erestemplate Hlectronic Reserve System Electronic Reserves Reading Please type all relevant information into the form, print the form and return it to the library circulation desk with each ERes photocopy. Page 1 of 2 ‘Electronic Reserves Professor Course Course ‘Semester Name Number [Robert Miller [Historical Narratives OT [SCRP502Sem || [Spring 2007 Reserve Reading Citation fangsfeld, Negr. Paul. creation and Evolutio: ed. M. Behe. St. Louis: Institute for 988. Creation and Bvolution. Pp. 105-159 in theological Encounter with Science & Technology Faith/Science Press. al aA To Be Posted by (date) the copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States |Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of ‘opyrighted materials. Under certain conditions specified in the aw, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or ther reproduction. |One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or production is not to be "used for any purpose other than private dy, scholarship, or research.” Ifa user makes a request for, or ater uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of hitp://www2.msmary.edu/librarylerestemplate. html 12/15/2000130 Yet for science to think tha it knows nature throug and through presup- poses that it grasps the whole pattern of things.!"8 Only if the whole is known can we say that miracles are exceptions to the rule. The doctrine of ‘creation on the contrary holds that the whole is not just the natural setting of the world, but is God himself, whose mind and actions elude human understanding, 149 With regard to the problem of divine providence, pre-modern thinkers did not produce theodicies, that is, ‘ational ¢ explanations of aris ‘They af firmed God's love and care for every creature, but did s0 in faith, realizing that they cannot make sense of the totality of things because they do not see what God sees. Faith makes sense of things only in a fragmentary way, leav- ing many quenions unanswered.!5! But moderns were not content with un- answered questions and wanted to grasp rationally the i ity between a world created by God and the presence of ell within iel?> The pre- moderns on the contrary lived with the mystery that somehow God was pre- sent in all things but not the cause of evil events. In trying to make sense of evil, moderns reduced it to manageable propor- tions, which is to make what is essentially irrational rational. 4 We can ‘only make sense of God's action if he is not a function of the world that is, docs not supplement or complement the world’s operations, but is of an entirely different order. God accomplishes everything that happens in the universe, and the universe, which is clearly not God, as the doctrine of creation afin, also acemplishes everthing oni own, in the order of "secondary causality." They can both accomplish everything because they operate on two completely different levels! é In Placher’s words, the pre-moderns did not believe there was any clear cut epistemological path from us to God. If we are to know anything substantial about God's mystery, he has to make that known in a revelation. !°8 Placher believes the many theologies which hold that they have made a "postpedernt turn beyond delsm are headed even further in the wrong direction. 1°? They Jook at God functionally, to make sense of natural processes. and by iden- tifying God closely with natural processes, they make him too intelligible to us, emptying him of his mystery. B. God's Relationship to the World in Contemporary Evolutiona ‘Theology i a In this section, we will limit ourselves to investigating whether contemporary theology which is done in an evolutionary key respects the doctrine of crea~ tion, which calls for a perspective on the world other than that of the natural 131 attitude. The real test of this will be whether there is room in this theology for Christian beliefs which completely surpass the capacity of reason, We will refer mostly to A. Peacocke, as he has a more developed theology than ‘thers who write in this area. Peacocke considers it urgent to reflect on how God acts in this world in light of scientific explanations of what occurs in nature, Otherwise Christian affir- mations will not be intelligible or plausible in the modern world. !98 Chris tianity even needs to reinterpret the faith to be consistent with contemporary knowledge.!59 Mooney notes that theology has traditionally been interested in human beings as social and historical Beings, but should not ignore look- jing at human beings as part of nature.!® There is even a trend in theology, says Peacocke, to recognize man’s relatedness to nature, so theology cannot ignore taking into account scientific interpretations of human life.'©1 In Keeping with Placher's warning about theological functionalism, we have to ask if this theological trend is so coricerned to make God make sense to the natural sciences that his true transcendence is obscured. We have a good glimpse of the direction.of Peacocke’s theology in his re- marks on ‘evolutionary naturalism.’ The tenets of this philosophy are (1) the rejection of the "supernatural’; (2) the conviction that nature is x process of dynamic change; and (3) the belief that an updated version of the Darwinian ‘mechanism can explain all developments in nature,}©? Peacocke docs not be- lieve these tenets are inconsistent with theology. ‘he last two points are sup- ported by scientific evidence. The first point is poorly formulated, but if it {s rephrased in the proper way, it can be given a meaning consistent with a theological perspective. For Peacocke as well as Mooney, talk of a supernat- ral presupposes the dualism we encounter in Enlightenment theology, and it is this dualism which most undermines the possibility of an evolutionary theology. This is the case, for the natural sciences regard all beings in the world, fgom the leat complex to human beings, as part of 2 natura order. It is impossible to defend evolution as a comprehensive interpretation of reality if some form of life escapes the evolutionary mechanism. In a dualistic understanding of reality, where supernatural is distinguished from the nat- ural, the only way for God to operate in the world would be by intervention from the outside.!®4 Evolutionary theology solves the problem of dualism and an interventionist God by arguing that God operates immanently, within the natural processes, so that there is no need to appeal to a supernatural over against the natural. This interpretation of God's activity echoes that of the natural attitude, according to which God and nature form together one whole, for God is so committed to working within nature it is not clear that132 he could speak or act in a way which completely transcended natural ways of knowing and being. Peacocke and Mooney reject the accusation that their theologies are com- pletely immanentist. For Peacocke, God docs indeed work “in, with and un- der” the processes of nature, but he also remains completely transcendent. Matters scif-organizationinto ever greater complexity is truly its own activity, but itis also fully God's on another level.!©2 Here he comes very close t0 Placher’s description of premodern theology, which attributed everything to both God and mature, just in different ways. Mooney too understands the universe to be operating according to its own order of causality (secondary causality), while God (the primary cause) docs everything on a completely different level.!66 Thus, Mooney and Peacocke would maintain that they do »ot fallinto pantheism, deism, or the vitalinticimmanentggy of a Chardin, for they respect both God’s transcendence and immanence.'®? Yet they do not give any concrete content to their idea of transcendence, for they are com- pletely absorbed in making God intelligible to a natural understanding of the world. One sign of the obscuring of the distinction between God and the world is the designation of the evolutionary process as “creative.” Its understandable that a scientist like Karl Popper or Albert Einstein would interpret the dy- namic nature of the world as creative, !©8 but Christian doctrine traditionally assigned creative powers to God alone. Given the dynamic, self-organizing nature of evolution, Peacocke believes that we can speak of an “inbuilt, in- herent creativity’ in the world itself. God is so deeply immanent in the world that it is yight to “identify the creativity of the world with that of its Creator." Peacocke recognizes that his language comes very close to that of panenthe- ism, which maintains that God is datnct from his creation, but views him as thoroughly immersed in creation, ! 9 Traditional Catholic theology! ”! would hhave difficulties with this doctrine, as it does not show clearly what kind of life God might have apart from his involvement in nature. As we saw, crea- tion implies that God could bave been without ever having created the world. Panentheism does not make a sharp enough distinction between God and the world. (One must consider how a scientist with no interest in theology might inter- pret Peacocke’s evolutionary theology. If the processes of nature can all be accounted for by natural causality, a scientist could interpret their simulta- neous attribution to God as just a new form of vitalism. If God's activity is the "creative process’ of nature, then inclusion of God in the description of 133 the process ultimately becomes superfluous. Peacocke holds that he over- ‘comes the vitalism of Chardin and other immanentist theologians by ascribing a dynamism to matter itself rather than postulating a vital principle which has been added to inert matter. 72 However, a scientist might argue that the intrinsic dynamism of matter dispenses with any appeal to God. Peacocke writes that "the procestes revealed by the sciences are in themselves God acting at Creator and God is not found! as some kind of additional factor added on to the processes of the world."!75 Deism and vitalistic immanen- tism had both gone wrong in regarding God as an additional factor, outside or inside nature, used to supplement natural explanations of the world’s op- erations. Yet going to the opposite extreme of identifying God's creativity with the creative process is just as problematic. It makes God's activity overly inteligible to us, stripping it of the element of mystery. It is im Peacocke’s description of the “causal joint’ between God and the world that the absence of a clear distinction between God and the world is evident.174 Peacocke is confident that we can clarify the causal joint. Indeed, with the exception of the doctrine of rato ex. nihil, God's activity in the world can be made intelligible to us. After reviewing a number of models for God's operation in the world, Peacocke settles on the operation of or- ganic systems in nature as a good explanatory model. We saw earlier that a two way causality is at work in organisms, from the parts to the whole and from the whole to the parts, so that evolution is not just a movement from below. The organisin whose activity best serves as a model for God's activity is the human person. A person cannot be understood reductionistically in biological language alone, and yet as a natural being in the world, the humgp person is a psychosomatic unity: the human brain-in-the-human body.1/7 ‘The state of the brain as a whole, which can be identified with consciousness, can influ- ‘ence the nerves and neurons which constitute it, in the form of ‘top-down’ causality. Transcendence is experienced by a person when he recognizes him- self to be a whole, or an "I, with control over the body, Immanence on the other hand is the experience of bodily activity itself ‘The way the human "I" or person operates in the body becomes a way of un- derstanding God's relationship to the world, As the brain imparts information to its various components, God imparts information to the world and its subs systems, that is either to the world as a whole or to its component parts. God has an impact on the world in a similar way to the influence of the brain on the body. Through the communication of information, he steers the world in a particular direction. "This process is analogous to an input of134 ‘information’ and so the kind of patterning and redisposition of the material world that our brains-in-our-bodies continually perform."!80 Just as the body. is understood to be an agent of the self, capable of expressing the selfs intentions and purposes, so the world becomes a vehicle of God's actions.!81 Peacocke’s analogy is not exactly that of the soul-body relationship, but his analogy suffers from the same weakness. The natural analogy does not make ‘a dear distinction between God's being and the world, While Peacocke m: tains that the brain in the body is only a model, it seems as if God is the human person only writ large. God's functioning in the world is as natural as the brain's operation in the body. Peacocke's analogy really turns out to be univocal speech, for God simply operates on a grander scale than human ‘beings. In human beings, transcendence is simply the experience of being a hole and not jst part but this doesnot imply a distinction between soul and body. ‘This kind of transcendence is not sufficient for God, for the doctrine of crea- tion demands that he be radically distinct from the world. In human beings, there is a "kind of fusion, without loss of distraction” between transcendence ‘and immanence.!8® The latter arc just two different ways of looking at the same thing, But if we transfer this way of thinking mutatis mutandis to God, the natural processes and God’s immanent activity become fused, while a true transcendence cannot be affirmed for fear of dualism. Transcendence be- comes a contentless cipher for a reality with no existential import. God re- ‘mains bound to a natural world as "perennially and eternally’ Creator.!83 Whatever reality he might have without the world cannot be imagined. It is precisely the doctrine of creation which opens up a totally new vision of life that transcends the natural, but is not in conflict with it or supplementary to it It is this transcendence which allows God also to be immanent. In Pea- ccocke's use of the image of the musical composer to describe God's creative ‘activity, everything in the world becomes intelligible, because everything fits together well as in a finely wrought composition. But the world is not as har- ‘monious and rational as this image would suggest; there is much that goes ‘wrong, and this is not brought out sufficiently. Mooney acknowledges that we cannot simply identify the evolutionary pro- cess with God's activity for then he becomes the author of evil. 84 Peacocke does address the phenomenon of evil, but he makes too much sense of it 0 that it loses its irrational force. Biological death is handled too coolly as. necessary juoment in the emergence of new life: the old has to give way to the new.!® It is not necessary to consider death the result of some primeval fall, as a consequence of a sin committed by the first human beings, but Pea- 135 cocke makes too little of the existential import of death in looking at it pri- marily as a natural phenomenon, Peacocke dogs acknowledge that death is a major existential concern of human beings,!®© but the natural attitude is so controlling that death appears too rational. The experience of absurdity it generates is not sufficiently developed. Peacocke and Mooney follow a general trend in contemporary theology to allow for the suffering of God as God's act of loving solidarity with his cre- ation.!87 Where Greek theology would not attribute suffering to God be- ‘cause passion implied change in an immutable God, contemporary theology reinterprets suffering to that it becomes a self-giving love and not just a involuntary ordeal. By showing that he is self-emptying love, particularly in the Incarnation, God addresses evil not by force but by persuasion, Thus, if God scems to tolerate evil, it is not that he is powesless but because his omni- potence is forebearing love. This vision fits well with an immanent theology, which identifies God's activity with the events of the world, ‘Yet God's love can only definitively conquer the power of evil if God is love ‘even before creation, which he can be if he is understood as a Trinity, a ‘communion of love.!88 Process theology also looks at God's handling of evil as persuasive love from within the world, but God's radical transcendence is not respected by process thought.!89 Mooney and Peacocke need to make a sharper distinetion between God and the world, so that the power of love at work in the world does not appear to be just’a grander and more dra- ‘matic instance of what human love is. Following the lead of pre-modern theology, we must be reticent about mak- ing God's activity too intelligible to us. The more it makes sense — whether to "common sense’ or the natural sciences — the more it becomes an idol, conforming to the human image and likeness. The natural processes of evo- lution as described by the sciences represent an understanding of the world according to the criteria of truth which govern the sciences. Like all scicntific theories, evolution is subject to-revision based on new evidence that emerges. ‘Theology is not in a position to evaluate scientific evidence, but it maintains, on the basis of the doctrine of creation, that there is a greater pattern of the whole than that of the natural order. It tries to shed light on what God might have to say to the world above and beyond what nature yields up on. her own to human inquiry. Nothing is solved for theology in reversing the deist understanding of God by making God immanent in natural processes. Whether it be the distant God of deism or the God who is close to us, the spatial metaphor belies the treatment of God like a worldly being which can bbe assigned a place.136 ‘That the natural attitude or scientific mentality dominates contemporary evo- lutionary theology is evident in Peacocke’s handling of specifically Christian ‘mysteries. I will select three (o illustrate the point. First, the doctrine of the Incarnation is understood according to the pattern of discontinuity and continuity which characterizes the whole evolutionary Process. Jemus is understood as an emergent, the appearance of something alktogether new in nature which is irreducible to what preceded it.!9° Jesus, ‘can be seen “from below" since he is in continuity with the whole human ace, and yet he is discontinuous from the rest of creation because of the ‘unique relationship which he as a human person has with God. The manifes- tation of God which his contemporaries glimpsed in him emanated from within creation; it was always 2 distinct possibility inherent in the potential fof human nature.!0) As if ie would mean a return to dualism, Peacocke hiolds that the Incarnation should not be seen as a "descent" from above, a8 ‘2 “unique invasion of the personhood of an individual human being.” Yet we must observe that the Incarnation does not imply the addition of a new being to an already constituted human being from outside. The lan- ‘guage of descent simply conveys the appearance in the world of a whole new Kind of being not derivative from human life, which is possible if God is a whole greater than the world, Peacocke's interpretation of the Incarnation represents the continuation of a long tradition going back to Schleiermacher, for whom Jesus was a more intense expression of the experience of God which all human beings have. Indeed, Peacocke aflirms that "what we have affirmed about Jesus is not, in principle, impossible for all humanity. . "192 To recognize that God is acting in and through Jesus is simply tg acknowledge a "new emergent had appear- ‘ed within created humanity."!%9 Jesus Christ is not from a transcendent, mysterious order, but is the best of what creation (evolution) has produced. God is defined here within natural parameters. The Incarnation as the tradi tion has understood it appears irrational to the natural attitude. It presup- poses an order which transcends nature. Like the pre-moderns we have to admit here the dimension of mystery. The Incarnation leads us to the second example, that of the virgin birth. From a biological viewpoint, the genetic constitution of a human being is ‘essential for the world.!9* Tf the conception of Jesus did not take place in the normal way, a "special creative at’ wopld have been required, fan extraordinary, almost magieal divine act. . ""2° This kind of "interven: tionist’ activity might occur in a mechanistic cosmology, but not in an evolu- tionary one where God is active within the process. Also theologically speak 137, ing, it would seem that Jesus could not have a complete humanity ifhe were conceived in some exceptional way, for this would imply a kind of docet- ism! To be fully human, both naturally and theologigally, Jesus would have to have had a human mother and a human father. If science establishes the parameters of what makes sense, then we are up against insurmountable barriers with the virgin birth. Pre-modern theology knew that it could not pry into such events as the virgin birth, knowing that it was part of a greater whole than nature, a whole ultimately impervious to human reason. Modern thinking, eager to make sense of everything, dis- solves the mystery. Finally, Peacocke rationalizes some of the miracles of Jesus so that they be- ‘come acceptable to natural science.!9° He accepts the healing miracles and exorcisms, as a natural explanation can make sense of them. Medical science acknowledges that sometimes people recover inexplicably from incurable ill- nesses. A psychological or psychosomatic factor seems to play a role in the cure. A charismatic individual like Jesus could set off the psychological reac- tion which would heal the person disposed toward him. These events are thus cmpticd of their mysterious and miraculous dimension by being given a completely naturalistic explanation. 7 On the other hand, Peacocke rejects the validity of the nature miracles, as they would require the violation of observed regularities in naturg, based on fandamental scientific laws, such as the irreversibility of death.!99 Though Peacocke is correct in pointing out that a number of exegetes question the nature miracles because of their highly kcrygmatic flavor, he excludes them because of their violation of natural laws. This presupposes that science really knows what nature is, not to mention that it exchides the possibility of an even greater order. ‘The three Christian mysteries we have treated all involve the element of the miraculous, that which fully transcends natural possibilities. Peacocke has difficulty with the miraculous because it resurrects the deist God who has to intervene from outside the world. Yet we would argue that the miraculous, ‘or even God's action in general, cannot be a function of any cosmology, mechanistic or evolutionary. Cosmologies describe the natural order, whereas the miraculous presupposes an order beyond mature, Peacocke puts con- straints on what faith confesses based on what is naturally possible, so he has let the natural attitude control his theology. If we try to understand the Christian mysteries from within nature, we will never be able to make sense of them.138 IV. Human Life as a "Special Creation" Most of the concerns of Christian theology with regard to evolution revolve around its implications for human life. This is the aspect highlighted by John Paul II in his talk to the Pontifical Academy of the Sciences. In keeping with a long tradition, he attributes what is properly human, what he calls the spir- ital soul, to an immediate creation by God. The two theologians who most influenced the Western theological tradition, Augustine and Aquinas, held for such an immediate creation,20 and their teaching was echoed in a number of dogmatic statements throughout the church's history.201 Altogether different from the affirmation itselfis the attempt to explain how and when the immediate creation occurs. Augustine, for example, thought that it most likely occurred at conception, but recognized that this created difficulties for his understanding of the transmission of original sin.?02 Human behavior becomes a strategy of survival for genes. Both Mooney and Peacocke reject this 2s reductionism, while also acknowledging that the unity of all levels means that there is some connection between genetics and human behavior which theology cannot ig- nore. Peacocke betrays a reductionistic tendency when he writes that buman behavior has a genetic and biological foundation "no matter how overlaid by nurture and culture.*22 Ic is as if culture is just a superstructure imposed on what human beings really are in their lowest common denominator. Sill another example of the irreducibility of human Wife is the fact that hu- sman beings are not only the product of their environment, bt active shapers of it as wel. Excessively mechanic accounts of human life overlook the im- pact which human life has on evolution, in a top-down’ kind of causality Hlaman beings are not just passive results of a physical process, We may identify this asa "Neo-Lamarelian’ iosight, that heredity is not just physical tr genetic, but involves the environment as well? In their cultural tradi- tions, humans pass on a heritage which forms the world as much as physical procestes The discovery of DNA/RNA led scientists to believe thatthe infor- nation contained in genetic codes completely determines human life apart from environmental influence. However, the human brain turns out to be an exception in natuyg, as it docs accept non-genetic information passed on in human traditions. 226 Beginning particularly atthe third level of behavior, the sciences have more and more recoggiged that human ife cannot be exhaustively understood in biological terms.“~/ There is a new appreciation of the need to find method- logies which respect personal being and do not apply categories appropriate to things In peychology, for example, this i apparent in the tel toward nitive science, which looks at human beings as subjects or persons and not srebjocu142 What srkes the scientist looking at huygap “from below is how much they scem to be misfits in their environment => The principe of natal election bh onthe survival ofthe best procrestor would lea ws to believe that fe flourishes through balanced adsptation ofthe creature tothe environment, ‘hina verified in llliving beings except human beings. The later represent a biological anomaly in tht they experience alienation from their natural en- vironment and other human beings ‘There is a gulf between the situation in which they find themselves and the world they would like to construct for themselves. This being out of joint with the world is evident in the crisis which death, suffering and the limita- tions which prevent the full realization of fruman potential provokes. A sense ‘of incompleteness and a Jack of integration result from the disparity between desire and achievement.*9 The "disease"?! with their evolved state, ‘questions about what the truc cavironment of human beings must be 252 A theist would have to wonder why God would create such a misfit. ‘What is being expressed here is human self-transcendence, the capacity to be a subject over objects At the ame time, continuity with the physical ‘world assures that human beings are also immanent in nature. The question that this tension raises is how human beings in the evolutionary process reached a state which scems to outstretch nature and what this implies about the peculiar kind of being humans possess. We have seen that Neo-Darwinians hold that human life emerged contingent ly and in a non-determinitic way,?°4 through natural processes, made pos- sible by the capacity of matter to organize itself in ever more complex struc- tures, At the end of a long process, the stuff of life emerged as self-conscious Persons. We have also seen that not everyone is as confident that "wholes" ‘can emerge from the addition of "parts" so easily. One who does not believe that the transition from physical processes to the phenomenon of conscious ‘ness is so simple is Richard Swinburne.2°5 = Swinburne does not accept either evolutionary theology’s nor reductionism’s explanation of the evolution of conscious life out of self-organizing matter. ‘What Mooney and Peacocke recognize as the real uniqueness of human life requires us, in his view, to speak in dualistic terms, such that human beings are said to be composed of two substances, soul and body.2°7 His argument is based on the impossibility of establishing any causal connection between physical and chemical processes in the brain, on the one hand, apd such ‘mental activity as tasting, smelling, or seeing, on the other hand.28 This is not to deny that brain processes are going on during mental activity, but 143 there is no way of differentiating between, for example, seeing red and see- ing green on the basis of physical-chemical reactions in the brain. Darwinism, he believes, might be akg show why natural selection favors the survival of conscious organisms,”*° yet this does not solve the problem of being unable to connect any concrete meng event with a specifi physio- logical process in a cause-effect relationship.” Swinburne concludes that ‘even just the evolution of animal souls remains a mystery and a fortiori the human soul with its unique experiences. Science can indeed describe what is going on in the brain during mental activity, but it cannot explain that activity on the basis of natural laws. Since no strict correlation of a causal kind is available, we cannot even gay for sure ifthe soul needs the brain.or any material object to support If there is no natural explanation of the coincidence of the two domains, we ray appeal to Cod 1g correlate the brain ofan animal or human with the activity of the soul.242 God not only has the power to make the connection, ‘where a natural bond is lacking, but he has reason to do so in the case of human beings, o afford them knowledge of the world and the ability to in- tervene in the world by intentional, purposefol action. Hence, there is an “explgnasion in terms of divine action for what is otherwise a total mys tery" Swinburne’s solution is a classic case of theological functionalism or of the appeal to the "God of the gaps." It is no different from Descartes’ appeal to God to guarantee that he is not deceived and that his identity does not change through conscious experience. While using the term ‘mystery’ to de- scribe the evolution of the soul, he robs it of all mystery by giving a clear and distinct explanation, albeit a non-stientific one. God makes everything ‘dear in the natural order and comes in handy where natural explanations are wanting. “The description of the body and soul as two substances sounds very much like Descartes’ description of the body and soul, which set the terms for the subsequent discussion copceyning the way these two realities might be con- nected with one another.*4* Mooney and Peacocke’s monism at least recog- nizes the profound unity of human life. Swinburne’s position embodies the Enlightenment dualism which they attack. On the other hand, the strength of Swinburne’s position isto bring out the inability of natural science to iden- tify the causal joint between conscious and physical life. The discontinuity be- tween the two cannot be overcome, in Swinburne’s mind, by an evolutionary process. Yet Swinburne has nothing more to offer than 2 “God of the gaps” to explain the uniqueness of human life, Indeed, he does not even recognizeM44 that uniqueness, for consciousness is a property of both animals and human beings. Evolutionary theology proposes a kind of wia media between radical reduc. tionism and theistic explanations by building mind into nature. Since Ein- stein’s relativity theory and the discovery of quantum mechanics, there is good season to regard mind as a fundamental structure ofthe material uni- verse.“ In the new physics itis impossible to abstract the observer from ‘what is observed. Some have speculated that mind has existed since the be- singing of the cosmos, since matter makes little sense apart from intelligent Ste! Tehard de Chardin spe of ths 8 an imerorty within natere while Whitchead posited the activity of mind at every stage of the evolution ary process. For Peacgcke, what we call mind is simply an organization of the stuff of the universe,®# 7 Rahner, who initially recognized the distinction between soul and body,248 sought a way of reconciling science’s understanding of mind with theology. He was able to do ths by reinterpreting matter ax “frozen spirit,” which God continually empowers to transcend itself“49 It is the created order itself which produces soul or spirit, 0 a God of the gaps is avoided, but God im- parts the dynamism to all finite beings to accomplish what they do. What we identify as spiritual reality is a product of the self-transcendence of matter. Evolutionary theology redefjnes matter in order to account for the emer- gence of mind from matter. What remains unclear isthe status of “spirit” or “soul” when it emerges in the evolutionary process. Is it something radi- cally new or just a new activity of matter? Rahner usually speaks as if mind achieves a distinet nature in itself making it different from matter, but at times he also maintains that mind is simply one form of matter’s activity.2°! ‘The sou] ig a form of matter but is also somehow "essentially different from matter "232 ‘This confusing speech arises from the ambiguity surrounding the notion of ‘matter, Historically, philosophy has distinguished matter from mind based ‘on the experience of two very different dimensions of reality to which these ‘terms refer, Scientific monism fuses them, but continues to recognize that the distinction is still meaningful. Rahner is unwilling t6 offend against scientific ‘monism, such that even the angels may have evolved from matter.2°? If an- gels can be accounted for only if they derive from matter, can even God be considered a "pure spirit?” Peacocke and Mooney assume that a real distinction between matter and spirit would imply a particular kind of dualistic anthropology, of a Cartesian 145 sort. Thus, they accept a kind of metaphysical agnosticism by which we speak iff mind represents something all together new in relationship to the physical world, We simply distinguish between the two dimensions by resort ng to two distinct, irreducible languages, but we bracket the question raised ‘by John Paul IT about an “ontological difference" between humans and the > vest of the natural world. | When Christian faith throughout its long history spoke of the immediate cre- © ation of the human soul by God, it presupposed a metaphysical difference. between human beings and the rest of creation, but the affirmation is a faith statement based on the doctrine of creation about the singular relationship which God has established with human beings. It presupposes that there is more to be said about human beings than the sciences can tell us, for God is a whole greater than nature and invites human beings to enter his world by a unique kind of participation. To attempt to figure out how or when such a special creation takes place is to lapse into a kind of naturalistic thinking, as ifthe act of creation were on the model of an inner-worldly event and could be defined in terms of space and time. The truly transcendent, metaphysical event cannot be appreciated if reduced to natural proportions. The doctrine of immediate creation says something "more" about human life than the sciences can say, but itis not "more" in a quantitative sensc, as an addition to other natural properties. Such a viewpoint does not contradict what the natural sciences cam tell us about evolution, but neither does it complement the scientific account. Rather, it reveals a whole new dimension of human life, that is, hat humans live in communion with God. We can take a clue from Walter Kasper as to how we can best understand ‘human being. In the context of Trinitarian theology, he notes that the tradi; tional approach to the Trinity was based on a metaphysics of substance.’ Substance was understood with inner-worldly things or objects in mind. But persons are subjects, and not objects, so that we end up with an inadequate ‘Trinitarian theology if we understand God in substantialst terms. We need a "personalist ontology” which recognizes the unique category of being we identify as persons. We can follow his method in rethinking anthropology, and getting beyond the dualism that has haunted modern thinking by developing a "personalist ontology” in the context of which the body-soul relationship can be under- stood. The notion of person pasted into western thought via the Trinitarian controversies in the early Church, and so has a theological background. "Per-146 son’ originally applied in a paradigmatic sense to God, and only derivatel tohuman beings 25 snsonty somes ‘The characteristic features of personhood became spiituality, incommunica- ble uniqueness, and transcendence toward the othes 28 Even ‘outside a spe cifically Christian context, these came to be recognized as metaphysical prop- erties of human beings. In modera times, the notion of person underwent 2 radical transformation, and came tobe equated with seliconsciousnes, 7 Where personhood retains its original connotations, the qualities of spirit- uality, mystery, and self-transcendence confer a unique metaphysical status con human beings which clearly sets them apart from the rest of creation. Schmitz cites St. Thomas to the effect that "person means completeness... It significs what is noblest in the whole of nature,"2°8 He then adds that the “dignity of the person lies in its ontological fullness.” Thomas followed Boethius in thinking of person in terms of substance, but Thomas, through his reflections on the Trinitarian processions, came to understand ‘person’ as the capacity for self-donation in love.”®9 The whole human individual reality is both "self-referential substance and self-donative person." The modern sense of self-consciousness is enough to define human beings as "sub- stance," but itis the capacity to transcend oneself that makes one a person, as the papal address also suggests. It is particularly the spiritual capacity of persons which makes no sense to speak of in terms of evolution. Persons may be spoken of in terms of “exis tence," a metaphysical category, and not in terms of Yessence."26! Evolution, on the other hand, is restricted to dealing with the essences of things; the issue of existence eludes scientifie methodology. The capacity of persons to communicate their incommunicability to others happens without loss of their substance. Natural science cannot fathom this, as change in natural beings means loss or addition. In short, given the meaning of personhood, it makes no sense to speak of their evolution from something. They have a complete- ness, as Thomas says, an ontological fullnes, which makes them a "whole” like God. The language of evolution simply cannot make this category intel. ligible. Hence, understanding human beings from a *personalist ontology" leads us to the limits of scientific dircourse, V. Conclusion Pope John Paul expressed the concerns that Christian theology has tradition ally had concerning the scientific theory of evolution. We identified three issues. First, theology needs to understand the kind of knowledge at stake in the scientific theory and its degree of certitude in relationship to what the 147 doctrine of creation makes known about the world, Second, Christian theol- ‘ogy has a particular interest in the implications of evolution for human life, jven the prerogatives of human beings as the image and likeness of God. Finally, the ability of Neo-Darwinism to explain the emergence of life in terms of natural mechanism alone raises a question about the place of God in the evolutionary process, and particularly, his ability to perform "special acts’ as in the creation of human life or the miracles. ; We examined the way contemporary theology has handled these three issues, and came to the conclusion that itis too highly controlled by the perspective fof the natural sciences. While critical of Enlightenment theology, it too is highly rationalistic, leaving litle room for anything other than a naturalistic ‘understanding of even the Christian mysteries. It goes the way of the "theo- logical functionalism which views God as something like a "condition of the possibility" of the world, The danger in this is evident when one looks back at the cosmologies of Augustine and Aquinas and realizes how much their entific views are out of date, conditioned by the knowledge of the day. Theology has not had a good record in its relationship with science. Tt has been reactive fundamentalism) isolationist (neo-orthodoxy), and accommoda- tionist (Himmanentist” theologians). Each of these are controlled by the pre- suppositions of science. Theology cannot get beyond this situation unless it hhas a proper sense of its own object of study and the kind of knowledge which is proper to it. In order to discover what this might be, we need to come to terms with the meaning of "mystery." Placher points out that theology has often been guily,of invoking mystery when it cannot find an explanation for something.“°? Scicnce is just as guilty, invoking a "God of the gaps" when it cannot offer a scientific explan- ation. Mystery, thus, has a bad name, But before modern times, mystery had a positive meaning. ‘The gaionalistc ideal of the Enlightenment led to a dissolution of mys- tery.203 The latter appeared to reason to be the refuge of the weak-minded vwho sought consolation in the darkness of feeling because they could ut tolerate the light of intellect. 264 Mystery, then, was understood negatively as ‘everything that remained after reason had accomplished its work, and with the advance of science, even the areas of knowledge still in the shadows could be illuminated. Theology understood the object of faith inthis context as supra-rational and inconceivable, that is, in a purely negative way. "Mys- tery was now an impassable boundary for knowledge, rather than the ulti- mate overflowing of all knowing.”148 In its pre-modern, positive meaning mystery is a fullness of being and knowing, which transcends all human knowing even as it embraces it in its ‘greater plenitude. Reason itself opens out on to mystery, so mystery need not conflict with reason. Only the Enlightenment understanding of reason re~ ards mystery as competitive because it pretends to a knowledge "within the bounds of reason alone." It is precisely the fullness of being that the doctrine of creation expresses as it refers us to a whole greater than nature. It is not threatened by natural ‘modes of knowing, and even presupposes them, for creation is not God and ‘thus has a relative autonomy. Yet the doctrine of creation maintains that the origin, sustenance, and destiny of human beings and the world cannot re- ceive a sufficient explanation from any of the natural sciences, either singly or collectively. In the Bible, creation is associated with the wisdom tradition.268 This is no accident, for human beings and the world are manifestations of a divine wis- dom which remains inscrutable, beyond human understanding, The mysteri cous character of the world and human beings springs from their relationship to God, who alone knows their inmost secrets. Mystery remains permanently mystery; the modern natural sciences do not dissolve it by forcing mature to yield up all her secrets. The sciences open out on mystery, not just because they come up against barriers that puzzle them, but because of the plenitude implied in mystery. ‘A truly ‘postmodern’ theology has to get beyond the rationalisticideal of the Enlightenment which remains that of the natural sciences, despite the more sophisticated hermencutical appreciation of their discipline which some scien- tists have. A retrieval of the premodern sense of mystery, and not just a re- turn to precritical ways of doing theology, would help theology get beyond the rationalism which it has taken over from the Enlightenment. Then it would not have to react to, isolate itself from, o accommodate itself to the natural sciences, but could invite them to be critical of their own understand ing of rationality and to place themselves within a broader enterprise of seck- ing to,understand human beings and the world, not just as scientists, but as sages. Those who believe that the opening of science to mystery leads to the end of science (e.g. Horgan) or to the use of theology to supplement science (e.g. Meyer) are equally on the wrong track. The doctrine of creation frees the world to be an object of investigation to the sciences, whose understanding of truth is determined by their methods, but the same doctrine maintains 149 that there is another understanding of truth not reducible to scientific categories. In God and his relationship to the world we have to do with a mystery which ‘cannot be grasped in terms of natural processes without turning God into the highest being in the natural order. To preserve God’s radical transcendence, the divine creativity cannot be conflated with the apparent ‘creativity’ of nature. To speak of nature as if it were permeated by a divine intelligence comes close to a deification of nature, In human persons we also encounter mystery. Despite the modern reduction, of person to consciousness, personhood in Peacocke and Mooney retains the ‘connotations of incommunicable uniqueness and transcendence which reflect its theological origins. When personhood is said to evolve, like everything thse, from matter, the reaton for this is to ensure a naturalistic explanation for the totality of reality and to avoid the specter of Cartesian dualism. Yet a *pertonalist ontology” need not presuppose a Cartesian dualism, nor does it feel constrained to conform a priari to a definition of mature. There is, in- stead, a plenitude of being implied in the notion of person which makes the natural categories of evolution inappropriate to articulate it, Unless it can be shown that nature is the whole of things, naturalistic explanations cannot do justice to the reality of God and of human persons. Endnotes 1 Pope John Paul IT, "Message tothe Pontifical Academy of Sciences on Evolution” in Origins 26 (Nov. 14, 1996), 350-52 2 Examples are Peter Appleborne, “Pope Shows How Faith and Evolution Gan Co- Exist," New York Timer 25 October 1996, A 12:5, and John Tagliabve, inthe same edition of the New York Times, A 1:1. 3 See Gayle White, "Pope's Statement Raises Hackles of Some Christians" Alanta Constitution, | Novernber 1996, D 7:1, and Mary Beth Marklein, USA Today, 25 ‘October, 1996, A 3:2. 4 See Michael §, Rose, "Pope and Evolution," Chicago Tribune 4 November 1998, 1.20:5 and George Weigl, "The Debate over Human Origins," The Catholic Standard 9 January 1997. 5 Michael Behe, "Darwin Under the Microscope," New York Times 29 October 1996, A253. 6 Francis Crick, Life uelf (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981), 88. 7 John Horgan, The End of Sciance (New York:Broadway Books, 1997), 138 ff 8 Christopher Mooney, S.J. Thealogy and Sciantfic Knowledge, Changing Models of God's Presence in the World (Notre Dame: University of Nowe Dame Press, 1996),158,150 23 24 25 26 27 28 Eman MeMullin, in "Evolution and Greation* in F. MeMullin, ed, Roaluion and Graton (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), esp. 21-48, recounts the attemptsby both science and theology to retain some place for God inthe face of the naturalistic explanations which modern science was increasingly able 1o give from the seventeenth through the twentieth centuries. John Paul I, op. et, 381 “id, 382 id Pius X11, "Humani Generis in Claudia Carlen, ed, The Papal Encyclicals 1989- 1958 @Picrian Pres, 1900), 175-84. A. Vanneste, "La Nouvelle Theologie du Péché Origine!" in Ephmerids Thelogicae Lovanienes (Dec. 1996), 249-277, concludes after many years dedicated to the sady ofthis theme that original sin should not be linked to a historical eventof the pax, but represents humanity's enduring tate before God Phus XT, 181: Investigations in science may go forward a8 long as ‘all re prepared to submit to the judgment of the Church.” Jolin Paul 1, op. ct, 350 id, 352, Tan Barbour, laws in Scince and Religion (NY: Harper & Row, 1966), 69-91. id, 91-98 id, 93-96 Bid, 96-98, ‘The scientist and theologian who more than anyone else hat ierpretation of evolutionary bilogy ix Arthur Peacocke. The essential points jn his interpretation may be found in two works: Theology for a Scnific Ae Being and Becoming — Natural, Divine, and Hanan (Minneapolis: Fortes Press, 1903) {hereafter ThSA] and God and the New Bslogy (San Francico: Harper & Row, 1986) (hereafter CNB}. Christopher Mooney, pi, appears to follow Pea- cocke's line of thinking, but does not go into as much deal Se ch. 4, "Theo- Jogy and Evolution," for armuch condensed version of what is found in Peacocke, MeMullin, in “Evolution and Creation," 45-48, gives an overview of the history of "sientiis ereationiam® in the United Stee. See p. 88, footnote 119, for Far- ther bibliography on the subject Yor a description ofthis postion, cee Barbour, 376-80. Peacocke, in CNB, 78, notes that there were a good number of "conciliatory theological responses to Darwinism." He dedicates ch, 5 toa dscusion of them country by country, and then in ch. 6 offers his own conciliatory positon. Barbour treats a number of efforts to incorporate evolution into theology. He refers to modernism and liberal theology (101-108), Chardin and other “imma ‘entist tendencies (284-408), and process thought (439-52). Fora brief overview ‘of Rahner, see Michael Barnes, "The Evolution ofthe Soul from Matter and the Role of Scionce in Karl Rahner's Theology, in Horizons 21 (1904): 85-104 Anne Clifford, "Postmodern Scientific Cosmology and the Christian God of Creation," in ‘Horiwns 21 (1984), 64-69, tes these concepts t0 describe postmodern science, 151 Peacocke, GNB, 34 ff and especially the section on “Some contemporary con- troversias about evolution," 39-50, Ibid, 38-35, for the material in Mid, 36. id, 87 Bid, 35 Bid, $6, hid, 37. Mooney, 122, uses this term to describe that agglomerate of matter, the first iving cell from which all life took the basic patterns of DNA. Peacocke, GNB, 98, quotes him. ‘| Peacocke, GNB, 39-41 for material in this paragraph, Horgan, 114-148, discusses each of their approaches and comparesand contrasts them, giving the impression there are fundamental divergences among them. Peacocke specifically discusses Gould’ theory of punctuated equilibrium, 44-46, ‘and finds it compatible with Neo-Darwinism. Also, Lynn Marguls's holistic bio- logy, which looks at the whole earth as a single ecosystem, is compatible with his holistic biology. Horgan, 119, quotes him. Anne Clifford, 64.69, and Mooney, 4-11, show how more and more scientists are aware of hermeneutical ises like historicity and subjectivity. The material in this section is based on their presentations. : Both Peacocke, GNB, 87, and Mooney, 10, describe themselves this way. "Evolution and Creation," 38-43, discusses the main types of evolution ary philosophy, Between the extremes of Spencer's and Royce’s philosophies, he identifies (a) emergent evolutionism, including Marxism; (b) philosophies based ‘on an organic model; (e) organic models which presuppose the active role of God in the process, Peacocke’s interpretation would fall into the third category. Gited in Horgan, 180. Mooney, 35-56. 7 Pannenberg makes this point in “Theological Questions to Scientists" im A. Peacocke, ed, The Science and Theology i the Twentath Century (Stockfield, Henley & London: Oriel Press, 1981), 4. See Mooney, 121-22, for his basic position and Peacocke, THSA, 89-49, for his ‘more detailed explanation. Peacocke, ThSA, 45-58. Mooney, 100-08. Peacocke, GNB, 93-4; Mooney, 154-57. Peacocke, ThSA, 51-6; Mooney, 156. Horgan, 193. bid, 135, id, 186. For a detailed exposition of Yorganiciam’ as opposed to vtalistie and mechanistic interpretations of nature, see Barbour, 924.57, Peacocke, CNB, 51-3. Barbour, 326 paragraph, 2, for the material in this paragraph.2 4 B 6 n B 79 80. a 82 84 85 86 87 88 sit, 327 hid, 329, Peacocke, ThSA, 60-1 Peacocke uses this language in ThSA, 54. Barbour, 394. Mid, 394-337. Mooney, 26-7; Peacocke, ThSA, 215-54, where he presents all the various levels jn human fe as so many dimensions of "natural human being.” Mooney, 32-36; Peacccke, ThSA, 245-47 Peacocke, GNB, 122 Mooney, 26. Stephen Meyer, "The Origin of Life and the Death of Materialism’ in Inter collegiate Review 31, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 24-48. Mid, 2. ‘Thid, 26. Horgan, 188-142, interviews Miller years later and finds that he is more perplexed than ever in trying to determine the origin of life. Meyer, 27. Among these difficulties were the incertiude about the make-up of the pre-biotic soup, its apparent hostility to fe, at well as the fossil record, which seems to point to a rapid emergence of life rather than a gradual, protracted process. Thid, 29-81. id, 29, Tid. Ii, 81-4 Wid, 34 Peacocke, GNB, 54: "For we see a world in process that is continuously capable, through its own inherent properdes and natural character, of producing new living forme — matter is now seen to be self-organizing" Meyer, 36, id, 37 [hid , 38. See Michae] Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-crtical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974). Meyer, 39. Iid., 39-40. Tid, 40. MeMullin, "Evolution and Creation," $-8, treats pre-Christian atiemptsto explain natural processes in terms of an ordering principle which is never the equivalent of the Christian God. Barbour, 337-8. Mid, 334-6. Francis P. Fillce, “The Evolution Wars" in Fellowship of Catholic Scholars Quarterly 20/8 (Summer 1907), 6. All of Filice's critical observations mentioned here are found on this page. Peacocke, GNB, 147 ff For our observations here on doctrine, we are relying on the International ‘Theological Commission statement, "The Interpretation of Dogma’ in Origins 153 20/1 (May 17, 1990): 1-14 {hereafter ITC) Akhough dogma represents a much narrower set of statements than doctrine, what we are pointing out here applies to both without distinction. Wid, & hid, 9-10, for the material in this paragraph. Congregation for the Doctrine ofthe Faith, Myrtrium Kedletia, no. 5, 1973, cited, in Francis Sullivan, Salvation Outside the Church? (New Yorl/Mahwah, N.J., 1992), 10. David Kelsey, "The Doctrine of Creation from Nothing," in E. MeMullin, ed., op. Gil, 186-8, chows how the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo was shaped in a polemical seting. Bedesiae, no. 5, notes that the Church must take into account the “human knowledge" of the day in formulating its doctrine. IT, 7 [bid,, 8; "In view of the scientific and technological researches of recent times, seems advisable to avoid premature determinations ad rather to favor decisions which offer direction and are finely differentiated.” Ernan MeMullin, "How Should Cosmology Relate to Theology," in A. Peacocke, ed,, The Sciencer and Theology in the Twentth Century, 48, acknowledges the possibilty of conflict between science and religion because of non-negotiable tenets of faith. ‘MeMullin, "Evolution and Creation," 11-21, shows how Augustine and Aquinas did this. ‘Mooney, 157; MeMullin, "How Should Cosmology Relate to Theology,” 28-40, discusses the attempt to interpret creation in cosmological categories Elizabeth Johnson, "Turn to the Heavens and the Farth: Retrieval of the Cosmos in Theology" in The Catholic Theological Society of America, Proctedings of the Fifty firet Annual Convention 51 (1996), 3-5. Clifford, "Postmodern Scientific Cosmology... 70-4 Mrid, 70. We are relying on the following works: Dianne Bergant and Carroll Stublmueller, “Creation According to the Old Testament” in E. MeMullin, ed., Evolution and Creation, 158-75; Anne Clifford, "Creation in J.Galvin, ed., ‘Spstenatic Theology Vol. I. Roman Catholic Perspectives (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 193-248. Bergant and Stublmueller, 158-6; 159-62. ‘Mooney, 158. ‘Mooney, 158, uses the Thominic dintnetion betnéen God's primary causality and creaturcly secondary causality to explain how God has to operate simultaneously with actions proper to creation. They do not complement one another as in syn~ ergisia, God is rather imparting constandy to creation the power to be and act. ‘See David Burrell, ‘Creation or Emanation: Two Paradigms of Reason” in David Burrell and Bernard McGinn, ed., God and ereotion: An Ecumenical Symposium (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 136. Mooney, 158, quotes St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I q. 105. a 5; "Since God is personally the cause184 109 110 aL ag 3 m4 us 116 7 1s 19 120 13 122 133 124 195 128 127 128 129 130 13 132 in all things of their whole very existence, than which nothing is more intimate cor imterior, it follows that God acts innermostly in all things.” Burrell, 27-98. He cites Hebrews 11:3 which bases the doctrine of creation on faith. Kven the use of Wisdor 18:1-5 and Romans 1-2 to try to rationally ‘demonstrate God's existence from creation presupposes the faith conviction that ‘nature is God's creation. In any case the doctrine of creation presupposes God's ‘existence and is not concerned with proving i. ‘See MeMullin, “How Should Cosmology Relate to Theology," 51-2, and Clifford, "Postmodern Scientific Cosmology.."75-81, fora brief discussion ofthe problem ‘and some proposals of a solution See Kelsey, 187-9, and Cliford, in Sytemati Theology, 210-16. MeMullin, "Evolution and Creation,” 9-10 For the material inthis paragraph, sec Keley, 176-60. Robert Sokolowsk, "Creation and Christian Understanding” in Burrell and McGinn, op. ct, 179, raintains thatthe Key to understanding creation isthe celatonship it implies between God and the world, and not what it has to say about the beginning or preservation of things. Clifford, in Systematic Theology, 198, also speaks of creation fn terms of a relationship between God and his people. Sokolowali, 180. hid, 181-3. Tid, 182. MeNfalln, "Evolution and Creation,"21 {brings out the risks tat theology and science ran in understanding God as a function of nature. Sokolowski, 183. id, 184. ‘bid, 185-6. See MeMalin, "Evolution and Creation, 35, for a good, concise statement of the problem. Bit, 43. ‘This is what happened in English physicosheology according to McMullin, ‘Evolution and Creation," 27-32. Thilp Sloan, "The Question of Natural Furpose"in MeMulin, ed, Buoluiom and Creation, 14. ‘The ideas in this paragraph are based on William Plicher's interpretation of ‘Aquinas on providence in his book, The Domataton of Transcendence. How ‘Moder Thinking about Gad Went Wrong (Louisvile, Ky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 118-6. Elizabeth Johnson, 67; Mooney, 29. Gifford, in Syromatic Telogy, 260-01; Bergant and Stuhlmueller, 162. Bergant and Saublmueller, 172, stress that the center ofthe doctrine of ereation is God We are relying on the work by Placher cited in the previous section, The Domestication of Transcendence. How Modern Thinking about Ged went Wrong Bid, 26. id, 178. Tid, 4 155, oe bee cud Pale eel ac Pek he ina the hoe te evi es Ben ree rena ee 136 Ibid, 74. oe Hs nd iin i Phe itn a eG ipabs tga gla ic emer oe oe Se el Tbid., 12 ff 128. 145 Bid, 134. Bed, 147 hid. 135 oF 148 Bid, 198. 149 Bid, 195. Placher’s point is that we understand God's character in a pattern of ‘activity, but we cannot understand the how or the mechanism of his operation. 150 This is the theme of chapter 12 in Placher, "Evil and Divine Transcendence. 154 Ibid, 212-18. 155 Bid. 112-19. 156 Ibid, 186. 157 id”, 183. Theologians should teach us instead, says Placher (192), that we do rot understand at all how God acts. 158 Peacocke, TRSA, 137-39. 189 Peacocke, GNB, 73. 160 Mooney, 32. 161 Peacocke, GNB, 116. 162 Ibid., 109. 163. Mooney,’ 32-86. 164 Peacocke, ThSA, 139-40. 165 Bid, 22-5; 176. 166 Mooney, 105; 1591 167 Peacocke, ThSA, 185-87; Mooney, 159-60. 168 See references to them in Mooney, 108 and 159. 169 Peacocke, GNB, 95 110 Peacocke, GNB, 96 and 108, note 16; TSA, 370, note 78.156 m Waker Kasper, The God of Jesus Ohvst (London: SCM Press LTD), 183, alludes to the problematic characier of panentheism, particulary in recognizing the personal being of God, Peacocke, ThSA, 245. Mid, 176. id, 151. eid, 137. ‘bid, 166-77. ids, 185-87, Bid, 16H; 16465, hid, 164-65. Peacocke, GNB, 108, Peacocke, TASA, 186. Peacocke, GNB, 8. Mooney, 106. Peacocke, THSA, 221-22. Bid, 251, Walter Kasper, The God of Jesu: Christ, 190 f. and Roch Keressty, Jenus Chit Fandanenials of Chrsology (New York: Alba House, 1991), 389 lf, Peacocke, ‘ThSA, 121-27 and Mooney, 169-175. It is difficult to finda Trinitarian theology in Peacocke, according to which the three persons of the Trinity pre-exist creation as distinct persons. The Divine Spiritappears wo be Gods presence in the world, and Jesus Christ appears to be a human person sho is singularly receptive to God's communication. See, for ‘example, THSA, 820; “The tame Cod in that outreach to humanity, as Holy Spirit, which united the human Jesus withthe Father, bis Creator, now Kindle and generates in us a love for God our Creator..." One of Pacher's arguments is that Trinitarian theology was a victim of the rationalization of theology. Enlightenment theology, not being able to explain the Trinity rationally, tended toward unitarianism, See Placher, ch: 10, "The Marginaliztion of the Trinity Barbour, 440-52, presents the fundamental points of process theology. Peacocke, TRSA, 201 fl Tid,, 902. hid. We could agree ithe distinguished between what Jeaus has by nature and what we have by grace. hid, 308, tid, 276, id, 277. id, 278, Bid, 279. Tid, 271. Tid, 274 ‘Augustine, Ge.ad lit, 728; Aquinas, Summa Thelogiae 400, 28.23 and Summa Contra Gents, 2.87. 201 202 203, 208 209 210 21 212 213. 314 218 216 2u7 157 ‘See the collection of Catholic dogmatic statements in Denzinger-Schénmetzer, Enchiridon 5) Dafinitonum et Decarationum de rebus fidei st marum. $6th cdition (Herder, 1976), nos.190, 360, 455-56, 685, 1007, 1440, 3024, 3896. ‘Augustine, Epistle 166.6. See the discussion in J.B. Royce, "Soul, Human, Origin. of in New Catholic Encyclopedia. Peacocke, TRSA, 208. Mooney, 33-34 See a detailed discussion of this principle in Mooney, chapter 2, "The Anthropic Principle in Cosmology and Theology," 45-70. Mooney, 46. John F. Haught, Scionce and Religion. From Conflict to Conversation (New York/Mahwah, NJ.: Paulist Press, 1995), 129. id, 150-31 Tid, 135-40, Peacocke, ThSA, 78-77. id, 76. Mid, 234, hid, 192. Mooney, 84; Peacocke, ThSA, 226. Mooney, 152. Be W. Pannenberg questions whether what the biblical anthropology maintains is identical with what modern seience has to say about human life, That is why he asks if there is anything in the natural composition of human life, as perceived by the sciences, which corresponds to the biblical understanding of humanity's special relationship with God. See his article, "Theological Questions to Scien- tists" in A, Peacocke, ed., The Sciences and Theology inthe Tuenteth Century, 11-12. ‘See Joseph Ratzinger, Bschaology, Death and Eternal Life. Dogmatic Theology. vol. 9 (Washington D.C: Catholic University Press, 1988), 140-61. Peacocke, TRSA, 205. Thid, 214. Thid, 218-16. 1ia,, 20. Mooney, 140-45, gives a good, concise overview of sociobiology; also Peacocke, ‘ThSA, 226-52. Peacocke, ThSA, 227, ‘Mooney, 145-50, explains Lamarck’ Bid. 146. Peacocke, ThSA, 251. Thid, 234-36, Mooney, 150-62; Peacocke, TRSA, 250-51, Peacocke, ThSA, 238; 250. Thid,, 77 Toid., 281-32. hid, 249. Bhid., 221; 245. thesis and its contemporary rendition,