Grevena, and while a number of W Force units jostled with German
probes against the passes of the Olympus-Aliakmon Line, Wilsons attention was divided. An ever-increasing portion of his time and energy was
taken by the ongoing planning for the imminent withdrawal of British and
Dominion troops to the Thermopylae Line, far to the south. It would be a
significant and dangerous operation, and one that at a stroke would effectively end British-Greek battlefield collaboration. Not that Wilson was
overly concerned about this particular issue; in fact the idea of W Force
self-reliance was one aspect of the Thermopylae position that had attracted him to the idea in the first place. Indeed, it was indicative of Wilsons
abandonment of any further thought of cooperation with the Greeks that
he instructed Blamey to make every possible effort to ensure that GK
[Greek] forces do not withdraw on routes available to Imperial forces, and
they do not in any way whatsoever hinder the withdrawal.1 Even so, assuming a clean break with the Germans along the Aliakmon-Olympus Line was
possible (and that was no guarantee), to reach the Thermopylae Line
W Force had to extricate itself from a front (from Kalabaka to the sea) of
some 100 kilometres, then move over more than 160 kilometres of dubious
roads to the south. British and Dominion units would have to link up with
transport and drive right across the exposed plain of Thessaly. Moreover,
all routes, those on both sides of Mt Olympus, from Servia, and the lateral
road from Kalabaka, converged on Larissa. If Larissa fell before forward
W Force units were clear, then they would be cut off. Further south at Lamia
withdrawing W Force troops would again be forced to converge, and nothing could be done to protect these choke points from air attack. However,
with ULTRA decrypts providing a clear indication that the Germans
1Force HQ Operation Order No. 12, 15 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/10.
302
chapter eleven
intended to rush armour south of Olympus as soon as possible, such risks

were accepted and the decision confirmed.2
At 9.50 a.m., 15 April, Wilson finally issued formal written orders for the
retreat to Thermopylaetwo days after the decision had effectively been
made. To cover the move four rearguard groups were to be organised (and
some were already moving). These rearguards were the 1st (UK) Armoured
Brigade, to operate in the Grevena Sector; Brigadier Saviges force in the
Kalabaka area; the 6th NZ Brigade in the vicinity of Elasson; and a newly
formed Lee Force at Domokos (consisting primarily of the 19th Australian
Brigade reinforced by the 2/6th and 2/7th Australian Battalions which had
previously been en route to join Savige at Kalabaka). Together these four
positions would cover the major road and rail routes to Larissa. W Force
engineers were to impose maximum demolitions on Greek roads to delay
the advancing Germans. Blamey was given responsibility for the actual
conduct of the withdrawal which, according to Brigadier Rowell at least,
was the last time Wilsons headquarters ever came into the picture as far
as running the W Force campaign in Greece was concerned.3
Blamey had actually issued his own written orders almost an hour before
Wilson, which provided much of the technical detail and timings for the
withdrawal. The move would occur in two phases. The first was to establish
Wilsons four rearguard positions and was to be complete by 8.00 a.m. the
following morning. As part of these moves Blamey ordered the 16th Australian Brigade, at last arriving into position between the 4th and 5th NZ
Brigades after marching south from Veria since 12 April, to march out again
that night to the south side of Servia prior to embussing for Zarkos. This
was to prove a continuing trial of endurance for Brigadier Allens men. Most
had been climbing with little rest for three days since vacating the Veria
Pass, with only a greatcoat and single blanket with which to sleep, often in
up to 60 centimetres of snow on steep mountain ravines. This new move
meant another 900 metre descent from the Servia position and a climb up
the other side. That march near killed us, one veteran later wrote, as the
mountain seemed to have no top.4 Once at Zarkos this brigade would form
2Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, pp. 90-91; Hinsley, British Intelligence in
the Second World War, p. 409; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 81.
6763(A) [1-4]; Anzac Corps War Diary, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/9; 6 Inf. Bde O.O. 2, 16
April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/1658; War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658;
ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139.
4Letter, Lieutenant K.L Kesteven, 2/4 Battalion, 17 May 1941, AWM 54, 234/2/17.

a fifth rearguard force which would block the Trikkala-Larissa Road and
cover the subsequent withdrawals of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade from
south of Grevena and Saviges force from Kalabaka.5
Phase two of the planned W Force withdrawal was to begin once the
rearguards were in position. Then, on the night of 17-18 April (with exact
timings subject to the ability of various formations to disengage from any
German forces in contact) the 5th NZ Brigade at Olympus, the 4th NZ
Brigade at Servia and Saviges force at Kalabaka would all retreat through
the rearguards to the Thermopylae Line. The following night the 6th NZ
Brigade at Elasson, the 16th Australian Brigade at Zarkos, and the 21st NZ
Battalion at Plantamon tunnel on the east coast, would similarly withdraw.
Last, the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade would retreat across the Thessaly Plain
during daylight hours on 19 April. Charringtons brigade would, in turn, be
covered by Lee Force at Domokos. All British and Dominion troops were
to be carried in trucks. The New Zealanders were to follow the road south
from their divisional position to Volos, and then move along the coast to
Lamia, and through the coastal pass to Thermopylae on the east of the new
line. The 6th Australian Division, on the other hand, was to withdraw along
the main highway through Pharsala and Domokos to Lamia and from there
to Brallos Pass to the west of Thermopylae.6
Behind the scenes, as planning for the withdrawal of W Force to the
Thermopylae Line was being finalised, another planning effortfor the
evacuation of British and Dominion troops from Greecewas continuing.
During the day Rear Admiral Turle sent a message to Admiral Cunningham
that such an evacuation would likely be necessary within a few days.7
Phase one W Force withdrawals to the Thermopylae Line had, in fact,
begun well before Blamey or Wilsons formal orders were released.
The 6th NZ Brigade had begun its move to the vicinity of Elasson late the
5Correspondence, narrative and draft notes (various) concerning the activities of the
26th (NZ) Battalion in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/172; McClymont, To Greece,
pp. 226-7; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 85.
6In the original scheme the line was to be extended southwest of Brallos but a lack of
troops and time prevented the execution of this part of the plan. HQ RAA Anzac Corps
Summary of the Operations of the Arty of the Anzac Corps in Greece, AWM 54, 75/4/3;
War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658; UK War Narratives The campaign
in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ
ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; McClymont, To Greece, p. 228.
1942, TNA WO 106/3120; Anzac Corps Operational Order No. 1, 15 April 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/30; War Diary HQ 1 Aust Corps Campaign in Greece, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/1; Long,
304
chapter eleven
A li a
NZ Div Cav positions
km
on
River
Vateron Kozani
Siatista
Metamorfosis
1 UK Armd Bde Planned
rearguard Greek positions
Kteni
19 Aust Bde to
withdraw
15 April
Grevena
Ve
n
Riv etik
er os
1 UK Armd
Bde
k
lia
on
r
ive
Katerini
16 Aust Bde starts

withdrawal
Servia
15 April
Rimnion
4 NZ Bde to withdraw
night 17/18 April
Saviges Force (planned) to withdraw

to Zarkos position night 17/18 April,
rear party to delay 18 April
Kalabaka
Ayios Dimitrios
AEGEAN
Kokkinoplos
SEA
2917 Mt Olympus
Domenikon
Milogousta
Platamon
21 Bn
NZ Div Cav patrols after

withdrawal from
Deskati Aliakmon positions
Karperon
5 NZ Bde to
withdraw night
17/18 April
Mega Elevderokhorion
os
Pini rge
Elasson
Go
Tempe
Gonnos
6 NZ Bde to be in
position night 15/16 April
to withdraw night 18/19 April
Allens Force
assembles 16 April
Tirnavos
Damasi
Pinios River
Pi n i o
Zarkos
Sin
Thomai
Ri
er
Trikkala
Rear position
16 Aust Bde
(one Bn by first
light 16 April)
Larissa
Nikina
Withdrawal route
for all 6 Aust Div units
Larissa to Brallos
Withdrawal
route for all
NZ Div units
Larissa to Molos
Velestinon
Pharsala
Almiros
Domokos
Lees Force
Spe
rkh
0
0
20 kilometres
10 miles
ios
Lamia
Rive
Stylis
6 Aust Div
route
Molos
NZ Div route
Map 11.1:The planned withdrawal from Thermopylae, 14-18 April 1941
Lake Voiviis
Volos

previous night. Next, in the early afternoon of 15 April the 19th Australian
Brigade began its withdrawal back south of the Aliakmon across a hastily
constructed bridge spanning 40 metres of deep, fast-flowing river. Despite
having to recall the widely dispersed companies of the 2/4th and 2/8th
Australian Battalions, the brigade managed to concentrate and begin its
march south only to discover that the makeshift bridge could not carry
vehicles. Engine blocks were smashed with hammers and gunners threw
their breech-blocks into the river. A battery of eleven invaluable anti-tank
guns was abandoned, along with wireless equipment that could not be
carried. A company of Australian machine gunners, who had laboured to
manhandle their guns and 90,000 rounds of ammunition into the 19th
Brigade position the previous day, marched out again without their weapons and without firing a shot. All infantrymen, but for one delayed company, had made the crossing by 1.00 a.m. the next morning.8
During the night of 15 April both Blamey and Brigadier Rowell became
convinced that an amendment to the corps withdrawal plan was required
as further messages of distress from the 21st NZ Battalion in the Plantamon
area continued to arrive. Rowell sent a message to Macky to hold on to the
last and that a senior officer was on his way to assist and advise. Next, with
the threat to the western flank now understood to be a little less pressing
than some of Brigadier Charringtons earlier reports had implied, Blamey
decided to dispense with the Zarkos rearguard position. Instead, the 16th
Australian Brigade would be used to reinforce the 21st NZ Battalion and
secure the right flank of the corps. After these arrangements had been set
in motion, Blamey received a message from Freyberg stating that Macky
had contacted his headquarters to inform him that the 21st NZ Battalion
had been forced to withdraw, and that its position was serious. Radio
contact with Macky was then lost.9
8One company missing from the 2/4th Australian Battalion was lost en route to the
bridge in the dark after a guide left his post. It eventually crossed under its own steam using
a small row-boat the next day and found its way to the 2/3rd Australian Field Regiments
position. Report on operations of 6th Australian Division in Greece, Major General
I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34; Report on operations of 2/1 Aust. M.G. Battalion
in Greece, Lieutenant Colonel Gooch, 9 July 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/17; Chronology of Operations, HQ RAA 6 Div Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; Correspondence, narrative and draft
notes (various) concerning the activities of the 26th (NZ) Battalion in Greece, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/172; War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658; Long, Greece, Crete
and Syria, p. 84; McClymont, To Greece, p. 223.
[1-4].
306
chapter eleven
Figure 11.1:A section of the town of Elasson, not far from the 6th NZ Brigades rearguard position, under heavy bomb attack by German aircraft. (Source: Australian War
Memorial: 067946)
The morning of 16 April broke with a red sunrise and a cloudy sky. From
around 9.00 a.m. it began to rain. Throughout the morning the situation
for the Greek EFAS in Albania, trying to withdraw on the far left of the Allied line, deteriorated rapidly. The 1st Greek Corps, west of the Aoos River,
had not yet begun any substantial move south as it was waiting for 2nd
Greek Corps withdrawal to finish. Far more concerning, however, was the
continuing decline in discipline and morale throughout the EFAS. Cases
of insubordination and desertion mounted. The previous day Papagos had
been forced to make a plea to his commanders in Albania to restore discipline and carry on the fight. Pitsikas called a meeting of his EFAS corps
commanders and Tsolakoglou, after which their views were delivered to
Papagos by the Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the EFAS, Colonel Theodoros
Grigoropoulos, who arrived at General Headquarters in Athens at 7.00 p.m.
The note he carried stated:
The situation of the Army from the aspect of morale and discipline is
extremely crucial. It is getting worse every moment The corps leaders

Kozani
Petrana
19 Bde, 13 April
Velvendos
16 Aust Bde
13/15 April
Kerasia
Kteni
1866
2/4 Bn
2/8 Bn
Moskhokhori
Servia
Kastania
26 Bn
Rimnion
Ferry
5 NZ
Bde
2/2 Bn
16 Bde
withdrawn
15/16 April
4 NZ Bde
Skotina
1643
2/1 Bn
Ayios
Dimitrios
Livadhion
19 Aust Bde 2/2 and Mikrovalton

withdrawn 2/3 Fd Regts
15/16 April
Dholikhi
1478
Riv
on
km
a
i
l
A
Karperon
er
Elati (Louzane)
Deskati
1093
NZ Div Cav
Elasson
0
0
6 NZ Bde
10 kilometres
5 miles
Domenikon
Milogousta
Map 11.2:The withdrawal of the 16th and 19th Australian Brigades, 15-16 April 1941
painfully foresee that we will not reach the final area in time. The Army
would have been disintegrated The causes of this situation are fatigue,
the occupation of Greek territories and the fear of being captured by the
Italians We believe that further resistance is impossible. An eventual
dispersion of the Army will create internal disorder and brigand bands with
indescribable disasters for the country. The spectre of dispersion appears
evident in those units which contain soldiers who come from territories
that have been occupied by the enemy, such as the XV, the XVII, the VI
Division 10
308
chapter eleven
This message was followed, on same evening, by an encrypted message

from Pitsikas to Papagos stressing the dire need for political intervention.11
The reply from Athens, after successive meetings between Papagos and
Grigoropoulos, was that the government could not countenance surrender
since British troops were still fighting. Moreover, it was only by fulfilling
alliance obligations to the full that Greece would ensure British support
after the war. Late that evening Grigoropoulos reported back to Pitsikas by
phone of the decisions reached. Pitsikas subsequently issued orders that
night to the 1st Greek Corps, the 2nd Greek Corps and the Borova Division
Group to continue the withdrawal, while stressing the need to maintain
cohesion.12
As instructed, the 1st Greek Corps withdrew during the night of 16 April
along the line Argyrokastro-Kakavia-Zitsa, without interference from the
Italians. Three days later it had, despite earlier dire predictions, successfully moved to occupy its designated final area basically along the GreekAlbanian border from Konispolis to Drimades. So too, over the same
period the 2nd Greek Corps withdrew without serious Italian meddling
but with ever-increasing rates of desertion and insubordination. By 20 April
it too, however, had made it to its designated position south of the Aoos to
the right flank of the 1st Greek Corps. Along the way both corps had endured
almost constant Luftwaffe attack. All towns, roads, railways and large buildings in Yannina, Arta, Preveza and Agrinion were devastated in a German
attempt to disrupt the ongoing retreats.13
Things did not go so smoothly for the Borova Division Group (the 1st
and 16th Greek Divisions) which was holding a blocking position at the
junction of the EFAS and WMFAS. These formations were beginning a
withdrawal from previous positions in Kiafe Kiarit area south to Borova
when, on the morning of 16 April, the 1st Greek Division found itself under
attack from troops of the Italian 11th Army approaching from the north.
The attack lasted all day but the Greek line held, despite serious desertion
which in many units exceeded 50 per cent of their previous strength. The
Italians considered the entire Greek front now to be in crisis, yet during
the night the 1st Greek Division managed to extract itself to the area of
Barbasi village, while the 16th Greek Division withdrew to Borova. The
11Ibid., pp. 222-3.
12Ibid.
13Ibid., p. 223; Anlage 1 zu Nr. 20/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die Operationen
der Armeeabteilung von Ost Makedonien (A.A.O.M.) whrend des deutsch-griechischen
Krieges vom 1941, BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 1 -19; Casson, Greece Against the Axis, p. 163; Wilson,
Eight Years Overseas, p. 91.

following day the 1st Greek Division moved further south to Koritza to regroup while at the same time the 16th Greek Division came under serious
Italian air and land attack at Borova. Again, however, the Greek line held.
By the night of 20 April both divisions had withdrawn to the vicinity of
Konitsa. Such withdrawals, under the circumstances, were a credit to both
formations.14
The main point of developing German effort on 16 April, however, was
further east. With his western flank becoming secured by the withdrawal
of the EFAS and the steady advance of the Italians, List pressed on with his
scheme to encircle W Force. With further attacks against the Servia Pass
considered pointless, throughout the day preparations hastened to rush
the 5th Armoured Division through Siatista Pass, as the new spearhead for
a push through Kalabaka to Larissa, continued.15 Also during the day elements of the 59th Motorcycle Battalion, from the German 9th Armoured
Division, reached Grevena and made contact with troops from the Adolf
Hitler Regiment in this area. At about 7.30 p.m. an advance guard from the
5th Armoured Division passed through Kozani, and took these motorcyclists
under command.16
Meanwhile, new plans were developed for the Adolf Hitler Regiment,
concentrated in the Kastoria area, to be relieved by the German 73rd Division and rushed south through the 9th Armoured Divisions reconnaissance
battalion to support the 5th Armoured Divisions advance with a thrust of
its own via Grevena to Deskati, and then to Elasson with the object of getting behind the Servia position. Luckily for W Force both operations required time to arrange. As it eventuated, Dietrichs regiment was severely
slowed by demolitions and rain and was unable to execute its planned
manoeuvre to Servia. Nonetheless, by 6.00 p.m. it had moved to seal the
Kastoria-Grevena Road at Argos Orestikon, cutting off any further organised
withdrawal by the WMFAS (by now renamed as the 3rd Greek Corps and
placed under Pitsikas direct command) southwards. As directed the previous day, what remained of Tsolakoglous divisions, by small group and unit,
began a long withdrawal west along the tracks leading into the Pindus
Mountains. Cut off and without rations, many units began to dissolve. A
proportion of soldiers from western Macedonia, scattered in that direction,
partly also in the direction of Epirus. The remnant of the CMFASs 12th and
534/5/25; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, pp. 223-4.
310
chapter eleven
20th Greek Divisions, now under Tsolakoglous command, limped through

Saviges defensive position near Kalabaka. The German capture of the upper Aliakmon valley and the cutting of Tsolakoglous line of retreat ended
any lingering Greek hopes of a new Olympus-Venetikos Line, as the 3rd
Greek Corps troops could no longer hope to re-deployed fast enough to
man it.
With no knowledge of the increasingly desperate circumstances faced
by the 3rd Greek Corps to his north, on morning of 16 April Brigadier Savige met with Tsolakoglou at his headquarters in order to solve what was,
from his perspective, the pressing issue of crowding in his defensive area.
Tsolakoglou promised to issue orders to clear Greek troops immediately
and agreed to meet Savige again at 2.00 p.m. that day to finalise details.17
Saviges meeting with Tsolakoglou and the subsequent withdrawal of
Headquarters 3rd Greek Corps were not the only important developments
in this sector on 15 April. The 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade was having difficulties of its own as it struggled south. Although low clouds and rain
prevented serious Luftwaffe attack, the morning was a nightmare for Charringtons troops of slow and dangerous movement through bomb holes,
mud and washouts south from the Venetikos River. No words can describe
it, wrote a member of the brigade, we slid and we slithered; lorries sank
in the mud up to their axles; in places we had to fell trees and nearly remake the road; we heaved and we pushed; we dug tracks out of the mud ...
I never want to see, or smell, anything like it again.18 The 1st (UK) Armoured
Brigade was strung out at this stage to almost 32 kilometres and some units
moved at a rate of around three kilometres per hour.19 How we got over
that road, mused Major Boileau of the 1st Rangers, I do not understand.20
In the afternoon Savige made first contact with Charringtons brigade
as its leading elements passed back through his position en route to
Larissa. Savige was immediately concerned that Charrington might not
have blown the bridge over the Venetikos and despatched a detachment
17Diary entry for 16 April 1941, S. Savige, AWM 3DRL 2529, 20. Probably influenced by
Tsolakoglous later role as the head of a Greek Quisling government, Savige subsequently
embellished his account of this meeting. See Notes by Lieutenant General S. Savige on
Australia in the War on 1939-45, AWM 3DRL 2529 [12].
18Letter, Barnett to Anon. (his mother), 5 January 1942, IWM Papers of Major R.A.
Barnett, 102 AT Regt, 07/23/1.
19War Diary of 2 RHA, 16 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1427; Chronology of operations, 17
Aust Inf Bde Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; entry for 16 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA
N 671/7, p. 161; McClymont, To Greece, p. 232; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 273, 286.
20Letter, Boileau to Anon., 6 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Major R.R.C. Boileau, 1 Rangers,
77/149/1.

of sappers to check. He was correct and the bridge was blown late on 16
April, as German columns passed through Grevena. Saviges task was further
complicated at midday when he received word that the bridge on the Larissa-Kalabaka road had been accidentally demolishedleaving now but
a single route and a single bridge available for his eventual withdrawal. At
9.00 p.m. two officers from Blameys headquarters arrived with instructions
that Savige must hold his position until midnight of 18-19 April, and that
the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade would stay to cover his subsequent withdrawal, with the senior of the two brigadiers to command the combined
force. A written order to this effect was produced by Anzac Corps headquarters at 11.55 p.m., 16 April, although it did not make it to Savige until
12.30 p.m. the following day.21
The problem for Savige was that Brigadier Charrington believed he had
already been ordered, via an earlier visit of his Brigade Major to Anzac
Corps headquarters, to withdraw into a reserve position behind the Thermopylae Line at Atalandiand he intended to comply. Charrington was
determined to get his brigade south, despite the fact that the German threat
to Grevena had not developed as seriously or quickly as Charrington assumed. The 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade did not, in fact, make contact with
any Germans at any time after leaving the Kozani Valley. An official report
later suggested its somewhat precipitate withdrawal may have been due
to the effects of heavy dive bombing and the many rumours of enemy
progress ...22 Even Wilson reflected that the situation for the Charringtons
brigade was never as critical as was imagined.23 It was noteworthy that
German reports later spoke of stubborn Greek resistance at the Venetikos
Bridgethe area where Charrington had previously been ordered to hold
well after the armoured brigade had departed. Nonetheless, during afternoon and through the night the rear echelon vehicles of the 1st (UK)
Armoured Brigade were already passing through Kalabaka. The net result
was that Savige and Charrington were set on a collision course. The former
expected the armoured brigade to stay, but the latter was on his way to
Thermopylae.24
[1-4]; Notes on Engineer Operations in Greece, April 1941, 14 June 1941, AWM 54, 313/4/52.
22Report on operations in Greece, March-April 1941, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral
H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet catalogued).
Department, 18 April 1941, NAA A5954, 528/1; notes by Lieutenant General S. Savige on
Australia in the War on 1939-45, AWM 3DRL 2529 [12]; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria,
pp. 103, 128.
312
chapter eleven
Moving further east across the front on 15 April, after the unsuccessful
attacks of the previous day Stummes 40th Corps made no further attempt
on the Servia Pass on 16 Aprilalthough artillery and aerial bombardment
continued. A German patrol of around forty men had managed to establish
itself on the heights north of Prosilion during the previous night, but it was
ejected early in the morning by a two-platoon attack from the 19th and 20th
NZ Battalions. Meanwhile, under the German barrage, throughout the day
the New Zealanders in the vicinity of the pass began to move to their assigned rearguard positions in preparation for the main withdrawal to the
Thermopylae Line. Their supporting Australian artillery also began to withdraw in the afternoon; one regiment to Zarkos, and another back to Elasson
to support the 6th NZ Brigade in its rearguard position (after losing a gun
which fell over a cliff during the zigzag drive on wet and slippery tracks).
The 20th NZ Battalion on the left was withdrawn to a position astride the
road at Lava to cover the retirement of the rest of the 4th NZ Brigade the
following night. The unit lost two carriers, a water truck and all of its motorcycles over cliffs during these perilous movements.25
Boehmes 18th Corps was much more determined to force W Force troops
from their defensive positions at the Olympus Pass during 16 April than
were Stummes troops at Servia. During the previous night the men of 22nd
NZ Battalion manning their forward posts astride the pass road heard Germans calling out such phrases as: Youll have to do better than that, in
order to disguise wire-cutting and mine lifting activities.26 Soon after dawn
this battalion was attacked lightly by German infantry from Battle Group
25Schmalz, Abteilung Ia, Kradschtzenbataillon 59, 25 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber
den Einsatz der 1. und 3. Kompanie beim Kampf um Servia vom 15. bis 18.4.1, BA MA RH
39/699, p. 3; Report on operations in Greece, 4 Inf. Bde. , 30 April 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476,
PUTTICK7/1/1; W.R. Creswell, Battle of Servia Pass, northern Greece, 1950, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/153; Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27;
GOCs [Freybergs] Diary (extracts), 2 January 2 September 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906,
WAII8/5/42-43; New Zealand Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105; correspondence (various) concerning the 20th Battalion in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/155;
ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; 4 NZ Inf Bde Group The engagement at Servia, 9/18 April 41, 30
April 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643 1/44; Anzac Corps Operations Instruction No. 1, 16 April 1941,
AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/1; Report on operations of 6th Australian Division in Greece, Major
General I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34.
Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; comments
by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, January 1950,
AWM 67, 5/17.

1, supported by the reinforced battalion-sized Baacke Group from the German 72nd Division. (The Baacke Group had previously been allocated as
the 18th Corps western flank guard and linking unit with the Sponeck
Group in the vicinity of Servia.) This initial probe was repulsed with mortar and artillery fire, although under the cover of the attack the Germans
brought forward their own mortars and infantry guns which quickly proved
a headache for the defenders. Moreover, as the dust settled both the 22nd
NZ and 28th (Maori) Battalions could now clearly see German vehicles
crowding the road to their north, all the way back to Katerini some 23 kilometres distant. The first five kilometres seemed to consist of tanks, armoured carriers and motorcycles. At 8.00 a.m. the leading German columns
advanced swiftly only to be caught in a bottleneck north of the pass and
halted by accurate and intense New Zealand artillery fire. By 9.00 a.m. the
22nd NZ Battalion reported at least 10 German vehicles and a tank destroyed.
Shortly afterwards another tank and ammunition lorry were ablaze. Nonetheless, German tanks worked as mobile pillboxes, peppering forward with
infantry detachments as close as 350 metres to the forward 5th NZ Brigade
positions. Again, however, they were driven back by artillery and mortars.27
The Germans to the north of the Olympus Pass now modified their plan.
With the main body of Battle Group 1 halted by artillery, the lead elements
of the Baacke Group were ordered to flank the position from the east, while
the 2nd Battalion (2nd Infantry Regiment) (from Battle Group 1) skirted
the defenders to the west. From 10.00 a.m. until 3.00 p.m. observation
in the vicinity of the pass was severely restricted due to rain and mist. When
the weather cleared the 28th (Maori) Battalion on the western flank watched
in the dim light as German infantry poured ominously into the deep Mavroneri ravine, through which ran the road to Skoteina, forward of their
left flank. As the ground fell away steeply in front of the Maoris, their defending fields of fire were as close as 20-30 metres. In the murky semidarkness the 7th and 9th Companies (2nd Battalion) suddenly swarmed
27Entry for 15 and 16 April 1941, 2. Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 Ia und Anlagen
1.1.41 14.6.41., BA MA RH 27-2/20, pp. 33-6; Summary of War Diary material for 22nd (NZ)
Battalion, 12 January 1940 31 October 1943, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/160; correspondence
(various, including interview transcripts) concerning the 22nd Battalion in Greece, 22nd
Battalion veterans to J.H. Henderson, 1950, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156; letter, Dyer to
Wards, 5 March 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/12; Report by Brig. Hargest on Greek Ops,
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162; Summary of operations of 5 NZ Infantry Brigade in Greece,
29 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156; comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History
Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, January 1950. AWM 67, 5/17; Long, Greece, Crete
and Syria, p. 100; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 268-71.
314
chapter eleven
out of the ravine along the Skoteina Road. They were fired at point-blank
range by the defenders and were thrown back. German machine guns and
mortars then began to pelt the Maoris forward positions from across the
ravine. Under this cover the two German companies again rushed across
the road and headed straight up the hillside. The New Zealanders fired
desperately but their barbed wire was cut and the attackers overwhelmed
their forward-most posts. The Maoris, however, put in fierce local counterattacks which forced the Germans to filter back down into the ravine once
againalthough there they remained dangerously placed to hamper the
planned withdrawal of the battalion that night.28
Although not quite so desperate a fight, the situation was similar on the
5th NZ Brigades eastern flank throughout the day as the forward positions
of the 23rd NZ Battalion, shrouded in mist, repulsed a number of attempts
by the 9th and 11th Cycle Companies (Baacke Group) to try and to manoeuvre around its flank. In the late afternoon the weather worsened with more
mist and rain, under the cover of which the Baacke Group reinforced its
leading companies. Poor visibility further assisted the Germans to penetrate
in areas where the defenders were thin on the ground on this flank and by
7.00 p.m. the 23rd NZ Battalion reported the infiltration of its forward positions. Under mounting pressure Brigadier Hargest acted decisively and
pushed the scheduled withdrawal timings for the brigade forward by two
hours. As the 28th (Maori) Battalion withdrew it was again attacked and
had to stop and fight as it broke awaya difficult proposition in thick forest surrounded by mist. The Maoris were reinforced, however, and the flank
stabilised, although the battalion was by now 90 minutes behind schedule.
It was also forced to climb in the darkness over greasy tracks and some
stragglers were lost. The two other battalions of Hargests brigade managed
to move largely to planalthough the 23rd NZ Battalion was forced to leave
10 carriers and 20 trucks behind and to abandon nine anti-tank guns when
they could not be manhandled along its steep muddy route over the shoulder of the mountain. All night the men of the 5th NZ Brigade trudged
through the blackness over barely discernible trails, discarding personal
gear when it could no longer be carried, to take up positions 11 kilometres
28Letter, Dyer to Wards, 5 March 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/12; comments by
W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, January 1950, AWM
67, 5/17; Report by 1 Coy 2 Inf Regt (2Pz Div), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Appendices to 2 Pz Div
Admin Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Notes on activities of 6 NZ Field
Regiment in Greece, 28 Mar to 29 Apr 41, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/123; Long, Greece, Crete
and Syria, p. 100.

to the southwest atop a pass through Ayios Dimitrios and Kokkinoplos,
where the brigade was to hold until its withdrawal to the Thermopylae Line
the next night. Even the Germans reported that the terrain was so extraordinarily difficult and the darkness so complete that men wandered from
barely discernible tracks. The Battle Group 1/Baacke Group advance was
thus paused until dawn.29
Unknown to Brigadier Hargest, throughout the day his position had in
fact been far more tenuous that it had seemed in the face of the limited
German infantry attacks put in against it. The mountain separating the 5th
NZ Brigade and the Pinios Gorge to the east appeared to the defenders to
be an impassable barrierit was not. A path from Skala Leptokaria on the
coast, for example, wound by way of Karya and Gonnos all the way to the
Larissa Road. Also, to the left of the 5th NZ Brigade, another track led over
the northern edge of the mountain through Skotina and Levadhion. German mountain troops were thus free to advance on either or both of these
paths to the north and south of Hargests brigade. Furthermore, the German
6th Mountain Division had received orders in the pre-dawn hours of 16
April to do exactly that. If New Zealanders then managed to hold their
positions at the Olympus and Plantamon passes then the German mountain
forces could be directed towards Gonnos via Leptokaria and Kalipevki, to
open the (south) western exit of the Pinios Gorge.30 Thus, had Hargests
brigade stood firm and not withdrawn, there is little doubt that it would
soon have been flanked. As it was, the introduction of the 6th Mountain
Division created another German axis of advance to Larissa in addition to
those being followed by Battle Groups 1 and 2 of the 2nd Armoured Division.31
Back at Anzac Corps headquarters, by the morning of 16 April Blamey
was becoming acutely aware of the danger posed, not by German encirclement at Kalabaka, but to the east at Plantamon. Previous Greek advice was
29Extracts from 72 Inf Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Notes
on translations of German documents relating to the Greece Campaign 1941, AWM 67, 5/17;
New Zealand Division in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/105; GOCs [Freybergs] Diary
(extracts), 2 January 2 September 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/5/42-43; 23 NZ Bn, ANZ
ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162; Summary of operations of 5 NZ Infantry Brigade in Greece, 29
April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156; Report by Brig. Hargest on Greek Ops, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/162; comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of
Internal Affairs, January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 100-1.
30Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
31Entry for 17 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der 6.GEB.DIV. BA MA RH 28-6/8;
316
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that no strong attack could be mounted in this wild country and Wilson,
Blamey and Freyberg had all agreed.32 Reports received the previous day
and during the night from the 21st NZ Battalion, however, told a different
story. The German attack on Mackys unit was launched at dawn, informed
by comprehensive intelligence provided by members of the New Zealand
battalion captured in the previous days skirmishing.33
On the saddle of the ridge above the Plantamon railway tunnel, the day
began with German tanks from the 1st Battalion (3rd Armoured Regiment),
edging forward in a frontal assault against Mackys battalion. The New
Zealanders simultaneously came under fire from the west where troops of
the German 2nd Motorcycle Battalion and the 1st Battalion (304th Infantry
Regiment), had infiltrated and now threatened to encircle the 21st NZ Battalions left flank. At 9.00 a.m., with his western company engaging in close
quarters fighting and virtually surrounded, and with the German frontal
attack having infiltrated his forward centre positions under a smoke screen,
Macky prepared to retreat. An hour later German tanks from the right-hand
attacking company, despite scrub, rocks, wire, and the steepness of the
hillside, were pressing along the saddle track and were almost at the crest
of the ridge. Many were lost shedding tracks on rough terrain or to mines,
but still the German armour crept forward. Macky ordered an immediate
withdrawal and, to the shock of corps headquarters (and his own artillery
detachment who understood the battalion to be under pressure but not
on the verge of collapse), Macky sent a final message before destroying his
radio: W/T Station 21 Bn closing down. Getting out.34 Macky led his men
back south to the bridge across the Pinios River without much enemy interference, and by dusk his unit had reached the western end of Pinios
Gorge. The German flag was hoisted from the castle at Plantamon but the
damaged tunnel, difficult tracks, and the steep southern slope of the ridge,
however, prevented any quick armoured follow-up. In fact, out of around
100 attacking German tanks only 30 were left operational for the next day.
32There is little doubt that the natural strength of the 21st (NZ) Battalion position was
over-estimated by Freybergbut a single battalion was all that could ever have been spared
in any case. Comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of Internal
Affairs, January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; B. Freyberg, Campaigns in Greece and Crete, October
1941, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6.
33Entry for 15 and 16 April 1941, 2. Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 Ia und Anlagen
1.1.41 14.6.41., BA MA RH 27-2/20, pp. 33-6; Extracts from 18 Corps intelligence report,
AWM 54, 534/2/27; Anzac Corp War Diary, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/9; L.G. Williams,
Operations of A Troop, 5 NZ Field Regiment, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/123.
34Quoted in W.G. McClymont, To Greece, p. 250.

Skala Leptokaryas
Leptokaria
AEGEAN
SEA
1310
I/304
Inf Regt
16 April
Skotina
2 MC Bn
15/16 April
Pandeleimon
I/3 Pz Regt
15 April
Kallipevke
Tunnel
A
D
21 Bn
10 am
16 April
Platamon
A Tp 5 Fd Regt
1587
Aigane
1264
Prygetos
Rapsani
Ferry
Tunnel demolition
le
Mu
Gonnos
er
Riv
io
Pin
track
0
0
4 kilometres
2 miles
Map 11.3:The attack on the 21st NZ Battalion by elements of the German 2nd Armoured
Divisions Battle Group 2, 15-16 April 1941
Exhausted German soldiers therefore grabbed what rest was on offer and
enjoyed large amounts of food left behind by the New Zealanders. This
bounty did not solve all German logistics problems, however, as stretched
supply lines meant the 2nd Armoured Divisions lead units had ammunition
and fuel assured only until the evening of 17 April.35
35Der Feldzug im Sdosten!, BA MA RH 20-12/105, p. 7; entry for 16 April 1941, Kriegs
tagebuch Nr. 1 des Kradschtzenbataillon 59 Begonnen: 1. August 1940 Abgeschlossen:
318
chapter eleven
Alarmed by Mackys earlier messages, Blamey had already despatched

his artillery commander, Brigadier Cyril Clowes, to visit Plantamon and
take any action deemed necessary to bring the situation under control,
and to prevent the Germans from interfering with imminent withdrawal
of the Anzac Corps through Larissa. Clowes left corps headquarters at 1.00
a.m. on 16 April but due to unfamiliarity with the route, a visit to Freyberg,
and a delay at Larissa where he could find no staff at the British sub-base
depot, did not actually reach the 21st NZ Battalions area of operations
until 11.15 a.m. Clowes met Macky at a ferry point at the western end of
Pinios Gorge. Macky claimed to have wanted to hold a new defensive position 2000 metres south of Plantamon, but had found it impractical and had
continued moving his unit southwest to the mouth of the gorge.36
The Pinios Gorge itself (otherwise known as the historic Vale of Tempe)
was a narrow river pass, with steep 20-30-metre sides covered with Judas
trees. Along the main gorge a railway ran along the north side and a road
along the south. Clowes acted decisively. He ordered Macky to cross the
river, to sink the ferry barge behind him, and then to make a stand on the
southern bank of the gorge in order to deny passage through it to the Germans at least until 19 April. Clowes later claimed that only his direct orders
prevented Macky from abandoning the gorge and continuing his withdrawal all the way back to Larissa. This charge was repeated by Brigadier
Rowell who believed Macky planned to rely on demolitions in the gorge to
slow the Germans. But for the timely arrival of Brigadier Clowes, wrote
Rowell, we would have had two German Divs in Larissa on 17 April, before
the withdrawal had commenced.37 To be fair, however, in Mackys defence
there is some credible evidence that Freyberg had indicated to him ear
lier that he could withdraw along the gorge if pressed, leaving demolitions
15. Mai 1941., BA MA RH 39/699; entry for 16 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 8 Generalkommando XVIII. Armeekorps, Fhrungsabteilung Begonnen: 6.April 1941 Abgeschlossen: 2.Juni
1941, BA MA RH 24-18/75; entry for 15 and 16 April 1941, 2. Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch
Nr. 4 Ia und Anlagen 1.1.41 14.6.41., BA MA RH 27-2/20, pp. 33-6; Extract of report by 3 Pz
Regt (2 Pz Div), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Appendices to 2 Pz Div Admin Diary (Greek Campaign),
AWM 54, 534/2/27; correspondence (various) 21st (NZ) Battalion veterans to J.F. Cody, ANZ
ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/8; Operations of A Troop, 5 NZ Field Regiment, L.G. Williams, ANZ
ADQZ 18886, WAII1/123; McClymont, To Greece, p. 251; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, pp. 82, 96-97;
Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 95; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 266-8.
36Correspondence (various) 21st (NZ) Battalion veterans to J.F. Cody, ANZ ADQZ 18902,
WAII3/1/8.
[1-4]; Casson, Greece Against the Axis, p. 156.

if necessary, before Freyberg had handed the whole Plantamon problem
to corps headquarters on 15 April.38
A stand, however, was now ordered by Clowes, even if it meant
extinction.39 He promised Macky reinforcement within 24 hours and advised him to pay attention to the northern bank as the Germans would
inevitably try and flank any troops holding the mouth of the gorge. If his
first position broke again Macky was to retire through the gorge but its exit
was, no matter what, to be definitively held to the last. Clowes left Macky
at 1.45 p.m. bound for corps headquarters to report the seriousness of the
developing situation. It was late in the afternoon before the 21st (NZ) Battalion managed to cross the ferry and take up its new position. Mackys
heavy vehicles had to take a detour and cross at a nearby railway bridge
and four artillery pieces supporting the battalion had to be manhandled
down the steep bank to the ferry and up the other side.40
During the previous night Blamey had already decided to reinforce
Mackys battalion with the 16th Australian Brigade. Thus, as the first of
Brigadier Allens units, the 2/2nd Australian Battalion under the command
of Lieutenant Colonel Fred Chilton, reached the road south of Servia at
10.00 a.m., after an eight-hour night march, it was met by a liaison officer
from corps headquarters. The exhausted Australians, with blistered feet
and torn clothing, rested where they stood while Chilton was ferried immediately to Blameys headquarters. There Rowell explained the last messages from the 21st NZ Battalion, that Clowes had not yet returned, and that
Chiltons battalion, reinforced with artillery and engineer detachments, an
anti-tank troop, plus two extra carrier platoons, was to assist the New Zealanders to hold the western entrance to Pinios Gorge for three or four days.
Chilton moved out immediately, and met Clowes (returning to corps headquarters) outside Larissa. Further north, at Tempe village, Chilton met with
Macky in the darkness. There he discovered that the New Zealand battalion
had thus far suffered only 35 casualties but much of its equipment had
been abandoned. The New Zealanders had yet not taken up a defensive
position as ordered by Clowes. Rather Mackys troops were at this point
resting in a nearby village with one platoon forward in the gorge at a road
38H.K. Kippenberger, Notes by Editor-in-Chief, New Zealand War Histories, on Christopher Buckleys narrative on Greece, AWM 67, 5/17; comments by the Editor-in-Chief, NZ
War Histories, on General Freybergs Detailed Comments (on a draft narrative of the Greek
campaign), AWM 67, 5/17.
40Quoted in McClymont, To Greece, p. 230; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 96.
320
chapter eleven
block to warn of any approaching Germans. Macky explained that his men
were feeling fatigued at the strain of recent fighting.41 The two decided to
meet in the morning to arrange mutual defence. During the night Chilton
made his headquarters at Evangelismos, south of Tempe, and his men
moved into position. In the meantime Blamey had decided to send the rest
of the 16th Australian Brigade, under Brigadier Allen, to reinforce Chilton
and Macky. Allen, busy in the Olympus foothills on the afternoon of 16 April
making contact with his own units, received instructions to block the Pinios
Gorge and to prevent the Germans entering Larissa, with the aid of a map
and torch at 2.00 a.m. at Anzac Corps headquarters.42 On his way to the
gorge Allen ordered his 2/3rd Australian Battalion, having recently marched
down from its new near Servia, to follow him as soon as possible. Allens
third infantry unit, 2/1st Australian Battalion, itself still trekking down from
the mountains, was made the divisional reserve.43
For their part the Germans had considered the capture of Pandeleimon
a difficult fightfrom the point of view of terrain in addition to the resistance of the 21st NZ Battalion. When the position was reported secured by
Battle Group 2 (2nd Armoured Division) at 11.00 a.m., 16 April, it initiated
a sort of race between this formation and the 6th Mountain Division as
to which might be first to take the key town of Larissa, now only a short
distance south. At midday Brigadier Schrner pushed his forward troops
even harder with his advance guardthe cavalry and cycle squadrons of
the 112th Reconnaissance Battalion, the 2nd Company (1st Battalion, 143rd
Mountain Regiment)ordered immediately and at best speed from Leptokaria to Gonnos. The idea was for this detachment to capture the western
flank of the Pinios Gorge, thus opening it to the 2nd Armoured Division
41Material copied for use in the compilation of New Zealand War History, ANZ ADQZ
188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3650]; Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July
1941, AWM 3DRL4142, 2/9 [6-14].
42Anzac Corps War Diary, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/9; McClymont, To Greece,
p. 253.
43C. Clowes, Report by C.C.R.A. on special mission to 21N.Z. Bn, 16 April 1941, 24 May
1941, AWM 3DRL 643, 1/44; Chronology of Operations, 16 Aust Inf Bde Greece, AWM54,
534/1/2; minute, Blamey to Freyberg, 16 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 643, 1/3; War Diary HQ 1 Aust
Corps Campaign in Greece, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/1; Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust,
Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9 [6-14]; Material copied for use in the compilation of New Zealand War History, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3650]; S.F. Rowell,
The campaign in Greece, April 1941, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A) [1-4]; comments by
W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, January 1950, AWM
67, 5/17; E.D. Ranke, Notes of Operations 16 Bde Greece, AWM 27, 116/2; 2/2 Battalion
sequence of events, AWM 54, 534/5/10; McClymont, To Greece, p. 252; Long, Greece, Crete
and Syria, p. 97.

(and in the process leapfrogging Battle Group 2). The 3rd Battalion (143rd
Mountain Regiment) was to follow the advance guard and a few hours
later Schrner gave orders for his whole division to conduct a sweeping
right flanking hook via Kalipaki to Gonnos as a precursor for a drive to
Larissa. This advance would take the mountaineers over the southern slopes
of Olympus towards what Schrner perceived as the decisive point in the
battle for Larissa. So far W Force had been successful in slowing the advance
of armoured units, but if the mountain troops entered the Larissa basin
ahead of the withdrawing Allies, the British-Dominion campaign would
be over. As it happened, in heavy rain over steep slopes and narrow rocky
tracks, the mountain infantry company of the 6th Mountain Divisions
advance guard quickly pulled ahead of its reconnaissance squadrons, so at
6.00 p.m. Schrner diverted both squadrons along the road into Pinios
Gorge to join Battle Group 2. This order, however, never reached the 112th
Reconnaissance Battalions commander who continued on towards Gonnos
with the mountaineers. Lieutenant General Veiel, predictably, was not content to wait for the mountaineers to clear his path for his division. With his
Battle Group 1 unable to pierce the Olympus Pass during the day, he decided to focus upon Battle Group 2, and ordered it to push on through the
Pinios Gorge as the quickest route to Larissa.44
After returning to his headquarters at Soumpasi from Kalabaka on 15th
April, Wilson found a message from Papagos asking him to meet at Lamia
at 6.00 a.m. the next day. Wilson set out at 1.00 a.m. but due to congested
roads and air raids (particularly at Pharsala) it was not until 10.00 a.m., 16
April, that he made it to the meeting at Lamia, only 80 kilometres south.
There the two generals reviewed the military situation. The Klisoura Pass
was lost and the WMFAS, in Papagoss words, had taken to the mountains
and were likely to turn up at Metsovon or Kalabaka but not for several
days.45 In Albania the Italians were moving forward across the whole front.
At this point Wilson at last informed Papagos of his plan to withdraw to
the Thermopylae Linefour days after he had made this choice. Papagos
agreed with the idea but was completely unaware that the W Force
entry for 17 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der 6.GEB.DIV., BA MA RH 28-6/8; 6 Mtn
Div battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War
Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27; McClymont, To Greece, p. 251; Long, Greece,
Crete and Syria, p. 126.
322
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withdrawal had actually begun. Wilson did nothing to let his superior officer know that this was the case. Papagos therefore remained under the
misunderstanding that the decision to occupy the Thermopylae Line was
made by them both at this meeting. In fact, Papagos issued a written order
for W Forces withdrawal to this line back in Athens the next day. Many
subsequent authors, including some present in Greece at the time, such as
Brigadier Savige, subsequently attempted to cast Wilsons deliberate duplicity in the best possible light. With regard to the move to Thermopylae Savige concluded Wilson and Papagos either failed to advise one another of
their intentions, or communications denied them doing so.46 This is not
the case. Papagos knew nothing of Wilsons plan until 16 April because
Wilson deliberately kept it from him. It is not surprising that Wilsons autobiography gives no exact date for Papagos sanction of the W Force withdrawal.47
Similarly, with no idea that British plans for an evacuation from Greece
were already in train, Papagos went on to suggest at his meeting with Wilson that in order to save Greece from devastation British forces ought to
depart the country entirely.48 The meeting finished at 12.00 p.m. and Wilson
moved to Thermopylae to await the arrival of his headquarters. In the meantime he immediately arranged to inform Wavell in Cairo of Papagos evacuation proposal. This was always going to be a delicate diplomatic issue
and Wavell asked for instructions from London, explaining he had ordered
Wilson to fight on with the Greeks, so long as they resisted, but that W Force
was authorised to fall back as required. Wavell added that an outline evacuation plan had already been prepared and that he had already stopped
the movement of supplies to Greecethus effectively guaranteeing the
plans implementation. In fact, Wavell informed Dill that such an evacuation should commence with occupation of new position [the Thermopylae
Line] and that naval and transportation measures should be put in
hand forthwith.49 Representatives of the Joint Planning Staff would
move to Athens next day to work out the details.50 Shocked by Rommels
approach to the Egyptian border in North Africa and in no mood for news
3DRL 2529 [12].
47Letter, Long to Rowell, 3 January 1951, AWM 3DRL 6763, Folder 5/11 [11-13]; Papagos,
The Battle of Greece, 1940-1941, pp. 379-80.
48Telegram, Wavell to Dill, 16 April 1941, TNA FO 371/28918.
49Ibid.
50Ibid.; McClymont, To Greece, p. 233; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 91.

of continuing reversals in Greece, Churchill replied to Wavell the next day
in a stinging telegram complaining about lack of information from Greece,
and stating that an evacuation could only proceed with the approval of the
Greeks. Either Wilson or Palairet, Churchill advised, was therefore to approach the Greek government for an endorsement of the evacuation if it
was required. At this point, with more optimism than Wavells pragmatic
assessment, Churchill was adamant that such preparations were to proceed
without prejudicing the defence of the Thermopylae Line.51
Back at Anzac Corps headquarters, as a consequence of events at
Plantamon, Blamey modified his orders for the withdrawal to the Thermopylae Line. With Savige Force on the left and Allen Force on the right, the
6th Australian Division would now be responsible for both flanks as the
New Zealand Division withdrew. After that Mackay was to control the withdrawal of Saviges brigade group, the small force at Zarkos, and Lee Force
at Domokos. On its withdrawal from the Pinios Gorge Allens force would
come under Freybergs command as it was to withdraw through Volos, along
the same route as the New Zealand Division. Each local force commander
was still responsible for demolitions in their area. Assuming the Germans
did not interfere with the standing timetable, the 4th and 5th NZ Brigades
would still withdraw on the night of 17 April, while the 6th NZ Brigade,
after holding during the day at Elasson, was still scheduled to move the
following night. The subsequent withdrawals of Savige Force (from its first
fallback position at Zarkos) and Allen Forces (from Pinios Gorge) were now,
however, at the discretion of Mackay and Freyberg respectively.52
51Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 89; Cruickshank, Greece 194041, p.
148; McClymont, To Greece, p. 234; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 92; Churchill, The Second
World War, pp. 202-3.
52Meanwhile, behind the front various W Force units continued to build up hasty
fallback positions in preparation for the upcoming retreat to the Thermopylae Line. In
preparation for the withdrawal of the 4th and 5th NZ Brigades from the Servia and Olympus
Passes, as an added precaution, Freyberg built a covering position at Elevtherokhorion.
This position was initially manned in the evening of 16 April by Duff Force, under Lieutenant Colonel C.S.J. Duff. This small force of two anti-tank troops, three carrier platoons and
a machine-gun company sat astride the roads to Olympus and Servia to the north of the
6th NZ Brigade position at Elasson. The following day this position was reinforced with the
greater part of the New Zealand Cavalry Regiment, but it was disbanded that night. Message,
Anzac Corps to HQ W Force, 16 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/3; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139;
Report by Brig. Hargest on Greek Ops, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162; Summary of operations of 5 NZ Infantry Brigade in Greece, 29 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156; War
Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658; Miscellaneous papers of Greece and Crete,
ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6; W.J.H. Sutton, The Greek Debacle 1941: the beginning
324
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Much further south near Domokos, Lee Force was preparing its corps
rearguard position on a high hill, which rose very sharply from the plain,
topped at its crest by a little church with a spire. The position had a view
of the road and railway running north into Domokos station five kilometres
away, with the village around 300 metres off the main road to the east. In
the morning of 16 April the 2/6th Australian Battalion (with a company of
the 2/5th Australian Battalion) arrived in this location. Brigadier Lee decided to defend halfway up the pass with a battalion each side of the road,
by now jammed with traffic moving south. His force was to have been joined
by the 19th Australian Brigade, which had marched south of Aliakmon by
dawn despite terrain and communication difficulties. A mix up, however,
(subsequently blamed on false directions given by Greek fifth columnists),
saw much of this brigade taking the wrong route and not joining Lee Force
until 18 April.53 As was the case across much of W Force, spirits were depressed. The weather is cold and bleak with snow, wrote a member of the
small Domokos rearguard, we have not had a hot meal in four days and no
sleep so we are not the best by any means.54
By the evening of 16 April, back in Athens more bad news from the front
line was encouraging an ever-hastening descent into disorganisation.
Palairet reported morale in the city was flagging and that his contacts in
the Greek General Staff reported Papagos nerves as frayed and his mood
as gloomy. Palairet believed the Greek Prime Minister Koryzis was not
equipped, as Metaxas might have been, to rally the army or the people at
this critical time. During the day Bishop Spyridon (from Yannina), further
urged Koryzis to surrender to the Germans in order to save Greece from
the Italians. The arrival of King Peter of Yugoslavia in the city inflamed
tensions further. Rumours spread that the Germans were about to enter
Athens as the locals watched hundreds of British and other foreign nationals evacuated from Phatleron Bay by British ships. DAlbiac reported to
and end, KMARL, 1999.1051; 6 Australian Division Administrative Instructions Nos. 20 and
21, 15 and 16 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/4/1; Report on operations of 6th Australian Division
in Greece, Major General I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34; McClymont, To Greece,
pp. 230-1, 285; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. 2, p. 91; Long, Greece, Crete
and Syria, pp. 99, 102.
53Report of 2/6 Aust Inf Bns participation in the Grecian Campaign covering the period
April 1-29, 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/35 [2]; Diary of Major H.C.D. Marshall, 27 Battalion, AWM
PR03/058; Report on operations of 6th Australian Division in Greece, Major General
I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34; diary extracts from Private F.J. Gorman, 2/6 Battalion, AWM PR85/250; McClymont, To Greece, p. 244.
54Diary Extracts from Private F.J. Gorman, 2/6 Battalion, AWM PR85/250. McClymont,
To Greece, p. 244.

Cairo that his strength was dwindling, with only 18 serviceable Blenheims,
16 Hurricanes and 12 Gladiators still flying. RAF headquarters in Athens
began to burn sensitive documents. The situation was worsened by a decision by the Greek Minister for War, Nicholas Papademas, which has been
interpreted as an attempt to undermine continuing Greek resistance, to
issue a directive placing all Greek conscripts not needed to fight (trainees
and those not equipped or ordered to the front), on leave. This left a mob
of soldiers in Athens wandering the streets, and did nothing to help the
mood.55
By the evening of 16 April, from a German perspective, the campaign
was progressing well. Field Marshal List now commanded three armoured
divisions, two mountain divisions and five of infantry inside Greece. Two
more infantry divisions lay as yet unemployed in the 12th Armys reserve.
To the north in occupied Yugoslavia Field Marshal Weichs now largely
unemployed army of 14 divisions (three armoured) could be used to reinforce List at any time. The leading elements of the German 9th Armoured
Division were southwest of Grevena and in the vicinity of Servia Pass. They
were, however, soon to be leapfrogged by the 5th Armoured Division advancing through Kozani to Grevena. On the 40th Corps western flank the
Adolf Hitler Regiment had reconnaissance elements four kilometres north
of Lipsista while the leading elements of the German 73rd Division were
at Florina. To the east the two battle groups of the 2nd Armoured Division
were in the vicinity of the Olympus Pass and moving into the Pinios Gorge.
In the mountains between them the forward units of the 6th Mountain
Division were at Leptokaria, with the 5th Mountain Division to its rear and
entering Katerini. With the Germans now convinced the British were already taking troops by sea from Volos and Piraeus, the whole campaign
was from this point, from a German perspective, a pursuit whereby the aim
was to maintain contact with the retreating W Force in order to disrupt its
eventual and inevitable evacuation. The German pursuit, however, continued to be delayed by the effects of the terrain, the weather and by supply
shortages. As such List decided to press on only with his furthest forward,
fastest and most mobile formations. The rest of the campaign would be
55Telegram, RAF Headquarters, Middle East to Air Ministry, 16 April 1941, TNA
CAB120/564; G. Long, The 6th Division in action, AWM PR88/72; report, Duties of Intelligence Personnel from April 14th to April 25th 1941, TNA AIR 23/6371; An Abridged History
of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 230; McClymont, To Greece, p. 234; Bitzes,
Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 237; Papagos, The Battle of Greece,
1940-41, p. 382.
326
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thus conducted on the German side with the forward units of the 2nd and
5th Armoured Divisions, the Adolf Hitler Regiment and the 5th and 6th
Mountain Divisions.56
At the same time, from 15-16 April, the very process of Lists preparation
to pursue W Force quickly, and Wilsons efforts to avoid being caught, continued to illuminate and illustrate a number of important aspects of the
campaign as a whole. One of the most repeated claims of the English language historical writing about the campaign is that the Greeks forced W
Force to retreat. Events throughout 15-16 April do not support this view.
The Greek line on the left flank of W Force had held fast, against British
expectation, until midday on 14 April. Even then, Papagos had reacted
quickly and Greek units in the area fought on, particularly the Greek Cavalry Division, without the help of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade. This Greek
resistance, along with heavy rain that had turned tracks to quagmires, meant
that there was no German flood of troops pouring south in this sector. Yet,
after the campaign, Wilson maintained the claim that the withdrawal to
the Thermopylae Line was necessary as the Greeks had disintegrated to his
west. Similar arguments were advanced in an Australian Army report which
concluded that the Greek collapse was a link in the chain of the inevitable57
which forced Wilson to withdraw, and the British post-war official history
of the campaign. This was not the case. The Greeks were hard pressed but
the Germans had not smashed through them. When Wilson first made his
choice to re-deploy to Thermopylae, on 13 April, the Greek-held Vernion
passes yet stood. This withdrawal was an anticipated need, not an immediate demand. It was not forced upon W Force due to a Greek collapse. Wilson freely decided to withdraw because of fear of what Greeks might do
on the flank, and an accurate deduction that W Forces own positions could
not be held indefinitely. Moreover, on the night of 15 April Blamey demonstrated that there was no immediate danger to W Forces left flank when
he re-deployed the 16th Australian Brigade from Zarkos to Pinios Gorge.
How could the supposed collapse of the Greeks on W Forces western flank
be so dire as to necessitate a withdrawal to Thermopylae, yet at the same
time not dire enough that Brigadier Allens significant western flank protection force could be spared for Pinios? Blameys correct reading of an easing
Extracts from evening reports from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete), AWM 67, 5/17;
57Report on Greece and Crete Campaign, 15 September 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/20.

of the position to the west undermines the whole notion of the move to
Thermopylae being forced on W Force by Greek failure.58
Instead, throughout most of 15 April the EFAS and most WMFAS formations were still withdrawing as plannedif under pressure. The Grevena
sector was not in a state of collapse during this day. The Greeks did not
disintegrate as Wavell told the War Office.59 Nor had they given away on
our flank as was subsequently recalled by many of W Forces private soldiersafter the message had been passed down to them by their superiors.60 Only in the afternoon of 15 April did the Adolf Hitler Regiment make
it to Grevena Road, and there were no Germans in Grevena until nightfall.
For their part, although the Greek corps commanders on the Albanian front
were by this stage convinced they needed to surrender, Pitsikas, on instructions from Athens, did not do so. Rather he ordered his men to fight on,
which they did. It is also important to reiterate that Wilson met Papagos
on the morning of 16 April and gained his superiors assent to withdraw to
the Thermopylae Lineafter giving orders for such a withdrawal the previous morning, and without informing Papagos that the withdrawal was
by the time of the meeting, was well under way. Furthermore, any claims,
like that made by Palairet back to London that it was Papagos who first
raised the idea of a British evacuation during his meeting with Wilson on
16 April, are disingenuous. It may well have been diplomatically convenient
for the British that Papagos made this suggestion, but the truth was that
planning for such an eventuality was well underway.61
It is useful also to use the events of 16 April to shed further light on a
number of observations made in the previous chapter regarding the actual fighting between German forces and W Force troops to this point. The
German attacks put in against the 5th NZ Brigade at the Olympus Pass were
primarily conducted by two infantry companies (against the 28th (Maori)
Battalion) and two companies of cyclists (against the 23nd NZ Battalion).
There was no numerical advantage to the attackers here. These infantry
attacks and attempts at infiltration were themselves necessitated by the
fact that the bulk of Battle Group 1s armour and motorised elements were
Greek Campaign, AWM 67, 5/17; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 83. Entry
for 16 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 8 Generalkommando XVIII. Armeekorps, Fhrungs
abteilung Begonnen: 6.April 1941 Abgeschlossen: 2.Juni 1941, BA MA RH 24-18/75.
59Telegram, Wavell to War Office, 14 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124.
61Telegram, Palairet to Foreign Office, 17 April 1941, TNA FO 371/28918.
328
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driven back on the road north of the Olympus Pass by effective New Zealand
artillery fire. This situation again undermines any idea of decisive German
armour in this campaign. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe continued to bombard
the 4th NZ Brigade at Servia Pass with no discernible results. The only sector where the Germans were able to bring superior weight of numbers and
firepower against the W Force line was at Plantamon. Here, the 21st NZ
Battalion was progressively forced from its position by the equivalent of
two German battalions supported by armour. Even at this point, however,
the defenders did not choose to stay and fight. Rather, after sustaining a
meagre 35 casualties, against the intent of instructions passed earlier to
him by his superiors, Macky withdrew before decisively committed. It is
this choice, and events on this crucial right hand flank of the W Force Line
in the vicinity of Pinios Gorge, that would decide much of how the remainder of the campaign unfolded.
the battle of pinios gorge (17-18 april)
329
Chapter Twelve
The Battle of Pinios Gorge (17-18 April)

Under generally overcast skies and rain the W Force front was relatively
quiet throughout 17 April. The defenders ongoing tactics of cratering roads
and destroying bridges, combined with congested and ever-lengthening
German lines of supply, continued to slow the German advance. Only the
Briton, complained the 2nd Armoured Division, retreats in such a planned
and ruthless way!1 Lists answer was to push his formations harder than
ever. Major General Veiels 2nd Armoured Division, frustrated by a stubborn
and gallant withdrawal action from what it considered to be a beaten enemy, thus ordered Battle Group 1 (still with the Baacke Group under command) to press forward on the heels of the withdrawing 5th NZ Brigade at
the Olympus Pass and make its way clear of the mountains.2 Further east,
Veiels Battle Group 2 was also instructed to push south at best speed,
through the Pinios Gorge to Larissa. Meanwhile, the 6th Mountain Division
continued its march over the mountains to Gonnos, near the western exit
of the gorge. At Servia, the Sponeck Group and other leading elements of
the 9th Armoured Division sent out fighting patrols during the day, although
no further effort was made to bridge the Aliakmon in this location, which
was swelling further from recent rain. Stummes orders in this sector were
to tie down the defenders while the 5th Armoured Division made its outflanking advance through Grevena towards Elasson-Trikkala. This division
was, however, running into problems of its own. Even though ordered to
continue without stopping throughout the night of 16-17 April, the 8th
Reconnaissance Battalion (leading the 5th Armoured Division) could not
prevent the demolition of the Venetikos Bridge. The whole of 17 April was
thus spent by this unit crossing the river.3
12. Panzer-Division Abt. Ic, Bericht ber den S.O.-Einsatz der 2. Panzer-Division., BA
MA RH 20-12/105, p. 4. Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 274-5.
2Entries for 17 and 18 April 1941, 2. Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 Ia und Anlagen 1.1.41 14.6.41., BA MA RH 27-2/20, pp. 36-40.
3Report by 8 Pz Recce Unit, AWM 54, 534/2/27; Appendices to 2 Pz Div Admin Diary
(Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary (Greek Campaign),
AWM 54, 534/2/27; Appendices to 2 Pz Div Admin Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54,
534/2/27; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 106.
330
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Despite the lull in fighting, throughout 17 April the centre of gravity for
W Force and the Germans on the eastern side of the Pindus Mountains
moved more and more towards Pinios Gorge. The 21st NZ Battalions withdrawal from the Plantamon ridge the previous day allowed Battle Group 2
to begin, with considerable earthworks and blasting, the difficult task of
transporting vehicles across the mountain spurs and improved cart tracks
towards the eastern entrance of the gorge. By the early afternoon, with
all the bridges across the Pinios in this location destroyed, the battle group
(led by the tanks of the 1st Battalion (3rd Armoured Regiment), under Lieutenant Colonel K. Decker) had entered the gorge and were proceeding west
along the railway tracks on its northern bank. At about half way along its
length the leading German vehicles found their way blocked on the railway
line by a blown tunnel. Deckers tank column halted. Wheeled vehicles
could not yet be brought up and his forward infantry and tanks here were
left entirely without supplies.4 This problem was only partially solved by
airdrops and use of small boats on the coast east of Olympus to ferry supplies forward.5
Meanwhile, slightly to the west, at around midday the 6th Mountain
Divisions vanguard (a company of the 3rd Battalion, 143rd Regiment) began
arriving at Gonnos, a village to the north of the western exit to the gorge,
after moving across the southern slopes of Mt. Olympus using the Leptokaria track. The inhabitants of Gonnos immediately informed them of
British patrols on south bank of the river. Brigadier Schrner, now himself
at Kalipevki, ordered the rest of the 3rd Battalion to rush to Gonnos to seal
the gorge from the west. After a short rest, at 3.00 p.m. the remainder of
the 143rd Regiment resumed its exhausting climb. Behind it, the 141st Regiment began its own march to Kalipevki. Schrner himself arrived at Gonnos at 4.00 p.m., 17 April. The trek over the mountains was later described
by Schrner as the most difficult task his men had yet faced. Food and supplies were running out for the mountain troops, just as they were for the
leading elements of the 2nd Armoured Division to their east. Limited emergency stores were dropped by air, others acquired on the march. Yet the
4Appendices to 2 Pz Div Admin Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
5Signature, Kommandeur, I./Panzer-Regiment 3, Asproprigos, 2 May 1941, BA MA RH
28-6/9b; entries for 17 and 18 April 1941, 2. Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 Ia und
Anlagen 1.1.41 14.6.41., BA MA RH 27-2/20, pp. 36-40; A few war experiences, reviewed
54, 624/7/2; Relevant extracts from daily QMG reports from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece &
Crete), AWM 67, 5/17; Extract of report by 3 Pz Regt (2 Pz Div), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
331
mountaineers pushed hard to open the Pinios Gorge from the west for the
tanks of Battle Group 2.6
As the leading elements of Battle Group 2 and the 6th Mountain Division
closed in on their position, during the morning of 17 April Chilton and
Macky planned their defence of the gorge. Chilton and Macky began the
day with a combined reconnaissance as far east as Mackys road block
within the gorge. Macky suggested that, pending Brigadier Allens arrival,
the entire force go under his command. Chilton refused. The two men did
agree, however, that the 21st NZ Battalion should deploy east of Tempe
village on high ground on the south bank of the Pinios (culminating in Mt
Ossa) and with a company within the gorge itself, in order to prevent the
Germans from driving through it from the northeast. The 2/2nd Australian
Battalion would take a position in depth on the western slopes of the same
heights at the western exit of the gorge, with the added responsibility of
protecting the left flank of the position from any infantry attack across the
Pinios River south of Gonnos. Weapon pits were dug and good use made
of low stone walls in the area. There was no wire, however, nor any anti-tank
mines.7
At 1.00 p.m. Brigadier Allen arrived and assumed command of the defence of Pinios Gorge from his headquarters at the Makrikhori railway
station. He immediately informed Chilton that the 2/3rd Australian Battalion and 11 carriers from the 2/5th and 2/11th Australian Battalions were
already reinforcing the position. Allen spent the rest of the afternoon trying
hastily to coordinate his defences, which were shaped entirely by the narrow, steep sided terrain and river within the gorge. At its western exit both
6Signature, I./Geb.Jg.Reg.143 Ia, 8 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber den Angriff ber
den Pinios am 18.4.1941. BA MA RH 28-6/9b, p. 2; Frster, Geb. Jg. Rgt. 141, Biwak Lutsa, 8
May 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber den Angriff ber den Pinios am 18.4.1941., BA MA RH
28-6/9b, pp. 1-2; entry for 16 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der 6.GEB.DIV., BA MA
RH 28-6/8; Bhme, der Kommandierende General, Generalkommando XVIII. Armeekorps
Abt. Ia, 0235 16 April 1941, Korpsbefehl, BA MA RH 28-6/9a; Schrner, Kdr. 6. Geb.
Div., Litohoron, 0910 16 April 1941, to Kdr.Pz.Jg. 47, BA MA RH 28-6/9a; Schrner, Kdr. 6.
Geb.-Div., 1115 16 April 1941, an XVIII. A.K., BA MA RH 28-6/9a; Schrner, 6. Gebirgs-Division,
Ia op, 2340 16 April 1941, Divisionsbefehl Nr. 55 fr das weitere Vorgehen der Division am
17.4. 1941., BA MA RH 28-6/9a, pp. 1-2; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 322-3.
7Letters (various) from 21st (NZ) Battalion veterans to I. McL. Wards, ANZ ADQZ 18902,
WAII3/1/7; letter, Stewart to Wards, 3 December 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/1; letter,
Wards to Stewart, 28 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/1; Material copied for use
in the compilation of New Zealand War History, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm
3650]; 7 NZ Anti-Tank Regiment Campaign in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/130; Report
on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL4142, 2/9 [6-14];
McClymont, To Greece, pp. 316-17; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 107.
332
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the railway (after crossing the river) and the road swung south to Larissa.
As the bottleneck for the entire W Force withdrawal, this town was both a
key German objective and Allens responsibility to protect. Expecting the
Germans to appear at any stage, and disturbed about the small number of
troops he had available to defend such a large, extended front, Allen accepted the deployments he found rather than attempting to change them
in any significant way. He subsequently ordered a platoon of the newly
arrived 2/3rd Australian Battalion to thicken up the centre of the 2/2nd
Australian Battalion, and sent a company of the same unit (under Chiltons
command) to the 2/2nd Battalions left flank at Makrikhori village (south
of Parapotamos).8 Nonetheless, a gap of some 2700 metres still existed on
this flank which could be covered only by patrols. The rest of the 2/3rd
Australian Battalion was used as a reserve to defend astride the road to
Larissa some kilometres south of Tempe, to extend the right flank further
and to patrol the roads to Sikourion and Ayia lest the Germans attempt a
flanking move on Larissa from the northeast.9 Allen reported to Major General Mackay that I can do no more than my best. 10
Despite the weaknesses of Allens force, Pinios Gorge was in many ways
a naturally strong defensive position. Any attack, even from west of the
barrier of the gorge itself, still needed to cross a significant river. The constricted terrain also offered opportunities for the defenders to delay any
advance on their positions. Such demolitions had, after all, already halted
Deckers tanks by the blocked railway tunnel on the north side of the gorge.
In the afternoon a successful attempt, cheered by German spectators, was
made to swim a tank across to the road on the south side of the gorge. Four
more crossed in this way, but two others were lost in the river. A separate
party of tanks attempted to bypass the tunnel demolitions by moving on
the north side of the gorge but they were held up by swampy ground.11
8Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9
[6-14]; Material copied for use in the compilation of New Zealand War History, ANZ ADQZ
188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3650]; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 287-8.
9Letter, Brown to Wards, 5 March 1953, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/3; N.L. Macky,
Report on operations of 21 Battalion in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156; K.A.
Longmore, Action of 33 Battery 7 NZ Anti-tank Regiment at Peneios Gorge, Greece, 18 April
1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126; comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch,
Department of Internal Affairs, January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; Material copied for use in the
Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9 [6-14];
Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 107-8; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 316-19.
10Chronology of Operations, G Branch HQ 6 Aust Div Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2.
11Barth, Major und Abteilungs-Kdr., I a, Aufklrungsabteilung 112, 5 May 1941, Athens,
Gefechtsbericht ber die Kmpfe im Tempital am 17. und 18.4.41, BA MA RH 28-6/9b, p. 2;
333
Meanwhile, frustrated at the lack of progress, at 4.00 p.m., 17 April, Decker ordered the cycle squadron of 112th Reconnaissance Battalion forward
to, and then beyond, the blocked tunnel. At 5.00 p.m., just past the tunnel,
the squadron was engaged by machine-gun fire from the 21st NZ Battalion
road block. The German cyclists immediately deployed to attack. With
almost no cover and badly exposed, however, they were soon forced back
into the tunnel. At that point one of the German tanks that had crossed to
the south side of the river arrived, engaged the New Zealand roadblock,
and forced it to retire 200 metres up the ridge. A little earlier Chilton had
sent one of his platoons to patrol the lower portion of the gorge to the
road-block position. As it arrived on the scene it was pinned by fire from
near the roadblockfrom the German tanks, and a small party of troops
of the 8/800th Special Unit (fresh from the aborted attempt to flank Mackys
previous Plantamon position by sea) which had by now joined them on
the south bank of the river. The Australian platoon was unable to break
away until nightfall and suffered a number killed and wounded. Chiltons
pleas to Macky to assist them during the afternoon elicited no response
from his headquarters, or from the New Zealand platoon which had originally been manning the roadblock. On the north side of the river Allied
artillery prevented German attempts to infiltrate much past the blocked
tunnel for the rest of the afternoon. The German cycle company managed
to crawl around 800 metres further forward as dusk fell, but was called back
by Decker to the tunnel. During the night tank columns of Battle Group 2
lined up behind the tunnel for several kilometres.12
Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL4142, 2/9 [6-14];
ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; Material copied for use in the compilation of New Zealand War
History, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3650]; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941,
pp. 279-81.
12The cycle squadron of 112 Reconnaissance Unit (with the cavalry squadron of the
same unit) had been detached from the 6th Mountain Divisions advance guard and reattached to Deckers battalion. Signature, Gebirgs-Art. Rgt. 118, 9 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht
ber das Gefecht bei GONOS am 18.4.1941., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, p. 1; Hptm.u.Abt.Kdr., I./
Geb.Art.Rgt. 118, Rafina, 9 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht der I. Abteilung Geb.Art. Rgt. 118 ber
den Einsatz in Griechenland., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, pp. 8-10; Barth, Major und AbteilungsKdr., I a, Aufklrungsabteilung 112, 5 May 1941, Athens, Gefechtsbericht ber die Kmpfe
im Tempital am 17. und 18.4.41, BA MA RH 28-6/9b, pp. 1-2; entries for 17 and 18 April 1941,
2. Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 Ia und Anlagen 1.1.41 14.6.41., BA MA RH 27-2/20,
pp. 36-40; 6 Mtn Div battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extract of report
by 3 Pz Regt (2 Pz Div), AWM 54, 534/2/27; letter, Brown to Wards, 5 March 1953, ANZ ADQZ
18902, WAII3/1/3; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 321-2.
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At Allens headquarters reports had been arriving all afternoon of small

bodies of Germans in the heights above Gonnos. Chilton therefore decided to despatch a fighting patrol in a small boat, found by the left hand
company of the 2/2nd Australian Battalion, across the river in the late afternoon to ascertain whether any Germans had in fact made it to the village
or its surrounding foothills. This patrol returned 2.00 a.m., after eight hours
of investigating, to report that the Germans were indeed in Gonnos, Rapsani
and Ambelakia, and patrolling the ground in between. During the night
the centre and left hand companies of Chiltons battalion patrolled the
south bank of the river and exchanged fire with Germans on the other side
thought to be conducting reconnaissance. Harassing Allied artillery fire
was laid on the demolitions to the front of the 21st NZ Battalion and on
German parties showing lights in the vicinity of Gonnos. This fire was surprisingly effective. In one bombardment Deckers tank battalion and patrols
from the 8/800th Special Unit lost more than 20 killed and wounded. The
rest of Allens men spent the evening building weapons pits, and digging
slit trenches.13
The German mountain troops closing up to the north of the river also
spent the night preparing for action the next day. During its move to Gonnos the 143rd Regiment was given warning order at 7.50 p.m. for an attack
over the Pinios River early the next morning. This was clarified further at
9.30 p.m. when Boehme ordered cooperation between the 6th Mountain
Division and the 2nd Armoured Division in clearing Pinios Gorge as fast
as possible in order to make an early push on Larissa. An hour later Schrner issued further instructions. His divisions part in the coming attack would
be mounted by two battalions of the 143rd Regiment. They would begin, at
7.00 a.m., with a feint attack by the 1st Battalion (by fire only), against defending troops in the Tempe-Parapotamos area. Then, at 7.30 a.m., the 3rd
Battalion of the same regiment would make a genuine attack on the
western flank of the 2/2nd Australian Battalions position, with the idea of
13Entry for 18 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der 6.GEB.DIV., BA MA RH 28-6/8;
Schrner, Die neuen Thermopylen. (Zum dreijhrigen Bestehen der 6.Geb.Div.: gegrndet
3.6.1940), BA MA RH 28-6/73, p. 2; With the Anzacs in Greece, J.D. Rogers, AWM 54, 534/5/9;
letters (various) from 21st (NZ) Battalion veterans to I. McL. Wards, ANZ ADQZ 18902,
WAII3/1/7; letter, Stewart to Wards, 3 December 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/1; letter,
Wards to Stewart, 28 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/1; Material copied for use
in the compilation of New Zealand War History, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm
3650]; Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9
[6-14]; comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs,
January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; McClymont, To Greece, p. 323.
335
pushing through it to Makrikhori village, and then along the road to Larissa. After the 3rd Battalion had gained its objective, the 1st Battalion was
to cross the river near Parapotamos and push to Larissa east of the road.
The overall purpose of the 143rd Regiments assault was the destruction of
defending forces on south bank of the Pinios, thereby opening up the gorge
and the Larissa Road. Meanwhile, as these attacks unfolded, the third element of Schrners plan was to begin. In this case the 2nd Company (1st
Battalion), the 6th Mountain Divisions original advance guard, was instructed to cross the Pinios further to the west. This companys special task
was to advance over the western slopes of the Erimin Mountains towards
the Larissa Road with the purpose of getting behind the defenders lines.
It could then block the road short of Larissa against either withdrawal by,
or reinforcement of, Allens force. As this attack unfolded the rest of the
6th Mountain Division was ordered to continue its march to Gonnos. The
coming assault by the mountaineers would be the first time they had faced
English troops, rather than Greeks. For its part, Battle Group 2 directed
Deckers tank battalion, along with the two squadron of the 112th Reconnaissance Battalion and the detachment of 8/800th Special Unit in the
vicinity of the blocked railway tunnel to push on through the gorge at first
light.14
The new day dawned at Pinios clear and fine. Schrners attacking battalions had only arrived complete in the Gonnos area during the night and
most of their members thus had only a few hours rest before moving up
to their attack assembly areas at first light. Orders were given at dawn and
the infantry companies prepared themselves. At 6.30 a.m. Allied artillery
began to fall on Gonnos, and on the German 1st Battalion. At 7.00 a.m. the
forward posts of Chiltons 2/2nd Australian Battalion spotted infantrymen
of this battalion, moving down the slopes from Gonnos towards the Pinios
River, in assault equipmentnot marching orderwith clear intent. The
volume of Allied shelling increased as these troops approached the river,
to which was soon added heavy fire from D Company, 2/2nd Australian
14Entry for 18 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der 6.GEB.DIV., BA MA RH 28-6/;
Schrner, 6. Gebirgs-Division., Ia op., 2200 17 April 1941, Divisionsbefehl Nr.55. fr den
Angriff am 18.4.41., BA MA RH 28-6/9a, pp. 1-2; signature, I./Geb.Jg.Reg.143 Ia, 8 May 1941,
Gefechtsbericht ber den Angriff ber den Pinios am 18.4.1941., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, p. 2;
signature, Kommandeur, I./Panzer-Regiment 3, Asproprigos, 2 May 1941, BA MA RH 28-6/9b;
Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27; 6 Mtn Div
battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; S.F. Rowell, The campaign in Greece,
April 1941, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A), [1-4]; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941,
pp. 287-8; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 126.
336
chapter twelve
Battalion in the hills east of Parapotamos, and by a composite Australian

carrier platoon operating from the southern bank of the river. After a prolonged machine-gun duel, by 10.00 a.m. this German feint attack had moved
to around 500 metres north of the river and halted. Reconnaissance found
the river east of Parapotamos impassable to the German infantrymen, most
of whom could not swim, and there was no material to make a crossing.
Unaware that this initial attack was only ever a ruse, Chilton later claimed
success at preventing the river crossing at this point.15 The aim of distracting the Australians from the advance of the 3rd Battalion to the west had,
however, already been achieved.16
Meanwhile, the real 3rd Battalion attack had begun. The unit had left
Gonnos and was two kilometres northwest of Parapotamos by 6.50 a.m.
Advancing eastwards, the Germans began to trickle across the river from
7.45 a.m., using a captured boat, and from late morning onwards by a ferryrun of two boats. The 2/2nd Australian Battalions carrier platoon, sent
forward to clear the river immediately to the front of D Company, engaged
the left flank of the German battalion at the river but could not stop it. At
11.00 a.m. Schrner personally ordered the artillery in support of the 3rd
Battalion to take on a direct-fire assault gun role against two Australian
company positions (D Company, 2/2nd Australian Battalion and C Company 2/3rd Australian Battalion) in position southwest of Parapotamos.
Under such fire, Chiltons left-hand positions were gradually becoming
encircled from the west. Half an hour later the Australians on this flank
were all but surrounded on three sides.17
By midday, to the east, the feint attack by the German 1st Battalion was
ordered to transform into a full-blown assault. The unit was instructed to
188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3650].
16The German battalion commander asked for permission to cross by ferry behind the
3rd Battalion to the west but was denied: signature, I./Geb.Jg.Reg.143 Ia, 8 May 1941,
Gefechtsbericht ber den Angriff ber den Pinios am 18.4.1941., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, p. 2;
6 Mtn Div battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from 6 Mtn Div
War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27; letter, Brown to Wards, 5 March 1953,
ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/3; J.D. Rogers, With the Anzacs in Greece, AWM 54, 534/5/9;
17Signature, I./Geb.Jg.Reg.143 Ia, 8 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber den Angriff ber
den Pinios am 18.4.1941., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, p. 2; Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary
(Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27; 6 Mtn Div battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM
54, 534/2/27; J.D. Rogers, With the Anzacs in Greece, AWM 54, 534/5/9; Long, Greece, Crete
and Syria, pp. 113-14.
337
cross the river by all available means between Evangelismos and Tempe to
open a path out of the gorge for the 2nd Armoured Division. By 1.00 p.m.
this crossing was well underway and, despite considerable defensive shell,
mortar and machine-gun fire on the river and its northern bank, and 20
metres of fast-flowing river, the first German company was across and
formed a beachhead. Over the next 90 minutes the remainder of the battalion forded the river, savaged by fire from A and C Companies, 2/2 Australian Battalion, on the high ground to the south. The cost was high many
German bodies and broken rafts drifted downstream. Meanwhile, by this
time the rest of the 143rd Regiment (less the 1st Battalion) had been ordered
to follow the 3rd Battalion across the Pinios at Parapotamos and to continue the axis of the main attack (via Makrikhori) along the railway line to
Larissa.18
As the German 1st Battalion began pushing across the Pinios, to Chiltons
shock and chagrin troops from the 21st NZ Battalion began flowing through
his headquarters location south of Evangelismos, in unformed groups, some
without equipmentclearly things had not been going well for Macky in
the gorge to the east. Efforts to convince the fleeing New Zealanders to stay,
even by Lieutenant Colonel G.B. Parkinson, in command of the 4th NZ
Field Regiment present at Chiltons headquarters, generally failed. Only
one New Zealand platoon falling back in this direction regrouped and reported to Chilton for further tasking. As they passed through, Mackys men
reported German tanks and infantry had driven them off their positions
and that they had received orders to withdraw independently. Up to this
point Macky had told neither Chilton nor Allen he was even under attack,
let alone that he intended to retire. Mackys last words, before contact
abruptly ceased were: Tanks are through the village [Tempe] and we are
withdrawing to the hills.19 Chiltons C Company, on his right flank immediately southeast of Tempe village, confirmed the New Zealanders flight.
Chilton warned the company to alert the anti-tank gun covering the
Schrner, Kommandeur, 6. Gebirgs-Division, 24 June 1941, Tagesbefehl., BA MA RH 28-6/21,
p. 1; signature, I./Geb.Jg.Reg.143 Ia, 8 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber den Angriff ber den
Pinios am 18.4.1941., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, p. 2; Chronology of Operations, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn
Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; Material copied for use in the compilation of New Zealand War
History, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3650]; 6 Mtn Div battle reports (Greek
campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete),
AWM 54, 534/2/27; McClymont, To Greece, p. 331.
19Chronology of Operations, 16 Aust Inf Bde Greece, AWM54, 534/1/2.
338
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s outhern exit of the gorge at Tempe but it too had already departed, without firing a shot.20
The pressure on the 21st NZ Battalion had in fact begun, as it had on the
2/2nd Australian Battalion to its west, at dawn. In this case, however, it was
not from Schrners mountaineers but the leading elements of Battle Group
2 continuing their push through the Pinios Gorge from the east. At first
light the cycle squadron of the 112th Reconnaissance Battalion renewed its
attack westward along the northern bank of the gorge. At first the cyclists
met less resistance than the day before and the squadron reached a railway
embankment two kilometres northeast of Itia village before it was halted
by heavy enfilade fire from New Zealand machine guns, mortars and artillery from hills on south bank of Pinios. German mortars answered with a
light bombardment, although they were soon interrupted by effective Allied
artillery counter-battery fire. Although this German squadron, duelling
with the main 21st NZ Battalion position from across the gorge, posed little
immediate threat, throughout the morning Macky worried about the sounds
of battle in the vicinity of the 2/2nd Australian Battalion to his flank. He
was soon convinced that a serious German attack was threatening his left
rear area. He called a morning conference and told his subordinates that,
if overwhelmed, they were to disperse to Volos. This order was contrary to
Brigadier Clowes earlier instructions to stay and form a second line of
defence if the battalion was pushed from its current position. Mackys orders
effectively left his individual company commanders to decide when
to retreat.21
The most significant effect of the advance of the 112th Reconnaissance
Battalion cycle squadron west along the northern bank of the Pinios was
not its fire, but the fact that it increasingly occupied the full attention of
20Bericht ber den Einsatz Sdost der Panzerjgerabteilung 38, BA MA RH 20-12/105,
p. 8; report, P.A. Cohen, The Battle of Peneios River, AWM 54, 534/2/22; memo, Cohen to
Allen, May 1941, AWM 54, 513/5/21; N.L. Macky, Report on operations of 21 Battalion in
Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156; K.A. Longmore, Action of 33 Battery 7 NZ Anti-tank
Regiment at Peneios Gorge, Greece, 18 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126; 7 NZ AntiTank Regiment Campaign in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/130; W.E. Murphy, Narrative
of 2 NZ Div. Arty. The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/240;
Narrative of action of Div. Arty. in Greece (with appendices), ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/113.
21Signature, Kommandeur, I./Panzer-Regiment 3, Asproprigos, 2 May 1941, BA MA RH
28-6/9b; 6 Mtn Div battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from
6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27; letters (various) from 21st
(NZ) Battalion veterans to I. McL. Wards, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/7; letter, Stewart to
Wards, 3 December 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/1; letter, Wards to Stewart, 28 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/1; McClymont, To Greece, p. 325.
339
the 21st NZ Battalion and its artillery. The New Zealanders were fixated on
the German cyclists across the gorge and were not, therefore, looking east
in the area of their original platoon roadblock. The problem was that after
the roadblock had been forced to retire the previous day, high ridges meant
that Macky had no way of knowing what was happening in this area. No
patrols were sent to observe it. No observation positions were deployed to
cover it. As a consequence the Germans were able to send further detachments of infantry from the 8/800th Special Unit, and small groups from the
7th Company (304th Regiment), across the river to the south bank and clear
the roadblock unobserved. This task was complete by midday, freeing up
the advance of the detachment of six German tanks that had managed to
ford the river the previous day. These tanks rolled at 12.15 p.m., west along
on the south bank of the gorge, and soon engaged the right flank of the
New Zealand battalion. German tanks duelled with the anti-tank guns
within Mackys perimeter and engaged exposed New Zealand infantry positions on the forward slopes of the southern bank of the gorge. The easternmost New Zealand companies were soon pushed back towards
Ambelakia village, isolating the anti-tank gun positions forward of them,
which soon fell. Not long afterwards, with German tanks just below them
and German infantry on the other side of the gorge, the remaining New
Zealand positions began to fall back. Though some posts continued to hold
on higher up the ridge, Mackys unit lost its cohesion. These were the parties withdrawing through the 2/2nd Australian Battalion, declaring German
armour was moving up the gorge behind them. At this stage the major
ity of Mackys men were fleeing south and southeast up the slopes of
Mt Ossa.22
In the meantime, with New Zealand defensive fire now slackening, the
leading elements of Battle Group 2 pushed further west along the gorge.
More of Deckers tanks, now largely unopposed, were on the verge of
breaking out into open ground west of Tempe village. The Germans were
22Entries for 17 and 18 April 1941, 2. Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 Ia und
Anlagen 1.1.41 14.6.41., BA MA RH 27-2/20, pp. 36-40; Extract of report by 3 Pz Regt (2 Pz
Div), AWM 54, 534/2/27; letters (various) from 21st (NZ) Battalion veterans to I. McL. Wards,
ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/7; letter, Stewart to Wards, 3 December 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902,
WAII3/1/1; letter, Wards to Stewart, 28 November 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/1;
N.L. Macky, Report on operations of 21 Battalion in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156;
K.A. Longmore, Action of 33 Battery 7 NZ Anti-tank Regiment at Peneios Gorge, Greece,
18 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126; letter, Brown to Wards, 5 March 1953, ANZ
ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/3; 7 NZ Anti-Tank Regiment Campaign in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/130; McClymont, To Greece, p. 324; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 114-15.
340
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cautious, however, and took time clearing the mouth of the gorge. Tanks
and infantry moving along south bank did not occupy Tempe until 3.00
p.m. The cyclists of the 112th Reconnaissance Battalion, still scrambling
along the northern bank, did not reach the village until half an hour later.
Nonetheless, with the 21st NZ Battalion now out of the fight, the 2/2nd
Australian Battalion faced not only frontal attack from German mountain
troops but now German armour approaching from its right flank.23
With Tempe secured, preparations for a concerted German attack against
Chiltons battalion began. First, Allens headquarters near Makrikhori railway station was bombed for 30 minutes by around 35 German aircraft. Next,
German tanks from Tempe drove towards Chiltons eastern (C Company)
position, while supporting infantry spread over the ridges previously occupied by the New Zealanders. Meanwhile, the German 1st Battalion (143rd
Regiment), launched an attack on Evangelismos, near the centre of Chiltons
position, from its hard-won bridgehead over the Pinios River.24 What followed for the 2/2nd Australian Battalion was a chaotic and desperate sort
of struggle by companies and platoons. Chilton lost communications with
his left forward company (D Company) after ordering it to mount a counterattack against troops of the German 3rd Battalion, seeking to flank his
position to the west. At around 4.00 p.m. a badly worded order from headquarters 2/3rd Australian Battalion to one of its companies, situated close
to Chiltons left forward company, led to a premature withdrawal of both
to Makrikhori village. When firing ceased on the Makrikhori slopes Chilton
incorrectly assumed both companies had been overrun. With the withdrawal of these companies the 2/2nd Australian Battalions left flank was
wide open. The forward anti-tank guns supporting his battalion now began
receiving small arms fire from this flank, as did Chiltons headquarters.25
23Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27; 6 Mtn
Div battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; McClymont, To Greece, p. 327;
24Report, P.A. Cohen, The Battle of Peneios River, AWM 54, 534/2/22; Long, Greece,
25The order was supposed to have directed the company from the 2/3rd Australian
Battalion (C Company) to withdraw when required to conform with any withdrawal by its
neighbouring 2/2nd Australian Battalion company (D Company). That is, C Company should
move with D Company, not the other way around. It was misinterpreted, however, as an
immediate order to retire. Report of Lieutenant C.M. Johnson, 2/1 Australian A/Tk Regiment, AWM 54, 534/3/8; 7 NZ Anti-Tank Regiment Campaign in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/130; signature, I./Geb.Jg.Reg.143 Ia, 8 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber den Angriff
ber den Pinios am 18.4.1941., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, p. 2; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 329-31.
341
By 5.00 p.m. the situation for the 2/2nd Australian Battalion was deteriorating even further. Allen managed to contact Chilton with rather optimistic orders to hold his position until 3.00 a.m. that night. Freyberg also
spoke to Chilton from Allens headquarters wanting to know where the 21st
NZ Battalion was and if he could speak to Macky. Chilton reported this as
impossible. The line went dead soon after and there were no more communications between Chilton and Allen. At 5.30 p.m. a liaison officer was
despatched from Allens headquarters to Chilton with new orders for his
unit to thin out and break contact as soon as it was dark. The liaison officer
returned to Allen at 7.00 p.m., however, with the news that he could not
get through to Chiltons headquarters.26
As the German mountain troops attacked what remained of the 2/2nd
Australian Battalion they were joined by the leading Battle Group 2 tanks,
which had by now had passed through Evangelismos from Tempe. As they
had proceeded west through the Pinios Gorge, each German tank had
dragged a trailer carrying a section of infantrymen (mostly from the 7th
Company, 304th Infantry Regiment), while more infantrymen followed on
behind. Chiltons C Company, on his right, soon reported that tanks had
broken into its position from Tempe and that it was taking fire from infantry on the high ground in the old 21st NZ Battalion position. The German
tanks in this area pulled up stationary for around 30 minutes firing machine
guns and cannon. C Companys infantrymen replied with small arms
without effectand the company was forced to withdraw shortly after 5.30
p.m. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion had made slow progress towards Evangelismos and the hills southeast of the village in the face of stubborn resistance from Chiltons A Company. At 5.55 p.m. two tanks approached this
company from the right flank. Soon after another ten German armoured
vehicles attacked, supported by infantry. A Company, by now out of contact
with Chilton, was also forced to withdraw. At around 6.00 p.m., after more
delay imposed predominantly by Allied artillery fire, the now combined
Battle Group 2 tank and infantry force broke out of the Pinios defile and
moved into open ground west of the mouth of the gorge. Within half an
hour later this force, in conjunction with the mountain troops, had overrun
most of the remaining 2/2nd Australian Battalion posts and forced them
to withdraw. Chiltons headquarters was by this stage receiving fire from
its front, from the direction of Tempe, and from the old left flank D
26Material copied for use in the compilation of New Zealand War History, ANZ ADQZ
188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3650]; Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July
1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9 [6-14]; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 117-18.
342
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Company positions now occupied by the Germans (which included an

assault gun).27
From 6.30 p.m. German troops and tanks emerged slowly from the gorge
from the east, delayed at every point by Allied artillery batteries which were
leapfrogging to the rear, firing often over open sights as they went, and by
the remaining Australian carriers which had formed up, hulls down, astride
a nearby road/railway junction to cover the withdrawal of any of Chiltons
infantrymen that managed to get away. By 6.45 p.m. they began to converge
with the mountaineers south of Evangelismos, where Chiltons headquarters and his last remaining company position (B Company) stood. The only
defending anti-tank gun left, sited 70 metres from Chiltons headquarters
had by now, once more, departed without orders. German troops were
approaching from the north and northwest. Germans were also seen to the
left-rear in foothills across the flat. Chilton thus ordered B Company to
withdraw. Five minutes later, with his headquarters group of around 70
men engaged by German infantry and tanks from 45-180 metres away, Chilton gave the final order to evacuate all remaining troops of his battalion.
From this point until darkness fell, small parties of Australians clambered
into the nearby hills east and west of road to Larissa, chased by streams of
German bullets, shells and mortar bombs. Most surviving Australian infantrymen were headed for the coast. Many groups rejoined each other in hills
that night and by end of next day the main party consisted of 12 officers
and 140 ranks from the 2/2nd Australian Battalion, as well as 7 officers and
120 ranks from the 21st NZ Battalion. Chilton was not with them. Eventually this group reached the coast five kilometres south of Koritza and waited two days for a Royal Navy pick up. Disappointed, it then split into small
groups, owing to difficulty of obtaining food, and the idea that small parties
had better chance to escape. Most went south and sought boats. By 25 April
the majority of the largest original group of escapees reached Skiathos
Island and from there moved to Chios Island. The single largest party of
122 Australian and New Zealand survivors of Pinios Gorge reached Crete
on 5 May.28
27Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27;
McClymont, To Greece, p. 335; Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July
1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9 [6-14]; Material copied for use in the compilation of New Zealand
War History, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3650]; letter, Brown to Wards, 5 March
1953, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/3; 6 Mtn Div battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM 54,
534/2/27; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 118-19.
28Signature, Gebirgs-Art. Rgt. 118, 9 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber das Gefecht bei
GONOS am 18.4.1941., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, p. 1; signature, Hptm.u.Abt.Kdr., I./Geb.Art.Rgt.
343
Figure 12.1:Survivors from the 2/2nd Australian Battalion after the engagement at Pinios
photographed on Euboea Island on the eve of their escape from Greece to Turkey. Lieutenant
Colonel Chilton is fourth from the left in the back row. (Source: Australian War Memorial:
134872)
The two German thrusts against Larissa had now converged. The 1st
Battalion (joined by the recently arrived 2nd Battalion, 143rd Regiment)
pressed on towards Makrikhori railway station, while the 3rd Battalion of
the regiment made a parallel push into the hills directly south of Parapotamos. The leading companies of two more battalions of Schrners newly
arrived 141st Regiment crossed the Pinios River to their rear and raced independently towards Makrikhori. The leading elements of the 2nd Armoured Divisions Battle Group 2, and these fresh mountain troops, made
it just south of the railway station before they were temporarily halted by
heavy Allied shelling and by the falling darkness.29
118, Rafina, 9 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht der I. Abteilung Geb.Art. Rgt. 118 ber den Einsatz
in Griechenland., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, pp. 8-10; diary extract from Lieutenant R. Blain, 2/2
Battalion, AWM PR03/134; 6 Mtn Div battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27;
memo, Cohen to Allen, May 1941, AWM 54, 513/5/21; letters (various) from 21st (NZ) Battalion veterans to I. McL. Wards, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/7; Report on operations of 21
Battalion in Greece, N.L. Macky, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156; Material copied for use in
the compilation of New Zealand War History, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3650];
Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL4142, 2/9 [6-14];
P.A. Cohen, report, The Battle of Peneios River, AWM 54, 534/2/22; Report on operations
of 6th Australian Division in Greece, Major General I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34;
29Frster, Geb. Jg. Rgt. 141, Biwak Lutsa, 8 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber den Angriff
ber den Pinios am 18.4.1941., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, pp. 1-2; signature, I./Geb.Jg.Reg.143 Ia,
344
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By 6.00 p.m., as German tanks broke out of the Pinios Gorge, Brigadier
Allen was ready to implement a hastily developed contingency plan. His
orders were still to deny the Germans the line through Tempe-Sikourion
until 3.00 a.m., 19 April, as the roads through Larissa were reserved until
1.00 a.m. for the withdrawal of the 6th NZ Brigade. With the loss of the 21st
NZ Battalion and most of the 2/2nd Australian Battalion cut off and dispersed this task would now have to be completed as a fighting withdrawal.
Allen first redeployed his headquarters and what guns could be gathered
to a road-rail junction south of Makrikhori, mindful that there were several points along the route back to Larissa where further blocking forces
could be placed. He remained confident that the Germans could be held
until nightfall, when the job would be much easier. Allen had, at Freybergs
suggestion, already ordered Lieutenant Colonel D.J. Lamb, commanding
the 2/3rd Australian Battalion, to prepare a rearguard line at these crossroads. In addition to preparing his own companies, Lamb was to forcibly
hold all guns particularly anti-tank gunsthat tried to get through from
the forward lines, and also to grab all other troops he saw and make use of
them.30 This included the two companies that had mistakenly withdrawn
from the left flank of the 2/2nd Australian Battalion and any straggling New
Zealanders. By 6.15 p.m. the troops gathered on Lambs hurriedly convened
rearguard line consisted of two companies from the 2/3rd and one from
the 2/2nd Australian Battalions, deployed on either side of the road to
Larissa. Allens surviving carrier force and a recently arrived squadron of
New Zealand cavalrymen reinforced them. Elements of Allens artillery,
including detachments which had pulled out of the forward positions without orders, were re-deployed by Lamb behind this screen. Closing rapidly
on this blocking force was Deckers leading tank company, now supported
by infantrymen from the 2nd Battalion (304th Regiment). To the west, the
1st and 2nd Battalions (141st Regiment), had taken over from the 143rd
Regiment as the vanguard of the 6th Mountain Division.31
8 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber den Angriff ber den Pinios am 18.4.1941., BA MA RH
28-6/9b, p. 2; 6 Mtn Div battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Long, Greece,
Crete and Syria, p. 127; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 287-8.
[6-14].
31Frster, Geb. Jg. Rgt. 141, Biwak Lutsa, 8 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber den Angriff
ber den Pinios am 18.4.1941., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, pp. 1-2; Material copied for use in the
letter, Brown to Wards, 5 March 1953, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/3; Chronology of Operations, 16 Aust Inf Bde Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust,
345
At around 6.30 p.m. Allens rearguard position was attacked by five German tanks moving astride the road. A hail of ineffective small arms fire
greeted them before two New Zealand 25-pounders were moved up into
the line to engage the tanks over open sights. In the ensuing duel two tanks
and one gun were lost before the artillerymen, now out of ammunition,
withdrew with their wounded. The remaining German tanks formed up
and continued forward. At that moment a squadron of German aircraft
appeared and thoroughly strafed Allens infantrymen and carriers. The
tanks pressed forward in the half-light of dusk and broke into the defending infantry positions. Rifles and Brens had no effect. At one point 15-20
Australians allegedly surrounded a German tank ineffectively pouring small
arms fire into it. Two Australian soldiers were crushed in their pits by tank
tracks. Nor did the Boys rifles of the New Zealand cavalrymen slow the
leading German vehicles before they too were forced to retire. With heavy
German mortar fire now falling, at 9.00 p.m. Lambs disheartened infantrymen began to move backwards, or into the hills on each side of the road,
and the line was broken. An Australian officer attached to Allens headquarters described how suddenly, everybody seemed to become panic
stricken and the one object appeared to be to get away.32 Both D Company
(2/2nd Australian Battalion) and C Company (2/3rd Australian Battalion)
thus withdrew for the second time without orders. The carriers and artillery
followed them. Only B Company, 2/3rd Australian Battalion, held in position until ordered to move. At this point Lieutenant Colonel Lamb once
again took control and reformed the withdrawing parties of infantrymen
1400 metres further south, again astride the road in the darkness. They were
soon joined by Allens headquarters, various artillery detachments and the
remaining Australian carriers. The men lay in the darkness, close enough
to touch each other. What was left of Allens transport was placed only a
few hundred metres to their rear.33
Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL4142, 2/9 [6-14]; comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War
History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; entries for 17
and 18 April 1941, 2. Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 Ia und Anlagen 1.1.41 14.6.41.,
BA MA RH 27-2/20, pp. 36-40; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 333-7; Long, Greece, Crete and
Syria, p. 119.
[6-14]; UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative The
Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618].
33Bericht ber den Einsatz Sdost der Panzerjgerabteilung 38, BA MA RH 20-12/105,
p. 8 ; Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9
[6-14]; signature, Kommandeur, I./Panzer-Regiment 3, Asproprigos, 2 May 1941, BA MA RH
28-6/9b; entries for 17 and 18 April 1941, 2. Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 Ia und
346
chapter twelve
Within minutes of Lamb rallying his ad hoc second rearguard line,

Deckers tanks once again arrived. The Australians opened fire. The leading German tank commander, standing waist-high in the turret, was riddled
with bullets. By now operating in the darkness this tank and others to its
rear fired tracer and shells randomly. This fire was met by an equally ineffective volley of small arms fire from the defenders, but nonetheless this
time the German armoured column stopped. In the dark the risk of supporting units firing on each other, a dangerous lack of fuel, and exhausted
ammunition supplies encouraged Deckers leading tank company to halt
in what Allen later called a scene of colourful confusion, a world of Very
lights, tracer bullets and blazing vehicles.34 Allen ordered Lamb to withdraw the force further back to a point where the road crossed a swampy
area, considered to be difficult terrain for tanks, north of Larissa. Allens
headquarters pulled at 9.30 p.m. with night and rumour spreading
disorder.35 Inexplicably, however, the Germans did not follow up their
armoured push with immediate infantry patrols or any other form of pressure. Instead, German tank crews once again resupplied themselves on
captured food taken in the main from abandoned Allied vehicles. Flares
subsequently rose to the flanks where German infantry explored the hills
but no more attacks developed. It was fortunate for Allens men that the
Germans had halted. The ford through this swamp was, in fact, found to
be blocked by a bogged New Zealand 25-pounder, and crammed with
transport. Allen noted the confusion of vehicles was such that the further
withdrawal of the force was almost impossible.36 The ford area was at last
cleared by 4.00 a.m.37
Anlagen 1.1.41 14.6.41., BA MA RH 27-2/20, pp. 36-40; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 120;
34Quoted in McClymont, To Greece, p. 339.
March-April, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7.
37G. Long, The 6th Division in action, AWM PR88/72; signature, Kommandeur, I./
Panzer-Regiment 3, Asproprigos, 2 May 1941, BA MA RH 28-6/9b; entries for 17 and 18 April
1941, 2. Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 Ia und Anlagen 1.1.41 14.6.41., BA MA RH
27-2/20, pp. 36-40; Extract of report by 3 Pz Regt (2 Pz Div), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Schrner,
Die neuen Thermopylen. (Zum dreijhrigen Bestehen der 6.Geb.Div.: gegrndet 3.6.1940),
BA MA RH 28-6/73, p. 2; Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941,
AWM 3DRL4142, 2/9 [6-14]; comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 121;

0
2 kilometres
992
1 mile
Rapsani
955
6 Mtn Div
noon
17 April
423
387
7/304
Gonnos
Itia
to Elasson
6 Mtn Div
18 April
43
III/1
Pinio
s R iv
er
43
I/143
20
feint attack
Parapotamos
D Coy 2/2 156
Makrikhori
7 pm
I/3 Pz
Regt
26 Bty
4 Fd Regt
A Tp, 5 Bde
A Coy
2/2
21
A/21
OP
C/21
OP
11 Pl
B/21
841
D/21
929
Evangelismos
B Coy
2/1
2/2
4 Fd Regt
1005
2 platoons
2/2
112 Recce
INSET
Itia
SEE INSET
C Coy
2/2
Elatia
I/3 Pz
Regt
A Coy 2/2
B Coy
2/3
16 Bde
Makrikhorion
B Sqn
Div Cav
2/3
I/3 Pz Regt crosses here

17 April
10 Pl
B/21
Ambelakia
I/3 Pz
6.30 pm
D Coy
2/3
125
0 pm
s
rol
pat y
ier fantr
r
r
Ca Pl In /2 Bn
1 2
2 pm
Coy OP
5.30 pm C2/3
591
5.3
12 Pl
B/21
Tempe
C Coy
2/2
141
2/1
264
Tunnel
demolition 382
112 Recce
18 April
358
to
road block
at Larissa
Ferry
199
112 Recce
and I/3 Pz Regt
17 April
710
7/143
18 April
347
I/3 Pz
Regt
3.30
pm
Tempe
21
C/21
OP
L A-tk Tp
A/21
OP
Field gun
A-Tk gun
2/1
Evangelismos
2/1
B Coy
172
Pournari
2/2
4 Fd Regt
500 metres
500 yards
Map 12.1:The Pinios Gorge Action, 17-18 April 1941
Despite the fact that the German pursuit had ended for the night, the withdrawal of Allens force from its second rearguard line through the swampy
ford to a position just north of Larissa did not proceed according to plan.
Unknown to Allen, the German 2nd Company (1st Battalion, 143rd Regiment), still under Schrners direct command, had followed orders and
moved around the left flank of the defenders and set up an ambush at a
road-rail level crossing four kilometres north of Larissa. It had been an epic
days march for this company which had begun by swimming the Pinios,
unnoticed by the Australians. Lieutenant Jacob, leading the company, then
made a reconnaissance of the country on the south side, noticed defenders
150 metres northwest of Makrikhori, and decided to deviate from his orig-
348
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inal instructions by taking a much wider and deeper sweep to the west
around the hills through Mavrolithos and Kuluri. Jacobs men were north
of Kuluri by 6.00 p.m., and reached their road-rail junction ambush site just
in time to capture two W Force trucks en route to Larissa from Tempe. The
Germans cut all telephone lines in use at the crossroads and a roadblock
was made with the two captured trucks. The company went into all-round
defence in a natural redoubt. To this point, from the morning of 17 April,
this company had marched around 150 kilometres across mountains and
difficult terrain with a total of two-and-a-half hours sleep.38
Almost immediately a nine to ten truck Allied ammunition convoy appeared and was captured by the German company. Then, at 10.30 p.m., the
leading vehicles of Allens long column from Pinios Gorge approached. The
Germans initiated another ambush, riddling the lead lorry with bullets and
calling for surrender. A carrier travelling with the convoy tried to force the
German roadblock at high speed, but it was engaged with machine-gun
and anti-tank rifle fire and destroyed. Allens convoy halted in confusion,
the road now thoroughly choked, and his remaining troops took cover as
best they could. Many opened fire on the German company position. At
11.30 p.m. two more carriers came forward, weapons blazing, and again tried
to crash through the road block. They were met with a wall of German fire,
but nonetheless pushed to close range, with dismounted troops following.
By around 1.00 a.m., however, the attack had petered out. Around thirty
Australians surrendered and the rest dispersed to the southeast. Others
escaped towards Larissa by skirting the roadblock on foot. Meanwhile, the
bulk of Allens column had been halted well short of the ambush site. Lamb,
noting the fire to this front, and therefore assuming Larissa to have fallen
to the Germans, decided to divert the column east, along what he mistakenly thought was the Volos Road. This was, however, a dead end route to a
village by the coast south of Mt Ossa. Allens force was dispersing in the
darkness; a large part of it was soon lost.39
38Signature, 6. Gebirgs-Division, Athens, 7 May 1941, Bericht ber den Einsatz und das
Gefecht der verst. 2./Geb.Jg.Rgt.143 am 18.u.19.4.41. bei Larissa., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, pp. 1-3;
Schrner, Kommandeur, 6. Gebirgs-Division, 24 June 1941, Tagesbefehl., BA MA RH 28-6/21,
p. 1; 6 Mtn Div battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Long, Greece, Crete
and Syria, p. 127.
Gefecht der verst. 2./Geb.Jg.Rgt.143 am 18.u.19.4.41. bei Larissa., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, pp. 1-3.
After trying to avoid the German company ambush on the Larissa Road the main body of
Allens column found itself stranded along a dead-end road mistakenly thought to be the
route to Volos. With Very lights indicating the proximity of German troops, from this point
349
Apart from the physical challenge of reaching its ambush position, Jacobs company ambush on the Larissa Road had attained some remarkable
results. It had, in effect, managed to block Allens withdrawal. Its success
also led to a later legend that Larissa had been in German hands during the
night of 18 April. This was never the case. Units of the 6th NZ Brigade were
in fact passing through the town until 4.00 a.m. the next morning. Other
rumours were that the confusion was a consequence of German agents in
Larissa misdirecting traffic, or of Greek fifth column activity, but there is
no evidence for such conclusions. Allens predicament was a consequence
of a well-executed successful German company-level operation. This was
achieved at a cost of two Germans killed, and two others wounded.40
There is no question that events in the vicinity of Pinios Gorge between
17-18 April were critical to the course and conduct of the remainder of the
Greek campaign. The chances of W Force successfully withdrawing to the
Thermopylae Line were in many ways predicated on Allens force holding
out until the morning of 19 April, after which time the threat to the bottleneck at Larissa would have passed and a critical situation would have been
saved. At the same time, the potential of breaking through the defenders
in this location, and thus cutting-off a large proportion of W Force from
moving south through Larissa represented a significant opportunity for the
German 18th Corps. Field Marshal List was later liberal in his praise for the
troops of the 6th Mountain Division and 2nd Armoured Division who fought
at Pinios. He remarked repeatedly about the excellent cooperation between
command and control faltered and much of the force broke up into smaller self-directing
groups. A proportion managed to reach the Anzac Corps again by trekking overland through
the foothills of Pelion and Mt Ossa to Thermopylae. By nightfall, 20 April 250 men from the
2/2nd Australian Battalion and 500 from the 2/3rd Australian Battalion had reformed into
a reserve position at Amphyklia. Corporal Rawson, 16 Australian Brigade (as told in March
1945), Withdrawal and Evacuation from Greece AWM 54, 534/3/3; Chronology of Operations, G Branch HQ 6 Aust Div Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; Material copied for use in the
Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9 [6-14];
Anzac Corps Intelligence Summary No. 1, 21 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/10; G. Long, The
6th Division in action, AWM PR88/72; 6 Mtn Div battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM
54, 534/2/27; A summary of the participation of the A.I.F. in the Lustreforce Expedition in
Greece March-April, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7.
Gefecht der verst. 2./Geb.Jg.Rgt.143 am 18.u.19.4.41. bei Larissa., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, pp. 1-3;
War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658; comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War
History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; S.F. Rowell,
The campaign in Greece, April 1941, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A), [1-4]; 6 Mtn Div
battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
350
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these formations, the very model of combined action, and the critical role
they played in the break out into the plains of Thessaly.41 The Pz [armoured] troops swift advance, List noted was made possible only by the
mountain troops splendid marching.42 He was correct in this regard. Without rations for three days, the leading troops of the 6th Mountain Division
had undertaken a monumental encircling hunger march to the west, then
climbed 1200 metres on the southern slopes of Mt. Olympus, before reaching the northern bank of the Pinios river before attacking the 2/2nd Australian Battalion and helping open the gorge for Battle Group 2.43 Brigadier
Allen may well have complained that his forces reserves, mentally and
physically, were overdrawn, but his men could not have been more tired
than these German mountain troops.44 Yet Lists tributes masked the fact
that Allen did hold on for sufficient time to protect Larissaif only by the
skin of his teeth. It is worth remembering in this regard that had Greek
forces north of Grevena (and difficult road conditions) not held the Germans to the north of Saviges force, then Allens switch to Pinios would
never have happened in the first place. It could not have been a closer run
sequence of events for W Force. 45
Taken in total, the Battle of Pinios Gorge sheds light on a number of the
common historical assumptions often made above the Greek campaign
and discussed in the preceding chapters. First, the pervading premise that
W Force troops were pushed from their positions by vastly superior German
numbers is once again unsupported by evidence. This claim can be traced
back to wartime propaganda and contemporary press declarations that the
defenders at Pinios participated in distinctly unequal combat, in that they
held up two divisions, which outnumbered them by at least ten to one.46
Such contentions are unsubstantiated. Allens brigade group faced attack
41Fighting in central and southern Greece, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W.
List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 309-10.
42Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
43General Georg Gartmayr, Bad Godesberg, letter to Generalfeldmarschall Schrner,
Munich, 6 July 1957, BA MA N 60/97, p. 1. See also Schrner, Die neuen Thermopylen. (Zum
dreijhrigen Bestehen der 6.Geb.Div.: gegrndet 3.6.1940), BA MA RH 28-6/73, p. 2.
44Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL4142, 2/9
45Schrner, Die neuen Thermopylen. (Zum dreijhrigen Bestehen der 6.Geb.Div.:
gegrndet 3.6.1940), BA MA RH 28-6/73, p. 2; Extracts from 12th Armys daily intelligence
reports (Greece), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
46Epic withdrawal from Greece, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 May 1941, AWM PR 88/72.
351
Figure 12.2:Field Marshal List congratulating German mountain troops following the
Battle of Pinios Gorge. (Source: ullstein bild/The Granger Collection, New York: 0172730)
by elements of two German divisions, but it certainly did not fight then as
divisions. In fact, the 21st NZ Battalion was assaulted, in the morning of 18
April, by 6-9 German tanks, around two companies of German troops from
112th Reconnaissance Battalion firing from across the gorge, small detachments of infantrymen from 8/800th Special Unit, and small groups from
the 7th Company (304th Regiment) which had managed to cross to the
south bank. This force increased as the afternoon approached, but by this
stage the 21st NZ Battalion was in the process of leaving the field. When
account is taken of the anti-tank support available to Macky, the force that
routed the New Zealanders was roughly equivalent.47
Similarly, on the western flank, Chiltons 2/2nd Australian Battalion was
attacked during the morning of 18 April by a single battalion (3rd Battalion,
143rd Regiment), less a company despatched to perform the Larissa ambush.
This attack was covered by a feint by the 1st Battalion (143rd Regiment).
Even conceding that in the afternoon Chiltons battalion was under fire
from some leading elements of Battle Group 2 emerging from the gorge,
and faced an attack by the 1st Battalion when it eventually moved against
Evangelismos, the actual numbers of troops engaging each other on the
47The public reaction to the Greek campaign, compiled by Gavin Long, AWM 3DRL
8052/109.
352
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ground in this sector still did not give much of a numerical advantage to
the Germans. Certainly, in both instances had the defenders held for longer,
then the Germans would have been free to concentrate an ever-increasing
force against thembut it did not develop that way. The Battle of Pinios
Gorge, as it eventuated, as opposed to how it might have proceeded, was
fought between roughly equal ground forces. The story was the same in
terms of artillery. The German attack was only effectively supported by the
1st Battalion (118th Artillery Regiment), which was low on ammunition and
could deliver only 400 rounds all day on 18 April. The 1st Battalion, 95th
Mountain Artillery Regiment, only arrived on the scene at 3.00 p.m., too
late to have an impact as German forces were already advancing on the
south side of the Pinios. Against this the 4th NZ Field Regiment supported
Allens men.48
In the same vein there were tanks present at Pinios, but here the terrain,
which contradicted all principles and experience, acted against their being
decisive.49 Due to demolitions, Deckers tanks had to be taken down to the
deep and swift Pinios River one by one with the help of engineers. A number were lost in the torrent and others bogged. The nine vehicles (at best)
that pressed their morning attack on the 21st NZ Battalion faced five antitank guns sited within Mackys position, as well as field guns prepared to
fire in an anti-tank role if required. This was no German wave of steel. More
tanks were deployed only after the 21st NZ Battalion had been removed
from the east of Tempe. During the battle the Germans lost in the vicinity
of 140 casualties. The defenders lost many more, especially considering
those taken prisoner or lost to their units, and not because they were overwhelmed by sheer numbers of unstoppable German tanks.50
Pinios revealed another important insight about the nature of the German advance down the Greek peninsula. Logistics problems, which had
been foreshadowed at the earliest stages of the campaign, were now becoming a significant operational concern for the Germans. To begin, the fact
that the Germans failed to clear the gorge in time to take Larissa and cut
the W Force withdrawal was largely a consequence of an inability to move
up supplies and troops in the Olympus sector. Simply put, the nature of
486 Mtn Div battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
49A few war experiences, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and General
H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2.
Greek Campaign, AWM 67, 5/17; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in
Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139.
353
the Greek terrain and Lists focus on speed left forward units dangerously
extended from their logistics depots. Vanguard units thus fought piecemeal,
not as concentrated units, and at times perilously short of supplies. In the
advance and attack at Pinios this logistics over-extension was only partially alleviated by airdrops and shipping ammunition, fuel and food by
small ships along Aegean coast. Some advance units still found themselves
so far forward they were forced to consume emergency rations and in many
cases leading German troops, out of touch with their supply lines and headquarters, relied on captured fuel and food from abandoned British and
Greek dumps. It is not too much to suggest that in some cases such booty,
and very low ammunition expenditures, was all that allowed German spearheads to continue forward. Such logistics risk-taking by the Germans had
marked the campaign from the start. Even in the largely motorised 40th
Corps, for example, as early as 7 April quartermasters were reporting difficulties of supplying rations and fuel. Thus far, such logistics gambles had
paid off, and in a campaign as short (both in terms of time and space) as
Greece the chances were that they would keep paying off. This type of logistics risk-taking, however, was an inherently dangerous practice. Many
of the logistics-related difficulties faced by the Germans in Greece foreshadowed supply disaster that would befall them in Russia.51
The question remains, however, that if it was not overwhelming German
numbers or armour that decided the issue at Pinios, and if the Germans
were to some degree overstretching already extended logistics chains, what
went wrong for the defenders? The first part of an answer to this question
must be centred on the vexed issue of the 21st NZ Battalions premature
withdrawalon which Australian and New Zealand military historians
have differed for many years. The Australian position is reasonably clear
and consistent. Official Australian reports all basically agreed that the New
Zealanders fell back, before they ought to have, thus exposing the right
flank of the 2/2nd Battalion, and making Chiltons position untenable, in
spite of his dogged efforts to hold on as long as possible.52 Major General
Mackay did not pull his punches, claiming that Allens whole position was
51Entry for 7 April 1941, Gen. Kdo. (mot) XXXX. A.K., Abt. Qu., 16 March 1941, Fortsetzung
des Kriegstagebuches (Band 2) Begonnen am 16.3.41 Beendet am 1.6.41., BA MA RH 24-40/153,
p. 48; Report of activities in Greece Apr 41 by Lt. Col. R.R. Vial, 12 January 1945, AWM 54,
534/2/32; G.E. Blau, Invasion Balkans!, pp. 82, 97, 101.
March-April, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7; UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ
[Microfilm 3618].
354
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compromised by the withdrawal of 21 NZ Bn and A Tk guns with them.53

Allen himself was later at pains to praise Chiltons battalion in that it held
on until late afternoon, in spite of the complete withdrawal of the 21 N.Z.
Bn.54 Captain R.R. Vial, of the 6th Australian Divisions intelligence section,
concluded after questioning some 21st NZ Battalion soldiers intercepted
while withdrawing at Allens headquarters that they had broken before
they were attacked by the enemy under the impression they were cut off.55
In summary, according to this common Australian interpretation, the New
Zealanders broke too early and without good cause, thus fatally undermining the whole Allied position at Pinios.56
Unsurprisingly, such conclusions have not been so readily accepted or
palatable to many New Zealand ex-servicemen and historians. Freyberg
wrote after the war that: there could be no adverse criticism of the actions
of the 21st New Zealand Battalion. They were overwhelmed by a greatly
superior enemy forcewhich was, of course, untrue.57 In response to
early British and Australian conclusions damning the failure of the 21st NZ
Battalion, Ian Wards, one of New Zealands official historians, declared that
Christopher Buckley, an Englishman who published an early account of
the campaign in 1952 which criticised Mackys unit, was neither an historian or a good journalist.58 In the same vein, according to Wards, Gavin
Long (the Australian official historian) was, an Australian and, by extension implication, not to be trusted.59 New Zealands official historians went
to great pains to try and find an alternative explanation of what happened
at Pinios. After all, it was clear that there ought to have been sufficient
forces in place to delay the Germans for longer than they did. The key aspect
was preventing German tanks leaving the gorge, which brought the focus
once more back to Mackys battalion. The 21st NZ Battalion, and its attached
anti-tank guns, should have stopped the small leading German infantry
and tank detachment on a restricted and narrow front in the gorge.
May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34.
[6-14]; UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative The
Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618].
534/2/32.
[1-4].
57Letter, Freyberg to Cody, 9 May 1951, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/8.
58Letter, Wards to McClymont, 22 December 1949, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/15.
59Ibid.
355
Over the years many authors, seeking to save Mackys reputation, have
generally concluded that it was Allens faulty dispositions which invited
the German breakthrough, rather than 21st NZ Battalions retreat. In particular, they argue, as they were deployed on hills on the south bank of the
Pinios and not in the gorge, Mackys men seemed sited to meet a frontal
attack from across the river. Along the high ridges the New Zealanders were
thus useless once German tanks were at Tempe. Furthermore, Allen placed
too little importance on the key tunnel demolition and road block in the
gorge itself. Of his seven anti-tank guns not one covered this obstacle. Only
two covered the gorge entrance and the rest were positioned too far back
to prevent German tanks debouching from the gorge. Perhaps a full infantry company with anti-tank weapons might have been placed covering this
obstacle to great effect. Allen also prepared no force for counter-attacks,
while two full companies (of the 2/3rd Australian Battalion) were in reserve
some six and a half kilometres distant. This did not seem, according to one
author, the best use was made of the troops available.60 Wards went further
in suggesting that the brigade commander didnt seem able to cope, and
that as a consequence of Allens dispositions, the battle there was lost
before a single enemy soldier appeared.61 While there is certainly something
to such complaints about Allens choice of defensive layout at Pinios, such
arguments must inevitably be seen as an attempt to shift focus from Mackys
failure, or else explain the poor performance of the 21st NZ Battalion in
this action.
While it is true that failing to cover the road block in the gorge adequately was a mistake by the defenders, it was as much Mackys error as it was
Allens. In fact, Macky himself later described this as his major mistake at
Pinios.62 Had an effective block been maintained then German tanks would
have had much more difficulty emerging from the gorge. This, admitted
Macky, we could and should have done.63 As well it was Macky who chose
to man the roadblock with a single platoon and Macky who chose not to
replace that platoon when it was forced off the position by the Germans.
His battalion had been given clear responsibility by Allen to cover the road
block and prevent German tanks moving out of the gorge. This he failed to
accomplish. The fact that the Germans were able to clear the roadblock
60Letter, Long to Allen, 18 February 1954, AWM 3DRL 4142, 6/9 [32-37].
61Letter, Wards to McClymont, 25 February 1953, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/15.
63Letter, Macky to Wards, 9 February 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/7.
356
chapter twelve
quickly and without interference was decisive as it opened the way for more
tanks to pour through the gorge. These were the vehicles that later swamped
Chiltons headquarters. Macky had also chosen, with his mission in mind,
to deploy his companies on the ridges south of the gorge; he had not been
directed there by Allen. Rather, with very little time available after arriving
at Pinios, and expecting the Germans at any minute, Allen accepted Mackys
choices. Allen recalled being puzzled in the afternoon of 17 April at Mackys
not covering his platoon at the roadblock, but believed the New Zealand
commander was rattled and considered it safer to let the dispositions
already agreed to stand. Allen was confident that Mackys force, with
its anti-tank guns, could perform its task of blocking the gorge and was,
in fact, more concerned before the battle about his left than the right
flank.64
The fact was once Mackys battalion vacated the roadblock and defile it
was too late for other forces to reoccupy them. Allen was rightly shocked
when the 21st NZ Battalion withdrew at midday without yet being hardpressed, and without permission. It might have been possible, if required,
to fall this battalion back through Chiltons position and reorganise it at
Lambs first fallback line but the New Zealanders quitted the field and
went up the ridges to the south instead. All of this, according to Chilton,
was a consequence of Mackys mental state in that he had given the game
away before the fight started.65 To some degree Macky conceded this point
when he later complained that he felt that no one but he was concerned
over the fate of his battalion at Pinios and that [n]o heart could be put into
tired troops.66 The small casualty figures for the 21st NZ Battalion compared
to the 2/2nd Australian Battalion further bears out Chiltons conclusion.
The New Zealanders lost only four men killed or wounded in the action,
compared to 62 from Chiltons unit. In addition, contrary to the idea that
the two reserve companies of the 2/3rd Australian Battalion were an unavoidable luxury, the actions of Mackys battalion meant retaining these
troops in a fallback position was vital and excluded them from use in any
counter-attack. Despite efforts to save its reputation, the fact remains that
the 21st NZ Battalion performed poorly at Pinios and endangered not only
64Letter, Chilton to Allen, May 1954, AWM 3DRL 4142, 6/9 [32-37]; letter, Allen to Long,
9 May 1954, AWM 3DRL 4142, 6/9 [32-37]; McClymont, To Greece, p. 322.
65Letter, Chilton to Allen, May 1954, AWM 3DRL 4142, 6/9 [32-37].
66N.L. Macky, Report on operations 21 Bn in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/8;
letter, Macky to Wards, 9 February 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/7.
357
this position, but the entire withdrawal of W Force as a result.67 In the end,
in private correspondence, even the New Zealand official historians could
not escape such conclusions. W.G. McClymont, the author of the New Zealand volume on the Greek Campaign, wrote in 1954 to Kippenberger, admitting that: Previously I had a feeling that Polly Macky was badly done by,
but after reading the story of the Peneios Gorge debacle, I think he was
lucky to get away with being returned to N.Z.68 I would add, he went on,
that an absence of determination and fighting spirit in the C.O. were the
causes of the disaster.69
At the same time questions concerning the 21st NZ Battalions performance have tended to overshadow another key reason for Allied difficulties
at Pinios. Here, attention must turn to the activities of Lieutenant Colonel
Parkinsons 4th NZ Field Regiment. In many ways this regiment failed as
badly as did Mackys infantrymen. No observed fire was ever established,
for example, on the roadblock as no artillery observation post had been
deployed to cover it. Nor were any artillery observation posts placed on the
western flank, which meant that the exposed advance of the German 3rd
Battalion (143rd Regiment), which represented a perfect artillery target,
went without effective Allied bombardment. So too, during the morning
of 18 April the Germans provided tempting artillery targets in the flat ground
below Gonnos and across the Pinios River, but communications failures
prevented full use of Parkinsons batteries. In addition, artillery fire intended to fall just forward of Tempe when called by Chilton, instead landed
within his C Company perimeter, with Parkinson himself having to call for
it to cease. In the early afternoon of 18 April artillery forward observers that
had eventually made it to Chiltons D Company position promptly withdrew, despite specific orders from Parkinson for them to remain. In early
afternoon some of his guns began moving out against Parkinsons orders.
Thus, when the German feint turned into an attack against Evangelismos,
effective artillery fire could not be brought down upon it. Parkinson appeared very distressed at this stage, recalled Chilton, and told me he had
sent back a senior officer to give the gunners 10 minutes drill to pull them
together.70 Allen informed Parkinson a little later, as more of his guns were
67Letter, Chilton to Allen, May 1954, AWM 3DRL 4142, 6/9 [32-37]; letter, Allen to Long,
9 May 1954, AWM 3DRL 4142, 6/9 [32-37].
68Letter, McClymont to Kippenberger, 16 February 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16b.
69Ibid.
[6-14].
358
chapter twelve
withdrawing without orders, that he was expected to stand and fight.71

History, quite rightly, has tended to judge Macky harshly, while Parkinson
has generally escaped the criticism his unit earned at Pinios Gorge.72
While questions of who was to blame for Allied difficulties from 17-18
April at Pinios are important in a historical sense, they do not change the
basic fact that Allen managed to hold on, if only just, until W Force had
moved through Larissa en route for the Thermopylae Line. Moreover, while
the battle of Pinios Gorge had unfolded, the rest of the front had, of course,
had not lain idle.
71Ibid.
72Comments by W.E. Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs,
January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; letter, Brown to Wards, 5 March 1953, ANZ ADQZ 18902,
WAII3/1/3.
across the plains of thessaly (17-18 april)
359
Chapter Thirteen
Across the plains of Thessaly (17-18 April)

Excluding the critical events at the Pinios Gorge, there was otherwise a
general lull in coordinated German pressure elsewhere across the W Force
front from 17-18 April. In Yugoslavia, after occupying Mostar and breaking
through the last Yugoslav resistance at Metkovic, elements of the Italian
2nd Army had reached Ragusa and met additional Italian columns from
Albania which had taken Getinje and Cattoro. General Simovi explained
to British and Greek representatives that due to the disloyalty of Croats
further resistance was impossible. The Yugoslav King and government had
already left the country bound for Greece, after authorising senior Yugoslav
officers to conclude an armistice with the Germans. In Athens the situation
was becoming more difficult. On 17 April Wilson hurried to a conference
with the Greek King, Papagos, Palairet, DAlbiac and Rear Admiral Turle.
The ensuing discussion concerned the practicality of continuing the fight,
whether W Force should evacuate, the impact of its staying or going on the
Greek civilian population, and the danger of the disintegration of the EFAS
and WMFAS. Wilson later claimed that he was shocked at the political
attitude displayed. The Greek government, according to Wilson, remained
in Athens at this stage only for fear of a complete end to Greek resistance
should it depart. The Greek Cabinet stood divided. Authority was slipping
from Koryzis hands, and ministers continued to give instructions and make
decisions without his knowledge. The Prime Minister accused Papademas
of treachery over his decision to grant leave to certain elements of the Greek
army the day before (see Chapter 11). Papademas at this time publicly announced a new directive to the Greek Army that further resistance was
impossible. He also disingenuously proclaimed the departure of the government from the capital. An hour later Papademas actions were disavowed
by official spokesmen and the Press was directed not to report his words.
Nonetheless, defeatism grew more widespread, despite the ongoing
propaganda effort.1
Department, 17 April 1941, NAA A816, 19/301/1061; entries for 16 and 17 April 1941, Halder,
Kriegstagebuch II, pp. 369, 371 respectively; Ein berblick ber die Operationen des jugo-
360
chapter thirteen
Meanwhile, British planning and preparation to evacuate from Greece

stepped up a gear. During the day Wavells Joint Planning Staff detachment,
under Rear Admiral Baillie-Grohman, arrived in Athens from Cairo to help
coordinate the operation. Baillie-Grohman had his first meeting with W
Force headquarters at 10.00 p.m. that night. There it was decided to send
out reconnaissance parties to identify suitable beach evacuation sites from
Euboea south to Kalamata, as Piraeus harbour was damaged, vulnerable
and increasingly dysfunctional. The RAF and Royal Navy were in no doubt
as to what was coming. Wellington bombers of the 37th and 38th Squadrons
returned to Egypt, while Admiral Cunningham sent a signal to his fleet
that, as a guiding principle for the upcoming evacuation, men were to be
saved as priority over equipment. The messages coming out of London
were just as clear. In anticipation of future events the British Chiefs of
Staff sent a telegram to Wavell with detailed advice on what to do once
an evacuation was orderedincluding the effective demolition of ports,
railways, fuel supplies, the blocking of the Corinth Canal, and even the
removal of Greek gold reserves. In the afternoon the British Secretary of
State for Dominion Affairs, Lord Cranborne, cabled Dominion representatives informing them of the developing plans for an evacuation.2 The Australians were nervous. Acting Prime Minister Arthur Fadden urged Menzies
in London to lobby for an immediate removal of Australian troops rather
than exhausting resources on a forlorn hope.3 Fadden replied to Cranborne
that there should be no hesitation in effecting a withdrawal before the
position becomes irretrievable.4 Even Churchill could not retain his optimism. He told Wavell that as W Force could not possibly stay in Greece
against the wishes of the Greek government, Wilson and Palairet should
slawischen Heeres im April 1941. (Dargestellt nach jugoslawischen Quellen.) II. Teil. Die
Kmpfe vom 9. April bis zum Abschlu des Waffenstillstandes am 17. April., Militrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 7/4 (1942), pp. 387-99; Texts of official war communiqus
extracted from the New York Times, AWM 54, 534/5/25; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria,
p. 112;. Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, pp. 237-8; Argyropoulo,
From Peace to Chaos, p. 170.
2Message, S. Hoare to Foreign Office, TNA FO 371/29819; Telegram, Chiefs of Staff to
General Headquarters, Middle East, 17 April 1941, TNA FO 371/29819; H.M. Wilson, report
on Greek campaign, TNA WO 201/53; H.T. Baillie-Grohman, report on the evacuation of
British forces from Greece, 15 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman
(not yet catalogued); draft manuscript Medical History of the War: Greece (1940-1941), TNA
AIR 49/11; cablegram, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Australian High Commissioner, 17 April 1941, NAA A1608, E41/1/3; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 80.
3Message, Fadden to Menzies, 17 April 1941, NAA A5954, 528/1.
4Cablegram, Fadden to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 17 April 1941, NAA
A5954, 528/1.
361
seek immediate endorsement for an evacuation from the Koryzis and the
King. In the meantime, directed Churchill, all your proposed preparations
for evacuation should proceed and you will naturally try to save as much
material as possible.5
Back at the front, with the stage set during the day for a pivotal showdown
at Pinios Gorge between Allens force and the leading elements of the German 6th Mountain and 2nd Armoured Divisions, preparations for the retreat south to the Thermopylae Line continued throughout the remainder
of W Force. In the vicinity of the Olympus Pass the withdrawal of the 5th
NZ Brigade began nervously. During the morning of 17 April Freyberg visited Brigadier Hargests headquarters and ordered the withdrawal of his
battalions to begin immediately, not that evening as planned, so that the
thick mist and fog in the area might shield the brigade from the Luftwaffe.
It was not the German air force, however, that turned out to be the problem.
The 23rd NZ Battalion was surprised at 7.00 a.m., as it prepared to depart,
by a German patrol from the Baacke Group. What followed was some very
confused close-quarter fighting. The New Zealanders defended their positions, noted the Germans, extremely sternly and courageously.6 After scoring direct mortar hits on their attackers, for example, a number of New
Zealanders threw their caps in the air and then disappeared behind their
sandbag barricades.7 Nonetheless, a number of the 23rd NZ Battalions
forward posts were driven back. The contest ended at around midday when
Hargest ordered the battalion to march out immediately to a road 10 kilometres to the southwest, and then by vehicle further south. The Baacke
Group was extended, exhausted, out of food, and could not follow. With
no reserve available it had endured 24 hours of combat under difficult
conditions. The next day, however, Captain Baacke was able to replenish
his troops from stores left behind by the New Zealanders, including trucks.
Baacke was ordered to reassemble his group in Elasson by 19 April.8 Apart
5Telegram, Churchill to Wavell, 17 April 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/37/96.
6Notes on translations of German documents relating to the Greece Campaign 1941,
AWM 67, 5/17.
7Ibid.
8As an indication of the difficulties faced by the Baacke Group because of the terrain,
it took, for example, 24-30 hours to evacuate its casualties in the vicinity of Olympus back
to Katerini. Miscellaneous papers of Greece and Crete, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6;
Extracts from 72 Inf Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; 23 NZ Bn, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162;
Report by Brig. Hargest on Greek Ops, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162; Summary of operations of 5 NZ Infantry Brigade in Greece, 29 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156;
362
chapter thirteen
Kato Melia
Haduladhika
Kariai
B/28
D/28
11 Pl
B Coy
Det D Coy
28 Bn
r
Rive
Mavro n eri
A/28
D/22
C/22
28 Bn
22 Bn
1209
5 Fd
Regt
Mount Brusti
1411
II/2 Inf Regt
B/22
C/28
Skotina
ko
Eli
To
Katerini
Battle Group 1
2 Pz Div
4 MG
Petras Sanatorium
A/22
B/23
er
Riv
A/23
976
23 Bn
C/23
Lokova
Adv Gd 72 Div
D/23
Ayios Dimitrios
F Tp 32 A-Tk
(Wheels)
Itam
os
R iv
e
22 Bn 4 am, 17 April
28 Bn 6 am, 17 April
Sec 17 Pl
23 Bn
1689
Withdrawal
route 23 Bn
1527
23 Bn 6.30 am, 17 April
Kokkinoplos
0
0
2786
4 kilometres
2 miles
Map 13.1:The 5th NZ Brigade holding the Olympus Pass, 14-17 April 1941
363
from the 23rd NZ Battalion, no other element of the 5th NZ Brigade was
pressured during the day, although a small party of Germans was spotted
at Ayios Dimitrios at 6.00 p.m., too late to interfere with the withdrawal. By
the afternoon Hargests formation was hastening south in convoy towards
Larissa, bound for Almiros, south of Volos port.9
Further west, at Servia Pass, the 4th NZ Brigades withdrawal unfolded
basically according to plan. In line with Stummes plan to outflank the
position with the 5th Armoured Division as soon as it arrived, there was
no infantry fighting in this sector throughout 17 April, although there were
intermittent artillery exchanges. The 19th NZ Battalion was successfully
withdrawn before midnight. The 18th NZ Battalion, however, had an arduous march out of its positions and half of the unit was still not at its rendezvous point by 3.00 a.m., 18 April, the time given to Lieutenant Colonel
H. Kippenberger, commanding the 20th NZ Battalion, to detonate the first
of the withdrawal demolitions. The first charge was fired soon after 4.00
a.m., but cries from stragglers on the wrong side of them caused Kippenberger to wait two more hours before detonating the last. Except for Kippenbergers rearguard the withdrawal from Servia was thus complete. The
main road south from Servia was by now covered by Brigadier Barrowcloughs 6th NZ Brigade at Elasson, with the New Zealand cavalry regiment
slightly forward of it at Elevtherokhorion.10
Further south, throughout 17 April Brigadier Lees corps rearguard position at Domokos continued to assemble. The 2/7th Australian Battalion
arrived from Larissa in the morning in a train the unit had assembled and
driven itself, as a consequence of the breakdown of the Greek civil railway.
British Narrative The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; McClymont, To Greece, p. 288.
9Miscellaneous papers of Greece and Crete, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6; message,
Freyberg to Blamey, 17 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/23; B. Freyberg, Campaigns in Greece
and Crete, October 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6; entry for 17 April 1941, Richthofen
diary, BA MA N 671/7, pp. 161-2; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 286-90.
10War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658; Draft Narrative 18 (Auckland)
Infantry Bn., NZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/150. HQ Company, 18 Battalion in Greece, 7 March
27 April 1941, A.S. Playle, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/148; History of the 2 NZ Division
Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139;
N.J. Mason, Draft Narrative Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/170; G.T. Seccombe, report,
15 June 1945, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; Miscellaneous papers of Greece and Crete, ANZ
ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6; War Diary HQ 1 Aust Corps Campaign in Greece, AWM
3DRL6643, 1/1; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April
1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; McClymont, To Greece, p. 294; Long, Greece, Crete and
Syria, p. 109.
364
chapter thirteen
Portions of the 2/4th and 2/8th Australian Battalions and other miscellaneous troops also arrived from the north to join the rearguard at Domokos.
By nightfall the 2/6th Australian Battalion was in position in foothills to
the right of the road north of Domokos, with the 2/7th Australian Battalion
on the left. The depleted 2/4th and 2/8th Australian Battalions were placed
in reservealthough Brigadier Vasey described one as hardly fit for a
battle.11 Slightly forward of Lees force, protecting an aerodrome south of
Larissa, was the reinforced 2/1st Australian Battalion (this force was what
was left of the Zarkos rearguard after the balance had been rushed to Pinios
Gorge). The nervous defenders at Domokos, waiting for the rest of W Force
to withdraw through their position, began to see fifth columnists everywhere. The 2/7th Australian Battalions Intelligence Section rounded up
twelve suspects, subsequently released. This thin evidence for the divided
loyalties of the Greek people, did not, however, stop Lees men from worrying.12 Soon after dark, 17 April, large bodies of W Force troops began
passing through Domokos.13
Throughout the morning of 17 April, across the W Force front, low clouds
and rain had helped the New Zealand brigades at Olympus and Servia to
withdraw successfully and protected the retreating columns from the Luftwaffe.14 At the same time, however, such conditions did not make for easy
vehicle movement. The Greek roads by this stage were choked with fighting
units moving to rearguard positions such as Domokos, with W Force depot
units en route to the Thermopylae Line, and various forms of Greek military
transportfrom aged buses to cartsall moving south. Against this stream
struggled a thin line of Allied vehicles bringing supplies back north to the
front. Movement frequently became gridlocked until the tangles of vehicles
could be unwoven. There were constant jams where narrow roads zigzagged
over mountain passes. On either side of the roads plodded increasing numbers of weary Greek soldiers and refugees. By the afternoon the weather
11Extract from War Diary of HQ Medium Artillery, 1 Anzac Corps, 6 April 1941, AWM
54, 534/2/29.
12P.J. Hurst, My Army Days, 2/7 Battalion, AWM MSS1656.
13The 2/6th (AS) Battalion had a company of the 2/5th (AS) Battalion attached which
had travelled from Athens with it. Diary of Major H.C.D. Marshall, 2/7 Battalion, AWM 54,
255/4/12; Cooperation of 31 Battery, 7 NZ Anti-tank Regiment, with Lee Force at Domokos
on the withdrawal to Molos, Greece (Apr 1941), D.J. Sweetzer, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126;
Chronology of Operations, 2/6 Aust Inf Bn Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; Report of 2/6 Aust
Inf Bns participation in the Grecian Campaign covering the period April 1-29, 1941, AWM
54, 534/2/35 [2]; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 111; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 92.
14Entry for 17 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, pp. 161-2.
365
cleared in some areas and the Luftwaffe did its best to interdict the slow
flow of traffic south. Stukas dove in packs against the thickest concentrations, while Messerschmitt fighters and Heinkel bombers flew low over the
columns bombing and strafing. Major H.C.D. Marshall, second-in-command
of the 2/7th Australian Battalion at Domokos, watched lines of traffic attacked from the air. It is impossible for me to find the words to describe
the chaotic nature, of the attacks, he noted, it had to be seen to be believed.15
Importantly, prior to 17 April, previous German air attack had made
many W Force drivers edgy and a significant proportion now abandoned
their vehicles in favour of roadside cover at the first sight of a plane
friendly or Germaneven at distances that posed no threat to their vehicles, which further slowed traffic. Marshall further noted, this fear of
planes soon infected all drivers and trucks and was a perfect case of mass
psychology.16 Along with being terrified many were infuriated by the immunity of German aircraft and at their own inability to retaliate. Fortunately for W Force the northern bridge across the Pinios River stood, despite
the proximity of hundreds of bomb craters. Not that the chaos of Larissa
and its surroundings during the day stopped many truckloads of W Force
soldiers from helping themselves to stocks of beer from a large abandoned
British canteenwhich could not have helped driving skill and accidents.
According to Captain R.R. Vial of the 6th Australian Divisions intelligence
staff,
I saw one driver run off the road and turn his truck over. I got a party to
help me tip it back and the driver offered me a case of beer for my trouble.
Another driver (on HQ 6 Div) offered me 6 bottles of beer as a bribe not to
tell the Camp Commandant, Captain G.T.R. Uff, that he was drunk.17
Nonetheless, by midnight four of the seven brigades in Blameys corps had

passed through the Larissa bottleneck and were either at Domokos, at their
Thermopylae positions, or strung out in between. It remained to extricate
the last three W Force brigades along congested roads to Larissa, and from
there over the single crowded road across the Thessaly plain, over a pass
at Pharsala and then through another at Domokos. These formations, it
seemed, looked certain to be hard pressed by the advancing Germans.18
15Diary of Major H.C.D. Marshall, 27 Battalion, AWM PR03/058; The Campaign in
Greece, AWM 54 534/5/13.
16Diary of Major H.C.D. Marshall, 27 Battalion, AWM PR03/058.
534/2/32.
18Crisp, The gods were neutral, p. 168; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 105-11.
366
chapter thirteen
Of these three W Force brigades yet to put significant distance between

themselves and the advancing Germans, the fortunes of Allens brigade at
Pinios Gorge have been discussed in the previous chapter. Far to the west,
on the morning of 17 April at Kalabaka, tensions were mounting between
the commanders of the other twoBrigadiers Savige and Charrington.
Charrington still intended to continue his withdrawal through Saviges
position all the way back to Atalandi, almost 300 kilometres to the south,
into a reserve position behind the Thermopylae Line. Savige, however, believed the armoured brigade was under orders to cover the withdrawal of
his own force. This was a serious matter. Charrington was under Blameys
command (through headquarters 6th Australian Division) and had been
for the last two days. Both he and Savige had been told by liaison officers
on the afternoon of 16 April of Blameys intention to use the armoured
brigade to cover withdrawal of Saviges force. At 10.00 a.m. Charrington
himself arrived at Kalabaka, as his brigade continued to withdraw, and met
with Savige. According to Savige, Charrington showed every appearance
of having reached the end of his tether.19 Charrington opened the conversation by saying he was moving to Larissa and his rear elements would clear
Kalabaka by nightfall. Savige asked if he had received Blameys orders to
cover his own withdrawal. Charrington admitted he had been so informed,
but that he was unable to comply as his men were exhausted and his vehicles needed urgent maintenance. There was a confrontation. Savige retorted that his men were tired too, and that the steady movement of
Charringtons transport rearward suggested little chance of widespread
vehicle breakdown within the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade. In desperation
Savige further pointed out that an Anzac Corps order demanded that Charrington stay and that, irrespective of seniority, Savige was prepared to fight
under Charringtons command. This was to no avail. Charrington agreed
only to leave a small detachment of carriers, anti-tank guns, machine gunners, and a reduced squadron of New Zealand cavalrymen at the Velemistion Bridge, forward of Saviges position. Blameys written order for the
armoured brigade to cover Saviges force reached Charrington at 12.30 p.m.,
before his brigade had yet cleared Kalabaka. Still Charrington refused to
stay.20 Savige signalled the 6th Australian Divisions headquarters on Charringtons departure, noting withdrawal of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade
19Notes by Lieutenant General S. Savige on Australia in the War on 1939-45, AWM 3
DRL 2529 [12].
20This detachment included a carrier platoon from the 1st Rangers, a troop from the
102nd Anti-tank Regiment, a platoon from the 27th NZ Machine Gun Battalion, two troops

To Koritza
Elements WMFAS
14 April
Lake
Kastoria
Kastoria
367
Lake
Rudnik
Gk Cav Div
14 April
Perdika
Klisoura
Ptolemais
Elements
20 Gk Div
14 April
Argos Orestikon
Vlasti
All Greeks dispersed

15 April
2111
Aliakm
on
Neapolis
Kivitos
1433
River
k
Ven eti
MO UNT AIN S
Siatista
Composite
Sqn 3 RTR
To Servia
B Coy Rangers
B Bty 102 A-Tk
Elements 12 Gk Div
14 April
D Coy
Rangers
1866
Rimnion
12 Gk Div Grevena
14/15 April
Main Body
1 UK Armd Bde
14 April
15 April
To Servia
1 UK Armd Bde
14/15 April
ive
1 (UK) Armd Bde

14 April
Kozani
er
Riv
15 April
20 Gk Div
14/15 April
Melissi
16 April
k
A li a
Karperon
nR
mo
Deskati
PINDU S
1093
Velemisti
1514
Metsovon
To Yannina
17 April
Kalabaka
S av
iges
Force
sR
Pinio
10 kilometres
5 miles
iver
1 UK Armd Bde
17 April
Trikkala
To Larissa
Map 13.2:The withdrawal of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade 14-17 April, 1941
368
chapter thirteen
cannot be stopped.21 In describing these events Charringtons Brigade

Major, Major J.R. Hobson, succinctly indicated his own (and his brigadiers)
intent in response to instructions to cover Saviges force. I scrambled out
of it, he wrote, later that day Rollie [Charrington] arrived, and we started
right back to behind Thermopylae.22
When Charrington eventually reported to Blamey at Soumpasi, he denied
knowledge of any orders to cover Savige Force, did not think they existed,
and did not recall meeting Savige at any time. This is doubtful. Corps orders
were certainly issued and there is no reason to suspect they were not received. Hobson was present at the 9.00 p.m. meeting the night before when
the Anzac Corps liaison officer had given Blameys verbal instructions for
the armoured brigade to remain, and was asked by Savige to make sure
similar orders reached Charrington. There is no doubt Charrington met
and discussed the issue with Savige. Yet the diary of the 1st (UK) Armoured
Brigade records that during the morning of 17 April Major Hobson arrived
at Charringtons headquarters with orders that the brigade must withdraw
to Atalandi. If this was so, then it is puzzling that Charrington made no
mention of Atalandi during his 10.00 a.m. meeting with Savige. The only
destination given by Charrington was Larissa. Nonetheless, there is a possibility that W Force headquarters did make such an order (although no
written record exists). Even here, however, Charrington was under Blameys
command and he knew it. He was bound to comply with the orders of his
superior headquarters first and foremost. If there was confusion, he was
not free to choose which instructions suited him best. For his part Major
General Mackay, Charringtons immediate superior, was incensed by the
armoured brigades continuing retirement. Mackay had planned the 1st
(UK) Armoured Brigade not only to cover Saviges retreat, but also to move
it just south of Larissa to cover subsequent withdrawals.23
Perhaps Charrington was influenced in his decision-making by the exhausted state of his brigade, which had been sorely tested since the actions
from the New Zealand cavalry regiment and several cruiser tanks from 3 RTR. G.T. Seccombe,
report, 15 June 1945, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; McClymont, To Greece, p. 233.
DRL 2529 [12].
22Letter, Hobson to Anonymous, 4 May 1941, TNA CAB 106/374.
DRL 2529 [12]; Report on operations of 6th Australian Division in Greece, Major General
I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34; letter, Latham to Charrington re: Draft extract from
Australian Official History, 16 June 1952, LHCMA Charrington 4/20/1; letter, Charrington to
Latham, 23 June 1952, LHCMA Charrington 4/20/3.
369
south of Kleidi Pass by the endless congestion of roads clogged by Greek

and Yugoslav refugees and by mechanical breakdownsproblems themselves exacerbated by his dubious choice to withdraw the formation along
rough mountain trails rather than on the main road. During the move to
Kalabaka all but two of 3 RTRs remaining tanks were lost to breakdown
not one was destroyed by the Germans.24 If not so beforehand, there was
no question that after Charringtons withdrawal to Kalabaka his brigade
was mechanically incapable of carrying out further covering roles. Perhaps
the most puzzling aspect of the whole incident, however, was Anzac Corps
headquarters comfortable acceptance that Charrington had disobeyed the
intent and letter of Blameys orders. Blameys headquarters concluded,
inexplicably, that he must not have received instructions to stay at Kalabaka after alla most improbable scenario. In fact, when he at last arrived
at Soumpasi, Charrington was warmly received.25
In any addition to the departure of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade,
Brigadier Savige faced a range of other difficulties and difficult choices in
the afternoon of 17 April. At 12.30 p.m. the liaison officer from Blameys
headquarters who had appeared with orders for Charrington to stay, also
carried instructions for Savige to withdraw his force to Zarkos that night
and to leave only a rearguard at Kalabaka the next day. An hour later a
second officer from Mackays headquarters arrived with similar instructions,
and with additional information that the road from Trikkala to Larissa was
jammed with vehicles from Charringtons brigade and withdrawing Greek
formations. The bridge over the Pinios River east of Zarkos had been accidentally demolished and a bypass road, through Tirnavos, was boggy.26
Savige had multiple dilemmas. The first was the difficulty of any withdrawal that night on choked roads south. Second, the demolitions Savige
24The cruiser tanks of 3 RTR had in fact been reported as having unsatisfactory tracks
before leaving England in November 1940. New tracks had been sent from Australia and
issued to the regiment in Egypt, but these were inferior to the originals. The mud in Greece
congealed around sprocket teeth, stretched the tracks, and broke track pins. It was a similar story for the 4th Hussars where only four of the 52 light tanks of the regiment were lost
to enemy action, the rest to mechanical failure or abandonment. 1st Armoured Brigade
Group notes on operations in Greece, April, 1941, 8 May 1941, TNA WO 201/2749.
DRL 2529 [12]; War Diary HQ 1 Aust Corps Campaign in Greece, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/1;
S.F. Rowell, The campaign in Greece, April 1941, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A) [1-4];
Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 97; Crisp, The gods were neutral, p. 136; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 91.
26The bridge collapsed when a detachment of W Force sappers thought to test the
potency of some commercial dynamite they had acquired on a bridge truss incorrectly
believed to be redundant. Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 110.
370
chapter thirteen
had planned to use to slow the German advance from Grevena were still
incomplete. Nor could any additional force cover his retreat. Savige also
considered that his role in protecting the corps western flank was not yet
finished. This quandary placed Savige in what he later described as the
most momentous occasion in my war service, in that he had to make a
decision which was contrary to the orders of my Commander.27 Savige held
a council of war with subordinates free to air their views on his plan to
stay in position until the road south had cleared. All agreed. The liaison
officer was sent back to Mackay with a note explaining the decision and
that Savige anticipated his withdrawal would begin on the night of 18
April.28
Meanwhile, to the north and west of Saviges position, the increasingly
desperate withdrawal of the Greek Albanian armies continued. By now,
however, the retreat looked more like a drawing in centred on Yannina
than any effort to form a new defensive line. In the first instance, Tsolakoglous 3rd Greek Corps headquarters was re-established at Metsovon (after
leaving Kalabaka) and later at Votonosi. Tsolakoglous mission from this
point was to cover the Metsovon Pass on the Grevena-Yannina road and
the eastern approaches to Yannina. The 12th and 20th Greek Divisions were
scattered and had ceased to exist as fighting formations. What remained
of Tsolakoglous 9th, 10th and 13th Greek Divisions trekked over the Pindus
Mountains en route to Metsovonwhere at this stage only four hardpressed Greek battalions held the pass against German and Italian reconnaissance elements. Tsolakoglous last formation, the 16th Greek Division,
was at this point travelling over the Pindus Mountains from the direction
of Koritza, aiming to join up with the EFAS west of Yannina.29
The two other corps of the Greek EFAS were faring no better than
Tsolakoglous troops. During the day the Italians, who now considered the
Greeks to be falling back in disorder stepped up their attacks along the
DRL 2529 [12].
28Diary entries for 16 and 17 April 1941, S. Savige, AWM 3DRL 529, 20; Chronology of
Operations, 17 Aust Inf Bde Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria,
p. 110.
vom 1941, BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 1 -19; Ein berblick ber die Operationen des griechischen
Heeres und des britischen Expeditionskorps im April 1941. (2. Teil.) Die Operationen der
verbndeten Streitkrfte bis zum Rckzuge des britischen Expeditionskorps aus Griechen
land., Militrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 8/2 (1943), p. 172; telegram, British Military
Mission to Wavell, 17 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian
and Greek-German War, p. 219; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, p. 272.
371
line Kelcyre to the sea, with an emphasis on Kelcyre (which fell during the
day) and Mt Grammoy. Both Agyrokastron and Porto Palmero were also
captured in an attempt to encircle Greek troops drawn up between the
Usum River and the sea. Another significant attack was launched on Lekdousi during the night.30 All the while the retreating formations of the 1st
and 2nd Greek Corps, as they trudged along the hopelessly clogged KoritzaYannina road, were coming under constant and heavy attack from the Italian Air Force, which also pressured the Greek supply line from Arta forward
to Yannina. Many Greek units that tried to avoid this congestion by withdrawing over the mountains towards Grevena found themselves cut off
and captured by elements of the Adolf Hitler Regiment in the Kivotos area,
west of the Siatista Pass, or by patrols from the 73rd Division operating out
of Kastoria. In all, close to 17,000 Greeks were captured this way up to 18
April. As all of this unfolded, during the day the senior commanders of the
EFAS held a conference in Yannina and confirmed their belief that further
resistance was futile.31
By 18 April, back in London, the evacuation of W Force from Greece was
felt to be both imminent and inevitable. Churchill issued a directive to his
senior military officers that they must now think of dividing their resources in the Mediterranean theatre between evacuating Greece and continuing operations in Libyawith the latter taking precedence. Churchill
mentioned Crete as a potential receptacle for what could be saved from
Greece, with the defence of the island to be considered at a later date.
Conscious of the need for political propriety, he also pressed Palairet to
make further and more direct enquiries of the Greek government and the
King as to their position regarding W Forces departure. Palairet furthered
the case for a hasty withdrawal with his assessment that in Athens, by 18
April, the general impression seems to be spreading that the war is now
over for Greece.32 Pressure was also still mounting from the Australian
government, which cabled Churchill claiming the immediate evacuation
30Message, British Military Mission to General Headquarters, Middle East, 21 April 1941,
TNA WO 201/49.
BA MA RH 67/1, p. 5; entry for 18 April 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, p. 371; Texts of official
war communiqus extracted from the New York Times, AWM 54, 534/5/25; telegram, British Military Mission to Wavell, 17 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124; Extracts from evening
reports from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete), AWM 67, 5/17; Extracts from 12th Armys
daily intelligence reports (Greece), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
32Telegram, Palairet to Foreign Office, 18 April 1941, TNA FO 371/29819.
372
chapter thirteen
Lake
Megali
Prespa
8 Gk Div
Forward Italian
positions
9 Gk Div
10 Gk Div
Devolis
Gk
Cav Div
r
Rive
Florina
li
vo
De
16 Gk Div
YUGOSLAVIA
Koritsa
Adolf Hitler
Regt
River
2384
Klisoura
Kastoria
Apsos
Ersek
Vellas
Forward
Italian
positions
Riv
er
r
ve
Ri
1670
ALBANIA
River
Neapolis
Siatista
os
Pramoritsa
River
Rive
River
ko
s
Aoos
Grevena
eti
mo
Ve
n
Konitsa
ak
o
tap
ran
Sa
Ali
Argyrokastron
1785
Riv
er
Krania
GREECE
Kalabaka
Konispol
Yannina
20 kilometres
10 miles
Map 13.3:The withdrawal of the WMFAS (3rd Greek Corps), 12-20 April 1941
of our troops from the mainland of Greece is essential.33 For his part, Wavell
separately telegraphed the Australian Army Headquarters informing it that
he was about to fly to Athens to urge earliest re-embarkation of our troops.34
At the same time, although accepting an evacuation as inevitable, Wavell
encouraged Wilson, unless the political situation changed radically, to prepare to make a stand at the Thermopylae Line. You should engage the
enemy, said Wavell, and force him to fight.35 If the line at Thermopylae
33Message, Fadden to Secretary, (British) Prime Ministers Office, 18 April 1941, NAA A
5954, 528/1.
34Message, Wavell to Australian Army Headquarters, 18 April 1941, NAA A5954, 528/6.
35Telegram, Wavell to Wilson, 18 April 1941. TNA FO 371/29819; McClymont, To Greece,
p. 362.
373
could be held long enough then it would give more time to organising
defences in Egypt and Creteas well as giving time to arrange an efficient
evacuation. W Force troops at the front, of course, still knew nothing of
any evacuation. Brigadier Rowell told staff at the 6th Australian Divisions
headquarters that the Thermopylae Line was to be used to hold the tip of
Greece as a base from which further forces could attack the Germans.36
At 10.00 a.m., 18 April, Wilson was called to another meeting in Athens
at the Tatoi Palace with the King, Koryzis, Papagos, Palairet, DAlbiac, Turle
and members of the Greek Cabinet. There the delegates once again discussed the military situation and whether W Force should leave Greece.
This question was, of course, already decided. British evacuation planning
staff were already in the country and Wavell had stopped the flow of British supplies. The only question, therefore, was when and how quickly Greek
consent might be forthcoming. Reality, of course, did not stop Wilson from
playing along with the charade. Papagos noted that while W Force was in
good condition, it could not hold at the Thermopylae Line for any length
of time. The Greek commanders also pointed to the rapid decline of the
EFAS. Wilson, with a bravado that belied his true feelings and knowledge
of British plans already in train, declared W Force could hold at Thermopylae until 6 May, provided the Greeks fought on in Epiruswhich in British eyes was unlikely. Closer to the mark, a little later Wilson expressed
private doubts that his new line could be held at all. Wilson and Papagos
both suggested the King and government stay in Athens as long as possible
to stiffen public opinion and maintain resistance. (Wilson later wrote, once
again, of his being shocked at the bad feeling in the capital during 18
April, and reported to Wavell prevailing talk of the uselessness of continuing the struggle.)37 In any case Papagos made it clear that Greek resistance
would not continue in any form if, or when, Athens fell. The King agreed
and for now the government stayed in the capital. Apart from this, however, no other substantive decisions were taken at this meeting.38
Meanwhile, British plans to leave Greece continued in earnest. Indeed,
air evacuations by Sunderland flying boats began that day when King Peter
36Telegram, Eden to Churchill, 18 April 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/37/124; Report of activities
in Greece Apr 41 by Lt. Col. R.R. Vial, 12 January 1945, AWM 54, 534/2/32; UK War Narratives
The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative The Campaign in Greece,
April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 113;
Cruickshank, Greece 194041, p. 151.
37Telegram, Wilson to Wavell, 18 April 1941, TNA FO 371/29819.
38Telegram, Palairet to General Headquarters, Middle East, 18 April 1941, TNA FO
371/29819; McClymont, To Greece, p. 364; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 93; Playfair, The
Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 94.
374
chapter thirteen
of Yugoslavia and other high-ranking political refugees were flown out.

Such air ferrying continued from this point up to 22 April, with Bombay
and Lodestar transport aircraft and two BOAC Flying Boats assisting the
Sunderlands where possible. As far as the main evacuation of W Force was
concerned, much organisation was required. Baillie-Grahams planning
team sought out coastal embarkation sites with roads within 1-2 kilometres
of them, covered assembly areas, local water supplies, and steeply shelving
shingle beaches. Fortunately, such sites were in abundance at the southern
extremity of the mainland and in the Peloponnese. British planners could
bank on no tidal problems and ample stocks of food and petrol, from dumps
near the beaches. An outline evacuation concept was formed whereby W
Force troops would make the long move to assembly areas at such sites in
a single day from the Thermopylae Line, lie up at night, stay concealed the
next day, destroy their equipment at dusk, then embark at night by ships
boats between 11.00 p.m. and 3.00 a.m. to be clear of the coast by daylight.
A caiques and local craft committee was set up by Baillie-Grohman to
solve a potential problem of bottlenecks from beaches to ships by chartering as many Greek boats as possible. If the Thermopylae Line held then a
start date for the evacuation was tentatively set for the night Monday 28
April. Adjustments to the disposition of the British fleet in the Mediterranean in order that it might conduct such an operation began at once.39
Back at the front, although action in the vicinity of Pinios Gorge during
18 April was critical to the withdrawal of W Force to the Thermopylae Line,
it was not the only point of contact between the Germans and Allied troops
during the day. At dawn, to the northwest, the most forward New Zealand
force was Kippenbergers small 4th NZ Brigade rearguard. This party waited until the last stragglers of the 4th NZ Brigade had passed through it in
the morning, then headed towards Elevtherokhorion, stopping to blow
demolitions and pick up engineer detachments on the way. Meanwhile, to
Kippenbergers south, north of Elasson and astride the junction of the
Katerini and Servia roads, waited the main body of the New Zealand Cavalry Regiment. The cavalrymen were surprised to have their breakfast interrupted by the sudden appearance of a troop of German tanks and
motorcycles from Battle Group 1, driving south down the Katerini Road
towards them. These mobile German troops had succeeded in moving
39G.S. Brunskill, The Administrative Aspect of the Campaign in Greece in 1941, October 1949, AWM 113, 5/2/5; H.T. Baillie-Grohman, report on the evacuation of British forces
from Greece, 15 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet
catalogued); McClymont, To Greece, pp. 363-4.
375
around the demolitions in the Olympus Pass, possibly, in part, by using

rough local tracks south from Skoteina. The three New Zealand anti-tank
portees in position on the Katerini road fork went into immediate action,
knocked out two German tanks, and drove the motorcycle troops back.
Kippenbergers detachment, still retiring south, arrived right in the middle
of this engagement and found themselves under fire from German tanks
at close range. The bulk of Kippenbergers party either took to the hills or
were killed or capturedKippenberger himself led one small group on
foot southwards and eventually re-joined the 25th NZ Battalion. After the
sharp and unexpected action involving Kippenberger, German tanks attacked the New Zealand cavalry position once more, this time along the
axis of both roads. Four more German tanks, two armoured cars and a
lorry were destroyed before the cavalry regiment withdrew, under pressure
from German mortars, after receiving word that all withdrawing W Force
troops were now behind the 6th NZ Brigades blocking position south of
Elasson.40
German tanks following closely behind the withdrawing cavalrymen
and did not take long to reach the 6th NZ Brigades main position. Here the
New Zealanders could see the small town of Elasson. To their south was
the village of Tirnavos, the approaches to which Brigadier Barrowclough
had been ordered to hold until that night, lest Larissa fall before the bulk
of W Force could clear it en route to the Thermopylae Line. Here Barrowcloughs brigade guarded two roads which led from Elasson to Larissa, one
over the steep Meneksos Pass to the southeast and the other by a twisting
but easier route to the southwest. The 24th NZ Battalion was positioned
astride the eastern route, eight kilometres south of Elasson, with little
cover but a good view of any enemy approach. The 25th NZ Battalion
was established on the western road, 3-5 kilometres northeast of Domenikon on rounded crests with a good view of roads south of Elasson.
40Report on of operations of rearguard 4 NZ Infantry Brigade, 17/18 April 1941, 30 May
1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/155; Draft Narrative Greece, N.J. Mason, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/170; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April
1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; , B Freyberg, Comment on General Blameys Report,
AWM 54 534/5/24; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to
April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; G.T. Seccombe, report, 15 June 1945, ANZ ADQZ
18902, WAII3/1/2; W.J.H. Sutton, The Greek Debacle 1941: the beginning and end, KMARL,
1999.1051; Report on operations Anzac Corps, T.A. Blamey, 21 June 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/24;
S.F. Rowell, The campaign in Greece, April 1941, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A) [1-4];
W.E. Murphy (NZ War History Branch), comments on Buckleys popular history of the
Greek campaign, January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 122-3; Golla,
Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 293-4.
376
chapter thirteen
Barrowcloughs third unit, the 26th NZ Battalion, after an arduous withdrawal from west of Servia, was in reserve some kilometres to the rear at
Domenikon. The brigade was supported by almost two regiments of field
and another of medium artillery, as well as 11 anti-tank guns dug in on the
25th Battalions front. No anti-tank guns supported the 24th NZ Battalion
as the pass it defended with the addition of demolitions and mines was
considered too steep for German tanks to breach.41
The action began for the 6th NZ Brigade as soon as the New Zealand
cavalrymen retired through its position reporting German armour was close
behind. By 10.30 a.m. the leading German elements were being shelled
particularly a collection of German trucks clustered in a defile north of
Elasson. As the German tanks pushed forward, even fiercer fire was progressively applied by more than forty Allied guns. This bombardment, combined
with the ongoing difficulty of bringing troops south over the Aliakmon
River, prevented the Germans concentrating for an attack until late in the
day. Earlier, at midday, a small force of tanks and vehicles had approached
the 24th NZ Battalion but had not pressed an attack. Some minor German
counter-battery fire was applied as Stuka dive-bombers passed overhead
in groups of 40-60 to attack positions further south. Only a single Dornier
bomber, however, attacked the brigade throughout the day. The Allied medium guns ran out of ammunition early afternoon and withdrew, and late
in the afternoon Barrowclough began to thin out his position in preparation
for his own retreat southwards.42
From this point the whole valley surrounding the 6th NZ Brigades
rearguard position became strangely quiet, only to spring into life just before dusk. The forward elements of Battle Group 1 had by now been reinforced by patrols from the Germans 9th Armoured Division, which
had moved through the abandoned Servia Pass at dawn and bridged the
41War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658; 24 Bn Operation Order No. 2,
18 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/10; Diary of C Coy, 24 Bn, D.G. Morrison, ANZ
ADQZ 18886, WAII1/164; The story of the part taken by A Company 24 NZ Battalion during
the campaign in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/164; Draft Narrative Greece, N.J. Mason,
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/170; Correspondence, narrative and draft notes (various) concerning the activities of the 26th (NZ) Battalion in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/172; Notes
on activities of 6 NZ Field Regiment in Greece, 28 Mar to 29 Apr 41, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/123; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 123; McClymont, To Greece, p. 293.
42Notes on activities of 6 NZ Field Regiment in Greece, 28 Mar to 29 Apr 41, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/123; Diary of C Coy, 24 Bn, D.G. Morrison, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/164; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/139; The story of the part taken by A Company 24 NZ Battalion during the
campaign in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/164.
377
Aliakmon at 6.00 p.m. Suddenly (and against Barrowcloughs expectations

as to which direction an attack would develop from), German shells began
crashing into the 24th NZ Battalions position and a column of lorries, led
by tanks, punched up the road towards Meneksos Pass. The leading German
tank hit mines, however, and soon Allied shells were falling in the midst of
the column. Nonetheless, German infantrymen leapt from their trucks and
attacked the forward 24th NZ Battalion posts, just as the defenders were
pulling back and preparing to withdraw. Eventually the Germans gained
the top of the pass but demolitions prevented their vehicles from following.
The attack achieved little, therefore, apart from delaying the 24th NZ Battalion. At 9.30 p.m. the last elements of this unit were withdrawn, and a
skeleton brigade rearguard itself retired at 11.30 p.m. blowing culverts on
the way. The 18 April contest, in the vicinity of Elasson, had most definitely belonged to the Allied artillery. An exciting day, recorded the 2/3rd
Australian Field Regiment, after having expended between 6500-8000
rounds on ripe German targets. 43
Further to the west the last of W Forces three rearguard positions (aside
from Barrowcloughs force at Elasson and Allens at Pinios Gorge ) remained
in the vicinity of Kalabakamuch to the annoyance of Major General
Mackay who was singularly unimpressed by Brigadier Saviges decision to
remain in place during 18 April. After receiving word of Saviges plans
late the previous night Mackay had despatched another liaison officer at
1.20 a.m. to Saviges headquarters ordering the force to withdraw immediately. Savige had no choice but to comply and informed Mackay that he
expected to be in the Larissa area no later than 3.00 p.m.44
43Entry for 18 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 9. Pz Division Begonnen: 11.7.40 Abgeschlossen: 18.5.1941., BA MA RH 27-9/2; Draft Narrative Greece, N.J. Mason, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/170; Correspondence, narrative and draft notes (various) concerning the
activities of the 26th (NZ) Battalion in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/172; History of the
2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/139; Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; SS
AH Orders for 19 Apr 41, AWM 54, 543/2/27; The 6th Division in action, G. Long, AWM
PR88/72; Diary of C Coy, 24 Bn, D.G. Morrison, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/164; The story of
the part taken by A Company 24 NZ Battalion during the campaign in Greece, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/164; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to
April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; Report on operations of 6th Australian Division
in Greece, Major General I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34; W.E. Murphy (NZ War
History Branch), comments on Buckleys popular history of the Greek campaign, January
1950, AWM 67, 5/17; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 123-8; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands
1941, pp. 265-6.
Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; Long, Greece,
378
chapter thirteen
To
Deskati
Elasson
Enemy thrust, noon
Tsaritsane
Tank attack, 7-8 pm
Demolitions
B
A
25 Bn
3 MG Coy
Tsinel
Radosivia
2/3 Fd
B/24 Regt
Domenikon
NZ Div Cav
(less B Sqn)
patrols to west
and south-west
Velesnikon A
Demolition-limit of
German advance
18 April
24 Bn
942
842
6 NZ Bde
F Tp
28 Fd Bty
876
738
7/143 Mtn Regt

9 pm, 18 April
15 kms from Gonnos
24 Bn withdrawn
by 9 pm, 18 April
i
Pin
er
R iv
os
Milogousta
25 Bn rearguard clear
by 12.30 am, 19 April
Tirnavos
Damasi
German road block

dusk, 18 April
0
0
4 kilometres
2 miles
Larissa cleared by
1.30 am, 19 April
Larissa
Map 13.4:The 6th NZ Brigade rearguard action at Elasson, 18 April 1941
Saviges withdrawal plan placed Lieutenant Colonel R. King, commanding

the 2/5th Australian Battalion, in charge of a small rearguard eight kilometres east of Kalabaka with orders to retire an hour after the main force
passed him by. The 2/1st Australian Battalion was on the road before dawn
and was in the vicinity of this rearguard by 10.00 a.m. For a short time after
his units had departed, but before the 2/5th Australian Battalion rearguard
had been set up a little to the east, nothing stood between the Germans
and Brigadier Savige but his batman, sharing some tea. Unfortunately for
Savige his planned withdrawal route made use of a bypass road which
crossed a bridge a few kilometres north of Syn Tomai. At 11.30 a.m., after
379
the main body had crossed it, this bridge, which had already been wired
for detonation, was attacked by German aircraft. A bomb landing nearby
set off the demolitions and the bridge was lost. Saviges force was split in
half. Brigade headquarters and most of the 2/5th Australian Battalion was
on the east side of the river, while the 2/11th Australian Battalion and the
rearguard were on the western side. The only other crossing for those cut
off was 56 kilometres away at a bridge near Tirnavos, close to the 6th NZ
Brigade sector. Savige decided to ferry the men across the river on pontoons
and send his transport through Tirnavos, despite the danger of German
activity in that area. Both movements succeeded without interference. By
8.15 p.m. the bulk of the 2/5th Australian Battalion had set off in vehicles
towards Larissa and the 2/11th Australian Battalion followed at 3.00 a.m.
the next day. The tail of Saviges last columns cleared Larissa around an
hour later.45
Throughout the day the gravest risk associated with Saviges withdrawal remained the potential advance of the German 5th Armoured Division
across his line of retreat. Here, however, Savige was aided by the continuing
problems of terrain faced by this German formation. After it had crossed
the Venetikos, the armoured division ran into problems south of Grevena
with no roads running in the direction of its advance. Unmarked trails could
be seen from aerial photographs and Stummes engineers determined that
the division could move across them. The going, however, proved extremely difficult. German troops toiled on bridges and improving trails. Tractors
and tanks were used to pull trucks through tough spots. After three nights
and two days of effort the division began at last to emerge down onto the
plains of Kalabaka on the morning of 19 Aprilmere hours after the last
of Saviges men had departed. Savige was correct in his later assessments
that, thanks to difficult Greek terrain, I was fortunate in not being attacked
by the full weight of power which the enemy could command.46 Nonetheless, it remained an epic mountain march for an armoured division.47
A little back from the front there is no question that 18 April was a nervous day at W Force and Anzac Corps Headquarters. The central concern
3DRL 2529 [12]; Copied Extracts from 17 Australian Infantry Brigade War Diary, AWM 54,
253/4/2; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941,
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 126.
3DRL 2529 [12].
47War for the Passes, an extract from the American Infantry Journal, October, 1941,
AWM 3DRL 6643 3/42; SS AH Orders for 19 Apr 41, AWM 54, 543/2/27.
380
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was that one or more of the rearguards (Allen at Pinios, Barrowclough at

Elasson, and Savige at Kalabaka) would be pushed back through Larissa
before the bottleneck was clear.48 In addition, there was always the risk of
a German air attack blocking the roads back to Larissa, or else preventing
movement south of it to Thermopylae. It was obvious to Allied commanders at first light that the day would be clear, with no more low clouds, and
perfect for Luftwaffe operations. There were no anti-aircraft guns or Allied
aircraft sufficiently north to protect the rearguards. Yet, strangely, the endless procession of W Force vehicles along the road south of Larissa was
unmolested from first light until 9.30 a.m. At that moment a momentous
explosion, 10 kilometres south of Larissa, marked a German bomb which
had missed its target at the bridge over the Enipeus River north of Pharsala, but which had hit a truckload of explosives. Previous to this chance
hit some 30 dive bombers had been attacking this bridge for half an hour
with no bombs falling within 50 metres of their target. Nonetheless, a huge
hole in the road and nearby embankment slowed and then stopped all
W Force traffic. The result was a completely gridlocked column of stationary allied vehicles some 16 kilometres long. Overhead, German aircraft now
attacked at will, and at regular intervals. The Anzac Corps Chief Engineer,
Brigadier C. Steele, rushed to the scene and immediately sent word back
down the helpless column for every driver to get out, grab a pick or shovel
and move forward. Teams were soon busy filling the crater and cutting a
detour. At 12.30 p.m. 30 German heavy bombers appeared to finish the job
on the bridge and to ensure the withdrawal could not recommence. Another 30-minute attack, however, managed only to chip concrete from the
bridges southern abetment. From 2.00 p.m. the Germans changed tactics
and flew single planes in relay over road sections 4-6 kilometres in length,
dropping the occasional bomb and strafing. Eventually, however, a track
was cut past the main crater and traffic flow was restored, despite continuing air attacks. The W Force withdrawal continued, if slowly, towards its
next line of defence.49
48Anzac Corp War Diary, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/9; Report on operations of 6th
Australian Division in Greece, Major General I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34; The
campaign in Greece, April 1941, Brigadier S.F. Rowell, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A) [1-4];
Chronology of Operations, Q Branch HQ 6 Aust Div Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2.
49War Diary HQ 1 Aust Corps Campaign in Greece, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/1; S.F. Rowell,
The campaign in Greece, April 1941, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A), [1-4]; D.J. Sweetzer,
Cooperation of 31 Battery, 7 NZ Anti-tank Regiment, with Lee Force at Domokos on the
withdrawal to Molos, Greece, (Apr 1941), ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126; Extracts from 18
381
Figure 13.1:W Force transport withdrawing southwards. Note the lack of vehicle dispersal
which tended to encourage Luftwaffe strafing. (Source: Australian War Memorial: 007649)
Far to the west, throughout 18 April the operational situation for the EFAS
continued to degenerate at an ever-increasing pace. Pitsikas retreating
troops were by now under constant Luftwaffe and Italian Air Force attack.
As formations closed in towards Yannina virtually the whole army had to
withdraw across a single bridge, twice destroyed and twice repaired. In
Papagos words, logistic difficulties alone were by now practically
insuperable.50 During the day the leading elements of the German 73rd
Division near Kastoria made contact with units of the 9th Italian Army
advancing east of Bilishte. At 11.00 a.m. the Adolf Hitler Regiment was ordered to detach its leading troops from the 5th Armoured Division, as soon
as they reached the Yannina-Kalabaka Road, and then drive them westwards
on a protective and reconnaissance rolecovering the right flank of the
40th Corps and providing intelligence as to Greek dispositions on the western side of the mountains.51 This advance to the flank and rear of the EFAS
threatened to cut off its withdrawal completely by pushing westward
Corps intelligence report, AWM 54, 534/2/27; entry for 18 April 1941, Richthofen diary,
BA MA N 671/7, p. 163; McClymont, To Greece, p. 292.
51SS AH Orders for 19 Apr 41, AWM 54, 543/2/27; Fighting in central and southern
Greece, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and General H. von Greiffenberg,
9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2.
382
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through the Metsovon Pass, and from there, to Yannina. Papagos rushed as
many more Greek units as possible to the fateful pass, the scene of a Greek
victory over the Italians the previous November, to reinforce the handful
of troops of the 11th Greek Division already in place. During the day a
pitched battle took place between several Greek units and the leading elements of the Adolf Hitler Regiment in the vicinity of the pass. The Greeks
fought bravely, but were soon on the verge of being encircled and overwhelmed.52
The situation in Pitsikas headquarters, and in Athens for that matter,
reflected the dire and desperate operational circumstances of the EFAS. At
11.00 a.m. Pitsikas telephoned Koryzis and Papagos telling them that:
The situation has reached its limit. The XVII [Division] troops are abandoning Legeritsa which covered the left flank of the [Borova] Divisions Group.
The A Army Corps [1st Corps] similarly reports a military leak of the VIII
Division. The XI Division, which covers Metsovo is leaking away. In the
name of God, save the Army from the Italians. PITSIKAS.53
The Prime Minister answered, My General, we are concerned for the Armys
honour, but above all, we are concerned with the Nations honour.54 Minutes later he, Papagos and Papademas receive copies of a similar plea from
Lieutenant General Bakos, commanding the 2nd Greek Corps. It read:
I have stated repeatedly, and I state again that presently a condition is rapidly unfolding resulting in a breakdown of discipline and an increase in the
desertion of officers in spite of measures taken which have included executions. I beg you in the name of God take immediate steps to avoid complete
destruction without precedent ... our tears have run dry.55
Papademas read out Bakos plea to a Greek Cabinet meeting which began
at 2.00 p.m. The issue of surrender was debated passionately. The King
refused to capitulate, having heard from Wilson that morning that the
vom 1941, BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 1 -19; Anl. 2 zu Nr. 9/42 geh.Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die
Krieges., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 3; entry for 18 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7,
p. 163; Texts of official war communiqus extracted from the New York Times, AWM 54,
534/5/25; cablegram, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to (Australian) Prime Ministers
Department, 19 April 1941, NAA A1608, E41/1/3; Extracts from evening reports from 12th
Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete), AWM 67, 5/17.
54Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 238.
55Ibid., pp. 238-9.
383
British felt they could hold the Thermopylae Line for four weeks. Papademas correctly condemned this notion as ridiculous. The Cabinet agreed
that the King and Government would soon need to evacuate to Crete, but
it could not decide whether to leave and let the generals to call a truce, or
order an immediate surrender. Koryzis proposed the formation of a new
government and was given two options by the Cabinet; either to permit
the military to take control of the government or permit the King to take
control, with Koryzis his deputy. After the Cabinet meeting the King, Koryzis, Konstantinos Maniadakis (the Greek Minister of Public Security) and
Major General Christos Kavrakos (Military Commandant of Athens) met
to discuss the maintenance of order in the capital. Discussions, predictably,
returned to the question of capitulation. Koryzis was strongly in favour of
surrender and had earlier in the day had a bitter confrontation with Palairet
about the issue. The Prime Minister again failed, however, to change the
Kings mind and left distraught. A little later the King summoned John
Diakos, former private counsellor to Metaxas, and dispatched him to Koryzis house to check on his wellbeing. When Diakos arrived the elevator
was in use so he raced up the stairs. Mrs Koryzis opened the door and told
an anxious Diakos that her husband was in his bedroom. The door was
locked, and as Diakos knocked a dull shot sounded out. Koryzis had committed suicide. Thus ended his unhappy ten-week term of office. Koryzis
had never wanted the job and had tried in vain to refuse his commission
from the King when it had been originally thrust upon him.56
Meanwhile, back at the Albanian front, Pitsikas corps commanders,
Demestihas, Bakos and Tsolakoglou, as well as the Orthodox Metropolitan
Bishop of Yannina, Spyridon, continued to press him hard to take the initiative and surrender to Germans at once. Pitsikas again decisively objected
not to the idea of surrender (with which he agreed), but rather to the idea
of doing it without official sanction. From this point the corps commanders
decided that Pitsikas would have to be replaced by the next senior military
officer, Tsolakoglou. Tsolakoglou, however, was initially wary of committing
what was, technically, treason. Throughout that day he continued to discuss
the issue with Pitsikas. Yet Pitsikas still refused to take the initiative so
Tsolakoglou sent his Chief of Staff, Colonel Athanasios Chrisohoou, to Athens to demand immediate decisions from the government. Chrisohoou
Department, 19 April 1941, NAA A1608, E41/1/3; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph,
Tragedy, 1939-1941, pp. 240-1; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German
War, p. 227; Argyropoulo, From Peace to Chaos, p. 170.
384
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arrived in Athens at 4.00 p.m., 18 April, and met with Papagos. Papagos told
him he was well aware of the situation in Epirus but as the commander of
British as well as Greek troops he could not enter into surrender negotiations, at least not until the British had departed. Chrisohoou saw the situation was at an impasse, with no one in Athens willing to take
responsibility for surrendering.57 The next day he sent a telegram to Tsolakoglou on his own initiative, without Greek General Headquarters endorsement, which read: If you assume responsibility, first you ought to get
authorisation from other Army Corps, to assign the action to you as having
contact with the Germans.58
By the evening of 18 April, despite W Force having held at Pinios Gorge
for long enough to squeeze through to Larissa, the Allied position in Greece
grew ever more tenuous. The Greek armies in Albania were on the verge
of collapse and the mood in Athens was desperate and fatalistic. For W
Force, the retreat to the Thermopylae Line was well and truly underway,
but by no means a foregone conclusion. In itself this retreat demanded
careful timing and movement of troops on a 100-kilometre front through
a series of bottlenecks on vulnerable and waterlogged roads. Even if this
withdrawal went according to plan (and the Germans would, of course, do
everything in their power to foil it), Wilson would still have lost his main
airfields and advance logistics bases further northand his Greek allies.
Under such demanding circumstances it is not surprising that from 17-18
April, during the first stages of this withdrawal, there was some loss of
control within the Anzac Corps. This situation was exacerbated by the fact
that elements of Blameys two divisions were in contact with the Germans,
while their main bodies were withdrawing 160 kilometres to the rear. Nor
did a last minute need to switch the New Zealand divisions route from the
sodden and muddy Volos Road to share the Lamia road with the 6th Australian Division help coordination or control. With both divisions now
forced to move on the same axis, units inevitably became mixed up along
the way. There were a number of reported cases of W Force departing south
in a very disorganised state, abandoning their camps without any apparent
attempt to destroy documents or equipment.59
BA MA RH 67/1, p. 5.
534/2/32.
385
The move itself also revealed a number of structural shortcomings. There

was a chronic lack, for example, of W Force provost personnel, and those
who were available were inexperienced with traffic control as a consequence of previous operations in the Western Desert. Many units were thus
forced to use their own troops as guides and traffic police. The lack of radios within Wilsons force to pass orders quickly and make amendments
to the plan, especially when contrasted to the numbers available within
German formations, was also hard-felt across W Force at this time. Nonetheless, the withdrawal to Thermopylae was successfully begunit remained to be seen if it would finish in a similar manner.60
The early stages of W Forces withdrawal to the Thermopylae Line also
offer a number of insights into many of the issues thus far traced throughout the campaign. On the 17 April, for example, four days after having decided to occupy the Thermopylae Line, Baillie-Grohmans staff had arrived
in Greece to coordinate an evacuation. Now for the fourth time (the Vermion-Olympus Line, the intermediate line, the Olympus-Aliakmon Line
and, last, the Thermopylae Line) Wilson was planning to abandon a defensive position before it was complete, or even fully manned. It is important
to note the sequence of these types of planned withdrawals as they help
correct the misinterpretation of Greece as a determined but doomed defence on the part of W Force. Rather, the British-Dominion campaign is
best described as a fighting retreat, from start to finish. W Force thus far
had delayed the German advance but had not yet, not once, tried to halt
it. Certainly individual units found themselves decisively engaged from
time to time but in such cases they were almost universally doing so as
rearguards in order to facilitate the withdrawals of other units. Even in such
cases, at Pinios Gorge and the Olympus Pass for example, W Force units in
desperate combat were still fighting with orders to withdraw in mind. They
were struggling to delay the Germans until a fixed time. They were never
fighting to hold their positions indefinitely.
Similarly, tanks were not a serious threat to the New Zealanders at the
Olympus Pass or at Elasson. In fact, once again, due to the restricted fields
of movement available to German armoured commanders, Allied artillery
proved an effective barrier. So too, typical German armoured attacks in
106/3161; Extracts from 18 Corps intelligence report, AWM 54, 534/2/27; Report on Greek
campaign, General H.M. Wilson, TNA WO 201/53; Anzac Corps War Diary, ANZ ADQZ 18906,
WAII8/2/9; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 91; Dockrill, British Strategy in Greece, the
Aliakmon Line, p. 117.
386
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Greece in this period are again more accurately described as predominantly infantry attacks by personnel from armoured formations. In line
with contemporary German doctrine, armoured advances were led by motorcycles until they were stopped by small arms or machine guns. These
reconnaissance troops worked forward and indicated their position to infantrymen which closed up behind them, usually bringing heavy mortars
with them. No tanks typically appeared until after this screen had done
best to locate enemy anti-tank defences. More often than not by the time
this stage had been reached Allied defenders in Greece were withdrawing.
Nor could German tanks have been used in a much more direct fashion,
even had German commanders wished it. Apart from the broken and constrictive terrain, it continued to prove very difficult to concentrate vehicles
forward due to shocking road conditions and the thoroughness of W Force
demolitions.61
What was the role of the Luftwaffe in this process of withdrawing W
Force to the Thermopylae Line? Once the W Force withdrawals were in full
swing, the RAF squadrons in support of W Force were forced to fall back
along same congested roads. It was impossible, for example, to keep using
Larissas aerodromes. Furthermore, due to a breakdown in RAF communications, and the overwhelming number of German short-range fighters
deployed, these squadrons found themselves at a severe operational disadvantage such that by 18 April continuous German attacks on Allied airfields had severely diminished the RAFs offensive capability. This was, of
course (as DAlbiac was at pains to point out), despite the personal valour
displayed by individual British pilots. It is also true that with improving
weather the W Force columns en route to the Thermopylae Line were increasingly attacked from the air and many Allied soldiers found the experience horrifying. Day after day the German Air Force bomb and machine
gun us, noted an officer of the 2/3rd Australian Field Regiment:
[w]here is the R.A.F? ... we suffer every morning and every evening these
temporary raids. We reach the stage where we long for night and quietness.
All day is a nightmare and the hours of daylight are so long. No English
planes are in the sky. What has gone wrong? Some begin to ask Are we to
be sacrificed to the German Air Force?62
611st Armoured Brigade Group notes on operations in Greece, April, 1941, 8 May 1941,
TNA WO 201/2749; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to
April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; Extracts from 12th Armys daily intelligence reports
(Greece), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
62Report by Captain K.M. Oliphant, 2/3 Field Regiment, AWM 54, 534/5/5.
387
What is much less certain than the terror caused by German air attack,
however, is the actual degree of material battlefield impact the Luftwaffe
brought to bear over this period.63
Yet contrary to contemporary perception, the remarkable aspect of the
Luftwaffe attacks against withdrawing W Force columns from 17-18 April
was the lack of material damage inflicted and its inability to cause serious
interruption. This is despite the dense stream of traffic from Larissa to
Lamia which made a perfect target, in clear weather. Few at the time realised
how small air casualties actually were, and the impression was that such
attacks were much more damaging than they proved.64 Constant air attack
on the 110-kilometre stretch between these two towns threw up no shortage
of noise and smoke, but caused relatively little damage. Only 15 direct hits
were recorded on the roads south from Larissa from 17-18 April and all of
them were repaired in less than three hours. No less than 12 separate raids
on this stretch of road on 18 April took only a minor toll on Allied men and
machines. The Luftwaffe did not come close to shutting down the Lamia
road. Mackay noted that intensive bombing around Larissa caused little
or no material damage to those targets.65 Blameys intelligence staff considered losses in men and MT [vehicles] have been much lower than might
have been expected.66 Brigadier Rowell went further, suggesting that:
I have no doubt, nor have any of the rest of us who were in Greece, that
had the RAF been in the same situation, not one of us would ever have
gotten back to the Thermopylae Line.67 Brigadier Steele, the Chief Engineer
of the Anzac Corps, concluded that the inefficiency of the German air force
in mistaking nuisance for strategic value enabled the Force to withdraw
successfully.68 Even Wavell noted that losses in circumstances were light.69
German reports that rolling Stuka attacks during the morning [of 18 April]
destroyed the enemy connections behind the lines, were well off the mark.70
April, 1941, 15 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/1196.
64Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 92.
May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34.
66Anzac Corps Intelligence Summary No. 1, 21 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/10.
6763(A) [1-4].
68Notes on Engineer Operation from Viewpoint of Anzac Corps, 14 May 1941, AWM
54, 534/2/25.
69Cablegram, Wavell to Fadden, 22 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/1/1.
70Entry for 18 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der 6.GEB.DIV, BA MA RH 28-6/8.
388
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There was a number of reasons for the Luftwaffes lack of impact here.
First, heavier German bombers struggled for accuracy as at numerous
points, particularly at the passes, they had to bomb from high altitude due
to the steepness of the terrain and height of nearby mountains. In addition,
the destructive power of the bombs themselves, particularly those delivered
by the Stukas, unless they found a direct hit, was dramatically reduced by
sodden ground. Counter-intuitively, more damage was done to W Force
columns from strafing by fighters than bombing. Also, as it happened the
most successful German hits on the roads were in places where repairs (or
deviations around damaged areas) were possible. Most of all, however, the
German 8th Air Corps dispersed its bombing effort. Richthofen had been
ordered to engage W Forces retreat, particularly at defiles and bridges, but
also to attack predicted embarkation points and to harass the withdrawal
routes for Greek forces from Yannina to Arta.71 Even in the Larissa-Lamia
sector, German bombers focussed on the Pharsala crater and scattered their
raids up and down the length of the road. Neither proved successful in
stopping the flow of traffic. The dispersal of complete air superiority in this
way quite possibly saved the Anzac Corps which, had its procession south
been halted, may well have been caught, decimated and scattered before
it ever reach the Thermopylae Line. It is noteworthy that the material ineffectiveness of German bombing at this point mirrored the situation played
out earlier at the forts of the Doiran-Nestos Line. It appears that the perception of the devastating effect of the Luftwaffe as part of German Blitzkrieg,
as it was seen to have applied in Poland and France, has often been uncritically applied to Greece. This was 1941 and the war was yet relatively
young. Bombing tactics and techniques on all sides were still evolving. In
many ways the Luftwaffe was not the decisive instrument in this period
that has so often been portrayed. Perceptions, on many levels, belied its
measurable material impact.72
At the same time, however, perceptions had an impact all of their own
on the Lamia road in this period. In this regard the psychological effect of
German bombing caused difficulties for W Force far in excess of the physical damage done. This was particularly true of dive bombing. Such attacks
shook the spirits of Wilsons withdrawing troops and discipline in some
71Extracts from 12th Army orders in Greece & Crete, AWM 67, 5/17.
6763(A) [1-4]; Report on Greek campaign, General H.M. Wilson, TNA WO 201/53; Long,
389
units, in the words of a British Inter-service report on the campaign, left

much to be desired.73 Even the Dominion official histories record this
period as a low point in Allied morale. Air attacks, as early as 17 April, were
described by an Australian Army report as having a cumulative effect on
morale.74 Brigadier Rowell agreed. Im bound to admit, he later wrote, that
the troops were thoroughly shaken. At every alarm troops took to the fields,
very often without any good reason.75 An officer of 3 RTR described the
same phenomenon of drivers leaping from their vehicle convoys at the first
sign of German aircraft. I had never seen so many men so unashamedly
afraid, he wrote, as I saw on the bomb-torn roads of Greece.76 Senior Allied
commanders like Freyberg and Mackay were forced in such circumstances
to make a point of exposing themselves to danger during air attacks, so that
word of their nonchalance spread. Overall, abandoned vehicles blocked
roads and halted convoys to a greater extent than bomb craters. So too,
Mackays headquarters concluded that the reason for so much German
machine gunning of vehicles was due to a tendency for W Force trucks to
bunch up or drive in close convoy. Had spacing and discipline been maintained, such convoys would not have attracted such constant attention.
Certainly there was no descent into wholesale panic or chaos, but the psychological impact was substantialeven though it did not equate in this
period to a significant battlefield impact.77
1942, TNA WO 106/3120.
March-April, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7.
6763(A) [1-4].
77Major Lessons from the operations in Greece by 6 Aust Div, 7 May 1941, AWM 3DRL
6850, 110.
390
chapter thirteen
the end of epirus (19-21 april)
391
Chapter Fourteen
The End in Epirus (19-21 April)

At around 7.00 a.m., 19 April, the leading elements of the German thrust
towards Larissa, the ambush company of mountaineers from the 143rd
Regiment and an advance guard of the 3rd Armoured Regiment, enter
ed the town together. Meanwhile, the leading elements of the 5th Armoured
Division, which had earlier crossed the Venetikos River and pushed its
reconnaissance elements forward on the heels of Saviges force through
Kalabaka, moved southeast towards the main highway south of Larissa.
This put Lieutenant General Fehns formation ahead of the main bodies of
both the 2nd Armoured and 6th Mountain Divisions. Once again a German
armoured formation in Greece had demonstrated the difference between
difficult and impossible terrain for mechanized forces. The successful
advance of the 5th Armoured Division convinced List to throw his full support behind it, and Fehn was from this point given primary responsibility
for pursuing W Force. Thus, those 9th Armoured Division troops in the
vicinity of Servia and Elasson were ordered to advance no further. Since it
no longer looked as though it would be needed for the pursuit of Allied
forces, the 9th Armoured Division was re-designated as the 18th Corps
reserve and eventually redeployed to Germany for rest and refitting. For
their part, Battle Groups 1 and 2 (2nd Armoured Division) were diverted
towards what List thought was an ongoing British evacuation at Volos. The
continuing pursuit towards the Thermopylae Line was now on a single axis
with the 5th and 6th Mountain Divisions (and the 2nd Armoured Division
after having cleared Volos) moving behind the 5th Armoured Division.1
Concurrent with the German breakout onto the Larissa plain, by 19 April
the 12th Army had begun pacification operations in eastern Macedonia,
Western Thrace and the Aegean Islands. The northeastern part of Greece
entry for 18 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 9. Pz Division Begonnen: 11.7.40 Abgeschlossen:
18.5.1941., BA MA RH 27-9/2; entries for 19, 20 and 21 April 1941, 2. Panzer Division, Kriegs
tagebuch Nr. 4 Ia und Anlagen 1.1.41 14.6.41., BA MA RH 27-2/20, pp. 40-3. Fighting in
central and southern Greece, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and General
H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, pp. 93, 99;
392
chapter fourteen
was occupied by the 30th Corps, with the German 50th Division moving to
Salonika and remaining there for the rest of the campaign. The islands of
Samothrace and Thasos had been taken earlier by troops of the 164th Division with the aid of Greek fishing boats, followed by German assault craft.
Thasos was solely defended by the inmates of a military convalescence
home and had fallen on 16 April, and Samothrace, which had no Greek
garrison, three days later. The same division, with the aid of a transport
steamer carrying a German infantry battalion and artillery battery, went
on to secure Lemnos on 25 April. In this case the battery was set up on deck
to provide improvised fire support on landing. With no lifeboats, Luftwaffe
support, and reports of British submarines in the area, the German Navy
had grave concerns about this operation. Nonetheless, the force approached
the island by night and landed on the north coast at dawn in assault boats
carried in the steamer. Resistance at the coast and in the interior was weak
and the island was occupied speedily and with few losses. The Italian Navy
then placed two destroyers at the 30th Corps disposal for the occupation
of Khios. These vessels ferried German troops forward and once again the
occupation unfolded without major incident and the island fell on 4 May.
While preparations to seize Samos were underway the island was occupied
by the Italians, operating from the Dodecanese Islands. German airborne
units, together with elements of 6th Mountain Division, subsequently seized
some of the larger Cyclades Islands such as Milos and the Sporades Islands
later in May.2
Back on the mainland, despite the clear and detailed tasks allocated by
List during 19 April, very little pursuit actually took place. In fact, by nightfall the 6th Mountain Divisions forward reconnaissance patrols were only
15 kilometres south of Larissa. It was a welcome respite for W Forces forward
troops, most of whom had only just managed to escape south through the
Larissa bottleneck the previous night. The day was best described, in this
sense, as a sort of operational pause for the Germans. It was to be the only
rest day in the campaign for 6th Mountain Division, whose troops had been
covering 50 to 60 kilometres a day in forced marches. The chief reason was
2Entries for 15, 19, 20, 21 April 1941, Generalkommando XXX.A.K., Abteilung Ic, Ttigkeitsbericht Sdost Begonnen Am 9.1.1941 In Rosiorii De Vede Beendet Am 21.5.1941 In
Kawalla Gefhrt Durch Oblt. Hammer, O.3 Vom 9.1. Bis 21.5.1941, BA MA RH 24-30/110,
pp. 38, 40, 42-3; unsigned, A.O.K.12, Ia Nr.833/41 geheim, 10.30, 18 April 1941, Fernschreiben
an Gen.Kdo. XXX.A.K., BA MA RH 20-12/93, pp. 1-2; Occupation of the Aegean Islands,
1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2.
393
Spelia
B Sqn
NZ Div Cav
ios
Pin
In f
ant
r y an
er
R iv
2/143 Mtn Regt

18 April
Makrikhorion
d c a rri er s
Most of 21 and 2/2 Bns

scattered in hills
214
D Tp
4 Fd Regt
Limit of advance
by 141 Mtn Regt
and I/3 Pz Regt
18 April
Sikourion
Mines and final

rearguard
Allens Force scatters over

ill-defined tracks
Road block
dusk 18 April
6 NZ Bde clear
by 1.30 am
19 April
Roa
Blind
I/3 Pz Regt with

elements of Mtn Div
6 am, 19 April
4 kilometres
2 miles
Larissa
Saviges Force
clear by 4 am
19 April
To Pharsala
To Volos
Map 14.1:W Force withdrawal through Larissa, 18-19 April 1941
once again logistics. Fuel was in particularly short supply for leading mechanized forces, while the mountain troops were in dire need of food and
other supplies after their epic approach marches. Headquarters, 5th Armoured Division noted that significant fuel re-supply could not be brought
forward in the next three days. Some of the mountain troops had last received regular rations on 10 April. The capture of Larissa, however, with
large stocks of Allied stores and a working airfield, provided many of the
answers to growing German supply problems, and ensured the pause would
last no longer than a day.3 Such was the captured bounty that soldiers of
3On 23 April 400,000 portions of German rations reached Larissa but these could only
be used for rear echelon troops as the fighting elements of the German divisions themselves
394
chapter fourteen
the 3rd Armoured Regiment stood with astonishment in their eyes in front
of this rich haul of quality goods.4
In Athens, the lull in fighting on 19 April brought little relief. The sudden
death of Koryzis dissolved the last vestiges of government control in the
city. The King, though prepared to take over the Government, was unable
to find anyone to take the post of Deputy Prime Minister at such a dangerous time. Few wished to join a government soon to be forced to surrender
and flee. Konstantinos Kotzias, former mayor of Athens, held the position
for a few hours during which he tried to mount a demonstration in the
streets in support of continuing the war. The King had hoped Kotzias appointment might restore confidence in the government, but it had the
reverse effect. The King then announced Lieutenant General Mazarakis,
the leader of the Venizelist Republican Party, would be appointed as Deputy Prime Minister within a predominantly military government. On grasping the scale of the military disaster facing the country, however, the next
day Mazarakis withdrew his acceptance of the post. Within this confusion
Palairet stepped up warnings to the War Office of his belief in the decline
of Greek morale, and what he claimed was rampant insubordination within the Greek army and navy. Palairet reported troops aboard trains returning from the front refused to disembark anywhere short of Athens and acts
of sabotage were reported at British aerodromes. Palairet also passed on
reports that individual pro-German officers were ordering their men not
to fire on German troops.5
Wavell arrived into the confusion of Athens on 19 April to assess the
situation. His first move was to call a conference with Wilson, W Forces
were too far forward: entries for 22 and 23 April 1941, Gen. Kdo. (mot) XXXX. A.K., Abt. Qu.,
Fortsetzung des Kriegstagebuches (Band 2) Begonnen am 16.3.41 Beendet am 1.6.41., BA
MA RH 24-40/153, pp. 41, 43-4; entry for 19 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der 6.GEB.
DIV., BA MA RH 28-6/8; Schrner, Die neuen Thermopylen. (Zum dreijhrigen Bestehen
der 6.Geb.Div.: gegrndet 3.6.1940), BA MA RH 28-6/73, p. 2; entry for 20 April 1941, 5.
Panzer-Division, Ib, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 5 u. 6. 1.1.1941-17.6.1941., BA MA RH 27-5/121, p. 159;
entry for 22 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 5 9. Panzer-Division, Abt. Ib Begonnen: 6. 7. 1940
Abgeschlossen: 18. 5. 1941, BA MA RH 27-9/30.
4Extract of report by 3 Pz Regt (2 Pz Div), AWM 54, 534/2/27. Extracts from 18 Corps
intelligence report, AWM 54, 534/2/27; Relevant extracts from daily QMG reports from
12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete), AWM 67, 5/17; Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary
(Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Fighting in central and southern Greece, reviewed
54, 624/7/2; McClymont, To Greece, p. 343.
5Telegram, Palairet to Foreign Office, 19 April 1941, TNA FO 371/29819; Anzac Corps
Intelligence Summary No. 1, 21 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/10.
395
two senior staff officers (Brigadiers Galloway and Brunskill), Baillie-

Grohman and DAlbiac. The first item on the agenda was the impending
evacuation. Arguments both for and against the withdrawal of W Force
were bandied about. The decision had, of course, already been made; but
a revival of optimism from Churchill back in London who was now increasingly of the opinion that if the Generals on the spot think they can hold
the Thermopylae position we should certainly support them, and the
fact that so far neither the King nor the Greek government had yet officially endorsed Papagos evacuation suggestion of 16 April, demanded
further discussionif only for forms sake.6
In favour of holding at Thermopylae for as long as possible were Wilsons
claim that it could actually be done in a military sense (a boast he knew
was unlikely to be tested), arguments that a stubborn defence would tie up
significant German forces (which might help stabilise the Allied situation
in North Africa), the possibility of inflicting heavy German casualties, the
preservation of equipment that would otherwise have to be abandoned,
and the restoration of a degree of British prestige. An evacuation, on the
other hand, risked heavy losses without exacting a commensurate price
from the Germans. In favour of departing Greece as soon as possible was
ULTRA intelligence indicating the Thermopylae was threatened by elements
of three German divisions, the growing instability of the Greek government,
the impossibility of reinforcement, the preservation of civilian lives and
infrastructure, the reality of ongoing and complete German air superiority,
and the fact that the British would soon be forced to feed civilians behind
the Thermopylae Line while maintaining their own force. This last requirement could never be achieved, especially as British supply ships to Greece
had already been turned around by Wavell. On top of these factors, it was
obvious the EFAS was doomed and some of its generals were already urging
surrender. It was a discussion, in Galloways words, of sentiment versus
facts.7 Unsurprisingly, the decision already made was re-confirmed.
W Force was leaving just as soon as it could be arranged, probably the night
of 28-29 April. The conference accepted that, with no time for rehearsals,
Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; McClymont,
To Greece, p. 365; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 242.
7Record of a meeting held at General Wilsons house on 18th April, 1941, to consider
the question of evacuation, TNA WO 201/53.
396
chapter fourteen
no air cover, and a 1030-kilometre ferry run to Alexandria, they would be

fortunate to get away with 30 per cent of the force.8
At 1.00 p.m. the same afternoon the British delegates at Wavells morning
meeting met again, this time at the Tatoi Palace. Also present for this meeting were Palairet, the King, Papagos and Mazarakis (with representatives
of the Venizelist Party). Wavell began by attacking the only remaining obstacle to the immediate execution of an evacuation. Out of political necessity, he told the gathering, W Force would fight for as long as the Greeks
did, and embark only if the Greek government wished it. To drive home
the point Palairet read aloud Churchills earlier message that an evacuation
could only take place with full support of the Greek government. Papagos
announced that the morale of the Greek Army was shaken, that EFAS could
no longer be maintained in the field, and that if the British held on they
would only bring more damage to his country. In despair Mazarakis lamented that he had been called in too late, the situation could not be retrieved, and that a W Force evacuation was the only course of action
available.9 The conference agreed that the British force should leave, although the decision was not made official until the next day as a government
still had to be formed, and the King wanted one last report on the military
situation on the Albanian front. Meanwhile, Pitsikas was to continue fighting as long as possible, or at least long enough for the W Force withdrawal
to be effected, and the war was to continue from the Greek islands with all
available means. Wilson was left by Wavell to fix embarkation dates and
details.10
Unfortunately for the Allied cause most of the disturbing rumours reaching Athens during 19 April from Albania were true. Pitsikas force was being
hammered at all points. In the vicinity of Grevena isolated pockets of Greeks
continued to surrender. From the east, during the day the Adolf Hitler
Regiments reconnaissance patrols had cleared the Metsovon Pass and were
probing Yanninain the process cutting the only remaining line of supply
to the EFAS. From the north elements of the 9th and 11th Italian Armies
observed Greek formations west of the Pindus Mountains apparently
8Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 93-4; H.T. Baillie-Grohman, Flashlights on the past,
1976, NMM, GRO/33; H.T. Baillie-Grohman, report on the evacuation of British forces from
Greece, 15 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet catalogued);
Hinsley, British Intelligence, pp. 408-9.
9H.M. Wilson, Report on Greek campaign, TNA WO 201/53.
10H.M. Wilson, Report on Greek campaign, TNA WO 201/53; Long, Greece, Crete and
Syria, p. 132.

0
16 Gk Div
20 kilometres
397
ALBANIA
10 miles
Koritza
Forward
Italian
positions
Devolis
River
6 Gk Div
1 Gk Div
17 Gk Div
Apsos
Ri
ve
r
Ri
r
ve
5 Gk Div
Aoo
s
4 Gk Div
Forward
Italian
positions
Aliakm
Frasseri
River
Ersek
Klissoura
on
GREECE
2070
2 Gk Div
River
1580
2200
os
8 Gk Div
o
tap
ran
Sa
Argyrokastron
Libhova
2633
Konitsa
Aoos
River
2480
Delvine
IONIAN
ALBANIA
SEA
Kavallari
CORFU
Konispol
1810
GREECE
Yannina
Corfu
Map 14.2:The withdrawal of the EFAS, 12-21 April 1941
disbanding in some places.11 Italian troops had broken the Greek rearguards
and reached the old Greek-Albanian border at almost all points. The Kings
need for categorical evidence of the hopelessness of the situation in Albania was not hard to satisfy.12
11Texts of official war communiqus extracted from the New York Times AWM 54,
534/5/25.
12Ibid.; Extracts from evening reports from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete), AWM
67, 5/17; A.C. Smith, Historical Study: The German Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring 1941),
398
chapter fourteen
Meanwhile, as Allied generals and Greek politicians talked of an evacuation in Athens, and as Pitsikas struggled to hold his formations together
in Epirus, the continuing W Force withdrawal to the Thermopylae Line
made full use of the pause by German ground units in the vicinity of Larissa. Throughout the day crowded columns moved across the Lamia plain
towards Domokos. The going, however, was still slow. Anzac Corps convoys
on this stretch of road, some up to 20 kilometres long, were packed tight
and remained vulnerable to air attackespecially as the weather was clear.
No German aircraft arrived, however, until some hours after dawn on 19
April and by then most of the W Force columns were moving. Heavy attacks
by groups of more than 20 German aircraft were mounted from 7.00 to 8.30
a.m. A second raid came at 12.00 midday and a third two hours later. Most
of the day was thus spent by the greater part of the Anzac Corps in their
trucks under sporadic fire. To give some sense of the crawling pace of the
retreat, the 2/1st Australian Battalion, for example, began driving at daylight.
It took four hours for the unit to travel the twenty kilometres south to Lamia,
and it was another seven hours, after stopping for air raids, until it at last
arrived at the Thermopylae Line.13 Such conditions continued to eat away
at fraying nerves. All day from dawn until dark we were constantly diving
for cover from German dive-bombers, recalled a driver of the 2/7th
Australian Battalion.14 This cant last, he lamented, everyones nerves are
going to pieces.15
Along with nervous W Force drivers, fatigue, and the perpetual difficulties of the Greek terrain also contributed to the sluggishness of the withdrawal to Thermopylae. In particular, the pass north of Lamia, and the
Thermopylae Line itself, were marked by very steep winding roads and
sheer cliffs. Despite periods of sunshine, poor road surfaces were still slippery with rain and slush, crowded with transport, and clogged with Greek
refugees, on foot and in carts intermixed with cattle, sheep, and household
goods of all descriptions. In the words of Captain K.M. Oliphant, 2/3rd
Australian Field Regiment, moving back over shocking roads and precipitous mountain passes covered in snowvehicles and guns topple over the
cliffs at nightit is too dark to see the road ... It becomes a veritable nightmare, no sleep for 7 nights, frayed tempers.16 Exhausted drivers fell asleep
US Dept of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-261, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1953,
p. 95; Lehmann, Die Leibstandarte Band I, pp. 395-402.
14Interview with Sergeant A.N. Palmer, 2/7 Battalion, AWM 54, 534/3/2.
15Ibid.
16Extracts from the diary of Captain K.M. Oliphant, 2/3 Field Regiment, TNA CAB
106/555.
399
at each halt then often failed to wake when columns moved off. Major
General Mackay himself rode down the convoy at one stage as a pillion
passenger on a motorcycle to address such delays. Despite such problems,
however, the W Force withdrawal south did slowly progress.17
Throughout the day the Anzac Corps rearguard at Domokos watched
the slow progression of W Force convoys moving south through its position.
Brigadier Lees men had been in this location for 48 hours with orders to
hold until the night of 21 April. During the day the last five tanks of 3 RTR
moved to reinforce the Domokos position. Mackay stayed with Lee at Domokos from 7.30 a.m. until 4.00 p.m., 19 April, and gave his approval to a decision made by Lee the previous day to despatch the 2/4th and 2/8th
Australian Battalions, previously his reserve, back to the Thermopylae Line.
Both men thought it unlikely that the Germans would be able to press
Domokos hard before Lees force was scheduled to withdraw.18
The constant stream of Anzac Corps traffic through Domokos at last
began to slacken at around 2.00 p.m., but from this point Luftwaffe attacks
on the pass increased. A period of two-and-a-half hours of constant attack
air attack by upwards of 30 German aircraft followed, but little material
damage was done. By late afternoon, with the first signs of German artillery
ranging on the position, Mackay assessed that the Domokos rearguard had
served its purpose and ordered Lee to withdraw his men at dusk. Lees
demolitions were blown at 7.00 p.m. Straggling troops and confusion, however, made preparations to withdraw difficult. At 8.00 p.m. Lee ordered
artillery to fire on a group of men dismounting from trucks forward of the
Domokos position. Two trucks burst into flames before it was discovered
they were, in fact, carrying British engineers and Cypriot pioneers who had
been delayed laying mines. This rather shaken group disabled its remaining
vehicles and trudged up the pass. So too, the 31st NZ Anti-tank Battery found
itself isolated to the north of Lees demolitions and was forced to destroy
its guns before retiring. Lees other significant problem was that one of his
officers had made contact with elements of Brigadier Allens headquarters
with the news that Allen was unsure of the position of his brigade. As a
17Extracts of letters from Major Crofton, Headquarters Anzac Corps, AWM 54, 534/2/14;
Report of activities in Greece Apr 41 by Lt. Col. R.R. Vial, 12 January 1945, AWM 54, 534/2/32;
Chronology of Operations, HQ 6 Division AASC Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; Wilson, Eight
Years Overseas, p. 92.
18Interview with Sergeant A.N. Palmer, 2/7 Battalion. AWM54 534/3/2; Report of 2/6
Aust Inf Bns participation in the Grecian Campaign covering the period April 1-29, 1941,
AWM 54, 534/2/35 [2]; McClymont, To Greece, p. 349-50; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria,
p. 135.
400
chapter fourteen
consequence, in case the remnants of the force which had fought at Pinios
had not yet managed to pass through Larissa, Lee ordered a small detachment to cover the road at a pass 20 kilometres south of Domokos at the
Lamia (Fourka) Pass while the main body of his group withdrew. This small
force, based on two infantry companies and a troop of 3 RTR tanks, was
placed under the command of Major H.G. Guinn, who did not actually
arrive in the area until the next morning. The withdrawal of Lees main
force was at last completed by 11.30 p.m., as Guinns men fumbled into their
new positions in the darkness.19
The only significant W Force formation not to move through Lees force
at Domokos during 19 April was the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade, already
south of the Thermopylae Line at Atalandi. During the day the 4th Hussars
and 3 RTR were sent to Athens to reform. The former were subsequently
sent south to Glyphada, near Athens under W Forces direct command,
while 3 RTR (minus tanks) remained in the capital for local defence.
During the night the balance of Charringtons brigade was despatched to
Thebes to protect this area from the potential threat of German advance
from Euboea behind the right flank of the Thermopylae position. By now,
excepting the tank troop left with Guinn, Charrington had lost all but a
single cruiser tank and seven light tanks to ongoing mechanical failure.
With detachments supporting the New Zealand Division at Thermopylae,
the Rangers and three rickety NZ armoured cars formed the sum total of
the remaining combat power of Charringtons brigade.20
[1-4]; P.J. Hurst, My Army Days, 2/7 Battalion, AWM MSS1656; Report of 2/6 Aust Inf Bns
participation in the Grecian Campaign covering the period April 1-29, 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/35 [2]; And so to Greece, 2/2 Battalion Papers, AWM PR83/137; D.J. Sweetzer,
Cooperation of 31 Battery, 7 NZ Anti-tank Regiment, with Lee Force at Domokos on the
withdrawal to Molos, Greece, (Apr 1941), ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126 History of the 2 NZ
Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139;
War Diary HQ 1 Aust Corps Campaign in Greece, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/1; interview with
Sergeant A.N. Palmer, 2/7 Battalion, AWM 54, 534/3/2; diary of Major H.C.D. Marshall, 2/7
Battalion, AWM 54, 255/4/12; W.E. Murphy (NZ War History Branch), Comments on Buckleys popular history of the Greek campaign, January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; McClymont, To
Greece, pp. 349-50; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 136-7.
20Report on Greek campaign, General H.M. Wilson, TNA WO 201/53; letter, Barnett to
anon. (his mother), 5 January 1942, IWM Papers of Major R.A. Barnett, 102 AT Regt, 07/23/1;
A. Whitehead (provost), Experience in Greece, 26 August 1944, TNA WO 201/122. 1st
Armoured Brigade Group, TNA WO 201/122; Situation Report, W Force to GHQ Middle East,
20 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124; letter, Charrington to Cynth, 29 April 1941, LHCMA Charrington 4/75a; letter, Boileau to Anon., 6 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Major R.R.C. Boileau, 1
Rangers, 77/149/1; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 141; Crisp, The gods were neutral, p. 188.
401
There was no improvement in Athens on 20 April, a cloudy Easter Sunday and Adolf Hitlers birthday. During the day news was received that the
Bulgarian Armys late entry into the campaign had begun with units crossing the border into northeast Greece. Meanwhile, the Greek King spent
most of the day desperately interviewing potential candidates to head up
a new government. In the evening, Vice Admiral Alexandros Sakellariou,
the Minister for Naval Affairs, was offered the Deputy Prime Ministership,
with King himself forced to continue on as Prime Minister. Sakellariou
accepted and managed to organise an ad hoc government. The Admirals
first step was to address Greek solders. I fully appreciate the situation,
announced Sakellariou, but you must know that there is every need to
continue this fight ... Consider the historic responsibility of the moment
and, in the knowledge that heroic decisions are to be taken, accomplish
more than your duty.21 As these negotiations unfolded, during the day
a force of 100 German dive bombers and escorts had attacked the airports
around Athens. DAlbiac launched the remainder of his RAF fighter force
of 15 Hurricanes against them. A third were lost. Wavell, still in Athens,
cabled the War Office in London noting that the military situation was such
that it naturally encourages quislings and faint-hearted elements.22
At Yannina, although convinced of the need to surrender for some time,
and with consent already given from Demestichas and Bakos to act, Lieutenant General Tsolakoglou yet hesitated to usurp Pitsikas. At 2.00 a.m., 20
April, however, he received Colonel Chrisohoous telegram sent from Athens, which provided the final impetus he required. Tsolakoglou immediately telephoned Pitsikas and announced he had been authorised by
General Headquarters, as well as by his fellow corps commanders, to offer
a truce. He had no such authorisation. Tsolakoglou read out Chrisohoous
telegram, as if it had come from Papagos, although perfectly aware that it
did not. Pitsikas knew the telegram from Athens was false and warned
Tsolakoglou against any meeting with the Germans.
The main threat to the EFAS at this point was the drive through the
Metsovon Pass by the 2nd Battalion (Adolf Hitler Regiment), which had
21Argyropoulo, From Peace to Chaos, p. 171.
22Telegram, Wavell to War Office, 20 April 1941, TNA FO 371/29820. Golla, Fall Griechen
land, pp. 330-1; cablegram, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to (Australian) Prime
Ministers Department, 21 April 1941, NAA A1608, E41/1/3; Extracts from morning reports
from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete), AWM 67, 5/17; Draft Manuscript Medical History
of the War: Greece (1940-1941), TNA AIR 49/11; entry for 20 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA
MA N 671/7, p. 165; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 133; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 358-9;
Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 241.
402
chapter fourteen
reconnoitred as far as Koutsoufliani the previous day. At dawn Greek artillery shelled the forward German column approaching Yannina, but its fire
was ordered to cease by the 3rd Greek Corps headquarters as a surrender
committee led by Tsolakoglou, which included an unsuspecting Major
General Karassos (former commander of CMFAS), had already departed
seeking an audience with the attackers. The commander of the Adolf Hitler Regiment, Sepp Dietrich, was as surprised as the Greek General Headquarters in Athens were soon to be when handed Tsolakoglous written
offer of capitulation. At 6.00 p.m. Dietrich met Tsolakoglou and signed a
truce protocol at Votonosi village. The protocol decreed that from that
moment hostilities between Germany and Greece would cease, and, on
Dietrichs word, within a few hours between Greece and Italy as well. Greek
troops would return to the original Greece-Albania border within 10 days,
Tsolakoglou offered, then they would demobilise, surrender their weapons,
and return home. For honours sake Greek officers would keep their side
arms. At 7.00 p.m. Tsolakoglous headquarters notified the rest of the EFAS
that the truce had been put into effect. Pitsikas henceforth considered
himself resigned and left for Athens the next morning.23
Two factors seem to have tipped Tsolakoglou into mutiny on 20 April.
The first, according to Keegan, was his determination to deny the Italians
the satisfaction of a victory they had not earned.24 Tsolakoglou was far
from alone in this point of view. Lieutenant General Bakos, for example,
sent a message to his divisional commanders informing them of the decision to negotiate a surrender to Germans while imploring them, for the
honour of the army, to hold off the Italians until the armistice was officially signed. It was also clear that the military position of the EFAS was
hopeless beyond a few days at most, even had all three of Pitsikas corps
commanders and their subordinates wished to fight to the bitter end. The
vom 1941, BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 1 -19; Anl. 2 zu Nr. 9/42 geh.Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die
Krieges., BA MA RH 67/1, p. 3; Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, 30 April 1941, Gefechtsbericht
der L.SS A.H. fr die Zeit vom 6.4.41 29.4.41., BA MA RH 24-40/17, p. 15; entry for 20 April
1941, Reichsfhrer SS Fhrungshauptamt, Einsatz der verst. L. SS. A. H. im Sdostfeldzug
1941, BA MA RH 20-12/466, p. 8; Capitulation of the Epirus Army, reviewed and edited by
Field Marshal S.W. List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2;
Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 337-9; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and
Greek-German War, p. 232; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941,
p. 237.
24J. Keegan, The Second World War, Viking, New York, 1990, p. 157.
403
northern highways supplying the EFAS had been systematically attacked

and a subsequent lack of food and other supplies was being felt. The civilian population centres in the areatowns like Yannina, Arta and Preveza
were by this time smoking ruins. Luftwaffe attacks on Eneas Zitsis and the
Phiripiados-Yannina road had destroyed almost all telephone communi
cations with the rest of Greece. Aside from the delay caused by road congestion, there was no limit to what force List could deploy, if required,
behind the Adolf Hitler Regiment, and Dietrichs forward elements had
during the day defeated the last Greek blocking force protecting Yannina
in the 1500-metre-high Metsovon Pass. The appearance of German troops
to the rear of the EFAS and in the vicinity of Yannina brought these realities
home decisively.25
Tsolakoglou, who went on to lead the first collaborationist Greek government of occupation, has been remembered as a traitor. Indeed he was tried
and sentenced to death after the war for his cooperation with the Germans.
Considering Tsolakoglous decision to surrender the EFAS in isolation, however, one might ask what other options were on the table? If national pride
demanded one last act of defiance in Albania, then Tsolakoglou was not
the man for it, but neither were his contemporaries in the EFAS who supported and encouraged his actions. It is also worth remembering that Pitsikas did not fundamentally disagree with Tsolakoglou as to the wisdom and
need to surrender.26 Rather, he refused to countenance independent action
without blessing from Athens, despite the potential cost to the men under
his command. To what degree might Pitsikas stance be interpreted as a
lack of moral courage rather than steadfastness or loyalty? Nevertheless,
the EFAS had surrendered and Tsolakoglou is remembered as the man who
raised the white flag, against the wishes of his commander and his King.
25Anl. 2 zu Nr. 9/42 geh.Mil. Att. Athen, Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der 11. Division in
der Gegend von Metsovon whrend des griechisch-deutschen Krieges., BA MA RH 67/1,
p. 3; Bieler, Kommando der deutschen Truppen im Epirus, Nr. 201/41 g.Kdos., 25 April 1941,
Joannina, to A.O.K. 12, Betr.: Kapitulation der griech. Epirus-Mazedonien-Armee, BA MA
RH 26-73/28, pp. 1-5; entry for 21 April 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, p. 374; Situation Report,
W Force to GHQ Middle East, 20 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124; Fighting in central and
southern Greece, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and General H. von
Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece,
WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 93; McClymont, To Greece, p. 366; Bitzes,
Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 245; Argyropoulo, From Peace
to Chaos, pp. 162-3.
26Telegram, Salisbury-Jones to War Office, 13 March 1941, TNA WO 169/2146; Zacha
rioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, p. 276.
404
chapter fourteen
Tsolakoglou himself wrote in his memoirs: I found myself before a historic dilemma: To allow the fight to continue and have a holocaust or, obeying the pleas of the Armys commanders, to assume the initiative of
surrendering.27
Back on the W Force front, by the morning of 20 April the Germans were
ready to resume their pursuit of British and Dominion troops southwards
although it again faced delays imposed by the Allied demolitions and traffic jams of German units. The reconnaissance elements of the 5th Armoured
Division led the push throughout the day, once again benefitting from the
chance discovery of an abandoned British dump which replenished fuel
supplies. After re-supplying and resting during the day, in the evening the
6th Mountain Division, with the advance guard of the 72nd Division (the
Baacke Group) now under its command, issued orders for its own move
south of Pharsala the following day. Meanwhile, Major Guinns small rearguard force, now all that stood between the Germans and the Thermopylae
Line, used the early hours of 20 April to dig in and rest. The small force was
to hold its position for as long as it took for the last forward New Zealand
troops to pass through Lamia. Wisely, during the morning Guinn enforced
absolute concealment as German reconnaissance aircraft circled overhead.28 At 2.00 p.m., unaware the pass was defended at all thanks to Guinns
camouflage, a detachment of four German motorcycles with side-cars from
the 8th Reconnaissance Battalion (5th Armoured Division), rode right into
the pass and were destroyed by Vickers fire in what amounted to an ambush.
A fifth motorcyclist, however, finding the wreckage of his comrades, made
a skid-turn and escaped. German columns following the
27Tsolakoglou was made leader of the collaborationist Greek government under Nazi
occupation from May 1941 to December 1942. Several other generals of the Epirus Army
became members of Tsolakoglous government, including Demestichas and Bakos. In May
1945, after Greece was liberated, Tsolakoglou was sentenced to death by a Special Collaborators Court. His penalty was subsequently reduced to life imprisonment. He died in prison
of cancer in 1948. The quotation used here comes from the Rizospastis newspaper, 8 April,
2001, referenced at <http://www.mlahanas.de/Greece/History/Portraits/GeorgiosTsolakoglou.html>, accessed 19 August 2011. For the formation of Tsolakoglous government see:
entries for 25-30 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch des Kommandos der deutschen Truppen in
Epirus. Vom 21.4.41 bis 11.5.41., BA MA RH 26-73/27, pp. 10-19; signature, Op. Abt. (I) Nr.
787/41 g.Kdos.Chefs., 27 April 1941, to G QU IV, Frd. Heere Ost, BA MA RH 2/1928; For an
example of the tendency to view Tsolakoglous motives and actions retrospectively:
Mazower, Inside Hitlers Greece, pp. 15-16.
H.G. Guinn, Report on activities of rear guard to Lee Force covering withdrawal from
Domokos to Thermopylae, 20 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 6850, 108; letter, Gilmer to Wards, 28
April 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/5; My Army Days, P.J. Hurst, 2/7 Battalion, AWM
MSS1656.
405
motorcyclists now began to deploy. First on the scene were heavy mortars
which began to bombard Guinns left flank. Meanwhile, two German armoured cars proceeded towards the pass, one straight down the road, moving slowly, and the other wide to the left trying to outflank the defenders.
Both were hampered by swampy ground. The vehicle proceeding down the
road got to within 100 metres of the defenders before two British tanks
hidden nearby moved out and blasted it. The second German armoured
car, now bogged, was set aflame with a single shot. Throughout the afternoon Guinn watched German troop planes landing every eight minutes
with men and equipment, only about four kilometres north of his position.
As the German infantrymen were ferried forward in trucks they were engaged by accurate machine-gun and tank fire and were unable either to
locate, or silence, Guinns dispersed and well-hidden positions.29
At 4.00 p.m. Guinn received a long awaited message that W Force troops
were clear of Lamia and that he could withdraw whenever he chosewhich
would not be long given that the Germans had at last concentrated for a
concerted attack. An hour later, as rain hammered down, German infantry
spread out across the plain while tanks started down the road towards the
pass firing as they came. Guinns Vickers crews fired continuously until
steam from their barrels gave away their positions to the attacking tanks,
which began to shell them. German artillery fire then began to fall on the
position, and Guinn ordered the force to retire. Such orders had been preempted, to some degree, by the British tank troop which began moving
south a little prematurely. Apparently this gentleman wanted to conduct
his own group his own way, noted Guinn, as never at any time did he show
any desire to take orders from me.30 The Germans responded to the movement with even heavier mortar and artillery fire. Panicky infantrymen
withdrew through engineers to their rear waiting to blow a nearby culvert
before clambering aboard trucks bound for the Thermopylae Line.31
29Report by 8 Pz Recce Unit, AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary
(Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27; War for the Passes, an extract from the American
Infantry Journal, October, 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643 3/42; Extracts from 18 Corps intelligence
report, AWM 54, 534/2/27; I. Mackay, Campaign in Greece, [transcript], 15 June 1941, AWM
27, 116/1; P.J. Hurst, My Army Days, 2/7 Battalion, AWM MSS1656; Report on operations of
2/1 Aust. M.G. Battalion in Greece, Lieutenant Colonel Gooch, 9 July 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/17;
letter, Gilmer to Wards, 28 April 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/5; Long, Greece, Crete and
Syria, p. 137; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, p. 332.
30Report on activities of rear guard to Lee Force covering withdrawal from Domokos
to Thermopylae, H.G. Guinn, 20 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 6850, 108.
31Guinns anti-tank guns, it seems, never received an order to depart, but nonetheless
managed to withdraw at the last minute. A handful of Australian infantrymen had not
retreated before the demolitions were blown and were forced to walk the 24 kilometres to
406
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Meanwhile, much further south, those W Force troops that had made it
to Thermopylae were settling into their new positions which lay across the
neck of a long peninsula with Athens near its southeastern tip. The line
itself ran south of the large town of Lamia, across the small Sperkhios
River, and up the 1200-metre Brallos escarpment and then back down to
the Gulf of Corinth. There were three roads running through the Thermopylae Line. The first, in the north, ran from Lamia across the Sperkhios and
then through Molos and Atalandi towards Athens. The Anzac Corps intended to hold not only the coastal pass but also the high mountain range
in the vicinity of Brallos, running to the west. The area between Molos and
the Brallos Pass, therefore, formed the northern third of the Thermopylae
position. Its southern two-thirds, from Brallos to the Gulf of Corinth, lay
astride a mountain range rising to 1800 metres. In the centre of the line,
two other roads, one from Lamia in the north and one from Amfissa in the
south, joined near the Brallos Pass and headed southeast towards Athens.
The road from Lamia to Brallos climbed the steep face of the mountains
from the plain upon which the Germans were regrouping, up a series of
zigzags, until it ran some 900 metres above sea level. The passage was so
steep that from the top of the 10-kilometre climb an observer could look
straight back down to the starting point, and to the patchwork quilt of fields
on the plain to the north. To the west of the steep Brallos road facing north,
a railway also climbed through the pass. Last, in the south of the Thermopylae position another road ran east from Amfissa, through Delphi, and on
to Levadia.32
Such was the confusion of the W Force withdrawal south that most units
in the Thermopylae Line did not receive written orders for the defence of
the position until the afternoon of 20 April, even though orders from Blamey
Thermopylae. Letter, Gilmer to Wards, 28 April 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/5; 7 NZ
Anti-Tank Regiment Campaign in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/130; W.E. Murphy (NZ
War History Branch), Comments on Buckleys popular history of the Greek campaign,
January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; Notes on 2/6 Australian Infantry Battalion during operations
in Greece, AWM 54, 534/2/19; Chronology of Operations, 2/6 Aust Inf Bn Greece, AWM
54, 534/1/2; interview with Sergeant A.N. Palmer, 2/7 Battalion, AWM 54, 534/3/2; Report
on operations of 2/1 Aust. M.G. Battalion in Greece, Lieutenant Colonel Gooch, 9 July 1941,
AWM 54, 534/5/17; Anzac Corps Intelligence Summary No. 1, 21 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643,
1/10.
March-April, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7; letter, Lieutenant K.L Kesteven, 2/4 Battalion, 17 May
1941, AWM 54, 234/2/17; G. Long, The 6th Division in action, AWM PR88/72; Anzac Corps
War Diary, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/9; McClymont, To Greece, p. 354; Long, Greece, Crete
and Syria, p. 140.
407
Figure 14.1:A view of Brallos Pass. (Source: Australian War Memorial: 067947)
had been drafted before lunch the previous day. The Anzac Corps plan was,
essentially, to block the two main passes southbetween the sea and northern slopes on the mountains (with the New Zealand division); and the
Brallos Pass through which ran the main road to Athens (with the 6th Australian Division). The third pass, south of Mt Parnassus through Delphi,
was not immediately accessible to a German advance, although it was
recognised that this might not be the case for long.33
Major General Mackay decided that Brigadier Vaseys 19th Australian
Brigade would form the backbone of his defence. The two depleted battalions of this formation had, by 20 April, been reinforced by the attachment
of the 2/1st and 2/5th Australian Battalions, and by its own 2/11th Australian
Battalion, joining the brigade for the first time since arriving in Greece.
Early in the afternoon Mackay instructed Vasey to hold a 10-kilometre line
across the main Larissa-Brallos road, just north of Skamnos, from a railway
tunnel in the west (near Oiti) to a 1400-metre hill east of the road. Vasey
had, however, already placed his units forward (north) of the area he was
33UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative,
The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; Playfair,
The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 99.
408
chapter fourteen
supposed to hold with one battalion on the extreme right linked with the
New Zealanders, another in the centre astride a loop in the road, and a
third on the left to cover the railway tunnel. At the top of the pass, in reserve,
were Vaseys remaining two battalions.34
It was indicative of the haste and confusion that marked the occupation
of the Thermopylae Line that Brigadier Saviges 17th Australian Brigade
received two different sets of orders. The first instructions, received at 12.00
p.m., 20 April, gave Savige the job of guarding the road and track exits from
the mountains to the west at Gravia, Apostolias, Anatoli and Gardikaki. On
his way to man these positions, however, Savige was met by Mackay and
Rowell with new orders to extend west two further kilometres past Gardikaki. Saviges left flank was now also to be refused to the Germans for a
further three kilometres past this position by patrolling. The distance for
Saviges two battalions to cover was some 12 kilometres by map (and further
on the ground). Some of the road and track exits Saviges Brigade had previously been responsible for were now to be covered by the two weak battalions left in the 16th Australian Brigade, led once again by Brigadier Allen
who had managed make it to the new line after a perilous dash in his staff
car through Larissa during the confused night of 18 April. Saviges new line
was in very rugged country. The difficult terrain meant that the Commanding Officer of the 2/6th Australian Battalion, for example, took some fiveand-a-half hours to complete the initial reconnaissance for his battalions
position. Communication was by runner only, which took hours even
within units. Nonetheless, by dusk Saviges battalions were in position.35
To the right of the Australians, the New Zealand division deployed on
the coastal pass between the sea to the east and sheer cliffs to the west. The
area between the road to Molos and the sea was sodden and swampy.
Throughout 20 April Freyberg wrestled with the problem of how to defend
his sector, from Ay Trias to the Australian positions about Brallos Pass.
A significant problem was the marshy ground from Sperkhios River to
34E.D. Ranke, Notes on Greek Campaign, AWM 27, 116/2; Report on operations of 6th
Australian Division in Greece, Major General I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34; Long,
35Late in the day the 2/5th Australian Battalion was placed back under Saviges command and put into reserve just west of Brallos. Notes by Lieutenant General S. Savige on
Australia in the War on 1939-45, AWM 3 DRL 2529 [12]; Report on operations of 6th Australian Division in Greece, Major General I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34; Chronology of Operations, 17 Aust Inf Bde Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; Report of 2/6 Aust Inf Bns
participation in the Grecian Campaign covering the period April 1-29, 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/35 [2].
409
Ay Trias which was untenable for infantry and had to be covered by observed
artillery fire. The end result was that the 6th NZ Brigade was placed on the
right of the forward zone, the 5th NZ Brigade to left and the 4th NZ Brigade
(with the NZ cavalry regiment) in reserve in the vicinity of Cape Knimis,
watching the coast for German seaborne landings. Meanwhile, Blameys
engineers, in his words, set to work with every form of demolition to obstruct the passage of the enemy. Bridges were destroyed, and the roadways
blown away in the mountain passes.36 Much more could have been done
in this regard, however, but for the fact that practically no engineering plant
or stores had been evacuated from the Larissa-Volos area.37
While the Thermopylae Line was a natural redoubt, the Anzac Corps
position was not as strong as it seemed. First, the lay of the land in the
eastern sector meant that the New Zealanders had to defend with two
brigades forward between the foothills and the coast. The Australians had
available the fighting equivalent of around six battalions, most of which
also needed to be deployed forward. There was thus no effective reserve
for the corps. Second, the line was too long to be held by only two divisions
for any prolonged resistanceas was pointed out to Wilson and the Australian government by Blamey in messages sent on the afternoon of 20
April.38 The right flank of Freybergs position was open and enfiladed from
Euboea and it was only a matter of time before the Germans occupied this
island. There was also a risk that a concentrated German armoured attack
across the plain southeast of Lamia might penetrate the line in the vicinity of Molos, in which case the 6th Australian Division would soon be surrounded. For this reason most of Freybergs artillery plan was built around
anti-tank defence. For their part, even if the Brallos Pass was held, the
Australians could be outflanked by troops moving up the mountain tracks
west of Brallos.39
36T. Blamey, Anzacs in Greece, 12 June 1941, AWM 27, 116/1.
376 Inf. Bde. O. O. No. 4, 21 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/1658; War Diary of
HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658; letter, Seccombe to Wards, 25 May 1955, ANZ ADQZ
18902, WAII3/1/2; Summary of War Diary material for 22nd (NZ) Battalion, 12 January 1940
31 October 1943, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/160; Correspondence (various, including interview transcripts) concerning the 22nd Battalion in Greece, 22nd Battalion veterans to J.H.
Henderson, 1950, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156; 23 NZ Bn, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162;
Engineer Summary of the campaign, May 1941, TNA WO 201/118; McClymont, To Greece,
pp. 352-5.
38Message, Blamey to Spender, 20 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/1/1.
39HQ RAA Anzac Corps Summary of the Operations of the Arty of the Anzac Corps in
Greece, AWM 54, 75/4/3; W.E. Murphy, Narrative of 2 NZ Div. Arty. The Campaign in
Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/240; Narrative of action of Div. Arty. in Greece
410
chapter fourteen
If such issues were not sufficient cause for concern within the Anzac
Corps, behind the line the plain of Thebes was also perfect for parachute
landings. Such an option was known to be available to the Germans in this
theatreit had been used in a limited manner against the Doiran-Nestos
Lineand there were few W Force troops available to deal with a parachute
attack to the rear. In addition, the Greek surrender at Yannina left open the
route south from Epirus to Delphi. If German troops made it to the Delphi
Pass they would expose the 6th Australian Divisions left-rear flank. Even
if the Germans ignored Delphi, troops from Yannina might bypass the entire Thermopylae position by cutting across the Gulf of Corinth by landings
at Patras, before moving into the Peloponnese. All of this was leaving aside
the difficulty of actually holding the Thermopylae Line in the face of overwhelming Luftwaffe dominance, even if the material effect of German air
attack had thus far been underwhelming. Blamey, for one, fretted that his
troops would soon be subjected to overwhelming preponderance of enemy
Air Force.40 Overlaid upon all these risks and problems for the Anzac Corps
was the growing exhaustion of many units. Brigadier Savige admitted on
20 April: My troops, who were tired, began to show signs of panic ... anything
up to bolting might happen. 41 Meanwhile, throughout the day vehicles of
the German 8th Reconnaissance Battalion (5th Armoured Division) were
seen moving into Lamia. That night Sperikos Bridge was demolished by the
defenders.42
By dusk on 20 April Blameys divisional commanders and their subordinates still knew nothing of any plans to evacuate Greece. Both Mackay
and Freyberg had been impressing on their men that there would be no
more withdrawals. Brigadier Vasey, at Brallos Pass, told his brigade that:
Here we bloody well are and here we bloody well stay, while Savige styled
this new line as a to the last round position.43 Similarly, Freyberg at corps
headquarters expressed the firm desire to stay and see the show through
whatever the result.44 He told his men that the present position is to be
(with appendices), ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/113; Point of interest in operations in Greece,
TNA WO 20/68; B. Freyberg, Campaigns in Greece and Crete, October 1941, ANZ ACGR
8476, PUTTICK2/4/6; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 140.
40Cablegram, Fadden to Fraser, 21 April 1941, NAA A5954, 528/1.
DRL 2529 [12].
42The Campaign in Greece, AWM 54 534/5/13; Extracts from 12th Armys daily intelligence reports (Greece), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Report by 8 Pz Recce Unit, AWM 54, 534/2/27.
43Diary of Major H.C.D. Marshall, 27 Battalion, AWM PR03/058.
411
held and from it we shall not retire.45 At 2.00 a.m. during the night of 20
April, however, Wilson and Wavell arrived at Blameys headquarters and
allowed news of the real plan to spread. It was not, as yet, possible to
provide full details as precise numbers and positions were still being firmed
up. One of the biggest concerns was that only a single route ran from the
road junction 10 kilometres southeast of Kephissokhori to Thebes. This was
a bottleneck through which all traffic to potential evacuation sites had to
pass.46
As plans to evacuate W Force firmed in Greece, high-level British vacillation between military and political imperatives continued. Churchill
cabled Eden during the day informing him that I am most reluctant to see
us quit.47 Revealing a distinct lack of awareness of the military situation
on the Thermopylae Line, Churchill even thought of a last-minute reinforcement of W Force from Egypt, despite the serious situation in the Western
Desert. Churchill further argued to Dill that we should make a firm and
sincere offer to defend the new position ... remember our conduct is on
view to the whole world.48 Yet at the same time the British Prime Minister
was forced to concede that all purely military considerations point to the
necessity of early evacuation, and to the desirability of saving as many as
possible of the Dominion troopsa pertinent issue given that the evacuation issue was to be put to the Dominions after British Cabinet meeting
next day.49 Eden reported that Menzies, for one, was worried about his
position in Australia if his people take a knock in Greece.50 Wavell was
told the sooner he could arrange evacuation on a satisfactory basis with
the Greeks the betterwhich was fortunate for Wavell given this plan had
been underway for some time.51
Clear, warm weather during the morning of 21 April gave the Germans
the opportunity to press on towards the Thermopylae Line. Air reconnaissance had been unable to determine the degree of W Force defensive works
45Ibid.
46Letter, Charrington to Cynth, 29 April 1941. LHCMA Charrington 4/75a; H.T. BaillieGrohman, report on the evacuation of British forces from Greece, 15 May 1941, IWM, Papers
of Vice-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman(not yet catalogued); H.M. Wilson, Report on Greek
campaign, TNA WO 201/53; War Diary HQ 1 Aust Corps Campaign in Greece. AWM 3DRL
6643, 1/1; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 143.
47Telegram, Churchill to Eden, 20 April 1941, TNA CAB 120/564.
48Telegram, Churchill to Dill, 20 April 1941, TNA CAB 120/564.
49Telegram, Churchill to Dill, 20 April 1941, TNA CAB 120/564. Telegram, Churchill to
Eden, 20 April 1941, TNA CAB 120/564.
50Entry for 21 April 1941, Eden diary, UBCRL AP 20/1/21.
51Extract of message, Churchill to Dill, 20 April 1941, TNA WO 106/2146; message,
Menzies to Fadden, 20 April 1941, NAA A5954, 528/6.
412
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in this area and the Germans were under the impression that that the
British Expeditionary Corps was embarking as fast as it could from Piraeus and Salamis.52 Again, however, difficult roads and demolitions slowed
the German advance. The main body of the 5th Armoured Division was
held at Domokos for most of the day and was able only to despatch light
troops forward to reinforce its reconnaissance unit in the vicinity of Lamia.
Behind these demolitions stretched the real strength of Fehns division
a long line of tanks and heavy trucks extending northwards. During the
afternoon the 6th Mountain Divisions advance guard (the Baacke Group)
arrived at Pharsala, midway between Larissa and Lamia. The rest of Brigadier Schrners mountain division tried to catch up but was slowed as Fehns
formation had priority on the terribly congested and damaged roads. Meanwhile, reconnaissance detachments of the 2nd Armoured Division (other
elements of this division were set to enter Volos the next morning), had
returned to Larissa and were also trying to jostle their way south. The 5th
Mountain Division was marching hard, but was yet still well north of Larissa. Lists earlier orders still stood. The 5th Armoured Division was to spearhead a push through the W Force line to Thebes and Athens. This thrust
would be supported by whichever 18th Corps units managed to keep pace.53
Meanwhile, amidst the centre of German congestion at Larissa on 21
April, the formal surrender of the EFAS took place. Tsolakoglou was flown
to a ceremony with Lists Chief of Staff, Major General Hans von Greiffenberg, to sign the capitulation documentation. In recognition of their brave
bearing, wrote Greiffenberg, Greek officers retained their sidearms (as
Tsolakoglou had requested) and Greek soldiers in the Epirus Army were
not considered to be prisoners of war, but instead were to be repatriated
at once by the Greek command.54 Back at EFAS headquarters, at 12.00 midday an order was sent to Pitsikas by Papagos, only just made aware of the
surrender negotiations, to relieve Tsolakoglou and keep on fighting. It was
too late. Pitsikas by this time had not only himself been removed but he
was on his way back to Athens. In the capital the Greek government tried
52Extracts from 18 Corps intelligence report, AWM 54, 534/2/27.
53Entries for 19, 20 and 21 April 1941, 2. Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 Ia und
Anlagen 1.1.41 14.6.41., BA MA RH 27-2/20, pp. 40-3; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers.
Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; Extracts from
6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Chronology of Operations,
G Branch HQ 6 Aust Div Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; Extracts from evening reports from
12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete), AWM 67, 5/17; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 97.
54Answers to a questionnaire given by the Australian Historical Section, General
H. von Greiffenberg, 4 July 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2.
413
desperately to repudiate Tsolakoglous arrangements. Wilson was assured

that even when the government left Athens a strong military commission
could be set up to facilitate the continuation of military operations.55
The wording of the second Greek surrender at Larissa (after the initial
negotiations between Tsolakoglou and Dietrich near Yannina) made no
mention of the Italians. Nonetheless, both List and Hitler initially accepted Tsolakoglous capitulation. List had even called upon General Ugo Cavallero, the Italian Commander-in-Chief in Albania, to halt his advance so as
not to endanger ongoing negotiations with the Greeks. Cavallero reported
this insult to Rome. Unsurprisingly, when Mussolini heard of the negotiationswithout Italian representationhe was furious and ordered immediate attacks against Greek forces still facing Italian troops. To Mussolinis
embarrassment, however, such attacks were generally repulsed. The Duce
then telephoned Hitler directly to demand Italian participation in the surrender ceremony. Consequently, Hitler sent Lieutenant General Jodl to
Greece to ensure the Italians were included.56
The next morning, negotiations took place between Jodl, Greiffenberg
and an Italian delegation at the Larissa airfield. The Italians demanded an
adjustment of the original surrender terms. All Greek military material, for
example, was to be considered spoils of war, much of which would go to
Italians. The Albanian border was also no longer the demarcation line between Italian and Greek troops but rather a line Igoumenitsa-BisdouniMetsovon was set, separating Italians and German occupation zones. All
Greek soldiers above the line would become Italian prisoners and all below
German prisoners. At 1.00 p.m. Jodls party flew to Yannina to open new
discussions with Tsolakoglou, who initially resisted the revised surrender
conditions. However, with Jodls direct intervention and with no real options, under the pressure of the situation Tsolakoglou accepted the new
55Cablegram, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Fadden, 22 April 1941, NAA
A1608, E41/1/3; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 133, 142; An Abridged History of the GreekItalian and Greek-German War, p. 233.
56Entry for 20 April 1941, Reichsfhrer SS Fhrungshauptamt, Einsatz der verst. L. SS.
A. H. im Sdostfeldzug 1941., BA MA RH 20-12/466, p. 8; entry for 21 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch des Kommandos der deutschen Truppen in Epirus. Vom 21.4.41 bis 11.5.41., BA MA RH
26-73/27, p. 1; von Rintelen, der deutsche General beim Hauptquartier der italienischen
Wehrmacht, Abschrift Pol. I M 10989 Rs., Nr. 798/41 g Kdos., Aufzeichnung ber die
Besprechungen betr. die Kapitulation der griechischen Epirus-Armee mit der italienischen
Wehrmachtfhrung., PA AA R 29.880, pp. 1-3; Mackensen, Rome, telegram to Auswrtiges
Amt, N r. 935 vom 27.4.41., PA AA R 29.880, pp. 1-2; entries for 21 April and 22 April 1941,
Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, pp. 374-5, 376 respectively.
414
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terms.57 Thus, in the presence of Lieutenant General Alberto Ferrero, the

Chief of Staff of the Italian Army Group in Albania, a third surrender ceremony was conducted on 23 April, at Headquarters 12th Army at Arsakli
near Salonika. To avoid any further offence to the Italians, OKH issued
guidelines to the press and military attachs forbidding any mention of the
string of surrender events that had unfolded thus far. According to General Franz Halder, Chief of the German Army General Staff, both he and
List resented such interference because it made the Commander-in-Chief
Twelfth Army look foolish in the eyes of the Greek Army, in that it could
create the impression that it was the Italians who forced the Greeks to
capitulate.58 List did not attend the final ceremony. In fact, in protest at
the involvement of the Italians in the surrender, German officers demonstratively invited Tsolakoglou to a meal afterwards while Jodl alone dined
with the Italians.59
As a consequence of the new surrender terms, in the 24 hours up to 11.00
p.m., 23 April, when the truce came into effect, Greek units rushed towards
Yannina in order to be found south of the Italian-German separation line.
Meanwhile, a battalion of the Adolf Hitler Regiment had been despatched
to the Albanian-Greek border. Its task was not to prevent the Greek retreat
but to hold off the advancing Italian units until the course of the demarcation line was known. Such was the level of Greek-Italian antipathy on this
front that the Germans feared that any Italian advance too far into Greek
territory would inspire continuing Greek-Italian fighting. They were correct.
Right up to the point that hostilities formally ceased in front of the 9th and
11th Italian Armies, their limited advances into Greek territory continued
to be resisted. In fighting in the last few days the Italians had lost some
57Entry for 22 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch des Kommandos der deutschen Truppen in
Epirus. Vom 21.4.41 bis 11.5.41., BA MA RH 26-73/27, p. 3-4.
58Entry for 21 April 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, p. 375.
59Richthofen felt the same way but understood that the Fhrer however has the
broader perspective that Mussolini also has to have successes in order to be able to sustain
himself: 2 May 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 182. Kapitulationsvertrag zwischen
dem deutschen Oberkommando der Wehrmacht und dem italienischen Oberkommando
in Albanien auf der einen und der griechischen Epirus-Mazedonian-Armee auf der anderen
Seite., BA MA RH 26-73/28, pp. 1-3; von Rintelen, der deutsche General beim Hauptquartier der italienischen Wehrmacht, Abschrift Pol. I M 10989 Rs., Nr. 798/41 g Kdos., Aufzeichnung ber die Besprechungen betr. die Kapitulation der griechischen Epirus-Armee mit
der italienischen Wehrmachtfhrung., PA AA R 29.880, pp. 4-6; entries for 22 and 23 April
1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, pp. 375 and 377 respectively; Hepp, Die 12. Armee im Balkanfeldzug 1941, p. 208; Peter Schenk, Kampf um die gais: die Kriegsmarine in griechischen
Gewssern 1941-1945, Verlag E.S. Mittler and Sohn, Hamburg, 2000, p. 14; MGFA, Germany
and the Second World War, Volume III, p. 512; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 345-7.
415
6000 dead and wounded including 400 officers. On 23 April alone General
Cavallero noted the loss of 30 officers and 400 men of the Bari Division
while storming the Ponti di Perote position in Albania. Nevertheless, the
German-Italian demarcation line was established at dawn on 24 April. The
last Greek troops, aside from a few stragglers, had crossed into Germancontrolled territory during the night.60 During the day all divisions of the
EFAS were reduced to 25 per cent manning and instructed in their current
locations until de-mobilised. On 25 April Tsolakoglou handed command
to Lieutenant General Dedestichas, flew to Athens, and formed a government four days later. On 2 May Hitler granted freedom to all Greek troops
still officially held as prisoners and two days after that all remaining Greek
military units were disbanded. In order to withdraw troops for the coming
campaign against the USSR, Hitler announced on 13 May that while Germany would retain some strategically important areas and the Bulgarians
would occupy parts of Eastern Macedonia and western Thrace, Italy would
be granted predominance in the rest of the country.61
Back south in the Thermopylae Line, throughout 21 April Blamey was
trying to anticipate how the approaching Germans might try to crack his
position.62 The same problem was, of course, occupying List and his
60Entry for 24 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch des Kommandos der deutschen Truppen in
Epirus. Vom 21.4.41 bis 11.5.41., BA MA RH 26-73/27, p. 7; Lehmann, Die Leibstandarte Band
I, pp. 401-13.
61Similar concessions had also been made to Italy in the surrender negotiations in
Yugoslavia: entry for 17 April 1941, Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, p. 370. During negotiations
Greek commanders expressed vigorous concerns at being taken by the Italians. The Germans
made clear to them that once the demarcation line was established, German forces would
immediately withdraw to it. This in turn led the Greek side to put more pressure on their
subordinate officers to bring their troops behind the German lines. It was notable that even
as Greek soldiers rushed south they kept their weapons and equipment to ensure these did
not fall into the hands of the Italians. Entry for 23 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch des Kommandos der deutschen Truppen in Epirus. Vom 21.4.41 bis 11.5.41., BA MA RH 26-73/27,
pp. 5-6; entries for 22 and 24 April 1941, Kriegstagebuch des Kommandos der deutschen
Truppen in Epirus. Vom 21.4.41 bis 11.5.41., BA MA RH 26-73/27, pp. 4 and 7 respectively;
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht W.F.St. /Abt. L, Nr.44545/41 g.Kdos.-Chefs. (I Op IV/
Qu), 18 April 1941, BA MA RW 4/588, pp. 2-8; Anlage 1 zu Nr. 20/42 geh. Mil. Att. Athen,
Bericht ber die Operationen der Armeeabteilung von Ost Makedonien (A.A.O.M.)
whrend des deutsch-griechischen Krieges vom 1941, BA MA RH 67/1, pp. 1 -19; Capitulation
of the Epirus Army, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and General H. von
Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; Texts of official war communiqus extracted
from the New York Times, AWM 54, 534/5/25; Allies serious position in Greece, Sydney
Morning Herald, 21 April 1941, AWM PR 88/72; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph,
Tragedy, 1939-1941, pp. 246-7; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German
War, pp. 235-9; Mazower, Inside Hitlers Greece, pp. 19-22.
416
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subordinates. The commander of the 12th Army called Thermopylae strong

in itself and exceedingly cleverly chosen.63 List knew the road and rail line
from Athens through the mountains could be blocked at the Brallos Pass,
which offered an excellent view and avenues of fire northwards towards
the Sperikos Plain. He also knew the inferior quality road along the coastal pass could also be blocked. German intelligence had, however, identified
a series of mule tracks half-way up the mountains which caught the eye of
German planners. The original idea had been to flank the whole Thermopylae position to the west using mountain troops along the western slopes
of the Oros Orti, in the direction of Castelli. Local reconnaissance, however, indicated this would take too much time. List decided, therefore, to
use the 6th Mountain Division to attack up the eastern slopes of Oros Orti
towards Gravia in order to clear a way for armoured forces which could
then penetrate the coastal road, through the Thermopylae Pass, towards
Molos.64
As the German planning process swung into action the forward Anzac
troops, busy wiring and digging, grew tense. At midday motorcyclists from
the 8th Reconnaissance Battalion advanced from Lamia to the destroyed
bridge over Sperkhios River and were engaged by the defenders. One rider
was killed and another captured. Later in the afternoon more German
vehicles could be seen entering Lamia and Australian artillery opened fire
on a column moving south from the village towards the Sperkhios, sending
them north once more.65
It was not only the looming advance of German ground forces that concerned the defenders, but, thanks to captured airfields at Larissa, German
reconnaissance planes and bombers ranged at will. Both Anzac Corps headquarters at Levadia and W Force headquarters at Thebes were prime targets
and W Force communications were constantly disrupted. Against these
raids the RAF could do little. DAlbiacs remaining fighter aircraft did their
best but faced an impossible task. The next day, 22 April, all remaining RAF
Gladiators in Greece were sent to Crete and the 10 operational British Hurricanes left were despatched to airfields at Argos in the Peloponnese in the
63Fighting in central and southern Greece, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal
64Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Report by
8 Pz Recce Unit, AWM 54, 534/2/27; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 158.
65Diary Extracts by Private S.J. Gorman, 2/6 Battalion, AWM PR85/250; diaries of Private
A.E. Lilly, KMARL, 1997.6; War Diary of 2 RHA, 21 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1427; McClymont,
To Greece, p. 360.

9 Pz Div
2 Pz Div
Battle Grp 1
Elasson
Adolf Hitler
Regt
Demolition
5 Pz Div
Trikkala
Pi ni
os
10 miles
AEGEAN
Larissa
Demolition
r
Rive
20 kilometres
2 Pz Div
Battle Grp 2
6 Mtn Div
Tirnavos
To Yannina
417
SEA
Lake
Voiviis
2 Pz
Div
9 Pz Div
5 Pz Div
Stavros
Volos
6 Mtn Div
Pharsala
5 Pz Div
Almiros
Lee Force
Lamia
Sperk hios
Rive
r
EUBOEA
Rearguard
Demolition bridge
Molos
5 and 6 4 NZ Bde
17 and NZ Bdes
19 Aust Bdes
Agrinion
2 NZ Div
6 Aust
Div
Levadia ANZAC
Corps
Thebes
Map 14.3:The German approach to the Thermopylae Line, 19-21 April 1941
hope they could, from there, cover the evacuation beaches west and south
of Athens.66
Meanwhile, throughout the day some minor alterations were made to
the W Force line. Freyberg adjusted his three brigades and more than five
supporting artillery regiments (and two anti-tank regiments) in the Thermopylae Pass. At the same time news of the collapse of the EFAS and the
increased risk of the W Force line being flanked by a force from Yannina
66Entry for 21 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 168; Situation Report,
W Force to GHQ Middle East, 21 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124; 6 Australian Division Administrative Instruction No. 22, 20 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/4/1; McClymont, To Greece,
pp. 358-9.
418
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moving south (to the west of the Pindus ranges), encouraged Wilson to
order a British special unit, just arrived in Greece and whose mission it
was to train Yugoslav partisans, to blow bridges west of Delphi and Amfissa. Two squadrons of the 4th Hussars were also despatched to watch the
coast on the south side of the Gulf of Corinth, either side of Patras, with a
third ordered to guard Corinth. Worryingly for Blamey, local Greeks on
Euboea Island reported that 200-300 Germans had landed in small boats
from Stylis. The New Zealand cavalry regiment was ordered to Khalkis to
reinforce the Rangers.67
Against this backdrop of mounting pressure at Thermopylae, W Force
evacuation planning gathered pace. Wilson returned to Athens and met
once more with Wavell, the King and the new Prime Minister, Tsouderos.
Outside, the population was on the verge of rioting and British troops in
the city were ordered to remain armed at all times. The King conceded no
Greek forces could now protect the western approaches to the Thermopylae Line. Wavell consequently announced (as he had already decided) that
he would then be forced to evacuate forthwith. The King agreed, promised
any and all aid possible, and personally apologised for the disaster. Tsouderos wrote to Palairet expressing his governments thanks to Britain, pointing out that the Greek Army was spent and could neither fight on with any
hope of success nor help its allies. He added that any further sacrifices
would be in vain and that it was therefore time for W Force to leave. This
was the political green light the British had been hoping for, but had never
relied upon. Later that day, now armed with Greek approval, Wavell gave
Wilson a written confirmation of his earlier verbal evacuation orders. All
W Force troops were to be taken to either Egypt or Crete. With German
radio already announcing Greece as another Dunkirk, Wavell directed that
should the evacuation fail, or should W Force soldiers be cut-off, they were
67Letter, Charrington to Cynth, 29 April 1941, LHCMA Charrington 4/75a; Conference
notes on Thermopylae Line, 21 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/10; Summary of War
Diary material for 22nd (NZ) Battalion, 12 January 1940 31 October 1943, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/160; War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658; correspondence, narrative
and draft notes (various) concerning the activities of the 26th (NZ) Battalion in Greece,
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/172; N.J. Mason, Draft Narrative Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/170; correspondence (various, including interview transcripts) concerning the 22nd
Battalion in Greece, 22nd Battalion veterans to J.H. Henderson, 1950, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/156; letter, Seccombe to Wards, 25 May 1955, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; memoir,
Campaign Greece 1941, IWM, Papers of Lieutenant Colonel C.M.L. Clements, 98/21/1;
The Campaign in Greece, AWM 54, 534/5/13; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 357-61; Long,
Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 141; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 96.
419
not to surrender, but rather escape into the Peloponnese or nearby islands
for an extraction at a later date.68
That evening Baillie-Grohman joined Wilson at Headquarters W Force
to discuss the detail of the plan to evacuate W Force. After dark he drove
with Wilson and Brigadier Galloway to the third bridge beyond Thebes to
an impromptu conference on the roadside with Blamey. There, Wilson
explained that as a consequence of the surrender of the Epirus Army, the
evacuation schedule would be brought forward, on Baillie-Grohmans advice, to the night of 24-25 April. Blamey was responsible for organising the
withdrawal from the Thermopylae Line and was to deliver the first ground
troops to the beaches by dawn 24 April. Baillie-Grohman confirmed, given
the loss of some 23 vessels to German bombing from 21-22 April (including
two Greek hospital ships and a destroyer), that the British evacuation ships
would be limited to arriving one hour after dark and departing the beaches no later than 3.00 a.m. to be out of the range of German aircraft by dawn.
These rules would limit evacuation time but increase security. Detailed
orders from W Force were to follow.69
From a naval perspective the plans hurriedly cobbled together by BaillieGrohmans staff and transmitted to the Anzac Corps by the side of the road
in darkness posed significant problems, at a time when Admiral Cunninghams forces were already over-taxed. For several weeks the British Navy in
the Mediterranean had been stretched thin by the need to ferry men and
supplies to Greece, and on 21 April the main fleet was returning from bombarding Tripoli. It was not due back at Alexandria for two more days. Detailed naval arrangements had to be made, therefore, on the run. In Crete,
the ships company of HMS York was organised into beach parties. Vice
Admiral Pridham-Wippell, second-in-command of the British Mediterranean Fleet, was appointed as the evacuation commander afloat or from
the seaward side, and began to develop his own plans for getting his ships
68A little behind the flow of events, but nonetheless aligned with Wavells intentions,
during the afternoon the British War Cabinet Joint Planning Staff submitted a paper on the
situation in Greece, noting that on purely military grounds, the arguments in favour of
immediate evacuation are overwhelming. Report, Situation in Greece, War Cabinet Joint
Planning Staff, 21 April 1941, TNA CAB 84/29. Cablegram, Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs to Australian Prime Ministers Department, NAA A5954, 528/1; G. Long, The 6th
Division in action, AWM PR88/72; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 133, 143; McClymont,
To Greece, p. 366; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 95.
69H.T. Baillie-Grohman, report on the evacuation of British forces from Greece, 15 May
1941, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet catalogued); HeckstallSmith and Baillie-Grohman, Greek Tragedy, p. 71; McClymont, To Greece, p. 367; Long, Greece,
Crete and Syria, p. 133; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 96.
420
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to the beaches and away again. Meanwhile, 30 wireless sets and 30 operators fresh from Britain (and all but untrained) were landed in Athens for
the purpose of setting up communications between embarkation beaches,
W Force headquarters, and Pridham-Wippells ships.70
Overall, the period 19-21 April was marked by three key developments
the capitulation of the Greek Albanian armies, Wilsons successful withdrawal and occupation of the Thermopylae Line, and more detailed planning for the evacuation of W Force from Greece. The withdrawal of
Imperial troops to Thermopylae was a narrow escape, but it was a consequence of German sluggishness rather than speedonce again this was
no Blitzkrieg. After the capture of Larissa the Germans were in no position
to press hard on the heels of W Force. Apart from the lack of available supplies already noted, the atrocious roads had taken such a toll on German
tires that, for example, with no reserves at hand the vehicle attrition rate
in Lists leading motorised columns was rising. Moreover, even when the
pursuit began it was sluggish, thanks largely to moonless nights and a continuous string of effective W Force demolitions. By 18 April traffic congestion on the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border was such that almost all movement
had come to a halt. To a large degree these factors explain the gap between
the size of the force the Germans employed in the campaign and their
capacity to bring it to bear. 71
The withdrawal to Thermopylae also provided continuing and abundant
evidence of the material ineffectiveness of the Luftwaffe, contrasted with
its considerable psychological impact. During 19-20 April German aircraft
attacked the three lanes of traffic that jammed the Larissa-Lamia-Thermopylae roads almost continuously. At some points W Force vehicles were
separated by no more than a metre and most were static for considerable
periods of time. Not only were German pilots unable to close such roads
and block the W Force withdrawal south, but casualties to vehicles and
personnel were, according to Mackay, not as heavy as might be expected
70The evacuation of the British forces from Greece April 1941: the part played by the
Royal Corps of Signals, TNA WO 244/102; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East,
p. 96.
71Entry for 19 April 1941, signature [Frhr v. Hanstein?], Kriegstagebuch Sdost der
Oberquartiermeister-Abteilung Armeeoberkommando 12, BA MA RH 20-12/286, p. 48;
Relevant extracts from daily QMG reports from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete), AWM
67, 5/17; letter, Stewart to Chapman (re: Biography of Iven Mackay), 15 August 1968, AWM
3DRL 6433; E.D. Ranke Notes on Greek Campaign, AWM 27, 116/2; History of the 2 NZ
Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139;
Blau, Invasion Balkans!, pp. 103-4; Cruickshank, Greece 194041, p. 153.
421
and should really have been less if vehicles had not bunched together and
halted.72 Most W Force vehicles lost in this period were, in fact, victims of
mechanical failure, were bogged, or had run off narrow roads. These two
days represented the heaviest casualties inflicted upon the withdrawing
Australian battalions for the whole campaign by air attackyet these figures amounted to a mere 17 killed and 37 wounded. In a savage 90-minute
air attack on the 17th Australian Brigade, between Domokos and Lamia,
only six vehicles were put out of action. The story was similar in the dug-in
rearguard positions. The 2/6th Australian Battalion at Domokos, for example, suffered air attack for almost 24 hours straight but lost only one
killed and two wounded as a result. Wilson reported that the withdrawal
to Thermopylae was completed with less loss than anticipated and with
few casualties to personnel.73 Even at a tactical level a platoon commander from the 2/4th Australian Battalion noted all this hate from the air is
rather ineffective considering the amount of stuff used.74 The German
Manual on Mountain Warfare which stated: Attack by low-flying aircraft
on troops in defiles is considered capable of bringing decisive results, was
yet again proven to be mistaken.75
The impact of the fear of air attack once again showed itself to be far
greater on W Force than its material effect. Such attacks, noted Blamey,
continued to impose great strain on morale.76 Despite the success of the
withdrawal, it was not assisted by ongoing ill-discipline, especially regarding drivers abandoning their vehicles in panic at air attack. This practice
regularly blocked narrow roads and held up the whole operation, particularly south of Larissa. Importantly, abandoned vehicles were also interpreted by the Germans as evidence of Luftwaffe effectiveness. An official
Allied engineering report noted that there were instances, among individuals and small parties, where a state closely approaching panic was
obtained.77 I did not think to get up and run, recalled a soldier of the 2/7th
Australian Battalion, my nerves and legs did it all by themselves.78 In any
May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34.
73Situation Report, W Force to GHQ Middle East, 21 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124.
74The 6th Division in action, G Long, AWM PR88/72.
75Probable German tactics in Greece, 25 March 1941, TNA WO 201/19. Notes by Lieutenant General S. Savige on Australia in the War on 1939-45, AWM 3 DRL 2529 [12]; A &
Q experience of 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. during Greek campaign, 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL 4142,
2/9 [6-14]; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 134.
76Message, Blamey to Spender, 20 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/1/1.
77Engineer Summary of the campaign, May 1941, TNA WO 201/118.
78My Army Days, P.J. Hurst, 2/7 Battalion, AWM MSS1656.
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case, according to Freyberg the whole problem may better be left unsaid
and so it usually has. Yet despite such incidents of ill-discipline the W Force
columns rolled on with very few casualties in men or material.79
Later both Wavell and Wilson consistently wrote of 19-21 April as a key
period. They both claimed that information was received concerning Tsolakoglous surrender and that the Adolf Hitler Regiment had reached Yannina. This left the Thermopylae position badly exposed from the west and
necessitated an immediate evacuation. Wavell took full advantage of the
Greek surrender to justify the decision to evacuate. In communications
with the Australian government he explicitly blamed the Greeks for the
need for W Force to depart. It was the complete collapse of the Greek Army
which has now asked for an armistice, he explained, which has placed our
forces in Greece in a dangerous position. Plans for an evacuation are now
being put into force.80 Wavell repeated this claim to the Australian Army
Headquarters the following day. Indeed, five days later he was still explaining the evacuation as a consequence of the Greek collapse in Epirus leaving open route via Agrinion to Athens.81 This disingenuous message was
readily swallowed at the front. In the words of an Australian artillery officer present, we could not stay the tide of his [the German] advance because it was always the flanks falling back which necessitated our
withdrawal.82
Such claims were incorrect. First, unofficial agreement was given by the
Greek government for a W Force evacuation on 19 April, before Tsolakoglous
surrender. This Greek approval, even when formalised on 21 April, was
merely the last political hurdle to be cleared. An evacuation was already
unfolding, with or without Greek assent. Greek permission was politically desirable but refusal to provide it would not have halted evacuation
plans. The Thermopylae Line may well have been susceptible to turning
from the western flank had Wilson elected to stay, but the threat never
materialised. It was another potential risk, not an actual danger. In this it
was much like the danger to a flank that had forced W Force to withdraw
to Thermopylae in the first place. Both were largely excuses to proceed
79Entry for 21 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der 6. GEB. DIV., BA MA RH 26-8/8;
B. Freyberg, Comment on General Blameys Report, AWM 54, 534/5/24. Cruickshank, Greece
194041, p. 153.
106/555.
423
along a course of action already decided upon, and doubly useful as they
conveniently laid the blame at the feet of the Greeks. In any case, whatever happened in Albania could not change the fact that Thermopylae
could stand for only so long as it took for the German divisions streaming
south to concentrate against it. Greeks surrendering or fighting on in Epirus had no impact on this.83
A slight variation of this idea was Wilsons post-war claim that the Greek
collapse in Epirus forced him to bring forward his evacuation timetable.
Again, there is little evidence to support the notion. Wilson needed no
encouragement in this regardall he needed was Greek endorsement, and
when this was given the evacuation proceeded as fast as was possible. The
night of 24 April was chosen, not coincidentally, as it was the earliest date
Cunninghams ships could be in position. This had nothing to do with events
at Yannina. Wilson, nonetheless, continued to repeat this misleading claim
after the campaign was over. He went out of his way, for example, to condemn the British Military Mission in Greece for not making him aware of
the defeatism of the Albanian armies, even before the German invasion.
The more attention that could be shifted to Tsolakoglou as a reason for W
Forces ignominious and hasty departure, the less chance the sequence of
events might be put under scrutiny. In truth, the events of 19-21 April did
nothing but confirm the pre-existing British plan to remove W Force from
Greece as soon as practicable.84
March-April, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7.
84Greece Comments on TSS, from Gavin Longs Extract Book No. 18, AWM 67, 5/18;
Extracts from 12th Armys daily intelligence reports (Greece), AWM 54, 534/2/27;
H.M. Wilson, Report on Greek campaign, TNA WO 201/53; Situation Report, W Force to
GHQ Middle East, 21 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124; M. Palairet, Political review of the Year
1941, 28 April 1942, TNA CAB 21/1494; Report on Greek campaign, General H.M. Wilson,
TNA WO 201/53; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 95.
424
chapter fourteen
brallos and the thermopylae pass (22-24 april)
425
Chapter Fifteen
Brallos and the Thermopylae Pass (22-24 April)

The morning of 22 April saw plans for the imminent W Force evacuation
from Greece finalized. After returning to Anzac Corps headquarters at Levadia from his late roadside night conference the previous night, Blamey gave
verbal orders for the evacuation to Mackay and Freyberg (via a runner) at
8.00 a.m. The plan was to form a corps rearguard at Erithrai (Kriekouki),
south of Thebes, based on the 4th NZ Brigade, which was tasked to deny
the Athens road to the Germans until the early hours of 26 April.1 Blamey
further instructed that on the night of 23-24 April one brigade group from
each of his divisions was to move to concealed pre-evacuation assembly
areas at Megara and Marathon. The following night these two groups would
embark, while the remaining brigade group in each division (the 6th Australian Division was to reform into two brigade groups, while the 4th NZ
Brigade was the designated corps rearguard) moved into their assembly
areas. On the night of 24-25 April this second wave would then depart, with
the Erithrai rearguard itself evacuating 48 hours later. With no time to spare,
Mackay and Freyberg immediately began issuing their own orders.2 Blamey
exhorted his troops: This is a time when all our training and control must
be exerted to the full. Duty is duty ... Every officer must pull his weight,
using all his initiative, energy and courage to carry out this movement in
military order. Cool heads!3
1Excluding this rearguard force, all subsequent W Force withdrawals were to be
restricted to carrying only what equipment and weapons that could be manhandled. All
other material, non-troop carrying vehicles, and even guns were to be disabled or destroyed
in place (although the order pertaining to guns was later countermanded). Anzac Corps
Operational Order No. 2, 22 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/30.
2War Diary HQ 1 Aust Corps Campaign in Greece, AWM 3DRL 6643; I. Mackay, Campaign in Greece [transcript], 15 June 1941, AWM 27, 116/1; Miscellaneous papers of Greece
and Crete, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6; letter, Charrington to Cynth, 29 April 1941,
LHCMA Charrington 4/75a; Anzac Corps Operational Order No. 2, 22 April 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/30; Report on operations in Greece, 4 Inf. Bde., 30 April 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476,
PUTTICK7/1/1; G. Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 143-5.
3Draft Middle East Public Relations Pamphlet: The Twenty Days in Greece, AWM
3DRL 6643, 1/37.
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chapter fifteen
Within the New Zealand Division Freyberg chose Hargests 5th NZ Brigade to embark first, followed by the 6th NZ Brigade. The former was to
begin withdrawing along the coast to Ayia Konstantinos on the night of 22
April, and to the Marathon beaches the following night in accordance with
Blameys plan, while Barrowcloughs brigade remained in place at Thermopylae with all divisional artillery. Contrary to corps orders, Freyberg instructed all New Zealand units to retain their heavy weapons and fighting
equipment until embarkation. A small divisional rearguard, based on the
NZ cavalry regiment, was raised by Freyberg to take up position west of
Cape Knimis. For his part Mackay chose first to withdraw a composite brigade to be known as Allen Group, consisting of Brigadier Allens depleted
units and Brigadier Saviges 17th Australian Brigade. The 19th Australian
Brigade group, which included the 2/1st Australian Battalion, would follow
the next night. Unlike the New Zealanders, Mackays troops set about destroying their heavy equipment as ordered.4
Wilsons instructions to Blamey were also replicated to all W Force units
not under the Anzac Corps direct command. As a consequence large numbers of Allied administrative and medical units, for example, began leaving
Athens on 22 April.5 At the same time Brigadier Parrington, in command
of the 81st Sub-Base Area, began shepherding 5000 administrative and base
troops across the Corinth Canal towards Argos in expectation of evacuation.
Concurrently, Colonel J. Blunt, the British Military Attach in Athens, set
out touring the Peloponnese to arrange local Greek assistance to any W
Force troops who found themselves unable to be evacuated. One group,
however, that was apparently left out of W Forces rapid evacuation planning was the RAF. Just after midnight, 22 April, the senior RAF Administrative Officer in Greece, Group Captain A.S.G. Lee, complained that up to
this point he had been given no information as to the evacuation of his
4NZ Div Operation Order No. 4, 22 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/10; Extract
for 64 Medium Regiment War Diary, 22 April 1941, TNA WO 169/1492; The 6th Division in
action, G Long, AWM PR88/72; NZ Division Operation Order No. 4, 22 April 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/26 [Part 3]; 6 Australian Division Operations Orders No. 6, 22 April1941, AWM 54,
534/2/30; letter, Seccombe to Wards, 25 May 1955, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; Report on
operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9 [6-14]; Material
copied for use in the compilation of New Zealand War History, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2
[Microfilm 3650]; Report of activities in Greece Apr 41 by Lt. Col. R.R. Vial, 12 January 1945,
AWM 54, 534/2/32; Chronology of Operations, 19 Aust Inf Bde Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2.
5In fact, the first vessel with 600 base troops aboard departed Piraeus on 19 April. UK
War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative, The Campaign
in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; McClymont, To Greece,
p. 367.
427
ground staff. In the vacuum DAlbiacs men had been developing plans of
their own and were flying out as many airmen as possible, with precedence
given to the technically skilled. Any airmen who could not be flown out
were now ordered to embark with the soldiers. Meanwhile, the few remaining RAF Hurricanes in Greece were transferred to airfields near Argos so
that they might cover the evacuation beaches.6
By 22 April Vice Admiral Pridham-Wippells hastily conceived naval plan
for the evacuation, Operation Demona fitting contrast to Operation Lustrewas swinging into action. The extraction flotilla was to comprise of
Royal Navy fighting vessels (the cruisers Orion, Ajax, Phoebe and Perth, the
anti-aircraft cruisers Coventry and Carlisle, 20 destroyers and three sloops),
traditional transports (such as the Ulster Prince and Thurland Castle) and
the assault landing ships Glenroy (which grounded leaving Alexandria),
Glenearn and Glengyle. This force would be complemented by miscellaneous vessels, including Greek fishing boats and motor-launches, collected
in Greece. It was only at 7.00 p.m., 22 April, however, that Pridham-Wippell
was officially informed that his ships would be required on the night of 24
April, not the 27 or 28 April as previously indicated. Naval arrangements
were once again thrown into turmoil as many vessels were already tasked
and required, at least by regulations, four days warning of any changes.
The basic naval concept was that ships laden with troops would proceed
directly to Alexandria, with the exception of the Glen ships and destroyers,
which would ply between Greece and Crete. Admiral Cunningham worried
that his battleships could not be used to screen and protect the operation
from the Italian navy as all available destroyer escorts, essential for the big
ships, were required for the evacuation itself.7 Meanwhile, ashore, BaillieGrohman chose evacuation beaches at Rafina and Porto Rafti (on the southeastern coast of Attica); Megara (between Athens and Corinth), and at
Navplion (south of Argos in the Peloponnese).8
IWM, 76/118/2; Report by Air Commodore J.W.B. Grigson, R.A.F. Activities in the Peloponessos 22nd April, 1941 to 29 April, 1941, TNA AIR 23/6371; letter, DAlbiac to AOC-in-C Middle
East, 5 October 1941, TNA AIR 23/1196; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 97.
7Telegram, Churchill to Wavell, 22 April 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/37/135-136; Playfair, The
Mediterranean and Middle East, pp. 97-8; Heckstall-Smith and Baillie-Grohman, Greek
Tragedy, pp. 80-1.
Royal Corps of Signals, TNA WO 244/102; Extracts from 18 Corps intelligence report, AWM
54, 534/2/27; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 160; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle
East, p. 97.
428
chapter fifteen
The solidification of evacuation plans did little to quell the growing

disquiet in the Dominions. New Zealands Prime Minister, Peter Fraser,
asked Churchill on 22 April to do everything possible to ensure safe evacuation of Freybergs division. Churchill replied with praise for the New Zealand effort, designed primarily to keep Frasers government from bothering
the British War Cabinet in this uncertain time.9 The New Zealanders were
not, however, so easily put off. Churchill reiterated that the safe withdrawal of men would have precedence over any other consideration except that
of honour.10 The same day Fraser cabled Arthur Fadden in Australia noting
testily that we have alreadyand more than oncerequested the British
authorities to take every step to ensure that if the worst came to the worst
evacuation from Greece could be accomplished.11
Allied troops in the Thermopylae Line faced a more immediate problem.
During the night they saw hundreds of German headlights streaming southwards; in the morning light of 22 April, they watched the growing concentration of German troops in the vicinity of Lamia. Heavy German guns were
moved into place and armoured vehicles were parked in the open, just out
of the artillery range of the defenders. In short order, a column of German
vehicles set out from Lamia and moved south to the Sperkhios River. The
column was halted, however, by two Australian field guns sited near the
crest of Brallos Pass, on the forward slopes of the escarpment, with orders
to prevent the Germans repairing the two bridges across the river on the
plain below. German batteries replied. The ensuing artillery duel lasted
throughout the day and the Australian guns were eventually blasted from
their positionssome 160 shells burst in the vicinity of one of them in this
eight-hour period. As an indication of how effective the fire of this pair of
guns had been in harassing the Germans, the next morning 52 dive bombers and fighters arrived and plastered their former locations for almost an
hour. Meanwhile, in the New Zealand sector, the 4th NZ Brigade moved
out to the Thebes rearguard area without incident and the withdrawal of
the 5th NZ Brigade (minus a force of around 60 men that stayed behind to
give the impression that the line was still occupied) began at 9.00 p.m. The
Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; Cruickshank,
Greece 194041, pp. 151-2.
10Telegram, Fraser to Churchill, 22 April 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/38/2-3. Telegram, Churchill
to Fraser, 22 April 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/38/5-6.
11Cablegram, Prime Minister of New Zealand to Fadden, 22 April 1941, NAA A5954,
528/1.
429
Figure 15.1:This photograph was taken from the site of the New Zealand positions near
Thermopylae, looking south from Lamia road over the Sperkhios River. (Source: Australian
6th NZ Brigade and Freybergs formidable artillery force remained in place

overlooking the road and river.12 In the exhaustion and confusion of another withdrawal, spirits were tested. One Anzac Corps soldier noted:
German bombers and fighter are now continually over us ... Between them
and the continual moves a man will be run dog poor ... No one seems to
know anything much ... I dont know what to make of this Army ... There is
even talk of our total evacuation from Greece in destroyers. Our organisation
seems to have gone haywire.13
While the Germans had been gathering slowly in Larissa for three days, an
inability to concentrate forces and supplies thanks largely to ongoing road
12War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/1658; W. Cremor, A Quick
Tour of Greece, AWM 54, 253/4/2; N.J. Mason, Draft Narrative Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/170; Summary of operations of 5 NZ Infantry Brigade in Greece, 29 April 1941, ANZ
ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156; Report by Brig. Hargest on Greek Ops, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162;
F. Baker, Report on activities of 28 (Maori) Battalion during Greek and Crete campaigns,
Mar-Jun 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/181; 5 (NZ) Infantry Brigade Operation Instruction
No. 9, 22 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [Part 3]; McClymont, To Greece, p. 376; Long, Greece,
Crete and Syria, pp. 146-8.
13Diary Extracts by Private S.J. Gorman, 2/6 Battalion, AWM PR85/250.
430
chapter fifteen
congestion and Allied demolitions meant they were still not yet ready to
mount a large-scale attack on the Thermopylae Line. This did not mean,
however, that German commanders as far south as Lamia were prepared
to sit idly in place. Their higher commands intent was clear. List had ordered
his formations to force their way through the Thermopylae Pass and to
press on, without halting, to Corinth and Athens.14 The 40th Corps (led by
the 5th Armoured Division) was to move through Lamia, past the defences at Thermopylae, then to the capital and into the Peloponnese. Meanwhile,
Boehmes 18th Corps was to press its leading elements to flank the Thermopylae position from the west.15
Accordingly, during the previous night, and with the main body of his
formation still jammed on the roads to the north, Lieutenant General Fehn
ordered his light reconnaissance forces in the vicinity of Lamia to advance
against the Thermopylae Line at dawn. The 55th Motorcycle Battalion was
directed to the west through Kato-Dio-Wuna to attack the left-hand flank
and rear of the Australian positions surrounding Brallos. This attack was
to be covered by the 3rd Company (8th Reconnaissance Battalion), which
would advance directly along the Lamia Road to occupy the attention of
the defenders, while a separate company of motorcyclists conducted a simultaneous feint attack along Lamia-Kutsia Road to the east. All heavy
weapons were left behind as it was impossible to get them over the Sper
khios River. Artillery fire began to fall on the attackers as they moved across
Sperkhios and entered the mountains. The further the motorcyclists penetrated, the more exhausting their advance became. Vineyards gave way to
rocky thornbush-covered peaks and bridle paths. The motorcycle battalion
was guided by Greek civilians towards the village of Delfinon, where, exhausted, it took up a defensive position. During night, while being shelled
heavily, the motorcyclists received orders to push further south and east at
dawn to pinpoint the defenders locations and to remove any blocks on the
pass roads. The 3rd Company (8th Reconnaissance Battalion) had had an
equally difficult day. At 11.30 a.m. it had forded Sperkhios and moved forward
to the village of Mustafa Bei and the adjacent high ground. There the
14List, Generalfeldmarschall, A.O.K. 12, Ia Nr. 1038/41 g.Kdos., 20.00 1822 April 1941,
Fernschreiben to XXXX.A.K. and others, BA MA RH 20-12/93, pp. 1-2.
15Much further northwest of the Thermopylae front the 73rd Division and Adolf
Hitler Regiment were to clear up all questions dealing with the capitulation of the Greek
northern army, while the 30th Corps made further preparations to occupy Lemnos and
other Greek islands. Ibid; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 146; McClymont, To Greece,
pp. 375-6; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 326-8.
431
company was halted by artillery fire and took significant casualties before
managing to find cover on the hillsides.16
Not to be outdone by the vanguard of Fehns armoured division, during
the morning Boehme ordered the leading elements of the 6th Mountain
Division to advance quickly to the Thermopylae Line. By the afternoon,
with most of the 5th Armoured Division still stalled on demolished roads
and with little progress having been made by the 55th Motorcycle Battalion,
the mountain troops prepared themselves for another long forced march
to relieve the situationthis time from Domokos to Lamia. Their advance
party was led by a group commanded by Colonel Maximilian Jais, based
on the 1st Battalion (141st Regiment), the 112th Reconnaissance Battalion
(cycle and cavalry squadrons), and the Baacke Group. Should the 5th Armoured Division remain unable to make substantial progress the next day,
Jais Group was ordered to flank the 6th Australian Divisions positions on
the steep slopes west of Brallos Pass, thereby opening the pass road and
relieving the pressure on German troops pinned in the Delfinon area. Meanwhile, another, smaller 18th Corps operation unfolded further to the east
when a company of the 8/800th Special Unit sailed from Volos to the north
coast of Euboea Island. The company met no resistance; rather it reported
it was received warmly by the population. For the next two days this patrol
moved south towards Khalkis, where evacuation operations were thought
to be ongoing.17
By the 23 April, St Georges Day, the Greek Government had all but lost
control. Only in Athens was there any response to its authority, and even
this was fading fast. One key problem for the government was that from
beginning of the German invasion the press had been tightly controlled
and carefully instructed not to alarm the Greek public. When this was contrasted to the obvious military reality, the shock was significant. The Greek
King, Crown Prince and most of the Cabinet departed by plane to Crete
16Report by 55 MC Bn on attack on hills south of Delfinos, 22 Apr, and attack on position south of Skamnos, 24 Apr, AWM 54, 534/2/27; Report by 8 Pz Recce Unit, AWM 54,
534/2/27; letter, Lieutenant K.L. Kesteven, 2/4 Battalion, 17 May 1941, AWM 54, 234/2/17;
Despatches by Mr R.T. Miller, NZEF Official War Correspondent, ANZ ACHR 8632, FRASERP4/1/2; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 148.
17Entry for 22 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der 6.GEB.DIV. BA MA RH 28-6/8;
Jais, Gebirgsjgerregiment 141, Spiridon, 10 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber den Angriff der
Kampfgruppe Jais gegen die Feindstellungen an den Thermopylen 23. 25.4.1941, BA MA
RH 28-6/9b, p. 3; Fighting in central and southern Greece, reviewed and edited by Field
Marshal S.W. List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; Extracts
from 18 Corps intelligence report, AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from evening reports from
12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete), AWM 67, 5/17.
432
chapter fifteen
before dawn the next day.18 Before leaving the mainland, the Greek King
proclaimed to the population that:
The cruel destinies of war compel Us today, to depart from Athens to the
State of Crete, from where we shall be able to continue the struggle We
are still unaware of the exact conditions under which the army of Epirus
signed a truce with the enemy unbeknown to Us, the Commander-in-Chief
and the Government. This truce does not essentially bind the free will of
the Nation Greeks do not be discouraged God and the right cause will
help us achieve the final victory be faithful to the idea of a united, undivided, free country Be courageous, the good days are to come19
To the north, on the Thermopylae Line, 23 April dawned with W Forces

attention still split between its upcoming departure from Greece and the
ever-increasing German presence north of the Sperkhios. Nor were spirits
buoyed within various headquarters helped by another disaster for the
small RAF force still left in Greece. During the morning British aircraft at
the Argos airfields were reinforced with Hurricanes from Crete. Two,
however, were lost fighting off a German air attack the same morning. During the afternoon a force of 30 to 40 German fighter-bombers again attack
ed the Argos airfields. It was, according to RAF Base Commander, the most
thorough low-flying attack I have ever seen.20 Thirteen Hurricanes were
destroyed on the ground and one in the air. It spelled, in effect, the end of
the RAF in Greece. The remaining seven Hurricanes (with 14 Gladiators)
were ordered to depart for Crete the next day. All remaining Blenheims and
Lysanders were flown directly to Egypt.21
Wilson at last managed to release his detailed written order for the
evacuation of W Force from Greece on 23 April which largely, but not completely, confirmed the plans already set in train. W Force was to be split up
into 4 groups: Anzac Corps, 80th Sub-Base Area, 82nd Sub-Base Area (based
on Headquarters, 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade); and a Force Headquarters
Group (containing units such as the 4th Hussars, what remained of 3 RTR,
the Australian and New Zealand Reinforcement Battalions, and base troops
18Argyropoulo, From Peace to Chaos, p. 149; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph,
Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 247.
1940 to April, 1941, 15 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/1196.
21Entry for 23 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 170; draft manuscript
Medical History of the War: Greece (1940-1941), TNA AIR 49/11; McClymont, To Greece,
p. 380.
433
in the Athens area).22 The idea was that this arrangement allowed Wilsons
headquarters direct control of units in its vicinity for the evacuation and
also a measure of fighting potential should it be required. Staffs were allocated to each of the five evacuation beach previously identified, and the
timetable for the evacuation was confirmed.23 Officers were issued orders
for their eyes only noting bold action might have to be taken if lines of
withdrawal were cut. If isolated troops could not break through, they were
to make for the hills and then the coast in order to be picked up by ships
or fishing boats. A monetary reward was to be offered to any Greek boat
captain taking British soldiers to Crete. Orders for such a contingency did
not make us any happier, noted one Australian officer.24
For the Anzac Corps immediate confusion between various headquarters
ensued over the details of Wilsons written evacuation order, particularly
with respect to timings. W Force ordered the 4th NZ Brigade to embark on
the night of 26-27 April, for example, but Freyberg had it leaving the night
before. Distances between headquarters, an ever-changing situation and
poor communications made such misunderstandings inevitable. Moreover,
no sooner had Wilson issued his orders than news of the destruction of the
RAF Hurricane force at Argos was received. It was a blow that followed
earlier reports of 23 Greek and Allied vessels sunk by Luftwaffe attack in
the last 48 hours. With news of such losses Wilson and Baillie-Grohman
now decided to embark a portion of W Force from more distant Peloponnese beaches, especially at Monemvasia and Kalamata, as the sea voyage
to Crete and attendant risk of air attack was shorter. Such last-minute
amendments only added to the uncertainty.25
22There were both Australian and NZ Reinforcement Battalions in Greece at the time.
Each numbered around 70 officers and 800 men with little fighting equipment and no
transport. UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative
The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 370-1.
24Diary of Major H.C.D. Marshall, 2/7 Battalion, AWM PR03/058. Force HQ Operation
Order No. 14, 23 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [Part 3]. See also Miscellaneous papers of
Greece and Crete, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6.
25According to German reporting the Luftwaffe sunk almost 80,000 tonnes of shipping
on 22 April, making a total of almost 600,000 so far in the campaign. Richthofen was
personally sceptical of such high claims. Entry for 22 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA
N 671/7, p. 170. A party of officers from the Anzac Corps and its subordinate divisional
headquarters arrived at W Force headquarters in the afternoon of 23 April for instructions
regarding beaches, routes, lay up and embarkation points. According to the leader of this
detachment, however, Wilsons staff was unable to give us any directions. Even Brigadier
Galloway apparently had little knowledge of the work to be done. Report of Anzac Corps
434
chapter fifteen
Khalkis EUBOEA
Levadia
Thebes
Patras
Elevsis
Rafina
Megara
C Beach
Theodora
Loutsa
P
Piraeus Athens
Porto Rafti
J
Beach
Corinth
Beach
D Beach
Markopoulon
PELOPONNESE
Argos
Tripolis
KEA
Navplion
S and T
Beaches
KITHNOS
IONIAN
SEA
Z
Beach
Kalamata
MIRTOAN
SEA
Yithion X and N
Beaches
0
0
40 kilometres
20 miles
Plitra Monemvasia
MILOS
Cape
Matapan
KITHIRA
Map 15.1:The W Force Evacuation Beaches
Meanwhile, the confusion and congestion that had hampered German

units in the vicinity of Lamia, by now a town of inhabited ruins, was rapidly being rectified. On the morning of 23 April Lieutenant General Stumme
reached the village and laid down definite plans for the continuing advance
of German units in the area. The narrowness of the sector in which the lead
German troops were operating, and the state of roads, had compelled List
to place Stumme in overall command of both his troops and those of 18th
Corps in the area. Stumme knew that both Thermopylae and Brallos
embarkation staff Greece, J.D. Rogers, AWM 54, 534/2/34; Report on Greek campaign,
General H.M. Wilson, TNA WO 201/53; Situation Report, W Force to GHQ Middle East, 23
April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece,
March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; 6 Inf. Bde. O. O. No. 5, 23 April 1941,
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/1658; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, pp. 98-9;
Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 97; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 374-5, 400; Golla, Der Fall
435
Passes were held by the Anzac Corps, but according to German intelligence,
only by one or two battalions protecting an ongoing evacuation. Stumme
thus ordered a large-scale attack for the following morning after a softening up raid by Stukas. Initially, what armoured forces from the 5th Armoured
Division that had made it forward (primarily the 1st Company, 31st Armoured Regiment, under Captain Prince Wilhelm Schnburg-Waldenburg)
would advance astride the main road to Brallos with the crest of the pass
as its immediate objective. Once the crest was taken a fast-moving infantry
force (the Baacke Group along with the cavalry and cycle squadrons of the
112th Reconnaissance Battalion), would thrust to Molos and Atalandi
through the New Zealand position between the hills and the sea. This attack
was set to begin at 6.00 a.m., 24 April.26
Concurrent with this main attack, Stumme also instructed the balance
of Colonel Jais group to continue its mission to outflank the Brallos Pass
to the west and cut W Forces line of retreat north of Gravia, taking the 55th
Motorcycle Battalion and elements of the company of the 8th Reconnaissance Battalion already in this area under his command. At this point Jais
was further reinforced with the 2nd Battalion (141st Regiment) and a detachment of 8/800th Special Unit. His basic plan for 24 April was to advance
his main body towards Paliokhorion, while (if possible) a battalion would
be detached over Aetos Ridge to attack the flank of defenders around Gardikaki. Although delayed by the need to build a bridge at Alamanas, which
was not finished until the afternoon, Jais headquarters and his reinforced
1st Battalion moved out soon after 8.00 p.m., 23 April. The balance of Jais
Group, which had just arrived in Lamia after an exhausting march, was
ordered to follow after a short rest. The combined German plan to force
the Thermopylae Line was thus reminiscent of what had unfolded at Tempe Gorge. Again, mountain troops were given the job of flanking the defenders while armoured units pushed on a more direct line.27
As this planning process unfolded, during 23 April German troops were
still exchanging fire with various Anzac Corps units within the Thermopylae
26Extracts from 12th Armys daily intelligence reports (Greece), AWM 54, 534/2/27;
Extracts from 18 Corps intelligence report, AWM 54, 534/2/27; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands
1941, pp. 330.
Gefechtsberich[sic] der 6. Geb. Div. ber die Thermopylen vom 23. 24. April 1941., BA
MA RH 28-6/73, p. 1; Jais, Gebirgsjgerregiment 141, Spiridon, 10 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht
ber den Angriff der Kampfgruppe Jais gegen die Feindstellungen an den Thermopylen 23.
25.4.1941, BA MA RH 28-6/9b, pp. 1-3; Appx to 40 Corps War Diary, Apr 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/27; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 384-5.
436
chapter fifteen
Line. The 55th Motorcycle Battalion in the vicinity of Delfinon rested and
reorganized throughout the day. Reconnaissance southwest of Delfinon
discovered Australian defenders on high ground 1000 metres southwest of
Skamnos, with strong machine-gun nests as well as tank traps and demolitions wired on either side of the road. Strong fighting patrols were dispatched to surprise these positions but they failed, primarily due to a lack
of artillery. Similar patrols from the 3rd Company (8th Reconnaissance
Battalion), by now also based in the Delfinon area, had to withdraw in the
face of heavy Australian fire. Between such sharp actions, sporadic machinegun fire was exchanged with these and other Australian outposts throughout the day. By the evening the commander of the motorcycle battalion
had decided to mount a deliberate dawn attack on the hills west of Skamnos
to force the defenders back and to take control of the road in the area. His
men got little rest, however, as the battalion was shelled from 11.00 p.m.
until first light the next morning.28
Yet it was not light German probing during the day nor the prospect of
the inevitable direct attack from Lamia that represented the greatest threat
in the minds of senior W Force officers throughout 23 April. With no knowledge of German plans for the coming dawn, it did not look likely that the
Thermopylae Line would be pierced in the short term. More worrying was
the risk that it might be flanked, for this threatened not only the integrity
of the defensive line, but the chances of successfully evacuating from
Greece. To the west, with Yannina now in German hands, Wilsons headquarters fretted about the prospect of a German flanking advance through
Amfissa and the Delphi Pass. To guard against (or at least give warning of)
this possibility, Greek Headquarters in Athens had sent a detachment of
Greek infantrymen to Navpakos, west of Amfissa. It also sent perhaps its
last functional and complete unit, the Reserve Officers College Battalion,
to Patras, immediately south of Navpakos on the Peloponnese side of the
Gulf of Corinth. Both forces were ordered to prevent a German advance
along either the north or south coast of the gulf. Wilson also sent the last
surviving vehicles of the 4th Hussars (a dozen light tanks, six carriers and
28Report by 8 Pz Recce Unit, AWM 54, 534/2/27; diary of Major H.C.D. Marshall, 2/7
Battalion, AWM PR03/058; Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM
54, 534/2/27; notes by Lieutenant General S. Savige on Australia in the War on 1939-45,
AWM 3 DRL 2529 [12]; Report by 55 MC Bn on attack on hills south of Delfinos, 22 Apr, and
attack on position south of Skamnos, 24 Apr, AWM 54, 534/2/27; Report on operations of
6th Australian Division in Greece, Major General I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34;
diary of Major H.C.D. Marshall, 2/7 Battalion, AWM 54, 255/4/12; letter, Lieutenant
K.L Kesteven, 2/4 Battalion, 17 May 1941, AWM 54, 234/2/17.
437
an armoured car), to Patras. Although morning aerial reconnaissance suggested no German movement yet south of Yannina, by 3.00 p.m. reports
were reaching Anzac Corps headquarters that hundreds of vehicles were
streaming south of the town. Nothing could be done to stop them being in
Delphi by dusk. Blamey thus decided to demolish the road between Amfissa and Delphi and a covering force, consisting of a reinforced 2/5th Australian Battalion group, took up this position on high features that night
six kilometres west of Levadia. The W Force position looked equally precarious on the right flank. During the day signs of the activities of the
company from the 8/800th Special Unit which had landed on Euboea Island
became evident. A patrol of New Zealand cavalrymen, rounding up 80 men
from the remnants of Allens force from Pinios Gorge that had made it to
the island, sighted several Germans and raced back to the mainland, wrecking the bridge at Khalkis behind them.29
Against this backdrop the withdrawals of Anzac Corps units from the
Thermopylae Line continued throughout the night of 23 April. In the Australian sector, despite their 12-kilometre front and the rugged country in
which they were deployed, the extraction of the 17th Australian Brigade
from the left of the 6th Australian Divisions line, along the remnants of
16th Australian Brigade, was achieved smoothly. Much of this was a consequence of Mackays decision to let vehicles run with lights onan acceptable risk given the lack of Luftwaffe activity during the night hours thus
far. After a 115-kilometre drive, by daybreak the Allen Group column laid
concealed and resting in olive groves either side of the Athens road near
the coast at Eleusis. During this move orders not to allow Greeks to interfere
with the withdrawal to the beaches were followed to the letter. One Australian soldier remembered forcibly preventing desperate Greeks trying to
climb aboard the trucks transports. Meanwhile, the only Australian formation now left in the Thermopylae Line, Brigadier Vaseys 19th Australian
Brigade, had withdrawn from its forward positions to the vicinity of Brallos,
leaving only a rearguard on top of the pass overlooking the Lamia plain. To
their east, the 6th NZ Brigade adjusted its positions and issued its own
29Letter, Seccombe to Wards, 25 May 1955, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; Report on
operations of 6th Australian Division in Greece, Major General I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM
54, 534/2/34; telegram, Palairet to Foreign Office, 22 April 1941, TNA FO 371/29819; letter,
Charrington to Cynth, 29 April 1941, LHCMA Charrington 4/75a; entry for 24 April 1941,
Reichsfhrer SS Fhrungshauptamt, Einsatz der verst. L. SS. A. H. im Sdostfeldzug 1941.,
BA MA RH 20-12/466, p. 9; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 148-9; McClymont, To Greece,
p. 378.
438
chapter fifteen
orders to withdraw by trucks, beginning the next night, to the Athens

beaches for embarkation.30
During the night Anzac Corps headquarters was also on the move. At
8.00 p.m. it closed at Levadia and re-opened at Mandra. Blamey was then
called to Wilsons headquarters and instructed to close his headquarters
from midnight, and to board a flying boat for Alexandria the next morning.
When Blamey returned to Mandra he told Brigadier Rowell of his orders
to fly to Egypt, that troops could no longer be taken off from the Athens
beaches, and that the standing evacuation plan would need to be amended to make more use of sites in the Peloponnese. Rowell protested that in
view of these changes Anzac Corps headquarters should stay to coordinate
the evacuation. Blamey refused. When he arrived in Alexandria Blamey
immediately took up the post of Wavells deputy, making him senior to
Wilson whom he had just served under. The whole affair opened a bitter
enmity between Rowell and Blamey that lasted for the rest of the war.31
The morning of 24 April dawned warm and partly overcast. The weather did not, however, discourage heavy German bombing on the roads from
Thebes to Eleusis and Eleusis to Corinth. Nor was there any let-up of the
pressure in Athens. With the capitulation of the EFAS now openly admitted,
Papagos at last resigned, a decision accepted immediately by the King, now
in Crete. One of Papagos last orders was to try and ensure Greek troops
stayed off the roads south of Thermopylae to facilitate the British evacuation. Papagos also disbanded Greek General Headquarters in Athens so as
to leave no Greek officer in high military position who might make terms
306 Inf. Bde. O. O. No. 5, 23 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/1658; 6 (NZ) Infantry
Brigade Operation Order No. 5, 23 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [Part 3]; Miscellaneous
papers of Greece and Crete, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6; Report by Brig. Hargest on
Greek Ops, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162; Summary of operations of 5 NZ Infantry Brigade
in Greece, 29 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156; F. Baker, Report on activities of 28
(Maori) Battalion during Greek and Crete campaigns, Mar-Jun 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/181; Report on operations of 6th Australian Division in Greece, Major General
I. Mackay, May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/34; , S. Savige, Resume of events covering movement
of 17 Aust Inf Bde from the night 24/25 April 41, 11 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6850, 113; 17 Australian Infantry Brigade Operations Order No. 7, 23 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/35 [part 2];
notes by Lieutenant General S. Savige on Australia in the War on 1939-45, AWM 3 DRL
2529 [12]; Chronology of Operations, 2/1 Aust Inf Bn Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; Corporal
Rawson, 16 Australian Brigade (as told in March 1945), Withdrawal and Evacuation from
Greece, AWM 54, 534/3/3; Appendix F to Operational Order No. 1, 23 April 1941, TNA WO
169/1492; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 148-50.
To Greece, p. 402.
439
with the Germans. Organised Greek resistance, now in form as well as fact,
was over. What fighting there was left to be done in this campaign would
fall to those still defending the Thermopylae Line. German radio announced
on the eve of the anniversary of the Gallipoli landings of 1915 (a significant
landmark on the Australian and New Zealand military calendars) that this
year it would mark disaster for Dominion troops in Greece.32
Stummes planned attack on the Thermopylae Line began at 7.30 a.m.
with German dive-bombers softening the defending positions in the vicinity of Brallos before the Jais Groups flanking attack was launched from the
Kato-Dio-Wuna area by the 55th Motorcycle Battalion, followed by the 1st
and 2nd Battalions (141st Regiment) (with the latter only arriving in position
at 5.00 a.m. that morning). By 9.00 a.m., however, Jais leading troops had
found that the forward Australian positions they had planned to assault
had already withdrawn. As a consequence, a detachment of two companies
of the 2nd Battalion (141st Regiment) was ordered to swing to the southeast
and cut the road eight kilometres south of Brallos to prevent further Allied
retreat, while the remainder of the group pushed on towards Brallos. The
German motorcyclists, leading the main attack, advanced across the Asopos
River and at around 11.30 a.m. ran head-on into the 2/11th Australian Battalion near the road at Skamnos, immediately north of Brallos. With no
artillery support of their own the motorcyclists soon found themselves
under heavy shellfire and pinned down in a ravine west of Kalivia.33
It seemed impossible to get out of the zone of fire and advance, noted
the German battalion commander, with any movement attracting significant fire.34
In the early afternoon, as elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalions (141st
Regiment) drew level with the stalled motorcycle battalion, they too came
under intense fire and bombardment. Nonetheless, the Germans rallied
for a renewed advance on two axesthrough Gardikaki village towards
suspected Allied gun positions in the hills to the southeast, and (the main
effort) along a railway line east towards Brallos. The German right-hand
32Situation Report, W Force to GHQ Middle East, 24 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124;
message, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Australian High Commissioner, 24 April
1941, NAA A1608, E41/1/3; A summary of the participation of the A.I.F. in the Lustreforce
Expedition in Greece March-April, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria,
p. 151-3.
33Jais, Gebirgsjgerregiment 141, Spiridon, 10 May 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber den
Angriff der Kampfgruppe Jais gegen die Feindstellungen an den Thermopylen 23. 25.4.1941,
BA MA RH 28-6/9b, p. 3.
34McClymont, To Greece, p. 386. Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 156.
440
chapter fifteen
column, moving through Gardikaki, met heavy shellfire but nonetheless

advanced slowly against well-sighted and well-camouflaged Australian
positions on hills to southeast. By 4.00 p.m. the ridge southeast of Gardikaki was taken and German troops were ordered to press further to a railway station just south of Brallos. Two hours later German patrols had
reached the station. Meanwhile, on the left-hand axis of the Jais Group
attack, the going was initially slow over difficult country and under heavy
shellfire. By 5.40 p.m., however, attackers on this flank were within 25 metres of forward Australian positions. At this point the forward 2/11th Australian Battalion posts were ordered to fall back and by 6.30 p.m. the
Germans had secured the area. Meanwhile, troops of the 55th Motorcycle
Battalion, now receiving less artillery fire from the Australian batteries,
managed to advance across rough country to the west and south of the
defences at Skamnos. Brigadier Vasey, fearing a breakthrough, ordered an
acceleration of his withdrawal plan. The 2/4th and 2/1st Australian Battalions were now to depart Brallos at 8.00 p.m. and the 2/11th Australian
Battalion an hour later.35
From around 6.30 p.m., with the Germans pressing hard from the west,
all forward Australian battalions were thinning out. So too, Australian artillery in Paliokhorion area, almost out of ammunition, was seen by the Germans packing up and withdrawing. There was little, however, that Jais could
do to stop the retreat as the detachment he had sent to cut the Brallos Road,
to the rear of the defenders, had encountered significant problems of its
own. It had faced both difficult country and fire from Australian positions
for much of its journey (in particular from a stubborn 2/1st Australian Battalion post near Gravia that duelled with it until dusk), and it was 8.30 p.m.
before this patrol had made it to within a few hundred metres of the GraviaBrallos Road. There, however, it stopped, short of its objective and completely exhausted. This was a crucial moment. Vasey had ordered his last
unit yet to withdraw, the 2/11th Australian Battalion, to hold until 9.00 p.m.
At this point, however, with a grave risk of this units line being flanked on
both sides, German pressure waned. The 2/11th Australian Battalion was
able to fall back (with the last detachments of the 2/1st Australian Battalion)
to a vehicle pick-up point near Brallos without much pressure at all. By 10.15
BA MA RH 28-6/9b, pp. 4-5; report by 55 MC Bn on attack on hills south of Delfinos, 22 Apr,
and attack on position south of Skamnos, 24 Apr, AWM 54, 534/2/27.
441
p.m., as the last Australian trucks moved off southeast along the Brallos
road, German Very lights were rising 450 metres south of Brallos and German shells were falling on the recently vacated Australian positions. The
leading German companies eventually reached Paliokhori at 11.30 p.m., but
contact with the withdrawing Australians was by then well and truly lost.36
Jais Group had managed to clear the Brallos Pass, but the German attempt to turn the left flank of the Thermopylae Line at Brallos had failed.
Nor could Jais claim to have forced the Australians from their positions.
Rather, with the attackers running out of steam in the early evening, Vaseys
brigade had managed to delay them long enough to ensure an orderly withdrawal. Nonetheless, Jais Group had done all that could be done. Its attack
had been launched under trying circumstances with little rest, in sapping
heat, over unreconnoitred country marked by ravines and sheer rock faces
which ran across its line of advance (difficulties which could not be appreciated from a map or from aerial reconnaissance). Jais men, although
burning to fight the English, were greatly exhausted by the long trek from
Lamia even before their attack began.37 A succession of deep ravines, which
had lain across their axis of advance, demanded the last reserves of
strength.38 Once underway the German attackers had also made wonderful artillery targets. The commander of one Australian field regiment later
wrote that the Hun gave us great targets by his methods of mass murdering
his troops.39 Furthermore, from the previous evening when stocks captured
at Lamia ran out, until midday on 25 April, Jais troops had had no food.
(His men, and other forward German troops, subsequently gorged themselves on piles of canned of food left at Brallos by the withdrawing Australians.) We look around more closely and find that the fairy tale of the land
of milk and honey [Schlaraffenland] has become reality, wrote one German,
cream, fruit, corned beef, in short anything one can think of, we discover
provided in enormous amounts.40 Still, the Australians had escaped. By
BA MA RH 28-6/9b, pp. 4-7; Chronology of Operations, 19 Aust Inf Bde Greece, AWM 54,
534/1/2; diary of Major H.C.D. Marshall, 2/7 Battalion, AWM 54, 255/4/12; Long, Greece, Crete
and Syria, pp. 157-9; McClymont, To Greece, p. 386; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941,
pp. 351-6.
BA MA RH 28-6/9b, p. 7.
38Extracts from 18 Corps intelligence report, AWM 54, 534/2/27.
40S. Hutter, ber den Panzern nach Griechenland, Schtzen-Verlag, Berlin, 1942, p. 167.
442
chapter fifteen
the morning 25 April, the 19th Australian Brigade was through the Anzac
Corps rearguard south of Thebes and moving towards its embarkation
point.41
To the east of Brallos, in accordance with Stummes plan, soon after the
Jais Group/55th Motorcycle Battalion attack had commenced, Captain
Schnburg-Waldenburgs reinforced tank company (which included four
Mark IV tanks with 75mm guns) began its advance directly on the Brallos
Pass along the road south from Lamia. The armoured column crossed the
Sperkhios River over a temporary bridge and before long was approaching
the foot of the escarpmentonly to be stopped in its tracks by demolition
craters. Stumme himself came forward to investigate. This area, forward of
Molos, had until this point been quiet. This now changed. Stumme decided to change the direction of his armoured thrust from the Brallos Pass
to the Thermopylae Passthrough the New Zealand positions. SchnburgWaldenburg was given new orders to push through to Molos and destroy
the artillery.42 Stummes last-minute change of plan in sending SchnburgWaldenburgs tank company towards Molos rather than Brallos caused
considerable confusion for the attackers. The Baacke Group, with the cavalry and cycle squadrons of the 112th Reconnaissance Battalion under command, had already been ordered to advance through Molos and were
approaching the New Zealand defences when they were surprised to find
Schnburg-Waldenburgs tanks in their midst.43
Standing in the way of the combined Schnburg-Waldenburg/Baacke
Group force now headed towards the Thermopylae Pass was the 6th NZ
Brigade defending the Molos bottleneck. The 24th NZ Battalion was on the
right, the 25th NZ Battalion on the left and the 26th NZ Battalion in reserve.
The main road split the two forward New Zealand battalions just south of
the point where the southern tributary to Sperkhios River branched northwards. The 24th NZ Battalions line ran from here northeast to the sea. The
25th Battalion, facing north, extended its front west to within five kilometres of the Alamanas Bridge over the Sperkhios. Brigadier Barrowclough
was expecting a German armoured assault, but such an attack was always
BA MA RH 28-6/9b, p. 8; Chronology of Operations, 2/1 Aust Inf Bn Greece, AWM 54,
534/1/2; Extracts from evening reports from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete), AWM
67, 5/17; Extracts from 18 Corps intelligence report, AWM 54, 534/2/27; McClymont, To
Greece, pp. 394-5.
43Report by 8 Pz Recce Unit, AWM 54, 534/2/27; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 388-9.
443
going to be difficult to mount. The marshes to the north, though passable,

were not easy going for tanks. On the other hand a tank attack directly
along the main road would be easy going but would cramp movement and
provide the defenders with tempting artillery targets. This was especially
relevant as, with only two battalions forward, the New Zealand defensive
line was reliant on the power of a considerable artillery force consisting of
a medium, four field, and two anti-tank regiments. Moreover, any attack
along the main road would also have to traverse the entire front of the 25th
NZ Battalion, some 5500 metres, only to run into a wall of artillery defence
at the 24th Battalion positionincluding three troops of 25-pounders in
an anti-tank role and a regiment and a half regiment of anti-tank guns.44
The battle in the New Zealand sector began at 2.00 p.m. when SchnburgWaldenburgs vanguard detachment of light tanks ventured across the
swamp in front of the 25th NZ Battalion and were engaged by long range
field gun fire. Two were lost immediately. The remnants of this leading
German tank troop then met up with the forward elements of Baacke Group
east of the Alamanas Bridge. Captain Baacke was met by SchnburgWaldenburg, who agreed his company would close up and support Baackes
advance. Impatient to begin, Baacke moved forward at once with his 9th
and 11th Companies (3rd Battalion, 124th Regiment), accompanied by
Schnburg-Waldenburgs forward tank troop. At around 3.00 p.m. the leading German tanks, pushing along the main road, ran into thick shellfire and
were halted close to the edge of the 25th NZ Battalions position. Baackes
infantrymen, previously attacking along basically the same axis as the tanks,
now worked their way into the hills just south of the road, and began applying significant pressure on the 25th NZ Battalion from the west and
southwest. A number of New Zealand outposts were pushed back. At 4.15
p.m., after they had closed up together, Baackes two forward infantry companies made a more coordinated attack on the closest 25th NZ Battalion
positions. The new assault was, however, halted only 300 metres from its
44E. Puttick, 4 NZ Inf. Bde. Gp. Preliminary Report of Operations, 30 April 1941, ANZ
ADQZ 18886, WAII1/146; D.G. Morrison, Diary of C Coy, 24 Bn, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/164;
The story of the part taken by A Company 24 NZ Battalion during the campaign in Greece,
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/164; N.J. Mason, Draft Narrative Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/170; War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/1658; B Echelon, 6
NZ Field Regiment on the march out of Greece, 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126; C.J.S.
Duff, 7th N.Z. Anti-Tank Regt. in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126(1); Notes on 6 NZ
Field Regiment in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/123; letter, Pipson to Wards, 14 September 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/3; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 153; Golla, Der
Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 374-5.
444
chapter fifteen
start point by determined small arms fire and a very effective artillery barrage brought down upon it. Heavy infantry weapons and mortars were
hurried forward by Baacke with orders given to prepare for another larger
and better supported assault.45
As Baackes infantry companies launched their 4.15 p.m. attack, Schnburg-Waldenburg threw the remainder of his tank company (which had
by now closed up to where his leading troop had stalled) forward along the
axis of the Molos road. Topography greatly restricted the tactical deployment of the German tanks at this stage and all 19 of Schnburg-Waldenburgs vehicles were forced to charge along the yellowish country road in
single file. Unsurprisingly, the German column soon found itself under the
same weight of artillery fire that had slowed Baackes infantry companies.
Nonetheless, the tanks pushed on and after two kilometres came upon the
forward infantrymen of the Baacke Groups left flank, who had taken cover in ditches by side of the road. Schnburg-Waldenburg was told that the
infantrymen could go no further due to the intensity of shellfire. With few
other available options, he ordered his tanks forward at an even greater
speed. The terrain grew more restrictive then ever. With hills rising sharply to 800 metres on their right, and the Thermopylae swamp on their left,
the German tanks could not deploy out of their single file column. We had
to push on, Schnburg-Waldenburg later wrote, do anything but stop.46
The tank column managed to make it past the first cluster of anti-tank and
field guns in the vicinity of the 25th NZ Battalion and a number of New
Zealand infantry posts near the road were driven back into the hills, but
German vehicles were left burning on the side of the road. Half a kilometre
further on the column ran headlong into even thicker anti-tank, artillery,
and machine-gun fire. Schnburg-Waldenburg ordered his 14 remaining
tanks to increase speed once again, and most passed through this second
position (and thus beyond the 25th NZ Battalion) by around 5.15 p.m. Soon
thereafter the increasingly desperate column crested a rise and met a wall
of fire from the 24th NZ Battalions position. Four more tanks were lost.
The time was now 5.35 p.m. In its frantic charge the German tank company
45C.J.S. Duff, 7th N.Z. Anti-Tank Regt. in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126(1); letter, Pipson to Wards, 14 September 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/3; Draft Narrative
Greece, N.J. Mason, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/170; 4 NZ Inf. Bde. Gp. Preliminary Report
of Operations, E. Puttick, 30 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/146; B Echelon, 6 NZ Field
Regiment on the march out of Greece, 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126; B. Freyberg,
Campaigns in Greece and Crete, October 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6; Notes on
6 NZ Field Regiment in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/123.
46Report by 1/31 Pz Regt on action 24 Apr, AWM 54, 534/2/27.
445
had fought as far forward as was possible. Halted by an impenetrable wall

of shells the company now worked its way back to the vicinity of Baackes
stalled infantry attack whose surviving members lay pressed into the
ground.47 At this point the New Zealanders ordered a devastating
divisional concentration of shellfire against Schnburg-Waldenburgs
surviving vehicles, trapped in an enclosed area on the road just west of the
25 NZ Battalion. It was a chaotic scene, described vividly by SchnburgWaldenburg:
The shells screamed more and more madly into the middle of the attacking
company Machine gun bullets whistled through the air in thousands.
Shell bursts tore the steel bodies apart ... a dance macabre ... Would we be
hit? When would the English counter-attack? Would reinforcements arrive?
The company was completely annihilated.48
Schnburg-Waldenburg was not exaggerating. Of the 19 tanks that began

his ill-fated charge, all were hit and damaged, 12 beyond repair.49
The beleaguered German attackers in the vicinity of the Thermopylae
Pass were reprieved at around 5.30 p.m. when Stukas temporarily silenced
the New Zealand guns. The lull was all the encouragement Baacke required
and he passed orders for another infantry attack, this time to be led by the
recently arrived cycle and cavalry squadrons on 112th Reconnaissance Battalion attacking on an axis parallel to, but south of the road followed earlier by Schnburg-Waldenburgs tanks. Baackes other forward troops, the
47Ibid. Report on action at Molos, AWM 54, 534/2/27; N.J. Mason, Draft Narrative
Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/170; letter, Pipson to Wards, 14 September 1954, ANZ
ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/3.
48Report by 1/31 Pz Regt on action 24 Apr, AWM 54, 534/2/27.
Leutnant Wolfg. Jacob, 1./Panzer-Rgt. 31., Bericht von dem Gefecht bei Molos der 1./Panzer
Rgt. 31 am 24.4.1941., BA MA RH 20-12/105, pp. 1-3; Baacke, Hptm.u.Btl.Kdr., to 72. Infanterie-Division, 16 May 1941, Bezug: Armee-Tages-Befehl vom 7.5.41 72.Inf.Div. Abt. Ic vom
15.5.41 Betr.: Gefecht bei Molos., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, pp. 1-2; Der Kampf um die Thermopylen. Nach Unterlagen von Hptm. Baacke, BA MA RH 26-72/180, pp. 1-10; Voraus-Abteilung,
72. Inf. Div., 18 April 1941, Elasson, Gefechtsbericht ber den Einsatz der Voraus-Abteilung
am 16. und 17.4.1941., BA MA RH 26-72/180, pp. 1-3; 72. Inf. div., Molos, 25 April 1941, Gefechtsbericht ber den Einsatz der Vorausabteilung vom 23. 25.4.1941., BA MA RH 26-72/180,
pp. 1-5; C.J.S. Duff, 7th N.Z. Anti-Tank Regt. in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126(1);
Diary of C Coy, 24 Bn, D.G. Morrison, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/164; The story of the part
taken by A Company 24 NZ Battalion during the campaign in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/164; 4 NZ Inf. Bde. Gp. Preliminary Report of Operations, E. Puttick, 30 April 1941,
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/146; B Echelon, 6 NZ Field Regiment on the march out of Greece,
1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126; Notes on 6 NZ Field Regiment in Greece, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/123; letter, Pipson to Wards, 14 September 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/3;
446
chapter fifteen
9th, 11th and by this time the 12th Companies (3rd Battalion, 124th Regiment), would support this flanking attack by continuing to pressure the
axis of the road. Moreover, this assault, unlike those that preceded it, would
be supported by the fire of two heavy German infantry guns which had at
last made it forward. Meanwhile, the mountain troops of the 3rd Battalion
(141st Regiment), were ordered to close up to Baackes position. Baackes
third attack began at around 6.00 p.m., but once again his troops were held
up by accurate and concentrated shelling. For the next two hours the German infantrymen nonetheless struggled forward and had reached a ridge
west of Ay Trias by dusk. The fighting was desperate and included grenade
attacks and an impromptu New Zealand bayonet charge. The New Zealand
perimeter wavered and shrunk eastwards, but it yet held. By this time the
attacking German infantry found itself badly mixed up and Baacke set
about reorganising his force.50
As darkness descended more and more German troops began closing
up to Baackes forward positions, including the remainder of SchnburgWaldenburgs parent unit (1st Battalion, 31st Armoured Regiment). In this
context Brigadier Schrner, commanding the 6th Mountain Division and
by now in charge of the Thermopylae Pass sector, ordered preparations to
commence for an overwhelming attack on the New Zealanders for the following day. At the front line, however, Captain Baacke, perhaps fearing his
chance for glory to be slipping through his fingers, decided once again not
to wait. For the fourth time, and despite the exhaustion of his men, casualties, and full knowledge of the attack planned for next day, Baacke decided
to mount another assault. He asked the few remaining operative tanks of
Schnburg-Waldenburgs company to take part, but by this time SchnburgWaldenburgs Commanding Officer, Major Hans von Lder, had arrived in
the forward area and refused Baacke on the grounds that a night attack was
not feasible for tanks in this terrain, that his tank gun sights were not usable
in the dark, and in any case the whole tank battalion was preparing for the
Baacke, Hptm.u.Btl.Kdr., to 72. Infanterie-Division, 16 May 1941, Bezug: Armee-Tages-Befehl
vom 7.5.41 72.Inf.Div. Abt. Ic vom 15.5.41 Betr.: Gefecht bei Molos., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, p. 2;
Der Kampf um die Thermopylen. Nach Unterlagen von Hptm. Baacke, BA MA RH 26-72/180,
pp. 1-10; Extracts from 72 Inf Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; C.J.S.
Duff, 7th N.Z. Anti-Tank Regt. in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126(1); E. Puttick, 4 NZ
Inf. Bde. Gp. Preliminary Report of Operations, 30 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/146;
letter, Pipson to Wards, 14 September 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/3; B Echelon, 6 NZ
Field Regiment on the march out of Greece, 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126; Notes on
6 NZ Field Regiment in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/123; McClymont, To Greece,
p. 390.
447
attack scheduled for the following morning. Lder decision to withhold

the tanks was supported by the commander of the 31st Armoured Regiment,
Brigadier E.F. von Bodenhausen, and by Schrner. Baacke, nonetheless,
argued for his force to push on without tank or artillery support. Although
Bodenhausen had no problem with the attempt, due to confusion over the
plan for the large-scale morning attack, Baacke was ordered not to proceed
by Lder.51
Baacke would not give up. He subsequently complained to Schrner,
who overruled von Lder and confirmed that Baacke was free to push on
alone if he so chose. Time, however, had been lost. Baackes night attack
was not actually launched until 2.30 a.m. The cycle squadron of the 112th
Reconnaissance Battalion moved cautiously down the road, with that
units dismounted cavalry squadron to its right rear and Baackes own
cycle squadron to the left rear. The 3rd Battalion, (124th Regiment) moved
in parallel along the hillside to their right. There were, however, no defenders left to fight. The Germans erroneously believed that they had forced
the New Zealanders out of their positions. The defenders, however, had
not been broken at all. They had simply left the pass according to their
withdrawal timetable and then departed in good order. By 3.30 a.m. Baacke
Group had entered Molos, but the 6th NZ Brigade had long since departed. In fact, the New Zealanders had begun withdrawing their artillery with
the lull in fighting at dusk, and at 9.15 p.m. the long-awaited trucks had
arrived and began carrying out New Zealand infantrymen. By midnight
Brigadier Barrowcloughs column was clear of Molos and moving east
through the brigade rearguard at Cape Knimis, then on towards the corps
rearguard at Erithrai. The irony was that had Baacke been allowed to attack
at 9.00 p.m., as he wished, he would have seriously interfered with Brigadier Barrowcloughs withdrawal.52
Baacke, Hptm.u.Btl.Kdr., to 72. Infanterie-Division, 16 May 1941, Bezug: Armee-Tages-Befehl
vom 7.5.41 72.Inf.Div. Abt. Ic vom 15.5.41 Betr.: Gefecht bei Molos., BA MA RH 28-6/9b,
pp. 2-4; Baacke, Hptm. u. Fhrer d. Vorausabt., Vorausabteilung, 72. Inf.Div., Molos, 25 April
1941, GEFECHTSBERICHT ber den Einsatz der Vorausabteilung vom 23.-25.4.1941, BA MA
RH 28-6/9b, pp. 1-3; Jansa, Major und Batteriechef, undated, Auszug aus dem Gefechtsbericht vom 1.5.1941 und dem Kriegstagebuch der 1./Flakregt.61, BA MA RH 28-6/9b, pp. 1-2;
Bericht ber die Durchfhrung des Auftrages an Krad-Schtz.-Zug Lt. Elsnitz., BA MA RH
28-6/9b, pp. 1-2; Report by 1/31 Pz Regt on action 24 Apr, AWM 54, 534/2/27; letter, Pipson
to Wards, 14 September 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/3; Report on action at Molos,
AWM 54, 534/2/27.
52Entry for 25 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der 6.GEB.DIV., BA MA RH 28-6/8.
After the conclusion of the campaign a bitter dispute broke out between Schrner (6th
448
chapter fifteen
As the Australian and New Zealand rearguard brigades skirmished with

the Germans on the Thermopylae Line during 24 April, planning for Operation Demon continued. As Wilson and Baillie-Grohman had directed,
the overall evacuation plan was amended during the day to take pressure
away from the Athens beaches (Rafina and Porto Rafti) in favour of the
more distant beaches in the Peloponnese. Under the amended plan the
5th NZ Brigade and various corps and RAF personnel would still embark
on the night of 24-25 April, from the Athens beaches and Navplion respectively. The following night the 19th Australian Brigade and part of the 1st
(UK) Armoured Brigade would also leave from the Athens beaches. So too,
on the night 26-27 April, the 6th NZ Brigade and the rest of the 1st (UK)
Armoured Brigade would depart from (Rafina and Porto Rafti), while the
4th NZ Brigade was evacuated from Megara. In order to protect this evacuation from a likely German follow-up, Brigadier Barrowclough was instructed to maintain a 6th NZ Brigade rearguard covering the road north of Tatoi
until 6.00 p.m., 26-27 April, the night of his brigades scheduled embarkation. Allen Group, however, one of the largest single groups to be moved,
was no longer to embark at Megara on the night of 24-25 April but was
Mountain Division) and Fehn (5th Armoured Division) over the action fought at the Thermopylae Pass. Schrner, in charge of the attack in the afternoon of the 24 April, ensured it
was portrayed in the 12th Armys reports as a success for the Baacke Group and his attached
mountain troops. Fehn, however, found such reports not very pleasing to the units of the
division and not even in accordance with the facts. Molos was not taken, contended Fehn,
by the heroic actions of the Baacke Group. Its initial assaults in fact failed and it was
Schnburg-Waldenburgs daring thrust that broke the defenders. The occupation of Molos
and capture of guns by Baacke was against no opposition. For his part, not even the award
of a Knights Cross lightened Baackes mood as he complained that too much credit was
given to Schnburg-Waldenburgs tanks. Gartmayr, 6. Gebirgs-Division, Ia, 16 May 1941,
BERICHT ber die Kmpfe bei den Thermopylen., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, p. 5; Baacke,
Hptm.u.Btl.Kdr., to 72. Infanterie-Division, 16 May 1941, Bezug: Armee-Tages-Befehl vom
7.5.41 72.Inf.Div. Abt. Ic vom 15.5.41 Betr.: Gefecht bei Molos., BA MA RH 28-6/9b, p. 4;
Baacke, Hptm. u. Fhrer d. Vorausabt., Vorausabteilung, 72. Inf.Div., Molos, 25 April 1941,
GEFECHTSBERICHT ber den Einsatz der Vorausabteilung vom 23.-25.4.1941, BA MA RH
28-6/9b, pp. 1-3; Appx to 40 Corps War Diary, Apr 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/27; 6 Mtn Div
battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary
(Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from 72 Inf Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/1658;
Miscellaneous papers of Greece and Crete, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6; W.E. Murphy
(NZ War History Branch), Comments on Buckleys popular history of the Greek campaign,
January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; 7th N.Z. Anti-Tank Regt. in Greece, C.J.S. Duff, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/126(1); B Echelon, 6 NZ Field Regiment on the march out of Greece, 1941, ANZ
ADQZ 18886, WAII1/126; Notes on 6 NZ Field Regiment in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/123; letter, Pipson to Wards, 14 September 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/3; letter,
Barnett to anon. (his mother), 5 January 1942, IWM, Papers of Major R.A. Barnett, 102 AT
Regt, 07/23/1; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 396-7; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 154-5.

5 Pz Div
6 Mtn Div
Stylis 40th Corps
Lamia
55 MC Bn
Jais Gp
449
I/141 and
II/141 Mtn Regts
1/95 Mtn Arty Regt
Kostalexi
I/31 Pz Regt
io
Sp
Baacke 112 Recce Unit

Gp 72 Div Adv Gd?
55 MC Bn
sR
ive
r
Imir Bei
h
erk
Ay Trias
Alamanas Bridge
B
C
Kata-Dio-Wuna
II/141
9.30 am
2 and 3 Coys
22nd
Koumaritsi
112
Recce
7/141
noon
2/11 Bn
I/141
6/141
7.30 pm
8 and 9/141
7/141
24 Bn A 26
Molos
D
D Bn 6 Bde
D
C
25 Bn
25 Bn Line
6.30 pm
55 MC Bn
noon
Kouvela
6,8 and 9/141
I/31 Pz
Regt
2/2 Fd
Regt
Brallos
I/141
11.50 pm
Kalothronion
2/1 Bn
less 2 Coys
6.30 pm
2/4 Bn
Coy 2/1 Bn
Gravia
9/141
9/141
4 kilometres
2 miles
Amfiklia
Map 15.2:Action at the Brallos and Thermopylae Passes, 24 April 1941
instead to move south over the Corinth Canal to Argos, and from there to
Kalamata in the extreme south of the Peloponnese for embarkation 48
hours later. Allens men, who had been busy all day dispersed in olive groves
near Eleusis preparing to evacuate, re-boarded their trucks at 9.30 p.m. and
began a 140-kilometre journey to Miloi. Similarly, Brigadier Parrington, now
in charge of around 5000 base troops to have been evacuated from the
Athens beaches, received orders to proceed instead to join Allen at Kalamata. Various other W Force base troops (including 3 RTR and the 4th
450
chapter fifteen
Hussars) were also re-routed to Peloponnese beaches, primarily at Navplion,

for evacuation on the night of 26-27 April.53
This revised W Force evacuation plan required immediate measures be
taken to protect the route to the Peloponnese. As such, during the day
Isthmus Force, based around the 19th NZ Battalion and the 4th Hussars,
was formed and sent to Corinth to prepare demolitions and keep the road
open for the passage of troops south. From 4.00 p.m., 24 April, Brigadier
Lee was appointed area commander in the Peloponnese with the job of
defending the peninsula while the evacuations were underway.54 It seemed
incongruous that while Lee, whose job it was under usual circumstances
to command the Anzac Corps medium artillery, was handed responsibility for coordinating the defence of the Peloponnese, most of W Forces
senior officers were busy leaving Greeceand their formationsbehind.
Blameys now defunct headquarters had left command of his two infantry
divisions in the hands of a hastily cobbled together W Force battle headquarters raised at Miloi. Thanks to a radio intercept the Germans were
aware of Blameys departure. Next, W Force headquarters promptly sent
orders to both Freyberg and Mackay to close their own headquarters and
embark forthwith. As a consequence Mackay and his senior staff set off to
Argos, their embarkation point, late in the afternoon of 24 April. Most of
his headquarters sailed in a British cruiser bound for Crete that night, while
Mackay himself embarked for Crete by flying boat early the next morning.
Thus another key link in the W Force chain of command was removed. The
Australian brigades, from the afternoon of 24 April, notionally under the
command of W Force at Miloi, were now effectively on their own.55
53War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/1658; Material copied for
use in the compilation of New Zealand War History, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm
3650]; Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9
[6-14]; 2/2 Battalion sequence of events, AWM 54, 534/5/10; G. Long, The 6th Division
in action, AWM PR88/72; H.T. Baillie-Grohman, report on the evacuation of British
forces from Greece, 15 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not
yet catalogued); Greece 1941: Diary of 81. Adv. Base Sub Area with Addenda, Brigadier
L. Parrington, IWM, 76/118/2; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 382-3, 400-8; Heckstall-Smith and
Baillie-Grohman, Greek Tragedy, p. 81; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 153.
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; The Campaign in Greece, April 6 28, 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/36;
Force Headquarters BTG Operation Instruction No. 15, 24 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/26
[Part 3]; extract from War Diary of HQ Medium Artillery, 1 Anzac Corps, 6 April 1941, AWM
54, 534/2/29; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 153; McClymont, To Greece, p. 400.
5/17; B. Freyberg, Events that led up to the evacuation of senior officers in the Greek
451
Freyberg received similar orders to evacuate himself on the night of

24-25 April, but he chose to disregard them, explaining to W Force headquarters that the 6th NZ Brigade was still engaged in heavy fighting at
Thermopylae Pass, and even if it managed to withdraw he would need to
control his divisions long and dangerous movements to its various evacuation points. W Forces answer that movement control would handle the
evacuation after he left was insufficient for Freyberg. I naturally went on
with the battle, he wrote afterwards.56 At that point, had Freyberg departed, W Force movement control would have assumed responsibility for no
less than seven fighting brigades, a number of independent units, a long
list of base units, labour battalions, and even displaced Yugoslavs. As it was,
with the departure of Mackay, Brigadier Allen was now left in charge of a
group that included seven battalions and two artillery regiments (closer to
a division than a brigade), with a headquarters whose officer strength now
consisted of himself, a major, a captain and two young lieutenants. According to the New Zealand official history of the campaign, it seemed at this
point that Wilson and Wavell were paying an inordinate and particular
attention to the safety of Dominion commanders given the significant
diplomatic repercussions that would no doubt follow if they were lost.57
Better they were brought out, even if it was without their troops. Freyberg
did not agree.58 In his opinion that decision cost 10,000 men and should
never have been taken.59 From the moment that Blamey and Mackay went,
noted Freyberg, there was no real control of the evacuation.60 It is not too
much to say, he continued, that there was no policy of command in the
withdrawal, and had Dunkirk been carried out in the same way as the
withdrawal from Greece, we should have lost the bulk of the British
Army there.61
In this confused and rapidly degenerating command environment, the
W Force evacuations set for the night of 24-25 April, the first of three large
campaign, 22nd to 29th April, 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/1/8; War Diary HQ 1 Aust
Corps Campaign in Greece, AWM 3DRL 6643; S.F. Rowell, The campaign in Greece, April
1941, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A), [1-4]; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 152; McClymont,
To Greece, p. 401; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 96.
58B. Freyberg, Events that led up to the evacuation of senior officers in the Greek
campaign, 22nd to 29th April, 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/1/8; letter, Stewart to
Chapman re: Biography of Iven Mackay, 15 August 1968, AWM 3DRL 6433; Long, Greece,
60Ibid.
61Ibid.
452
chapter fifteen
embarkations, began. At Porto Rafti, troops of the 5th NZ Brigade lay concealed until nightfall. Then, at 9.00 p.m., they marched to the beach. In an
hour around 4000 men were ferried, in two landing craft, into the transport
Glengyle, while 700 more boarded the cruiser Calcutta. This was a significant
achievement and testament to some creative counting given that the captain of the Glengyle had told the beach master he could take on 1500-2000
men at most. This is the biggest 1500 I have ever seen, mused the captain,
[j]ust as well I didnt say 2500.62 The ships sailed at 3.40 a.m. the next
morning and were attacked from air after dawn but no damage was sustained. They reached Suda Bay in Crete 4.00 p.m. that afternoon. Despite
the best efforts of the navy, around 500 men had been left on the beach at
Porto Rafti. Most were subsequently picked up by tank landing craft and
ferried to Kea Island.63
The evacuation at Navplion of a wide variety of base units set for the
same night did not proceed as smoothly as at Porto Rafti. By 24 April
the small town of Navplion was bursting with men and vehicles. Although
the navy expected to take off around 5000 men, closer to 7500 had concentrated in the vicinity of the village during the day. After nightfall, in bands
of 50 they marched through the streets of the town, strewn with glass and
badly damaged from German air attack, and at 10.30 p.m. began to embark
in barges and ships boats. During the process of embarkation, however,
the transport Ulster Prince ran aground at the harbour entrance. Although
the vessel was refloated it ran aground again near the wharf and was lost.
This disaster limited numbers that could be taken out and preventing any
further use of the Navplion wharves by Pridham-Wippells destroyers. It
also significantly affected the navys lift capacity for the rest of Operation
Demon. Nonetheless, assisted by ten fishing boats operated by the Navy, by
3.00 a.m. around 6500 men were on board the transport Glenearn, the
cruiser Phoebe, the Australian destroyers Stuart and Voyager, and the
corvette Hyacinth.64
62Scarfe and Scarfe, No Taste for Carnage, p. 102.
63W.D. Philp, Greece and Crete, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/123; Report by Brig. Hargest
on Greek Ops, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/162; Summary of operations of 5 NZ Infantry
Brigade in Greece, 29 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/156; Report on activities of 28
(Maori) Battalion during Greek and Crete campaigns, Mar-Jun 1941, F. Baker, ANZ ADQZ
18886, WAII1/181; H.D. Pridham-Whipple, Evacuation from Greece 24-29 April, 1941, 5 May
1941, AWM 3DRL 6643, 3/37; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 160; McClymont, To Greece,
pp. 402-3.
64H.D. Pridham-Whipple, Evacuation from Greece 24-29 April, 1941, 5 May 1941, AWM
3DRL 6643, 3/37; W.D. Philp, Greece and Crete, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/123; Long, Greece,
453
Aside from these planned naval evacuations on the night of 24-25 April,
a tragic ad hoc effort had been made from Piraeus earlier in the day. The
large Greek luxury yacht Hellas arrived unexpectedly at the devastated port
and attempted to take on around 500 civilians and another 800 wounded
soldiers. At 7.00 p.m., with the loading of the yacht almost complete, German aircraft attacked and the Hellas was hit by two bombs, setting it ablaze.
With the gangway destroyed passengers and crew were trapped in burning
cabins and in short order the boat rolled over. Around 500-750 of those
already onboard perished.65
In general terms, the period 22-24 April represented success for W Force
in that it consolidated and held the Thermopylae Line long enough to facilitate the beginning of its evacuation from Greece. In the process the 19th
Australian and 6th NZ Brigades, in particular, managed to delay the German
advance sufficiently, and at the same time withdraw skilfully enough to slip
away without significant casualties. Such achievements and the skill with
which they were undertaken were much lauded at the time and have been
since. Wavell announced to the acting Australian Prime Minister, Fadden,
for example, that the: Extrication of troops from forward positions to Thermopylae line by difficult roads ... was [a] magnificent performance in the
face of heavy and continuous attacks by armoured troops and large air
force.66 The Anzac line at Thermopylae was unbroken, proclaimed the
press in Britain and the Dominions, thanks to the earnest resolution and
the Anzac spirit.67 But such claims were misleading. The real reasons were
much more prosaic.
The first explanation as to why the Thermopylae Line stood long enough
for Operation Demon to begin was the difficult and sluggish German concentration of force in the vicinity of Lamia. A single axis of advance for two
armoured and one mountain division caused monumental traffic control
problems that were never overcome. Congested roads and Allied demolitions combined to ensure that a grand total of one company of German
tanks was available to pressure the W Force line at Thermopylae before its
scheduled withdrawal. Major General Hans von Greiffenberg, Lists Chief
of Staff, considered that the destruction of road bottle-necks and bridges
north of Thermopylae was most effective in delaying a pursuit.68 Major L.
65Autobiography of Captain D.R. Jackson, AWM 68, 3DRL 8052/109; McClymont, To
Greece, p. 405; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 161.
67Future of forces in Greece, Sydney Morning Herald, 22 April 1941, AWM PR 88/72.
68H. von Greiffenberg, Answers to a questionnaire given by the Australian Historical
Section, 4 July 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2.
454
chapter fifteen
Glombik, an intelligence officer at Lists headquarters, agreed that such

demolitions caused a lamentable delay in operations.69 Had it not been
for such demolitions, topography, or the underdeveloped state of Greek
roads, then the Thermopylae Line would have been smashed with little
concern over the defensive power of the Anzac spirit. Moreover, if any
branch of W Force contributed to this delay it was not the infantrymen of
the two forward brigades, but the accurate and intensive Allied artillery
fire applied to the vicinity of Lamia throughout this period. The fact that
W Force was evacuating, and that such guns were therefore to be destroyed
in place, helped in this regard as they could be manned until the last moment by skeleton crews. Had the Anzac Corps been withdrawing to another defensive line then the artillery would have been required to depart
much earlier than it did, and again the result would likely have been different.70
Nor can Wavells claims to Fadden of the significance of German armoured attacks during this period be sustained. At Thermopylae, as
throughout the campaign, the impact of German tanks was negligible. The
engagement once again proved that, at this stage of the war, a resolute
infantry defence supported by artillery could stop an armoured advance.
In fact, Schnburg-Waldenburgs attack against the 6th NZ Brigade was the
second time in two weeks a German armoured thrust was stopped in its
tracks by dug-in infantry well supported by artillery. On 11 April a similar
attempt against the Tobruk perimeter in North Africa left 17 destroyed German tanks behind. This was repeated at Tobruk again on 1 May. The tank
attack against the New Zealand line was a disaster for the Germans, capably and decisively dealt with by well-sited field and anti-tank artillery, and
largely a consequence of poor topographical appreciation and tactical
decision-making by Schnburg-Waldenburg.71 Even German intelligence
admitted how easily the armoured thrust had been blunted. The enemy
showed great coolness in dealing with tanks, noted the 6th Mountain Division, allowing them to approach to point-blank range and then opening
fire on them with anti-tank guns and artillery.72
23 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2.
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM
54, 534/2/27.
71B. Freyberg, Comment on General Blameys Report, AWM 54, 534/5/24; McClymont,
To Greece, pp. 390-2; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 159.
726 Mtn Div battle reports (Greek campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27. Point of interest in
operations in Greece, TNA WO 20/68.
455
Once again, as at Pinios Gorge, far more pressure was applied against
the Brallos and Thermopylae Passes by dismounted German infantrymen,
most of whom had already undertaken exhausting marches with restricted
supplies even to get to the front line, than by tanks. The fact that such light
forces were used against the Allied line was a consequence of the delay in
getting heavy forces forward already noted, and German doctrine which
encouraged quick attacks on the line of march. This meant, once again,
that the Germans mounted a series of assaults in an ad hoc and impromptu fashion that put them at a numerical disadvantage. At Brallos the four
battalions of the 19th Australian Brigade were attacked by elements of three
German infantry battalions within the Jais Group (55th Motorcycle, and
1st and 2nd Battalions (141st Regiment)). At Molos the 24 companies of the
6th NZ Brigade were attacked initially only by two companies of Baackes
infantrymen (9th and 11th Companies) and a troop of tanks. This was followed a little later by an attack using the same two companies and a company of tanks. In his final attack of 6.00 p.m., 24 April, Baacke threw four
companies (with the addition of two from the 112th Reconnaissance Battalion) against the defenders.73 The story was similar in terms of artillery.
The medium regiment (less one troop), four field regiments, two anti-tank
regiments and a light anti-aircraft battery available to the New Zealanders
dwarfed the limited amount of artillery the Germans could press forward
in this sector throughout the day. The balance of force equation alone might
have predicted the outcome.74
The final and continuing historical misunderstanding of the period 2224 April, on and to the south of the Thermopylae Line, relates to German
airpower. Wavells prediction that the chief danger was the numerical
superiority of enemy air force which will undoubtedly devote all its efforts
to hampering our withdrawal was incorrect.75 As had been the case during
the period of withdrawal to Thermopylae, W Forces retreat from this last
73The 9th and 11th (cycle) Companies and the 12th Machine Gun Company from the
3rd Battalion, 124th Regiment; the cycle squadron from the 72nd Division and the cycle and
cavalry squadrons from the 112th Reconnaissance Unit. Extracts from 72 Inf Div War Diary
(Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
74Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts
from 72 Inf Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; S.F. Rowell, The campaign
in Greece, April 1941, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A) [1-4]; Extracts from morning reports
from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete), AWM 67, 5/17; W.E. Murphy, Narrative of 2 NZ
Div. Arty. The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/240; Narrative
of action of Div. Arty. in Greece (with appendices), ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/113.
456
chapter fifteen
defensive line was all but unaffected by the Luftwaffe in any material sense.
Continuing uninterrupted aerial attacks neither inflicted significant damage nor prevented another withdrawal along limited axes past numerous
bottlenecks. This was a significant German failure. The attacks that were
mounted seemed to be aimed at destroying individual vehicles rather than
blocking designated choke points.76 Instead of trying to block W Forces
withdrawal into the Thermopylae Line during this period Richthofen was
concentrating further south. On 22 April he had given the order to destroy
the Corinth-Argos road, which was not carried out because of a lack of
available bombs. The next day such attacks were mounted but again with
disappointing effects. Richthofen blamed no bombs with good shrapnel
effect and sensitive fuses.77 He mistakenly consoled himself that the Stukas
had created huge blocking holes on the routes into the Peloponnese.78
Again it was fear of air attack by day (as the Germans did not fly at night),
not the reality of bombing, that had an influence. Brigadier Allens convoy
out of the Thermopylae Line on the morning of 24 April, for example, found
itself hampered by mass hysteria over planes which caused frequent halts
and resulted in the column ending up a perfect hotch potch of all units
mixed in.79 Nonetheless, W Force got away from Thermopylae in reasonably
good shape and by dawn on 25 April significant numbers of troops had
already left Greece. It remained to be seen if the Germans could do a better
job of foiling the rest of the evacuation than they had managed thus far in
upsetting the previous string of W Force withdrawals.
1942, TNA WO 106/3120.
78Entry for 23 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 171; Golla, Der Fall Griechen
lands 1941, p. 360.
79Diary of Major H.C.D. Marshall, 2/7 Battalion, AWM PR03/058.
corinth and the peloponnese (25-26 april)
457
Chapter Sixteen
Corinth and the Peloponnese (25-26 April)

By early morning, 25 April, W Force was well clear of the Thermopylae Line
and all but a handful of units had moved through the Anzac Corps main
rearguard position at Erithrai.1 Once again only kilometres of demolished
road separated the retreating force from the Germans. German plans to
pursue W Force south from Thermopylae took form as the morning of 25
April unfolded. In the first instance the intermingled troops of the 18th and
40th Corps in the vicinity of the recently vacated Allied line were separated and given new orders, the first of which involved clearing the substantial demolitions left by the defenders south of the passes. By 10.30 a.m.,
the Baacke Group (joined by motorcyclists from the 47th Anti-tank Battalion, 6th Mountain Division), accompanied by the 8th Reconnaissance
Battalion (5th Armoured Division), had made it to Atalandi, and was pushing on towards Thebes with instructions to head for Athens. Meanwhile,
Jais Group, which was at Gravia at the southern edge of the former Australian position at Brallos Pass by 8.00 a.m., marched slowly southeast along
the inland road towards Athens. By late afternoon Jais men, still exhausted,
had covered only around 10 kilometres and were resting at Dadion.2
1Still forward of the 4th NZ Brigade at Erithrai were troops from the 1st (UK) Armoured
Brigade in the vicinity of Thebes, and small group covering northern flank at Khalkis (including the New Zealand Divisions rearguard moving from Cape Knimis to Khalkis). Meanwhile,
German mopping-up operations continued against the Greek island garrisons yet to be
captured. By the evening of 25 April, for example, Lemnos had fallen to two battalions of
the German 164th Division transported to the island aboard a German ship, fishing boats
and two Italian destroyers. The defenders at Lemnos had consisted of a convalescent company of wounded Greek soldiers (armed with six machine guns and rifles) as well as around
100 police: entries for 23, 24, 25 and 26 April 1941, Generalkommando XXX.A.K., Abteilung
Ic, Ttigkeitsbericht Sdost Begonnen am 9.1.1941 in rosiorii de vede
beendet am 21.5.1941 in kawalla gefhrt durch oblt. Hammer, o.3 vom 9.1.
bis 21.5.1941, BA MA RH 24-30/110, pp. 43-7; Extracts from 12th Armys daily intelligence
reports (Greece), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from evening reports from 12th Army to GHQ
(Greece & Crete), AWM 67, 5/17.
2Voraus-Abteilung, 72. Inf. Div., 18 April 1941, Elason, Gefechtsbericht ber den Einsatz
der Voraus-Abteilung am 16. und 17.4.1941., BA MA RH 26-72/180, p. 2; Report by 8 Pz Recce
Unit, AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from 18 Corps intelligence report, AWM 54, 534/2/27;
McClymont, To Greece, p. 398; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 158.
458
chapter sixteen
In addition to these continuing pushes along the main roads to Athens

from Thermopylae, List was planning three other simultaneous operations
to cut off W Forces ongoing withdrawal. First, the 2nd Motorcycle Battalion
(2nd Armoured Division), which had landed behind the company of 8/800th
Special Unit on the northern tip of Euboea, was directed immediately to
Khalkis, and thence onto the mainland to intercept any withdrawing Allied
columns it could catch. The attempt failed, however, as the motorcyclists
only arrived at nightfall of 25 April, by which time most withdrawing Allied
troops in this area had moved on to the southeast. A second attempted
German flanking manoeuvre ordered into action at this time was to be
conducted by the Adolf Hitler Regiment. During 25 April orders were issued
by Dietrich that a strong force was to be sent south of Yannina as fast as it
could travel via Arta and Agrinion to Messolonghion. From here this force
would reconnoitre, gather boats and to cross to Patras on the Peloponnese
with intention of cutting the Corinth Canal from the west. There was never any thought, as Wilson had feared, of such a detachment turning the
Thermopylae position at Delphi. Corinth was its target. The third developing German plan against the W Force line of retreat was conceived as an
adjunct to (or replacement for, if required) the Adolf Hitler Regiments
march on Corinth. It involved a parachute attack on the Corinth Canal
which, if successful, would capture the Corinth Bridge and prevent any
further Allied retreat into the Peloponnese. Low aerial reconnaissance of
whole Corinth isthmus commenced forthwith.3
Meanwhile, on the morning of 25 April Freyberg set out for Athens to
find Wilson and seek clarification about what was becoming an increasingly desperate and disorganised evacuation operation, at least in Attica.
On arrival in the capital he was disturbed to find military dumps of fuel,
food, ammunition and vehicles left to be looted, and a disorganisation and
appearance of almost desperation that had not been evident in the forward
areas.4 At the same time, noted Freyberg, Greek military and civil population were most courteous and eager to help us in any way and appeared
heartbroken that our efforts to help them had brought disaster upon our
3Entries for 25-26 April 1941, Reichsfhrer SS Fhrungshauptamt, Einsatz der verst. L.
SS. A. H. im Sdostfeldzug 1941., BA MA RH 20-12/466, p. 9; Extracts from 12th Armys
campaign in the Balkans a strategic survey, AWM 67, 5/17; SS AH Orders for 25-26
Apr 41, AWM 54, 543/2/27; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 100; MGFA,
Germany and the Second World War, Volume III, p. 514; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941,
pp. 358, 379.
4McClymont, To Greece, p. 405. Lehmann, Die Leibstandarte Band I, pp. 415-20.
459
forces.5 The scene was repeated in the most pathetic, touching reception
received by the 6th NZ Brigade as it moved through the streets later in the
day.6 Barrowcloughs trucks rattled through the city to cheering, clapping
crowds, some of whom threw flowers, all with the clear knowledge that the
next columns entering their city would probably be German. In any case,
when Freyberg caught up with Wilson both men quickly fell into a discussion with Baillie-Grohman about the seriousness of the situation. Further
changes to the evacuation plan were deemed necessary.7
The first of the last-minute changes to the W Force embarkation scheme
resulting from the Freyberg-Wilson-Baillie-Grohman meeting of 25 April
in Athens was for the 4th NZ Brigade rearguard to abandon its plan of
evacuating from Megara and instead stay in position for an additional 24
hours before withdrawing during the night of 26 April to take up a new
rearguard position immediately south of the Corinth Canal. Meanwhile,
the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade (with most of the NZ cavalry regiment) was
instructed to cover the approaches to Rafina and Porto Rafti on W Forces
eastern flank and subsequently embark from Rafina on the night of 26
April.8 The 6th NZ Brigade, which was to have had this task, was now to
move directly to the Peloponnesefirst to a position a few kilometres
south of the Corinth Canal then on to Tripolis, 110 kilometres to the south,
astride the junction of roads to Patrai, Corinth and Monemvasia. Further,
increasing Luftwaffe activity meant that the scheduled evacuation of the
19th Australian Brigade for the night of 25 April would still go ahead, but
from Megara not the beaches east of Athens. Moreover, given the need to
evacuate the 4th and 6th NZ Brigades from the Peloponnese, the whole
evacuation operation was now to be extended for three more nights up to
29 April. Freyberg himself was to move with his 6th NZ Brigade and assume
command of all troops on the Peloponnese once he crossed the Corinth
6War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/1658. See also letter, Barnett
to anon. (his mother), 5 January 1942, IWM, Papers of Major R.A. Barnett, 102 AT Regt,
07/23/1.
7B. Freyberg, Campaigns in Greece and Crete, October 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476,
PUTTICK2/4/6; 4 NZ Inf Bde Group The engagement at Servia, 9/18 April 41, 30 April 1941,
AWM 3DRL 6643 1/44; UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative, The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm
3618]; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 405-6; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 155.
8Charringtons eastern Attica rearguard consisted of the 1st Rangers, the New Zealand
Cavalry Regiment, eight New Zealand field guns, 12 New Zealand anti-tank guns and an
engineer detachment. Its specific task was to deny the Germans the high ground north of
Tatoi until embarkation. Force Operation Instruction No. 16, 25 April 1941, TNA WO 201/53.
460
chapter sixteen
Canal. From the night of 26 April the withdrawal of all remaining W Force
troops in the Peloponnese was to be done as fast as possible with approximately equal proportions evacuating from beaches at Kalamata, Yithion,
Plitra and Monemvasia.9
In the context of developing plans for a German converging attack on
Corinth, from both the west and from the sky, the small Isthmus Force
near Corinth took on disproportionate importance. Brigadier Lee, concerned about forward German troops reaching the bridge ahead of withdrawing W Force units, and by prospects of parachute troops landing at
the canal and on surrounding airfields, tried his best to reinforce the position. As a consequence, during the early hours of 25 April, as the Allen
Group column moved over the Corinth Bridge, Brigadier Saviges car was
stopped by one of Lees staff officers. Lee wanted an extra battalion placed
at his disposal. Savige agreed to leave two companies from the 2/6th Australian Battalion with Isthmus Force in the vicinity of the bridge, while the
balance of the battalion was detached to Lee to guard airfields in the vicinity of his headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel E.G.G. Lillingston, commanding
the 4th Hussars, and whose headquarters was at Corinth, assumed responsibility for defending the Corinth Bridge area. Lillingston had already detailed a number of anti-aircraft detachments and a squadron of his regiment
to defend the bridge area. His engineer detachment had also prepared the
bridge for demolitionswith rather ambiguous orders that it should not
fall into German hands. In addition to protecting the bridge, Lillingston
also had responsibility for patrolling the coast west of Corinth. With only
12 tanks, six carriers and an armoured car, the 4th Hussars was a very thin
force with which to cover 112 kilometres of territory.10
During the morning Lillingston placed A Company (2/6th Australian
Battalion) on the north side of the canal, defending the bridge. Under attack from the air from the time it took up its position, the Australian company was joined at around 1.00 p.m. by B Company (19th NZ Battalion),
which took up a position about a kilometre away along the Letracki Road.
Meanwhile, B Company (2/6th Australian Battalion) had been ordered to
the area midway between Corinth and the Canal bridge, but before it could
take up its position was intercepted by Freyberg and tasked first to repair
9Force Operation Instruction No. 16, 25 April 1941, TNA WO 201/53; Report on operations in Greece, 4 Inf. Bde., 30 April 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK4/2/4; diary of Brigadier
E. Puttick (24 March 3 August 1941), ANZ ACGR 8479, PUTTICK7/1/1; McClymont, To
Greece, pp. 406-8, 435.
DRL 2529 [12]; The events at the Corinth Canal, AWM 3DRL 6850, 108; Report on landing
of German parachute troops near Corinth, AWM 3DRL 6850, 108.
461
a detour through the town. If the object was to ensure the withdrawal of
close to 6000 troops into the Peloponnese, reasoned Freyberg, the Australians would be better employed easing traffic congestion near Corinth
(bound to come under air attack during the day) rather than to lay in wait
for Germans who had not appeared yet. After this was finished B Company
took up an anti-parachute position near Lillingtons headquarters. At 5.00
p.m. a local conference of Isthmus Force was held at Lillingston at his headquarters. With so much air activity during the daythere had barely been
a period of 30 minutes in which no bombs were fallingit was agreed
likely that some type of German attack on the canal area might be mounted in the near future. This possibility was underscored from 8.30 p.m. when
an intense German aerial attack by upwards of 20 aircraft on the area of
the canal was mounted. At the conclusion of the attack the 6th NZ Brigade
made its way across the bridge and into the Peloponnese.11
As Lillingstons small force stationed in the Corinth area prepared itself
as best it could, the remaining elements of W Force still in the Athens area
were clearing out fast. British stores depots in Athens were handed over to
Greek authorities to be distributed to a population already facing food
shortages. By this stage the majority of the Greek navy, including a cruiser,
eight destroyers and five submarines, had fled the Athens area to Alexandria.
During the morning the Australian and New Zealand Reinforcement Battalion at Daphne Camp near Athens, which consisted of all arms and services reinforcements and collected stragglers, received orders to move to
Argos via Corinth the next night. It was indicative of the chaos in Athens
that such orders took twelve hours to disseminate. That night Wilson himself left Athens to set up a new headquarters at Miloi (south of Argos). He
crossed into the Peloponnese two hour before dawn. Rear Admiral BaillieGrohmans evacuation planning staff left Athens around the same time as
Wilson. Unfortunately for W Force, such moves put at an end the relatively good wireless communications from Athens and Baillie-Grohmans
staff were never again able to maintain satisfactory radio contact with the
evacuation beaches.12
11Report of 2/6 Aust Inf Bns participation in the Grecian Campaign covering the period
April 1-29, 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/35 [2]; narrative of Captain H.A. Dean, 2/6 Battalion, 5 July
1945, AWM 54, 234/2/16; message, Lee to Savige, 24 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 529, 20; Resum
of events covering movement of 17 Aust Inf Bde from the night 24/25 April 41, S. Savige, 11
June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6850, 113; War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/1658; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 162.
12Report on Services during the campaign in Greece March and April, 1941, Brigadier
W. dA. Collins, 2 May 1942, TNA WO 201/40; report, Greek Naval Vessels, 9 May 1941, TNA
FO 371/29859; autobiography of Captain D.R. Jackson, 1 Anzac Corps, AWM 68, 3DRL
462
chapter sixteen
Pandeleimon
0
0
2 kilometres
10 Pl B Coy
19 Bn
1 mile
Loutraki
G ul f of Corinth
Corinth
4 Hussars
2 Sec
6 Fd Coy
11 and 12 Pls
B/19
Coy 2/6 Bn
rin
th
Ca
HQ 6 Fd Coy
1 and 3 Secs
Co
C Sqn
Div Cav
4 guns
16 Hy AA Bty
na
l
Isthmia
Coy
2/6 Bn
Examillia
Map 16.1:W Force Corinth Canal Positions, 26 April 1941
The beach far to the south at Kalamata was by now emerging as perhaps
the most important of the W Force evacuation sites, and there confusion
was beginning to set in. Brigadier Parrington was the senior officer present
in the area with his thousands of base troops. No naval staff, however, was
yet to be seen to help coordinate an evacuation. Nor was Parrington thinking of any potential need to defend his beach, with many of his headquarters staff spending the day making traffic signs, rather than siting machine
8052/109; Force Operation Instruction No. 16, 25 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/26 [Part 3];
H.T. Baillie-Grohman, report on the evacuation of British forces from Greece, 15 May 1941,
IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet catalogued); Long, Greece, Crete
and Syria, p. 165.
463
guns. Parringtons command rapidly grew more complicated still when, in

the early hours of 26 April, the 600 vehicles carrying Brigadier Allens 6000
menthe largest single column moving south at this stagearrived at
Kalamata. The whole area north of the town was covered with vehicles, all
waiting to be destroyed. The town and beach area were teaming with scared,
exhausted troops as yet without specific orders as to exactly how they were
to be evacuated.13
For all the confusion and hastily amendments to plans made throughout
25 April, during the night W Force still managed to carry out its second
large-scale evacuation. This was achieved despite the fact that PridhamWhippell, in command of the evacuation ships afloat, had no picture of
the unfolding military situation on land. Nonetheless, he received instructions that during the night around 5000 men were to be taken from Megara and detailed the transports Pennland and Thurland Castle, along with
the cruiser Coventry and the destroyers Wryneck, Diamond and Griffin, to
move to the beachhead. En route, however, the Pennland was attacked from
the air and sunk. In response, Pridham-Whippell diverted three more destroyers, Decoy, Hasty and Havock, to Megara to try and pick up Pennlands
quota. Once the ships arrived, loading of the 19th Australian Brigade aboard
the Thurland Castle went smoothly, largely as a consequence of Brigadier
Vaseys order that his fighting formation had priority over sick, wounded
and miscellaneous units that had gathered in the area. Due to the breakdown of a ships landing craft, close to 500 of these assorted troops were
left behind when the last boat moved out at 2.30 a.m. This large group was
instructed to move to the Peloponnese in the hope of better luck on subsequent nights. Nonetheless, some 5900 men were successfully evacuated
from Megara that night. The Thurland Castle was dive-bombed several
times en route to Crete but it arrived safely.14 On the German side Richthofen suspected W Force were evacuating troops by night but thought it
cannot be many, and without vehicles.15
13Diary of Major H.C.D. Marshall, 2/7 Battalion, AWM PR03/058; Report on operations
in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9 [6-14]; Material copied for
use in the compilation of New Zealand War History, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm
3650]; 2/2 Battalion sequence of events AWM 54, 534/5/10; Greece 1941: Diary of 81. Adv.
Base Sub Area with Addenda, Brigadier L. Parrington, IWM, 76/118/2; Long, Greece, Crete
and Syria, pp. 164-5.
3DRL 6643, 3/37; J.D. Rogers, Report of Anzac Corps embarkation staff Greece, AWM 54,
534/2/34; I. Mackay, Report on operations of 6th Australian Division in Greece, May 1941,
AWM 54, 534/2/34; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 164; Playfair, The Mediterranean and
Middle East, p. 100.
464
chapter sixteen
During the morning of 26 April the leading German units pushing towards Athens from the northwest received further instructions, both for
the occupation of Attica and the pursuit of W Force into the Peloponnese.
The 8th Reconnaissance Battalion and motorcyclists of the 47th Anti-Tank
Battalion were ordered to continue on as fast as possible to occupy Athens
and Piraeus. Baacke Group was directed to continue its advance, with
Marathon as its objective. Meanwhile, the main body of the 5th Armoured
Division was to pursue W Force via a direct drive on Corinth, and from
there towards Tripolis in Peloponnese, whence fighting elements could be
despatched to Argos, Kalamata and Sparta as required. For its part, the 2nd
Motorcycle Battalion sent strong reconnaissance patrols across to the mainland from Khalkis during the morning and found the area vacant of defenders. The unit was thus ordered to push straight for Athens via Malakusa,
rather than for Thebes as had been originally ordered, and from there on
to Lavrion on the southeastern tip of Attica. Further to the northwest the
leading reconnaissance detachment of the Adolf Hitler Regiment raced
southwards, and by the evening of 26 April had managed to cross over to
Rhien on the Peloponnesian coast of the Gulf of Corinth. From there they
marched seven kilometres to Patras, survived a friendly air attack thanks
to Luftwaffe ignorance of the operation, and dispersed the small detachment of the 4th Hussars and Greek Reserve Officers Battalion stationed in
the area. The 3rd Battalion (Adolf Hitler Regiment), was instructed to follow
over the same crossing as soon as possible and then trail the regiments
reconnaissance detachment in a push towards Pyrgos and Corinth from
the west.16 Troops of the 3rd Battalion were surprised by how well they
were received by the locals during this advance who overwhelmed the
vehicles with apples and flowers.17
Meanwhile, plans for a parachute attack on the Corinth Bridge had
taken a more definite form. German airborne troops that had previously
16Entries for 25 and 26 April 1941, Reichsfhrer SS Fhrungshauptamt, Einsatz der
verst. L. SS. A. H. im Sdostfeldzug 1941., BA MA RH 20-12/466, p. 9; Leibstandarte SS Adolf
Hitler, 30 April 1941, Gefechtsbericht der L.SS A.H. fr die Zeit vom 6.4.41 29.4.41., BA MA
RH 24-40/17, pp. 15-16; Wisshaupt, undated, Der Balkanfeldzug der 12. Armee,, BA MA MSG
2/3963, p. 30; entry for 26 April 1941 Richthofen, diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 175; Appx to 40
Corps War Diary, Apr 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from War Diary of III BN SS AH
in Greece, AWM 54, 543/2/27; Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete),
AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from report of 2 MC Bn (2 Pz Div), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Playfair,
The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 103; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 393-4;
Lehmann, Die Leibstandarte Band I, pp. 415-20.
17Extracts from War Diary of III BN SS AH in Greece, AWM 54, 543/2/27.
465
been designated to invade Lemnos were readily at hand for the operation
after it was discovered that the single British battalion which had landed
on the island on 4 April had been withdrawn eight days later. Nonetheless,
the decision to execute the parachute attack had been a drawn-out process.
An original warning order for the airborne capture of the Corinth Canal
issued on 23 April did not meet with approval from all German commanders in Greece. While List agreed that the operation would yield worthwhile
results, Richthofen thought the idea unnecessary if not foolish as it would
use all available air transport groups to secure its supplies, which meant
he could mount far fewer simultaneous attacks on Allied shipping or transport columns.18 The question resonated up the chain of command and
eventually only Grings support for the idea ensured it went ahead without,
according to Richthofen, due regard to situation on the ground.19
The German airborne plan against Corinth called for an attack by two
reinforced battalions of the 2nd Parachute Regiment (7th Flieger (airborne)
Division), under the command of Colonel Alfred Sturm. Five groups of Ju52
aircraft were to drop the paratroopers at the canal to block the escape of
British troops into the Peloponnese, while gliders were used to land troops
almost on top of the Corinth Bridge to capture it intact. The capture of the
bridge was important for two reasons. First, it would facilitate the fastest
possible pursuit of W Force into the Peloponnese and second, an undamaged canal would ensure oil supply from Romania to Italy flowed with
minimal interruption. By 25 April more than 400 three-engine transport
and tow planes of the Luftwaffes 4th Air Fleet, as well as numerous troopand cargo-carrying gliders, were transferred from the Plovdiv area in Bulgaria to airfields at Larissa. With air attacks the previous day all but wiping
out the scant W Force anti-aircraft defences near Corinth, the airborne
assault was scheduled to begin early in the morning of 26 April.20
The German attack on Corinth began at 7.00 a.m. with a flight of Me110s
bombing and strafing Lillingstons remaining anti-aircraft positions south
of bridge. In short order additional flights of Me110s and Me109s appeared
and attacked all visibly defended positions. Five minutes later the Stukas
19Entry for 24 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 174. MGFA, Germany and
the Second World War, Volume III, p. 514.
20Entry for 26 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 175; UK War Narratives
The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative, The Campaign in Greece,
April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; McClymont, To Greece, p. 417; MGFA,
Germany and the Second World War, Volume III, p. 515.
466
chapter sixteen
arrived and began their dive-bombing runsmany without releasing their

bombs in the first instance to increase the psychological effect. In total
some 80-100 fighters and 20-30 dive bombers continued this heavy and
concerted air assault for 30 to 45 minutes before troop carrying aircraft
arrived. At this point Ju52 aircraft, flying very slowly and in formations of
three so tight their wings almost touched, and taking advantage of the haze
over water and arriving undetected, began disgorging paratroops from large
square hatches in the bottom of their fuselages.21 According to Captain
K.M. Oliphant, a witness to the air assault from the 2/3rd Australian Field
Regiment,
We were awakened ... with a bedlam of bombing, machine gunning and
aeroplanesI will never forget itthe sky was black with German planes
... it was hell let loosethere were not a dozen overhead at a time but
hundreds. I never imagined such a terror-stricken instrument could be initiated by manthey screamed down us as low as 40 feet raining bombs on
us and machine gunning every tree in that areait was unbelievably terrifyingthe climax came with the arrival of the troop-carrying planes.22
When the order was given to exit their aircraft the German paratroopers
jumped so thickly that their parachutes appeared to touch as they emerged,
and from such a low height at around 90 metres (previous German paratroops in Holland had descended from 300 metres) that they were only a
few seconds in the air and few were engaged by ground fire during their
descent. Each aircraft carried a platoon of paratroopers. Many platoons
sustained a number of casualties during their descent due to parachutes
not opening, canopies getting caught on planes (some were seen departing
with parachutes flapping behind), or from soldiers releasing from their
parachutes while still fifteen to thirty metres in the air. Other troops jumped
so low that their parachutes did not have time to deploy fully and they
seemed to the defenders almost to bounce.23
106/555.
23Report on landing of German parachute troops near Corinth by Officer Commanding, 16 Heavy AA Battery, 22 May 1941, TNA WO 201/122; Hermann Gtzl, undated, Die
Luftlandung bei Korinth am 26.4.1941, pp. 1-17, plus three pages of maps; Alfred Merglen,
[undated], Die deutsche Luftlande-Operation bei Korinth 26. April 1941 Versuch einer
Bewertung, pp. 1-5; Hermann Gtzl, Wie es zu der Luftlandung bei Korinth kam, Der
deutsche Fallschirmjger, 4 (1956), pp. 2-4, plus an unsigned 7-page typescript with the same
title: all in BA MA N 667/8; letter, McClymont to Ward, 9 September 1955, ANZ ADQZ 18902,
WAII3/1/15; Letter, Seccombe to Wards, 20 May 1955, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16a; Crisp,
The gods were neutral, p. 204.
467
While the outer two in each formation of three Ju52s dropped troops
descending under white parachutes, the inner aircraft dropped stores, consisting of steel cylinders around two metres long dropped under grey, black
or red canopies, and canvas bundles thrown from aircraft without parachutes. The equipment in these packages, which included weapons, landed around 90-270 metres from each platoon. Thus, when the German
paratroops actually landed they were unarmed (apart from the odd revolver) and a full ten minutes was needed to organise and equip. The first
landings of 600-800 paratroops were aimed to the immediate north and
south of the canal bridge. Simultaneously, a German glider landed beside
the bridge and troops poured out. Other gliders touched down to the north
and south of the canal. Subsequent waves of paratroops descended in an
almost continuous stream to occupy the ridge of high ground south of the
canal. With no artillery or armoured vehicles available, German soldiers
rallied to their officers. German flags were spread on the bonnets of vehicles
which had been commandeered and troops waved blue and white handkerchiefs at aircraft to signal themselves as friendly. Meanwhile, heavy
Luftwaffe attacks continued in the vicinity of Corinth and in areas where
no paratroops had landed. Continuous bombing and strafing runs were
also mounted on the road south of Corinth to prevent any W Force counterattack from Argos.24
Once on the ground German troops closest to the Corinth Bridge, a
detachment of engineers from a glider that had landed on the south side
of the canal within five metres of the fuse for the bridge demolitions, raced
forward and successfully cut the cables to the packages of gun cotton, gelignite and TNT set to wreck the bridge and send it plummeting down to
block the canal. Quite unexpectedly, however, almost immediately after
the fuse was cut the detonation was nonetheless set off and the bridge
destroyed in a monumental explosion. The question of how or who set it
off remains vexed to this day. An officer from the 2/6th Australian Battalion
stationed in the area claimed the bridge had been detonated by an accidental hit from British artillery shell, but no Allied artillery was falling in
24Entry for 26 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 175; letter, McClymont
to Ward, 9 September 1955, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/15; History of the 2 NZ Division
Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; letter,
Seccombe to Wards, 20 May 1955, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16a; Report on landing of
German parachute troops near Corinth, AWM 3DRL 6850, 108; The events at the Corinth
Canal, AWM 3DRL 6850, 108; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 166; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 387-93, 402-4.
468
chapter sixteen
the vicinity of the bridge at the time. The generally accepted version of
events suggests that two nearby W Force officers managed to set off the
detonation by rifle fire. Their first shot missed but the second initiated the
explosion. The possibility of the charges being set off by rifle fire was disputed at the time, and has been since, but Wilson nonetheless decorated
the two officers for the actions. Alternatively, a later report by New Zealand
engineers in the area claimed that two of their number had made a dash
to light the fuses, although there is little evidence to corroborate the claim.
For their part the Germans believed that the bridge was detonated by accident when German soldiers clearing it had unwisely piled up the explosives only for them to be hit by a random bullet causing the detonation.
Whatever the case the bridge was lost to the Germans, and the access route
into the Peloponnese thus blocked for any W Force troops still north of the
canal. The lost bridge did not, however, slow the Germans as much as Wilson might have hoped. Later in the same day German sappers managed to
span the canal with a pontoon bridge built alongside the ruined structure.25
The arrival of the German paratroops and the detonation of the Corinth
Bridge initiated a desperate defensive fight for the scattered and thin line
of W Force troops charged with holding the canal area. Apart from the
detachment from the 4th Hussars and the three rifle companies (from
the 19th NZ Battalion and the 2/6th Australian Battalion) already dug in,
at the time of the German attack a squadron of New Zealand cavalrymen
and two carrier platoons from the 22nd NZ and 28th (Maori) Battalions
were also caught up in the confusion of a poorly-coordinated defence. The
Australian company north of the canal was immediately cut off by German
landings to the south of the bridge and was soon under attack from paratroops advancing on its position. Two German gliders then landed within
the company area and their occupants were machine gunned before they
could emerge. From this point, however, the Australian company was
25Narrative of Captain H.A. Dean, 2/6 Battalion, 5 July 1945, AWM 54, 234/2/16; The
events at the Corinth Canal, AWM 3DRL 6850, 108; Final fighting on the Peloponnese,
1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; Miscellaneous messages dealing with the campaign in southern
Greece, AWM 54, 534/2/27; letter, McClymont to Ward, 9 September 1955, ANZ ADQZ
18902, WAII3/1/15; Hermann Gtzl, undated, Die Luftlandung bei Korinth am 26.4.1941, pp.
1-17, plus three pages of maps; Alfred Merglen [undated], Die deutsche Luftlande-Operation
bei Korinth 26. April 1941 Versuch einer Bewertung, pp. 1-5; Hermann Gtzl, Wie es zu
der Luftlandung bei Korinth kam, Der deutsche Fallschirmjger, 4 (1956), pp. 2-4, plus an
unsigned 7-page typescript with the same title: all in BA MA N 667/8; McClymont, To Greece,
p. 417; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 98.
469
quickly overrun. Its headquarters was the last post to fall, under heavy fire,
with the company clerk throwing out grenades until one exploded in his
hand. The Australian company position was taken at 11.00 a.m. Meanwhile,
the company from the 19th NZ Battalion, around a kilometre from the
bridge, tried to counter-attack towards the canal but was beaten back and
the majority of its men ended up as prisoners. The second Australian company in the area, near Lillingtons headquarters, could hear firing from the
vicinity of the Corinth Bridge but received no orders from Headquarters,
4th Hussars. The Australian infantry watched various units withdrawing
and eventually did the same under somewhat unorganised and uncoordinated circumstances. For their part the New Zealand cavalry squadron and
carrier platoons put up a stiff resistance to German advances south of the
canal after the initial landings, but were themselves soon overwhelmed.
Those W Force troops not killed or captured in the vicinity of Corinth began
desperate small group attempts at escape.26
Throughout this confused skirmishing the 4th Hussars were conspicuously absent. It appears that from the moment the German attack commenced Lillingstons headquarters effectively shut down. Certainly no
orders were passed to its subordinate infantry companies and no support
was offered by Lillingstons three squadrons further to the west, which,
apart from the detachment overrun at Patras, managed to withdraw south
towards Tripolis. The W Force defence of the canal was perhaps best
summed up by an official Australian Army report which described it as
offering practically no opposition as detachments melted away ... making
as best they could for the beaches.27 Some 21 officers and 900 Allied soldiers
(as well as 1450 uniformed Greeks) were taken at Corinth for the loss of 63
Germans killed, 158 wounded and 16 missing. Interestingly, many W Force
prisoners taken in this attack described their captors as good types, a high
proportion of whom spoke English and many of whom were university
students from Berlin. Quite a few carried cameras which they used freely
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; letter, McClymont to Ward, 9 September 1955, ANZ ADQZ
18902, WAII3/1/15; Report on anti-parachute operations by Officer Commanding B Coy,
2/6 Bn Corinth Canal Area 25/26 Apr. 41, AWM 54, 534/2/35 [2]; narrative of Captain H.A.
Dean, 2/6 Battalion, 5 July 1945, AWM 54, 234/2/16; letter, Lieutenant Colonel G.F. Smith to
Army Headquarters, 23 June 1953, AWM 119, 397; letter, Seccombe to Wards, 20 May 1955,
ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16a; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 165-6; Golla, Der Fall
Griechenlands 1941, pp. 387-93, 402-4.
March-April, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7.
470
chapter sixteen
once fighting was done and the paratroops were generally regarded as being lenient and well-disposed to their prisoners.28
The consequences of the fall of Corinth upon the ongoing evacuation
of W Force from Greece were immediate and considerable. Although the
attack had come too late to cut off the bulk of W Force troops, and failed
to capture the bridge intact, it had still managed to separate W Force from
its rearguardthe 4th NZ Brigade and elements of the 1st (UK) Armoured
Brigade still in position south of Thebes. The landings also isolated W Force
soldiers still gathered in the hope of embarkation at Megara. Some 500 of
these troops were intercepted by the German paratroops as they made their
way to Corinth. Some made it back to Athens, others joined the 4th NZ
Brigade, while a small numbered managed to sail from Megara in small
Greek fishing boats. The majority, however, were taken prisoner.29
Major General Freyberg, in command of all W Force troops in the Peloponnese since he moved across the Corinth Bridge the previous night with
the 6th NZ Brigade, received his first warning of the German parachute
attack at Corinth at 9.00am, 26 April. Initially thinking it to be a small
company-level attack, Freyberg responded by ordering Brigadier Barrowclough to send aid to Isthmus Force and half of the 26th NZ Battalion was
subsequently despatched back north from Tripolis to ensure the canal
bridge remained open to allow withdrawal that night of the 4th NZ Brigade.
This small relief force did not get far and was forced to take cover from
German air attack in the village of Golomos, eight kilometres south of
Corinth. There it engaged German paratroops spreading south from their
landing zones near Corinth. There was no chance of the New Zealanders
pushing further forward to the canal. In any case, the detachment soon
28Interestingly, according to Reichsfhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler the racial and general
attitudes and conduct of British prisoners taken at Corinth was, from a propaganda perspective, unfortunately very good. Gefangenenwesen. attached to signature, Anlage 20
zu A.O.K. 12, Nr. 950/41 g.Kdos., Qu.2, 22 June 1941, Kriegstagebuch Sdost., BA MA RH
20-12/345, p. 2. Notes on 2/6 Australian Infantry Battalion during operations in Greece,
AWM 54, 534/2/19; Chronology of Operations, 2/6 Aust Inf Bn Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2;
Memoir, Campaign Greece 1941, IWM, Papers of Lieutenant Colonel C.M.L. Clements,
98/21/1; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941,
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; Miscellaneous messages dealing with the campaign in southern Greece, AWM 54, 534/2/27; Narrative of Captain H.A. Dean, 2/6 Battalion, 5 July 1945,
AWM 54, 234/2/16; Extracts from a report obtained from an officer who has just returned
from the Middle East, AWM 54, 534/0/11; letter, Seccombe to Wards, 20 May 1955, ANZ
ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16a; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 167.
The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; Long,
471
Volos
Karditsa
AEGEAN
SEA
Lamia
III Bn SS
AH Div
Molos
Brallos
Agrinion
Livanatais
5 Pz Div
2 MC Bn
Levadia
Patras
2 MC Bn
Thebes
Kriekouki
Sqns
4 Hussars
assemble
EUBOEA
Khalkis
I/31
Pz
8 Recce
4 Bde
Megara
Paratroops
Elevsis
1 Armd Bde
Rafina
Piraeus Athens
Corinth
Arty Gp to leave
26/27 April
Porto Rafti
SALAMIS
Pyrgos
26 Bn
25 Bn
Miloi
Tripolis
24 Bn
KEA
Navplion
Embarkation
26/27 April
ION IAN
SEA
Kalamata
MIRTOAN
Embarkation
26/27 April
SEA
Yithion
Plitra
Monemvasia
MEDITERR ANEAN
SEA
Cape
Matapan
40 kilometres
20 miles
KITHIRA
Map 16.2:The situation in southern Greece on 26 April 1941 after the German paratroop
landings at Corinth
received word that the bridge was destroyed and, with the point of its mission now lost, it withdrew south. Meanwhile, Freyberg became aware,
through stragglers from Corinth, of the true scale of the airborne attack
and his thoughts turned at once to the question of how the 4th NZ Brigade
472
chapter sixteen
might be recovered, and how the evacuations scheduled for that night from
Navplion might now be protected. To solve the second problem Freyberg
ordered the 24th NZ Battalion to remain at Tripolis with the 25th NZ Battalion sent to Miloi to cover Navplion beach. These battalions were to hold
their positions until the night of 27 April, before withdrawing to Monemvasia for embarkation. All other organised units and stragglers were to
defend the Argos area until nightfall on 26 April before also withdrawing
to Monemvasia. The unit with the furthest to move in this regard were the
remnants of the 4th Hussars, fleeing south from Patras. This move proved
difficult to coordinate and while eventually its advance guard made it to
the Miloi area, the main body of the unit (around 300 strong) continued
south to Kalamata.30
The 4th NZ Brigades predicament was more difficult for Freyberg to
solve. Brigadier Putticks rearguard positions at Erithrai were well-concealed
and remained hidden from German aerial observation throughout the
morning of 26 April. As a consequence, an unsuspecting German column
of around 100 vehicles, led once again by the tanks of the 1st Battalion (31st
Armoured Regiment), approached along the road from Thebes at 11.00 a.m.
As the column grew close enough for the defending New Zealand artillerymen to see its tail, they opened fire, dispersing the German vehicles which
drove at high speed back towards Thebes, leaving eight of their number
destroyed by the roadside. An hour later, having given away its position,
Putticks rearguard came under concerted air attack and by 1.00 p.m. under
artillery attack as well. Such bombardments continued for the rest of the
afternoon, accompanied by occasional light German armoured probing.
In the late afternoon a formation of German infantry moving towards the
left flank was dispersed by New Zealand machine-gun fire at a range of
2700 metres. All the while streams of German vehicles were seen moving
east along the road towards Skhimatarion. Among them were elements of
the 8th Reconnaissance Battalion and a motorcycle platoon from the 47th
Anti-tank Battalion, which by nightfall had moved south beyond Malakasa,
a village east of Thebes and north of Athens. In this area they were joined
by the 2nd Motorcycle Battalion and elements of 8/800th Special Unit, now
back on the mainland from Euboea. Both detachments, it seemed, had
orders to enter Athens, contrary to Stummes general instructions ordering
30Report by 1/31 Pz Regt on action24 Apr, AWM 54, 534/2/27; correspondence, narrative and draft notes (various) concerning the activities of the 26th (NZ) Battalion in Greece,
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/172; War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde., ANZ ADQZ 18886,
WAII1/1658; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 422-5; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 168.
473
18th Corps units to halt and occupy the country to the north. There was an
unofficial German race on, between Stumme and Boehme, as to whose
troops would enter the capital first.31
Meanwhile, at 4th NZ Brigade headquarters news of the German assault
on Corinth was received at 2.00 p.m., 26 April, and Puttick concluded that
the canal bridge was either captured or wreckedeither of which would
make his orders to retire over the bridge that night difficult to execute. Four
hours later, however, he still had no definite information and made worstcase plans to hold an area 15 kilometres east of the canal until night of 27
April. If no arrangements could be made for embarkation by that time then
Puttick intended to fight his way back across the canalthrough the German paratroopsor to a nearby beach in the hope an evacuation might
be effected at a later stage. At last at 6.30 p.m. new orders to embark at
Porto Rafti were received by a runner from the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade
and confirmed by radio from artillery supporting the brigade at Porto Rafti. Such orders were timely given reports of another large column of German
vehicles near Likouresi, a village 16 kilometres east of Thebes, well on the
way to encircling Putticks position. The process of getting these instructions through to the 4th NZ Brigade had been difficult. With no way to
contact the brigade directly other than by radio (with codes already destroyed), Freyberg was forced to transmit to Puttick in clear: move and
withdraw from the beaches Hargest used.32 Even then, however, the message failed to get through. Fortunately for the New Zealanders the transmission was received by Charringtons headquarters, which managed to relay
it on. Aware that shipping would probably be available the following night,
the brigade began to withdraw to Porto Rafti at 9.00 p.m. It had been a difficult day of waiting for Putticks troops. One member of the 18th NZ Battalion described it as hard as hell on the nerves. A man wanted to shout or
do something to ease the suspense.33 With no interference from German
ground troops, however, Putticks men were soon rolling through Eleusis
and Athens. By daybreak, 27 April, the brigade was dispersed and lying
under the cover of olive trees on a small plain northwest of Markopoulon
at the mouth of the fertile valley which ran to Porto Rafti.34
31Report on operations in Greece, 4 Inf. Bde., 30 April 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK4/2/4; diary of Brigadier E. Puttick (24 March 3 August 1941), ANZ ACGR 8479, PUTTICK7/1/1; Extracts from 12th Armys daily intelligence reports (Greece), AWM 54, 534/2/27;
McClymont, To Greece, pp. 432-5; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, p. 395.
32W.G. McClymont, To Greece, p. 424.
33Diaries of Private V.R Ball, KMARL, 1994.1825.
34Report on operations in Greece, 4 Inf. Bde., 30 April 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK4/2/4; Diary of Brigadier E. Puttick (24 March 3 August 1941), ANZ ACGR 8479,
474
chapter sixteen
As the 4th NZ Brigade spent the evening of 26 April driving towards the
Athens beaches, the concentration of troops already gathered there waited
expectantly for the arrival of the Royal Navy. These groups were much relieved as the destroyers Kingston, Kandahar, Nubian, Decoy and Hasty appeared, along with the cruiser Carlisle, off the beaches. A heavy swell,
however, meant that the transports Glengyle and Salween were forced to
stay two kilometres offshore and the ferrying of troops proceeded slowly
as a result. The operation began at 10.00 p.m. From Porto Rafti three artillery
regiments and most of the 27th New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion was
loaded into the Salween, Carlisle, Kandahar and Kingston. A group of 500
men previously left on Kea Island was also ferried back to the beach and
on loaded onboard. This convoy sailed on time at 3.00 a.m. At Rafina, however, the naval convoy was unable to take on all those who required passage.
When Glengyle sailed 800 members of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade (including Charringtons headquarters), were left on the beach. According to
Major Boileau, in command of the Rangers: We told the men another boat
would come the next night, not that we thought it of course.35 The combined evacuation at Porto Rafti and Rafina was nonetheless a considerable
success despite those left behind. In total close to 8200 men were taken off
during the night from these beaches.36
During the night of 26 April W Force evacuations also proceeded from
Tolos and Navplion beaches in the Peloponnese, south of Argos. The operation did not, however, begin well. The landing ship Glenearn was designated to embark troops at Navplion but it was hit by a German bomb
during the early evening and was forced to retire to Alexandria, with its
landing craft detached to Monemvasia. As a consequence Pridham-Wippell
PUTTICK7/1/1; Miscellaneous papers of Greece and Crete, ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6;
B. Freyberg, Detailed comment upon draft of Mr. Buckleys popular history of the Greek
Campaign, AWM 67, 5/17; 4 NZ Inf Bde Group The engagement at Servia, 9/18 April 41,
30 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643 1/44; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 169; McClymont, To
Greece, pp. 424-5, 436-7.
77/149/1.
36Diary of a beach party, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/127; Evacuation from Porto Rafti
ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/144; Report, Evacuation from Greece 24-29 April, 1941,
H.D. Pridham-Whipple, 5 May 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643, 3/37; H.T. Baillie-Grohman, report
on the evacuation of British forces from Greece, 15 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral
H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet catalogued); The evacuation of the British forces from Greece
April 1941: the part played by the Royal Corps of Signals, TNA WO 244/102; letter, Seccombe
to Wards, 25 May 1955, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/2; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 16970; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 427-8.
475
ordered his flagship, the cruiser Orion, and the Australian cruiser Perth to
take up the slack and join another cruiser (the Calcutta), four destroyers
and two transports (Slamat and Khedive Ismail) already assembled there.
The destroyer Stuart was detached to Tolos. Predictably, the progress of the
evacuation at Navplion was hampered by the burnt-out wreck of the Ulster
Prince which blocked destroyers from docking properly at the pier. Transfers were thus affected by men wading out through rough surf, chest high,
to be taken onboard small boatsdangerous in the choppy seasand up
to 100 were washed overboard to drown. Due to the lack of small boats for
transfers the troopship Khedive Ismail was forced to sail away with no troops
aboard. Further complicating matters at Navplion was the fact that the
Stuart, full from Tolos, was forced to return to cross-load with Orion. Stuart
returned to Tolos with Perth to continue the evacuation from that beach
but was hampered by a sand bar which regularly stranded its landing craft.
By 4.00 a.m. some 2000 had been embarked from Tolos beachbut 1500
more remained. From Navplion around 2600 were taken away leaving 1700
ashore.37 A landing craft departed Navplion the next morning bound for
Monemvasia, which it reached at dawn on 28 April, with another 600 Australians aboard. In total, however, only 5200 of the planned 8000 were
taken from the Argos beaches that night. Around 700 of those left stranded
at Navplion subsequently marched to Tolos where they spent the next
day hiding from German aircraft which cruised overhead, bombing and
machine-gunning opportunity targets at will.38
Desperate to cram on board as many troops as possible, the convoy from
Navplion did not, in fact, depart until 4.30 am90 minutes after it ought
to have cleared the beaches and after having been ordered repeatedly to
do so. Having sailed so late the troopship Slamat was discovered by German
aircraft at 7.15 a.m., attacked and disabled. The destroyer Diamond was
ordered to go alongside and take off Slamats 500 passengers. At little later,
37This composite Australian battalion had arrived at Tolos on the morning of 26 April.
It had been en route to Kalamata but, while in Tripolis, the road south was bombed and
thereafter considered impassable. Half of the unit nonetheless continued on, but those
stranded behind the demolished road could go no further and took up positions near
Tripolis, only to be ordered by Lee to move to cover the embarkations at Argos beaches:
autobiography of Captain D.R. Jackson, 1 Anzac Corps, AWM 68, 3DRL 8052/109.
3DRL 6643, 3/37; extracts of Letters from Major Crofton, Headquarters Anzac Corps, AWM
54, 534/2/14; H.D. Pridham-Whipple, Evacuation from Greece 24-29 April, 1941, 5 May 1941.
AWM 3DRL 6643, 3/37; entry for 27 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 177; Long,
Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 170-1; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 428-9; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 101.
476
chapter sixteen
Figure 16.1:Navplion, from which allied troops were evacuated. (Source: Australian War
Memorial: 130843)
at 9.10 a.m., another destroyer, Wryneck was also despatched to assist Diamond which had, for the last hour, been under dive-bombing attack and
calling for help. At 9.25 a.m. Diamond reported most survivors from Slamat
had been picked up and that the ship was headed for Crete. An hour later
Wryneck was desperately requesting fighter protection. By late that evening
it was apparent that all three vessels had been lost. From a group of about
1000 men in total from these three ships, only one naval officer, 42 sailors
and 8 soldiers were rescued.39
Further south, during 26 April between 16-18,000 troops had assembled
near Kalamata in conditions of increasing confusion. A third of this mass
was Allen Force, with the rest consisting of base troops, Yugoslavs and assorted others. The remnants of 4th Hussars and the New Zealand Reinforcement Battalion would soon join the throng. Allens column had arrived that
morning and halted to the north of the town. Rather than a well-ordered
beachhead, however, Allen found a crowded and increasingly confused
tangle of men. According to Brigadier Savige, it was apparent that the
3DRL 6643, 3/37; Entry for 27 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 177; Long,
477
Figure 16.2:Australian troops resting under the trees in the Kalamata area, 26 April 1941.
Embarkation Staff had little opportunity to work out requirements for the
embarkation of troops.40 Allen sought out Brigadier Parrington, in command of the embarkation area, to prioritize his fighting units (as the most
valuable and important troops to be saved) for that evenings evacuations.
Parrington accepted the argument and divided the collected mass into four
groups: Allen Force; troops northeast of Kalamata; those recently arrived
by train; and a fourth group of troops not elsewhere included placed under
the command of his camp commandant. All men at Kalamata, after being
allocated into groups, were on command to march to a designated beach
or quay to await their allotted ship. Despite this hasty planning, Parrington
and the Australian brigadiers were concerned about morale and discipline
in the largely officerless mass. Allen ordered active measures to stop any
man not under his command from embarking on his ships and impressed
upon his subordinates the importance of soldierly bearing at this
key juncture.41
40Resum of events covering movement of 17 Aust Inf Bde from the night 24/25 April
41, S. Savige, 11 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6850, 113.
534/2/32.
478
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In the afternoon the Australian brigades, less their drivers who remained
in place north of Kalamata, began moving to the beach. Allen gave his
orders at 4.00 p.m. and posted guards at his allocated wharf, still not certain
that ships would even appear that night. As darkness fell confused instructions and rumours circulated. Even movement in the surrounding orchards
and olive groves, cut by small canals, en route to the beach was difficult.
What followed was best described as an ad hoc and disorganised sequence
of events. Brigadier Savige, conscious of the shortness of available time
after dusk, deliberately pressed all his units forward regardless of previous
orders. During this push to the beach rear echelon units became hopelessly mixed and there was no attempt made to sort them out, rather every
pressure was exercised to push troops towards the wharf to embark. Thus
a constant if disorganised stream of troops was maintained. Despite the
manner of their arrival, once the Australian brigades reached the shoreline
discipline was tight. One observer described a great packed rectangle of
thousands of men, twenty men deep and 200 yards long, who stood very
still, not talking, not smoking; there was an occasional cough, and over the
top of the block there played a continual little motion as men raised themselves on their heels to look to the front.42 In the muddle, however, Allens
plan to send runners at an appropriate time to tell the Australian drivers
to destroy their vehicles and report to the beach was forgotten and they
continued to wait patiently for instructions to embark that would never
come.43
At 10.00 p.m. Allens men saw a light out to sea approaching the shore.
The relief was palpable. More orders were given and lines of waiting men
shuffled forward. Meanwhile, the shapes of destroyers became visible by
the wharf. These vessels, Defender, Hero and Hereward began ferrying men
to the transports Dilwarra, City of London, and Costa Rica. At one stage
resentment over the preferential treatment that had been accorded the
Australian battalions broke through when a number of Auxiliary Military
Pioneer Corps soldiers tried to force their way onto a destroyer allocated
to Allens force, only to be beaten back by the rifle butts of the 2/2nd Australian Battalion. At 2.45 a.m. Allen was told that no more destroyers would
3DRL 2529 [12]; Chronology of Operations, 16 Aust Inf Bde Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2; H.D.
Pridham-Whipple, Evacuation from Greece 24-29 April, 1941, 5 May 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643,
3/37; statement by Captain J.J. Hindmarsh, 2/1st Australian Machine Gun Battalion, AWM
54, 781/3/1.
479
be arriving that night but that they would return the next evening. He knew
that four Australian battalions had embarkedthe last by a narrow margin
as a consequence of being caught behind a block of Parringtons base troops
crowding to the wharf. In addition to the drivers, however, a detachment
of the 2/1st Field Regiment, some Yugoslav anti-aircraft gunners, and a small
numbers of others from Allen Group had also been left behind. Allen left
two staff officers behind on the beach to collect and embark these troops
the following night.44 Both he and Savige boarded the last destroyer. Just
as it swung away from the quay the officer in charge of Saviges headquarters staff called from the pier that the rising gangplank had cut them off
too late. Around 8600 were evacuated from Kalamata that nightthe
largest number taken off a single beach in one evening. Considerably more
than that number, however, including more than 5000 Yugoslavs and pioneers, remained behind.45
During the night of 26 April, as W Force troops were embarked en masse
from the Athens and Peloponnese beaches, a fourth much smaller but
nonetheless significant evacuation was unfolding at Miloi. Freyberg had
been called to W Force headquarters earlier that morning and told by Wilson: Bernard, I hand over Greece to you.46 Wilsons departure that night
left Freyberg as the only W Force general left in Greece. When darkness
fell, Wilson, senior officers and key dignitaries such as Prince Peter of
Greece, Konstantinos Maniadakis, Vice Admiral Sakellariou, Major General Heywood (and members of his Military Mission) moved themselves
to the quay at Miloi and awaited a seaplane to fly them to Suda Bay. By their
own choice, however, and despite an invitation from Wilson to move with
him to Crete, Rear Admiral Baillie-Grohman and Brigadier Galloway chose
instead to board a destroyer bound for Monemvasia to watch over final
embarkations in that area. After boarding, tensions mounted in Wilsons
44This number included nineteen of Allen Forces officers and 361 soldiers. Of this
group fifty were killed or wounded over the next two days by German air attack. Report
of activities in Greece Apr 41 by Lt. Col. R.R. Vial, 12 January 1945, AWM 54, 534/2/32;
DRL 2529 [12]; S. Savige, Resum of events covering movement of 17 Aust Inf Bde from the
night 24/25 April 41, 11 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6850, 113; diary of Sergeant D. Reid, 2/8 Australian Infantry Battalion, AWM 54, 253/4/3; Material copied for use in the compilation of
New Zealand War History, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3650]; Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde., 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL 4142, 2/9 [6-14]; Greece 1941:
Diary of 81. Adv. Base Sub Area with Addenda, Brigadier L. Parrington, IWM, 76/118/2.
46Detailed comment upon draft of Mr. Buckleys popular history of the Greek Campaign, B. Freyberg, AWM 67, 5/17.
480
chapter sixteen
flying boat as the pilot was not authorised to land in Crete before 6.30 a.m.
the next day, but had insufficient fuel to stay in the air throughout the night.
Instead, the seaplane taxied down the coast to avoid the advancing Germans. The wind came up and the seas grew choppy but eventually the
aircraft and its 55 passengers made it safely to Crete.47
The period 25-26 April marked a significant deterioration in the control
and coherence of W Force in Greece. Perhaps as a consequence of the
overall outcome of the evacuations, the degree of this confusion, and the
danger it represented, has often been overlooked in existing accounts of
the Greek campaign. Too often the optimistic post-campaign or post-war
accounts of this key 48 hours by senior W Force participants, with reputations on the line, have been accepted at face value. Brigadier Charringtons
reflections on this desperate period in Attica after the evacuation of the
Thermopylae Line, that our retirements have always been coordinated and
we have, I think, inflicted really heavy casualties on the troops advancing
against us, were an apt case in point.48 On the contrary, confusion and
chaos were increasingly dominant W Force characteristics. The need to
improvise evacuation plans meant last-minute changes were relayed successfully to some units on the move, and not at all to others. Complex
switches of units between formations caused uncertainty in orders and
added to the burden of liaison. Congestion grew ever more serious. Closer
to the mark an Australian report admitted that control, in fact, was becoming well-nigh impossible.49 The 2/5th Australian Battalion claimed that it
was almost impossible to obtain reliable information as the whereabouts
of other units of other headquarters.50 For his part Rear Admiral BaillieGrohman later acknowledged that the situation in Greece deteriorated far
more rapidly than had been anticipated.51 Indeed, the precise situation at
the front, including locations of units, was to a very real degree unknown
47H.T. Baillie-Grohman, report on the evacuation of British forces from Greece, 15 May
1941, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet catalogued); Situation
Report, W Force to GHQ Middle East, 16 April 1941, TNA WO 106/3124; UK War Narratives
The campaign in Greece, ANZ W3799/4; British Narrative, The Campaign in Greece,
April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials,
Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 248; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 426-7; Wilson, Eight Years
Overseas, pp. 98-9.
48Letter, Charrington to Cynth, 29 April 1941, LHCMA, Charrington 4/75a.
March-April, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7.
50Report on 2/5 Aust Inf Bn action in Greece from 12 Apr 27 Apr 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/35 [2].
51Flashlights on the past, H.T. Baillie-Grohman, 1976, NMM, GRO/33.
481
to Wilsons headquarters at this time. In this regard the radio Baillie-Grohman brought with him to Greece, against orders, was crucial in avoiding a
very possible fiasco.52 W Forces command and control problems in this
period were compounded by the closing of Wilsons headquarters and his
evacuation to Egypt on the night of 26-27 April. This decision caused the
same sort of problems as the choice to close Anzac Corps headquarters
three nights earlier.53
Importantly for British and Dominion forces, continuing German logistic and movement difficulties still prevented List from capitalising on W
Forces difficulties. Lists headquarters fielded direct complaints from formations competing with each other for priority use of the restricted road
system. The pursuit from the Thermopylae Line was conducted, by necessity thanks to such congestion, on a logistic shoestring. Field kitchens and
first-line divisional transport, for example, had not been with leading elements of the 6th Mountain Division since before the German invasion had
begun. Schrners vanguard units, including those that pressed on past the
Thermopylae Line into Attica, were forced to live off the land and captured
W Force supplies.54 Quartermasters within the 5th Armoured Division
reported that forward units were relying completely on captured fuel supplies and rations, while their counterparts in Lists headquarters noted
vehicles within the 12th Army had all but come to a standstill by 27 April
because of a lack of spare tyres. Even had stocks been available, however,
they could not have been brought forward. Thanks to continuing traffic
jams, by this stage of the campaign it was taking a single German four days
to travel the 270 kilometres between Salonika and Larissa.55
The most significant German attempt to disrupt planned British and
Dominion evacuations, the bulk of which had now been transferred to the
Peloponnese, was the parachute attack on the Corinth Canal. Had this
52Ibid.
53Report on the evacuation of British forces from Greece, Vice-Admiral H.T. BaillieGrohman, 15 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet catalogued); Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 268-9.
54Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete), AWM 54, 534/2/27; Relevant
extracts from daily QMG reports from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete), AWM 67, 5/17.
55Relevant extracts from daily QMG reports from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece & Crete),
AWM 67, 5/17. Entries for 21.00 and 21.30 26 April 1941, 5. Panzer-Division, Ib, Kriegstagebuch
Nr. 5 u. 6. 1.1.1941-17.6.1941., BA MA RH 27-5/121, p. 179; entries for 26 and 27 April 1941, signature [Frhr v. Hanstein?], Kriegstagebuch Sdost der Oberquartiermeister-Abteilung
Armeeoberkommando 12, BA MA RH 20-12/286, pp. 53-4; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941,
p. 378.
482
chapter sixteen
operation been executed a few days earlier then the consequences for
W Force would have been dire. Trapped in Attica and denied the use of
southern Peloponnese beaches, Wilsons evacuation plans would have been
shattered. As it was the airborne attack sent shockwaves across the Mediterranean theatre. Wavell sent a message out across his command that:
Hitherto most of us have expected our anti-parachutist detachments would
be able to shoot up parachutists at leisure as they dropped from height, but
the German technique at Corinth did not make this possible.56 W Forces
defence of the key Corinth Bridge area was ineffectual. Taken by surprise,
the thin line of defenders was almost immediately and completely overwhelmed. Thus, [l]osses of the parachutists were inconsiderable, noted
List, as their attack ... took the British completely by surprise.57 Yet this
situation should never have eventuated. Wilson was warned by his own
staff (and Papagos) in late March 1941 of the risk of German parachute attack on bridges. Furthermore, on 8 April, 48 hours after the German attack
on Greece began, W Force Headquarters issued an instruction titled: Threat
from Parachute Troops and Recognition of Friendly Troops, which described
the known concentration of German airborne troops in Bulgaria, and cited
the example of their use in Holland.58 Only the day before the German
airborne attack on Corinth Wilsons headquarters issued another instruction warning of more precise indications of an operational air-landing.59
From 18 April, it revealed, some 250 Ju52 aircraft were freed from routine
transport duties and were being concentrated around Plovdiv. They were
being provided with the full complement of air-landing conductors and
were all being equipped for a type of operation, which is almost certainly
connected with glider-towing.60 Furthermore, on 24 April British intelligence knew that the in-principle decision for an airborne attack had been
approved by Gring. W Force accurately predicted a short-range operation
with a clue for a further objective lying in the decision not to bomb the
Corinth Canal.61 That Isthmus Force was still surprised is astonishing and
speaks wonders for the degree of British and Dominion confusion and
56Minute, GHQ Middle East (internal), 2 May 1941, AWM 3DRL 6850, 110.
57Final fighting on the Peloponnese, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List
and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2.
58Threat from parachute troops and methods of recognition of friendly troops, 8 April
1941, TNA WO 201/19.
59Air Landing Operations in the South East, 25 April 1941, TNA HW 13/1.
60Ibid.
61Ibid.
483
disorder. The only question left to be answered was could W Force finish
the evacuation it had begun?62
62Headquarters BTE War Diary, 8 April 1941, TNA WO 169/994B; Probable German
tactics in Greece, 25 March 1941, TNA WO 201/19; Force Operation Instruction No. 16, 25
April 1941, TNA WO 201/53; Report of conversation between General Papagos and Mr. Watt,
24 March 1941, TNA WO 201/51; Force Operation Instruction No. 16, 25 April 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/26 [Part 3]; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 104.
484
chapter sixteen
the final evacuations (27-28 april)
485
Chapter Seventeen
The Final Evacuations (27-28 April)

The German pursuit of British and Dominion troops southwards on Sunday,
27 April, placed considerable pressure on the final phase of W Forces scheduled departure from Greece. A little after 8.00 a.m. leading German units
at last entered Athens. It had not been what might be called a co-operative
effort between the units involved in this thrust. Rather, reconnaissance
detachments from both the 5th Armoured and 6th Mountain Divisions
both raced southwards only to be held up by the demolition of a bridge
south of Malakasa. At this point the motor-cycle platoon of the 47th Antitank Battalion (6th Mountain Division) broke ahead and entered the city,
leaving the armoured cars of the 8th Reconnaissance Battalion (5th Armoured Division) to finish repairs on the bridge. At 8.20 a.m., ten minutes
after these motorcyclists had arrived, a patrol of the 8/800th Special Unit
led the 2nd Motorcycle Battalion (2nd Armoured Division) into Athens.
The new arrivals took the shortest route to the Acropolis and at 8.45 a.m.
hoisted a German flag carried specially for the occasion. The officers from
these two 18th Corps detachments then sent a combined telegram directly to Hitler informing him of their entry into the city. This very unusual
action was deeply resented by the commander of the 5th Armoured Division, Lieutenant General Fehn, whose reconnaissance unit, left behind at
Malakasa, was the one that had been originally ordered to take the city by
Stumme. Fehn complained that his formation was thus robbed of the
prestige of capturing the capital. The two 18th Corps officers who had reported to Hitler, according to Fehn, must have sneaked up to the Acropolis and hoisted the flag while the commander of 8 Recce Unit was receiving
the surrender of the city.1 Fehns reconnaissance unit, however, only reached
Athens at 9.00 a.m. to accept the surrender of Athens from the Mayor
(Amvrosios Plytas), the Head of Athens Garrison (Major General Christos
Kavrakos), and the citys Prefect (Vice Admiral Konstantinos Petzopoulos).
In their unauthorised entry into the capital the 18th Corps troops, according to Fehn, acted in an unseemly and unsoldierlike manner, at their own
1Appx to 40 Corps War Diary, Apr 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/27. The arrival of German
forces in Athens is well-summarized in Mazower, Inside Hitlers Greece, pp. 4-8.
486
chapter seventeen
initiative and without orders, or else were instructed or incited by their

commanders to get there first for the sake of prestige.2 Either option, noted Fehn with rancour, was contrary to military decency and quite
inexcusable.3 Such inter-formation squabbling at this stage speaks volumes
for the state of the campaign. That the German commanders were more
interested in prestige than they were in W Force is an accurate reflection
on what little was left of Allied resistance in Greece. In any case, the Germans took possession, within the city, of a huge quantity of military supplies
that materially assisted their continuing advance south into the Peloponnese.4
For their part Athenians had been expecting a German entry into their
city for several days and on 27 April generally confined themselves to their
homes with their windows shut. The previous night Athens Radio had made
the following announcement:
Greeks, stand firm, proud, and dignified. You must prove yourselves worthy
of your history. The valour and victory of our army has already been recognised. The righteousness of our cause will also be recognised. We did our
duty honestly. Greece will live again and will be great, because she fought
honestly for a just cause and for freedom. Brothers! Have courage and
patience.5
In the days that followed the people of Athens, and newspapers around
the world, told differing stories about the citys fall. According to the most
popular account, the Evzone soldier on guard duty at the Acropolis,
2Appx to 40 Corps War Diary, Apr 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/27.
3Ibid.
4Such stocks included 2500 cubic metres of petrol, 7000 of diesel and 1500 of aviation
fuel, thousands of rifles with tons of ammunition, and 20 trucks preloaded with sugar and
rations and various other military and medical supplies. This did not include the as yet
uncounted but substantial stores at Piraeus. Frhr v. Hanstein, Flug nach Athen am 28.4.1941.,
BA MA RH 20-12/290, p. 1 . Entry for 27 April 1941, KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der 6.GEB.DIV.
BA MA RH 28-6/8; Fehn, 5. Panzer Division, Abt. Ia, to Generalkommando XXXX.A.K., 16
May 1941, Bezug: Fernmndl. Anforderung des Athen-Berichtes durch I a XXXX.A.K., BA
MA RH 24-40/17, pp. 1-3; Abt. Ia, Kradschtzen-Bataillon 2, Gefechtsbericht ber den Vorstoss des Kradschtzen-Bataillon 2 ber die Insel Euba, Chalkis auf Athen, die Besetzung
Athens und den Kampf bei Porto Raphti., BA MA RH 20-12/105, p. 3; signature, PanzerAufklrungs-Abteilung 8, Bericht der Panzer-Aufklrungs-Abteilung 8 ber ihren Einsatz
im Balkanfeldzug, BA MA RH 20-12/105, p. 8; Fighting in central and southern Greece,
1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 107; An Abridged History of the GreekItalian and Greek-German War, pp. 237-38; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 396, 399.
5M. Fafalios, and C. Hadjipateras, Greece 1940-41: Eyewitnessed, Efstathiadis Group,
Athens, 1995, pp. 248-9.
487
Konstantinos Koukidis, took down the Greek flag, wrapped himself in it,
and jumped off the monument as the Germans approached. Whether the
story was true or not, many Greeks believed it and Koukidis gained his
martyrdom.6
Meanwhile, by the morning of 27 April the naval component of Operation Demon was stretched to the limit. Suda Bay in Crete was packed with
ships and troops and could take no more. Pridham-Wippell knew that all
available transports were full and that any further evacuations would have
to be carried out by his warships. He thus ordered the laden Glengyle, Salween, Khedive Ismail, Dilwarra, City of London and Costa Rica to Alexandria,
escorted by a group of two cruisers and five destroyers, with another naval
detachment guarding their passage from the northwest. Soon after daybreak, however, air raids began on the convoy which had departed in the
early hours from Kalamata. On hearing the air raid sirens men poured out
on deck to defend the ships. On City of London, for example, 84 machine
guns of various types were mounted and manned. Up until 2.30 p.m. the
Luftwaffe lost seven aircraft attacking this convoy without success. At that
moment, however, a German plane glided out of the sun and a few seconds
after pulling out of its dive two bombs hit the water two metres from the
port-rear of the Costa Rica, which brought an avalanche of water over the
forecastle, stopping the engines. The ship began taking on water. At 3.00
p.m. all troops were ordered to fall in on deck for an evacuation. The operation was delayed at this point by some crew members shouting every
man for himself, which prompted around 20 to jump overboard only to
have to be picked back up. The destroyers Hero, Defender and Hereward
then came forward to tranship the passengersa dangerous proposition
with the Costa Rica listing badly and rising and falling some six metres in
the swell. Nonetheless, after 45 minutes of men swinging down the side of
the transport on ropes, and jumping for the destroyer decks, the transfer
was complete without any fatalities. By the end the Costa Rica had listed
so much to starboard that the final party to leave stepped off its lower
bridge onto the forecastle of a waiting destroyer. The overladen rescue ships
dashed for Crete.7
6R.H. Bailey, Partisans and Guerrillas (World War II), Time Life UK, London, 1979,
p. 53; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 248.
7P.J. Hurst, My Army Days, 2/7 Battalion, AWM MSS1656; C.W. Gray, 2/7 Battalion in
Crete, AWM 54, 534/2/23; S. Savige, Resume of events covering movement of 17 Aust Inf
Bde from the night 24/25 April 41, 11 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6850, 113; diary of Major H.C.D.
Marshall, 2/7 Battalion, AWM 54, 255/4/12; H.D. Pridham-Whipple, Evacuation from Greece
488
chapter seventeen
Figure 17.1:W Force troops being taken ashore at Suda Bay, Crete, in a small coastal
steamer after being evacuated from southern Greece on 27 April 1941. (Source: Australian
War Memorial: P01345.009)
Back at the Athens beaches the remaining W Force units north of the
Corinth Canal spent the morning of 27 April anticipating both their impending evacuation and the arrival of their German pursuers. For the 4th
NZ Brigade near Porto Rafti the prospect of defending the beachhead from
German forces swinging southeast from Thebes was an immediate and
pressing concern for Brigadier Puttick. W Force movement control had
identified his evacuation site with no tactical considerations. Defences thus
had to be prepared in open daylight and, given that there had been no
contact with any remnants from the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade left at
Rafina around 16 kilometres to the north, these would be reliant upon Putticks own resources. Discarding any policy of concealment, from 9.00 a.m.
the New Zealanders began the immediate construction and occupation of
a defensive perimeter 450 metres east of the village of Markopoulon on the
Athens-Porto Rafti Road. The work was spotted, however, at 11.00 a.m. by a
force of more than 20 German aircraft, and aggressively bombed and strafed.
24-29 April, 1941, 5 May 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643, 3/37; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, pp. 1745; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 101; Smith, Historical Study: The German
Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring 1941), p. 111.
489
Unfortunately for the New Zealanders, this fire detonated a shell in an

artillery ammunition store that initiated a chain reaction of explosions.
Soon both vehicles and the nearby pine wood countryside were ablaze.
Nine guns were lost in the maelstrom and a platoon of infantrymen were
killed or wounded. Meanwhile squadrons of German aircraft continued to
pour fire into the burning fields and forest. The 4th NZ Brigade defensive
position had largely been completed by the early afternoonand just
in time.8
The German 2nd Motorcycle Battalion left Athens at 3.00 p.m. bound
for Lavrion to try and regain contact with fleeing British and Dominion
troops. As it departed it received a report that the enemy was between
Markopoulos and Porto Rafti racing for the coast. A company from the
battalion, accompanied by light tanks, was thus detached and ordered to
investigate while the rest of the unit pushed further south. An hour later,
just east of Markopoulos, this German company column came under heavy
New Zealand artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire. No heavy weapons or
artillery were available to the small German column, which subsequently
requested Stuka air support for an attack. The dive-bombers, however, could
not be arranged before nightfall. Brigadier Putticks men, unaware that it
was only a company-sized group that had approached, made hasty contingency plans in case their line was attacked and broken by German tanks.
No such attack eventuated. The Germans remained in the area near Markopoulos village throughout the afternoon and evening, preparing to attack
at dawn. The planned German assault, however, would never be launched.
At 6.00 p.m. Putticks brigade began destroying its remaining vehicles and
at 8.45 p.m. the guns at Porto Rafti were disabled. At 9.00 p.m. the forward
4th NZ Brigade defensive positions were withdrawn and the New Zealanders were met at the beach by small boats, including destroyer whaleboats
and fishing vessels, which began ferrying runs to the waiting cruiser Ajax
and the destroyers Kingston and Kimberley. Around 3800 men of the brigade
were taken off Porto Rafti beach during the night and landed in Crete
next day.9
8Report on operations in Greece, 4 Inf. Bde., 30 April 1941, ANZ ACGR 8476,
PUTTICK4/2/4; 4 NZ Inf. Bde. Gp. Preliminary Report of Operations, E. Puttick, 30 April
1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/146; diary of Brigadier E. Puttick (24 March 3 August 1941),
ANZ ACGR 8479, PUTTICK7/1/1; UK War Narratives The campaign in Greece, ANZ
[Microfilm 3618]; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 438-9.
94 NZ Inf. Bde. Gp. Preliminary Report of Operations, E. Puttick, 30 April 1941, ANZ
ADQZ 18886, WAII1/146; Report on operations in Greece, 4 Inf. Bde., 30 April 1941,
490
chapter seventeen
To the north of the 4th NZ Brigade, the remainder of the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade group that had been left behind the previous night spent
a harrowing day in a concealed position next to the beach, well aware the
Germans had taken Athens and were likely to be heading their way. In the
morning German aircraft attacked and destroyed collections of Allied vehicles on the hills north of Rafina and in the village itself, but Brigadier
Charringtons 800 men remained undetected. One of his officers, who spoke
classical Greek, took command of a fishing boat in the harbour which might
come in handy should the navy fail to arrive that night to evacuate the
forceand Charrington expected no ships. A detachment of around 250
men was therefore left with this fishing boat and at 5.00 p.m. Charrington
and the remainder set off for Porto Rafti, where ships were known to be
due. Not long after it set out Charringtons column was subjected to air
attack and he began to worry that the German presence between Rafina
and Porto Rafti might be too strong to risk. In the interim Charrington had
also been intercepted by a liaison officer from the 4th NZ Brigade who assured him a vessel was indeed headed for Rafina. After marching around
five kilometres Charrington therefore decided to turn the column around
and returned to his start point. Meanwhile, the plan to make use of the
fishing boat had been set back by its pro-German owner who had disabled
the engine. Sail power looked to be the only option and this boat, loaded
to the gunnels, was preparing to pull away from the beach at 1.15 a.m. when
the ghostly shape of the destroyer Havock appeared off shore. The Havock,
after having been told of men waiting at Porto Rafti by evacuees from Rafina, had steamed at best speed to pick them up. By 4.00 a.m. all 800 of
Charringtons much-relieved force were onboard and bound for Crete. Charrington later reflected: I think almost the best moment of my life ... [was]
when I stood on the bridge of the Havock.10 Leading German patrols were
five kilometres from Rafina when the Havock departed.11
ANZ ACGR 8476, PUTTICK4/2/4; diary of Brigadier E. Puttick (24 March 3 August 1941),
ANZ ACGR 8479, PUTTICK7/1/1; Extracts from report of 2 MC Bn ( 2 Pz Div), AWM 54,
534/2/27; J.A.D. Ritchie, Account of escape from Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/111.
4 NZ Inf Bde Group The engagement at Servia, 9/18 April 41, 30 April 1941, AWM 3DRL
6643 1/44; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 176; McClymont, To Greece, p. 441.
Royal Corps of Signals, TNA WO 244/102; Letter, Boileau to anon., 6 May 1941, IWM, Papers
of Major R.R.C. Boileau, 1 Rangers, 77/149/1; History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; McClymont, To Greece,
491
As the last elements of W Force north of Corinth slipped away from

Greece during the night of 27 April, an advance guard of the 5th Armoured
Division, reinforced by two companies of parachutists, had bypassed them
and pushed into the Peloponnese with orders to engage the scattered British units there, and to prevent their embarking at Kalamata or other small
ports.12 Meanwhile, to the west, by 11.00 a.m. the 3rd Battalion (Adolf Hitler
Regiment), had assembled in trains and steamed westwards towards
Corinth as previously directed. Once there, and clearly no longer required
for any assault on the canal, the battalion collected its reconnaissance unit
(which was already in the town) and entrained back to Patras. The battalion was now instructed to advance down the west coast of the Peloponnese towards Pirgos, to envelop any retreating W Force elements from
west.13
The remaining W Force rearguard in the Peloponnese, the 6th NZ Brigade, spent 27 April in the Tripolis area with its attention split between
ongoing German aerial harassment, a potential German ground approach
from the north and new orders to move with Freybergs headquarters 200
kilometres south to an embarkation area at Monemvasia that night. Barrowclough began thinning his units out in daylight under heavy air attack
during the late afternoon. Nonetheless, the move was a success and at daybreak the next morning the brigade lay concealed within the defensive line
at Monemvasia. Brigadier Lee had already positioned his disparate forces
in this vicinity, and the road approaching it had been set with demolitions
sourced from depth charges taken from a Greek destroyer that had run
aground in the harbour. The stay-behind party from W Force Headquarters,
including Baillie-Grohman and Colonel J.S. Blunt (the military attach in
Athens) was also in position in Monemvasia, and had collected local Greek
fishing boats in case they were required. The Greek residents of Monemvasia were encouraged to flee into the hills to give the Germans the impression of a deserted village.14
12Fighting in central and southern Greece, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal
13Entries for 27-29 April 1941, Reichsfhrer SS Fhrungshauptamt, Einsatz der verst.
L. SS. A. H. im Sdostfeldzug 1941., BA MA RH 20-12/466, p. 10; Appx to 40 Corps War Diary,
Apr 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/27; Miscellaneous messages dealing with the campaign in southern Greece, AWM 54, 534/2/27; Extracts from War Diary of III BN SS AH in Greece,
AWM 54, 543/2/27; Lehmann, Die Leibstandarte Band I, pp. 422-5.
14Baillie-Grohman later complained some British headquarters officers arrived at
Monemvasia with golf clubs, tennis racquets and large suitcases. Letter, Baillie-Grohman
to anon., 13 November 1959, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet
492
chapter seventeen
At the same time, at the Argos beaches of Navplion and Tolos, there were
still around 2000 troopswith their numbers growing all the time as stragglers arrived. By this stage many were without food. Most spent the day
being machine gunned and bombed by circling German aircraft. A desperate rearguard of the only organised fighting troops in the vicinity was formed
around the Australian Reinforcement Battalion and a detachment of 200
men from 3 RTR sent north from Tripolis. Royal Navy destroyers were expected that night but none arrived. At 3.00 a.m. the collected troops, formed
up for their embarkations, dispersed once again for another days hiding.
Two W Force officers, equipped with 150,000 drachmae (around 250), were
sent at dawn along the coast in search of small boats that might be used
the following night if the navy again failed to show. Although more than a
dozen boats were found, with the Germans so close none of their owners
would sell at any price.15
At Kalamata on 27 April, after the withdrawal of the Australian brigades
the previous night, but where some 8000 troops still waited evacuation,
the situation was unravelling. Around three-quarters of the men remaining
in the area were unarmed and largely leaderless base troops, Palestinian
and Cypriot labourers, and Yugoslavs. The only organised fighting forces
now present were the New Zealand Reinforcement Battalion (800 men), a
group of almost 400 Australians (from the 2/1st Field Regiment and the 17th
Australian Brigade), and around 300 troops from two 4th Hussar squadrons
that arrived from the vicinity of Corinth at around 6.00 p.m. (in trucks as
all their tanks had been lost). Major C.M.L. Clements, in charge of one of
these 4th Hussars squadrons, described his subsequent search for Brigadier
Parrington amidst shouts of Lie Down, hide yourself or you will attract
the bombers from the crowds ofI will not call them soldiers but soldier
refugees, mostly base troops, services, working parties, etc.16 On locating
Parrington, Clements told him that Germans had landed at Patras and were
headed south. Clements then asked what part his squadron was to play in
defence of the port and was sent to the north of the port to take control of
the two-squadron Hussar detachment. His small force was to cover the
road and provide any early warning of a German approach to Kalamata.
catalogued); Correspondence, narrative and draft notes (various) concerning the activities
of the 26th (NZ) Battalion in Greece, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/172; War Diary of HQ 6 NZ
Inf. Bde., 18886, WAII1/1658; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 177.
The Campaign in Greece, April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 188999, WAII2 [Microfilm 3618]; Long,
Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 178; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 97.
16Memoir Campaign Greece 1941, IWM, Papers of Lieutenant Colonel C.M.L.
Clements, 98/21/1.
493
This loose but large collection of men at Kalamata was strafed and
bombed throughout the day and was approaching the limit of its cohesive
endurance. By nightfall Brigadier Parrington, out of radio contact with any
W Force elements outside of Kalamata, found himself in an acute situation
which he euphemistically described as a very high test of discipline.17
Troops at Kalamata were disheartened, exhausted and had more than an
inkling that something had gone terribly wrong. In such circumstances,
noted Parrington, they do not respond very readily to orders.18 Men grew
paranoid about vehicle lights at night, for example, without rational cause
given the Luftwaffes reluctance to operate in the darkness. Parringtons
own car had its side lights smashed by rifle butts as he drove past clusters
of his own men. At this point Parrington made a perplexing decision. He
knew full well that no ships were scheduled to arrive at Kalamata that night.
He had been told this by the destroyer crews the previous evening and had
had it confirmed by his naval embarkation officer. Yet in the early evening
of 27 April Parrington nonetheless ordered a mustering of troops for an
embarkation. Men formed up, marched to the quay, and began waiting here
and on the beach for ships that would never arrive. At 1.00 a.m., when it
was obvious that none would be evacuated that night, the order was passed
to disperse once again and wait for a chance the next evening. Why Parrington chose this course of action remains a mystery. Perhaps he did it,
according to Lieutenant Colonel A.G.M. Jolliffe (the Principal Military Embarkation Officer at Kalamata), to get in practice for next night. Alternatively, he might have considered it a way to occupy the troops and maintain
discipline. Parrington might even have held out hope that the navy would
turn up anyway. As it was, this tragic parade that must have had a devastating effect on already brittle morale. Some units kept cohesion and returned
to their waiting areas. Others broke up from this point, seeking cover and
escape as best they could. All faced the prospect of another day of air attack,
the inevitability of approaching German columns, and a desperate but
fading hope that they might be rescued the next night.19
The morning of 28 April initiated the final stage of W Forces evacuation
from Greece and of the Greek campaign as a whole. The next 24 hours
IWM, 76/118/2.
18Ibid.
19Report on attachment to Brig Allen, AWM 3DRL 6850, 108; letter, Jolliffe to BaillieGrohman, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet catalogued);
McClymont, To Greece, p. 444; Heckstall-Smith and Baillie-Grohman, Greek Tragedy, p. 198.
494
chapter seventeen
represented the climax of the race between British and Dominion efforts
to escape and German attempts to prevent them.20 The continuing German
thrust into the Peloponnese was still on two axes. The 3rd Battalion (Adolf
Hitler Regiment), proceeded down the west coast by rail towards Pirgos,
which it reached late in the day. This group, however, was moving too slowly and had too much ground to cover to threaten the remaining W Force
enclaves. The real threat came from the vanguard of the 5th Armoured
Division rushing south from Corinth. By lunchtime a detachment had
speared off to the east towards Miloi and Navplion. Meanwhile, by 6.00
p.m. significant elements from this division had made it past Tripolis but
failed to turn down the side road along which the 6th NZ Brigade had
withdrawn to Monemvasia. The fact that the Germans missed this turn
off was the only thing that gave Brigadier Barrowcloughs men any chance
to embark undisturbed that night. At the same time, however, it encouraged
a rapid thrust in the direction of Kalamata.21
Meanwhile, remaining W Force troops in the vicinity of Navplion and
Tolos had guessed correctly that German ground forces could not be far
away. The Australian half-battalion rearguard dug in for a close defence of
Tolos beach (Navplion having been ordered abandoned), on the forward
slopes of a low ridge just north of the town. During the morning they were
joined by a handful of volunteers from the beach. Late in the morning
Lieutenant Colonel J.H. Courage of the British Pioneer Corps, in charge of
the beach, called a conference. Around 20 officers attended, most from
base units. Courage put forth the situation. Troops in the area were low on
food, short of fighting elements, there was little chance of any ship returning for them, and he no longer had any way to communicate with the navy.
Views were sought. Most voted to disperse and Courage authorised individuals and groups to do so. The small rearguard, however, said it would
stay, fight and hopefully last another night. In the words of an Australian
20Aside from W Force units, during the day the last of the British SOE operatives in
Greece were also forced to evacuate. SOE operations during the campaign had had only
limited success. After operatives had destroyed facilities at Salonika, for example, they were
banned from demolition operations in either Piraeus or Athens. SOE did manage to infiltrate
a number of small parties behind Italian lines in Albania without the knowledge of the
Greek General Staff and also met with some success in distributing anti-Axis propaganda,
especially through Athens radio over which SOE had a large measure of control. When they
departed SOE operatives left behind two radios with codes, 1.5 tons of explosives in Athens
and 3.5 tons in Macedonia, some of which was built into the Cathedral at Kavalla where
the Bishop was an SOE agent. Greece, TNA HS 7/158.
21McClymont, To Greece, p. 448; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 108.
495
officer present, we were left with our own decision and from that time
there were two separate and mutually disapproving groups at Tolos.22
Early in the afternoon this rearguard was engaged by the column of German
trucks and captured carriers detached from the main 5th Armoured Division advance. The lead German vehicles were bunched up and the column
was halted a few hundred metres to the front of the defenders and shot
up by the Australians. More Germans were soon seen, however, deploying
in depth and soon mortar bombs and machine guns began pinning the
defenders. On the right flank of the small rearguard the casualties mounted. After two and a half hours, although no ground had been lost by the
defenders, their numbers and ammunition were dwindling. An Australian
officer raced to the beach to try and get more ammunition but found groups
of W Force men in the area openly hostile, blaming the rearguard for the
incoming fire. The Australian drew a revolver and withdrew without securing any more bullets. After a further 30 minutes the small defending force
was overcome. Confusion reigned at Tolos. By 5.00 p.m. most troops still in
the area had surrendered. Some had managed to escape in stolen boats,
while others trudged south hoping to find some other way out of Greece.23
Spared by the German decision not to take the southeastern fork in the
road to Kalamata during their advance south from Tripolis, and protected
by their successful concealment despite extensive reconnaissance by German aircraft, W Force troops collected at Monemvasia were more fortunate.
After dark, Baillie-Grohman and his staff proceeded to Monemvasia beach
and there met Freyberg at 9.30 p.m. Neither officer had any confirmation
that ships were arriving. Nonetheless, the first of the collected troops in
the area moved down to their point of embarkation, a long, thin stone
causeway connecting the mainland to a rocky island, and began their nervous wait. Freyberg later wrote that the period on the beach at Monemvasia was the most anxious he had faced. By 10.30 p.m. no ships had arrived
so Freyberg despatched a lighter to try and make contact with any nearby
British naval vessels. It met two British destroyers, the Isis and Griffin, on
their way into the port. These ships were joined at 1.00 a.m. by the cruiser
Ajax, and two more destroyers, Havock and Hotspur. The vessels approached
as close as possible, then troop landing craft, fishing boats and sail boats
22Autobiography of Captain D.R. Jackson, 1 Anzac Corps, AWM 68, 3DRL 8052/109.
23Ibid.; Citation for the Award of the Military Cross, Lieutenant M. Derbyshire, 24
March 1942, AWM 54, 781/6/6; The Campaign in Greece, April 6 28, 1941, AWM 54,
534/2/36; letter, D.S Hogarth to G. Long, c.1955, AWM 67, 10/4B; Long, Greece, Crete and
Syria, p. 179; McClymont, To Greece, p. 443.
496
chapter seventeen
ferried the men out to them. The last boatload carried Freyberg, BaillieGrohman, and brigadiers Galloway, Barrowclough and Lee out to Ajax. In
total 4320 men, all of those waiting, were taken off Monemvasia during the
night and arrived on Crete at 8.00 a.m. the next morning.24
The final and most significant challenge for Operation Demon, however,
was always going to be at Kalamata. Here, Parringtons 8,000 largely unorganised troops waited throughout 28 Apriland it was towards this mass
that the central German thrust was aimed. During the morning Parrington
once again arranged his remaining troops, as best he could, into a series of
groups for embarkation that night. Meanwhile, continuing Luftwaffe air
raids, mostly strafing runs by Me109 fighters, saw casualties mounting. Orders for the evacuation were unchanged from the previous night with New
Zealand Reinforcement Battalion troops tasked with defending the northern approach to town while the armed Australians were to be held as a
reserve. From 6.00 p.m. columns were to assemble and begin the move to
the quay, which was to be guarded by an armed 50-man detachment posted to prevent embarkations out of order. The thin 4th Hussars screen to
the north, the last elements scheduled to depart, was ordered to withdraw
at 12.30 a.m. to the quay.25
At 4.00 p.m. Major Clements small force screening Kalamata to the north
reported no Germans within 40 kilometres of the beach. Shortly thereafter,
however, a German column appeared and engaged one of his squadrons
astride the road. A short but savage action broke out. The squadron under
attack mounted an ineffectual defence and the Germans broke through.
Clements second squadron, which ought to have come to their assistance,
24While this operation had been underway at Monemvasia, a smaller scale but equally
successful evacuation had taken place from Kithira Island, off Cape Malea and the southern
tip of the Peloponnese. There the sloop Hyacinth, towing a landing craft, managed to
evacuate around 850 men, 600 of them RAF personnel, from the island to Suda Bay. Flashlights on the past, H.T. Baillie-Grohman, 1976, NMM, GRO/33; The Greek Debacle 1941: the
beginning and end, Private W.J.H. Sutton, KMARL, 1999.1051; Extracts of Letters from Major
Crofton, Headquarters Anzac Corps, AWM 54, 534/2/14; extract from War Diary of HQ
Medium Artillery, 1 Anzac Corps, 6 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/29; H.T. Baillie-Grohman,
report on the evacuation of British forces from Greece, 15 May 1941, IWM, Papers of ViceAdmiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet catalogued); Report, Evacuation from Greece 24-29
April, 1941, H.D. Pridham-Whipple, 5 May 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643, 3/37; History of the 2 NZ
Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139.
Kithira fell to a German motorised infantry regiment on 10 May 1941: von Groddeck, Oberst,
Inf.Rgt. 120 (mot) Abt. Ia, 30 May 1941, Bericht ber die Besetzung der Insel Kythera.,
BA MA RH 26-60/18, pp. 1-10.
25Report on attachment to Brig Allen, AWM 3DRL 6850, 108; entry for 27 April 1941,
Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 178.
497
failed to appear. The remnants of the 4th Hussars detachment disappeared

into the hills, while Clements, asleep when the German attack began, found
himself a prisoner of war. Two hours later, at 6.00 p.m., as the troops at
Kalamata began organising themselves in preparation for moving down
the beach, a reinforced German company, having burst through the 4th
Hussars screen, drove into the town. Meeting no opposition as most of
Parringtons troops were gathered to the east, this company took scattered
prisoners and pressed immediately to the Kalamata harbour where it drew
up near a customs house. There the Germans guarded their prisoners and
began to probe eastwards along the waterfront. As no serious fighting had
yet developed, more Allied soldiers were surprised and captured, including
the naval beach-master, Captain Clark-Hall (with his signaller), whose task
was to have coordinated the planned embarkation. Two German field guns
were set up on the wharf and began to shell Parringtons dispersal areas.
German machine guns and mortars soon added their weight of fire.26
Having taken the Kalamata quay, however, the Germans soon grew nervous about the reality of their situation given the number of nearby Allied
troops and increasing signs of a counter-attack as news of the arrival of
enemy troops spread to thousands assembled in nearby olive groves. At
7.30 p.m. Parrington held a hurried conference and, with British destroyers
said to be in sight offshore, ordered an attack to retake the Kalamata wharf.
From this point furious and desperate fighting broke out around the quay
as the German company traded fire with scattered W Force troops. Small
organised and uncoordinated W Force parties formed to clear the streets
inland and parallel to the waterfront, sometimes led by officers, sometimes
leading themselves. If soldiers within the nearby olive and orange groves
chose to get involved in the fighting they made their way to the quay, while
others not so inclined hid among the excited throng. By now light was fading and confusion reigned. Various disparate W Force groups began to approach the German position from north, while fighting along the waterfront,
one block at a time, continued. Soon the German artillery pieces present
fell silent, along with the machine gunners. As Allied troops began appearing in side streets and laneways next to the German company, it withdrew
for a final stand in buildings at the southern end of waterfront. Finally,
Clements, 98/21/1; report by Captain A.W. Gray, 11 July 1945, AWM 54, 534/2/1; D. Patterson,
Account of the action at Kalamata, Greece, 18 January 1949, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16a.
Letter, A.C. Jervis to McClymont, 4 September 1960, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/116b; Long,
498
chapter seventeen
surrounded and hard pressed with severe casualties and out of ammunition, the surviving Germans surrendered at around 9.30 p.m. They were
disarmed and their weapons thrown into the sea. The German company
group had taken 101 casualties, including 41 killed.27
As the fight for the Kalamata quay was underway, the approaching naval
evacuation force, the cruisers Perth and Phoebe, along with the destroyers
Nubian, Defender, Hero, Hereward, Decoy and Hasty, neared the beach. Hero,
the leading ship, was sent forward by Captain Phillip Bowyer-Smith, in
command of the Perth and charge of the naval convoy, to scout the harbour.
At 8.45 p.m. a lamp signal was made between Hero and the shore. Brigadier
Parrington, aware that the fight for the quay was still in progress, ordered
the message: Enemy hold quayam attacking to clearStand bySend
boat to beach, sent back to Hero, which promptly edged to the shore and
sent one of its lieutenants ashore. Meanwhile, a somewhat truncated message of Boche in harbour was sent from Hero to Perth. Heros officer ashore
subsequently radioed Perth that there were Germans in the town but British troops to the southeast of it. At 9.10 p.m. Perth and the evacuation convoy, 16 kilometres from Kalamata, watched tracer fire and explosions from
the direction of the quay. At 9.30 p.m. Heros lieutenant radioed another
message to Bowyer-Smith aboard Perth that the quay was now back in
British hands, that the beach was ready for embarkation, and that the embarkation could now begin. This message, however, due to radio problems,
was not received on Perth until 10.11p.m. Meanwhile, by 9.30 p.m., at the
same time the all clear message had been sent to Perth, Bowyer-Smith,
acting on the original message that Germans were at the quay and from
what he had seen, had decided to abandon the operation and all ships but
Hero were at that time withdrawing. Even with the eventual receipt of the
10.11 p.m. message to begin the evacuation, Bowyer-Smith, well on his way
south, chose not to change his mind. My disappointment was therefore
27One of the local Allied counter-attacks was led by a New Zealander, Sergeant Jack
Hinton, who was subsequently wounded and captured. While a prisoner of war Hinton
learned he had been awarded a Victoria Cross for the action. D. Patterson, Account of the
action at Kalamata, Greece, 18 January 1949, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16a. Letter, A.C.
Jervis to McClymont, 4 September 1960, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/116b; report by Captain
A.W. Gray, 11 July 1945, AWM 54, 534/2/1; report by Private J.J. Woodward, 6 November 1945,
AWM 54, 534/2/13; letter, Woodhill to Allen, 4 May 1941. AWM 54, 534/6/1; W.J.H. Sutton,
The Greek Debacle 1941: the beginning and end, KMARL, 1999.1051; Greece 1941: Diary of
81. Adv. Base Sub Area with Addenda, Brigadier L. Parrington, IWM, 76/118/2; McClymont,
To Greece, pp. 457-60; Heckstall-Smith and Baillie-Grohman, Greek Tragedy, p. 201; Golla,
Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 412-14.
499
very great, Parrington later wrote, when the destroyer which had taken my
message out to the commander of the squadron returned and signalled
operation postponed.28
At 10.50 p.m. Pridham-Whippell, who had been receiving reports of the
exchanges from Kalamata, instructed Hero to use its discretion and evacuate as many as it could. Hero, now the only Royal Navy vessel at Kalamata,
could not hope to evacuate many of Parringtons force. Fortunately, British
naval authorities in Crete had already ordered destroyers Kandahar, Kingston and Kimberly to reinforce Bowyer-Smiths convoy. These ships arrived
at Kalamata at 1.00 a.m. A shortage of small boats and limited time, however, meant only the wounded and around 332 men of the 8000 waiting
were taken on board. Most of those who fought to retake the waterfront
were left behind. According to Parrington, Heros lieutenant ashore explained that Bowyer-Smiths convoy had departed as it had received orders
for all ships to rejoin the fleet as the Italian Navy was at sea and, if they got
across Kalamata Bay, the squadron would be trapped. There is no evidence,
however, to suggest that this rumour came from anywhere other than the
lieutenants imagination. The fiction perhaps served, in the heat of the
moment, to remove some of the sting of disappointment from those stranded on the beach. The destroyers moved out at 3.00 a.m. signalling Many
Regrets.29
As soon as the last destroyer left Kalamata, Brigadier Parrington assembled all troops and the beach and summoned their officers. There he
informed them that he intended to surrender the force at daybreak and
any who did not wish to lay down their arms ought to be clear of the beach
by dawn. Parrington explained this course of action to his subordinates in
that his German prisoners had truthfully reported that they were part of
an advance guard for the 5th Armoured Division. Parrington assumed,
correctly, that another German column was at that moment advancing
towards Kalamata. In addition, Allied transport at Kalamata had been disabled, there were no rations left, and little ammunition. Parringtons force
was by now also caring for around 250 wounded with no medical supplies.
28Report on attachment to Brig Allen, AWM 3DRL 6850, 108; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 103.
29Report, Evacuation from Greece 24-29 April, 1941, H.D. Pridham-Whipple, 5 May
1941, AWM 3DRL 6643, 3/37; report on the evacuation of British forces from Greece, ViceAdmiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman, 15 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral H.T. BaillieGrohman (not yet catalogued); Greece 1941: Diary of 81. Adv. Base Sub Area with Addenda,
Brigadier L. Parrington, IWM, 76/118/2; McClymont, To Greece, pp. 459-60; Long, Greece,
500
chapter seventeen
Parrington later stated, I considered putting the quay in a state of defence

and endeavouring to hold it with such weapons & Amn we had.30 This,
however, he believed would not have prevented the inevitable capture of
his remaining troops. Such troops, had the attempt been made, would also
inevitably be subject to intensive air action at dawn and there was no way
of stopping German artillery from bombarding the port and its approacheswhich also effectively ruled out any further embarkations. In these
circumstances, noted Parrington, it seemed to me that no useful military
purpose could be served by offering further resistance.31 No attendee at
the conference had any alternative suggestions. Among the German prisoners was an officer who could speak English and who had actually gone to
school with a liaison officer from the 4th Hussars on Parringtons staff. Both
were sent to the nearest German headquarters with the offer of surrender.32
The German reply to Parringtons offer arrived at 6.30 a.m., 29 April,
accepting his capitulation and directing him to meet with Lieutenant General Fehn at the Rex Hotel in Athens at 9.00 a.m. Parrington was received
with courtesy. His men were given medical support but no rations, as the
advancing Germans had outrun their own supply columns. Parrington
spent the next night going over the events of the previous 24 hrs and wondering if there was anything we could have done to prevent this unfortunate
ending.33 Meanwhile, Pridham-Wippell was instructed to continue to
evacuate troops who might be straggling along the coast south of Kalamata. His destroyers picked up around 250 in the next two nights and 700 were
collected from island of Milos. These evacuees reported any chance of
further embarkations after 30 April was slim as Germans were mopping
up in the area. Nonetheless, many small groups, operating on their own
initiative and usually with the support of Greek locals, managed to find
their own way back to Crete in the following three weeks. Around 7500
men went into captivity at Kalamata, close to half of all W Force losses in
the campaign.34
IWM, 76/118/2.
31Ibid.
32Report on attachment to Brig Allen, AWM 3DRL 6850, 108; Account of the action
at Kalamata, Greece, D. Patterson, 18 January 1949, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16a. Letter,
A.C. Jervis to McClymont, 4 September 1960, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/116b; McClymont,
To Greece, pp. 459-60.
IWM, 76/118/2.
34Report by Captain A.W. Gray, 11 July 1945, AWM 54, 534/2/1; H.D. Pridham-Whipple,
Evacuation from Greece 24-29 April, 1941, 5 May 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643, 3/37; statement
501
Brigadier Parrington quickly became the Allied scapegoat for what was
seen in its aftermath as an unnecessary disaster at Kalamatadespite the
fact that a post-war military court of enquiry held on the Kalamata affair
found the disaster to have fallen within the normal parameters of wartime
events and saw no reasons for further investigations. Nonetheless, the first
argument in this regard was that forwarded by Wilsonthat Parrington
precipitated the disaster by neglecting even the most basic military principles. No precautions were taken, wrote Wilson, no road blocks or reconnaissance was mounted away from the beach, and this allowed the German
company into Kalamata in the first place. Freyberg agreed with Wilson.
Parrington, in Freybergs opinion, should have mounted a coordinated a
defence of the beaches as had been the case at Porto Rafti with the 4th NZ
Brigade.35 If they had told me, added Freyberg for good measure, I would
have come and got them away by holding on and marching them to Monemvasia for evacuation.36 Baillie-Grohman joined the post-war chorus damning Parringtons defeatist attitude and incompetence which, in
Baillie-Grohmans opinion, led to his force being completely surprised.37
Brigadier Parrington was a convenient scapegoat for what happened at
Kalamata.38
In the first instance Wilsons charge that Parrington failed to seek early
warning of a German arrival is unfair. He explicitly ordered Clements 4th
Hussars squadrons to screen Kalamata port. That the Hussars failed either
to delay the Germans, or even warn him of their approach after specifically reporting on the eve of their arrival that there were no Germans in
sight, was not Parringtons mistake. Moreover, the numerous accounts blaming Parrington for not mounting a stoic defence where perhaps a more
resolute commander would have welded his men into a fighting force to
hold off the Germans for long enough for new arrangements to be made
for their evacuation were unfounded. Parringtons reasons for surrendering
by Captain J.J. Hindmarsh, 2/1 Australian MG Battalion, AWM 54, 781/3/1; Miscellaneous
messages dealing with the campaign in southern Greece, AWM 54, 534/2/27. German
reports are Artillerie-Regiment 116, Greece, end May 1941, An all alten Kameraden, Freunde
und Gnner des Artillerie-Regiments 116., BA MA RH 41/1162, p. 5; in signature, I.A., Der
Chef des Generalstabes, Fr die Gruppe Stumme, 30 April 1941, Abschlumeldung., BA MA
RH 24-40/17, pp. 1-2.
36Ibid.
37Heckstall-Smith and Baillie-Grohman, Greek Tragedy, p. 207.
38Letter, Playfair to Baillie-Grohman, 1 February 1954, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral
H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet catalogued); Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 99.
502
chapter seventeen
were sound. Continued resistance from the morning of 29 April would have
resulted in nothing more than further loss of life. The example of Brigadier
Putticks fighting evacuation at Porto Rafti is a false analogy. Puttick commanded a coherent, well-armed, well-trained, disciplined fighting formation with considerable artillery and anti-armour support. Parrington led,
by accident, an ad hoc collection of mostly unarmed, un-trained, hungry,
frightened base troops, labourers and Yugoslav refugees led by an inadequate, inappropriate and undersized staff bereft of any standing supply or
command arrangements. Parrington himself had a badly injured leg from
a fall on 15 April, and had difficulty moving about. A week earlier he talked
of how exhausted he was, how much he saw his problems as never ending
and how little sleep or food he had been taking. The fighting potential of
both groups was not equal. The attitude of Parringtons men was well illustrated in the numbers who chose not to fight on or escape, but who
rather marched into captivityin the words of an Australian gunner
under their own free will.39 There is little doubt that Parrington saw himself as custodian of an evacuation rather than as the commander of a
fighting force, but for good reason. It was noteworthy that, despite his postwar claims, when he heard from Pridham-Whippell during the night of 28
April that the evacuation at Kalamata had been cancelled, Wilson said that
he thought that troops there would have no choice but to surrender. Parringtons successful post-war libel action against Baillie-Grohman did not,
however, remove the taint to his reputation.40 Brigadier Savige of the 17th
Australian Brigade was more frank when he asked: Did Parrington have a
dogs chance? I dont think so.41 For Savige, charges of blame for Kalamata
were an account which should never have been debited to him.42
One aspect of the disaster at Kalamata not often explored is the role of
Captain Bowyer-Smith. The fact is, had Bowyer-Smith not decided not to
abandon the evacuation, or even had he chosen to re-mount it after receiv39Report by Gunner A.F. Donald, 2/1 Field Regiment, 13 May 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/6.
IWM, 76/118/2; Parrington v Anthony Blond, Ltd: Statement in Open Court, IWM, Papers
of Vice-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet catalogued); letter, Freyberg to Kippenberger,
16 January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; letter, Baillie-Grohman to Charrington, LHCMA Charrington
4/27; Heckstall-Smith and Baillie-Grohman, Greek Tragedy, pp. 204-05; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 103; Heckstall-Smith and Baillie-Grohman, Greek Tragedy,
p. 205.
DRL 2529 [12].
42Ibid.
503
ing word of a clear beach at 10.10 p.m., a large proportion of Parringtons

stranded men may well have been successfully embarked. It is insufficient
to ascribe any credibility to the rumour propagated by Heros lieutenant
ashore that fear of the Italians swayed Bowyer-Smiths hand. Given the
outcome at the Battle of Matapan the month before, the chance of Italian
interference in Operation Demon was minimal, and accepted by all. Moreover, the Italian fleet was not actually anywhere nearby. If Bowyer-Smith
had come into the port, closed it with his cruisers (as had been done before),
and sent his destroyers alongside, the evacuation could have proceeded.
Instead he remained out to sea and out of contact. There is no evidence of
any orders to Bowyer-Smith to rejoin the fleet. Indeed, Pridham-Whippell
would not have sent three more destroyers to Kalamata if there had been
any real risk. Bowyer-Smith must have realised this. It was true that BowyerSmiths convoy had been shadowed north by the Luftwaffe and certainly
the Germans knew its destination. Enemy submarines had also been reported in the area. But this powerful force, at full speed, was more than
capable of dealing with such threats. In the five hours after Bowyer-Smith
departed many of the troops at Kalamata could have been saved.43
Regardless of the apportionment of blame for the failed evacuation at
Kalamata, for all intents and purposes Brigadier Parringtons surrender
signalled the end of the Greek campaign. Yet even taking account of the
loss of so many at this point, the high mark for W Force in Greece remained
its successful evacuation. The bulk of the British and Dominion troops sent
to Greece were safely removed. This was no means a minor achievement
in the circumstances, and well beyond the hopes and expectations of senior
British officers before Operation Demon commenced. It is very difficult,
however, to provide a precise figure of the number of W Force troops actually evacuated from 24-28 April. Numbers provided in the desperate and
confused nights of the evacuation by beach masters, for example, varied
considerably with those provided by the navy. There is no question about
the 62,611 W Force troops originally shipped to Greece. However, at night,
in haste, Greek troops, Yugoslavs and British and Greek civilians were intermingled with British and Dominion military evacuees, which tended to
inflate the numbers of W Force troops taken off. The situation was exacerbated by the nature of the evacuation itself where, understandably, accurate
record keeping was a secondary priority. The sum of bodies evacuated, for
IWM, 76/118/2; Heckstall-Smith and Baillie-Grohman, Greek Tragedy, p. 208.
504
chapter seventeen
Figure 17.2:A convoy of troops from Greece arriving at Alexandria, Egypt, 28 April 1941.
example, by British naval reports came to 50,672. When added to the 14,700
troops known to be lost in Greece, this gave a total of 65,372more than
had deployed to Greece. Aside from seaborne evacuations, between 23-28
April the RAF also managed to fly around 940 passengers out of Greece to
Crete and Egypt transport aircraft and flying boats.44
In terms of the continuing war in the Mediterranean it was noteworthy,
that for all the surprising success of Operation Demon, Allied troops who
did get away from Greece did so in the main with only the equipment they
happened to be carrying. W Force lost all its artillery (with exception of
44Memo, Summary of evacuation operations by 216 (B.T.) Sqn, 12 May 1941, TNA AIR
23/6136; Memo Sunderland Evacuation Operations, 5 May 1941, TNA AIR 23/6136; memo,
Chronological narrative of evacuation operations, No. 267 Squadron, 1 May 1941, TNA AIR
23/6136; draft manuscript Medical History of the War: Greece (1940-1941), TNA AIR 49/11;
Casualties by Arms Greece and Crete, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/26; Battle casualties by
units Greece & Crete campaigns (Apr May 1941), ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/57; McClymont, To Greece, p. 486; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 181.
505
very few anti-tank pieces), all of its armoured vehicles and transport, virtually all baggage and heavy technical equipment, and a large proportion of
its arms and automatic weapons. In the Anzac Corps alone this included
more than 2100 vans and lorries, more than 180 cars and 72 carriers. Such
material losses, with Rommel applying significant pressure in North Africa,
could ill be afforded by Middle East Command. Neither could the 209 RAF
aircraft lost in Greece (more than half of them damaged or abandoned on
the ground), nor 130 lost aircrew be easily replaced in the Mediterranean
theatre at this stage of the war. Again, however, Wilson and Wavell were
well-pleased with what was saved. The list of losses very well could, and
perhaps from a German perspective should, have been much longer.45
On 30 April Field Marshal List reported to Berlin that: There is now not
an Englishmen left fighting on the Greek mainland.46 There were, however, plenty of former W Force soldiers, individually and in small groups,
bent on escape. By December 1941 a further 1400 had managed to escape
or been evacuated from the Greek mainland.47
In many ways British and Dominion relief as to the success of W Forces
evacuation from Greece went some considerable way to masking the significant difficulties faced in the last 48 hours of the operation. This tendency was compounded by the inevitable propaganda which followed the
campaign. The British press praised the various rearguards who apparently imposed a slow and cautious advance on the Germans in spite of
their massive superiority in numbers. The reality, of course, had been quite
different. The success of the final stage of the evacuations was a close-run
issue, and one open to criticism at the timeeven if such voices of dissent
have subsequently faded. Freyberg, for example, maintained that the plan
March-April, 1941, AWM 54, 534/5/7; Draft Manuscript Medical History of the War: Greece
(1940-1941), TNA AIR 49/11.
5/17.
47Cablegram, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Curtin, 20 December 1941,
AWM 54, 534/1/1; Report on interrogation of escaped soldiers, 21 August 1941, AWM 254, 35;
Report of WO2 T.A.M. Boulter, 19 August 1941, AWM 54, 781/3/2; Draft Manuscript Medical History of the War: Greece (1940-1941), TNA AIR 49/11; Escapes from Greece, a collection
of personal testimonies edited by M.B. McGlynn, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/10/37; Escape
Accounts in Greece and Crete, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/10/36; The Hun was my host,
ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/10/39; Escapes, Greece and Crete (parts 1& 2), ANZ AGCO 8333
IA1/3393, 181/58; Interrogation report of Mme. A.J. Argyropoulo, September 1941, TNA WO
208/3354. For more on Greek support for allied soldiers in hiding and allied escapes see:
Mazower, Inside Hitlers Greece, pp. 85-6.
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used was a bad one.48 He firmly believed that a properly coordinated withdrawal as a force to a defensible location or beach would have gotten all
fighting troops and some equipment away. W Forces disintegration into
widely spread groups gave up the chance for a coordinated rearguard battle in terrain that generally favoured the defender. It also sacrificed control
as no senior W Force officer still in Greece at this time, including Freyberg,
Galloway and Baillie-Grohman, even knew where fuel or food dumps to
supply them were located.49
Beyond Freybergs specific complaints, certainly the decision to extend
the evacuations into the Peloponnese was open to question. Despite the
perceived risk to the navy, the troops from the Athens beaches got away
with no trouble, and on occasion at these beaches there were more berths
available than men to be taken off. The plan was that the Peloponnese could
be held while troops embarked further south, and this was why the Corinth
Bridge was to be blown. Yet the Corinth Bridge, the key to this plan, was
never seriously defended. In any case the Germans crossed the Gulf of
Corinth at Patras and could never be kept from the Peloponneseat least
not with the tankless 4th Hussars watching 100 kilometres of coast. There
was a clear gap here between faulty conceptual plans and the impossibility of their execution. W Force was not saved in the final stages by the skill
of its withdrawal or the tenacity of its rearguards so much as the inability
of the Germans to pressure seriously its increasingly ad hoc and poorly
executed embarkation plan.50 Brigadier Brunskill, Wilsons administrative
commander, confessed after the conclusion of the campaign to strong
doubts about the handling of the evacuation in the last stages which have
not been dispelled by accounts subsequently written.51
Even at the lowest levels the execution of the final W Force evacuations
from Greece was fraught with problems and with danger. Engineers and
demolition parties should have been among the last to leavethey were
in some cases the firstand too many stores were left for Germans rather
than being destroyed. Beach parties were universally insufficient in
48Letter, Freyberg to Kippenberger, 16 January 1950, AWM 67 5/17.
Department, NAA A1608, E41/1/3; letter, Freyberg to Kippenberger, 16 January 1950, AWM
67, 5/17.
To Greece, p. 422.
51Draft Manuscript, Brigadier G.S. Brunskill, IWM, PP/MCR/136.
507
numbers, and how they were employed was inconsistent. Sometimes the
Glen ships, for example, landed their own beach masters who gave contradictory orders. On other occasions these beach parties were themselves
charged with behaving in an unbecoming manner and one that lacked
discipline.52 Their appearance of nervous paralysis, complained BaillieGrohman, often contrasted to that of the soldiers they were embarking and
was not conducive to the rapid turnaround of landing craft and boats.53 But
these men were themselves untrained and unprepared. Most came from
the crew of HMS York, pitch-forked into it at the last moment.54 Conversely, a number of beach masters complained about the conduct of naval boat
crews and berth parties. Moreover, control of evacuation ships themselves
was left to the senior naval officers afloat, not those ashore, and problems
like that at Kalamata were the results. This particular outcome might have
been avoided entirely had the convoys been coordinated by senior naval
officers ashore. Nor were there ever enough small craft to support the evacuation with ferrying runs from beaches and piers. Admiral Cunningham
admitted how fortunate it had been that the Glen ships, with their all important landing craft, were in the Mediterranean at the time of Operation
Demon. They only arrived at the last minute. Without them the evacuation
could not have proceeded as it did. In total only 14,000around 27 per cent
of all those evacuatedwere taken directly off piers or wharves. The remainder owed their rescue to Glen ship landing craft and other small boats.55
In this context, the Royal Navy deserves far more acknowledgement for
the success of Operation Demon than anything planned or coordinated
from within W Force. The work done by Cunningham and Pridham-Whipple, and the sailors of the cruiser squadron and destroyer flotillas, most
often in an absence of information from beyond the beaches, was crucial.
So too was the work of Baillie-Grohman and his small staff ashore, none
of whom spoke Greek, and who laboured amidst a rapidly deteriorating
military situation. Baillie-Grohman understandably ranked the evacuation
1942, TNA WO 106/3120.
53Report on the evacuation of British forces from Greece, Vice-Admiral H.T. BaillieGrohman, 15 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet catalogued).
54Ibid.; Heckstall-Smith and Baillie-Grohman, Greek Tragedy, p. 230.
1942, TNA WO 106/3120; Report on Operation Demon, 7 July 1941, IWM, Papers of ViceAdmiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet catalogued); Heckstall-Smith and Baillie-Grohman,
Greek Tragedy, p. 230.
508
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as one of the two most outstanding achievements of his career. Similarly,

the role of Greek ships in the W Force embarkations has often been overlooked. Greek coastal steamers, fishing boats and other small craft operated tirelessly ferrying men out to waiting ships, and continued to do so
after the official evacuation operation was completed.56
The final important observation to be made about the last 48 hours of
the W Force evacuation from Greece concerns the Luftwaffe, whose lack
of impact on Operation Demon was striking. Surprisingly, few British ships
were losttwo destroyers and four transports were all that was sunk.57
Field Marshal List accepted that British ships generally cleared Greek ports
safely, but he believed dive-bombing had subsequently sunk an enormous
number of evacuating ships.58 Richthofens attitude was similar in that he
accepted many W Force troops undoubtedly escaped the beaches, but concluded that considerably more Imperial troops must have been drowned
thanks to attacks on shipping than were captured.59 Both were incorrect.
Richthofen congratulated himself on between 300,000 tonnes (Greek reports) and 500,000 tonnes (German reports) of shipping sunk in the campaign. But most of these vessels were Greek merchant ships whose loss,
given the difficulty of overland supply of Greek troops and the nature of
W Forces retreat from 6 April, had negligible logistic (and certainly very
little operational) bearing on the conduct of the campaign.60 Churchill
himself alluded to Luftwaffe effectiveness in the final stages of the Greek
campaign in a speech to House of Common on 30 April. Given numbers
taken out, mused the Britain Prime Minister, and
[c]onsidering that our air force was, through the superiority of the enemy,
forced to leave the airfields from which alone it could effectively cover the
retreat of the troops and that only a small portion of it could cover the
points of embarkation, this must be considered remarkable.61
56Letter, Freyberg to Kippenberger, 16 January 1950, AWM 67 5/17; Greeces campaign

against the Axis, June 1946, TNA WO 106/3125; Argyropoulo, From Peace to Chaos, p. 168.
57Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 104; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands
1941, p. 434.
58Extracts from 12th Armys campaign in the Balkans a strategic survey, AWM 67,
5/17.
60Entries for 27, 29 April and 7 May 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, pp. 177, 180,
185.
Department, 30 April 1941, NAA A5954, 528/6.
509
The sentiment was echoed by Wavell who earlier commented on 28 April

that heavy air attacks [on] troops have not, repeat not, so far caused serious
casualties.62
One of the chief reasons for the Luftwaffes failure to disrupt the evacuations seriously was its ongoing refusal to operate at night. W Force embarkation points by 28 April were known to the Germans. Moreover, even
if German pilots were inexperienced and ill-equipped for night bombing,
and even if captured Greek airfields were not set up for night flying, such
operations still ought to have been possible by the use of flares. Richthofen
knew that too many W force units were escaping at night but consoled
himself by concluding incorrectly it cannot be many.63 Luftwaffe night
attacks would have severely endangered and interrupted, if not rendered
impossible, the type of evacuations that unfolded at most W Force beach
sites. Thank goodness, wrote Charrington after his evacuation, they did
little or no night bombing, so that an interrupted stream could arrive at
the coast every night, I darent think what would have happened if he [the
Germans] had tried it.64 [W]hatever the reason for the Luftwaffes refusal
to mount such operations, noted Bailie-Grohman in his official report of
Operation Demon, our evacuation was certainly very much simplified by
the enemys failure in this regard.65 The reality of the W Force escape was
testament to the ineffectiveness of the German air force in Greece, not its
decisive impact.66
63Entry for 25 April 1941, Richthofen, diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 175.
65Report on the evacuation of British forces from Greece, Vice-Admiral H.T. BaillieGrohman, 15 May 1941, IWM, Papers of Vice-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman (not yet catalogued).
1942, TNA WO 106/3120.
510
chapter seventeen
PART THREE
EVALUATION
511
512
chapter seventeen
the outcome explained
513
Chapter Eighteen
The Outcome Explained

On 6 April 1941 the German 12th Army of around 250,000 men attacked a
Greek force outside Albania estimated at 90,000 men and a British-Dominion force of some 60,000 troops. The Germans effectively conducted two
types of operation within this single campaign. One was against poorly
equipped and hastily trained Greek forces who nonetheless fought fiercely for their country until it became clear that they had lost. In this case
Germanys victory over Greek forces followed the pattern of the early part
of the war in Europe. German success in the period 1939 to June 1941 had
with the significant exception of the French campaignalways been triumphs over far weaker European countries and forces. Germany was far
economically, technologically and militarily stronger than Greece in April
1941. Germanys victory in this sense was therefore unsurprisingalthough,
as earlier chapters have demonstrated, it occurred for different reasons
than often argued.
The second type of operation was in many ways a largely theatrical or
hollow type of fight against British and Dominion troops, thanks to the
German inability to force W Force into a decisive engagement before it was
able to withdraw and eventually evacuate. The nature of this phase was
not immediately clear to the German side, or to many in W Force at the
time, but it shaped all the combat and operational decisions that have been
traced through preceding chapters. The single most important factor that
determined the essential characteristics and the overall outcome of this
aspect of the campaign was the nature of the British-Dominion commitment, and the understanding of this by W Force commanders. Only by
focussing on this can the issues associated with the balance of forces on
the German and the Allied side, and the roles of German armour and air
powermisunderstood in existing interpretationsbe placed in context.
German numerical superiority, armour and air dominance, while present
during the campaign, did not play the decisive or determining role usually
ascribed to them.
The course of the campaign was shaped from beginning to end by the
timed series of British-Dominion withdrawals. W Forces conduct of the
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campaign from the outset demonstrated that it represented a limited commitment onlythe British were never prepared to risk the destruction of
Wilsons command in the forlorn hope of saving Greece. W Force was deployed to Greece both as a political gesture and in the hope of creating a
Balkan Front. Middle East Command did not have the resources to send a
more formidable force. Its purpose was to encourage a nominally larger
combined Yugoslav-Greek force to resist andif that resistance did not
succeedto withdraw to fight again another day. W Forces commanders
were aware of this from the beginning. Major General Freyberg thought it
clear to everybody that intervention in Greece must end eventually in
evacuation ... we were and had always been in a hopeless position.1 Thus
a scheme of manoeuvre was designed by the British to preserve the W Force
and to bring it home again. Even Admiral Cunningham admitted that when
the decision to send troops to Greece was finally taken, the navy began at
once thinking of how we should bring them out.2 Many British commanders therefore approached the campaign from the beginning with a completely different mindset than that of their German counterparts.
This basic guiding principle accounts for the lack of significant or decisive battles between W Force and the Germans. The Germans advanced,
restricted by limited Greek roads as much as Allied defenders, seeking to
end the campaign as quickly as possible before turning against the USSR.
British-Dominion forces, assisted by ULTRA intelligence as to the position
and intention of forward German troops, retreated before them in accordance with their own strategic imperatives.3 W Force was, therefore, by no
means forced out of Greece by combat. The British-Dominion campaign
was a withdrawal from the beginning to the endand it was planned that
way. No W Force unit ever engaged its German counterpart without possessing pre-existing orders to withdraw. The closest any W Force unit came
to receiving and acting upon a no retreat order was the 21st NZ Battalion
in the period 14-16 April. Even here, however, although directed on two
separate occasions to hold until the last man, such orders were superseded
by the time this battalion actually engaged German troops. No British,
Australian or New Zealand unit was ever under orders, at the time it was
Greek Campaign, AWM 67, 5/17.
3See H. Hinsley, The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War, seminar given on
19 October 1993, Cambridge University, <http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/His
torical/hinsley.html>, accessed 30 January 2012.
515
attacked by German troops, to hold the line indefinitely. Where significant

actions were fought, it was by German vanguards making contact with
Allied rearguards either in the process of conducting a withdrawal, or with
orders to hold only for a limited time. Where W Force units became decisively engaged, as was the case at Kleidi Pass and Pinios Gorge, for example,
it was by mistake and as a consequence of being forced into the situation
by rapid German advances. All W Force battles were for the purpose of
causing delay in order to facilitate further withdrawal. None was fought to
stop the German advance. Major General Freybergs chief operations officer, Colonel K.L. Stewart, recalled after the war that: When writing operation orders, I drafted the Intention para N.Z. Div will hold the line ...
for the so-called Metaxas position, for Olympus, and at Thermopylae, and
each time the general said NO, we are not fighting it out here.4 Playfair
recognised this essential truth in opening his account of W Forces campaign
with the candid remark that the British campaign on the mainland of
Greece was a withdrawal from start to finisheven if he refrained from
pointing out that this was, in fact, always accepted by British planners as
the likely course of events.5 This overall situation was most assuredly not
the case for the Greeks who fought in the Doiran-Nestos Line, the moun
tain passes southeast of Kleidi, and across the Albanian front, to halt the
invaders.
The net result (for W Force as a whole, not for individual British or Dominion soldiers, the Greeks or the Germans) could almost be described as
a simulation of a campaign. W Force went through the motions, but British
strategic imperatives ensured it would never, as a force, come to serious
grips with the Germans. This type of artificiality has probably contributed
to the misperceptions at the time and afterwards that have dogged the
analysis of the campaign. Time and again the Germans assumed that they
had forced the British out of positions by the aggressive combat actions of
their vanguard units when they had not; the British commanders had
assumed Greek forces were disintegrating when they were not, and so on.
These misperceptions have been replicated in much of the subsequent
historical literature.6 Certainly, the Greeks attempted to defend their nation.
British and Dominion troops, however, did not.
4Letter, Stewart to Kippenberger, 16 February 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16b.
5Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 83.
6One exception was the study by Leo Hepp, a major on Lists headquarters during the
campaign, writing in 1955. Hepp claimed that List tried to force the British forces into a
decisive battle in the Larissa basin but despite all the efforts of the 12th Army the British
516
chapter eighteen
The essential nature of the W Force campaign in Greeceto interfere

with the Germans while at the same time preserving itselfhad a number
of important ramifications. The first of these was the nature of the fighting.
German reports noted that their enemys main priority was to save life
rather than fight. This was shown, for example, by abandoning armoured
vehicles when broken down or out of fuel rather than fighting to keep or
recover them. Fehn observed that he was only ever opposed by rearguards
whose task seemed to be to delay, not stop, the advance until the main body
of W Force could be evacuated safely. For the Germans even these rearguards
demonstrated that self-preservation was the dominant priority in that
British-Dominion withdrawals were always early and they invariably left
their equipment behind.7 According to Lieutenant General Veiel, Wilsons
intentions were demonstrated time and again by an over sensitivity to his
flanks, which encouraged withdrawals before they were strictly necessary
in order to ensure W Force was not decisively engaged so that further withdrawal was impossible.8 A further indicator of the nature of W Forces campaign in Greece were its casualty figures. Of the 62,611 British and
Dominion soldiers sent to Greece the total of those killed, wounded and
missed (not including prisoners) accounted for only 2,500four per cent
losses through combat.9
None of this is to imply that W Force avoided decisive engagement in
Greece without good strategic reason. For the British-Dominion force to
have stood and fought might have slowed the Germans, but its size, equipment and mindset meant that it could not have stopped them. Such actions
would have unquestionably resulted in the loss of the Anzac Corps and
many other W Force units. Even if British and Dominion troops had inflicted proportionate losses on Lists army, the Germans were far better
placed to replace their casualties in this theatre at this stage of the war, if
expeditionary corps was able to evade a decisive battle in middle Greece through very
skilfully conducted retreating struggles under exemplary exploitation of the terrain which
was very adaptable to such a style of fighting. Hepp, Die 12. Armee im Balkanfeldzug 1941,
pp. 208-9.
7Notes on English methods of fighting (Greece), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
8Telegram, Wavell to War Office, 20 April 1941, TNA FO 371/29820; I. Mackay, Campaign
in Greece [transcript], 15 June 1941, AWM 27, 116/1; Notes on English methods of fighting
(Greece), AWM 54, 534/2/27.
9Higham, The Myth of the Defence of Northern Greece October 1940 April 1941,
p. 143. C.E.W. Bean, A.I.F. Losses; Many Prisoners Likely; Comparison with 1914-18, AWM
38, 3DRL 6673/1018[6]; Notes for LO (Australia) submitted by 6 Aust Div, I. Mackay,
AWM 3DRL 6850, 113.
517
required, than Middle East Command. To preserve W Force was the correct
strategic decision for the British.
Understanding the basic division between Greek and W Force intentionsto halt or to delay the German invasion respectivelyexplains
much of the underlying friction between the two allies throughout the
campaign. It accounts for the original British-Greek disagreements as to
what line should be held on the eve of the German invasion. The DoiranNestos Line offered the best chance of blocking a German attack and encouraging Yugoslav involvement (hence its appeal to the Greeks), while the
Vermion-Olympus Line offered the option of falling back if required (a W
Force imperative). Acknowledging this divergent strategic intent also provides considerable insight into Wilsons less than open dealings with Papagos concerning W Force withdrawals south from the Olympus-Aliakmon
and Thermopylae Lines. There were significant cross-purposes here. Papagos was attempting to defend his country, Wilson to ensure his force survived to fight another day. These different goals fostered distrust in the
relationships between senior Greek and W Force commanders, a state of
affairs exacerbated early on by the loss of the EMFAS in the Doiran-Nestos
Line early in the campaign without any W Force effort to assist it. The
obvious Greek conclusion was that the British could have done more to
help.10
Cooperation between W Force and the Greeks was also undermined by
a sense of cultural and racial superiority on the part of W Force commanders, combined with the judgements of a technologically and economically
advanced power of a weaker and technologically less-developed country.
Cultural stereotypes that implicitly considered the Greeks more likely to
panic were a product of the colonial and neo-colonial relationships between
Britain and Greek populations in the Mediterranean. This result of such
British attitudes was manifested in a clear lack of faith in their Greek allies
even before Operation Marita commenced. Chapter One has shown how
the British Chiefs of Staff did not assess Greek military capacity highly
in the 1930s. Some of this reaction was itself based upon a sense of shock
at the lack of mechanisation, logistic infrastructure and modern equipment
possessed by the Greeks. Lack of confidence in the Greeks had a marked
impact on the campaign. The unsubstantiated assumption that the Greeks
could never hold off the Germans reinforced Wilsons pre-existing desire
to withdraw from the Vermion-Olympus Line and the Aliakmon-Olympus
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Figure 18.1:Greek forces in retreat during the campaign. The almost continuous string of
W Force withdrawals was not however, as many authors have suggested, an inevitable
result of crumbling Greek resistance or premature Greek retreats. (Source: Australian War
Memorial: 007945)
Line under the supposition that his allies to the west had disintegrated.
Later, the looming capitulation of the EFAS was used as an excuse as to
why the Thermopylae Line could not be held. Subsequent efforts made by
W Force commanders to blame the Greeks for successive decisions to withdraw reflected an ethnocentric lack of faith in their allies. Brigadier Rowell
suggested defeat in Greece was not our fault as our allies were not as
staunch in practice as they appear on papera charge in many ways more
legitimately levelled at W Force than the Greeks.11 Such conclusions ignored
11Letter, Rowell to Morshead, 17 May 1941, AWM 54, 225/1/11. R. Holland and D. Markides,
The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, pp. 4, 10-11, 244, 247; Barros, Britain, Greece and the
Politics of Sanctions, p. 209; G.S. Brunskill, The Administrative Aspect of the Campaign in
Greece in 1941, October 1949, AWM 113, 5/2/5; message, Freyberg to Acting Prime Minister,
6 June 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/5/42; Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg
519
both the underlying W Force imperative to keep open the ability to withdraw
and evacuate, and failed to acknowledge the reality, demonstrated in the
Doiran-Nestos Line and in mountain passes north of Grevena, that the
Greeks were far more effective in blunting German attacks than the British
supposed.12
As W Forces actions in Greece were unquestionably shaped by the desire
to survive to fight another day, so too the Greeks were similarly influenced
by considerations of what might come afterwards. Greek authorities, perhaps in acknowledgement of the likely outcome of the German invasion,
were in the final stages of the campaign, for example, unwilling to have
certain economic infrastructure destroyed beyond repair to slow Lists advancing columns. Such facilities would still be needed even after a German
victory. In the Peloponnese, in particular, with the outcome of the campaign
in no doubt, little or no effective effort was made by the Greeks to hamper
German advances. The Adolf Hitler Regiment, when it crossed to Patras,
for example, found the railway intact and could thus rush troops east to
Corinth and south towards Kalamata. In the subsequent attack on Crete
the Germans used petrol installations at Piraeus whose destruction the
Greek authorities had expressly forbidden, while Athens radio station
(which should have been rendered useless) was subsequently used as a
beacon for German aircraft.13
To be sure there was a range of other impediments to effective Greek-W
Force cooperation. One of them was the language barrier. Mackay, for example, was forced to communicate with Lieutenant General Kotoulas, sharing his defensive sector from 7 April, in slow, irritating French. At a lower
level one Australian advance party sent to Greece was forced to use handsignals to sign a tank to their Greek allies with one arm forward while
saying bang, bang!14 Repeatedly senior British personnel like Wilson,
Wavell, Pridham-Whippell and Baillie-Grohman lamented the language
difficulties in their reports.15 This situation developed in spite of Wavells
request to the War Office a month before the German invasion began
1939-1941, pp. 195-6, 330-7. On British attitudes to Mediterranean people, see the classification of Maltese labour battalions as coloured in The War Office, Statistics of the Military
Effort of the British Empire during the Great War 19141920, first published 1922, reprinted
The Naval & Military Press, Uckfield, East Sussex, 1999, p. 160. We are grateful to Dr John
Connor for this example.
13McClymont, To Greece, pp. 471-2; Mott-Radclyffe, Foreign Body in the Eye, pp. 80-1.
520
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requesting 250 interpreters for W Force as an operational necessity.16 The

net result was, in Freybergs words, a [c]omplete lack of liaison ... for which
we must take our share of the blame.17
It is possible to identify a number of other additional factors that made
W Force less effective than it might have been. The first factor in this regard
concerns the quality of W Force command arrangements which were problematic from the time of its arrival in Greece. Quite apart from the decision
to prevent Wilson actually taking command of the force until the very eve
of the German invasion, the choice taken on 14 April to split W Force headquarters between Athens and a forward command headquarters at Elasson
was questioned, even from Cairo. It placed Wilsons chief operations officer
and three of his staff forward and left three more junior operations staff in
Athens without operational filestwo of whom thus became de facto
sorting clerks. Yet Athens was the hub of intelligence in Greece. The result
was that often too little information sent forward (with the exception of
ULTRA decrypts which seem to have arrived in a timely fashion) and no
picture of the front was ever sent rearwards. Wilson himself mirrored this
split in his dual roles of field commander (of the Anzac Corps, and the
CMFAS for a proportion of the campaign) and as an expedition commander who had to deal with the political and administrative challenges of the
Greek Government. Unsurprisingly, Wilson often wished that one could
have been in two places at the same time.18 In his post-war correspondence
Freyberg criticized the separation and dislocation of W Force command
elements.19 It is also worth remembering here that Headquarters W Force,
in Freybergs words, was not a standing or experienced headquarters. Rather, it was an ad hoc collection of officers from every part of the Middle East
who did not know their jobs.20 This contrasted sharply with its subordinate
divisional and even corps staff that had been training or fighting together
for more than a year.
16Telegram, Wavell to War Office, 7 March 1941, TNA WO 106/3121; telegram, War Office
to Wavell, 10 March 1941, TNA WO 106/3121.
Greek Campaign, AWM 67, 5/17. Mott-Radclyffe, Foreign Body in the Eye, pp. 72-3.
19Message, General Headquarters Middle East to Wilson, 14 March 1941, TNA WO 201/26;
Notes on G.S.I., H.Q., B.T.G., Athens; 2nd to 23rd April 41, TNA WO 201/42; G.S. Brunskill,
The Administrative Aspect of the Campaign in Greece in 1941, October 1949, AWM 113,
5/2/5; Suggested Administrative Lessons from Greece and Crete, Brigadier L.S. Brunskill,
9 June 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/5/42.
521
A second fundamental weakness of W Force command structure even

before the German invasion was launched was its organisation in accordance with peacetime arrangements in Greece. There was never, for example, an effective British naval commander ashore. Rear Admiral Turle,
the obvious choice, was left as head of the British Mission in Athens (of
which Major General Heywoods Military Mission to the Greek Army was
a part). The British Ambassador and Military Attach also stayed in Athens
throughout the campaign, further complicating the command and liaison
situation. The British Military Mission remained as a discrete entity, even
after W Forces arrival, and stayed attached to the Greek General Staff. The
British air commander in Greece, DAlbiac, independent of W Force command, was physically separated from Wilson for most of the campaign. In
this context, command coordination could not have been more complex
and difficult. A reorganization, simplification and clarification of command
responsibilities might have been more effective, but probably fell victim
to the inertia of administrative precedent. It was revealing that the criticisms made of command arrangements by the British Inter-Service Committee on Greece were suppressed by Wilson, Blamey and others until after
the fall of Crete in June 1941. As consequence of Blameys complaints, the
report eventually released was less than half the size and detail of that
originally drafted. Freyberg, for one, considered that this committee, though
composed of relatively junior officers, had the courage to tell the truth.21
Its chairman, Brigadier Salisbury-Jones, was never employed in Middle East
Command again.22
Nor did W Forces command and control problems improve much once
the campaign began. On 8 April, for example, a key date as the Germans
prepared to push into the Monastir Gap, W Force lines of command were
complicated and confusing. Blameys corps headquarters at Gerania commanded the New Zealand Division, the 12th Greek Division, and the 6th
Australian Division. The Greek CMFAS (at this stage consisting of only the
20th Greek Division) was deployed in the same general area, but under its
21Letter, Freyberg to Kippenberger, 16 January 1950, AWM 67 5/17.
22Apart from Salisbury-Jones, the committee members included Lieutenant Colonel
G.E.R. Bastin and Wing Commander E.C. Huddleston. Its Secretary was Squadron Leader
P.Y.H Smith: minute, Blamey to CGS, 27 September 1942, AWM 54, 534/5/24; report, Interservices committee on the campaign in Greece, July 1941, TNA WO 106/3161; letter, Rowell
to Long, 10 January 1951, AWM 3DRL 6763, Folder 5/11, [11-13]; G.S. Brunskill, The Administrative Aspect of the Campaign in Greece in 1941, October 1949, AWM 113, 5/2/5; draft
narrative on Administration of the 2nd NZEF (pp. 44-65), W.G. Stevens, ANZ ADQZ 18908
WAII, 11/25; Draft Manuscript, Brigadier G.S. Brunskill, IWM, PP/MCR/136.
522
chapter eighteen
own separate commander, while Mackays temporary blocking force at

Kleidi Pass bypassed Blamey and answered directly to Wilson. Command
and control during W Forces long retreat south from the Olympus-Aliakmon
Line was more difficult still. Positions reached through exhausting marches were preparedonly to be abandonedoften without sight of the enemy. Orders and amendments struggled to get to commanders, let alone
soldiers, which in turn led to rear units appearing jittery at times during
the withdrawal, partly due to lack of passage of information.23 To this were
added the problems caused by the premature departure of Blamey, Mackay, and later Wilson, before the W Force evacuation was complete.24
One particularly important factor in the command and control challenges faced by British and Dominion troops in Greece was inadequate
internal communications. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that
the W Force Line of Communication Signals Unit, which only arrived after
fighting began, had a high proportion of Jewish operators scratched together in Palestine, many of whom could not speak Englishnot an ideal
trait in telephone operators. After the campaign began, and as the Greek
telephone and telegraph system began to shut down under the weight of
its usage, due to bombing, and as its civilian operators increasingly ceased
work, W Force relied more and more on radio communications. Yet the
forces wireless operators were not well enough trained and had little experience or confidence with their sets (especially as compared to the other services, or the German Army). Due to the imposition of radio silence
no tests had been allowed prior to 6 April. It was soon discovered that the
British wireless sets at hand were insufficiently powered to ensure reliable
communication over the distances between units demanded by the Greek
terrain. The situation was not helped from 1 April onwards by strong and
confusing signals being picked up in Greece from the battles begun in Cyrenaica, and from German and Italian commercial stations. Internal W Force
radio communications were also manifestly hampered by the highly complex system of Allied codenames, veiled map references, and other means
by which to hide unit identity and location which proved too cumbersome,
slow and ill-suited to mobile operations. This was aggravated by a lack of
trained high-grade cipher personnel, which sometimes caused incorrect
messages to be sent, and, due to poor security measures, from time to time
23Report of WO2 T.A.M. Boulter, 19 August 1941, AWM 54, 781/3/2.
24McClymont, To Greece, p. 474; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 84;
523
allowed the Germans to learn of W Force dispositions and movements.

Overall, there were also not enough radios within W Force to supply the
links needed to get around or over the Greek mountain ranges, which constantly interfered with reception. Where radio failed W Force was forced
to fall back on a system of liaison officers and runners, mostly travelling at
night, which sometimes took upwards of 24 hours to move between superior and subordinate units.25
Another factor which frustrated W Force commanders was inadequate
intelligence about the theatre into which they had deployed. This included
a dearth of data on terrain and the physical condition, dispositions and
plans of the Greek and Yugoslav Armies. Indeed, these states seemed to
know more about the details and shortcomings of W Force than the other
way around. From ULTRA and other sources the British were well-informed
of German movements and intentions from mid-January 1941, yet information on Greek and Yugoslav forces seemed not to be at Wilsons disposal in
April. Some of the blame for such poor intelligence must rest with the interaction between Heywoods Military Mission and W Force headquarters
(and the British military attachs in Yugoslavia). After the war Wavell reflected on the difficulty of making a plan for W Force when it proved so
hard, for example, to get information about Yugoslavia. He could not,
claimed Wavell, find out anything reliable about its state of preparedness.26
(In this regard the British seem to have been much more focused on counting the numbers of Yugoslav divisions than ascertaining their quality or
assessing the countrys political cohesiveness.) Indeed, if we had known
what the state of the Yugoslav forces really was, Wavell later mused, this
might have imposed a great deal more caution on us.27 Many W Force
veterans blamed the Military Mission for their lack of information on Greece
rather than admit to their own role in this communication breakdown.
After the campaign W Force veterans like Brigadier Charrington were
IWM, 76/118/2; Notes for LO (Australia) submitted by 6 Aust Div, I. Mackay, AWM 3DRL
6850, 113; report, The tactical employment of the Arty of Anzac Corps, 20 May 1941, AWM
54, 534/2/30; Inter-service lessons learnt in the campaign in Greece, March to April, 1941,
12 March 1942, TNA WO 106/3120; minute, Blamey to C-in-C ME Forces, 29 January 1942,
AWM 3DRL 643, 1/4; The campaign in Greece, April 1941, Brigadier S.F. Rowell, 6 June 1941,
AWM 3DRL 6763(A), [1-4]; report on Greek campaign, General H.M. Wilson, TNA WO
201/53; Signals 6 Australian Division Report on Signal Operations in Greece, 26 May 1941,
AWM 54, 425/6/92.
26Notes of an interview, Wilmot and Wavell, 11 March 1949, AWM 67, 5/17.
27Ibid.
524
chapter eighteen
s cathing. He called the Military Mission a collection of incompetents headed by an absolute old ditherer called Heywood, who really were Public
Enemy No. 1 from the moment we landed ... what they had done [since
November 1941] beyond feasting and rioting in Athens I cant think.28 Heywood in particular, Charrington complained, had no military knowledge
whatsoever, nor any capacity or probably desire for grasping the key points
of any big problem.29
Wilson claimed to have received no intelligence from Heywoods Mission
prior to the German invasion regarding the exhausted state of the Greek
Army or its other limitations. Heywood later countered that the Military
Mission was not blind to the incapacity of Greek army to fight a modern
war. Rather, it had continuously pointed out Greek lack of transport and
equipment. As regards the inability of the Greek Army to move, wrote
Heywood, it is surely self-evident that an Army organised on a pack basis,
without a single wheel within the Division, operating in a mountainous
and practically roadless country, cannot be expected to move rapidly.30
Telegrams from the Military Mission back to Middle East Command and
London to this effect were sentalthough Heywood was rebuked by the
War Office in mid-March 1941 that their contents were inadequate and
incomplete.31 W Force further complained that Heywood failed even to
supply general information on Greece with regard to maps, roads and communications. What was given to W Force in this regard was often inaccurate.
Moreover, Heywoods staff had several months to source such key information and nearly thirty officers with which to do it. The Military Mission
countered that it had collected considerable information on roads which
were incorporated in a map which was not used as extensively as it should
have been by W Force. Wilson and Heywoods headquarters, perhaps to
some degree reflecting their personal mutual animosity, did not communicate as well as they should have. Colonel Salisbury-Jones, who worked for
Heywood, noted in 1944 that unfortunately there was a clash of personalities between General Wilson and General Heywood; and during the short
period between the arrival of the British Expeditionary Force and the German attack, the Mission was rarely, if ever, consulted.32 No matter what
29Ibid.
30Memo, Heywood to Salisbury-Jones, 10 July 1941, TNA WO 106/3169.
31Telegram, War Office to Wavell, 17 March 1941, TNA WO 169/2146.
32Letter, Salisbury-Jones to the Under-Secretary of State, War Office, April 1944,
TNA WO 106/3169.
525
the Military Missions shortcomings, had relations between the two organisations been more cooperative, senior W Force officers might have
made more use of the information the Mission had been able to gather.33
Aside from information that flowed (or failed to flow) to W Force from
the Military Mission, a number of authors over the years have emphasized
the role of ULTRA intelligence in influencing Wilsons decisions to withdraw
from his various defensive lines in Greece, or else as a significant factor in
timing these withdrawals. Hunt, for example, implies that the information
he gained from ULTRA decrypts gave Wilson an undeserved reputation for
skill in conducting the withdrawal, describing him as lucky.34 Similarly,
Hinsley described high-grade Sigint sent out from the United Kingdom as
being of enormous value for its effect in reducing the scale of the calamity.35
That British and German forces did not clash in any significant way in the
campaign was, for Hinsley, due at least in part to the value to the British
forces during their retreat of the higher-level intelligence sent from
London.36
It is possible, however, to exaggerate the role of strategic intelligence.
While there is no question that accurate Ultra information (especially
with respect to German tactical intentions), sourced largely from Luftwaffe
communications, found its way to W Force in Greece, even Hinsley admits
that [a]bout the way these appreciations were used little explicit evidence has survived.37 These sources would have reinforced information
available to Wilson from alternate sources such as field intelligence, refugees, limited aerial reconnaissance, W Forces own patrols and the Greeks.
ULTRA often contributed and confirmed decisions that were already in
train (or made) due predominantly to the constraints on the British deployment. The same, of course, was not true of its value before the campaign
33Mott-Radclyffe, a member of the Military Mission, claimed that it had provided
considerable information to W Force, as had the British military attach, Colonel Blunt. In
Mott-Radclyffes opinion Heywood was made the scapegoat. At the same time, MottRadclyffe also notes that relations between military attach and mission deteriorated under
Heywood. Mott-Radclyffe, Foreign Body in the Eye, pp. 48-9, 54-5, 67-8, 86-7. Report, Interservices committee on the campaign in Greece, July 1941, TNA WO 106/3161; Memo, Heywood to Salisbury-Jones, 10 July 1941, TNA WO 106/3169; GHQ Instructions for Force Lustre,
28 February 1941, AWM 54 534/4/2; Report, Inter-services committee on the campaign in
Greece, July 1941, TNA WO 106/3161; Cruickshank, Greece 194041, pp. 154-5; Dockrill, British Strategy in Greece, the Aliakmon Line, p. 116.
34Hunt, Foreword to the 1990 Edition, A Don at War, Frank Cass, London, p. xv.
35Hinsley, British Intelligence Volume One, p. 406.
36Ibid., p. 407.
37Ibid., p. 408.
526
chapter eighteen
(and in Crete) in building up a strategic picture of German forces and intentions, but as a tactical toolone which influenced Wilsons operational decision-makingUltra was not of central importance. In any case,
the limited size and scope of W Force and its operations meant that Wilson
could never use such intelligence offensively. Perhaps the most important
contribution of Ultra intelligence was that its identification of positions
of the many German spearheads enabled W Force retreat to be conducted
with a degree of confidence and composure which would otherwise have
been impossible.38
A post-campaign reluctance by participants and subsequent authors to
admit that the W Force commitment to Greece was only ever token in a
military sense, and that this was politically and strategically appropriate,
lies behind some of the most prevalent misinterpretations of the campaign.
(This issue is explored in Chapter 19.)
The first of these is the notion of German numerical superiority as being
decisive. A balance of forces calculation alone is not a sufficient explanation of the course and outcome of a campaign, as the Italo-Greek and
Russo-Finnish Wars had demonstrated. Wars are often won by the weaker,
poorer power. The Greek Army that the attacking Germans encountered,
however, was exhausted by the national effort that had not only pushed
the Italian invaders out of Greece but then sought to defeat them in Albania. Greek forces had done far better in October-December 1940 than outside observers had anticipated, but they were at the end of their tether by
6 April 1941. When Germany attacked in Macedonia and Thrace, all but
four weak Greek divisions (and two more hastily formed and fragile formations) were fighting the Italians in Albania. On this front the Italian Tepelene
offensive had led to mounting Greek casualties and all but exhausted Greek
military supplies. The EFAS and the WMFAS in Albania would be lucky to
hold on against the Italians in April 1941; they certainly could not be used
to reinforce the line in Macedonia. Even had the Italians given up on the
day the Germans attacked, the Greek forces opposing them would still have
had to walk east to meet Lists army, and they would have been too late.
The Germans faced older, poorly trained and equipped men in an undermanned Metaxas Line. Thanks to the Italians, once this was pierced the
Germans were destined only ever to face a thin screen of Greek forces ar38Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy 1941-1945, p. 50. Hinsley, British Intelligence
in the Second World War, pp. 115, 407. See also R. Lewin, ULTRA Goes to War; D. Hunt, A Don
at War.
527
rayed against them south of the Bulgarian and southeastern Yugoslav frontier.39
Once through the Doiran-Nestos Line the Germans were met by a limited British-Dominion commitment in W Force, which was clear testament
that Wavell never had the necessary military resources in Middle East to
permit simultaneous operations in North Africa and Greece. The very most
Britain could ever have deployed to Greece to meet the German invasion
was four divisions of infantry and a brigade of armour. As it was around
half this amount was sent. Against this the Germans deployed a much
larger force, front-loaded ... and designed for maximum impact,40 operating according to the long-established Prussian-German military practice
of seeking to bring an overwhelming force to bear against the enemy at a
chosen point of attack. Prussian-German preferences for speed in attack,
which necessitated overwhelming force, were further accentuated in this
campaign because of the interaction of its timetable with that for Barbarossa. 41
The Germans actually overestimated the size of the challenge they faced
in the Balkans and committed some twenty infantry (and mountain) and
seven armoured divisions against Yugoslavia and Greece. The conquest of
both was carried out with only a fraction of the forces the Germans had
prepared to conduct them. The primary reason for this, in the case of Greece,
was that the size of the force that could actually be deployed was limited
significantly by the Greek terrain and limited transport infrastructure which
allowed only around a third of the 12th Army to penetrate as far south as
Attica. Underdeveloped Greek roads running through numerous mountain
and ridgeline passes contributed to the development of chokepoints for
both sides, whether retreating or attacking, and thus to the traffic jams
which characterized the campaign behind the lines. These limited routes,
made more difficult thanks to inclement weather during the campaign,
also worsened the effect of the characteristic German neglect of logistics.
Such factors acted to blunt the impact of the force imbalance between
39War Made New An Interview with Max Boot, D. Yerxa (ed.), Recent Themes in military history: historians in conversation, The University of South Carolina Press, Columbia,
S.C., 2008, p. 46; Higham, The Myth of the Defence of Northern Greece, October 1940 April
1941, pp. 136-44.
40Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, p. 18.
41Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 192; Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, pp. 3-8, 15-18,
22, 32. On German military culture more generally, see R.M. Citino, The German Way of
War: From the Thirty Years War to the Third Reich, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence,
2005, especially Chapter 9.
528
chapter eighteen
attackers and defenders because the Germans could not bring their large
numbers (and armour) to bear as they would have done on a flatter country. It also meant that the routes of German advances could be predicted,
which made the British practice of detonation and demolition of bottlenecks, bridges and road cuttings in their withdrawals particularly effective
in delaying German advances. Largely as a result of these constraints, and
the overall British strategic approach to the campaign, the German victory
was achieved without the destruction of the enemy force.42
Thanks largely, therefore, to Greeces distinctive topography and its limited transportation network, the Greek campaign was not determined by
German overall numerical superiority, which remained potential rather
than actual.43 W Force, did not, in fact, fight any German division in Greece
as a complete division. Instead, British and Dominion rearguard elements
fought advance guards from these German formations. At no time was a
significant proportion of any German division in battle against W Force.
As has been demonstrated, at the point of battle, the only place where
relative numbers counted, more often than not W Force units outnumbered
their attackers. A paper count of divisions shows a clear German advantage,
but it was never realised on the ground. Further, thanks again to the restrictions imposed by Greeces landscape and road network, overwhelming
German numbers could never have been concentrated fast enough to
threaten W Forces withdrawal timetable even if List had wished it. Many
German motorised units spent the campaign snarled up in giant traffic
jams behind the lines. This frustrating gridlock was, in fact, the dominant
memory of Greece for a large proportion of the 12th Army.44
Greek terrain also meant that many aspects of the German force were
either less effective than has been commonly suggested, or had effects
other than those usually advanced. Just as with the misconceptions of the
role of German numerical superiority, the overwhelming German advantage
42Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 192; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, p. 332, 443.
43Anzac Davids in Greece, Sydney Morning Herald, 19 May 1941, AWM PR 88/72; The
public reaction to the Greek campaign, compiled by Gavin Long, AWM 3DRL 8052/109;
text of broadcast by Eden, 9 May 1941, TNA FO 371/29816; cablegram, Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs to (Australian) Prime Ministers Department, 30 April 1941, NAA A5954,
528/6; I. Mackay, Campaign in Greece [transcript], 15 June 1941, AWM 27, 116/1; message,
Freyberg to Acting Prime Minister, 6 June 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/5/42.
44A. E. Frauenfeld, May 1941, 600 km auf der Strasse des Sieges von Saloniki nach
Athen!, PA AA R 60717, p. 1; Extracts from 12th Armys campaign in the Balkans a strategic survey, AWM 67, 5/17; Draft notes on the Greek campaign, G. Long, AWM 3DRL
8052/109; Heeresarchivsrat Dr. Ernst Wisshaupt, undated, Der Balkanfeldzug der 12. Armee,
Generalfeldmarschall List Ein strategischer berblick, BA MA MSG 2/3963, pp. 32-4.
529
in airpower did not determine the outcomes on the battlefield during the
mainland Greek campaign. There is no doubt whatsoever about the fact of
German air superiority in Greece nor of its psychological impact on individual W Force soldiers. Early in the campaign the Luftwaffe was limited
only by the number of squadrons that could be fielded from airfields in
Bulgaria, and around Salonika after it fell. As the 12th Army advanced, the
number of airfields available to the German air force only increased. Around
1000 German aircraft in Richthofens 8th Air Corps, and the 4th Air Fleet
operating in the Balkans, faced only DAlbiacs plainly token RAF commitment of about eighty aircraft to Greece. German air superiority was complete. The idea of its decisive battlefield impact, however, is questionable.45
Certainly, the degree of fear engendered within W Force by consistent
German air attack was considerable: the diaries and memoirs of participants
are clear testament to this. This was the most significant impact, or role, of
the Luftwaffe during the Greek campaign. In mid-May 1941 Brigadier Savige
lamented the way the men ran as if in flight when an air raid was on.46 By
the time of the withdrawal from the Thermopylae Line a large proportion
of W Force drivers were diving for cover on hearing a plane, not seeing it.
The prevailing infection, noted Major H.C.D. Marshall, second-in-command
of the 2/7th Australian Battalion, scattered the troops whenever someone
yelled out plane.47 In the face of air attack the standard of troop discipline,
observed DAlbiac, went from low to, in some cases deplorable.48 At one
stage, en route to the Thermopylae Line, Wilson watched one of his battalions in trucks scattering from their vehicles at the sight of an eagle. The
important point is that in many cases the effects of air bombing and low
flying attacks [were] moral rather than material,49 in the words of the British inter-service investigation of lessons to be learned in Greece. In other
words, the fear displayed by W Force was by far and away out of all proportion to the damage done.50
45McClymont, To Greece, p. 500; Fort, Wavell, p. 203; Garnett, The Campaign in Greece
and Crete, p. 11.
46Notes (recorded by Brigadier S. Savige) of a speech given by Major General I. Mackay
at Hill 69 (Crete) to the officers of 6 Division, 12 May 1941, AWM 54, 253/4/2.
47Ibid.
48Letter, DAlbiac to AOC-in-C Middle East, 5 October 1941, TNA AIR 23/1196.
1942, TNA WO 106/3120.
50Report on Greek campaign, General H.M. Wilson, TNA WO 201/53; Chronology of
Operations, 2/5 Aust Inf Bn Greece, AWM 54, 534/1/2.
530
chapter eighteen
While the psychological effect of German bombing was significant, and

as noted on various occasion led to a degeneration of discipline and order
in a number of W Force detachments, in the main W Force morale was
never broken from the air. While men in withdrawal convoys dove from
their trucks to take cover at the sight of German planes, there was no wholesale breakdown of command authority, disobeying of orders, or rampant
insubordination. Many Imperial soldiers may well have been terrified of
the Luftwaffe, and showed it, but the military discipline and functioning
of British and Dominion units and formations did not crack as a result. The
degree of control displayed at various embarkation beaches is clear testament to this fact. The exception here was perhaps the last 24 hours at Kalamata, but here the Luftwaffe was but one of the pressures facing
Parringtons force. In this regard Churchills comment on 30 April that air
bombing prolonged day after day has failed to break the discipline and
order of the marching columns, was correct.51 Fear of the Luftwaffe, and
its considerable psychological impact, has often been misinterpreted, misrepresented or misremembered as equating to a decisive physical battlefield
impact in Greece.
A close analysis of battlefield actions in Greece show that not a single
W Force platoon was forced from a defensive position due to air attack. Nor
did concentrated German bombing and strafing of Greek positions in the
Doiran-Nestos Line or Vermion mountains have much real material impact
or cause substantial casualties. British transport and supply was not seriously hampered by German aircraftespecially relative to the difficulties
caused by bad roads. W Force trucks, in general, were not lost to bombs as
much as to being bogged, or being crashed by exhausted drivers. The Luftwaffe failed to attain many material outcomes in Greece. Perhaps its greatest achievement was the damage done to the port of Athensbut this
hardly decided the campaign. It was itself more a consequence of a chance
fire aboard a ship loaded with explosives that should never have been at
Piraeus, than Luftwaffe effectiveness. German aircraft proved unable to
disrupt W Force movements seriously at any stage, let alone trap and destroy
British and Dominion formations. W Force withdrew down the Greek peninsula and evacuated successfully in spite of the Luftwaffe.52 What was true
Department, 30 April 1941, NAA A5954, 528/6.
52Entry for 8 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, pp. 149-50; McClymont,
To Greece, p. 501.
531
Figure 18.2:German bombs bursting on the Domokos-Lamia Road in an unsuccessful

attempt to disrupt the flow of W Force traffic south. (Source: Australian War Memorial:
069849)
of W Force was also true of Luftwaffe action against the Greeks. Richthofen
was personally shocked about the lack of effects of Stuka attacks against
the Greeks defending the Rupel Pass in the Doiran-Nestos Line. He recorded in his diary how Greek prisoners taken in the border fortifications
reported themselves much more afraid of artillery and flamethrowers than
dive-bombing which apparently had no effect at all on them.53
Many W Force observers present in Greece were aware of the contrast
between the Luftwaffes psychological significance for individual British
and Dominion soldiers compared to its lack of material battlefield impact.
Brigadier Savige considered damage to be slight from the air action. But
for every vehicle damaged by air bombing, he went on to note, 2 or 3 were
ditched by drivers panicking.54 Brigadier Rowell concurred, suggesting
Allied forces were losing our sense of proportion in regard to the German
Air Force.55 The 6th Australian Division noted in early May 1941 that:
53Emphasis in original. Entry for 10 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 153.
54Notes (recorded by Brigadier S. Savige) of speech given by Major General I. Mackay
at Hill 69 (Crete) to the officers of 6 Division, 12 May 1941, AWM 54, 253/4/2.
6763(A) [1-4].
532
chapter eighteen
Despite the absolute air supremacy enjoyed by the German Air Force operating in the area of the Anzac Corps, the material results of their bombing and machine gunning were in fact so meagre as to have no real effect.56
An Anzac Corps post-campaign training instruction concluded that from
a casualty producing point of view and the material damage done, it was
practically so much wasted effort.57 April 1941 was still a long way from a
time later in the war when massed, more accurate and far better coordinated ground attack could be used to produce real effects on the ground.
This was not the experience in Greece. German air attack may have left a
profound imprint in the minds of many W Force soldiers but it was largely
ineffective in producing results on the battlefield.58
There were a number of factors that undermined Luftwaffe effectiveness
in Greece. The most obvious of these was the weather which restricted
operations and, thanks to sodden ground, often the damage caused by
individual bombs. Another was a decision not to operate in the darkness
encouraged by a lack of night landing facilities at many captured Greek
airfields. In this instance it is important to note that reports from Kampfgeschwader 2 (a specialized bombing wing), for example, confirmed that
night actions could have been flown, if directed, with the use of specialized
vehicles at various airfields equipped with lamps. It was only ordered, however, to a restricted extent.59 Another factor was overburdened airfields,
thanks to the sheer numbers of aircraft employed, particularly those captured during the campaign. In some cases wings of up to 15-20 squadrons
shared a single airfield. This was only possible due to the limited RAF threat,
but it nonetheless hampered operations.60
56Major Lessons from the operations in Greece by 6 Aust Div, 7 May 1941,
AWM 3DRL 6850, 110.
57Draft Anzac Corps Training Instruction, AWM 3DRL 643, 1/40.
58Letter, Long to anon., AWM PR88/72, 3/18; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 196.
59Signature, Kampfgeschwader 2, Ia Nr. 1206/41 geh., 9 May 1941, Erfahrungsbericht
ber den Zeitabschnitt von der Bereitstellung zum Einsatz gegen Griechenland bis zur
Beendigung der Kampfhandlungen gegen Griechenland., BA MA RL 8/242, p. 6.
Beendigung der Kampfhandlungen gegen Griechenland., BA MA RL 8/242, p. 7. Von
Richthofen, Gen.-Kdo. VIII.Fl.Korps, Ic Nr. 1990/41 geh., 30 April 1941, Betr.: Feldzug Griechenland Jugoslawien., BA MA RL 8/245, p. 2. Golla contends that the Luftwaffe had orders
not to bomb the main roads south because of the delays that this would cause German
forces. This claim, however, is not substantiated by any archival references. The authors
have been unable to trace any such orders, or reference to them, in German archives. Golla,
533
So too the nature of the Greek countryside, whose mountain ranges and
high features required steep angles of attack or high-level bombing, often
acted, to use the language of Luftwaffe reporting, to restrict the effect of
air attack. German pilots were often hesitant to bomb areas based solely
on reconnaissance reports where they could not see an enemy. Yet the
requirement to stay high in many cases, combined with effective enemy
camouflage, made W Force troops difficult to identify. The result tended to
be that suspect areas had bombs scattered over them, rather than being
subject to focused attack. Added to all this was generally poor bombing
accuracy, and a tendency to attack W Force concentrations piecemeal and
as they were found, rather than concentrating aerial forces to block W Force
lines of retreat at various chokepoints. For his part, from 20 April Richthofen
grew less interested in interdicting W Force traffic and more engrossed,
now that the Luftwaffe could reach Athens from captured airfields near
Larissa, with attacking port facilities and shipping.61 Yet many of Richt
hofens aircraft, thanks to their relience on dropping small bombs from
medium height, were ill-suited to disrupting W Force evacuations at sea.
German Dornier 17 squadrons, for example, reported themselves, thanks
to their reliance on using small bombs dropped from medium heights,
particularly badly suited for this battle purpose.62 The numbers sunk
in relation to the tonnage encountered were a ratio of 1:15, reported one
wing, evidence of the ineffectiveness of 50kg bombs against ships of 1000
tons upwards.63
Der Fall Griechenlands, pp. 297, 444-5. Gollas argument is at odds with Richthofens diary.
Entry for 24 April 1941, von Richthofen, diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 174.
61Signature, Obersteutnant u. Geschw. Komodore, [part of word unreadable] Kampfgeschwader Immelmann 2, [section unreadable] Nr. 390/41 geh. to Generalkommando
des VIII. Fliegerkorps, Abt Ia, 10 May 1941, Bezug: Funkspruch VIII.Fl.-Korps, Ia vom 4.5.41.
Betr.: Erfahrungsbericht ber dem Zeitabschnitt von der Bereitstellung gegen Griechenland
und Jugoslawien bis zur Beendigung der Kampfhandlungen gegen Griechenland., BA MA
RL 8/242, p. 5; Signature, Kampfgeschwader 2, Ia Nr. 1206/41 geh., 9 May 1941, Erfahrungsbericht ber den Zeitabschnitt von der Bereitstellung zum Einsatz gegen Griechenland bis
zur Beendigung der Kampfhandlungen gegen Griechenland., BA MA RL 8/242, pp. 6-7;
entry for 20 April 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, p. 165; extract from War Diary of
HQ Medium Artillery, 1 Anzac Corps, 6 April 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/29; 1st Armoured Brigade
Group notes on operations in Greece, April, 1941, 8 May 1941, TNA WO 201/2749; Blau,
Invasion Balkans!, p. 109; MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume III, p. 511.
Beendigung der Kampfhandlungen gegen Griechenland., BA MA RL 8/242, p. 7.
63In this context Luftwaffe claims to have around 280,000 tonnes of shipping from 15-13
April should be treated with scepticism. Signature, Kampfgeschwader 2, Ia Nr. 1206/41 geh.,
9 May 1941, Erfahrungsbericht ber den Zeitabschnitt von der Bereitstellung zum Einsatz
534
chapter eighteen
Like their army counterparts, Luftwaffe units in Greece also suffered

considerable supply and logistics difficulties. Elements within the 8th Air
Corps reported insufficient pilots, transport and communications staff.
Many crews had to fly for ten to twelve hours a day. Replacements were at
times completely unavailable and planes had to be left behind because key
parts could not be brought forward. The supply of fuel for some wings was
sufficient only because they were able to secure captured supplies. Others,
such as Zerstrergeschwader 26 (a heavy fighter wing flying Messerschmitt
Bf 110s), had such difficulties with the supply of fuel that they often did not
know until immediately before a scheduled action whether there would
be enough fuel to launch it. Jagdgeschwader 77 (a fighter wing), in addition
to reporting difficult relations with the army during the campaign, was
unable, at any stage, to provide the prescribed amount of rations to its
members. Further, by 22 April technical and supply issue were such that
only a third of Richthofens Stuka force was available for operations. Whatever the causes, however, operational or logistic, the net result was consistent. Far from being a decisive instrument in Greece, Luftwaffe air attacks
were limited in their material effectiveness.64
Why then, the question naturally arises, was the impact of the Luftwaffe
so exaggerated after the campaign by so many senior Allied generals? In
his report of the campaign Wilson concluded that it had been quite wrong
to attempt to compete with the German army without an adequate air
force as W Forces prospects melted away when the German air force [was]
gegen Griechenland bis zur Beendigung der Kampfhandlungen gegen Griechenland., BA
MA RL 8/242, p. 7; Corum, Richthofen, p. 248; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, p. 444-6.
64[10 May 1941] Schalk, Oberstleutnant und Geschwaderkomodore, Zerstrungsgeschwader Horst Wessel Nr. 26, Erfahrungsbericht ber den Einsatz gegen Jugoslawien
und Griechenland., BA MA RL 8/242, p. 5; signature, Hauptmann und Staffelkapitn,
Transportstaffel des VIII. Fliegerkorps, 5 May 1941, Bezug: Generalkommando des VIII.
Fl.K.Abt. Qu/Qu 2 v. 5.5.41 Betr.: Erfahrungsbericht, Erfahrungsbericht ber die Zeit von
der Bereitsstellung gegen Griechenland und Jugoslawien bis zur Beendigung der Kampfhandlungen., BA MA RL 8/242, p. 2; signature, Obersteutnant u. Geshcw. Komodore, [part
of word unreadable] Kampfgeschwader Immelmann 2, [section unreadable] Nr. 390/41
geh. to Generalkommando des VIII. Fliegerkorps, Abt Ia, 10 May 1941, Bezug: Funkspruch
VIII.Fl.-Korps, Ia vom 4.5.41. Betr.: Erfahrungsbericht ber dem Zeitabschnitt von der Bereit
stellung gegen Griechenland und Jugoslawien bis zur Beendigung der Kampfhandlungen
gegen Griechenland., BA MA RL 8/242, pp. 8-9; signature, Mjr. und Geschwaderkomodore,
Anl. zu 163/42. g.K. J.G.77 vom 17.5.41., Erfahrungsbericht des Jagdgeschwaders 77 ber
den Einsatz in Balkanfeldzug. BA MA RL 8/242, pp. 2-8; signature, Kampfgeschwader 2, Ia
Nr. 1206/41 geh., 9 May 1941, Erfahrungsbericht ber den Zeitabschnitt von der Bereitstellung zum Einsatz gegen Griechenland bis zur Beendigung der Kampfhandlungen gegen
Griechenland., BA MA RL 8/242, p. 15; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 331, 444-6.
535
Figure 18.3:German aircraft and supplies on a captured Greek airfield. The impact of the
Luftwaffe throughout the Greek campaign has traditionally been overstated. (Source:
allowed full liberty of action.65 This argument resonated with veterans of

the Greek campaign who saw ample first-hand evidence of German air
superiority.66
Self-interest was one factor. Attributing responsibility for the outcome
in Greece to the clear disparity between British and German air forces
shifted the responsibility for what was perceived as a failure in Greece by
many participants, not aware of or prepared to acknowledge W Forces real
political and strategic purpose in Greece, onto the RAF and the campaign
planners. DAlbiac, for one, knew that many senior army commanders were
looking to use the issue of inadequate W Force airpower to explain their
difficulties and in the aftermath of the campaign was himself at pains to
stress that before invasion he was fully aware that the air forces at my
disposal could not give the support which the army desired and which we
would like to have given.67
65H.M. Wilson, Report on Greek campaign, TNA WO 201/53.
66Report by Captain K.M. Oliphant, 2/3 Field Regiment, AWM 54, 534/5/5.
536
chapter eighteen
Even before the German invasion began, however, the Allied military
intellectual climate was fertile ground for such conclusions. During the
interwar years most western militaries had made assumptions that air attacks on ground forces would be much greater and more accurate than
between in the previous war. In addition, experience of air attack on rear
positions and convoys in France in 1940 had given visually spectacular
encouragement to pre-existing conceptions of the decisiveness of air bombardment, at least at this stage in the war. Prior to the Greek campaign,
therefore, and in its aftermath, Allied commanders had a distorted belief
in the power of air attack to decide ground engagements. From this grew
many unfounded and misleading assertions that Greece was lost due to
the superiority of German airpower.68
At the same time there was an important second institutional element
that influenced British Army assessments of German airpower in Greece.
This was a standing agenda, itself part of a longer-running doctrinal dispute
in Britain, to subordinate elements of the RAF to operational army control.
[T]this campaign brought out perfectly clearlyas have all others, noted
Wilson in his post-campaign report, the need for an Army Air Force.69
Advocacy of this idea was not restricted to senior British officers. Brigadier
Rowell, for example, wrote that the campaign merely emphasised one great
fundamental lesson already learned in France in 1940, namely that the
R.A.F. must come closer to the battlefield if we are to have a chance of
competing with the German Army on reasonably equal terms.70 By this
Rowell meant getting the allocation of R.A.F. units down as far as Corps.71
Unsurprisingly, senior RAF officers were furious at this conclusion. DAlbiac
claimed that Wilsons report did not give the true fact.72 I have no hesitation in saying that those references, and still more the inferences they appear to contain, he went on, are at best inexcusably uninformed, and in
most cases are definitely mischievous.73 Frustratingly for Wilson and the
68Reasons for failure of the Greek campaign, AWM 67, 5/17; letter, Long to anon.,
AWM PR88/72, 3/18; extracts contained within a telegram, UK High Commissioner to
Dominions Office, 23 April 1941, TNA CAB 21/1494; message, Blamey to Prime Minister,
14 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 643, 1/9; text of BBC Broadcast, edited by T. Blamey, 31 December
1942, AWM 3DRL 643, 2/111.
70Letter, Rowell to Blamey, 11 June 1941, AWM 54, 225/1/11.
6763(A) [1-4].
72Letter, DAlbiac to AOC-in-C Middle East, 5 October 1941, TNA AIR 23/1196.
73Ibid.
537
other advocates of an army air-arm, the British inter-service report on the

campaign concluded that the subordination of RAF forces to the ground
commander in Greece would not have made any difference at all.74
Similar arguments of German numerical superiority were advanced
concerning the impact of armour. The sheer quantity (and quality) of German tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles involved in the campaign,
contended many British and Dominion participants and subsequent observers, sealed W Forces fate. Churchill himself claimed the Imperial force
had been pursued by no less than three German armoured divisions as
well as the whole strength of the German mechanised forces which could
be brought to bear in the actual fighting.75 The sentiment was echoed by
Menzies, who described himself much disturbed by a failure here [in London] to realise the full implications of mechanisation.76 As far as offering
another explanation for the W Forces difficulties in Greece, and the manner in which it unfolded, that did not reflect badly on them, Allied generals
were all too eager to step into lineespecially as those who were aware of
the political purpose of the limited deployment could hardly justify it in
such terms in the immediate aftermath of the evacuation. Wavell for one
did not hesitate to perpetuate the notion of a crucial role played by German
tanks. There was [n]o doubt that our troops were completely on top whenever they met the Germans under reasonable condition, he wrote, but
numbers of AFVs gave the Germans the advantage.77 Blamey too pointed
to this overwhelming superiority in ... armoured fighting vehicles [which]
gave enemy to great advantage.78 Once again this theme was picked up by
the Allied press in the wake of the campaign.79
Again, a simple comparison of the orders of battle between W Force and
12th Army formations deployed to Greece does show a huge disparity in
armoured forces. Lists three armoured divisions dwarfed the fighting potential of the single British armoured brigade deployed. As has been demonstrated, however, no German armoured formations ever had the chance
to fight en masse. Rather, it was their vanguard infantry and reconnaissance
74Ibid.; report on Greek campaign, General H.M. Wilson, TNA WO 201/53; Inter-service
lessons learnt in the campaign in Greece, March to April, 1941, 12 March 1942, TNA WO
106/3120; letter, Blamey to C-in C Middle East, 7 August 1941, AWM 3DRL 643, 1/4.
75Point of interest in operations in Greece, TNA WO 20/68.
76Cablegram, Menzies to Fadden, 30 April 1941, NAA A5954, 528/1.
77Telegram, Wavell to War Office, 30 April 1941, TNA CAB 65/18.
78Message, Blamey to Army Headquarters, 2 May 1941, NAA A5954, 528/6.
79The public reaction to the Greek campaign, compiled by Gavin Long, AWM 3DRL
8052/109.
538
chapter eighteen
elements urged on by ambitious commanders and junior officers that invariably ran up against W Force rearguardsand these were mounted in
trucks, motorbikes, bicycles and on footnot in tanks. In fact, the largest
coordinated German tank actions, at Ptolemais and the Thermopylae Pass,
involved a company-and-a-half and a company of German armoured vehicles respectively. At Pinios Gorge no more than nine tanks pressured the
21st NZ Battalion before it began to withdraw. This was but a fraction of the
armour available to the German divisions in questionbut it was all that
was (or could) be brought to bear.
W Force never fought a German armoured division, as a division, in
Greece. Barely any German tanks saw any action against W Force. The terrain of central and southern Greece meant those German tanks that made
it to the point of battle were never able to deploy on a wide front, mount
flanking actions on the march, or provide the type of shock effect to battle
as demanded by German doctrine. Furthermore, in the few isolated incidents where German tanks ran up against W Force positions, they proved
remarkably ineffective, largely as a consequence of the terrain and the effectiveness of W Force artillery. At Ptolemais the 1st (UK) Brigade reported
poor German armoured procedures and inaccurate gunnery was the key
to allowing the British to escape. At Thermopylae Captain SchnburgWaldenburgs reckless charge saw his tank company wiped out by New
Zealand guns. Even at Pinios Gorge it was infantry attacks by troops of the
6th Mountain Division, who in fifteen days during the campaign marched
almost 500 kilometres (100 kilometres through mountains), that proved
decisive, not the slow and constricted advance of tanks.80
None of this is to suggest that German tanks had no impact on the campaign. German ability to move armour through mountainous country was
very important in that it surprised and upset key planning assumptions on
various Allied headquarters. Once again Allied estimations of tank-proof
terrain, as had been the case with the mountain roads of the Ardennes,
were shown to be flawed. Two crucial early steps in the campaignthe
seizure of Skopje and capture of Salonikacould not have been achieved
80More tanks from the German 3rd Armoured Regiment subsequently passed through
Pinios Gorge but by the time they arrived the New Zealanders were already disappearing
into the hills. A few war experiences, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W. List and
General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; 1st Armoured Brigade Group
notes on operations in Greece, April, 1941, 8 May 1941, TNA WO 201/2749; Report, The
tactical employment of the Arty of Anzac Corps, 20 May 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/30; Notes of
an interview, Long and Wavell, 11 March 1949, AWM 67, 5/17; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas,
p. 89; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, p. 444.
539
Figure 18.4:An unidentified group of German soldiers travelling down the road in Greece.
These troops, typical of the vanguard armoured and reconnaissance units which usually
engaged W Force rearguards in Greece, are riding motorcycles and bicyclesnot driving
tanks. (Source: Australian War Memorial: P02767.006)
in time required to bring about the operational effects the Germans relied
upon without rapid armoured movement. The Greek General Staff was to
some degree paralyzed by German speed in these examples. These operations were not, however, directed against W Force and cannot be accepted
as reasons for the British and Dominion difficulties.81
Aside from overwhelming German numbers, airpower and armour, there
were a number of supplementary explanations offered, often by external
observers in the Dominions seeking to account for how and why W Force
was ejected so rapidly from Greece. One of the most common was the notion that the British-Imperial force was underequipped. There were public
81Lessons learned as a result of training and the campaign in Greece, AWM 54,
534/2/30; Anzac Corps Intelligence Summary No. 1, 21 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/10; K.R.
Walker, Report on Greece and Crete Campaign, 15, September 1941, AWM 54, 534/2/20;
Fighting in central and southern Greece and Concluding Remarks, reviewed and edited
Blau, Invasion Balkans!, pp. 108-9; Garnett, The Campaign in Greece and Crete, p. 20.
540
chapter eighteen
and press claims at the time to this effect, but the only general to support
this view was Mackay, who later admitted that he did so to influence public opinion in Australia to stimulate a greater effort to produce military
supplies.82 Blamey himself confirmed the Anzac Corps was a well-equipped
formation, and that any suggestion otherwise cannot be sustained.83 Nonetheless, in response to growing public disquiet about this issue in the aftermath of the campaign, the acting Australian Prime Minister, Arthur
Fadden, was forced to declare publicly that: Whatever might be said ... one
thing is quite certainthe result of the Greek campaign was in no way
associated with the extent or the degree of equipment of the A.I.F. 84 Fadden was correct. W Force was no better or worse equipped than the Germanswho, it might be added, were more than happy to use captured
British weapons and vehicles whenever they were found.85
At the same time, equipment shortages did influence the outcome of
the campaign for the Greeks. The Greek Army was not at all a modern
force, but one that marched by animal transport with the mobility, in Brigadier Brunskills words, of a snail.86 It was deficient, according to British
standards, in all manner of equipment. In many cases the Greeks were
armed with weapons purchased from several countries no longer able to
supply ammunition due to subjugation by Germany. Captured Italian stocks
were from the outset, therefore, a chief source of Greek supplyand the
Fascist arms industry had a well-deserved reputation for producing poor
equipment. There were no Greek tanks and very few anti-tank weapons
available to Greek units. Greek divisions had few medium and field guns.
Combat rations for Greek infantrymen were little more than black bread,
as by 6 April all of Greece was already suffering food shortages, particularly of meat and flour. Due to transport shortages Greek unit maintenance,
away from ports or rail, was laborious. Moreover, Greek manpower, logistic
and equipment stocks had been all but exhausted by the Italians in Albania
before the Germans struck. Certainly the Germans considered the Greek
army to be a pre-modern force primarily due to its lack of anti-air and
82War Cabinet Minute (Australian), Alleged statements by Minister for the Navy
regarding lack of equipment in Greece, 16 May 1941, NAA A5954, 528/6; message, Menzies
to Blamey, 13 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 643, 1/9; Monson, The Battle of Greece, p. 13; Summary
of discussions, Long and Mackay, AWM 67, 5/17.
83Message, Blamey to Prime Minister, 14 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 643, 1/9; Notes for
Statement by the Prime Minister Military Position in the Middle East, AWM 54, 534/1/1.
84Monson, The Battle of Greece, p. 4.
541
anti-armoured guns, even if they acknowledged the stamina and resolve

of the individual Greek soldier. Greek logistic and equipment deficiencies
also made the various Greek defensive stands in the Doiran-Nestos Line
and the mountain passes of Macedonia even more admirable, acknowledgement of which was avoided by Wilson and his staff. What might have
been a valid explanation of Greek difficulties was not one for W Force.87
Though individual W Force units were relatively well-equipped, many
were not well-prepared for the conditions they met in Greece. Most W Force
battalions had to carry, march and climb to a much greater extent than had
been the case in the far more mechanised environment of the Western
Desert of North Africa they came from. There was no time to get physically
or mentally accustomed to mountainous Greek terrain. Troops had to trek
long distances, often, and with little food or rest in unfamiliar environmental conditions. Many Australians saw snow for the first time in Greece. The
2/3rd Australian Battalion, for example, described devastating fatigue, as a
consequence of the previously unknown requirements of mountain warfare,
as the greatest problem of the campaign.88 According to this unit its men
were physically fit and hard in the normal sense, but found their leg muscles insufficiently developed to sustain long climbs.89 This situation was not
shared by the Germans whose specially trained and equipped mountain
and reconnaissance troops, in particular, proved their worth.90
Overall, in a sense, especially given some of the real difficulties faced by
W Force, the overall outcome of the Greek campaign was predictable. Once
the defence of southern Yugoslavia crumbled, the only real chance of holding the Germans, as Papagos recognized, crumbled with it. With its left
flank exposed, the EMFAS in the Doiran-Nestos Line could not stand indefinitely, especially with the bulk of the Greek Army stuck in Albania
because of the Italiansa traditionally under-acknowledged strategic effect of Mussolinis forces on the course and conduct of the mainland Greek
campaign. It is likely, however, that even had the Germans stayed out of
Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian frontier could not have stood indefinitely. The
balance of forces available to the Wehrmacht in the Balkans suggested that
if Hitler wanted northern Greece, he would get it. The only question was
at what cost.
87Ibid.; MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume III, p. 495; Long, Greece,
Crete and Syria, p. 30; Garnett, The Campaign in Greece and Crete, pp. 6-7.
88Notes on Warfare in Mountainous Country, 3 December 1941, AWM 54, 519/6/28.
89Ibid.
90 Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 84; Blau, Invasion Balkans!, p. 111.
542
chapter eighteen
The British decision not to defend forward with the Greeks on the Bulgarian border, the correct strategic choice from a British perspective, ensured the price paid by Lists 12th Army was less than it might have been.
At the same time, however, it allowed for the preservation of W Force, a
valid and important British strategic imperative. From the moment the
Germans broke into Macedonia W Force never tried to stop them. Rather,
it tried to slow Lists advance, trade space for time, and set itself to depart,
as intact as possible, as soon as it became politically permissible to do so.
This was the essence of the Greek campaign. It was not, however, and nor
could it be, a central component of how the campaign, in its aftermath,
was justified and the commitment to Greece vindicated in Britain and the
Dominions. It is to this issue that attention now turns.
justifications, vindications and unnecessary debates
543
Chapter Nineteen
Justifications, Vindications and Unnecessary Debates

Max Hastings has described Churchills decision to despatch British and
Dominion ground forces to Greece in 1941 as one of the most controversial
of his wartime premiershipand it was a choice that remained controversial well after the campaigns conclusion.1 Indeed, the British decision
to commit W Force is unusual in the volume of retrospective argument it
has generated. Most of the debates surrounding this particular deployment,
however, are generally different from the endless might-have-been-type
arguments that, as noted by Klaus Schmider, have marked Anglo-Saxon
histories of the Mediterranean Theatre as a whole.2 From a British and
Dominion perspective, Greece is more about justifying the attempt, or
vindicating the effort. The fascinating and perplexing point here is that
such debates are, in a cold, realist sense, unnecessary. For all its military
difficulties, the deployment of W Force to Greece was essentially successfula political gesture with political dividends made with at a relatively
minor cost. From the moment the campaign concluded, however, there
grew a pervasive disquiet in contemporary participants, decision-makers
and commentators that the decision to go to Greece was a mistakeand
a range of attempts to counter the perception that the campaign was one
of the most splendid failures in British military history.3
There are some obvious reasons why this debate continued in Britain
and the Dominions in the immediate post-war period in the memoirs of
contemporaries. The decision was contentious at the time and opposed by
a range of leading military figures in positions subordinate to those actually involved in the decision. The commitment to Greece was also made at
a time when the Italian threat to British African colonies appeared to be
coming to an end, but then seemed discredited, even irresponsible, given
subsequent defeats in Crete and the Western Desert. Rommels February
1941 attack marked the start of a period of British defeats and setbacks that
did not stop until El Alamein.
1Hastings, Finest Years, p. 124.
2K. Schmider, The Mediterranean in 1940-1941: Crossroads of Lost Opportunities?,
War & Society. Vol 15, No. 2, 1997, p. 19.
3Fort, Wavell, p. 205.
544
chapter nineteen
So the counter-factual if only arguments gained immediate traction.

Had W Force not been sent to Greece it might have been used to make Crete
an impregnable fortress. According to Sir John Colville, Churchills Assistant
Private Secretary, the Prime Minister lamented in September 1941 that: We
could and should have defended Crete, and advised the Greek Government
to make the best terms it could.4 Alternatively, instead of going to Greece,
W Force might have been better employed to help capture Tripoli in early
1941, thus forestalling subsequent German success in North Africa. Lieutenant General Richard OConnor, in command of Western Desert Force, certainly believed at the time (though he reversed his opinion later) that with
sufficient support, and without the order to halt that came as a consequence
of Greece, he could have taken Tripoli.5 These were very attractive criticisms
or alternatives in the context of the perceived military (not political)
humiliation Greece represented. For those like Churchill who had
contributed to the decision to despatch W Force, however, such argu
ments needed to be publicly countered. W Force did go to Greece and was
ejected three weeks later. The issue then, for these men, was again one of
justification.
In the final analysis the decision to create a contested theatre of military
operations in Greece was essentially one made in the UK, with the Dominion governments following Londons lead. It was the British government
that had deployed RAF squadrons in Greece as a response to the Italian
invasion from Albania in 1940 and it was Whitehall that agitated to become
involved in Greece in early 1941, even after Metaxas refusal of a token British military commitment in January. In 1939 Britain had promised to support
Greece to the extent of its capability. Given the course of the war thus far,
however, and especially the multiple commitments of Middle East Command in Africa, there was a very limited amount that could be done to help
Greece furtherespecially if Germany decided to become involved. More4Entry for 12 September 1941, ibid., p. 356.
5This was, however, never the case. Overstretched British logistic lines from Egypt
could not hope to have coped with the distances involved, while the vulnerability of the
Royal Navy that far west precluded the attempt, regardless of the deployment to Greece.
There was also never any chance that the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade, thanks to the condition of its tank tracks, could ever have reached the front in North Africa, let alone helped
to continue OConnors advance. For a discussion of this issue see C. Stockings, Bardia:
Myth, Reality and the Heirs of Anzac, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2009, pp. 281-4; see also Despatch
of British Forces to Greece: Notes on possible questions which may be raised in debate,
LHCMA, Dill 3/2/7; notes of an interview, Long and Wavell, 11 March 1949, AWM 67, 5/17;
What Wavell has done, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 July 1941, AWM PR 88/72.
545
over, the fact that France was no longer a belligerent and therefore a military factor in the eastern Mediterranean meant that the original strategic
basis of the pledge to Greece had disappeared. Metaxas rejection of what
British military support could be readily sent to Greece in early 1941 represented a clear and painless way out for Britain. Again, the British were
given a second opportunity to exit with honour from Greece when they
were prevented by the Greek government from landing a force until the
Germans entered Bulgaria. Yet British policy-makers and generals chose to
press on and not only maintain military links with Greece but make them
stronger. In doing so the British forced Hitlers hand.
For their part, as noted in Chapter 2, the Germans had never wished to
become entangled in the Balkans. The Greeks alone, at the end of their
logistic tether in Albania in early 1941, could not inflict a heavy enough
defeat on Italian forces in this theatre to bring down Mussolinis regime
making the German need intervene on these grounds unlikely. After all,
while the Greeks might have surprised the world by the way they had halted and reversed Italian gains in late 1940 and early 1941, they were hardly
in a position to defeat Mussolinis armies, and nor could they be expected
to hold on indefinitely. The original German plan to occupy northern
Greece, then the entire Greek mainland, was a reluctant response to British
involvement. Even the Yugoslav coup, which sealed the fate of that nation
and precipitated the final plans of the antagonists, would not have unfolded as it did without a British presence and support. The German invasion of Greece and the campaign that followed in April 1941 was a
consequence of British decision-making.6
After the campaign the British choice to create an active theatre in
Greece seemed difficult to justify for many contemporary participants and
observers. The clear case could be made, as easily in early 1941 as today, that
the ensuing campaign would be one without the slightest chance of Allied
military successif success was defined as successfully opposing the German invasion. Even the traditional explanations for W Forces defeatGerman numbers, airpower, and armour, for examplewere entirely
predictable. So too, the state of Greek logistic, equipment and other military
shortfalls was well-known to the British Military Mission before the commencement of the campaign. Similar observations of the state of Yugoslav
defences were there to be made, even if British diplomatic, intelligence
and planning staff failed to make them.
6For Britains role in the coup see Onslow, Britain and the Belgrade Coup of 27 March
1941 Revisited, pp. 1-57.
546
chapter nineteen
After the fall of mainland Greece the first attempt to justify or vindicate
what seemed in military terms to be an abject failure by a number of senior
British officers was that that, though lost, the campaign had at least had a
fighting chance of a successful military outcome. The Middle East Commanders-in-Chief Committee, reviewing lessons learned in Greece, concluded the deployment was in the nature of a military gamblewith
the inference that gambles, by definition, sometimes pay off.7 The War
Office, in 1942, re-affirmed that the original W Force Vermion-Olympus
Line could, under certain circumstances, have been held. Wavell himself
took this position. This defensive line, he wrote, was by no means as hopeless as the outcome made it seem, especially had the Greeks provided four
first-rate divisions to supplement W Force as promiseddivisions, it should
be noted, that the British knew full well did not exist in late March 1941.8
In an interview in 1949 Wavell confirmed, once again, that in his opinion
there was always a reasonable chance of defending Greece against German
attack.9 Perhaps influenced by Serbian resistance against the Austrians in
World War I, when asked if the British plan was overly reliant on Yugoslavia,
Wavell answered that [a]lthough we got very little encouragement from
Belgrade, we believed that when the time came Yugoslavia would fight, and
would at least impose a very long delay on any enemy movement through
their hills.10 Such wishful thinking concerning the defensive potential of
an army about which the British knew very little, and one upon which a
large portion of the military strategy for the defence of Greece was predicated, certainly falls in the gamble category. On 18 April, during the campaign itself, Churchill wrote to Palairet that: The British Forces had, and
have, but one role to play in Greece, and that is to render the maximum
possible assistance for as long as possiblenot to defeat the 12th Army.11
This last role was not feasible. Wavell knew this as well as Churchill. So did
Wilson and his senior subordinates. Even accepting the role of chance in
war and contingencies of history, W Force was deployed in Greece against
an enemy beyond its capacity to stop. There was never any real intention
to defeat the invaders on the battlefield. The impossibility of military success, of actually stopping the Germans, was not only obvious, but as has
1942, TNA WO 106/3120.
8Notes of an interview, Wilmot and Wavell, 11 March 1949. AWM 67, 5/17.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
11Churchill to Palairet, 18 April 1941, TNA FO 371/28918.
547
been demonstrated shaped W Forces campaign from start to finish into

one long withdrawal.12
The closer the invasion got, and certainly once it was underway, the
clearer it must have appeared to Allied military leaders, and to Churchill,
that all that could be done was to go through the motions of resistance and
to withdraw with the least possible loss. So what was the point of it all if
Wilsons and Blameys task was not to fight, but rather to coordinate a series
of rearguard actions with the idea of avoiding encirclement and destruction, pending evacuation? The answer, unsurprisingly, is politics. In the
words of Major R. Hobson, the Brigade Major of the 1st (UK) Armoured
Brigade, Eden, Dill and other British decision-makers jolly well knew what
we were in forbut pressed on with the deployment anyway.13 Such men
sought outcomes from Greece not necessarily connected with W Forces
battlefield fortunes. Cold arguments concerning long-term political outcomes, however, were unlikely to sway W Force veterans or public. It is in
this context that one of the earliest attempts at justification emergedBritish noblesse oblige.14
As David Reynolds has demonstrated, Churchills influence on subsequent historical writing about Greece is considerable and after the campaign had finished Churchill expressed his open relief that Britains honour
as a nation was clear.15 The guarantee [to Greece] stood in fair weather
and foul alike, proclaimed the British War Office in 1942, for here were a
people who not only had the right to help but who also deserved help.16
Eden wrote on 26 April 1941, even as the campaign concluded, that: We
were bound to go to the help of the Greeks ... It would have been impossible for any British government to refuse.17 Importantly, British public
opinion had already shown that arguments based on such sentiment resonated. The failure to rescue Norway, after all, had helped overthrow the
Chamberlain government. For Britain then, Greece represented an end to
a succession of unfulfilled guarantees to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Romanianone of whom received any help against German aggression.
12Garnett, The Campaign in Greece and Crete, p. 5; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 192;
13Letter, Hobson to Anonymous, 4 May 1941, TNA CAB 106/374.
14Cruickshank, Greece 194041, p. 184.
15See D. Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second
World War, Penguin, London, 2004.
17Despatch of British Forces to Greece: Notes on possible questions which may be
raised in debate, LHCMA, Dill 3/2/7.
548
chapter nineteen
Certainly, the moral card was one played regularly by the British in their
dealings with the Dominion governments, and by the Dominion governments in their own attempts to justify involvement in Greece, before, during and after the campaign. The Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies,
stressed to the Australian public the decision to deploy had been based on
overwhelming moral grounds.18 We should keep it clearly before the public mind, Menzies continued, that it would have been impossible for us to
have deserted Greece.19
The morality of the deployment was also a theme that appealed to
many those within W Force charged with executing the ill-fated campaign.
Air Vice Marshal DAlbiac, for example, was adamant in that the decision
made was the right one and in accordance with the best traditions of our
race.20 It would have been morally reprehensible, in the eyes of our countrymen, he continued, not to help Greece.21 We had encouraged the Greeks
in their resistance to the Italians, echoed Admiral Cunningham, and it
seemed all wrong to desert them now.22 Brigadier Charrington agreed that
once Greece decided to oppose Germany, whether with or without our
assistance, I think our Cabinet had to send something.23 The morality of
the decision to aid Greece impacted not only on British decision-making
at the time, but also on subsequent interpretation of the campaign. Possibly already writing with an eye to the historical record, Eden himself
cabled Churchill in February 1941 contending it better to run the risk of
failure and to suffer with the Greeks than to make no attempt to help
them.24 Moral sentiment, national honour and Churchills own awareness
of the verdict of history, combined powerfully with political interests.25
After the campaign, the most frequently mentioned strategic justification of the British deployment to Greece, even if with a relatively token
force, was to encourage the establishment of an Allied Balkan front to
18Summary of War Cabinet conclusions dealing with the Balkans and the Middle East
and with military assistance to Greece, 14 January 1941 to 21 April 1941, NAA A5954, 626/6.
19Ibid.
21Ibid.
24Dockrill, British Strategy in Greece, the Aliakmon Line, p. 109.
25Telegram, Palairet to Eden, 21 April 1941, TNA FO 371/29820; Wilson, Eight Years
Overseas, p. 100; Hastings, Finest Years, p. 114; C.M. Woodhouse, The Drama of the Aliakmon
Line, International Congress for the 50 Years from the 1940-1941 Epopee and the Battle for
Crete, International Commission of Military History, Athens, 1991, p. 47.
justifications, vindications and unnecessary debates 549
Figure 19.1:A photograph taken during the visit to the Middle and Near East of the British
Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. Left to right: (unknown); Air Vice Marshal R.M.
Drummond, Deputy Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East; Anthony Eden; General
Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East; Lieutenant General Henry
Maitland Wilson, Commander-in-Chief, W Force; and Squadron Leader I.D. McLachlan.
Eden was a key figure in shaping the original British decision to deploy W Force to Greece.
threaten the Axis southern flanksimilar to that which was built in World
War I. The three most likely and important members of such a bloc would
be Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey. A British failure to support the Greeks
thus risked not only the abandonment of this offensive hope, but would
also place at risk defensive diplomatic efforts in the region. If Britain stayed
out of Greece there would be no counter to continuing German coercion
and domination of the Balkans along the pattern set in Romania, Hungary,
Bulgaria and (before the coup) in Yugoslavia. The British knew that if the
Germans succeeded in establishing political hegemony over the region,
this would have threatened their position in the Middle East. It would have
been impossible in such a scenario, for example, to bring aid to Turkey if
it was attacked. This was an influential argument prior to the campaign.
On 7 March 1941, for example, the South African Prime Minister and member of the Imperial War Cabinet, General Jan Smuts, sent a message to
Churchill that: We should not leave Greece alone at this grave juncture as
550
chapter nineteen
the consequences of such a step might be worse in their effects in the

Balkans and on our cause generally than even a possible setback in action.26
It was also a notion used after the campaign to vindicate the decision to
deploy W Force. After the war Wavell described them as good and obvious
political considerations which Mr. Eden naturally had in mind.27 Equally, participants in the campaign such as Brigadier Brunskill maintained
that, through its political and diplomatic effects in the Balkans, the venture
in Greece did much to save the whole situation in the Middle East.28 In
the Dominions, John Curtin, who became Prime Minister in Australia in
October 1941, argued that a failure to support Greece would have had an
equally bad effect in Spain, which would have been disastrous to the United Kingdom.29 An anti-Axis Balkan front, or at least a Balkans not under
German diplomatic control, was a valuable prize. Even if the Allied gamble
failed to pay off, it was argued, the risks were worth taking and the attempt
was wholly vindicated.30
The complete failure of the British plans to create a Balkan front, however, made it hard to use this as a viable justification of the deployment
after the event. Even though the Yugoslav coup had kept alive the British
hopes in this regard, there was little evidence at the time (and afterwards)
to underpin the hope and risk associated with an attempt to establish it.
There was no substantial indication that Yugoslavia (prior to the coup) or
Turkey would either decide to stand against Germany, or mount an effective
fight if they did. Rather, British intelligence on Greek, Yugoslav and Turkish
intentions was generally less accurate than that on the Germans. British
hopes in this regard were based on wishful thinking, and an optimistic
assessment of the possibilities.31 Indeed, after the British decision was made
to go to Greece, the Yugoslavs resolved to adhere to the Tripartite Pact and
Turkey made it clear, as it had repeatedly done, that Britain lacked the
military strength to induce it to seek anything other than neutrality.32 Moreover, even had W Forces deployment to Greece achieved such political and
diplomatic objectives, according to the advice of a number of high-ranking
British officers (including General Sir John Kennedy, the British Armys
26Telegram, Smuts to Churchill, 7 March 1941, TNA FO 954/11.
27Notes of an interview, Wilmot and Wavell, 11 March 1949, AWM 67, 5/17.
29Despatch of the British Military Forces to Greece, AWM 67, 5/17.
30McClymont, To Greece, pp. 484-5.
31Hinsley, British Intelligence Volume One, p. 359.
32G. Long, Draft notes on the Greek campaign, AWM 3DRL 8052/109.
551
Deputy Chief of Staff) it still would have been, on practical grounds, impossible to form an effective military front in the Balkans.33
An important alternative political justification of W Forces deployment
to Greece, was the impact the commitment might have in the US. Guarantees had repeatedly been given. Greece had stood up to Italy and had signalled its intention to fight a German invasion. There were suggestions in
London at the time that there might be serious implications in the US
should Britain fail to defend a worthy ally in need. Britain could not win
the war alone and Churchill knew it. The British Prime Minister was already
desperately cultivating the friendship with the US and on 7 March, when
the decision to to aid Greece was confirmed, the Lend-Lease Bill was in
front of the US Congress. It was passed two days later. The British Foreign
Office, prior to this date, had been tracking pointed criticism in the US of
Britains not giving more aid to Greece. Prior to the German invasion
Churchill, through Eden, was also well aware of ongoing US interest in the
Balkans. (Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State, was busy urging Yugoslavia and Turkey to resist German invasion and promised both Lend-Lease
aid. Meanwhile, Colonel William Donovan, President Roosevelts roving
intelligence emissary, conducted his own tours of the region.) It is clear
that Churchill considered US opinion before supporting Greece, and hoped
that the risks involved in assisting the plucky Greeks would not be lost on
Roosevelt.34
After the campaign in Greece had run its course, the US President called
the deployment of W Force heroic and very useful work, and a wholly
justified action.35 Cablegrams from London seeking assent to the planned
deployment to Greece were sent to both Canberra and Wellington on 25
February 1941 which specifically pointed to the importance of public opinion in the US. In London, Menzies wrote to his deputy, Arthur Fadden, that
the effect on American opinion of our pursuing this bold course will unquestionably be great.36 I saw the American unofficial ambassador, Colonel Donovan, in Cairo after his return from the Balkans, Menzies continued,
and he has stressed to the President of the United States the importance
of the formation of a Balkan Front.37 The plain fear was, in Menzies words,
33Dockrill, British Strategy in Greece, the Aliakmon Line, p. 109.
34Telegram, Government of the United Kingdom to High Commissioners in Australia
and New Zealand, 25 February 1941, TNA PREM 3/63/11; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials,
Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941, p. 249; Cruickshank, Greece 194041, p. 152.
36Cablegram, Menzies to Fadden (no. 153.), AWM 54, 534/1/1.
37Ibid.
552
chapter nineteen
that had Greece been deserted, the US would have been lukewarm towards
us and, at the worst, might even have adopted a similar attitude of desertion of our cause.38 Churchill and Menzies were not the only senior Allied
figures to make this connection. According to the Chief of the British Air
Staff, Air Chief Marshal Charles Portal, We had one eye on world opinion
and particularly American opinion, and we felt that our stock in the world
would go down if we didnt try to do something for the Greeks.39 Wavell
also referred repeatedly to the potentially disastrous effect on the US and
other neutrals should Britain have held back from committing troops in
Greece.40
While consideration of public and political opinion in the US may well
have helped decide the British military deployment to Greece, it did not
come without attendant political risk. In February 1941 the British Ministry
of Information advised that the loss of Greece to the Axis would not have a
significant effect on world opinion so long as there were British successes
elsewhere, and that Britain had made clear that it had not gone to Greece
due to limited resources. Africa was far more important in this regard and
deploying W Force to Greece unquestionably weakened the Allied position
in the Western Desert. Even accepting domestic public pressure to be seen
to be doing something at this stage of the war, the danger of another comprehensive and rapid defeat, followed by an ignominious evacuation, might
in itself be more damaging to world (and US) opinion and British prestige
than any capital derived from taking the risk in the first place.41
In the final analysis perhaps the single largest political factors in the
decision to despatch W Force to Greece were of a type that could not easily be used ex post facto to justify or vindicate the decision and this, perhaps,
helps explain the traditional emphasis placed on the factors previously
discussed. These factors were the personal decisions and roles of Anthony
Eden and Archibald Wavell. There were, of course, a host of individuals
and organisations involved in the choice to deploy W Force and the way
that deployment unfolded, yet Eden and Wavell remain pivotal. In Edens
case, he was physically present in the Middle East in the period leading up
to April 1941 and his advice to Churchill and the War Cabinet was, as a
consequence, accorded significant weight. Eden (along with Dill), was on
38Despatch of the British Military Forces to Greece, AWM 67, 5/17.
39Notes of conversation with Lord Portal, 24 March 1948, LHCMA 15/15/14.
40Notes of an interview, Long and Wavell, 11 March 1949, AWM 67, 5/17.
41Minute, Lord Hood to Minister for Information, 24 February 1941, TNA INF 1/892.
553
the spot talking to Middle East Command, Greek politicians and the Greek
King, the Balkan states, General Papagos and the Military Mission. Even
though Churchill took final responsibility for deploying British and Dominion troops to Greece, in truth Eden had a blank cheque. Churchill by no
means pressured either Eden or Dill into agreeing to the Greek enterprise.
In fact, the British Prime Minister vacillated about the deployment and was
eventually swayed and set on his final course by Eden.42
As far as campaign planning was concerned, it was Eden who met with
the Greek government on 22-23 February and had the opportunity to demand, as a condition of deployment, that the Greeks conform to the
planned British defensive line. He did not. Edens ambiguous intervention
at this meeting muddied the waters. The miscommunication with Papagos
over which forward line to be occupied was (along with Heywood) essentially Edens fault. Eden was also central to the mistaken planning assumption that the Yugoslavs could slow the German advance. Edens stressing
in his early meetings with the Greeks of the formidable strength the British were prepared to send may well have encouraged their acceptance of
British aid in the first place. To some observers, like Menzies, in retrospect
it seemed that Eden had laboured throughout to arrange the Greek deployment rather than to assess objectively whether or not it ought to have
proceeded.43 Lieutenant Colonel Kippenberger, as post-war editor-in-chief
of the New Zealand official history of World War II, agreed. Throughout
he [Eden] seems to have been anxious that the expedition should go ahead,
wrote Kippenberger, and it is possible that he over-persuaded two tired
and fairly elderly soldiers [Dill and Wavell].44 Eden was, according to Kippenberger, keenly conscious of the possibilities that success would open
up, and it is always a temptation, he noted, to undertake operations because
it would be nice to succeed.45 In this respect, according to Carlton, Eden
was the captive of his own reputation as an anti-appeaser. His recklessness
42Letter, Wards to McClymont, 27 September 1957, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16b;
Minutes of (Australian) Advisory War Council meeting, 11 November 1941, NAA A5954,
528/8; Summary of discussions, Long and Mackay, AWM 67, 5/17; G. Long, Draft notes on
the Greek campaign, AWM 3DRL 8052/109. For additional analysis of Edens decisionmaking with respect to Greece see Lawlor, Churchill and the politics of war, pp. 168-71; Thorpe,
Eden, pp. 258-61.
43Famous Men-and the Great Greek Blunder, B. Liddell Hart, LHCMA 15/15/14; Memo,
Wards to Kippenberger, 8 September 1952, ANZ ADQZ 18908, WAII11, 24(30); Long, Greece,
Crete and Syria, p. 194; Cruickshank, Greece 194041, pp. 180-1; Carlton, Eden, pp. 173-7.
44Note on the preliminaries to Greece Campaign, H. Kippenberger, 7 December 1950,
ANZ ADQZ 18908, WAII11, 24(30).
45Ibid.
554
chapter nineteen
surrounding Greece was thus a consequence of the fact he was to a large

degree a prisoner of his public reputation, not entirely deserved, for vigour
and valour in politics.46
For his part Eden himself seemed at pains to justify his role, even as the
campaign was concluding.47 On 26 April he wrote to Churchill comparing
Greece to British action in the Napoleonic Wars where we landed in Europe
more than a score of times, having on most, if not all of these occasions, to
come off again, having deranged the enemys plans.48 Three days earlier,
with the idea that the British landings somehow delayed the Germans
enough to foil Hitlers plans to move against Turkey and the British position
in the Eastern Mediterranean, Eden wrote that even after an evacuation
the balance sheet will still be in our favour.49
Along with Eden, the other key British figure in the decision to deploy
to Greece was Wavell, as the principal channel of military advice from the
Middle East to London. Some authors have tried hard to relieve Wavell of
his responsibility in this regard. The argument is that he always had deep
misgivings about the deployment to Greece (although, if he did, they were
never expressed officially). It has been further suggested that it would have
been hard for Wavell to oppose the idea as the British War Cabinet had
made it clear, early on, that it wanted to send troops to Greece. Added to
this, thanks to disagreements regarding the use of British and Dominion
troops during the Libyan Campaign of 1940-41, Wavells personal relationship with Churchill was strained. Yet Wavell had his chances to air his views.
He never went on record with doubts about Greece, but rather the reverse.
On 19 February Wavell wrote a memo strongly in favour of a deployment
to Greece for Dill to pass on to Eden.50 Wavell, along with Dill, also gave
crucial testimony to the British government in February and March 1941
that the operation stood a reasonable chance of success. If Wavell kept his
true opinions to himself at this juncture, this is in itself an indictment. It
was his responsibility to advise his superiors in accordance with his beliefs,
46Carlton, Eden, p. 180.
47For Edens position see The Rt. Hon The Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs; The Reckoning, Cassell, London, 1965, chapters 7-10, pp. 184-263.
48Message, Eden to Churchill, 26 April 1941, UBCRL, AP20/8/425.
49Entry for 23 April 1941, Eden diary, UBCRL AP20/1/21. Message, Eden to Churchill, 26
April 1941, UBCRL, AP20/8/425.
50Fort cites Lampson as suggesting that it was Donovan who persuaded Wavell of the
importance of a British foothold in the Balkans. Fort, Wavell, pp. 192-3. On Donovans possible influence on Wavell and Dill, see entries for 19 and 20 February 1941, Dykes diary,
Danchev, Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance, pp. 58-60.
555
even if it may have meant the loss of his job. Freyberg was adamant after
the campaign that Wavell should have stoutly refused to do more than put
forward the great difficulties from a military point of view and only agreed
to carry out their decision after having placed on the record his views upon
the military limitation of Lustre Force.51 Wavell did nothing of the sort. By
keeping quiet he either failed in his moral and official duty if he disagreed
that the deployment could accomplish something in a military sense, or
he failed in his strategic and operational appreciation by believing that it
might succeed in a strictly military sense.52 Interestingly, Robin Higham
speculated that Wavell sought to deceive both Churchill and Dill with respect to Greece. The best way Wavell thought to fulfil Britains obligations
to Greece, Higham contended, was to pretend to do so. Wavells plan was
thus to appear to offer a force to defend Greece with the expectation that
a rapid German advance before it could be despatched would forestall the
need to send it. If this was true Wavell was beaten by the weather and
Bulgarian roads, which delayed the German invasion.53 Be this as it may,
the last word perhaps belongs to Wavell himself. He was alleged to have
quipped to Dill at the end of the string of March conferences in Athens:
Well Jack when I am court-martialled for this decision I hope you will be
one of the court.54
It is worth noting at this stage that the British were not the only ones
with political motivations and post-campaign justification to deploy W
Force to Greece. Once the Germans entered Bulgaria and their intentions
were clear, on the Greek side the King, for one, convinced the Allies would
eventually win the war, considered it an imperative to make any military
strategic concessions necessary in order to guarantee British involvement.
Otherwise, not only would the British be absent from the struggle but also
hostility would be provoked on the part of the Britishhostility which
could have the severest consequences for Greece, and of which there were
already some indications.55 British involvement, even if it ended in defeat,
52In this regard, Hinsley contended that Wavells headquarters in Cairo believed the
German preparations in mid-March were a bluff. Hinsley, British Intelligence Volume One,
p. 361.
53For Churchills low opinion of Wavell see entry for 14 August 1940, Eden diary, UBCRL
AP 20/1/20. Letter, Freyberg to Kippenberger, 16 January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; entry for 1 May
1941, Eden diary, UBCRL AP20/1/21; letter, Butler to Kippenberger, 29 November 1956, ANZ
ADQZ 18908, WAII11, 24(30); Kennedy, The Business of War, p. 87; Higham, The Myth of the
Defence of Northern Greece October 1940 April 1941, p. 144.
54Notes of interview with Major-General Sir Ian Jacob, 31 March 1948, LHCMA 15/15/14.
55Woodhouse, The Drama of the Aliakmon Line, p. 47.
556
chapter nineteen
would have important long-term implications for Greece, provided the

Allies went on to win the war. Post-war Greek republican and liberal leaders went further, using the British deployment to further their own domestic agendas. Many claimed that the monarchists had not fought to Greeces
full potential and had therefore let the British down. One such leader, General Stephanos Sarafis, who won a reputation in the Greek resistance,
claimed [o]ur British allies were left to fight alone and exposed and thus,
at Thermopylae where Leonidas and 300 Spartans fell the Greeks were
absent while the British fought.56
In terms of post-campaign attempts to vindicate the decision to despatch
W Force to Greece, it is important to note that some contemporaries and
later historians argued that none of the political justifications for the British intervention which emerged was sufficient.57 Blamey was an early champion of this point of view. As far as my limited knowledge goes, he wrote,
the main reason for the despatch of the force appears to have been a political one.58 This was true, but in Blameys opinion inappropriate. The
outstanding lesson of the Greek campaign, Blamey continued, is that no
reason whatever should outweigh military considerations when it is proposed to embark on a campaign.59 I am one of a very large number who
do not, and never did, he went on, accept it as fact that this Campaign was
a political necessity.60 Freyberg was equally damning in this regard in that
Greece was a disaster that was embarked upon for political reasons.61 It
was a crime, therefore, that Wavell allowed himself to be forced into making a decision which was a political one.62 He should not, according to
Freyberg, have allowed himself to be so widely influenced by the political
side of the problem.63
Arguments that only military considerations should be considered when
deciding whether to commit military forces, however, ignore the very purpose of war. As Clausewitz observed, the basic rationale to fight a war is
political, and the attainment of political (not battlefield) goals are the appropriate objectives of sound military strategy. If a military deployment
56S. Sarafis, Greek resistance army: the story of ELAS (translated by Sylvia Moody),
Merlin, London, 1980, p. xxvi.
57Fort, Wavell, p. 184.
58Letter, Blamey to C-in C Middle East, 7 August 1941, AWM 3DRL 643, 1/4.
59Ibid.
60Minute, Blamey to C-in-C ME Forces, 29 January 1942, AWM 3DRL 643, 1/4.
62Ibid.
63Ibid.
557
which must inevitably lead to military defeat is made, but at the same time
that deployment succeeds in achieving important political outcomes, then
this is perfectly in line with the raison dtre of armed forces. Armies are
employed, not necessarily to win battlefield glory, but to fight, and to die,
in pursuit of political outcomes.64 Nor, according to such Clausewitzian
rationales, is it a soldiers job, whatever his rank, to second-guess the political context of his orders. [W]e alone, noted Churchill, could measure
the proportion of world events, and final responsibility lay with us.65 Sometimes the political context is such, admitted Dill with respect to the campaign, as to make it necessary to take risks which from a purely military
point of view, may seem inadvisable.66 General John Kennedy echoed this
sentiment to the US military attach in London, Raymond Lee, in that the
campaign had been decided for political motivesit was a speculation ...
with the possibility of very large dividends.67 As has been discussed, it is
clear that there were (and are) weaknesses or difficulties in the attempts
that were made in the aftermath of the Greek campaign to justify W Forces
deployment. It is equally certain, however, that attempts to discredit this
decision on the grounds that political considerations were too dominant
in the decision-making process are inappropriate.
The British post-campaign process of attempting to justify the decision
to commit troops to Greece was mirrored in the Dominionswith some
important local twists. After all, the bulk of W Forces fighting troops were
from Australia and New Zealand. There is also no question that their respective governments had the unassailable right to refuse to deploy troops to
Greece, and to insist perhaps, for example, on their being kept in North
Africa to guard clear Allied interests in this theatre. Moreover, serious questions were asked immediately after the campaign by Dominion governments, the press and other commentators about the decision to follow
Britains lead in Greece.68 As time has passed, partly reflecting changes in
65Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 5, p. 218.
66J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol 2, September 1939 June 1941, HMSO, London, 1957,
p. 531.
67Entry for 15 April 1941, James Leutze (ed.), The London Journal of General Raymond
E.W. Lee 1940-1941, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1971, p. 242.
68Before the campaign was even complete, for example, the Sydney Telegraph, asked:
Was Canberra informed of the facts as, apparently, they are known to the British Broadcasting Company ... did it send our men into this adventure knowing what we now know? The
Sydney Sun asked what damning indictment could there be of the sense of responsibility
which inspired the disastrous adventure, while the Sydney Morning Herald pointed to
evident miscalculations in the Dominions decision-making processes, and henceforth for
558
chapter nineteen
the relations between Britain and Australia and New Zealand, Dominion
decisions to provide troops for Greece have tended to be seen in an increasingly negative light. In this regard a number of criticisms (and justifications)
of the decision to commit troops have been made in both Australia and
New Zealand: apparent Imperial manipulation of information supplied; a
British failure to consult the Dominion governments before commitments
involving their troops were made by Britain to Greece; that Dominion leaders were too deferential to Whitehall; and like Gallipoli perhaps, Australians
and New Zealanders once again fell victims of Churchills scheming. According to these lines of argument the Dominions were mere spectators,
then, in a great tragedy in which their soldiers were the lead actors.69
The Australian government and Menzies, along with its New Zealand
counterpart, led by Peter Fraser, were suspicious of the idea of deploying
W Force from the very beginning. As soon as Menzies arrived in Britain on
20 February 1941, Churchill raised the question of sending Australian troops
to Greece. The Australian Prime Minister replied that he would need much
more information before making any commitment. Even after receiving
military appreciations from Wavell and Dill in support of a deployment to
Greece, supplemented by positive indications from Eden as to the intentions of Yugoslavia and Turkey, Menzies was reluctant. On 25 February
telegrams were sent to Wellington and to Canberra to inform the Dominions
that the British Cabinet had, the previous day, decided that everything
possible should be done to help the Greeks. The plan, at that stage, was to
base a force to be sent to Greece on two Australian infantry divisions and
one from New Zealand. The Dominion governments were advised that the
Greeks had already accepted this offer and had agreed for the designated
troops to begin moving forthwith.70 The British thus urged Dominion
acceptance of the most prudent and experienced military opinion
at our disposal, for a plan that offered reasonable prospect of achieving
its objectives.71
Dominion representation in an Imperial War Cabinet. The public reaction to the Greek
campaign, compiled by Gavin Long, AWM 3DRL 8052/109; extracts contained within a
telegram, UK High Commissioner to Dominions Office, 23 April 1941, TNA CAB 21/1494.
69Draft Bulletin article discussed at Australian Advisory War Council meeting, 29 April
1941, NAA A2676, 1001 Attachment 1; Comments, Greek Draft, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/15;
I. McGibbon, New Zealand and the Decision to Aid Greece, February-March 1941, International Congress for the 50 Years from the 1940-1941 Epopee and the Battle for Crete, p. 129.
70Comments, Greek Draft, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/15.
71Telegram, Government of the United Kingdom to High Commissioners in Australia
and New Zealand, 25 February 1941, TNA PREM 3/63/11.
559
While is clear that in late February 1941 the British expected the Dominion governments to do as they were asked, reactions in Canberra and Wellington, however, were doubtful. The New Zealand government told London
that it was most anxious and willing to make the New Zealand Division
available in the manner proposed, but at the same time wanted reassurance
that the Force is in fact adequate to meet the probable scale of the attack.72
The British responded by pointing out that its military experts, on the spot,
believed the landing could succeed. Similar concerns were put forth by
Australian Government in a cable to Menzies in London. Canberra noted
the risky nature of the British proposal, which included a time pressure
that appeared to discourage it from seeking further information. The Australians feared that the size of force appears relatively small for the task
proposed and thus Australian consent was conditional on plans having
been completed beforehand to ensure that evacuation if needed will be
successfully undertaken.73 Menzies put this position to Churchill personally at the War Cabinet meeting of 27 February, and was assured such contingencies were already being considered. Menzies was also reminded that
the New Zealanders had already agreedwithout referring to Frasers
own reservations. Thus, despite his misgivings Menzies supported the
enterprise.74
Developments in Greece and Egypt in the first week in March 1941 concerning the size of W Force transformed what was always considered by
the Dominion governments as a risky if worthwhile proposition, into what
seemed like an increasingly dangerous venture. On 6 March the British War
Cabinet, itself growing ever more nervous, became aware of the compromise
agreement signed between Eden, Dill and Papagos in Athens two days
earlier which effectively locked the British into deploying W Force to Greece.
Menzies, present at this meeting, had a most anxious time in putting Australian concerns forward. By now the Australian Prime Minister was under
no doubt that the proposition was not as good as it was and explained to
the War Cabinet that, while Australia was not likely to refuse to take great
risks in a good cause, we must inevitably feel some resentment at the notion that a Minister [Eden] not authorised by us should make an agreement
72Telegram, Government of New Zealand to War Office, 26 February 1941, TNA PREM
3/63/11.
73Telegram, Fadden to Menzies, 26 February 1941, TNA PREM 3/63/11.
74Cablegram, Menzies to Fadden (No. 153), AWM 54, 534/1/1; telegram, War Office to
Government of New Zealand, 1 March 1941, TNA PREM 3/63/11; Comments, Greek Draft,
ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/15.
560
chapter nineteen
binding upon us which substantially modified a proposal already accepted

by us.75 Yet Menzies, harbouring growing and significant doubts, informed
Fadden back in Canberra that he was comfortable that Australian anxieties
on this matter have been fully appreciated by those here.76 Menzies had
been convinced once again that while the hazards were more considerable
than ever, the Greek scheme was by no means a lost cause.77
Concerns over the deployment of W Force in the first week of March in
New Zealand followed a similar pattern. After being informed of the compromise British-Greek plan agreed to on 4 March, Fraser too was well aware
that his Cabinet was now considering a much more risky operation than
had been the case on 26 February. Again, however, the British War Cabinet
requested his assent to the employment of the New Zealand Division,
which was, in fact, already en route to Greece.78 Frasers government replied
on 9 March that it had given a most careful and earnest consideration of
an operation it now regarded as even more dangerous and speculative.79
Nevertheless, the New Zealanders could not contemplate the possibility
of abandoning the Greeks to their fate.80 To do so, in their eyes would
destroy the moral basis of our cause and invite results greater in their potential damage to us than any failure of the contemplated operation.81 The
Fraser government, cognisant of the growing risk, and the fact that their
division was irreplaceable at this stage of the warand indeed was the
most prominent part of the entire nations war effortstill intended to
support the British decision. Like the Australians they had not been duped;
they were anxious, aware of the growing risks, and thus urged, as had Menzies, for British planners to give a full and immediate consideration of the
means of withdrawal both on land and at sea should this unfortunate course
prove to be necessary.82
75Telegram, Menzies to Fadden, 8 March 1941, TNA PREM 3/63/11.
76Ibid.
77Ibid.; Advisory War Council Minute, International situation, 25 March 1941, NAA
A5954, 585/4.
78Comments, Greek Draft, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/15; McGibbon, New Zealand
and the Decision to Aid Greece, February-March 1941, p. 131.
79McGibbon, New Zealand and the Decision to Aid Greece, February-March 1941,
p. 131.
80Telegram, New Zealand Government to Dominions Office, 9 March 1941, TNA PREM
3/63/11.
81Ibid.
82Telegram, New Zealand Government to Dominions Office, 9 March 1941, TNA PREM
3/63/11. Letter, Freyberg to Kippenberger, 16 January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; Reaction by New
Zealand Government to Deteriorated Situation, NAA A5954, 528/1; Note on the preliminar-
561
The missing element in the discussion of Dominion decision-making

thus far is, of course, the roles of the Australian and New Zealand contingent
commanders within W Force. The Dominion governments were not blind
to the risks of Greece, or uncritically accepting of British assurances. Rather, they were forced to choose a course of action based on what information
was at hand. Blamey and Freyberg were important conduits of such information and advicebut herein lay a problem. To address the former first,
Blameys powers as the officer in charge of the 2nd AIF were set down in
February 1940. Part of his mandate was that no part of that force was to be
detached or employed without his express consent. At the same time, however, the 1st Australian Corps, as a fighting formation, was under Wavells
operational control. Blamey was thus caught, in the crucial January-February 1941 period, between his responsibilities to report his opinion of the
potential Greek operation to the Australian government and his role as a
subordinate military commander. This was doubly complicated by Menzies
presence in London.83
Blamey claimed to have been first told of the deployment to Greece by
Wavell on 18 February, and to have responded that the matter should be
referred to Australia. Wavell, however, then revealed he had already discussed the possibility of Greece with Menzies. Certainly no agreement was
provided at this time by Menzies but Blamey reasonably assumed that his
Prime Minister knew of the plan. Blamey thus chose not to make any contact with Menzies. Wavell subsequently read Blamey a telegram from London showing that the War Cabinet had, on 24 February, approved the
operation and that Menzies had been present at the Cabinet meeting. Again,
therefore, Blamey chose not to raise the issue directly with Menzies, despite
his mounting personal concerns. It was not until 5 March, when plans for
W Force were becoming known in Egypt, and the same day the W Force
advance party departed for Greece, that Blamey put pen to paper, writing
to Menzies that the plan is, of course, what I feared; piecemeal despatch
to Europe.84 I am not criticising the higher policy that required it, Blamey
continued, but regret that it must take this dangerous form.85 This letter
did not contain specific criticisms of the W Force plan as Blamey, at this
stage, was unaware of the details. It was not received by Menzies for a
ies to Greece Campaign, H. Kippenberger, 7 December 1950, ANZ ADQZ 18908, WAII11,
24(30); letter, Butler to Kippenberger, 4 October 1955, ANZ ADQZ 18908, WAII11, 24(30).
83Notes to War Cabinet Agendum No. 37/1940, NAA A5954, 528/1.
84Letter, Blamey to Menzies, 5 March 1941, AWM 3DRL 643, 1/4.
85Ibid.
562
chapter nineteen
Figure 19.2:Lieutenant General Thomas Blamey; Lieutenant General Henry Maitland

Wilson; and Major General B.C. Freyberg. Both Blamey and Freyberg faced the challenges
in Greece of acting as both Wilsons operational subordinates and national contingent
commanders. (Source: Australian War Memorial: 128425)
number of days. Two crucial weeks had thus passed during which both
Menzies and Blamey harboured significant personal doubts, but neither
had communicated them to the other.
The next day, 6 March, Blamey was summoned to a meeting held by Dill
and Wavell and details of the deployment were revealed to him. Blamey
later described the meeting as feeling as though he was receiving instructions from his superior officers, rather than being asked for his opinion.
After the war Blamey maintained that he told both British officers at this
meeting that he was opposed to the deployment. Blamey was then asked
by them if he would refuse to go to Greece if ordered. Blamey considered
this a trap and said that he would go, although by now the small size of the
force had confirmed his low opinion of the W Forces prospects. The following day Wavell was informed by the British Cabinet that he was authorised to proceed in Greece and that it would inform the Dominions. On 8
March Blamey cabled Percy Spender, the Australian Minister for the Army,
asking to submit his views on the coming operation, and was instructed to
do so. On 10 March Blamey thus cabled Spender and Fadden describing the
operation as extremely hazardous.86 This was followed by a letter to
86Message, Blamey to Spender, 10 March 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/291; minute,
Blamey to CGS, 27 September 1942, AWM 3DRL 643, 2/45.
563
S pender along the same lines in which Blamey described the sequence of
being told of the operation on 6 March by Wavell and Dill, and of his reservations. In this latest letter Blamey reported Dill and Wavell now hold
very firmly that the operation should be put in hand, while at the same
time describing the regret that I still feel ... operation is most hazardous.87
By now, however, it was too late. Menzies had already, during the British
War Cabinet meeting of 6 March, without receiving any word of demur
from Blamey, signalled Australias intention to proceed. During a subsequent
investigation of this sequence of events by the Australian Advisory War
Cabinet on 11 November 1941, Menzies claimed he felt some pains had been
taken to keep Blameys critical view from him.88
Blamey was kept out of the detailed picture of the W Force deployment
to Greece by Wavell until 6 March, completely in accordance with Blameys
position as a subordinate formation commanderbut completely inappropriately with regard to his position as a national contingent commander. Both Wavell and Blamey are to blame for this. Wavell ought to have been
aware of Blameys responsibilities and prerogatives. By the same token,
however, Blamey was most assuredly aware of them and failed outright to
demand answersas he was authorized and duty-bound to do. He thus
formulated and expressed his disquiet too late. Nor was Menzies free of
culpability. The Australian Prime Minister never demanded advice from
his most senior general in Egypt. Menzies reasonable concerns, expressed
to the British War Cabinet, were assuaged by British reassurancenot by
advice from his national representative and commander of the force likely to deploy. Both men far too readily accepted assurances that the other
had agreed with the concept of the Greek operation.
The breakdown in communications between Blamey and Menzies was
paralleled by a similar lack of communications between Freyberg and
Fraserand for similar reasons. Like Blamey, as a national contingent commander Freyberg had not only the right, but the duty to communicate
directly with the New Zealand government on policy and decisions effecting his division. This responsibility had already been expressly established.
He was also, however, again like Blamey, in the position of a subordinate
87Letter, Blamey to Spender, 12 March 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/291.
88Message, Blamey to Fadden, 8 March 1941, AWM 3DRL 643, 4/13; message, Fadden
to Blamey, 9 March 1941, AWM 3DRL 643, 4/13; letter, Blamey to Spender, 12 March 1941,
AWM 54, 534/2/19; minute, Blamey to CGS, 27 September 1942, AWM 3DRL 643, 2/45;
minutes of (Australian) Advisory War Council meeting, 11 November 1941, NAA A5954,
528/8; Summary of discussions, Long and Mackay, AWM 67, 5/17.
564
chapter nineteen
general which tended to raise a conflicting set of priorities. Freyberg complained after the war that he was never consulted in either the general or
the detailed planning of the Greek campaign.89 With regard to the New
Zealanders, Wavells actions and attitude were actually worse than those
applied to the Australian corps. In late 1940 a party of 19 New Zealand
engineers was deployed to Greece without Freybergs knowledge. Freyberg
was first informed, but not consulted, about a possible deployment to
Greece for his division on 17 February. Freyberg later claimed at this point
Wavell told him the New Zealand government had already agreed. This,
however, could not have been the case as the first idea that New Zealand
troops might be deployed to Greece was sent to Wellington in a British
cable to Fraser in the afternoon of 26 February, seeking his approval. Within three hours agreement had been sent back to London, with no effort
being made to seek Freybergs opinion.90
Again, like Blamey, throughout the second half of February and the
beginning of March, as more details became known, Freybergs personal
reservations about W Force increased to the point that before he deployed
he held no personal hopes of success. The Australians and New Zealanders
Freyberg later wrote, were under no illusions as to what they thought of
the mission they were being sent upon.91 At no time, however, did Freyberg
see fit, as was his mandate and responsibility, to inform his government of
his views.92 For his part Fraser, assuming Freyberg was the best placed to
know, took his silence as assent to the operation. If Freyberg believed it too
dangerous, thought Fraser, he would have made his views known. Fraser
assumed Freyberg had been asked about and consented to the deployment.
Like Menzies, Fraser was impressed by the British arguments for the strategic and political necessity of the deployment, and by Wavells and Dills
dubious contentions that W Force had a fair chance of stopping a German
invasion. Fraser was perhaps also conscious of Menzies position in London
and within the decision-making process, and the Australians had agreed.
Nothing short of a direct appeal from Freyberg was ever likely to sway
Frasers course, and Freyberg chose to keep quiet.93 After the fall of Crete,
89Letter, McClymont to Kippenberger [regarding Freybergs comments on draft
Australian official history], 16 February 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16b.
90Letter, Wards to McClymont, 26 August 1955, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16b;
McGibbon, New Zealand and the Decision to Aid Greece, February-March 1941, p. 130.
92Comments, Greek Draft, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/15; McGibbon, New Zealand
and the Decision to Aid Greece, February-March 1941, p. 131.
93Letter, Wards to McClymont, 26 August 1955, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16b.
565
Freyberg was summoned by Fraser, who flew to Cairo and questioned him
about the Greek campaign. Their Freyberg admitted that he had had no
illusions about the difficulties ahead in Greece.94 Fraser was unimpressed
by his choice to keep such opinions to himself and told his general: In
future, no matter who is your commander-in-chief, you must report at once
any disagreement as to the operational employment of the New Zealand
Forces.95
Overall, Wavell and his senior staff at Headquarters, Middle East Command, never seemed to grasp fully the fact that Freyberg and Blamey were
national representatives as well as subordinate officers. Their governments
expected frank and timely advice and opinion. Wavell expected them to
carry out orders, not question the wisdom of decisions made. Both Dominion officers felt they were never asked for their opinions by their military
superiors but were told what was to occur. Preliminary arrangements were
made without any reference to either Blamey or myself, complained Freyberg, we were just told to go to Greece.96 Both were later rightly reprimanded by their political masters that they had been expected to pass on
their concerns without hesitation. By the same token, however, their Prime
Ministers never asked.97
In terms of contextualizing, and to some degree vindicating, what
seemed after the campaign to many in the Dominions to be questionable
decision-making processes in Canberra and Wellington, were questions of
failed British political responsibility. Churchill and his government singularly failed to communicate openly and fully with the Australian or New
Zealand governments until after 4 March, when the decision to send W
Force to Greece had effectively been made. The British government offered
Dominion divisions to the Greeks, who had already accepted, before this
commitment was agreed to in either Canberra or Wellington. The Dominions were faced with the choice of concurrence, or a withdrawal of their
troops that would have resulted in Britain reneging on a commitment already made. This sequence of events was a grave indictment of the idea of
any truly cooperative conception of Imperial defence in 1941. The attitude
seems to have been that Dominion troops were there to be used and
Dominion governments could be relied upon to do what they were asked.
95Ibid.
96Ibid.
97Comments, Greek Draft, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/15; letter, Wards to McClymont,
26 August 1955, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16b.
566
chapter nineteen
Figure 19.3:Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Blamey, commanding the 2nd AIF, and
Mr. Robert Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, meeting in February 1941 in Egypt.
Mr. F. Shedden (left) was the Secretary of the Australian Department of Defence. The
Australian acceptance of the decision to deploy to Greece was complicated by a lack
of effective communication between Menzies and Blamey. (Source: Australian War
Memorial: 005779)
On the other side of the equation, significant responsibility for this state
of affairs lies with the Dominions themselves. It was the duty of both the
Australian and New Zealand governments to ensure they were adequately
informed of military matters impacting on their troops. Neither ever asserted its right to swift and accurate information from London, and to demand consultation, as might have been done. The habit of deferring to
British military judgement and the perceived need to present a united front
were still well-ingrained in the early war years. For understandable strategic and even cultural reasons it would always have been very difficult not
to go along with the recommendations of the British War Cabinetbut
the British cannot be held singularly responsible for such Dominion
attitudes.98
Like the path that led to decisions agreeing to the deployment of their
troops to Greece, the official attempts to justify the commitment of troops
98G. Long, Draft notes on the Greek campaign, AWM 3DRL 8052/109; Reconstruction
of the crime, compiled by Gavin Long, AWM 3DRL 8052/109; letter, Long to Hasluck,
17 December 1948, AWM 3DRL 8052/109; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 194.
567
to Greece in Australia and New Zealand followed similar trajectories. Aside

from notions justifying Dominion decisions to deploy troops to Greece as
a consequence of British coercion or duplicity, the dual themes of honour
and duty nobly carried through used to vindicate the deployment in Britain
also found fertile ground in the Dominions, especially in the press and in
official public announcements. Although dissatisfied with the breakdown
of communications between Freyberg and his government, Fraser still
thought that the decision to assist the Greeks was right, and unavoidable
and justified it in those terms. In early May 1941 he wrote to Freyberg that
[w]hatever the future may bring, our souls are strengthened by the fact
that the step was taken with all its known dangers and risks, and that the
nation which makes and carries out such decisions will face whatever may
come, and conquer.99 So too, Menzies concluded his government was
bound, in the circumstances, to take the decision it did and he made no
apology for it. If we had refused to go into Greece, Menzies contended, we
should legitimately have been subjected to a storm of criticism all over the
world and have lost our own self-respect ... It was our duty to help Greece.100
The Greeks did not hesitate, he went on, [t]hey did not sit in armchairs ...
Nobody could be standing anywhere today with his head high if we had
failed to accept the challenge.101
In the final analysis the great irony of the range of post-campaign attempts to justify the deployment of troops to Greece in Britain and the
Dominions is that they are, from a twenty-first century perspective, wholly unnecessary. Following a time-honoured British peripheral and limited
strategy a small military force was despatched to Greece for political purposes. Some of these were achieved, some were not. It fought to preserve
itself, and escaped with surprisingly light losses. Such an outcome, on balance, must be counted as a success. Such terms, however, could never be
used to describe the campaign in its immediate aftermath. To admit
the political nature of the deployment and its deliberately limited prose
cution may have seemed too dismissive of the loss and suffering of
those sacrificed as a result. This, in itself, played a role in the search for a
greater justification.
99Letter, McClymont to Kippenberger, 16 February 1954, ANZ ADQZ 18902, WAII3/1/16b;
message, Freyberg to List Z, 13 May 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/291.
100Draft Bulletin article discussed at Australian Advisory War Council meeting, 29 April
1941, NAA A2676, 1001 Attachment 1.
101Ibid.
568
chapter nineteen
Within the preceding discussion surrounding attempts to justify the

decision to deploy W Force to Greece there is one final and crucial issue
that has so far not been addressed. It is one often argued, in the aftermath
of the campaign and since, as being so important to the course and outcome
of World War II that it alone vindicated the British decision to mount a
campaign in Greece, and the Dominion decisions to participate in it. That
is, the British attempt to forestall a German invasion of the Greek mainland,
itself a precursor to the invasion of Crete, fatally disrupted German plans
for the invasion of the USSR. According to this line of reasoning the failure
of Operation Barbarossa can be traced to events in Greece in April 1941. If
this is true, the Greek campaign was a watershed for the war as a whole.
The magnitude and potential importance of this claim warrants an in-depth
and detailed analysis. This final yet fundamental question is the last piece
in the Greek puzzle.
marita and barbarossa
569
Chapter Twenty
Marita and Barbarossa

There is no question that the German invasion of Greece on 6 April 1941
was fundamentally connected with the attack launched against the USSR
a little over six weeks later, on 22 June. Indeed, as has been discussed, the
need to safeguard the Romanian oil fields as well as the need to protect the
southern flank of the planned thrust into Soviet Union, both of which
demanded an intervention in their own right, were driving forces behind
Hitlers decision first to capture northern Greece, and then to remove the
Allied presence from the entire Greek peninsula (and Crete). On 20 February 1941 Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, chief of OKW, presented to Hitler a
memorandum prepared by Lieutenant General Georg Thomas, of the Defence Economy and Armament Office in OKW, entitled Military and Economic Consequences of an Operation in the East. A copy was sent to Gring.
In it Thomas pointed out that German oil stocks would not be enough to
meet the planned German operations in the USSRrather they would be
sufficient for only two complete months of operation. Gring subsequently met with Ion Antonescu, the Romanian Prime Minister, on 5 March, to
ensure quicker supply of Romanian oil. Also, Barbarossas Directive 21, of
18 December 1940, saw the line Volga-Archangelsk as the final goal of the
operation, 1500 kilometres from the Reich border, with the early occupation
of the Donez basin in the south. This omitted the Caucasian oil fields
making the retention and protection of the Romanian fields even more
important (although by July Hitler had foreseen the conquest of Baku in a
separate operation after reaching the Volga-Archangelsk line).1 Hitler saw
the eastern Mediterranean primarily, therefore, as a first line of defence for
a vital economic resource and his plans for Lebensraum in the east. In this
way, in the words of Brigadier Walter Warlimont, deputy head of OKW
Operations Staff, Operation Marita was directed essentially against
England, essentially defensive, and always secondary to the planned
Soviet campaign.2
1See Eichholtz, Krieg um l, pp. 46, 80-1.
2Hitler was, for example (according to Warlimont), equally determined that Crete
should not remain in the hands of the British because of the danger of air attacks on the
Romanian oil-fields: Warlimont, Inside Hitlers Headquarters 1939-45, p. 131.
570
chapter twenty
However, while the connections between Marita and Barbarossa are

clear, the strategic importance of the relationship between them, and in
particular the degree to which Greece fatally interfered with German plans
for the USSR, is much more open to debate. This is a key question because
as German fortunes in the USSR waned, the idea that Greece saved the
Soviets became perhaps the most powerful tool by which those on the Allied side involved in Greece legitimised and justified their decisions and
actions. Many of the key Allied actors in Greece and the wider war in 1941,
men such as Wilson, Eden and Churchill, and after the war on the German
side men such as List and even Keitel (eager to find excuses for the failure
of Barbarossa), championed the notion that the German invasion of Greece
was decisive in this regard. Indeed, as early as September 1941 Colville recorded Churchills reflection that the campaign, and the Yugoslav volte-face
which it entailed, had delayed Germany and might after all prove to have
been an advantage.3 It was, after all, the continuing British interest and
ever-growing presence in the Balkans, culminating in the deployment of
W Force, which forced the Germans to act, and in doing so ruined the
planned timetable for Barbarossa. Such an enforced delay to the start-date
for the invasion of the USSR then put German forces in the east behind
schedule, eventually making them vulnerable to the Russian winter, which
in turn saved Moscow and marked the first step towards German defeat in
a theatre that was decisive for the war in Europe. The argument made by
these men was picked up and passed on by a succession of historians and
commentators of the campaign in Greece. If such an interpretation is correct, the repercussions are enormous. Any amount of Allied ineptitude in
Greece, indeed the defeat of the Greek Army and W Force in its entirety,
melts away in the face of such an argument. If Greece was a material cause
of German defeat on the Eastern Front then not only was the British deployment wholly justified by any scale of measurement, but the campaign
might rightly be described as an important turning point in the war as a
whole. That is, of course, if it is correct. Given its importance, such a thesis
requires careful thought and analysis.4
3Entry for 28 September 1941, Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street diaries
1939-1955, Norton, New York, 1985, p. 443.
4On Eden and the origins of this Allied justification see Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten
Weltkrieg, pp. 429-30, and Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941,
pp. 282-4; on its role in Greek politics and historiography, see Richter, Griechenland im
Zweiten Weltkrieg, pp. 431-3. On the German generals and Nazi leaders reasons for supporting this, because it prevented focus on their own mistakes, ibid., pp. 433-5. It has been
speculated that success in Greece opened up significant strategic opportunities for the
571
The place to begin such an investigation is with the German planning

process for Operation Barbarossa, as it related to the invasion of Greece
(and Yugoslavia). Hitler and his military commanders were from the very
beginning conscious of the importance of the timing of the starting date
of the invasion of the USSR. Directive 21 specifically noted the need to
crush the USSR in a rapid campaign, with preparations for it to be concluded by mid-May 1941. The German Army High Command followed with
a similar directive of its own on 31 January 1941. German planners were very
much concerned with not being tied down in the Balkans a day longer
than necessary.5 It was essential that the invasion of the Soviet Union start
as soon as possible in order to make best use of favourable weather. Good
weather was important as it was required for speed, so that the attackers
could reach their first territorial objective (and limit of a viable German
supply line)the line of the Dnepr-Dvina Riversas fast as possible. In
an incredible display of misplaced assumptions and optimism, the whole
strategic basis of Barbarossa was that a successful drive from the Soviet
frontier to this line would, in the space of a few weeks, paralyse and destroy
the fighting potential of the Red Army. Such a lightning drive would thus
avoid the spectre of a war of attrition. Only around five months then, from
the middle of May and to onset of winter, was to be allowed for the conduct
of this monumental invasion.6
Complicating the German imperative to begin Barbarossa as soon as
possible in May, in order that it be concluded before the onset of the Soviet winter, was the need to act in Greece. Thus the relationship between
the two operations, from the outset, was intimate. Operation Marita was
a pre-condition for Barbarossa. The attack on Greece, framed as a supporting operation for the invasion of the USSR, was actually referred to in German documents as an auxiliary measure. It is clear that individuals and
staffs of key formations that fought in the Balkans, for example, continued
their work planning and preparing for Barbarossa during the campaign.
The two invasions were, from December 1940, connected in their logic and
timingorganisationally, operationally and strategically. Marita and BarGermans with regard to pursuing Grand Admiral Eric Admiral Raeders dream of a Mediterranean strategy. In this regard see Warlimont, Inside Hitlers Headquarters 1939-45, p. 130.
Aside from the inevitable logistic and naval difficulties of this strategy, however, it was
never a possibility with German attention focused to the east.
5Warlimont, Inside Hitlers Headquarters 1939-45, p. 130.
6E. Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, Hodder Arnold, New York, 2007, p. 41; Stahel,
Operation Barbarossa and Germanys Defeat in the East, pp. 41-2, 77.
572
chapter twenty
barossa had, from a German perspective, to be well-coordinated. More

importantly, for several key reasons the occupation of Greece had to be
completed before the invasion of the USSR could be launched.7
The first and most obvious factors that demanded the German military
complete Marita before the start of the Soviet campaign were strategic.
They were, in short, the same considerations that convinced Hitler to act
in Greece in the first place, and they have been discussed in detail in the
earlier chapters. To recapitulate, mainland Greece (and Crete) had to be
cleared of an Allied presence as they put the RAF in range of the Romanian
oil fields, a key economic asset and vital strategic resourceeven if Germany was not planning to invade the USSRand doubly so given plans
for Barbarossa. Hitler was particularly and personally sensitive to the risk
of Allied attack against these oilfields and specifically ordered the German
22nd (Air Landing) Division, flown in March 1940 to Ploesti, to protect them
from sabotage (thus rendering it unavailable for the capture of Crete).
Moreover, the growing British interest and presence in Greece in early 1941
represented an unacceptable risk to the right flank of the planned German
invasion of the USSR. Allied interference from the south was not to be
countenanced. Hitler would not launch Barbarossa while there was a threat
to Romanian oil (see Chapter 2).8
The problem then for German planners, faced with the unavoidable
need to tie the start date of Barbarossa to the end date of Marita, was that
any delay in starting the invasion of Greece threatened to reduce an already
tight timeline for the scheduled beginning of the operation against the
USSR. Yet there was little that could be done to prevent it. Delays in the
build-up for Marita for the 12th Army in Bulgaria in mid-January 1941 soon
began to pressure the planned mid-May start date for Barbarossa decided
upon in December the previous year. As a consequence, by the end of
January the scheduled launch date for Barbarossa had begun to slip, with
1 June 1941 now put forward as a start date. The decision by Hitler (made
on 17 March) to drive the British from the whole Greek mainland, not just
northern Greece, set the Barbarossa timetable back even further and threat7Entry for 27 March 1941, Kriegstagebuch des Panzerarmee-Oberkdo 1 (bis 5.10. Pz.
Gr. 1) Teil I Vorbereitungen der Operation Barbarossa (5.2. 21.6.41), BA MA RH 21-1/463
Teil I; G. Theophanous, The Impact of Operation Marita on the Timing of Operation Barbarossa, International Congress for the 50 Years from the 1940-1941 Epopee and the Battle for
Crete, pp. 67-8.
8Theophanous, The Impact of Operation Marita on the Timing of Operation
Barbarossa, p. 70.
573
ened to destroy the necessary coordination between both operations. By

22 March it was clear that the 12th Armys infantry divisions could never
hope to complete the invasion of Greece and return in time for the beginning of Barbarossa on 1 June. The time required for the concentration of
forces south in the Balkans was eating away at the additional time required
to re-concentrate them for the thrust against the USSR. In the last week of
March, therefore, increasingly desperate attempts were made to speed up
Marita. This is why, although his deployments and preparations in Bulgaria yet were incomplete, List nonetheless strove to comply with the schedules set for him, and planned his attack on Greece to start on 1 April. The
Yugoslavia coup, however, meant the end for any German hopes of a late
May-early June start for Barbarossa. Plans drawn up on 27 March for Operation 25, and the revised plan for Marita, saw Barbarossa postponed once
again. Although it was not as yet an official position at this stage, General
Franz Halder, Head of OKH, believed that at this point the Russian campaign
must be delayed once again, for about four weeks. On 6 April, the day both
Greece and Yugoslavia were attacked, Hitler told Goebbels that he estimated the campaign in Greece and Yugoslavia would take around two
months. A new official start date for Barbarossa was subsequently set for
22 June 1941.9
There is little doubt then that the German planning process for Marita,
and to a lesser degree for Operation 25, forced a delay to the planned start
date for Barbarossa by around six weeks from that which was originally
intended. It is also fair to say that the British decision to land W Force had
helped to bring about this state of affairs. As has been discussed, had the
British stayed out of Greece and had the Italians avoided collapse in Albania (which was likely given the state of Greek logistics after the Tepelene
Offensive) then Hitler may well have been able to avoid a military commitment to the Balkans altogetheras he had always wished. So too, it was
the gradual increase in British commitment to Greece that convinced Hitler to expand Marita into an invasion and occupation of all of Greece
rather than its northern territories. Neither is it likely that Yugoslavia would
have changed from a reluctant ally to an outright enemy had a British presence not been felt in the Balkans. All such deliberations and amendments
9Preliminary history of the Balkan campaign, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal
S.W. List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM 54, 624/7/2; Long, Greece,
Crete and Syria, p. 193; McClymont, To Greece, p. 484; Churchill, The Second World War,
Vol. 5, p. 328; MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume III, p. 525; van Creveld,
Hitlers Strategy 1940-1941, pp. 98-102, 136; entry for 6 April 1941, Goebbels Tagebcher,
Band 4, p. 572.
574
chapter twenty
to the plan for Barbarossa, it should be noted, had thus far been made
without a shot being fired in the Balkan theatre.10
Once the German invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia were underway,
it became clear to the planning staff at OKH and OKW that, despite the
rapid success of the campaigns, it would be impossible to bring forward
the newly proposed 22 June start date for Barbarossa. The forces involved
in the Balkan operations would be needed in the east. War-gaming overseen
by Lieutenant General Friedrich Paulus, Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief
of the Operations Section at OKH, in late 1940 had already shown the Germans would need every available formation for the planned third stage of
Barbarossa (the occupation of most of the European part of the USSR),
which, even then, Paulus concluded, might not be sufficient numbers. Even
though Paulus failed to even try to persuade Hitler (or OKH) of the significance of his findings, the need for every available unit for Barbarossa
was well understood prior to 6 April. The issue then was one of re-deployment from the Balkans to the Barbarossa staging areas. In this regard the
invasion of Yugoslavia was not a point of grave concern. In fact, it opened
an avenue of attack into Greece which helped break the defenders more
quickly and provided roads that could move units back into Germany in
preparation for the invasion of the USSR much faster than had such redeployments been limited to Greek-Bulgarian roads alone. As soon as it was
clear that the Yugoslav campaign was decided, the flow of German forces
into the country was reversed. As early as 14 April some of Weichs infantry
formations were re-routed to their Barbarossa concentration points, while
on 24 April three of the 2nd Armys armoured divisions were ordered to
return to Germany. By end of May German security divisions had released
the last combat troops in Yugoslavia earmarked for action in the USSR.11
The speed of re-deployment out of the Balkans in preparation for Barbarossa by Weichs 2nd Army in Yugoslavia could never be replicated by
Lists 12th Army in Greece. In fact, as early as 5 December 1940 Field Marshal
Walther von Brauchitsch, commander of the German Army, had made clear
to Hitler his opinion that the troops used in Marita would not be available
at the start of the invasion of the USSR. The imperative for speed, however,
clearly affected the course and conduct of Marita. Major General Mackay
10Greeces campaign against the Axis, June 1946, TNA WO 106/3125.
11Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germanys Defeat in the East, pp. 55-60; Van Creveld,
Hitlers Strategy 1940-1941, pp. 95, 182; Theophanous, The Impact of Operation Marita on
the Timing of Operation Barbarossa, p. 70.
575
specifically noted, for example, German tactics borne of confidence in

numbers and equipment, pushing on without waiting, infiltrating here and
outflanking there.12 Confidence was no doubt an issue in this regard, and
so too pervading German operational preferencesbut an unyielding pressure to finish the Greek campaign as soon as possible added to the mix.
The need to finish Marita in time for Barbarossa was behind a number of
specific German decisions during the campaign. On 8 April, only 48 hours
into the campaign, the German General Staff confirmed that the formations
used in Greece would have to be refurbished before they would be employed
in Barbarossa. As a consequence, even before victory was secured, a number of German units in Greece were rushed home for refitting. On 16 April
Hitler directed that German troops must leave the Balkans as soon as possible after the end of the campaign. Subsequent time pressures made it
impossible to disarm or pacify the Greek or Yugoslav populations properly,
particularly in mountain areas. Weapons and military supplies often disappeared before they could be seized, promoting an early rise in the Greek
resistance. The need to redeploy on account of Barbarossa, ordered by
Hitler as early as 16 April, also necessitated handing much of the control
of occupied Greece to the Italians at the earliest possible moment. Thanks,
however, to an almost universal Greek animosity towards the Italians, this
transference of responsibility weakened Tsolakoglous new government,
and tended to encourage further resistance (or at least undermine collaboration). In time, Italian inability to keep the Balkans quiet forced the
Germans, against their wishes, to return.13
In any case the Greek campaign was not complete until the end of April
and significant time was then required in order to withdraw Lists formations back into Romania, in order for them to form the southern prong of
Army Group South, as had been planned, for the coming invasion of the
USSR. The problem of post-campaign movement, however, was compounded by the same congestion, poor quality Greek roads, and a concurrent and
continuing need to move supplies south that had hampered the German
advance from 6-29 April. Even those formations that made it back to north12I. Mackay, Campaign in Greece [transcript], 15 June 1941, AWM 27, 116/1.
13Oberkommando der Wehrmacht W.F.St. /Abt. L, Nr.44545/41 g.Kdos.-Chefs. (I Op
IV/Qu), 18 April 1941, BA MA RW 4/588, pp. 1-8; Jodl, Der Chef des Wehrmachtsfhrungsstabes im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, 12 May 1941, to Chef L, BA MA RW 4/588, p. 1;
Halder, Generalstab des Heeres, Gen Qu/Abt.I/Qu 2 Nr. I/ 0333 /41 geh.Kdos., 8 April 1941,
Betr.: Auffrischung., to Chef H.Rst und B.d.E., BA MA RH 2/927, pp. 1-4; Blau, Invasion
Balkans!, 1997, p. 112; Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 435; Golla, Der Fall
Griechenlands 1941, p. 416.
576
chapter twenty
ern Greece, Bulgaria and eastern Thrace had their railway timetables upset
en route to their Barbarossa concentration points in Galicia by choked up
lines of communication. In the end the Germans were successful in redeploying only one of the three armoured divisions involved in Marita, the
9th Armoured Division, in time for the beginning of Operation Barbarossa.
The 2nd and 5th Armoured Divisions were not able to join the campaign
in Russia until October 1941. As noted after the war by Field Marshals von
Kleist and von Rundstedt, many of the tanks of these divisions, following
Marita, were in dire need of engine overhauls, refits, and crew rest.14 Moreover, the 12th Army, as a formation, was unable to redeploy in time. It was
subsequently ordered, minus its armoured formations, to remain on temporary occupation duties in Greece. Army Group South was thus robbed
of six infantry divisions for the attack on the USSR. There was no chance
that even those elements of the 12th Army that did manage to redeploy in
time for Barbarossa could have done so any earlier. Once again, Marita
ensured Barbarossa could begin no earlier than 22 June.15
Importantly, it was not only the inevitably slow redeployment of German
ground formations in Greece to their Barbarossa assembly areas that precluded any earlier start than 22 June for the attack against the USSR, but
those in the air as well. Richthofens 8th Air Corps, the primary Luftwaffe
formation used in the Greek campaign, was itself earmarked as a vital component of Barbarossa. It was to fight during the invasion of the USSR in the
central group of armies (within the 2nd Air Fleet) which represented the
main German thrust. On 22 June the Luftwaffe positioned some 1,945 aircraft
for the invasion.16 The 8th Air Corps held 680 of them35 per cent of
total airpower available for Barbarossaon a critical front. Richthofens
aerial forces were critical for the invasion. The 8th Air Corps, however, could
only be transferred to its Barbarossa staging points, from Craiova to Oderberg and to Souvalky, in Poland, from the end of Mayat the completion
of the invasion of Crete. The contingent relationship between Crete and
Barbarossa was recognized at the time. On 12 May German planners met
in Salzburg specifically to adjudicate between the demands of both opera14Theophanous, The Impact of Operation Marita on the Timing of Operation Barbarossa, pp. 70-1.
15Letter, Blumentritt to Liddell Hart, 17 March 1948, LHCMA 15/15/14; Long, Greece,
Crete and Syria, p. 193; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 95, 101; van Creveld, Hitlers Strategy
1940-1941, pp. 134-5; McClymont, To Greece, p. 484.
16This is the figure for operational war planes deployed in the east. In total the Luftwaffe deployed 3,904 aircraft in the east (3,032 operational). MGFA, Germany and the
Second World War, Volume IV, pp. 370-1.
577
tions. The movement of Richthofens corps was actually carried out between
28 May and 20 June. It was logistically impossible to redeploy this key Luftwaffe formation any faster. It is also noteworthy that the need for speed in
Crete, like mainland Greece, led to a number of improvisations in the
preparation and execution of the operation. Many of these represented
shortcomings that would not have been present had time not been an issue.
Further, losses suffered by the 8th Air Corps in Crete, especially in troop
carriers, materially affected the air strength available for Barbarossa. The
decimation of airborne troops in Crete and the impact this had on Hitlers
opinion on the viability of paratroop operations also reduced the possibility of similar large-scale airborne actions on the Eastern Front. The German
attack on Crete was quite obviously made possible by, and in many ways
was an extension of, Operation Marita. Once more, this time from a Luftwaffe perspective, as a consequence of the necessary invasion of Greece,
22 June was the earliest possible moment Germany could launch its invasion of the USSR.17
Despite the obvious connections, the idea that Marita delayed the start
date for Barbarossa from mid-May until 22 June is a notion that has come
in and out of historical fashion. One alternative interpretation de-emphasizes the role of the campaign in Greece in this regard in favour of focusing
upon meteorological factors. This line of argument suggests that it was the
annual spring flooding in eastern Poland and western European Russia that
caused mid-May to be set as the earliest possible original start date for
Barbarossa in the first place. Before that date the ground in the vicinity of
the Bug and San rivers, the former of which was the new dividing line between Germany and the USSR after the annexation of Poland in 1939, and
the latter of which ran north-south in southwest Poland near the Ukraine
border, was usually a sodden morass with muddy roads. This had been the
same reason why the German offensive in 1915, from Galicia at Gorlice
Tarnow, had itself been set to begin no earlier than May. Further east at
that time of year such problems were typically even more pronounced,
especially in boggy forests near Rokitno and Berezina.
In this context, while advocates of the weather argument in general
accept that Barbarossa was around six weeks late in starting, they point
17Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Nr.44 708/41 gK Chefs. WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.), 12 May
1941, Protokoll der Besprechung am 12.5. 18.00 Uhr bei OKW/WFSt./Abt. L in Salzburg, BA
MA RW 4/588, pp. 1-6; Campaigns in Greece and Crete, B. Freyberg, October 1941, ANZ
ACGR 8476, PUTTICK2/4/6; Theophanous, The Impact of Operation Marita on the Timing
of Operation Barbarossa, pp. 70-1; van Creveld, Hitlers Strategy 1940-1941, pp. 171, 176.
578
chapter twenty
to the particularly bad weather of the spring of 1941the late thawas

being a much more significant factor than Greece. It was primarily weather conditions, under this line of argument, that prevented a mid-May beginning for the invasion of the USSR. The claim is that as late as the beginning
of June 1941 the Polish-Russian river valleys were still flooded and partly
impassable. This, certainly, was Halders view. He claimed that the Bug and
its tributaries were still too swollen until early June 1941 which precluded
an earlier launch for Barbarossa. So too, Lieutenant General Gnther Blumentritt, at the time Chief of Staff of the German 4th Army (part of Army
Group Centre), later claimed that in late May 1941 many western Polish
rivers, including the Bug in front of his army in the Brest-Litovsk area, were
still overflowing their banks. Even after the floods stopped, according to
Blumentritt, it usually took 8-10 days after the arrival of summer to dry the
region sufficiently for military manoeuvres. It was thus severe flooding in
Eastern Europe that prevented wide-ranging military movement before
mid-June, and underwrote the decision to set the Barbarossa start-date at
22 June. Such certainly arguments swayed, among others, the influential
British military historian, Sir Basil Liddell Hart. At the same time, in recent
years the testimony of a number of senior German officers such as Halder
and Blumentritt about the course and conduct of the war against the USSR
from the German perspective has come under criticism. They have been
shown to be unreliable witnesses. In this regard the idea of an impassable
Polish mire in May might also be questioned.18
In assessing the validity of the weather argument over Greece as the
primary cause for delay in launching Barbarossa, the most recent version
of this argument examines some meteorological data for the regions in
Poland and western Russia through which the German invasion needed to
pass. To begin with, average temperatures in 1941 were not severe. In the
Vilnius area (in the path of Army Group North), for example, the temperature in May averaged 9.4 degrees, rising in June to 15.2 degrees celsius. Nor
was rainfall in the area much more of a problem than was typical. In April
1941 it was slightly above the average for that month, but in May rainfall
18For a detailed discussion of this with respect to Halder, for example, see R. Smelser
and E.J. Davies, The Myth of the Eastern Front, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008.
In this book the authors argue that, after 1945, thanks to his own publications and influence
over Western historians, Halder played a key role in creating a misleading view of the NaziSoviet war. Letter, Blumentritt to Liddell Hart, 17 March 1948, LHCMA 15/15/14; Famous
Men-and the Great Greek Blunder, B. Liddell Hart. LHCMA 15/15/14; MGFA, Germany and
the Second World War, Volume III, p. 525.
579
was significantly less than the typical monthly average. The situation was
much the same around Warsaw and the staging areas for Army Group Centre. In May and June Warsaw had only three days where rainfall was in
excess of nine millimetres per day. For 43 days in this period total rainfall
each day was between 0-1 millimetres. For the crucial first half of May average rainfall was 1-1.2 millimetres per day (excluding 2 May when 6.5 millimetres fell). During the first nine days of June there was no rain at all in
the Warsaw area. Such figures do not point to an uncommonly wet season,
or unusually wet conditions in key Barbarossa assembly areas. Moving
south, from 15 May to 15 June 1941 there was no widespread flooding in or
around city of Zamosh (230 kilometres southwest of Warsaw and 45 kilometres from the Bug River at the old Polish-Soviet border). From 1 April to
15 June the ground in the area was dry for whole, or part of the day, for 39
days. Only for seven days in total did it rain all day. Interestingly, arguments
to do with the weather as a factor delaying the start of Barbarossa were
also challenged by men such as General Heinz Guderian (himself, admittedly, not always a reliable source), in command of the 2nd Armoured
Group (Army Group Centre) for the invasion of the USSR. Guderian later
claimed that he personally reconnoitred Bug and its tributaries and found
them overflowing only until early May. Besides, the Germans had in the
past successfully experimented in crossing the river in waterproof tanks.
Papagos claimed that Halder told him, contrary to his later testimony, when
both were prisoners in the same German camp, that it was the Greek campaign, not the weather that forced the German General Staff to change the
start date for Barbarossa.19
Leaving aside the weather then, there were additional causes of the
delay imposed on Barbarossa that were not related to military operations
in Greece. Van Creveld has argued that German equipment shortages of
all kinds would have prevented Barbarossa from starting any earlier than
22 June, regardless of Marita or swollen Polish rivers. He argues that at the
time the invasion of the USSR was finally launched, some 40 per cent of
attacking German divisions had to be wholly or in part supplied with cap19For a full discussion of this issue see the work of Andrew Zapantis, the first scholar
to use surviving Eastern European meteorological data to make a case that spring in Poland
in 1941 was not exceptionally wet or cold, and therefore the weather could not have been
a significant factor in the decision to delay the Russian invasion until 22 June: A. Zapantis,
Hitlers Balkan campaign and the invasion of the USSR, East European Monographs, Boulder,
1987, passim. See also Theophanous, The Impact of Operation Marita on the Timing of
Operation Barbarossa, pp. 68-9.
580
chapter twenty
tured French material. The 10th Armoured Division, for example, did not
receive its complement of equipment until it started marching east on 10
June. Similarly, the 20th Armoured Division and the 14th, 18th, 25th and
36th Motorised Divisions were all supplied with French vehicles, and postponement of their movement east to their Barbarossa assembly areas was
still under discussion on 20 May. The 13th Armoured Division was only
ready on 28 May and the 3rd Motorised Division only received its full complement of equipment at the last moment before moving east on 6 June.
The arrival of the last Barbarossa attack formation at its pre-invasion staging area from Greece, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Division (upgraded
from its regimental status after Marita), was unquestionably delayed by a
shortage of vehicles for its replenishment.20
Overall, the answer to the question of why Barbarossa was delayed from
a planned start date of mid-May to 22 June is, predictably, complex. It is
entirely possible to go too far in focusing in any one direction and suggest,
for example, that it was Greece, and only Greece, that was responsible for
the delay in the invasion of Russia.21 In truth, the delay had multiple, but
not equal, causes. The first point to keep in mind is that the 22 June date
was put forth in early April and confirmed at the end of April. Insofar as
weather was concerned German planners may well have been influenced
by fears of a late thaw, boggy terrain and flooded riversbut these were
not known facts in the first week of April. A prediction of bad weather may
have been an important consideration in framing the Barbarossa start-date,
but it could not have been a definitive one. To this end the divergent views
of Halder and Guderian (and historians like Zapantis for that matter) as to
the state of the eastern Polish rivers and potential going in western Russia
in May 1941 are moot. The date had already been set, before the state of any
unusual flooding could be known, and once it had been initiated the machinery of military preparation meant that it could not be easily amended.
There are weaknesses, also, in the equipment argument of van Creveld,
again related to the fact that the start date for Barbarossa was set in April
not May or June. It is possible, for example, that German logistics organisations were simply working to the deadlines provided. Had the date for
Barbarossa been set earlier, German re-fitters and movement controllers
20Van Creveld, Hitlers Strategy 1940-1941, pp. 174-5. Mllers graph in MGFA, Germany
and Second World War, Volume IV (pp. 222-3) notes that the 25th and 36th Motorised Divisions used German vehicles. The point, however, remains the same.
21This is the case, for example, in Zapantis thesis. For a further critique of Zapantis
arguments see Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 431-2.
581
might (theoretically at least) have found ways to accommodate it. This

brings the debate back, once more, to Greece.
As a consequence of the speed of the Yugoslav capitulation, the duration
of large-scale German military involvement in the Balkans was inevitably
set by the length of time it took to capture Greece. It was not by coincidence
that Barbarossa start date was confirmed only at the end of the Greek
campaign (late April). The invasion of the USSR could not, and would
never be launched until the successful conclusion of this campaign, and
the subsequent invasion of Crete which itself was contingent on, and an
extension of, Operation Marita. It is here, perhaps, that one might look to
the weather. After all, the late thaw of 1941 delayed the opening of the
Bulgarian passes and slowed the 12th Armys concentrationdelaying the
start of Marita, with an inevitable impact on Barbarossa. All German units
from the Balkans, in particular motorized or mechanized formations,
needed a minimum of three weeks for refitting after the campaigns in
Yugoslavia and Greece ended. So too, it would take time for the 8th Air
Corps to redeploy in preparation for Barbarossa after Crete had been takenand the Crete operation was approved by Hitler before the Barbarossa start date was confirmed on 30 April. Such factors were known to
Brauchitsch and his staff in the first week of April in a way that the weather and other equipment-related considerations could only be guessed at
or estimated. The inescapable conclusion is that it was perhaps not exclusively, but certainly primarily Operation Marita that delayed the beginning
of Barbarossa until 22 June 1941.22
Having established that Barbarossa was delayed, and that the primary
(but not sole) cause of that delay was the invasion of Greece, what light
does this shed on the original British decision to deploy W Force? After all,
if the delay to Barbarossa was, in fact, a key factor in the eventual defeat
of the German invasion by the Soviets, then it seems that the decision to
deploy to Greece was not only justified but a stroke of strategic genius. The
problem, however, is that this compelling and attractive line of argument
is fundamentally flawed in that it relies on retrospective reasoning. It is
true that correspondence between Churchill, Eden and Dill in early 1941
demonstrates that potential Russian-German enmity was a broad political
consideration against which the decision to support Greece was taken. At
the same time, however, no direct link was ever made, at the time, between
22Higham, The Myth of the Defence of Northern Greece October 1940 April 1941,
p. 221.
582
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a British deployment to Greece and its likely implications for the defence
of the USSR. The Australian Prime Minister at the time of the campaign,
for example, was quite clear after the war that at no time in the lead-up to
Greece was it suggested that the landing might influence the course of
German-Soviet relations. Despite Churchills and Edens subsequent claims
about the impact of Marita on Barbarossa, there was never any suggestion
on the British side prior to 6 April that any W Force objective was to delay
or help thwart a German attack on Russia. According to Wavell no one in
the prelude to Greece ever raised the issue let alone suggested that an intervention might help delay an attack on Russia. This essential truth was
confirmed by Freyberg who claimed repeatedly that there was never any
appreciation before the campaign that foresaw a German attack on Russia.
That a delay resulted was, from a British perspective, a strategic accident.
Thus any and all claims using Barbarossa to justify W Force were, in Freybergs opinion, all part of a tendency for those who were responsible ... to
minimise the disaster.23 Such a method of justification, noted Major General de Guingand, is similar to a punter who, who having bought by mistake
the wrong ticket at the tote, finds that horse wins, and then goes about
saying What a clever boy am I!24
Yet during the war these claims were made strongly. Wilson, for example,
addressing 400 expatriated Allied prisoners from Greek campaign in November 1943 in Cairo, proclaimed: We have definite proof that if we had
not gone into Greece the attack against Russia would have started much
earlier, with the Russians defeat as a possible result.25 It was the winter
which saved Moscow, he claimed, and Greece was responsible for the six
weeks delay which allowed the winter to intervene.26 Much further east
Stalin emphasized the point broadcasting to the Greeks on Moscow Radio:
You were small but you have fought against the big ones and you have
prevailed Thanks to your sacrifice, we Russians have gained time to defend
ourselves, and for this we are grateful to you.27 Hitler himself in February
1945 claimed the delay caused by the Greek campaign led directly to the
24Famous Men-and the Great Greek Blunder, B. Liddell Hart, LHCMA 15/15/14. Notes
of discussion with R.G. Menzies, then Prime Minister of Australia, 2 February 1948, LHCMA
15/15/14; Notes of an interview, Long and Wavell, 11 March 1949, AWM 67, 5/17; McClymont,
To Greece, p. 482.
25Age, Campaign in Greece, 12 November 1943, NAA A5954, 528/1.
26Ibid.
27Martis, The Battle for the Fortified Positions of Macedonia and Thrace, p. 50.
583
Figure 20.1:German troops move along a road on bicycles, motor bikes, and in trucks
and tanks during Operation Barbarossa in the Soviet Union. (Source: Australian War
Memorial: P02018.061)
calamitous delay of the attack on Russia.28 Had Germany been able to

launch Barbarossa in mid-May as initially intended, wrote Hitler, we would
have been in a position to end the campaign in the East before the onset
of winter.29 Such a theme also echoed through the post-war apologetics
of a range of senior German strategists and planners. Field Marshal von
Kleist contended that the main cause of our failure [in the USSR] was that
year winter came early.30At Nuremberg Field Marshal Keitel stated that
without the great delay imposed by Greece, events on the Eastern Front
and the war as a whole would have turned out very differently.31 Such
testimony must, however, be treated carefully. It was, no doubt, much more
comfortable and self-serving for senior German staff officers to admit to
28See Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, p. 107. Mawdsley quotes from A. Hitler, Hitlers
Politisches Testament, Albrecht Knaus, Hamburg, 1991, p. 87f.
29Ibid.
30Theophanous, The Impact of Operation Marita on the Timing of Operation Barbarossa, p. 68.
31Martis, The Battle for the Fortified Positions of Macedonia and Thrace, p. 50.
584
chapter twenty
being defeated by winter than it was to concede their own planning failures.32
There are important problems with this interpretation. First, even if the
early winter of 1941 was accepted as a genuine cause of German defeat in
the east (which, as will be shown later, it is not), German troops were not
caught in the cold purely on account of Barbarossas delayed beginning.
Rather, the root cause was that the basic assumption behind German strategy in USSR had been shown to be flawed by the end of summer 1941. The
invaders had reached the Dnepr-Dvina line well before winter but had not
ended Soviet resistance as predicted. The Germans now sought an alternative means of ensuring victory. Hitler and German High Command disagreed strongly over what policy should be followed, which at this point
cost the Germans several weeks.33 Halder (conveniently ignoring logistic
constraints) had always regarded the southern thrust into the Ukraine a
diversion from the main effort that should have been consistently directed
at the Red Army in front of Moscow. Halder was backed by Field Marshal
Fedor von Bock (in command of Army Group Centre) and by Brauchitsch
(who was typically less outspoken). Nonetheless, after a series of confrontations Hitler got his way. Rather than renew an immediate offensive against
Moscow, on 21 August Army Group Centre began a huge right hook manoeuvre that took Kiev on 19 Septemberand more than 650,000 Soviet
troops. Precious time and resources were expended by Hitlers insistence
that Leningrad and the Ukraine be the primary objectives of the next phase
of the invasion, until it was eventually agreed to drive on Moscow before
the onset of winter. It was not until the first week of October then that
Operation Typhoon, the push to Moscow, was well underway. Six Soviet
armies were encircled at Vyazma and Bryanskwith the loss of 600,000
more Soviet troops. On 16 October, with the Germans within 140 kilometres
32MGFA, Germany and the Second World War, Volume III, p. 525.
33There is a comprehensive literature on the German decision not to press on against
Moscow in August or September 1941. See, for example, W. Murray and A.R. Millett, A War
to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2000;
Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germanys Defeat in the East; A. Tooze, The Wages of
Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, Penguin, London, 2007; Mawdsley, Thunder in the East; D.M. Glantz and J.M. House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red
Army Stopped Hitler, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1995; K. Reinhardt, Moscow the
Turning Point: The Failure of Hitlers Strategy in the Winter of 1941-1942, Berg, Oxford, 1992; J.
Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalins War with Germany, Sterling, London, 2002; M. van
Creveld, Hitlers Strategy 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue, Cambridge University Press, London,
1973; E.F. Ziemke and M.E. Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East, Hippocrene
Books, New York, 1988.
585
from the capital, the population of Moscow briefly panicked. By 31 October,

however, the German advance had run out of steam and Operation Typhoon
was ordered to a halt as the temperatures fell.34
There are a number of reasons why the Germans failed to press on against
Moscow immediately from August 1941. First, after a slow start by Army
Group South in the first two weeks of the invasion, success in the central
sector had been less spectacular than in Belorussia and the Ukraine. On
top of this was ongoing interest in the economic resources to the south. At
the same time Hitler also believed the defending Soviet armies in the Moscow region had already been broken, and that the northern and southern
theatres were more vulnerable than ever. Furthermore, the Germans still
had to deal with the huge numbers of Soviet prisoners taken west of Moscow, as well as continuing resistance that around Viazma and south of
Briansk. Last, time was needed to bring forward supplies to the infantrymen
of Army Group Centre. With all this in mind it is fair to suggest that German
decision-making was at least as responsible for failing to take Moscow
before winter as was the late beginning to the invasion. The Germans did
not fail to capture Moscow because of freezing weather; rather they were
caught short by the weather because they failed to reach Moscow. There is
an important difference. Last, the assumption that the fall of Moscow in
itself would have a decisive effect on the Soviet will or ability to continue
to resist the Germans is unfounded.35
Even more importantly, any idea that Marita, through the delay it caused
Barbarossa, was an important factor in the overall German failure on the
Eastern Front is undermined by the growing body of historical scholarship
pointing to the irrelevance of winter as an explanation for this defeat.
34See the forthcoming study by David Stahel, Operation Typhoon and Hitlers drive on
Moscow (2013), passim. We are grateful to Dr Stahel for allowing us to read the manuscript
in press.
35Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 109-10; Tooze, Wages of Destruction, pp. 488-95.
For an example of the type of work contending that had only Moscow been attacked in
August 1941 it would have fell to the Germans, which would likely have changed the course
and even the outcome of the war in the East, see R.H.S. Stolfi, Hitlers Panzers East: World
War II Reinterpreted, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1991. Contrary to this thesis,
however, had Moscow been taken there is little evidence to suggest that Stalin and the
Soviet leadership would have lost popular credibility and authority. Nor is there sufficient
evidence to conclude that the Soviet people and troops would have, as a consequence,
somehow become too demoralized to carry on fighting. Due to the nature of the Soviet
system the loss of the capital may not have been critical at all. Weinberg, A World at Arms,
p. 270; Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, p. 70; Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germanys
Defeat in the East, pp. 339-44.
586
chapter twenty
Despite the remarkable achievements of German soldiers and their commanders, the invasion had failed before the Soviet winter.
By September 1941 the Germans had actually driven almost 650 kilometres into the USSR. As noted, the Germans had reached and exceeded the
Dnepr-Dvina lineby which time the Red Army was supposed to have
been broken. In the process the Soviets had suffered enormous damage
some 177 Soviet divisions were lost in 1941, in excess of 2 million troops
most from June-September. The real problem for the Germans was not the
weather at this stage, rather the fact that despite their suffering enormous
losses the Soviets had fought harder than expected. The Germans from this
point found themselves facing the second strategic echelon of the Red
Army, which itself was being constantly reinforced by reserve formations
from deeper within the USSR. The invaders had grossly underestimated
the number of divisions Stalin was able to put into the field, the tenacity
displayed by those formations despite their lack of equipment, training
and leadership; and the political strength and unity behind them which
was not, again contrary to German expectations, showing any signs of disintegration. What followed was a war of attrition that the Germans were
unlikely to win. It was entirely unsurprising, in this context, that German
field officers would use their memoirs and post-war testimonies to blame
time and winter for their failurecrediting the Red Army and the Soviet
state for it was a much less palatable option.36
There is no question that the German failure to break Soviet resistance
in 1941, despite unprecedented victories and advances, was a turning point
on the Eastern Front. Importantly, however, recent studies stress that this
failure was based on a combination of poor German operational and logistic planning, inadequate intelligence, ideologically and incorrect raciallybased assumptions about the fighting potential of Soviet soldiers and the
Communist state, and the imbalance between Germanys resources and
the scale of the victory it had to achieve. Stahels in-depth analysis of the
1941 summer campaign, for example, highlights the remarkable internal
problems of the key German armoured formations. He shows how such
difficulties, unrelated to the onset of winter, were already present during
the earliest phases of the invasion. Other recent scholars of the Eastern
Front such as Glantz and Mawdsley have begun to show how the first few
months of Barbarossa were far from the easy victories for the German army
as they have so often been portrayed. Rather, the fighting was hard and the
36Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 85-7; Tooze, Wages of Destruction, p. 487.
587
casualties heavy, on the German side as well as the Soviet. These historians,
and others in recent years, have gone a long way to demonstrate that Soviet tenacity prior to winter in 1941, in spite of tremendous losses, coupled
with German logistic and other difficulties, had already converted the campaign into a battle of attrition that Germany could not win.37
In conclusion, the idea that Greece saved Russia cannot be sustained.
It is clear that Operation Marita, more than any other single factor, encouraged the German High Command to postpone the start date for Barbarossa from mid-May to 22 June 1941. While considerations such as the
meteorological conditions in eastern Poland and western Russia, along
with inevitable problems associated with supplying and equipping such a
vast invasion force, may well have helped inform such a decision, these
factors cannot detract from the central importance of Greece in this regard.
At the same time the delay caused by Marita cannot, by any stretch of legitimacy, be used to justify the decision to deploy W Force. The likely outcome of a German invasion of Russia was not a meaningful part of British
strategic calculations at the time. That it was used after the fact in such a
way speaks more to the agendas and imperatives of those individuals touting such a message than it does to historical accuracy or proper context.
Nor can the delay caused to Barbarossa by Marita be reasonably portrayed
as a cause or catalyst for German defeat in the east. In the first instance the
Germans themselves wasted almost as much time deciding upon strategic
priorities after their initial successes as that lost in Greece. Second, the
whole conception of the Germans running out of time in Russia and being
beaten by the onset of winter is no longer generally accepted by historians.
The outcome of Barbarossa did not in itself justify the Greek campaign. In
the final analysis the fall of mainland Greece must be judged then on its
own terms.
37See Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germanys Defeat in the East, 2009; Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East; and various titles by David Glantz on the Eastern Front including
Barbarossa Derailed: the battle for Smolensk 10 July 10 September 1941, Vol. 1, Helion and
Company, Solihull, 2010.
588
chapter twenty
epilogue
589
Epilogue
Operation Marita was a clear and comprehensive German success completed in 22 days of fightingdespite British intervention. The invasion
had been planned effectively, despite its hurried schedule and last-minute
changes, and executed by German military professionalsdelayed and
frustrated more often than not by difficult Greek terrain and restricted
routes than by Allied resistance. The Germans achieved all their strategic
objectives in Greece. Britain was forced out of the Balkans and the Aegean;
the campaign strengthened Italys position in southeast Europe and bound
Mussolini closer yet to Hitler; German control of Romanian oil was secured
until April 1944; and, most importantly, the invasion of Russia could now
proceed without any chance of external interference. The cost had been
relatively slight. The 12th Army lost around 1160 killed, 3750 wounded and
another 360 missing.1
Nor did the post-invasion occupation of Greece come with much of a
price for Germany in the first instance. In accordance with Hitlers orders
that only two to three German divisions were to be left in Greece (around
Athens and Salonika), Field Marshal Lists army began to withdraw as
early as the end of April, replaced in the main by Italian troops. Importantly, the campaign was also the last time the Germans fought in World
War II driven purely by strategic and political calculations towards definite
and limited objectives. In the USSR, ideological ends were connected to
operational means. It was also the last time Germany won a strategic victory in the sense that the string of battles brought about a defined political
end state. Greece in many ways thus marked the climax of Nazi confidence,
Hitlers prestige, and German war-making. Six years of diplomacy and two
of conflict had humbled France and removed Britain from the continent.
Most of Europe was under German control. Operation Marita was thus a
high point before a very long fall.2
1Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, p. 432; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, p. 648.
2Oberkommando der Wehrmacht W.F.St. /Abt. L, Nr.44545/41 g.Kdos.-Chefs. (I Op
IV/Qu), 18 April 1941, BA MA RW 4/588, pp. 2-8; Concluding Remarks, reviewed and edited
Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 183; McClymont, To Greece, p. 486; MGFA, Germany and
the Second World War, Volume III, p. 516; van Creveld, Hitlers Strategy 1940 1941, pp. 177-8.
590
epilogue
For the Allied war effort the conclusion of the Greek mainland campaign
represented another serious strategic setback. It was the third time British
forces had been evacuated from continental Europe in the space of two
years, all under humiliating circumstances. Events in Greece, combined
with the threat from Rommel in North Africa, were enough of a political
setback at home for the British government to seek (and receive) affirmation through a vote of confidence. While close to 16,000 troops lost in Greece
(most as prisoners) represented a considerable manpower blow for Britain
and its allies, at this stage in the war the problem of lost soldiers was outstripped as an immediate and pressing concern by the material losses suffered in the campaign. W Force abandoned more than 8000 vehicles, all of
its anti-aircraft guns and artillery pieces, most of its mortars, and almost
all its medium machine guns. Everything that had gone to Greece had had
to be dangerously transported through the gauntlet of U-boats from Britain,
via the Cape of Good Hope. From a naval perspective the campaign had
cost two destroyers and over 300,000 tons of shipping. The RAF lost squadrons of aircraft desperately needed in North Africa. British Middle East
Command had committed its reserve of war materiel to Greece and the
losses could not be easily replenished at this stage of the war.3
There were strategic ramifications as well. The loss of Greece to the Allied cause led to the fall of Crete, the retention of Rhodes by the Italians,
and therefore the loss of sea control in the central Mediterraneanwhich
brought with it a restricted air operation zone for Allied forces in North
Africa and the Middle East. Importantly, with the Royal Navys reconnaissance effort and small craft fleet engaged in moving W Force to Greece,
vigilance over the central Mediterranean inevitably relaxed, allowing Rommels force to deploy to Tripoli.4 There is no question that the Africa Corps
subsequent advances would have been much more difficult had W Force
remained in Libya, not sailed for Greece. When asked whether, if the Greek
campaign had never happened, Rommel could have been held at El Agheila, General Wavell replied possibly.5 Wavell also conceded that if the Benghazi area had been held more strongly, with troops subsequently despatched
to Greece, then Rommel might not have been encouraged to advance so
3Casualties by Arms Greece and Crete, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII 1/26; Battle Casualties By Units Greece & Crete Campaigns (Apr May 1941), ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/57;
Fort, Wavell, p. 204; Cruickshank, Greece 194041, p. 190; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941,
p. 433-4.
5Notes of an interview, Long and Wavell, 11 March 1949, AWM 67, 5/17.
epilogue
591
deeply into Cyrenaica in late March 1941.6 In any case recriminations for
the disaster began immediately in Cairo. In Blameys words there was a
hum of splenetic activity, reminiscent of an overturned beehive. Everybody
was writing out reports, the Army blaming the Air Force the Air Force
blaming the Army The atmosphere was full of acrimonious tension.7 It
was enough, combined with the subsequent loss of Crete, to prompt Sir
Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to
write on 29 April 1941: Our soldiers are the most pathetic amateurs, pitted
against professionals, while General Dill, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff was the most unimpressiveif charmingpersonality I have ever
come across.8
Unsurprisingly, Greek casualties dwarfed German losses, and those of
W Force. From the time of the Italian attack until the end of the mainland
campaign, almost 80,000 Greek soldiers were killed, wounded or missing.
Greek losses from the German invasion extended, however, far beyond
April 1941. The Germans hauled off close to sixty per cent of the Greek
wheat crop for that year, and most available petrol and leather was also
taken back to the Reich. Gold reserves, including rings, were stripped from
Athens and some churches even lost their bells. Meanwhile, occupying Axis
troops cleaned out the countryside of eggs, meat and almost everything
else wherever they were billetedjust as they had, as a consequence of
overextended logistics lines, seized food and other goods as they had advanced. A crisis erupted on 25 April, for example, when the recently surrendered EFAS found itself without enough food to feed its troops. The
Greek commander claimed the Germans had seized the food stocks for
their own men. Similarly, two British soldiers taken prisoner in April 1941,
but who subsequently escaped, for example, reported occupying troops
living on the country and seizing every scrap of food they could find in
shops and houses.9 Aside from plundering the country, German authorities
competed with the Italians for control of the Greek economy. The net result
was to aggravate the problems of the poor harvest of 1941 into a famine in
the winter of 1941-42. In 1942 Mussolini was forced to intervene on Greeces
behalf warning Hitler that the country was facing an economic and financial disaster. The human tragedy was such that by June the same year the
6Letter, Blamey to C-in C Middle East, 7 August 1941. 3DRL 643, 1/4.
7Ibid.; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 195.
8Entry for 29 April 1941, Dilks, Cadogan Diaries, p. 374.
592
epilogue
British had agreed to lift their blockade to supply food for Greek civilians
via the International Red Cross.10
Following its eventual liberation in October 1944 Greece was a shattered
nation, supporting 6.8 million undernourished and barely housed citizens.
It had lost thirteen per cent of its population (940,000 people) and more
than half its national wealth. All but seventy-five of its pre-war merchant
fleet of 483 ships was gone and 472 of its 713 sailing vessels were missing
a disaster for a country dependent on the sea. Britain by comparison lost
one per cent of its population and around a quarter of its wealth during
the war. The United States lost 0.002 per cent of its people during the conflict. Moreover, more than 1700 Greek villages had been destroyed as reprisals for resistance actions during the Axis occupation. Many shared the fate
of the town of Kalavryta, where almost the entire male population were
executed in response to nearby guerrilla activity before the village was
burned. The experience of occupation for Greece had, according to Mark
Mazower, for the scale of famine, inflation and physical destruction few
parallels in Europe.11 Nor did the suffering stop after the war as 1946 marked
the beginning of four years of savage civil war and more armed foreign
intervention. Typical of most intra-state conflict this was perhaps even
more vicious, due to its fratricidal nature, than the invasion and occupation
that preceded it. With British and US support the last Democratic Army of
Greece (Communist) stronghold, located near the Albanian border where
the first shots of the Italo-Greek war were fired in October 1940, fell on 30
August 1949.12
In 1940-1 King George IIs decisions had been guided by the judgement
that Britain would win the war and Greece needed to fight by its side to
have a share in the victorious peace (the same motive as Mussolinis decision to enter the war on the side of Germany). The Kings loyalty to Britain
was rewarded. The United Kingdom ensured that Greece would remain in
the Western sphere of influence in Churchills wartime agreements with
10Report of WO2 T.A.M. Boulter, 19 August 1941, AWM 54, 781/3/2; entry for 25 April
1941, Kriegstagebuch des Kommandos der deutschen Truppen in Epirus. Vom 21.4.41 bis
11.5.41., BA MA RH 26-73/27, pp. 8-9; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and GreekGerman War, p. 298; Mazower, Inside Hitlers Greece, pp. 24-52, 67, 69-70, 375; Richter,
Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 405-19; Zacharioudakis, Die deutschgriechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941, pp. 293-7; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 433-4.
11Mazower, Inside Hitlers Greece, p. xvii.
12Ibid., p. 179; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941,
pp. 251-4.
epilogue
593
Stalin, and Greece was the only Balkan country to remain a monarchy past
the immediate post-war years.13
In many ways the Greek campaign highlighted aspects the historic and
cultural ways of war of both Britain and Germany as displayed in the
early phases of World War II. The British wereto German eyeslavishly
supplied and willing to sacrifice this materiel in order to protect lives. They
drew on their naval strength to reduce the loss of personnel andas an
Imperial powerthey were willing to draw on their Dominion forces. The
British conducted expeditionary warfare with a keen eye to the balance
between loss and gain. Wilson and his superiors ultimately made judicious
decisions about the significance of the theatre to the overall British war
effort, and therefore the extent to which the forces committed should be
sacrificed. This peripheral expeditionary pattern was repeated in the failed
British attempt to capture the Italian-held Dodecanese Islands from 8 September to 22 November 1943.14
For their part, at the time German commanders believed that success
in Greece indicated the superiority of their own way of war. Internal reports
tended to coincide with Hitlers own thoughts on the campaignthat
nothing was impossible for the German soldier. While at one level they
recognised that the British were only defending in rearguard operations,
many German field commanders nonetheless assumed that their own role
had been to break British resistance and to have driven W Force from Greece.
Those commanding the poorly coordinated attack on the New Zealanders
at Molos, for example, believed their success proved the value (as in France)
of pressing into enemy positions at night and that their aggression and the
noise of battle so shook the defenders they fled without a fight, when the
New Zealanders had, in fact, withdrawn. From a Luftwaffe perspective
Richthofen concluded the New Zealand artillery positions near Molos to
have been abandoned due to a collapse resulting from aerial attacks the
day before yesterday.15 In reality, the New Zealanders had simply withdrawn
as planned. Similarly, the earlier attack at the Kleidi Pass was and operations in the Monastir Gap were described as decisive successes achieved
13Ibid., pp. 23-4; Bitzes, Hellas and the War: Trials, Triumph, Tragedy, 1939-1941,
pp. 251-4; R. Clogg, The Greek Government-in-Exile 1941-4, The International History Review,
Vol. 1, No. 3, 1979, pp. 380, 390-2, 397-8; Barker, British Policy in Southeast Europe in the
Second World War, pp. 10, 144-6, 170.
14Holland and Markides, The British and the Hellenes, pp. 193-4.
594
epilogue
with an astonishingly small amount of forces, again ignoring the fact that
the defenders had been intent on retreating.16
Yet many German officers could not see and did not accept that the
retreat and evacuation of W Force during the Greek campaign was more a
consequence of Allied decision-making and operational priorities than the
result of German fighting power on the spot. This assumption was understandable on the face of it. For German forces this was the third time that
they had seen a relatively minor British commitment followed by a fighting
withdrawal in the face of spirited German offensivesin Norway, France
and Greece. Lieutenant Colonel George Soldan, an inter-war German military thinker, wrote a report soon after the end of Operation Marita which
captured the inflated sense of German superiority. As in no earlier theatre
of war, he wrote, ... our superiority in leadership, in tactical mobility and
adaptability, in the art of exploiting the terrain, in readiness to shoot, in
lan and presence of mind and complete expertise in collaboration of arms
were brought to bear in Yugoslavia and Greece.17 Soldan concluded that
this was the basis of the secret of why also these campaigns could become
Blitzkriege to the surprise of our enemies.18 Such attitudes were a clear
indication that by mid-1941 the Germans were starting to over-estimate
their own effectiveness and to believe their own propaganda. German victories, such as they were in Greece, were not won by some form of miraculous or unstoppable Blitzkrieg, but in the traditional manner of
Prussian-German battlefield successby the aggressive actions of individual officers and units vying for glory and, after the action, often competing with each other for recognition. The resulting intellectual environment
did little to encourage reflection or improvement. Rather it reinforced a
16E. Rhricht, Der Balkanfeldzug 1941, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 12/4 (1962),
p. 223. Voraus-Abteilung, 72. Inf. Div., 18 April 1941, Elason, Gefechtsbericht ber den Einsatz der Voraus-Abteilung am 16. und 17.4.1941., BA MA RH 26-72/180, p. 3; entry for 26 April
1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N 671/7, pp. 176-7.
17Oberstleutnant G. Soldan, Aus den Kmpfen in Jugoslawien und Griechenland.
Nichts ist dem deutschen Soldaten unmglich, BA MA RH 20-12/398, p. 1.
18Ibid. Von Tippelskirchs post-war analysis of the campaign also pointed to decisive
success in action like that at Kleidi Pass, despite acknowledging that W Force had been in
the process of withdrawing. See Tippelskirch, Der Deutsche Balkanfeldzug 1941, p. 63. In
his 1955 study Leo Hepp, a major on Lists headquarters during the campaign, echoed these
sentiments in that he claimed it was a measure of the energetic German pursuit and the
effectiveness of the Luftwaffe that the 12th Army forced W Force to leave behind all its
equipment. This, of course, ignores the fact that W Force ordered its formations to leave
their equipment behind so as to evacuate as many troops as possible in the shortest possible space of time. Hepp, Die 12. Armee im Balkanfeldzug 1941, p. 209.
epilogue
595
growing assumption that the Germans needed only to continue what they
were already doing.19
There is no doubt that German troops had marched far and fast to catch
up with the W Force, and had won, but the three-week campaign itself
foreshadowed many of the characteristic weaknesses of the German warmaking, failings which would be brutally exposed in the fighting in the
Soviet Union. The German intelligence on Greece was poor; their ability
to read their enemys intentions (especially in the case of W Force) was
weak. Some German commanders later tried to shift the blame for a lack
of accurate information regarding the Doiran-Nestos Line, for example,
onto the Bulgarian intelligence services which, they complained, failed
pass on data to discover the extent and strength of the Greek fortifications.
The Bulgarians, however, were not planning to invade northern Greece.
This intelligence failure belonged to the Germans.20
The German campaign was also conducted on a logistic shoestring and
marked by significant supply problems, exacerbated by Lists operational
practice of switching responsibilities between formations as the course of
the campaign unfolded. Even at the start of the invasion, for example, troops
of the 40th Corps were equipped with only six to fourteen days rations
(depending on the unit) on the assumption that these would last until
captured stores were available for replenishment. As it happened, this supposition proved correct. Stummes formations in Yugoslavia took such an
amount of goods that they were able to attack into Greece without waiting
for the creation of a new supply base. But the point is that the Germans
knew that distances to be covered and poor roads would make re-supply
almost impossible, yet no logistic contingency planning was made. The
attackers relied on a rolling series of victories, and their enemys generous
stocks, to supply themselves. The 6th Mountain Divisions Operations Officer, Major Georg Gartmayr, described the hunger march of mountain
troops on 18 April, which made possible the second armoured divisions
seizure of the Tempe Pass [Pinios Gorge].21 A little later the German troops
19See for example Schrner, 6. Gebirgs-Division, I a, 8 May 1941, Krzer Erfahrungsbericht ber den Feldzug in Griechenland., BA MA Rh 28-6/21, pp. 1-2; Golla, Der Fall
20Entry for 9.50 a.m., 9 April 1941, Generalkommando XXX.A.K., Abteilung Ic, Ttigkeitsbericht Sdost Begonnen Am 9.1.1941 In Rosiorii De Vede Beendet Am 21.5.1941 In
Kawalla Gefhrt Durch Oblt. Hammer, O.3 Vom 9.1. Bis 21.5.1941, BA MA RH 24-30/110,
pp. 32-3.
21Georg Gartmayr, Bad Godesberg, to Generalfeldmarschall Schrner, Munich, 6 July
1957, BA MA N 60/97, p. 1.
596
epilogue
who arrived in Athens looked half-starved to the Greeks who met them
there. It was no surprise that spontaneous and unauthorised competition
erupted between units to seize supplies captured in the capitala struggle
for much-needed provisions and equipment the Luftwaffe lost thanks to
the speed with which German army units gobbled them up, much to Richthofens chagrin. For his part, after the campaign Lieutenant Colonel Jobst
Freiherr von Hanstein, Lists chief of supply and administration, blamed
the lack of any practical help by the German Navy for the difficulties of
supplying German troops in Greece. Prior to the invasion OKW had instructed troops in Greece that plundering the population would be punished strictly and that unnecessary destruction to the economic life of the
country was to be avoided. Hungry soldiers, however, had their own priorities and poor logistic planning therefore undermined this effort from
the beginning. Overall, in many cases it was only due to a combination of
pilfering, living off the land, captured enemy goods, and the undemanding
nature of the troops who often had to deprive themselves, as noted in a
report from the 40th Corps, that the Germans could continue their advances.22 Yet the supply challenges of Greece, barely overcome in a rapid and
successful campaign, would be nothing to those that waited on the Eastern
Front.23
In comparison with their British counterparts, the German commanders
were in many ways thus less strategically (and logistically) conscious. Military developments were interpreted using a narrow battlefield perspective.
The Germans in Greece tended to understand capture of Allied stores (and
vacated defensive positions), for example, as indications of military triumphs that had not in fact taken place. Similarly, later in 1941 in the USSR,
German officers mistook continuing victories in battle and the capture of
vast numbers of Soviet prisoners for strategic success.
22Murawski, I.A., Korpsintendant XXXX. A.K., Ttigkeitsbericht Nr. 7, BA MA RH
24-40/154, p. 18.
23Merkblatt fr das Verhalten der Truppe in Griechenland, attached to signature, I.A.,
W.F.St./Abt. L (IV/Qu) Nr. 442548/41 g.Kdos.-Chefs., 4 March 1941, Betrifft: Marita., BA
MA RW 4/588Obstlt. i.G. Frhr. v. Hanstein, Reisebericht vom 26.4.41, BA MA RH 20-12/290,
p. 2; 16.3. 23.3.41 Vorbereitende Manahmen fr die Versorgung fr den Angriff gegen
Griechenland.; 31.3. 5.4.41 Vorbereitende Manahmen fr die Versorgung fr den Angriff
des XXXX. A.K. gegen Jugoslawien.; entries for 9-11 April 1941, Gen. Kdo. (mot) XXXX. A.K.,
Abt. Qu., 16 March 1941, Fortsetzung des Kriegstagebuches (Band 2) Begonnen am 16.3.41
Beendet am 1.6.41., BA MA RH 24-40/153, pp. 37-8, 43-5, 52, 56; signature [Schuberth],
A.O.Kraft., 16 May 1941, Erfahrungsbericht., Betr.: Beuteerfassungsstab Oberst Schuberth
Athen., BA MA RH 20-12/290, pp. 3-5, 8; entry for 10 May 1941, Richthofen diary, BA MA N
671/7, p. 187; Mazower, Inside Hitlers Greece, pp. 23-4.
epilogue
597
By the end of April 1941 the mainland Greek campaign had run its course.
Subsequent events in Crete, North Africa, the USSR and around the globe
would soon capture the attention of belligerents on all sides. Yet those three
critical weeks in Greece in April 1941 were importantand remain so
within the military historiography of the war 70 years on. The campaign in
the Balkans marked the last complete German strategic victory of the war.
Nonetheless, the conduct of the campaign revealed weaknesses and shortcomings in the German military effort that would play a significant role in
Germanys inability to win later the same year in the Soviet Union, when
faced with more testing circumstances.
598
epilogue
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599
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Series
B6121
MP729/7
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Naval historical files

Secret correspondence files
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AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

Series
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Diary of G.F. Smith, 2/6 Battalion
3DRL 2381
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3DRL 2529
Savige Papers
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3DRL 6643; PR 00/332 Blamey Papers
3DRL 6673
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AWM 27
Records arranged according to AWM library subject classification
AWM 52
2nd AIF & CMF unit war diaries, 1939-45 War
AWM 54
Written records, 1939-45 War
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bibliography
Written records, 1939-45 War (second series)
Diaries of W.S.G. Foxwell, 2/7th Battalion
Papers of T.R. Neeman, 2/6th Battalion
Memoirs of H.C.D. Marshall, 2/7th Battalion
Papers of R. Bain, 2/2nd Battalion
Papers of J. Gillespie
2/7th Battalion Papers
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Long Papers
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Papers of the Office of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff
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bibliography
WO 244
WO 315
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WO 373
Papers of the Directorate of Signals

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94/47/1
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catalogued
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601
602
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1993.1351
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Diaries of Private V.R. Ball
Diary of Private H. Loftus
Diary of Major W.M. Moffat
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The Greece debacle 1941: the beginning and the end, Trooper W.J.H. Sutton
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bibliography
603
Botschaft Rom (Quirinal) Geheimakten

Botschaft in Rom (Quirinal)
Bro des Staatssekretrs
Gesandtschaft Athen
Nachlass Mackensen, Hans Georg von
Politische Abteilung Geheime Reichssachen
RAM Akten des Bros des Reichsministers des Auswrtigen Amtes
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RZ 501-RZ 509 Kultur bis 1945
RZ 515 Handakten Feist und Pfleiderer Deutsche Kulturpolitik in Sdosteuropa und im
Nahen Osten 1938-1941
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Persnlicher Stab Reichsfhrer-SS

Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP
Auenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP
Alte Reichskanzlei
Reichsministerium fur Volksaufklarung und Propaganda
Auswrtiges Amt
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index
621
INDEX*
1st Armoured Brigade (UK)
arrival in Athens 99
at Atalandi 400
at Rafina 474
contact lost with 488
covers Greek withdrawals 226
defends Kleidi Pass 200, 210
demolitions by 188
depletion of 254, 266
deployment of 1067, 1978
dive-bombing of 299
elements of isolated 470
evacuation plans 448, 459, 490
fallback positions 224
forward deployment 102
ordered to protect CMFAS withdrawal
247
rearguard role 190, 278, 302
reports on 18th Corps movements 158
retreats beyond Grevena 288, 303
slow movement of 3101
supplies lorries for evacuation 169
withdrawal to OlympusAliakmon
Line 213
withdrawal towards Grevena 276
withdraws contrary to orders 3669,
367
1st Armoured Group (Germany)
approach to Belgrade 207
assault plans 126
enters Belgrade 228
in 12th Army 100
in Yugoslavia 191
moved to 2nd Army 131
1st Army Group (Yugoslavia) 177, 228
1st Corps (Australia) ( Anzac Corps)
arrives in Athens 99
at Thermopylae Line 407
at Veria Pass 102
headquarters of closed 438, 481
justification for use in Greece 55767
loss of control in 384

losses in Greek campaign 12
renaming of 232
under Wavell 561
1st Corps (Greece) 77, 258, 308
1st Division (Greece) 280, 3089
1st Field Regiment (Australian) 116
1st Rangers see 9th Battalion Kings Royal
Rifle Corps (UK)
2/1st Anti-tank Regiment (Australian) 120,
186, 201
2/1st Battalion (Australian)
at Aliakmon River 1712
becomes reserve 320
guards aerodrome 364
joins 19th Brigade 407
leaves Brallos 440
slow progress of 398
withdrawal of 378
2/1st Field Regiment (Australian)
in Argos 492
to form rearguard force 289
troops from left behind 479
2/2nd Australian Field Regiment, guns lost
by 230
2/2nd Battalion (Australia)
at Pinios Gorge 3312, 3347
at Servia Pass 31920
compared with opposing forces 3512
embarkation by 478
rearguard role 3445
survivors from 342, 343
withdrawal exposes flank of 33941
2/3rd Battalion (Australian)
at Pinios Gorge 320, 3312, 3345, 340
at Vevi Pass 1867
British retreat through 240
on exhausting terrain 541
rearguard role 3445
reserves from unused 356
withdrawal march 215
*In this index service personnel are listed with their highest rank as given in the text.
Military units are shown by name with their national basis in parentheses(Germany),
(UK), etc. Mixed Allied units are listed as (Allied). Page numbers for images and maps are
shown in italics.
622
index
2/3rd Field Regiment (Australian) 377, 398

2/4th Battalion (Australian)
at Sotir ridge 2501
defends Kleidi Pass 2012, 210
deployment of 141
ineffective air attacks on 421
leaves Brallos 440
ordered to retire 242
pins down German patrols 223
rearguard role 364
withdrawal to Thermopylae Line 305,
399
at Kalabaka 288
covering force 437
in Savige Force 285
on confusion in W Force 480
rearguard role 289, 3789
at Corinth Canal 460, 4689
at Domokos 324
in Lee Force 302
in Savige Force 285
losses to air attacks 421
rearguard role 364
in Lee Force 302
in Savige Force 285
intelligence section 364
panic among 421
rearguard role 3634
at Kleidi Pass 201, 203
deployment of 141
fatigue among 221
hypothermia in 237
in Battle of Vevi 23840, 2423
infiltration of 212
orders to shoot intruders 225
rearguard role 364
repels German attack 2223
withdraws to Thermopylae Line 305,
399
at Kalabaka 288
at Pinios Gorge 331
evacuation orders 426
falls back from Thermopylae Line 440
ferried across river 379
in Savige Force 285

leaves Brallos 440
pins down German motorcyclists 439
2nd Armoured Division (Germany)
advance from Salonika 208, 229
advance on Makrikhori 343
advance to Larissa 272
approaches Olympus Pass 325
approaches Thermopylae Line 391
approaches W Force 249
at DoiranNestos Line 157
attacks by 2724
diverted to Volos 391
effectiveness of 2045
enters Greece 166
forms battle groups 281
forms eastern wing 196
in 12th Army 100
in Operation Barbarossa 576
in Yugoslavia 165
moved south 218
rate of progress 298
slowed by demolitions 329
2nd Armoured Division (UK), Support
Group from 99
2nd Army (Germany) 131, 228 see also
names of individual units
2nd Army (Italy)
in Slovenia 140
in Yugoslavia 152, 359
successes of 191
2nd Army (Yugoslavia) 151, 284
2nd Corps (Greece) 227, 258, 308
2nd Division (Greece) 280
2nd Division (NZ)
coastal deployment 102
deployment of 10711
divisional cavalry 117
in 1st Australian Corps 99
in intermediate line 197
2nd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment (UK)
99
2nd Infantry Regiment (Germany) 281
2nd Motorcycle Battalion (Germany)
advance on Athens 464, 472, 485
approaches Markopoulos 487
at Platamon Pass 2745, 2956, 299, 316
in Battle Group 2 281
sent to Khalkis 458
index
2nd Parachute Regiment 465
2nd Reconnaissance Battalion (Germany)
208
2nd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery (UK)
99, 106, 186
3rd Armoured Regiment (Germany)
at Larissa 391, 394
at Platamon Pass 2956, 316
enters Pinios Gorge 329
forms battle groups 281
3rd Army (Hungary), invades Yugoslavia
228
3rd Army (Yugoslavia)
at Shtip 157
collapse of 1834, 204
in Albania 16970, 183
3rd Battalion Royal Tank Regiment (UK)
at Amyndaion 107
at Kleidi Pass 200
at Ptolemais 254
demoralised by air attacks 389
in 1st Armoured Brigade (UK) 99
in Argos 492
in Savige Force 285
progressive retreat by 297
rearguard role 399400
reinforced by machine gunners 120
sent to Athens 400
tanks abandoned by 221
under Mackay 186
withdrawal of 2512, 256
3rd Corps (Greece) 309, 370
3rd Division (Greece) 280
4th Division (Greece), withdrawal of 258,
280
4th Field Regiment (NZ), at Pinios Gorge
352, 357
4th Hussars see 4th Regiment Queens
Own Hussars (UK)
4th Infantry Brigade (NZ)
aerial bombardment of 328
at Platamon Pass 2756
at Servia Pass 198, 215, 25960, 28992
attacks on 3745
beachhead defence 4889
in Intermediate Line 197
in W Force 99
isolation of 470
623
moved to Thebes 428

rearguard role 425
withdrawal of 189, 303, 312, 323, 363
4th Mountain Division (Germany) 100
4th Regiment Queens Own Hussars (UK)
at Kalamata beach 4967, 501
at Monastir Gap 212
at Ptolemais 2524
at Sotir ridge 250
attacks on 464
coastal patrols 418
coordination problems 472
demolitions by 188
deployment of 106
in Argos 492
in Isthmus Force 450
sent to Athens 400
sent to Patras 4367
under Charrington 99
withdrawal of 276
5th (Cretan) Division (Greece), rout of 258
5th Armoured Division (Germany)
advance on Athens 485
advance on Corinth 464
advance on Elasson 329
advance on Grevena 325
advance on Koritza 2289
advance on Lamia 2934
advances southward 183, 391
aims for Monastir Gap 208
ambushed by rearguard 4045
approaches Kalamata beach 499
approaches Thermopylae Line 391, 412
at Brallos Pass 435
at Monastir Gap 282
at Siasta Pass 309
attached to 40th Corps 1956
attacks Tolos 495
difficulties advancing 379
forms western wing 196
in 1st Armoured Group 100
in Peleponnese 491
logistics problems 393
outflanking move 363
pursues retreating troops 404, 494
supply shortages 481
5th Army (Yugoslavia) 138
5th Division (Greece), withdrawal of 280
624
index

at Olympus Pass 1167, 189, 217
at Servia Pass 294
deployment of 108
dive-bombing of 299
embarkation of 452
engages German attack 273
evacuation plans 426, 448
flank attacks on 314, 327
in W Force 99
withdraws to Thermopylae Line 303,
3145, 323, 361, 428
5th Mountain Division (Germany)
advance from Salonika 208
advances by 17980
approaches Thermopylae Line 412
assault plans 126
at Katerini 325
at Neo Petrisi 168
attacks by 154
breaks through defensive line 167
fighting by 1678
holds north of Aliakmon 282
in 1st Armoured Group 100
on Greek resistance 192
5th Regiment (Greece), desertions from
280
6th Division (Australia)
arrival in Greece 100
at Veria Pass 102
at Vevi Pass 186
covers withdrawal route 323
evacuation plans 425
in 1st Australian Corps 99
lands at Piraeus 115
on effects of dive bombing 532
on Lamia Road 384
6th Division (Greece), withdrawal of 280
at Dolikhe 217
at Elasson 273
at Larissa 349, 3756
at Olympus Pass 189
at Sperkhios River 429
at Thermopylae Pass 409, 442, 447
evacuated 426, 448, 459, 491
in Athens 459
in Peloponnese 461
rearguard role 302, 312, 363
tank assault halted by 454
under Freyberg 99
withdrawal of 198, 3034, 323, 4378
6th Mountain Division (Germany)
advance on Thebes 457
advance on Thermopylae Line 391, 431
advance on W Force 249
advance to Larissa 272
advances by 218
assault plans 126
at Demir Kapou 154
at Leptokaria 325
at Oros Orti 416
at Pinios Gorge 32931, 3345, 538
at Rodopolis 155
bypass route sought by 296
diverted to Katerini 2812
hunger march of 5956
infiltration by 168
islands taken by 392
mountain crossing by 315, 320
on loss of tanks 454
praise for 34950, 351
pursues retreating troops 404
under Boehme 101
7th Air Division (Germany) 465
7th Army (Yugoslavia) 152
7th Company, Witt Battle Group
(Germany) 222
7th Division (Australia), detained in North
Africa 160
7th Division (Greece) 156, 167, 179
7th Division (Yugoslavia) 152
7th Medium Regiment (UK), arrival in
Athens 99
8/800th (Brandenburg) Special Unit
(Germany)
at Katerini 273
flanking attack on Thermopylae Line
435
in Battle Group 1: 281
plans to outflank defenders 296
takes Euboea Island 431, 437
index
8th Air Corps (Germany)
at Rupel Pass 158
delays in redeployment 581
disperses bombing effort 388
uses Romanian airfields 67
8th Armoured Division (Germany),
advance through Yugoslavia 207
8th Division (Greece), withdrawal by 280
8th Reconnaissance Battalion (Germany)
advance on Athens 464, 472, 485
at Thermopylae Line 410, 4356
at Venetikos Bridge 329
defence against 416
flank attack covered by 4301
9th Armoured Division (Germany)
advance on Elasson 282
advance on Larissa 3767
at Monastir Gap 2089
at Ptolemais 256
at Servia Pass 325
attack plans 225
forms advanced guard 245
in 40th (Motorised) Corps 100
orders to advance 228
pursuit group from 272
rate of progress 298
rest and redeployment 391
southward advance 266
tanks from 221
9th Army (Italy)
connects with German forces 381
in Albania 140, 16970
in Pindus Mountains 396
9th Battalion Kings Royal Rifle Corps (UK)
(1st Rangers)
at Kleidi Pass 210, 214
deployment of 106
in Battle of Vevi 2389
in W Force 99
issue rum ration 225
under Charrington 400
withdrawal from Vevi 269
withdrawal to Ptolemais 2512
9th Division (Greece)
advances by 1834
withdrawal of 248, 279, 287, 370
625
10th Air Corps (Germany) 134

10th Armoured Division (Germany) 580
10th Division (Greece), withdrawal of 248,
279, 287, 370
11th Air Corps (Germany) 134
11th Army (Italy) 140, 396
11th Division (Greece) 226, 278, 382
11th Infantry Regiment (Germany) 272,
275, 28991
12th Army (Germany)
after Yugoslav coup 131
attacks Serbia 1523
casualties in 589
delayed by weather conditions 581
in Macedonia and islands 392
in Yugoslavia 165
logistics problems 1245, 3523
move into Greece 669
planned advance of 1956
structure of 100
underutilisation of 527
withdrawn from Operation Barbarossa
576
at Siatista Pass 257, 276
at Veria Pass 1012, 190
in CMFAS 121
new defensive line 182
perceived confusion in 234
reassembles near Grevena 287
relief of 115
retreat through Kalabaka 310
scattering of 370
withdrawal of 2134, 219, 224, 230, 278
12th Jadranska Division (Yugoslavia) 170
at Pogradets 170
in Albania 1834
unexpected resistance by 2867
14th Armoured Division (Germany), in
Yugoslavia 207
14th Division (Greece) see also Divisions
Group (Greek)
attacks on 167
defends DoiranNestos Line 179
German pressure on 155
626
index
lack of supplies 172

resistance to invasion 192
14th Motorised Division (Germany) 580
15th Division (Greece), withdrawal by 280
15th Zetska Division (Yugoslavia) 184
16th Brigade (Australian)
at Servia Pass 25960
at Veria Pass 160, 190
demolitions by 198
intended to reinforce 21st Battalion 305
withdrawal of 215, 22930, 303, 307
at Hairopouli 287
withdrawal of 227, 248, 279, 308, 370
conflicting orders 408
covers W Force withdrawal 285
deployment of 262
evacuated 426, 437
in Argos 492
losses to air attacks 421
17th Division (Greece) 280, 286
18th (Mountain) Corps (Germany) 100
18th Battalion (NZ)
at Servia 2156
deployment of 110
in Athens 15960
prepares for embarkation 473
withdrawal delayed 363
18th Corps (Germany)
advance on Larissa 215, 229, 272
advance on W Force 2178, 249
advance on Yannitsa 198
artillery bombardment 158
assault plans 126
at DoiranNestos Line 1534, 1578,
166
at Olympus Pass 3124
demolitions cleared by 185, 34950,
457
difficulties faced by 159
flanks Thermopylae Line 430
on Greek border 132
reserve deployed for 391

resistance to 168
18th Division (Greece) see also Divisions
Group (Greek)
defensive line 179
19th Battalion (NZ)
ambushes German force 290
at Olympus Pass 117
at Servia Pass 215, 312
deployment of 110
at Battle of Vevi 267
at Domokos 324
at Kerasia 266
at Kleidi Pass 200
at Zarkos 3023
defensive plans 197
deployment of 115, 141, 171
embarkation of 463
evacuation plans 426, 442, 448, 459
in Lee Force 302
prepares for attack 259
under Mackay 186
withdrawal of 213, 305, 307, 437
19th Infantry Division (Germany) 101
19th Motorised Division (Greece)
anti-parachute duties 109
at Kerkini Lake 166
at Veria Pass 102
defends Salonika 1656
fails to stop German advance 155, 180
in CMFAS 101, 121
20th Battalion (NZ)
demolitions by 363
deployment of 110
at Kleidi Pass 201
at Klisoura Pass 257
attacks on 277
blocking position 278
in CMFAS 101, 121
new defensive line 182, 190
index
passes held by 102
perceived confusion in 234
retreat through Kalabaka 310
scattering of 370
withdrawal of 2134, 2234, 230, 278
21st Battalion (NZ)
at Pinios Gorge 31920, 3313, 3379,
3512
defend Platamon Tunnel 1989, 2956
distress messages from 305
engagement orders rescinded 514
engages German patrols 2745
misinformed as to enemy strength 217
moved to Platamon 161
premature withdrawal of 316, 3537
repel German attack 298
21st Brigade (Greece)
at Nympheon 201
blocking instructions 278
fighting by 2456
reinforces Cavalry Division 182
withdrawal of 245
22nd (Air Landing) Division (Germany)
572
22nd Battalion (NZ)
at Corinth Canal 468
at Olympus Pass 273, 3123
at Servia Pass 294
withdraws to Olympus 161
23rd Battalion (NZ)
at Servia Pass 294
attacks on 3612
24th Battalion (NZ)
at Larissa 3757
at Thermopylae Pass 442, 444
at Tripolis 472
deployment of 110
25th Battalion (NZ)
at Larissa 3756
at Miloi 472
at Thermopylae Pass 4424
deployment of 110
25th Vardarska Division (Yugoslavia) 170
26th Battalion (NZ)
at Larissa 376
at Olympus Pass 117
at Platamon Tunnel 116
deployment of 110
sent to Tripolis 470
627
26th Regiment (Greece) 85

27th Machine Gun Battalion (NZ) 120,
186, 474
28th (Maori) Battalion (NZ)
at Servia Pass 294
attached to 5th Brigade 99
deployment of 117
30th Corps (Germany)
after breakthrough 167
assault plans 126, 133
in 12th Army 101
in northern Greece 392
31st Anti-tank Battery (NZ), isolation of
399
31st Armoured Regiment (Germany)
at Brallos Pass 435
at Thermopylae Pass 4423, 4467
31st Kosovska Division (Yugoslavia) 170,
1834
33rd Armoured Regiment (Germany)
advance on Kozani 245
at Ptolemais 2523, 256
attack orders 2501
38th Anti-Tank Unit (Germany), forms
battle groups 281
40th (Motorised) Corps (Germany)
advance from Ptolemais 272
advance on Lamia 430
aims for Monastir Gap 2089
at Servia Pass 312
demolitions cleared by 457
directed to Yugoslav border 133
effectiveness of 204
in 12th Army 100
in Yugoslavia 152, 165, 183
supply shortages 256, 353, 5956
threatens Albanian gains 170
41st (Motorised) Corps (Germany)
enters Belgrade 228
in 12th Army 100
moved to 2nd Army 131
41st Regiment (Greece) 84, 155
46th Motorised Corps (Germany) 132, 191
628
index
47th Anti-Tank Battalion (Germany),

advance on Athens 464, 472
49th Mountain Corps (Germany) 132
50th Corps (Germany) 101
50th Infantry Division (Germany)
advances by 180
at Salonika 167, 392
crosses Bulgarian border 157
in 12th Army 101
51st Corps (Germany) 132, 228
55th Motorcycle Battalion (Germany) 430,
4356, 43940
59th Motorcycle Battalion (Germany)
advances to Lipsista 287
at Grevena 309
at Ptolemais 252
attacks on 290
reinforces 11th Infantry Regiment 272
64th Medium (Artillery) Regiment (UK)
under Lee 120
under Mackay 186
withdrawal of 2401
71st Regiment (Greece) 85
72nd Cycle Squadron (Germany) 229
72nd Infantry Division (Germany)
advances by 169, 208
at DoiranNestos Line 156, 17980
at Rupel Pass 132
at Salonika 218, 282
in 12th Army 101
in Falakro Sector 1678
pursues retreating troops 404
73rd Infantry Division (Germany)
advances by 287
at Florina 325
at Kastoria 309
at Klisoura Pass 277
at Monastir Gap 208, 282
connects with Italian forces 381
Greek troops captured by 371
in 12th Army 100
orders to advance 229
resistance to 279
73rd Regiment (Greece) 84
80th Base Sub Area (Allied) 124
81st Base Sub Area (Allied) 124

82nd Regiment (Greece) 101
85th Mountain Regiment (Germany) 154
92nd Regiment (Greece) 85
95th Mountain Artillery Regiment
(Germany) 352
102nd Anti-tank Regiment (UK) 99, 254
112th Reconnaissance Battalion (Germany)
advance on Thermopylae Line 431
at Brallos Pass 435
118th Artillery Regiment (Germany) 352
124th Infantry Regiment (Germany) 229,
4467
125th Infantry Regiment (Germany)
assault plans 126
at Fort Rupel 1556, 167
in 12th Army 101
retired with casualties 168
141st Regiment (Germany)
at Makrikhori 343
at Pinios Gorge 344
at Thermopylae Pass 431, 435, 43940,
446
143rd Mountain Regiment (Germany)
ambush by 34750
at Makrikhori 343
captures Larissa 391
failure to bombard 357
164th Infantry Division (Germany)
at Fort Echinos 180
captures Greek Islands 392
deployment of 167
in 12th Army 101
191st Motorised Regiment (Greece) 86, 101
192nd Motorised Regiment (Greece) 101
193rd Motorised Regiment (Greece) 101
304th Infantry Regiment (Germany)
at Olympus Pass 273
at Platamon Pass 296, 316
in Battle Group 2: 281
index
Adolf Hitler Regiment see Leibstandarte
SS Adolf Hitler Regiment/Division
(Germany)
Air Fleet Four (Germany) 134
air warfare see Italian military forces;
Luftwaffe; Royal Air Force
Ajax, HMS 162, 427, 487, 495
Albania
German plans for 656
Greek forces cut off in 53
Greek resistance in 45, 144, 397
Greek withdrawal from 205, 2256,
2335, 2478
Italian forces driven from 423, 71,
778, 153
Italian takeover of 2, 19, 212
partition of 413
territorial claims by 356
Yugoslav attacks on 129, 16970
Alexandria, troops arriving at 504
Aliakmon River 216, 2602, 261 see also
OlympusAliakmon Line
AliakmonVenetikos Line, preparation
of 205
Allen, Brigadier Arthur Tubby see also
Allen Group
at Kalamata beach 4778
at Pinios Gorge 320, 3312, 344, 346,
3538
returns to 16th Brigade 408
Allen Group
arrives at Kalamata 4623
embarkation of 4769
withdrawal plans 323
Allied military forces see also names of
individual states and units; W Force
assumed superiority of 1201
at Kleidi Pass 221
battlefield optimism 143
official histories 7
planned positions 233
ways of war 593
Amphissa, defence of 436
Amyndaion Detachment (Allied)
deployment of 141
Lee given command of 120
logistical importance of 171
reinforcement of 160
Anfuso, Filippo 38
Antonescu, General Ion 37, 569
Anzac Corps see 1st Corps (Australia)
629
Appel Battle Group (Germany) 2378, 244

Argos Orestikon, battle of 287
Army Group South (Germany) 5756
Army Supreme Command (Germany)
623
artillery engagements
at Brallos Pass 428
at Kleidi Pass 221
at Larissa 377
at Pinios Gorge 352
defence for NZ positions 109
on Thermopylae Line 454
withdrawal from 241
Athens
embarkations from 4745
German troops enter 4857
Luftwaffe attacks on 401
morale failing in 3245
rising tension in 218
W Force evacuates from 461
Australian military forces see 1st Corps
(Australia); names of individual units
Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps (Allied),
embarkation by 478
Axios Valley 83
Axis powers see German military forces;
Germany; Italian military forces; Italy
Baacke, Captain Karl 229
Baacke Group (Germany)
advance on Marathon 464
at Brallos Pass 435
at Thermopylae Pass 412, 431, 4427
attacks by 361
formation of 229
Badoglio, Field Marshal Pietro 43
Baillie-Grohman, Vice-Admiral (Harold)
Tom
account of invasion 6
conference with Wavell 395
evacuated 427, 459, 479, 4956
leaves Athens 461
on Kalamata losses 5012
on level of confusion 4801
on Luftwaffe attacks 5089
orders given to 265
role in evacuation 359, 374, 419, 491,
5078
630
Bakopoulos, Lieutenant General
Konstantinos
asks for reinforcements 158
attempts to block German advance
1545
negotiates EMFAS surrender 1801
Salonika strategy 1267
surrenders EMFAS 193
urges surrender 402
Bakos, Lieutenant General Georgios 227,
283, 3823
Balkan Pact 32
Balkan policies 1733, 28, 5501
Balkan states see names of individual
states
Balkan Wars 19
Barbarity Force 41, 45, 48, 94
Barnett, Lieutenant R.A. 143
Barrowclough, Brigadier H.E. 110, 4956
Barsko Division (Yugoslavia) 165
Barter, Colonel A.R. 289
Batas, Major General Napoleon 101
Battle Group 1 (Germany)
5th Brigade attacks 294
attacks NZ Cavalry Regiment 3745
pursues 5th Brigade 329
Battle Group 2 (Germany)
advances on Makrikhori 343
tanks from 341
Beda Fomm, battle of 44
Beles area, weak spot in 878, 1534
Belgrade 151, 228
Blamey, Field Marshal Thomas 562, 566
advises moving NZ line back 118
appeals for reinforcements 160
at Pinios Gorge 3267
biography of 8
commands 21st Battalion 295
critical of Wilsons orders 230
demolitions by 409
doubtful about W Force deployment
5615
index
flies to Alexandria 438
Greek troops under 214
on adequacy of equipment 540
on mechanised troops 537
on political reasons for campaign 556
on scapegoating 591
on staged withdrawals 234
orders Savige to Kalabaka 285
orders to Charrington 366
orders withdrawal march 215
reconnaissance by 106
withdrawal orders 3012, 323
Blenheim squadrons (UK)
attacked on ground 286
attacks on Bulgaria 162
defend Kleidi Pass 211
defend Salonika 166
deployment of 1045
evacuate to Egypt 432
Blumentritt, Lieutenant General Gnther
578
Blunt, Colonel J.S. 426, 491
Bock, Field Marshal Fedor von 584
Boehme, Lieutenant General Franz 100
Boileau, Major D.R.C. 201, 240, 269, 310
Boris III, King of Bulgaria 38, 63, 110
Borova Division Group (Greece) 248,
3089
Borowietz, Colonel Willibald 245
Borowietz Group (Germany) 245, 250
Bosnia, Germans welcomed in 249
Bowyer-Smith, Captain Phillip 4989,
5012
Brallos Pass 407
defence of 428, 449
relative forces in 455
Brauchitsch, Walther von 151, 584
Britain see United Kingdom
British Inter-Service Committee on Greece
521
British military forces see also names of
individual units; Royal Air Force; Royal
Navy
Balkan policies 23
command structure 978
decision to defend Greece 4551
early resistance to Germany 26
lost in Greece 12
Middle East Command 58
under-equipping claims 540
index
British Military Mission
ambiguous role of 521
communications via 95
criticism of 5234
relays call for supplies 82
British Somaliland, Italian victories in 30
Brunskill, Brigadier G.S.
arrives in Athens 945, 97
at Piraeus bombing 1623
criticises evacuation plans 506
logistics plans 1234
on Greek troops in Albania 235
on W Force evacuating Greece 265
BTG see W Force
Buckley, Christopher 56, 354
Bulgaria
Balkan Pact provisions 32
German pressure on 63, 66
German troops in 69, 912, 113, 126, 134
involvement in fall of Greece 38, 401,
542
joins Tripartite Pact 62, 678
military intelligence failures 595
refuses military participation 13940
territorial demands by 19, 28
Turkish non-aggression pact 51
under German control 56
Burne, Alfred 12
Cadogan, Sir Alexander 591
Calcutta, HMS 162, 452, 475
Campbell, Ronald 59
Canadian military forces 190
Carlisle, HMS 427
Carol II, King of Romania 267, 37
Casson, Major Stanley 159
Castellorizzo, failure to retake 57
casualties
among German paratroops 466
at Pinios Gorge 334, 337, 342, 348, 352,
356
at Servia Pass 292
DoiranNestos campaign 194
from Luftwaffe attacks 4201
in 12th Army 589
in W Force 504, 516
Italian troops in Albania 415
Cavallero, Count Ugo 434, 163, 413, 415
631
Cavalry Division (Greece)

at Pisoderion Pass 182, 257
fighting by 245, 247
repulses 40th Corps 20910, 223
resistance to invasion 287, 326
risk of being cut off 2778
sent to Khalkis 418
Cavalry Regiment (NZ)
at Elevthorokorion 363
at Pinios Gorge 344
at Servia Pass 260
attacks on 2723, 3745
sights German advance 232
Central Macedonian Field Army Section
(Greece)
composition of 1012
confusion perceived in 2301, 234
defensive plans 197
depletion of 266
liaison with W Force 142
moved to hold passes 234
required to hold positions 2256
withdrawal to Olympus-Aliakmon
Line 213
Chamberlain, Neville 20
Chapman, Ivan 7
Charrington, Brigadier H.V.S.
at Ptolemais 2534
commands 1st Armoured Brigade 99
conflicts with Savige 3112
defensive positioning 107
encourages troops 1889
in blocking force 244
injury to 276
on British Military Mission 5234
on CMFAS 122
on losses to Luftwaffe 509
on moral obligations to Greece 548
on Wilson 967
overoptimism of 480
tank attack ordered by 251
withdraws Brigade contrary to orders
3669
Chilton, Lieutenant Colonel Fred 343
asks for reinforcements 333
Chrisohoou, Colonel Athanasios 3834,
401
632
index
Churchill, Winston
appeals to for supplies 1056
criticises lack of information 3234
Edens influence on 5534
exaggerates German numbers 537
on air attacks 530
on evacuation 3601, 371
on Luftwaffe ineffectiveness 5089
on military theatre 50
on safe withdrawal 428
on Yugoslav coup 128
pledges aid to Greece 468, 512,
5434
reassures Menzies 559
relations with Dominion governments
5656
reluctance to withdraw 411
reports to Cabinet 557
US policies 551
Ciano, Count Galeazzo 21, 35, 64
Citino, Robert 3
City of London 478, 487
Clan Fraser, SS, explosion of 1624
Clark-Hall, Captain 497
Clausewitz, Carl von 5567
Clements, Major C.M.L.
at Monastir Gap 212
at Ptolemais 252
capture of 4967
on 1st Rangers 269
searches for Parrington 492
Clowes, Brigadier Cyril 318
CMFAS see Central Macedonian Field
Army Section (Greece)
Collins, Brigadier W. dA. 122
Colville, Sir John 544, 570
Connell, John, account of invasion 67
Corfu 21, 42
Corinth Canal
attacks on planned 458
capture of 46670, 471
defence of 460, 462
paratroop attack plans 4656
significance of 4812
Costa Rica, SS 478, 487
Courage, Lieutenant Colonel J.H. 494
Coventry, HMS 427, 463
Cranborne, Lord 360
Crete
5th Brigade evacuated to 452

British interest in holding 467
invasion of 5767, 581
Cripps, Stafford 49
Croatia
declares independence 207
German sympathisers in 1767
Germans welcomed in 249
Cunningham, Admiral Andrew
advised of Balkan policies 489
on inevitability of evacuation 514
Curtin, John, on political reasons for
campaign 550
Cyclades Islands, fall of 392
Cyrenaica 50, 141
Czechoslovakia 1922
DAlbiac, Air Vice-Marshal John 49
forces under 48
high-level conferences 359, 373
isolated from W Force HQ 521
losses reported by 3245
on air defences 1035
on scapegoating of RAF 5356
refuses to relocate 98
Yugoslav policies 129
Dalmatia, Germans welcomed in 249
Das Deutsche Reich und das Zweite
Weltkrieg 101
Das Reich SS Motorised Division
(Germany) 100
Daut Hoggia (Hoxha) 35
de Guingand, Lieutenant Colonel Francis
Freddie 145, 265, 582
Decker, Colonel K. 329
Decoy, HMS 463, 474, 498
Dedes, Lieutenant General Panagiotis 84,
2267
Defender, HMS 478, 487, 498
Delfinon 430
Delphi, German advance on 437
Demestihas, Lieutenant General
Panagiotis 283, 383, 415
Democratic Army of Greece (Communist)
592
Der Fall Griechenlands 19391941 11
Diakos, John 383
index
Diamond, HMS 463, 4756
Dietrich, Lieutenant General Josef Sepp
225, 402
Diggers and Greeks 89
Dill, General John
criticisms of 591
fact-finding mission 512
in Greece 55, 60
negotiations with Yugoslavia 1368
on Greek situation 284
on Yugoslav unpreparedness 176
role in initiating Greek campaign
5525, 5623
Dilwarra, SS 478, 487
Directives see Fhrer Directives
Divisions Group (Greece) 1534, 156, 179
DneprDvina line 584, 586
Dodecanese Islands, campaign to capture
593
Dodecanese Regiment (Greece)
at Kleidi Pass 201
at Vevi Pass 186
in CMFAS 101
withdrawal of 214, 242, 245
DoiranNestos Line
battle for 194, 195
deployment to 53
effectiveness of defence 1724
German attack on 1537, 17980
in Greek defensive plan 823
strengths and weaknesses 867, 1445
Domokos
Lee Force at 324
rearguard force at 289, 399
retreat through 364
Donovan, Colonel William Bill 60, 551
Dornier bombers (Germany) 284, 533
Dougherty, Lieutenant Colonel Ivan 223,
239
Drummond, Air Vice Marshal R.M. 549
Eastern Macedonian Field Army Section
(Greece)
capture of threatened 3812
casualties in 194
collapse of 3068, 3957
composition of 84
concentration zone planned for 247
disastrous retreat 258
633
help with evacuating 169

Italian attacks on 280, 3701
reaches Kossina 286
shortage of food for 591
staged withdrawal of 225
strength of 87
surrender of 181, 191, 193, 4023, 412
withdrawal to Kavallari 397
withdrawal to VermionOlympus Line
127
Eden, Anthony 56, 549
appeals for more supplies 122
declines meeting with Stalin 49
diplomatic efforts 5861
message to Greek PM 149
Middle East missions 512, 55
misunderstanding with Papagos 54
on Greek morale 1056
on support for Greece 41, 47, 5478
5524
Edessa Pass 934
Egypt see also North Africa
British give priority to 141
Italian victories in 301
troop convoys from attacked 108
Elasson
bombing of 284, 286, 306
fighting near 3756
headquarters at 98
Epirus Field Army Section (Greece) 77
Erbach-Schnberg, Prince Viktor zu 149
Erithrai, defence of 472
Ethiopia, British reconquest of 44
ethnic issues in Yugoslav defence 176
Evangelismos, attack on 3402
Evros Brigade (Greece) 857, 157, 167
Fadden, Arthur 128, 360, 540
Falakro Sector 85, 167, 192
Farinacci, Roberto 43
Fehn, Lieutenant General Gustav
accepts Parringtons surrender 500
heads 5th Armoured Division 293
leads southward advance 391
on entry to Athens 4856
on W Force resistance 516
Ferrero, Lieutenant General Alberto 414
Fort Arpalouki 166
Fort Dasavli 167
634
index
Fort Echinos 157, 167, 180

Fort Istibei 85, 154, 166
Fort Kelkayia 166
Fort Lisse 167
Fort Nimphaea 157, 167
Fort Paleouriones 192, 193
Fort Perithori 167, 179
Fort Popotlivitsa 166, 179
Fort Rupel
attacks on 1556, 159, 167, 192
battle for 179
German attack plans 132
France
defeat and partioning 26
extends guarantees to threatened states
223
pre-war Italian policy 178
pre-war Mediterranean policy 20
treaty system 1920
Fraser, Peter
Freybergs communications with
5635
on W Force deployment 428, 55860,
567
Freyberg, Lieutenant General Bernard C.
562
assigns troops to provost duty 4601
assumes command of Peloponnese
45960
at Servia Pass 294
biography of 8
critical of Wilsons orders 230
criticises evacuation plans 5056
doubtful about W Force deployment
5635
evacuated 4956
evacuation orders 426, 451
in Athens 4589
last Allied general left in Greece 479
learns of paratroop assault 470
loses communications with Chilton
341
on holding Platamon Pass 274
on inevitability of evacuation 514
on need to withdraw 189
on Operation Barbarossa 582
on Pinios Gorge retreat 354
on W Force disorganisation 5201
on Wavells support for Greek
campaign 555
orders to Macky 3189

orders troops to hold position 217
orders withdrawal 361
praise for Papagos 8990
prepares to retire 161
relations with Galloway 118
unaware of evacuation plans 4101
Fhrer Directives 62, 656, 571
Galloway, Brigadier Sandy
arrives in Athens 94, 97
evacuated 480, 4956
relations with Freyberg 118
Gambier-Parry, General H.D. 49
Gardikaki, German advance through
43940
Gartmayr, Major Georg 595
George II, King of Greece 49
as head of state 17
British visit 23
conference with 359
endorses evacuation 418
in surrender debate 3823
influence of 218
loyalty to Allies 312, 5556, 5923
meetings with Wavell 396
moves to Crete 4312
seeks new government 401
takes over government 394
German military forces see also names of
individual units
armoured units in 5, 8, 5378
artillery 38
attacks on Greece and Yugoslavia
14950
in Bulgaria 912, 93, 134
infantry 539
infiltration tactics 212
intelligence service 142, 595
naval forces 596
paratroops 98, 156, 410, 458, 4656, 482
plan of attack 135
plunder Greek resources 5912, 596
prepare for Operation Barbarossa
5701
prisoners from 292
relative numbers in 299, 5289
sense of superiority 5935
supply problems 595
use of tanks by 3856
index
victory over Greek forces 513
view of campaign 2034
welcomed by locals 464
German-Japanese Anti-Comintern pact 18
Germany see also German military forces;
Hitler, Adolf
Balkan policies 234, 278, 615
Greek invasion plans 1, 110, 545
Mediterranean strategy 256
military history in 10
non-aggression pact with Soviet Union
24
pre-war expansion 189
records of Operation Marita 34
relations with Italy 18, 39
response to Yugoslav coup 130
Gladiator Squadrons (UK) 1045, 416, 432
Glenearn, HMS 427, 452, 4745
Glengyle, HMS 427, 452, 474, 487
Glenroy, HMS 427
Glombik, Major L. 454
Golla, Karl-Heinz 11
Golomos, defence of 470
Gonnos, German advance on 3345
Gring, Reichsmarschall Hermann 465,
569
Graziani, Field Marshal Rodolfo 301
Grazzi, Emmanuel 40
Greece see also Greek military forces
Axis plunder of 5912
Civil War in 592
climate of 73, 76, 237, 581
demanding terrain 716, 541
effect of invasions on 218
German imports from 24
German invasion of 1, 14950
Italian invasion of 1, 359, 423
liberation from Germany 592
military history in 9
misunderstandings with Britain 524
mobilization of 40, 42
political conditions in 313
political reasons for defending 5478
pre-war history 17
private boats assist with evacuation
from 508
radio communication fails in 5223
rebel generals sign truce protocol 402
relations with Italy 212
territorial demands by 19
transport problems in 187, 230, 3645,
398
635
Greek military forces 518 see also names of

individual units
Air Force 1023
blamed for collapse of resistance 422
bravery commended 1934
casualties in 591
confusion perceived in 224, 2302
cultural stereotypes of 5178
defence of DoiranNestos Line 173
desertions among 231, 27980
Divisions Group 84
equipment of 5401
exhausted state of 5267
in Albania 79
infrastructure preserved by 519
morale of 7980
naval vessels leave mainland 461
resistance to invasion 57, 9
supply problems 82
withdrawal from Albania 370
Greiffenberg, Major General Hans von 91,
4123, 4534
Grevina, surrenders in 396
Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 11
Griffin, HMS 463, 495
Grigoropoulos, Colonel Theodoros 3067
Grossdeutschland Regiment (Germany)
100
Guderian, General Heinz 579
Guinn, Major H.G. 400, 4045
Haining, Lieutenant General Sir Robert 80
Halder, General Franz
approaches Italy for aid 140
directs Kleist to Yugoslavia 131
on German reluctance to invade
Greece 112
on Operation Barbarossa 573, 578, 584
on surrender of Greek forces 414
Halifax, Lord 60
Hanstein, Lieutenant Colonel Jobst
Freiherr von 596
Hargest, Brigadier J.E.
reports battalions lost 294
Hartmann, Lieutenant General Otto 101
Hastings, Max 50, 543
Hasty, HMS 463, 474, 498
Havock, HMS 463, 490, 495
Heinkel bombers (Germany) 25960, 365
Hellas steam yacht, evacuees on lost 452
636
index
Helli, RHS, torpedoed 36

Hepp, Major Leo, commends Greek
bravery 193
Hereward, HMS 478, 487, 498
Hermann Goering Regiment (Germany)
100
Hero, HMS 478, 487, 4989
Herring, Brigadier 200
Heusinger, Colonel Adolf 62
Heywood, Major General T.G.
evacuated 479
interprets at high-level conferences 53
liaison through 95
on Beles weakness 87
on British Military Mission 524
relations with Wilson 97
Higham, Robin 555
Hill, Maria 89
Hitler, Adolf
agrees to support Italian troops 44
Barbarossa and 575, 5824
capture of Athens reported to 485
confirms Italian participation in
surrender 413
directs German troops into Albania
199
frees Greek prisoners 415
instructions to von Ribbentrop 24
Mediterranean strategy 26
on Yugoslav Army 249
orders conquest of Yugoslavia 1301
orders invasion of Greece 112
relations with Mussolini 18, 367, 39,
1401
relations with Soviet Union 689
speech on Balkan campaign 149
Hobson, Major R.
on cold conditions 203
on Greek troop movements 2301
on withdrawals from battle 188
ordered to cover Savige Force 368
Hollidt, Lieutenant General Karl-Adolf 157
Hondros, Lieutenant Colonel Georgios
245
Hopkins, Harry 50
Hotspur, HMS 495
Hubicki, Lieutenant General Alfred Ritter
von 256, 291
Hull, Cordell 60, 551
Hungary
invades Yugoslavia 228
joins Tripartite Pact 62

support for Germany 139
territorial demands by 19, 28
Hurricane squadrons (UK)
attacked on ground 286, 432
defend Kleidi Pass 211
deployment of 1045
Me109s shot down by 158
moved to Argos 4167, 427
Hyacinth, HMS 452
Imperial troops see Allied military forces
nonu , smet 69
intermediate line
abandonment of 233
Greek troops withdraw to 189
plans for 161
Wilsons commitment to 205
withdrawal to ordered 186
Isis, HMS 495
island defence 117
Isthmus Force (Allied) 450, 4601, 4823
Italian military forces
advance into Albania 371
advance through Lubljana 249
air attacks by 280
Air Force bombings 371
Albanian campaign 71, 78, 184, 226
early victories 2930
in Greek surrender 4145
occupy Greece 415, 589
Regia Marina 141, 392
under Mussolini 2930
Italy see also Italian military forces;
Mussolini, Benito
discussions with Germany 140
effect of Greek campaign on 10
Fascist foreign policy 18
Hitlers support for 64
invasion of Greece by 12, 32, 359
pre-war expansion 19
threat to Greece from 178, 212
Jacob, Lieutenant 3478
Jagdgeschwader 77 (Germany) 534
Jais, Colonel Maximilian 431
Jais Group (Germany) 435, 4401, 457
Jankovi, General 1368
Japan, Germany seeks alliance with 61
Jodl, Lieutenant General Alfred 125, 413
Joliffe, Lieutenant Colonel A.G.M. 493
Junkers 52 transport aircraft (Germany)
4667, 482
index
Kalabaka
defence of 285
German advance on 379
looting and chaos in 289
Kalamata 477
battle for beachhead 4978
evacuations from beach at 4623,
4767, 496
investigation of losses at 501
troops left behind at 4923
Kalavryta, citizens of executed 592
Kalis, Colonel Anastasias 85, 157
Kandahar, HMS 474, 499
Karadag Sector 84, 156, 167, 192
Karassos, Major General Christos
becomes CMFAS Commander 106, 190
heads 20th Greek Division 101
in capitulation party 402
not told of withdrawal plans 214
shifts headquarters 219
Katerini, defence of 119, 297
Kavrakos, Major General Christos 383, 485
Keitel, Field Marshal Wilhelm 96, 569, 583
Kelcyre, Italian capture of 371
Kelli, German occupation of 242
Kennedy, General Sir John 5501, 557
Kent Corps (Canada) 190
Khalkis harbour 286
Khedive Ismail, SS 475, 487
Khios, fall of 392
Kiev, German capture of 584
Kimberly, HMS 487, 499
Kingston, HMS 474, 487, 499
Kippenberger, Lieutenant Colonel H. 363,
375, 553
Kleidi Pass see also Vevi, Battle of
defence of 20912, 2223
geography of 200
loss of 245
plans to block 120
Kleist, Field Marshal Edwald von 100, 576,
583
Klisoura Pass
danger of attack via 257
difficulty defending 277
geography of 200
results of loss 271, 283
Klissoura, Greeks capture 43
Koeppen, Lieutenant Colonel HansJoachim von 245
Koritza, German advance on 2289
637
Koryzis, Alexandros 56
appointed PM 445
fails to raise morale 324
high-level conferences 373
loses authority 359
negotiations with Britain 53
suicide of 383
Kotoulas, Lieutenant General Ioannis
commands CMFAS 101
communications problems 519
replaced by Karassos 106, 190
supports withdrawal by EMFAS 127
Kotzias, Konstantinos 394
Koukidis, Konstantinos 4867
Kozani 202, 220, 275
Kuebler, Lieutenant General Ludwig 132
Khn, General Friedrich 207
Lamb, Lieutenant Colonel D.J. 3445
Lamia
as choke point 301
German advance from 4345
German troops in 4289
rearguard coverage of 400
withdrawal to 3889
Larissa
bombing of 286
capture of 349, 3934
defence of 332, 378
importance of 271, 301
paratroop attack launched from 465
withdrawal through 393
Lee, Brigadier E.A.
Amyndaion Detachment under 120
appointed area commander 450
at Domokos 324
evacuated 4956
Mackay consults 187
Lee, Group Captain A.S.G. 4267
Lee Force (Allied)
sent to Vevi Pass 1867
withdrawal Plans 3234
Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Regiment/
Division (Germany)
at Grevena 327
at Kleidi Pass 221
at Klisoura Pass 277, 296
638
index
at Lipsista 325
at Metsovon Pass 396, 402
at Monastir 199, 2089
at Patras 464
at Pirgos 491, 494
at Pisoderion Pass 257, 266
at Siatista Pass 277
attack plans for 250
captures Prilep 183
cuts off WMFAS withdrawal 309
Greek troops captured by 371
held by 13th Division 2867
in 12th Army 100
in Weidenhaupt Group 238
in Yugoslavia 152
railway left intact for 519
reconnaissance role 381
resistance to 279
sent to block Italian advance 414
Lemnos. defence of 392
Lend Lease Bill (US) 551
Libya see North Africa
Liddell Hart, Sir Basil 578
Lillingston, Lieutenant Colonel E.G.G. 460
Line of Communication Signals Unit
(Allied) 522
List, Field Marshal Wilhelm 351
accepts EMFAS surrender 181
attack plans 6670, 1956
forces under 3256
invasion orders 2289
on Bulgarian transport 91
on decision to conquer Greece 112
on intercepted radio message 208
on supplies 125
on W Force evacuation 505
praise for troops 34950
protests removal of troops 1312
Little Entente 1920
Liubas, Major General Nikolaos 86
Ljubljana, fall of 207
Lhr, General Alexander 134
Long, Gavin 7, 354
Longmore, Air Chief Marshal Arthur 41
Luder, Major General Hans von 4467
Luftwaffe (Germany) see also names of
individual units
at Corinth Bridge 461, 4656

at Thermopylae Line 416, 439, 4556
attacks 1st Armoured Brigade 288
attacks Belgrade 151
attacks DoiranNestos Line 1589
attacks Greek shipping 125
attacks pass defences 2767
attacks RAF bases 386, 432
attacks retreating columns 308, 380,
3869, 3989, 531
attacks W Force positions 284
attacks Yugoslav columns 152
Bulgarian bases 91
demolition attempts by 456
effect on RAF in Mediterranean 103
evacuation craft sunk by 487, 5089
failure against ground troops 174,
2989, 328, 3879, 4201, 5304
magnetic mines laid by 163
psychological impact of attacks by
52930
raids on troops awaiting embarkation
496
reconnaissance flights 107, 110
role in invasion 56, 8, 220
uses Greek airfields 535
Lustreforce see W Force
Lysander squadrons (UK), fly to Egypt 432
Macedonia, Greek forces in 53
Mackay, Major General Iven
demolitions ordered by 210
evacuated 450
on German tactics 5745
on Luftwaffe ineffectiveness 387
on Pinios Gorge retreat 3534
orders artillery withdrawal 241
organises blocking position 199200
pessimistic on defence 2012
relations with Charrington 368
relations with Savige 3778
Thermopylae Line defence orders
4078
withdrawal orders 214, 223
Macky, Lieutenant Colonel N.I.
index
commands 21st Battalion 217
contact with lost 305
Mala Reka ridge 200
Maniadakis, Konstantinos 383, 479
Markopoulon, beachhead at 487
Marshall, Major H.C.D. 365, 529
Matapan, Battle of 141
Mattenklott, Major General Franz 156, 193
Mavroneri Ravine, attack along 3134
Mavroudis, Nikolaos 21
Mazarakis, Lieutenant General 394, 396
Mazower, Mark 592
McClymont, W.G. 7, 357
McLachlan, Squadron Leader I.D. 549
Megara, embarkation from 463, 470
Menzies, Sir Robert 566
doubtful about W Force 411, 55860,
563
on Eden 553
on US considerations 5512
on W Force deployment 567
requests assurances 55
Messerschmitt fighters (Germany) 365,
465, 496
Metaxas, General Ioannis 49
as Prime Minister 17
death of 44
negotiations for British support 50
popular support for 312
pre-war negotiations by 213
receives declaration of war 40
Metaxas Line 834, 526
Metsovon Pass, capture of 4023
Michael, King of Romania 37
Middle East Commanders-in-Chief
Committee 546
Military and Economic Consequences of
an Operation in the East 569
Military Mission to Greece (UK) 48
Miloi, embarkations from 479
Mirkovi, Brigadier Bora 128
Mitchell, Lieutenant Colonel J.W.
counter-attack ordered by 240
mistaken for spy 221
orders night withdrawal 243
Molos, defence of see Thermopylae Line
639
Molotov, Vyacheslav, visits Berlin 68

Monastir Gap
armoured brigade sent to 1823
attempts to block breakthrough 160
attention drawn to 11920
defence of 107, 142
delays in attacking 199
geography of 72
invasion route through 208
vulnerability of 144
Monemvasia, evacuations from 491, 4956
Moranska Division (Yugoslavia) 165
Moscow, German failure to capture 585
motorised transport 187
Mussolini, Benito 70, 163
Albanian visits 69, 78
German support for 44, 65
leadership style 30
refuses to accept Greek surrender 413
relations with Hitler 18, 36, 1401
National Schism 31
Navplion, evacuations from 452, 474, 475,
492
Nedic, General M. 184
Nestos Brigade (Greece)
defends DoiranNestos Line 157
falls back 167
in EMFAS 857
resistance to invasion 192
Nestos River valley 83
Neumann-Silkow, Major General Walter
207
New Zealand Division see 2nd Division
(NZ)
New Zealand military forces see also
names of individual units
justification for use in Greece 55767
lost in Greece 12
official histories of 7
North Africa
Allied priority given to 160
effect of Greek campaign on 5901
German offensive in limits supplies to
Greece 1034
German successes in 285
Italian defeats in 44, 50
Nubian, HMS 474, 498
OConnor, Lieutenant General Richard
544
Oliphant, Captain K.M. 398, 466
640
index
Olympus Pass 189, 297, 362

OlympusAliakmon Line
choice to abandon 264
deployment along 219
establishment of 186
plans for 197
W Force withdraws to 213, 234
OlympusVenetikos Line, withdrawal from
Albania to form 225
Operation Barbarossa
fundamental flaws in 5857
German plans for 61
German troops in 583
Greek campaign delays start of 527,
5724
orders for confirmed 66
reasons for delay 57781
reasons for failure 56870, 57980,
5823
Romanian oil vital to 64
Operation Demon
commences 427
naval component of 487
planning for 265, 448
Operation Mandibles 48, 57
Operation Marita
as precondition for Barbarossa 5712
planning for 115
preparations for 66
success of 1
Operation Retribution 149
Operation Typhoon 5845
operational history 3, 910
Orion, HMS 427, 475
Oros Orti, attack on 416
Pact of Steel, signing of 19
Palairet, Sir Michael
as British Ambassador to Greece 41
on evacuation 371
reports desertions and insubordination
394
Papademas, Nicholas 3245, 359
Papagos, General Alexandros 49, 56
Albanian campaign plans 76, 789
as Commander-in-Chief 423, 4389
authorises withdrawals 182, 213
committed to Yugoslav involvement
145
criticised for late withdrawal from

Albania 235
deployments by 2778
drafts surrender orders 181
fails to visit Macedonia 107
forward defence strategy 127
in surrender debate 3823
manages Albanian withdrawal 257
negotiations with Britain 53, 55
negotiations with W Force 219, 2623,
3212, 517
on delays to Barbarossa 579
on Mackays withdrawal 246
response to invasion 158
strategic war plans 889
unwillingness to surrender 308, 384
Papakonstantinou, Colonel Miltiades 190
Papakonstantinou, Major General
Konstantinos 84
Parkinson, Lieutenant Colonel G.B. 337,
3578
Parrington, Brigadier L.
at Kalamata beach 4623, 4967,
499500
commands 81st Sub Base Area 124
in Argos 4923
on Larissa attacks 286
on Piraeus disaster 1634
scapegoating of 5012
Paul, Prince of Yugoslavia 5960, 69
Paulus, Lieutenant General Friedrich 574
Pennland, SS 463
Peresi, Lieutenant Colonel 801
Permeti sector, Albania 43
Perth, HMAS 427, 475, 498
Peter II, King of Yugoslavia 128, 324
Peter, Prince of Greece 479
Petres, German occupation of 242
Petzopoulos, Vice Admiral Konstantinos
485
Phatleron Bay, evacuations via 3245
Phoebe, HMS 427, 452, 498
Pinios Gorge
battle of 31821, 32958, 347
German tanks at 538
Piraeus
Allied troops land at 912, 96
index
as main W Force port 76
bombing raids on 1624, 286
petrol installations at 519
Pisoderion Pass
danger of attack via 257
German attack on 209, 250
need to hold 271
Pitsikas, Lieutenant General Ioannis
commands EFAS 77, 225
continued resistance by 327, 396
in surrender debate 2823, 382, 383
on collapse of morale 227
replaced by Tsolakoglou 4012
returns to Athens 4123
withdrawal orders 308
Platamon Pass
access to Pinios Gorge via 116
attacks on 3167, 317
defence of 295, 297
relative forces at 328
Playfair, I.S.O. 7, 515
Plytas, Amvrisios 485
Pogradec, Greeks capture 43
Poland 245, 5779
Portal, Air Chief Marshal Charles 552
Porto Rafti, embarkations at 452, 473, 487,
490
Prasca, Sebastiano Visconti 42
Pridham-Wippell, Vice Admiral Sir Henry
41920, 499, 500
provost personnel, shortage of 385
Ptolemais 244, 2513
Puttick, Brigadier E. 110, 473
Raeder, Admiral Erich 25
Rafina, troops left behind at 474
Rangers see 9th Battalion Kings Royal
Rifle Corps (UK)
Reinforcement Battalion (Allied) 461, 492
Reinhard, Lieutenant General HansWolfgang 132
Reinhardt, Lieutenant General GeorgHans 100
Rendel, G.W. 63
Reserve Officers College Battalion
(Greece) 436, 464
Reynolds, David 547
Ribbentrop, Joachim von 235, 36
Richter, Heinz 11
Richthofen, Wolfram Freiherr von
commands 8th Air Corps 134
commends Greek bravery 1934
641
criticises Sponeck 292

demolitions ordered by 456
on evacuation 463
on shipping sunk by Luftwaffe 508
Rintelen, Enno von 65
Roatta, General Mario 140
Rodopolis Sector 84, 1534
Romania
cedes territory to Soviet Union 267
German moves against 22
German supply ships in 125
German troops in 37, 669
need to protect oilfields of 56972
pre-war international relations 1920
role in German strategy 64, 139
Soviet territorial claims on 24
RomeBerlin Axis, declaration of 18
Roupesko Sector 84, 166, 194
Rowell, Brigadier S.F.
appeals for reinforcements 160
Blameys relations with 438
critical of Greek forces 518
on Battle of Vevi 268
on Greek jitters 106
on Greek roads 74
on Luftwaffe attacks 387, 389
on Mackys retreat 318
on RAF autonomy 536
Royal Air Force (UK) see also names of
individual units
aircraft lost by 3245, 386, 401, 505
as threat to Romanian oil fields 572
attacks on Bulgaria 162
autonomy of resented 536
evacuations by 3734, 504
failure to repel invasion 5
Greek contingent in 1034
no evacuation plans made for 4267
planes removed from Greece 432
pressure on 286
strategy of 180
supports Greek resistance 41
Royal Navy (UK) see also names of
individual units
lack of liaison with W Force 520
losses in Greek campaign 590
642
index
Mediterranean policy 20
role in evacuation 41920, 4512
Swordfish torpedo bombers 104
Yugoslavia requests aid from 2278
Rundstedt, Field Marshal von 576
Rupel Pass see Fort Rupel
Russia see Soviet Union
Sakellariou, Alexandros 401, 479
Salisbury-Jones, Brigadier G.
critical report by 521, 524
in British Military Mission 95
on German advance 185
reports loss of EMFAS 191
Salonika
defence of 1656
strategic importance of 76, 81, 137
surrender of 20, 1812
Salween, HMS 474, 487
Samothrace, German capture of 392
Saracoglu, Skr 58
Sarafis, Stephanos 556
Saronic Gulf, mining of 286
Savige, Brigadier Stan
at Kalamata beach 4768
commands 17th Brigade 115, 218
on air attacks 529
ordered to Kalabaka 285
promised forces reduced 2889
reinforces Corinth Bridge 460
relations with Charrington 3668
withdrawal plans 36970, 3789
Savige Force (Allied)
formation of 285
withdrawal plans 303, 323
Schmider, Klaus 543
Schneckenburger, Brigadier Wilhelm 155
Schnburg-Waldenburg, Captain Prince
Wilhelm 435, 4435
Schrner, Brigadier Ferdinand
advances on Gonnos 3201, 330
at Pinios Gorge 3346
attacks Thermopylae Pass 4467
commands 6th Mountain Division 249
Second Vienna Arbitration 28
Serbia, German troops in 185
Servia Pass
battle for 198
defence of 25960, 28993, 293, 297

withdrawal from 363
Shedden, F. 566
Shone, Terence 59
Siatista Pass 257, 271, 276
Sidi Barrani, taken by Allies 44
Sidirokastro Sector 84
Simopoulos, M.C. 105
Simovi, General Dusan T.
as Yugoslav Premier 128
capitulation by 359
flees Belgrade 151
flees to Greece 285
reluctance of to commit 130, 136, 138
Sissis, Major General Georgios 157
Skamnos, defence of 436
Skopje, surrender of 1845
Slamat, SS, disabled and lost 4756
Slovakia, joins Tripartite Pact 62
Smuts, Jan 57, 54950
Soddu, Ubaldu 39, 424
Soldan, Lieutenant General George 593
Sotir ridge 242, 2445, 250
Southern Army (Yugoslavia) 165
Soviet Union see also Operation
Barbarossa
Balkan interests 20, 24, 68
Bulgarian policies 634
demands Romanian territory 267
German invasion of delayed 4
German relations with 278, 61
prisoners from taken by German army
5845
unexpected resistance to invasion 584
Spanish Civil War, Italian intervention in
19, 30
Special Unit (UK), demolitions by 418
Spender, Percy 5623
Sperikos Bridge, demolition of 410
Sponeck, Colonel Hans Graf von 272,
2912 see also Sponeck Group
Sponeck Group (Germany)
at Servia Pass 329
crosses Aliakmon River 28991
Spyridon, Bishop of Yannina 283, 324, 383
SS Reich Motorised Division (Germany),
enters Belgrade 228
Stalin, Josef 582
Steele, Brigadier C. 380, 387
Stergiopoulos, Major General Leonidas 84,
1534
index
Stewart, Colonel K.L. 515
Struma River 83
Strumica Valleys 878
Strumitsa Valley pass 132
Stuart, HMAS 452, 475
Stuka dive bombers (Germany) 175
at Corinth Bridge 4656
attack Servia Pass 291
attack Thermopylae Line 439
bomb 4th Brigade 25960
relative ineffectiveness of 2989
transport harassed by 365
Stumme, Lieutenant General Georg
attack plans 2245, 24950, 4345
changes attack to Thermopylae Pass
442
commands 40th Corps 100
leads southward advance 208
orders attack on Servia Pass 291
Stumme Group (Germany) 277
Sturm, Colonel Alfred 465
Suda Bay, Crete 4878, 488
Sudan, Italian victories in 30
Swordfish torpedo bombers (UK) 104
tank assaults
at Pinios Gorge 352
Tempe, German capture of 340
Tepelene offensive 78, 812
Thasos, taken by Germany 392
Thebes, defence of 400
Thermopylae Line
flanking attacks on 4301
geography of 406
German approach to 417
misperceptions of 453
options for defence of 395
preparations for defence 372
reasons for choice of 423
tank assault at 538
W Force withdraws to 2624, 2835,
385, 398
withdrawal from 3012, 304, 361
Thermopylae Pass, defence of 449
Thessaly, German advance through 359
Thomas, Lieutenant General Georg 569
Thurland Castle, HMS 427, 463
Thylakas Sector 84
Tobruk, German tanks halted at 454
Tolos 4745, 492, 494
643
Touloubar Sector 85
Tripartite Pact
Balkan front blocked by 550
Balkan states approached to join 62, 66
Soviet conditions for joining 689
Yugoslavia joins 59, 69, 126
Tripoli, defence of as alternative to Greek
campaign 544
Tsolakoglou, Lieutenant General Georgios
Albanian campaign 138
argues for capitulation 283, 3834
commands WMFAS 77
formal surrender by 4034, 4124
forms government 415
hastens withdrawal 227
manages 3rd Corps withdrawal 310
offers capitulation 4012
Tsouderos, Emmanouil 418
Turkey
alliances sought with 5860
Balkan Pact provisions 32
commits to non-belligerence 1645
German reassurances to 150
German relations with 69
neutrality of 191
non-aggression pact with Bulgaria 51
Turle, Rear Admiral C.E.
advises evacuation 265
heads British Military Mission 521
warns evacuation imminent 303
Ulster Prince, HMS 427, 452, 475
ULTRA code decryptions
effect on Wilsons decisions 161
importance of 5256
indicate rapid German advance 3012
United Kingdom see also British military
forces
Balkan policies 1733, 458
effect of war on 592
extends guarantees to threatened states
223
limited commitments to Greece 5445
military supplies from 82, 122
misunderstandings with Greece 524
political reasons for defending Greece
5478
pre-war Italian policy 178
644
index
pre-war Mediterranean policy 20

recognises importance of Yugoslavia
80
response to Italian invasion of Greece
35
United States 60, 5512, 592
USSR see Soviet Union
Vasey, Brigadier George
at Domokos 364
commands 19th Brigade 115
orders hold on artillery fire 240
token force of 259
unaware of evacuation plans 410
Veiel, Major General Rudolf
at Pinios Gorge 321
commands 2nd Armoured Division 157
negotiates EMFAS surrender 181
on W Force resistance 516
Venetikos River 288, 3101, 329
VermionOlympus Line
Allied troops commit to 130
delays in preparing 55
EMFAS defends 934
plans to defend 1701
possibility of having held 546
preparation of 1123
strengths and weaknesses of 119
Yugoslav defeat and 53
Vevi, Battle of 2378, 240, 255, 2669 see
also Kleidi Pass
Vial, Captain R.R. 354, 365
Vietinghoff, Lieutenant General Heinrich
von 132
Vinkovci revolt 177
Vogel, Detlev 101
Volos harbour 76, 286, 323
Voyager, HMAS 452
W Force (Allied) 202, 220
adequacy of equipment 540
arrival in Greece 1
chances of success 4, 1745
command line problems 5212
commitment to withdrawal 5134
communications problems 123, 51923
cultural stereotypes in 5178
declining morale of 389, 52930
demolitions by 329, 528
disorganisation of 3845
early problems 113
embarking for Greece 109

equipment lost by 5045, 590
evacuates Athens 461
evacuation beaches 434
evacuation plans 145, 2645, 3034,
360, 374, 3956
fog of war faced by 159
frictions in 118
Greek troops abandoned by 2623
humiliating defeat of 590
intermediate line plans 182, 1856
liaison with CMFAS 142
logistics involvement 1701
numbers of evacuated 5034
on OlympusAliakmon Line 271
opens headquarters 945, 97
organisational breakdown 4801
physical condition of 203
prepares for attack 259
proposed reorganisation 161
relative success of 5434
repeated withdrawals prior to combat
2056, 219, 234, 2835, 326
retreat blocked by bomb crater 380
retreat to Erithrai 457
troop losses 348, 590
vehicular retreat 381, 389
Wards, Ian 269, 354
Warlimont, Brigadier Walter 569
Warsaw, climatic conditions in 5789
Wavell, General Sir Archibald 549
agrees to further withdrawals 262
blames Greeks for collapse of
resistance 4223
confirms evacuation orders 4189
keeps W Force secret 956
meetings in Athens 3946
on effect of Greece on North African
campaign 5901
on evacuation 322, 372
on losses to Luftwaffe 387, 509
on military intelligence failings 523
on paratroops 482
on VermionOlympus Line 546
plans W Force evacuation 265
praise for withdrawal 453
prioritises North Africa 160
relations with Blamey and Freyberg
565
index
requests Greek interpreters 51920
5526, 5623
supports British intervention 502
Wilson visited by 162
Weichs, Field Marshal Maximilian von
131, 325
Weidenhaupt Group (Germany) 238, 242,
267
Wellington bomber squadrons (UK) 162,
359
Western Desert see North Africa
Western Macedonian Field Army Section
(Greece) see also 3rd Corps (Greece)
attacks Albania 153
concentration zone planned for 2478
continues withdrawal 279
in triangular salient 257
loss of morale in 2867
partial withdrawal of 182
renamed 3rd Greek Corps 309
troops in concerned about attack
7980
under Tsolakoglou 77
withdrawal of 372
Wilson, Lieutenant General Henry
Maitland Jumbo 549, 562 see also W
Force
appointed to command of Greek forces
58
blames Greeks for collapse of
resistance 423
command hindered by secrecy 967
critical of Papagos 89
decision to split headquarters 113
defensive plans 1701
deployments by 1189
deploys Amyndaion Detachment 141
evacuation of causes confusion 481
intermediate line orders 1967
leaves Athens 461
loses confidence in Greek troops 262
moves to Elasson 98
on CMFAS 1212
on ineffective air attacks 4201
on RAF autonomy 536
orders to Savige 289
orders withdrawals 213
645
Papagoss relations with 219, 3212, 517

planned withdrawals by 3012, 385
realistic viewpoint 1434
response to invasion 1601
splits headquarters 520
Witt, Major Franz 209, 221
Witt Battle Group (Germany)
at Battle of Vevi 23840, 267
attack on Sotir ridge 250
formation of 209
Wryneck, HMS 463, 4756
Yannina, Greek forces retreat to 370
York, HMS 419, 507
Yugoslavia see also Belgrade
18th Corps drives through 1578
alliances sought with 59
British intelligence about poor 523
collapse of resistance in 183
conquest of 2278
coup in changes allegiances 12730, 150
critical role in invasion of Greece 1756
German isolation of 62
German pressure on 66
Germany launches attack on 14950
government attempts to flee 284
Greek strategy dependent on 801
hopes for alliance with 57
military weakness 1389
negotiations with 1368
Operation Barbarossa and 574
pre-war Italian intervention 19
resistance by neutralised 233
resistance collapses in 359
signs Tripartite Pact 126
strategic importance of 89, 5412, 546
supports Greek resistance 41
unreliability of 146
Yugoslav military forces see also names of
individual units
Air Force 103
collapse of 7, 185
in Albania 16970
partisans left behind in evacuation 479
Zagreb, fall of 207
Zerstorungsgeschwader 26 (Germany) 534
Zissis, Major General Ioannis 85, 167
Zoiopoulos, Major General Christos 84
646
index

Swastika Over Acropolis

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contents

Swastika over the Acropolis

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/hw

Swastika over the Acropolis

Craig Stockings and Eleanor Hancock

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

For Emma, Georgia, Charlotte and Thomas Stockings

Twas just a month agonot more

Setting the Scene

The Drama Unfolds

LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES

SETTING THE SCENE

The fall of Northeastern Greece (8-9 April) 179

New Battle Lines (10-12 April)

The Battle of Vevi (12-13 April)

Pressure on the Passes (14-15 April)

The Battle of Pinios Gorge (17-18 April)

Across the plains of Thessaly (17-18 April) 359

Corinth and the Peloponnese (25-26 April) 457

The Final Evacuations (27-28 April)

The Outcome Explained

Marita and Barbarossa

Emma, is a true partner. Let me also thank my children, Georgia, Charlotte

list of maps and figures

LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES

list of maps and figures

list of maps and figures

list of maps and figures

18.3 German aircraft and supplies on a captured Greek airfield. The

Map P.1:The Mediterranean Theatre, 1941

Map P.2:GreeceShowing various Allied defensive lines of critical significance during

in English and German. We are, at present, working on a separate project

In the absence of many detailed operational studies from which to

area of much scholarly endeavour in either Italy or Germany. Furthermore,

being annihilated by the Luftwaffe during their withdrawal to the south.44

SETTING THE SCENE

axis ambitions in europe and greece 1933-1940

Axis Ambitions in Europe and Greece 1933-1940: Greece is

axis ambitions in europe and greece 1933-1940

previous role of the protector of Austrian independence and supported the

axis ambitions in europe and greece 1933-1940

axis ambitions in europe and greece 1933-1940

was an important source of secure raw materials, particularly Romanian

axis ambitions in europe and greece 1933-1940

In Germany rearmament and economic policy had been directed since

axis ambitions in europe and greece 1933-1940

of the conflicting territorial demands of both Hungary and Bulgaria on

axis ambitions in europe and greece 1933-1940

Despite fascist ambitions, Italy continued to be the least of the great

axis ambitions in europe and greece 1933-1940

wheredespite further pressure from MussoliniGraziani failed to begin

support as a barrier to Italian demands on Greece, though a recent study

axis ambitions in europe and greece 1933-1940

September 1939 foundered on Germanys willingness to go to war over

the italo-greek war, the powers and the balkans

The Italo-Greek War, the powers and the Balkans:

rebuffed. Nonetheless, Metaxas told the German ambassador in August

the italo-greek war, the powers and the balkans

In ordering an invasion of Greece, Mussolini overruled the warnings of

the italo-greek war, the powers and the balkans

Doubts about the looming winter notwithstanding, the Italian military

the italo-greek war, the powers and the balkans

The balance of forces, armaments and economies so favoured Italy on

the italo-greek war, the powers and the balkans