sday, August 26, 2009

Case digests for Constitutional Law (Midterms)

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Labels: case digest, Political Law Review

scribbled by swexie @ 9:25 PM 0 Objections

Monday, February 02, 2009

University of San Agustin Employees Union vs Court of Appeals Case Digest

This is a case between the University of San Agustin Employees Union-FFW (UNION)
and The University of San Agustin (UNIV).

Sometime on 2000, the parties agreed on a 5-year CBA, the economic provisions of
which are effective for 3 years only. After the lapse of 3 years, the parties
negotiated on the economic provisions but did not agree on the terms during the
remaining 2 years of the CBA and beyond.

Since the parties did not agree on the computation of tuition incremental proceeds
(TIP) which shall be the basis for the increase of salaries, they underwent a
preventive mediation proceedings at the NCMB.

Still unresolved, the Union declared a bargaining deadlock and thereafter filed a
Notice of Strike at the NCMB, which was expectedly opposed by the Univ through a
Motion to Strike-out Notice of Strike and Refer the Dispute to Voluntary
Arbitration, since the CBA contained a "no-strike, no-lockout" provision, and a
grievance machinery for settling disputes, including a voluntary arbitration
mechanism should the grievance machinery fail to settle the dispute. The NCMB,
however, failed to resolved the Univ's Motion

Thereafter, both parties made a joint request for the Secretary of Labor and
Employment (SOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute.

On September 18, 2003, he SOLE assumed jurisdication, and with such assumption of
jurisdiction, any strike or lockout was strictly enjoined.

The day after the SOLE assumed jurisdiction, and on the same day that the
Assumption of Jurisdiction Order (AJO) was supposedly served to both parties, the
Union staged a strike. Union members refused to receive a copy of the AJO
assailing that only the Union President is authorized to receive the same. The
Union filed a Petition Declare Illegal Strike and Loss of Employment Status of the
striking employees, which Petition was filed at the NLRC. Such Petition was later
on consolidated with the case pending before the SOLE, at the request of the Univ.

The SOLE rendered a Decision resolving the various economic issues over which the
parties had a deadlock in the collective bargaining, and likewise dismissed the
Petition to Declare Illegal Strike.

The University elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals after its Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the SOLE.

The Court of Appeals partially granted the Petition. It declared the strike as
illegal, but affirmed the SOLE's decision regarding the economic issues.

Both the Univ and the Union filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration.
Basing on the CA's decision, on April 7, 2005, the Univ served the striking
employees with their notices for termination and concurrently, the Union filed
with the NCMB a second notice of strike, this time on ground of alleged union
busting.

On April 22, 2005, the parties again took initial steps to negotiate the new CBA
but said attempts proved futile. Hence, on April 25, 2005, the Union went on
strike. In reaction, the University notified the Union that it was pulling out of
the negotiations because of the strike.

On August 23, 2005, the CA, acting on the parties' respective motions for
reconsideration, promulgated the herein challenged Partially Amended Decision.
Finding merit in the respondent University's motion for partial reconsideration,
the CA ruled that the SOLE abused its discretion in resolving the economic issues
on the ground that said issues were proper subject of the grievance machinery as
embodied in the parties' CBA. Consequently, the CA directed the parties to refer
the economic issues of the CBA to voluntary arbitration. The CA, however, stood
firm in its finding that the strike conducted by the petitioner Union was illegal
and its officers were deemed to have lost their employment status.

Thus, the Union and its dismissed officers file this Petition to the Supreme
Court, on the following issues:

Whether or not the strike was illegal and the Union Officers deemed to have lost
their employment status on their failure to return to work immediately upon the
service of AJO issued by the SOLE.

Whether or not the economic provisions of the CBA should be referred to Voluntary
Arbitration.
The Supreme Court resolved the foregoing issues as follows:

On the first issue, the SC ruled that ART. 263 of the Labor Code
provides: ."..Such assumption or certification (of the SOLE) shall have the effect
of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as
specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place
at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees
shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike or lockout." The phrase "immediately return to work" indicates
an almost instantaneous or automatic compliance for a striker to return to work
once an AJO has been duly served. Therefore, the act of the striking employees is
violative of the foregoing provision.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled that economic benefits, which
included the issue on the formula in computing the TIP share of the employees, is
one that arises from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA, and these
matters should be referred to a Voluntary Arbitrator, as provided in Art. 261 and
262 of the Labor Code. The peculiar facts of the instant case show that the
University was deprived of a remedy that would have enjoined the Union strike and
was left without any recourse except to invoke the jurisdiction of the SOLE.

Labels: case digest, labor relations cases

scribbled by swexie @ 7:55 PM 1 Objections

Wednesday, July 16, 2008

Los Ba�os Rural Bank vs Africa

Petitioner Los Ba�os questioned the decision of the Court of Appeals in granting
respondent Pacita Africa's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain petitioner from proceeding with the foreclosure and
consolidation of the title over the subject property after such property was
allegedly sold to Macy Africa by forging Pacita Africa's signature.

Los Ba�os argued that they should not be enjoined from foreclosing hte property
because the foreclosure sale has long been effected and since it is a consummated
act, it can no longer be restrained.

The SC held that in the instant case, the status quo was the situation of the
parties at the time of filing the Amended Complaint, at the poin where the
property was already foreclosed. But, the last actual uncontested status that
preceeded the conroversy was when the property in dispute was still registered int
he name of Macy Africa, petitioner not having consolidated in its name the title
thereto.

Moreover, the court also held that the requisites for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction are present and established by Pacita Africa. A writ of
preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon an
applican't showing of two important requisites; namely: (1) the right to be
protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative
of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would
cause an irreparable injustice.

The issuance of the wirt of preliminary injuction would no doubt preserve the
status quo.
Labels: case digest, Provisional Remedies

scribbled by swexie @ 11:03 PM 0 Objections

Phil. Sinter vs Cagayan Electric Light and Power Company

Whether or not an injunction lies against the final and executory judgment of the
Energy Regulatory Board?

No. After a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the
court to order its execution. No court, perforce, should interfere by injunction
or otherwise to restrain such execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of
exceptions; hence, when facts and circumstances later transpire that would render
execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a competent court to
stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a change int he situation
of parties can warrant an injunctive relief.
Labels: case digest, Provisional Remedies

scribbled by swexie @ 8:42 PM 0 Objections

Saturday, November 17, 2007

Lacson vs Reyes GR No. 86250 February 26, 1990
Atty. Ephraim Serquina did not pay docket fees in his Motion for Attorney�s Fees,
contending that such motion was only incidental to the probate of the will of
Carmelita Farlin, he being the executor thereof. Thereafter, the heirs filed their
answer and denied the claim for P68,000.00 attorney�s fees alleging that the sum
agreed upon was only P7,000.00, a sum they had allegedly already paid.

The Supreme Court ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon payment of the prescribed docket fees. The payment of docket fees is required
before the Motion for Attorney�s Fees could be validly tired.
Labels: case digest, Remedial law

scribbled by swexie @ 7:34 PM 3 Objections

Tacay vs RTC of Tagum GR Nos 88075-77 December 20, 1989

Tacay vs RTC of Tagum

GR Nos. 88075-77
December 20, 1989

Facts:
These were 2 separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of
Tagum for recovery of possession (acciones publiciana) against 3 defendants,
namely: Antonia Noel, Ponciano Panes, and Maximo Tacay.

Pineda was the owner of 790 sqm land evidenced by TCT No. T-46560. The previous
owner of such land has allowed the 3 defendants to use or occupy the same by mere
tolerance. Pineda, having himself the need to used the property, has demanded the
defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals therefore, but such
were refused.

The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant
alleging that it did not specify the amounts of actual, nominal, and exemplary
damages, nor the assessed value of the property, that being bars the determination
of the RTC�s jurisdiction in deciding the case.

The Motions to Dismiss were denied but the claims for damages in the complaint
were expunged for failure to specify the amounts. Thus, the defendants filed a
Joint Petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and temporary restraining
order against the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the amount of damages claimed and the assessed value of the
property are relevant in the determination of the court�s jurisdiction in a case
for recovery of possession of property?

Decision:
Determinative of the court�s jurisdiction in a recovery of possession of property
is the nature of the action (one of accion publicaina) and not the value of the
property, it may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying claim for
actual, nominal or exemplary damages and such action would fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. The court acquired jurisdiction upon
the filing of the complaint and payment of the prescribed docket fees.

(CLICK THE TITLE TO VIEW THE FULL TEXT OF THE CASE @ LAWPHIL.NET)
ANOTHER TACAY VS RTC OF TAGUM DIGEGST AT ARELLANOLAW.NET
Labels: case digest, Remedial law
scribbled by swexie @ 7:24 PM 0 Objections

Sun Insurance Office Ltd. vs Hon. Asuncion and Manuel Uy Po Tiong GR No. 79937-38
February 13, 1989

Facts:
Sun insurance filed a case for the consignation of premiums on a fire insurance
policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private
respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for
failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. Meanwhile, the
Respondent Manuel Tiong also filed a case against Sun Insurance for the refund of
premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, seeking the payment
of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney�s fees,
expenses of litigation, and costs of suit, but the damages sought were not
specifically stated in the prayer, although it may be inferred from the body of
the complaint that it would amount to about P50M. In the body of the original
complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In
the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The amount of only
P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed
an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less
than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the
complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said
amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the
additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than
P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an
additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is
approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an
additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the
respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be
reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition,
and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent
paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears
to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the
total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to
about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket
fee of P257,810.49.

Issue:
Whether or not the court acquires jurisdiction when the correct and proper docket
fee has not been paid?

Ruling:
Manchester ruling applies, with modification. Statutes regulating the procedure of
courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and in that
respect.
The Court dismissed petitioner�s motion and ordered the Clerk of court to re-asses
the docket fees.

Personal Observation:
The case is different in Manchester because the respondent herein has shown
compliance by paying docket fees upon reassessment and has also paid the docket
fees on its amended complaint increasing the claim for damages. Furthermore, there
is no substantial evidence that the respondent has the intention of deliberately
defraud the court or evaded the payment of docket fees.
(CLICK ON THE TITLE TO VIEW THE FULL TEXT OF THE CASE @LAWPHIL.NET)
Labels: case digest, Remedial law

scribbled by swexie @ 7:14 PM 0 Objections

Manchester Development Corporation vs Court of Appeals GR No. 75919 May 7, 1987

Facts:
This was originally a case of an action for torts and damages and specific
performance with a prayer for temporary restraining order. The damages were not
specifically stated in the prayer but the body of the complaint assessed a P78.75M
damages suffered by the petitioner. The amount of docket fees paid was only
P410.00. The petitioner then amended the complaint and reduced the damages to P10M
only.

Issues:
When does a court acquire jurisdiction?
Does an amended complaint vest jurisdiction in the court?

Ruling:
The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.

(CLICK THE TITLE OF THE CASE TO VIEW THE FULL TEXT @LAWPHIL.NET)
Labels: case digest, Remedial law

scribbled by swexie @ 7:09 PM 0 Objections

Thursday, November 15, 2007

Japan Airlines V. Asuncion (G.R No. 161730, January 28,2005) 449 SCRA 544

Digested by Ms. Karen Mae Gonzales

FACTS:
This petition for review seeks to reverse and set aside the October 9, 2002
decision of the Court of Appeals and its January 12, 2004 resolution, which
affirmed in toto the June 10, 1997 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 61 in Civil Case No. 92-3635.
On March 27, 1992, respondents Michael and Jeanette Asuncion left Manila on board
Japan Airlines� (JAL) Flight 742 bound for Los Angeles. Their itinerary included a
stop-over in Narita and an overnight stay at Hotel Nikko Narita. Upon arrival at
Narita, Mrs. Noriko Etou-Higuchi of JAL endorsed their applications for shore pass
and directed them to the Japanese immigration official. A shore pass is required
of a foreigner aboard a vessel or aircraft who desires to stay in the neighborhood
of the port of call for not more than 72 hours.
During their interview, the Japanese immigration official noted that Michael
appeared shorter than his height as indicated in his passport. Because of this
inconsistency, respondents were denied shore pass entries and were brought instead
to the Narita Airport Rest House where they were billeted overnight.
Mr. Atsushi Takemoto of the International Service Center (ISC), the agency tasked
by Japan�s Immigration Department to handle passengers who were denied shore pass
entries, brought respondents to the Narita Airport Rest House where they stayed
overnight until their departure the following day for Los Angeles. Respondents
were charged US$400.00 each for their accommodation, security service and meals.

On December 12, 1992, respondents filed a complaint for damages claiming that JAL
did not fully apprise them of their travel requirements and that they were rudely
and forcibly detained at Narita Airport.

Issue: Whether or not JAL is liable of breach of contract of carriage.

Side Issues:
� Whether or not JAL is liable for moral, exemplary damages,
� Whether or not the plaintiff is liable for attorney�s fee and cost of suit
incurred (JAL counterclaim)

Ruling:

The court finds that JAL did not breach its contract of carriage with respondents.
It may be true that JAL has the duty to inspect whether its passengers have the
necessary travel documents, however, such duty does not extend to checking the
veracity of every entry in these documents. JAL could not vouch for the
authenticity of a passport and the correctness of the entries therein. The power
to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act which cannot be
interfered with even by JAL. This is not within the ambit of the contract of
carriage entered into by JAL and herein respondents. As such, JAL should not be
faulted for the denial of respondents� shore pass applications.

In the Respondents claim that petitioner breached its contract of carriage when it
failed to explain to the immigration authorities that they had overnight vouchers
at the Hotel Nikko Narita. They imputed that JAL did not exhaust all means to
prevent the denial of their shore pass entry applications. JAL or any of its
representatives have no authority to interfere with or influence the immigration
authorities. The most that could be expected of JAL is to endorse respondents�
applications, which Mrs. Higuchi did immediately upon their arrival in Narita.

Moral damages may be recovered in cases where one willfully causes injury to
property, or in cases of breach of contract where the other party acts
fraudulently or in bad faith. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, when the party to a contract acts in wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. Attorney�s fees are allowed when
exemplary damages are awarded and when the party to a suit is compelled to incur
expenses to protect his interest.[17] There being no breach of contract nor proof
that JAL acted in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner, there is no basis for
the award of any form of damages.

Neither should JAL be held liable to reimburse respondents the amount of

US$800.00. It has been sufficiently proven that the amount pertained to ISC, an
agency separate and distinct from JAL, in payment for the accommodations provided
to respondents. The payments did not in any manner accrue to the benefit of JAL.

However, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed JAL�s counterclaim
for litigation expenses, exemplary damages and attorney�s fees. The action was
filed by respondents in utmost good faith and not manifestly frivolous.
Respondents honestly believed that JAL breached its contract. A person�s right to
litigate should not be penalized by holding him liable for damages. This is
especially true when the filing of the case is to enforce what he believes to be
his rightful claim against another although found to be erroneous.[

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
October 9, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals and its January 12, 2004
resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 57440, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the
finding of breach on the part of petitioner and the award of damages, attorney�s
fees and costs of the suit in favor of respondents is concerned. Accordingly,
there being no breach of contract on the part of petitioner, the award of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney�s fees and costs of the suit in
favor of respondents Michael and Jeanette Asuncion, is DELETED for lack of basis.
However, the dismissal for lack of merit of petitioner�s counterclaim for
litigation expenses, exemplary damages and attorney�s fees, is SUSTAINED. No
pronouncement as to costs
Labels: case digest, Transportation Law

scribbled by swexie @ 10:50 PM 1 Objections

Dangwa Transportation Co. vs Court of Appeals GR No. 95582 October 1991

Facts:
On March 25, 1985, Pedrito Cudiamat was ran over by a bus operated by Dangwa
Transportation Company, and driven by Theodore Lardizabal. Lardizabal, being
reckless and negligent, has prematurely stepped on the accelerator of the bus just
as when Cudiamat boarded the same. The sudden jerk movement caused Cudiamat to
fall from the platform and was ran over by they bus. Moreover, the driver did not
immediately brought the victim to the nearest hospital for medical attention.

Issue:
Whether or not the driver and bus company are liable for the death of P. Cudiamat.

Held:
They are liable.

Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers
transported by the according to all the circumstances of each case. A common
carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard
for all the circumstances.

It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of

carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the
part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by
the passenger. By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation
to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary
diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might
be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence
of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be
proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has
exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the
Civil Code.
Labels: case digest, Transportation Law

scribbled by swexie @ 10:17 PM 0 Objections

Tuesday, October 16, 2007

Land Titles: Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals; July 5, 1996

Facts:
The case is for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution
from a certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The inscription
was caused to be made by the private respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title
No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name of the
spouses Uychocde, and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry, issued in the name of the
spouses Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land from the Uychocdes, and are now
the petitioners in this case.

The subject property was bought by Sajonas spouses on September 1983 and caused
the annotation of their adverse claim on August 1984. The Deed of Sale was
executed upon the full payment of the purchase price and the same was registered
only on August 1985.

Meanwhile, without the petitioners' knowledge, there has been a compromise

agreement between the spouses Uychocde and Pilares (Uychocde's judgment creditor),
and a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On February 12,
1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of
levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was
annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.

Issue:
Which should be preferred between the notice of levy on execution and the deed of
absolute sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 1984, but
was registered only on August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy on execution was
annotated six (6) months prior to the registration of the sale on February 12,
1985.

Decision:
The annotation of the adverse claim is equivalent to notice to third persons of
the interest of the claimant. The provision of the law (PD 1529) that the adverse
claim is only valid for 30 days cannot be upheld. Clearly, the intention of the
law is otherwise as may be gleaned on the following discussion:
�Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land
adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is made in this decree for registering
the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or
interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of certificate
of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a
description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant�s
residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement
shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title.
The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may
be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest:
Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the
same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.

Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a
petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the
cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon
the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as
may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the
registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after
notice and hearing shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was
frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos,
nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty
days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of
Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.�

Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency

between the portions of the law such that the provision on cancellation of adverse
claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity
period. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse
claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will
remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the
adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period,
its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a
useless ceremony.<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->

To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without
qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the
statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the
annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a
person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or
right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now
P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third
parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest or the
same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.

Petition was granted. The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT
No. N-109417 is ordered CANCELLED.
Labels: case digest

scribbled by swexie @ 2:45 AM 0 Objections

Tuesday, October 02, 2007

CASE DIGEST: Congson vs NLRC

FACTS:

The case was originally filed by herein respondents Bargo et al against Congson,
the former being hired as piece-rate workers responsible for the loading/unloading
of tuna catch for Southern Fishing Industry owned by the latter.

In 1990, the piece-rate workers were replaced with a new set of workers because of
their alleged refusal/resistance to the proposed reduction of their piece-rate
payment per tuna (the former rate was P1.00 per tuna movement. The reduction was
proposed because of the decrease in the volume of tuna catch). They filed for
underpayment of wages, contending that their average monthly rate did not exceed
P1000, plus non-payment of overtime pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave
pay, and separation pay.

The labor arbiter decided in favor of the workers and directed Congson to pay the
monetary claims for salary differentials, 13th month pay, service incentive leave
pay, and separation pay.

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, in toto, thus the
instant petition.

ISSUES:
1. W/N THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO A SEPARATION PAY?

2. W/N THE COMPUTATION OF WAGES SHOULD INCLUDE THE VALUE OF TUNA LIVER AND
INTESTINES THAT WERE TAKEN BY THE REPONDENT WORKERS AS PART OF THEIR COMPENSATION?

HELD:

1. YES. There being a substantive proof that the respondent workers are to be
reinstated by their employer, the award for separation pay is appropriate.
Separation pay may be given when the employer-employee relationship is to so
tainted that reinstatement would not prosper.

2. NO. Article 102 par.1 of the Labor Code states that: Forms of payment. No
employer shall pay the wages of an employee by means of promissory notes,
vouchers, coupons, tokens, tickets, chits, or any object other than legal tender,
even when expressly requested by the employee. Thus, the computation made by the
labor arbiter in arriving at the money claims is correct.

Labels: case digest

scribbled by swexie @ 12:00 AM 0 Objections

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