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    Philosophy

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    14 Kim Philosophy-Of-mind 99-114 Rotated

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    qloria
    Philosophy

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    (Mind athe Brin 9 causal contribution can the pain make? There seems no leftover causal work that the pain has to be cilled on to performs. Again, the identification of the pain with its underlying neural event appears to dissolve all these puzzles. ‘There is, of course, the epiphenomenalist solution: Both the hand with- drawal and the pain are caused by neural sate N, and the pain itself has no further causal role in this situation. But unlike the identity solution, the epiphenomenalist move renders the pain causally inert and ends up simply denying our intial assumption that a sharp pain caused the hand’s jerky mo- tion. We should note, howeves, that although it may well be true that psy- choneural identification will solve the mental causation problem, it may not be the only solution, or the best one, Moreover, what if these psychoneural identities are not available? If chey ae there, well and good. But if there is no reason to think that they are there, should we believe that they exist just be- cause they would solve a problem for us? Shouldn't the availability of psy- choneural identities be established on independent grounds? (Mental causation is discussed in greater detail in chapter 7.) What Does “Identity” Mean? ‘The identity theory states that mental events are identical with brain processes. Sometimes such expressions as “state.” “phenomenon,” and “oc- currence” are used interchangeably with “event” and “process.” As a specific example of psychoneural identity, let us agtin consider the statement “pains are C-fiber excitations.” This is sometimes glossed as follows: “For a person (organism) to be in pain is for him to be in the C-fiber excitation state.” For 1 proper understanding and evaluation of the identity theory we ned to be clearer about the logic and ontology of such statements. Let us frst consider the notion of “identity.” By expressions such as “the same” or “identical” we sometimes mean equality in some magnitude, or being instances ot tokens falling under the same kind or type, and this sense must be sharply distinguished from strict ‘identity or identity proper. When we say thatthe two base angles ofan isosce- les triangle are the same or identical, we only mean that their magnitude is the same, not that they are one and the same angle. (If that were the case, there would be only one angle here, not two!) And when we say, “I just ‘boughe the same book you bought yesterday,” what we have in mind are two copies, or tokens, ofthe seme title, not a single copy; whereas, when you say, “Lhave five books in my backpack,” you ar likely o have in mind five inc vidual books, some, or even all, of which may be copies of the same ttle 100 Mind ar the Brain “When X is identical with Y in che strict sense, we have one thing, not two. Socrates is identical with Xanthippe's husband. What we have two of are the ‘names “Socrates” and “Xanthippe’s husband.” Two names and one object: The names pick our, or refer to, one and the same person. — Some identities are known a priori; for example, “5 +7 = 12" and “2= the smallest prime number” But the face that water = H,O or that the morning stat» the evening statis something we have discovered from observation and ‘experience; itis not something that could have been ascertained a priori or bby merely investigating the meanings or concepts associated with the expres- sions “water,” “H,0,” “the morning star.” and “the evening star.” So these identities are empirical, not a priori truths. “The identity theorist would say that mind-body identities are empirical in the same way. The concept of pain and the concept of C-fiber excitations are distinct and independent, and this explains how it is possible for some- ‘one, say, Socrates, to know a lot about pains but nothing about C-fibers or their excitations. So this psychoneural identity is nor certifiable conceptu- ally or solely from the meanings of “pain” and “C-fber activation.” Ie is an ‘empirical ruth (assuming that it is a truth) that depends on sophisticated and laborious neurophysiological research. For this reason, mind-brain identities, it is claimed, are ike “theoretical identities” in the sciences, like the following: + Water is H,0. + Heat is molecular kinetic energy. «+ The cause of AIDS is infection by the HIV virus. «+ Light is electromagnetic radiation. In each such case, a phenomenon or object is identified with something described in the theoretical vocabulary of science. Identities like these are 2 central part of our scientific knowledge of the world; each tells what some- thing “really is”—its true mature as revealed by scientific investigation. As we saw earlier in connection with the second explanatory argument for psy- choneural idemtties, such identities can have important explanatory roles. “Water = H,0” can help us explain why water dissolves salt by allowing us to invoke the properties of HO in our explanation. Similaey, research in neu rophysiology has revealed to us what pain really is—ic is the excitation of C- fibers—and chis identity may have a role in explaining psychological regularities involving pain. ‘Mind a he Brin tot Identity—or “strict” identity—is governed by the following law: Indiscrnibilty of Identicals. 1X is idenvical with Y, X and ¥ share all their properties in common—that is, for any property P, X has P ifand only if¥ has B ld This is sometimes called “Leibnit’s lav,” although this term is also used to =. the following, often disputed, principle, which is the converse of the st law: Identity of Indscernibles. I X and Y share all theit properties in com- ‘mon, X is identical with Y. ‘The fist law, the indiscernibility ofdentcals, is uncontroversial and man- ifestly true: IFX is indeed identical with Y, there is one thing here and not two, So how could any property be had by X but not by ¥? Saying chat it could isto say that the property is both had and not had by one and the same thing, which obviously is a contradiction. In any case, this law tells us that all we need in order to refute an identity laim "X = Y" isa single prop- erty B, however trivial and inconsequential it may be, such that X has it and Y¥ does not, or ¥has it but X does not. We ean call such a propercy a “differ- centiating property” for X and Y. As we shall soon see, that is the strategy em- ployed by the foes of the identity theory: Various properties have been proposed as differentiating properties for the mental and the physical. Token Physicalism and Type Physicalism ‘The identity theory standardly talks of “events,” saying, as we have seen, that ‘mental events are physical events in the brain, But what is an event? There are two alternative approaches to the metaphysics of events, and the choice between them makes a difference to the ways in which the identity theory can be understood, One view takes events as basic concrete particulars of the world, along with material objects. Like material things, they have proper- ties and fll under kinds. Thus, an event may be an explosion or the collapse of abridge; it can be swift, violent, and unexpected. On this view, a particu- lat occurrence of pain isan event that falls under the event kind pains alter natively, we may say that that occurrence has the property of being a pain 102 Mind asthe Brin ‘event. It can fill under other event kinds and have other properties as wel: It isa dull, pounding pain, ic is caused by a decayed tooth, it wakes you up in the middle of the night, and it lsts intermittently for more than three hours. ‘And if the identity theory is correct, it is also a brain event, an event falling under the neural event kind C-fiber excitation, On this view of events as basic particulars, therefore, the assertion that a given pain event, ¢, isa C-fber excitation i to say that ¢ falls under two event Kinds, pain and C-fiber excitation—that is, es both a pain and a C-fiber ex- citation. To put it another way, this event, , has both the property of being a pain and the property of being a C-fiber excitation. (= ‘now the standard statement of the identity cheory: Q (I) Every mental event isa physical event. ‘On the present construal of events this comes to: (la) Token Physicals. Every event that falls under a mental event kind also fills under a physical event kind (or every event that has a mental | property has also some physical property). © We may consider talk of “event kinds” as equivalent to talk of “properties” of events, since every property of events can be thought of as defining a kind of events—namely the kind comprising events with that property. (Ia) is also called “token-identity theory,” since it identifies each mental “event token” ‘with a physical “event token.” An event token, or token event, is a dated in- dividual occurrence, like the occurrence of pain to a particular person at a particular time, Event tokens are contrasted with event types, or event kinds, say, pains and itches, Token physicalists stress that ther thesis, (Ia), does not tail a claim about the identity of mental types with physical rypes, a thesis | “ype physicalism” or “type-identity theory”: (Ib) Type Physicalism. Mental kinds are physical kinds; alternatively, ‘mental properties are physical properties. | Note that the terms “kind,” “type.” and “property” are used interchange- ably in this context. LL. Whats the relationship beoween token and type physicalism? Type physi-

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