1 2 1 2

1,,110004
E-mail:xuxinhe@ise.neu.edu.cn
2,,110004

E-mail: jixiangruyiwy@126.com

--

Analysis on the Achievement Milestones and Limitations of Game Theory

XU Xinhe1, WANG Yan2, LIU Jihong1, ZHANG Xuefeng2
1 Computer Game Group, Institute of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University,Shenyang 110004
E-mail: xuxinhe@ise.neu.edu.cn

2Institute of System Science, Northeastern University; Shenyang 110004, China

E-mail: jixiangruyiwy@126.com
Abstract: The game issues are more complicated and difficult to be solved than the control and decision-making problems, therefore they
are more challenging. Game Theory facing to the modeling and solution of various game issues has undergone over half a century of fast
development, and has obtained a series of achievement which can been regarded as milestones. So it has played a great improving role in the
development of economics and relevant fields. After introducing the main achievement of Game Theory, the essence and the basic model of
Game Theory are summarized, i.e. Rationality Prediction- Equilibrium. But when facing the complicated dynamic game systems, for
example, chess game, it is hard to solve the move problem by the current Game Theory. It seems that some limitations of Game Theory are
showed. Therefore, the Game Theory and Computer Game should be combined so that we can overcome some limitations, improve the
extension of the theory, and create a new situation for the applications of Game Theory.
Keywords: Game Theory; Rationality; Consistent Prediction; Nash Equilibrium; Computer Games; Event Game

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1. (Introduction)

20
70
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2
3
 4

2 (Review of
Achievement Milestones of Game Theory)

1500

Waldgrave 1713
CournotA
[2]Bertrand

Edgeworth

E.Zermelo 1913
Backward induction
[3]
procedureE.Borel1921 [4]

ggJohn von
Neuman 1928
[5]


ggJohn von Neumang

Oskar Morgenstern 1944
[6]


gJohnNash1950
[7]

Cournot
ABertrand

Albert W.Tucker
Prisoners Dilemma


g(Reinhard Selten)
1965
Subgame Perfect

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Nash Equilibrium[8]

gJohnHarsanyi1967-1968

[9]

Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium


Sequential Equlibrium

Kreps and Wilson 1982 [10]


1975
Trembling hand Perfect Equilibrium
[11]


Signaling games

6pence 1973

2001
[12]

(Differential games)
20

1216

Issacs
[13]

1971 Friedman


2050
g(Thomas Schelling)

The Strategy of Conflict[14]


gRobert Aumann

1959 Strong
Equilibrium[15]

Nontransferable utility
1966

Michael Maschler


Interactive epistemology 1976

Agreeing to disagree[16]
Lewis 1969

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g
g 2005 

[1]

3.
(Rationality PredictionEquilibrium--the
Essence of Game Theory)

[17]


[17]

[8]

[17]



1 Bayes 
1 

Equilibrium outcome

4. (Analysis on Limitations of
Game Theory)




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EgZermelo)

[18]

[19]

5.
Discussion on the
Way to Overcome the Limitations

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