IZTOPIKOTEQrPA®IKA NEPIOAIKH EKAOZH FIA THN IZTOPIA TEQPAGIA KAI TONOFPAGIA TOY EAAHNIKOY XOPOY KATA TOYE MEZOYE XPONOYE TIMHTIKO A®IEPQMA STON AHMHTPH BEAIZZAPONOYAO TOMOE TETAPTOZ TIANNENA-OEZZAAONIKH 1994FRANK L. HOLT SPITAMENES AGAINST ALEXANDER Spitamenes of Bactria-Sogdiana has been called «the most formidable opponent who ever faced Alexander», and yet we learn all too little about this remarkable figure in the expansive literature devoted to Alexander's campaigns'. This general neglect of a leader of such historical and military significance is almost certainly the result of two major problems, one ancient and the other modern. The first problem is a notorious breakdown in the ancient accounts of Alexander's campaigns in Sogdiana and Bactria: the narrative of Diodorus suffers a long lacuna here. while the texts of Curtius and Arian are at loggerheads over matters of basic chronology and topography’. Given this source problem, it has been easier to give military credit to Spitamenes (after all, Alexander spent a very long time dealing with this «rebel») than to analyze in any detail the way in which he waged his war against the Macedonians. In other words, we can assume that Spitamenes was doing 1. The quotation is taken from J. F. C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great (New Brunswick. New Jersey. 1960). p. 122. Likewise. W. W. Tam, Alexander the Great (Oxford, 1948), p. 73 called Spitamenes «the best opponent Alexander met». I am less certain about the meaning of Lane Fox's more recent judgment in The Search for Alexander (Boston. 1980). p. 292: «Alexander's most awkward enemy». On the neglect of Spitamenes, consult the bibliographic survey by Jakob Seibert. Alexander der Grosse (Darmstadt, 1972) where Darius III and Porus figure prominently. but Spitamenes not at all. The ancient sources for Spitamenes’career are given by H. Berve. Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage (Munich. 1926), Volume 2 pp. 359-361. 2. Diodorus’ account breaks off at 17.83.9 with the capture and execution of Bessus: it does not resume until Alexander's forces march toward India two years later. Thus. his entire narrative of the Sogdian war against Spitamenes is lost. Arrian’s account suffers from apparent compression, and follows a largely topical rather than chronological approach in this section. Reconciling his version with that of Curtius for the years 329-327 B.C. is extremely difficult on a number of counts; for three very different «solutions» to the impassee. see I, N. Khlopin. Historical Geography of Central Asian Southern Regions (Ashkabad, 1983) in Russian; A. B. Bosworth, Conquest and Empire (Cambridge. 1988); and F. Holt, Alexander the Great and Bactria (Leiden, 1988)52 Frank L. Holt something right-but what? Until we can wrestle this information from our sources, Spitamenes must remain an enigma, important but unknown. The second problem arises from a modem error in our construction of a model for the logistics of Alexander's campaigns. In 1978, Donald Engels produced an ingenious and influential study on the subject of supply and its role in shaping the strategies and tactics of Alexander's Macedonian army’. In a work that offers so much to the field, it is unfortunate that the logistical system described by Engels does not accurately express or explain the supply situation for Alexander —or Spitamenes— in ancient Central Asia. His proposed «grain diet» model is too rigid to account for such regional diversity as one finds in Alexander’s Asian marches; indeed, a better model might readily be found in the account of Xenophon’s Anabasis where grain was constantly supplemented in the army’s diet by a steady haul of captured cattle, domestic and wild pigs, poultry, and other meat products‘. By employing the wrong logistical model for Bactria and Sogdiana, modern studies have misconstrued the strategies of both Alexander and Spitamenes by under-estimating the significance of the cattle so frequently mentioned in our sources. What follows is an attempt to sort through these problems, ancient and modern, which have made it impossible to under- stand the nature of Spitamenes’ successes against Alexander. With an appro- priate model in mind for both Macedonian and Bactro-Sogdian logistics, we shall re-examine the troubled sources for these campaigns in an attempt to give meaning to the movements —and motives— of Alexander and Spitamenes. In reconstructing the system of supply for the Macedonian army, Engels has estimated that it required nearly 511.000 pounds of food and forage (plus 160.000 gallons of water) each day*. He then insists that these prodigious needs were met by a diet of grain, mainly wheat and barley, because meat was not storable, was rarely available, and because no herds are ever mentioned with the army’. Finally, Engels juxtaposes this model upon the diverse and often treacherous environment of Central Asia with remarkable results: «It is a 3. D. Engels. Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley. 1978). Important criticisms have been offered in the numerous reviews of this work, to which should be added the specific comments of P. Briant in L' Asie Centrale et les royaumes proche-orientaux du premier millenaire (Paris, 1984), p. 62; and P. Goukowsky. «Recherches Recentes sur Alexandre le Grand (1978-1982)». REG 96 (1983), 237. 4, See F. Holt, «Imperium Macedonicum and the East: The Problem of Logistics». Archaia Makedonika 5 (1993): 585-592. 5. Engels. op. cit., pp. 18-25 and 144-145, 6. Engels, op. cit. pp. 124-125.Spitamenes Against Alexander 53 testimony to the productivity of Sogdiana in the fourth century B.C. that at no time in the entire campaign did a supply shortage occur»’. Our sources, troubled though they are, prove that this is not the case. From the beginning of Alexander’s march into Bactria-Sogdiana, logistics were clearly the Achilles Heel of the Macedonian army. The king’s logistical «system» was not yet equal to the task of safely crossing the mountains and deserts of Central Asia. The journey through the Hindu Kush caused immense suffering due to a shortage of food; the march across the desert from Bactra (modern Balkh) to Sogdiana was likewise a disaster because of insufficient water, Casualties were very high, morale sank dangerously, and the disorganized Macedonian invaders were open to attack by the enemy. Bessus, however, did not strike while the Macedonians were in extremis. The Bactrian satrap/king could muster only half a winning strategy —a scorched-earth plan of retreat. This was not enough, and soon Bessus was betrayed*, It remained for the Sogdians to find a leader capable of a grander strategy, one which compounded the logistical problems of Alexander by adding well-timed attacks against the king’s critical lines of supply. Spitamanes would be that leader’. With the foundation of Alexandria- Eschate (modern Khodjend) in 329 B.C., Alexander's new colonial policy in Bactria-Sogdiana provoked outright rebellion among many of the inhabitants of the Jaxartes (modern Syr-Darya) frontier. According to our sources, the first hostilities were specifically directed against a band of Macedonian foragers''. The obvious native response was to protect local property and to 7. Engels, op. cit.. p. 104. In a footnote, Engels mentions only the problem encountered by Andromachus' cavalry when time was not taken to refresh the horses. 8. QC 75.11-26; Arrian 329.6-3.305. For detailed analysis of these events, see Holt (op. cit.. n. 4). 9. While it is clear that Spitamenes was the most active and effective leader of the Sogdian, Bactrian, and Scythian forces opposing Alexander. I do not wish to perpetuate the false impression of a «national» leader of a «nationalist» uprising. His was the largest following (and the one with the only grand strategy that I can identify) among those which fought Alexander in Central Asia; it is unclear how much (if any) control Spitamenes could exercise over other native leaders such as Sisimithres, Catanes. Oxyartes, and others. We should perhaps keep in mind the nature of the moder Afghan Mujahadin, with their own severe rivalries and shifting coalitions within a «united resistance movement». 10. F. Holt, «Alexander's Settlements in Central Asia», Archaia Makedonika 4 (1986). 315: 318; more fully in Holt, Alexander and Bactria, pp. 52-60. This was the first of Alexander's many foundations to provoke @ direct military response, and so to be constructed under enemy fire. 11, QC 7.6.1: Arrian 3.30.10-1154 Frank L. Holt cut off Macedonian supplies in order to hinder the enemy's building program. This fighting became notoriously fierce, and resulted in devastating reprisals against the Sogdian towns and their territories. This «land of plenty» soon proved to be a land of not enough. Cyropolis (modern Ura-Tyube), the largest native settlement, finally surrendered when it could not be supplied with water”. The Macedonians, too, suffered from inadequate supplies of fresh water; during the fighting beyond the Jaxartes, the king himself was compelled to drink from brackish wells and suffered grievously". For both sides, access to food and water was clearly a problem from the very beginning of the Bactrian and Sogdian campaigns. Spitamenes understood this crisis quite well, and so struck quickly against Alexander's main supply and communications link at Maracanda (modern Samarcand), Backed by his Sogdian and Scythian cavalry, Spitamenes was no mere hot-head whose hit-and-run tactics were aimed haphazardly. With an offensive strategy that targeted Alexander's supply line, Spitamanes improved upon Bessus‘old plan to wear down the Macedonian army in a long war of attrition. Until Alexander learned something of Central Asian logistics from Spitamanes himself, the Sogdians were very successful. In the worst battlefield disaster of the anabasis, the large force sent back by Alexander to recover Maracanda was ambushed and destroyed'*. Besides a failure in command, the Macedonian force suffered from inadequate provisions: the horses were dangerously weak for want of rest and fodder" Alexander responded by keeping quiet the magnitude of the disaster. and later undertook the fastest forced-march of his career to secure the situation. He was too slow to catch Spitamenes. but he took his cue from the rebel. He left a relatively small force to hold Sogdiana during the winter, perhaps to conserve winter provisions, and systematically denuded what remained in the Polytimetus (modern Zerafshan) valley not only to punish the natives, but also to deny food to the scattered forces of Spitamenes"*. Alexander then wintered at Bactra” for obvious logistical reasons, though 12, Arvian 4.3.1-4: Alexander was able to break into the city when he noticed that the winter steambeds into the city were dry. leaving a passage under the walls. Later. the citadel itself could rot hold out without water. 13, Arrian 4.4.8.9, 14. Arian 45.2.-4.6.3; QC 7.7.31-39. For the most recent study of the sources for this defeat, see N. G. L. Hammond, «The Macedonian Defeat Near Samarcand», AncW 22 (1991): 41-47. 15, Arian 4.55. 16. QC 7.8.22 and 7.10.10; Arrian 4.65. 17. Artian 4.7.1: QC 7.10.10-12,Spitamenes Against Alexander 55 not at all for the odd one given by Engels. He insists that Alexander chose Bactra because it lay «near» a navigable river — the Oxus (modern Amu- Darya)". The problem, of course, is that «little Gedrosia» (the Turkestan desert) which stretched between Bactra and the Oxus. terrain which had already cost the army a large number of casualties. While it is evident that Alexander learned to cross the desert without repeating the disaster of his initial attempt in 329 B. it does not follow that winter supplies from ravaged Sogdiana were regularly transported across the desert to Bactra. Engels’own logistical model for supply transport will not allow it because the round-trip of the pack train would itself consume the whole load”, Instead, Bactria proper, thus far spared the destructions witnessed in Sogdiana, was able to meet the winter needs of Alexander's army, even with the addition of 22.000 Graeco-Macedonian rein- forcements”. Consistent with his strategy, however, Spitamenes made certain that the supply situation in Bactria would be very different for the Macedonian army in the following year. When the Macedonian army crossed again into Sogdiana the following. spring, it did so with better regard for local conditions. The men dug wells at the Oxus rather than risk contaminated water; Alexander divided his army into nine units to enlarge its field of operations and to ease the burden of supply” Four units patrolled across Bactria; five swept through the valleys of the Pamir Mountains. In some places, the Sogdians anticipated Alexander's attack and so had stock-piled provisions in special fortresses”. These had to be stormed or seized through intimidation, their foodstuffs no doubt taken as needed by Alexander's men. The king next insured that these peoples would henceforth remain in their valleys, tilling the soil and tending cattle to the benefit of his soldiers and settlers. Indeed, he found a broader colonization plan to be an ideal means of spreading out his military forces among the Sogdians, in effect quartering his troops there as a form of royal tribute”. This was especially important in view of the growing number of Greek mercenaries arriving in the region. All of these actions allowed the troops to feed themselves during much of the campaigning season. and lessened the chance that Spitamenes might cut a main artery of communications and supply But as another winter approached, the elusive Spitamenes did conceive an 18, Engels. op. cit.. pp. 27 and 61 19, Engels. op. cit.. pp. 19-22. 20. QC 7.10,10-12: Arrian 4.7.2. 21. QC 7.10.13 and 8.1.1: Arrian 4.15.7-8 and 4.16.1-3, 22. QC TAAL I-14. 23. On the colonies, see Holt. Alexander and Bactria, pp. 62-64.56 Frank L. Holt effective attack where it was apparently least expected. While much of Alexan- der’s army was dispersed in Sogdiana, with one unit specifically searching for Spitamenes™, the rebel leader took a great risk and outmaneuvered the forces in Bactria with good effect. More than a mere spontaneous raid to embarass the Macedonians, this seems to have been a deliberate strike against Alexander's previous winter quarters. First, Spitamenes destroyed a garrison guarding the road a few days out from Bactra. Then the neighboring villages were devastated, and their cattle herded away’. Finally, Spitamenes and his cavalry approached Bactra itself. This walled city could not be stormed, as Spitamenes must have known. That the rebel herded away the cattle there must have been his intention all along”. The importance of these herds must not be overlooked. The role of livestock in the economy of Central Asia has always been crucial, and our sources make it clear that this was true in antiquity”. We must understand that ‘Alexander’s army relied heavily upon meat and dairy products during its two years in Bactria-Sogdiana. Meat has more calories per weight than grain, and until eaten it has the added advantage of transporting itself. Dried beef, too, was known to the Macedonians; Arrian specifically records its use by Alexander's army in Sogdiana, in addition to beef on the hoof”. Yet. Engels 24. That of Coenus and Artabazus, the satrap: Arian 4.16.3. 25, QC 8.1.3-5: Arian 4.16.45 26. Artian 4.165: here must mean cattle. as later events (Arrian 4.16.7) show: cf. QC 8.1.4 27. On the modern (pre-industrial) economy of these areas, the careful observations made by early European explorers are still very useful. For example. the journey of Dr. Eugene Schuyler, member of the American and Imperial Russian Geographic Societies. produced much valuable data ‘on population, irrigation, crop yields, and livestock in his two volume Turkistan (New York, 1876). especially Volume I, pp. 284-307. Schuyler describes vividly the recurrence of famine in what was once Sogdiana, in spite of its relative fertility in a broad desert environment. Likewise. in Henry Landsdell’s two volume Russian Central Asia (London, 1885). we can find tables of statisties for cattle breeding and crop yields for various districts: Vol. 1, pp. 420. 484. 544-545, ‘Against this background must be set the unusual circumstances of 329-328 B.C.. which included the ravages of war and occupation by a large army of invaders. While the natives might be reluctant to cut deeply into their herds, the increasing scarcity of grain would leave little choice but to sacrifice the cattle. Besides, the invaders would care little about the long-range problems which arise when pastoralists and semi-nomads lose their livestock 28. On this important subject. consult the complementary studies by J. A. Huston. The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953 (Washington, D.C. 1966), pp. 215-217; and E. Risch. Supplying Washington's Army (Washington, D.C.. 1981), pp. 200-203 and 241 29, Arian 4.21.10: cf. QC 8.4.17-20. Alexander must have known how effectively cattle had served the needs of earlier Greek armies. For examples. Herodotus 8.19 and Thucydides 4.16.1Spitamenes Against Alexander 97 insists upon a grain diet in his logistical model, because (he claims) meat was not storable, was rarely available, and because no herds are ever mentioned accompanying the army. None of this is true for the campaign in Central Asia, as we might well imagine and as the sources (notably Arrian) clearly attest. Spitamenes knew this as well, and was anxious to disrupt Alexander's winter preparations by devastating fields and driving off flocks from the vicinity of the satrapal capital. Whether Alexander had yet decided to winter in Sogdiana rather than again in Bactria we do not know, but it is noteworthy that the man in charge of arrangements for the comforts of Alexander and his court was indeed at Bactra when Spitamenes attacked”. This Peithon, in fact, assumed command of an illfated effort to recover the cattle, which may well have been his responsibility. Although Craterus later mounted a more successful attack against the retreating rebels, Alexander was forced to send Hephaestion to Bactra in order to secure the situation and to arrange what he could for winter supplies; Alexander himself kept most of the army in Sogdiana". The Bactrian raid of Spitamenes had created a supply problem there for the winter, and perhaps this convinced the king to keep his army dispersed in Sogdiana. Soon thereafter, Alexander led his troops on a massive hunt in Bazaira which netted some 4.000 beasts and ended in a huge banquet”. This was hardly on a scale for recreation alone; nor was it a «royal» hunt involving only the court. Given the number of hunters and hunted, this was much like a foraging expedition in what had been a protected park”. As another means of securing immediate supplies, the army was then divided into separate units which moved through the more populous and fertile districts of Sogdiana before settling into Nautaca for the two month dead of winter". Alexander's army could gather supplies and, too, deny them to Spitamenes and his troops record such rations for both Athenian and Spartan forces. More importantly. Xenophon’s Anabasis quite plainly describes how much Greek soldiers in Asia relied upon the meat of oxen, sheep, pigs. poultry, and cattle: 2.4.27: 35.2: 45.31: 4.7.17: 5.23-4 30. Artian 4.16.6; Berve, op. cit., pp. 311-312. 31. QC 8.2.13, 32. QC 8.1.11-19. 33. The precise locationof ancient Bazaira is not known, but the context suggests an area near Maracanda. Such a game preserve at Bokhara is recorded in later Persian literature: see the account of Alexander Burnes in Volume I, pp. 350-352 of his Travels into Bokhara (London, 1834). 34, Arvian 4.17.3-4.18.2; QC 8.2.14-40, The modern locations of Nautaca, Xenippa, and Gaba are disputed. The latter sites clearly bordered upon the Scythian desert: Nautaca lay nearer the Sogdian mountains.58 Frank L. Holt In fact, Spitamenes was finally entrapped and defeated during a supply raid near a site called Gabae, and his desperate Scythian allies plundered the baggage of the rebel Bactrians and Sogdians before bolting into the desert. Like Darius and Bessus before him, Spitamenes was betrayed’. His strategy had worked very well, especially at the outset. and this success clearly set Spitamenes apart from many other adversaries of Alexander. But in the end, the rebel leader fell victim to his own logistical strategy. Just as Spitamenes had been trying to cut off Macedonian access to precious supplies. so was Alexander able to disperse his forces, create multiple lines of supply. and set withering ambushes for his enemy. It was a brilliant strategy for which Spitamenes deserves some credit, though Alexander was not slow to learn. Even so, the struggle for scarce supplies went on after the demise of Spitamenes, making for the Macedonian soldiers a famous winter of their discontents". There were wintry sieges of Sogdian fortresses, one goal of which was the stockpile of food that had been hoarded into each. Though it suffered from shortages, the army endured until it finally marched from winter camp — and straight into a blizzard”. The men lacked provisions and became lost: over 2.000 reportedly perished. In this emergency. Sisimithres brought to Alexander a huge baggage train, plus «flocks and herds» to be distributed among the troops. Even here. it would appear that Alexander was still struggling with the problems of Sogdian logistics. Sisimithres was able to save the army, and even brought enough provisions so that Alexander could order (a little late) that each soldier carry six days' rations of cooked food (presumably meat) for the march against the Sacae. To repay Sisimithres. and that in the proper currency of Central Asia, Alexander later gave him the cattle which were raided from the Sacae tribes™. From his Sogdian enemies and allies, Alexander learned a great deal about the fight for survival in the severe conditions of Central Asia. During this long, period, the Macedonian army was certainly not consistently well-supplied. Nor was this a land of plenty where grain easily met the needs of natives and newcomers during a devastating war. Cattle were also important, and became part of the logistical struggle for ascendancy in Central Asia. With these factors in mind, we may perhaps understand more clearly the war between Alexander and his «most formidable opponent», Spitamenes of Bactria-Sogdiana. 35. The sources give two versions of his betrayal and death: Arrian 4.17.7 and QC 83.1-16, 36. See Holt, Alexander and Bactria. pp. 77-80. 37. QC 84.119. 38. QC 8.420.