Emile Durkheim,

1858~1917

A Collection of Essays,
with Translations and a Bibliography
EDITED BY KURT

H. .-........-WOLFF

Contributors
CHARLES BLEND
PAUL BOHANNAN
LEWIS A. COSER
HUGH DALZIEL DUNCAN
JEROME D. FOLKMAN
ROSCOE C. HINKLE, JR.
PAUL HONIGSHEIM
KAZUTA KURAUCHI
JOSEPH NEYER
TALCOTT PARSONS
HENRIPEYRE
ALBERT PIERCE
MELVIN RICHTER
ALBERT SALOMON
KURT H. WOLFF

Repl'oduced fmm El11ile Durkheim's Le~OIlS de sociologe by pennisson

or Presses Uniyersitaires de Franee

EMILE D URKHEli\f

THE GHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS

COLUMBUS J L1(;,{)
,
,

THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

DURKHEIM'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE

THEORY OF INTEGRATION
OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS
T ALCOTT P ARSONS

'

tive i8 tIle Comtean conception of Itconsen8US" as the focus of

unity in sodeties. This was the prmary origin of the famous ,_,
concept of the consGence collective; this rather than any German conception'of Geist is clearly what Durkheim ha~ in mind.
It was a sound starting point, but it was much too SImple and
undifferentiated to serve his purposes; primarily, perhaps, be
cause it couId not account for the fundamental phenomenon
of unity in diversity, the phenomenon of the integraton of a
highly differentiated system.
The negative reference point is the utilitaran conception of
the interplay of discrete individual interest,. as first. put f~rward
by Herbert Spencer who conceived of an Industnal soclety as
a network of "contractual relations,"l The importance of relations o contract, that is, relations in which terms are settled'by sorne type o[ ad hoc agreement, was an immediate. cons.equence of the divsion oI labor which had been emphaslzed In
the long tradition of utlitarian economics derivin? from Loc~e
and .fTom Adam Smith's famous chapter. Durkhelffi made thls
u-adition the focal point of his criticism, tackling it in one of
its main citadels; and, in so doing, he raised the problem of
the differentiated system which Comte had not really dealt with.
In ths critique, Durkheim ShOW8, w~th charact.eristic th?roughness and penetration, that Spencer s assumptlons-whl.c?
were those common to the whole liberal branch of the uuhtarian tradition-failed to account for even the most elementary com ponent o order in a sys,tem ~f s.o~ial relati~ns that
was allegedIy based on the pursult of IndIVIdual self-lnterest.
To put it a little differently, no one ~ad. been abI~ ~o a2n~wer
Hobbes's fundamental question from wzthzn the tradttton~ Slnce
IIobbes's own solution was palpably unacceptable. As 18 well
known, Durkheim's emphasis is on the institution of contract,
which at one point he characterizes as consisting ~n the "noncontractual elements of contract, These are not ltems agreed
'upon by contracting pardes in the particular si~uationJ b':t
are norms established in the sodety, norms whlch underhe
and are independent of any particular contract" They ar~ partly
embodied in formal law, though not necessanly only In what
in a strict technical sense is called the law of contract by jurists,
and partly in more informal t'understandings" and practice.
The content oE these norms may be surnmed up as follows:

It is appropriate at this time, just a little over one hund;red

his
years after the birth of Emile Durkheim, to take stock
contrbutions to what was perhaps the central area of hIS theoretical interest. The development of theoretical thinking that
has taken place in the intervening years enables us to achieve
clarity in the identificaton and evaluation of these
contributions.
1t can be said, 1 think, that it was the problem of the integration o the social system, of what holds societies together, whith
was the most persistent preoccupaton of Durkheim's career.
In the situaton oE the time, one couId not have chosen a more
strategic focus for contributing to sociological theory. Moreover the work Durkhem did in this fieId can be sad to have
bee~ nothing short oE epoch-making; he did not stand entirely
alone, but his work was far more sharply Eocused and deeply
penetratng than that o any other author of his time. Because
of this profundity, the full implications oE his work have not
yet been entirely assimilated by the relevant professional
groups. Furthermore, in addition to the intrinsic compIexity
of rhe subject, the rather spedal frame of reference of French
Positivism in which he couched his analysis has made it difficult
to interpret him.
The present essay wiU not attempt to be a scholarly review
either oE Durkheim's own printed work or of the secondary
literature. It will rather attempt-in the light of a good many
years of preoccupation with the problems for which Durkheim
gave what were for his time classical formulations-to assess
sorne o the main lines of his spedal contribution and to indi~
cate the ways in which it has been both necessary and possible
to try to go beyond th~ stage at which he left them.

.cf

There are two essential reference points in Durkheim's inidal /\

orientation: one is positive and the other negative. The posi- \
118

/-\

\
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DURKHEIM

THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

T?ey consist, first of aH, in definitions DE what content is permItted and what content is prohibited in contractual agreemel1t-in Western society of recent times, for instance, contracts
that infringe on .the personal liberty of either party or of any
third party in his prvate capacity are prohibited; second, in
definitions of the means of securing the assent of the other
party that are legitimate and of those that are iIlegitimate-in
general, coercion and fraud are considered illegitimate, however difficult it may be to draw exact borderlines; third, in
definitions of the scope and limts of responsibility which may
be .reasonably (or legally) imputed to one or another party to
a contractual relation, either orginally on the basis of his
Ucapacity" to enter binding agreements-as agent for a collectivity, for example-or subsequently on the basis of the consequences to himself and others of the agreements made; and,
rourth, in definitions of the degree to which the interest of
the society s' involved in any particular prvate agreement, the
degree to which prvate contracts bear on the nterests of third
parties or on those of the collectivity as a whole. 3
Durkheim postulated the existence of what he called organic
solidarity as a functional necessity underlying the institutionalizaton of contracto This may be characterized as the integration
of units, units which, in the last analysis, are individual persons
in roles, who are performing qualitatively differentiated functions in the social system. The implication of such differentiation is that the needs of the unit cannot be met solely by his
own activities. By virtue of .the specialization of his function,
the unit becomes dependent on the activities of others who
must meet the needs which are not covered by this specialized
function. There is, therefore, a special type of interdependence
that is generated by this functional differentiation. The proto.
type i8 the kind of division of labor described by the economists.
ClearIy, Durkheim's conception is broader than this. For example, he describes the differentiation of function between the
sexes, in social as well as biological terms, as a case of the
division of labor in his sense.
What, then, is indicated by "organic solidarity"? The most
important problem in interpreting the meaning of the concept
is to determine ts relation to the conception of the conscience

collective. Durkheim's primary in terest is in the fact that units

agree on norrns because they are backed by values held in
corumon, although the interests o the differentiated units must
necessarily diverge. Durkheim's original definition of the con
science collective is as follows: "L' ensemble des croyances et
des sentiments communs a la moyenne des membres d'une
meme socit forme un systcme d termin qui a sa vie propre;
on peut l'appeler la conscience collective ou commune."4. The
keynote oE this definition i5, clearIy, beliefs and sentiments that
are held in common. This formula is essential, for it indicates
that the problem of solidarity is located in the area oE what
may very broadly be called the motivational aspects of commitment to the society, and to conformity with the expectations
institutionalized within it. Taken alone, however, it is too
general to serve as more than a point oE departure for an
analysis of the problems o solidarity and hence o sodetal
integration. Furthermore, Durkheim himself was seriously
embarrassed by the problem oE how to connect the conscience
collective with the differentiation resulting from the division
of labor.

120

121

1
-!

It seems to me that Durkheim's formula needs to be further

elaborated by two sets o distinctions. He himself made essential
contributions to one of these, the distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity; but one oE the main sources of
difficulty in understanding his work is his relative neglect of
the second set of distinctions, and his tendency to confuse it
with the first. This second set concerns the levels of generality "
achieved by the cultural patterns-values, differentiated norms,
collectivities, and roles-that have been institutionalized in a
society. It also concerns the controls that articulate these levels ,"
and that determine the direction in which the controls. operate.
A discussion of the levels of generality of these four cultural
patterns will provide a setting for a consideration of mechanical
and organic solidarity and of the re1ations betweell them.
1 think it is correct to sa y that in the course of his career
Durkheim gradually crystallized and clarified a conviction
which can be stated in terms more modern than he himself -'1
used: The structure of a society, or of any human social

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DURKHEIM

system, consists in (is not simply influenced by) patterns of

normative culture5 whch are institutionalized in the social
system and internalized (thoug-h not in identical ways) in the
per80nali~ies of its individual members. The cultural patterns
]U~t outhned are the four different types of components oE
thlS structure. Elsewhere, they are referred io as Hlevels oE
g-enerality oE normative culture." Though all are institutionalized, eaeh has a different relaton to the strueture and processes
o the society. Societal values eonsttute t,he eomponent whieh
reaches the highest level of generality; for they are conceptions
of the desirable society that are held in eoromon by its members. Societal values are thus distinguished from other types
oI values---:-such as p.ersonal ones~in that the eategory of object
evah~ated 18 the socIal system and not personalities, organisms,
phYSlcal systerns, or cultural systems ('ltheories," for example).
The value system of the society is, then, the set of normative
judgments he1d by the members of the society which define,
with specific reference to their own society, what to them iti a
good society. In so far as this set of values ls in fact held in
comrnon and lS institutionalized, it is descriptive of the society
as an empirical entity. This institutionalization i8 a matter of
degTee, however; for rnembers of a going society will, to sorne
extent,. difer in their values even at the requisite level, and
they wIlt to a certain degree, fal to aet in accordance withthe
values they hold. But with aH these qualifications, 1t is still
correct to say that, values held in c~mmon eonstitute the primary reference pOlnt far the analysls of a social system as an
, emprical system. 6
, The p~rarnount vaIue system is re1evant to the description
of the sOClety as a whole, but it does not distnguish normative
ju.dg~ents wh~ch refer to differentiated parts or subsystems
WIthln the Soclety. Therefore, when a differenee of values is
imputed to the two sexes, to regional gTOUpS, to class groups,
and so on, one has gone from describing societal values to
describing those that eharacterize another social system, one
which shouId be treated analytically as a subsystem of the
society oE reference. When this step has been taken, it beeomes
essential to make another distinction, the distinction between
value and diferentiated norm. ,
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THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

At the subsystem level, members of the society who do and

who do not participate in the subsystem of reference have
evaluative judgments which they apply to the qualities and
performances of those members who do, as distinguished fram
those who do not, participate in it. These judgments are "specifications," that is, applications of the general principIes of the
eommon societal value system at a more concrete level. The
expectations of behavior of those who are members of the
subsystern are not the sarne as those of non-members. Thus,
in the case of sex role. the vaIues appIying" to the behavior of
the two sexes are shared by both, but the norms which regulate
that behavior apply differentially to the two sexes. In so fal'
as a pattern oE behavior i8 sex-specific, rnembers of one sex
group wiU conform with it, the other not. This is to say thai:'
values are shared, presumptive1y, by all members of the most
extensive relevant system, whereas norms are a funetion of the
differentiation of socially significant behavior which is institutionalized in different parts oE that system.
It follows from this that values as such do not involve a
reference to a situaton, or a reference to the differentiation of
the unts of the system in which they are institutionalized.
N orms. on the other hand, make this differentiation explicito
In one respect, they are derived frorn the evaluative judgments
that have been institutionalized in the value system; but independently of this component, they also inelude, as is clear in
the case of legal systems, three other specifications. The first
specifies the categories of units to which the norm applies; this
is the prablem ot jurisdiction. The seeond specifies what the J
eo~sequences will be to the unit that conforms and to the \
unIt that does not conform to the requil'ements of the norm J
(variations in degree are, of eourse, possible) ; this is the problem of sanctions or enforcernent. Finally, the third specifies
that the meaning of the norrn shall be interpreted in the light
of the eharaeter and the situations of the units to which it
applies; this constitutes the prohlem of interpretation, which
is roughly equivalent to the' appelIate funetion in law. It
should be noted that in this case the referenee to the situation
is eonfined to the one in which the unit acts vis-a-vis other
unts. It is thus ntrasysternic. When the reference i8 to situ.123
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THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

DURKHEIM

ations external to the system, the levels of collectivity and role

strueture; to be outlined later, must be brought into the
picture.
Values, then, are the "normative patterns that are descrptive of a positively evaluated social system. Norms are generalized patterns of expectation which define differentiated patterns
oE expeetation for the differentiated kinds of units withn a
system. In a particular system, norms always stand at a lower
level oE cultural generality than do values. Put a Hule differ, ently, norms can be legitimized by values, but not vice versa.
t--- A collectivity stands at a still lower level in the hierarchy of
the nonnative control of behavior. Subject both to the more
general values oE the system and to the norms regulating the
behavior oI the relevant differentiated types of units within' the
system, the normative culture of a collectivity defines and regulates a concrete system of eo-ordinated activity which can at any
given time be characterized by the commitments of specifically
designated persons, and which can be understood as a specifie
system of colleetive goals in a specifie situation. The funetional
reference of norms at the level of the colleetivity is, then, no'
longer general, but is made specific in the particular goals,
situations, and l'esources oE the colleetivity, including its "share"
in the goals and resourees of society. This specification of funedon, -rhough it is oI varying degree, emphasizes the faet that it
is the goal of the collectivity which defines its level of concrete~
ness, since the goal of a unit in a system is, in so far as the system
is well integrated, the basis on which its primary function in
the system is specified.
The normative eharacter of a collective goal is precisely given
by this specification of function in a system, but it is subject
to given situational exigencies that are external to the system.
This specifieation is not necessary for the definition of a norm,
hut it s essential for further specification at the level of the
organization oI the collectivty.
Collectivities consttute the essential operative units oE social
systems, to such an extent that where relations of co-operation
and /lsolidarity" for a given functional unit goal do not exist
withfn collectivities, and the function is perfonned hy a single
independent individual-by the independent artisan or profes~
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124

sional practitioner, for example-it is legitima te to speak of this

as the limiting case of the collectivity: it is a collectivity consisting of one member.
AH social systenls arise out of the interaction of human ndi.
viduals as units. Hence the most important exigencies of the
situation in which collectivities as units perfonn social functions are the conditions for effective performance by the
constituent human individuals (including their command o
physical facilities). But since the typical individual participa tes
in more than one collectivity, the relevant structural unit is not
the "total" individual or personality, but the individual in a
role. In ts normative aspect, then, a role may be thought of as
the system of normative expectations for the performance o a
participating individual in his capacity as a member DE a e01lectivity. The role lS the primary point of direct articulation
between the personality of the individual and the structure of
the social system.
Values norms, and collecdve goals-all in sorne sense control,
"govern:' and "regula te" the behavior of individuals
roles.
But only at the level of the role i8 the normative content of
expectations specifically oriented to the exigencies presented by
the personalities or l/motives" of individuals (and categories of
them differentiated by sex, age, level of education, place of
residence, and the like) and by the organic and physical
environment.
In their functioning, social systems are, oE course, subject to
still other exigencies. But such exigencies are not normative in
the sense used in this discussion; they do not involve the orientation of persons to and through conceptions of what is desirable. Thus the sheer facts of the physical environment are
simply there; they are not altered by any institutionalization of
human culture, although they may, of course, be controlled
through such human cultural media as technology. This control,
however, involves values, norms, collectivities, and role-expectations; and, as part oE the social strueture, it should be analyzed
in these terms.
J

in

Values, norms, collectivities and roles are categories that

are deseriptive of the structural aspect of a social system only.
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DURICHEIM

In addition to such categories, it is necessary to analyze the

system in functional terms in order to analyze processes of
differentiation and the operatian of these processes within a
structure. Furthermore, process utilizes resources, carrying them
thraugh a series of stages of genesis, and either "consuming'~
them or incorporating and combining' theln into types of output
or product, such as cultural change. The structure of institu~
tionalized norms is the main paint of articulation between
these sodetal structures and the functional exigencies of the
system. These exigencies, in tum, determine the mechanisms
and categories of input and output relative to integration. Let
us try to relate these considerations to the categories of me
chanical and organic solidarity.
"
Durkheim's conception of mechanical solidarity is rooted in'
what 1 have called the system of common societal values. This
is evident from the strong emphasis which he places on the
relation of mechanical solidarity to the conscience collective.
As a system of "beliefs and sentiments that are held in common, Durkheim's conscience collective is more broadly defined
than the system of societal values which 1 have given above. But
it is certain that such a system is included in Durkheim's defini~
tion, and it can be argued that a system of values is the structural core oE the system of beliefs and sentiments to which" he
refers. It should be clear, however, that Durkheim did not
attempt to systematically distinguish and classify the components of the conscience collective.1 and this would ,seem to be
essential if a satisfactory analysis of its relation to the problem
of solidarity s to be made.
Such an analysis must do at least two things. In the first place,
the value component must be distinguished from the others,
tbat is, from cognitive (existential) beliefs, patterns of motivational commitment (these are close to Durkheim's "senti~
ments"), and patterns of legitimation of collective action (these
will figure in the discussion presentIy). The second task in~
volves the determination of the variations in tbe levels of generality and degrees of specficty of the components-of values,
in particular-which eventuates in a scale cOITesponding to the
differentiation of a society into numerous subsystems. Because
of his failure to perform these two tasks, Durkheim was not
H

126

THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

able to be very exact about the relation oE the conscience col~

lective to mechanical solidarity, and was forced to resort to contrasting this relation with that of the conscience collective to
organic solidarity-and this relation gave him considerable
difficulty.
Mechanical solidarity is rooted in the common value component of the conscience collective and is an expression" of it.
Its relation to the other components is problematical. There is ,
however, another major aspect of mechanical solidaTity, nalnely,
its relation to the structure of the society as a collectivity. Every
society is organized in terms of a paramount structure of the
total system as a coIlectivity. In the highly differentiated modern society, this structure takes the form of governmental organization. In addition, there is, of course, an immensely complex network of lower-Ievel collectivities some of which are
subdvisions of the governmental structure, while others are
independent of it in various ways and degrees. The problem
of mechanical solidarity arises wherever a collectivity is organized, but it is essential to understand what system is under
consideration.
The focus of Durkhem's analysis oE mechanical solidarity,
in so far as it concerns the structure of the social system, lies, 1
suggest, in the relation between the paramount values of tIle
society and its organization as a collectivity at the requisite level;
that is, the governmental organization of the society where the
system oE reference is, as it is for Durkheim} the society as a
whole. Mechanical solidarity i8 the integration of the common
values of the society with the commtments of units within it
to contribute to the attainment of collective goals-either negatively by refraining from action which would be felt to be dis~
ruptive of this function, or positively by taking responsibility
for it.
This duality of reference is brought out with particular
clarity in Durkheim's discussion oE criminallaw as an index or
expression of mechanical solidarity. On the one hand, he makes
reference to common "sentiments"; on the other, to obligations
to the organized collectivity as such. 7 Also, since in all advanced
societies government is the paramount agent for the application
of coercan, Durkheim strongly emphasizes the role of the ele127
41

-~dM~I),m;;::;;::;;;:;gg.~~2C!'!t~"

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THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

DURKHEIM

ment of sanction in the repressive type of law. Two of the four

primary funetional referenees of a legal system noted above,
legitimation and enforeement through sanctions, figure lmportantly in what Durkheim calls repressive law.
The above considerations account for the loeaton of the
phenomenon of mechanical solidarity with reference to the
structure oE the social system. This solidarity or integration of
the system s brought about by the interplay of the system of
eommon values, which legitimizes organization in the interest
of collective goaIs, with the commitments of units of the system
(which are, in the last analysis, individual persons in roles) to
loyalty and responsibility. This loyalty and responsibility are
not only to the values themselves, but to the collectivity whose
functioning is guided by those values and which institutionalizes '
them. This location in the social structure does not, however,
telI us anything about the mechanisms by which the integration
is generated.
Before approaching the question of the mechanisms which
produce integration, it will be well to raise the corresponding
question of struetural Iocation with respect to "organic solidarity:' My suggestion is that, by contrast with the question of
mechanical solidarity, this one do es not concern the value system
directly, but rather the system of institutionalized norros in
relaton to the structure of roles in the society. This is not putting it in Durkheim's own terms, for he did not use the concept
of role which has become so important to sociological theory in
the last generation. The importance of the reference to norms
in his analysis is, however, entirely clear.
Furthermore, Durkheirn's discussion is fully in accord with
the distinction made previously between values and differentiated norms as structural components of the social system, sine e
he so strongly emphasized the l"elation oE organic solidarity to
the differentiation of functions among units in the system, and
specifically to the differentiation of expectations of behavior. 8
Though he enumerated a number of other fields, it i8 also
clear that there lS, for Durkheim, a special l"elation between
organic solidarity, contract, and the economic aspects of the
organizaton of societies. This relation can, 1 think provide the
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128

principal cIue to the way in which roles are involved. Collectivides, it has been suggested previously, constitute the primary
operative agencies for the performance of social function. The
resources necessary for that performance consist, in turn, besides
solidarity tself and the related patterns of "organization: in
cultural resources, physical facilities, and human services.
"Solidarity" cannot be treated as a component for Durkheim's
purposes because it is his dependent variable; he is concerned
with the conditions on which it depends. He does not treat cultural resources-knowledge, for example. He 8 carefu!, nevertheless, to take account oE the role of physical facil ties in discusing the institutionalization of property rights. His main
concern, however, is with human services and the ways in which
they can be integrated for the performance of social functon.
The central problem involved here may be looked at, in the
first instance, in a developmental setting. It is a general characteristic of "primitive societies that the allocaton of resources
among their structurally significant unts is overwhelmingly
ascribed. This is most obvious in the eeonomic sphere itself.
The factors o production are controlled by units which do not
have specialized economic primacy of function, and they are
typicaIly not transferable from one unit to another. Indeed,
even products are seldom exchanged, and when they are, the
transfer is likely to take place as a ceremonial exchange of gifts
rather than in barter, as we understand ir-to say nothing of
market exchange. This lS particularly true o labor, the central
factor of economic production.
The division of labor brings freedom from ascriptive ties
regarding the u tilization o consumable goods and services and
the factors of production themselves. The structurallocation o
organic solidarity thus concerns the dual problem of how the
processes by which the potentially eonflicting interests that have
been generated can be reconciled without disruptive conflict
(this leads, of CQurse, into the Hobbesian problem), and of how
the societal interest in efficient production can be protected and
promoted.
Every society must, as a prerequisite of its functioning, presume sorne integration of the interest of units with those of the
society-elsewhere 1 have called this the "institutional integraN
129
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THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

DURKHEIM

tion of motivation."il But this by itseH is not enough. Qne path

to further development is to use the organs of the collective
attainment of goals as the agencies for defining and enforcing
integration or solidarity o this type. This involves a near fusion
of mechanical and organic bases of solidarity of the sort that is
most conspicuous in socialistic economies. An indepe.ndent basis
oE integration can develop, however, frorn the institutionaliza
tion of systems of norms and mechanisms that without eentralized direcdon permit the allocation o fluid resources to
proceed in a positively integrated manner.
This set of nOTros and mechanisms is organized in terms of
two complementary reference points. Qne of these is the sociological reference to economic analysis -and interests, the process
by which generalized disposability of resources builds up. This
eoncerns aboye all the institutionalization of contraet, of property, and of the disposability of labor service through employment in oceupational roles. Property and labor then beeome
generalized resources. They can be allocated and controlled
through processes which establish functionalIy specific c1aims,
rather than through prior (and, therefore, in all likelihood,
functionally irrelevant) bases of ascriptive claim, such as membership in a eommon kinship unit. This, oE course, involves
sorne sort oE process oE exchange among functionally differentiated units in the system.
It is an essential aspect of Durkheim's argument that this
genel'alizability and fluid disposability of resources requires
more than a freeing from in'elevant, usually ascriptive constraints. It also requires a positive institutionalization of correllative obligations and rights which are defined in terms of a
normative structure. From the point of view of the definition
of resources, this type of normative regulation becomes the
more imperative the furtheT removed the ultimate utilization o
rhe Tesource is trom what luay be thought of as a "natuTal,"
to-be-taken~for-granted set oE rights to this utilizaton. From the
point of view of the resource, then, a dual process is necessary:
First, the resource must be "generalized"-this involves freeing
it from aseriptive controls; and, second, the positive obligation
to enter into the generalized allocative system must be established. Thus in a primarily ascriptive society, the equivalent oE

what are occupational roles in our own were filled on the basis
o kinship obligations, as in the case of a SOn who follows his
father as the proprietor and cultivator of the land held by the
continuing kinship unit. In our own society, to train for an
occupation in which one can compete in the labor market, and
to be willing to take one's chances on finding satisfactory employment consttute a positively institutionalized obligation of
the normal adult male, and of a considerable number oE the
members of the other sexo Therefore, there is, in a sense, a
"speculative" production of labor power which precedes any
specification of its channels of use. This is, of course, even more
true oE the control of physical facilities.
At the same time, there must also be a series of mechanisms
which ean determine the patterns in which such a genel'alized
resource is utilized. As the division of labor becomes more
highly developed, the proportion of such resources which are
utilized in colleetivities that have specific functions becomes
greater. These collectivities cOIDluand monetary resources which
can in turn be used to contract ,for labor services and to provide
necessary physical facilities. The institutionalization of contract
is the normative system which offers access to such resourees-whatever the function o the organization itself may be. The
institution of property, then, regulates monetary resources and
physical facilities; the institution oE oceupation control s human
services.
It is important to note here the complex relation which exists
between the eeonomic and non-economc aspects of the constellation oE faetors that 1 am outlining. Economic production
as sueh is only one of the primary societal functions served by
the processes of production and mobilization of fluid resources
through the institutionalization oE contraet, markets, money,
property, and occupational roles. Indeed, any major function
may be promoted in that way-edueation, health care, scientific
research, and governmental administraton. There are only
certain speciallimiting cases, like the family and certain aspects
oE the poltical process, which cannot be "bureaucratized" in
this sense.
At the same time, ir is correct to say that the mechanisms
involved here-regardless of the ultimate function that they

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subserve in any particular case-are primarily economic;

namely, contract, markets, rooney, and the lke. We must exercise great care, therefore, when using such a terro as eco noroic in this kind of analysis.
The generalized disposability of resources, then, is one major
aspect of the functional complex whch is institt,ltionalized
through organic solidarity. The other aspect concerns the
standards and mechanisms by which their allocation aroong
alternative claimant units of the social structure is worked out.
Here it i8 clear that, within the institutional framework of
contract, property, and occupation, the primary direct mechanisms concern the structuring of markets and the institutionalization of money.
This brings us back to the aubtle way5 in which conventional
economic and non-economic elements re involved. The market
mar be regarded as the structural framework for the allocation
of diaposable resources in so far as the mechanism of this allocadon is primarily Tee1y contractual at the level of the operative
organization or collectivity. Two other types of mechanism must
be dstinguished froID this one, however. The first is administrative allotment , which i8 a "free" disposal of resources by
those who supposedly- enjoy nearly full control of thero. Theoretically, this would be the case if the economy were fully socialized, for a central planning body would simply make decisions
and assign budgetary quotas-indeed it might also directly
distribute labor and physical facilities. The second mechanism
involves negotiation between the higher agencies which hold
the resources and their prospective users in such a way that
political power plays a prominent part in determining the outcome whether or not governmental structures are prominently
involved. An example oE this would be the distribution through
legislative action of public works benefits on the basis of re
gional and local interests, a procedure .which -aften involves a
good deal of Hl og-rolling."
Empirically, there is shading-off between these types. Typologically, however, in the market the bargaining powers of the
contracting partners are approximately equal; neither the holdH
ers nor the utilizers of resources are simply utold where tbey
are to go or what they are to get; and the degree of power held
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132

by the higher level oE the goal-directed organization of the relevant colIectivity structure i5 not the decisive mechanism in the
process of allocation. The market ls an institutionalized mechanism which neutralizes both these porential mechanisms of
allocat~on in a num?er oE arcas, preventing them from being
the pnmary determlnants of more detailed allocations. This
means essentially that there i8 a hierarchy of allocative mecha?ism~, whose relations to each other are ordered by instituuonahzed norms. Among these norms are those which define
the areas within which, and the oecasions on which, the more
:~drast~,cH contro~s may and may not be allowed to supersede the
freer mechanlsm of the market. Thus the taxing power oE
government determ~nes a co~pulsory allocation of monetary
reso~rces; an,d ~ert~In alloeauons are subject to legislative con
trolln that lImltatIons are placed on the freedom of individual
units to contraet for them at will.
However, it i8 clearly in accord with Durkheim's views oE
organic s?lidarity to point out that within the roarket sphere
E:eedo.m 15 balanced and controIled by complex sets of institutlonahz~d n?rms, so t~at the ~reedoms thelTIselves and the rights
and obltgatlons assoClated WIth them are defined in terms of
8uch institutionalized nOl'ros. There are, in this are a, two man
categories oE such institutionalized structures. One conceros the
institutionalization or the monetary mechanism itself, the defintion of the spbere of its legitimate use, and, of course, the
limits of thi8 sphere. The other concerns the institutionalization
of conditions ~nder which market transactions involving different subcategones of resonrces may be entered into. Let us take
up the latter class of nOTms first.
In general tenns, nOTms of the highest order in a modern
s?ciety clearly have the status of formal legal rules and prinCIpIes. They are subject to the legislative power, and the task
of interpreting and administering thero is the responsibility of
the courts of law. For organic solidarity, as noted aboye, the
complex of contract, property, and occupation is central;
whereas leadership, authority, and what 1 llave elsewhere called
llregulation" are central to mechanical solidarity.
Freedom of contract, then, includes the freedom to define the
conditions and limitations of the various terros which-as 1
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DURKHEIM

have previously set forth-are involved in a contractual system

with respect to the content of agreements, the means oE securassent, the scope of responsibility, and the societal int.e:est.
At both the legal and informal levels, then, these condltIOnS
and limitations vary in accordance with the societaI functons
performed by the contracting units, the vario"?s .aspects ~f the
situations in which they operate. and other simIlar consIderations. Thus a private relationship between a physician and a
patient, established to serve the interest of the patient's health,
i8 sanctioned. However, the offering oE certain types oE health
service is restricted, partIy by law and partly by infonnal institu tionalization. and may be performed only by licensed and
"adequately trained physicians; and the acceptance of such
services S, if it is legitimate, restricted, in a more informal sense,
to persons who are really "sick." There is abundant evidence
that there is wide area in which illness 8 not so much an
objective "condition" as a socially defined role.
Thererore, the problern of the content of contractual relations involves differentiating between role-categories which are
regarded as the legitimate bearers of various social functions
and those which are llOt. A Clconsumer" or "client" may contract
for a very wide range of goods and services, but he s not com*
pletely free to choose the agencies with which he will contract,
since institutional norms define the functions which certain
agencies may perform.
In addition, the ways in which the terms of the contract are
settled are institutionalized in various ways, and this influences
the structure oE the market. Economists have been particularly
con cerned with one type, the "commercial market, where
prices are arrived at on the basis of Itcompeti~ion," and where it
is an institutionalized expectatioll that the nght o the purveying agency to continue in operation is a function oE its ability
to meet expenses and to show a profit. Furthermore, it is the
customer's expectation that the price he pays will cover the full
cost of what he purchases. I-Iowever, the structure of the market
in which a large number of governmental, pl'ofessional, and
other services are purveyed, is quite different. Although a
service may be entirely free in the rnonetary sense, the conditions of eligibility may be sharply defined, as in the case oE those

regulating admisson to public hospitals. Or, as i8 often the case

in private medical practice, there may be a sliding scale oE costs,
so that one participant in the conu'act, the patient-contrary
to what 8 expected of the customer in the commercial market
-fulfills only part oE his obligaton in that the iee he pays
covers only a portion of the costs of performing the service C011tracted for.
Furthermore, there is the problem oE the scope of the responsibility involved in such a reJaton. The Spencerian version
of theJdea of contract tended to assume that the question of the
participants' abilities to Ildelivert> presented no complicated
problem. The typical economic exchange in which the buyer
has sufficient money and the seller sufficient goods i8 taken as
the prototype. But this i8 by no means always the situation. As
an illustration, let us again take a certain type oE professional
relationship. A sick person cannot be held responsible for endng his deplored condirion simply by making a. voluntary effort:
his helplessness is a primary criterion by which his need bf, and
right to. professional service is determned. But he ls responsible
for recognizing his helplessness and for actively co-operating
with therapeutic agencies in bringing about his recovery. These
agencies, in turn, though their role may be defined in terms of
technical competence, must recognze a wide variation in the
capacities of individuals so that i.f there is a failure in certain
cases, the physician is not held responsible, provided he has
done his best. Another good example is found in education
where because _of the youth of the ignorant person, ignorance
is Dot cODsidered culpable. Nor js a child expected to educate
himself without the help of schools. He i5, however, expected to
work hard in acquiring his educaton within the framework of
the schoo1. And sorne children are harder to educate than others,
and failures are not treated as being always or wholly the teacher's fault. There are elaborately institutionalized norms covering fields such as these.
The protection of the interest of society in contractual relations is more diffusely institutionalized; it is, in a sense, an
aspect of a11 the norms in this area. At the legal level, however,
there are a number o provisions which enable the courts and
other governmental agencies that represent the public inteTest

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DURKHEIM

to intervene in order to prevent or modify such arrangements.

Because o its very nature, the institutionalization of -a contractual system involves the imposition of a whole system o
limitations on the powers of government. But the residual opportunities ror priva te interests to exploit their freedom against
the rest of the society require the maintenance of a delicately
balanced equilibrium of integration.

THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

nels. Not only is it necessary to have it, but, it must be noted in

a .highly develope~ market system, th.ere is an extraordina~ily
wlde range of cholces open to the unlt that possesses sufficient
funds. The other mediating function of money is to serve as a
reward. Rere the reference is in the nature of the case comparative and relative; what counts is the amount of monetary income received by one unit or resource as compared with that
reeeived by another. I t is this unction of money which is the
primary focus of the regulation of the process of alloeation of
resources, in so .far as this is the result of market transactions.
The basie principIe is the economie one: A resouree will flow to
that one o the situations in which it is utilized which offers the
highest relative reward, the reward being, in this case, monetary.
Rere again it is essential, however, to insst on the same basic
distinction which was made in conneetion with the standards
of alloeaton. Money is not the sole component of the complex
of rewards. It has primacy over other components only when
the function of economic producton has primacy over other
functions, that is. in the ~'business" sector of the organizational
and occupational system. It is essentiaHy for this reason that the
monetary remuneraton for human services in that sector is
higher than other sectors 5uch as governme~t, educaton, and
so on. But even where other components of reward-political
power, integrative acceptance or solidarity, or cultural prestige
-have primacy within a given subsystem, it is essential that the
monetary remuneration correspond to the quality of the services
performed, as determined on the basis of the dominant criteria
for that subsystem. In the academic profession, for example,
contrary to the situation in the business occupations, the
arnount of one's income is not a valid measure of one's relative
prestige in the general occupational system. Within the profession, however, and especially within the same faculty, there
s strong pressure to establish a correspondence between professional eompetence and the salaries paid. Failure to do so is a
prime source of integrative strain.

The monetary mechanism is essential because, in the first

place, the division of labor cannot develop very far if aH exchanges are restricted to the level of barter. In a fully developed
system, money has four primary functions. It serves, first, as a
measure of the economic value of resources and products. 1t is
in this connection that we speak or the gross national product
as a monetary SUID. Second, it serves as a standard for the rational allocation oE resources, for comparing cost and outcome.
Only in the "business" sector, where productive function in the
economic sense has primacy, is the monetary standard the primary one appled. But in other functional areas, too, such as
education or health, monetary cost is a very essential evaluative
mechanism in that it is, trom the point of view oE the unit, the
basis ror evaluating one major component in the conditions
necessary to accomplish whatever goal is involved, and s, from
the point oE view of the system at large, a measure of the sacrificed uses to which the resourees in question might have been
puto
'lt is thus essential to diseriminate profitability as a measure
of the worth-whileness of a function from the use of monetary
cost as one component of the conditions which must be weighed
in arriving at a judgment of worth-whileness. The capacity
somehow to cover monetary cost, the ability to raise the money
somehow, is, of course, a necessary limiting eondition oE those
functons which require resourees that are acquired through
the market.
In serving as a measure and standard, money does not cireulate; nothing changes hands. In perrorming its other two functions, however, money is a medium of exchange. In the first of
these, money is an essential facility wherever the attainment of
_goals is dependent on resources accessible through market chan-

1 have taken the space to discuss the relation among the aUocation o fluid resources, the institutionalization of contract,
property, and occupation, and the market and money in sorne

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DURKHEIM

detail because such an analysis is more comprehensive than any

Durkheim was in a position to give, and thus provides a larger
setting in which to evaluate the true importance of bis basic
insights about organic solidarity. His cru<:ial ~nsi?ht is. that there
must be, in this area, a whole complex of InstltutIonahzed norrns
as a condition of the stability of a functionally differentiated
system. In De la division du travail social, Durkheirh dd not
go very far in analyzing the rnotivations underIying adherence
to such norms. But he was entirely cIear on one central point,
namely, that ths adherence on the part oE the acting unit in the
system couId not be motivated prnarily by considerations of
expedient utility. Th,is is the ~as~c r:as~n ~hy the con~ept of
the conscience collectzve as consIstlng In behefs and sentlments
held in common" is of such central importance. In his later
work, he took three major steps bearing on this question of
motivaton. Before attempting to outHne these, however, it is
well to discuss briefly the relation oE the conscience collective to
organic solidarity and the relation of organic and mechanical
solidarity to each other.
.
Concerning the first of these two problems, DurkheIm seems
to have been genuinely conEused, for he failed to clarify the
structural distinction between values and norms, which 1 have
presented earlier, and did not se: that this disti~ction ~pp~ies
and is relevant equally to organlc and mechanlcal sohdanty.
Instead, he got-bogged down in the identificaton of mechanical
solidarity with a lack of differentiation of structure, and hence
with the similarity o roles which are personal expressions of
the community of beliefs and sentiments. Consequently, he had
no clear criteria for defining the relation of functionally differ~
entiated norms to the conscience collective. Durkheim's treatment of the conception of the 'dynamic density" of a social
system and its relation to competition represents, as Schnore
has pointed out,10 a valid atteI?P~ to solve th~ problem of ~e
processes o structural differentlatIon, but he dl~ not succee~ In
linking it to his master concep~ of the consaence ~ollecttVe.
It is now possible to state thlS fundamental relatlon more
adequately: As noted aboye, the. crucial componen.t of the
conscience collective is common sOCletal values. Commltment to
such values, carefully interpreted with reference to the object
138
J

THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

concerned-that is, the society as such-and to the level oE

generality or specification, is one major component of the gen~
eral phenomenon oE institutionalization. Institutionalization is,
in turn, the primary basis, at the level of the integration oI t:he
social systern, of Durkheim's "solidarity." But with respect to
any fundamental function of the social systern, values must be
specified in terms oE their relevance to that particular function.
Furthermore, values must be brought to bear on the legitimation of the differentiated institutionalized norms which are
necessary to regulate behavior in the area of that fllllctlon-to
regulate ir, on the one hand, in relation to the concrete exigencies under which it operates, and, on the other, in relation to
the interest o the society as a system. Legitimaton itself, how"
ever, is not enough; in addition, there must be the functons of
defining jurisdiction, of defining and administering sanctions,
and of interpreting the norms themselves.
This basic complex of relationships and functions can be
quite c1early worked out for the division of labor as an economic
phenomenon and for the institutions clustering a~ound it. This
complex was Durkheim's primary reference; and except for the
fact that his formulation of ts re1ation to the conscience collective is ambiguous, he marle an excellent start on anaIyzing ir.
But he did not see that the properties of the contractual complex are directly paralleled by those of the complex involving
mechanical solidarity. 1 have suggested that this parallel primarily concerns the relations between common values and the
institutionalization of poltical function in the society. Here
also, the values must be specified at a concrete level in order to
legitimize not only society in the broadest sense, but also the
type of organization which s institutionalized in it for the attainment of collective goals. This organizaton is, however, a
differentiated functional area which in certain fundamental
respects is parallel to, or cognate with, that of the mobilization
of fluid resources. Furthermore, it involves differentiated structures within itself at the norm, colIectivity, and role levels.
Hence the Telation oE values to norms is essentially the same in
this area as in the economic. The norms must be legitimated,
but, in addition, jurisdictions must be defined, sanctions sped139
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DURKHEIM

fied, and norros interpreted. The conscience collective does llot

perform these functions directly or automatically. The differentiated normative complex which centers on the institutionalization of leadership and authority parallels the complex which
centers on contract, property. and occupational role in .the
economic area. Power is a measure and medium that in those
respects which are relevant is parallel to money.ll
Durkheim's treatment involves a further complication,
namely, the problem of evolutionary sequence. Re made two
crucally important points in this connection. The first is that
the development of the patterns of organic solidarity that are
connected with an extensive division of labor presupposes the
existence oI a system of societal integraton characterized by
mechanical solidarity. The second i8 that the economic divison '
of labor and an elaborated and differentiated govemmental
organization develop concomitantly. It is not a case of one's
developing at the expense of the other.
Sound as these two insights were, Durkheim's association of
mechanical solidarity with a lack of structural differentiation
inelined him toward identifying this ,association with primitiveness in an evolutionary sense, and prevented hm from making
the essential connection between common values and the legitimaton of the political order and organization in a mOTe differentiated, modern type of society. The relation of modem
poltical institutions to solidarity-very much like that of economic nstitutions to solidarity-was simply left hanging in the
airo
1 should liIte to suggest, therefore, a refinement of Durkheim's
classification. If organic solidarity and mechanical solidarity are
eorrelative terms, one should refer to the type of solidarity
which focuses on the legitimaton of political institutions, and
the other to that type which focuses on economic institutions.
Broadly speaking, we may say that, although the situaton vares
substantially with the type of social structure, both exist simul.
taneously in parts of the same social system, parts that can be
distinguished on the basis of structure and through analysis;
and there should be no general tendency far one to repIace the
other. The solidarity which exists prior to the development of
any of the higher levels of social differentiation is not the same
140

thing as this "politi~al" type. The latter is closer to the principal

referent of Durkhelm's mechanical solidarity, hut 1 should prefer another term-"diffuse solidarity," for example. It is the
eommon matrix out of which both the others have emerged by
a process of differentiation.
D~rkh~im seems to have faced a very common diffieulty in
deahng w1th th~ processes of differentiation. When a component
oE ~ system reta~ns the same name at a later, more highly differentlate~ phase
the development of the system that it had ~t
ano e.arher, less ~lfferentiate~ one, the component can-ying the
onglnal,na~e wlll have less Importance in the later phase. This
follows l~evItably from the faet that in the earlier phase t may
ha ve deslgnated one of,. say, four eognate eomponents, and in
th~ later P?ase one oftlelght. This diminishing of importance is
ofren attnbu
ted to a los8 of functions" 01' "a decll'n e In
.
h"
?trengt on the part of the c?mponent named. Coad examples
In contemporary Western soelety are IIfamily" and "religion."12
These names have been used throughout the suecessive phases
of our development, but the components they have designated
~ave ,nor remained ?ognate. T~e modern urban family whose
funct:on of econ?m~c prOductlon has been transferred to oc
eupatIon~1 o~ganlza~lo~s i5 not cognate with the peasant househo~d w~lch lS a pnne1pal unit of production, in addition to
be1ng, hke rhe ~odern one, a unit for the rearing of ehildren
and the. regulatlon of personality. In its capacity as a unit of
product102' th~ peasant family is , in fact, a tlfamily firm/' but
the term firm 15 usually llot applied to ir.
O?e qualifi~ation o this argument, touching upon the hierarc~lc.al ordenng of functions in social systems, should be made.
ThlS 18 that politicaI organization, within an instltutionalized
framework of order, must indeed precede, in the developmental
sequence, the emel'genee o~ a highly differentiated market type
oi. e~onomy. Rence there 18 sorne emprical justification, even
wlthln the t:amew?rk have sketched, fol' Durkheim's saying
that mechanlcal sohdaTlty precedes organic solidarity.

Ir:

~s

previously noted, in De la division du travail social Durk

helm ~ad mueh to say about the role of institutionalized norms
but httle about the eharaeter of the motivation underlying
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THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

DURKHEIM

commitment to values and to confonnity with norms. However,

his clear insight that the operation oE the "rational p~rsuit of
selfainterest" as interpreted in u tilitarian and economlC ~heory
does not offer an explanation of this commit:nent, provlded a
setting for approaching the problem. In hlS ear~~er p~as~s,
Durkheim tended to be content with the formula of, extenonty
and constraint" in an interpretation which treated norms as
though they were simply among the "!acts .of lHe" in the situaton of the individual, a formula WhlCh dld not help to solve
the fundamental difficulty presented by utilitarianism. In Le
suicide however, and in his work on the sociology of education,
he took two important steps beyond this position which 1 shall
sketch briefly.
.
The first is his discovery and pardal development of the Idea'
of the internalization DE values and norms. The second is the
discrimination he makes, with spedal reference to the problem
of the nature oE modern "individualism between two ranges
oE variation. One of these concerns types of institutionalized
value-norm complexes, and is exemplified by the distinction between egoism and altruismo The other concerns the types oE
relations that the individual can have to whatever norms and
values are institutionalized. Rere the discrimination between
"egoism" and "anomie" is crucial; it .is parallel to that ~etween
Haltruism" and "fatalism: 1 shall bnefly take up each In tUl'n.
Concerning the internalization of values ~nd. norms, we m~y
say that, within certain limits, a~tual beha~lOr In the e~onomlC
and poltical fields can be reIatIv~ly well lnterpr~ted In te~'ms
of the processes by which the indlvIdual adapts. hlmself ratlonally to the existence of the norms and the 8anct1On8 attached to
them, so that they simply become a part of the "fa~ts oE ,life:"
Durkheim saw clearly that the existence and functlona.l l?dISpensability of the institutionalizati?n of these ~orms 18 lndependent of the interests of the unIts.. but he dld not hav~ a
theory to explain, in t~rms of motiv~tio?J the p:O~;8S ?y w~lc.h
institutions are estabhshed and malntalned. RIS sOClologlStlC
positivism"13 prevented his fo~ulating SUC~l .a theory.
Durkheim was led to make hlS study of SUIClde by a paradox:
According to utilitarian theory, a rising standard of living
should bring about a general increase in "happiness"; however

concomitant with the certain rise in the standard of living in

Western countries, there was a marked rise in the suicide rate.
Why was it that as people became happier, more of them Idlled
themselves?
It ls not necessary to review here Durkheim's famous marshalling of facts and his analysis of them. What concerns us is
that the decisive break-through in solvng the paradox carne
ahout with his working out of the concept DE anoroie. To be
sure, anomie was only one of the four components in his. analysis
DE the reasom underlying variations in the suicide rate J but it i8
the decisive theoretical one in the present contexto
The older viewJ which the early Durkheim shal'ed, saw the
goals of the action of the individual as located within his own
personality. and saw sodal norms, which were "exterior" to
him J as located in society, which was a "reality sui generis."
Because they were located in two different systems, the goaIs of
the individual and the norms of society were dissociated from
each other. Durkheim's concept of anomie was a formu]ation of
his great insight that th18 dissociation was untenable, that the
goals of the individual could not be treated as being independent of the norms and values of the societYJ but were, in
fact "given meaning," that i5 legitimized, by these values. They
must, therefore, belong to the same system. If personal goals
were part of the personality, then values and nonns, the conscience collective~ must also be part of the personality. At the
same time Durkheim couId not abandon the doctrine oE the
independence DE institutional norms from the "individual."
This was the very core of his conception of solidarity and to
abandon it would have meant reverting to the utilitarian position. Hence the only solution was the conception of the interpenetraton oE personality and social system, the conception that
it must be true, in sorne sense that values and norros were parts
of the {{individual consciousness," and were, at the same time
analytically independent of Hthe individual:' In the earlier
stages, Durkheim attempted to solve this problem by the conception that there were two "consciousnesses" within the same
personality, but gradually he tended to abandon this view.
It is noteworthy that Durkheim, working in sociology, discovered esseutially the same basic phenomenon of internaliza-

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DURKHEIM

tion and interpenetration as did Freud in his study oE the

personality, and that the same discovery was made independently by Charles I-Iorton Cooley and George Herbert Mead.
This convergence is, in my opinion, oue of the great landmarks
in the development of modern social science.,
To restate Durkheim's main point concerning tl).e operation
of anomie: An individual does not commit suicide primarily
because he lacks the llmeans" to accomplish his goals, but because his goals cannot be meaningfully integrated with the
expectations which have been insttutionalized in values and
nonns. The factoys responsible foy this malintegration may be
social, cultural, or psychological in any combination, but the
crucial point of strain concerns the meaningfulness of situatons
and of alternatives of action. This problem of meaning could'
not arise if norms and values were merely parts of the external
situation and not of the actual "beliefs and sentiments" oE the
individuaL
Durkheim left many problems connected with the clarification and interpretation of anomie unresolved, but his concept
clearly pointed the way to a theory of the problem of social
control which was not susceptible to his own criticism oE utilitarianism, and could, when linked to modern psychological
insight into the personality, lead to a theory of the motivation
underlying conformity and deviation, and hence to a theory
of the mechanisms by which solidarity is established and
maintained.
On psychological grounds, it can be said that since internalized values and norms, as well as some oE the components of
goals, are involved in the motivation to conformity, certain
crucial components oE that motivaton, and of the mechanisms
by which it is established, mantained, and restored, are not
fully or direct1y attributable to ltreason." In other words, it is
not enough merely to make clear to the actor what the stuation is and what the consequences of alternative courses of
action are likely to be; for the mechanisms and components of
motivation, and the components of the mechanisms of social
control that mirror the various aspects oE this motivaton, are
non-rationaI. This puts the mechanisms of social control in a
dass that is different from that of the market, the ordinal)'
144

TRE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

exercise :>f. poli:icall~adership and power, of legislaton and of

the admlnIstratlon-lll its higher judicial aspects-of the le al

~~m.

Those aspects oE il1ness which can be associated with "psychic"

factors= and the correspondng features of the therapeutic process Whl~h treats them, can serve as a prototype of this kind of
me~hanIsm: and can be systematically related to the processes
of . ln~~ract:on that are involved in the socialization of the
chIld. ~t 18, however, equally cIear that there is need for an
elaboratlon o theory in this fie1d which is parallel to that which
1 ~ave. pr~viously outli~ed for the problem area of organic
sohdanty In so far as 1t concerns economc institutions and
~ar~ets. Clearly, not all social control that is oriented to mot~vatlon concerns illn~ss and therapy. For example, it seems very
hke1y that the practIce of Iaw has coguate functions Over a
consld<:rable area in our own society. Lawyers, however, are not
theraplsts. !he subsystem o~ the society which presents prob~em.s ?f SOCIal control to WhlCh lawyers are relevant. is not an
IndIVIdual personality, as is the one to which physicians are
relev.ant, but a system that iuvolves two or more parties in their
relatIOns to the normative system which regulates all of them
Hence there is more than one attorney. and there are courts:
Her~ the analogue of anomie is a situation in which nor,ms, and
posslbly the values th~t He, behind ~hem, are not sufficiently
well defined to place clIents In a meanlngful situaton for action
so that the pressure of this situation tends to motivate them to
act Hirrationally." ~his need llOt, however, imply that they
have psychopathologlcal personalities. Again it is the relational
system, not the individual, which needs straightening out. It
seem.s to me that Durkheim's own treatment of religious ritual
provldes another example, on which 1 shall remark brieHy later.
, I~ sh~uld also be noted that in following up this line of reasonlng m the years following the publicaton oE Le suicide
Durk~ei~ made, in h~s w~rk on ed~cation, the first majo;
contnbutlon to the soclologlcal analysls of the socialization of
the child. 15 It. was in this connection that he was able to clarify
more fully hlS theory of the nature of the internalization of
values and norms by redefining constraint as the exercise of
moral authority through the conscience o the individual. In
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DURKHEIM

this way, it became clear that the moral component o the

conscience collective is social: first, in that it is made up of
values that are common to, and shared by, the members of the
society; second, in that through the process of socialization the
new members o the society undergo a process by which these
values are internalized; and third, in that there are special
mechanisms which re-enforce the commitment 'to the values
thus made in ways that involve the non-rational layers of the
personality structure, so that deviation is counteracted by cura~
tive mechanisms. With this definition, Durkheim provided a
new understanding of the operation DI the social system-one
which was scarcely within the purview of the Durkheim of De
la division clu travail social.
J

The other main contribution of Le suicide to the present

discussion is the conception of what may be called t/institutionalized individualism," at the center oI which is Durkheim's
concept or go'isme as distinguished from anomie. This is an
extension of the basic insight of De la division du tTavail social ~
but here Durkheim applies it in an altogether novel context and
links it with the problems of social control just discussed.
Utilitarianism and with it the methodological individualism
(verging on reductionism) of our intellectual tradition have
tended to interpret the emphasis placed on the sphere o freedom and the expected independent achievement of the unt of
a system as meaning that the unit is free from the controls of
the system. It has thus reduced the importance of the integration of the system, whether positively or negatively valued.
Spencerian individualism was the negation o social control in
the present sense o this concepto
There is, of course, an obvious sense in which this is true, for
immediate control by direct authority is incompatible with in~
dividual freedom. But there is another and deeper sense in
which it is DOt true. An institutionalized order in which individuaIs are expected to assume great responsibility and strive
for high achievement, and in which they are rewarded through
socially organized sanctions of such behavior, cannot be accoun ted for by postulating the lessening of all aspects of institutionalized control. Instead, Buch an order, with its comlnon
values, its institutionalized norms} its sanctions and media, its
146

THE

.1;
{

:,1

.:<'<.:<.<:':

INTEGRATION

OF

SOCIAL SYSTEMS

:nec~an.isms
lnstlt~tlOna~

of social control, represents a particular mode of

St1:uctllring. It emphatically does llOt represent
anomle, Wh1Ch 18 the weakening of control in the sense of the
weakening of solidarity.
!he cIassic. empi~ical formulation of this point in Le suicide
IS In connectIon WIth the Protestant-Catholic differential. The
Catholic is, in matters of religion, subjected to the direct con~
trol of the authorities of his church: he must accept official
dogma on penalty .DE excommunication; he must accept the
sacrame.ntal authonty of the priest in the matter of his own
salvation, and. so 0I?' ~he Protestant church as a collectivity
does not exerClse thlS }ond of authority. A Protestant is free oI
these types oI controL But he is not free to choose whether or
not. to accept such controls, for he may not, if he wishes to reT?a,ln a good ~r~t~stant, relinquish his freedom to accept rehglouS responslbIllty imposed on him in his direct relation to
God. The obligation to accept such responsibility is legitimized
?y the coromon va~ues of the Protestant group and is translated
lnto norms governlng behavior.
Largely for ideological reasons this basic insight is still far
~'om being fully assimlated into the thinking of social scientIsts. But there are few of Durkheim's contributions which do
mo~e in relating the theoretical approach to the analysis of
soclal.systems, to the elnpirical interpretation oE the major
features oE the modern type of society.
<.

. This problem brings' us around to another very important

lInk between the two dominant themes in Durkheim's original
treat~ent oE the problems of social integration; namely, the
relatlO? betwe~n organic and mechanical solidarity. Clearly,
there 18 a relatlon between the egoistic factor in suicide and
organic solidarity, and between the altruistic factor and mechanical solidarity. This becomes manifest in the association
~etwee~ areas of the social structure in whch the collectivity is
tlght1y Integr~te~ (s~c~ as the army) and there is a high incidence of altrulstlc sUICIde, and those in which market relations
predo:ninat~ (the professions and business, for example) and
t?ere lS a hlgh frequency of egoistic suicide. A parallel con'elauon may be seen between types of societies.
However, correlations such as these raise the question of the
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DURKHEIM

THE

kinds of mechanisms which are associated with the different

problems of integratan. Very early ~urkheim e~P?asized the
importance of the definitions of certaln acts. as cnmlnal and of
prescriptions for punishing them a~ ~~chanlsms th~t re-e~force
mechanical solidarty. In De la dtvz.ston du travavl soctal, he
used this re-enforcement prmarily as a foil- to highlight t~e
contrast with the functioning of civillaw in relation to organlc
solidarity. In this connection, ~~s primary re~erence was dearly
to the solidarity of the collectlvlty as tIle maln structural focus
of the problem of integTat~on. .
.
.
It is noteworthy that, In hIS last penod, DurkhelI~ carne
around to a fieId which S in terros of the aboye analys1s, very
closely related to the problems of mech~nical s~lidarity, but
this time the relaton is seen from the pOlnt of Vlew of values .
rather than from that of their political implementation. 1 am
referring to his anal ysis of religion in its relation to society in
Les formes lrnentai1'es de la vie religieuse. Ther~ ar~ many
notable features in this work, but the one of speclal lnterest
here is the treatment of religious ritual as a mechanism for the
re-enforcement of social solidarity.
The most important link between this wor~{ a~d De la ~iv!
sion du travail social, written twenty years earher, lS Durkhe1l1~ s
continuing concern with the conscience collec#ve. However, In
the earEer work this concept was used merely as a reference
point for the analysis of the economic level of social differentiation and the attendant problems of integration. In the later
ane,' by contrast, the question of the primary role of the conscience collective in the social system as a whole comes to the
center oE the stage. As Durkheim treats it, ritual of the com
munal sort is the direct expression of the commitment af me~
bers of the collectivity-that is, the highest-level relevant socIal
system-to the values which they hold in. common. But it, is~ at
the same time, more than just an expresslon of the~, for It 18 a
way in which through "dramatization" these commltments may
be renewed and any tendencies to weaken them may be forestalled.
lt is quite clear that religious ritual as it is co~ceived ~n this
work is not directly concerned wth the formulaUon and lmplementation of norms, but rather with the Hinward the interJ

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INTEGRATION

OF

SOCIAL SYSTEMS

nalized aspects DE the systems of values and norffis, with their

direct involvement in the structure oE personalties. Moreover,
it concerns ther relation to motivation in the context of the
non-rational components referred to above. Thererore, in this
last major phase of his work, Durkheim was clearly building
on the results he had attained in his studies of suicide and education. But here for the first time he regarded the maintenance
oE the institutionalized value system in the society as a focus of
social process, rather than as a point of reference from which to
analyze other structures and processes.
There is, at the same time, an interesting return to his original reference points, for he explicitly takes up the problem of
the role of the conscience collective-that iS of collective values
-at the level of the value system, rather than at that of the
structure DE the concrete collectivity and of the obligations to it.
Therefore, he ends up placing his original problem of organic
solidarity within a more general framework oE order, one in
which there is a poltical organization which can enforce a uniform criminal law, but in which there is also a system of values
which can legitimize norms that are independent oE the particular political order and its Horgans."
This was a majot" step in the differen tiatian of the theoretical
components of the hydra-headed problem oE social integration.
It is perhaps significant, however, that Durkheim dealt with the
problem of religious ritual in empirical detail only in the context oI the primitive religions. 1 interpret this to mean that the
old problem aI the reIation between the genetic and the analytical aspects oE the problem of discriminaton of components
still plagued him. In a way, he simply drove the problem of
mechanical solidarity back to a more generalized level, seeking
the Horigins" of repressive law in the religious commitments
that are ritualized in the great tribal ceremonies. In so doing, he
contributed enonnously to our understanding of processes of
social control at this level, an understanding that definitely included their motivational reference. But by virtue of his unfortunate confusion, he obscured rather than illuminated the
pl'oblem of the relations of solidarity to the structural differentiation of modern society, the analysis of which was his original
point of reference.
149
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DURKHEIM

There is almost complete agreement that Durkheim was one

o a very small company o sociological theorists who, during a
critical phase in the development of the discipline, penetrated
to deeper levels o analysis than had been reached by any of
their predecessors and who formulated the main problems on
which we have been working ever since. The subject of this
paper is, 1 think, the rocal center of Durkheim's contribution
to theory. He was the theorist par excellence of the problem
are a o social integration. He was more concerned with the
primary core o the social system itsel than with the relations
of that system to those that border it--culture, personalitYJ and
the organism in the physical environment. In addition, he was
not, in a sense, greatly concerned with problems of social structure. Though he always retained an interest in making com-'
parative studies, he did not attempt to probe the crucial
problems of comparative morphological dassification so deeply
as did his contemporary Max Weber.
Durkheim's central problem, the solution of which he pur~
sued with rare persistence, was to determine the major axes
around which the integrative functions and processes of a
society are organized. His analysis was marred by many crudi~
des, and there are many aspects of it which have become obsole te; but his criticism of the utilitaran tradition and his
conceptions of the conscience collective) and o mechanical
and organic solidarity-though raising many problems of in terpretation-served both him and the discipline well.
The important thing about these conceptions is that they
cut across the Unes of the conventional structural analysis of
social systems, which broke them down into political, economic,
religious, and other similar categories. Only with a conceptuali~
zaton such as Durkheim's was it possible to approach the
problems of social integration on a level that is general enough
to permit the establishment of a new theoretical orientation.
The fact that he succeeded in developing this conceptualization
is the basis of Durkheim's stature as a theorist.
Durkheim dscovered determinate theoretcal relations among
a whole range of empirical subject matters which are usually
parceled out among different disciplines and specialties within
disciplines. In De la division du travail social) he established
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THE

INTEGRATION

OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

relations between law and the traditional empirical

matter o economics, subsuming both of them under a
theoretical perspective. He also included fru itfu 1 discussions
of poltical matters, in which he observed that governmerlt"
has de:eloped .concomitantly with the economy of private
enterpnse. In hIS later work, he carried his analysis of connections nto the field of psychological theory; he was driven to
this by the logic of the problems he wished to solve, although
he had said originaIly that psychological considerations are
irrelevant to sociological problems. I-lis investigations into
psychological theory enabled him not only to enrich his own
analysis but also to establish the basis of a remarkable convergenc~ with Freud, thereby providing a means by which the
conceptlons of rationality of the economic tradition of thought
and the role of the non-rational components of motivation in
the psychoanalytic tradition could be linked. Fin ally , in. his
later work he analyzed the relevance of religion to the secular
aspects of social organization.
This remarkable ability to see relations among fields usually
treated as unconnected was possible only because Durkheim
constantly kept in mind the fact that he was dealing with the
p:oblem of integration of a single system, not a congeries of
dlserete subsystems. He was a theorist par excellence of the
functioning of systems.
In the above discussion, 1 have stressed many of the complications and difficulties underlying Durkheim's analyses. He
was undoubtedly highly selective and was, therefore, in a
sense, "biased"-take, for example, his confusing of the evolutionary and the analytical problems in relation to the status
of mechanical solidarity. The structural problems can be
greatly clarified by building on the tradition of Weber, and
the relations to personality can be greatly clarified by mobilizing psychological knowledge which either did not exist in
Durkhe~m's time or was contained in works in which (like
the earher ones of Freud) he showed no interest.
Such critical analysis results in considerable revision of
Durkheim's positions. It does not result in refutation of them,
however. It involves only extension and refinement, for Durkheim established the basic foundations for developing a fruidul
theory of social integration.

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DURKHEIM-

1. 1 have always considered the focal point of Durkheim's early work

in this respect to lie in "Organic and Contractual Solidarity" (Book 1,
Chapo vii) , The Division of Labor in Society, transo George Simpson (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1947). It starts as a critique of
Spencer but actually goes c1ear back to Hobbes.
'

2. One reason for this is that the hypothetical turning-over of absolute

authority to an unrestricted sovereign was empirical1y incompatible with
the existence of the liberal governmental regimes which were a commonplace in the Western World of Durk.heim's time. On this phase of the history o thought the best source is stilI. without question, Elie Halvy, The
Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, t!"ans. Mary :Morris ([1901-4] New
York: Macmillan Co., 1928) .
3. Durkheim does not, o course, in his more general discussion, confine
himself to contract at the legal or other levels. He relates organic solidarity
also to domestic, commerciaI. procedural, administrative, and constitutional
law. Cf. The Division of Labor in Society, p. 122.
4. De la dvision du tmvail social (Paris: Flix Alean, 1893), p. 46.
5. The term "normative culture" will be used a number of times below.
Here "normative" refers to any "level" of culture, the evaluative judgments of which govern or define standards and allocations at the leve1 below. This usage is to be distinguished from those which refer to differen
tiated norms designating, in a particular system, one level in the hierarchy
of nonnative culture.
6. Such a system of societal values may, of course, change over a period
of time, but it is the most stable component of the social structure.
7. "The acts that it [repressive law] prohibits and qualifies as crimes are
of two sorts. Either they directly manifest very violent dissemblance between the agent who accomplishes them and the collective type, or else they
offend the organ of the common conscience."-The Division of Labor in
Society, p. 106. The context makes cIear that by the "organ" Durkheim
means the government.
8. There is, of course, a sense in which the crimina1law also lays down
norms. Essentially, these norms concern the minimum standards of behavior
which are considered acceptable on the part of members of the societyregardless of their differentiated functions--who are not disqualified by
mental incapacity, and so on. In a highly differentiated society, however,
the largest body of norms increasingly concerns the relations between dif
ferentiated functions in the fields Durkheim enumerated; namely, contraet,
family life, commerce, administration, and the constitutional structure of
the collectivity.
9. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, lIt: Free Press of
Glencoe, Illinois, 1951), pp. 36-45.
10. Cf. Leo F. Schnore, "Social Morphology and Human Ecology,"
Ame1'ican Journal of Sociology~ LXIII (1958), 620-34.

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THE

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SYSTEMS

11. Unfortunately, space does not permit developing this line of analysis
further. SeveraI statements, which, though brief and in complete, are sorne.
what more extensive than the one found here, will be found in TaIcott
Parsons, "~u~lOrity, Legi~imation and Political Process," in Authority, ed.
Cad J. Fnednch (Cambndge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), and
Talcott Parsons, 'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Poltieal
System," in American Voting Behavior, ed. Eugene Burdick and Arthur J.
Brodbeck (Glencoe, III.: Free Press of Glencoe, l1linois, 1958). Max
Weber's treatment of authority constitutes an essential complement to
Durkheim's of mechanieal solidarity.
lO

12. 1 have deaIt with these two cases in, respectively, Family, Socialization and Interaction Process (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois.
1956), Chapo i, and "Sorne Reflections on Religious Organization in the
Unted States," Daedalus, LXXXVII (1958). This, and the paper from
Auth.ority cited in n. 11. above, are included .in the collection of my essays
pubhshed under the tItle Structure and Process in J..lodern Societies
(Glencoe, 111.: Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1960).
13. TaIcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937), Chaps. viii-ix.
14. Parsons, The Social System, Chapo vii.
. 15. Most notably in L~Education morale (Paris: Flix Alean, 1923), and
In the volume of essays, Education and Sociology~ transo Sherwood Fox
([1922} Glencoe, lB.: Free Press of Glencoe,.Illinois, 1956) .

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